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HISTORY  
OF THE  
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.

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# HISTORY

OF THE

# PHILOSOPHY OF MIND :

EMBRACING THE

OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON MENTAL SCIENCE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.

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FROM THE COMMENCEMENT  
OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY,  
TO THE TIME OF LOCKE.



# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

ETC. ETC.

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## CHAPTER I.

### SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICIANS.

WE come now to another land-mark in the history of the philosophy of the human mind, viz. the Scholastic Metaphysicians. These were a numerous, very learned, and subtile body of men; and with all those subjects which came within the range of their speculations, they showed the most complete and intimate acquaintance. At no period of the history of the human understanding, have ingenuity and refined reasoning been more fully brought into play, than by the Schoolmen; and the only lament we can express, in reference to their labours, is, that they should have wasted so much time, zeal, and talent, upon comparatively subordinate departments of mental philosophy.

We have been brought up from our infancy with a set of preconceived notions respecting the utter

futility of the doctrines of the Schoolmen. It becomes, therefore, a real task, in after years of our lives, to enter, with any degree of ardour, into their general reasonings and speculations. But to a really inquisitive mind their discussions are not destitute of pleasure and utility; inasmuch as they raised some very interesting and important disputes upon matters of intrinsic curiosity, which have not, even at this hour, been satisfactorily decided by our ablest modern metaphysicians. Notwithstanding the ample discussions of modern times, as to the nature of universal ideas and propositions, and the influence of language in all our speculations on the mind, there still hangs over these questions a considerable portion of obscurity and doubt. These have not hitherto been chased away by the lights of modern science; nor from the constituted order of things, does it seem very probable that we shall ever be able to remove these questions beyond the pale of disputation, which formed the staple article of the scholastic philosophy.

The principal objections which modern philosophers have advanced against the general scope and tendency of scholastic metaphysics, may be summed up under the following heads.

First. That the views of the Schoolmen had nothing bold or original in them; that they were adopted by mere chance, from the wreck and scattered fragments of the Greek and Oriental philosophy; and that these unconnected and heterogeneous materials were made the foundation of a system of oppressive dogmatism and unprofitable wrangling.



Second. That the spirit of the Scholastic philosophy was a slavish and timid spirit; that it was devoid of every characteristic of real independence; and that this crouching submission to authority made it a dangerous weapon in the hands of civil and ecclesiastical power.

Third. That the connexion between the speculations of the Schoolmen, considered as a system of human knowledge, was too closely interwoven with religion; that the clergy and the monastic orders were the leading expounders of scholastic learning; that this circumstance had a natural tendency to throw all public instruction into the hands of the Schoolmen; that this gave rise to many serious evils in civil and ecclesiastical affairs; that the whole scheme of the scholastic system rested on an assumption that it was based upon the same foundation as revealed religion itself; and consequently that any sceptical objections to the principles of the former might fairly enough be considered as a direct attack upon the doctrines and establishments of the latter.

Fourth. That the scholastic system had a blighting and withering effect upon all other kinds of knowledge; that the sciences of natural philosophy, as well as morals and legislation, were thrown into the back ground; and that the necessary effects of this narrow scheme of human investigation, tended to impair the natural vigour of genius, and to cramp the most important faculties of the understanding.

It may here be remarked, that nearly all the

scholastic metaphysics took their rise from a theological source. They were made subservient, in a great measure, to the elucidation of abstract doctrines of theology. The subtle and perplexing questions arising out of original sin, predestination, and grace, were the topics which lay at the bottom of nearly all scholastic disputation. The abstract nature of the mind of man, his various powers, feelings, habits, and emotions, and the divers philosophical theories devised to account for them, were all keenly investigated, in order that some reflexed light might be thrown upon the different aspects in which these profound doctrines were viewed by their respective opponents or adherents.

But the grand, or at least the ostensible, question which the scholastic philosophers were engaged in solving, was that respecting the precise nature of ideas and general terms. It was on this point they put forth all their strength and powers, and succeeded in exciting a lively interest throughout the whole of Christendom for more than four centuries.

In all the ancient speculations on the nature of the human mind, we find it was generally assumed, by every sect of philosophers, that there was always an object distinct from the mind itself. This object was that about which the mind was said to be conversant, when in the act of thinking. From this source sprung the question which the scholastics took up, What is the *immediate* object of thought attached to a general or universal term? When our minds are engaged with particular things, as a particular house, a particular person, or a par-

tiacular garden, then these are said to be objects of the mind's conception; but the difficulty arose, What is the object of the mind when we speak of houses in general, persons in general, or gardens in general? Is the idea attached to a universal, general, or generic term, precisely the same as that attached to a particular name?

What the most celebrated metaphysicians of antiquity said on this point, is shrouded in considerable doubt and contradiction. It is alleged, that the Pythagoreans, and latterly the Platonists, maintained that universal notions or ideas were not copies from external things; but that, nevertheless, they possessed a separate existence from the mind itself; that particular objects had the same individual *essences*, as the general class had, of which they formed a part; and that this *general essence* is the object which the mind has always before it, when it makes either general or particular things objects of its contemplation. This general essence is indivisible, and possesses an absolute individuality of existence. "The idea of a thing," says Plato, "is that which makes *one* of the *many*; which preserving the unity and integrity of its own nature, runs through and mixes with things infinite in number; and yet, however multiform it may appear, is always the same; so that by it we find out and discriminate the thing, whatever shapes it may assume, and under whatever disguise it may conceal itself."\*

\* Plato in Phædro.

The opinion of Aristotle on the nature of universals is generally considered to have been nearly the same as that of Plato; only the language of the former was more precise and guarded. Aristotle maintained that all individual things were composed of matter and form, and that it was this *form* which conferred on particular things the same qualities as belonged to a genus. Matter was the object of the external senses, but the general form was exclusively perceived by the intellect; and, as men in general were principally engrossed with what affected their outward senses of perception, the philosopher's exclusive province lay in working upon the materials which belonged to the intellectual portion of our nature. There was, however, a difference between Aristotle and Plato as to the nature of ideas. According to both, the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity; but in addition to this opinion Plato maintained that there was also an *idea of form* belonging to every thing, which form also existed from eternity, according to which every thing is made. Aristotle dissented from this; he asserted that matter could exist without form, but that form could not exist without matter.\*

The Stoical philosophers held a somewhat different creed; but what their opinions precisely were, is, even at this day, a matter of doubt and conjecture.

This doctrine about the nature of particular and

\* See Brucker's History of Philosophy on this point.

general ideas, proved a fruitful source of dispute, from the third century, when the attempt was made by the Eclectic philosophers at Alexandria, to reconcile the opinions of Aristotle and Plato, till the date of the Scholastic Philosophy. But nothing came out of these bickerings; for the subject appears too difficult a one for any set of speculators to manage. "Up to about the eleventh century," Professor Stewart observes, "the opinion which was prevalent was, (to use the scholastic language of the times) that universals do not exist *before* things, nor *after* things, but *in* things; that is, (if I may be allowed to attempt a commentary upon expressions to which I do not pretend to be able to annex very precise notions) universal ideas have not (as Plato thought) an existence separable from individual objects; and, therefore, they could not have existed prior to them in the order of time; nor yet (according to the doctrine of the Stoics) are they mere conceptions of the mind, formed in consequence of an examination and comparison of particulars; but these ideas or forms are from eternity united inseparably with that matter of which things consist; or, as the Aristotelians sometimes express themselves, the forms of things are from eternity immersed in matter."\*

Now this was the precise state of matters, when Roscellinus, and his pupil, the celebrated Peter Abelard, stated the question as to the nature of *genus* and *species*. They both maintained that there was

\* Elements, Vol. 1. p. 169.

nothing existing in nature corresponding to general terms, and that in all our reasonings and speculations, in which general terms are used, *words*, and not ideas, are the things with which the mind is then conversant.

This doctrine was soon vigorously opposed, and the two parties took different names; the one, who affirmed there were no general ideas, took the name of *Nominalists*; and the other, who maintained there were universal ideas, to correspond with general terms, adopted the name of *Realists*. There was also an intermediate sect of the Scholastic Philosophers, who took the name of *Conceptualists*.

We will give a short explanation of the principles of these three sects. The theory of the Nominalists was simply this. They affirmed there were two classes of truths, respecting individual things or objects belonging to the same genus or order; namely, one class relating to *individual objects*, and their particular qualities or properties; the other class to *general truths*, which arise out of those qualities or circumstances, which all the things or objects possess in common. The words which are used to designate these general qualities or circumstances are called *general terms*; and the Nominalists declare that when men talk or reason about these general or common attributes of things, this general term *alone* is the *only* thing with which the mind is conversant.

The Realists denied this doctrine *in toto*. They maintained that, though these general terms were

used in our descriptions of the similar properties or qualities of things, yet there was a *general idea* always present in the mind, when it thus characterized the common attributes which belonged to a particular genus. This general term was not a mere verbal instrument; but stood for a *real* permanent intellectual conception, which was always present to the mind, and to which the name of *general idea* was uniformly given.

The *Conceptualists* attempted to steer a middle course between these two opposite doctrines. They all, however, agreed with the Nominalists in denouncing general ideas or conceptions, such as the Realists considered them to be; but they still thought the mind had the power, when requisite to exercise it, of creating these general notions. They said there were no essences, or universal ideas, to agree with general terms; and that the mind could reason about classes of individuals without the mediation of language.

It may be observed, that the great veneration which the Scholastic philosophers generally paid to the opinions and judgment of Aristotle, was one of the grand efficient and operating causes of the long disputes which subsisted among them. Vives observes, "There are both philosophers and divines, who not only say that Aristotle reached the utmost boundaries of science, but that his syllogistic method of reasoning is the most direct and certain path to knowledge; a presumption which has led us to receive, upon the authority of Aristotle, many tenets, as fully known and established, which are

by no means such; for why should we fatigue ourselves with further inquiry, when it is agreed that nothing can be discovered beyond what may be found in his writings. Hence has sprung up in the minds of men an incredible degree of indolence; so that every one thinks it safest and most pleasant to see with another's eyes, and believe with another's faith, and to examine nothing for himself."

The discussion of these questions has been generally placed in an unfavourable light by modern philosophers. They have been considered frivolous and unsatisfactory. Ludovius Vives again observes, "Some persons maintain, that studies of this description are useful to prepare the way for other kinds of learning, by sharpening the faculties of the student; and that those who understand such subtle questions, will the more readily acquire knowledge of a less difficult nature. Neither of these assertions is true. One of the chief reasons why questions of this kind are thought profound and ingenious is, that they are not fully comprehended; for it is no uncommon thing for men to applaud what they do not understand. In the opinion of many, however, these enigmatieal subtilities are only to be ranked as childish amusements; being in truth, not the produce of vigorous understanding exercised by sound erudition, but springing up in an unoccupied mind, from a sheer ignorance of better things, like noxious weeds in uncultivated grounds."\*

\* Lib. 3. p. 129.



My Lord Bacon uses nearly the same language. "As many natural bodies," says he, "whilst they are still entire, are corrupted, and putrefy, so the solid knowledge of things often degenerates into subtle, vain, and silly speculations, which, although they may not seem altogether destitute of ingenuity, are insipid and useless. This kind of unsound learning, which preys upon itself, has often appeared, particularly among the Scholastics; who, having much leisure, quick parts, and little reading; being in mind as closely confined to the writings of a few authors, and especially of their dictator Aristotle, as they are in body to the cells of their monasteries; and being, moreover, in a great measure, ignorant of the history both of nature and the world; out of very flimsy materials, but with the most rapid and violent motion of the shuttle of thought, they have woven those laborious webs which are preserved in their writings. The truth is, that the human mind, when it is employed upon external objects, is directed in its operations by the nature of the materials upon which its faculties are exercised; but if, like the spider, it draws its materials from within itself, it produces cobwebs of learning, wonderful indeed for the fineness of the threads and the delicacy of the workmanship, but of no real value or use."\*

The introduction and prosecution of the Scholastic philosophy, are marked by extraordinary excitement, wherever it was studied. Emperors and

\* De Aug. Scient. t. 1.

kings, as well as the clergy and the laity, partook of the frantic contention. The Universities of France, England, and Germany, became one grand arena for the discussion of the abstract doctrines of the overheated parties; and sovereigns, led doubtless by some political reasons of the day, took a part in the contest, and scrupled not, on some occasions, to employ the civil power to gain a victory or punish an enemy. The accounts which creditable historians and eye-witnesses have given of these contests, exceed all ordinary belief. We are told by one author, that at the public discussions of the Scholastic ages, it was no uncommon thing to see the disputants shout till they were quite hoarse, use the most gross and insulting language, make grimaces at each other, threaten personal chastisement, and struggle with and endeavour to prostrate each other to the ground. When words and threats failed, recourse was had to the fists. As in the wrestling schools, they buff, and spit, and kick, and bite; and even go beyond this, and use clubs, and other dangerous weapons, so that many get wounded, and not a few killed outright.\*

Erasmus likewise tells us, that in those contests the parties grew first pale, then they reddened in anger, began to spit upon, and attack each other

\* “Clamores primum ad raviu, hinc improbitas, sannæ, minæ, convitia, dum luctantur, et uterque alterum tentat prosternere: consumptis verbis venit ad pugnos, ad veram luctam ex ficta et simulata. Quinetiam, quæ contingunt in palestra, illic non desunt colaphi, alapæ, consputio, calces, morsus; etiam quæ jam supra leges palæstræ, fustes, ferrum; saucii multi, uonnunquam occisi.” — *Ludovicus Vives*.

with their fists; some speaking the language of the Nominalists, and some that of the Realists.\*

Dr. Mosheim gives us a striking instance of the violent animosity which subsisted between the Nominalists and the Realists, in the execution of John Huss. The Doctor tells us that "Huss was not only attached to the party of the Realists, but was peculiarly severe in opposition to their adversaries. And now he was so unhappy as to be brought before a tribunal which was principally composed of the Nominalists, with the famous John Gerson at their head, who was the zealous patron of that faction, and the mortal enemy of Huss. Nothing could equal the vindictive pleasure the Nominalists felt from an event that put this unfortunate prisoner in their power, and gave them an opportunity of satisfying their vengeance to the full; and accordingly, in their letter to Lewis, the king of France, they do not pretend to deny that Huss fell a victim to the resentment of their sect, which is also confirmed by the Council of Constance."†

Though the scholastic philosophy presents, in many points of view, a humiliating and lamentable instance of the weakness and perversity of human nature, yet it is not without some redeeming qualities. It must always be borne in mind, that one grand object which lay beneath the surface of all metaphysical and theological controversy, was an

\* "Eos usque ad pallorem, usque ad convitia, usque ad sputa, nonnunquam et usque ad pugnos invicem digladiari, alios ut Nominales alios ut Reales, loqui."

† Ecclesiastical Hist. Vol. 1. p. 704.

ardent desire for intellectual liberty and freedom of discussion. This, in fact, gave rise to the Scholastic system, and was, with more or less energy, the animating principle which pervaded it throughout all its career. What many of the learned and able doctors of the Schools contended for was, a perfect right for human reason to canvass and discuss the general principles of philosophy and religion, no matter to what result that investigation might lead. We find a striking instance of this growing spirit for mental liberty and inquiry, in the declarations of Abelard, who tells us, in his *Introduction to Theology*, that his pupils demanded him to give them "some philosophical arguments, such as were fit to satisfy their minds; begged he would instruct them, not merely to repeat what he taught them, but to understand it; for no one can believe that which he does not comprehend, and it is absurd to set out to preach to others concerning things which neither those who teach nor those who learn can understand. What other end can the study of philosophy have, if not to lead us to the knowledge of God, to which all studies should be subordinate? For what purpose is the reading of profane authors, and of books which treat of worldly affairs, permitted to believers, if not to enable them to understand the truths of the Holy Scriptures, and to give them the abilities necessary to defend them? It is above all things desirable for this purpose, that we should strengthen one another with all the power of reason; so that in questions so difficult and complicated as those

which form the object of Christian faith, you may be able to hinder the subtilties of its enemies from too easily corrupting its purity."

There has of late years sprung up, among the learned and philosophical of all countries, a strong feeling towards exploring everything connected with the literature of the middle or "dark" ages of the Schoolmen. A notion is entertained that treasures of wisdom are hidden in this department of history, and that there may be more truth in the sanguine prophecy of Leibnitz, who affirmed his belief "that there is much gold concealed under this barbarous philosophy," than what at first sight meets the eye. Whether this novel opinion be well founded, to the extent which some enthusiastic speculators imagine, it would be rash, perhaps, to predict; but certain it is, that no one can fully appreciate all the curious and interesting institutions which took their rise in the middle ages, and which have exercised, to the present moment, such an extensive influence over the interests of humanity, without a pretty general acquaintance with the nature and history of the scholastic philosophy. It lies at the root of a great deal of sound knowledge, in morals, politics, religion, and metaphysics.

It would lead us to form an erroneous notion of Scholastic philosophy, and of those long and furious contentions to which it gave rise, were we to limit the matter in dispute solely to particular and universal ideas. Scholasticism was, as already remarked, essentially a theological controversy. The theories of the Nominalists and Realists would soon

have been deprived of all interest, but for the constant supply of controversial matter which theology afforded. Particulars and universals were constantly viewed through a religious medium. They were often, it is true, discussed metaphysically; but still there was almost invariably an application of their influence on religious doctrines, expressed or understood. They were never properly disjoined from theology. The theory of the Nominalists was considered more in unison with certain views of revealed truth; and the ideas of the Realists decidedly in favour of an opposite conclusion. This was the real source of the long and bitter contest. The leading theological doctrines which were discussed through the medium of the Scholastic metaphysics, were, the Trinity, Predestination, Grace, Justification, and the Sacraments.

These various subtle, but interesting doctrines were discussed through the medium of Scholastic learning, upon this simple ground, that all the declarations of Scripture made an appeal to human nature, and were to be received and viewed through the channel of human thought. We must, therefore, ascertain the laws of that thought, before we can arrive at satisfactory conclusions on religious doctrines. This was the main position of all the most celebrated Scholastics on doctrinal theology. They never departed from it. Whatever disputes occurred on matters of detail, they one and all seemed to have agreed on this point. In fact, there was no choice in the subject. If any doctrine were to be established or defended, it could only be

through the medium of the laws and constitution of mind; and these it was necessary to settle in some mode or other, before a single step could be taken in any controversy.

We see these observations verified in every movement of Scholastic divinity. When Thomas Aquinas discussed the doctrine of the Trinity, he continually made his appeal to the mental notions we possess of intelligence, of a ruling and creative power, and from the necessity, so to speak, we are laid under, of giving a principle of life to every thing of a creative nature. We see, in every paragraph of his writings on doctrinal points, how deeply he had studied the Platonic philosophy, and brought his treasures from this source to bear on the matters in dispute.\*

In the revival of the Pelagian controversy on Predestination and Grace, in the ninth century, we find the early founders of the scholastic learning following the same course as Aquinas. We have *necessary* and *contingent* truths constantly appealed to, and the nature of these truths defined and illustrated by an examination of the laws of thought, in reference to causation. John Scotus Erigena brings all his strength to bear upon the dispute, and to show that the notions of *Death*, *Sin*, and *Evil*, considered in their general aspect, had no proper existence in the Divine Mind, and would not, *therefore*, be pre-existent or predestinated. True, his opponents Ratramn, Prudentius, and Florus, a Deacon of

\* Summa Theol. Prima Pars. Qu. 13.

Lyons, remonstrate against the application of philosophical principles to such an inquiry, and insist on taking their stand upon the simple declaration of the Scriptures; yet we afterwards clearly see how the doctrines of Predestination and Grace became consolidated and systematized by the application of the dialectic principles of the Aristotelian philosophy, and the current of metaphysical opinions which flowed from the school of the New Platonists.

The doctrine of Justification we find discussed by the Schoolmen through the channel of their mental philosophy. The personal nature of man is laid down, and then considered relatively to the Divine agency. The human will, and our notions of duty, obligation, and punishment, are contrasted with the sovereignty of the Deity, and certain conclusions drawn from that contrast. The Divine influence, acting on man's affairs, is discussed, through the medium of many of those principles of philosophizing so prevalent in the latter years of the Alexandrian school; and every divine, acquainted with the historical progress of the orthodox creed of the present day, knows that the doctrine of Justification, among other things, was fully illustrated in strict conformity to the principles of scholastic philosophy and erudition.

On the nature and influence of the elements of the Eucharist, the same mode of discussion was employed as on other doctrines of theology. The efficacy of the sacramental elements in the Christian life became an early topic of disputation in the scholastic philosophy; and it gave rise to all that



mass of very subtle, and sometimes unintelligible, argumentation, on the nature of *matter, form, substance, accident*, and the like, which we find so abundant in the dogmatic theology and metaphysics of the Schools. The Divine influence which was supposed to be conveyed to the mind or soul of a duly qualified sacramental partaker, was illustrated by the maxims and principles of the Platonic philosophy, and particularly by the illustrations of it furnished by Plotinus, Proclus, and their successors. All the different creeds, entertained by Christians of every denomination, on the nature and offices of the Sacraments, are to be found in the scholastic metaphysics, illustrated at great length, and placed in every possible light which dialectical and mental subtlety could accomplish.

The whole of scholastic disputation, relative to the doctrines of theology, is grounded on two things, *faith* and *reason*. Where does the one end and the other begin? This is the question on which all the contentions of the Schoolmen rested. The distinctive *principles* of reason had necessarily to be recognised and illustrated, and this gave rise to all the metaphysical discussion we everywhere meet with in their voluminous writings. The application of the science of mind to theology became a necessary thing; because without the union of the two there could have been no system of doctrinal faith whatever, *considered as a regular, elaborated, dogmatical system*. Philosophy was necessary to methodise and classify religious truths.\*

\* See Note A. at the end of this Volume.

It may readily be conceded, that many of the disputes and controversies of the learned doctors of the middle ages, were frivolous and unprofitable; but it must also be remembered that they were not all of this description. We must not be too sweeping in our conclusions on this matter. In nearly all their writings we shall find the elementary principles of many important branches of human knowledge, treated in a style and manner not unworthy of the most brilliant periods of modern literature. There is no department of knowledge, with the exception of physical science, to which much has been added in the way of principle, since the days of the Schoolmen. Their views of things are some times buried under a load of recondite learning, subtle disquisitions, and quaint terms, but still valuable elementary principles are there. And however much modern taste may attempt to despise scholastic erudition, it may yet with some confidence be affirmed, that a man will make but a very poor lawyer, divine, politician, or mental philosopher, who is altogether ignorant of the literature of the Schools.

The scholastic disputations and studies laid the foundation of the modern institutions of European education; and on this ground have many claims on our sympathy and gratitude. "Never," says Roger Bacon, "never was there such a show of wisdom, such exercises in all branches, and in all kingdoms, as within these forty years. Teachers are every way dispersed, in cities, in castles, and in villages, taken particularly from the new mo-

nastie orders.” A learned and popular periodical\* makes the following just observations on these declarations. “In fact, these new orders, whose activity was whetted by a desire to distinguish themselves, and who took up the ground of education, as left unoccupied by their predecessors, contributed not a little to diffuse the ardour for study, and to obtain the foundation of schools and colleges for the advancement of their favourite science. Most of the universities and colleges for the higher branches of education, throughout Europe, owe their origin to these times, and to the passion for these studies. To the scholastic logic, after the fall of Constantinople, was added the study of the ancient Latin and Greek; and at that point, in most of the institutions of education in Europe, especially where unhappily they became united with rich ecclesiastical establishments, the business of improvement stopt.”

In addition to these observations, we shall add those of a distinguished historian, who, in alluding to the influence of the Scholastic philosophy, says, “But fruitless and ill directed as those speculations were, their novelty roused, and their boldness interested the human mind. The ardour with which men pursued those uninviting studies was astonishing. Genuine philosophy was never cultivated, in any enlightened age, with more zeal. Schools, upon the model of those instituted by Charlemagne, were opened in every cathedral, and almost in every monastery of note. Colleges and universities were

\* Edinburgh Review for April 1814.

created, and formed into communities or corporations, governed by their own laws, and invested with separate and extensive jurisdiction over their own members. A regular course of studies was planned. Privileges of great value were conferred on masters and scholars. Academical titles and honours of various kinds were invented as a recompense for both. Nor was it in the schools alone that superiority in science led to reputation and authority; it became an object of respect in life, and advanced such as acquired it to a rank of no inconsiderable eminence. Allured by all these advantages, an incredible number of students resorted to these new seats of learning, and crowded with eagerness into that new path which was opened to fame and distinction.”\*

#### RABANUS MAURUS. 856 A. D.

Rabanus Maurus was one of the most acute and distinguished men of his day. He was a zealous disciple of Alcuinus, and disseminated his philosophy over the greater part of Germany and France. Maurus was archbishop of Mayence, and the book attributed to his pen, and which contains his ideas of mental philosophy, is called “Veni Creator.” The reader will find the speculative notions of Alcuinus adopted with but little variation by the learned prelate. Maurus took an active part, in the latter portion of his life, in a controversy on the free-

\* Robertson’s Hist. of Charles V.

dom of the human will, and the application of that doctrine to theological questions. A full account of this will be found in the *Histoire Littéraire de France*, tome 4. pp. 263, 264.\*

JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA. 886 A.D.

This philosopher was a native of Ireland, (some say of Scotland), and is generally considered the founder of the Scholastic system. He was attached for a considerable time to the court of Charles the Bald, afterwards to that of Alfred the Great, and latterly presided at the University of Oxford.

His work on the "*Division of Nature*,"† contains his views on mental subjects. This work is full of abstruse and subtile reasonings and speculations on existence in general, and the mysterious operations of creation. It is based on the doctrines of the New Platonists. The spirit of the work aims at supporting the proposition, that philosophy is grounded on religion, and not religion upon philosophy.

The following observations contain the substance of his notions on the nature of *existence* and *non-existence*. Every order of rational and intellectual creation may be considered under a twofold aspect, as existing, and not existing. An order of beings

\* The whole works of Maurus are comprised in 3 vols. fol. Cologne, 1627. See also, Hist. Littéraire de France ; Du Pin's Ecclesiastical Hist. ; and Cave's Hist. Litt.

† Oxford, 1681.

exist when they are known to themselves, or to other superior intelligences; and this order may be considered as not existing, when they are not known to inferior natures. Every thing we know of the causes of matter, fashioned or moulded by intelligence, in time, and place, and according to the laws of succession, receives the name of *being*, in the ordinary language of the world at large; and, on the other hand, every thing contained in the bosom of nature, which is not manifested by the accidents of time and place, is considered as *not existing*. According to this view there is an *apparent* and a *real* existence.\*

His opinions on the nature of the *essence* of things, are rather singular. He says, that though every thing we know as existing, is known to us through the double relation of time and space; only the *essence* of these things is exempt from these conditions of inward perception. This essence subsists by itself; and in its own nature is exempt of time and place. It alone enjoys true existence. Every thing we perceive of other creatures, whether by the bodily senses or by the understanding, is nothing else but a sort of accident of an essence, incomprehensible to itself, but which makes itself known by quantity, form, space, and time, so as

\* "Videtur vero mihi divisio naturæ per quatuor differentias quatuor species recipere; quarum prima est quæ creat, nec creatur; secunda quæ creatur et creat; tertia quæ creatur, nec creat; et quarta denique, quæ neque creatur, nec creat. Harum ergo quatuor binæ sibi invicem opponuntur; nam tertia opponitur primæ, quarta vero secundæ." (De Div. Nat. lib. 1. p. 1.)

we cannot know what it is in itself, but only that a certain thing exists.

John Scotus' ideas on the general nature and powers of the human understanding, may be gathered from the following digest.

We distinguish in the understanding two things, *reason* and *sense*; not, however, the *external* senses, but the internal ones. The external organs of sensation only connect the soul or understanding with the body. But the various faculties and powers of the soul are only divers manifestations and relations of a similar principle and action. The external senses themselves, though divided, from their respective effects, into five kinds, are nevertheless but one, relatively to their *principle of action*, which has its foundation in the heart. This principle is uniform and simple. It receives the representations of sensible things, which proceed from the qualities and number of external objects, by the channel of the five organs of sensation, which may be termed the gates to the intellectual city. These senses, like a porter or messenger, again introduce these representations to the internal senses, which preside over the operations of the mind. There are then three orders of these operations; namely, the first, which belongs to the understanding; the second, which appertains to reason; and the third, which is attached to the organs of sense. The first elevates itself beyond the confines of the natural world, but cannot detect the precise nature of the object to which it directs itself; for that object is the divinity, of whose nature and essence we can

know but very little, if any thing at all. The second, or reasoning operation, directs us to the Deity, as a universal Cause; discusses the nature of the soul; forms judgments and conclusions on the nature of external objects; and moulds this information into the rules and maxims of science, by carefully collected deductions from cause and effect. The third operation is confined to outward things. Here the soul places itself in contact with them, through the instrumentality of certain signs, and establishes in itself reasons for the nature and constitution of things. It brings before it both simple and compound objects, groups them together, divides them, orders and distributes them, and again brings them back to their own proper notions, which reside in its internal sense. Here, again, these objects are stripped and disengaged from their sensible appearances, and are purified and made true.

There are two kinds of images. The first reside in the organs of sense, and are the result of impressions made upon them by external objects; the second appertain to the outward senses, and follow from the first organs; it is by this channel, and by these transformations, that our sensations are converted into notions or ideas. The soul by degrees falls back, as it were, upon itself, and reviews the first and second order of sensations. Purified by these salutary exercises, enlightened by science, and perfected by religion, the soul is perpetually directed towards the Author of all things. It constantly moves towards the centre,



like the celestial bodies which move round their respective orbits. The second operation of the soul is limited to the objects of nature, and possesses a knowledge of the Deity, as a universal Cause. In the same manner as we obtain an acquaintance with sensible things by images, we likewise obtain our superior notions, or ideas of primordial causes, or those divine operations which afford certain and conclusive intimations of a Supreme Cause. It is this which the Greeks called *Logos*, and the Latins *Ratio*.

It may be worthy here of especial notice, that one of the fundamental propositions of the system advocated and propounded by John Scotus, was, *that we cannot know what things are in themselves, but only what they appear to us to be; and that the whole fabric of nature can only be successfully investigated through the medium of time and space.* This opinion is evidently the key-stone to some modern theories of metaphysics.

We find in this author's treatise, *De Prædestinatione*, page 103, the following principle, which runs through the whole of his philosophical and theological speculations. "There are not two distinct branches of human studies, philosophy and religion; for true philosophy is true religion, and true religion is true philosophy."

We shall give the following passages from this early writer, which will show pretty distinctly the kind of metaphysical philosophy he cultivated.

"1st. Nature and time were created together, but *authority* does not date from the origin of time

and nature. It was *reason* which commenced simultaneously with nature and time. This is demonstrable by reason itself; for authority is derived from reason, not reason from authority. All authority not based on reason appears worthless; but reason, supported by its own intrinsic force, needs no confirmation from authority. To me legitimate authority appears to be no other than truth discovered by the force of reason, and transmitted by the holy Fathers for the use of future generations.

“2nd. There is no necessity for adducing the authority of the fathers, especially if they are generally known, unless such authority be useful for the support of reason in the eyes of men who are more influenced by it than by reason.

“3rd. The salvation of the faithful consists in the belief of what reason affirms respecting the sole principle of all things, and in the comprehension of what reason dictates.

“4th. Faith I believe to be no other than a certain principle by which, in a reasonable nature, the knowledge of the Creator is derived.

“5th. The soul's nature is unknown, but it begins to manifest itself, both to itself and to others, in its form, and that form is reason.

“6th. The true course of reasoning may proceed from the natural study of things sensible to the pure contemplation of things spiritual.

“7th. So far from being of little importance, the knowledge of things sensible is exceedingly useful towards the comprehension of things intel-

ligible. For as through the senses we arrive at intelligence, so through the creature we arrive at the Creator.

“8th. The cause of all things, which is God, is at once simple and multiple. The divine essence is diffused, that is, it multiplies itself, in all things which exist; and afterwards, by the same process, that essence, disengaging itself from the infinite variety of existing things, returns to concentrate itself in that simple unity which comprises all things, which is in God and is God, so that God is every thing, and every thing is God.

“9th. Just as in its origin the whole river springs from a fountain, just as the water arising from that fountain spreads without intermission along the bed of that river, whatever the length of its course; so the divine goodness, essence, wisdom, life—all that exists in the universal source of things—first diffuses itself into primary causes, thus giving them being, and afterwards passes from these primary causes into their effects, thus circulating, in a manner ineffable, and in a course uninterrupted, from things superior to things inferior, and returning at length to its source by paths the most intricate and secret.

“10th. God who alone truly exists, is the essence of all things; for, as Dionysius the Areopagite says, ‘Being in all things is that which partakes of the divinity.’

“11th. God is the beginning, the middle, and the end: the beginning, in that all things proceed from him and participate in his essence; the middle, in that all things subsist by him; the end, in

that all things tend towards him as their repose, as the term of their motion, as the stability of their perfection.

“12th. Every thing termed an image of God, every thing we see, feel, and comprehend, is but an appearance of what is unseen; a manifestation of what is hidden; a path opened towards the intelligence of what we do not comprehend; a denomination of that which is ineffable; a step towards that which cannot be reached; a form of that which has no form.

“13th. We can conceive nothing in the creature except the Creator, who alone truly is. Out of him nothing can be properly termed essential; for all things proceeding from him are merely, as regards their existence, a certain participation in the being of him who alone has no procession, who subsists by himself.

“14th. We should not conceive God and the creature to be two distinct beings, but as one and the same being. For the creature subsists in God; and God, in a manner equally wonderful and ineffable, creates himself, if we may thus speak, in the creature in which he is manifested: from invisible he becomes visible; from incomprehensible, comprehensible.”\*

Those who are acquainted with the general tenor of theological and metaphysical controversies in Europe since Scotus' time, will readily recognize in the above passages, many of the seeds of those

\* See Literature of the Middle Ages, in Lardner's Cyclopaedia; Baronius Ecclesi.; and Fleury's Histoire Ecclesiastique.

controverted disquisitions. These quotations display the remarkable sagacity and subtlety of his genius, and the vigorous powers of thought with which he could grasp the most abstract questions.

The "Division of Nature" was considered an heretical book by many portions of the Catholic clergy. It was condemned to be burnt by Pope Honorius III. at the request of the Archbishop of Sens.\*

This author left another work, called "The Vision of God." It has, however, been lost; though Mabillon declares that he saw a copy of it in the library of the abbey of Clairemarie, near St. Omer. The work is said to have furnished the most striking proofs of the surprising subtlety and profound argumentative powers of the author.

John Scotus entered warmly into the controversy on predestination with Gottschalcus; and the chronicles of the times affirm that he displayed surprising talents in the course of the public discussions of this knotty and interminable question. It would appear, from the scanty records of the dispute, that Scotus drew some very nice distinctions between the Almighty's foreknowledge, and his permission of sinners to continue their vicious courses unchecked and unreclaimed. And it may be mentioned here, that the discussions on predestination, grace, and free-will, were the great incentives, in this age, to metaphysical subtlety and dialectical dexterity. Men of learning devoted their whole lives to these animating controversies; and

\* Albert de Trois-Fontaines, *Chronique*, p. 514. There are several MS. copies of the work in the public libraries of France.

at no period in the history of philosophy did the desire for disputation, and the love of victory, display themselves with more eager and chivalrous devotion. Every thing which learning, ingenuity, and eloquence could do, was brought to bear upon these interesting topics of theological contention.

Many clerical writers make grievous complaints against Scotus, for having translated the spurious work attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, and thus opened the flood-gates of mysticism and frantic devotion into the Christian Church.\*

#### GERBERT (SILVESTER II.) 1003 A. D.

This philosopher and ecclesiastic was one of the most able and remarkable men of his day. He was not only deeply skilled in all speculative systems of the ancients; but his knowledge of the mathematics, natural history, belles lettres, and natural philosophy, went far beyond his age. Indeed this was so marked and striking, that he was accused of blasphemy and magic, and experienced no small difficulty, on many occasions, in exculpating himself from the serious accusations brought against him, both by the learned and the ignorant.†

He was born of obscure parentage, and received his education in one of the monasteries in Aquitaine. His zeal and talents soon, however, brought him into distinction. He travelled into Spain, and

\* See Chron. Scot. Ed. Galæi; Will. Malmesbury, De Gestis Regum Ang. lib. 2. c. 4.; Histoire Litt. de France, tom. 5. p. 423.; Roger Hoveden, Ann. ad 883; Mabillon, sect. 3.

† Apologie pour les grands hommes soupçonnés de Magie, chap. 19.

studied speculative philosophy, with other branches of knowledge, among the Arabians at the University of Cordova. Here he laid the foundation of that skill in metaphysical science which he afterwards displayed, and which excited the wonder and envy of his rivals. He was an ardent lover of both Plato and Aristotle, and it is said that he considered Plato's ideas of a Deity were by far the most consistent and intelligible of which the old Grecian philosophy could boast. The peculiar opinions on the mind which Gerbert entertained, when coupled with his doctrinal views on religion, occasioned him to be accused of Manicheism; but this he laboured to show was altogether unfounded. The great service he rendered to mental philosophy was his influence in making known the Arabian speculations. These became more generally diffused in France and Italy through the exertions of this learned and talented prelate.\*

#### LANFRANC OF PAVIA. 1089 A.D.

This was an able and distinguished teacher of Philosophy and Dialectics. He was a native of Pavia, but settled at Avranches in Normandy, in the year 1036, where he established a seminary of learning, which gained, under his auspices, great

\* See the Epistles of Silvester II. which are still extant, amounting to 161; *Histoire Littéraire de France*, tom. 6. pp. 577—611; Berington's *Literary History of the Middle Ages*, p. 202; Sharon Turner's *England, Middle Ages*, Vol. 4. p. 434; William of Malmesbury, *De Gestis Regum Angliæ*, lib. 2. p. 36.

popularity and renown. He was deeply read in metaphysical learning, and applied it to that department of education, so eagerly sought after and highly estimated, the art of subtile disputation. Among his pupils, we are told, were "clerks, the sons of gentlemen, masters of transcendent renown, powerful chiefs, and individuals of high nobility."\*

William Duke of Normandy was one of the admirers of Lanfranc, and admitted him to the most familiar confidence. When the Duke made his descent upon England, he invited Lanfranc to take charge of the English Church, and made him Archbishop of Canterbury. His labours in matters of learning, form an important and interesting epoch in the history of literature.†

#### PETER DAMIAN. 1072 A.D.

This was a learned ecclesiastic, and an acute metaphysician. His speculations were chiefly confined to matters connected with the existence of the Deity, and with those attributes with which we clothe Almighty Power. The principles which Damian maintained on these points exercised a powerful influence over the minds of the learned of his time.‡

\* See Milo Crispin; Will of Malmesbury; Gemmet; and other authorities mentioned by Tiraboschi, Brueker, and Fleury.

† See Note B at the end of this Volume.

‡ See Baronius, *Annal.* 1059; and the *Histoire Littéraire de France*, tom. 5; and *Rerum Ital Script.* t. 5. The best Edition of the writings of Damiau is that of Rome, 1606. 3 vols. folio.



## ROSCCELLINUS. 1089 A. D.

This distinguished Scholastic was a Canon of Compiègne. He took a different view of metaphysics from John Scotus. The latter dealt with the absolute, and took his stand upon the abstract principles of ontology. Roscellinus, on the contrary, considered the individual perceptions of the mind as his starting point. He maintained that all general ideas are nothing but simple abstractions, which the mind forms by comparing a certain number of individuals with each other. These ideas have no existence independent of the mind which conceives them. Humanity, goodness, beauty, life, and such like general terms, are merely forms of expression given to a certain number of individual perceptions, and do not stand for any abstract ideas which have a positive existence independent of the thinking principle. These general terms are a mere contrivance, from the mechanism of language, to prevent tedious and endless repetitions. This author is usually considered the real founder of the school of the Nominalists.

## ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. 1109 A. D.

This learned prelate is chiefly known amongst philosophers for his enthusiastic attachment to a favourite opinion, that it was possible to show, from reason alone, every thing which ought to form our faith respecting the Divinity. In his work, *Dia-*

*logues on Truth*, we find the following principles laid down.

1st. That the intimations of our external organs of sense are founded on truth. If these intimations are at any time erroneous and deceptive, it arises from our internal sense of perception.

2nd. There is truth in the essence of things; it is derived from the supreme truth, which is God himself.

3rd. Truth has neither beginning nor end.

We shall notice here two curious works of this author. The one is entitled, *Monologium, seu exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei*, in which the author represents a man seeking after truths, with the single instrument of human reason. The same idea is pursued in the celebrated *Meditations* of Descartes. The other book of St. Anselm is called *Proslogium, seu fides quærens intellectum*, and consists of twenty-six short chapters. The aim of the first work is to display the workings of the mind when without truth, but earnestly intent upon its discovery; and, in the second work, we have the man in possession of the truth, but we must look at his attempts to demonstrate it to other minds.\*

\* Here is a brief analysis of both works. *Monologium*. Prefatio. Quatenus auctoritate scripturæ penitus nihil persuaderetur. Quæcumque autem ibi dixi, sub persona secum sola cogitatione disputantis et investigantis ea quæ prius non animadvertisset, prolata sunt. Quæ de Deo necessario credimus, patet quia ea ipsa quislibet, si vel medioeris ingenii fuerit, sola ratione sibi nec ipsi magna ex parte persuadere possit. Hoc cum multis modis fieri possit, meum modum hic ponam, quem estimo cuique homini esse aptissimum.

*Proslogium*. Proœmium. Postquam opuseculum quoddam velut exem-

The treatise in which St. Anselm displays the most profound metaphysical acumen, is in his *De Concordia Præscientiæ et Prædestinationis necnon Gratiæ Dei cum libero Arbitrio*. We shall endeavour to give a general outline of his reasonings on this naturally difficult subject.

Though it may be admitted that what the Almighty foresees, must necessarily come to pass, yet the action itself is not necessarily influenced by the foreknowledge. Some events are bound in the chain of fatality; others again are, in the fullest meaning of the term, contingent, depending upon time and events; the former are ordained by eternal power, and the latter are foreseen by divine wisdom. But the great question to be considered here is, How do we logically prove foreknowledge to be connected with a necessity of action? There are but two ways in which this question can be considered; either an event *may* come to pass, or may *not*; one of the two things *must* happen. On either supposition infinite power and intelligence must see it. If we consider necessity as a simple accident, it can have no relation with the foreknowledge of the Deity; because, though this foreknowledge embraces a certain action to be performed, it does not necessarily determine that action to be done. If Divine prescience must involve necessity, then there can be no human will, or voluntary power

plum meditandi de ratione fidei, cogentibus me precibus quorundam fratrum, in persona alicujus tacite secum ratiocinando quæ nesciat investigantis, edidi; considerans illud esse multorum concatenatione contextum argumentum quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret.

whatever. The correct view of the matter is, that the Divine prescience merely foresees the actions which a free agent performs. Men commit crimes, not *because* the Almighty foresees their conduct ; but it is foreseen, *because* the will of man guides and directs it.

St. Anselm maintains that, in the strict sense of language, there can be no such thing as foreknowledge in the Divine nature ; and for this reason, that *space* and *time* do not circumscribe the Deity as they do human nature. With Him all things are present ; there can be no succession of ideas ; and past, present, and future can have no relation to his nature or attributes.

The opinions which St. Anselm maintained on the abstract nature of mind, will be found in the first part of his works, from the 1st to the 40th Chapter inclusive. Another important section of his metaphysical disquisitions will be seen by referring to his "*Dialogues on Truth*," from page 109 to 115 inclusive.

The metaphysical genius of Anselm was of the highest order. It was profound and comprehensive. He displayed likewise great versatility in the exercise of his knowledge and talents. The times in which he lived were exceedingly favourable to his reputation and influence as a controversialist. There was a keen relish for disputes on predestination, free-will, the abstract nature of truth, the nature and attributes of Deity, and similar subjects connected with the first principles of doctrinal theology.

The art or science of logic owes much to St. Anselm, and his master Lanfranc. In their day controversies were undertaken and conducted with but little reference to a proper arrangement of subjects or correct definitions of terms; but St. Anselm in particular did much in the way of rectifying this disorderly state of things. He composed a treatise called the *Grammarian*, which furnishes the reader with a rational view of the end or object of all ratiocination.\*

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We may observe here, in passing, that it would appear, from conflicting historians and heated proselytes, that Plato and Aristotle held, in the twelfth century, about an equal share of authority among the scholastic dialecticians. In some localities, and with some particular religious sects, Aristotle was the decided favourite, and his system was adopted and illustrated with all the ardour which new and enthusiastic partisans could display. Plato likewise had his disciples, and they were obviously distinguishable from those of his rival. The Platonic admirers were generally noticed by their mystical and rapturous notions of theological doctrines, and their zealous attachment to such views of Christianity as led to piety and virtue. The Aristotelians, on the other hand, were lax in discipline and cold in feeling; and these untoward circumstances were generally attributed

\* See *Histoire Litt. de France*, tom. 6; Tiraboschi, *Storia della Litt. Ital.* tom. 3. l. 4. The best edition of the works of St. Anselm is that of Venice, 1744, 2 vols. folio. See also Note C. at the end of this Volume.

to the arid and mechanical complexion of all the Stagirite's speculations. Plato moved the inner man, Aristotle only affected the outward conduct of social and religious conventionalities. This created a marked distinction between the two rival Grecian systems. There were, as it may naturally be supposed, some spirits of a more mild and timid character, who sought to reconcile both parties, by some compromising or qualifying views of philosophy, but these were few in number and insignificant in influence. The fact was, that nothing but decision and zeal had any charms; and every disputant was considered under a religious and social obligation to range himself on one side or on the other, and contend for his party with all the ardour and vehemence of which he was susceptible. This was the only line of conduct which gave an earnest of sincerity.

WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX. 1120 A. D.

This *Venerable Doctor*, as he was called, was a pupil of Roscellinus, but differed from his master about universal ideas. These he considered had a positive existence, independent of all forms of language. There was something permanent and real in such words as goodness, life, beauty, existence; they expressed the essence of things which existed beyond the mind which perceived them.

William de Champeaux founded the Abbey of St. Victor, and is considered the first dialectician who delivered a series of formal lectures on the Scholastic philosophy. His method of instruction

and his eloquence were unrivalled. We have the testimony of Abelard on this point, who says, "I preferred the armour of dialectic warfare to all other modes of philosophy; for it I quitted the military life, choosing rather the conflicts of disputation than the trophies of real battle. With this view, emulating the Peripatetic fame, and disputing as I went, I passed through various provinces, wherever I understood that the study was zealously pursued. At length I reached Paris, which was then the great theatre of the art, where William of Champeaux taught, whom I chose for my preceptor."\*

It would appear that the opinions of William underwent a great change in his latter years; that, in fact, he renounced his creed as a Realist, which had earned both for himself and his school such a wide-spread reputation. Abelard visited him in the latter period of his career, and remarks, "Again I attended his school to hear his lecture on the art of rhetoric; but where, in our several contests, I so pressed him on his favourite doctrine of *universals*, that he gave up the point, renounced his former opinion, and hence lost all the fame which he had acquired."

William of Champeaux has been accused, in modern times, of entertaining opinions precisely the same as those promulgated by Spinoza. Upon the authority of Abelard, his pupil, William is said to have maintained "The sameness of universals, which asserts that the same thing exists essentially and wholly in every one of its individuals, among

\* Abelard's Epis. 1. p. 5.

which there is no difference as to essence, but only a variety arising from a number of accidents.”\*

ABELARD. 1142 A.D.

This distinguished man, famous for his learning and misfortunes, cultivated the science of the human mind with great assiduity and success. But his writings on this branch of knowledge are as yet confined to MSS. in public libraries, on the Continent of Europe. A French author, some time ago, promised the *logic* of Abelard, but the literary world has not yet been favoured with the publication. In consequence of these circumstances, our remarks on this eminent Schoolman must be very brief, and confined principally to those observations which his contemporaries and others have made on his peculiar views on the nature of the human mind, and its various faculties and powers.

John of Salisbury says, “That Abelard and his disciples looked upon the proposition, that we can affirm one thing from another thing, as a great absurdity; though this absurdity was backed with the authority of Aristotle.”

Abelard, as is well known, was a most zealous Nominalist, and never for a moment showed the slightest symptoms of any thing like compromise of or doubt in his creed. He seems to have set out in very early life with this theory, and to have fought for it a fierce battle through his rather eventful life. His opinions had unquestionably a

\* Abelard's *Epis.* 1. p. 5.



powerful influence over Scholastic discussions for many centuries after his death.

An eminent French writer, M. Cousin, has recently published a volume on the merits of Abelard and his writings. The reader will find there an ample notice of the MSS. attributed to Abelard, which are still unpublished in the libraries of France. On his general merits as a philosopher, M. Cousin makes the following remarks.

“Tel fut Pierre Abélard, il est avec Saint Bernard dans l’ordre intellectuel le plus grand personnage du 12<sup>me</sup> siècle. Comme Saint Bernard représente l’esprit conservateur, et l’orthodoxie chrétienne dans son admirable bon sens, sa profondeur sans subtilité, sa pathétique éloquence, mais aussi dans ses ombrages et dans ses limites parfois trop étroites, de même Abélard et son école représentent en quelque sorte le côté libéral et novateur du temps, avec ses promesses souvent trompeuses et mélange inévitable de bien et de mal, de raison et d’extravagance. Il exerça sur son siècle une sorte de prestige. De 1108 à 1140, il obtint dans l’enseignement des succès inouïs jusqu’alors, et qui, s’ils n’étaient attestés par irrécusables témoins, ressembleraient à des inventions fabuleuses.”\*

\* P. 302. According to the *Histoire Littéraire de France*, the following are a list of the undated manuscripts of Abelard in the public libraries in Europe.

In the King’s library at Paris,—Glossa Abælardi in Topica, No. 7493. —College of St. Victor, four works, namely, *Petri Peripatetici libri quatuor Categoriarum, sive super prædicamenta Aristotelis*; *Petri Peripatetici analiticorum liber primus et secundus*; *Idem, Liber Divisionum*; *Idem, Liber Definitionum*; In the Library of St. Michel: *Tractatus Abe-*

## ALMARIC.

This metaphysician and theologian taught at Paris and gained considerable notoriety by the boldness of his doctrines, and the zeal he displayed in their promulgation. He agreed with Abelard as to Nominal theory, but endeavoured to combine it with some peculiar views from the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. Almaric has been accused of advocating a species of mystical pantheism. The following propositions he strenuously contended for, "That God is all in all; and all things are in God. The Creator is identical with his creatures."\*

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About this period, metaphysical learning was still assiduously cultivated, and schools or academies were established at Padua, Modena, Naples, Capua, Toulouse, Salamanca, Lyons, and Cologne, where it was taught with other branches of education. Plato had, at this epoch, the decided advantage over Aristotle among the Greeks; but the latter took the lead among the Romans. The Greeks were partial to all the speculations of the

*lardi de Intellectibus; Ejusdem Abelardi Physica Aristotelis.* In the same library will also be found, *Petri Abelardi sermo de generatione et corruptione*; and *De Intellectibus et Speculationibus*, which is the same as the second treatise, above mentioned.—In the Ambrosian Library, Milan, *Petri Abælardi in Porphyrii Universalia, in predicamenta, in Libros Perihamentes.*—In the Abbey of Pamies, in Savoy; *Petri Abælardi de Universalibus et Singularibus ad Olivarium filium suum tractatus.*

\* Du Boullay, *Histoire Univ. de Paris*, tome 3. p. 25. Chancellor Gerson, *De Concordia Metaph. et Logicæ*. p. 18.

latter Platonists, which they endeavoured to use for the illustration of some of their peculiar notions on theology. In the West, mental philosophy found munificent patrons in the Emperor Frederik II. and Alphonso X. king of Leon; the former of whom caused the works of Aristotle to be translated into Latin, with the laudable view of giving them a more extended circulation, and making them more generally topics of commentary and public discussion.

GILBERT, BISHOP OF POITIERS. 1154 A. D.

Gilbert was a distinguished ecclesiastic, and cultivated an intimate acquaintance with all the metaphysical works current in his day. The boldness of his speculative doctrines excited the attention and apprehensions of the church; but he defended himself with so much cleverness and subtlety, that he parried the blow of ecclesiastical censure which was levelled at him.\* He has left a work entitled "*The Six Principles*," which is a condensation of the Categories of Aristotle to that number.

PETER LOMBARD, BISHOP OF PARIS.

1164 A. D.

Peter, Bishop of Paris, was surnamed Lombard from the place of his birth. He was a most dis-

\* Some Historians affirm that he was condemned at a synod held at Rheims. See Du Pin and Brucker.

tinguished metaphysical theologian in his day. His celebrated book, "*The Master of Sentences*," excited great attention among the Clergy for a long period. This work is divided into four books, and these again into many sections. In the first, he treats of the *Trinity*, and the *attributes* of the Godhead; in the second, *creation* in general, including *the origin of angels*, the *formation and fall of man*, *free-will*, *grace*, *original sin*, and *actual transgression*; the third part is devoted to the mystery of the *incarnation*, to *faith*, *hope*, and *charity*, the gifts of the Spirit, and *the commandments of God*; and in the fourth, we find an account of the *sacraments*, the *resurrection*, the *last judgment*, and *the state of the righteous in heaven*.

This work, though apparently a complete treatise on doctrinal religion, abounds with many disquisitions of a metaphysic nature. Indeed, the distinguished dialectician had evidently made theological principles a sort of stepping stone for his subtile powers of argumentation. This is apparent, I think, from some of his topics of discussion; namely, whether *two persons* were capable of being made *incarnate*; whether our Saviour, as man, be a *person* or a *thing*; whether the human will, and the action which follows it, be *two different sins*; and why it is that the will, among all the other varied powers of the mind and soul, should be alone considered susceptible of sin?\*

\* See Du Pin, Eceles. Hist., and Brueker, tom. 3; and the Author's work, Sententiarum, lib. 4. Paris, 1539.

M. De Gerando makes the following remarks on this famous Scholastic. "Disciple d'Abélard, Pierre Lombard, l'Auteur du *Maître des Sentences*, fut plus heureux, et appartient au petit nombre de ceux qui échappèrent aux censures ecclésiastiques. Il fut le prince des Réalistes. Son livre obtint des applaudissemens universels, devint en quelque sorte classique pour l'âge suivant, et exerça un grand nombre de commentateurs et d'interprètes; c'est une sorte de collection de problèmes théologiques, dans l'exposition desquels Pierre présente tour à tour les argumens pour et contre, et donne ensuite la solution. Il mérite d'être noté, comme ayant contribué à déterminer la forme des discussions de l'école."\*

#### HUGH SAINT VICTOR. 1173 A. D.

The views of this Prelate on the nature of the human mind, may be embodied in the following observations.

Our organs of sensation apprise us of the nature of external objects; and the imagination refers to things beyond the confines of matter. The latter power expands itself every where; and moves, and acts, and creates, and wills, just as it pleases. It ranges over boundless space; and embraces all the works of the Almighty, meditates and contemplates upon them, and all heavenly phenomena. Reason perceives the substance, forms, differences, proper-

\* Hist. Comparée. Vol. 4. p. 409.

ties, and qualities of objects; it detaches the qualities from the object, not, however, in reality, but by the power of abstraction, and places them before the eye of the mind. The understanding is the faculty which perceives invisible and spiritual substances or things. Intelligence is that which immediately recognises the existence and attributes of the Deity; and which ascends to the source of all things, and to all that is immutably true. This intelligence is exclusively directed to the abstract principles of things; that is to say, those relating to the Deity, to substance, and ideas generally. Genius seeks after that which is unknown; and reason judges of these discoveries of genius. Memory gathers and preserves these judgments, and collects other fresh materials from new decisions. There is thus established a progressive system of ascension, from things inferior to things superior; the one depending upon the other. The understanding is a kind of image of intelligence; reason a sort of image of the understanding; and so on, throughout the whole extent of mental operations. The senses form the imagination; and this again gives birth to reason and sagacity. The divine presence enlightens reason, and thus produces intelligence; and this again gives rise to that which we term wisdom. There are two distinct movements, or it may be said, there are two distinct sexes, in the human spirit. One movement bears reason to heavenly things; this is true wisdom; the other movement draws it

downwards to earthly objects, and this constitutes worldly prudence and judgment.\*

Hugh St. Victor's opinions on mental subjects will be found in the early part of the 3rd Volume of his works. They will be read with great interest.

WILLIAM OF CONCHES. 1150 A.D.

This was an author of great talent and acuteness. He laboured, and with some success, to reconcile the doctrine of ideas with the *categories* and *forms* of Aristotle.

RICHARD, ABBE OF SAINT VICTOR. 1173 A.D.

The philosophical remarks and observations of this author, are far beyond the intelligence of his age. "Man," says he, "contends at once with ignorance, vice, and weakness of body. Wisdom enables him to triumph over the first, virtue the second, and the mechanical arts of life the third." Again, "Physical investigations mount from effects to causes, and likewise descend from causes to effects."

"There are three parts to instruction; experience, rational deductions, and faith. The first conducts to profane and worldly knowledge; the other two, to everlasting knowledge. Wisdom conducts to virtue, and virtue to wisdom; nevertheless, men are generally carried with more ardour towards wisdom than towards virtue. The latter requires sacrifices; a triumph over our passions, which

\* Eruditio Didascalica, Book 2nd. c. 6.

cannot, in ordinary cases, be obtained without a considerable effort."

"Philosophy is the living thought ; the identical reason ; the primitive intelligence of all things."

"The exercise of the bodily senses precedes the senses of the heart, in a knowledge of things ; for if the mind were not made previously acquainted with them through the influence of the organs of sensation, there could be no opportunity for it to exercise thought upon these objects. What are visible things, if they are not a kind of picture of invisible objects ? But intelligence is the power, by the aid of which we can perceive invisible objects."

The metaphysical opinions of this author will be found detailed, at considerable length, in his 3rd book, which is divided into 24 chapters.

#### JOHN OF SALISBURY. 1180 A.D.

This distinguished individual, a disciple of Abelard, flourished in the twelfth century. He had studied with great care the works of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Zeno, Epicurus, Chrysippus, and Aristotle ; and was profoundly skilled in all the leading questions relating to metaphysics, which had either been debated in the schools of antiquity, or were still matters of disputation in his own day.

In the controversies of his age he took an active part ; but his opinions seem to have undergone a change at different periods of his career. On the whole, however, he adhered, with some qualifications, to the doctrines of Aristotle on the nature of the human mind. The following is his exposition



of the notions of the Conceptionalists, a sect of metaphysicians which existed in his own times. "The senses," says he, "judge of material things; but intelligence is requisite to perceive spiritual or incorporeal things; and reason to form a judgment of them. The understanding considers real objects under various points of view; sometimes in an absolute manner, sometimes as a whole, sometimes as connected with other things with which they are not necessarily connected, and sometimes separated from that with which they may be combined. Though by analysis the appearance of things may be otherwise than their real qualities, this operation is not, nevertheless, a vain conception of the mind, for it opens the way to the most sagacious and useful investigations. Analysis is an instrument of philosophy; it sharpens reason; and distinguishes objects according to their true nature. If we separate the understanding from the faculty of abstraction, we shall remove from the arts the arsenal which contains their instruments. What the senses perceive, that is subject to forms, is primary and singular substance. We give the name of *secondary substance* to that which is necessary to the existence of objects, and to their susceptibility of being known by us. That which is *one* is always one. A *universal* is that which is common to many, by reason of the constitution of their nature. The notion of a universal is produced in the understanding when it perceives the conformity which nature has established amongst divers objects, as

to their forms, qualities, &c. Though qualities and relations cannot exist separately in the order of realities, they can be separately laid hold of by the mind; and this is the essential end or purpose of all true philosophy."

Professor Stewart has the following remarks respecting this distinguished individual. "Among the literary men of this period, (the twelfth century) none seems to have arisen to such an eminent superiority above his age in the liberality of his philosophical views, as John of Salisbury, the celebrated friend of Thomas à Becket. In his youth he had studied at Paris under Abelard and other eminent masters, and had applied himself, with distinguished ardour and success, to the subtile speculations which then occupied the Schools. After a long absence, when his mind was enlarged by more liberal and useful pursuits, and by an extensive intercourse with the world, he had the curiosity to revisit the scene of his early studies, and to compare his own acquisitions with those of his old companions."\*

ANSELME of LAON, (1117); ROBERT PELLEYN, † (1154); HUGH of Amiens, (1164); PETER of Poitiers, (1205); and HILDEBERT of Tours, (1134); are authors more or less connected with scholastic speculations; and to those who wish to penetrate deeply into the subject, they will afford instruction.

\* Elements, vol. 1. p. 554. † See note D. at the end of this Volume.

## ALAIN OF THE ISLES. 1209 A. D.

This was a very subtle and acute reasoner. There is a poem entitled *Anti-Glandian*, from his pen. It is full of the speculative theories of the Alexandrian school.

## DAVID DE DINANT. 1220 A. D.

This was a very bold, and considered a somewhat heretical, Scholastic. He was an enthusiastic admirer of Aristotle, and brought his authority to bear upon almost every abstract question as to the mind and its faculties and operations. He maintained that the Deity is the material principle of all things.\*

## ADELARD OF BATH. 1230 A. D.

This individual was a very spirited and zealous cultivator of the speculative philosophy of his own times. He travelled in Egypt, in Asia Minor, and among the Moors in Spain, and experienced great hardships and privations. His great aim in his intellectual labours was to reconcile the Peripatetic doctrines with those of Plato.† Adelard is the author of an ingenious allegory which represents a youth devoted to the study of philosophy, holding a discussion with another person, a decided enemy to all knowledge, and who endeavours to dissuade him from pursuing his studies, by arguments attempting to show the superiority of worldly and

\* See Note E. at the end of the Volume.

† See Jourdain, *Recherches Critiques sur les Traductions d'Aristote* p. 285.

sensual pleasures, to those of an intellectual description. Adelard was certainly very instrumental in drawing the attention of the philosophers of his age, to the importance of the Arabian metaphysics, of which he entertained a lofty idea.

ALEXANDER DE HALLES. 1245 A. D.

This scholastic writer was called the *Irrefragable Doctor*. He was the author of four books on metaphysics, one upon the soul ; and commentaries on Peter Lombard's book of *Sentences*.

WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE. 1249 A. D.

This is a well-known ecclesiastic. He was a singularly amiable man, and joined a profound erudition to a humble and pious spirit. His mental speculations were all under the complete control of a deep sense of religious truth ; and he made it a point to give no countenance to any doctrine which had the slightest appearance of running counter to the express and implied doctrines of the Christian faith.

VINCENT DE BEAUVAIS. 1264 A. D.

This was a learned ecclesiastic, who received great patronage from the king of France. Vincent was the author of a kind of General Summary of Knowledge, entitled, *Speculum Doctrinale, Historiale, Naturale, et Morale*, which shows that he was deeply versed in the mental philosophy of the day.

This *Mirror* contains many very curious matters connected with physical science generally. The

metaphysical portion of it is also very interesting. Vineent decides every question on mind by making an appeal to Aristotle, whom he only knew, however, through the channel of the Arabian philosophy. He supports with much zeal the Realist theory. The three grand problems proposed by Porphyry, in his introduction to the Categories, relative to the certainty of general ideas, engrossed the whole of Vineent's attention. Before resolving them, he ascribes three different meanings to the word *being*; the one metaphysical, the second mathematical, and the third physical. On the first problem, after comparing the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on the point, he comes to the conclusion, that universals exist not only in the intellect, but in nature. The second problem he solves in accordance with universals relative to spiritual matters. The third problem he resolves in the following fashion. "There are two causes which bring the universal within the sphere of being; the one material, which resides in the individual; the other efficient, which resides in the understanding. Under the first relation the universal is *one* in many; in the second it is *one* simply as unity. Thus we are able to reconcile the conflicting opinions of Plato and Aristotle."\*

ROBERT OF LINCOLN. 1265 A.D.

This author taught mental philosophy with considerable success both at Paris and Oxford. He

\* Speculum Doctrinale, lib. 3. chap. 7.

wrote a commentary on the works of Aristotle, in which he attempted to reconcile his metaphysics with the general current of theological doctrines.

WILLIAM, BISHOP OF PARIS. 1270 A.D.

This erudite theologian was profoundly skilled in metaphysical learning of all kinds. He had studied, with great care, most of the Arabian and Jewish writings on the human mind ; and the works of Avicenna, Alfarabi, Algazel, Averroes, and Avicbron, were quite familiar to him. Aristotle, Plato, and all the other distinguished Grecian metaphysicians, were his constant companions in study.

This philosopher distinguished six different acceptations of the word *truth*. First, The fidelity of the sign should express the thing designated. Second, Reality opposed to apparent deception. Third, The purity of a substance, as when we call good silver that which is exempt from all adulteration. Fourth, The essence of things, such as is expressed by the definition. Fifth, The existence of the Creator. Sixth, Simple logical truth, which relates to the harmony between the terms and the proposition.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 1274 A. D.

This writer on the human mind studied, in his younger years, at Naples, but finished his academical instruction at Cologne, under Albert the Great.

St. Thomas entered very minutely into the long disputed question of the precise origin of our knowledge. He maintains that the soul receives and preserves images of objects, but that these images are not received through the external senses. Bodies are made known to us by an immaterial, necessary, and universal intelligence. On the question, what portion of our knowledge is derived from the senses, he enters largely into the opinions of the sages of antiquity on the point; opposes Democritus and Plato; and affirms that Aristotle has chosen the happy medium between two opposite views. He affirms that truth cannot be entirely obtained by the senses; intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible knowledge; not as its *complete and absolute cause*, but as the *substance of its cause*. The understanding, from the long time it is connected with the body, can form conceptions only through the agency of sensible images; for every thing we are acquainted with, in our present state of being, is known from the comparison of sensible things. Abstraction is formed in this manner. Intelligent images or *species*, received into the understanding, resemble objects, but are not the objects themselves.

St. Thomas draws the line between particulars and generals by affirming that the former are perceived only by the senses, and the latter by the power of intelligence.\*

\* "Sensus non est cognoscitivus nisi singularium. . . . intellectus autem est cognoscitivus universalium."—(Summa contra Gent. chap. 67.)

Thomas Aquinas held the opinion that man, by virtue of his own native mental energies, was able to raise himself to a knowledge of the principles of natural law. He says, "Quod notum est Dei, fuit in sapientibus gentilium quantum ad aliquid vera Dei cognitio; quia quod notum est Dei, id est, quod cognoscibile est de Deo ab homine per rationem, manifestum est illis. Sic ergo Deus illis manifestavit, vel interius infundendo lumen, vel exterius proponendo visibiles creaturas, in quibus, sicut in quodam libro, Dei cognitio legeretur..... Inter præcepta Decalogi non computantur duo genera præceptorum, illa scilicet quæ sunt prima et communia, quorum non oportet aliquam editionem esse, nisi quod sunt scripta in ratione naturali quasi per se nota: sicut quod homo nulli debet malfacere, et alia hujusmodi."

In the Doctor's treatise *De Veritate*, he mentions the *rationes seminales*, which constitute the principles of intelligence, and are not derived in any manner from the senses. He observes, "Rationis lumen, quo principia.....sunt nobis nota, est nobis à Deo inditum quasi quædam similitudo increatæ veritatis in nobis resultantis; unde, cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius hominis, constat, quod Deus est qui interius etiam principaliter sanat..... Certitudinem scientiæ, ut dictum est, habet aliquis a solo Deo, qui nobis lumen rationis indidit, per quod principia cognoscimus, ex quibus oritur scientiæ certitudo; et tamen scientia ab homine quo-

\* De Veritate, quæst. 11. art. 4.



dammodo causatur, ut dictum est, nempe sicut causatur sanitas a medico.”\*

On the abstract nature of truth, Aquinas maintains that truth exists because the Deity exists, and reciprocally, that the Deity exists because truth exists.\*

St. Thomas was of opinion that we could not prove the existence of a Deity from arguments *à priori*; but that we might do so from arguments *à posteriori*. The latter arguments were, in his opinion, quite conclusive for the establishment of this great and important truth.

The Deity, he says, is in all things as their cause, but not in their form or essence.

His work, entitled *Summa Theologiæ*, is considered the most valuable book which appeared in the middle ages. It is full of sound metaphysical thoughts and reflections; and contains besides, a body of divinity, and moral and political principles and reflections, well entitled to the attentive consideration of students of those separate departments of human knowledge.

It is impossible, from the limited space allotted to the consideration of the Scholastic philosophy, in this work, for us to give any thing like a full abstract of all the metaphysical questions treated

\* “Etiam qui negat veritatem esse concedit veritatem esse: si enim veritas non est, verum est veritatem non esse; sed; enim Deus est ipsa veritas; ergo, veritatem esse verum est. Propositio Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia prædicatum est idem cum subjecto; sed pro eo qui non scit quid est Deus, per se nota non est, sed indiget demonstrari.”—(*De Veritate*.)

of in this *Summa Theologiæ*, and in the other treatises of this learned Doctor. His whole works extend to *twenty-three* volumes folio. All we can do, therefore, is barely to enumerate the questions he discusses on the nature of mind, and leave the reader to fill up the outline himself.

The following observations respecting Aquinas, are from the *Edinburgh Review*, and are, on the whole, well entitled to the reader's attention.

“The most conspicuous Schoolman of this second period was Aquinas, whose *Secunda Secundæ* continued for three hundred years to be the ethical code of Christendom. No work of a private man, probably, ever had so many commentators as this once famous treatise. *Suarez*, the last celebrated person among them, was a contemporary of Lord Bacon. The first reformers of learning distinguished it by honorable commendations from the other productions of the Schools. Erasmus considered Aquinas as superior in genius to any man since his time; and Vives owns him to be the soundest writer among the Schoolmen. However the *Secunda* might be disgraced by the manual of Henry VIII., it is a matter of some interest to see the book which was the first moral instructor of Sir Thomas More. Fontenelle, a Cartesian, exempt from any prejudice in favour of a Schoolman or a Saint, says that, ‘in another age, Aquinas might have become a Descartes.’ To this moral treatise Leibnitz chiefly alludes in the just observation frequently repeated by him, that ‘There was gold in the impure mass of Scho-

lastic philosophy, and that Grotius had discovered it.' The same great philosopher, indeed, often confessed his own obligations to the Schoolmen, and the value of some part of their works, at the moment when such an avowal required most courage, when their authority had been just entirely abolished, and before the dread of its restoration was extinguished. Under the shelter of this authority, we may venture to own that we have read this work in the nineteenth century with pleasure and advantage. Whatever may be thought of his theological morals, it is certain, that no moralist has stated the nature and grounds of all the common duties of mankind with more fulness and perspicuity. The number and refinement of the practical observations in this work, which have been repeated by modern philosophers, have sometimes given rise to suspicion of plagiarism against these last, instead of the much more reasonable inference that the superior understanding of this ingenuous recluse had anticipated remarks which, without any knowledge of his writings, were naturally presented to succeeding writers by their observations of human nature in a more civilized age!

“To find the exact agreement of such a work as that of Aquinas with the moral precepts of our own age, has some tendency to heighten our reverence for the rule of life which thus preserves its unchangeable simplicity, amidst the fluctuations of opinion, under the most unlike and repugnant modes of thinking, and in periods of the most sin-

gular, or if it so pleases the reader, of the most perverted speculation.”\*

ST. BONAVENTURE. 1277 A. D.

This author, called the Seraphic Doctor, was a public teacher of philosophy in Tuscany, and cultivated the science of the human mind with great assiduity and success. According to his views, there are four modes of mental illumination. The first is external, and teaches the mechanical arts of life; the second is internal, and shows the natural forms, and sensible truths of things; the third is also internal, and manifests intellectual and philosophical truths; and the fourth teaches divine things. All is derived from one and the same primitive light, celestial intelligence. The arts are a representation of the grand work by which the Creator has given life and being to his creatures. The perceptions of sense operate as a kind of medium to certain *sensible species*, which detach themselves from objects, and became united to the organs and faculty of feeling.

There is a truth in language, a truth in things, and a truth in manners. Metaphysics embrace a knowledge of all these three; and reduce them to the principle from which they are derived, according to ideal types; that is to say, to God who is at once the principle, the end, and the copy.

The following passages will furnish the reader

\* Vol. 27; see also Dr. Hampden's Life of Thomas Aquinas, in the Encyclopædia Metropolitana.

with a general idea of the author's ontological principles.

“Intellectum.....propositionum tunc intellectus noster dicitur veraciter comprehendere, cum certitudinaliter scit illas veras esse, et hoc scire est scire, quoniam ille non potest falli in illa comprehensione. Scit enim quod veritas illa non potest aliter se habere. Scit igitur veritatem illam esse incommutabilem. Sed cum ipsa mens nostra sit commutabilis, illam sic incommutabiliter relucen-tem non potest videre, nisi per aliquam aliam lucem omnino incommutabiliter radiantem, quam impossibile est esse creaturam mutabilem. Scit igitur in illa luce quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, quæ est lux vera et Verbum in principio apud Deum. Intellectum autem illationis tunc veraciter percipit noster intellectus, quando videt quod conclusio necessario sequitur ex præmissis, quod non solum videt in terminis necessariis, verum etiam in contingentibus, ut, si homo currit, homo movetur.....Hujusmodi igitur illationis necessitas non venit ab existentia rei in materia, quia est contingens, nec ab existentia rei in anima, quia tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re. Venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte æterna, secundum quam res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem, ad illius æternæ artis repræsentationem. Omnis igitur, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione (cap. 39), vere ratiocinantis lumen accenditur ab illa veritate.”\*

\* Itin. ment. in Deum, Cap. 3. Op. tom. 7. p. 130 Moguntiaë 1609.

Nisi.....cognoscatur quid est ens per se, non potest plene sciri definitio alicujus specialis substantiæ. Nec ens per se cognosci potest, nisi cognoscatur cum suis conditionibus quæ sunt unum, verum, bonum. Ens autem cum possit cogitari ut diminutum et ut completum, ut imperfectum et ut perfectum, ut ens in potentia et ut ens in actu, ut ens secundum quid et ut ens simpliciter, ut ensin parte et ut ens totaliter, ut ens transiens et ut ens manens, ut ens per illud et ut ens per se, ut ens permixtum et ut ens purum, ut ens dependens et ut ens absolutum, ut ens posterius et ut ens prius, ut ens mutabile et ut ens immutabile, ut ens simplex et ut ens compositum: cum privationes et defectus nullatenus possint cognosci nisi per positiones, non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicujus entium creatorum, nisi inveniatur ab intellectu entis purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi et absoluti: quod est simpliciter ei æternum ens, in quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate. Quomodo autem sciret intellectus hoc esse ens defectivum et incompletum, si nullam haberet cognitionem entis absque omni defectu? et sic de aliis conditionibus prælibatis.”\*

Chancellor Gerson was a most enthusiastic admirer of St. Bonaventure, and adopts his sentiments and opinions. “*Intelligentia simplex est vis animæ cognitiva, suscipiens immediate a Deo naturalem quamdam lucem, in qua et per quam principia prima cognoscuntur esse vera et certis-*

\* S. Bonav. Op. tom. 7. p. 130.

sima, terminis apprehensis. Principia hujusmodi nominantur aliquando dignitates, aliquando communes animi conceptiones, aliquando regulæ primæ incommutabiles et impossibiles aliter se habere. ....Qualis vero sit illa lux naturalis, dici potest probabiliter, aut quod est aliqua dispositio connaturalis et concreta animæ, quam aliqui vocare videntur habitum principiorum; vel probabilius, quod est ipsamet animæ existens lux quædam intellectualis naturæ, derivata ab infinita luce primæ intelligentiæ, quæ Deus est, de quo Joannes; *Erat lux vera quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*”\*

In the 4th volume of the works of St. Bonaventure, there are a great number of valuable remarks on the abstract nature of Deity; on His threefold existence; on His creative power; the unity and efficiency of His will; and on all those collateral questions which form the staple commodity of theological metaphysics. The same volume is also devoted to an examination of man, both intellectually and physically. The discussions are exceedingly interesting and conducted with singular acuteness and ability.

St. Bonaventure's strictures on Aristotle's metaphysical system, are very voluminous, and curious withal. The three principal chapters are, that on the *mind*, the book on metaphysics, and that on the moral faculty. The author's *Compendium Theologicæ Veritatis* contains a great deal of that kind of speculation peculiar to the Schools. The 52nd

\* De Myste. Theol. Antverpiæ 1706.

chapter, *On consciousness* and *On the immortality of the soul*, are well entitled to a careful perusal.

ALBERT THE GREAT. 1280 A. D.

Albert was one of the most eminent metaphysical and general philosophers of his age. He studied at Pavia, and afterwards removed to Paris, where he taught the doctrines of Aristotle with great élat. After spending some years here, he removed to Cologne, where he died in the eighty-seventh year of his age, covered with honour and renown.

Albert agreed with Aristotle in the opinion that the soul of man was composed of three distinct parts; namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. He defined this distinction as the forms of organic bodies, and the principle of life.

On the faculties of the mind, Albert maintained that the organs of sensation have a passive power. Apprehension, which belongs to them, seizes hold of the forms of objects, not by virtue of the existence which it derives from these organs, but by the assistance of a certain image, under which is shadowed forth some sensible or intelligible notion. This apprehension has four degrees: First, the inferior degree, consisting of an abstract form of matter, but not of its power and qualities: this inferior degree belongs to the external senses. The second consists in an abstract general conception of matter, without separating it from its properties and qualities: this degree belongs to imagination. The



third is that by which we perceive certain moral qualities and intentions, which the senses do not impress upon us directly, but which qualities and intentions are revealed to us through the assistance of the organs of sensation: this degree of apprehension is allied to true knowledge, and presupposes a certain degree of appreciation and comparison of objects. The fourth species of apprehension is the most elevated and distinguished. It seizes the essential modes or properties of things, strips them of their ordinary qualities, and separates them from their specious characteristics, and conducts us safely to the formation of universal ideas. This is properly the understanding. This power, denominated understanding, was considered by Albert as filling the same situation in our mental economy that our common organs of sensation do in reference to external objects. It is the limit, or central point to which all the images of sensation diverge, and also the divers relations of suitability and unsuitability of objects. It is from hence that emerge all our abstract notions respecting divine things, and also mathematic ideas of figure, number, and quantity. These various abstractions reside in the understanding, under three different modes; first, that of every-day science; secondly, that of permanent and habitual knowledge, without relation to present time or circumstances; and thirdly, knowledge of a fleeting and transitory nature.

Some very curious and ingenious speculations will be found in the 2nd Traet, book 2nd, of the works of Albert, relative to cause and effect. It

is clear from the general scope of his reasoning, particularly upon efficient and final causes, that he had anticipated some recent speculations on the same subject. His definition of what is commonly meant by *fate*, is very excellent, and much to the purpose.

In book 3rd, *De Anima*, the reader will find an interesting chapter, entitled *De parte rationali*. Albert goes into a lengthy discussion on the opinions which many of the Greek philosophers entertained on the nature of the human mind; and also examines very minutely some of the mental theories of the Arabians, and the most distinguished Fathers of the Church. The whole chapter is interesting.

The opinions of Albert on the metaphysics of the Epicurean and Stoical schools are very interesting, and display an intimate acquaintance with them. His views on the nature and offices of the senses, and the phenomena of sensation generally, are detailed in the 3rd volume of his works.

#### ÆGIDIUS DE COLONNA. 1300 A. D.

This metaphysician made truth to consist in the relations between external objects and the understanding. He divided truth into three kinds, logical truth, real truth, and absolute truth. In the first, the understanding produces the object; in the second, the object produces the idea; in the third, a more lofty principle, the Deity himself, produces at once both the idea and object.

This writer distinguished two kinds of existence;

absolute existence and derivative existenee. The first is infinite, and subsists by virtue of its own nature; the second depends upon the first, and is finite and conditional. Matter, according to his notion, is a simple power or substance, in which there is nothing active.

#### RICHARD DE MIDDLETON. 1300 A. D.

This philosopher, called the *solid* Doctor, belonged to Oxford, where he publicly taught philosophy for many years, and where he died in the year 1300.

He maintained in opposition to the Thomists, that there was a radical and constitutional difference between human souls. He also says, "The human soul is a certain kind of expansion, different however from the expansion of bodies, though it has some relation to it. The former is present in every part of the human body, as God is in every part of space."

#### DUNS SCOTUS. 1308 A. D.

This eminent individual was one of the most learned and famous amongst the Scholastic philosophers. England, Scotland, and Ireland have each disputed the honour of giving him birth. He studied at Paris; attended the lectures of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas; and died in 1308. He was called, by way of eminence, the *subtilc Doctor*.

Duns Scotus distinguished two kinds of ideas; sensible ideas, and absolute or necessary ones. The first class of notions can never be certain or infallible; 1st, because the external world, from which they are immediately derived, is perpetually changing its aspect; and 2nd, because the human mind itself does also change its forms. Hence it is clear that immutable science cannot rest upon what is perceived by the senses, even though these sensual notions are purified by passing through the mind.\* All science must then rest upon real and absolute ideas. Relatively to these necessary truths, sensation is the *occasion* of them, but not their *cause*; they rest upon the inherent essence which forms them.

WILLIAM OCCAM. 1347 A. D.

This was a most distinguished scholastic metaphysician. He was born at Ockham, in the county of Kent, and studied at Merton College, Oxford, under the celebrated Duns Scotus, and obtained the name of the *invincible Doctor*. He wrote against Pope John XXII., whom he denounced as an incorrigible heretic; and advocated the cause of Pope Nicholas V., who had been appointed by the Emperor of Bavaria. It is related of Occam that he told that Emperor, that "if he would defend him with his sword, he would defend him (the Emperor) with his pen." Tennemann remarks that this divine died persecuted, but not conquered,

at the Court of Bavaria, where he had been obliged to seek shelter from his numerous and implacable enemies.

Occam adopted the theory of the Nominalists, and maintained that general ideas could not have an existence independent of external things, and of the Deity. In external things there can be no general ideas; for in this case, they must either be the whole, or only a part of these things. In reference to the Deity these things do not constitute the independent essence of the Divinity; but are simple objects of knowledge. In the mind of man there is nothing else. "Every substance is numerically one and singular; it is itself and no other. It is not the same with a universal. If the universal were a thing existing in a number of individual or particular things, it would then possess a distinct and independent existence, apart from these particular things; for every thing which is superior to another thing, must, according to the established laws of God, be independent of that thing; a consequence which leads to gross absurdity, in reference to universal notions."\*

Occam attacked the doctrine of *sensible or intelligible species*, by contending that there were only two orders of things, material and spiritual; and that the mind obtained a knowledge of both by a direct communication, without the aid of any intermediate agency or instrument whatever.

Occam maintained that what constituted the

\* Logica Occami, Chap. 14. 15. 25. 41.

distinction between *right* and *wrong* in morals, depended upon the *will* of God.

This Scholastic writer particularly dwells upon the importance of attending to the influence which language exercises over our thoughts; because, in his opinion, words form the real intermediate instruments of thought and reasoning, between the mind itself and external things.

The commentators and critics of Oeeam have differed as to the precise nature of his own opinions, on the controversy between the Realists and Nominalists. He is charged with arguing in the most decided tone against the Realists; stating the ease of the Nominalists, and then refraining from expressing his own opinions upon either side of the controversy. What these really were, he leaves for the reader to conjecture. The general opinion, however, seems to be, that he could not go the whole length with the Nominalists' theory; and that he was, in substance, what is termed a *Conceptualist*.

JOHN CHARLIER DE GERSON. 1363 A. D.

This amiable and distinguished man was born at Gerson in Champagne, in 1363. He filled the important and honourable office of Chancellor of the University of Paris; but strange to say, he voluntarily resigned this situation, formally renounced all connexion with learning and science, and retired to the city of Lyons, for the purpose of teaching a school of poor and destitute children.

He wrote and published a work there, entitled, *The Art of Conducting little Children to God*. This singular movement in his life, has induced some French philosophers to call him the *Fénélon* of his age.

He seems, however, to have entertained two other favourite objects, in his retirement from the seat of learning and the active bustle of Parisian life; the endeavour to reconcile the differences between the Realists and Nominalists, in a satisfactory and philosophical manner; and to promulgate a system of mystical theology, which seems to have long occupied his mind. On both of these projects we shall hazard a few remarks.

Gerson had long seen that there was great confusion existing between theology and philosophy, and metaphysics and logic; and that the fierce controversy between the Realists and Nominalists owed its origin to this heterogeneous mixture of principles and rules of reasoning. He set himself, therefore, to correct, if he possibly could, this serious abuse. In reference to modes of philosophising, he laid it down as a principle or maxim, that "Logic was not of itself a science, but only the path which conducted to science." He thought that the pivot on which the whole contention of the schools moved, arose from the notion which was invariably attached to the general term *being*, as the point of contact between the thinking principle and an external universe; a notion which had been buried under a load of obscurity by imaginary abstractions and refined verbal distinctions. He defines two

distinct modes of *being*, “The one is absolute *being* or *existence*, arising from the nature of the thing itself; the other consists in its representative character as an object of the understanding. *Being*, under the latter point of view, is quite a different thing from what it is under the former. This distinction will be found to be the key for the pacification of the Realists and Nominalists, if it can be clearly and steadily seized and kept in view by the mind. Real *being* or *existence* cannot constitute a science, when considered in its objective character, in relation to positive or absolute reality; it does not change its real existence to agree with modifications arising out of this objective character. Such is the error of the Realists, who wish to establish metaphysics upon realities, without taking into account the operations of the understanding. On the other hand, the Nominalists envelop themselves too frequently with numerous verbal distinctions, which have little or no meaning.”\*

How far these critical observations were calculated to reconcile the conflicting and opposite opinions of the scholastic combatants, the reader must judge for himself. That they were well intentioned there can be no doubt; but that they were calculated to effect the grand object aimed at, will probably still remain one of those questions of Sir Roger de Coverley, where “much might be said on both sides.”

The theological mysticism of Gerson is expounded

\* De Concordia Metaph. et Logic. 20.



in his work, *Theologia Mystica*. According to his notions, unfolded in this publication, philosophy in general leads the mind regularly, but by slow degrees, and by a chain of arguments also, to the Deity; whether these arguments be derived from the magnificent and stupendous works of nature, or from man himself. But there is a shorter route to this knowledge of the Divinity, and it is by mystical theology. This is not an abstract science, it is an experimental science; only it is not founded upon physical experiment, nor argumentative experience, but upon personal and individual experience; to be, in fact, conscious of certain sentiments, and of the phenomena which are incontestably in the human mind. It is founded upon the inward feelings and emotions which the religious soul experiences. These feelings and emotions are invested with a real existence, and conduce to the formation of a real system. This system can appear erroneous only to those who have not sufficiently tested the facts. True science is, then, religious sentiment, or the immediate intuition of God upon the soul. Whoever possesses this intuition, is in the possession of true science.\*

Gerson maintains that mystic theology is far superior to the speculative theology of the Schools. The following are the reasons for this opinion.

\* *Theologia mystica innititur ad sui doctrinam experientis habitis intra, in cordibus animarum devotarum; hæc autem experientia nequit ad cognitionem immediatam vel intuitionem deduci illorum qui talium inexperti sunt.*

First, Mystic theology joins sentiment to intelligence ; it elevates a man above himself; it animates and enlivens him ; it confers an experimental knowledge upon him ; not an abstract knowledge, but an experimental knowledge, which flows from no less a source than from the manifestations of the Deity himself to man. Second, For a man to acquire this interesting species of knowledge, it is not necessary he should be a learned man, it is only sufficient that he be clothed with the attributes of human nature. Third, This mystic theology can arrive at the highest degree of perfection without literature, whilst speculative theology cannot be perfect unless it arrives, by gradual steps, at the immediate intuition of the Deity, even to the knowledge of the sovereign good ; that is to say, without a relation more or less intimate with mystic theology. This theology, since it leads directly to God, can pass by the sciences of the Schools ; but speculative theology cannot arrive at the Deity, without necessarily passing through the forms of mysticism. Fourth, Mystic theology alone confers peace and happiness upon man. Science is a sterile exercise, by which man thinks he is gradually approaching the Divinity, whilst he is only, in many cases, deceiving himself. On the other hand, mystic religion is a salutary, real, and practical exercise, which leads the soul infallibly to God, and consequently can never depart from perfect and absolute reality. In fine, the end of mysticism is exaltation ; not of the imagination, nor of intelligence alone, but of

the whole soul ; an exaltation which terminates in a complete identification with the Deity himself.\*

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The Scholastic controversy continued a languishing existence for some time after this period, in France and Germany. But after the death of Gerson it soon became extinct. In the year 1473, Louis XI. of France, at the suggestion of his confessor, the bishop of Avanches, issued a severe decree against the doctrines of the Nominalists, and ordered all their writings to be seized and placed in some place of security, that the people might no longer have access to them. But this decree was mitigated the following year, and some of the writings of this obnoxious sect were released from their imprisonment, and allowed to circulate as heretofore among the learned. Further concessions were afterwards granted ; and in the year 1481,

\* Præstat theologia mystica speculativæ : 1<sup>o</sup> quod affectum pingat intelligentiæ nomenque elevet supra se ipsum, ubi incalescit ex cognitione experimentalis illabentis in se Dei ; 2<sup>o</sup> quod acquiri possit a quovis homine probo etiam idiota ; 3<sup>o</sup> quod bene possit esse perfecta in genere suo sine omni litteratura, minime vero scientifica perfecta esse queat sine mystica ; 4<sup>o</sup> quod mystica etiam se sola quietat et beatificat non vero sola cognitiva ; quod scilicet cognitio magis fatigat rem cognitam sibi assimilare, quam quod ipsa supra se exeat et in rem eat, unde etiam Deum haud attingit prout est, sed tantum prout cognoscitur à nobis . . . Mystica finis supremus est raptus non imaginationis aut rationis, sed mentis, qui quidem raptus etiam excessus mentis dicitur, ita ut mens tota in Deo quem unice amat absorpta quiescat eique intime unita inhaerens unus cum ipso spiritus fiat per perfectam voluntatis conformitatem. — See Works, 3 vols. folio. Basil, 1488.

full liberty was conferred upon all Nominalists, and they were forthwith reinstated in all their former power and authority in the various universities and seats of learning in the kingdom.

We have now brought to a close the scholastic warfare, which raged, with more or less violence, for nearly five hundred years. It is certainly one of the most remarkable events in the history of human speculation. Feeble and faint on its first appearance, it waxed in strength and firmness as time and favourable circumstances aided its growth, until it seized upon the minds of whole nations, and exercised the most despotic authority over every other branch of knowledge. No man could be heard but on particular and universal ideas. If he wandered into the region of natural philosophy, and picked up a few scattered facts, he was accused of magic or blasphemy. The Church was down upon him with all its terrific censures and excommunications; and henceforth he became a marked or ruined man. All honours, emoluments, and fame centered in scholastic learning. The dialectician, if he were eloquent or subtile, and particularly if he could wield the pen of a ready writer, had a full command over all this world's goods, and his name would be handed down to admiring ages as the "Angelic," the "Redoubtable," or the "Invincible" Doctor. Scores of thousands of pupils congregated from all parts of Europe to receive the benefits from the public instructions of such a fortunate disputant, and to equip themselves with that logical armour which would enable them to

join, with honour and efficiency, in the general speculative conflict.

But the singularity of the contest did not end here. It settled or decided nothing. It left the questions which it undertook to solve just where it found them. After all the talent, and learning, and subtlety, and zeal, which had been brought to bear for centuries on the questions at issue, not a single step had been gained towards their solution. The fervour and enthusiasm of the Crusaders did effect their object in taking possession of the Holy Land, and retaining it for a number of years; but the Scholastic Crusaders were not by any means so fortunate. They could carry the citadel neither by assault nor manœuvre. The question of particular and universal ideas was too subtle for all their skill and learning. We ought not, however, to blame them for not doing what could not be accomplished. The questions are intrinsically full of interest. Important conclusions depend upon them; yet at this very hour they are still in the same position as when the first Schoolmen took them up. Has any modern metaphysician cleared up the mystery of universals? Has any one demonstrated, or offered probable proof of, what they are, what offices they perform in the intellectual economy, and in what relations they stand as to the use of language? We venture to say that no intelligent and candid metaphysician will answer in the affirmative. True it is, we find many writers ranging themselves on this and on that side of the controversy; but they do so, not from having

fully convinced themselves of the abstract truth of their respective positions, but from one side of the dispute being more in unison with their other important opinions, than its opposite. There are Nominalists and Realists at the present day; but their differences are held in abeyance by other questions which have obtained the ascendancy. No man in modern times laboured more sincerely and zealously to establish the Nominal theory, than the late Professor Stewart, and yet he could not succeed, even to his own satisfaction. Hear his own words; they certainly do not constitute the language of victory.

“ Still, however, it may be argued, that, although in such cases there should be *no object of thought* in the mind, there must exist *something* or other *to which its attention is directed*. To this difficulty I have no answer to make, but by repeating the fact which I have already endeavoured to establish; that there are only two ways in which we can possibly speculate about classes of objects; the one by means of a word or generic term; the other, by means of one particular individual of the class which we consider as the representative of the rest; and that these two methods of carrying on our general speculations are at bottom so much the same, as to authorise us to lay down as a principle, that, without the use of signs, all our thoughts must have related to individuals. When we reason, therefore, concerning classes or genera, the objects of our attention are merely signs; or if, in any instance, the generic word should recal some indivi-

dual, this circumstance is to be regarded only as a consequence of an accidental association, which has rather a tendency to disturb, than to assist us in our reasoning.”\*

\* *Philosophy of the Mind*, Vol. 1. p. 101.

## CHAPTER II.

REFLECTIONS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE  
IN ALL SPECULATIONS ON THE NATURE AND  
OPERATIONS OF MIND, FROM A CONSIDERATION  
OF SCHOLASTIC DISPUTATION.

THERE are few, I believe, who have had their attention awakened to the nature of man, who have not viewed with curiosity and interest the importance of language. Its origin, and the offices it performs in the intellectual economy, are still wrapped in comparative obscurity. Modern philosophers have entered on the consideration of the subject with great zeal and learning; they have met, however, with but indifferent success. There has been no lack of systems and theories, but they have all proved inadequate for the solution of the complicated phenomena involved in the origin and use of signs. One thing is quite certain, that without language, man's civilization could never have been accomplished. His powers and knowledge would have been confined within inconceivably narrow limits; and he would have appeared an object scarcely one degree above the beasts of the field.



In the general improvement and diffusion of knowledge which have taken place within the last century, language has not been neglected. In what are termed the *pure sciences*, the effects which have been the result of this increased attention to the nature and offices of language, have not been so marked as in other departments of human knowledge. In branches of speculation connected with the social and political duties and interests of mankind, and in polite and elegant literature, the attention recently paid to the principles of language, and the rules for the application of these principles, have had the happy effect of facilitating the acquisition of useful information, and of enabling us, in many cases, to reason with greater accuracy and security.

But the science of the human mind differs essentially from every other; and, on this account, the imperfections and ambiguities of language are more sorely felt. The long disputes among the schoolmen furnish a striking exemplification of this. And even in the speculations of the best writers on the mind from their day to the present time, we labour under a thousand difficulties from the imperfections of language. Whoever has paid even ordinary attention to this subject, must have often remarked how large a share of the controversial writings of metaphysicians is fairly traceable to the want of appropriate and well defined terms. One philosopher rails at another, and accuses him of misrepresenting facts, and vamping them up to suit a theory. The other, in the spirit of retaliation, la-

ments the narrowness of his antagonist's intellect, which prevents him from perceiving how beautifully and logically he resolves every mental operation into one general and sweeping principle. Praise is abundantly lavished, by their respective partisans, on both combatants. Their learning and ingenuity are extolled beyond all measure. Men of science and erudition are divided into sects on the questions at issue, each feeling deeply interested in the fame and reputation of its champion. A few years pass away in the squabble, and the scene becomes changed. Some innovator, more daring and successful than his predecessors, demonstrates to the world, that the whole controversy owed its existence to the use of an ambiguous epithet, or to the accidental or unwarrantable employment of a metaphor!

And such, it may be reasonably apprehended, will prove the lot of many future speculations on the human mind. Some of our best modern writers have been deeply sensible of the imperfections of language in this branch of study, and have fondly anticipated that they were able, in some measure at least, to remove them. But in this hope they have experienced disappointment. The late Professor Stewart, whose talents and acquirements peculiarly fitted him for the task, has made many observations on the decided progress which the philosophy of mind has made, since Mr. Locke's time, by the superior accuracy of the language employed in its elucidation. And he cites a passage from the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, to prove his statement. Locke, in

speaking of the association of ideas, employs the following language to express his meaning. He compares ideas "to trains of motion in the animal spirits, which, once set agoing, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural."

This representation of ideas *treading in a smooth path*, is severely criticised by Mr. Stewart. He thinks it an outrageous and unpardonable liberty taken with language; and he fancies no modern philosopher would express himself in this manner. Now all this critical indignation is misapplied. Mr. Loeke has only done here, what Mr. Stewart himself, and every writer on the mind, of recent standing, has done a thousand times over. Such phrases as *a part of the human mind, ideas passing through the mind, a vigorous understanding, a robust mind, a mind capable of sounding the most profound depths of thought, the mind's eye, the mind grappling with a subject*, and innumerable expressions of a similar nature, are to be found in the writings of Mr. Stewart, and, indeed, in the works of all our recent metaphysicians. All these forms of language are at bottom just as reprehensible, and just as *material* in their origin and import, as the words employed by Mr. Loeke. We may ask a modern philosophical critic what is meant by *a part of the mind*, by *ideas passing through the mind*, by the *mind grappling* a subject? To all such questions he will find himself placed in pre-

eisely the same position as Mr. Locke would have been placed, had he been called upon, in his lifetime, to justify his language. The import of the passage extracted from his *Essay*, is to convey a notion of a fact well known to all reasoners on the mind, and indeed to every person more or less, that certain trains of thought are excited more readily, according to the frequency of their occurrence. Mr. Locke did not mean to say that the mind was literally a *road* or *path*, and that ideas were *material objects* tending to smooth and level it down by frequently passing over it. His metaphor might be considered homely and plain, but there was no impropriety or absurdity implied in its use. We ought to bear in mind that all language is *metaphorical* when applied to the mind. There is no great room for choice in the matter. The only rule which can be laid down by philosophical criticism relative to explaining the nature and operations of the mind, must, from the necessities of the case, be a very general one, liable to many exceptions. We should be guided by the usual conventionalities of the language in which we write, and of the age in which we live. No rule, aiming at fractional niceties or critical perfection, can ever be sound.

Were a superior intelligent Being to overlook the contentions among metaphysicians, which take their rise from the imperfections and ambiguities of language when applied to the nature and operations of the mind, we might suppose such a being, under the influence of a spirit of sportive raillery

and banter, and in keeping with that loose and vulgar scepticism prevalent in the world at large, on the value of such abstract speculations, to address contending sects and parties in the following strain.

“O Metaphysicians! the most pretending and subtle of all philosophers! why will you wrangle with one another; why will you waste your strength, and burn the midnight oil, in attempting to describe that which is incapable of description? You claim the privilege of teaching a science which you consider and call the *first philosophy*. You affirm that it is eminently conducive to knowledge and happiness; yet you are ever engaged in controversies about the nature of this science; what are its nature, limits, and effects. Does not this bear the imprint of inconsistency? Might not this teach you more humility, and to be less arrogant in your pretensions? Though truth be your professed aim, and the dearest object of your hearts, yet it seems evidently beyond your reach. Doubt and uncertainty have hitherto been the only fruits of your labours.

“Look, then, around you for the causes of this uncertainty and perplexity. You will then have made one step in advance in the knowledge of your minds. These causes are neither numerous, nor remote from view. They lie at the threshold of your inquiries. Do you not see that the Author of nature has placed man in the world below, and surrounded him with a multitude of objects which strike his senses and rivet his attention? That

He has conferred upon him the faculty of speech, to discourse about, and to distinguish, these objects from each other? In thus richly endowing him, He has also denied him the means of examining with minuteness, and of defining with precision, that invisible and ever active part of his frame, which you denominate the mind or soul of man. It is a universal law of your constitution, to which you must of necessity submit, that you can give no true description of that which is not an object of sense, either to yourselves and others. There is no avoiding this decree. Material objects must be described by other more familiar objects of perception; but that which is immaterial you cannot describe. This arises from the nature of language. As it has a direct reference to sensible objects, when you attempt to explain the laws and principles of intellectual existence, you are only deceiving yourselves. For what light can you hope to throw upon mental operations, by a phraseology constantly used to designate the properties and states of matter? Had language been originally constructed from a survey of the laws of mind as well as of those of matter, the case would then have assumed another aspect. There would have been little or no risk in apprehending and describing intellectual objects. Affairs are otherwise arranged. You cannot take a single step in the explanation of your minds, without the use of language which relates to material things. How, then, can you communicate to others any adequate or faithful description of mental laws through such a medium?

“ All metaphysical terms, you say, are founded upon a principle of analogy ; but there can be no analogy between two things which have no common properties. You define matter to be that which is extended, moveable, and figured, and you say the mind is neither extended, moveable, nor figured. What analogy can there be, then, between mind and matter ? None. Yet in all systems of the mind you find language employed, which, if literally applied, confers extension, mobility, and figure on mind. You talk of the *comprehensiveness*, the *activity*, and the *conformation* of a man’s intellect. Were I to grant you the benefit of your reservation, that you only employ these terms in a *metaphorical sense*, what would that amount to ? What is meant by a *metaphorical sense* ? Simply, that things are not what they are represented to be. What, then, it may be demanded, are they ? What is that which you call the *science of mind*, if all you can say about it consists in metaphor ?

“ Now I shall not press you too hardly. I have no pleasure in running you into a corner. I shall grant, that when you confine yourselves in description to the more obvious and striking phenomena of thought, the use of metaphors seems well enough suited for the ordinary purposes of life and conversation. In depicting those operations of the mind, manifested in the gestures of the body, the motion and expressions of the countenance, the application of figurative language is exceedingly proper and forcible, and can scarcely ever be misunderstood. When we say that the mind is depressed, agitated,

or elevated, we speak a language intelligible to all mankind. On the other hand, when you attempt to explain more methodically the abstract nature of your thinking principle, those remote and hidden faculties, which display their power in the extensive calculating capabilities of the mathematician, the creative energies of the poet, and the delicate perception and subtle logic of the man of taste and sentiment, then you find the imperfections of language, and acknowledge that it presents a powerful barrier against explaining mental operations in a clear and unexceptionable manner. A traveller would have nearly as good a chance of describing with accuracy the extent, situation, and natural productions of a country, in passing through it in the first glimmerings of twilight, as a metaphysician has in describing the nature and operations of the human mind through the murky medium of metaphors and similes.

“It is an important and useful branch of philosophy, you tell us, to be well acquainted with what is within, and what beyond the human faculties. This is the constant theme and burden of your daily instructions. It becomes you, therefore, to consider whether, in your endeavours to investigate and illustrate the nature and laws of thought, you are not striving for that which your circumscribed faculties prevent you from ever obtaining. The history of your science induces me to conjecture that those precautionary maxims respecting the limitation of your powers, have not always been kept steadily in view. You have often been the dupes



of an ardent and sanguine imagination. What is the present state of metaphysical science? What is contained in the majority of those books which treat of the study? Nearly one half of them are taken up with controversies on the constituted imperfections of language. There is scarcely what may be termed a general principle of your numerous systems which is not an object of doubt and contention.

“All of you seem to agree, that the drawing of analogies from the material to the intellectual world, is one of the most fruitful sources of error. But where is the line to be drawn between what are just, and what are erroneous, analogies? If you allow every philosopher to establish his own discrimination as a criterion, this will not check dispute, nor produce unanimity. If you affirm there should be no analogical references made from matter to mind, this is nothing short of saying there is no such thing as mind at all. This conclusion is inevitable, if you take into consideration that it is utterly impossible to treat of the laws of thought, or to form anything respecting them, without employing a language descriptive of material objects and their qualities. Our judgments must, therefore, under such circumstances, be influenced by analogical appearances, which, upon a careful and more systematic inquiry, may be found delusive and fallacious.”

## CHAPTER III.

THE SCIENCE OF MIND CONSEQUENT UPON THE  
DECLINE OF SCHOLASTIC LEARNING, AND THE  
REVIVAL OF LETTERS IN EUROPE.

THIS will, perhaps, appear, in the eyes of many, but a comparatively barren and uninteresting period in the history of the science of the human mind. It is still, however, a period which ought to be clearly sketched out and defined in the historical chart of this branch of knowledge. It is, in fact, a sort of connecting link between two different species of intellectual existences; and is made to serve a useful purpose in the mental economy, just like those classes of animated beings, which, though unsusceptible of accurate classification, form, nevertheless, a firm bond to unite the whole of organized life into one stupendous and concatenated system.

We may observe, at the outset, that there were, in reality, few works produced by the authors whom we are about to enumerate, of a purely metaphysical nature, nor any containing very original views or theories of the human understanding. This sei-

ence was generally amalgamated and mixed up with other kindred branches of knowledge. The whole mass of metaphysieal disquisition may properly enough be summed up under four leading divisions; first, an exposition of the system of Plato; secondly, illustrations of, and commentaries on, Aristotle's mental philosophy; thirdly, a species of superficial septicism; and fourthly, a system of mysticism, containing a compound of religion, morality, and metaphysics.

This order of things was not altogether uniform, nor did it last for any great length of time. A rival interest gradually arose, which day after day increased in power and authority. This was the Aristotelian system. Many of the admirers and expounders of Plato promulgated wild conceits and extravagant absurdities, which the leading tenets of the "divine sage," under indiscreet management, were, from their very nature, but too apt to create and foster. This conflict between the merits of Plato and Aristotle, was violent and bitter; but it essentially contributed to the diffusion of general knowledge, and to the introduction of more rational views of mental philosophy.

All the writers noticed in this chapter, occupy that portion of philosophical history recognised as the era of the revival of letters in Europe, after the downfall of Constantinople. Cosmo de Medici was the leading instrument, in the fifteenth century, of the revival of the metaphysieal genius of Italy, by the institution of the Florentine Academy, where the philosophical speculations of

Plato were illustrated and expounded. Cosmo was encouraged in this literary enterprise by the exhortations and counsels of Gemistus Pletho, a Greek philosopher, who filled the official situation of deputy from the Greek government, and the Council assembled at Ferrara, and afterwards at Florence, for considering the practicability of uniting the Greek and Latin Churches.\* Lorenzo, the grandson of Cosmo, imbibed the same partiality and reverence as his grandfather for the doctrines of Plato; and even made commentaries himself upon the works of the Grecian sage. Lorenzo also renewed the solemn annual feasts to the memory of Plato, which had been discontinued from the days of Plotinus and Porphyrius. By these and other means, the Platonic philosophy was raised to an unprecedented degree of splendour. The minds of the learned were under the influence of a degree of philosophical enthusiasm, of which we can, at the present day, form but a very inadequate conception. Historians mention that Pletho declared his firm conviction, that Pagan philosophy would soon gain the ascendancy over both Christianity and Mahometanism.†

\* "The example of the Roman Pontiff was preceded or imitated by a Florentine merchant, who governed the Republic without arms, and without a title. Cosmo of Medici was the father of a line of Princes, whose name and age are almost synonymous with the restoration of learning; his credit was ennobled into fame; his riches were dedicated to the service of mankind; he corresponded at once with Cairo and London; and a cargo of Indian spices and Greek books were often imported in the same vessel."—*Gibbon, Decline and Fall*, chap. 66.

† See Note F. at the end of this Volume.

The writers of this period of history are distinguishable from the Scholastics by a more light and airy character conferred on all their speculations. The former were not so formal, dull, and verbose as the latter. The Scholastics were like heavy cavalry, encased in a coat of mail, which obstructed, on many occasions, the unfettered exercise of physical strength and prowess. The writers, at the epoch of the revival of letters, resembled light infantry, full of sprightliness and activity, and ready for any undertaking where personal courage, adroitness, and skill were wanted. The Scholastics were, from the formal routine of their philosophical speculations, limited to the consideration of a few topics, scanned through a confused and narrow medium; the writers of these times felt themselves at liberty to extend their investigations on all sides, and to embrace everything which legitimately came within the range of thought and observation. Without particular and universal ideas, the Schoolmen were dead and lifeless; they could not move an inch. The thinking and active spirits of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, broke down this artificial barrier, and claimed the privilege of entering the wide arena of discussion at any point of the circle they chose. This necessarily soon led to great and important changes in the whole course of speculation on the human mind and its varied powers and faculties.

DANTE. 1300 A.D.

This distinguished Italian poet may be fairly

enough placed among the metaphysicians of his age. His works are full of the sublimest ideas of the intellectual nature of man. He says, "God is one; the universe is one thought of God; the universe is therefore one. All things come from God; they all participate, more or less, in the divine nature, according to the end for which they are created. They all float to different points over the great ocean of existence; but they are all moved by the same will. Flowers in the garden of God all merit our love, according to the degree of excellence he has bestowed upon each of these. MAN is the most eminent. Upon him God has bestowed more of his own nature than upon any other creature. In the continuous scale of being, that man whose nature is the most degraded touches upon the animal. He whose nature is the most noble approaches that of the angel. *Every thing that comes from the hand of God tends towards that perfection of which it is susceptible, and man more frequently and more vigorously than all the rest; there is this difference between him and other creatures, that his perfectibility is possible, meaning indefinite.* Coming from the bosom of God, the human soul incessantly aspires towards him, and endeavours, by holiness and knowledge, to be re-united to him. Now the life of the individual is too short and too weak to enable him to satisfy that yearning in this world; but around him, before him, stand the whole human race, to which he is allied by his social nature that never dies, but through successive generations works onward to eternal truth. Mankind is

one. God has made nothing in vain ; and if there exists a *collective* of men, it is because there is one aim for them all, and one work to be accomplished by them all. Mankind, then, ought to work together, in order that all the intellectual powers which are bestowed amongst them, may receive the highest possible development, whether in the sphere of thought or action. Mankind must be one, even as God is one ; one in organization, as they are one in principle. Unity is taught by the manifest design of God in the external world, and by the necessity of an aim. Now this unity seeks for something by which it may be represented ; and this unity is found in government.”

RAYMOND LULLY. 1315 A.D.

This able and singular man was born at Palma, a small town in the Island of Majorca. In his early years he filled the situation of steward in the household of the king of Majorca ; where he formed an amorous connection, though a married man, which produced a long train of unpleasant consequences. It is said he was converted in the act of penning “a sonnet to his mistress’ eye-brow.” Certain it is, however, that he changed his conduct, and devoted himself most zealously to a religious and intellectual course of life. He entered into a hermitage, where he composed his first treatise, the *Ars Major* or *Generalis*; principally directed against the doctrines of Mohammed. Being of an ardent and active turn of mind, he formed the plan of visiting Africa,

with a view of Christianizing its inhabitants, and banishing for ever from the world the errors and impieties of Mohammedanism. Full of this adventure, he repaired to Rome, to solieit the assistance of the Holy See ; but after many earnest applications, he was denied any aid from that quarter. He felt the disappointment deeply, but did not despair. He was determined to carry out the enterprise, by virtue of his own individual efforts. In 1295 he landed at Tunis, and immediately ehallenged the Moorish doctors to a public disputation. They tendered such proofs of the truth of their faith as they possessed ; and Lully replied to them. One of his grand principles for guiding the judgment in thcological matters, and which he frequently in his controversies insisted upon, was that “It is the part of wisdom to choose that faith which ascribes to the Deity the most goodness, power, glory, and perfection ; which exhibits the most harmony between cause and effect, betwcn the Creator and the creature.” An admirable rule, which strikingly manifests the sagacity of the man.

His suecess, however, among the Moors, was not great. It is said that his reasonings on the Trinity and the Incarnation appeared so foreible to his learned antagonists, that they yielded to their superior cogency, and were inclined to receive the sacrament of baptism ; but at this juncture some of the civil authorities interfered, and laid violent hands upon Lully. They threatened at first to behead him ; but ultimately they adopted a more humane course, and banished him from the country,



with an injunction, that if ever they found him there again, death would be his certain portion.

But this untoward termination of a favorite scheme did not effectually damp his ardour. He made many efforts to induce the heads of the Church to espouse his cause, and assist him in another descent upon the African shore. At the Council of Vienna, he obtained the establishment of Professors' chairs for the Oriental languages, Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic, at the cities of Rome, Paris, Salamanca, and Oxford; but his solicitations could procure no further active assistance. No missionaries could be found to engage with him in such a hazardous enterprise. In this dilemma, and in his eightieth year, he was determined to set out again for Tunis alone. For a short time, he was not noticed or molested; but being worked up to a high pitch of zeal, he rushed into the great square of Bugia, and made such a violent attack upon the national faith, that the people stoned him upon the spot. His body was taken to Majorca, where he is honoured as a Saint. The following is his character, as drawn by himself. "Homo fui in matrimonio copulatus, prolem habui, competenter dives, lascivus et mundanus. Omnia, ut Dei amorem et bonum publicum possem procurare, et sanctam fidem exaltare, libenter dimisi. Arabicum didici; pluries ad prædicandum Saracenis exivi, propter fidem captus fui, incarceratus, verberatus; quadraginta quinque annos, ut ecclesiæ rectores ad bonum publicum et Christianos principes movere possem,

laboravi. Nunc senex sum, nunc pauper sum, in eodem proposito sum, in eodem usque ad mortem mansurus, si Dominus ipse dabit."

Dr. Mosheim, in his Ecelesiastical History, makes the following remarks on this singular writer. "Raymond Lully was the author of a new and very singular kind of philosophy, which he endeavoured to illustrate and defend by his voluminous writings. He was a native of Majorca, and admirable for the extent and fecundity of his genius; yet at the same time a strange compound of reason and folly. Being full of zeal for the propagation of the gospel, and having performed many voyages and undergone various hardships to promote it, he was slain at Bugia, in Africa, in the year 1315, by the Mahometans, whom he was attempting to convert. The Franciscans, to whose third order it is said he belonged, extolled him to the skies, and took great pains to persuade several popes to canonize him: while many, on the contrary, and especially the Dominicans, inveighed bitterly against him, calling him a harebrained chimerist, a hot-headed fanatic, a heretic, a magician, and a mere compiler of the works of the Mahometans. The popes entertained different opinions of him; some esteemed him a harmless pious man, while others pronounced him a vile heretic. But whoever peruses the writings of Lully without prejudice, will not be biassed by either of these parties. It is at least certain that he would have been a great man, had the warmth and fertility of his imagination been tempered with a sound judgment."

The metaphysical works of Lully are mixed up and incorporated with his speculations on the following topics: De Formâ Dei; De convenientiâ quam habet Fides et Intellectus in objecto; De Substantiâ et Accidente, in quo probatur Trinitas; De Trinitate in Unitate, sive de Essentiâ Dei; De Ente Infinito; De Ente Absoluto; De Inearnatione; De Prædestinatione et Libero Arbitrio; and De Conceptione Virginali.

Lully's *Great Art* is one of the principal foundations of his fame. It has been noticed by many authors. His admirers have not failed to pass the highest eulogiums upon it, and to declare that nothing short of inspiration itself could have suggested and executed it. That there is no small degree of ingenuity manifested in its contrivance, must be admitted by all who have examined it with any share of dispassionate attention; but that it was never calculated to effect the grand object of its author, must likewise be sufficiently apparent from its radical imperfections. To form a mechanical system to make men reason accurately and profoundly upon matters appertaining to human nature, is, at bottom, a more fanatical and irrational enterprise than seeking the philosopher's stone. There is but one way to all such knowledge; and that way cannot be materially shortened, nor made to present fewer difficulties than it did three thousand years ago.

The following Table forms the ground work of his *Grand Art*.

## TABULA AD ARTIS BREVIS, &amp;c.

A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	I.	K.
Absoluta.	Bonitas.	Magnitudo.	Æternitas seu Duratio.	Potestas.	Sapientia.	Voluntas.	Virtus.	Veritas.	Gloria.
T. Relata seu respectus.	Differentia.	Concordantia.	Contrariedades.	Principium.	Medium.	Finis.	Majoritas.	Æqualitas.	Minoritas.
Q. Quæstiones.	Utrum ?	Quid ?	De quo ?	Quare ?	Quantum ?	Quale ?	Quando ?	Ubi ?	Quomodo ? Cum quo ?
S. Subiecta.	Deus.	Angelus.	Cælum.	Homo.	Imaginatio.	Sensitiva.	Vegetativa.	Elementativa.	Instrumentativa.
V. Virtutes.	Justitia.	Prudentia.	Fortitudo.	Temperantia.	Fides.	Spes.	Charitas.	Patientia.	Pietas.
V. Vicia.	Avaritia.	Gula.	Luxuria.	Superbia.	Acidia.	Invidia.	Ira.	Mendacium.	Inconstantia.

Predicata. Alphabætum seu Principia  
huius artis sunt.

1. Essentia.  
2. Unitas.  
3. Perfectio.

This tabular statement is further illustrated by five different figures or diagrams, showing the various combinations of the items in the Table, under certain heads. As we cannot give these diagrams here, the reader is referred to the works of the author, where everything is illustrated at great length, and with considerable perspicuity.\*

The Spanish commentators on Raymond Lully are pretty numerous, and to those who may feel an interest in his singular speculations, most of these writers will afford some instruction. The following are what I have looked into, though only in a casual manner.

*Alphonsus de Cepeda.* Arbol de la Ciencia de Raimundo Lullo.

*Petrus Ciruelo.* De Arte Raimundi.

*Petrus Hieronymus Sanchez de Lizarazu.* Methodus Generalis ad omnes Scientias.

*Franciscus Marzal.* Ars Generalis Illustrata.

*Jaimus Januarius.* Ars Artium Raimundi.

*Petrus de Guevara.* Arte General para todas las Ciencias.

*Joannes Arce de Herrera.* Apologia pro Raimundo.

The principal design of these separate publications, is to explain and to advocate the Lullian principles of mental philosophy. Some enter very fully into objections which were urged against it, with a view of removing them ; while, on the other hand, it is occasionally admitted that the objections

\* The best edition of Lully's works, is that of Mayence, in 5 vols. folio.

are of an insuperable description, and cannot be satisfactorily answered. They all lavish the most unbounded praise upon Lully, and consider him one of the most acute and active intellects that Europe ever produced.

GEORGE GEMISTUS PLETHO. 1391 A.D.

This writer, already alluded to, was a Greek by birth, and took refuge in Italy, after the fall of Constantinople. He came under the patronage of the Council of Florence; and his friend and disciple, Cardinal Bessarion, promoted his interest and views in every possible way. Gemistus was passionately enamoured of the Platonic system of the mind, though he was not free from those erroneous and corrupted views of it so prevalent in the East. He entered into violent controversies with the Aristotelians, and displayed great talent as a disputant. He wrote *Expositio Oraculorum Magicorum Zoroastris*, in which he shows his intimate knowledge of the Eastern philosophy, and of that which prevailed in the latter period of the Alexandrian school. In this work, he lays down twelve leading principles of the Platonic theology, and furnishes besides, a concise epitome of the whole of Plato's philosophical system. His other two works, "On the Difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy," and "Natural Arguments Concerning God," are, on the whole, very excellent publications. In the latter treatise, concerning the Deity, the reader will readily recognise some opinions promulgated

many centuries before by Proclus, and other commentators on the Platonic dogmas.\*

Mr. Roscoe makes the following observations on this distinguished Greek. "Amongst those chosen on the part of the Greeks, was Gemistus Pletho, who was then at a very advanced period of a life which had been devoted to the study of the Platonic philosophy. As often as his public avocations afforded him an opportunity, he employed himself in the propagation of his opinions, which were not only new to the scholars of Italy, but were greatly at variance with those doctrines which had long obtained an uninterrupted ascendancy in all the public schools and seminaries of learning. So powerful was the effect which the discourses of Gemistus had upon Cosmo de Medici, who was his constant auditor, that he determined to establish an academy at Florence, for the sole purpose of cultivating this new and more elevated species of philosophy."†

BESSARION, BISHOP OF NICE. 1400 A.D.

This was a profound and sagacious philosopher. His great aim was to reconcile the ancient systems of Grecian speculation with the leading doctrines of Christianity. He was a zealous disciple of Plato, but he by no means despised Aristotle. He was one of the Greek clergy appointed to form a junction with the Latin Church. On his return to the East,

\* Fabri. Bib. Grec. vol 10, p. 740.

† Roscoe's Life of Lorenzo de Medici, p. 49.

he was nominated by the Emperor Manuel Palæologus to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but his great zeal gave offence to the Greeks, and he was obliged to fly into Italy for shelter. He wrote a defence of Plato, against the attacks of George Trebizond, and translated the metaphysical works of Aristotle into Latin.\*

#### MARSILIUS FICINUS. 1430 A.D.

This author was a Florentine by birth, and, under the patronage of Cosmo de Medici, was educated by Pletho, for the express purpose of translating the works of Plato, and defending his system against the attacks of its enemies. He executed this undertaking, but not to the complete satisfaction of the Platonists of the day, who maintained that the translator and commentator had not done justice to the Grecian sage; inasmuch as he had been more anxious to incorporate some notions of his own with those of Plato, than to give the world a naked and undisguised translation of his author. Besides this, Ficinus is censured for his too free use of the Alexandrian commentaries on Plato's system. In this he fancied he saw clearly all the peculiar doctrines and mysteries of the Christian religion. He considered Socrates as a complete type of our Saviour. Ficinus entered into a profound discussion on the immortality of the soul. On this subject, however, he does not favour us, in the way of argument, with much that is new.

\* See Note G. at the end of the Volume.



Besides the works of Plato, Ficinus translated into Latin the treatises of Porphyry, Jamblicus, and Proclus, and also the Platonic theology, which contains a curious assemblage of speculative notions.

The theological opinions of Ficinus seem to have been, that the human soul was an emanation from the Deity, and that its chance of again reverting into and forming a part of the Godhead, depended upon a life of mortification and contemplation. He enters into many abstruse speculations on the nature and faculties of the immortal soul, on the divine attributes, and the existence and offices of angelic beings. All these discussions derive their origin from the notions of Proclus and others of the Alexandrian school. There is little originality thrown into the disquisitions by any thing which Ficinus has advanced.

Mr. Hallam makes the following remarks on Ficinus: "Cosmo de Medici selected Marsilius Ficinus, as a youth of great promise, to be educated in the mysteries of Platonism, that he might become the chief and preceptor of the new academy; nor did the devotion of the young philosopher fall short of the patron's hopes. Ficinus declares himself to have profited as much by the conversation of Cosmo as by the writings of Plato; but this is said in a dedication to Lorenzo, and the author has not on other occasions escaped the reproach of flattery. He began as early as 1456, at the age of twenty-three, to write on the Platonic philosophy; but being as yet ignorant of Greek, prudently gave

way to the advice of Cosmo and Landino, that he should acquire more knowledge before he imparted it to the world.”\*

Mr. Roscoe also notices Ficinus : “The education of Ficinus was, as he himself informs us, entirely directed to the new philosophy. The doctrines and precepts of the Grecian sage were assiduously instilled into his infant mind, and, as he increased in years, he applied himself to the study, not of the works of Plato only, but also those of Plotinus, a distinguished promoter of the doctrines of that philosopher in the third century. Nor were the expectations which Cosmo had formed of Ficinus disappointed. The Florentine academy was some years afterwards established with great credit, and was the first institution of Europe for the pursuit of science, detached from the scholastic method then universally adopted. It is true, the sublime and fanciful doctrines of Plato were almost as remote from the purposes of common life and general utility, as the dogmatic opinions of Aristotle ; but the introduction of the former was, nevertheless, of essential service to the cause of free inquiry and substantial knowledge. By dividing the attention of the learned, they deprived the doctrines of Aristotle of that servile respect and veneration which had so long been paid to them ; and by introducing the discussion of new subjects, they prepared the way

\* Literature of the Middle Ages, vol. 1. p. 147.

for the pursuit of truths more properly within the sphere of the human intellect.”\*

Of the devotion of Cosmo de Medici to the study of Plato, and the lively interest he took in the labours of Ficinus, we have a striking testimony in a letter which Cosmo wrote to his pupil, inviting him to visit him at his country residence. “Yesterday,” says Cosmo, “I arrived at Careggi, not so much for the purpose of improving my fields, as myself : let me see you, Marsilius, as soon as possible, and forget not to bring with you the book of our favourite Plato, DE SUMMO BONO—which I presume, according to your promise, you have ere this translated into Latin ; for there is no employment to which I so ardently devote myself as to find out the true road to happiness. Come then, and fail not to bring with you the Orphean Lyre.”†

THEODORE GAZA, 1440 A.D. ; GEORGIUS SCHOLARIUS, 1464 A.D. ; GEORGE OF TREBIZOND, 1484 A.D.

These were three Greek writers, and came into Italy under the patronage of the Medici. They were all of them enthusiastic admirers of Aristotle ; and zealously maintained the superiority of his philosophy over his master Plato’s. Gaza outstripped the munificence of his patron, and by extravagance brought himself to abject poverty. To relieve his wants he translated Aristotle’s work “On the History of Animals,” and dedicated it to

\* Life of Lorenzo de Medici, p. 51.

† Marsilii Ficini Florentini Opera, Paris, 1641.

Pope Sextus IV. in hopes of receiving some handsome donation in his difficulties. He only received, however, a very small sum; and this mortified him so much, that he threw the money into the Tiber, left Rome for Calabria, and put an end to his existence.

Trebizond taught philosophy at Venice, and afterwards at Rome. He was deeply skilled in all the metaphysical systems of the ancients. The Peripatetic philosophy was his great favourite; and so much did his zeal get the better of his judgment and candour, that he could not bear almost to hear the name of Plato mentioned. Whenever he wrote against his system, he displayed the most outrageous and rabid animosity and violence.

Scholarius was a profound scholar and thinker. He too was a strenuous advocate for the doctrines of the Stagirite. He wrote an Introduction to Porphyry on *Universals*, and a commentary on the categories of Aristotle, and on the book *De Interpretatione*. All these display great knowledge of the history of the human mind.

#### APOLLINARIUS OFFRED. 1450 A.D.

This author wrote a learned commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, which acquired great popularity in many of the universities and public schools in Europe. He was a man of great talents, and one of the most acute metaphysicians of his day.\*

\* Morhof, Polyh. t. 2. l. 1. c. 11.

## JOHN REUCHLIN. 1455 A.D.

This author was a native of Pfortzheim, in Suabia. He studied philosophy at Paris, and entered deeply into all kinds of speculative opinions on mental subjects. He was a professed admirer and follower of Aristotle. He removed to Basil, then to Orleans, and from thence went into Italy, and became acquainted with Ficinus, Politian, Picus, and other enthusiastic Platonists, who seem to have effected a change in the metaphysical creed of Reuchlin, for he renounced his Aristotelian notions and adopted those of his new friends. Here he also changed his name to Capino. When residing at Rome, he undertook the learning of the Hebrew language, with a view of entering fully into the Cabalistic writings. These he proposed making subservient to a complete illustration of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines. This compound he professed and taught for several years. He wrote "*De Verbo Mirifico*," and "*De Arte Cabalistica*."\*

## PETER POMPONATIUS. 1462 A.D.

This writer was born at Mantua, of a noble family, in 1462. He followed the medical profession, studied philosophy at the university of Padua, and was raised to the chair of that seat of

\* Opera Reuchlin. 1519. See also Melancthon, Vit. Reuch. Declam. t 3, p. 380.

learning, from which he laboured hard to establish the system of Aristotle throughout the whole of Italy. In 1525 he published a work entitled "*De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, et Providentia Dei*," in five books. About the same time he published another treatise "*On the immortality of the Soul*." There were several remarks and arguments in this book which roused the anger of the public authorities, but the author ultimately explained himself out of danger. Another work of his made its appearance after his death, called, "*De naturalium effectuum admirandis causis seu incantationibus liber*." Bologna 1556.

The peculiar metaphysical opinions of Pomponatius are concisely expressed in the Ninth Chapter of his "*De Immortalitate Animæ*." There are three modes of being; intelligences separated from matter and its forms and qualities; these are of a pure celestial nature. Secondly, there are species of intelligences which must necessarily be connected with material bodies; these hold an inferior station in the scale of existence to the former. Thirdly, there is an intelligent principle which holds a kind of medium station between these two just mentioned; this is the human understanding, which exists in a state of relation or connection with, both the celestial intelligences and the second or animal order of beings. This understanding may be said to reside in bodies, inasmuch as it moves and controuls them; but it is not a part or constituent element of bodies, nor does it extend through them in all their members or divisions.

The essence of the understanding consists in being able to reflect upon its own operations; and in the development of this power, it displays itself to us under various phases, which we denominate separate faculties, or modes of existence.

NICOLAS DE CUSA. 1464 A. D.

This metaphysical writer was born at Cusanus, in the dioecese of Treves. After entering into the Church, and taking several theological degrees, he was appointed by Pope Eugenius IV. legate to Constantinople, with a view of bringing about a reconciliation between the Greek and Latin Churches. He cultivated the Pythagorean part of the Platonic theory, with great zeal and assiduity; and he endeavoured to show, that if, upon the Pythagorean hypothesis, we could explain the phenomena of the material world, and mount up to the *primitive unit* of creation, yet we could not, from our constitution, know this creative unit, except through its numerical developments, and not by any means through its real essence. Cusa thought that a knowledge of absolute truth was not allowed to man; and that the highest proof of a man's wisdom was to acknowledge his ignorance of all such matters. His work entitled "*Apologia Doctæ Ignorantiæ*," has been considered by the learned as a very curious book, for the age in which it appeared.\*

\* Nicholai Cusani Ope. 3 Vol. fol.; Paris, 1514.

## ERASMUS. 1464 A. D.

The writings of Erasmus are well known; but his name and reputation are more intimately connected with the stirring events of the Reformation, than with his skill in philosophy. He was a humorous censurer of that which he considered spurious or false philosophy; and in his treatise called "The Praise of Folly," the most bitter and severe sarcasms will be found against the Scholastics.

## LUDOVICUS VIVES. 1470 A. D.

This author was a native of Valencia in Spain, but studied the Scholastic philosophy for several years in Paris. He went afterwards to the University of Louvain, where he distinguished himself by his knowledge of philosophy and letters. He came to England, and was employed by Henry VIII. as preceptor to his daughter Mary. Opposing, however, the king's divorce, he fell into disgrace at court, and was glad to escape from punishment by going to Bruges, where he devoted the remainder of his life to contemplation and philosophy.

His writings are "*De Prima Philosophia*," "*De Explanatione Essentiarum*," "*De Censura Veri*," "*De Initiis, Sectis, et Laudibus Philosophiæ*," and, "*De Corruptis Artibus et Tradendis Disciplinis*." The learned Morhof, in his *Polyhistor*, says, that the writings of Vives are "golden remains," and ought to be carefully perused by all



intelligent men.\* Du Pin compares Erasmus, Buddæus, and Vives together; the first has wit, the second learning, and the third judgment. “Vives,” says he, “was not only excellent in polite letters, a judicious critic, and an eminent philosopher, but he applied himself also to divinity, and was successful in it.”†

There is an interesting account of Vives in a work, entitled “On the Learned Men of Valencia,” written in Spanish by Vincent Ximenes. The whole works of Vives were translated, in 1782, from the Latin into Spanish, under the superintendance of Sabian Fuero, Archbishop of Valencia.

#### GEORGE VENET. 1482 A. D.

This author wrote two works, *Harmonia Mundi*, and *Problemata in Scripturam Sacram*. These contain a jumble of the opinions of Aristotle, Plato, and the doctrines of the Jewish Cabala. His chief idea was that Pythagoras and Plato, Orpheus and Zoroaster, Job and Solomon, St. John and St. Paul, Origen and Dionysius, all derived their systems from the same fountain, the *Logos*.

#### JOHN PICUS OF MIRANDOLA. 1485 A. D.

This is a very singular personage. He was of an illustrious Italian family; and when a youth of

\* Tom 1. l. 2. c. 2.

† See Du Pin and Brucker.

fourteen was sent to Bologna to study the Canon law, with the ultimate view of entering into holy orders. He did not, however, follow the path prescribed by his parents, but devoted himself, for nearly six years, to the study of speculative philosophy; which had more charms for him than any thing else. He visited most of the Universities of Italy and France, with the desire of becoming acquainted with every system of metaphysics, and with every distinguished professor and cultivator of them. He acquired a complete mastery over the most abstruse theories and speculations; so that he was quite a marvel to all the grave and learned doctors of the age.

Through the translations and commentaries of Marsilius Ficinus, he became enraptured with Platonic ideas. They engrossed his entire mind; he studied them by day, and dreamed of them by night. Being of a lively and susceptible temperament, his soul burned within him for speculative glory and enterprise; and to be the author and propounder of a new theory of human nature and human knowledge, was to attain the highest pitch of mundane glory. Full of these ideas and aspirations, he fell into the hands of a cunning and designing man, who induced him to purchase fifty Hebrew manuscripts, which, it was alleged, had been written by Esdras, and which contained all the secret mysteries of the Cabala. From this moment common sense seems to have lost all command over him. One absurd theory after another

took possession of his mind ; and he plunged deeper and deeper into all kinds of speculative excesses.\*

Full of wild projects, Picus repaired to Rome, and, obtaining the permission of Innocent VIII., he forthwith propounded his grand scheme for banishing all ignorance and doubt from the world. This notable plan consisted of nine hundred theses or propositions, of a logical, ethical, mathematical, physical, metaphysical, theological, magical, and cabalistical nature ; and he offered to enter into a public discussion on all or any of these points, with the most talented and learned men of Rome. These speculative materials were all taken from the Grecian and Arabian philosophers, from the most speculative and abstruse of the Schoolmen, and from various denominations of Jewish mystics. It is natural to suppose, that this bold and novel movement would create no small degree of astonishment in Rome, and arouse the fears and jealousy of the Church and Universities. And this is just what did happen. Picus found himself surrounded with difficulties ; but he seems to have possessed a larger share of that tact and prudence in worldly matters than usually falls to the lot of such excitable beings as himself. He parried the blows which his enemies aimed at him ; and Alexander IV. publicly exonerated him from all evil design in his attempts to make his philosophical opinions and principles known to the world.

Mr. Hallam has some remarks on the subsequent

\* See Carniani, ch. 3. p. 63 ; Meiners, *Lebens-beschreibungen berühmter männer*, 2. p. 21 ; and Tiraboschi, vol. 7. p. 325.

movements of this extraordinary man, which I cannot refrain from quoting. “ He had, meantime, as we may infer from his later writings, receded from some of the bolder opinions of his youth. His mind became more devout, and more fearful of deviating from the Church. On his first appearance at Florence, uniting rare beauty with high birth and unequalled renown, he had been much sought by women, and returned their love. But at the age of twenty-five he withdrew himself from all worldly distraction, destroying, as he said, his own amatory poems, to the regret of his friends. He now published several works, of which the *Heptaphus* is a cabalistic exposition of the first chapter of Genesis. It is remarkable that, with his excessive tendency to belief, he rejected altogether, and confuted in a separate treatise, the popular science of astrology, in which men so much more conspicuous in philosophy have trusted. But he had projected many other undertakings of vast extent: an Allegorical exposition of the New Testament; a Defence of the Vulgate and Septuagint against the Jews; a Vindication of Christianity against every species of infidelity and heresy; and, finally, a *Harmony of Philosophy*, reconciling the apparent inconsistencies of all writers, ancient and modern, who deserved the name of wise, as he had already attempted by Plato and Aristotle. In these arduous labours he was cut off by a fever, at the age of thirty-one, in 1494, on the very day that Charles VIII. made his entry into Florence. A man so justly called the phoenix of his age, and so extraor-

dinarily gifted by nature, ought not to be slightly passed over, though he may have left nothing which we could read with advantage. If we talk of "the admirable Crichton," who is little better than a shadow, and lives but in panegyric, so much superior and more wonderful a person as John Picus of Mirandola should not be forgotten."\*

## CORNELIUS AGRIPPA. 1486 A. D.

Agrippa was a native of Nettesheym, near Cologne, and seems to have devoted his early years to Alchemy. In mature life, he displayed great partiality for speculative knowledge; and we find him in a professor's chair, at Dole, in Burgundy, delivering lectures on Reuchlin's treatise, *De Verbo Mirifico*. He came afterwards to London, then went to Cologne, passed into Italy, where he joined the army, and taught at the same time speculative philosophy at Pavia, where he pretended that he was inspired from heaven. Falling into extreme poverty, he suffered many privations; but at length he obtained a civil office in the city of Mentz, which, however, he only retained a short time, on account of his rude and indiscreet attacks on monkish institutions. He was driven to Geneva; afterwards we find him at Lyons, in which city he was appointed physician to the mother of Francis I., and obtained great influence by the profession of astrology. This run of good fortune was but of short

\* Literature of the Middle Ages, Vol. 1. p. 203. See also the life of Picus by his nephew John Francis Picus; Brucker and Buhle.

duration. He was dismissed from office; after which he went to Antwerp, and placed himself under the patronage of Margaret of Austria, and became historiographer to the Emperor Charles V. He still, however, continued his satirical propensities, and wrote two books, one "On the Vanity of the Sciences," and the other "On the Occult Philosophy." These alienated the affections of his friends, and he fell into poverty again, and was committed to prison for debt. He was compassionately released from this unpleasant position by a few kind friends; and afterwards removed to Grenoble, where he died in 1535.

Agrippa was a man of good natural parts, but his metaphysical opinions were of the most wild and untenable description. They were a compound of all strange things, which had ever been dreamed of by speculative enthusiasts. To give an outline of them is impossible. We may state, however, that he maintains there are four elements in nature, by whose agency the phenomena of the world are produced; but in these he has recourse to the old device in world-making, of joining the power of a *soul*, or living principle, which gives life and motion to all things. The stars have also an influence upon human beings, as well as material objects. There is a graduated scale of being, by which the highest and the lowest orders of existences are connected together. The world is filled with innumerable hosts of intelligences, angelic creatures, and demons; and these can only be propitiated by a process of fumigation, with such ingredients as have an affinity or

correspondence with the properties of these beings. This is the only mode of subduing them, and bringing them under the power of man.\*

JOHN ARGYROPYLUS. 1486 A.D.

This writer and philosopher was a native of Constantinople, and was one of those who obtained the patronage of Cosmo de Medici. Argyropyus translated some of the works of Aristotle, at the suggestion of his kind patron, and taught the Aristotelian philosophy at Rome, with considerable success.†

JAMES FABER. 1490 A.D.

James Faber, or Le Fevre, was a native of Picardy, and received his academical education at Paris. He acquired a great knowledge in philosophy, which he further extended by travelling through various countries, almost solely with the view of holding converse with the learned and philosophic. He entertained a mortal enmity to the Scholastic philosophy, under every form; and wished to bring back the learned to the consideration of the genuine works of Aristotle, and to adopt them in all their native simplicity and spirit. He wrote a commentary on the Peripatetic doctrines, which is well known for its force and

\* See Brucker, vol. 4, p. 410; Sprengel, vol. 3, p. 226; Hallam, *Lit. Middle Ages*, vol. 1, p. 386.

† Bullart, *Ac. Sc.* tome 1, p. 269. Bayle has some curious notices of this author, see *Dict. Art. Argyropyus*.

perspicuity. It is said of him, that he "was the first among the French, as Cicero among the Romans, who united philosophy and eloquence." His energy and boldness were by no means palatable to the Doctors of the Sorbonne, who charged him with heresy; but he found a safe retreat at the Court of Margaret of Navarre.

SEPULVEDA. 1490 A.D.

This was a Spanish metaphysician, born of a noble family at Cordova. He displayed in early life a passionate desire for speculative knowledge. After a few years' hard study, and when he was quite a young man, he was appointed professor at the University of Salamanca, and historiographer to Charles V. Sepulveda translated the works of Aristotle, and entered into a very extensive correspondence with most of the learned men in every country in Europe. In 1526 he wrote a work on Free-will and Necessity. His whole works were published at Madrid, in 1780, in 4 vols. 4to.

THEOPHRASTUS PARACELsus. 1493 A. D.

This speculative visionary was born at Einsiedeln, near Zurich. He displayed at a very early age an insatiable thirst for knowledge, and visited, for the purpose of intellectual improvement, almost every country in Europe, and some districts of Asia and Africa. Medicine was his ostensible profession, and the channel through which he generally con-



veyed all his speculative opinions on the nature of mind, and on the elements of theology. Among these he maintained, that there was a perfect analogy between all the works of nature and the constitution of man ; that these two ran parallel to each other, even in the most minute particulars ; but that this harmony can only be known through the medium of revelation. Hence arises the complete insufficiency of heathen philosophy to explain the phenomena of existence. Mr. Hallam has the following observations on Paracelsus. "A mixture of fanaticism and imposture is very palpable in Paracelsus, as in what he calls his Cabalistic art, which produces by imagination and natural faith, 'per fidem naturalem ingenitam,' all magical operations, and counterfeits by these means whatever we see in the external world. Man has a sidereal as well as a material body, an astral element, of which all do not partake in equal degrees ; and therefore the power of magic, which is in fact the power of astral properties, or of producing those effects which the stars naturally produce, is not equally attainable by all. This astral element of the body survives for a time after death, and explains the apparitions of dead persons ; but in this state it is subject to those who possess the art of magic, which is then called necromancy.

"Paracelsus maintained the animation of every thing ; all minerals both feed and render their food. And besides this life of every part of nature, it is peopled with spiritual beings, inhabitants of the four elements, subject to disease and death like man. These are the silvans (sylphs), undines

or nymphs, gnomes, and salamanders. It is thus observable that he first gave them names which rendered afterwards the Rosicrucian fables so celebrated. These live with man, and sometimes, except the salamanders, bear children to him; they know future events, and reveal them to us; they are also guardians of hidden treasures, which may be obtained by their means. I may perhaps have said too much about paradoxes so absurd and mendacious; but literature is a garden of weeds as well as of flowers; and Paracelsus forms a link in the history of opinion, which should not be overlooked.”\*

All the works of Paracelsus are exceedingly obscure. His *Philosophia Sagax*, or “Subtile Philosophy,” is a compound of medical, magical, and philosophical notions, treated of in the most mystical and bewildering terms. His other treatises, “*The Production and Fruit of the Four Elements*,” and “*The Secrets of Nature, their Origin, Causes, Character, and Properties*,” will scarcely repay the trouble of perusal.

#### CARDAN. 1501 A. D.

This writer was a native of Pavia, and followed the profession of a physician. He studied mathematics at an early age, and soon made himself a proficient in other branches of learning. His life was chequered and eventful, which he gives us in a work entitled *De Vita Propria*.

\* Lit. Middle Ages, Vol. 1. p. 385.

Cardan compares the universe to the human body; conferring upon it a living principle, which he denominates *universal sympathy*. There is a counteracting agent to this, called *antipathy*. These are only the same powers which the ancient philosophers employed to account for the phenomena of existing things. They had their love and hatred, their concord and discord; which seemed to be some ill-conceived or one-sided view of the universal law of gravitation.\*

The principles of all organic creations are heat and moisture. The first is the universal soul, which penetrates all things; the second is a corporeal principle, which operates in a manner peculiar to itself, in three distinct elements, air, water, and fire.

Man is a creation *sui generis*; he belongs neither to the animal nor vegetable kingdoms. The characteristic which distinguishes him from all other existences, is that of possessing a species of knowledge identical with divine wisdom. His end is to know heavenly things; to exercise universal authority over everything on earth; and to bring to perfection whatever he invents.

Men may be divided into three great classes, according to their degrees of knowledge, or rather according to the predominating qualities of their understandings; namely, pure rationalists, those of mental mediocrity, and those of a decidedly sen-

\* "Sympathiam voco consensum rerum absque manifesta ratione; antipathiam, dissidium....Utramque esse in rebus, veramque earum constituere vitam, innumera probant exempla."

sual cast. Every man carries within his own being two worlds, the human and the superhuman; the finite and the infinite. These constitute the living and active principles of all virtue and wisdom.

The most convincing proof of man's immortality, is the intuitive consciousness of the soul's identity with God.\*

Cardan was not proof against the notion that there subsisted a strong sympathy between the heavenly bodies and the bodies of men. The sun was in harmony with the heart, the moon with the animal juices. Every organized body possessed a share of animal life. This was diffused throughout the whole of nature. All, however, is regulated by the principles of numbers. Heat and moisture are the two grand principles of nature; the first is the *formal*, and the second the *material* cause of all things.†

#### BERNARDINO TELESIO. 1508 A. D.

This author was a native of Cozena, in the province of Naples, and was born in 1508. He obtained the professorship of natural history at Naples, a situation he filled with great honour and ability. In pursuing his metaphysical studies, he displayed great independence of thought, and a sound judgment, and seemed determined to give his adherence to no mental creeds which would not

\* The most complete edition of Cardan's works is that of Lyons, 1663, in 10 vols. folio.

† Brucker, vol. 5. p. 85. Sprengel, vol. 3. 278.

bear a severe examination. He neither agreed with the Alexandrian nor with the Arabian interpretation of Aristotle's system; but took out of it just what he himself thought was sound and good. He revived the ancient system of Democritus, which had long remained, during many a fierce philosophical conflict, neglected and unnoticed. Telesio published his famous work, entitled, *De Natura, juxta propria principia*, at Naples, in 1586. The principle which runs through this treatise is, that in all our mental investigations we should take our start from real or sensible things, and not from abstractions. *Realia entia, non abstracta*. The author also combats the general scope and aim of the whole of the Scholastic philosophy, and endeavours to impress upon the minds of the philosophers of his own times, that we should base the whole of our philosophy upon the reality of things, and a careful study of nature's works. Experience and the sensations from our external senses, must be our only guides. These opinions disturbed his peace, for the ecclesiastical authorities of Naples thought them erroneous and dangerous. He took flight into his own part of the country, where he was allowed to die in peace.

CESALPINI D'AREZZIO. 1509 A. D.

This writer was born in 1509, and, it is said, studied philosophy at Padua, with considerable success. The leading idea of his system is that God is not to be considered as the *cause*, but as

the *substance* of the world. This opinion, however, brought him into trouble with the ecclesiastical authorities; but on account of his having been physician to Clement VIII., he was enabled to shelter himself from personal danger.

LUTHER, CALVIN, MELANCTHON, AND KNOX.  
1510 A. D.

The principal agents in the Protestant Reformation exercised a powerful influence over the cultivation of the philosophy of mind. A determined and great movement in religion could not but be attended with a corresponding effect upon the speculative doctrines, with which the elements of theology are necessarily connected. The formality which reigned in all the scholastic establishments in Europe; their slavish attachment to particular sects and dogmas; the trivial nature of many of their discussions; the detached fragments in which philosophy presented itself; its complete dependence upon theology; and its total want of rational and comprehensive interpreters; were all powerful motives for the Reformers to wish for a change, and to endeavour, if possible, to give perfect freedom to the human mind to pursue, unfettered, any course of speculation it thought fit.

We are told that Luther, in the early part of life, had studied with great zeal the writings of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus; and that his opinion relative to universals was on the side of the Nominalists. To this sect he attached

himself for many years. But as he advanced in life, and became involved in the weighty theological disputes which have rendered his name ever memorable, it seems that philosophical studies not only lost their charms, but became positively disagreeable to him. The whole Scholastic dispute appeared frivolous, and injurious to the interests of true religion. Luther was one of those men who are warm friends but bitter enemies. Having imbibed a hatred against the Scholastic Doctors, his animosity knew no bounds; and he railed against all speculative doctrines and pursuits with violent and indiscriminate recklessness. He frequently expresses the most withering contempt for Aristotle and all his works. Even the writings of the Greek on Natural Philosophy were not spared. Luther says, "What doth it contribute towards the knowledge of things, to be perpetually trifling and cavilling, in language conceived and prescribed by Aristotle, concerning matter, form, motion, and time." Again, "I am persuaded that neither Thomas, nor all the Thomists together, ever understood a single chapter of Aristotle."\*

Calvin studied the systems of both Aristotle and Plato, and was naturally fond of metaphysical studies. Indeed his *Institutes* are a pretty convincing proof of his skill in speculative knowledge, and in the art of reasoning. Some of the Reformers, among whom was Zuingle, wished to abolish philosophical studies altogether in Universities and

\* Declarationes ad Heidelbergenses apud Werensdorf.

schools of education; but Calvin opposed this, on the broad ground, that speculative knowledge was not only absolutely necessary for the right understanding of Christian truth, but of incalculable benefit towards the refutation of heresy and error. In those public seminaries of learning, immediately under his controul, he appointed professors of philosophy, but restricted them to a plain exposition of the Aristotelian system, with the direct view of strengthening the reasoning faculties of theological students. In several of the Reformed academies, the Logic of Peter Ramus was adopted instead of Aristotle's work on that subject.

Melancthon followed a somewhat different course from Luther as to the cultivation of philosophy. He revived the study of the Peripatetic system in public schools, and considered it a useful auxiliary to theological pursuits. Still he was not blinded to the great imperfections of Scholastic methods of teaching, and of the mischiefs they occasioned amongst the youth devoted to the ministry. He says, " Ever since this method of philosophising has been introduced, ancient learning has been despised, mathematics deserted, and sacred studies more negligently cultivated. Among the variety of opinions which prevail in the different Scholastic factions, you will scarcely find one that is consistent with itself. Truth is everywhere confounded with error, and every doctor is more concerned to gather crowds by his noisy disputations, than to discover and establish sound philosophy. In the mean time dissensions everywhere arise; enmities



are cherished; rancour supplies the place of that candid spirit which ought ever to accompany learning; and the ancient union betwixt the Muses and Graces is dissolved."

Melancthon's influence had great weight in all the Universities under Protestant authority. A great number of distinguished men taught the philosophy which he adopted. Among these we may mention Simon Simonius, Philip Scherbius, Ernest Sonner, Michael Piccart, Christopher Scheibel, Cornclius Martini, Daniel Stahl, James Schenke, Conrad Hornejus, Christian Dreyer, Hermann Conring, and Melchior Zeidler.

John Knox, when young, was a zealous cultivator of philosophy, which he considered indispensable to the higher purposes of theological instruction. And it is worthy of remark here, that the Church of Scotland, which considers him as its founder, has uniformly imposed upon all students desirous of theological appointments, a considerable acquaintance with the philosophy of mind, in all its various ramifications.

#### PETER RAMUS. 1515 A.D.

This distinguished metaphysical writer and controversialist was born in Picardy, in 1515, of very poor parents. He obtained, however, through some means, access to the University of Paris, to perform the duties of a situation which gave little promise of future celebrity. But he soon raised himself, by the most indefatigable labour and zeal, to a conspi-

cuous station among the learned and talented of the day. He attacked with vigour the Peripatetic philosophy, then all dominant in the University of Paris; and by this means he was necessarily brought into angry collision with all the most eminent heads of that seat of learning. We are told by Teissier, in his *Eloge des Hommes Savans*, that the books of Ramus (his *Institutiones Dialecticæ*, and *Animadversiones Aristotelicæ*), were prohibited by the Court, and publicly denounced before the Royal College. He was condemned to abstain from teaching philosophy, and was also very nearly being sent to the galleys. His sentence was published in Latin and French, and posted throughout all the streets of Paris. Both himself and his doctrines were publicly ridiculed upon the stage, amidst uproarious plaudits of thousands of the disciples of Aristotle's philosophy. But a more severe fate awaited him. His enemies raised the cry against him of secretly espousing Protestant doctrines; and, in consequence of this imputation, he was assassinated at the great Massacre of St. Bartholomew. His body was thrown out of one of the windows of the College; and his infuriated pupils tore out his very intestines, and dragged them about the street.\*

The direct and active instrument by which this dreadful tragedy was effected, was a book of logic which Ramus had composed, the *Institutiones Dialecticæ*. The reasons for the writing of this work, are the following, which he states himself. He says that after he had spent three years

\* See Varillas, *Hist. de Charles IX.* liv. 9; and De Thou, lib. 52.

in the study of logic, he asked himself of what use it had been to him; if it had rendered him more fluent in speech, given him a finer and quicker skill in poetry, made him better acquainted with all those really important matters, which when a man thoroughly understands, he is said to be a wise man. The answer to these self-interrogatories was of a negative kind. Where, then, lay the imperfection? Did it rest with him, or with the system of logic which he studied? He pondered over this matter for some time; at length the dialogues of Plato fell into his hands, and he fancied he discovered a more plain and effective instrument for general reasoning, than that he had been using from Aristotle. Full of this subject, he soon concocted a system of logic of his own; and it was with this instrument that he produced such a terrific effect, amongst the learned Aristotelians in the University of Paris.

On the abstract merits of this new logic, and in what it differed from Aristotle's system, which was then taught in the schools, various and discordant opinions have been entertained. The historian Buhle says, "If we look at this work of Ramus, and estimate it by what was previously in use, we shall see a great superiority in the new production. If, however, we judge of it by the nature and extent of the science itself, and the improvements which have been effected in it of later times, then, I conceive, Ramus will not be entitled to much commendation."\*

\* Buhle, Vol. 2. pp. 593—595.

The logic of Ramus, after his death, became very popular in many of the Universities of Europe. It was introduced into Germany by Melancthon; in Italy it found some countenance; in France, in several districts, it nearly divided the honour with Aristotle himself; while in England and Scotland it was uncommonly well received. Andrew Melville introduced it to the University of Glasgow. Brucker tells us that few eminent schools were to be found where it was not known.

F. PICCOLOMINI. 1520 A.D.

The subject of this notice was born at Centi, in the Duchy of Modena, in 1552. He studied philosophy with great assiduity and success at the University of Padua, and obtained considerable reputation as an acute philosopher. He expounded the metaphysical system of Aristotle.

FRANCIS GEORGE ZORZI. 1520 A.D.

This author was a Franciscan monk, and his mental philosophy is of a mystic complexion. He had studied very profoundly all the writings of the Pythagoreans, the new Platonists, the Rabbins, and the Cabalistics; and had jumbled them all together in a strange confusion. The writings of Origen, and Dionysius the Areopagite, were especial favourites with him. His "*Canticles on the Harmony of the World*," were published in 1525, and excited a good deal of attention among philosophers at its first appearance. The Oriental emanations con-

stitute the foundation of his system, so far as his medley of opinions can be designated by such a name. “The Divinity,” says he, “is the only efficient cause in the universe ; it is also a subjective and formal cause ; and creates other beings by virtue of its own innate power of creation. The elements are in the Deity, and form the rudiments of things ; the *ideas* or sources from which being is produced. These ideas are not merely *copies*, as Plato fancied, but are the effusions, the Divine illustrations ; and communicate, by the power of their own nature, the constituent elements or essences of every thing which exists.”\*

#### FRANCISCUS PATRICIUS. 1529 A.D.

This author is but little known. He wrote a work entitled *Discussiones Peripateticæ*. For several years he taught philosophy at Ferrara and at Rome, with reputation. According to his notions, true philosophy consists in the *love of wisdom* ; this wisdom consists in a knowledge of all things ; all things constitute order ; and this order is the connexion of things *in time*. Philosophy takes its origin from that which is first known, which is *light*. This is the powerful and subtile element, through whose agency all things are created.

#### TALEN OMER. 1530 A.D.

This writer was a zealous disciple of Peter Ramus, and laboured most assiduously to extend the logic

\* Proœmium Cautici. Cant. 1. 4. 6. 10. 16.

of his master. Omer attacked the Peripatetic doctrine with great vigour, and with some success. In England his treatise on logic was revised and arranged by no less a person than the immortal John Milton.

JAMES CONCIO. 1530 A.D.

This author was a native of Trent, and obtained considerable notoriety in his day, among divines, by his book on the *Stratagems of Satan*. On embracing the principles of the Reformation, he came to England in 1567, and obtained a pension from Queen Elizabeth. He is the author of a small work, entitled, *De Methodo*, written in Latin. This work is little known. Method, the author contends, is of the greatest importance to sound knowledge. "It is," he says, "the proper manner of proceeding, whether in the examination of known truths, the obtaining those which are not known, or in transmitting knowledge to others. But a philosophical method requires some preliminary arrangements. It is requisite we should determine beforehand in what the knowledge of things consists, how we obtain that knowledge, what matters it embraces, and what portion of these we are able to trace to their proper causes. These are considerations of great moment. We may be said to have a perfect knowledge of a thing if we know what it is, what are its causes and effects, and are able to comprehend it, not only as a whole, but in all its most minute parts and dependencies. We should know the genus, as well as the species; not only

immediate or proximate causes and effects, but those that are more remote and hidden.”\*

Again Concio says, “The human mind can arrive at the knowledge of finite things, and things fixed and immutable; and, in consequence, can know universals, but it cannot comprehend the infinite.”

“The relation which the known bears to the unknown, on which alone we can ground our investigations, consists in the connection between the general and the particular, the whole and its parts, the compound and the simple, and the cause and its effect.”

“All knowledge deduced from a process of reasoning, presupposes some primitive truths, immediate, founded in nature, and independent of the reasoning process. The office of Method is to bring these primitive truths to light.”†

On the difference between abstract truths and truths drawn from every-day experience, Concio makes the following remarks: “The first (abstract truths) are general; they form an essential part of human nature, and are immediately assented to as soon as expressed. Truths from experience are obtained through the medium of the senses, and become, by frequent repetition, objects of positive and certain knowledge.”‡

\* De Methodo, §. 1. 3. 13. 14. † Ib. §. 9. p. 29. ‡ Ib. §. 9. p. 32. 33.

## JAMES ZABARELLA. 1532 A. D.

This person was born at Padua, and studied philosophy at the University of that city. He was a believer in Astrology. He wrote, "Commentaries on Aristotle." His system of logic was taken from Germany. He maintained that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul could not be proved from Aristotle's philosophy. This brought him under the lash of the Inquisition, but he successfully defended his positions, and escaped punishment.

## GOCCLENIUS. 1547 A. D.

This writer on the human mind was born at Corbeck. He was the author of a work entitled *Psychologia; hoc est, de hominis perfectione animæ*, which was published at Marbourgh in 1590. He is the first writer who applied the modern word Psychology to intellectual studies.

## TAURELLUS. 1547 A. D.

This was a German writer, born at Mumpelgard, and a most devoted advocate for the Platonic system. His works gained him considerable reputation in his day. It is said, however, that he was fonder of engrafting some fanciful theories of his own upon Plato's principles, than of keeping steadily to the letter of the law as laid down by the Grecian sage.



## LEONICO TOMEIO. 1547 A. D.

This philosopher was born at Venice, and in his early years cultivated an acquaintance with the philosophy of Greece. He translated Aristotle, Proclus, and several other ancient writers. Italy owes him a debt of gratitude for his labours.\*

## MARIUS NIZOLINI. 1553 A. D.

This author published a work at Parma, "On the Proper Principles and Mode of Reasoning," in which he enters at considerable length on some of the maxims of Aristotle; particularly what concerns the nature and application of general terms. His arguments against the Realists, and in favour of the theory of the Nominalists, will be found in the sixth chapter of the first book. The author shows the utter hollowness of the arguments of the Realists, and that the opposite system is, in every point of view, more consonant with the dictates of common sense and sound philosophy.

## ALEXANDER ACHILLINI. 1560 A. D.

This philosopher followed the medical profession, and published several works on anatomy and medi-

\* See Fabricius, Bib. Lat. tom. 4. p. 788.

cine. But in addition to these professional studies, he had read and studied Aristotle profoundly. He viewed the philosophy of the Stagirite through the medium of the Arabian interpretation, and not through that of the Alexandrian School. He was called the Second Aristotle.

GIORDANO BRUNO. 1560 A. D.

Giordano Bruno was born at Nola, in the middle of the sixteenth century. He entered among the Dominicans, but from his doubts about religion, and his peculiar philosophical opinions, he was discarded from this community, and was also obliged to leave Italy altogether. He went to Geneva, and from thence to Paris, where he commenced a vigorous attack upon the philosophy of Aristotle. He afterwards visited England, where he took up his abode with Sir Philip Sidney. After leaving England, he visited several of the most distinguished cities in Germany, where he delivered lectures, both publicly and to select parties. He had a strong wish to visit Italy again, and was at length induced to take shelter in Venice, at that time the most liberal portion of that country. Here he remained in peace for a short time; but he was eventually handed over to the Inquisition at Rome, and was burned as a common heretic, on the 17th Feb. 1600.

Bruno was distinguished by great originality and force of genius. He was not a mere compiler or

expositor of other men's systems; but always thought for himself, and uniformly displayed a really independent mind. He defended the Copernican system of philosophy. His metaphysical views approach very nearly to some opinions which have been of late very popular in Germany. There is great subtlety and acuteness manifested in all his works.\*

Those who will take the trouble of examining the works of Bruno carefully, will find the germs of several modern systems of philosophy; those of Descartes and Leibnitz, in particular. The whirlpools of the former, and the optimism of the latter, are clearly defined. The atoms of Gassendi may also be found in his writings.

The following quotations show the peculiar notions which pervaded Bruno's speculative systems.

“Or, quanto a la causa effettrice, dico l'efficiente fisico universale esser l'intelletto universale, ch' è la prima e principal facultà dell'anima del mondo, la qual è forma universale di quello.....L'intelletto universale è l'intimo più reale e propria facultà, e parte potenziale dell'anima del mondo. Questo è uno medesimo ch'empic il tutto, illumina l'universo, e indirizza la natura a produrre le sue specie, come il nostro intelletto è la congrua produzione di specie razionali.....Questo è nominato di Platonici fabbro del mondo.” p. 235.

\* The best works of the author are, “Della Causa, Principio, e Uno;” Paris, 1584; “Dell' Infinito Universo e Mondo” Venice, 1584; “De Monade, numero et figura;” Franckfort, 1591.

“Dunqueabbiamo un principio intrinseco formale eterno e sussistente, incomparabilmente migliore di quello che han finto li sofisti, che versano circa gl'accidenti, ignoranti de la sustanza de le cose, e che vengono a ponere le sustanze corrottibili, per chè quello chiamano massimamente, primamente e principalmente sustanza, che resulta da la composizione; in che non è altro, ch'uno accidente, che non contiene in se nulla stabilità e verità, e si risolve in nulla.” p. 242.

“ Son tre sorti d'intelletto ; il divino, ch'è tutto, questo mondano, che fa tutto ; gli altri particolari, che si fanno tutti. E vera causa efficiente (l'intelletto mondano) non tanto estrinseca, come anch' intrinseca di tutte cose naturali.....Mi par, che detrahan a la divina bontà e a l'eccellenza di questo grande animale e simulacro del primo principio quelli, che non vogliono intendere, nè affermare, il mondo con li suoi membri essere animato.” p. 239.

“E dunque l'universo uno, infinito, immobile. Una dico è la possibilità assoluta, uno l'atto, una la forma o anima, una la materia o corpo, una la cosa, uno lo ente, uno il massimo e ottimo, il quale non deve posser essere compreso, e però infinibile e interminabile, e per tanto infinito e interminato, e per conseguenza immobile. Questo non si muove localmente ; per chè non ha cosa fuor di sè, ove si trasporte, atteso che sia il tutto. Non si genera ; per chè non è altro essere, che lui possa desiderare o aspettare, atteso che abbia tutto lo essere. Non si corrompe ; perchè non è altra cosa, in cui si cangi,

atteso che lui sia ogni cosa. Non può sminuire o crescere, atteso ch'è infinito, a cui come non si può aggiungere, così è da cui non si può sottrarre, per ciò che lo infinito non ha parti proporzionali. Non è alterabile in altra disposizione, per chè non ha esterno, da cui patisca, e per cui venga in qualche affezione. Oltre chè per comprender tutte contrarietàadi nell'esser suo, in unità o convenienza, e nessuna inclinazione posser avere ad altro e novo essere, o pur ad altro e altro modo d'essere, non può esser soggetto di mutazione secondo qualità alcuna, nè può aver contrario diverso, che l'alteri, per chè in lui è ogni cosa concorde. Non è materia, per chè non è figurato, nè figurabile, non è terminato, nè terminabile. Non è forma, per chè non informa, nè figura altra, atteso che è tutto, è massimo, è uno, è universo. Non si comprende; per chè non è maggior di sè. Non si è compreso; perchè non è minor di sè. Non si agguaglia; per chè non è altro e altro, ma uno e medesimo. Essendo medesimo ed uno, non ha essere ed essere; e per chè non ha essere ed essere, non ha parti e parti; è per ciò chè non ha parte o parte, non è composto. Questo è termine di sorte, che non è termine; e talmente forma, che non è forma; e talmente materia, che non è materia; e talmente anima, che non è anima; per chè è il tutto indifferentemente, e però è uno, l'universo è uno." p. 280.

“Ecco, come non è possibile, ma necessario, che l'ottimo, massimo, incomprendibile, è tutto, è per tutto, è in tutto, per chè come semplice ed indivisi-

bile può esser tutto, esser per tutto, essere in tutto. E così non è stato vanamente detto, che Giove empie tutte le cose, inabita tutte le parti dell'universo, è centro di ciò, che ha l'essere uno in tutto, e per cui uno è tutto. Il quale, essendo tutte le cose, e comprendendo tutto l'essere in se, viene a far, che ogni cosa sia in ogni cosa. Ma mi direste, per chè dunque le cose si cangiano, la materia particolare si forza ad altre forme? Vi rispondo, che non è mutazione, che cerca altro essere, ma altro modo di essere. E questa è la differenza tra l'universo e le cose dell'universo; per chè nullo comprendo tutto l'essere e tutti modi di essere; di questa nascuna ha tutto l'essere, ma non tutti i modi di essere." p. 282.

Causa, Principio, ed Uno sempiterno,  
 Onde l'esser, la vita, il moto pende,  
 E a lungo, a largo, a profondo si stende  
 Quanto si dice in ciel, terra ed inferno.

Con senso, con ragion, con mente scerno  
 Ch'atto, misura e conto non comprende,  
 Quel vigor, mole, e numero, che tende  
 Oltre ogni inferior, mezzo e superno.

Cieco error, tempo avaro, ria fortuna,  
 Sorda invidia, vil rabbia, iniquo zelo,  
 Crudo cor, empio ingegno, strano ardire,  
 Non basteranno a farmi l'aria bruna,  
 Non mi parrann' avanti gl'occhi il velo,  
 Non faran mai, ch'il mio bel sol non mire.\*

\* See Mr. Hallam's notice of Bruno, in "Lit. Middle Ages;" and also the works of Bruno, by Christian Bartholomew, published at Paris, in three vols. 1847.

Bruno was a man of rare and splendid talents, but his mind was unequally balanced. His imagination was ardent and enthusiastic; and there was joined to this a power of contemplating the most abstract subjects, and tracing them through all their subtile ramifications. Sincerity and a love of truth were stamped on every movement of his mind. He loved to dwell upon the mystical and sublime, and to mould the more subtile movements of the mind into systems and theories; to fashion his thoughts into new and original combinations; and to feed an inordinate vanity with the thought that he was doing what no one else could do. His knowledge was profound and varied, and always at hand on all occasions and exigencies. He joined the sublimity of Plato and the dialectic skill of Aristotle, with the whimsical notions of Raymund Lully and the mystical abstractions of Averroes. The spirituality of his mind preserved him from low and huckstering views of the universe and of man. In all his eccentricities and imaginative flights, he rivets your attention, and excites your sympathy and regard. He shows you the world of existence and thought in a thousand different forms; he treats you with a series of speculative dissolving views, which display to admirable perfection the consummate skill of the artist, and fill the mind with astonishment and delight. But he is far removed from the sober and severe realities of life. The portion of solid knowledge we derive from him is scanty; and the contemplation of his

intellectual character and fate, leaves a melancholy reflexion that what is brilliant is not always useful, nor are the most splendid gifts of the mind a security against error and misfortune.

FRANCIS SANCHEZ. 1562 A. D.

This writer was a Portuguese physician, and at an early age was sent to several universities in France and Italy, to study philosophy. He became a preceptor at the College of Toulouse; where he expounded Aristotle; but being a man of a very acute mind, and ambitious of distinction, the ordinary routine of the school of metaphysics by no means satisfied him, and he indulged in abstruse speculations of his own. He soon began to doubt of almost every thing! He was obliged, however, to act with prudence, for the Church viewed at this period, with great jealousy, all departures from the prescribed routine of academical instruction. He published a work, entitled "*De multum nobili et prima Universali Scientia, quod nihil scitur,*" in which he severely censures all those philosophers who implicitly adopt fundamental principles of systems, without examining the foundations on which they rest. Mr. Hallam, in his very best style, has entered fully into the opinions of Sanchez; and the reader will find them at the end of the volume.\*

\* See Note II. at the end of this Volume.



## THOMAS CAMPANELLA. 1568 A. D.

This author was an Italian monk of the Dominican order, and was born in 1568. He attempted to reform the whole range of philosophy, and particularly combated some of the positions of Aristotle. This boldness of discussion furnished a plausible motive for his enemies to accuse him of conspiracy; and upon this charge he was committed to prison, first at Naples, and afterwards at Rome. This captivity he endured with the greatest fortitude for the long space of twenty-seven years. In his solitude he amused himself with writing verses.\* He made his escape from Rome, and flew to Paris for protection, where Cardinal de Richelieu showed him great kindness.

His metaphysical opinions are nearly the same as those of Telesio. Campanella maintains that experience should be our guide in all intellectual investigations. He says, "*Sentire est scire.*" Against the scholastic philosophy he has the following remark: "*Cognitio divinorum non habetur per syllogismum, qui est quasi sagitta qua seopum attingimus a longo absque gestu, neque modo per auctoritatem, quod est tangere quasi per manum alienam.*"†

\* Scelta d'alcune poesie filosofiche. 1532.

† His works are, *De sensu rerum et magia*, Frankfort. 1620; *Philosophiæ Rationalis et Realis partes 5*, Paris, 1638; *Universalis Philosophiæ sive Metaphysicarum rerum juxta propria dogmata partes 3*, Paris, 1638; *Realis Philosophiæ Epilogistica partes 4*, Frankfort, 1828.

## ROBERT FLUDD. 1574 A. D.

Robert Fludd was a native of Milgate, in Kent, and obtained considerable reputation as a physician in England. He was of a contemplative and enthusiastic turn of mind, and adopted trains of speculative thought which led him into all manner of absurdities in matters of philosophy. He dived into all the Cabalistic and Mystical systems; and jumbled them together in such rich and incomprehensible confusion, that no one could obtain even a glimpse of what he really did maintain. All that can be gathered from his writings are the following positions. He undertakes to establish a perfect unity among metaphysical theories, and to make them subservient to the illustration of medicine, theology, and morals; that *light* is the grand active principle of existence, and the creator of all things; in fact, Deity itself. It flows eternally from his own unfathomable depths, and successively produces animate and inanimate creations, and all pure and ethereal intelligences. In his *Philosophia Mosaica*, this principle of *light* seems again divided into three parts; *darkness* is the first substance, *water* the second, and *divine light* the third. This last is the central essence, or creative and vivifying principle. These various elements blended in certain proportions, produce all phenomena, production, generation, and re-production.

The works of Fludd are very numerous, amounting to five volumes folio. The learned Gassendi

undertook a formal refutation of his philosophical errors, in a work entitled, “*Examen Philosophiæ Fluddianæ.*”\*

JACOB BÖHME. 1575 A. D.

This individual was a poor shoemaker at Gorlitz, in Germany, and was born in 1575. He displayed in early life a decided turn for reading; but his only library, for a long time, was a book containing the lives of the holy Fathers of the Church. This work he read with great diligence and earnestness; and, joining many of its statements with his own contemplations on the works of nature, he was led into those peculiar trains of thought which form the characteristic feature in all his publications.

His mind received also a decided bias from the following circumstance, which he was wont often to relate in after life. His master and mistress being abroad one day, there came into the shop a person of a very reverend and grave deportment, but dressed in mean and shabby clothing. He took up a pair of shoes and desired to purchase them. Böhme being very timid in fixing a price upon them, lest he should make a mistake, seemed averse to closing the bargain; but the stranger persisting in purchasing, the boy fixed a rather high figure upon the articles. The money was immediately paid. The old man then went a little distance from the shop-door, and called out, in a

\* See Wood's Ath. Oxon. l. 2. p. 390.

loud and authoritative tone, "Jacob! Jacob! come forth." Jacob, astonished at the hearing of his Christian name, obeyed the call, when the stranger, fixing his piercing eyes upon him, addressed him thus: "Jacob, thou art little but shalt be great, and become another man, such a one as the world shall wonder at; therefore be pious, fear God, and reverence his word. Read diligently the Holy Scriptures, wherein thou hast comfort and instruction. For thou must endure much misery and poverty, and suffer persecution; but be courageous and persevere, for God loves and is gracious unto thee." So saying, the old man pressed the hand of the boy, and gave him a kind and impressive look.

This address made a deep and lasting impression upon the youth's mind. He grew more serious and devout; attended public worship most regularly; gave his nights and leisure hours to the perusal of the Holy Scriptures; and cultivated an inward piety and devotion which astonished all who were about him.

He published his first book in 1610, which he called *Aurora, or the Morning Redness*. The manuscript of this work was given into the hands of an intimate friend of the author's, who had it secretly transcribed very quickly, and by this means publicity was given to it, and Böhme drawn from his obscurity. The treatise fell into the hands of a zealous clergyman called Richter, who, thinking its principles erroneous and dangerous, denounced them from the pulpit, and called upon the magis-

tracy to prosecute the author. The Senate summoned Böhme forthwith, seized his book, and admonished him to leave off writing for the future, and “*stick to his last.*” This injunction was obeyed for the space of seven years, when Böhme thought himself again moved to write, and so continued at intervals to the end of his days.

After the first appearance of the *Aurora, or the Morning Redness*, the author was visited by a great number of learned persons; and especially by one Balthasar Walter, of Silesia, who had travelled for several years through Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, in search of ancient magical learning. The result of this enterprise did not meet with his sanguine expectations; for he declared, on his becoming acquainted with Böhme, that he had found at home, in a poor cottage, that for which he had travelled so far in vain. Walter gave Böhme the name of the *Teutonic Philosopher*. He went also to the German Universities in quest of all such questions respecting the nature and properties of the human soul, as were thought impossible to be fundamentally resolved. These, amounting to forty, he took to Böhme, who answered them all to his entire satisfaction. These were afterwards printed; and it is related that, on an English translation of them being presented to King Charles the First, he declared that “If Böhme were no scholar, the Holy Ghost was now in men; but if he were a scholar, he was one of the best.”

The following is a list of this author’s works; those in parentheses were left unfinished at his death.

1. Aurora.—2. Of the Three Principles, 1619.—3. Of the Threefold Life of Man, 1620.—4. Answers to the forty questions of the Soul.—5. Of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ; Of the Suffering, Death, and Resurrection of Christ; Of the Tree of Faith.—6. Of the Six Points, great and small.—7. Of the Heavenly and Earthly Mystery.—8. Of the last Times, to P. K.—9. De Signatura Rerum.—10. A Consolatory book of the Four Complexions.—11. An Apology to Balthasar Tilken, in two parts.—12. Considerations upon Isaias Stiefel's book.—13. Of true Repentance, 1622.—14. Of true Resignation.—15. A book of Regeneration.—16. A book of Predestination and Election of God, 1623.—17. A Compendium of Repentance.—18. *Mysterium Magnum*, or an Exposition upon Genesis.—19. A Table of the Principles, or a Key of his Writings.—20. Of the Supersensual Life.—21. (Of the Divine Vision.)—22. Of the two Testaments of Christ, Baptism and the Supper.—23. Dialogue between the Enlightened and Unenlightened Soul.—24. An Apology for a book on true Repentance, against a Pamphlet of the Primate of Gorlitz, George Richter.—25. (A book of 177 Theosophick Questions.)—26. An Epitome of the *Mysterium Magnum*.—27. (The Holy Weeks, or the Prayer-Book.)—28. A Table of the Divine Manifestation.—29. Of the Errors of the sects of Ezckiel Meths, and Isaias Stiefel; or *Antistiefelius* 2d.—30. A Book of the Last Judgment.—31. Letters to divers Persons, with Keys for hidden words.

It is difficult to systematize accurately the opi-

nions of Böhme ; but for ordinary purposes of reference to his writings, they may be classed under the following heads.—1. The impossibility of arriving at truth by any other means than by direct illumination from above.—2. A theory of creation.—3. Relations subsisting between the Deity and man.—4. The identity of the human soul with the Divine Nature, and the constituted differences between them both, as to form.—5. Original sin.—6. The interrogation of the soul.—7. A symbolical exposition of Christianity.

The theosophy of Böhme consists in his attempt to demonstrate that all things could not have been otherwise than they are, because they owe their origin to the attributes of the Deity. In various places of his writings he seems to have adopted language which was, in his own day, construed into an approval of the Manichean theory of two independent principles. To form a candid and correct opinion of his general system, we must not lay too much stress upon his comparisons and images, because these were employed only as means to represent intellectual realities which are removed to a great distance from our ordinary trains of thought. Looking at the general lineaments of Böhme's philosophy, we may trace many resemblances between it and several modern systems of speculation which have, within the last fifty years, made their appearance in Germany.

The opinions of Böhme made a considerable sensation in his day amongst a certain class of learned men. The clergy were, however, strongly opposed to him, and his body was refused the rites of Chris-

tian burial, until the magistrates had to make a representation that it would be a disgrace to insult the earthly remains of one who had led a peaceable life, and lived in strict communion with the Lutheran Church. His friends were chiefly amongst noblemen, courtiers, physicians, and rich merchants. It is mentioned, upon the authority of William Law, in the Appendix to his "Appeal to all that doubt or disbelieve the truths of the Gospel," that many autograph extracts from Böhme were found amongst the papers of Sir Isaac Newton after his decease. Law goes so far as to affirm it as his opinion that Newton derived the fundamental principles of his system from Böhme's writings; but that he did not like to make the avowal, lest it might bring ridicule and contempt upon his own speculations.\*

JOHN HUARTE. 1575 A.D.

It is rather uncertain whether this metaphysical writer was by birth a Spaniard or a Frenchman; but his book is written in the Spanish language, and was published about the year 1641. He is represented as having been a physician. His publication has been translated into almost all the languages of Europe. The edition now referred to is as follows "*Examen de Ingenios para las Ciencias, donde se muestra la diferencia de habilidades, que ay en los hombres; y el genere de letras, que cada uno responde en particular.*" Par el Doctor Huarte, Madrid, 1578.

\* See Penny Cyclopedia, where there is a full account of Bohme.



The general scope of this treatise, is to trace out the intimate connection which subsists between certain kinds of minds, and certain kinds of physical temperaments of body. This line of inquiry had evidently been suggested to the author from the profession which he followed, which is one of those departments of human learning very suitably fitted for classifying the facts and analogies which arise out of the union and sympathy between mind and body. All speculations of this description, when prudently guided, are useful to a certain extent, in the important work of education ; and it was from a settled conviction of this kind that the author was wishful to give his thoughts a practical turn. He was so full of enthusiasm, and so deeply impressed with the importance of his discoveries, that he determined to memorialize Philip II. of Spain, to carry his views into operation throughout the whole of his kingdom ; and particularly in the seminaries of learning. A part of the memorial is as follows : “ As I have frequently remarked, the mind of man is very narrow and circumscribed, and when it attempts to do more than one thing at once, it only embarrasses itself. I have always thought it never could thoroughly know two arts or professions ; and when this was attempted, one of the two was sure to be imperfectly understood. Thus it seems to me, that it is requisite to set apart a number of sagacious and learned men, to examine, and investigate into, the mental qualifications and capabilities of young persons ; in

order to oblige them to make a choice of such sciences and professions, as would be most in accordance with their intellectual constitutions; and not to leave the matter to their own choice or direction. For in general cases, this choice will necessarily be an injudicious one, and will induce them to give a preference to some line of life which will prove less advantageous and useful to them, than if they were under the direction of suitable and qualified counsellors. It would happen from all this, Sire, that you would have better workmen, and more finished workmanship, throughout your dominions, and persons who knew better, than those at present, how to unite nature with art. I should also wish the learned academies of your kingdom to be placed under a similar regulation; for, as constituted at present, all students go from one faculty of learning to another without their understanding Latin well; so, in like manner, examinations should be instituted to ascertain that when any one wished to study logic, or philosophy, or medicine, or theology, or law, he had that peculiar constitution or aptitude of mind, fitted for that particular profession."

The leading principles which are to be our guide in this national examination of minds, are embraced in three principal divisions; namely, those principles which refer to the powers of memory; those which belong to the understanding; and those we commonly assign to the imagination. These three divisions we must constantly keep

before us; and if we guide our selections by them, we shall not fail to be correct in the majority of instances.

Huarte maintains that if a mind applies itself to a science, which it is not fitted by nature to prosecute, it will fail of its object. And he severely condemns the mode commonly adopted, of entering into particular professions without once considering the intellectual qualifications requisite for their honourable and successful cultivation.

The doctrine of *temperaments* is discussed by Huarte, at considerable length, in the fifth chapter of his work. He shows the connexion between bodily conformation and intellectual vigour. In the eighth chapter, we find a very curious doctrine promulgated, that the various degrees of heat, moisture, and dryness, fully account for all the intellectual varieties and powers of man. Huarte says, "As long as the rational soul is in the body, it is impossible it should perform different and contrary actions, if to each it have its proper and peculiar instruments. This is clearly seen in the animal faculty, which exercises divers actions in the exterior senses, each having its particular and proper organ; the sight has it often in one manner, the hearing after another; the taste, the smell, and the touch, after another; and if this were not so, there would be but one sort of actions; all would consist either in the sight, or in the hearing, or taste, or touch. \* \* \* \* We understand, we imagine, and remember, by the same animal virtue. But if it be true, that each action requires its par-

particular instrument, there must necessarily be one organ in the brain to understand, another to imagine, and a third to remember; for if the brain were organized after one and the same manner, all would be either memory, or understanding, or imagination." The writer then goes on to show the effects of heat, moisture, and dryness on the various powers of the mind. On the effect of these on imagination he says; "Imagination arises from the heat, because there remains in the brain no other rational faculty, so we have no other quality to ascribe to it. For the sciences appertaining to the imagination, are the exercise of them that rave in their sickness, and not the same with those which belong to the understanding and memory. And suppose that phrensy, madness, and melancholy, are the over-heated passions of the brain, we may thence draw a strong proof, that *the imagination consists in heat.*\*

To those who are fond of tracing the sympathy between the body and mind, the work of Huarte will afford them no small portion of amusement and instruction. It is, in fact, a very curious treatise. It has been twice translated into English, under the title of "*The Tryal of Wits.*"

The following is an enumeration of the chapters of the work in the original Spanish.

Cap. 1.—Pruevase por un exemplo, que si el muchacho no tiene el ingenio y habilidad que pide la ciencia que quiere estudiar, por demas es oyrla

\* The Tryal of Wits, p. 148.

de buenos maestros, tener muchos libros, ni travajar en ellos toda la vida, no valen nada.

Cap. 2.—Como la naturaleza es la que haze al muehaeho habil para aprender.

Cap. 3.—Qual parte del euerpo ha de estar bien templada, para que el muehaeho tenga habilidad.

Cap. 4.—Muestrase que el anima vegetativa, sensitiva y raeional, son sabias, sin ser enseñadas de nadie ; teniendo el temperamento conveniente que piden sus obras.

Cap. 5.—Pruevase, que de solas tres ealidades, eolor, humedad, y sequedad, salen todas las differeneias de ingenios, que ay en el hombre.

On this part of the author's subject he makes the following remarks.

“ Aunque no de qualquiera grado destas tres calidades, resulta una differeneia de ingenio : porque a tanta intension puede llegar la sequedad, el eolor y la humedad, que desbarate totalmente la faeultad animal, conforme aquella senteneia de Galeno—(*Lib. 2. aph. com. 20.*) Y asi es eierto ; porque aunque el entendimiento se aproveeha de la sequedad ; però tanta puede ser, que le eonsuma sus obras.” P. 89.

Cap. 6.—Ponense algunas dudas y argumentos, contra la doetrina del capitulo passado, y la respuesta de ellos.

Cap. 7.—Muestrase que aunque el anima raeional, a menester el temperamento de las quatro ealidades primeras, asi para estar en el euerpo como para deseurrir y raeioeinar, que no por esso se insiere que es corruptible y mortal.

Cap. 8.—Como se da a cada diferencia de ingenio la ciencia que le responde en particular; y se le quita la que le es repugnante y contraria.

Cap. 9.—Como se prueba, que eloquencia y policia en hablar, no puede estar en los hombres de grande entendimiento.

Cap. 10.—Como se prueba que la theorica de la Theologia, pertenece al entendimiento; y el predicar (que es su practica) a la imaginacion.

Cap. 11.—Como la Theorica de las leyes pertenece a la memoria; y el abogar y juzgar, (que es su practica) al entendimiento; y el governar una republica, a la imaginacion.

Cap. 12.—Como se prueba que la Theorica de la medicina, parte della pertenece a la memoria; y parte al entendimiento, y la practica a la imaginacion.

Cap. 13.—Como se declara, a que diferencia de habilidad, pertenece el arte militar; y con que señales se a de conocer el hombre, que alcanzare esta manera de ingenio.

Cap. 14.—Como se declara, a que diferencia de habilidad pertenece el officio de Rey, y que señales a de tener al que tuviere esta manera de ingenio.

Cap. 15.—Capitulo notable, donde se trae la manera como los padres han de engendrar los hijos sabios, y del ingenio que quieren las letras.

This last chapter is illustrated at great length in several sections.

## LUCILIO VANINI. 1585 A. D.

This well-known person was born at Naples in 1585. He travelled through Germany, Holland, England, and France, but was arrested at Toulouse, and was condemned by the Parliament to be burnt alive for his offensive and irreligious opinions. This sentence was carried into effect in 1619.

Vanini published two books under the following titles. “*Amphitheatrum æternum Providentiæ divino-magicum, christiano-physicum, nec non astro-nomico-catholicum, adversus veteres philosophos, atheos epicureos, peripateticos et stoicos. Lugduni, 1615.*” The second publication is entitled, “*De admirandis naturæ, reginæ deæque mortalium, arcanis, dialogorum inter Alexandrum et Julium Cesarem lib. 4; cum approbatione Facultatis Sorbonicæ. Lutet. 1616.*”

There has been a difference of opinion as to the precise nature of the irreligious principles of Vanini. I think it is obvious he was not an atheist, in the common acceptation of that word. The following is a passage from his first work. “All beings are either finite or infinite. There is not a single finite being which is sufficient of itself, or which can exist by virtue of its own nature. This is the reason why it is easy to give a necessary demonstration of the existence of a Deity. This demonstration does not, however, rest upon the relation of cause and effect, but upon the relation of phenomena to being and to matter. Since every

finite creature is imperfect in itself, it is necessary there should be something infinite; otherwise a finite creature would be impossible, for there would really be nothing at all. Now it is impossible there should be nothing at all; and, consequently, it is equally impossible but that there should be an infinite and eternal being. This infinite and eternal being is God.”\*

It may also be mentioned, that when under examination by the Advocate-General of Avignon, who took upon himself the duty of reading Vanini a lecture on the proofs of a Deity, principally grounded on ancient sophisms and paradoxes, the accused took up a piece of straw, and answered the zealous official in the following words. “If you have no more cogent reasons for the belief of an Almighty power than those which you have just submitted to me, I should, perhaps, merit the accusation you have brought against me. But look at this piece of straw; it did not make itself; therefore, God exists.”†

OTTO CASMAN. 1590 A. D.

This writer belonged to the Church, and was

\* “Omne ens aut finitum est aut infinitum, sed nullum ens finitum a se; quocirca satis patet non per motum (ad modum Aristotelis) sed primarum entium partitiones a nobis cognosci Deum esse, et quidem necessaria demonstratione. Nam alias non esset æternum ens, et sic nihil omnino esset; alioqui nihil esse est impossibile, ergo et æternum ens non esse pariter est impossibile. Ens igitur æternum esse adeoque Deum esse, necessarium est.”—(Amphitheatrum.)

\* See Note I. at the end of this Volume.



pastor of a congregation at Stade, and Rector of the public school in the same town. He was a pupil of Goclenius, and adopted nearly the same metaphysical opinions. He exclaims against the unprofitable nature of the Aristotelian philosophy, and recommends to all students the study of nature for themselves. This plan he adopted himself, but with comparatively insignificant results. His works are, “*On the Formation of the World,*” and “*Modest assertion of true and Christian Philosophy.*”

COUNT SCIPIO AGNELLI. 1600 A. D.

This Italian author was a very able and zealous writer against the Peripatetic philosophy. His work, *Disceptationes de Idæis*, published at Venice in 1615, is an abundant proof of his knowledge and talents.

The author maintains that the foundation of the Platonic theory is to be found in that passage in the book of Genesis which says, “Let us make man in our own image.” He likewise traces the same declaration, though not so pointedly made, in the Psalms, and in St. John’s Gospel. He strengthens his argument by appealing to Hermas, Zoroaster, Orphens, Pythagoras, and Empedocles. All these authors clearly prove, in the opinion of Agnelli, that the ancient sages were well acquainted with the Divine word, or *Logos*.

This author endeavours to reconcile the differences between Plato and Aristotle on the subject of ideas; but he is not very successful in dissipating

the clouds which hang over this knotty point. His remarks are subtile and ingenious, but not very convincing.\*

\* Disceptationes de Idæis, lib. 1. pp. 10. 20.

## CHAPTER IV.

ON SOME METAPHYSICAL WRITERS AMONG THE  
RELIGIOUS ORDERS IN SPAIN AND ITALY.

THE writers on mental subjects whom we shall briefly notice in this chapter, were attached to the Scholastic dialectics, and displayed a most decided aversion to all the modern theories and speculations on the mind which had sprung up in many parts of Europe since the days of Chancellor Gerson. Shrouded within the walls of religious institutions, having little or no intercourse with the world at large, and considering the established order of Scholastic tuition to be a thing as immoveably fixed as the earth itself, innovations in modes of thinking and instruction on vitally important subjects were the last things to enter into their thoughts, or receive their assent. Accordingly we find in all their writings a great sameness. The academical philosophy they taught was founded on the works of Aristotle, as explained by the Arabian writers; it was hedged about with a vast apparatus of rules, precepts, authorities, and

divisions without end; it was a gigantic and cumbersome machine; venerable, unquestionably, in the eyes of collegiate professors, for its magnitude and antiquity; but evidently productive of a soporific and deadening influence on the active and vigorous powers of the human intellect. Still, however, there was something good and useful in this colossal system. It had a conservative tendency. It was based upon the common sense of mankind, and kept the door completely closed against all whimsical and unprofitable speculations on the principles of human action. Though many of these metaphysical writers, particularly those located in Spanish academies and colleges, dealt largely in casuistry, in reference to the principles of morals and jurisprudence, yet it is an unquestionable fact, that there are some of the soundest and most valuable maxims and illustrations of these important branches of human knowledge to be found in the writings of these Scholastic doctors. There is a vigorous and healthy tone in all their reasonings on these topics, which we may look for in vain in other quarters in Europe, where better things might, at first sight, be expected.

In addition to the veneration which the Dominican orders entertained for Aristotle, they were almost equally attached to St. Thomas Aquinas. Indeed it is difficult to tell whether the Stagirite or the Saint was the greatest favourite. But there can be no question that the writings of St. Thomas gave a wholesome and practical turn to all the speculations of the Schools; and by this

means the Aristotelian system became serviceable in the development of really useful and interesting branches of knowledge and education. The diallectics of the Grecian sage, and the religious opinions of Aquinas, were the materials out of which every thing was cut and carved which emanated from this section of Scholastic inquiry and speculation.

On some of the happy effects derived from this latter branch of Scholastic discipline, we shall quote a few remarks from a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, well qualified to give an opinion on the subject.

“That part of knowledge which relates to the strict duties of men and nations towards each other, according to the precise rules of justice, independent of all considerations of positive law, has been treated, in modern times, apart from general ethics on the one hand, and the municipal institutions of any state on the other. The parts, or the whole of this science, have received many names—The law of nature and nations; Public law; International law. It arose from the Scholastic philosophy; and its first dawn may be discerned about the middle of the sixteenth century in Spain. For some time before this period, the Schools had tended to more independence of opinion. Among other marks of it, we may observe, that the commentaries on the *Secunda* began to be succeeded by treatises *De Justitiá et Jure*, in which the great Doctors of the Schools were indeed still cited, but which justified, in some measure, their assumption

of a more independent title. That title, together with some degree of the independent spirit which it denoted, arose from the increased study of the Roman law—a science which, as it treated of many of the same questions as the ethics of the schools, naturally tended to rival their authority; and which, together with the casuistry rendered necessary by auricular confession, materially affected the character of this rising science, long after its emancipation from the Schools. In the other cultivated countries of Europe, the Reformers of religion and philosophy had thrown off the Scholastic yoke. In Spain the Schoolmen were left to their natural progress. Francis de St. Victoria, frequently cited by Grotius, seems to have been the first man who acquired reputation by this study.”

THOMAS DE VIO. 1500 A.D.

This learned ecclesiastic commonly goes under the name of Cardinal Cajetan. He was a man of a profound and subtile mind, and obtained great reputation in his day. He was sent to Germany by Leo X. to endeavour to bring back Luther to the bosom of the Catholic Church. His principal work connected with metaphysics, is his commentary prefixed to the works of Thomas Aquinas, and which is now universally published with the works of the “Angelic Doctor.” The Cardinal has entered very fully into that part of Aquinas’ work which

treats of the *principle of individuality*; and has shrouded the question in no small degree of obscurity. The *principle of individuality* is that which constitutes a person's being himself, and which makes him different from other persons. This made a capital question for subtile disputation. It was rich in knotty distinctions; and proved a valuable bequest to the insatiable thirst for contention of the learned Schoolmen. A man's *specific nature*, or *individuality*, is incommunicable. What makes it so? One party says, because it has something *specific* and *positive* about it, while another affirms that it possesses a *material form* or *stamped seal*; *matter* and *quantity* must constitute individuality. But then there is plurality here. Two things are implied in this affirmation. This presents another difficulty. After long and bitter contention, the difficulty was thought to be got over, by the notable discovery that *matter* presented itself *directly* to the understanding, and *quantity* *obliquely*!\*

FATHER FRANCIS DE ST. VICTORIA. 1530 A.D.

This learned Spaniard studied philosophy and dialectics at Paris, and afterwards removed to Salamanca, where his academical renown soon produced him a multitude of students from all parts of Europe. The metaphysics he taught were chiefly those contained in the works of Thomas Aquinas.

\* See the Commentary of Cajetan, in the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas.

## FRANCISCUS TOLEDO. 1550 A. D.

Toledo was a great logician, and a man of considerable ability. His writings were popular in his day; but the metaphysical portion of them is not of any great moment. His works are *Instructiones ad Logicam*, Cologne, 1575; *Commentaria cum Quæstionibus in Universam Aristotelis Logicam*, Venice, 1588; *De Anima*, Venice, 1579.

## FATHER BENEDICTUS HENRICUS. 1556 A. D.

This was a Spanish metaphysical writer of considerable note. His works are, *Theologica in Sanctum Thomam commentaria*; and, *Metaphysicæ Prælectiones*. In the first work he expounds the doctrines of Aquinas, with an especial reference to theology; and in the second, he gives an outline of the principal topics contained in Aristotle's metaphysics.

## FATHER DIDACUS DE ZUNIGA. 1560 A. D.

This was a learned man in his day. He taught philosophy with great clearness, and was universally popular among the Spanish ecclesiastics. He published, in 1597, *Philosophiæ Prima Pars, qua perfecte et eleganter quatuor Scientiæ, Metaphysica, Dialectica, Rhetorica, et Physica, &c.* This work maintained a reputable station in all the semi-



naries of learning in Spain, for many years after the author's death.

FATHER DIDACUS DE HERRERA. 1560 A. D.

This writer devoted a great portion of his life to the expounding of the doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas. He was also the author of a work on Boethius' *Consolations of Philosophy*. He was enthusiastically attached to Aristotle, and published a work entitled, *Glossa super Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros*.

CHRYSOSTOMUS JAVELLO. 1560 A. D.

This writer was a professor of philosophy at the College of Bologna. Though a teacher of the Aristotelian system, yet he displayed a marked predilection for Plato. The grounds of this preference were, that the "divine" sage was more in conformity, in all his speculations, with the leading principles of religion and morality, than any other of the philosophers of Greece. There are some curious and valuable speculations on the human mind throughout his works; though the principal of them are directed to the investigation of our moral nature, and to the rights and duties which arise out of our social and political relations.\*

\* See the works of Javello, published at Lyons, in three vols. 1580.

## FRANCISCUS SUAREZ. 1570 A. D.

This was the most distinguished man among the ecclesiastical orders of Spain. He belonged to the Dominicans. His works on doctrinal theology, morals, the principles of law, and the rules of logic, are numerous, and of the highest order of excellence. Every branch of learning and speculation he has touched upon, he has made his own.

He wrote a work on Liberty and Necessity, and on the Freedom of the Divine Will. These two works abound with a multitude of profound observations, and the reasoning throughout is consecutive and well sustained. He shows in particular how notions of personal freedom are indissolubly connected with all right ideas of Divine government and agency.

Suarez was an enthusiastic Thomist, and wrote a commentary upon the works of Aquinas. This is considered far superior to the ordinary run of similar publications among the Dominican ecclesiastics.

His great work as a metaphysician, is his "*Metaphysicarum Disquisitionum Disputationes*, published at Genoa, in 1608. This is a treatise of great comprehension and subtility. He does not follow the doctrines of Aristotle, but thinks and reasons for himself. Hence it was, that this work excited so much attention in his day, for both the arrangement and language were entirely different from

what were commonly adopted in Scholastic works on philosophy in the sixteenth century.

The science of mind, according to Suarez, is confined exclusively to the consideration of *being*; not the being of *reason* or *accident*, but *real being*, abstracted from all its attributes or auxiliaries. This alone constitutes the science of mind. It is a comprehensive branch of knowledge, embracing every thing which is endowed with sensibility and intelligence, and is perfectly independent of the sciences of natural philosophy and mathematics.\*

The author every way affirms that metaphysics is an indivisible science; it cannot be separated into parts; its unity of object constitutes its peculiar nature. It comprehends, also, the perception of substance and its attributes, as displayed in all the vigour of abstract truth; beings created and uncreated; substances finite and infinite; what is necessary and what contingent; cause and effect; and those general and particular notions and ideas which form the elements of all knowledge. This science is, in the author's opinion, of the highest importance; it embraces the exercise of reason in its loftiest capabilities; and raises our thoughts to the essences, properties, and modes of being, of all intellectual things around us.†

The speculations of Suarez on cause and effect, are subtle, and in conformity with those commonly

\* *Metaphysicarum Disquisitionum* Disput. 1. sect. 1. The edition of the author's books here referred to, is that of Venice, 1740, in twenty-three volumes folio.

† *Disquis. Metaphy.* Disput. 1. sect. 2. 3. 4.

entertained by the Scholastics. With Aristotle, he divides causes into four orders or classes, material, formal, efficient, and final.\*

MELCHIOR CANUS. 1580 A. D.

This writer, one of the Dominicans of Spain, obtained great reputation for his learning and general talents. He was a bold and independent thinker, and many useful truths are to be found in his writings. He was a disciple of Francis de St. Victoria, was a determined enemy of the Jesuits, and spoke very freely against the abuses of the scholastic philosophy in the middle ages. He cautions the clergy to be careful in avoiding two great stumbling-blocks in their disputations and studies; not to take what is unknown for that which is known, and not to waste their strength on frivolous things, difficult to prove, and not necessary to their calling. Canus also recommends a spirit of deep humility to all philosophers, and tells them it is more commendable to be ignorant of some matters, than to pretend to understand them. He censures, in no light terms, the interminable disputes between the disciples of Scotus and those of Thomas Aquinas. In his learned work, *De Locis Theologicis*, he points out many intricate metaphysical questions which the Clergy should avoid entering into; such for example as the question about universals, or whether the Deity could have produced matter *without form*.†

\* Disquis. Metaphy. Disp. sect. 4. 5.

† Lib. 9, chap. 7.

## GABRIEL VASQUEZ. 1580 A.D.

This author was a great commentator on Aquinas. He was also the writer of some valuable works on morals, and doctrinal divinity. His *Metaphysicæ Disquisitiones* was published in 1614. It is a good work of its kind, and excited considerable attention even beyond the confines of his own country.

## FATHER DOMINIC ASOTO. 1580 A. D.

This distinguished man was confessor to Charles V. and a disciple of Father Francis de St. Victoria. Asoto assisted at the famous Council of Trent. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry, in which he displayed a most intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of Greece. His celebrated work, *De Justitiâ et Jure*, contains a valuable collection of scholastic opinions, upon the nature and application of the general principles of public right.

## ANTONIUS RUBIO. 1582 A. D.

This author published a work *On the Soul*, showing its immortal and incorruptible nature, and the high destinies to which it will ultimately attain. He expounded the Peripatetic philosophy, and showed its superior excellencies over all other systems. He was also a writer on logic, and published in 1605 his work, *Commentaria in Univer-*

*sam Aristotelis Logicam, sive Logica Mexicana.*  
His *Commentaria in Libros de Anima*, appeared in  
1613.

FRANCISCUS MURCIA DE LA LLANA.  
1584 A. D.

This was one of the many voluminous writers of Spain. He was a professor of philosophy, and his public lectures were exceedingly popular. His works on abstract speculations, are the following :  
1. *Selecta circa Universam Aristotelis Dialecticam*, 1606. 2. *Circa 8 Libros Physicorum una cum Tractatu de Subsistentia et Modis Unionum*, 1606. 3. *Circa Libros Animæ, una eum Disputatione de Immortalitate Animæ*, 1609. 4. *Circa Libros Aristotelis de Cælo*, 1609. 5. *Circa Libros de Generatione et Corruptione*, 1609. In addition to these works, the author wrote a treatise on the Philosophical Speculations of Gabriel Vasquez.

ADRIAN DI CORNETO. 1595 A. D.

This author was a Cardinal, and a great favourite of Alexander VI. He wrote a work, called, *De Vera Philosophiâ*. It contains an examination and illustration of the philosophy of the Fathers of the Church ; particularly the writings of St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and St. Gregory the Great. Corneto shows what were their general opinions on profane learning, and on its rightful application to theological doctrines.

FATHER FRANCISCUS D'ARANXO. 1596 A. D.

This was a voluminous commentator on Thomas Aquinas. He wrote three separate works to illustrate his philosophical and theological opinions. In addition to these, D'Araxo published, *Commentarium in Universam Aristotelis Metaphysicam*, at Salamanca, in 1631. This is considered one of the best commentaries on the opinions of the Stagirite, which is to be found in Spain among the numerous works on the same subject.

FRANCISCUS GONZALEZ. 1600 A. D.

Gonzalez was highly esteemed for his metaphysical and logical acuteness. His works are, *Logica Tripartita*, and *Metaphysica*, both published at Rome. In the last mentioned treatise there are, between the first and sixth chapters, some interesting discussions on the abstract nature of mind.

FATHER FRANCISCUS DE BIVAR. 1628 A. D.

This was a voluminous and popular writer. His name stands high among Spanish ecclesiasties. He published, *Tractatus de Incarnatione Verbi Divini; itemque alia in Aristotelis Logicam, Physicam, Metaphysicam*.

## BALTHAZAR TELLEZ. 1640 A. D.

This was a learned ecclesiastic, and a zealous disciple of St. Thomas. He entered into all the subtle points which the latter raised in the Church, and endeavoured to render them more easily comprehended. The work of Tellez, called *Summa Universæ Philosophiæ*, which was published in 1642, is a very elaborate and profound work. He died in 1684.

As our limits will not permit a further particular enumeration of more of those ecclesiastical writers on the mind, who flourished in the sixteenth and the commencement of the seventeenth centuries, and who were chiefly resident in the monastic institutions in Spain and Italy, we shall finish our list with a bare mention of their names.

Alphonsus Vera Cruz. *Tractatu de Animæ Immortalitate*. Salamanca, 1575 fol.

Antonius Andrea. *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*. Paris, 1495.

Antonio Coronelli. *Quæstiones Logicæ, et in Posteriora Analytica Arist.*

Antonius Johannes Andreas. *Peripateticæ Doctrinæ Encomion*, 1553.

Gregorius Valentinus Arcisius. *Isagogen Porphyrii*, Salamanca, 1554; *Aristotelis Logicæ Institutiones*, 1562.

Bartho. Joseph Paschasius. *Logica*, Valencia; *Oratio de Interp. Aristotelicæ Rationis*. Franckfort, 1591.



Dominic Soto. *In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, et in libros de Demonstratione Commentaria.* Veniee, 1573.

Joh. Bapt. Monlorius. *In Priora Analytica Aristotelis,* Franekfort, 1591.

Joh. Clementis. *In Aristotelis Categorias.*

Petr. Joh. Nunnesius. *Oratio de Causis Difficultatis Aristotelicæ.* Franekfort, 1591.

Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza; Roderieus de Arriaga; Petrus de Oviedo; Angelus Maurique; Petrus de Fonseca; Franciscus Sylvester; Joh. Ponzius; Claudius Frassen; J. Caramuel de Lobkowitz; P. Valles; Petrus Alphonsus; Manoel de Goes; P. Riecioli; Jerome Dardini; J. Lallemandet; Barthelemi Gomez; Mareilus Vazquez; P. Zanardo; Martinus Meurissus; and D. Bannes.\*

\* See Morhof. Polyhis. ; Bibliotheca Hispanica; and Brucker.

## CHAPTER V.

## LORD BACON.

NEXT to the introduction of Christianity, it has been said, that the most important event in the history of philosophy, was the influence of Lord Bacon's writings. This influence was not at first very marked and striking; but it gradually, as years rolled on, became very important, and changed the whole aspect of mental investigations. For it is a fact indisputable, and beyond all controversy, that the whole appearance of metaphysical disquisitions was entirely altered after Bacon's time; and so favourable and forcible a direction have men's minds taken upon this interesting branch of human knowledge since his day, that we have scarcely a single instance of any man of eminence falling back into the old and forsaken path of inquiry, even to obtain the temporary *éclat* that novelty or an ambitious singularity might confer. The writings of Lord Bacon, directly treating of the human mind, and its faculties, are but few in

number; but they are interesting, as they display an intimate knowledge of the subject, and a thorough acquaintance with all those rules and principles which should be applied to the investigation of truth in this department of science. On this view of Bacon's merits, I cannot do better than quote the words of Professor Stewart, who, in all his writings on the subject of mind, has uniformly borne testimony to the benefits this branch of knowledge has derived from the hints and reflexions of the author of the *Novum Organum*.

“It would be difficult to name another writer prior to Locke, whose words are enriched with so many just observations on the intellectual phenomena. Among these, the most valuable relate to the laws of memory and of imagination; the latter of which subjects he seems to have studied with peculiar care. In one short but beautiful paragraph concerning *Poetry* (under which title may be comprehended all the various creations of this faculty,) he has exhausted every thing that philosophy and good sense have yet had to offer, on what has been since called the *Beau Ideal*; a topic which has furnished occasion to so many over-refinements among the French critics, and to so much extravagance and mysticism in the *cloud-capt* metaphysics of the new German school. In considering imagination as connected with that species of sympathy to which medical writers have given the name of *imitation*, he has suggested some very important hints which none of his successors have hitherto prosecuted; and has, at the

same time left an example of cautious inquiry, worthy to be studied by all who may attempt to investigate the laws regulating the union between mind and body. His illustration of the different classes of prejudices incident to human nature, is, in point of practical utility, at least equal to any thing on that head to be found in Locke; of whom it is impossible to forbear remarking as a circumstance not easily explicable, that he should have resumed this important discussion, without once mentioning the name of his great predecessor. The chief improvement made by Locke, in the further prosecution of the argument, is the application of Hobbes's theory of association to explain in what manner the prejudices are originally generated.

“In Bacon's scattered hints on topics connected with the philosophy of the mind, strictly so called, nothing is more remarkable than the precise and just ideas they display of the proper aim of this science. He had manifestly reflected much and successfully on the operations of his own understanding, and had studied with uncommon sagacity the intellectual characters of others. Of his reflections and observations on both subjects, he has recorded many important results, and has in general stated them without the slightest reference to any physiological explanations founded on the caprices of metaphorical language. If, on some occasions, he assumes the existence of *animal spirits*, as the medium of communication between soul and body, it must be remembered, that this was *then* the universal belief of the learned; and that it was at

a much later period not less confidently avowed by Locke. Nor ought it to be overlooked (I mention it to the credit of *both* authors), that in such instances the *factis* commonly so stated, as to render it easy for the reader to detach it from the *theory*. As to the scholastic questions concerning the nature and essence of mind,—whether it be extended or unextended; whether it have any relation to space or to time; or, whether (as was contended by others) it exist in *every ubi*, but in *no place*; Bacon has uniformly passed them over with silent contempt; and has probably contributed not less effectually to bring them into general discredit, by this indirect intimation of his own opinion, than if he had descended to the ungrateful task of exposing their absurdity.”

On the limits and boundaries of human knowledge, Lord Bacon has the following observations: “For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath two parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul, whether it be notive or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain: which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather a maze than in a way. But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more

really and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath yet been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion; for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a 'producat,' but was immediately inspired from God; so it is not possible that it should be otherwise than by accident, subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul, must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance."\*

Lord Bacon divides the human mind into three faculties or divisions; Memory, Imagination, and Reason. These are the foundations on which all knowledge rests. History, in all its branches, relates to memory; poetry, and fiction of all kinds, to the imagination; and philosophy to reason. On the nature of memory, his Lordship has the following remarks: "This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one a prenotation, the other emblem. Prenotation dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn of much better practice than that in use; and besides which axioms, there

\* Works, Vol. 2. p. 170. Ed. 1825.

are divers more touching helps of memory not inferior to them.”\*

Of the nature of Imagination, Bacon observes, “It is true that the imagination is an agent or ‘nuncius,’ in both provinces, both the judieial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have judged; and reason sendeth over to imagination before the deerce can be acted; for imagination ever preeedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of imagination hath differing faees; for the face towards reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good. Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but it is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth, no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message.....For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought ever aecess to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation into reason is from the imagination.”†

*Reason*, according to Bacon, is the noblest of all the powers or faeulties of the soul. He calls it “the first creature of God.” He maintains, however, that mankind have no strong innate desire for the exercise of reason. “The part,” says he, “of human philosophy which is rational, is of all

\* Works, Vol. 2. p. 196. Edition 1825.

† Works, Vol. 2. p. 174.

knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge, is ‘pabulum animi,’ so in the nature of men’s appetites to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned, ‘ad ollas carniū,’ and were weary of manna ; which though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable.” “The arts intellectual are four in number ;” and these, the author says, are invention, judgment, memory, and tradition.

Lord Bacon’s treatise “On the Advancement of Learning,” contains a sort of outline of all science, as far as it was then known. 1st. Relating to the Memory, or History. 2nd. Relating to the Imagination, or Poetry. 3rd. Relating to the Understanding, or Philosophy. The arrangement of the treatise may be thus exhibited.

- |   |  |   |                                |                      |
|---|--|---|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| { | 1. The excellence of learning, and its communications. | { | 1. By divines.                 |                      |
|   | 1. Objections to learning                              |   | 2. By politicians.             |                      |
|   | 2. Proofs of the advantages of learning.               |   | 3. From errors of the learned. |                      |
|   |  |   | 1. Divine.                     |                      |
|   |  |   | 2. Human.                      |                      |
|   | 2. What has been done, and what omitted.               |   |                                |                      |
|   | {  | { | 1. Preliminary.                | 1. Universities.     |
|   |  |   | 2. Libraries.                  |                      |
|   |  |   | 3. Persons of the learned.     |                      |
|   | {  | { | 2. Division.                   | 1. History.          |
|   |  |   | 2. Poetry.                     | 1. Natural religion. |
|   |  |   | 3. Philo. .                    | 2. Natural philo.    |
|   |  |   | 3. Human philo.                |                      |



The reader will find nearly all the leading principles of Bacon's method of philosophising, in this work, "On the Advancement of Learning." Many of the principles are undoubtedly more fully illustrated in his "De Augmentis," and in other divisions of his labours; but still the real marrow of the system is to be found in the "Advancement." This book is divided into several parts; and the "De Augmentis," into nine.

The nature of final causes, and the influence they ought to exercise over our investigations of truth, are not overlooked by Lord Bacon; nor have his Lordship's opinions escaped the critical eye of modern philosophers. It is obvious, however, that he lays but little stress on the utility of searching for final causes; and the principal reasons assigned for this conclusion is, that men are so apt to let their imaginations wander, and strive to fashion the operations of nature to some fancied resemblance to human actions. Bacon affirms, that final causes are comparatively barren of fruits,\* but he qualifies this declaration by the following observations, which have been noticed by the late Professor Stewart. "The second part of metaphysics," says his Lordship, "is the investigation of final causes; which I object to, not as a speculation which ought to be neglected, but as one which has, in general, been very improperly regarded as a branch of physies. If this were merely a fault of

\* "Causarum finalium inquisitio sterilis est, et tanquam virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit."

arrangement, I should not be disposed to lay great stress upon it; for arrangement is useful chiefly as a help to perspicuity, and does not affect the substantial matter of science. But in this instance a disregard of method has occasioned the most fatal consequences to philosophy; inasmuch as the consideration of final causes in physics has supplanted and banished the study of physical causes; the fancy amusing itself with illusory explanations derived from the former, and misleading the curiosity from a steady prosecution of the latter." Again, "I would not, however, be understood by these observations, to insinuate that the final causes just mentioned may not be found in truth, and in a metaphysical view, extremely worthy of attention; but only that when such disquisitions invade and overrun the appropriate province of physics, they are likely to lay waste and ruin that department of knowledge."\*

In many parts of the writings of Lord Bacon, we find striking evidence of the firm persuasion, that the mental faculties and powers of man were very different in their nature from those possessed by the brute creation. This difference was not one of *degree* but of *kind*. On one occasion he says, "I do not, therefore, approve of that confused and promiscuous method in which philosophers are accustomed to treat of pneumatology, as if the human soul ranked above those of brutes, merely like the sun above the stars, or like gold above other metals."

\* De Augm. Scient. lib. 2, cap. 4.

Bacon had a supreme contempt for the ancient philosophers, and for all their disciples and commentators. He allowed many of them to be men of great and extraordinary powers, but they were comparatively ignorant, he considered, how to conduct scientific investigations. As to their genius, he says, "A cripple in the right way may beat a racer in the wrong one. Nay, the fleetest the racer is who has once missed his way, the farther he leaves it behind." "We have an example," continues he, "in Aristotle, who corrupted natural philosophy with logic; being all along more solicitous how men might defend themselves by answers, and advance nothing that should be *positive in words*, than to *come at the inward truth of nature*."

The leading and special reason why Lord Bacon is worthy of notice, in a treatise on mental science, is, on account of his *Novum Organum*, which, though chiefly intended as an instrument for the discovery and communication of physical science, has, nevertheless, had considerable influence on all speculations on the general principles of human nature which have come before the public since his day. It is principally on this account that he is so justly entitled to every degree of respectful consideration whenever he speaks of intellectual science.

The following remarks from his pen seem to point out the great object and purpose of the *Novum Organum*. "But whence," says he, "can arise such vagueness and sterility in all the physical systems which have hitherto existed in the world? It is not certainly from anything in na-

ture itself; for the steadiness and regularity of the laws by which it is governed clearly mark them out as objects of certain and precise knowledge. Neither can it arise from any want of ability in those who have pursued such inquiries, many of whom have been men of the highest talent and genius of the ages in which they lived; and it can therefore arise from nothing else but the perverseness and insufficiency of the methods that have been pursued. Men have sought to make a world from their own conceptions, and to draw from their own minds all the materials which they employed; but if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience and observation, they would have had facts and not opinions to reason about, and might have ultimately arrived at the knowledge of the laws which govern the material world."

"As things are at present conducted," he adds, "a sudden transition is made from sensible objects and particular facts to general propositions, which are accounted principles, and round which, as round so many fixed poles, disputation and argument continually revolve. From the propositions thus hastily assumed, all things are derived by a process compendious and precipitate; ill suited to discovery, but wonderfully accommodated to debate. The way that promises success is the reverse of this. It requires we should generalize slowly, going from particular things to those that are but one step more general; from these to others of greater extent; and so on to such as are universal. By such means we may hope to arrive at princi-

ples, not vague and obscure, but luminous and well defined, such as nature herself will not refuse to acknowledge.”

We must mention here Lord Bacon’s *Causes of Error* in all human speculations; as they are well fitted, even now, to furnish the young inquirer after truth with a useful and valuable guide. These causes of erroneous conclusions he has whimsically classed under the denomination of *Idols*;\* and the following compose the list.

Idola Tribus	.....	Idols of the Tribe;
Specus	.....	of the Den;
Fori	.....	of the Forum;
Theatri	.....	of the Theatre.

First. THE IDOLS OF THE TRIBE.—These sources of error are founded upon the constitution of human nature; and exercise their influence, more or less, over all mankind. “The mind,” Bacon observes, “is not like a plain mirror, which reflects the images of things exactly as they are; it is like a mirror of an uneven surface, which combines its own figure with the figure of the object it represents.” The leading feature of this class of errors, placed under the head of *Idols of the Tribe*, is, that disposition in the human mind to generalize too rapidly, and without a due regard to the number and well authenticated nature of particular facts. This is a very general defect; but it is impossible to frame any definite rules for its removal or cor-

\* See some remarks on the use of the word *Idol*, in Hallam, Litt. Middle Ages, Vol. 2. p. 387.

rection. This power of generalizing is the foundation of all our knowledge, as well as our errors.

2nd. THE IDOLS OF THE DEN. These sources of error are grounded on the natural and constitutional differences amongst men. The moral characters of the human race are vastly diversified; and these peculiarities, joined to particular kinds of education, moral feelings, habits, stations of life, and a thousand other things, affect the judgment, and lead men to form wrong conclusions, on many subjects submitted to their consideration. An immense portion of erroneous conclusions take their rise from this source.

3rd. THE IDOLS OF THE FORUM. This class of errors is that which arises from the imperfections of language, and its wilful perversion, for the sake of victory, and to make out a case for interested purposes. This is also a prolific source of error and confusion amongst men.

4th. THE IDOLS OF THE THEATRE. This description of mental delusions takes its rise from attachments to particular systems or schools of philosophy. These philosophical confederacies, headed by illustrious names, are well known to prove a most fruitful source of error, and to fetter the human mind from one generation to another.

In the second book of the "Organum," he states the nature of *induction*. The first and grand object he affirms is, to obtain a history of phenomena, and this history must include all their *modifications and varieties*. All facts must be accurately related and properly arranged; they must be fully authen-

ticated, and no doubtful evidence is to be received. When this is all done, we are in a position to inquire into the *cause* or *form* of these phenomena. In doing this, however, we are to consider well and carefully all those things which are *excluded* from the number of possible causes or forms; and then the first step in the process of induction is taken. When a sufficient number of these exclusions are made, one principle is fixed on as the *cause*; and by reasoning from it synthetically, we shall be able to ascertain if the phenomena can be satisfactorily accounted for. Bacon lays great stress upon this process; for he says, "It may perhaps be competent to angels or superior intelligences to determine the form or essence directly, by affirmations from the first considerations of the subject; but it is certainly beyond the powers of man, to whom it is only given to proceed at first by negatives, and in the last place to end in affirmatives, after the exclusion of every thing else."

In order, however, to regulate and ascertain the relative number and importance of facts, Bacon had to lay down some rules for the guidance of the judgment. He enumerates *twenty-seven* different species or kinds of facts. These are too numerous for our consideration here.

Philosophers of the last and present century have taken a deep interest in the Baconian method of investigation. It has been viewed on all sides, and its advantages and disadvantages have been variously estimated. Some consider it useless; others, of great value; whilst a few steer a middle course,

between unbounded praise and unqualified censure. As the subject is both interesting and important, we shall hazard a few observations upon it, and furnish a brief sketch of the opinions eminent men entertain on the logical merits of the great author of the "Novum Organum."

We are informed by Lord Bacon himself, that the "Novum Organum" was the labour of thirty years, and the grand object of it was, "to try whether I can get help in one intended part of this work, namely, the compiling of a Natural and Experimental History, which must be the foundation of a true and active philosophy."

Every reader to whom philosophy is not altogether a stranger, will readily perceive that the foundation stone of the Baconian logic is, the uniformity and stability of the laws of nature. Unless there were a firm belief in these, the "Novum Organum" would be a dead letter. It is this which gives life and force to the whole system. All mankind may, therefore, be said to follow the precepts of Bacon; for when they fall into speculative or practical error, it is only from an unskilful use of the instrument, not from a want of the instrument itself. They either generalize too soon or too late. They have not mastered all the facts of the case, or been able to refer them to the general principle or cause to which they ought to be referred.

Looking at human nature just as we see it displayed in every-day life, we find in it two distinct principles, connected with the discovery and propagation of truth. First, we have the desire for



knowledge. This manifests itself in all men more or less. External nature presents to man's early years a chaotic mass of objects, the properties, the mutual relations, and uses of which he can, by no reasonings *à priori*, discover and discriminate. Certain objects affect his senses of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling; and his internal consciousness makes him at an early period acquainted with his own mind, so as to know what is indicated by the terms thinking, willing, and feeling. Here then is the foundation on which is erected the superstructure of science and philosophy. He continues to creep on in the path of knowledge by slow degrees; learning the properties of one thing to-day, and the uses of another thing to-morrow. The manner in which external objects affect him, makes him institute inquiries into their *causes*, to form *general notions* respecting them, and to systematise and arrange his whole stock of facts and observations. This is the *inductive philosophy* of which the learned are perpetually talking. It is not a thing of yesterday, it is not a thing discovered and unfolded by Lord Bacon; but it is a thing coeval with the history of man; it has existed ever since his creation, and must be hourly put in operation by him, while he continues upon earth, clothed with the present attributes of his nature. Every child, and every untutored savage, adopt this "inductive method;" for without its aid, their certain and speedy destruction would become inevitable. Every *general term* of language, and every *general conception* of the mind, constitute *a theory*, under

which are arranged a certain number of particular things, and which is formed in precisely the same manner as Newton's theory of gravitation, or Harvey's theory of the circulation of the blood.

But now we come to another principle of the human mind, namely, that *strong and powerful impulse to shorten and abridge the labour of experiment and observation*. This begets a constant desire to find out some short route to the knowledge of the *causes* of things. Mental labour is not of *itself* a very natural or pleasant thing. Long continued and patient efforts of thought are what few men can support; and it is by no means an unfrequent occurrence that men of splendid genius are the most disdainful of the drudgery of collecting facts and recording observations. They feel a strong inward dislike to be converted into mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water." Hence they are always aiming at making some splendid discovery, which will not only immortalize themselves, but enable future generations to obtain knowledge on a vast deal casier terms than their predecessors. Theories and hypotheses are consequently invented, and this forms the first era of practical philosophy. Simple facts, experiments, observations, the properties of substances, and the relative effects of bodies on each other, are all arranged under general heads, and referred to general principles. In following this method, errors are committed from man's sheer inability to grasp the whole compass of nature, and dive into her hidden springs of action. Hence crude systems are formed, erroneous

principles promulgated, and fictitious reasonings instituted, in reference to the phenomena of nature. But this is not a departure from the "inductive method" of Bacon; it is only an inefficient and unskilful use of the instrument. Every theory and hypothesis must have a certain number of facts and observations arranged under them, to enable them to rest upon; and the same process of the mind is employed in this arrangement, as where the theory or hypothesis is invested with the character of truth or great probability. In fact, theories and general deductions of all kinds differ from each other only *in degree*, and not in *kind* or *essence*. We have them at this day invested with every shade and degree of probability, from what amounts to almost demonstrative evidence, down to mere fancy and delusion; but still they are all made by the same means, directed to effect a given end, and reared upon the same frame-work of the mind.

We may remark, in passing, that there is, even in this desire of all men to abridge their mental labour in the acquisition of knowledge, a manifestly wise and useful purpose. Were we debarred from hazarding any hypothesis, or propounding any theory, until we had ascertained the precise nature of every thing around us,—until we had taken, so to speak, the whole machine to pieces, and examined its individual parts,—we should never obtain any useful knowledge whatever. Besides, the natural weakness and imbecility of the human faculties effectually prevent us from following such a course.

But this desire to arrange, methodise, and consolidate our individual experiences and observations enables us to convert our information to some useful end or purpose, even though these methods of arrangement may be partial and defective. Without synthetical reasoning, man would almost cease to be a rational creature.

The great secret, then, in the “inductive” science of Lord Bacon is, to draw no general conclusions not fully warranted by facts; and to establish no general principles of science, but upon the sure foundation of experiment and observation. If we make a partial or incomplete collection of particular facts, and if we attempt to deduce from them what Bacon calls his *axiomata generalia*, we must wander in the dark, and we never can repose with perfect confidence upon our conclusions. In one word, my Lord Verulam says to the future cultivators of science and philosophy, “Now, my good friends, take care and cultivate a habit of vigilant attention, and do not, with a view to abridge your labour, or from any other motive, attempt to generalise your information too early. The paths of knowledge are beset with innumerable difficulties and perplexities, which bewilder and distract the judgment of the traveller; but with a view of aiding you to overcome these obstacles, I have arranged and classified a number of them under different heads, called *idols of the mind*, in order that you may the more readily recognise them, and disentangle yourself from them. I tell you nothing new; I only earnestly entreat you to keep in the track which is clearly pointed

out to you by nature, and attend carefully to her counsels and suggestions. Take warning from those who have gone before you. A precipitate and hasty desire to leap to general conclusions, fostered unquestionably by a strong impulse of the mind itself, has been the bane of rational philosophy, and has been productive of all those idle theories and systems, which, like the fluttering insect, glitter but for a day, and sink for ever into oblivion."

It must be obvious, that the "inductive method" of Bacon can never be applied as an *absolute test* of the truth of any theory, or any general principles of science, grounded on an induction of facts. This method does not define, nor indeed could it possibly do so, what precise number of facts, observations, or experiments are requisite to entitle you to the privilege of drawing general conclusions, or to establish any theoretic system whatever. This must always remain a matter of pure opinion, and a topic upon which different judgments may be pronounced. We can have no positive guarantee that a system of philosophy, which to-day seems solid, and immoveably fixed on a copious deduction of facts, may not to-morrow, by the discovery of circumstances which have hitherto eluded the vigilant attention of previous experimenters, be shaken to its very centre. There is not a physical theory at this moment, however generally received among the learned, that can be said to be absolutely placed beyond the possibility of such a catastrophe. The whole history of science furnishes proofs innumerable that the utmost degree of evidence which any

theory can furnish, does not rise above *a high degree of probability*.\*

It has often been objected to Bacon's method that it is very imperfect on account of its limitation to *induction*. It should have been *deductive* also. Both processes are indispensable to a sound method of philosophical investigation. This omission on the part of Bacon has been attempted to be explained, by affirming that the second part of his method was never published; and that in this he intended to treat of *deduction*. On the other hand, it is supposed that his want of mathematical knowledge lay at the bottom of his great dislike to all deductive reasoning.†

As the opinions on Bacon and his method are very opposite and contradictory, we may be permit-

\* See the Author's Essay on Logic, 2nd Edition. 1847.

† “L'uomo ch'in questa parte ha più chiaramente annunziate le idee più luminose, è Bacone. L'assioma arditò di lui era; *tale aliquid invenire per quod alia omnia expedite inveniri possent*. Egli intendeva che dalla storia bene ordinata dello scibile, e dalle tavole d'esso ben compilate risultasse uu metodo da potersi applicare non solo alle operazioni della mente ma a tutta quant è la natura. E però chiaramente distingue questa sua dalla logica ch'egli chiama volgare. La distingue e nel fine, e nell'ordine della dimostrazione, e ne' principii da dimostrare. La logica, dicegli, da noi desiderata, cerca non gli argomenti ma le arti, non le conseguenze de' principii, ma i principii stessi, non le ragioni probabili, ma i metodi pratici: non tende a vincere l'avversario con la disputa, ma la natura con l'opra: rimette in discussione le cose dalla logica comune accettate per vere; é veramente inventrice. Bacone in tutte l'opere sue che riguardano tale argomento “Degli aumante delle scienze, “Il nuovo organo” Il globo intellettuale, in tutte ha per mira la riforma de' metodi: persuaso auch'egli forse di quella sentenza Aristotelica, che rinchiude un rimprovero sì vero ma impossibile ad evitare, “ell'a cosa assurde cercare la scienza insieme e il metodo della scienza.” Studi Filofofici di N. TOMMASEO. Venezia, 1840. vol. 1. p. 261.

ted to select a few passages from the most distinguished and able of his critics who have taken different views of his abilities and system.

“The great glory of literature,” says Hume, “in this island, during the reign of James, was Lord Bacon. If we consider the variety of talents displayed by this man, as a public speaker, a man of business, a wit, a courtier, a companion, an author, a philosopher, he is justly entitled to great admiration. If we consider him merely as an author and a philosopher, the light in which we view him at present, though very estimable he was yet inferior to his contemporary Galileo, perhaps even to Kepler. Bacon pointed out, at a distance, the road to philosophy; Galileo both pointed it out to others, and made himself considerable advances in it. The Englishman was ignorant of geometry; the Florentine revived that science, excelled in it, and was the first who applied it, together with experiment, to natural philosophy. The former rejected, with the most positive disdain, the system of Copernicus; the latter fortified it with new proofs, derived both from reason and the senses. Bacon’s style is stiff and rigid; his wit, though often brilliant, is also often unnatural and far-fetched. Galileo is a lively and agreeable, though somewhat a prolix writer.”

“Though it cannot be denied,” says Professor Playfair, in answer to this, “that there is considerable truth in these remarks, yet it seems to me, that the comparison is not made with the justness and discrimination which might have been expected from Hume, who appears studiously to have contrasted

what is most excellent in Galileo with what is most defective in Bacon. It is true, that Galileo showed the way in the application of mathematics and geometry to physical investigation, and that the immediate utility of his performance was greater than that of Bacon, as it impressed more movement on the age in which he lived, example being always so much more powerful than precept. Bacon, indeed, wrote for an age more enlightened than his own, and it was long before the full merit of his work was understood. But though Galileo was a geometer, and Bacon unacquainted with the mathematics; though Galileo added new proofs to the system of the earth's motion, which Bacon rejected altogether; yet is it certain, I think, that the former has more followers as equals in the world of science than the latter, and that his excellence, though so high, is less unrivalled. The range which Bacon's speculations embraced was altogether immense. He cast a penetrating eye on the whole of science, from its feeblest and most infantine state to that strength and perfection from which it was then so remote, and which it is perhaps destined to approach continually, but never to attain. More substitutes might be found for Galileo than for Bacon. More than one could be mentioned, who, in the place of the former, would probably have done what he did; but the history of human knowledge points out nobody of whom it can be said, that, placed in the situation of Bacon, he would have done what Bacon did: no man whose prophetic genius would have enabled him to de-



lineate a system of science which had not yet begun to exist—who could have derived the knowledge of what *ought to be* from what *was not*, and who could have become so rich in wisdom, though he received from his predecessors no inheritance but their errors. I am inclined, therefore, to agree with D'Alembert, 'that when one considers the sound and enlarged views of this great man, the multitude of objects to which his mind was turned, and the boldness of his style, which unites the most sublime images with the most rigorous precision, one is disposed to regard him as the greatest, the most universal, and the most eloquent of philosophers.'

On the merits of Bacon, Mr. Hallam has the following judicious observations: "It is no proof of a solid acquaintance with Lord Bacon's philosophy to deify his name as the ancient Schools did those of their founders, or even to exaggerate the powers of his genius. Powers they were surprisingly great, yet limited in their range, and not in all respects equal; nor could they overcome every impediment of circumstances. Even of Bacon it may be said that he attempted more than he achieved, and perhaps more than he clearly apprehended. His objects appear sometimes indistinct, and I am not sure that they are always consistent."\*

We find it necessary to notice here, the work of Le Comte Joseph de Maistre, entitled, "Examen de la Philosophie de Bacon."† The treatise dis-

\* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. 2, p. 426.

† Paris. 1836. 2 vols.

plays great ability, as everything which has come from the same author's pen unquestionably does. We cannot fully go into the arguments which are brought forward to show what he conceives to be the true nature of the Baconian philosophy; but shall merely content ourselves with stating three or four general propositions, which De Maistre attempts to establish, and leave the reader to refer, in aid of more full information, to the pages of the original work itself.

1st. The author sets out with affirming that all the declarations of Bacon, and all the declarations of his followers and admirers, as to the low state of science and knowledge at the period when the *Novum Organum* was published, was a pure delusion. Human knowledge was then just as firmly based, and as rational and healthy in its practical application, as it is at the present moment. Induction was as generally followed then as now.

2nd. To place physical science, as Bacon and his followers do, before the knowledge of human nature, is absurd, and contrary to the established order of things.

3rd. That Bacon's ideas of physical science itself, and the specimens he has left us of his own acquirements in this branch of knowledge, show a lamentable want of even ordinary good sense, and of those common elements of scientific acquisition, which even the uninitiated may easily master. These positions are attempted to be established by an examination of Bacon's knowledge of the laws of motion, optics, meteorology, the nature of light, &c.

4th. The end or object of Bacon's system, or method of philosophizing, is calculated to wean men's minds from all really useful and serious studies of their own intellectual, moral, and religious natures; by conferring on merely experimental knowledge, or the properties of material things, a disproportioned share of attention.

5th. That whenever Bacon has ventured to discuss any particular topic relative to human nature considered in its intellectual, moral, social, and religious states, he has uniformly displayed the most erroneous views; and this can be sufficiently substantiated by what he has written on a Divine Intelligence, the human soul, of the origin of spontaneous motion, on the nature of our organs of sense, and of sensibility generally, on matter and the principles of things, on the union of religion with science, and on the nature of those theological principles which he himself personally entertained and adopted as his creed.\*

\* See Note J. at the end of the Volume.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THOMAS HOBBES.

MR. HOBBES was not in his life time, nor has he been since his death, so much distinguished by his metaphysical as his moral and political speculations. The latter brought him into immediate and hostile contact with theologians and politicians of all sects, parties, and nations.

His opinions on mental subjects are very valuable and interesting. They are principally unfolded in his work called *Leviathan*. Here we find the leading maxim of Locke's philosophy clearly and explicitly laid down; namely, *that all our ideas are derived through the medium of the senses*. In the first chapter of this work, *On Man*, we have this general principle stated with great force and perspicuity. "Concerning the thoughts of man," says he, "I will consider them first *singly*, and afterwards in *train*, or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality, or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an *object*: which

object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of man's body, and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.

“The original of them all is that which we call SENSE, (for there is no conception in a man's mind, which doth not at first, totally, or by parts, bear together upon the organs of SENSE.) The rest are derived from that original.

“To know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have also written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

“The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves and other strings, membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself; which endeavour, because *outward*, seemeth to be some matter without. And this *seeming* or *fancy*, is that which men call *sense*, and consisteth, as to the eye, in a *light* or *colour*, or *figure*; to the ear in a *sound*; to the nostril in an *odour*; to the tongue and palate in a *savour*; and to the rest of the body in *heat*, *cold*, *hardness*, *softness*, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities, called *sensible*, are in the object that causeth them but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our

organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else but divers motions; but their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceeth a din; so doth bodies also we see and hear, produce the same by their strong though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and echoes of reflection we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another; and though at some certain distance, the real and very object seems invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion of external things upon our eye, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.”\*

Every reader will here perceive by one glance, from the above extract, the principles which pervade the celebrated essay of Mr. Locke; particularly the discussions in that work on the secondary qualities of matter. Indeed, this quotation from Mr. Hobbes, with some trifling alterations, might stand very well, though published thirty-seven years before, as a preface or introduction to the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

\* *Leviathan*, pp. 3 and 4.

On the nature and influence of language on all human reasoning, Hobbes entertained those opinions which have been ascribed to the *Nominalists* in Scholastic history. On the nature of general terms he says, "The universality of one name to many things, hath been the cause that men think the things themselves are universal; and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of men that are, have been, or shall be, in the world, there is yet something else, that we call *man*, namely, *man in general*; deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth. For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general, he meaneth no more but that the painter should chuse what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be; none of which are universal. But when we would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chuseth. It is plain, therefore, that there is nothing universal but names; which are therefore indefinite, because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer; whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way."\*

\* Triplos, chapter 4. § 6.

Again, on the nature of language, we find the following remarks in Hobbes's Treatise "*On Man.*" "By this imposition," says he, "of names, some of larger and some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech at all (such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him, different in shape from the former, he cannot know, without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observeth that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any particular thing in this triangle, but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all for which he named it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms, *Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles.* And thus the consequence formed in one particular, comes to be registered, and remembered as a universal rule; and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found



true *here*, and *now*, to be true in all *times* and *places*.”\*

I think it quite evident, that the modern doctrine of the association of ideas is explicitly treated of by Mr. Hobbes. One of the important faculties of the mind, he says, is imagination; which, however, he considers only as a branch or species of the general faculty of memory. “For as at a great distance of place that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as voices grow weak and inarticulate; so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose (for example) of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions many particular circumstances. This *decaying sense*, when we would express the thing itself, (I mean *fancy* itself,) we call *imagination*, as I said before; but when we would express the *decay*, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called *memory*. So that *imagination* and *memory* are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.”† He then goes on, in the next chapter, to treat of the *trains of imagination*; and no one who carefully peruses this part of the work, but will perceive the principle on which the comparatively recent doctrine of association is founded.

The next and last important faculty of the mind which Mr. Hobbes mentions, is that of *Reason*; and this he defines to be “nothing but reckoning

\* Part 1. chap. 4.

† Leviathan, p. 5.

(that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts; I say *marking* them, when we reckon by ourselves, and *signifying* when we demonstrate or approve our reckoning to other men.”\*

There is a strong material tendency in the metaphysics of Hobbes. This is displayed throughout all his reasonings. Every thing comes by and through the senses. His language is quite plain and undisguised on this point. He says, “According to the two principal parts of man, I divide his faculties into two sorts; faculties of the *body*, and faculties of the *mind*.”

“Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the body is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up in these three heads; power *nutritive*, power *generative*, and power *motive*.”

“Of the powers of the mind there be two sorts; *cognitive*, *imaginative*, or *conceptive*; and *motive*.”

“For the understanding of what I mean by the power *cognitive*, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain *images* or conceptions of the things without us. This *imagery* and *representation* of the qualities of things without, is that which we call our *conception*, *imagination*, *idea*, *notice*, or knowledge of them; and the *faculty* or power by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call *cognitive*”

\* Leviathan, p. 18.

*power, or conceptive, the power of knowing or conceiving."*

The higher power of intellectual reflexion, seems to be excluded from Mr. Hobbes's views of the mind; particularly if we are to lay any stress upon the following observations. "All the qualities called *sensible* are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several *motions* of the matter by which it presseth on our organs diversely. *Neither in us that are pressed are they any thing else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion.*" This is precisely the system of *transformed sensations*, which obtained considerable celebrity, in many European schools of philosophy, a century afterwards.

The honour is awarded to Hobbes of having been the first writer on mind who maintained that our sensations do not correspond with the qualities of external objects. In the "Meditations" of Descartes the same proposition is laid down; but whether he had obtained any previous knowledge of Hobbes's idea of the subject, is not known.\* The author of the "Leviathan" observes: "Because the images in vision, consisting of colour and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves; and for the same cause that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell or of the air. And this

\* See Mr. Hallam on this point, Lit. Middle Ages, Vol. 3. p. 271.

opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a paradox; and yet the introduction of *species visible* and *intelligible* (which is necessary for the maintenance of this opinion) passing to and fro from the object, is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall, therefore, endeavour to make plain these points.

“That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen.

“That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the *motion, agitation, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance in the head.*

“That as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from *the other senses*, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the *sentient.*”

The opinions on Mr. Hobbes's writings have been so numerous, and so conflicting, that it is quite beyond a passing notice of his principles, to enumerate them. We shall give, however, a short quotation from a critic of undoubted talent and reputation. Sir James Mackintosh observes, in his Dissertation, prefixed to the Encyclopedia Britannica, that “Hobbes's philosophical writings might be read without reminding any one the author was more than an intellectual machine. They never betray a feeling, except that insupportable arrogance which looks down on men as a lower species of beings; whose almost unanimous hostility is so far from shaking the firmness of his conviction, or even ruffling the calmness of his contempt, that it appears too petty a circumstance

to require explanation, or even to merit notice. Let it not be forgotten, that part of his renown depends on the application of his admirable powers to expound truth when he meets it. This great merit is conspicuous in that part of his treatise of *Human Nature* which relates to the percipient and reasoning faculties. It is also very remarkable in many of his *secondary principles* on the subject of government and law, which, while the first principles are false and dangerous, are as admirable for his accustomed and unrivalled propriety of expression. In many of these observations he even shows a disposition to soften his paradoxes, and to conform to the common sense of mankind.”\*

\* See Note K. at the end of the Volume.

## CHAPTER VII.

RAYMOND DE SEBONDE—MONTAIGNE—CHARRON.



THESE authors are connected together in the history of philosophical speculation. They were all singular men in their day, and exercised no small influence over the minds of those who took an interest in the current literature of the times.

## RAYMOND DE SEBONDE.

This author's work on *Natural Theology* is a very remarkable one for the age in which it appeared. The writer aims at establishing revealed religion upon the foundation of human reason, without any aid from the testimonies of revelation. This work was translated into French by Montaigne, who wrote that introduction to it, which is so often referred to in the *Life and Writings* of the first of French Essayists.

Sebonde considered that the visible universe was the grand book of nature for man to study. Here he could obtain knowledge without a master. All

authority is to be discarded, and men must rest their principles and belief upon the solid ground of actual observation.\*

## MONTAIGNE.

This French writer was not a systematic speculator on the human mind, though he informs us that he constantly dwelt upon the nature and movements of his own intellectual faculties. "I study myself," says he, "more than any other subject. This is my metaphysic, this my natural philosophy."†

Montaigne is commonly classed, by writers on philosophy, among the Sceptics, but his scepticism was of a unique kind. It does not proceed from any refined and abstruse reasoning, from an attachment to particular theories, nor from any conflicting views of the higher species of intellectual phenomena; but chiefly from those loose and undefined views of things which men of the world, of quick and lively talents, are apt to entertain. He had no settled notions or principles upon any thing. Whatever occupied his mind for the time being, that was the only true and right one. We have this from his own declaration. "The writings of the best authors," says he, "among the ancients, being full and solid, tempt and carry which way almost they will. He that I am reading seems

\* *Théologie Naturelle de Raymond de Sebonde*, Paris, 1611.

† *Essays*, Book 3. Chap. 13.

always to have the most force; and I find that every one in turn has reason, though they contradict one another.”\*

The principal part of Montaigne's *Essays* which has a bearing on mental subjects, and which displays his loose scepticism, is that containing his apology for *Raymond de Sebonde*, just mentioned. The work of this author was placed in the hands of Montaigne by his pious father, with a view to counteract the opinions of the Reformation, then assuming a formidable appearance. The object of the Spanish treatise is to show that Christians ought not to make human reasoning the foundation of their belief, since the object of it can only be conceived by faith, and a special revelation from heaven. Montaigne yields assent to this principle, and it leads him to dispute the conclusions of human reason, and to entertain the opinion that this power does not essentially differ from the instinctive faculties of the animal creation. “Whoever has the patience,” say Professor Stewart, “to peruse this chapter, (the 12th,) with attention, will be surprised to find in it the rudiments of a great part of the licentious philosophy of the eighteenth century; nor can he fail to remark the address with which the author avails himself of the language afterwards adopted by Bayle, Helvetius, and Hume.”†

This criticism is somewhat modified by what Mr. Hallam says on the subject of Montaigne's sceptical turn of mind. “The scepticism of Mon-

\* Book 2. Chap. 12.

† Prelim. Dissert. p. 52.



taigne, concerning which so much has been said, is not displayed in religion, for he was a steady Catholic, though his faith seems to have been rather that of acquiescence than conviction; nor in such subtilities of metaphysical Pyrrhonism as we find in Sanchez, which had no attraction for his careless nature. But he had read much of Sextus Empiricus, and might perhaps have derived something from his favourite Plutarch. He had also been forcibly struck by the recent narratives of travellers, which he sometimes received with a credulity as to evidence, not rarely combined with theoretical scepticism, and which is too much the fault of his age to bring censure on an individual. It was then assumed that all travellers were trustworthy, and still more that none of the Greek and Roman authors have recorded falsehoods. Hence he was at a loss to discover a general rule of moral law, as an implanted instinct, or necessary deduction of common reason, in the varying usages and opinions of mankind. But his scepticism was less extravagant and unreasonable at that time than it would be now. Things then really doubtful have been proved, and positions, entrenched by authority which he dared not to scruple, have been overthrown; truth, in retiring from her outposts, has become more unassailable in her citadel.”\*

\* Lit. Middle Ages, Vol. 2. p. 29.

## CHARRON.

This author was the disciple and friend of Montaigne, and imbibed his sceptical notions. Charron tells us that he obtained all his knowledge of human nature from the study of himself. Man is the grand phenomenon of existence; and to improve his condition is the great object to be attained by all philosophical investigations into his nature. M. De Gerando tells us that, "Tout, dans Charron, respire une raison calme, prudente et modeste; il n'est pas seulement religieux, il est pieux; son langage, ordinairement froid et décoloré s'anime lorsqu'il recommande le culte en esprit et en vérité. La vie de cet homme de bien, de ce philosophe, était en cela conforme à ses maximes."

His metaphysical opinions were a sort of compound from Plato, Aristotle, and Galen. The soul, he thinks, contains all knowledge within itself, and derives nothing from the senses; on the contrary, the senses owe every thing to the mind. This mind is a part of the Divine Mind, and depends upon it for its movements and functions.\* Though the soul has a lofty origin, yet it is not without its glaring imperfections. These are five in number; vanity, weakness, fickleness, unhappiness, and presumption.†

Charron seems to have been a little more severely handled by the Clergy, for his sceptical turn of

\* De la Sagesse, lib. 2. Chap. 3.

† Ibid. § 44.

mind, than his friend Montaigne. There was some injustice in this. Voltaire twits the Church upon this partial dispensation of justice, in the following lines :—

Montaigne, cet auteur charmant,  
Tour-à-tour profond et frivole,  
Dans son château paisiblement,  
Loin de tout frondeur malévole,  
Doutoit de tout impunément,  
Et se moquoit très-librement  
Des bavards fourrés de l'école.  
Mais quand son élève Charron,  
Plus retenu, plus méthodique,  
De Sagesse donna leçon,  
Il fut près de périr, dit-on,  
Par la haine théologique.

*Épître au Président Hénault.*

## CHAPTER VIII.



## DESCARTES.

THIS is one of those distinguished philosophers who have filled the world with their fame; and his writings will remain an imperishable monument of his genius and labour, as long as the world of letters exists. That clever but unfortunate Author, Condorcet, observes, that Descartes has indisputable claims to be considered as the father of unfettered philosophic inquiry in Europe. Of Bacon, this French author remarks, that "though he possessed, in a most eminent degree, the genius of philosophy, he did not unite with it the genius of the sciences; and that the methods proposed by him for the investigation of truth, consisting entirely of precepts he was unable to exemplify, had little or no effect in accelerating the rate of discovery. This honour was reserved for Descartes, who combined in himself the characteristic endowments of both his predecessors. If, in the physical sciences, his march be less sure than that of Galileo; if his logic be less cautious than that of Bacon; yet the very temerity

of his errors was instrumental to the progress of the human race. He gave activity to minds which the circumspection of his rivals could not awake from their lethargy. He called upon men to throw off the yoke of authority, acknowledging no influence but what reason should avow. And his call was obeyed by a multitude of followers, encouraged by the boldness and fascinated by the enthusiasm of their leader."

One of the chief features by which Descartes' mental disquisitions are recognised, is, that it is only from the patient study of the *mind itself*, that we can form just conceptions of its nature and powers. Its immateriality must likewise be taken for granted, and steadily kept before our eyes in all our investigations. He also teaches the necessity of avoiding all subtile and unprofitable discussions respecting the abstract nature of mind, and to confine ourselves only to those *facts* which we can establish by an appeal to our own consciousness. These are sound principles of inestimable value.

But Descartes did not barely content himself with an exposition of these general principles of investigation; he endeavoured to carry them into full and effective operation; and the following is an outline of his mode of applying his own instruments.

He set out in his philosophical career with a full determination to doubt everything, save and except the naked feelings of his own mind, which he conceived could not, by any possibility, be liable

to doubt or cavil. Hence his famous aphorism, well known to the generality of metaphysical readers, "Cogito, ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am." Amongst the number of matters which he proposed submitting to the most rigorous investigation, were: Mathematical evidence, the existence of a Deity, the existence of a material world, and even the existence of his own body. The commonly received reasons and opinions concerning all these important and interesting subjects, did not appear to him invested with anything approaching to rational or conclusive evidence; and, on this account, it was a solemn and onerous duty imposed on every sincere lover of truth, to submit the whole to that logical ordeal, which would either place them upon such a solid basis that there would be no future cavil or doubt, or would discard them from the creeds of all sound and enlightened philosophers for the time to come. These were the general and disinterested opinions which animated him in his great undertaking.

The above aphorism of Descartes created no little ridicule among his opponents, who thought it more likely he might be sooner laughed out of his principles than reasoned out of them. They said the position, *Cogito, ergo sum*, was sheer folly; it was, to use a common proverb, "putting the cart before the horse." The axiom would at any rate have stood just as well if it had been inverted, "I am, therefore I think." The learned Gassendi maintained that the proposition was a mere *petitio principii*, or begging of the question. Besides, giving Des-

cartes the full benefit of his own construction, what is meant by *I think*? It is not a simple idea, but a very complex one. It involves many things. To think, is to think of something. What is that something? It must exist, and have substance, and shape, and colour, as well as existence; and there must be an affinity between it and the sentient principle which thinks. In fine, the questions are almost endless, which may be urged as arising out of this very concise and apparently simply expressed axiom.

I should, however, be doing great injustice to Descartes, to take any advantages of the mode of his stating the argument; because we are furnished with the best possible proof of what his real intention and meaning were, for laying down the proposition in this formal manner. He meant it only as a *simple declaration of consciousness*; and, as such, his *Cogito, ergo sum*, ought always to be considered.

The object of assuming this proposition (which is not proved) was that he might have a starting point for his reasonings. He wanted a solid foundation; and he thought his own consciousness would afford him what he needed. No man can doubt his own existence; for the very doubt would imply that there is something in existence which did doubt. Therefore, said Descartes to himself, I cannot be deceived in taking my own feelings and sensations as a guide; they must be true as existing things; and from them I will make the

attempt to demonstrate the existence and truth of other important principles of knowledge.\*

He had now got one step in his journey; he believed in his own existence; this he contended could never be doubted. He then attempted to go forward, and demonstrate the existence of a First Cause. This subject led him into a long course of subtile and refined reasoning, which terminated in a firm conviction that this great truth rested upon as solid a foundation as did his own mental consciousness. In his future progress he continued equally successful in demonstrating the solidity of mathematical evidence, the evidence for an external world, and even the evidence for the existence of his own body. All these appeared successively invested with irresistible and overwhelming evidence. This course of philosophical inquiry, and its results, induced the celebrated D'Alembert to remark, that "Descartes began with doubting of every thing, and ended in believing that he had left nothing unexplained."

The exact mode of investigation which Descartes followed, may be illustrated by the following remarks from his *Meditations*.

"What am I?" he asks. "A thinking being; that is, a being doubting, knowing, affirming, denying, consenting, refusing, susceptible of pleasure and of pain. Of all these things I might have had complete experience, without any previous acquaint-

\* See what Descartes says on this point in the third and fifth series of objections, affixed to his "Meditations."



ance with the qualities and laws of matter ; and therefore it is impossible that the study of matter can avail me aught in the study of myself." This, accordingly, Descartes laid down as a first principle, that *nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at all subservient to the knowledge of mind* ; and that the sensible images involved in all our common forms of speaking concerning its operations, are to be guarded against with the most anxious care, as tending to confound, in our apprehensions, two classes of phenomena, which it is of the last importance to distinguish accurately from each other.

Descartes' work on the "Principles of Philosophy," is a very able and superior composition. In the first part of it, he discusses the important question as to the principles or origin of human knowledge. In the second part, he enters upon an inquiry into the nature of the material world, and unfolds the laws of matter. The third part is devoted to the visible world ; and the fourth, to the earth we inhabit.

In Descartes' work "On Man," the reader will find some very ingenious and curious speculations on the influence of our minds upon our bodily frames. Some of the peculiar opinions for which the author has been generally celebrated, will be found in this portion of his philosophical labours.

His far-famed Metaphysical Meditations, already alluded to, contain the following topics of discussion. 1st. Meditation on things of the existence of which we may reasonably entertain a doubt. 2nd. On the nature of the human mind. 3rd. On what we

can know of the Deity. 4th. On truth and falsehood. 5th. On the essence of material things, and the foundation of our faith in the Supreme Being. 6th. On the existence of material things. And 7th. On the distinction between the soul and the body.

It is difficult to systematise the reasonings and conclusions of such a subtile and discursive mind as that of Descartes; but there are two or three leading points in his mental cogitations, which we shall bring before the general reader's attention.

He seems, from his ordinary mode of arrangement, to have considered our thoughts or ideas as divided into three leading kinds or classes; namely, a species of *innate ideas*, such as he conceived we possess of the Deity, of His various attributes of goodness, bencvolence, justice, power, and wisdom; the second class of ideas are invested with an adventitious character, and arise in the mind from the operation of material objects on our senses, and comprehend those of sound, taste, smell, &c.; and the third he distinguishes by the term fictitious, which are formed by the uniting and assembling of all the various ideas previously in the mind from the other sources of our knowledge.

The *seat of the soul* was a favourite topic of speculation with Descartes. He imagined that this interesting spot was the *pineal gland*, or according to anatomists, *conarion*. This part of the brain was thought the most appropriate for the residence of the thinking principle, which he had invested with the attribute of indivisi-

bility. The philosopher enters into a long dissertation to show how the soul performs all her functions of thinking, judging, feeling, remembering, &c., through the instrumentality of this tubular organ. There was evidently a great inconsistency in this doctrine; inasmuch as the whole fabric of the philosophy of Descartes was reared upon the very opposite theory, *that of mind not having any necessary dependence upon, or property in common with, material objects*. But this notion about the *seat of the soul* was evidently of a material complexion; and there can be no doubt but it laid the foundation for several subsequent material theories of mind, which gained considerable attention, both in this country and on the Continent.

This theory about the *pineal gland* had been introduced to the learned philosophers at Oxford and Cambridge, and excited a keen controversy at both these Universities. This induced our poet, Matthew Prior, to write his "Alma Mater," which ridicules this notion most severely and wittily.

—————" Here Matthew said,  
 Alma in verse, in prose the mind,  
 By Aristotle's pen defined,  
 Throughout the body squat or tall,  
 Is *bona fide*, all in all,  
 And yet, slap dash, is all again  
 In every sinew, nerve, and vein;  
 Runs here and there like Hamlet's ghost,  
 While every where she rules the roast.

This system, Richard, we are told,  
 The men of Oxford firmly hold;

The Cambridge wits, you know, deny,  
 With *ipse dixit* to comply.  
 They say, (for in good truth they speak  
 With small respect of that old Greek)  
 That putting all his words together,  
 'Tis three blue beans in one blue bladder.  
 Alma, they strenuously maintain,  
 Sits cock-horse on her throne, the brain,  
 And from that seat of thought dispenses,  
 Her sovereign pleasure to the senses."

It may prove instructive to the student and general reader, to make a brief allusion to Descartes' doctrine of *Vortices*, by which he attempted to explain the phenomena of the material world, and which created such a lively interest among the literati of Europe, when it was first published.

He maintains there is nothing but substance in the universe; this is divided into two kinds; one a spiritual or thinking, and the other an extended substance. Descartes affirms there can be no vacuum in nature; that the world is full; as every thing which is extended is matter.

Now he supposes that the Deity created matter of an indefinite extension; that it was portioned out into little small square patches full of angles; that it was, by his sovereign power, impressed with two motions. One which made each part revolve round its own centre; and one which enabled an assemblage of these patches to turn round a common centre; and thus as many different vortices or eddies were created, as there were masses of matter created.

The mode of operation is thus unfolded by Descartes. The various angular masses of matter could not move amongst each other without breaking off their angles; and this necessary friction of the different parts would produce three elements. The first a fine dust, formed from the broken angles; the second, the spheres formed after their angularity was destroyed; and the third, those spheres whose angles might remain entire, or be only partially destroyed.

The *dust*, or the first of the three elements, would, according to the established laws of motion, take its place in the centre of such system or vortex, on account of its diminutive parts; and this, Descartes thinks, constitutes the sun and fixed stars. The second part, rendered smooth by the destruction of its angles, constitutes the atmosphere. The third element, with a portion of its angles, forms the earth, comets, &c. This is a concise view of this celebrated theory of vortices.

Professor Stewart, who paid a great deal of attention to the writings of Descartes, gives the following concise enumeration of the advantages the philosophy of mind derived from his labours.

“His luminous exposition of the common logical error of attempting to define words which express notions too simple to admit of analysis. Mr. Locke claims this improvement as entirely his own; but the merit of it unquestionably belongs to Descartes, although it must be owned that he has not always sufficiently attended to it in his own researches.”

“His observations on the different classes of our prejudices—particularly on the errors to which we are liable in consequence of a careless use of language as the instrument of thought. The greater part of these observations, if not the whole, had been previously hinted at by Bacon; but they are expressed by Descartes with greater precision and simplicity, and in a style better adapted to the present age.”

“The paramount and indisputable authority, which, in all our reasonings concerning the human mind, he ascribes to the evidence of consciousness. Of this logical principle he has availed himself, with irresistible force, in refuting the scholastic sophisms against the liberty of human actions, drawn from the prescience of the Deity, and other considerations of a theological nature.”

“The most important, however, of all his improvements in metaphysics, is the distinction which he has so clearly and so strongly drawn between the *primary* and the *secondary* qualities of matter. This distinction was not unknown to some of the ancient schools of philosophy in Greece; but it was afterwards rejected by Aristotle, and by the schoolmen; and it was reserved for Descartes to place it in such a light, as (with the exception of a very few sceptical or rather paradoxical theorists) to unite the opinions of all succeeding inquirers. For this step, so apparently easy, but so momentous in its consequences, Descartes was not indebted to any long or difficult processes of reasoning; but to those habits of accurate and patient

attention to the operations of his own mind, which, from his early years, it was the great business of his life to cultivate.”

“It may be proper to add, that the epithets *primary* and *secondary*, now universally employed to mark the distinction in question, were first introduced by Locke; a circumstance which may have contributed to throw into the shade the merits of those inquirers who had previously struck into the same path.”

The French Encyclopædists observe, “that Descartes threw no additional light upon first causes, or their mode of operation. He has not extended the limits of the ancients on this subject. All is as mysterious to us now, as it was before.”\*

But whatever opinions may be entertained on the merits of Descartes’ system as a whole, it is an unquestionable fact, that, with the exception of Locke, no metaphysician of modern times has left a deeper impression upon the minds of the learned than he has done. We meet with large fragments of his system scattered over every part of the civilized world. In his own day, and long after his death, he was all powerful. His writings engrossed universal attention and authority. We find his disciples amongst persons of all shades of theological belief. In the bosom of the Catholic church, we see Arnauld, and Pascal, and Fénelon, and Bossuet, and Malebranche, embracing and expounding his doctrines with all possible zeal. His

\* Article “Cartésianisme.”

system was, at an early period of its existence, brought to England; Spinoza adopted its leading principles in Holland; and Leibnitz in Germany. In fact, no one attempted, long after his death, to write or speak on metaphysical subjects, without making himself acquainted, in some measure at least, with the philosophical disquisitions of this most remarkable man.

Nor was the influence of his writings confined to philosophers and theologians alone; it penetrated into every department of literature. It was conveyed through numerous channels to the ears of the most humble and illiterate peasants. The most celebrated French poets of his age, with the exception of Molière, occasionally quenched their thirst at his spiritual fountain; and expounded the mysteries of his system, through the instrumentality of their tuneful numbers. When the writings of the illustrious philosopher had well nigh incurred the displeasure of the Parliament of Paris, Boileau crushed the hostile movement with his burlesque pen; and the genius of La Fontaine showed, by the following verses, that it delighted to roam among the rugged questions of the Cartesian theory.

“ La volonté nous détermine,  
 Non l'objet, ni l'instinct. Je parle, je chemine,  
 Je sens en moi certain agent,  
 Tout obéit dans ma machine,  
 A ce principe intelligent.  
 Il est distinct du corps, se conçoit nettement,  
 Se conçoit mieux que le corps même;  
 De tous nos mouvements, c'est l'arbitre suprême,



Mais comment le corps l'entendit-il ?  
 C'est là le point. Je vois l'outil  
 Obéir à la main ; mais la main, qui la guide ?  
 Eh ! qui guide les cicux dans leur course rapide ?  
 Quelque ange est attaché peut-être à ces grands corps ;  
 Un esprit vit en nous et meut tous nos ressorts,  
 L'impression se fait ; le moyen ? je l'ignore,  
 Et s'il faut en parler avec sincérité,  
 Descartes l'ignorait encore."

There cannot be a more convincing proof of the influence of the opinions of Descartes on the history of mental speculations since his day, than the questions proposed by the French Institute, and made a prize Essay, which was awarded to M. Bouillier, Professor of Philosophy of the Faculty of Letters of Lyons. These questions were the following.—1. An Exposition of the state of philosophy before Descartes' time.—2. To determine the character of the philosophical revolution of which he was the author, his method of philosophising, and his entire system in reference to human knowledge.—3. The immediate effects which the development of his system produced, not only upon his avowed disciples, such as Regis, Rohault, Delaforge, &c., but upon men of genius, whose speculations he had greatly influenced, like Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, Bayle, and Leibnitz.—4. To appreciate most specially the degree of influence which the system of Descartes exercised over Spinoza and Malebranche.—5. To determine the exact situation which Leibnitz holds in the Car-

tesian philosophy.—6. To estimate the real value of the Cartesian revolution, as a collection of principles and consequences, and the succession of eminent men who embraced it, from the first appearance of the “Discourse on Method,” in 1637, to the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the death of Leibnitz.—7. To examine into the errors contained in the Cartesian system, and to point out the portion of truth which it has left to posterity.

On the important subject, the existence of a Deity, we find Descartes’ opinions laid down with great clearness in the “Bibliothèque Universelle” of Geneva, published in July, 1842. The following quotation is from a review in this periodical of M. Bouillier’s Essay, on the above questions proposed by the French Institute.

“L’existence de Dieu est établie dans le ‘Discours de la Méthode’ par trois démonstrations qui reposent sur les principes suivans: 1°. *Les idées diffèrent en tant qu’images, et celles qui représentent des substances, ont plus de réalité objective que les autres, c’est-à-dire participent par représentations à plus de degrés d’être ou de perfection que celles qui représentent seulement des modes ou des accidens.* 2°. *Il doit pour le moins y avoir autant de réalité dans la cause efficiente qu’il y en a dans l’effet, et de là il suit non-seulement que le néant ne saurait produire aucune chose, mais aussi ce qui est plus parfait, c’est-à-dire ce qui contient en soi plus de réalité, ne peut être une suite et une dépendance du moins parfait.* La première

de ces démonstrations part de l'idée d'infini qui se trouve dans chaque âme d'homme, et arrive à l'existence d'un être infini réalisant cette idée. Voici, débarrassée de tout développement, la manière dont Descartes présente cette preuve la plus importante des trois :—D'après le second principe qu'il vient de poser, toutes les fois qu'en faisant l'examen de ces idées, Descartes en trouve une qui ne dépasse pas les forces de l'homme et a pu être créée par lui, il la considère comme n'ayant pas une origine supérieure. Mais au milieu des idées de ce genre, il en est une qui ne peut pas découler d'une source humaine, c'est celle d'une substance infinie. Il cherche donc l'origine de cette idée dans un être supérieur ayant toutes les perfections, c'est-à-dire en Dieu.—La seconde preuve part de l'existence de l'homme créature, et arrive par l'application du principe de causalité à l'existence de Dieu créateur. J'existe et j'ai l'idée de Dieu, or je ne puis tenir mon existence de moi-même, je ne puis pas l'attribuer à mes parents comme cause première, ou à quelques autres causes moins parfaites que Dieu ; donc elle me vient de Dieu, donc Dieu existe.—La troisième enfin, qui n'a pas plus de valeur pour être fort ancienne et avoir déjà été présentée par Saint Anselme, revient à ceci : toutes les fois que j'ai l'idée d'une chose, et que cette chose me paraît posséder certaines qualités, elle les possède réellement. Or j'ai l'idée d'être ayant toutes les perfections, y compris l'existence, donc Dieu existe. Cet être dont l'existence est incontestable après cette triple démonstration, possède

donc tous les attributs qui constituent la perfection. Et d'abord il est libre, toute dépendance impliquant une certaine imperfection ; il est infiniment bon, intelligent, puissant ; il est éternel, présent partout, et il jouit d'une prescience infinie ; enfin il est créateur et conservateur. Remarquons ici que pour Descartes ces deux derniers attributs se confondent et que, d'après l'idée qu'il se fait des substances créées, Dieu ne conserve le monde qu'en tant qu'il le crée sans cesse. En effet, après avoir distingué d'après leurs qualités l'esprit et la matière, et avoir établi une séparation profonde entre les propriétés de l'âme et celles du corps, entre les faits du monde intérieur qui nous sont révélés par la conscience et les faits du monde extérieur qui nous sont connus par les sens, il arrive à cette conclusion,—qu'à des attributs différents correspondent des substances différentes, et que les attributs de l'âme, entre autres la pensée, étant essentiellement distincts de ceux du corps, l'étendue par exemple, les substances qui supportent ces attributs doivent être de nature diverse ou même opposée. Puis il se demande quelle est la nature des substances créées ? Pour résoudre cette grande question, un seul moyen se présente, c'est d'étudier la substance qui seule tombe immédiatement sous l'œil de la conscience, à savoir l'âme. Voici comment Descartes d'après cette étude définit la substance : *Une chose qui existe de façon qu'elle n'a besoin que de soi-même pour exister.* Mais aussitôt, voyant sortir le panthéisme de cette définition, Descartes la modifie en disant que le mot "substance" n'a

pas la même signification par rapport à Dieu et par rapport aux créatures. Ainsi quand il s'agit des choses créées, il faut entendre par substance les choses qui n'ont besoin pour exister que de l'action ordinaire et continue de Dieu. De là, on le voit, il est aisé de conclure que toutes les substances sont passives, qu'elles n'existent ou n'agissent qu'en vertu de l'action divine, et aussi qu'il n'y a réellement qu'un être qui mérite le nom de substance, et dont toutes les choses créées ne sont que des modifications."

On the doctrine of *innate ideas*, it would appear that Descartes has been subjected to a great deal of misapprehension. In one of his letters he complains of this, and enters into some explanations, in reference to his real opinions on this long contested question. Voltaire was an active agent in this work of misrepresentation. In his *Letters concerning the English Nation*, he says: "Descartes asserted that the soul, at its coming into the body, is informed with the whole series of metaphysical notions; knowing God, infinite space, possessing all abstract ideas; in a word, completely endued with the most sublime lights, which it unhappily forgets at its issuing from the womb.

"With regard to myself, I am as little inclined as Locke could be, to fancy that some weeks after I was conceived, I was a very learned soul: knowing at that time a thousand things which I forgot at my birth; and possessing when in the womb, (though to no manner of purpose) knowledge which I lost the instant I had occasion for it; and which

I have never since been able to recover perfectly.”

Descartes, however, in one of his letters, places this accusation in its true light. “When I said that the idea of God is *innate* in us, I never meant more than this, that nature hath endowed us with a faculty by which we may know God; but I have never either said or thought, that such ideas had an actual existence, or even that they were a *species* distinct from the faculty of thinking. I will even go farther, and assert that nobody has kept at a greater distance than myself from all this trash of scholastic entities, inasmuch as I could not help smiling when I read the numerous arguments which Regius has so industriously collected to show that infants have no actual knowledge of God while they remain in the womb. Although the idea of God is so imprinted on our minds, that every person has within himself the faculty of knowing him, it does not follow that there may not have been various individuals who have passed through life without ever making this idea a distinct object of apprehension; and, in truth, they who think they have an idea of a plurality of Gods, have no idea of God whatever.”\*

On this subject the late Professor Stewart has the following judicious remarks. “The prevailing misapprehensions with respect to this, and some other principles of the Cartesian metaphysics, can only be accounted for by supposing, that the opinions of Descartes have been more frequently judged of

\* Epistle 99.

from the glosses of his followers than from his own works. It seems never to have been sufficiently known to his adversaries, either in France or in England, that, after his philosophy had become fashionable in Holland, a number of Dutch divines, whose opinions differed very widely from his, found it convenient to shelter their own errors under his established name; and that some of them went so far as to avail themselves of his authority in propagating tenets directly opposite to his declared sentiments. Hence a distinction of *the Cartesians* into the *genuine* and the *pseudo-Cartesians*; and hence an inconsistency in their representations of the metaphysical ideas of their master, which can only be cleared up by a reference (seldom thought of) to his own very concise and perspicuous text.”\*

The question as to Descartes' belief in innate ideas is not, however, free from doubt and perplexity. His letters make him contradict himself on this point. He says, “By the word *idea*, I understand all that can be in our thoughts; and I distinguish three sorts of ideas; *adventitious*, like the common idea of the sun; *framed* by the mind, such as that which astronomical reasoning gives of the sun; and *innate*, as the idea of God, mind, body, a triangle, and generally *all those which represent true, immutable, and eternal essences.*”†

As a striking illustration of the truth of a great part of the remarks of Professor Stewart, we may

\* Dissertation, page 252.

† Letter 54.

here allude to the misconception of his master, Dr. Reid, of Descartes' theory of perception. We can scarcely bring ourselves to believe that the Doctor had ever carefully perused the writings of the famous philosopher whom he criticises. "The writings of Descartes," says the Doctor, "have in general a remarkable degree of perspicuity; and he undoubtedly intended that, in this particular, his philosophy should be a perfect contrast to that of Aristotle; yet in what he has said, in different parts of his writings, of our perception of external objects, there seems to be some obscurity, and even inconsistency. Whether owing to his having had different opinions on the subject, at different times, or to the difficulty he found in it, I will not pretend to say." Now we venture to affirm there is no difficulty or obscurity in the case, beyond the Doctor's own brain. Descartes is, on this point, in reference to the act of perception, in constant harmony with himself. But Reid wished to have him enlisted as one of the members of that philosophical fraternity, who maintained the doctrine of *images* of the mind; and, therefore, prefaced his remarks with this charge of ambiguity and apparent inconsistency. The Scotch philosopher then goes on to say: "There are two points in particular wherein I cannot reconcile him with himself. The first, regarding the place of the ideas or *images* of external things, which are the immediate objects of perception; the second, with regard to the veracity of our external senses. As to the first, he



sometimes places the ideas of material objects in the brain, not only when they are perceived, but when they are remembered or imagined; yet he sometimes says, that we are not to conceive the images or traces in the brain, to be perceived, as if there were eyes in the brain; these traces are only *the occasions* on which, by the laws of the union of soul and body, ideas are excited in the mind; and, therefore, it is not necessary that there should be an exact resemblance between those traces, and the things represented by them, any more than that words or signs should be exactly like the things signified by them. These two opinions, I think, cannot be reconciled. For if the images or traces in the brain are perceived, they must be the objects of perception, and not the occasions of it only. On the other hand, if they are only the occasions of our perceiving, they are not perceived at all." Now the plain answer to this is, that Descartes nowhere affirms that the images or traces in the brain are ever *perceived*. Even if he had gone this length, it would not have solved the question of perception. But what he plainly says is, that these traces are made in the brain by the action of the several *media* of bodies, which occasion or create perceptions in our minds. This interpretation of his meaning is confirmed by the following quotation from the sixth chapter of his *Dioptrics*.

"Licet autem hæc pictura sic transmissa in cerebrum, semper aliquid similitudinis ex objectis,

a quibus venit, retineat ; non tamen ab eo credendum est, ut supra quoque monuimus, hanc similitudinem esse quæ facit ut illa sentiamus ; quasi denuo alii quidam oculi in cerebro nostro forent, quibus illam contemplari possemus. Sed potius motus esse a quibus hæc pictura componitur, qui immediate in animam nostram agentes, quatenus illa eorpori unita est, a natura instituti sunt, ad sensus tales in ea excitandos. Quod latius hic exponere libet. Omnes qualitates, quas in visus objectis percipimus, ad sex primarias reduci queunt, ad lumen scilicet, colorem, situm, distantiam, magnitudinem et figuram. Et primo quantum ad lumen et colorem, quæ sola proprie ad sensum visionis pertinent, cogitandum illam animæ nostræ naturam esse, ut per vim motuum, qui in illa cerebri regione occurrunt, unde tenuia nervorum opticeorum fila oriuntur, luminis sensum percipiat : per eorundem autem motuum diversitatem, sensum coloris. Quemadmodum per motus nervorum auribus respondentium, sonos dignoscit ; et ex motibus nervorum linguæ, varios sapes ; et in universum, ex motu nervorum totius corporis moderato, quandam titillationem sentit ; et dolorem ex violento ; quum interea in his omnibus similitudine nulla opus sit inter ideas, quas illa percipit, et motus qui earum sunt causæ.”

Here the author, in treating of the sense of sight, and of the other senses, supposes motion to be produced from them all upon the nervous coat of the brain ; and though he maintains that in

reference to vision, an image of the object is formed upon the outward coat of the brain, corresponding to that upon the retina of the eye, yet he asserts we are not to form the conclusion that the mind recognises this image, as if it had eyes to see it, but that all which such an explication is meant to serve is, that certain motions are communicated to the brain, and certain effects consequently produced in it, which create that power which we term perception. This is his plain and obvious meaning. He has nothing to do with images, in the sense in which Dr. Reid uses the term. But the Doctor seemed determined to substantiate his accusation; and we find him accordingly charging the philosopher with openly and unequivocally maintaining this curious theory of images. "It is to be observed," says the northern Philosopher, "that Descartes rejected a part only of the ancient theory concerning the perception of external objects by the senses, and that he adopted the other part. That theory may be divided into two parts; the first, that *images*, species, or forms of external things, come from the objects, and enter by the avenues of the senses to the mind; the second part is, that the external object itself is not perceived, but only the *species* or *image* of it in the mind. The first part Descartes and his followers rejected, and refuted by solid arguments; but the second part neither he nor his followers have thought of calling in question; being persuaded that it is only a *representative image* in the mind

of the external object that we perceive, and not the object itself. And this image, which the Peripatetics called a species, he calls an *idea*, *changing the name only, while he admits the thing.*"

Now these statements display a desperate love of theory in the Doctor. He seems determined to make out a case for the support of his ideal system, a pure creation of his own brain. Descartes must have been, upon this representation of Reid's, one of the most stupid of all men who ever dabbled in philosophy, if he had rejected the *sensible* species of the Peripatetic hypothesis, and still retained the doctrine of representative images in the brain; which, in point of fact, really amounted to precisely the same thing. But let Descartes speak for himself. In his "Dioptrics," (chap. 4, sec. 6) he says, "Observandum præterea, animam nullis imaginibus ab objectis ad cerebrum missis egere ut sentiat, (contra quam communiter philosophi nostri statuunt,) aut ad minimum, longe aliter illarum imaginum naturam concipiendam esse quam vulgo fit. Nec alia causa imagines istas fingere eos impulit, nisi quod viderent mentem nostram efficaciter pictura excitari ad apprehendendum objectum illud, quod exhibet : ex hoc enim judicarunt, illam eodem modo excitandam, ad apprehendenda ea quæ sensus movent, per exiguas quasdam imagines in capite nostro delineatas. Sed nobis contra est advertendum, multa præter imagines esse, quæ cogitationes excitant, ut exempli gratia, verba et signa, nullo modo similia iis quæ significant." Here Descartes

combats the opinions of the Schoolmen that there must be images in the mind which bear a resemblance to external things. He maintains also that there is no necessity for any such similitudes to account for perception. The *representative* images he considers not as *objects* of *perception*, but simply as the *causes* of perception. Again he says, “*Multa præter imagines esse quæ cogitationes excitant, exempli gratia, verba et signa. Eodem igitur modo imagines, in cerebri nostro formatae, considerandæ sunt, et notandum tantummodo quæri qua ratione animam moveant, ad percipiendas diversas illas qualitates objectorum e quibus manant, non autem quomodo ipsæ iis similes. Ut quum cæcus noster varia corpora baculo suo impellit, certum est eo nullas imagines ad cerebrum illius mittere; sed tantum diversimodi movendo baculum, pro variis qualitatibus, quæ in iis sunt, eadem opera manus etiam nervos diversimodi movere, et deinceps loca cerebri, unde ii descendunt; cujus rei occasione mens totidem diversas qualitates in his corporibus dignoscit, quot varietates apprehendit in eo motu, qui ab iis in cerebro excitatur.*” Again, chap. 5, he says, “*Manifeste itaque videmus, non opus esse ad sentiendum, ut anima contempletur ullas imagines quæ reddant id ipsum quod sentitur.*” Finally, in his *Treatise on the Passions*, part 1, article 23, “*Percceptiones quæ referuntur ad res extra nos positas, scilicet ad objecta sensuum nostrorum, produuntur, (saltem cum nostra opinio falsa non est) ab his objectis quæ,*

excitando quosdam motus in organis sensuum externorum, excitant quoque nonnullos motus opera nervorum in cerebro, qui efficiunt ut anima illa sentiat; sicuti cum videmus lumen tedæ et audimus sonum campanæ, hic sonus et hoc lumen sunt duæ diversæ actiones, quæ per id solum quod excitant duos diversos motus in quibusdam ex nostris nervis et eorum ope in cerebro, dant animæ duas distinctas sensationes.”

The great importance of the doctrine of perception must be our apology for this lengthened notice of it. Every metaphysical reader knows that its disquisition occupies, in the writings of the moderns, a vast portion of their contents. Indeed the doctrine lies at the foundation of all mental investigations; and, therefore, to have correct conceptions of the opinions of those who have entered deeply into its exposition, cannot fail to prove of interest and advantage to all those who cultivate this branch of knowledge.\*

But Descartes has, like all bold and successful speculators, experienced opposition in his path of fame and distinction. Several writers have attempted to strip him of his honours, by affirming that he borrowed largely from the labours and speculations of those who had gone before him. Leibnitz expressly says, that Descartes borrowed his famous demonstration of the existence of a

\* See on this subject, “A Search of Truth in the Science of the Human Mind,” by the Rev. F. Beaseley, Philadelphia, 1822.

Deity, of which we have already spoken, from St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury; and that he had taken a great portion of his best thoughts from the scholastic writers.\* M. Pellisson, a French writer of distinction, maintains that Descartes gave as new thoughts of his own, what may be found in Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, and the Fathers of the Church. And he adds, "I am very much deceived if his famous proposition, "I think, therefore I am," is not taken word for word from a treatise attributed to St. Augustine.† Even M. Cousin remarks, in speaking of the Monologue of St. Anselm, "C'est un antécédent faible sans doute, mais c'est un antécédent du grand ouvrage de Descartes, et, chose étrange, on y trouve plus d'une idée célèbre des Méditations."‡

There is a very excellent little work by Antoine Guenard, which gained the prize of the French Academy, in 1755, upon the question, "En quoi consiste l'esprit Philosophique, les caractères qui le distinguent, et les bornes qu'il ne doit jamais franchir, conformément à ces paroles de St. Paul; *Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem?*" This discourse was reprinted in Paris in 1821; but only one hundred copies were struck off. There are three distinct views taken of Descartes' writings. 1st: Guenard dilates upon the grand and sublime conceptions of Descartes, in the application

\* Op. Omn. tom. 1, p. 243.

† Ap. Cousin, *Fragm. Phil.* Paris, 1838, tome 2, p. 227.

‡ *Cours de l'Hist. de la Phil.* du 18<sup>e</sup> siècle, lec. 9.

of algebra to geometry, and in his successful development of the general laws of the physical world. 2nd: The alliance of this truly philosophical spirit with matters connected with the belles lettres, and works of taste and art. And 3rd: Assigning the *true limits* of the reasoning faculties, in matters connected with the great and leading principles of natural and revealed religion.

Descartes has often been severely criticised by modern philosophers, *for not following up his own principle to its ultimate results*. Now this accusation appears to me to be grounded on a total misconception of what Descartes laid down, as his philosophical starting point. Mere *consciousness* is a purely passive and lifeless thing. It is a *condition* or *state* of thought, but nothing more. The moment you invest it with active power, with spontaneous energy, with motion, creative effort, or with any attribute which disturbs or alters its passive character; from that moment you make consciousness an altogether different thing from that which Descartes conceived it to be, and from what it really is in itself, when abstractly considered. He cannot justly or reasonably be charged with omitting to do that which he had no power to perform. You have got consciousness; you feel it, you are sensible of it; you can contemplate it; but what then? Do you wish to account for phenomena by it? How do you move? Do you make that an active body or essence, which you affirm is a passive thing? Do you bring any foreign influ-



ence to bear upon consciousness ; then what is its nature, and mode of operation ? In fact, view the matter in every possible light, it will be found that Descartes had chained himself so firmly to his first position, that he could not stir hand or foot. It was a mockery to call upon him to proceed ; for he had no instrument to effect any thing with. He saw a vast world before him ; but he had no fulcrum on which to place a lever to move or direct it. And every metaphysician must be reduced to the same exigencies, who takes, or pretends to take, the naked principle of consciousness to account for the phenomena of existence.\*

\* \* The following list of publications relative to Descartes and his writings may be consulted, by those who are desirous of a critical knowledge of subject :—*Réflexions d'un Académicien sur la vie de M. Descartes, envoyées à un ami en Hollande*, Haye, 1692 ; Fr. Tepelii, *Historia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ*, Nuremberg, 1672 ; *Ibid.*, *De Vitâ et Philos. Cartesii*, 1644 ; De Vries, *Dissert. Histor. Philos. de R. Cartesii Meditationibus, &c.*, 1692 ; *Ibid.*, *Exercitationes Rationales, &c.* ; *Nonveaux Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Cartésianisme*, par M. G., Paris, 1692 ; *Admiranda Methodus Novæ Philos.*, R. Descartes, 1645 ; Ant. Legrand, *Institutio Philosophica Secundum Principia R. Descartes*, London, 1672 ; *Ibid.*, *Philosophia Veterum* ; *Ibid.*, *Apologia pro Cartesio*, London, 1672 ; Louis F. Ancillon, *Judicium de judiciis circa Argumentum Cartesianum*, Berlin, 1792 ; Clanberg, *Opera Philosophica*, Amsterdam, 1691 ; *Ibid.*, *Logica Vetus et Nova Ontosophiâ de Cognitione Dei et Nostri*, 1656 ; *Ibid.*, *Initiatio Philos. seu Dubitatio Cartesianâ* ; Arnold Genliux, *Logica Fundamental*, 1662 ; *Ibid.*, *Annotata Percurrentia ad R. Cartesii Principia*, 1690 ; *Ibid.*, *Annotata Majora*, 1691 ; Becker, *De Bertoverte Wereld*, 1690 ; *Ibid.*, *Parallelismus et Dissensus Aristotelicæ et Cartesianæ Philos.* 1643 ; *Ibid.*, *Selectæ ex Philosophiâ Disputationes*, 1650 ; Alexander Roell, *Disputationes, &c. Franc.* 1700 ; Rnard Andala, *Syntagma Theologico-Physico-Metaphysicum*, Franc. 1710.

\* See Note L. at the end of the Volume.

The critical study of the writings of Descartes has become very general in France within the last thirty years. The whole of his works have been published by M. Cousin, in 11 volumes, 1824. In 1832 we have M. Grayer's "Essais Philosophiques suivis de la Metaphysique de Descartes assemblée et mise en ordre." M. Bouillier in 1842 published his "Histoire et Critique de la Révolution Cartésienne." In 1844 M. Jules Simon issued a small edition of Descartes' works, with an Introductory Essay. M. Damiron in 1846 gave to the world his "Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 18<sup>e</sup> siècle," in which is contained a report of the six memoirs given to the Academy of Sciences upon the Philosophy of Descartes, and the effects of its promulgation in Europe.

## CHAPTER IX.



## GASSENDI.

THIS was an Italian writer of great power and industry ; and his opinions of the mental constitution of man exercised, in his own day, a very extensive influence over the literature of Europe. He was the contemporary of Descartes, and opposed his system of *vortices* and *innate ideas*, with great vigour and success.

The philosophical works of Gassendi are very voluminous ; and for this reason, it is impossible to give, in this notice, more than a very general summary of them. The author commences by laying down the leading principles of philosophy ; such as the existence of a Deity, the nature of matter and motion, and a providential cause manifested throughout the whole range of creation. This part of the writings of Gassendi is full to overflowing of just and striking remarks, and the most beautiful reflections on the various topics brought under

the reader's consideration. In the 18th chapter of the first book, which treats of the existence and providence of God, the author observes, that all philosophers, with the exception of a very limited number indeed, have been compelled to admit, from the evidences of wisdom, order, and power manifested in every thing which falls under the notice of man, in the universe around him, that a first *Great Cause* must preside over the works of creation. This, he affirms, is a truth beyond all controversy, and which lies at the foundation of all true philosophy.

The author then goes on to treat of the nature of matter, and its secondary qualities, such as heat, cold, colour, &c. On these refined and subtile points, the author seems to have been a good deal puzzled, and his general conceptions of them are by no means very intelligibly developed. He then treats of the science of Logic, and of the use and abuse of the syllogism. Next come the physical sciences of Astronomy, and also Astrology, the latter of which he affirms to have no foundation whatever in nature. He devotes a considerable portion of attention to meteors, planets, animals; and then comes to the consideration of the sublime and interesting question of the immateriality of the human soul. He states the various opinions that both the ancient and modern philosophers have entertained on this important subject. Gassendi candidly admits that the inquiry is an intricate and difficult one to pursue; but, at the same time, decidedly affirms,

that the evidences for the soul's immateriality are so full, explicit, and overwhelming, that no person can reasonably have the smallest doubt upon the point, who will set about the investigation in a candid and considerate spirit. The whole of this discussion is full of interest to the scientific reader.

The author then passes to metaphysical topics, and discusses the usual branches of this department of knowledge; such as the nature and origin of our sensations; our active and passive faculties, imagination, &c. All these matters are treated in a very clear and popular manner.

The philosophy of Europe owes a deep debt of gratitude to Gassendi, not for his inventive genius, but for the universality of his labours. His zeal in the cause of knowledge was ardent and disinterested; and he communicated a manly and independent spirit to all departments of philosophical discussion. Mere authority, without science, was nothing in his eyes. He tells us himself that, though educated in the scholastic learning of the age, it had, even in his early youth, but few charms in his estimation; and that the writings of Vives, Ramus, Pic Mirandole, and Charron, infused that bold and independent spirit which he manifested in all his philosophical discussions, and retained to the last hour of his life. When appointed to give public lectures at the university of Aix, on the doctrines of Aristotle, he accompanied his instructions with so many qualifications as to the dogmas

of the Stagirite, that his own opinions became so notorious, and were considered so bold and important, that they were regularly embodied in a formal treatise, under the title of “*Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversus Aristotelicos*,” and published in 1624. Here he ridiculed the pedantic dialectics of the schools; demonstrated the inutility of the syllogistic method of reasoning; and lashed, with a withering scorn and derision, the cumbersome machinery of the categorics, and rules, and definitions, which had so long formed the logical armament of all the public institutions of education throughout Christendom.\*

Gassendi was a zealous advocate for the importance of considering final causes in all our philosophical speculations. In writing to Descartes on this subject, he has the following observations.

\* An English writer, Thomas White, a zealous Aristotelian, has the following remarks on the general tendency of Gassendi’s philosophy. “*Scepticism*, born of old by an unlucky miscarriage of nature, for her own credit carried off the tongues of the eloquent, when it had long been fastened and buried by the steadiness of Christian faith; this monster, snatched from the teeth of worms and insects, *Peter Gassendi*, a man of most piercing sagacity, of neat and copious eloquence, of most pleasing behaviour and wonderful diligence, by a kind of magic hath endeavoured to restore again to life. He, a person (which is the strongest of all) most tenacious of Catholic faith, and never suspected guilty of mischievous tenets; whereas, yet, this scepticism is the mother of infinite errors, and all heresies, and that very *seducing philosophy, and vain fallacy*, which the Saints warned by the Apostles have taught us to beware of. Here this man, otherwise eminent, in his *Paradoxical Exercitations* against the Aristotelians, hath dared to expose, not veiled as before, and wandering like the Queen in the dark, but bold-faced, and painted, to the multitude and market-place.”—*Sciri*, &c., p. 30.

“ In respect to your employment of final causes in physics, you might perhaps with propriety have done it at another opportunity ; but when the question is concerning the Deity, it seems to me that you would reject the main argument by which the divine wisdom, power, providence, and consequently existence, can be grounded through the light of nature. I may omit from my consideration the whole world, the heavens, and all things therein, still how can you argue better than from the *use* of parts in plants, in animals, in men, in the whole of your own bodily frame, who have the likeness of God ? We know well that some great men, from the mere anatomical examination of the human body, rise not only to the knowledge of God, but raise hymns to him, because he formed and arranged all parts in such a manner for their destined purposes, that he is to be highly praised on account of his incomparable skill and foresight.”\*

How far Gassendi stands charged with a decided leaning towards materialism, is a difficult point to determine. His language is apparently dubious and contradictory on the subject. In his work, “ *Disquisitio Metaphysica*,” which was written to counteract the influence of Descartes’ system, he does suggest, that it is by no means very clear that the power of thought should be necessarily and entirely removed from a corporeal substance.† We must make, however, suitable allowances for metaphorical expressions used in the ardour of contro-

\* De Vero et Falso.

† Vol. 2. p. 183.

versial warfare, and for that strong desire which Gassendi manifested to subvert the hypothesis of his great rival. If we take the general scope and tenor of his writings on the nature of mind into consideration, we shall feel constrained to admit that its spirituality, in the fullest sense of the term, was unconditionally maintained by this distinguished philosopher. As to any expressions describing thought as a *clear and subtile substance*, spread over the surface of bodies, little can fairly be deduced from them. The time when he wrote, the controversy in which he was engaged, and the constitutional imperfections of language, are quite sufficient to account for all such discrepancies in the statements of an ardent and voluminous author.

Some of the French philosophers maintain that great injustice has been done to Gassendi's reputation and fame, by depriving him of the honour of first expounding those doctrines which have almost universally been ascribed to Locke as their author. It is acknowledged on all hands that Gassendi was one of the first to make the philosophy of Bacon known and appreciated on the continent; and that his labours in this direction were great, and zealously discharged. With respect to his having anticipated Locke in the chief metaphysical doctrines which he developed and illustrated in his celebrated "Essay," there is less solid evidence of Gassendi's priority of discovery. That there are striking coincidences of opinion between the English philosopher and the Italian, is quite true; nor can it be denied that Gassendi distinctly declares that we



have ideas from the mind's power of reflecting inwardly on its own faculties, which is one of the leading positions of Locke's theory. Besides, there are other circumstances which ought to be taken into account. Gassendi published his "Paradoxes against Aristotle" in the year 1624; and his "Logic" a short time afterwards. He died in 1655. Mr. Locke did not publish his "Essay on the Human Understanding," until *twenty-six years after the death of the Italian writer*. In the mean time, the philosophy of Gassendi had been made known in England, and commentaries written on it, by Mr. Charleton, so that it was quite naturalized, as it were, amongst all the learned men in England. Whether Mr. Locke was really acquainted with Gassendi's works, I am unable to determine.

Professor Stewart has the following remarks on the genius and writings of Gassendi: "His learning, indeed, was at once vast and accurate; and as a philosopher he is justly entitled to the praise of being one of the first who entered thoroughly into the spirit of the Baconian logic. But his inventive powers, which were probably not of the highest order, seem to have been either dissipated amongst the multiplicity of his literary pursuits, or laid asleep by his indefatigable labours as a commentator and a compiler. From a writer of this class, new lights were not to be expected in the study of the human mind; and accordingly *here* he has done little or nothing but to revive and repeat over the doctrines of the old Epicureans. His works amount to six large volumes in folio; but the substance of

them might be compressed into a much smaller compass, without any diminution of their value."

The system of Gassendi was made known in England by Mr. Walter Charleton, in his work, entitled "Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendia," London, 1684; and the same system was promulgated in Germany by Henry Majus, in his "Physica Vetus &c." published at Francfort, in 1689.

## CHAPTER X.

PASCAL, HERBERT, AND PARKER.



PASCAL.

PASCAL was not a professed metaphysician, but he was by no means ignorant of many abstruse theories and principles of mind. His writings are justly held in high repute, in every country where literature and science are cultivated. His famous *Provincial Letters*, were highly instrumental in asserting the right of private judgment and reason on all matters appertaining to human liberty and happiness.

Pascal recommends self-knowledge. "Man's mind," he says, "holds the same rank in the order of intelligent beings, as his body in material nature; and all that it can do, is to discern somewhat of the middle of things, in an endless despair of ever knowing their beginning or their end. All things are called out of nothing, and carried onwards to infinity. Who can follow in this endless race? The Author of these wonders comprehends them. No other can."

As a sample of that pious doubt which we discover in the writings of Pascal, we may cite the following. "That which completes our inability to know the essential nature of things is, that they are simple, and that we are a compound of two different and opposing natures, body and spirit; for it is impossible that the portion of us which thinks, can be other than spiritual; and as to the pretence, that we are simply corporeal, that would exclude us still more entirely from the knowledge of things; because there is nothing more inconceivable, than that matter should comprehend itself."\*

"It is this compound nature of body and spirit which had almost led all philosophers to confuse their ideas of things; and to attribute to matter that which belongs only to spirit; and to spirit, that which consists but with matter; for, they say boldly, that bodies tend downwards; that they seek the centre; that they shrink from destruction; that they dread a vacuum; and that they have inclinations, sympathies, antipathies, &c.; which are all qualities that can only exist in mind. And in speaking of spirits, they consider them as occupying a place, and attribute to them motion from place to place, &c.—which are the qualities of bodies."†

\* Essays, Chap. 3.

† "Les deux principes de vérité, la raison et le sens, outre qu'ils manquent souvent de sincérité, s'abusent réciproquement l'un l'autre. Les seules abusent la raison par de fausses apparences; et cette même piperie, qu'ils lui apportent, ils la reçoivent d'elle à leur tour: elle s'en revanche. Les passions de l'âme troublent les sens, et leur font des impressions fâcheuses; ils mentent et se trompent à l'envi." Again Pascal observes, "Nous sommes sur un milieu vaste, toujours incertains et

“Instead, therefore, of receiving the ideas of things, simply as they are, we tinge, with the qualities of our compound being, all the simple things that we contemplate.”

“Who would not suppose, when they see us attach to every thing the compound notions of body and spirit, that this mixture was familiarly comprehensible to us? Yet it is the thing of which we know the least. Man is to himself the most astonishing object in nature, for he cannot conceive what body is, still less what spirit is, and less than all how a body and a spirit can be united. This is the climax of his difficulties, and yet it is his proper being.”\*

On the nature of evidence, and of the value and influence of mere abstract reasoning on the minds of the mass of mankind, Pascal has the following observations. “We ought not to misconceive our own nature. We are a body as well as a spirit; and hence demonstration is not the only channel of persuasion. How few things are capable of demonstration? Such proof, too, only convinces the understanding; custom gives the most conclusive proof, for it influences the senses, and by them the judgment is carried along without being aware of it. Who has proved the coming of to-morrow, or the fact of our own death? And yet what is

flottants entre l'ignorance et la connoissance, et si nous pensons aller plus avant, notre objet branle, et échappe à nos prises.” *Pensées, Fragments, et Lettres de Blaise Pascal, par M. Prosper Faugère*, 2 vol. Paris, 1847.

\* Essays, Chap. 3.

more universally believed? It is then custom which persuades us. Custom makes so many Turks and Pagans. Custom makes artisans and soldiers. True, we must begin here to search for truth, that we may have recourse to it when we have found out where the truth lies, in order to imbue ourselves more thoroughly with that belief, which otherwise would fade. For to have the series of proofs incessantly before the mind, is more than we are equal to. We must acquire a more easy method of belief; that of habit, which, without violence, without art, and, without argument, inclines all our powers to this belief, so that the mind glides into it naturally. It is not enough to believe only by the strength of rational conviction, while the senses incline us to believe the contrary. Our two powers must go forth together; the understanding, led by those reasonings which it suffices to have explained thoroughly once; the affections, by habit, which keep them perpetually from wandering.”\*

LORD HERBERT, OF CHERBURY.

The noble author's work, *De Veritate*, has excited some little attention among speculative philosophers, for the boldness and nonchalance with which he advances all his opinions, even on the most recondite and debateable questions. He seems to have written his work under an impression that

\* Essays, Chap. 7.

he alone had found out all the secrets of nature; and that other philosophers had been groping in the dark, without either the sagacity to perceive, or the honesty to declare truth to the world at large.

The first thing is, the means of discerning truth. Both ancient and modern philosophers have been fettered in their movements in searching after it. They have not enjoyed that perfect freedom necessary for wholesome discussion. Men of mercenary and hypocritical minds cannot promulgate truth. It is against their nature. Their interests lie in the contrary direction, and they love to perpetuate ignorance and dissimulation. A man must have a liberal and independent mind to advocate and proclaim the truth.

His Lordship lays down several elementary axioms relative to truth. 1st. That truth exists. 2nd. That it is coeval with the existence of the things to which it bears a relation. 3rd. It exists everywhere. 4th. It is self-evident. 5th. There are as many truths as there are differences among things. 6th. Our natural faculties make these differences known to us. 7th. There is a truth belonging to these truths.\* Truth is then divided into four sorts; the truth of the thing or object, the truth of appearance, the truth of conception, and the truth of the understanding.† There are again four different faculties which possess a rela-

\* What the author means by this, I do not know.

† De Veritate, pp. 9. 16.

tionship with external nature; these are natural instinct, internal perception, external sensation, and the reasoning faculty or power. Instinct is that faculty which is given to all men by Divine Providence, and imprinted on the soul itself from its creation. It is unerring in its aim, and comprehensive in its range. It embraces all general and universally received notions; and forms to itself complex ideas, without reasoning; such as analogy, genus, species, universals, cause and effect, good, evil, beautiful, and the like.\* These notions or ideas are not derived from external objects, they are only the exciting cause of them. They are alike independent of reason. These notions possess six distinct characteristics; priority, independence, generality, certainty, necessity, and a spontaneous and universal assent.†

Internal perception denotes the conformity of objects with this faculty in all men of sound mind. Internal sensation certifies the existence and qualities of these objects, so far as our feelings are concerned. The reasoning faculty is the noblest of all, and shows us the relations we stand in both towards God and man.‡

#### SAMUEL PARKER.

Mr. Parker's work, entitled "A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonic Philosophie,"§ was

\* De Veritate, pp. 50. 52. 56. 57. 58. 61. † Ibid. pp. 71. 78.

‡ Ibid. pp. 170. 190.

§ Published at Oxford, 1666.



composed to counteract the opinions of Theophilus Gale, and other writers, who were passionately devoted to Plato and his philosophy.

Though Mr. Parker pays much homage to Plato, still he thinks there are great defects in his system. We shall take a few passages from Mr. Parker's work, bearing on points of speculative metaphysics. "However the ease may be as to other innate notions, the existence of *Plato's Ideas* is altogether precarious and uncertain, and therefore absolutely unfit to be made the foundation of all science; for by them they unanimously understand pictures and images of things, painted and carved on the mind, rather than habits, thoughts, or conceptions."\* Again: "But to suppose that the understanding cannot act, unless it be employed about an object really existing, is not only precarious, but for any thing that appears to the contrary, opposite to every means of experience, seeing we are all able to create chimeras at pleasure. But though this *postulatum* were granted as to created intellects, yet to tie and limit the contemplations of the *Divine mind* to a pre-existent object, is (beside many other absurdities) not less rash and unwarrantable than to confine the operations of Omnipotence to the laws of matter and motion; seeing then there is no tolerable evidence to be produced of the truth and reality of these *mental images*, what can more betray the cause of science to the exceptions of sceptics than to resolve its utmost truth and evidence in such uncertain and imaginary principles?"†

\* Page 58.

† Page 59.

“The office of definitions is not to explain the nature of things, but to fix and circumscribe the signification of words; for they being notes of things, unless their signification be settled, their meaning must needs be equivocal and uncertain. ....I hope sufficiently to evince the vanity of metaphysical definitions, in order to the discovering the hidden essences of things. But further, we are so far from attaining any certain and real knowledge of *incorporeal beings*, that we are not able to know any thing of *corporeal substances*, as abstract from their accidents. There is nothing can more perplex my faculties, than the simple *idea* of naked matter. And it certainly was never intended that mere essences should be the objects of our faculties.”\*

\* Page 64.

## CHAPTER XI.



THEOPHILUS GALE.

THIS author was a Non-conformist divine, but had been educated at Oxford. His principal works relative to mental philosophy, are his "Court of the Gentiles," and his "Philosophia Generalis." The former treatise is more generally known than the latter.

The "Court of the Gentiles" is a book of great merit, and unquestionable learning. The grand aim is, to show that the philosophy and literature of the Greeks were directly derived from the Jewish nation, and that Plato was the chief instrument in accomplishing this transmission. These two positions he supports, by Jewish testimonies, the authority of the Fathers of the Church, the testimony of heathen philosophers, historians, and legislators, and by the opinions of many learned authors and critics of modern times; among whom may be mentioned, Ludovicus Vives, Stenchus Eugubius, Joseph Scaliger, Serranus, Heinsius, Selden, Preston, Parker, Jackson, Hammond, Cudworth, Stillingfleet, Usher, Bochart, Vossius, and Grotius.

In a work of this kind, we have no room to enlarge upon this very interesting inquiry; in fact, we can do little more, than merely state the author's aim and object. But being anxious to do something like justice to this very amiable and learned man, the following observations may be illustrative, in some measure, of his general argument, and of the chief proposition he was so desirous of establishing.

From the geographical position of the land of Judea, a communication must have been opened up with all the leading nations of ancient celebrity. The wars in which the Jews were often involved, and their migratory habits, must have materially assisted in making them objects of foreign curiosity and remark. And this would be more especially the case, when they had so completely succeeded, under almost superhuman disadvantages, in preserving, in a perfect form, all those social and religious observances, which had constituted, from the remotest period, the distinguishing feature of their nation. We cannot look upon these Jewish manners, ingrafted as they were upon a peculiar system of religious and civil polity, as becoming objects of regard among neighbouring nations, merely from their singularity alone. These nations must have been led to the contemplation of those general principles of religion and politics, which gave rise to social habits and ceremonial observances, so completely distinct from those of any other people.

It is impossible to look at that singular fact, the translation of the Old Testament into the Greek language, which took place about the third cen-

tury before the Christian era, without being convinced of the high probability, that the knowledge and influence of the Jewish laws extended far beyond the boundaries of their own kingdom. There have been controversies as to the precise manner in which the Septuagint was made; but it has never been seriously doubted, that the work was executed at or near the time which the general voice of history proclaims. This fact pre-supposes a knowledge of Jewish laws and religion long prior to the time of this celebrated translation; and the fact also pre-supposes that this knowledge must have been pretty widely diffused. This undertaking was not entered upon from mere curiosity, or for private purposes; it must have arisen from some very general wish expressed by a whole nation. Such an enterprise as this, immediately effected by kingly authority, must have produced a good deal of public discussion, and could not have been accomplished in a corner. On the contrary, it must have tended to spread far and wide a knowledge of the civil and religious institutions of the inhabitants of Judea.

It is a very common idea among the learned, that almost all the leading objects of heathen worship, and the leading principles of its speculative dogmas, were taken from the Jewish Scriptures; and are merely to be considered as corruptions of those important facts and doctrines found in the sacred volume. Now if there be any truth in this opinion, we must be led to the conclusion that these religious opinions, doctrines, and rites were

not the only things adopted by heathen nations from the Jewish system. A portion at least of knowledge relative to the general laws and social customs of the Jews must have been carried down the current of popular tradition, along with other materials. By this means the seeds of political wisdom and equity would become scattered over every portion of the heathen world, where anything like philosophy and cultivation prevailed.

These conjectures are greatly strengthened by the repeated declarations of many ancient writers. In addition to these, there is a very pointed and striking prediction in the Book of Deuteronomy, that all nations should acknowledge the wisdom, equity, and humanity of the Hebrew code of laws. "Behold I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the Lord my God commandeth me; keep therefore and do them, for this is your wisdom, in the sight of all nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people."

Several heathen legislators acknowledge their great obligations to the Jewish nation. Plato affirms that all laws came from God, and that no mortal men were founders of them. His words are, "No mortal men ought to institute any law without consulting some oracle." All the first legislators in both the Roman and Grecian States, pretended they received their laws from the Gods. Owen, in his *Theologia*, says, "The wisers of the heathens knew full well, that all right and power derived their origin from God himself. For whereas

all power is seated in God, they most rightly supposed that none could be duly partakers thereof but by Him; and thence they judged it most equal, that all laws imposed on the society of the people, should flow from his *divine institution*. This truth they either saw or heard to be consigned in the Mosaic legislation."

We find in Diodorus Siculus the following observations. "According to that ancient life which was in Egypt under the gods and heroes in those fabulous times, it is said that Moses was a man commemorated to have been of great soul and well-ordered life." Mariana, the Jesuit, has the following remark upon this passage. "Moses, after the invention of letters, was the first of all who persuaded the people to use written laws, which is produced by Cyril and Diodorus." Owen (already mentioned) observes, "There is none who hath taught that there were amongst mankind any written laws more ancient than the Mosaic. Neither is it confirmed by any authentic testimony that there were any stated laws, although unwritten, (besides the dictates of right reason), constituted by the people for their government, before the Mosaic age. But that the fame of the Mosaic legislation should spread itself far and wide, was foretold by the Spirit of God in the Book of Deuteronomy; for the most ancient of the Greeks do acknowledge, *that Moses was the first legislator.*"

The Grecian lawgivers are generally supposed to have been of more ancient origin than those of Rome; and I find that Grotius observes, "Add

hereto, the undoubted antiquity of Moses' writings; an argument whereof is this, that the most ancient *Attic laws*, from whence, in after times, the Roman were derived, owe their origin to Moses' laws." Cunæus, in his "Hebrew Republic," makes the following remarks; "Truly the Greeians, whilst they ambitiously impute their benefits to all nations, plaee their giving laws among the chiefest. For they mention their Lyeurgnses, Draeos, Solons, or if there be any names more ancient. But all this gloriation is vain; for this aerial nation is silenced by the Jew Flavius Josephus, whose *Apology* (learned to a miraele) against Appian, that enemy to the Jews, is extant. Flavius shows there that the Greek legislators, if eompared to Moses, are of the lowest antiquity, and seem to have been born but of yesterday." Hermippus, in his life of Pythagoras, quoted by Josephus against Appian, says, "These things he said and did, imitating the opinions of the Jews and Thraeians, and transferring them to himself; for truly this man took many things into his own philosophy from the Jewish laws."

The influence of the Jewish laws on the condition of the world, during the early ages of Greeian history, has been often pointed out by distinguished writers, from the resemblance existing between many of the institutions and ceremonies of both countries. The Athenians had a prescribed will of divorce; and so had the Jews. Among the Jews the father gave names to the children; and such was the eustom among the Greeks. The purgation



oath among the Greeks strongly resembles the oath of jealousy among the Hebrews. The harvest and vintage festival among the Greeks; the presentation of the best of their flocks, and the offering of their first fruits to the gods, together with the portion prescribed for the priests: the interdiction against garments of divers colours; protecting from violence the man who fled to their altars; would seem to indicate that the Greeks had carefully copied the usages of the Jews. And whence was it that no person was permitted to approach the altar of Diana, who had touched a dead body, or been exposed to other causes of impurity; and that the laws of Athens admitted no man to the priesthood who had any blemish upon his person—unless from the institutions of Moses? And has not the agrarian law of Lycurgus its prototype, though none of its defects, in the agrarian laws of the Hebrews? Many of the Athenian laws in relation to the descent of property, and the prohibited degrees of relationship of marriage, seem to have been transcribed by Solon from the laws of Moses. Sir Matthew Hale, in his “History of the Common Laws of England,” affirms, “that among the Grecians, the laws of descents resemble the laws of the Jews.” Gouget, in his elaborate and learned Treatise “On the Origin of Laws,” observes that, “The more we meditate on the laws of Moses, the more we shall perceive their wisdom and inspiration. They alone have the inestimable advantage never to have undergone any of the revolutions common

to all human laws, which have always demanded frequent amendments ; sometimes changes ; sometimes additions ; sometimes the retrenching of superfluities. There has been nothing changed, nothing added, nothing retrenched, from the laws of Moses, for above three thousand years." Milman, in his "History of the Jews," remarks, "that the Hebrew lawgiver has exercised, over the destinies of mankind, a more extensive and permanent influence than any other individual in the annals of the world." Hooker, in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," likewise remarks, "Of law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world. All things in heaven and earth do her homage ; the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt from her power."

The opinion that written language was the result of Revelation, is supported by high authority among the Christian Fathers ; Clemens Alexandrinus, Cyril, and St. Augustine, maintain this opinion ; and among the moderns, Mariana, Dr. John Owen, Sir Charles Woollsey, and Doctors Winder and Mac Knight, do the same.

Chronologists maintain that David and Solomon were contemporaneous with Hiram in Phœnicia, with Hadadezer in Assyria ; and, according to Sir Isaac Newton, with Sesostris in Egypt, and Cadmus in Greece. Nearly about this time we find letters were introduced into different Pagan nations ; and they gradually became habitations for genius and

learning, in proportion as they were more or less remotely distant from the Holy Land.

In relation, however, to the precise period when the art of writing was communicated to other nations, different and contradictory opinions have certainly been expressed by learned writers. When the Jews were wanderers in the Desert, and were under the guidance of Joshua in his wars, there was no opportunity of communicating with other nations. From the death of Joshua to the time of Samuel, the nation was sunk into a low and degraded condition. Mr. Milman describes it as "the heroic age of Jewish history, abounding in wild adventure and desperate feats of individual valour." Under the reign of Samuel, the nation, however, took up a new position. He founded a school of prophets: he wrote the early part of the life of Moses, and a treatise on Civil Government, which was called "*The Manners of the Kingdom,*" for the especial instruction of Saul, the first King. David was a prince of highly cultivated mind. Then came the distinguished reign of Solomon, which, as already noticed, attracted the attention of surrounding nations, both for its wisdom and its riches. His court was the most splendid and enlightened in the world. This was a time of profound peace. Agriculture and commerce flourished; and the Metropolis of Judea was rendered "the beauty and perfection of the whole earth." It is probable, that it was not till about this time that the art of writing became known to heathen nations.

It may be remarked, that Egypt was the school from which the Grecian philosophers were said to derive their wisdom. Now there existed from the earliest times, a close and constant intercourse between Judea and Egypt; so that it is by no means an improbable circumstance that these philosophers should become acquainted with the Jewish writings. We have the most direct proof that great multitudes of the Jews flocked to Egypt prior to the Babylonish captivity, in direct opposition to the threatenings and warnings of God, through his prophet Jeremiah. When Egypt was reduced under the Assyrian empire, the punishment of these idolatrous Jews followed, as the prophet had predicted. These public occurrences must have directed general attention to the Jewish tenets, and made them objects of deep interest with many eastern nations.

Now these may be considered as the leading arguments, which Gale and his admirers advance for the truth of his theory as to the origin of heathen philosophy. The subject is full of interest; but, from some cause, which is not very apparent, it has been lightly passed over by modern philosophical writers. Real useful knowledge could not receive a more valuable boon than a work devoted to the exclusive consideration of the important question, which it is the professed object of Mr. Gale's treatise to discuss, but which has not been successful in removing many doubts and difficulties which still hang around it.

Gale's "*Philosophia Generalis*" endeavours to

show that Plato received all his knowledge of theology from the Hebrews, and that his system agrees, in its leading doctrines, with what the Holy Scriptures teach. His enthusiasm for Plato is unbounded; so likewise was his hatred of the Cartesian philosophy, which he considered subversive of sound morals and religion.\*

Mr. Hallam has the following notice of this author: "Gale's *Court of the Gentiles*, which appeared partly in 1669, and partly in later years, is incomparably a more learned work than that of Stanley. Its aim is to prove that all heathen philosophy, whether barbaric or Greek, was borrowed from the Scriptures, or at least from the Jews. The first part is entitled, *Of Philology*, which traces the same leading principle by means of language; the second, *Of Philosophy*; the third treats of the *Vanity of Philosophy*; and the fourth, of *Reformed Philosophy*, wherein Plato's moral and metaphysic or prime philosophy; is reduced to an useful form and method." Gale has been reckoned among Platonic philosophers, and indeed he professes to find a great resemblance between the philosophy of Plato and his own. But he is a determined Calvinist, in all respects, and scruples not to say, 'Whatever God wills is just, because He wills it,' and again, 'God willeth nothing without himself, because it is just; but it is therefore just because He willeth it. The reasons of good and evil ex-

\* See Wood's *Ath. Ox.* vol. 2; Calamy; and Brucker's *History of Philosophy*.

trinsic to the Divine essence, are all dependent on the Divine will, either discernment or legislative." It is not likely that Plato would have acknowledged such a disciple.' '\*

\* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. 3, p. 303.

## CHAPTER XII.

CUDWORTH, DIGBY, AND WHITE.



DR. CUDWORTH.

The *Intellectual System* of Dr. Cudworth is undoubtedly the production of a man of great learning and genius. It is not, however, a work which can ever become what may be termed popular. The learning is too profuse and erudite, the arguments too refined, and the logical conclusions too far removed from the ordinary track of mental speculation, for common readers of philosophical subjects to relish and appreciate them.

The express purpose for which the *Intellectual System* was written, was to counteract the evil tendency of the doctrine of *philosophical necessity*, which had been brought into considerable notice in Cudworth's day, by the writings of Hobbes and the theological doctrines of the English Antinomians. The Doctor thought he saw in this doctrine, the utter destruction of all moral notions of right and wrong, of all religious principle, and all just

ideas of civil and political freedom. He set earnestly, therefore, about the task of eradicating this heresy, and the *Intellectual System* is the fruit of that labour.

Cudworth was a passionate admirer of the mental and moral philosophy of Plato; and this admiration gave a decided bias to all his speculations and conclusions, respecting the nature and faculties of the human mind.

According to the author of the *Intellectual System*, the mind of man perceives, through the means of outward objects; but these mental perceptions are as vastly increased in number over the mere sensations from without, as the ideas of a learned man, in perusing a well-written book, are over the ideas of a totally illiterate person or a brute. "To the eyes of both, the same characters will appear; but the learned man, in those characters, will see heaven, earth, sun, and stars; read profound theorems of philosophy or geometry; learn a great deal of new knowledge from them, and admire the wisdom of the composer; while, to the other, nothing appears but black streaks down on white paper. The reason of which is, that the mind of the one is furnished with certain previous inward anticipations, ideas, and instruction, that the other wants."—"In the room of this book of *human* composition let us now substitute the book of nature, written all over with the characters and impressions of *divine* wisdom and goodness, but legible only to an intellectual eye. To the sense of both man and brute, there appears nothing else



in it, but, as in the other, so many inky serawls; that is, nothing but figure and colours. But the mind, which hath a participation of divine wisdom that made it, upon occasion of these sensible delineations, exerting its own inward activity, will have not only a wonderful scene, and large prospects of other thoughts laid before it, and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematicall, and moral, displayed; but also clearly read the divine wisdom and goodness in every page of this great volume, as if it were written in large and legible characters."

Again this author says, "that the mind contains in itself virtually (as the future plant or tree is contained in the seed) general notions of all things which unfold themselves as occasions invite, and proper circumstances occur."

It is one of the leading objects of the *Intellectual System*, to demonstrate the folly and wickedness of Atheism. There seem to be three forms in which this heresy displays itself, and against which Dr. Cudworth brings his arguments and learning to bear. The first atheistical form is that which represents all the decrees of the First Cause to be eternal, absolute, and inflexible; the second is that form of atheism which was countenanced by Zeno and Chrysippus among the Greeks, and the Essenes among the Jews, and which supposes that the Deity acts by general and necessary laws; and the third form is that which reduces every thing to blind and physical impulses of material ageneies or powers. All these various phases of atheism are traced through their argumentative and histo-

rical ramifications, with wonderful learning, and great power of argument.

Dr. Cudworth's Treatise on Free-will, has been recently published from the manuscript in the British Museum, by the Rev. John Allen. It is a very masterly work. It was written as an answer to Mr. Hobbes and other writers of the Necessitarian school. Cudworth says, "We seem clearly to be led by the *instinct of nature* to think that there is something *in nostra potestate, in our own power*, (though dependent on God Almighty), and that we are not altogether passive in our actings, nor determined by inevitable necessity in whatsoever we do. Because we praise and dispraise, commend and blame men for their actings, much otherwise than we do inanimate beings or brute animals. When we blame or commend a clock or automaton, we do it so as not imputing to that automaton its being the cause of its own moving well or ill, agreeably or disagreeably to the end it was designed for, this being ascribed by us only to the artificer; but when we blame a man for any wicked action, as for taking away another man's life, either by perjury or by wilful murder, we blame him not only as doing otherwise than ought to have been done, but also than he might have done, and that it was possible for him to have avoided it, so that he was himself the cause of the evil thereof. We do not impute the evil of all men's wicked actions to God the Creator and *maker of them*, after the same manner as we do the faults of a clock or watch wholly to the watchmaker. All

men's words at least free God from the blame of wicked actions, pronouncing God as causeless and guiltless of them, and we cast the blame of them wholly on the men themselves, as principles of action, and the true causes of the moral defects of them. So also do we blame men's acting viciously and immorally in another sense than we blame a halting or a stumbling horse; or than we blame the natural and necessary infirmities of men themselves when uncontracted by vice. For in this case we so blame the infirmities as to pity the men themselves, looking upon them as unfortunate but not as faulty. But we blame men's vices, with a displeasure against the persons themselves."\*

\* \* The learned Meiners has disputed the identity of the principles advocated by Cudworth, and those of Plato; and he is inclined to think that the Doctor's opinions contain the germ of Kant's doctrines. Professor Buhle combats both opinions in his *Manual of Philosophy*, 6th part, 2ud. Lect. p. 809.

### SIR KENELM DIGBY.

Sir Kenelm was a man of considerable parts, and enjoyed, during his life, the reputation of being a philosopher.† His metaphysical works are, 1st,

\* *Free-will*, pp. 1.2.

† "He was a person very eminent and notorious throughout the whole course of his life, from his cradle to his grave; of an ancient family and noble extraction; and inherited a fair and plentiful fortune, notwithstanding the attainder of his father. He was a man of very extraordinary person and presence, which drew the eyes of all men upon him, which were more fixed by a wonderful graceful behaviour, a flowing courtesy and civility, and a volubility of language, as surprised and delighted."—  
LORD CLARENDON.

“Treatise on the Nature of Bodies ;” 2nd, “A Treatise declaring the Operations and Nature of Man’s Soul, out of which the Immortality of Reasonable Souls is evinced ;” and 3rd, “Institutionum Peripateticarum libri quinque, cum Appendice Theologica de Origine Mundi.”

In the “Treatise on the Nature of Bodies,” we find the author, towards the close of the work, entering into a disquisition on the nature of plants and animals. Man, and his organs of sensation, the faculty of memory, and the voluntary powers, are described. He descants on all the five senses, and points out their peculiar uses, and modes of action. In the chapter on *memory*, he disagrees with Descartes’ theory of *animal spirits*; but Digby’s own ideas on the subject are scarcely more plausible than the French philosopher’s. “Let us examine,” says Digby, “a little more particularly, how the causes we have assigned raise these bodies that rest in the memory, and bring them to the phantasy. The middlemost of them, (namely *chance*), needs no looking into; because the principles that govern it are uncertain ones. But the first and the last, (which are the appetite and the will) have a power of moving the brain and nerves depending upon it, conveniently and agreeably to their dispositions. Out of which it follows, that the little similitudes in the eaves of the brain reeling and swimming about, (as you see in the washing of currants or of rice, by the winding about and circular turning of the cook’s hand), divers sorts of bodies go their courses for a pretty while; so that the most ordi-

nary objects cannot choose but present themselves quickly, because there are many of them, and are every way scattered about; but others that are fewer are longer ere they come in view; much like as in a string or strop of beads, that, containing more little ones than great ones, if you pluck to you the string they all hang on, you shall meet with many more of one sort, than of the other.

“Now, as soon as the brain hath lighted on any of those it seeks for, it puts as it were a stop upon the motion of that; or at least, it moves it so, that it goes not far away, and is revocable at will, and seems like a bait to draw into the fantasy others belonging to the same thing, either through similitude of nature, or by their connexion in the impression; and by this means hinders other objects, not pertinent to the work the fancy hath in hand, from offering themselves unseasonably in the multitudes that otherwise they would do.”\*

There are many very acute reflexions in the author's treatise on the immortality of the soul. The drift of the chief argument pervading the work, may be discovered in the following statement of the Author. “We proposed to ourselves to show, that our souls are immortal; whereupon, easting about to find the grounds of immortality, and discerning it to be a negative, we conceived that we ought to begin to search, with inquiring what mortality is, and what be the *causes* of it; which when we should have discerned, and brought the soul to their test, if we found they trenched not upon her,

\* Treatise on the Nature of Bodies. pp 359, 360.

nor any way concerned her condition, we might safely conclude that of necessity she *must* be immortal. Looking then into the causes of *mortality*, we saw that all *bodies* round about us were *mortal*; whence perceiving that *mortality* extended itself as far as *corporeity*, we found ourselves obliged, if we would free the *soul* from that law, to show that she was *not corporeal*. This could not be done, without inquiring what *corporeity* was. Now it being a rule among logicians that a definition cannot be good unless it comprehend and reach to every particular of that which is defined, we perceived it impossible to know completely what a body is, without taking a general view of all those things which we comprise under the name and meaning of bodies. This is the cause we spent so much time on in the *First Treatise*, and I hope to good purpose, for there we found that the nature of *body* consisted in being *made of parts*; that all the *differences of bodies* are reduced to *having* more or less *parts*, in comparison to their *substance*, thus and thus *ordered*; and lastly, that all their *operations* are nothing else but *local motions*, which follow naturally out of *having parts*. So as it appears evidently from hence, that, if any thing have a *being*, and yet have *no parts*, it is *not a body*, but a substance of *another* quality and condition; and consequently, if we can find the *soul's being* to be *without parts*, and that her *operations* are *no local translation*; we evidently conclude her to be an *Immaterial* or *Spiritual substance*.”\*

\* A Treatise declaring the Operations and Nature of Man's Soul. Preface.

This author's work, "Institutiones Peripateticæ," is a defence of the philosophy of the Stagirite. He was zealously attached to it, and considered the modern speculations on mind, both on the Continent and in England, as untenable and mischievous.\*

## THOMAS WHITE.

This author obtained considerable celebrity in his day, and his metaphysical speculations are by no means devoid of interest. He was a Roman Catholic clergyman, and a most zealous defender of Aristotle's philosophy. He taught publicly at Lisbon, Douay, Rome, and Paris.

White's treatise, "Religion and Reason mutually corresponding and assisting each other," is a controversial one. It is argumentatively written, and contains many profound observations on the nature and union of body and mind.

This author's work, "An Exclusion of Sceptics from all Title to Dispute; being an Answer to the Vanity of Dogmatizing," enters very fully into Glanvil's book, and endeavours to overturn most of his statements and arguments. Here White defends with great pertinacity the syllogistic theory of Aristotle; and shows that his logic is admirably fitted to promote and communicate true knowledge.

\* Wood's Athen. Oxon. vol. 2.

We shall here quote a passage from this work, on *Memory*, which is part of the answer which the author gives to Glanvil's remarks on this faculty. White says, "First, I must weaken this consequence, that, '*if any thing about memory has not hitherto been explained, we must therefore make account it never will be, or that it is impossible to be explained.*' We must be aware too, that always some things will be unknown; either because their trivialness merits not the pains of learning them; or in that, at length, the bulk of things known will be grown so great, that more will be burdensome to the understanding.' Now, to complain of such like is to have forgot human shortness. What, therefore, seems my task in this question is, to bring into play those things which are already established and evident about memory. First, then, 'tis evident, we must distinguish what is *memory*, and what *remembrance*; for memory is only a conserving of the impressions made by the objects, whereby the animal is rendered able to use them when he lists or needs. But *remembrance* is a certain motion whereby that power of using the impressions is reduced into *act* and *use*. Concerning memory, therefore, a reason is to be given both of its station or rest, and of the causes or manner of its motion; and of both, if I be not mistaken, nature and experience offer evident footsteps for tracing them.

"In the first place, that all things that move the senses have certain minute particles of their body



shorn off; as to *touch*, *taste*, and *smell*, is too notorious to abide contest. He that denies the same force to the light, returning from the thing to the eyes, must deny, too, that the sun extracts exhalations from the earth and sea; there being no more diversity in the operations, but that the one is greater and stronger, and the other weaker and less. Now that these atoms get up to the brain, by the waftage of the spirits, (that is, a certain liquid and most subtile substance) can scarce be denied by one never so peevish, that is put in mind how waters and oils are impregnated. These atoms, therefore, must of necessity strike, not without some violence, upon that part of the brain, whose being struck causes perception. Again, that a stream, or anything liquid, dashed against a resister, should not leap back again, is most clearly repugnant, both to experience and reason. And that a substance any thing viscous, being repulsed, should not stick to any thing solid, is equally impossible; as also, that a notable part of that stream should not cling together, is against the nature of glueyness. The walls, therefore, of the empty and hollow places of the brain, must of necessity be all hung and furnished with little threads. Conclude we then, that through all the senses, excepting hearing, the animal is enabled, by atoms constantly sticking in it, to make use again of the impressions made by objects. In fine, since sound is made by collision of the air, it is evident from anatomy, that it drives the hammer of the ear to beat upon the

anvil; by which beat, it is not to be believed but certain particles must fly off and strike the fancy; the orderly storing up, therefore, of these, is apt to constitute the memory of sounds. The structure, then, of *memory*, (if I am not mistaken) is rationally enough declared.”\*

The author’s work, “*De Medio Animarum Statu*,” gave great offence to many members of the Catholic faith, both at home and abroad. The British House of Commons even took it up, and condemned it along with Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, in the following resolution :

“Anno 1666.

Die Mercurii, 17 Octobris, 18 Car. II.

“Ordered, that the Commissioners to which the Bill against Atheism and profaneness is committed, be empowered to receive information touching such books as tend to atheism, blasphemy, and profaneness, or against the essence and attributes of God, and in particular the book published in the name of one White, and the book of Mr. Hobbes, called ‘*Leviathan*,’ and to report their opinions to the House.”

\* \* \* The following is a list of the principal works of Thomas White :—*Institutiones Peripateticæ, ad Mentem Kenelmi Digbæi*, 1646; *Quæstio Theologica, de Humani Arbitrii Libertate*, 1653; *De Medio Animarum Statu*, 1653; *the Practice of Christian Perfection*, 1653; *A Contemplation of Heaven*, 1654; *State of the Future Life*, 1654; *Sonus Buccinæ, sive Tres Tractatus de Virtutibus Fidei et Theologiæ*, Paris, 1654; *The Grounds of Obedience to Government*, 1655; *Tabulæ Suffragiales*

\* Exclusion of Sceptics, p. 38.

de Terminandis Fidei Litibus, 1655 ; Euclides Physicus, 1657 ; Euclides Metaphysicus, sive de Principiis Sapientiae, 1658 ; Exercitatio Geometrica, 1658 ; Controversy Logick, or the Method to come to Truth in Matters of Religion, 1659 ; Mens Augustini de Gratia Adami, 1659 ; Chrysopsis, vel in Scientiis Obscurioribus Tutela Geometrica, 1659. Mr. Dodd enumerates forty-six distinct publications of Mr. White.

## CHAPTER XIII.



## DE LA FORGE, REGIS, AND CORDEMOI.

THE philosophy of Descartes was, on the whole, very generally received throughout the continent, but there were particular localities and seats of learning where it was but coldly welcomed, and even in some cases entirely prohibited. This state of things had the natural effect of stimulating the advocates of the new philosophy to renewed efforts for its diffusion and illustration. Able and zealous partisans sprung up on all sides to defend the leading principles of Descartes, and to place his system beyond the pale of doubt or cavil. Among these disciples De la Forge and Regis hold a conspicuous place.

## LOUIS DE LA FORGE.

This zealous Cartesian was a physician at Saumur, and published his "Traité de l'Esprit de l'Homme," at Paris, in 1666. In this work the author eulogizes the splendid talents of Descartes to the utmost, and even maintains that he merits the epithet *divine* much better than Plato himself does.

The treatise of De la Forge is almost a literal transcript of the system of his master. In the notes appended to the volume, he corrects some slight mistakes into which Descartes had fallen, in respect to the nature and operation of the senses. On the great question, In what does our knowledge consist, De la Forge maintains that "to know is simply to perceive that which is internally represented in the mind."\* We cannot go beyond what we are conscious of. He affirms the reality of external things by means of copies or images of them being formed in the mind altogether independent of our consent or will. Innate ideas De la Forge reduces to three classes; the first, a substance which thinks; the second, a substance which is extended; and the third is composed of the union of the other two.

A very interesting portion of the volume consists in the author's tracing out some very curious coincidences between the doctrine of Descartes and some speculations of St. Augustine's.†

#### PIERRE SYLVAIN REGIS.

This was also one of the enthusiastic disciples of Descartes. "All I have said," says Regis, "being due to M. Descartes, whose principles and method I have followed, even in explanations that are different from his own."

The chief work of Regis made its appearance

\* *Traité*, pp. 89. 96. 97.

† *Traité de l'Esprit de l'Homme*, préface.

at Paris, in 1690, in three volumes quarto, entitled "Système de la Philosophie." It is an extremely interesting work, not only considered as an illustration of the general features of the Cartesian philosophy, but in relation to the science of mind generally; abounding as it does with many very profound disquisitions, on topics not usually found in publications on the same subject at this period of history.

This author's disquisition on the union of the soul and body is interesting. The grand principle, however, which regulates this mysterious and important union, is the *will of God*. All bodily movements act on the soul by a special and divine influence, which has arranged that certain thoughts shall arise in the mind simultaneously, through the instrumentality of certain motions of the body.\* The Deity is the efficient cause of everything we see, and we all act as mere secondary instruments in His hand.

According to Regis, we know all things only through the medium of ideas; and if we have not these, we can form no idea or conception of any kind. Existence can have no positive or intelligible meaning, apart from the doctrine of ideas.

It is one of the axioms of Regis, that every mode pre-supposes a substance in which it resides. It is from this principle that the author deduces the objective existence of space, inasmuch as length, breadth, and depth cannot form part of ourselves,

\* Book 1, 2nd Part, p. 124.

for none of these properties belong to the thinking substance called the soul. Nor can it be conceived how even the Supreme Being could furnish us with the idea of space, if that space did not possess an absolute existence.

Regis lays down the same principle as Descartes,—and some critics have thought, with a good deal more clearness and accuracy,—that the knowledge of our own minds is not derived from reasoning. “We obtain this knowledge by a simple and internal intimation, which precedes all acquired knowledge, and which I call consciousness, (*conscience*).” Regis seems, however, to have had some misgivings of the famous axiom of his master, “I think, therefore I am;” for he enters into some explanations of the nature and character of consciousness, which show that his mind was rather unsettled upon this fundamental point of Cartesian philosophy.\*

### GERARD DE CORDEMOI.

This Author introduced the Cartesian system into the French Academy, in a work entitled “Six Discours sur la distinction et l’union de l’Ame et

\* “Je suis donc une pensée; cependant je crains encore de me définir mal, quand je dis que je suis une pensée, qui a la propriété de douter et d’avoir de la certitude; car quelle apparence y a-t-il que ma nature, qui doit être une chose fixe et permanente, consiste dans la pensée, puisque je sais par expérience que mes pensées sont dans un flux continu, et que je ne pense jamais à la même chose deux momens de suite? Mais quand je considère la difficulté de plus près, je conçois aisément qu’elle vient de ce que le mot de pensée est équivoque, et que je

du Corps," which was published at Paris, in 1702. This treatise is simply a running commentary on the leading principles of Descartes' theory, and contains little that is original.

Cordemoi was also the author of a work on the origin and formation of language, entitled "Discours Physique sur la Parole." It is an ingenious and readable book.

m'en sers indifféremment pour signifier la pensée qui constitue ma nature, et pour désigner les différentes manières d'être de cette pensée ; ce qui est une erreur extrême, car il y a cette différence entre la pensée qui constitue ma nature, et les pensées qui n'en sont que les manières d'être, que la première est une pensée fixe et permanente, et que les autres sont des pensées changeantes et passagères. C'est pourquoi, afin de donner une idée exacte de ma nature, je dirai que je suis une pensée qui existe en elle-même, et qui est le sujet de toutes mes manières de penser. Je dis que je suis une pensée, pour marquer ce que la pensée qui constitue ma nature a de commun avec la pensée en général qui comprend sous soi toutes les manières particulières de penser ; et j'ajoute, qui existe en elle-même, et qui est le sujet de différentes manières de penser, pour désigner ce que cette pensée a de particulier qui la distingue de la pensée en général, vu qu'elle n'existe que dans l'entendement de celui qui la conçoit ainsi que toutes les autres natures universelles."



## CHAPTER XIV.

BUCHANAN, AYLEWORTH, SERGEANT, NORRIS,  
GLANVIL.

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DAVID BUCHANAN.

THIS author published his work at Paris, in 1636, entitled “*Historia Animæ Humanæ.*” It is an extremely valuable performance, full of good sense; and displays besides, an acuteness not surpassed by any English author at the period of history when Buchanan published his work.

The treatise is divided into seven chapters, and these again into several sections.

The author dwells upon the great importance of a knowledge of the mind, and discusses the nature and number of its faculties. The 14th, 15th, and 16th Sections of the third Chapter, are worthy of especial notice.

WILLIAM AYLEWORTH.

This English author published his work, called “*Metaphysica Scholastica,*” at Cologne, in 1655. Its

object is, to apply the reasonings commonly employed in the schools, to explain and elucidate the various doctrines of the Christian faith. There are various excellent remarks scattered up and down in the treatise. It is rare.\*

### J. SERGEANT.

This author published his work, called "Solid Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the Idealists," in 1697. It is a curious treatise, and seldom to be found in our public libraries.

Mr. Sergeant has the following propositions.

1st. That the new mode of philosophizing is dangerous and unsound, and rational knowledge is reduced to a "lamentable condition:" and the author says, that as "all truths in natural objects were thus in eminent danger to be overrun, and borne down by imaginary conceits; and apprehending that God's providence had fitted and enabled me to redress such great mischiefs; I thought it became me to reinstate Reason in her sovereignty over fancy."† Again, the author tells us, "Indeed I must own I have a high opinion of my principles and my method, which nature and God's good providence have lay'd and established."‡

2nd. That "the world has been sufficiently pestered already with books on philosophy, nay, volumes blown up to a vast bulk with windy and

\* See the Preface, and the 4th and 6th Chapters.

† Solid Philosophy, p. 8.

‡ Ibid. p. 11.

frothy probabilities, and petty inconclusive topics."

3rd. That "few men are there who will profess to demonstrate in philosophy, or to reduce their discourses to evidence." \* \* \* "Without doing which, and abiding by the trial, perhaps there is not one word of truth in all philosophy, nor any thing but learned romances in all the Universities in Europe."\*

4th. That "a *notion* is the very thing itself existing in my understanding;" and this "is so manifestly true, that were it otherwise, it is impossible any man living should know any thing at all."†

5th. "When I simply apprehend the thing, or any mode or accident of it, this operation of my understanding is within my mind, and completed there. I grant it; therefore, the thing apprehended, which is the object of that operation, must be there likewise."‡

6th. That with respect to the Deity the author maintains, "that God is a pure *actuality* of Being, actually and ever exercised, and undetermined to act; that actual existence being essential to Him, his peculiar effect is, to give existence, or to create things; and to conserve them in being, which is a perpetual creation, or creation continued; and therefore that it is more diametrically opposite to His nature to cause a *not being*, then it is for light to create darkness."

\* Solid Phil. p. 13.

† p. 27.

‡ p. 29.

## JOHN NORRIS.

This metaphysician was an Episcopal Clergyman, and an author of considerable reputation in his day. His principal work is, "An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible world." It is composed of two parts; the one published in 1701, and the other in 1704.

This is a work of undoubted genius. There is a depth and power of reasoning in it, which is not equalled in the writings of any English author of the same period, with the exception of Mr. Locke's Essay. The grand object of Norris's treatise is to carry out what he conceived was the true interpretation of Plato's philosophy, which maintained that all our ideas were only the *exemplaria rerum in mente Divinâ*, or the original forms or patterns of things in the Divine understanding. In developing his theory, the author enters into discussions on the abstract nature of thought, as it is displayed in perception, in the power of the will, in sentiment, in the *criterium* of truth, in abstraction and imagination, in vision, and in the nature of our ideas on material and spiritual objects. He endeavours to show that all objects are seen or understood through the instrumentality of ideas; that these ideas do not derive their existence from the senses; that the Scholastic maxim, '*That there is nothing in the understanding but what was first in the senses,*' is unfounded; that these ideas do not take

their origin from the operations of the mind itself; that they are not created in us by the Deity; that they are not derived from contemplations of the perfections and modalities of the soul; but that the ideas are part and parcel of the Divine nature itself.

Norris professes to carry out the principles of Father Malebranche to their fair and legitimate results. On the nature of *truths* and *essences*, the English author says: "But if this account should be considered too general and indeterminate for the satisfaction of the inquisitive, and I must speak out more explicitly, then let them for whose sake it is expected I should do so, be pleased to consider and reeal to mind what has been shown at large in the preeeding chapter, concerning the simple reasons or essenees of things, which are the principles of our *Ideal system*, the constituent parts whereof the intelligible world does consist. Does it not evidently appear, from what has been there so fully discoursed, that the simple essenees or *ideal reasons* of things, are of a necessary and eternal existence, like those truths which are founded upon them? And have we not more lately shown these ideas to be omnipresent as well as eternal? Both these have been proved. But now consider, can there be anything that is necessary, eternal, or omnipresent out of the superlatively exeellent and adorable nature of that infinitely perfect Being, who is necessary, self-existent, and independent, to whom it is essential to be, as having the root of all

being and perfection in Himself, and who is therefore eternal and omnipresent, comprehending all duration and filling all places, because he is infinite and immense, both in his whole being, and in the whole manner of it? He exists every way infinitely, and therefore both eternally and omnipresently. But then I say again, is there, or can there be, any such existing out of the *Divine nature*? To this question all the reason and all the philosophy in the world answers directly, No. And the point is too clear, and too confessed, to need any formal discussion or confirmation. And therefore, since there is no such way of existence possible out of God, I think I need not scruple to conclude that our intelligible world, or world of ideas, that has been proved to exist, is really IN GOD.\*

On the doctrine of *eternal truths*, Norris makes the following observations. "We have now carried our prospect of the intelligible world through the bright and shining regions of the Divine ideas; and through conversing so long with such dazzling objects, and travelling, as one may say, with the sun in our faces, we might now be reconciled to shades and thickets, and prefer refreshing greens before sunbeams, the confused amusements of the imagination before the clearest discoveries of pure reason and intellect; it fares with us as with men that climb up a high mountain, who, though wearied with their latter stages, and beginning to number their steps, yet finding their prospects to

\* An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal, pp. 137. 138.

enlarge with their weariness, know not how to give over till they arrive as far as they can go, and are possessed of the utmost view.

“Proceed we now, then, from the consideration of the Divine ideas, to another equally necessary and less contested part of this theory, the doctrine of *eternal truths*. Not that I suppose it is, or can be, well denied, that God has the ideas of all things in himself, or that things are ideally in Him, as that signifies in general and at large that He thinks upon them, and that they are in Him *objectively*, or *tanquam in cognoscente*, in the same sense as when we are said to have such or such ideas, when we think upon such and such things, it being otherwise impossible that God should be, I will not say an Omniscient, but even a thinking or understanding Being. And accordingly even M. Arnauld himself, as great an *Anti-Idealist* as he is, will in this large sense not scruple to allow that all things are *in God*, that there is an intelligible sun, and intelligible extension. But the question is, whether God has *so* the ideas of things as that His essence or substance should have the intelligible perfections of all beings really in it, and so be the representative or exhibitivè of all Beings according as it is variously imitable or participable by them. And this seems to be the thing that M. Arnauld contests with his adversary, denying all such *representative beings in God*.” . . . . . “Herein I think he betrays a wonderful inconsistency; for though I cannot conclude from any act of *my* understanding, or any conception *I* have of things, and therefore

I myself am essentially representative of them, as containing their perfections in my own nature, because possibly I may be united to some other being in whom these perfections are, and in whom I may view and contemplate them; yet when I attribute the conception of things to God, and suppose them to be ideally in Him, I find a necessity to conclude, that he contains their perfections in his own essence, and accordingly see them in those representative perfections; all supposition of union to any other being that may be a light to him, or of his seeing things out of himself, being in all cases most impious and unphilosophical.”\*

Mr. Hallam makes the following remarks on Mr. Norris. “Malebranche had, however, an English supporter of some celebrity in his own age, Norris; a disciple, and one of the latest we have had, of the Platonic school of Henry More. The principal metaphysical treatise of Norris, his *Essay on the Ideal World*, was published in two parts, 1701 and 1702. It does not therefore come in our limits. Norris is more thoroughly Platonic than Malebranche, to whom, however, he pays great deference, and adopts his fundamental hypothesis on ‘seeing all things in God.’ He is a writer of fine genius, and a noble elevation of moral sentiment, such as predisposes men for the Platonic schemes of theosophy. He looked up to Augustine with as much veneration as to Plato; and respected, more perhaps than Malebranche, certainly more than the generality

\* An Essay, Vol. 1. pp. 303. 304.



of English writers, the theological metaphysicians of the Schools. With these he mingled some visions of a later mysticism. But his reasonings will seldom bear a close scrutiny.”\*

### JOSEPH GLANVIL.

This English author published his work called “The Vanity of Dogmatizing,” in 1661; and another edition, in 1665, under the title of “Sceptis Scientifica.” The chief aim of Glauvil is to show the degeneracy of our race, both mentally and bodily; and that what has hitherto gone under the name of science or wisdom, is little better than sheer folly. The Aristotelian or school philosophy is nothing but a play upon words; it tells us nothing but what a child may understand.†

The author, in his preface, gives us the following outline of the object of his treatise. “For the design,” says he, “of this discourse, the *title* speaks it: it is levied against *dogmatizing*, and attacks a daring enemy, *confidence in opinion*. The *knowledge* I teach, is *ignorance*: and methinks the theory of our own natures should be enough to learn it us. We came into the world, and we know not how; we live in it in a self-nescience; and go hence again and are as ignorant of our recess. We grow, we live, we move at first in a microcosm, and

\* Literature of the Middle Ages, Vol. 2.

† The late Dugald Stewart remarks in reference to the “Sceptis Scientifica,” that it is “One of the most acute and original productions of which English philosophy had then to boast.”—(*Dissertation*, p. 247.)

can give no more scientific account of the state of our three quarters confinement, than if we have never been extant in the greater world, but had expired in an *abortion*; we are enlarged from the prison of the womb, we live, we grow, and give being to our like: we see, we hear, and outward objects affect our other senses: we understand, we will, we imagine, and remember: and yet know no more of the immediate reasons of most of these common functions, than those little *embryo* ANCHORITES: we breathe, we talk, we move, while we are ignorant of the manner of these vital performances. The *Dogmatist* knows not how he moves his finger; nor by what art or method he turns his tongue in his vocal expressions. Now parts are added to our substance, to supply our continual decayings, and as we die we are born daily; nor can we give a certain account, how the aliment is so prepared for nutrition, or by what *mechanism* it is so regularly distributed; the turning of it into chyle, by the stomach's heat, is a general and unsatisfying solution. We love, we hate, we joy, we grieve; passions annoy, and our minds are disturbed by those corporal *estimations*. Nor yet can we tell how these should reach our unbodied selves, or how the soul should be affected by these heterogencous agitations. We lay us down, to sleep away our diurnal cares; night shuts up the senses' windows, the mind contracts into the brain's centre. We live in death, and lie as in the grave. Now we know nothing, nor can our waking thoughts inform us, who is Morpheus, and what that leaden key that locks

us up within our senseless cells. There is a difficulty that pincheth, nor will it easily be resolved. The soul is awake, and solicited by external motions, for some of them reach the perceptive region in the most silent repose and obscurity of night. What is it then that prevents our sensations? or if we do perceive, how is it that we know it not? But we dream, see visions, converse with chimæras; the one half of our lives is a romance, a fiction. We retain a catch of those pretty stories, and our awakened imagination smiles in the recollection. Nor yet can our most severe inquiries find what did so abuse us, or show the nature and manner of these nocturnal illusions. When we puzzle ourselves in the disquisition, we do but dream, and every hypothesis is a fancy. Our most industrious conceits are but like their object, and as uncertain as those of midnight. Thus when some days and nights have gone over us, the stroke of fate concludes the number of our pulses; we take our leave of the *sun* and *moon*, and bid mortality adieu. The mental flame is extinct, the soul retires into another world, and the body to dwell with dust. Nor doth the last scene yield us any more satisfaction in our *autography*; for we are as ignorant how the soul leaves the light, as how it first came into it; we know as little how the union is dissolved, that is, the chain of the so different subsistencies that compound us, as how it first commenced. This then is the creature that so pretends to *knowledge*, and that makes such a noise and bustle for *opinions*."

On the mode of operation between body and mind, Glanvil has the following observations: "In the unions which we understand, the extremes are reconciled by interceding participations of natures, which have somewhat of either. But body and spirit stand at such a distance in their essential compositions, that to suppose an uniter of a middle construction that would partake of some of the qualities of both, is unwarranted by any of our faculties, yea, most absonous to our reasons; since there is not any the least affinity betwixt length, breadth, and thickness; and apprehension, judgment, and discourse; the former of which are the most immediate results, if not essentials, of matter; the latter, of spirit."\*

The mode of explaining the operations of thought through the medium of images, is thus spoken of by the author. "How is it, and by what art does it (the soul) read that such an image or stroke in matter, (whether that of her vehicle or of the brain, the case is the same) signifies such an object? Did we learn an alphabet in our embryo state? And how comes it to pass that we are not aware of any such congenite apprehensions? We know what we know; but do we know any more? That by diversity of motions we should spell out figures, distances, magnitudes, colours, things not resembled by them, we must attribute to some secret deduction. But what this deduction should be, or by what medium this knowledge is advanced, is as dark as ignorance.

\* *Septis Scientifica*, p. 16.

One that hath not the knowledge of letters may see the figures, but comprehends not the meaning included in them; an infant may hear the sounds and see the motion of the lips, but hath no conception conveyed by them, not knowing what they are intended to signify. So our souls, though they might have perceived the motions and images themselves by simple sense; yet without some implicit inference, it seems inconceivable how by that means they should apprehend their antitypes. The striking of divers filaments of the brain cannot well be supposed to represent distances, except some kind of inference be allotted us in our faculties; the concession of which will only stead us as a refuge for ignorance, when we shall meet what we would seem to shun.”\*

On the nature of Sensation, Glanvil maintains that we literally know nothing. “But besides those absurdities that lie more deep, and are of a more mysterious alloy, we are at a loss for a scientific account even of our senses, the most knowable of our faculties. Our eyes, that see other things, see not themselves; and those percipient foundations of knowledge are themselves unknown. That the soul is the sole percipient, which alone hath animadversion and sense, properly so called, and that the body is only the receiver and conveyer of corporeal impressions, is as certain as philosophy can make it.”†

\* *Sceptis Scientifica*, pp. 22. 23.

† *The Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 28.

The nature and operation of our other faculties are equally as inexplicable, according to our author's views. "The memory," says he, "is a faculty whose nature is as obscure and as much of riddle in it as any of the former. It seems to be an organical power, because bodily distempers often mar its ideas, and cause a total oblivion. But what instruments the soul useth in her review of past impressions, is a question which may drive inquiry to despair."\* The author then goes into a formal examination of four different theories of memory; namely, Descartes, with his *glandula pinealis*; Sir K. Digby's *exuvie* and material images; Aristotle's *intentional* species; and Hobbes's *decaying sense*. These he batters down with argument seasoned with the spices of banter and ridicule. For example, he says, in reference to the theories of Descartes and Digby, "These are the endeavours of these two *great sages*, than whom it may be the sun never saw a more learned pair. And yet as a sad evidence of the infirmities of lapsed humanity, these great *Sophi* fail here of their wonted success in unriddling nature. And I think favour itself can say no more of either hypothesis, than that they are ingenious attempts. Nor do I speak this to derogate from the grandeur of their wits used to victory; I should rather confer what I could to the erecting of such trophies to them as might eternize their memories."†

In Glanvil's work, called "Plus Ultra, or the

\* The Vanity, &c., p. 32.

† Ibid. p. 33.

Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the days of Aristotle," published in 1668, the reader will find some curious statements and opinions. He stigmatises the whole system of Aristotle in no measured terms.

In Glanvil's Essays, there are many most excellent observations on important topics connected with the human mind. The following may be perused with great benefit and pleasure. "Against Confidence in Philosophy;" "Of Scepticism and Certainty;" "Modern Improvements of Knowledge;" "The Usefulness of Philosophy in Theology;" "The Agreement of Reason and Religion;" "Anti-fanatic Theology, and Free Philosophy."

In the author's work, "Philosophia Pia," he descants upon the wonders of creation, and how powerfully the works of the Almighty are calculated to enlarge the mind, and to fix it upon His existence and attributes. The Treatise is divided into four parts: "1st. That God is to be praised for his works; 2nd. That his works are to be studied by those that would praise him for them; 3rd. That the study of nature and God's works, is very serviceable to religion; and 4th. That the ministers and professors of religion ought not to discourage, but promote the knowledge of nature and the works of its Author. In this work the author is very careful to impress upon the reader's attention, not to consider the universe under a *mechanical* point of view; for this will probably lead him to infidelity, by his mind constantly dwelling upon secondary causes.

The "Plus Ultra" of Glanvil contains a series of arguments and statements, showing the great superiority of knowledge derived from observation and experiment, over that which is obtained from a consideration of our mental constitution. "The philosophy," says he, "that must signify either for *light* or *use*, must not be the *work* of the *mind* turned in upon *itself*; but it must be raised from the *observations* and *applications* of *sense*, and take its account from things, as they are in the *sensible world*. The illustrious Lord Bacon hath noted this as the chief cause of the unprofitableness of the *former methods* of *knowledge*, namely, that they were but the *exercises* of the *mind*, making *conclusions*, and spinning out notions from its own *native store*; from which way of proceeding nothing but *dispute* and air could be expected."\*

\*.\* The following is a list of Glanvil's works:—The Vanity of Dogmatizing; or, Confidence in Opinions, London, 1661. A Reply to the Exceptions of Thomas Albius, London, 1665. Plus Ultra; or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the days of Aristotle, London, 1668. The way to Happiness, London, 1670. Defence of Reason in Affairs of Religion, London, 1670. Philosophia Pia; or a Discourse of the Religious Temper and Tendencies of the Experimental Philosophy professed by the Royal Society, London, 1671. Preparatory Answer to Henry Stubbe, London, 1671. Seasonable Reflexions and Discourses in order to the conviction and cure of the scoffing and infidelity of a Degenerate Age, London, 1676. Essays on several subjects in Philosophy and Religion, London, 1676. Essay concerning Preaching, London, 1678. Two choice and useful Treatises; the one, Lux Orientalis, or an inquiry into the opinions of the Eastern Sages concerning the pre-existence of souls; the other, a Discourse of Truth, by Dr. Rust; with Annotations on both, London, 1682. Saddneismms Triumphatus; or a Full and Plain Evidence concerning Witches and Apparitions, London, 1726.

\* Plus Ultra, p. 52.



## CHAPTER XV.



## FATHER MALEBRANCHE.

FATHER Malebranche was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the French school. He was a man of a great and noble mind. Nature had endowed him with some of her most valuable gifts. He had a keen and subtile power of analysis, a solid judgment, a lively fancy, serious and contemplative habits of thought, a pure and unsophisticated love of truth, and a feeling of religious piety, equally removed from fanaticism on the one hand, and apathetic indifference on the other. He was, in the fullest acceptation of the terms, an epitome of all that is great and good in human nature. Philosophy has never had, from the days of Socrates, a more amiable and docile spirit than his. Every thing about his speculations bears the imprint of a dignified and lofty mind; nothing crotchetty or little found any sympathy with its movements and aspirations. All his contemplations centred on Deity itself; and never was there philosophic mortal more deeply sensible of conducting

all his inquiries, in that spirit and frame of mind, becoming the innate seriousness and sublimity of the position he had selected as a starting point for his philosophy.

It was a small work, "*On Man*," of Descartes, which first engaged the attention of Malebranche; but he soon entered with passionate devotion into the whole of the Cartesian system. He analysed it; he looked at it on all sides; and subjected it to the severe scrutiny of his own inward feelings, or consciousness. He acquiesced in its leading principles, but thought there were omissions and defects in it. To supply the one and remedy the other, was a duty which he conceived he should discharge with all seriousness and care. He prosecuted the subject with ardour; made a modification of the doctrines here, and an extension there; until he ended in forming a theory of his own, which, even during his life time, and for many years after his death, was considered a first-rate performance by nearly all the speculative philosophers in Europe.

There are several treatises of Malebranche's on metaphysical subjects, but his chief work is the "*Recherche de la Vérité*." This embraces a variety of important topics. It is divided into six books. The first shows the sources of error which arise from the irregular and uncertain intimations which the bodily senses give of external objects. In the second book we have the errors which arise from the exercise of the imagination. These constitute a numerous batch. The spirituality of the mind,

or thinking principle, is developed in the third book; and this is the most interesting part of the work. He here unfolds his peculiar theory of seeing all things in God. The fourth and fifth books detail the evils and errors of judgment which flow from the various passions and propensities of human nature. The sixth and concluding book points out those rules and methods we should adopt in the search after truth.

After Malebranche had completely mastered the whole of Descartes' system, he saw that it was built upon too narrow a basis. Descartes was entirely shrouded within the confines of his own feelings, or self. He had no power to move. Consciousness, *per se*, explained nothing, demonstrated nothing, affirmed nothing. It was something to gaze at; it was something to turn the inward eye upon; but this was all. The '*Cogito, ergo sum,*' which Malebranche affirmed was the taking of the thing for granted which had to be proved, was a complete dead letter; for, before it could be turned to any philosophical purpose, *something must be invested with vitality or motion*. Here was the grand stumbling-block to the learned and pious Jesuit; and this it was which obliged him to have recourse to the particular theory he adopted, to supply the *hiatus* he found in his master's system.

Malebranche's notion of *seeing everything in God*, has conferred upon him a distinctive character among theoretical writers on the mind. His positions are, that the Divine Nature had in himself the ideas of every thing he had created; and by

this reason saw all things in reflecting upon his own attributes and perfections. The Deity is thus intimately eonneeted with our souls ; and it is from this souree that we again see every thing in Him. The ætion upon, and the influence between, the Creator and the thing created, are constant and reciprocal. We say, therefore, that we see all things in God, who is the grand souree of all true representations of created things. The philosopher, however, observes, that though we see all things in the Deity, yet we have not our *sensations* from Him. When, for example, we perceive an external object, the perception is of a compound nature ; and includes both a *sensation*, and a *pure idea*. This sensation is a modification of the human soul, and is the necessary effect of the divine influence ; but the idea which is joined to it, is only in the Almighty himself ; and it is only through Him we can see it.

This doctrine in the history of philosophy, goes by the name of *Occasional Causes*. According to its further development, the will of the soul of man is not the *immediate cause* of the motion of his body, but only the *occasion* of God's creating that motion ; and the impression which is made by a body upon any organ of sense, is not the *cause* of that sensation in my mind, but only the *occasion* of the Deity producing that sensation. " For example, when my hand is burned by the fire, it is not the fire which raises the idea of pain ; but an opportunity is thus given for the Almighty to produce such an idea within me. Again, when I wish

to move my finger, it is not my soul which moves it; but the Almighty, through the channel of my volition, takes the *occasion* to move that member of my body.”

A theory of this kind, making, in fact, the Deity the *efficient* and *immediate* cause of everything which takes place in the universe, was sure to encounter great opposition. And accordingly we find it very generally denounced by many of the most distinguished philosophers, who, nevertheless, were devoutly attached to religious principles and sentiments. The scheme was not susceptible of any general application to the real events of human existence, or to any harmonious agreement with the common-sense view which all mankind entertain of the Divine nature and government, and the free-will of man.

In Malebranche's "Traité de Morale," we see his metaphysical theory developed very fully. In the first chapter the author describes the nature and offices of reason, the grand attribute of intelligence. "The *reason* of man," says he, "is the *word* or the wisdom of God himself; for every creature is a particular being, but the reason of man is universal."

"If my own particular mind were my reason and my light, my mind would also be the reason of all intelligent beings; for I am sure that my reason enlightens all intelligent creatures. My pain no one can possibly feel but myself, but every one may recognise the truth which I contemplate; so that the pain I feel is a modification of my own

proper substance, but truth is a possession of all spiritual beings.

“Thus, by the instrumentality of reason, I have, or may have, some society or intercourse with the Deity, and all other intelligent beings; because they all possess something in common with me, to wit, *reason*.

“This spiritual society consists in a participation of the same intellectual substance of the word from which all spiritual beings may receive nourishment. In contemplating this Divine substance, I am able to see some part of what God thinks; for God sees all truths, and there are some which I cannot perceive. I am able also to discover something of the *will* of the Deity; for He wills nothing but in accordance with a certain order, and this order is not altogether unknown to me. It is certain that God loves things according as they are worthy of love or esteem; and I can discover that there are some things more perfect, more valuable, and consequently more worthy of love than others.”\*

Father Malebranche has often, I am afraid, been misunderstood, if not misrepresented, relative to the precise notions he entertained of *cause and effect*. He has been accused, though I think upon very insufficient grounds, of leading the way to the doctrines of modern scepticism. There is, however, a wide and palpable difference between his opinions and those advanced by Mr. Hume; although the late Professor Stewart has told us, that both philosophers were of opinion that there was no *efficient*

\* Œuvres, Vol. 1, p. 400.

*cause* in any thing. "This accordingly," says the Professor, "was the conclusion Malebranche deduced from premises very nearly the same with Mr. Hume's." The following passages from the learned Jesuit, in his own language, will, it is hoped, prove useful in placing this matter in its proper light.

"Il y a," says he, "bien des raisons qui m'empêchent d'attribuer aux causes secondes ou naturelles, une force, une puissance, une efficace pour produire quoi que ce soit. Mais la principale est que cette opinion ne me paraît pas même concevable. Quelqu'effort que je fasse pour la comprendre, je ne puis trouver en moi d'idée qui me représente ce que ce peut être que la force ou la puissance qu'on attribue aux créatures. Et je ne erois pas même faire de jugement téméraire d'assurer que ceux qui soutiennent que les créatures sont en elles-mêmes de la force et de la puissance, avancent ce qu'ils ne conçoivent point clairement. Car enfin, si les philosophes concevoient clairement que les causes secondes ont une véritable force pour agir et pour produire leur semblable, étant homme aussi bien qu'eux et partieipant comme eux à la souveraine raison, je pourrois apparemment découvrir l'idée qui leur représente cette force. Mais quelqu'effort d'esprit que je fasse, je ne puis trouver de force, d'efficace, de puissance, que dans la volonté de l'être infiniment parfait." Again he says, "Mais non seulement les hommes ne sont point les véritables causes des mouvements qu'ils produisent dans leurs corps, il semble même qu'il y ait contradiction

qu'ils puissent l'être. Cause véritable, est une cause entre laquelle et son effet l'esprit apperçoit une liaison nécessaire, c'est ainsi que je l'entends. Or, il n'y a que l'être infiniment parfait, entre la volonté duquel et ses effets l'esprit apperçoit une liaison nécessaire. Il n'y a donc que Dieu qui soit véritable cause, et qui ait véritablement la puissance de mouvoir les corps. Je dis de plus, qu'il n'est pas concevable que Dieu puisse communiquer aux hommes ou aux Anges la puissance qu'il a de remuer les corps ; et que ceux qui prétendent, que le pouvoir que nous avons de remuer nos bras, est une véritable puissance, doivent avouer que Dieu peut aussi donner aux esprits la puissance de créer, d'anéantir, de faire toutes les choses possibles ; et en un mot, qu'il peut les rendre tout-puissans."\*

\* Book 6, part 2, chapter 3, Touchant l'efficace attribuée aux causes secondes.



## CHAPTER XVI.



## DAVID DERODON, DUIHAMEL, AND MARIOTTE.

WE have placed these three authors under one head, for the sake of historical connexion. They were individually more or less instrumental in diffusing a knowledge of the writings and philosophical opinions of Bacon and Gassendi in France; and on this account performed a great and essential service to science. They were all metaphysicians of repute in their day; and their various disquisitions on mental subjects may be consulted even now, with some degree of pleasure and advantage.

## DAVID DERODON.

David Derodon taught philosophy in several places in France, but finally went to Geneva, where he seems to have ended his days.

His knowledge of philosophy was both extensive and profound. He kept up a close correspondence with many learned men of his time, particularly

with Galileo and Descartes. His metaphysics were, however, of a scholastic nature, and present a curious compound from the speculations of the Arabian philosophers, the early Scholastic divines, and some of the writers among the Dominicans of Spain. He was considered one of the most eminent logicians of his day.

We find from his writings, that he admitted the truth of Aristotle's general principles, and made them the foundation of his public lectures on philosophy. Matter and form, the different principles of causation, the division of the soul into the vegetable, the sensitive, and the rational, may all be found in the speculations of Derodon. His great delight lay, however, in argumentation. His agreement with any system was only conditional and formal; he always had innumerable objections to every thing he seemed to acquiesce in. Hence his contention with the predicaments of Aristotle; his attempted refutation of the term universal; and the contrasts he instituted between the whole system of the Stagirite, and the philosophical opinions of Plato, Democritus, Epicurus, and many other distinguished men of antiquity.

Derodon took great delight in discussions on the nature of *genus* and *species*, and on those curious and puzzling questions which go under the name of the *Cross of Logicians*. The following are some of the debateable points. "The term genus cannot be defined, for the definition must necessarily involve the thing to be defined. Genus is an individual, for it is numerically *one*. Genus is a species;

but species is not a genus; therefore, species is more general than genus.”\*

Derodon enters into long discussions on the nature of being, and the peculiar province of reason. His writings are both ill-arranged and obscure. In the course of his disquisitions on these points, we find the author zealously attached to the old maxim, *that there is nothing in the understanding which was not first in the senses*. This he considers as a fundamental principle in all rational systems of speculative philosophy.†

#### DUHAMEL.

Duhamel was a very learned man, and was the first Secretary to the French Academy. Fontenelle has ably eulogised both his talents and character.‡

The philosophy of Bacon attracted the attention of Duhamel. He thinks Bacon's method defective for the want of *deductive* evidence. Duhamel maintains that both theoretical and practical knowledge throw a mutual light on each other, and they ought

\* See Logica, part 1. p. 306.

† Metaphysica, 1674. Art. 2. Disputatio de ente reali.

‡ “Duhamel était un ecclésiastique de la plus haute piété et de la vertu la plus accomplie. Rien n'égalait son désintéressement; sa simplicité était parfaite. Il cultivait les sciences avec une infatigable ardeur, mais sans aucun autre mobile que l'amour de la vérité. Il avait été curé de Neuilly-sur-Marne, et chaque année il retournait visiter les bons villageois auxquels il avait inspiré autant de vénération que de reconnaissance. On aime à retrouver d'aussi beaux caractères chez les hommes qui ont cultivé la philosophie, et ce motif n'a pas été étranger à l'intérêt que nous ont inspiré les travaux du premier secrétaire de l'Académie des Sciences.” (*De Gerando, Hist. Comparée, Vol. 6. p. 152.*)

to go hand in hand in the study and elucidation of philosophy. "The investigation of causes," he says, "is confirmed by experience; but experiments by themselves are often only blind and fortuitous kinds of things, unless there be some light thrown on their causes."\*

On the nature of sensation, and of our ideas, both simple and general, Duhamel had pondered deeply. His views on these points were somewhat different from those of Gassendi and Descartes. He understood by the word *idea*, not that image which was imprinted by the operation of the senses, but that image which the mind itself conceives in the act of thinking.† There are two things, therefore, to be considered in reference to this conception of idea, namely, the mode by which it appertains to the mind, or flows from it; and the way and manner in which it makes us acquainted with external bodies. These are two separate matters. He is inclined to think that ideas are images of outward existences, and that they give that bold and faithful representation of them which the whole economy of thought requires we should possess. But he nevertheless divides these ideas or images into two classes, and illustrates the distinction by comparing one sort to the idea which the painter has of his subject before he displays it upon canvass; and the other to that image or representation which the actual figure itself communicates,

\* De Mente Humanâ, lib. 3, chap. 7. § 3 and 4; also chap. 8. § 1—4.

† Ibid. lib. 1. chap. 1.

when the work is executed and the painting finished. There is a mental and a corporeal meaning to the word *idca*.\*

Though Duhamel generally approved of the inductive theory of Bacon; yet he says, it is occasionally pregnant with error and delusion; and that imperfect induction is the immediate cause of many false conclusions. The safeguard against erroneous judgments lies in making the induction of facts perfect and complete. Hasty and crude generalizations prove the bane of real knowledge.†

The mental powers of analysis and synthesis are discussed by Duhamel, and the nature and limits of each accurately defined.‡

Duhamel aimed to produce a species of philosophical eclecticism. He was anxious to reconcile all the discrepancies between great and rival systems; to cull out what was sound and practicable, from what was visionary and useless; to bring the great and honoured names of antiquity into conjunction with those of modern times; and to remove for ever those party and sectarian barriers which formed such an impediment to the study and progress of true philosophy. This he thought might be accomplished, if men of science would earnestly set about the task. His arguments and observations on this subject are very plausible, but the extent to which they are carried precludes our quoting them here.§

\* De Mente Humanâ, lib. 1. chap. 1. § 1. 5.

† Ibid. lib. 3. chap. 7.

‡ Ibid. lib. 3. chap. 6.

§ See De Consensu Veteris et Novæ Philosophiæ, lib. 1. chap. 1. Rheims, 1675.

This author composed a treatise for the use of public institutions of learning, embracing a full and complete course of philosophical instruction. It is divided into three leading parts, Logie, Morals, and Metaphysics. This is a very elaborate work, and an excellent one of its kind.\*

#### MARIOTTE.

This author belonged to the Church, and published a work, in 1678, entitled, “*Essai de Logique, contenant les Prineipes des Seienes.*” This treatise contains many excellent things, and its philosophy is based upon the certainty of human knowledge, relative to all primary and necessary truths. In the development of the more abstract principles of thought, the Abbé Mariotte has not been by any means very happy; in fact, he considered men did not know much of the matter. He says, we know natural objects by the effects they produce on us, or by the relations they stand in towards other things or ourselves; but our organs of sensation do not teach us what those objects are in themselves, but only what they appear to us to be.†

\* *Philosophia Vetus et Nova ad Usum Scholæ Accommodata.* 2 vols. Paris, 1684.

† See *Essai*, p. 130.

## CHAPTER XVII.



BECK, DALGARNO, AND WILKINS.

WE have here classed these writers together, on account of their having had one object in view, and all appearing about the same period of time. This object was nothing short of forming an universal language or character, which should be the means of intellectual intercourse amongst all the nations of the world; so that knowledge and science should no longer be shackled by the numerous impediments which now stand in the way between various nations, from the dissimilarity in their oral or written languages. The object was certainly grand and comprehensive; but it was impracticable; and all its partisans and admirers showed themselves entirely ignorant of the nature of the human mind, and of those faculties or divisions of it, which are more immediately called into requisition in the acquiring of speech, and the transmitting of our thoughts to others, through the means of artificial characters or symbols.

The speculations of these writers are not, how-

ever, entirely destitute of interest in a metaphysical point of view. They indirectly threw considerable light on portions of our mental constitution, not only very interesting in themselves, but which are apt to be passed over, in ordinary treatises on the mind, without receiving that due share of attention to which they are justly entitled. Besides, it must be remembered that these advocates for a general philosophical character or language, paved the way for all those successful and philanthropic efforts which have been made in modern times, both in our own country and upon the continent, for communicating knowledge to the deaf and dumb. Their speculations drew the attention of men to the practicability of this humane and desirable object; and on this ground alone we owe them our grateful acknowledgments.

#### CAVE BECK.

Mr. Beck is the author of a work entitled, "The Universal Character, by which all Nations in the world may understand one another's conceptions, reading out of one common writing their own tongue." This treatise is curious, chiefly from its rarity, and having been the first publication of the kind, either in England or on the Continent. The author calls himself a Master of Arts; and his work is dated, London, 1657. The copy I have consulted is written in French and Latin.

The author, in his Preface, descants upon the impediments thrown in the way of unrestricted



intercourse of the *minds* of nations, by the variety of languages employed; and feels quite confident that such a system of signs might be made, as would greatly facilitate the mental intercourse of nations. He thinks that the Egyptian hieroglyphical writing, and the Chinese language, are calculated to give some encouragement towards the attainment of this highly desirable object.

#### GEORGE DALGARNO.

This author was a native of Aberdcen; but after receiving his education at the College there, he removed to Oxford, where he conducted a classical seminary until his death. His principal work is entitled, "The Art of Symbols, considered as a popular, universal, and philosophical language, by which persons of the most opposite dialects might, in the space of two weeks, communicate with each other all their thoughts on ordinary topics, either by writing or speaking, and this may be done as distinctly as in their native languages. Besides, by means of it, young people may acquire the principles of philosophy, and the effective use of logic, much more easily and quickly than from the usual writings of philosophers."\* This treatise, in Latin, was originally published in London, in 1660.

\* "Ars Signorum, vulgo Character Universalis, et Lingua Philosophica, qua poterunt homines diversissimorum idiomatum spatio duarum septimanarum omnia animi sui seusa (in rebus familiaribus) non minus intelligibiliter, sive scribendo, sive loquendo, mutuo communicare, quam

The object or nature of the “Ars Signorum,” is thus quaintly explained by the author. “Interpretation, in its largest sense, is *an act of cognitive power, expressing the inward motions by outward visible signs*. Of this there are three kinds. 1st, Supernatural; 2nd, Natural; 3rd, Artificial or Institutional; to which I give the names of Chrematology, Physiology, and Sematology. Chrematology is when Almighty God reveals his will by extraordinary means, as dreams, visions, apparitions, &c.; and this, in the division of arts, falls under Divinity. Physiology is when the internal passions are expressed by such external signs as have a natural connexion, by way of cause and effect, with the passion they discover, as laughing, weeping, frowning, &c.; and this way of interpretation being common to the brute with man, belongs to natural philosophy. And because this goes not far enough to serve the rational soul, therefore man has invented Sematology, that is, an art of impressing the conceits of the mind upon sensible and material objects, which have not the least shadow of affinity to the images of the things they carry impress upon them; and this is interpretation in the strictest and most proper sense, and to reduce this wonderful effect of reason to such rules of art as the nature of it requires, is the proper subject of “Ars Signorum,” which, ac-

linguis propriis vernaculis. Præterea, hinc etiam poterunt juvenes, philosophiæ principia, et veram Logicæ praxin, citius et facilius multo imbibere quam ex vulgaribus Philosophorum Scriptis.”

ording to the commonly received distribution of arts, is nothing else but a rational Grammar.”\*

The most remarkable thing connected with the publication of this work, was the interest which Charles II. evinced in it. He was induced to write a letter on the subject, calling upon all learned men, and especially the Clergy, to render the author aid in his great enterprise. The document is curious both in a historical and literary point of view; and for these reasons we insert it here, without any further apology.

“CHARLES R.

“Whereas we have been informed by the testimonies of divers learned men, from both the Universities of our Kingdom of England, concerning the great pains taken by *George Dalgarno*, in a Scholastic and Literary design, of an *universal character*, and *philosophical language*; all of them approving and commending his discovery, judging it to be of singular use for facilitating the matter of communication and intercourse between people of different Languages, and consequently a proper and effectual means for advancing all the parts of real and useful knowledge, civilising barbarous nations, propagating the Gospel, and increasing traffic and commerce. We understanding moreover, by certificates from several credible persons, that through the various vicissitudes of Providence, he hath suffered the loss of a considerable estate, by reason whereof he is wholly disabled from affording that charge and expence for the effectual prosecution of this work, as the nature of it requires :

“We therefore, out of a tender consideration of the premises,

\* Introduction, p. 115.

and for manifesting our good will and affection towards the promoting of art, and the encouraging all such ingenious persons of our subjects, who shall attempt and effect any thing tending to public good ; as we do declare that, we will ourselves express some token of our Royal favour, for the helping forward this so laudable and hopeful enterprise ; So also, reflecting upon its common and universal usefulness, we do by these our Letters of Recommendation incite as many of our subjects, (especially the Reverend and learned Clergy) as are truly apprehensive and sensible of the defectiveness of art, chiefly in this particual of Language ; what great loss mankind is at there-through, how acceptable it will be before God, and praiseworthy among men, to encourage and advance those ways of learning, wherein the general good of mankind is intended : that such would, as their affections shall incline them, and their places enable them, put their helping hands to the bringing forth this (as yet) infant design, now stieking in the birth.

“This will give just cause to our posterity through succeeding generations, while they are reaping the fruit of our ingenuity and industry, to look back upon us with reverence ; and from our example they will be provoked not to rest upon what they shall have received from us ; but still to be endeavouring to proceed in a further repairing the decays of nature, until art have done its last, or, which is most probable, nature cease to be, or be Renewed.

“Given at our Court at Whitehall this 26 November, in the 12th year of our Reign.

“WILL. MORICE.”

Besides the “*Ars Signorum*,” Dalgarno wrote a treatise called “*Didascalocophus, or the Deaf and Dumb Man’s Tutor*.” This was published at Oxford in 1680, and contains many excellent observations and suggestions, on the art of communicating knowledge through the medium of signs.

The following are extracts from the "Deaf and Dumb Man's Tutor:" "I conceive there might be successful addresses made to a dumb child even in its cradle, when he begins *risu cognoscere matrem*; if the mother or nurse had but as nimble a hand as commonly they have a tongue. For instance, I doubt not but the words *hand, foot, dog, cat, hat, &c.*, written fair, and as often presented to the deaf child's eye, pointing from the words to the things, and *vice versa*, as the blind child hears them spoken, would be known and remembered as soon by the one as by the other. And, as I think the eye to be as docile as the ear, so neither see I any reason, but the hand might be made as tractable an organ as the tongue; and as soon brought to form, if not fair, at least legible characters, as the tongue to imitate and echo back articulate sounds."

"The difficulties of learning to read, on the common plan, are so great, that one may justly wonder how young ones come to get over them.....Now, the deaf child, under his mother's tuition, passes securely by all these rocks and quicksands. The distinction of letters, their names, their powers, their order, the dividing words into syllables, and of them again making words, to which may be added *tone* and *accent*; none of these puzzling niceties hinder his progress.....It is true, after he has past the discipline of the nursery, and comes to learn grammatically, then he must begin to learn to know letters written, by their figure, number, order, &c."

The late Professor Stewart entertained a high

opinion of the genius of Dalgarno, and thought he had been contemptuously and seurvily treated by his contemporaries.\* Certain it is that he has seldom, if ever, been mentioned by any modern writer on metaphysical subjects; and it is almost equally certain, that one of his contemporaries has not scrupled to suppress his name, if not to make use of his thoughts.

Anthony Wood seems to intimate, that Bishop Wilkins availed himself of the suggestions of Dalgarno. He says, "The reader may be pleased to know, that one George Dalgarno, a Scot, wrote a book, entitled, 'Ars Signorum,' London, 1660. This book, before it went to press, the author *communicated to Dr. Wilkins, who from thence taking a hint of greater matter*, earried it on, and brought it up to that which you see extant. . This Dalgarno was born at Old Aberdeen, and bred in the University of New Aberdeen; taught a private grammar school with good success for about thirty years together, in the Parishes of St. Michael and St. Mary Mag. in Oxford; wrote also '*Didascalocophus, or the Deaf and Dumb Man's Tutor*;' and dying of a fever, on the 28th August, 1686, aged sixty or

\* "As they (the writings of Dalgarno) are now become extremely rare, and would together form a very small octavo volume, I cannot help thinking that a bookseller, who should reprint them, would be fully indemnified by the sale. The fate of Dalgarno will be hard indeed, if, in addition to the unjust neglect he experienced from his contemporaries, the proofs he has left of his philosophical talents should be suffered to sink into total oblivion." (*Preliminary Diss.*) The works of Dalgarno have been recently published, by the MAITLAND CLUB, in a handsome manner, at Edinburgh.

more, was buried in the north body of the church of St. Mary Magdalen.”\*

In the *Biographia Britannica* we find the following observations on the same subject, from the pen of one of Bishop Wilkins’ biographers: “In the preparatory epistle to the ‘Essay towards a Real Character,’ Dr. Wilkins mentions several persons who assisted him in this work, particularly WILLOUGHBY, RAY, and DR. WILLIAM LLOYD and others; but it is remarkable that he does not mention Dalgarno; and the more, because Dr. Wilkins’ own name is printed on the margin of King Charles II.’s letter prefixed to Dalgarno’s book, as one of those who informed his Majesty of Dalgarno’s design, and approved it as a thing that might be of singular use to facilitate an intercourse between people of different languages; which prevailed with his Majesty to grant his said letters of recommendation to so many of his subjects, especially of the clergy, as were sensible of the defectiveness of art in this particular.”

Mr. Hallam makes the following remarks on Dalgarno’s work: “The scheme of Dalgarno is fundamentally bad, in that he assumes himself, or the authors he follows, to have given a complete distribution of all things and ideas; after which his language is only an artificial scheme of symbols. It is evident that until objects are truly classified, a representative method of signs can only rivet and perpetuate error. We have but to look at his tabular

\* Wood’s Athen. Oxon. vol. 2, p. 506.

synopsis to see that his ignorance in physies, in the largest sense of the word, renders his scheme deficient; and he has also committed the error of adopting the combinations of the ordinary alphabet, with a little help from the Greek, which, even with his slender knowledge of species, soon leave him incapable of expressing them. But Dalgarno has several acute remarks; and it deserves especially to be observed, that he anticipated the famous discovery of the Dutch philologers, namely, that all other parts of speech may be reduced to the noun, dexterously, if not successfully, resolving the verb-substantive into the affirmative participle.\*

#### JOHN WILKINS.

This author was a distinguished English prelate, and Bishop of Chester. His work, entitled "An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language," was published in London, in 1668. This is a large folio volume, and it would be impossible to give here even a bare outline of its nature and contents. I must, therefore, refer the reader to the treatise itself. The object of it appears to me to be altogether unattainable. I shall just mention that the "Essay" is divided into four parts. The first comprehends an account of the origin of languages, their changes and corruptions, the origin of writing, the formation of alphabets, and the general principles which pervade all the kinds of

\* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. 3, p. 361.



languages of which we have any knowledge. The second part contains universal philosophy, embracing all our ideas of abstract thought, existence in general, the being of a God, the physical constitution of the world, and the arrangement and classification of all the various animate and inanimate things contained in it. The third part relates to philosophical grammar, which displays the individual parts or elements of common discourse. And the fourth part is devoted to the development of the author's plan of a *real character*, or language for the communication among all nations and people, of every thing connected with the nature, qualities, &c. of the numerous things mentioned in the three preceding parts of the work. There is a specimen of the author's philosophical language in the Lord's Prayer, given towards the end of the volume.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

A FEW CASUAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF TRUTH, SUGGESTED FROM THE CONTENTS OF SOME OF THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS, WHICH RELATE TO SCEPTICAL OPINIONS ON THE CHARACTER OF EVIDENCE.

AFTER the decline of the Scholastic philosophy, and when men had begun to exercise their minds in speculative inquiries without any formal restrictions, a loose and indefinite scepticism arose among many of them in reference to the nature of *Truth*. The spirit of the old Sceptics seemed again to have been revived. The genius of the Schoolmen was averse to raising controversies on the nature of evidence; for the great question which lay at the bottom of their system was, *that fundamental principles were not to be called in question*. This rule became, however, no longer influential on men's minds, and the consequence was, that a number of writers, some of whom were pious individuals living in the bosom of the Church, began to question the elements of human knowledge and belief. The motives which suggested such a course have been

often a subject of discussion and speculation ; but little of a satisfactory nature can be obtained from matters of this kind. These modern doubters did not attempt in their writings to embody scepticism into a regular system or theory, but stated their views rather in the shape of doubts, or simple interrogatories, than in grave and lengthened dissertations. These writers appeared simultaneously in every country of Europe ; and perhaps the probable solution of the phenomenon may be found in this circumstance ; that the minds of men having been for ages depressed with a heavy load of Scholastic forms and rules, naturally rebounded to a greater distance on the removal of the pressure, and fell into the habit of calling everything in question, just as they had before implicitly adopted everything which was told them.

In such a history of mental science as we have been attempting to give, it cannot but prove advantageous, particularly to general readers and students, to have something to guide them in discussions on the nature of truth ; something to which they can refer in their own minds ; and which may tend to correct or modify such doubts as may fairly and legitimately suggest themselves, on conning over the speculations of some modern writers on the evidences of what constitutes reality or certainty. What we shall offer will simply relate to the classification of the different kinds of truths, and to the giving a brief sketch of the manner and circumstances attending their first entrance into the mind. The following statements

are purely elementary ; chiefly designed for those who may have had few opportunities of indulging in metaphysical reading. Young and ardent minds, when they perceive philosophers of distinguished eminence and piety calling in question the ordinary evidences of truth, are apt to be puzzled and bewildered, and to feel dissatisfied that the elements of knowledge and certainty are not placed upon a more solid foundation than they are found to be. To remove or correct suggestions of this kind, is the principal object of the following desultory remarks.

What is truth ? is a question which has been asked since the first dawn of reflection and letters among men ; and has received innumerable and contradictory answers. But the frequency and earnestness of the interrogatory are sufficient indications that there must be a deeply-seated cause in the human soul for putting it ; and that it is not a mere unmeaning sound, which idle curiosity or captious sophistry continually utters. In every language, and among the rudest of mankind, we find a name for *truth* ; and the history of the human race, as well as the history of every individual mind, demonstrates that *certainty* is an invariable condition of intellectual intelligence, in every form and degree in which it may present itself.

The question, What is truth ? arises from a desire to know what are the *essences* of things ; just as we find philosophers asking, What is matter ? what is mind ? what is motion ? what is duration ? We want, in fact, to know if a *general* idea is different

from a *particular* one. Here we encounter again the doctrine about *universals*. The human mind is naturally restless and inquisitive on this point. We are always attempting to push our inquiries to the utmost bounds of creation and intelligence; nothing seems calculated to satisfy our cravings, short of Divine wisdom itself. This is one of the many conditions of our existence; and undoubtedly it is placed there for wise and beneficent purposes. To give an answer to the question, What is truth? in an abstract form, is impossible; any more than to give answers to the question, What is the abstract nature of mind or of motion? But of this we shall say more by and by. We shall pass on to the more popular statement of the question.

Looking at man's situation in the world, it is clear that *truth* must be the discovery or fruits of his daily and hourly experience or inward mental reflection. As men are able, from their social intercourse, to communicate their ideas to one another, some means must be established for ascertaining the truth of what they mutually affirm or deny; and these means are the employment of certain terms, which indicate the existence or non-existence of such and such things, relations, causes, and effects. Truth, in what may be conventionally called *its early developments*, is the simple avowal that something, or some quality, or some circumstance, is simply *what it is*. Existence constitutes truth; and is a condition inseparable from it, in all forms in which the human mind can recognize it. This is obviously the case in reference

to mathematical truths. Every proposition consists in an *assertion*. We say that the three angles of every right angled triangle are equal to two right ones; and we affirm this to be *true*, because inward reflection and experience confirm the *fact* or *assertion*. These properties and relations are inherent, or *exist* in the conception of the figure. The terms we employ to express propositions of such a nature as this just mentioned, are the *signs*, and the triangle is *the thing signified*; and the harmony or agreement between the two, is that which we in this case denominate *truth*. The circumstances which accompany the development and recognition of truth in all mathematical propositions whatever, are precisely the same; and hence it is, that we always consider the word *truth*, in its abstract signification, to consist in the agreement of the sign with the thing signified.\*

*Invariableness* is an attribute belonging to all mathematical truths. They have always been understood and conceived by mankind in the same light, in all ages of the world. This must strike every casual observer of the nature of human knowledge and its various divisions, as a remarkable circumstance. *Form* and *magnitude* are recognised as the first properties of matter, previous

\* I enter here into no questionable topics as to the precise nature of mathematical truths, considered in their more abstract nature or essence. This will be noticed elsewhere. I desire only to mention, that those who are inquisitive on this subject, whether mathematical axioms are generalizations from experience, or are *à priori* suggestions of pure reason, will find the point discussed in the controversy between Mr. Mills and Dr. Whewell.

to their convertibility to some *useful* purpose; and *number* must have followed, if it were not coeval with, the conception of their properties. These constitute the elements, so to speak, of mathematical science. This science, like every other, would doubtless be progressive; and we may imagine that something like the following would be the steps of the progress. When want compelled man's attention to a particular *form* of any body, a circle for example, he would soon find that it was difficult to make a perfect one, or one which he might think was beyond the reach of doubt. Still this comparatively incorrect circle he would make, and it would suggest the idea of a *perfect one*; and then he would perceive that there was a *point* somewhere within the circumference, which was equally distant from every part of it. This he would call the *centre*. He would here obtain a resting place for his thoughts to dwell upon. This would enable him to move forward step by step in developing the qualities or properties of this circle. He would always be comparing the conclusions with the definitions; and would discard from his mind all considerations about any circle he might make with his hands. Now this is the process which mathematicians follow in all cases. *Sense* was the origin of the science, but *sense* will not perfect it; it must be brought within the sphere of the mind, and there illustrated and elaborated into a mighty whole. This is mathematical truth. It is intellectual, imaginative, ideal. It is a mental creation, resting upon the bare evidence of internal consciousness.

In *physical truths* we start from *sense* also ; but the intellectual efforts or appliances are not so generally called into requisition. If we throw a stone up into the air, it will fall to the ground. We mould this into a verbal or formal proposition. When the proposition is enunciated, it is denominated the *sign*, and the stone thrown up, and descending to the earth, is the *thing signified*. It is commonly said that truth in physics consists in an *agreement* of the sign with the thing indicated; but this must be taken with a certain limitation. In mathematics, we cannot *conceive the opposite* of a proposition, if the definitions are taken for granted. We cannot conceive how the radii of a circle could possibly be of various lengths. But (and this is important to keep in view) we can conceive the opposite of every physical fact whatever, as far as science has hitherto pushed its inquiries. We can fancy the stone not to fall, but to go forward; not to go forward, but to hang in the air. We could alter in imagination the whole physical phenomena of the universe; there is nothing intellectually incongruous or contradictory in the supposition. But not so in respect to *magnitude* and *numbers*. These we cannot conceive susceptible of alteration. And this state of things constitutes the grand and radical difference between truths in mathematics, and truths in physics or natural philosophy.

*Agreement*, then, between the sign and the thing signified, is not *absolute*, but *conditional*, in physics. When we open our eyes on external things, we find



a great diversity among them. Their appearances and properties are varied to an almost infinite degree. When we enter upon a careful and minute examination of them, we place nature, so to speak, in a certain position, and *observe the result*. We do not *reason* about it; we observe simply. We find by experience the result always the same, *if all the circumstances in the supposed experiment have been the same*. As long as the properties of bodies remain radically unaltered, we have the greatest possible assurance that our knowledge from natural philosophy, however limited or extended that may be, will remain unshaken and unchanged. That knowledge rests upon the nature of things; to give a reason for which is evidently beyond the faculties of man.

We come now to consider another large class of important and interesting truths; those which spring out of and relate to human nature. These may, for our present purpose, be arranged under three divisions; moral truths, metaphysical truths, and religious truths. It may be stated in reference to all these classes of truths, that they have always been, and must ever be, from their peculiar nature, subjects of more or less dispute. They stand upon a different basis from truths in mathematics and in natural philosophy. But more of this in another place.

Moral truths arise almost exclusively out of the relations which one man stands in towards others of his kind. These relations have to be sought for and discovered by reason, and the situation in which we happen to be placed. We examine ourselves,

and mark our various desires and propensities ; see how these display and manifest themselves in reference to others ; and register in our minds all the various modifications of feeling, desire, and will. We look also with intensity and interest upon the actions and passions of others ; and we enter into numerous comparisons between them and ourselves, and draw multitudes of rules, maxims, and inferences, from the complicated relations and movements of those with whom we come in contact. The truths deducible from our moral nature come home to the understandings of men, with overwhelming power and authority. They are not a whit less convincing than truths of mathematics or natural history. We cannot move a single step in the world without recognising and feeling the force of their obligation. Man soon finds that he cannot enjoy the world alone ; he must make some sacrifice to the inclinations, and feelings, and desires, and wants of others ; otherwise he will experience the effects of retaliation and the consequences of anger in his own person or estate. He must, to a certain extent, consult the happiness of others, in order to enjoy some degree of comfort and happiness himself. And moral truths are by no means confined to civilized life ; but the savage in the desert acknowledges and takes them for his guide. Whenever two human beings are together, there must spring out of that relation a certain number of moral truths, to which both must, and will, yield a ready and cheerful obedience. No society, however rude and limited, could exist for a single hour,

without the controlling influence of moral obligation, and the tacit or expressed belief in certain moral truths.

Now as to the kind and degree of evidence which moral axioms afford, much may be said, and much has ever been said since the world was made. Speculations on this subject have been innumerable; and they will continue to be rife till the end of time. There is little or no doubt as to fundamental or general truths; it is only to their particular and individual application that dissent chiefly refers. The evidence for the leading principles in morals is derived from consciousness, from memory, and from the testimony of our senses and internal feelings. These, in a certain point of view, teach us morals, just as we are taught the qualities and properties of material things around us. What we experience and feel constitutes the grand evidence in both cases.

Metaphysical truths are those which relate to the abstract nature and powers of the human mind. That they have long been, and are still likely to remain, objects of doubt and discussion, this historical work itself is a sufficient testimony. But there must be always this powerful and overwhelming argument against all sceptical doubts as to the mere existence of *mind*, and its faculties and powers, that these very doubts themselves must in reality be annihilated if mind does not exist. The evidence, therefore, for mind, must, from the very nature of things, and from the very form in which every proposition must be framed, be as

conclusive as any thing can possibly be. If there be no mind, then there is nothing; neither truth nor falsehood. All sceptical arguments, when pushed to an extremity, are perfectly suicidal.

Religious truths originate in the relations which subsist between man and his Creator. These relations, by mere reason, cannot be fully developed or comprehended. We may take the existence of an intelligent First Cause, as a principle assented to by all mankind. There may be, and there are, different modes of apprehending and expressing it; but the creative principle is indelibly imprinted on the mind of man, and is almost ever present, so to speak, to his inward frame.

These religious truths are commonly divided into two classes; one which refers to natural religion, and the other to Divine revelation.

The truths of natural religion are numerous, diversified, and require considerable mental power and acquirements to embrace them as a whole. They arise out of the complicated mechanism of the universe around us, and our modes of viewing and considering them. They possess all the evidence which the senses themselves can furnish; and it is impossible to resist the conviction, from what we see around us, and feel within us, that a guiding and overruling Governor of the world exists; as it is to resist the evidence of an external universe around us.

The religious truths arising from revelation are numerous and interesting in the highest degree. The existence of a Divine Being is established;

and He is described as all-powerful, wise, and benevolent. The sources of this class of truth are numerous, and arise out of many abstract considerations. To barely enumerate these, would greatly exceed our limits. We shall leave them, therefore, to the reader's reflection; and we are particularly urged to do this, inasmuch as we shall have to touch upon many important topics connected with this division of theological truths, in subsequent portions of this work.

Now in looking back again to the question, What is truth? and scanning over the enumeration of the classes of particular truths just given, it may be asked, Is there any thing in the condition of man, as a social and intelligent being, which can add to the evidence of truth; which can show that a recognition of truth is productive of any effects on the lot of humanity? or in other words, Does the development of truth in general add any thing to the power and happiness of the human race? Now we can answer this in the affirmative; indeed we cannot possibly answer it in any other manner, unless we renounce the evidence of our senses altogether. We say, therefore, that there is a cogent proof that truth not only exists in things, and in their relations around us, but that its recognition, and belief, and application, are productive of a wonderful and happy influence on human nature. For let us cast a glance at man when he is comparatively a stranger to the knowledge and power of truth. Let us look at him when he is a wanderer in the desert. He lives precariously from day to

day, like the beasts around him. Fear and superstition are his hourly companions; and he is almost an entire stranger to all those noble and exhilarating pleasures which arise out of a well-ordered community. He is a compound of gloom, suspicion, impatience, improvidence, and revenge. An alien to the tender and compassionate feelings of our nature, he knows nothing of justice and mercy; therefore blood-thirsty retaliation is his constant weapon against the infliction of injuries.

Let us look at the other side of the picture; and behold man under the influence and knowledge of truth. What a different being he is; and how strikingly does he display the influence of that which scepticism affects to deny. Happiness, it is true, is not always commensurate with the knowledge of truth; but still there is a constant and powerful effort made, from the constitution of things, to effect an approximation. Look at man's resources from a knowledge of mathematical and physical truths; and witness the extent of his power, and his multiplied, and almost endless enjoyments. Every thing is made subservient to his wants and desires; and he seems like a little deity himself, wielding the irresistible elements according to his will. By his knowledge and application of the mechanical powers he becomes invested with more strength than the rhinoceros, and can outstrip the fleetness of the antelope. By turns we witness him rolling at ease in his chariot, skimming on the surface of the deep, making the tempests or waves obey him, and mounted in the air, flying on the wings of the wind.

His mind, too, becomes enlarged and comprehensive, to an almost inconceivable extent, when contrasted with the limited range of the savage. And yet what are the effects of all these truths, compared with a knowledge of those which centre in his own breast? Great and surprising as the former are, they dwindle into nothingness compared with those truths which bind him to his kindred, to his home, to his relatives, and to his God. These open out an inexhaustible source of knowledge, power, comfort, hope, and enjoyment. These fill his bosom with rational convictions and animating hopes, even on themes which stretch beyond the world he inhabits.

Such are the relations which subsist between truth and man. The more he studies and cultivates it, the more powerful and happy is he destined to become. This is not a theory, not an assertion, not a probable opinion or conjecture; it is an absolute and visible fact, and rests upon the self-same foundation as the existence of external things around us, or the existence of our own feelings and sensations. The relationship between him and truth is one of the palpable conditions of creation. There is no room for sceptical doubts here; you must either deny the reality of every thing, even your own individual existence, and the certainty of the very doubts you express; or you must allow the connection between man's influence and happiness, and that which he calls knowledge and certainty. No middle course can possibly be conceived.

And we may observe here, that all the various

classes of truths we have enumerated, are bound together in one great and stupendous whole. They cannot be separated, either in the individual, or the aggregate body of society, without experiencing a corresponding diminution of real power and happiness. They must all go hand in hand. If a man had mathematical knowledge, and nothing else, he would be little removed, if at all, beyond the savage : if he possessed all physical skill, this would not improve his lot. On the other hand, if his inquiries were exclusively confined to matters connected with his own internal feelings, and to those principles and axioms he lays down for the government of his species, he could not exist for a single day. All branches of knowledge and truth have an immutable and eternal relationship to each other ; and the condition is that they must be cultivated in certain given proportions, in order to realize all the benefits which are inseparably connected with their conjoint cultivation and acquirement.



## CHAPTER XIX.

## BENEDICT SPINOZA.

SPINOZA was an Amsterdam Jew, of Portuguese extraction ; but, before his becoming author, had been expelled from the synagogue, for contumacy to his parents. He mixed with the Christians of the city, though there is no ground for supposing that he ever formally attached himself to the Church.

He became passionately fond of the philosophy of Descartes ; and, when about his thirtieth year, he published an “Abridgment of the Meditations of Descartes ;” to which he added an Appendix, containing some of his own peculiar opinions. To the leading or fundamental principle of the Cartesian philosophy, Spinoza seems to have given his assent, *that consciousness was the basis of all certainty* ; but so far as the two philosophers worked out this problem, nothing can be more opposite than the Cartesian and the Spinozian theories, taken as two separate and entire bodies of speculation. Descartes’ was like the living frame ; Spinoza’s like the marble statue.\*

\* “It was in little else than his *physical principles* that he agreed with Descartes ; for no two philosophers ever differed more widely in their

The leading principle of the philosophy of Spinoza, according to the general interpretation of his numerous commentators, is that the Deity and the universe are one and the same thing. He conceives that the essence of the Divine nature is a compound of two distinct elements, *thought* and *extension*. In his definition of what matter really is, he adopted the hypothesis of Descartes, and made it consist of extension alone. Spinoza maintains that the Supreme Being is the *cause* of all things; that he acts not from choice, but from necessity; and that good and evil are alike the effect of His power.

These general positions the author endeavours to demonstrate in a mathematical form, from certain definitions, axioms, and propositions; which we shall submit to the reader's notice, with a few short remarks upon some of them.

### *Definitions.*

1. By Cause I mean that, the essence of which is necessarily involved in its existence.
2. A finite being or substance is that which can be limited by another thing of the same nature.
3. Substance is that which the mind can conceive *per se*, and which requires no conception antecedent to it.\*

metaphysical and theological tenets. Fontenelle characterises his system as Cartesianism pushed to extravagance." (Stewart, Diss.)

\* Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est, et per se concipitur; hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.

4. An attribute of a substance is that which the mind perceives to constitute the essence of that substance.\*

5. The modes of a substance are its accidents, through or by which it is conceived.†

6. By God I understand a Being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence. Whatever expresses an essence, and involves no contradiction, may be predicated of an absolutely infinite Being.‡

7. A thing is conceived to possess freedom of action which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and which possesses the power of self-determination. But whatever owes its existence to another thing, must act according to fixed laws and rules.

8. Eternity must be considered as identical with existence itself.

### *Axioms.*

1. Every thing which exists, must exist in itself, or in some other thing.

\* Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.

† Per modum intelligo substantiæ affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, et per quod etiam conceipitur.

‡ Per Deum intelligo Eas absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit. Deo absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus essentiam pertinet, quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.

2. A thing which cannot be conceived through another thing, must be conceived through itself.

3. From any fixed or determined cause, the effect must necessarily follow; and *vice versá*, if there be no fixed or determined cause, no effect can take place.

4. The knowledge of an effect depends upon a knowledge of the cause, and the one includes the other.

5. Things having nothing in common with each other, cannot be comprehended by each other; that is, the conception of the one does not necessarily include that of the other.

6. A true or correct idea must necessarily agree with its original or representative in nature.\*

7. A thing which can be clearly conceived as non-existing, cannot, in its essence, include existence.

### *Propositions.*

1. Substance must be prior in its nature to its accidents.

2. Different substances, which have different attributes, can have nothing in common among them.

3. Things which have nothing in common, cannot be the cause of each other.

4. Two or more things having distinct natures, can be known among themselves only through the diversity of their attributes or modes.

\* *Idea vera debet eum suo ideato convenire.*

5. There cannot be two or more substances of the same nature, or possessing the same attributes.

6. One substance cannot create another substance.

7. The necessary condition of all substance is to exist.

8. All substance must necessarily be infinite.

One radical defect in this system of philosophy, is the mathematical form which is given to it. In every thing appertaining to human nature, this mode of reasoning is defective and fallacious. It is a fact, and a fact which ought never to be overlooked in all philosophical discussions relative to our mental constitution, that since the very first dawn of philosophy to the present hour, there has not been one single successful experiment in applying mathematical forms of reasoning to intellectual, moral, political, or theological topics. Many attempts have been made, but there is not one proved tolerably consistent or rational. They have invariably assumed such a form, and been so redolent of absurdity, that the common sense and common feelings of mankind have completely overwhelmed them with derision and contempt. But on this topic we shall not enlarge here, but proceed at once to make a few remarks on these several definitions, axioms, and propositions.

In the first definition, the word *cause* is ambiguously employed. The author limits it to mere *existence*. Now the term *cause*, in every language, and in every conception of it, involves three

distinct things; *existence, power, and intelligence*. A cause limited to mere existence, is the most absurd thing imaginable. Indeed it cannot be conceived at all.

The third and fourth definitions are contradictory to each other. A *substance* is defined to be that which can be conceived in itself; and an *attribute* is defined to be also the *essence of substance*, that is, substance itself. The *attribute* and the *substance* must then be one and the same thing. But in the notion of all mankind an *attribute* is only a *quality* or *mode* of existence of a thing, but not the thing itself. The *fifth* proposition, when viewed in conjunction with the third and fourth, tends to render the darkness impenetrable. *Modes* express *attributes*, and *attributes* are the essence of *substances*; so that here are three things involved in one idea or definition.

Passing over the 6th and 7th definitions, we come to the 8th, which makes eternity identical with existence. This is a most fanciful, and, logically considered, an unintelligible definition. Existence and duration are two things as distinct in their conception as any two opposite things can well be.

The 4th axiom is wide of the mark. It maintains that we can have no knowledge of effects, unless we have a knowledge of the causes. Mr. Hallam observes relative to this axiom, "It seems to be in this fourth axiom, and in the proposition grounded upon it, that the fundamental fallacy lurks. The relation between a cause and effect is surely something perfectly different from our perfect compre-

hension of it, or indeed from our having any knowledge of it at all; much less can the contrary assertion be deemed axiomatic.”\* And it may be remarked in addition to what Mr. Hallam here states, that even upon the supposition that we know nothing more about cause and effect, than a mere succession of sequences, still the axiom of Spinoza is fundamentally erroneous.

The first proposition is curious. The definitions 4th and 5th make attributes and modes the essences of substance; but the proposition just as it stands, makes the substance to exist, before that which constitutes its essence or nature exists; which I conceive to be a most palpable contradiction. If the attributes or modes had not been identified with substance itself, but only considered as something *added* to it, then the proposition would have had something plausible to recommend it. It might then have been conceived, but now it cannot.

The third proposition makes identity of essence a necessary condition of causation. The fifth axiom, on which this is grounded, does not support the proposition; for though the axiom maintains that things which have nothing in common cannot be understood by means of each other, yet this by no means involves causation. This is altogether a different matter.

The eighth proposition is a strange combination of words and ideas. It affirms something about a non-entity, a thing which does not exist; and the

\* Litt. Middle Ages, Vol. 3. p. 342.

proposition also maintains that this non-entity has an *essence*, and that this essence does not involve *existence*, which is itself, in the eighth definition, stated to be identical with *eternity*. This sophistry is carried far beyond the bounds of philosophical gravity ; it becomes positively full of drollery.

It must always be borne in mind, in viewing the system of Spinoza *as a whole*, that the notions which he attaches, or endeavours to make his readers attach, to the word *substance*, are purely hypothetical. Though there be definitions and axioms, yet the whole is a hypothetical fabric, and this word substance plays an important part in the drama of intellectual delusion. He rings the changes upon it in a thousand different forms. There is a grand and imposing display of legitimate deduction from his premises ; but the foundation is unsound and rotten, and the moment we institute anything approaching a rigid analysis into the first logical position he lays down, on which the superstructure is to be reared, we feel the whole edifice crumble beneath our feet. It is this consideration which has induced his latest Parisian Editor, M. Saisset, to remark, that Spinoza does not *demonstrate* his system, he only *develops* it.

Some writers have entertained the opinion that the irreligious and atheistical doctrines legitimately and logically deduced from his writings, were not intentionally inculcated, but were the result of an entire ignorance of their nature and tendency. They maintain that the general complexion of his forms of reasoning, clearly show, that he was thoroughly bewildered in the cobwebs of his own



subtlety. However, whatever truth there may be in this conjecture, certain it is, that but one opinion can be formed as to the general tendency of his doctrines and speculations. They are evidently calculated to mislead the minds of the young and inexperienced, and to induce them to sport with a species of paradoxical dialectics, which must in the end produce injurious consequences on their moral, intellectual, and religious welfare.

We shall furnish the reader with the means of forming his own judgment on the nature of the most obnoxious tenets of Spinoza's system, by pointing out the passages in his writings, under divers heads, where his own words can be readily consulted.

1. His material notions of the nature of the human mind generally; and of his opinions in reference to extension when applied to the Deity. See *Eth.* part 2, prop. 2, Op. tom. 2, p. 79.

2. His notions of the nature of the Deity; his disquisitions on the personality and liberty of the First Cause; and his denial of the union of the Divine Mind with intelligence and will. See *Eth.* part 1, Schol. prop. 17, prop. 31, 32, Op. tom. 2, pp. 52, 53, 54, 62, 63.

3. His denial of a superintending and directing Power over the world, and his notion of final causes, and that everything we see around us is the effect of a stern necessity. See *Eth.* Appen. prop. 36, pp. 69, 72.

4. On the eternal and uncreated nature of the First Great Cause, the non-possession of liberty of

action, and on what we call good, beautiful, wise, and providential, as applied to the government of the world. See *Eth.* part 1, corol. prop. 8, 6, 16, 17; corol. prop. 17; Schol. 2, prop. 29, 33; Schol. prop. 35, Append. prop. 36; Part 2, Schol. prop. 3. Tom. 2, pp. 31, 38, 52, 53, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 79, 80.

5. On the nature of man; his fate, his physical nature, instincts, &c. See Tract. theol. pol. chap. 2, 16. Epist. 23, 25, 32. Op. tom. 1, p. 188, 359, seq.; 513, 541, seq. *Eth.* Part 1, Appendix, prop. 36; part 2, prop. 48; part 4, schol. 2, prop. 37. Tract Pol. chap. 2, § 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 18, 22; chap. 3, § 13. Op. tom. 11, p. 69, seq. 121, 122, 231, 232, 307, seq.; 314, seq.; 323.

No small portion of the discrepancy of opinion among the commentators of Spinoza, as to the extent of his infidelity and atheistical notions, has arisen from the various interpretations put upon his language. The meaning he attaches to the words God, and substance, and extension, and thought, creates this ambiguity. Some have considered him quite a religious man, others as a Deist of the most rational and intelligent order; while the general impression among the mass of readers has been that his system is entirely denuded of every living and active principle of theology, either natural or revealed. For these reasons we shall quote a few passages in his own words, that persons may have an opportunity of judging for themselves, as to the general nature and tendency of his philosophical writings.

“Infinitum (adeoque etiam substantia infinita) absoluta affirmatio est.—Porro ex eadem ratione infinita sequitur etiam infinitum nonnisi unum et quidem indivisibile esse posse. Sequitur seeundo rem extensam et rem cogitantem vel Dei attributa esse, vel affectiones attributorum Dei.

“Quidquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse vel eoneipi potest. Ex neessitate autem divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis (hoe est omnia quæ sub intelleetum divinum eadere possunt) sequi debeat.

“Quodeunque singulare, sive quævis res quæ finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, nec ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinatur ab alia eausa, quæ etiam finita est, et determinatam habet existentiam, et sic in infinitum.

“Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus, et a nemine eoætus agit. Deus ergo est omnium rerum eausa immanens, non vero transiens. Deus est eausa effieiens non tantum rerum existentiae sed etiam essentiae.

“In rerum natura nullum datur contingens, sed omnia ex neessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt ad eerto modo existendum et operandum.

“Per naturam naturantem intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se eoneipitur, nempe Deus, quatenus ut eausa libera eonsideratur. Per naturam naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex neessitate Dei naturæ, sive uniusejusque Dei attributorum sequitur; hoe est omnes attributorum Dei modos, quatenus eonsiderantur ut res quæ in

Deo sunt, et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec coniepi possunt.

“Deus non operatur ex libertate voluntatis. Et res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerit, quam quo productæ sunt. Porro intellectus Dei, qui est vera causa rerum, eum ipsius voluntate et potentia essentialiter unum et idem est. Nec agit Deus sub ratione boni, sic enim aliquid esse extra Deum boni deberet, quod a Deo non dependet, vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collinet. Dei quoque potentia est ipsa ejus essentia: ex sola enim necessitate Dei sequitur Deum esse causam sui et omnium rerum.

“Cogitatio attributum Dei est. Etenim singulares cogitationes, sive hæc et alia cogitatio, modi sunt qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimunt. Competit ergo Deo, utpote necessario virtute cogitandi infinito, infinita infinitis modis cogitare; h. e. datur in Deo necessario idea tam ejus essentiæ quam omnium quæ ex ejus essentia necessario sequuntur. Omne enim quod in Dei potestate est, necessarium est.

“Extensio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res externa. Omne quicquid est, et ab infinito intellectu coniepitur, ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet; ino una et eadem est substantia quæ jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Etenim, e. g., modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa. Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum. Et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis, sive sub attributo cogitationis

concipimus, unum eundemque ordinem, sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem, h. e. easdem res invicem sequi concipimus.

“Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Per corpus intelligo modum qui Dei essentiam, quatenus ut res extensa consideratur, certo et determinato modo exprimit.—Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum quem mens format propterea quod res est cogitans. Ideæ rerum singularium sive modorum essentiæ formales in Dei attributis continentur.

“Idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest; non enim comprehendit intellectus divinus quidquam nisi ipsum Deum et ejus attributa. Est autem Deus non nisi unicus.”

Now the plain interpretation which is to be put upon these passages is, that there is *one* substance infinite in its nature, and that substance is God. Whatever exists, exists in God; for external to his existence nothing can possibly be conceived. All things are but the manifestation of his Being. An inexorable necessity binds the whole together. It is quite clear that there is not the slightest foundation here on which to erect any theological opinions whatever. Without the *personality* of the Deity, there can be no religious doctrine or sentiments. In all rational systems of natural religion, this personality is never dispensed with. You must have a *Creator*, and you must have something which He *created* and *upholds*; other-

wise a single religious or devotional feeling or opinion cannot penetrate the soul. The Deity must be clothed with the attributes of intelligence, and will, and power, or we can have no idea of Deity at all. We may call an eternal and self-existing *substance* a God, but this does not constitute it one. The theological ideas in the mind of man remain unchanged; they never have altered; and these ideas of Deity involve all the attributes just mentioned. A naked, eternal, self-existing, infinitely extended substance, is a pure negation; it accounts for nothing; and, at bottom, really means nothing. It is a play upon words, it is trifling with the plainest suggestions of the mind of man, to designate a mental abstraction of this kind with the name of God. The God of the savage in the wilderness, as well as the God of the Christian, has always been invested with personality, with intelligence, with will, with power; and these attributes or modes of existence arise out of the deep recesses of the human mind, and, in fact, constitute a part of its very nature or essence. Thought, in all its manifestations, is the concentrated embodiment of this personal, spir<sup>i</sup>tual, and vivifying power. It is an impenetrable chaos without it. There is neither life nor wisdom where its voice is not heard and recognised. And, in truth, we find more of the elements of real moral grandeur, and power, and sympathy, in the system of the untutored savage, who,

“ Sees God in clouds, or hears him in the wind,”

and who peoples the woods and the groves with fairies, genii, and demons, than in such a sterile and lifeless theory as that immediately under consideration. The system of the Indian bears the same superiority over the speculative abstractions of Spinoza, as the living body does to the dead one.

It must be acknowledged, however, that many of the discrepancies of opinion on the nature and tendency of such systems of philosophy as that of Spinoza, have a common origin. They take their rise from the various modes men adopt in judging of the operations of the Deity in the work of creation and providence. Some talk in general and vague terms of His power and agency; and others again bring these perpetually before us, in every movement of life and nature. There can be no right conceptions of a Deity, where *personality* and *freedom of action* are denied; and, on the other hand, when these attributes are continually pressed into service, and more enlarged views of the Divine government overlooked, men naturally fall into idolatrous and superstitious practices and modes of thinking. Truth lies here in steering a middle path. We must refer to the general laws of creation, and make them objects of philosophical investigation; and yet we must not lose sight, for a single moment, of the personality and the individual superintendence of Almighty power. We must hold the balance even, with a steadiness of purpose, or we shall assuredly fall into error. We cannot mark the precise limits where general laws end and particular ones begin; and hence it follows, that there

will always be a variety of modes of viewing the movements of divine power, amongst the thinking and inquisitive part of mankind; and in proportion as they swerve more to one side or to the other, their systems will be stamped with a corresponding imperfection.

Though the lines of demarcation between a general and a particular providential power are invisible to us, yet we are so mentally constituted, that we can readily enough detect any decided leaning to either side of the balance. If a man be always dealing in generalities, descanting on the essence rather than the substance of power, and shrouding his system of speculation under the drapery of rhapsodical and evanescent principles of divine agency, he becomes an object of reasonable suspicion, and we are inclined to test his faith and orthodoxy by some decided and particular religious creed. On the other hand, when a man brings the Divine personality to bear upon every individual act and deed, however trivial and low, we see at once that he is devoid of all noble and elevated conceptions of the great Author of his being. We can readily enough determine where certain recognised limits on either side are passed, though we are unable to decide on fractional deviations from the centre of sound philosophy and religion.

The late Professor Stewart has some observations on this subject, which I think are well entitled to our consideration. He says,—

“Among the doctrines of natural and revealed religion which Spinoza affected to embrace, was



that of the Divine Omnipresence ; a doctrine which, combined with the *Plenum* of Descartes, led him by a short and plausible process of reasoning to the revival of the old theory which represented God as the soul of the world ; or rather to that identification of God and the material universe, which I take to be still more agreeable to the idea of Spinoza. I am particularly anxious to direct the attention of my readers to this part of his system, as I conceive it to be at present very generally misrepresented, or at least very generally misunderstood ; a thing not to be wondered at, considering the total neglect into which his remarks have long fallen. It is only in this way I can account for the frequent use which has most unfairly been made of the term Spinozism, to stigmatize and discredit some doctrines, or rather some modes of speaking, which have been sanctioned, not only by the wisest of the ancients, but by the highest names in English philosophy and literature ; and which, whether right or wrong, will be found, on a careful examination, not to have the most distant affinity to the absurd creed with which they have been confounded. I am afraid that Pope, in the following lines of the *Dunciad*, suffered himself so far to be misled by the malignity of Warburton, as to aim a secret stab at Newton and Clarke, by associating their figurative, and not altogether unexceptionable, language concerning *space*, (when they called it the *sensorium* of the Deity), with the opinion of Spinoza, as I have just explained it.

“ ‘Thrust some mechanic cause into the place,  
Or bind in matter, or *diffuse in space.*’

“ How little was it suspected by the poet when his sarcasm escaped him, that the charge of Spinozism and Pantheism was afterwards to be brought against himself for the sublimest passage to be found in his writings !

“ ‘ All are but parts of one stupendous whole,  
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.’

\* \* \* \* \*

“ ‘ Lives through all life, *extends through all extent,*]  
*Spreads undivided, operates unspent.*”

Nor, I would add, is this poetical idea of embodying the Almighty, with the stupendous and glorious works of creation, confined to Pope ; for we find the same philosophical thought expressed in many authors, both ancient and modern, and particularly in Thomson’s fine hymn to “ The Deity ;”

“ ‘ These, as they change, Almighty Father, these,  
Are but the varied God.’”

Since the writings of Spinoza have attracted so much attention, particularly on the Continent, within these few years, there has been a growing attempt to magnify the moral and religious worth of his character beyond its due merits. As a general rule, we have nothing to do with the private lives of the philosophers whose works we notice ; but when an effort is made, either directly or by inference, to throw a seductive gloss over any particular speculative system about which there have

always been, and must ever be, opposite and conflicting opinions, we have then a clear right to examine the personal pretensions which are thus obtrusively and ostentatiously placed before us. The admirers of Spinoza make him a God;\* and wish the world to believe that his system bears the imprint of Almighty intelligence and wisdom. That Spinoza was a man of inoffensive, plain, and simple habits, we are not at all disposed to deny; nor are we inclined to doubt, according to his biographers, that he frequently displayed a playful and kindly spirit to those among whom he habitually associated. The mere animal instincts of our nature could scarcely be so far depressed, as not to evince occasionally such social manifestations. But what we maintain is, and what we are in a position to

\* “Offer up with me a lock of hair to the holy but despised Spinoza! The mighty spirit of the universe penetrated him; the Infinite was his beginning and end; the world the only object of his affection and love. He was filled with religion and religious devotion; and on this account he stands alone, elevated above a profane world, without disciples, and even without citizenship.”—(Schleiermacher.)

“The great mind that wrought so powerfully on mine, and had so great an influence on the whole form of my opinions, was Spinoza’s. After I had looked round the world in vain for means of shaping my strange moral being, I fell at last on the ‘Ethics’ of this man. What I read in this work,—what I thought I read in it—I can give no account of; enough that I found there a calm to my passions; it seemed to open to me a wide and free view over all the sensuous and moral world. But what particularly rivetted me was the boundless disinterestedness that beamed forth from every sentence. The all-equalizing serenity of Spinoza contrasted with my all-agitating vehemence; his mathematical precision, with my practical way of feeling and representing.”—(Goethe, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. 14.)

prove, as far as such matters can be proved, is, that Spinoza's character was a really *selfish character*, in the very worst sense of that term. It embodied many intrinsically bad qualities; qualities which can never be too severely or too generally deprecated.

He lived to himself, and for himself. He had no deep sympathies with humanity around him. All his notions of the duties and objects of human existence, were mean, huckstring, and little. He showed no signs of vitality save by the mere gratification of his animal wants. Luxuries he despised, because he had no refined or lofty feelings for their rational enjoyment; nor moral energy of character to obtain them. His habits were low, childish, and grovelling; and he was an entire stranger to that healthy and hearty interchange of hilarity, mirth, and good-nature, which are to man as pleasant flowers strewed in his journey through life. Spinoza had but one idea; that was, to banish all intelligence and wisdom from the universe; and this scheme, by concentrated thought and fixity of purpose, he moulded into something like philosophical arrangement and form. And truth obliges us to say, that there never was a speculator on human nature more successful and happy in framing a system, which, in all its lineaments and bearings, so fully, and to the life, harmonized with his own moral and social character, as does that of the Amsterdam philosopher. The one is a perfect representation of the other. He had his eternal

substance, and his infinite extension; and with these he rung the changes on the abstractions of his mind, until he brought forth something which has disgusted many, and puzzled not a few since his day; and while he was effecting all this, the moral nature of the man became reduced to as few elements as his speculative system; until, in fact, he was reduced to a mere dry husk,—a shrivelled abstraction of humanity. . He had no enthusiasm, nor feeling, for what was great, noble, and praiseworthy; no love of country warmed his bosom; nor did the temporary glow of personal friendship ever betray him into an indiscreet act of liberality or kindness. No; Benedict Spinoza was a piece of reasoning mechanism, and nothing more.

Are we in a position to prove these assertions?

This will not be difficult. We shall advance nothing about his life or conduct; we shall simply content ourselves with glancing at those facts and circumstances, which his admirers have brought forward to public notice, as infallible proofs of his heroic virtue, and the elevated moral feelings he possessed and cherished. And it is truly a matter of surprise, to find such whimsical details brought into discussion, in grave and abstract systems of philosophy, in order to prove that the expounder of a particular system, which is acknowledged on all hands to run counter to the religious opinions and feelings of a great portion of mankind, was a man of singular worth of character; and that, on this very account, we have a complete guarantee

that he would promulgate no theory which was not in perfectly good keeping with the nobleness and dignity of his nature. We repeat, it is singular to find such common-place matters engaging the attention of erudite and profound philosophers. But such is the case. As to the prudence of making the appeal they do, we shall not offer a single word in opposition; but merely state, that in giving our commentary on biographical incidents and facts, we shall conduct ourselves with as much gravity and seriousness, as it is possible for us to bring to bear upon matters so redolent of sentiments and feelings of an opposite character.

We are told that Spinoza, when a boy, shadowed forth the great thinker and arraigner of Providence; for that once when he was sick, he demanded to know the cause of his pains, why he, a little innocent boy, should be called upon to suffer; and asked "Why, Whence, and Whither" all this should be. Now, to plain understandings there seems nothing remarkable in all this; nothing out of the common course of nature; but his enthusiastic admirers think differently; they considered these sickly and puling interrogatories as a decided indication of the future grandeur of the man.

The next thing we find the moderns extolling, is his conduct to his parents. They wished him to be taught in their religion, but he was obstinate and rebellious. This gave great umbrage to his friends. They tried both harshness and kindness, but they proved unavailing. He was finally expelled

from the Jewish synagogue. Now all this is in good keeping with his *real* character; but it has no great or decided bearing upon that fictitious one with which he has of recent years been invested. Dogged obstinacy is not real greatness of mind; it has little in common with it. It is always an attribute of a constitutionally low and imperfect moral nature. The base may occasionally pass for the real metal; but, in general, mankind are always able to detect the difference. And in common life it would not be considered a very good omen of future goodness and worth, for a youth to prove so unmanageable, so unfeeling and rebellious to his parents, as Spinoza did in this instance.

After excommunication, his biographers tell us Spinoza was thrown an "outcast" on the world. A physician took compassion on him, placed him in his family, and undertook to teach him Latin. His patron had a daughter, with whom he fell in love. This is a fruitful source of panegyric to his admirers. They drew a parallel between him and Abelard, only it happens that there is nothing in common between them. It would appear, from the circumstantial account of the affair, that Spinoza never made any formal advances to the fair object of his attachment, but contented himself with "downcast looks on the ground;" and the consequence was, the lady gave her hand to a more hearty and ardent admirer; and henceforth, say his biographers, with great simplicity, he renounced love for ever, and made a mistress of philosophy.

All this needs no comment; the coldness and apathy of the man are vividly portrayed.

As years rolled on, Spinoza found it necessary to betake himself to some profession for a livelihood. He learned the art of glass polishing, and followed it steadily. This was undoubtedly honourable, independent, and praiseworthy; but this is just what millions of our race do in every civilized country. He was a single man; lived, we are told, with great abstemiousness and frugality; and, therefore, he might be supposed to be able to provide for his daily wants without any violent sacrifice of time or labour. There is nothing here to call forth remarkable commendation. There is no romance about the movements or fortunes of Spinoza. He experienced few difficulties in obtaining what he wanted. He asked for little, and that little was readily supplied. There are no violent struggles for bare existence; he hears not the piercing cries of his own offspring for bread which cannot be supplied; nor does he smart under the pangs which a parent must feel, from the heartless ingratitude of a perverse and obstinate child. None of these things afflict him; because he lives to himself and for himself, and comes not within the range of such trials as test man's real virtue and strength of character. It is indeed ludicrous to witness the common-place incidents of his life set off with all the pomp and circumstance of sterling greatness, for the sole purpose, it would seem, of throwing a *halo* around that speculative system which he has left us as the fruits of his leisure and



retirement from the world. This we consider hardly fair. Take the system; eulogise it as you like; but let it rest on its own intrinsic merits. Do not praise the author for what he did not profess to be, and for what he really was not. His admirers may consistently keep to the qualities of the *head*, but to those of the *heart* they have clearly no claim.

Great credit is taken for Spinoza's virtues, on account of the friendly notices which were bestowed on him by persons of rank and station. But to those who know anything of continental habits and modes of thinking, in reference to science and literature, this is by no means any indication at all of a man's moral or religious worth. A reputation for talents or learning is highly respected, and very properly and beneficially so; but this respect seldom demands more than the endowments of the understanding. We are also told that Spinoza was offered the chair of Philosophy of the University of Heidelberg, but magnanimously refused it. This showed an act of good sense; for he had no philosophy to teach; and he certainly would have appeared to his students as a very singular professor, had he attempted to develop and carry out the system of speculation now associated with his name. A public teacher of the philosophy of human nature to young students, whose avowed theory entirely excluded a Divine intelligent Cause, would certainly have been an anomaly in any seminary of instruction in the world. Spinoza knew more of the decencies and proprieties of life than to expose himself in a situation of this kind. There

was more sense in the refusal than in the offer of the vacant chair.

As a proof of the abstemious habits of Spinoza, it is stated with great circumstantiality that, after his death, it was discovered from his private papers that on ONE occasion (the account particularly mentions the *one*) he had eaten nothing for dinner but *soupe au lait*, a little *butter*, and a *pot of beer*; and on another day he had a *bason of gruel*, some *butter*, and a *quantity of raisins*. We think there is no great self-denial evinced in these statements. Many philosophers have speculated upon a less substantial meal than milk, butter, and beer. Nay, we are very confident, that many a turtle-loving Alderman of the city of London, has *once* at least in his life been put upon as low fare as Spinoza, either from choice or necessity, used on these two occasions. His disciples show more zeal than discretion; for the inference we are led to draw from these statements is, that on all other occasions Spinoza indulged in more luxurious viands. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact, that his enemies, who were his contemporaries, accuse him of gluttony, and call him an *Epicurean* philosopher.\*

The amusements of Spinoza have been called into requisition to prove the elevation and nobleness of his private character, and the soundness of his philosophy. The materials are, however, very scanty on this point. We are only told that his hours of

\* See the writings of Dr. Nieuwentyt, Amsterdam, 1720.

recreation were spent in smoking his pipe, talking occasionally with his fellow lodgers, and *witnessing fights between two spiders*. His biographers mention that the last exhibition offered him so much lively amusement, that the tears were often seen rolling down his cheeks from excessive laughter. We have no doubt but this is quite true; and every reader will allow that it is in strict keeping with his character and habits, as exemplified by other incidents of his life.

We have gone into these matters of pure philosophical twaddle, from no motive of throwing obloquy upon the dead; but solely from a sense of duty. Spinoza, we know and believe, was a very ingenious man; had a mind peculiarly adapted to such speculations as he indulged in; and his works altogether display an average share of talent, and no more. We feel assured also, that he was a sober, industrious, and peaceable citizen, in the ordinary acceptation of these terms. Thus far we cheerfully go, but no farther. When we hear the clergy of all countries stigmatised as "bigots," and "ignorant enthusiasts," for speaking of his system as atheistical in its tendency; when we see grave philosophers deifying his name, on the ground of his high moral worth, and his genuine and unaffected piety; when all this is put forth, upon the strength of his having, in early youth, shaken off parental authority, lived a life of selfish seclusion, of his having once had to dine off milk, butter, and beer, and of his having generally indulged in smoking, and witnessing the combats of spiders;

when we hear these things dwelt upon as incontestable evidences of the superlative dignity and worth of the man, we cannot refrain from feeling the impulse of derision and contempt for all such childish and maudlin zeal.\*

We shall close this notice of Spinoza with a few remarks from two or three writers, on the general character of his speculations, and his worth as a man. These remarks might be greatly multiplied; for there are few authors since the days of Descartes, whose writings have called forth such a contrariety of opinion as those of Spinoza. Our space is however limited, and we must bring this chapter to a termination.

Dr. Mosheim, in his "Ecclesiastical History," has the following passage, in reference to the philosopher of Amsterdam: "This man observed in his conduct the rules of wisdom and probity, much better than many who profess themselves Christians; nor did he ever endeavour to pervert the sentiments or to corrupt the morals of those with whom he lived; or to inspire, in his discourse, a contempt of religion or virtue."

Voltaire, in the article "Dieu," published in the *Encyclopédie*, says, "You are very confused, Benedict Spinoza, but are you as dangerous as they say? I maintain not; and my reason is, that you are very perplexed, you have written in bad Latin, and

\* See "La Vie de B. de Spinoza, tirée des écrits de ce Fameux Philosophe, et du témoignage de plusieurs personnes dignes de foi, qui l'ont connu particulièrement; par Jean Colerus, Ministre de l'Eglise Luthérienne de la Haye."

there are not ten persons in all Europe who will read you from end to end. When is an author dangerous? When he is read by the idle of the Court, and by women.”

M. Cousin has the following remarks respecting Spinoza :

“Loin d’être un athée, comme on l’en accuse, Spinoza a tellement le sentiment de Dieu, qu’il en perd le sentiment de l’homme. Cette existence temporaire et bornée, rien de ce qui est fini ne lui paraît digne du nom d’existence, et lui il n’y a pour lui d’être véritable que l’Être éternel. Ce livre tout hérissé qu’il est, à la manière du temps, de formules géométriques, si aride et si repoussant dans son style, est au fond un hymne mystique, un élan et un soupir de l’âme vers celui qui seul peut dire légitimement *Je suis celui qui suis*. Spinoza est essentiellement Juif, et bien plus qu’il ne le croyait lui-même. Le Dieu des Juifs est un Dieu terrible. Nulle créature vivante n’a de prix à ses yeux, et l’âme de l’homme lui est comme l’herbe des champs, et le sang des bêtes de somme. (*Ecclésiaste*). Il appartenait à une autre époque du monde, à des lumières tout autrement hautes que celles du Judaïsme, de rétablir le lieu du fini et de l’Infini, de séparer l’âme de tous les autres objets, de l’arracher à la nature, où elle était comme ensévelie, et par une médiation et une rédemption sublime, de la mettre en un juste rapport avec Dieu. Spinoza n’a pas connu cette médiation. Pour lui le fini est resté d’un côté et l’Infini de l’autre ; l’Infini ne produisant le fini que pour le détruire sans raison et

sans fin. Sa vie est le symbole de son système. Adorant l'Eternel, sans cesse en face de l'Infini, il a dédaigné ce monde qui passe ; il n'a connu ni le plaisir, ni l'action, ni la gloire, car il n'a pas soupçonné la sienne. Spinoza est un Mouni Indien, un Soufi Persan, un moine enthousiaste ; et l'auteur auquel ressemble le plus ce prétendu athée, est l'auteur inconnu de *l'Imitation de Jésus Christ*.\*

\* Fragm. Philo. Paris, 1838.

## CHAPTER XX.



BOSSUET, HUYGENS, AND FENELON.

AFTER the writings of Descartes had been generally made known on the Continent, we find a visible change in metaphysical discussion in most of the public seminaries of learning, and in the bosom of the Catholic Church. New light seems to have been diffused over the philosophical portion of her clergy. They saw in the new *method* of Descartes something both to approve and stand in awe of; and they resolved to take what was good, and reject what was suspicious or bad. The Aristotelian philosophy was now nearly completely forsaken; but Plato, his rival, did not supply his place. Still the general spirit of Descartes' speculations lay in a Platonic direction; and it was this circumstance which seemed to excite the interest of the philosophical portion of Catholic writers. Descartes' notions on innate ideas and principles, his separation of mind and matter, and the general tone of his theological opinions on the nature of Deity and the human soul, tended to cement the

relationship of his system to the Platonic model. The chief aim, therefore, which the writers whose names we have placed at the head of this chapter, had in view, was to make metaphysical philosophy a handmaid to religion; to make, in fact, the plain and rational deductions of the former harmonize with the doctrines and precepts of the latter. This was the grand object of their pursuit; and whatever opinions we may entertain as to the successful accomplishment of this enterprise, all must allow that great ability and knowledge were displayed in its prosecution.

## BOSSUET.

The metaphysical work of this distinguished French preacher, entitled, "Traité de la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-Même," was expressly written for the instruction of the Dauphin of France. It is unquestionably one of the very best books of the kind which have ever appeared in any language. It is clear, forcible, and eloquent. Everything in it displays the hand of a master.

In treating of the human mind, the author describes the functions of sensation; and then shews how the superior powers of the understanding mould these sensational elements, and make them subservient to the higher purposes of human thought and science. The various modes in which these complicated intellectual operations are carried on, give rise to a considerable diversity of talent and knowledge among men. The author classes



mankind into three sorts ; men of understanding, men of imagination, and men of memories.\* These display in their respective developments the reasoning faculty, the imaginative faculty, and the faculty of retention. The three qualities of thought are invariably blended in individuals in certain proportions ; but it seldom or ever happens that we find them all in equal strength and vigour in the same person. Indeed, the intellectual economy, as it is displayed in the masses of mankind, and when considered relatively to their social and mental necessities, strikingly forbids such a union.

Sensation, according to Bossuet, effects an important office in the economy of thought. It prepares and procures the materials of thinking ; it excites the mind to action ; and is the medium through which we hold an intercourse with surrounding nature. But this sensation must not be confounded with that higher power, by which the soul is able to turn, as it were, upon itself, and view its own perceptions ; this is the power of reflexion.† It is an important faculty, and the only one which is fitted to serve as the basis of every metaphysical theory.

In Bossuet's ideas of the nature of Truth, we find the real scope and spirit of his mental theory. Truth is that which exists, falsehood is that which has no existence. Truth being eternal, must have a mode of existence which is also eternal. We can find this only in the Deity. All principles and

\* *Traité de Connaissance*, chap. 1, § 7. 8.      † *Ibid.* chap. 1. § 12.

truths existed here, ages before the human understanding was created; and consequently, we can only be said to *find truths*, not to *create them*. It follows clearly, then, that there must be a Being in whom all these truths reside. It is then in Him, by an incomprehensible process, that we see and comprehend all truths. He is the God eternal, and fountain of all intelligence and truth. It is in Him that we see everything, that all men see the truth, and that it for ever presents the same unvaried aspect and appearance. We may mould this truth into divers shapes, to suit our duties and necessities, but the eternal principles of it repose in the Godhead.\*

After giving utterance to opinions of this description, it does seem to be the height of inconsistency for Bossuet to express a repugnance to Father Malebranche's doctrine of seeing all things in God. And what renders the inconsistency more glaring is, that Bossuet was not content with simple expressions of displeasure, but actually instigated Anthony Arnauld to write his work on *True and False Ideas*, in opposition to Malebranche's system.†

#### HUYGENS.

This author was a distinguished Professor at the University of Louvain, and excited a good deal of

\* *Traité de Connaissance*, chap. 1, § 16.

† See Bossuet, *Letters*; one 25 June, 1683, to the Archbishop of Utrecht; and the other dated 21 May, 1687, to a disciple of Malebranche.

attention for his metaphysical opinions, and for the boldness with which he promulgated them. His leading principle was that Truth was eternal and uncreated; that it resided in the Deity. Truth governs and commands the understanding; and the understanding submits itself to it, but is not the judge of it. We can only see truth through the Deity, who is above all human authority, and the source of all intelligence. The unity and universality of Truth is a proof that Deity is its only proper source.

## FENELON.

Fenelon embraced the general principles of Descartes' philosophy, but did not follow him implicitly in all his opinions. Mental speculations did not form a leading object in the studies of Fenelon; they were only made subservient to illustrations of theological truth. He had, however, a decided genius for subtile and knotty questions. His gentle and amiable spirit loved to hover over the immensities of existence and being; but his thoughts never assumed the boldness of dogmatism, nor the logical severity of a confirmed theorist. They were intelligent, persuasive, inquiring, and suggestive. What he said was in the spirit of a devoted and affectionate pupil, willing to learn, and to receive instruction with gratitude and delight.

Fenelon was favourable to the doctrine of images, and supposed they left impressions on the brain,

which were perceived by the mind, and which images were faithful representations of external objects.\* Ideas so generated in the mind seemed to him, however, to be influenced by a certain law, which gave them in some measure the appearance of possessing a distinct existence, even from our own minds. These ideas, he says, constitute, not only a light, but a rule; it is a rule I cannot sit in judgment upon, and yet it constrains me to judge. In one sense those thoughts or ideas are myself, for they are my reason; in another sense, they are not myself, for I am subject to change, but they are immutable. These ideas are universal, necessary, and eternal.†

Again the amiable and pious author says, “In fact, my reason is in myself; for it is necessary I should always look internally to find it; but there is a superior reason which corrects me, which I consult, and which exercises authority over me. It is an internal monitor, which makes me speak, which keeps me silent, which makes me believe, and which creates suspicion and doubt. In listening to it, I receive instruction; in listening only to myself, I am deceived. This monitor is every where; and its voice is heard from one end of the universe to the other, and by all mankind as well as myself.”‡

\* *Traité de l'Existence de Dieu*, part 1. chap. 4.

† *Ibid.*, part 2. Chap. 4.

‡ *Ibid.*, part 2. Chap. 4.

## CHAPTER XXI.

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TSCHIRNHAUSEN, THOMASIIUS, GEULINX, AND  
POIRET.

THESE three authors may be classed under the same head, so far as historical arrangement is concerned. They are necessary links in the great chain of German philosophy.

## TSCHIRNHAUSEN.

This author is connected with the early history of German speculation. He was a man of great and varied information, and cultivated mental philosophy with ardour and success. His treatise, *Medicina Mentis*, published at Leipsic, in 1695, was the fruit of his metaphysical studies.

Tschirnhausen divided philosophers into three classes; the first those who had only a verbal knowledge of science, and contented themselves with the technical arrangements of a special terminology; the second cultivated an acquaintance with the history of scientific opinions, and made a choice of a system from what presented itself to

their notice; the third class, in addition to all acquired knowledge, thought and judged for themselves, and endeavoured to extend the boundaries of knowledge by original observations and inquiries.

The author lays down four leading principles as a foundation for all his speculations on human nature. "1st. I am conscious of many things; 2nd. I am favourably affected by some things, and unpleasantly by others; 3rd. There are some things I can conceive, and there are others beyond my powers of conception; and 4th. I perceive, by the help of the external senses, internal images or modifications of what I experience."\*

The difficulties in the progress of truth arise from the irregular action of the power of imagination; from confounding the *rational being* with *real existence*; from our inability of duly appreciating that knowledge which we do possess; for want of our attention being steadily and powerfully directed to particular studies; and from the unsteadiness and changeableness of the mind itself. These imperfections of our nature may be, in some measure, corrected by a careful and attentive study of the laws which regulate cause and effect, and by cultivating a habit of observing and detecting general principles. The latter are of essential importance in all philosophical disquisitions.

Tschirnhausen was an ardent admirer of Spinoza, though it does not appear that he adopted any of

\* *Medicina Mentis, præfatio.*

his important principles of philosophy. He said that he thought that Spinoza had given a more elevated representation of the Deity than Descartes himself had done.\*

#### CHRISTIAN THOMASIVS.

The claims of Thomasius to metaphysical celebrity are but slender. The ontological or higher branches of the science, he entirely disowned. He adopted the School maxim that there was nothing in the understanding but what had previously been in the senses. This principle he divided into two parts; the one declares to be true every thing which the understanding perceives by the senses; and the other those notions which harmonize with what the mind conceives from materials which are offered to its notice by external representations.

We cannot know what mind is; we only know its effects or conditions, but not its abstract elements. The foundation of all truth lies in ourselves; to know ourselves is the highest wisdom.†

The author also defines thought, “a mental discourse about images, by the movement of external things, and through the instrumentality of the senses stamped on the brain.”

#### ARNOLD GEULINX.

This author followed the medical profession at

\* Vide Stuck, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philos.; See also Fulleborn and Brucker.

† See Fulleborn and Brucker.

Leyden, and was the writer of several treatises on metaphysical subjects. The principal of these are, "Methodus Inveniendi Argumenta," published in 1675; and the other, "Annotata Majora in Principia Philosophiæ Renati Des Cartes, et Opera Philosophica," which was given to the world in 1709.

The last is the work of Geulinx which has excited the principal share of attention among the philosophic writers of modern times. By some he has been awarded the honour of being the first who suggested the theory of *occasional causes*; by others again that favour has been conferred on De la Forge.\*

The reader will find that part of the "Annotata," under the head "Disputatio Metaphysica," the most important relative to mental science.†

#### PETER POIRET.

Peter Poiret was, in the early part of life, a zealous advocate for the Cartesian philosophy; but he renounced it, and fell into mystical trains of thought. He wrote a work against Mr. Locke, entitled "Fides et Ratio collatæ, ac suo utraque loco redditæ, adversus principia J. Lockii." There are many original and profound observations scattered throughout this treatise. The author also wrote "Economie de la Divine Providence," in which his mystical views are fully developed. *Faith* to guide the understanding, and *grace* to sanctify the will, are

\* See this matter stated in Damiron, Essai, 17<sup>e</sup> Siècle, vol. 2, book 4.

† Pp. 266—292.



the chief instruments in the work of man's regeneration.

Poiret published also another work, called "De Naturâ Idearum ex origine suâ Repetitâ," &c. This treatise, though published at Amsterdam, created a considerable sensation throughout the whole of France. Indeed the whole of Poiret's speculations, mystical and often unintelligible as they were, took a firm hold of the philosophic and religious portion of his countrymen. He died in 1719.

There were several other writers of a kindred genius with Poiret, who flourished in or near his own time. William Postel published his "Panthosion;" and Mutius Pansa, his "Accord de la Philosophie Profane et Chrétienne." Amos Comenius and Jean Bazer are both of the same school. We cannot, for want of space, enter into an individual examination of these speculative labours.

## CHAPTER XXII.



FONTENELLE, REGNAULT, D'AGUESSEAU,  
AND TERRASSON.

THESE French writers have a great similarity, in their philosophical opinions of the mind, with each other. They all viewed metaphysics through the medium of theology, and the common sense principles of human life. None of them ventured upon framing theories or systems, but contented themselves with being humble though independent interpreters of the more elaborated and complicated disquisitions of others. They collectively form, however, a characteristic feature in the history of speculative science in France ; and their respective opinions exerted no small degree of influence over minds of a bolder and more daring stamp, previous to that great social and political revolution of which their country was the theatre.

FONTENELLE.

Fontenelle is one of the most distinguished men

of whom France has just cause to feel proud. He cultivated with great success both physical and mental philosophy, and was, in every sense, as amiable in his private deportment, as celebrated for his philosophical acuteness and discernment.

His first metaphysical work was printed at Amsterdam, in 1686, and without his name. It is called "Doutes sur le Système des Causes Occasionnelles." It was levelled against the theory of Descartes, but particularly against the extension of that theory by Father Malebranche. Fontenelle shows that the term *cause* is used by both these eminent philosophers in a loose and ambiguous sense; and this has led to innumerable misconceptions in the development of their respective theories. Fontenelle attempts to give a more philosophical definition of a cause, which he says must always mean, in the conception of all minds, something fully adequate to produce the effect. This is the only true definition of a *cause*. It must be owned, however, that his own description of causation is very defective, and that he has not been so successful in overthrowing the arguments of his opponents, as he imagines.\*

Fontenelle took a wider range of speculation in his *Fragmens*, on *Human Reason*, the *Human Mind*, and on *Instinct*. In all of these tracts he displays great originality of thought, and discusses the nature and laws of intellectual existence altogether independent of any theoretical views of Descartes,

\* Doutes sur le Système des Causes Occasionnelles, chap. 3, pp. 10 - 16.

or of any other philosopher. The Secretary of the Academy intimates, that he purposes treating of the mind with all simplicity of expression, and arranging its phenomena without the assistance of any cumbrous dialectical frame-work. General propositions, which constitute the foundation of knowledge and science, are derived, in his conception, from often repeated experiments. The *necessary truths* of other reasoners on the mind, he calls *natural axioms*. The rule for obtaining these axioms the author lays down, namely, that when nature displays her entire manifestations, the same necessity which makes them what they are, compels the human mind to conceive them as they exist. These *natural axioms* are divided into two classes; the one derived from a survey of our internal mental operations, and the other from external objects, and their relations, without us. These two orders of axioms embrace every thing which comes within the scope of human intelligence.\*

On what Fontenelle calls the *Laws of Thought*, he is very happy and original in his illustrations. His opinions are in perfect harmony with what was some time afterwards more fully developed by Father Buffier, and still later by the Scotch School of metaphysics. Fontenelle tells us that it was an indispensable condition of creation itself, that the fundamental laws of human belief should be placed beyond the possibility of misconception or uncertainty. The mind judges truly, and relies with

\* Fragmens d'un Traité de la Raison Humaine, pp. 290, 294.

implicit confidence never to be shaken, upon its judgment, in all matters, when it appears impossible for it to come to any other conclusion. This principle of agreement, arising from the constituted order of things, is the foundation of every thing in the shape of knowledge and conviction.\*

#### FATHER REGNAULT.

This learned Jesuit is entitled to great praise for his zealous and successful devotion in disseminating useful truths on topics connected with intellectual philosophy. The chief object to which the labours of Regnault were directed was, to improve and simplify, as much as possible, the study of logic. His work on this subject is, "La Logique en forme d'Entretiens, ou l'Art de trouver la Vérité," and was published at Paris, in 1742.

The author treats of the mind in the following order. He distinguishes all perceptions arising from sensation, imagination, sentiment, and moral feel-

\* "Il a fallu que Dieu, en imprimant la loi générale de créance, évitât le cas de l'erreur. L'esprit juge vrai tout ce qu'il ne peut pas juger autrement, sans examiner et sans savoir si cette impossibilité de concevoir autrement est une marque sûre de vérité. C'est sur ce fondement que repose le témoignage des sens; quoi que la nature des choses ne s'y montre pas toute, c'est pourtant par ce que la nature des choses est telle qu'elles se montrent d'une certaine manière; en tant qu'elles se montrent ainsi, ce qu'on en voit a sa vérité. Mais la présence des objets détermine nécessairement l'esprit à les concevoir d'une telle façon et non d'une autre; si je vois un homme debout, il m'est impossible de le voir couché, etc. A ce mouvement naturel de créance, l'esprit ajoute une règle qu'il se fait à lui-même, c'est qu'il juge vrai aussi tout ce qu'il croit ne devoir pas concevoir autrement, quoiqu'il le pût."—(*Fragments*, pp. 291, 294, 298.)

ing, from those of a purely intellectual cast, which are denuded of all sensible external qualities. These two orders of our perceptions are made known to us by two characteristic circumstances; the one we recognise by themselves, and not through the intervention of anything else; the other we know from the agency of external things. The last class of ideas, the author thinks, are the most important for man to acquire. He considers them, also, as the true *representatives* of the external qualities or essences of bodies.\* The author lays down nine rules to aid the mind in forming these ideas, and how to regulate and apply them to the purpose of detecting general truth, and to point out the limits between the suggestions of reason, and the principles and maxims of authority.†

On the nature of our ideas from sensible objects, Regnault has the following observations. "Those sensible ideas which, by the natural judgments which accompany them, seem sometimes to be confounded with the soul or mind itself, are, nevertheless, sufficient to demonstrate the reality of things. In separating or referring them to divers places, they are still united to *myself*, in the sole and individual *moi*, where they can be readily distinguished from other things, but not from that which I call *myself*. Indeed, all the senses seem indivisible; it is a clear and distinct notion which we have of our soul, that it is perfectly *one*, simple,

\* See *Eléments de Métaphysique*, Entretien 2, pp. 12. 20. 53; and Entretien 12, p. 200.

† *Ibid.* Entretiens 3 and 12.

and indivisible ; an indivisibility which appears the more wonderful and admirable, inasmuch as we seem, so to speak, to be able to expand ourselves outwardly to an almost infinite number of objects.”\*

On matters connected with the principles of education, to which Father Regnault had paid great attention, we find him expressing himself upon the general nature of instruction in this manner. “Socrates,” says he, “and St. Augustine after him, had good grounds for maintaining that no man could teach another anything. That which we denominate instruction in a master, is simply the art of interrogating his disciple, according to a received method, with a view to the discovery of that truth which is in his own mind. And that which we call learning or acquiring knowledge in a pupil, is only the development of the faculty of attention, and its steady concentration upon our inward thoughts or ideas.”†

These opinions formed, in after years, the foundation of several speculations among French philosophers, which we shall notice more fully in another part of this Volume.

Like Malebranche, Father Regnault centred all his philosophy upon Deity. God is the source and active cause of our existence, and the reason which discovers the sciences to us is that heavenly monitor which points out the paths in which we ought to tread. There are, however, two kinds or degrees

\* Discours sur les Idées, pp. 212. 214.

† Discours sur l’Ame. pp. 1. 6.

of reason ; the one, of an eternal nature, superior to our minds, which contains within it all the principles of divine and human knowledge ; the other is what may be termed *natural* reason, and is, in some measure, of human creation. This natural reason is distinguished by four characteristics or attributes : an ardent desire for truth ; a power of recognising primitive or elementary ideas ; a faculty of weighing and judging of evidence ; and a power to suspend our judgment, when the materials submitted to us are of an inadequate or contradictory nature.\*

#### HENRY FRANCIS D'AGUESSEAU.

This philosopher was Chancellor of France, and Voltaire affirms he was one of the most intelligent and upright who ever filled that important situation.

D'Aguesseau was a zealous cultivator of mental speculation, and had studied Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and Locke, with great attention. His peculiar views on metaphysics, which were not originally intended for publication, are contained in a work entitled "*Meditations Metaphysiques sur les Vraies ou les Fausses Idées de la Justice.*"

The Chancellor had a decided leaning to the philosophy of Plato, and a corresponding repugnance to the theories of mind which made it depend upon, or be considered as a result of, material agen-

\* Discours 15 sur les Idées, p. 192. Discours sur la Raison, pp. 2. 95.



cies. His understanding was of too solid and masculine a character to be led by a purely mystical hypothesis; but he conceived that by our referring the nature of mind to a Divine origin, we were better able to explain what the thinking principle of man really was; and for this reason, that we recognise the same character in the Divinity as in man, though the former is placed at an inconceivable distance of perfection. Such an hypothesis, the Chancellor contends, is highly favourable to the development of a lofty theology, as well as a sound and effective moral and political code of laws and regulations.

Entertaining these ideas, it was natural he should object to the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, on the origin of human knowledge. Making the senses the source of all our ideas, appeared to D'Aguesseau as too material and degrading. Of Locke, however, he entertained a high opinion, and he maintains there are many portions of his "Essay" with which he cordially agrees.

#### THE ABBE TERRASSON.

This ecclesiastic was an able man, and a most devoted disciple of the Cartesian system. So absorbing and extravagant was his admiration of it, that he frequently said that the whole of philosophy was contained in the mind of Descartes. He has dwelt at considerable length, in his work "Introduction à la Philosophie," upon the immense

influence which the writings of Descartes had upon the opinions and taste of his countrymen.

The basis of his metaphysics rests upon this principle, "that human philosophy is not sufficient to make us thoroughly acquainted with the nature of things; but it is sufficient to indicate the true principles of science."\*

\* "La Philosophie humaine ne suffit pas pour nous faire découvrir les vrais principes des choses; mais elle suffit pour indiquer les vrais principes des sciences." (*Introduction à la Philosophie*, pp. 8, 9.)

## CHAPTER XXIII.



ANTHONY ARNAULD.

ANTHONY Arnauld was unquestionably a very acute and sound metaphysician. He combated with uncommon zeal and effect, both the mental and theological creeds of Father Malebranche. The whole of Arnauld's works, which are chiefly of a controversial nature, amount to the surprising number of *forty-five volumes quarto*!

There are two publications of his, on mental subjects, well entitled to notice and commendation; his work "On True and False Ideas," and his "Art of Thinking." In the former he seems to have been led to conclude, that the common theories about our ideas were not satisfactory to his mind; for he maintains that "material things are perceived *immediately* by the mind, without the intervention of ideas."

Arnauld conceives that it is the essential character of an intellectual being, to be conscious of

its own existence and of its own operations. To *think* and to *perceive* are one and the same thing ; and the *idea* of an object is simply the *perception* of it. Perception is a modified representative of the object. These representative ideas are not, however, to be considered in the light of *images* or *pictures* ; they are only deemed such in relation to our perceptions themselves. Representative ideas are considered in this light because they are the medium through which external objects are formally presented to the mind.\*

Arnauld's notions on perception constituted the peculiar feature of his metaphysical system. All his positions and reasonings rested upon them. He every way affirms that perception is an act of intuition ; and that it is only in the mind that objects present themselves. It is an erroneous opinion that objects must necessarily be contiguous to our organs before they can be perceived. We can perceive objects which are at a distance from us, by the sense of vision. The only thing necessarily present to us is that which we call *objective*, which constitutes the internal perception.†

Arnauld tells us in many portions of his works, that we do not perceive objects *immediately* ; the only immediate object before the mind is the *idea*. We have ideas of the properties or qualities of things, and this is all we know about the matter.

\* Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, Rouen, 1724, chap. 2. pp. 2. 38. 39 ; chap. 6. pp. 48. 59 ; also, Défense d'Arnauld, tom. 38. de ses Œuvres, p. 381.

† Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, chap. 8. pp. 68. 80.

These ideas or perceptions constitute the *objective* reality of what the mind is said to perceive.\*

The soul of man is partly *active*, and partly *passive*, in reference to its perceptions. It is active, inasmuch as it creates within itself, and by virtue of its own nature or essence, certain ideas; and it is passive, as it receives impressions or ideas from objects external to it. The active class of its ideas are those connected with the process of reasoning; the passive, those which the Almighty has stamped upon the soul at its creation, and which manifest themselves through the medium of the senses.

Arnauld then stoutly defends Descartes' system, that the human mind has no immediate or direct knowledge of external things. The act of perception is alone sufficient for all purposes, without having recourse to any thing really existing without us. Arnauld says, "Le corps ne peut agir sur l'âme comme cause physique. La volonté et la puissance divines ont seules établi le rapport indirect d'après lequel nos perceptions correspondent en effet à certains êtres extérieurs qu'on appelle corps, soit qu'ils soient présents ou éloignés de nous. La connaissance que nous avons de leur existence est légitimée seulement par quelques arguments tirés de la véracité de Dieu, et des motifs qui nous portent à croire que, dans la sagesse de ses desseins, il a en effet établi une semblable correspondance."†

\* Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, chap. 8. pp. 48. 50.

† Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, chap. 28. p. 333. Examen du traité de l'essence des corps, Œuvres d'Arnauld, tom. 32. pp. 146. 149.

Internal consciousness is, as Arnauld affirms, the centre from which all the intellectual knowledge of man is derived. It is the source of all science.\*

Arnauld is well entitled to a distinguished place in the history of the philosophy of mind in this century, by his Port Royal Logic. This little work, of which he was the chief writer, exercised a great influence over systems and theories of education; and it was the first treatise which attempted to lay bare the Aristotelian method of reasoning on important subjects connected with human nature.

The first part of "L'Art de Penser," contains an account of the nature and origin of our ideas; both individual and complex. He seems to have taken the word idea to be pure thought, whatever is in the mind, or occupies it for the time being. Arnauld says this word is unsusceptible of any definition; because there is no word more simple than itself. This gives the key to what was his real meaning of this term.

Arnauld opposes the doctrine that ideas are obtained by the senses. He concedes, however, that some ideas may be derived from this source, but they are only occasional, (*par occasion*). All our ideas have a higher origin, and belong to the mind

\* "La conscience intime est pour l'homme le seul foyer de lumière; c'est de son sein qu'émanent les idées claires, ces idées claires qui seules constituent la vraie science. Nous connaissons par des idées claires, non seulement les choses que nous apercevons immédiatement, comme notre âme; mais aussi celles auxquelles nous ne pouvons atteindre que par le raisonnement, comme les âmes des autres hommes."—Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées. chap. 23 et 25.

itself, forming its constituent and necessary elements.\*

The "Art of Thinking" was a joint production between Arnauld and his friend Nicole, and it has even been said that others had a share in its manufacture. However this may be, certain it is that the work is a most able one. It often goes by the name of the "Port Royal Logic." M. Crousaz, in his "Logic," maintains that Arnauld's "Art of Thinking" exercised a more powerful influence in reforming academical instruction throughout the whole continent of Europe, than the writings of either Bacon or Descartes.

The biographical accounts of Arnauld state, that "he died in an obscure retreat at Brussels, in 1692, without fortune, and even without the comfort of a servant; *he* whose nephew had been a minister of state, and who might himself have been a *Cardinal*. The pleasure of being able to *publish* his sentiments, was to him a sufficient recompence." This hard lot called forth from the pen of Boileau the following stinging and reproachful lines:—

"Au pied de cet autel de structure grossière,  
Git sans pompe, enfermé dans une vile bière,

\* Brucker gives us the following concise statement of Arnauld's views. "Antonius Arnauldus, ut argumenta Malebranchii eo fortius everteret, peculiarum sententiam defendit, asseruitque, ideas earumque perceptiones esse unum idemque, et non nisi relationibus differre. Idem scilicet esse, quatenus ad objectum refertur quod mens considerat; perceptionem vero, quatenus ad ipsam mentem quæ percipit; duplicem tamen illam relationem ad unam pertinere mentis modificationem." (*Hist. Phil. de Ideis*, p. 248.)

Le plus savant mortel, qui jamais ait écrit ;  
Arnauld, qui sur la grâce instruit par Jésus-Christ,  
Combattant pour l'église, a, dans l'église même,  
Souffert plus d'un outrage et plus d'un anathème.  
Plein d'un feu qu'en son cœur souffla l'esprit divin,  
Il terrassa Pélage, il foudroya Calvin ;  
De tous ces faux docteurs confondit la morale ;  
Mais, pour le fruit de son zèle, on l'a vu rebuté,  
En cent lieux opprimé par la noire cabale.  
Errant, pauvre, banni, proscrit, persecuté ;  
Et même par sa mort, leur fureur mal éteinte  
N'en eût jamais laissé les cendres en repos,  
Si Dieu lui-même, ici, de son ouaille sainte,  
A ces loups dévorants n'avait caché les os."



## CHAPTER XXIV.

HENRY MORE, JOHN PORDAGE, AND MICHAEL  
MOOR.

—◆—  
HENRY MORE.

THIS writer was one of the Cambridge Platonists, and an intimate friend of Theophilus Gale. He was very mystically inclined, and viewed the movement which was then in active operation on the Continent, in reference to speculative philosophy, with some degree of fear and jealousy.

More was a sincere inquirer after truth; and he has furnished us with a detailed account of his indefatigable labours, and the disappointments he encountered in the search of it. He tells us he commenced with the Grecian philosophers, in whose writings he found an almost inexhaustible source of philosophical thought. His mind, however, was not at rest. There still appeared great defects in the ancient speculation. He loved Plato; and the more he viewed his system through the glosses of the Alexandrian commentators, he liked him the better. Still prosecuting his investigations,

he plunged into the writings of the Fathers of the Church, and the mystical doctrines of the Cabala.

Here his soul was, for a time, wrapped up in the most refined spiritualism. Truth appeared to him arrayed in all her most gorgeous splendour. The conversations with his friend Gale dissipated these mysterious notions, and induced him to place his reliance at once on the doctrines and declarations of Scripture, in which he would find all that was really good and tenable of the heathen philosophy, clearly and forcibly stated. This seems to have, in some degree, satisfied him; and he continued during the remainder of his life to discuss and illustrate profane learning, through the medium of scriptural truth.

It would appear that More entertained a passionate attachment to Descartes and his system, for he praises him after his death, in a letter to Clerelier, and maintains that he had been highly influential in the support of sound religion. More says, "For the Peripatetics pretend that there are certain substantial forms emanating from matter, and so united to it that they cannot subsist without it, to which class these philosophers refer the souls of almost all living things; even those to which they allow sensation and thought; while the Epicureans, on the other hand, who laugh at substantial forms, ascribe thought to matter itself; so that it is M. Descartes alone, of all philosophers, who has at once banished from philosophy all those substantial forms or souls derived from matter,

and absolutely divested matter itself of the faculty of feeling and thinking.\*”

More's correspondence with Descartes, written in Latin, is contained in eleven letters from both philosophers. They relate to the nature of matter, to the existence of a vacuum, to the nature of extension, to the intelligence of animals, to the laws of motion, to the mysterious union of mind and body, to certain laws and principles of optics, and to the more general maxims of the Cartesian system, relatively to the human mind.

The metaphysical works of Henry More are, “*Conjectura Cabalistica* ;” “*An Antidote against Atheism* ;” “*Enchiridion Metaphysicum* ;” “*De Anima ejusque Facultatibus* ;” “*The Immortality of the Soul*.”

The treatise against Atheism is divided into fourteen chapters ; and the general scope of the author embraces the arguments for the existence of a Divine Mind, from the wisdom displayed in the constitution and government of the universe ; from the uniform belief of mankind in all ages in the existence of a Deity ; and the high probability, from the very nature of mind itself, that a creative and providential Intelligence superintends the affairs of mankind.

There is an Appendix to this Treatise, in which the author attempts to answer all the objections which had been made to the arguments and statements he had advanced.

\* See Hallam, *Litt. Middle Ages*, Vol. 2. p. 443.

The author's Treatise on the "Immortality of the Soul," contains nineteen chapters, and abounds with many ingenious and profound thoughts. He sums up the result in few words. "We have now finished our discourse, the summary result whereof is this; That there is an incorporeal substance, and that in man, which we call his soul. That this soul of his subsists and acts after the death of his body, and that usually first in an aerial vehicle, as other *demons* do; wherein she is not exempt from fate, but is then perfect and secure when she has obtained her *ætherial* one, she being then out of the reach of that evil principle, whose dominion is commensurable with misery and death."\*

#### JOHN PORDAGE.

This was one of the English mystical writers. He published his work about 1680, called, "Theologia Mystica, sive Arcana Mystica que Doctrina de Invisibilibus Æternis, &c. non Rationali arte, sed cognitione Intuitivâ descripta." The author took Böhme for a guide in all his speculations. He was the author of a long poem, called "Mundorum Explicatio," in which he attempts to explain all the mental, physical, and spiritual phenomena of the universe.

Pordage entertained, among other curious notions, that before man's fall, every *idea* we have of things on earth was most vividly seen in Paradise.

\* Philosophical Works, p. 233, London, 1662.

“Th’ Eternal Heaven’s glorious beamings shone  
Upon that orb ; an everlasting sun  
To it they were, which never rose nor set,  
Nor changes here of night or day permit ;  
T’was always day, t’was always noon, it was  
There always sun-shine in that springing place.  
All the *ideas* of what we behold,  
Upon this orb, shone there in purest gold,  
In greater claritude and brightness far,  
Than the night’s goddess, or the evening star.”\*

## MICHAEL MOOR.

This author was a Roman Catholic divine, and born in Dublin in 1640. He completed his studies in philosophy at Paris. His works are, “*De Existentia Dei, et Humanæ Mentis Immortalitate,*” published at Paris in 1692 ; and his “*Vera Sciendi Methodus,*” which appeared at the same place, in 1716.

\* *Mundorum Explicatio*, p. 244. This work is ornamented with a very curious Hieroglyphical figure, descriptive of the Deity, Tree of Life, &c. &c.

## CHAPTER XXV.

HUET, LE VAYER, FOUCHER, AND MERSENNE.



## HUET, BISHOP OF AVRANCHES.

THE metaphysical speculations of this writer are very interesting. He was for many years a most zealous disciple of Descartes; but after due reflection he entirely abjured his opinions, and published his famous work, “*Censura Philosophiæ Cartesianæ.*”

Huet was a bold but reckless thinker; a curious compound of religious dogmatism and sceptical laxity. He had run through the whole circle of speculative opinions, both ancient and modern, but could find no secure resting place for the sole of his foot. He was all things by turns, and nothing long. He was a riddle to all his contemporaries when alive; and after his death he appeared to his friends still more incomprehensible, from the publication of his posthumous work, the “*Traité Philosophique sur la Faiblesse de l’Esprit Hu-*

main." This proved the full consummation of his eccentric mind and character.\*

The *apparent* object of Huet's reasonings seems to have been, to depreciate the evidence for human knowledge, with a view of inducing men to adopt implicitly the doctrines of the Church. In his works, "*Demonstratio Evangelica*," and "*Quæstiones Alnetanæ*," † he affirms there are but two paths to knowledge; the one by sense and reason, and the other by faith. The first is obscure, doubtful, deceptive, incapable of leading us to complete certainty; the second is luminous, direct, invariable in its operation, throws a flood of light over every thing necessary for man to know, and exereises the most soothing and tranquillizing influence over his mind. ‡

Huet endeavours to shew that human reason, and revelation, should always go hand in hand; that there exists, to a certain extent, an agreement between all the chief deductions of human thought, and the truths of revelation; but that whenever there arise doubts and difficulties from human reasonings, then we ought to apply for suceour and assistance to the divine record. This is the leading principle which pervades the Author's posthumous work, the "*Traité Philosophique de la Faiblesse de l'Esprit Humain*."

It is obvious that the Bishop does not entirely renounce all human knowledge; he only places it in an inferior rank to revealed truth. Human

\* There is an English translation of this work, London, 1725.

† The *Demonstratio Evangelica* was published at Paris, in 1679; and the *Quæstiones Alnetanæ*, at Caen, in 1690. ‡ *Demonstratio*, pp. 7, 8.

knowledge, however, never rises beyond a degree of probability; and even on this point, we meet with occasional expressions in the Author's works, which would almost induce one to believe that he was an advocate for absolute Pyrrhonism.

After entering, for example, into a discussion as to the way in which ideas are conveyed to the mind, we find him putting questions of this kind: What guarantee have we of the truth of our impressions of things? Are the species or images faithful representations of external objects? Are they infallible and unerring guides? What are the necessary and logical relations which subsist between the instrument of perception and the things or matters perceived? After long and intricate discussion on these and similar points, he comes to the absolute conclusion, *that men cannot acquire a knowledge of external objects.*\* "We demand," says he, "a *criterium* of truth; a sign, a stamp to which conviction shall be attached. But where is this *criterium*? It is not in man, and nature declares she knows nothing of it. It cannot be in the instruments we use, for our senses and imagination deal only in deceptive impressions; and the understanding and reason offer no grounds for certainty, since they are both a hidden mystery to us. Nor need we look for it in the active energy of the mind itself. In fine, to find the *criterium* of truth, we must previously know what truth is; whilst again, to know truth, we would still require a *criterium*.

\* See the Author's reasonings in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11, of *Traité Phil.*



Of what importance is a rule, if it be not a right one? And how can we know it is right?"\*

Still the venerable Bishop does not feel comfortable in absolute scepticism; and he, therefore, lays down a qualified proposition, that there is certainly some truth to be found in the nature and existence of things. The mind does recognise truth, but only in an imperfect and superficial manner. There is a probability sufficient to guide men in the common affairs of life, and this probability has also its *criterium*. This criterium may be considered of a double nature; that portion which belongs to the exercise of our senses, and that which results from modified impressions on the brain.†

The faculty of doubting, answers a certain providential purpose in the economy of man, and is of a twofold character. The one enables us to avoid error, obstinacy, and ignorance; and the other is of a more lofty nature, and gradually prepares and fits the mind for the reception of divine faith.‡

#### LA MOTHE LE VAYER.

This distinguished individual was preceptor to Louis XIV., and was profoundly skilled both in ancient and modern metaphysical knowledge. He evinced, however, a decided leaning towards scepticism, though he guarded his opinions with so much care, that he succeeded in escaping any direct censure from the Catholic clergy in France, who

\* *Traité Philosophique*, Chap. 8. † Chaps. 4 and 5. ‡ Chap. 6.

were generally pretty keen sighted as to these matters.

La Mothe le Vayer openly gave the preference of the philosophy of Aristotle to that of Plato. He was also favourably inclined to the systems of Epicurus and the Stoics. He maintains the principle that we can know nothing but through the instrumentality of our senses; they form the door of the soul, through which every thing must enter. Should we have the misfortune to be deprived of any of our organs of sense, we shall consequently experience a diminution of our knowledge.\*

Though the senses are here spoken of as the medium through which knowledge is conveyed to the soul, yet La Mothe le Vayer considers that the senses themselves are by no means to be invariably relied on. They are liable to deceive and bewilder us. The internal conceptions of the mind are likewise afflicted with a similar imperfection. We cannot always depend upon their suggestions.

The scepticism of this French author is not of an academical description. He uses no subtile or refined arguments in support of his positions. He displays more of the loose off-hand man of the world, than of the philosophical recluse or deep thinker.

#### ABBE SIMON FOUCHER.

This metaphysician was celebrated in his day for his strenuous exertions to uphold the Academic

\* *Opuscule Sceptique*, t. 2. Paris, 1654.

philosophy in all its original purity, and for his bold and resolute denunciations of the system of Descartes. His works are difficult to procure, partly from the circumstance that some of them were only privately printed for the gratification of his friends.\*

The Abbé Foucher maintains that though there were always differences of opinion among the Academicians, yet these differences did not affect the essentials of human knowledge and belief. The doubt which their disputes engendered was a harmless, and often a beneficial thing. All the ancient sects of philosophers were sincere and zealous in their searches after truth; therefore they never seriously doubted of its existence. And the Abbé also endeavours to show that the spirit of the Academic speculation was infinitely more in unison with the letter and spirit of Christianity, than the current tone of modern philosophy. "All the laws of the Academicians harmonize with revealed religion. For what do they in reality prescribe? Simply how to conduct demonstrations in matters of philosophy, not to agitate questions which they were not competent to decide."† Again; "The laws which regulate the academical philosophy are nothing but the rules and suggestions of common sense. They are limited to self-evident truths, and reject mere opinion or resemblance. If they say occasionally

\* The following is a list of his writings on philosophy: "Lettre par un Académicien," Paris, 1675; "Réponse pour la Critique," 1679; "Dissertation, contenant l'Apologie des Académiciens," 1687; "Dialogue entre Empiriasstre et Philalète;" "Dissertation sur la Recherche de la Vérité, ou sur la Logique des Académiciens," 1673.

† Apologie des Académiciens, part 1.

that all things are incomprehensible, they only apply this language to an understanding of the abstract nature of external things around us. When they affirm that the senses are not the sources of knowledge and truth, they only by this declaration reduce the impressions made by the senses to what they are in reality, simple phenomena. When they declare that words do not furnish ideas, they at once confer a real dignity both upon the mind and language. If the Academic philosophy suspends our assent to unknown matters, it guards us at the same time from an innumerable host of errors. It makes us acquainted with truths of incalculable value and interest. It teaches the existence of our own inward principle of thought; its unity, its spirituality, its immortality, the existence of a Deity, the unity of His person, His power over the course of nature, His providence, the liberty with which he has endowed His intelligent and accountable creatures. All these the Academicians uphold. In fact, all these principles they have themselves derived from a divine faith. They stopped at the vestibule of philosophy, rather than penetrated into the temple.”\*

Foucher reproaches Descartes with having originally based his philosophy upon Academic principles, and then abandoned this position to throw himself upon the *objective* nature of mind. In that axiom of Descartes' system, wherein he affirms *that we ought to attribute to all things whatever can be*

\* Apologie des Académiciens, part 4.

clearly comprehended or contained in the ideas we have of them, Foucher declares is embodied all that is most reprehensible and dangerous in that great philosopher's method. It is, when seriously and carefully examined, absurd and untenable in the highest degree.\*

The Abbé Foucher maintains that all our ideas are merely *states of the mind*; and we cannot know them in any other character. His arguments on this subject are very clearly and forcibly stated.†

The author disputes the existence of *necessary truths* in physics and morals, but admits them in reference to mathematics, and the existence of a Deity.‡

#### P. MERSENNE.

This writer on the mind was an intimate friend and correspondent of Descartes, and obtained some

\* “Nous ne sommes pas certains que les choses ne contiennent rien qui ne soit enfermé dans les idées que nous en avons; première observation que les Cartésiens n'osent pas même nier. Il en est une seconde qu'ils ne peuvent contester davantage; c'est qu'il y a dans toutes nos idées, les plus simples même, au moins quelque chose qui nous appartient et qui vient de nous, puisqu'elles se modifient suivant nos propres dispositions; elles dépendent encore des milieux et des circonstances.” (*Réponse pour la Critique*, p. 46.)

† See Note M at the end of the Volume.

‡ “Les vérités mathématiques ne sont que de pures suppositions, qui ne nous instruisent pas de ce qu'il y a de réel hors de nous; ce qu'elles ont d'immuable dépend des abstractions que notre esprit fait à sa discrétion; il est donc l'auteur de ce qu'il y a de fixe dans ces vérités.” (*Réponse pour la Critique*, p. 24.)

reputation during the early stages of the promulgation of Cartesianism. Mersenne wrote and published his work, entitled "La Vérité des Sciences contre les Sceptiques," in 1625, before the appearance of Descartes' method. Mersenne was a man of great shrewdness, but his writings display glaring and palpable contradictions. He praises Aristotle as the father of true philosophy, yet he censures and condemns him severely. He praises Bacon, then criticises him with undue severity. Mersenne discusses at considerable length the nature of mathematical evidence; and concludes by maintaining, that mental philosophy, jurisprudence, and all the arts and sciences, should be taught and illustrated through the aid of mathematics.\*

Mersenne holds the opinion throughout the whole of his work, that the mind itself is the real and effective source of all its powers and perceptions of abstract truth.†

\* La Vérité des Sciences, liv. 1<sup>r</sup>, Chaps. 8. 9. 10. 13. 14.

† "L'entendement supplée aux manquements des sens extérieurs et même intérieurs, par une lumière spirituelle et universelle qu'il a de sa propre nature, dès le moment de sa création; cette lumière naturelle est perfectionnée et mise en acte par le moyen de la méditation, de l'étude, de l'expérience, et des sciences." (p. 193.)

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## BAXTER AND LORD STAIR.



## ANDREW BAXTER.

THIS author was born at Aberdeen in 1687, and is known by his "Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul."

The metaphysical opinions embodied in this treatise, may be arranged under three heads; namely, first, the author's arguments against the sceptical notion of the non-existence of matter; secondly, his opinions on the nature of the divine agency, in the material world; and thirdly, his arguments for the immateriality of the human soul, from a survey of the Copernican theory of the universe.

His mode of proving the existence of external things contains many curious and ingenious observations and arguments. He shows the absurdity implied in the very enunciation of the sceptical proposition; and then goes on to prove, from the testimony of consciousness, that we possess the

highest degree of evidence for the existence of external things.

Mr. Baxter maintains that the Deity is the *immediate* agent in producing *material* phenomena; but in the *moral world* the case is different. "The Deity," he says, "is not only at the head of nature, but in every part of it. A chain of material causes betwixt the Deity and the effect produced, and much more a series of them, is such a supposition as would conceal the Deity from the knowledge of mortals for ever. We might search for matter above matter, till we were lost in a labyrinth out of which no philosopher ever yet found his way. This way of bringing in second causes is borrowed from the government of the moral world, where free agents act a part; but it is very improperly applied to the material universe, where matter and motion only (or mechanism as it is called) come in competition with the Deity."\*

The train of thought, from the consideration of the planetary system, to strengthen the arguments for the immortality of the soul, is a very natural one to suggest itself to reflective minds, and has often, since Baxter's time, been used, both by philosophers and divines. All the laws connected with this beautiful system, when considered in a certain point of view, are calculated to inspire a fervent belief that we are destined to survive our present temporal state of existence.

Baxter ascribes all the imperfections of the

\* Appendix to the first part of *Inquiry*, pp. 109. 110.



human soul to its mechanical connexion with the body, and on this supposition attempts to show that the mistakes and mental delusions which arise from dreaming, spectral illusions, drunkenness, &c. are derivable from this source. In his "Essay on Dreaming," he affirms that the phenomena arising from this state of the mind, cannot be referred to the soul itself, to chance, or to any kind of mechanism; but that they are the effect of "living beings existing separate from matter; that they act in that state; that they act upon the matters of our bodies, and prompt our sleeping visions."

In his various illustrations of this opinion, we find many observations which seem to give some countenance to metaphysical principles of a very different complexion from those of his own. The disciples of Hartley, and the modern phrenologists, might claim him as an authority for their respective dogmas. Baxter says, "If a man, under an indisposition of body, from what cause soever it may arise, should see what other people about him do not see, and cannot see, if the object seen is such as cannot be produced without a spontaneous cause; if he sees it with fright and reluctance, and if it gives him uneasiness and pain, so that the soul itself cannot be this cause; provided, I say, he sees so, and such, it follows from the reasoning above that a *living intelligent cause* as certainly tampers with his organ then, and makes impressions upon it, and maintains them there, notwithstanding the action of external objects upon it at the same time, as if the same thing happened to him in his sleep

only. If the thing seen be of that kind, and hath all the conditions requisite to infer the conclusion concerning a vision seen in sleep, the circumstance of being awake can make no alteration, nor change the necessity of the reasons in the former case.” “It requires but a greater degree of the same power to make *delusory impressions upon the sensory*, while real external objects are making *true impressions* upon it, than it would require to make the same impressions while no other impression from external objects is made upon it at the same time. If one is made to see in his sleep a man pursuing him with a drawn sword, there are certain *proper vibrations excited in the optic nerves*, or such impressions made upon that part of the brain upon which the optic nerves act, as if these vibrations were excited in them; and if the same vibrations are more powerfully excited in the optic nerves while the eyes are open, than those excited by external objects then acting, the man pursuing with the drawn sword will still appear, even though the eyes are open. And thus by easy steps we see *that dreaming may degenerate into possession*; and that the cause and nature of both is the same, differing in degree, for dreaming is but *possession in sleep*.” “What is said with respect to the objects of sight is easily applicable to those of *hearing*.” “The more pregnant instances, where people are subjected to illusions of the fancy, and such things as disorder their imaginations, generally happen after the brain hath been discomposed with *anger, fear, disappointment*, or other violent passions.”

## LORD STAIR.

I am sorry I have not been fortunate enough to fall in with the publication of his lordship, relative to philosophical topics. I must, therefore, avail myself of the short account given of him by the late Professor Stewart.

“Lord Stair’s ‘*Physiologia Nova Experimentalis*,’ (published at Leyden in 1686) is also worthy of notice in the literary history of Scotland. Although it bears few marks of the eminent talents which distinguished the author, both as a lawyer and as a statesman, it discovers a very extensive acquaintance with the metaphysical as well as with the physical doctrines which were chiefly in vogue at that period; more particularly with the leading doctrines of Gassendi, Descartes, and Malebranche. Many acute, and some important strictures, are made on the errors of all the three, and at the same time complete justice is done to their merits; the writer everywhere manifesting an independence of opinion and a spirit of free inquiry, very uncommon among the philosophers of the seventeenth century. The work is dedicated to the Royal Society of London, of the utility of which institution, in promoting experimental knowledge, he appears to have been fully aware.”

## CHAPTER XXVII.



## GODFREY WILLIAM LEIBNITZ.

LEIBNITZ was one of the most subtile and distinguished metaphysicians of whom the whole continent of Europe can boast. He was, in reality, the founder of a numerous and influential sect of philosophers, who subsequently flourished in Germany, Holland, France, and Italy; and who have, by their able and learned expositions and commentaries on their master's works, given a tone to mental philosophy, in all these respective nations, which is marked and distinguishable, even at the present hour.

Leibnitz was a profound and original thinker. He was ambitious of fame, and his talents and acquirements were every way commensurate with his thirst for distinction. There was no question too comprehensive for his intellect, nor any which had been discussed by others, to which he could not add many original and valuable remarks. He was familiar with the whole range of ancient and mo-

dern speculation ; and his philosophy is an embodiment of eclecticism, on the most liberal and extensive scale. We find him in intimate communion with Plato and Aristotle, as well as with Democritus and Pythagoras. Plotinus, and Proclus, and the Alexandrian philosophers, were his constant companions when he soared into the higher regions of thought and being, and developed his lofty views of the Creator of the universe and of the soul of man. He revolted from everything which had the most distant alliance with materialism. Though he deals with the laws of matter and motion, yet he carefully avoids, in the construction of his systems, the trammels of mechanism ; and when he sees them likely to drive him to a corner, he rushes through the maze, and takes his stand again upon purely spiritual grounds. For the Scholastic philosophy he entertained a profound reverence ; and his soul sympathised ardently with all those lofty spirits which figure in the history of speculative philosophy soon after its revival in Italy under the fostering care of the Medici. With the most eminent men of his own times he kept up a constant literary correspondence, which is invariably characterized by that ardent love of truth, that devotedness to true knowledge, and that due appreciation of the philosophical labours of others, which formed the mains-prings of his life, and which will hand down his name to posterity with honour and renown.

On the general and preliminary question respecting the origin of our knowledge, Leibnitz is

commonly considered to coincide, to a very considerable extent, with the leading doctrines of Mr. Locke. The German philosopher manifests, however, a decided leaning to the ancient notions of the Platonists, that the ideas of certain things belong to the mind alone, as part of its nature or essence. "The seeds of our knowledge," says he, "or in other words, our ideas, and the eternal truths which are derived from them, are contained in the mind itself; nor is this wonderful, seeing that we know, through the medium of our own consciousness, that we recognise within us the ideas of *existence*, of *unity*, of *substance*, of *action*, and other notions of a similar kind."

The metaphysical theories and speculations of Leibnitz may, for the sake of brevity and arrangement, be classed under four heads; namely, his *Pre-established Harmony*, his *System of Monads*, the scheme of *Philosophical Necessity*, and his *Theory of Optimism*. On each of these topics we shall make a few general observations, and then glance at some detached speculations on mental philosophy, which are scattered throughout the body of his works.

The principles on which the "pre-established harmony" rests, may be briefly stated to be the following:—The author maintains that the soul does not in reality operate on the body, nor the body on the soul; but that each has its separate and independent laws, modes of action, and operation. The soul, by means of its perceptions and volitions, gives rise to one class of phenomena; and body, through the

instrumentality of its physical properties to another class. The perceptions and volitions of the mind are followed immediately by corresponding motions in the body; not, it must be kept in remembrance, by means of any necessary connection between the two, but solely from the very nice and delicate mechanism of our bodily structure. The impressions usually made upon the mind, through the influence of external objects upon our organs of sensation, have really no effect upon us; but nevertheless the suitable ideas arise in it, at the very precise and individual moment of time, in consequence of causes of a very different nature from those of the bodily impressions.

In order to make this matter as clear as possible, we shall quote the Author's own words: "I cannot help," says he, "coming into this notion, that God created the *soul* in such a manner at first that it should *represent* within itself all the simultaneous changes of the body; and that He has made the body also in such a manner, as that it must of itself do what the soul wills; so that the laws which make the thoughts of the soul follow each other in regular succession, *must* produce *images* which shall be co-incident with the impressions made by external objects upon our organs of sense; while the laws by which the motions of body follow each other are likewise so coincident with the thoughts of the soul, as to give to our *volitions and actions* the very same appearance, as if the latter were really the natural and necessary consequence of the former."\*

\* Œuvres, vol. 1, p. 163.

Again, Leibnitz remarks ; “ Suppose that an intelligent and powerful being, who knew beforehand every particular thing that I could order my footman to do to-morrow, should make a machine to resemble my footman exactly, and punctually to perform all day whatever I directed. On this supposition would not *my will* in issuing all the details of my orders, remain, in every respect, in the same circumstances as before ? And would not my *machine-footman*, in performing his different movements, have the appearance of acting only in obedience to my commands ?”

These statements are made with a view of establishing the position, *that the mind and the body act and re-act upon each other without there being any real connexion between them.* The supposed *machine-footman* has no real connexion with my mind which gives him orders how to act. In the same manner the impressions made on our organs of sense by external things, possess no real connexion with the corresponding thoughts in the mind ; but the whole process of cause and effect, in these matters, is arranged by a system of fixed and immutable harmony, pre-established between these different operations by the Deity himself.

The system of Universal Harmony was considered by Leibnitz as a demonstrative proof of the existence of a Divine mind. He thought that the movements of the soul, the conceptions we have of external objects, and that order which we recognise in every thing we behold, were incontestable argu-



ments in favour of the philosophical certainty of this great and important truth.\*

The same difficulty which Malebranche perceived in Descartes' system, gave rise, without the shadow of a doubt, to this theory of Pre-established Harmony. The principle of *consciousness*, which is the corner-stone of Cartesianism, was found by Leibnitz an unproductive and unmanageable thing. The grand object he wished to know was, how mind acts upon body, and body upon mind; but the simple *Cogito, ergo sum*, threw no light on the subject. Some theory or other seemed, therefore, requisite to account for the phenomena of mental existence. Malebranche took one route, and Leibnitz another. They both, however, agreed in one point, that the connexion between body and mind was not real, but only apparent. Their subsequent speculations were widely different. In his "Occasional Causes," Malebranche affirmed, that this intercourse between the corporeal and mental states was maintained and carried on by the constant and immediate agency of the Almighty. Without this efficient and incessant action, the mind and body could not influence one another. The Pre-established Harmony is a different thing from this. Both, it is true, refer the agency to the Deity; but Leibnitz confines and limits the Divine power to the creation and adjustment of our bodies and souls to each other; and then their mutual action, in every

\* This argument is fully developed in the "Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain," page 407. Raspe's Edition, Amsterdam and Leipsic, 1765.

period of their existence, is supported and maintained by the influence of necessary and determined laws, which are impressed upon both at the moment of their creation. There is, according to this view of the matter, more *mechanism* in Leibnitz's scheme, than in that of Malebranche; and so far as this goes, the former theory is more objectionable, religiously considered, and more unphilosophical in its spirit, than the latter. The following observations from Professor Stewart, on the point under consideration, are sound and judicious. "Of these two opposite hypotheses," says he, "that of Leibnitz is by far the more unphilosophical and untenable. The chief objection to the doctrine of *Occasional Causes*, is, that it presumes to decide upon a question of which human reason is altogether incompetent to judge,—our ignorance of the mode in which matter acts upon mind, or mind upon matter; furnishing not the shadow of a proof that the one may not act directly and immediately on the other, in some way incomprehensible by our faculties. But the doctrine of *Pre-established Harmony*, besides being equally liable to this objection, labours under the additional disadvantage of involving a perplexed and totally inconsistent conception of the nature of mechanism; an inconsistency, by the way, with which all those philosophers are justly chargeable, who imagine that, by likening the universe to a machine, they get rid of the necessity of admitting the constant agency of powers essentially different from the known qualities of matter. The word mechanism properly expresses

a combination of natural powers to produce a certain effect. When such a combination is successful, a machine once set a-going will sometimes continue to perform its office for a considerable time, without requiring the interposition of the artist. And hence we are led to conclude, that the case may perhaps be similar, with respect to the universe, when once put in motion by the Deity. This idea of Leibnitz is carried so far as to exclude the supposition of any subsequent agency in the first contriver and mover, except in the case of a miracle. But the falseness of the analogy appears from this, that the moving force in every machine is some *natural power*, such as gravity or electricity; and, consequently, the very idea of mechanism assumes the existence of these active powers, of which it is the professed object of a mechanical theory of the universe to give an explanation.”\*

What Leibnitz considers as a *monad* of matter, is somewhat difficult to comprehend. It is made at one time something resembling an *atom*, but then it differs widely from the notion we attach to this word in ordinary discourse, or even in philosophical language; for the *monad* contains, within itself, a principle of vitality and life. It is, in the fullest extent of the term, a living principle. The following are some attempts to furnish the reader with his ideas on these ultimate principles of material existences. The translations are taken from scattered remarks throughout the whole body of his numerous works.

\* Dissertation.

“A substance is a thing susceptible of action or motion. A simple substance is that which has no individual parts. A compound substance is an aggregate of simple substances, or what we term *monads*.

“Compounded substances or bodies are multitudes. Simple substances, lives, souls, spirits, are units. (*Les substances simples, les vies, les âmes, les esprits, sont des unités.*) Such simple substances must exist everywhere; for without these simple substances there could be no compound ones. All nature is, therefore, full of life.

“*Monads* are not atoms of *matter*, but atoms of *substance*; real units, which are the first or rudimentary principles in the composition of all things, and the last elements in the analysis of substances; of which principles or elements, what we call *bodies* are only the phenomena.

“A *monad* is not a *material* but a *formal* atom, because it is impossible for a thing to be at once material, and possessed of a real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to revive the obsolete doctrine of *substantial forms* (the essence of which resides in *force*) separating it, however, from the various abuses to which it is liable.

“Every *monad* is a living mirror, representing the universe, according to its particular point of view, and subject to as regular laws as the universe itself.

“Every *monad*, with a particular body, makes a living substance.

“The knowledge of every *soul* extends to infinity

and to all things ; but this knowledge is confused. As a person walking on the margin of the sea, and, listening to its roar, hears the noise of each individual wave of which the whole noise is made up, but without being able to distinguish one sound from another ; in like manner, our confused perceptions are the result of the impressions made upon us by the whole universe. The case is precisely the same with each *monad*.

“As for the *reasonable* soul or mind (*l'esprit*) there is something in it more than in the *monads*, or even than in those souls which are simple. It is not only a mirror of the universe of created things, but an image of the Deity. Such minds are capable of reflected acts, and of conceiving what is meant by the words, *I, substance, monad, soul, mind* ; in a word, of conceiving *things and truths* unconnected with matter ; and it is this which renders us capable of science and of demonstrative reasoning.

“What becomes of these *souls, or forms*, on the death of the animal ? There is no alternative, that not only the soul is preserved, but that the *animal itself with its organical machine continues to exist*, although the destruction of its grosser parts has reduced it to a smallness, as invisible to our limited vision, as it was before the moment of conception. Thus we conclude that neither animals nor souls perish at death ; nor is there any such thing as *death*, if that word be understood with rigorous and metaphysical accuracy. The soul never quits completely the body, with which it is united ; nor

does it pass from one body into another with which it had no connection before; a *metamorphosis* takes place, but no *metempsychosis*.”\*

We shall now make a few observations on the third class of mental speculations, which characterise the labours of Leibnitz. This relates to the doctrine of *philosophical necessity*; a doctrine which has exercised, on very important branches of human knowledge, a great influence over the minds of speculative men, both on the Continent and in Great Britain, for the last hundred and fifty years. By the eloquence of his writings, and the authority of his name, he made this doctrine very popular amongst a variety of philosophical sects in Germany, France, and the Low Countries; and, in fact, stood in the same relation in reference to the promulgation of this dogma in these countries that Anthony Collins did in respect to its promulgation in England. It has often been laid to the charge of Leibnitz that he has shown himself guilty of great inconsistency in his zealous advocacy of the principle of necessary connection; inasmuch as it stood in direct opposition to the fundamental maxim on which his whole philosophical system was reared, namely, *the spirituality of the human soul, or mind of man*. And this charge is not, by any means, unfounded; for such is the constitution of our minds, that we cannot reconcile the workings of a necessary principle of action with the doctrine of

\* See *Monadologie*, pp. 1, 8, 9, 36, 63, 66, 70, 78, 82; *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce*, pp. 3, 4; *Nouveau Système de la Nature*, pp. 15, 17, 19; *Le Manuel de MM. Salius et Scorbiae*.

the complete and absolute immateriality of the thinking part of man. The two ideas are perfectly incongruous and mutually repulsive.

There can be little doubt but the two questions, namely, *the sufficient reason* and *the law of continuity*, were broached by Leibnitz, for the sole purpose of acting as auxiliaries in the illustration and exposition of this doctrine of necessity. And it must be owned they were well fitted to answer the contemplated end.

In Leibnitz's controversy with Dr. Clarke, on this doctrine of necessary connection, we find an account of this principle of *sufficient reason*. The former says, "The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of *contradiction* or *identity*; that is, that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. But in order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another principle is requisite (as I have observed in my *Theodicæa*), I mean the principle of *sufficient reason*; or, in other words, *that nothing happens without a reason why it should not be so* rather than otherwise. And, accordingly, Archimedes was obliged, in his book "*De Æquilibrio*," to take for granted, that if there be a balance in which every thing is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at rest. It is because no *reason* can be given why one side should weigh down rather than the other. Now, by this simple principle of the *sufficient reason* may be demonstrated the being of a God, and all the other parts of metaphysics or natural theology;

and even, in some measure, those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, such as the dynamical principles, or the principles of forces."

The *law of continuity*, as understood and explained by Leibnitz, is of a very subtile and abstract nature; he assumed that all changes in bodies of every kind, were produced by insensible gradations; so that no body could pass from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, without passing through all the intermediate stages of velocity. This law was termed the *law of continuity*, and he applied it in all his physical, metaphysical, and theological speculations. He maintains that the existenee of perfectly hard bodies, such as we conceive *atoms* to be, is impossible, under the influence of this *law of continuity*; because if two of these atoms were to meet in opposite directions, with equal forces, they would both necessarily stop at once.

These two doctrines, *sufficient reason* and the *law of continuity*, were brought to bear on all vulnerable and controverted points of Leibnitz's system of mental philosophy. The former principle led, by an easy route, to the conclusion that the human mind must be under the influence of the most absolute necessity; and that this necessary principle must also be applied to the conduct of the Deity himself, in all his operations. The *law of continuity*, as far as it was susceptible, was employed to strengthen and confirm the same conclusion. All the phenomena of nature, both mental and physical, appeared in his eyes as one whole, unbroken, concatenated chain of being. This no-



tion, which seemed always a predominating one in his mind, led him to take such delight in soaring into the regions of conjecture and fancy. In his "Theodicæa" he says, "May there not exist an immense space beyond the region of the stars? And may not this empyreal heaven be filled with happiness and glory? It may be conceived to resemble an ocean of bliss, or an assemblage of mighty rivers, on the banks of which all those created beings who are destined for glory shall finish their course, by the complete perfection of their respective natures."

On the doctrine of Optimism advocated by Leibnitz, little needs here be said. Every man is more or less an Optimist; and the doctrine assumes many different forms, and derives countenance and support from almost every philosophical view which we can take of the phenomena of the universe. The *à posteriori* arguments for a Deity; the doctrine of final causes; the theory of a general and particular providence; are all only modifications of Optimism, and are grounded on the same kind of arguments, and illustrated by the same class of observations and facts. The peculiar constitution of the physical and moral worlds, and the peculiar mode in which the intellect of man views every thing around him, necessarily suggest such trains of thought as make him an Optimist, in every possible situation in life. The wise and the ignorant, the rich and the poor, the religious and the profane, are alike disposed, when placed in certain situations, to lend a willing ear to the

soothing whispers of those who think that all things are for the best. We trace these feelings of contentment and resignation with the circumstances of our lot, and the reasons on which they are commonly grounded, from the very earliest records of our race. Some of the wisest and best of men, both among ancient and modern philosophers, have maintained the leading opinions on which the theory of Optimism is raised.

There is not much that is positively new in Leibnitz's view of this theory; but the whole of his illustrations of it are in strictly good keeping with the general principles and spirit of his philosophy. He was a passionate admirer of Plato, and like him placed all beings and essences in the *Divine intelligence*. The Deity is possessed of infinite wisdom, and, therefore, every thing which is created by an act of His will, must be the very best, on the whole, which can possibly be made. The present world is, in the constituted order of things, the very best world that could be made. It may seem to us defective; but it is solely because we cannot see all the relationships and dependencies connected with it, in reference to other created things. This is the foundation of all our notions of imperfection and defectiveness, in the constitution and government of the universe.\*

On the nature of Truth generally, Leibnitz has many valuable remarks. Matters of fact or obser-

\* See *Théodicée*; De la Bonté de Dieu, pp. 8. 19. 194. 221. 226. 228. De la Cause de Dieu, pp. 13. 14. 16. 46. 47.; *Monadologie*, pp. 43. 47.

vation, he maintains, must be exclusively referred to internal consciousness. We have no other evidence for their certainty. He does not, however, view this consciousness merely as a simple and passive thing, as we may infer Descartes did, in many of his speculations; but we are, according to Leibnitz, to think of it in connexion with our personal identity as living and intelligent creatures. The act or state of consciousness is nothing when viewed by itself; it means nothing; but when considered in relation to the unity of our whole nature, then it becomes a fruitful and living principle. He tells us plainly, that the truths or matters of fact or observation, are, contemplated in themselves, isolated and sterile things; that experience alone can never furnish the mind with general or absolute truths; nor entitle us to draw any conclusions from present feelings or impressions, to future consequences. Another and a higher mental power is requisite to accomplish this purpose. We are to look to that connexion which is established by the Almighty between our *reason*, and matters or things which affect our senses, for the real foundation of all those general and important truths which constitute wisdom and science. There is a necessary alliance between this lofty power of the intellect, and those common and fleeting perceptions which we experience from our sensational faculties.”\*

A creature which could only attend to his sensations and feelings would be levelled to the animal

\* Conform. Fidei cum Rat. § 1. 2. 24. Théodicée, § 9. 37. Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, pp. 317. 328. 395. 444.

creation. It is the grand prerogative of man to consolidate, and to arrange the facts of experience ; to draw conclusions from them for his future movements, and to treasure them up for the purpose of transmission to his posterity. Experience by itself is only “ the instinct of ignorance.”\*

There is a striking similarity between some portions of Leibnitz’s philosophy, and that of Malebranche, particularly as to the idea of seeing every thing in God. Leibnitz distinctly says, that the Deity is the sole object immediately external to our souls, exercising upon them a constant and direct action.† The same doctrine is laid down when the author is discussing the nature of necessary truths. He says, “ Les Vérités nécessaires constituent donc la métaphysique, la science des élus, c’est-à-dire la philosophie première. Elles sont essentiellement *conditionnelles*, soit que la condition soit avouée, comme dans les propositions *hypothétiques*, soit qu’elle soit cachée, comme dans les propositions caté-

\* “ Les hommes agissent à l’instar des bêtes, lorsque les consécutives de leurs perceptions ne dépendent que du principe de la mémoire, semblables alors aux médecins empiriques qui n’ont qu’une simple pratique sans théorie ; et dans le vrai, nous ne sommes que des empiriques dans les trois quarts de nos actions. Par exemple, si nous attendons demain le lever du soleil, notre unique fondement c’est que le soleil s’est levé constamment tous les jours : il n’y a que les astronomes qui le prévoient par le raisonnement.” (Princip. Phil. § 23.) See also “ Dissert. De Conformâ. Fidei cum Ratione,” § 68 ; “ Comment. de Animâ Brutorum ;” Œuvres, tom. 2me, p. 233. Œuvres philosophiques, tom. 6. p. 422.

† See on this point, Annotations, etc., tom. 1, des Œuvres, § 5 ; Théodicée, § 20. 184. 185. 186. 189. ; Examens des principes de Malebranche, tom. 2. des Œuvres, p. 211 ; Lettre à Rémond de Montmort. ibid, p. 217 ; Meditat. de Cognit. ibid. tom. 2, p. 17 ; Princip. Philos. §. 43. 44. 47. ; Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain, p. 414.

goriques. Elles résident en Dieu même ; c'est dans l'esprit suprême et universel qu'elles trouvent leur réalité, comme l'ont dit Platon et St. Augustin ; elles composent ce monde intellectuel qui nous est commun avec la Divinité ; Dieu lui-même les institue, mais non par un acte de sa volonté."

The best metaphysical work of Leibnitz, is his "Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain." All his peculiar opinions on the nature of mind and its operations, may be found here. It is written much upon the same plan as Mr. Locke's "Essay," only Leibnitz employs the form of dialogue. He tells us, in the Preface, that before he had seen Locke's treatise, he had amassed nearly all the materials for the "Essais ;" but it is quite apparent, by the arrangement of the work, that he must have derived some useful hints from the celebrated work of our countryman. Barring here and there some peculiar opinions, common to both authors, the two "Essays" have a very marked resemblance, both in title and substance, to each other.

It is in this work that Leibnitz pays a cheerful tribute of praise to Mr. Locke's "Essay," of which he had previously spoken in terms by no means flattering.\* In the Preface to the "Nouveaux Essais," we find the German philosopher thus express-

\* See Stewart's "Dissertation," in which he says that Leibnitz expressed himself contemptuously respecting the Englishman's production. Mr. Stewart was not aware of the existence of the "Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain," when he penned this remark ; and this is the reason why the laudatory observations of Leibnitz were not referred to by the Professor.

ing himself:—"The 'Essay concerning the Human Understanding,' written by a famous Englishman, is one of the most esteemed productions of our time. I have determined to make some observations on it.....I shall thus obtain a favourable introduction for my remarks by placing them in such respectable company.....I must confess, I often am of a different opinion; but so far from feeling any desire to detract from the merits of this distinguished writer, I am conscious of doing him an act of justice in making known the reasons why I differ from him, and why I am desirous to give a check to his authority, when I think it is likely to prevail over reason on some important subjects. In fact, although the writer of the 'Essay,' says a thousand things to which I can readily give my assent, yet our systems differ considerably. His has a closer relationship to that of Aristotle; mine to that of Plato."

Leibnitz's philosophy, as a whole, was grand and aspiring. He attempted to solve all the great problems connected with the history of speculative science from its earliest dawn even to his own day. We have the origin of knowledge, the origin and government of the universe, the connexion of mind with body and body with mind, the origin of evil, the sovereign good, the doctrine of necessary connexion; and many other topics, all discussed in a way and manner peculiarly his own. There was nothing too vast for his grasp, nor too intricate for his subtlety. Some distinguished critics have thought that if he had attempted less, he would have accomplished

more. Mr. Gibbon says, "Even the powers of Leibnitz were dissipated by the multiplicity of his pursuits. He attempted more than he could finish ; he designed more than he could execute ; his imagination was too easily satisfied with a bold and rapid glance on the subject which he was impatient to leave ; and he may be compared to those heroes whose empire has been lost in the ambition of universal conquest."

We shall just add the words of a famous French writer on the same subject ; "Leibnitz was bolder than Descartes, more subtile than Bayle, less profound than Newton, and less sagacious than Locke ; but the only one amongst these illustrious names who appears to have embraced the dominion of reason in all its extent, and to have contributed most to that philosophical spirit, which now constitutes the glory of our age."\*

\* \* See L'Eloge de Leibnitz par Fontenelle ; La vie de Leibnitz, par le Chevalier de Jaucourt, Leipsic, 1740 ; The "Eloge " of Leibnitz, by Köstner, Altenburg, 1769 ; The Life of Leibnitz, by Hisman, Munster, 1783 ; and the article Leibnitz, in the Biographie Universelle.

\* Baily, Eloge de Leibnitz.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

HIRNHAIM, ROELL, FROMONDUS, AND WINSPERSSE.



## HIRNHAIM.

JEROME Hirnhaim, of Prague, was a metaphysical writer of considerable power and acuteness. He published his work, "De la Certitude des Connaissances Humaines," at Paris, in 1671. It was well received, and brought the author into general notice among the philosophers of the day.

The principal aim of the Author was, to correct as far as it was possible the sceptical spirit which had been infused into the philosophic mind of France by the writings of Montaigne. Hirnhaim completely exonerates the accomplished Essayist from any sinister intention in his writings; but still he maintains that the pernicious consequences of his sceptical turn of mind were not the less obvious and destructive, though allowed the full benefit of purity of motive and intention.



Hirnhaim entrenched himself within the pale of the Peripatetic philosophy. He thought it the best antidote against wild and licentious theories. It was conservative in its tendency, and always demanded a fair portion of argument and demonstration from its disciples; and these were powerful checks against that undefined scepticism which revels in universal indecision and doubt.

The fundamental principles of human belief were warmly advocated by Hirnhaim. He made them the ground work of all his speculations. Man has a positive knowledge of his own existence; he has intuitive perceptions of right and wrong, and fixed and invariable principles of action for the effective discharge of all the duties of life. These form essential parts of his very nature and being.

Hirnhaim thinks the belief or faith men implicitly, and upon the spur of the moment, place on certain things, is a very curious phenomenon, mentally considered.\*

The historian Tennemann observes, that Hirnhaim displayed considerable ability in his declamations against the inordinate vanity and obscurity of philosophers; and grounded his observations chiefly upon the illusory nature of all knowledge, and that there was no deduction of human reason

\* "Il y a une *foi humaine* infaillible, celle qui s'attache aux faits, qui repose sur les témoignages, qui se justifie par l'assemblage et l'harmonie des motifs et des arguments; c'est la connaissance historique. . . Croire quelque chose, ou avoir foi pour quelque chose, c'est être persuadé que quelque chose est, sur le témoignage que nous en rend quelque personne à l'autorité de laquelle nous soumettons notre jugement et donnons notre confiance."—(De la Certitude des Connaissances Humaines, chap. 7.)

that might not be set aside by Divine revelation. The sacred writings, grace, and an inward spiritual light, were the only sure foundations of human intelligence or wisdom.\*

#### HERMANN ALEXANDER ROELL.

This author was a distinguished Protestant divine, and Professor of theology at Daelberg, in Westphalia. The metaphysical work by which he is known as a philosopher, is entitled “*Institutiones Philosophicæ de Theologia Naturali duæ, de Ideis Innatis una,*” and was published at Frankfort, in 1662.

The author defends the theory of Descartes, and attempts to show that his views are not only philosophically sound, but harmonize with the leading doctrines of Christianity. The work is very interesting, and will amply repay a careful perusal.†

#### LIBERTUS FROMNDUS.

This writer was an opponent of the Cartesian philosophy. His work is entitled, “*Philosophia Christiana de Anima,*” and made its appearance at Louvain, in 1649. This treatise is a kind of running commentary on all the ancient systems of philosophy, those maintained by the Fathers of the Church and the Scholastic divines, and the

\* Tennemann's Grundriss, sec. 342.

† See particularly from p. 59 to 119.

opinions promulgated by modern speculators on mental topics. The most readable portion of the work is that wherein the author treats of our organs of sense, and how a knowledge of sensible objects is conveyed to the mind.\*

## VAN WINSPERSSE.

This Dutch author's metaphysical work is denominated, "Institutiones Metaphysicæ in Usum Academicum Conscriptæ." It is chiefly designed as an elementary treatise for collegiate purposes. It embraces no particular mental theory, but is written upon the Eclectic principle of taking what the author conceived was best from the speculations of preceding writers. The opinions of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff, predominate, however, throughout the work, and impart to it a somewhat distinctive and sectarian character.

The author proceeds on Ontological principles. He lays down at the commencement the simple elementary notions we possess of being and intelligence. Definitions and rules are stated with great care and minuteness.† The author then enters into an examination of the theories of Descartes and Leibnitz, and rejects the doctrine of innate ideas. He censures Descartes for insisting on the passive nature of the soul, in the formation of ideas; and thinks this destructive of all sound and elevated conceptions of the human understanding.‡

\* See pp. 484. 818.

† Institutiones Metaphy. pp. 13. 14.

‡ Inst. Met. 419, 424.

The author conceives that the simplest theory of human knowledge, the theory which presents the least number of formidable objections, is that which considers perception as representative of things in the mind. Upon no other hypothesis can you satisfactorily account for so many of the phenomena of thought. The author candidly allows, however, that there are difficulties in the way of this theory, and that all the objections of the idealists relative to extension and other qualities of bodies, are of such a nature as not to admit of a complete and satisfactory solution.\*

\* *Institutiones Met.* pp. 408. 409. 945—953.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

BOULAINVILLIERS, LAMY, WITTICH, AND  
NIEUWENTYT.

THE writings of Spinoza created a considerable sensation in most countries of Europe, from their boldness, and the systematic form of their philosophy. Some few applauded, and many condemned them; and considered they were dangerous to religion and morals, and really unsound in philosophy. The three authors above named, followed closely after the appearance of Spinoza's system, and excited considerable notoriety among the learned of the day.

## COUNT DE BOULAINVILLIERS.

Boulainvilliers appeared under false colours. He pretended to *refute* Spinoza, while he was all the time making his doctrines more obvious and fascinating. His work was entitled a "Réfutation de Spinoza," and, under this specious and deceptive appellation, obtained very general circulation, particularly in France.

In this work Boulainvilliers shows considerable talent; and in addition to the principal elements of Spinoza's theory, he added some peculiar view of his own, on the leading topics connected with the systems he *seemingly* wishes to refute. To the questions of *thought* and *extension*, he has added that of *being*; and those who are wishful to consult his reasonings on the subject, we refer to his book.\*

#### LAMY.

This author was a Benedictine, and the work he published against the system of Spinoza, is entitled, "Le Nouvel Athéisme Renversé." It made its appearance at Paris in 1696, and was favourably received by the public.

#### CHRISTOPHER WITTICH.

Wittich was a Dutch author, and took up the Spinozian theory with great zeal. His work is called "Anti-Spinoza," and was published at Amsterdam in 1690.

#### BERNARD NIEUWENTYT.

This author wrote several philosophical Treatises, in the Flemish or Low Dutch language, some of which have been translated both into French and

\* See pp. 7. 14. 18. 23. 26. 27. 29. 33 and 38.

English. He was a very able man, a physician by profession, and a great enemy to the opinions promulgated by Spinoza. On the last subject he published a very elaborate work in quarto, under the title of “The Foundation of Truth, or a Right Manifestation of Wisdom, both as it regards Mind, as well as Physical Things; in Refutation of the Writings of Spinoza on the Mind.”\*

Dr. Nieuwentyt enters into a long discussion on the nature of true philosophy, both ancient and modern; and into the peculiar nature of mathematical evidence. This discussion occupies three parts of the work. In the fourth part the author institutes a formal examination of Spinoza’s system; and in the course of fifteen chapters, sifts it through all its ramifications. As the work is rare, and has not, that I am aware of, been translated into any other language than the one it was originally written in, I shall endeavour to give a condensed sketch of the line of argument which the learned author follows in examining the metaphysical system of his opponent.†

1st. The Doctor draws a comparison between Spinoza’s system, and the system of various other authors; and endeavours to show that the mode of reasoning adopted by the former throughout all his

\* “Gronden van Zekerheid, of De Rechte Betoogwyse der Wiskundigen so in het Denkbeeldige, als in Zakelyke. Ter Wederlegging van Spinozaas Denkbeeldig Samenstel; Bernard Nieuwentyt. Amsterdam, 1720.

† Gronden van Zekerheid, pp. 15—160.

works, is entirely opposite to that which sound philosophy warrants.\*

2. It is maintained by Dr. Nieuwentyt, that though Spinoza has given his system the mathematical form, and displayed it in the imposing garb of definitions, axioms, and corollaries, yet he has not followed the correct mode of reasoning which all other mathematicians have invariably pursued. On the contrary, the whole of Spinoza's views are developed by, and rest upon, purely metaphysical instead of mathematical proof.†

3. The system of Spinoza is arbitrary and fanciful; his definitions are of his own creating; some of them are extravagant and absurd, even upon his own showing; and on the whole, the system is not worked out in that regular connected manner in which a mathematical problem ought to be.‡

4. Spinoza goes upon the supposition that all other systems of philosophy are erroneous except his own; and that they are productive of nothing but falsehood and mischief. His own theory, however, is nothing but a few naked propositions strung together in mathematical form, but entirely devoid of that firm and concatenated stability which real mathematical evidence affords the mind.

5. Dr. Nieuwentyt charges Spinoza with shrouding his system in pure abstractions of the mind, which he takes as the only *criteria* of truth; while he fails to show their logical relationship or con-

\* Gronden van Zekerheid, p. 244. † Ibid. p. 247. ‡ Ibid. p. 250.



gruity. He merely contents himself with declaring that such and such things are true, but offers no satisfactory proof in their support.\*

6. Although Spinoza's fundamental propositions are gratuitous and contradictory, yet he still draws conclusions from them, as if they were invested with the attribute of intuitive evidence. His whole proceeding is contrary to the letter and spirit of every true system of philosophy.†

7. Spinoza discards the truths of experience entirely from his system. Proofs from this source are of no avail. The truth of his positions he supports by self-styled references to his own feelings, but he has not submitted them to the test of real experience in other persons. His whole views of human nature are distorted and twisted to square with a preconceived hypothesis.‡

8. There is a strain of insincerity running through the whole of Spinoza's disquisitions. He is not actuated by a sincere and ardent love of truth. He is dogmatical, rash, and sophistical. There is a sullen doggedness, a contemptuous disregard of what other eminent individuals have written on the same subject, a want of generous sympathy and feeling, an obstinate adherence to crotchety sophisms, conspicuously displayed throughout every section of his writings.§

9. It is impossible for any candid and enlightened mind to acquiesce in the philosophy of Spinoza, because it is, from its purely gratuitous na-

\* Gronden van Zekerheid, p. 259.

† Ibid., pp. 264. 267.

‡ Ibid., p. 274.

§ Ibid., p. 276.

ture, entirely destitute of all those rational investigations and dispassionate modes of philosophizing, which are necessary both for the development of truth and the communicating it to others.\*

10. No one can doubt but that the licentious spirit which the writings of Spinoza have an evident tendency to create and foster, must have been inspired from his own depraved ideas and modes of life. To confound the notions of virtue and vice seems to have been one of his ruling motives of action.

11. In perusing the speculations of Spinoza we see on every side so much sophistry, that we are led to conclude that he must be either a very insincere man, or a very ignorant one.

12. That supposing we were to grant all the leading principles or definitions he lays down to be true, yet he does not work out his results or inferences fairly and legitimately. As a theoretical writer he is miserably deficient. The minds of his readers are puzzled, but never enlightened. †

\* Gronden Van Zekerheid, p. 297.

† Ibid., pp. 338. 357.

## CHAPTER XXX.



JOHN LOCKE.

WE come now to notice the Father of the present modern system of British metaphysical philosophy. Mr. Locke, in the opinion of many, stands in the same relation to mental, as Sir Isaac Newton does to physical, science. The "Essay on the Human Understanding" is unquestionably one of the most wonderful books that ever were written on the subject of which it treats. Whether considered in reference to the comprehensive principles it unfolds, or to the varied illustrations which accompany and adorn their development, it must ever remain a standard work, as long as mental inquiries engage the attention of mankind.

Every thing connected with the production of this famous publication, becomes extremely interesting to all inquisitive minds. Mr. Locke was in his *fifty-eighth* year when it came first from the press; therefore it embodied all the advantages which his riper years and understanding could

confer upon it. His own account of the origin and progress of the work is curious. He says in his Preface; "Five or six friends, meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties which arose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that it should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by entreaty, written by incoherent parcels, and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest." And again, farther on, he adds that, "when he first put pen to paper, he thought all he should have to say on the matter would have been contained in one sheet; but that the farther he went, the larger prospect he had; new discoveries still leading him on, till his book grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in."

The system of Mr. Locke has, for above a century and a half, been discussed at such a great length, and been so closely viewed in almost every possible light, that it would require rare powers of invention indeed, to say any thing new upon it. We shall therefore confine our observations to three distinct points, namely; First, give a brief notice of the general principles of the “Essay on the Human Understanding;” secondly, point out the misconceptions and misapplications of the system amongst Continental speculators; and thirdly, show the fallacies into which some of our own countrymen have fallen, in their critiques on Locke’s speculations.

As a preliminary step, we must make a remark or two upon the use which Mr. Locke makes of the word *Idea*. This word is in almost every sentence of his book, and it becomes of the greatest moment to attend to what he means by it; not only to comprehend his general arguments and statements, but to enter into the nature and spirit of those various controversies which have taken place, both in England and on the Continent, relative to his system generally, and to the use of this term in particular. He tells us that *idea* “is that term which I think seems best to stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*; or *whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking*; and I could not avoid frequently using it.” This is a very concise and clear definition. It displays an anxious care in the writer, that he

may not be misunderstood. And it is a just rule of criticism, that an author should always have the full benefit of the meaning which he attaches to particular words or phrases, when any dispute or misconception arises on the general import of his doctrine. Critics and commentators have no right to give their own interpretation of an author's words, without previously appealing to his definitions. Had a rule of this kind been carefully observed, in reference to Mr. Locke, philosophy would have been spared a good deal of useless and perverse discussion; as we shall abundantly show in other parts of this work.\*

Mr. Locke seems to have been almost prophetic as to the misconceptions and misrepresentations of his meaning of the word *idea*, which have been so long prevalent; and to have been desirous of warning his commentators against error and delusion. We find him giving us this further elucidation of his meaning of the word. "To discover the nature of our *ideas* the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are *ideas* or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in bodies that cause such perceptions in us, that *so we may not think*, (as perhaps usually is done) *that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject*; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our

\* On the meaning of the word *idea*, see Locke's Second and Third Letters to the Bishop of Worcester.

*ideas*, which yet, upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.”\*

These are weighty matters, and worthy of the best attention of all those philosophers who feel an interest in ascertaining the real value and import of Locke’s system. We shall have frequent occasion to advert to these definitions in subsequent stages of our historical progress.

We must also say a word or two here of Locke’s *method* of philosophizing; what was the grand object he had in view, and in what manner he purposed accomplishing it. That object was “to inquire into the *original*, *certainty*, and *extent* of human knowledge.” And his plan for conducting this inquiry was :

“First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, *notions*, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

“Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

“Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith and opinion; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth we have yet no certain knowledge; and we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.”

\* Book 2. Chap. 8.

Here is Locke's *method*; it is strictly psychological; and the first great attempt that had been made upon the same principle.

The first general doctrine discussed in the "Essay," is relative to the existence of *innate ideas*. This topic has been fruitful of discussion, not only in England, but upon the Continent; and even at the present moment there is some doubt as to what Locke really meant by the term innate ideas, and whether there be any such in the human understanding as he conceives them to be. However, it is of importance that we should know what the author has advanced on the subject. We are not in a fit state to give an opinion on the question, till we have first heard what his statements are.

The following passage from Locke is as fully expressive of his views on the subject as any that can be found in his "Essay." "First, it is evident that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths; it seeming to me near a contradiction to say that there are truths imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them,



they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say that a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew; which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then by the same reason all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted; since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it, and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to an improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say,

is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in respect of their original; they must all be innate, or all adventitious; in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words, to be in the understanding, have any propriety, they signify to be understood; so that to be in the understanding and not to be understood, to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not, in the mind or understanding. If, therefore, these two propositions, 'whatsoever is, is,' and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it."\*

The most vulnerable point of Locke's system, is his doctrine of *innate ideas*. The weakness of his arguments, however, appears to me to lie more in his language, than in his proofs themselves. He does not deny that men have a certain *innate*

\* Essay, book 1.

*capacity* to recognise truths of the most abstract form and nature; but he affirms that the mind is not born with these truths, put into the *shape of axioms*. There must be previous sensations experienced before truths of such a nature can be appreciated by the mind. Self-evident propositions—such, e. g. as that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, or that a whole is greater than a part—cannot be known by children or savages. This is quite true; but the observation does not meet the merits of the question. Children or savages may not comprehend these axioms, when put into the formal drapery of logical terms; but all their reasonings, and movements of life, are grounded upon a full and complete recognition of these and similar abstract forms of thought. Experience may precede, but it does not create those general truths. They are part and parcel of the mind itself. We are not born lisping abstract axioms; but they are immediately recognised by every sane mind, the moment that the terms in which they are involved are sufficiently understood. There could be no general or scientific truth unless these elementary principles of thought and reasoning were universally diffused among our race.\*

Now, it is very doubtful that Locke ever for a moment thought of denying the *innate materials of thought* out of which these formal axioms are derived. He says he maintains the *capacity* to know abstract truths, and that this may be consi-

\* See Leibnitz; “Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain,” Book I.

dered, in a certain point of view, as *innate*. This brings the dispute within very narrow limits. I allow, says Locke, that there is in the mind an innate capacity to form and conceive certain universal propositions, but I deny that men are born with these formal axioms, ready framed in their understandings. His opponents reply, we allow these axioms are not clothed in a logical dress in the infant or savage mind, but that these minds contain the rudiments, or germs, or elements, of these axioms, as a part of their spiritual or mental nature. This appears to me the sum or substance of the difference between Mr. Locke and his critics on this part of the question of innate ideas. If there be a real difference, it is one resting solely on the different terms in which both parties express themselves.

In the discussion of this question of innate ideas, Locke has fallen into a great error, relative to the practical utility of general axioms of our knowledge. He says, "These general maxims, (such as 'Whatever is, is,' and 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be') are of great use in disputes, to stop the mouth of wranglers; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forward in its search after knowledge." Again, "As to other less general maxims, they are no more than bare verbal propositions, and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another."

Now these axioms, and many others of a similar nature, are the rudiments of all thought and reasoning; and if they had had no existence, we should

not have been able to enter into or appreciate any arguments whatever. The Author's language on this topic is very unguarded.\*

It would appear that the first part of the "Essay on the Human Understanding," which treats of Innate ideas and Innate principles, was not considered by the author as possessing so much value as the other parts of the work. Though this part has proved the chief topic of controversy, yet there is good reason for supposing that this doctrine about innate ideas and principles was only intended as a sort of introductory address to keep the reader's attention fixed upon the leading proposition, that there were no ideas which did not arise from impressions upon the senses or from reflection. This, however, is only a conjecture. One thing is certain, and gives it a degree of plausibility, that in his abridgment of the "Essay," published in Le Clerc's "Journal," this first part is omitted altogether; and the reason for this he states in the following words:—

"J'ai tâché d'abord de prouver que notre esprit est au commencement ce qu'on appelle une 'tabula rasa;' c'est-à-dire, sans idées et sans connaissance. Mais comme ce n'a été que pour détruire les préjugés de quelques philosophes, j'ai cru que dans ce petit abrégé de mes principes je devais passer toutes les disputes préliminaires qui composent le livre premier."†

\* See Cousin, Histoire de la Phil., Leçon 25.

† Biblio. Universelle, 1688.

On the origin of our knowledge, Mr. Locke maintains that we have two distinct sources from which our ideas are derived; *sensation* and *reflection*. On the former he says, "Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call *sensation*."\*

The second source of our knowledge is thus described by the author. "*The other fountain* from which experience furnishes the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas which it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to *reflect on* and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we

\* Essay, Book 2. Chap. 1.

being conseious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings ideas as distinct, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other *sensation*, so I call this *reflection*; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.\* Again he says, “The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.*”

Perhaps the two following paragraphs may place Locke's doctrine in a still clearer point of view, than the preceding quotations.

“If it be demanded, *when a man begins to have ideas?* I think the true answer is, when he first has any *sensation?* I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with *sensation*; which is such an impression or motion, made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems *first* to employ itself in such operations as we call *perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c.*

\* Works, Vol. 1. p. 78.

“In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, and about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call *ideas of reflection*. These impressions that are made on our senses by objects extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself, (which, when reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation), are, as I have said, the *original of all our knowledge*.”\*

This, then, is the simple and plain exposition of Locke’s metaphysical opinions as to the origin of our ideas. There are two sources of knowledge; one resides in the organs of sensation, and the other in the inward power which the mind itself possesses to reflect upon its own ideas and operations.

Some critics have considered it a difficult matter to determine what the power of reflection consists of, according to Mr. Locke’s views. The analysis of this power is an analysis of other faculties or powers, so that, it is affirmed, we are still as far as ever removed from a knowledge of those particular ideas, which it is the province of this reflection to create. “The mind,” says he, “first employs itself about the impressions made on the senses.”† Still, it is contended, this does not show us how reflected ideas or conceptions arise in the understanding. This general power of reflection is made

\* Works, Vol. 1. pp. 91, 92.

† See Essay, Book 2. Chap. 2.



up of a certain number of faculties, such as *retention, discernment, comparison, composition, and abstraction*. It is the province of these powers; either individually or jointly, to take cognizance of ideas, but they do not create them. From this it has been asserted, that the power of reflection, the second source of our knowledge, is quite inadequate for accomplishing the purpose of showing how general ideas, such as are never referred to sense, derive their origin. The ideas which are commonly supposed to be the offspring of reflection, are Space, Time, Infinity, Causality, Personal Identity, Substance, the ideas of Good and Evil, and the conceptions of a First Cause. For the origin of all these, it is contended the power of reflection, brought forward by Mr. Loekc, is, as used by himself, manifestly and glaringly insufficient.

There certainly does appear, at first sight, to be something plausible in the objections brought against Locke's power of reflection; but I feel firmly convinced, that a careful study of his work, and making all reasonable allowance for his peculiar mode of treating his subject, will be found sufficient to remove every ambiguity as to his meaning. We must on this topic take the whole scope and tenor of his reasoning into consideration; not isolated remarks or detached sentences. Loekc is not an author that can be truthfully interpreted in this way. Now it is quite apparent to every attentive and candid reader, that he speaks of reflection,

not as a *passive* instrument, but an *active* and *creative power*. He speaks of it, in innumerable passages, as combining, arranging, and creating ideas, out of the materials which the senses furnish. M. Cousin has charged Locke with confounding reflection with consciousness. Nothing can be further from the truth than this. The "Essay," from one end to the other, proclaims loudly against this interpretation of his meaning. Three fourths of the whole book is taken up with the detailed operations of this reflective power, and in what way, and to what extent, it is considered by the author as the true origin of the most important parts of human knowledge. As to M. Cousin's objection against Locke's theory, that it does not satisfactorily account for our ideas of *Space*, it amounts to nothing. The French philosopher has entirely misconceived Locke's reasonings on the matter. But more of this in subsequent parts of this work.

Perhaps the following tabular analysis of the faculty of reflection may prove of use, in showing the various purposes to which the author of the "Essay" applied it, to account for mental phenomena.

A TABULAR ANALYSIS OF REFLECTION.

REFLECTION.	{	1. PERCEPTION ...	{	First step to knowledge— Employed about Ideas— Distinguished from passive perceptions—Common to all animated creatures— Is of three kinds.
		2. RETENTION ...	{	1. Contemplation. 2. Memory. 3. Association.
		3. DISCERNING ...	{	1. Clear ideas. 2. Wit. 3. Judgment.
		4. COMPARING ...	{	Ideas of relations. Imperfect in brutes.
		5. COMPOUNDING OR ENLARGING.	{	Ideas of numbers and simple modes.
		6. ABSTRACTION..	{	Distinguishes men from brutes — Forms general ideas, or principles from particulars — Genus and species — Essences — Language.
		7. VOLITION .....	{	1. Power of acting. 2. Power of choosing.

There are some remarkable observations in Locke's first letter to the Bishop of Worcester, which I think calculated to throw a light upon what he meant by sensation and reflection being the two sources of our knowledge. "These words of your Lordship contain nothing, as I see, in them, against me; for I never said that the general idea of sub-

stance comes in by sensation or reflection ; or that it is a simple idea of sensation or reflection, though it be ultimately founded in them ; for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of something, or being, with a relation of a support to accidents. *For general ideas come not into the mind by sensation, or reflection ; but are the creatures, or inventions of the understanding.*” Again, “The ideas of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, knowing, &c., come into my mind by reflection.”

The same inattention to Locke’s meaning has induced a well known English philosopher, Dr. Whewell, to suppose that the author of the “*Essay on the Human Understanding*,” has no correct conceptions of the nature of abstract propositions and axioms, but referred them to operations of *sense* as their cause. The Doctor does not allude to *reflection*, but conducts his reasonings and remarks upon the supposition, that Locke only maintains the existence of one source of knowledge,—*sensation*. The Doctor observes, “Our notion of power or cause is in like manner got from the senses ; and yet, though these ideas are thus mere fragments of our experience, Locke does not hesitate to ascribe to them necessity and universality when they occur in propositions. Thus he maintains the necessary truth of geometrical properties ; he asserts that the resistance arising from solidity is absolutely insurmountable ; he conceives that nothing short of Omnipotence can annihilate a particle of matter ; and he has no misgivings in arguing upon the axiom that every thing must have a cause. He does not perceive that

upon his own account of the origin of our knowledge, we can have no right to make any of these assertions. If our knowledge of the truths which concern the external world were wholly derived from experience, all that we could venture to say would be, that geometrical properties of figures are true *as far as we have tried them*; that we have seen no *example* of a solid body being reduced to occupy less space by pressure, or of a material substance annihilated by natural means; and that, *whatever we have examined*, we have found that every change has had a cause.”\*

It is manifest from innumerable passages in Locke’s works, that he ascribed necessity and universality to many ideas, when they are placed in the form of propositions. The following observations will prove decisive on this head.

“There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea; as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or angle, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is, whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of any thing without us, except God, can certainly be known farther than our senses inform us.

“There is another sort of propositions wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas and their dependence on one another. *Such propositions may be universal and certain.*

\* Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. 2, p. 459.

So, having the idea of God and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me ; and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such species whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how certain soever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the existence of men in the world, but *will be true of all such creatures wherever they do exist* : which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ideas. In the former case our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things producing ideas in our minds by our senses ; in the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas, (be they what they will) that are in our minds, producing there general certain propositions.

“ Many of these are called *æternæ veritates*, and all of them indeed are so ; not from being written in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them propositions in any one’s mind till he, having got the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions, therefore, are called eternal truths, not

because they are eternal propositions actually formed and antecedent to the understanding that makes them ; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere of them out of the mind and existed before ; but because being once made about abstract ideas so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true.”\*

A few years after Mr. Locke's Essay was published in England, it became pretty widely circulated on the continent of Europe, where it gave rise to numerous discussions and commentaries. Some distinguished philosophers approved of his theory, whilst others received it with coldness and distrust. There was, however, among nearly all of his critics, a general misconception of his real meaning on some vital parts of his system. The more volatile and zealous section of his admirers took the first part of it, namely, *sensation*, but discarded the other, *reflection* ; or at least made the latter to be only a kind of modification of the former. Locke's theory became, in fact, a decidedly materialized theory on the Continent. By the mechanism of our organs of sensation alone, every mental phenomenon was attempted to be explained ; and this led to many unsound and absurd conclusions, in reference to the nature of the mind, and its powers and faculties.

Many of the garbled statements, and absurd

\* Book 4. chap. 11. § 13, 14.

misconceptions, on the leading doctrines of the "Essay on the Human Understanding," so prevalent among the French philosophers, might be given here; but these would only lead us to anticipate the reflections which we shall have to make on this subject, in a subsequent portion of this treatise; and on this ground we are compelled to omit them.\*

Misapprehensions of Mr. Locke's system have been as equally rife in Great Britain as on the Continent. The erroneous notions entertained by many philosophers in Scotland, in particular, as to the nature and tendency of what they termed his *ideal system*, are certainly curious incidents in the history of mental philosophy. We are filled with

\* Gassendi, in a letter to Descartes says, "All our knowledge appears plainly to derive its origin from the senses; and although you deny the maxim 'Quicquid est in intellectu præesse debere in sensu,' yet this maxim appears, nevertheless, to be true, since our knowledge is all ultimately obtained by an *influx* or incursion from things external; which knowledge afterwards undergoes various modifications by means of analogy, composition, division, amplification, extenuation, and other similar processes, which it is unnecessary to enumerate." Diderot, in a variety of publications maintains the same opinion. He says, on one occasion "Every idea must necessarily, when brought to its state of *ultimate decomposition*, resolve itself into a *sensible* representation or picture; and since every thing in the understanding has been introduced there by the channel of sensation, whatever proceeds out of the understanding is either chimerical, or must be able, in returning by the same road, to re-attach itself to its sensible archetype. Hence an important rule in philosophy; that every expression which cannot find an external and a visible object to which it can thus establish its affinity, is destitute of any true meaning." (Works, Book 4th.)

Condorcet, in his "Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind," remarks that "Locke was the first who proved that all our ideas are compounded of sensations."



astonishment to see men of learning and talents falling into such flagrant and palpable mistakes, and persevering in them with such pertinacious obstinacy. The mode of warfare adopted against Locke has been characterised in this quarter, by so much of the mock heroic and sublime, that one feels a powerful propensity, in spite of the gravity and importance of the subject, to indulge in a spirit of ridicule and derision, at the fruitless and whimsical display of so much learning, time, and labour. Don Quixote was not more eager to combat the windmills, which he mistook for valiant opponents, than were the Scotch phalanx of metaphysicians to engage in the chase after *images, copies, impressions, and representatives* of external things. It is quite amusing to see them floundering about in the shadowy sloughs of their own creation, and when emerging from them, loudly denouncing Mr. Locke's system as "a puny and malignant ray," just sufficient to "shed a darkness visible upon the human faculties;" as an "*ignis fatuus* leading us into bogs and quagmires;" as a thing "making an attempt no less audacious than that of the giants to dethrone Jupiter; in waging an unequal war with common sense, from which it must come off with dishonour and loss;" as a system of philosophy constituting "one of the main pillars of modern scepticism;" as a prolific "parent of the many paradoxes so shocking to common sense, and of that scepticism, which disgrace our philosophy of the mind, and have brought upon it the ridicule and contempt of all sensible men;" as the "forbidden

tree of knowledge, which we no sooner taste, than we perceive ourselves naked, and stripped of all things, of our very selves ; nay, we see ourselves, and the whole frame of nature, shrink into fleeting ideas, and like Epicurus' atoms, dance about in emptiness ;" as a piece of gross deception, " like the Trojan horse, which had a specious appearance both of innocence and beauty, but carried in its belly death and destruction to all science and common sense ;" how amusing, we say, to hear all this from our friends north of the Tweed, about a thing which was a pure phantom of their own brains.

It must be owned, that for a considerable period after the establishment of the Scottish school of philosophy, these undeserved and unfounded attacks upon the " Essay on the Human Understanding," shed an unfriendly influence over the name and reputation of its author. But the temporary cloud has passed away. Within the last thirty years, men have seen into the real nature and value of his work ; and have perceived that his opponents had either inadvertently or wilfully done him great injustice. We shall substantiate this charge more fully in future sections of this treatise ; when we come to notice the speculations of those philosophers who have taken the most active part in depreciating the value, and distorting the doctrines of Mr. Locke's " Essay."

The more closely, however, Mr. Locke's " Essay" is investigated, the more firmly will the candid and unprejudiced reader become convinced, that he can never be justly deprived of his great merits.

His system, as a whole, is founded on truth and nature, and is unfolded in a manner peculiarly his own. The great object of the author is to communicate what he knows to his readers, in the plainest and clearest manner possible. He speaks to us as a kind, intelligent, and familiar friend. He takes us by the hand into every chamber and corner of the intellectual structure, and explains what there is to be seen in the most homely and intelligible terms. With all the intricate windings and localities he is intimately acquainted. He never assumes the pedant, nor clouds the judgment with mystical inuendos. If he suspects you do not understand very clearly the nature or scope of an argument, he will go over the ground a dozen times rather than you shall remain in ignorance, or have a single doubt clinging to your mind. If he thinks he makes you see a thing, he is content; his proselytising extends no further. He does not parade his own merits between you and the subject. He is one of the most humble, the most patient, and most pains-taking interpreters of nature, that ever undertook the office since the origin of philosophy. Truth and simplicity are the corner stones of his mind; and hence it is that he derides all philosophical books which abound with "words of learned length and thundering sound." "Vague and insignificant forms," says he, "of speech, and abuse of language, have for so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learn-

ing and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon this sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to the human understanding."

It has frequently been remarked, that though Mr. Loeke belonged to the medical profession, yet there is not, in the whole of his Essay, a single observation which points to the dissecting room or the laboratory. All kinds of theoretic or hypothetical knowledge hung loosely about him; and this has proved highly beneficial to his influence and reputation. Nothing can be more just and true than what Warburton says of him, in a letter to Dr. Hurd.—“But the sage Loeke supported himself by no system, on the one hand; nor on the other, did he dishonour himself by any whimsies. The consequence of which was, that, neither following the fashion, nor striking the imagination, he at first had neither followers nor admirers, but being every way very clear, and every way solid, he, at length, worked his way, and afterwards was subject to no reverses. He was not affected by the new fashions of philosophy, who leaned upon none of the old; nor did he afford ground for the after attacks of envy and folly, by any fanciful hypotheses, which, when grown old, are the most nauseous of all things.”

Loeke was constitutionally of an analytical turn of mind; and he has dived into every nook and

corner of our intellectual structure. He has subjected it to the same process of observation as Newton did the material world. There is no single book of metaphysics, in any language, ancient or modern, in which there is so much sound sense, and such an accurate knowledge of mental phenomena manifested, as in the "Essay on the Human Understanding." The proceedings of the mind in every possible case, the prescribed methods of removing difficulties created by the imperfections of language, and the limits of the understanding to what is really attainable, show the author to be one of the most instructive, original, and practical metaphysicians of whom any country can boast.

We shall conclude this notice of Locke, for whom we entertain a lively veneration, with a few remarks from the pen of the late Sir James Mackintosh:—

"Few books have contributed more to rectify prejudice, to undermine established errors, to diffuse a just mode of thinking, to excite a fearless spirit of inquiry, and yet to contain it within the boundaries which nature has prescribed to the human understanding. An amendment of the general habits of thought is, in most parts of knowledge, an object as important as even the discovery of new truths, though it is not so palpable, nor in nature so capable of being estimated by superficial observers. In the mental and moral world, which scarcely admits of anything that can be called discovery, the correction of the intellectual habits is probably the greatest service which can be rendered

to science. In this respect the merit of Locke is unrivalled; his writings have diffused throughout the civilized world the love of civil liberty, the spirit of toleration and charity in religious differences, the disposition to reject whatever is obscure, fantastic, hypothetical in speculation, to reduce verbal disputes to their proper value, to abandon problems which admit of no solution, to distrust whatever cannot be clearly expressed, to render theory the simple expression of facts, and to prefer those studies which most directly contribute to human happiness. If Bacon first discovered the rules by which knowledge is improved, Locke has most contributed to make mankind at large observe them. He has done most, though often by remedies of silent and almost insensible operation, to cure the distempers which obstruct the operation of these rules, and thus led to that general diffusion of a healthy and vigorous understanding, which is at once the greatest of all improvements, and the instrument by which all other improvements must be accomplished. He has left to posterity the instructive example of a prudent Reformer, and of a philosophy temperate as well as liberal, which spares the feelings of the good, and avoids direct hostility with obstinate, formidable prejudice. If Locke made no discoveries, Socrates made none. Yet both did more for the improvement of the understanding, and not less for the progress of knowledge, than the authors of the most brilliant discoveries. Mr. Locke will ever be looked upon as

one of the greatest ornaments of the English nation, and the most distant posterity will speak of him in language addressed to him by the poet (Gray),

“ O decus Anglicæ certe, O lux altera gentis.”\*

\* Edinburgh Review, 1821, p. 243.—See Note N. at the End of this Volume.





NOTES  
AND  
ILLUSTRATIONS.



## NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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### NOTE A.—Page 19.

“The method of a Logical Philosophy must consist chiefly in discussion of opinions. Argument and not evidence, will be the object of its pursuit. It will be concerned in finding out what may be unanswerably affirmed, rather than what is the fact and the truth of things. The interminable questions of the Schoolmen were but an exaggeration of the method of Aristotle himself:—a depraved application of his maxim, that, “to propose doubts” “well,” is of service for the discovery of truth. This mode of proceeding was strictly their philosophical analysis: in untying the perplexed knots in which the ingenuity of speculation or fancy might entangle a subject, they were opening, according to their views, the real nature of the subject so involved. It was more indeed the example of the Greek Sophists that they followed, than of Aristotle himself in this respect. For though Aristotle may ascribe too great importance to the discussion of Logical questions and difficulties, he has not so entirely rested the truth of science upon them; nor has he descended to such frivolities of inquiry. The Schoolmen, however, rest the whole strength of the cause in the determination of questions. Their whole theology is a congeries of doubts: the effect of which is to leave the mind in a state of Academic scepticism, very different from that reasonable satisfaction which is apparently the object of pursuit. They readily seized the manner of the philosopher, so far as it appeared on the surface of his writings. They pronounced sententiously; but they omitted to philosophise largely. The vast materials through which his research must have extended, were to them a subterranean world, over which they trod with unsuspecting step. What added

to their delusion was, that the writings of Aristotle are, for the most part, suggestive treatises, composed with reference to the oral instructions, with which they were accompanied in their delivery. Appearing consequently in the form of text-books, they were easily converted into authorities, applicable in detached sentences to the decision of each controverted point.

“In Scholasticism accordingly the Dialectical Art was all in all. Theology becoming a science founded on definitions, and being conceived to contain the first principles of all other sciences, was forced to have recourse to the analytical power of language, the only means of combining into one mass the various incongruous materials usurped into its system. Each term of language being significant of an indefinite number of particulars; and these particulars again, when denoted by words, being each significant of other particulars; language presents a medium of classification to an indefinite extent. But the very medium of classification thus presented, enabling the mind to combine things, independently of actual observation of facts with a view to such combination, imposes on us by the subtlety and facility of its application. We believe that we have combined real facts in nature, when we have explored and marked connexions which our own minds have woven together.

“Such then was the theology of the Schools. It is, in effect, what we designate in a word by Realism—the conversion of mere logical and metaphysical truth into physical—a description, as it were, of the lands and seas of the visible world by an untravelled eye, from a study of the map of the human mind. For whilst some Scholastics professed to disclaim the Realist doctrine, yet, as I have already observed of the great leader of the Nominalists of the fourteenth century, all were practically Realists in this respect, that they applied the analytical power of language to the interpretation of nature. It may further illustrate the character of a theology so constructed, to observe the analogy which it bears to the personifications of heathen mythology. The genius of Paganism seized the fancy with some image of loveliness or mirth or awe, expressing the tendency of the mind to realize its own abstractions, in the fabled beings of a many-peopled heaven. Scholasticism in like manner has its apotheosis; only that here an exact logic has worked the transmutation, which poetry effected in the other.” (Dr. Hampden’s Scholastic Philosophy.)

## NOTE B.—Page 34.

Dr. Mosheim, in his Ecclesiastical History, makes the following remarks :—

“ We shall here transcribe a passage from the works of Lanfranc, who is considered by many as the father of the Scholastic system, that the reader may see how far the first Schoolmen surpassed their disciples and followers in wisdom, modesty, and candour. We take this passage from that prelate’s book concerning the Body and Blood of Christ, and it is as follows :—“*Testis mihi Deus est et conscientia mea, quia in tractatu divinarum literarum nec proponere nec ad propositas respondere cuperem dialecticas quæstiones vel earum solutiones. Et si quando materia disputandi talis est, ut hujus artis regulis valeat enucleatius explicari in quantum possum, per æquipollentias propositionum tego artem, ne videar magis arte, quam veritate, sanctorumque patrum auctoritate confidere.*” Lanfranc here declares in the most solemn manner, even by an appeal to God and his conscience, that he was so far in having the least inclination to propose or answer logical questions in the course of his theological labours, that on the contrary, when he was forced to have recourse to dialectics, in order the better to illustrate his subject, he concealed the succours he derived from thence with all possible care, lest he should seem to place more confidence in the resources of art than in the simplicity of truth, and the authority of the holy Fathers. These last words show plainly the two sources from whence the Christian doctors had hitherto derived all their tenets, and the arguments by which they obtained them,—viz., from the Holy Scriptures, which Lanfranc here calls the truth, and from the writings of the ancient Fathers of the Church. To these two sources of theology and argumentation, a third was added in this century, even the science of logic, which, however, was only employed by the managers of controversy to repulse their adversaries, who came armed with syllogisms, or to remove difficulties which were drawn from reason and from the nature of things. But in succeeding times, the two former sources were either entirely neglected or sparingly employed, and philosophical demonstration, or, at least, something that bore that name, was regarded as a sufficient support to the truths of religion.”

## NOTE C.—Page 39.

The following observations on St. Anselm, from the pen of a sagacious French writer, are worthy of record. “Ses argumens métaphysiques en faveur de l’existence de Dieu prouvent seulement deux choses : la première, qu’il était réaliste ; la seconde, qu’il était beaucoup plus près d’être panthéiste qu’il ne s’en doutait ; car si toutes les choses n’ont d’attributs ontologiques communs et essentiels que parce qu’elles les tiennent d’une source unique, que ces attributs soient des réalités qui dérivent de la réalité absolue, et que cette réalité soit Dieu, Dieu est tout, Dieu seul est, tout le reste n’a qu’une apparence d’être. Aussi Spinoza nous semble être, de tous les Cartésiens, le seul qui ait été parfaitement conséquent. C’est ce qu’on reconnaît maintenant en Allemagne, où l’on est panthéiste avoué dès qu’on est réaliste et qu’on accorde quelque valeur à l’argument métaphysique ou ontologique de l’existence de Dieu. Saint Anselme raisonne de la même manière sur l’être, sur la beauté, et sur la vérité, sur le bien, en un mot sur tout ce qu’il regarde comme des qualités positives, pour en prouver la réalité primordiale, suprême et une. Voici son argument sur le bien : ‘Convincitur insipiens esse in intellectu aliquid bonum, quod majus cogitari nequit quia hoc cum audit, intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur utique in intellectu est. At certe bonum id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo ; si enim quo majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, utique eo quo majus cogitari non potest, majus cogitari posset (scil. id quod tali sit etiam in re.) Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non potest, et in intellectu et in re, quod utique sic vere est, et nec cogitari possit non esse.’

“Il s’agissait de trouver une formule, c’est-à-dire un argument général qui comprît tous les autres : Saint Anselme y parvient après de longues méditations. Voici cet argument général. La majeure est la même que dans l’argument précédent. ‘Convincitur, etc., jusqu’à *in intellectu est* :’ mais il continue aussi : ‘At certe id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in intellectu solo ; si enim quo majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, utique eo quo majus cogitari posset (scil. id quod tale sit etiam in re).

“ ‘Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.

“ ‘Hoc ipsum autem (ens quo majus cogitari nequit) sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.

“ ‘Non potest cogitari aliquid esse, quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod majus est utique eo quod non esse cogitari potest.

“ ‘Quasi si id quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse ; id ipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, quod convenire non potest.

“ ‘Vere ergo est aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse ; et hoc est tu, Domine Deus noster.’

“ Saint Anselme distingue plusieurs sortes de vérité, suivant qu’on la considère par rapport à l’expression, à la pensée, à l’opinion, à la volonté, à l’action, à l’essence des choses. Il définit la vérité en général : ‘Rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis,’ et dit que la vérité, la rectitude, et la justice, se définissent mutuellement.

“ La philosophie ne devrait servir, suivant Saint Anselme, qu’à étendre la religion. ‘Nullus Christianus debet disputare quod Catholica Ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur quomodo non sit, sed semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando, secundum illam vivendo, humiliter quærere rationem quomodo sit. Si potest intelligere, Deo gratias agat ; si non potest intelligere, non emittat cornua ad ventilandum, sed submittat caput ad venerandum.’ Il semble oublier qu’il faut déjà faire usage de sa raison pour reconnaître l’Eglise, et pour accepter son enseignement comme dogme imposé, avant même de le comprendre parfaitement : car si l’on ne s’en faisait aucune idée, il ne serait plus qu’un vain assemblage de paroles. Or il importe beaucoup que cette idée première soit juste, et par conséquent que la raison préside déjà à son admission, puisqu’elle n’a plus rien à faire ensuite qu’à s’efforcer de le comprendre tel qu’elle l’a conçu d’abord, sans pouvoir en rien changer.

“ Cette opinion de Saint Anselme sur l’usage de la raison en matière de religion positive se trouve dans sa préface au *De Incarnat. Verbi*, ouvrage qu’il composa parce que l’on avait argumenté à l’Abbaye du Bec de la manière suivante : ‘Si in Deo tres personæ sunt una tantum res, et non sunt tres res, unaquæque per se separatim,—ita tamen ut potentia et voluntate omnino sit idem : ergo Pater cum Spiritu Sancto, cum Filio est incarnatus.’

“ St. Anselme est surtout célèbre en philosophie par son argu-

ment métaphysique en faveur de l'existence de Dieu."—*Histoire Abregée de la Philosophie*, par J. Tissot, Dijon, 1840.

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NOTE D.—Page 52.

David de Dinant says, "Quæro si  $\nu\tilde{o}\nu_c$ , h.e. substantia mentalis quæ est primum formabile in omnes incorporeas substantias, et materia possibilis ad tres dimensiones, quæ est primum formabile in omnes corporales substantias, differunt, an non. . . Si differunt, sub aliquo communi, quo illa differentia egreditur, differunt; et illud commune per differentias formabile est in utrumque, (hinc in  $\nu\tilde{o}\nu$ , illinc in materiam trium dimensionum capacem) quod autem unum formabile in plura, materia est, vel adminus principium materiale; propter quod ait philosophus in nono libro primæ philosophiæ quod quæcunque sunt in genere uno, eorum est materia una. Si ergo dicatur unam esse materiam materiæ primæ et  $\nu\tilde{o}\nu_c$  erit primæ materiæ materia, et hoc ibit in infinitum; relinquitur ergo quod  $\nu\tilde{o}\nu_c$  et materia prima sint idem.

"Deus, et materia prima, et  $\nu\tilde{o}\nu_c$ , aut differunt, aut non. Si differunt, oportet sub aliquo communi, a quo differentiæ illæ exeunt, differant, et sequitur ex hoc, (a) quod illud commune genus sit ad illa, (b) et quod hoc genus materialis principii sit notitia ad illa, (c) et quod primorum materialium sit materiæ quod inconueniens est. Et ex hoc videtur relinqui quod *Deus*, et  $\nu\tilde{o}\nu_c$ ; quia quæcunque sunt, et nulla differentia differunt, eadem sunt."

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NOTE E.—Page 53.

Robert Pullen attempts to refute the notions of Abelard upon the peculiar species of optimism which he ascribed to the Divine action.—"Si dispositio Dei res aliter ac fiunt, nec prius ordinare nec post ordinationem immutare valet, quomodo sanctorum studium, et pro studio salus, aut impiorum perversitas, et pro ea infernum rite disputatur? Quomodo gratias agam auctori meo qui mihi tribuit quod negare nequivit? Nam si coactus dedit, aut voluntate quam cavere vel vitare nequit, quam gratiam de



me promeruit? Quomodo reatum aliquem contraham, dum efficaciam vitandi noxia nunquam habui, nec accipere a Deo potui? Quæ denique mira in Deo impotentia, si beneficium potens est inchoare in homine, inchoatum autem perficere omnino non valet, quia tribuere cuiquam plus non potest quam actu tribuit? etc.”

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NOTE F.—Page 94.

The establishment of the Florentine Academy had a powerful influence over the cultivation of speculative philosophy, not only in Italy, but in every part of Europe. Cosmo de Medici was indefatigable in his exertions for this grand object. A passionate admirer himself of the “divine” Plato, he employed his wealth and influence in obtaining every thing rare and costly connected with Grecian and Roman literature. His great and extensive commercial connexions enabled him to procure objects of interest, which mere wealth alone could not have obtained. He employed many learned men in travelling into distant countries in search of rare books and manuscripts. He amassed a valuable collection of works, in the Hebrew, Chaldaic, Arabic, and Greek languages; and with these and other costly materials, laid the foundation for those splendid libraries in Italy, which are the pride of the nation, and at this hour the admiration of all literary strangers.

The Academy was still more influential for good, during the life time of Lorenzo de Medici, who was enthusiastically devoted to its interests, and who spared neither wealth nor influence to extend its usefulness and fame. He established the Platonic festival, which had been celebrated from Plato’s death to the days of his disciples Plotinus and Porphyry, but which had been discontinued for the long space of twelve hundred years. “The day fixed,” says Mr. Roscoe, “for this purpose, was the 7th of November, which was supposed to be the anniversary not only of the birth of Plato, but of his death; which happened among his friends, at a convivial banquet, precisely at the close of his eighty-first year. The person appointed by Lorenzo to preside over the ceremony at Florence, was Francesco Bandini, whose rank and learning rendered him extremely proper for the office. On the same day another party met

at Lorenzo's villa at Careggi, where he presided in person. At these meetings, to which the most learned men in Italy resorted, it was the custom for one of the party, after dinner, to select certain passages from the works of Plato, which were submitted to the elucidation of the company, each of the guests undertaking the illustration or discussion of some important or doubtful point. By this institution, which was continued for several years, the philosophy of Plato was supported not only in credit, but in splendour, and its professors were considered as the most respectable and enlightened men of the age."\*

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NOTE G. Page 106.

“Bessarion combattit la célèbre hypothèse d'Averroës sur l'âme universelle, et admit avec les platoniciens quatre espèces d'âmes : celles qui respirent dans les astrés, dans les génies, dans les hommes, dans les animaux. La diversité des principes établis par Aristote et par Platon sur les opérations de l'art et sur celles de la nature avait excité entre Pléthon et Georges de Trébizonde un débat dans lequel Bessarion intervint avec le dessein de concilier les opinions des deux grands philosophes. Il n'admit point qu'il puisse y avoir de but là où il n'y a pas d'intention ; mais, en distinguant l'action réfléchie de la production mécanique (*agere et facere*,) il pensa qu'Aristote et Platon n'avaient point différé précisément sur le caractère de ces deux notions ; qu'ils s'étaient séparés seulement sur l'explication transcendente qu'elles peuvent recevoir ; qu'Aristote avait également attribué à la nature et à l'art cette double manière d'opérer ; qu'on ne devait pas prendre à la rigueur les maximes du Stagirite sur ce sujet ; et qu'il y avait attaché lui-même une valeur moins absolue que celle qu'on leur avait prêtée. Le Cardinal commenta la théorie de ce philosophe sur les causes finales. Si le plus souvent il aperçut avec sagacité, détermina avec précision les limites qui séparaient les deux systèmes de philosophie, il fut moins heureux lorsqu'il voulut en établir les assimilations ; comme tous les platoniciens récents, c'était Platon qu'il prenait ordinairement pour guide, et, placé dans ce point de vue, il

\* Life of Lorenzo de Medici, p. 224.

se flattait de découvrir des concordances qu'eût moins facilement admises le platouisme primitif."—(*De Gerando, Histoire Comparée, vol. 5, p. 58.*)

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NOTE H.—Page 146.

"Sanchez, a Portuguese physician, settled as a public instructor at Toulouse, took a different course; the preface of the treatise, 'Quod Nihil Scitur,' is dated from that city in 1576; but no edition is known to have existed before 1581. This work is a mere tissue of sceptical fallacies, propounded, however, with a confident tone not unusual in that class of sophists. He begins abruptly with these words; 'Nec unum hoc scio, me nihil scire, coniecto tamen nec me nec alios. Hæc mihi vexillum propositio sit, hæc sequenda venit, nihil scitur. Hanc si probare scivero, merito concludam nihil sciri; si nescivero, hoc ipso melius; id enim asscrebam.' A good deal more follows in the same sophistical style of cavillation. 'Hoc unum semper maxime ab aliquo expetivi, quod modo facio, ut vere diceret an aliquid perfecte sciret; nusquam tamen inveni, præterquam iu sapiente illo proboque viro Socrate (licet et Pyrrhonii, Academici et Sceptici vocati, cum Favorino id etiam assererent,) quod hoc unum sciebat quod nihil sciret. Quo solo dicto mihi doctissimus iudicatur; quamquam nec adhuc omnino mihi explerit mentem; cum et illud unum, sicut alia, ignoraret.'

"Sanchez put a few things well; but his scepticism, as we perceive, is extravagant. After descanting on Montaigne's favorite topic, the various manners and opinions of mankind, he says, 'Nou fuem faceremus si omnes omnium mores recensere vellemus. An tu his eandem rationem, quam nobis, omnino putes? Mihi non verisimile videtur. Nihil tamen ambo scimus. Negabis forsau tales aliquos esse homines. Non contendam; sic ab aliis accipi.' Yet, notwithstanding his sweeping denunciation of all science in the boldest tone of Pyrrhonism, Sanchez comes at length to admit the possibility of a limited or probable knowledge of truth; and, as might perhaps be expected, conceives that he had himself attained it. 'There are two modes,' he observes, 'of discovering truth, by neither of which do men learn the real nature of things, but yet obtain some kind of insight into them. These are experiment and reason, neither being sufficient alone; but experiments, however

well conducted, do not show us the nature of things, and reason can only conjecture them. Hence there can be no such thing as perfect science; and books have been employed to eke out the deficiencies of our own experience; but their confusion, prolixity, multitude, and want of trustworthiness, prevent this resource from being of much value, nor is life long enough for so much study. Besides, this perfect knowledge requires a perfect recipient of it, and a right disposition of the subject of knowledge, which two I have never seen. Reader, if you have met with them, write me word.' He concludes this treatise by promising another, 'in which we shall explain the method of knowing truth, as far as human weakness will permit;' and as his self-complacency rises above his affected scepticism, adds, 'mihi in animo est firmam et facilem quantum possim scientiam fundare.'

"This treatise of Sanchez bears witness to a deep sense of the imperfections of the received systems in science and reasoning, and to a restless longing for truth, which strikes us in our writers of this latter period of the sixteenth century. Lord Bacon, I believe, has never alluded to Sanchez, and such paradoxical scepticism was likely to disgust his strong mind; yet we may sometimes discern signs of a Baconian spirit in the attacks of our Spanish philosopher on the syllogistic logic, as being built on abstract, and not significant, terms, and in his clear perception of the difference between a knowledge of words and one of things."

We shall here add a few words, from the same pen, relative to two other authors of some note.

"*Marius Nizolini*. 'De Veris Principiis et Vera Ratioue Philosophandi contra Pseudo-Philosophos.' (Parma, 1553.) It owes, however, what reputation it possesses, to Leibnitz, who reprinted it in 1670, with a very able preface, one of his first contributions to philosophy. The treatise itself, he says, was almost strangled in the birth; and certainly the invectives of Nizolini against the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle could have had little chance of success in a country like Italy, where that authority was more undoubted and durable than any other. The aim of Nizolini was to set up the best authors of Greece and Rome, and the study of philology, against the scholastic terminology. But certainly this polite literature was not sufficient for the discovery of truth; nor does the book keep up to the promise of its title; though, by endeavouring

to eradicate barbarous sophistry, he may be said to have laboured in the interests of real philosophy. This preface of Leibnitz animadverts on what appeared to him some metaphysical errors of Nizolini, especially an excess of nominalism which tended to undermine the foundations of certainty, and his presumptuous scorn of Aristotle. His own object was rather to recommend the treatise as a model of philosophical language without barbarism, than to bestow much praise on its philosophy. Brucker has spoken of it rather slightly, and Buhle with much contempt. I am not prepared by a sufficient study of its contents to pass any judgment; but Buhle's censure has appeared to me somewhat unfair. Dugald Stewart, who was not acquainted with what the latter has said, thinks Nizolini deserving of more commendation than Brucker has assigned to him. He argues against all dialectics, and therefore differs from Ramus; concluding with two propositions as the result of his whole book:—That as many logicians and metaphysicians as are any where found, so many capital enemies of truth will then and there exist; and that, as long as Aristotle shall be supreme in logic and metaphysics in the schools, so long will error and barbarism reign over the mind. There is nothing very deep or pointed in this summary of his reasoning.

“The *Margarita Antoniana*, by Gomez Pereira, published at Medina del Campo in 1554, has been chiefly remembered as the ground of one of the many charges against Descartes, for appropriating unacknowledged opinions of his predecessors. The book is exceedingly scarce, which has been strangely ascribed to the efforts of Descartes to suppress it. There is, however, a copy of the original edition in the British Museum, and it has been reprinted in Spain. It was an unhappy theft, if theft it were; for what Pereira maintained was precisely the most untenable proposition of the great French philosopher—the absence of sensation in brutes. Pereira argues against this with an extraordinary disregard of common phenomena, on the assumption of certain maxims which cannot be true, if they contradict inferences from our observation far more convincing than themselves. We find him give a curious reason for denying that we can infer the sensibility of brutes from their outward actions; namely, that this would prove too much, and lead us to believe them rational beings; instancing among other stories, true or false, of apparent sagacity, the dog in pursuit of a hare, who,

coming where two roads meet, if he traces no scent on the first, takes the other without trial. Pereira is a rejecter of Aristotelian despotism ; and observes that in matters of speculation and not of faith, no authority is to be respected. Notwithstanding this assertion of freedom, he seems to be wholly enchained by the metaphysics of the Schools ; nor should I have thought the book worthy of notice, but for its scarcity, and the circumstance above-mentioned about Descartes” (Hallam, Literature of the Middle Ages.)

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NOTE I.—Page 162.

“ Quelques historiens de la philosophie ont compté l'infortuné Vanini au nombre des auteurs qui ont tenté d'opérer une révolution dans la marche de cette science. Nous ne saurions imiter leur exemple ; Vanini est loin d'avoir, à nos yeux, ce caractère ; on ne saurait reconnaître même en lui un droit réel au titre de philosophe. Car il ne suffit pas, pour mériter un tel titre, de discourir ou d'écrire sur la philosophie. Rien de plus atroce, sans doute, que l'arrêt porté contre ce malheureux, rien de plus odieux que le langage passionné avec lequel certains auteurs, tels que le P. Garasse, Durand, et d'autres, ont encore poursuivi sa mémoire. Mais la juste indignation que les âmes honnêtes doivent ressentir en présence de telles iniquités, ne doit point influencer sur l'idée qu'on peut concevoir du mérite des travaux exécutés par celui qui en a été la victime. Ceux des écrits de Vanini qui nous sont connus annoncent un homme qui avait beaucoup lu, qui avait beaucoup exercé son esprit sur toutes sortes de sujets, qui affectait la singularité : mais ils ne signalent point un penseur, ils annoncent plutôt le désordre des idées que leur originalité. L'un porte pour titre *Amphitheatrum optinæ Providentiæ, divino-magicum, christiano-physicum, necnon astrologico-catholicum, adversus veteres philosophos, atheos, epicureos, peripateticos et stoicos* ; Lugd., 1615, in 8vo. Le second, *De admirandis naturæ reginæ deæque mortalium arcanis, libri IV* ; Lutet., 1616, in 8vo. Tous deux avaient été examinés par des docteurs, imprimés avec approbation et privilège ; tous deux étaient dirigés, en apparence du moins, contre l'athéisme ; mais dans l'un

et l'autre on peut soupçonner l'intention cachée d'affaiblir plutôt que de faire valoir les fondements sur lesquels reposent les idées religieuses. On suppose que l'opinion secrète de Vanini confondait la Divinité avec la nature, le Créateur avec ses ouvrages. Cependant quelques savants, tels que Morhoff, Barlæus, Dieckmann, ont porté de lui un jugement plus favorable, et le procès fait à ses ouvrages ne peut certainement être considéré encore aujourd'hui comme définitivement jugé au tribunal d'une raison impartiale. On cite aussi de lui quelques autres ouvrages, tels qu'Un Traité de la Véritable Sagesse, un autre De Contemneudâ Gloriâ, dans lesquels il faisait, dit-on, l'apologie de la religion, mais qui ne paraissent pas avoir survécu."—(De Gerando, vol. 5. p. 444.)

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NOTE J.—Page 205.

“Toujours une image ou une comparaison à la place du raisonnement! C'est la manière éternelle de Bacon. Il ne s'agit point ici de *l'usage du compas*, qui est commun à tous les hommes; il s'agit du *compas* même. On demande s'il peut y avoir un *nouveau compas*, et c'est ce que je nie. L'homme peut sans doute apprendre par l'exercice à se servir plus *dextrement* de son compas comme de son esprit; mais le compas sera toujours le même, sauf toutefois une plus ou moins grande perfection dans l'instrument; comme il peut y avoir des esprits plus ou moins heureusement nés, quoique tous soient les mêmes dans leur essence.

L'orgueilleuse médiocrité de Condillae a pu rendre plus piquant de nos jours le projet ridicule de *refaire l'entendement humain*. Au fond, néanmoins, le projet et l'expression appartiennent à Bacon, et c'est purement et simplement un acte de folie et rien de plus. Refaire l'entendement humain pour le rendre plus propre à la gymnastique, c'est précisément la même idée. J'honore la sagesse qui propose un *nouvel organe*, autant que celle qui proposerait une *nouvelle jambe*. Ces *Méthodes*, ces *instaurations*, ces *Nouveaux organes*, ces *Elans philosophiques*, etc., ne sont que des mots qui ne doivent point être pris à la lettre, des jeux d'esprit qui peuvent tout au plus servir d'exemples, mais jamais de moyens. C'est ainsi que l'art poétique d'Horace ou celui de Boileau peuvent être utiles à un poète, comme modèles de poésie, mais point du tout comme

moyens de créer des poèmes ; car il ne peut y avoir de moyens artificiels de créer ou d'inventer.

“ Lorsque Descartes part de son doute universel, on peut l'écouter avec les égards dus à un homme tel que lui, et recevoir son doute comme une règle de fausse position qui ne saurait avoir de grands inconvénients. Dans le fond, néanmoins, la règle est impossible et la supposition chimérique ; car il ne dépend de personne de commencer par ce doute, et chaque philosophe s'élance nécessairement dans la carrière avec toute la masse de connaissance qu'il a trouvée autour de lui.

“ Tout novateur invente un mot qui sert de point de ralliement à ses disciples, s'il doit en avoir. Bacon avec son *induction*, Kant avec sa *critique*, Condillac avec son *analyse*, ont enrôlé la foule, ils ont fait secte ; c'est-à-dire qui l'orgueil national n'a pas dédaigné de marcher à la suite de l'orgueil individuel qui s'annouçait comme un grand inventeur. Dans le fait cependant ces mots ne sont que des illusions, car il ne peut y avoir de nouvelle science de l'intelligence, ni surtout de nouvelle méthode pour découvrir. L'orgueil peut seulement donner de nouveaux noms à d'anciennes notions, et l'ignorance et l'application peuvent prendre ces noms pour des choses.” — (*Examen de la Philosophie de Bacon*, tom. 1. p. 8. Par Le Comte Joseph de Maistre.)

“ The vulgar notion about Bacon we take to be this, that he invented a new method of arriving at truth, which method is called Induction, and that he detected some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning which had been in vogue before his time. This notion is about as well founded as that of the people who, in the middle ages, imagined that Virgil was a great conjuror. Many who are far too well informed to talk such extravagant nonsense, entertain what we think incorrect notions as to what Bacon really effected in this matter.

“ The inductive method has been practised ever since the beginning of the world by every human being. It is constantly practised by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless schoolboy, by the very child at the breast. That method leads the clown to the conclusion, that if he sows barley he shall not reap wheat. By that method the schoolboy learns that a cloudy day is the best for catching trout. The very infant, we imagine, is led by induction to expect milk from his mother or nurse, and none from his father.



“Not only is it not true that Bacon invented the inductive method; but it is not true that he was the first person who correctly analysed that method and explained its uses. Aristotle had long before pointed out the absurdity of supposing that syllogistic reasoning could ever conduct men to the discovery of any new principle; had shown that such discoveries must be made by induction, and by induction alone; and had given the history of the inductive process, concisely indeed, but with great perspicuity and precision.

“Again, we are not inclined to ascribe much practical value to that analysis of the inductive method which Bacon has given in the second book of the *Novum Organum*. It is indeed an elaborate and correct analysis. But it is an analysis of that which we are all doing from morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dreams. A plain man finds his stomach out of order. He never heard Lord Bacon’s name. But he proceeds, in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, and satisfies himself that minced pies have done the mischief. ‘I ate minced pies on Monday and Wednesday, and I was kept awake by indigestion all night.’ This is the *comparantia ad intellectum instantiarum convenientium*. ‘I did not eat any on Tuesday and Friday, I was quite well.’ This is the *comparantia instantiarum in proximo quæ natura data privantur*. ‘I ate very sparingly of them on Sunday, and was very slightly indisposed in the evening. But on Christmas-day I almost dined on them, and was so ill that I was in great danger.’ This is the *comparantia instantiarum secundum majus et minus*. ‘It cannot have been the brandy which I took with them, for I have drunk brandy for years without being the worse for it.’ This is the *rejectio naturarum*. Our invalid then proceeds to what is termed by Bacon the *vindemiatio*, and pronounces that minced pies do not agree with him.”—(*Macaulay’s Essays*, vol. 2, p. 406.)

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NOTE K.—Page 215.

A distinguished French writer makes the following remarks on the merits of Hobbes as a metaphysician.

“... Hobbes fut plus sincère ou tout au moins plus conséquent.

Après un premier voyage à Paris, où ce philosophe se lia avec Gassendi, il y revint, chassé de sa patrie par la révolution, et habita la France durant plusieurs années. A en juger par l'intimité qui s'établit entre les deux philosophes, il y a grande apparence que Hobbes embrassa les opinions métaphysiques de Gassendi, ou tout au moins qu'ils puisèrent à la même source leur doctrine. Ce qu'il y a de certain, c'est que les principes du philosophe Anglais sur la question fondamentale sont tout-à-fait les mêmes que ceux de son ami. Il adopte comme lui la maxime d'Epicure, *que toutes nos idées viennent des sens*, et l'appuie du même raisonnement. Comme nous ne pouvons rien nous représenter que sous des formes matérielles, et que l'on ne conçoit pas ce que serait une idée qui ne représenterait pas son objet, il s'ensuit que toutes nos idées viennent des sens, et sont des idées de choses matérielles. Mais Hobbes pousse plus avant, et avec la rigueur logique qui le distingue éminemment, arrive à la conséquence définitive du principe. Selon lui, tout être est nécessairement matériel. Les phénomènes intérieurs ne sont que des résultats de l'organisation du corps ; l'objet ébranle l'organe ; le mouvement se communique par les nerfs au cerveau, et de-là au cœur ; le cœur, affaibli sous la pression, fait effort pour s'en délivrer, et renvoie le mouvement à l'extérieur : ainsi s'expliquent la *sensation* et la *réaction volontaire*. De la sensation diversement transformée naissent la *mémoire*, l'*imagination*, et tout ce que nous appelons *facultés de l'intelligence*. Les sensations accumulées dans le cerveau se combinent de mille façons différentes, et c'est ainsi que se forment les idées *de composition*, *d'abstraction*, *de comparaison*, en un mot toutes les idées possibles. Toute la doctrine que professa, un siècle plus tard, Condillac, dans le *Traité des Sensations*, et à l'exactitude physiologique près, toute celle que développa Cabanis dans son livre des *Rapports du physique et du moral*, se trouvent ou complètement exposées ou clairement présentes dans la philosophie de Hobbes. On peut ajouter qu'elle reproduit également les principales idées d'Epicure sur l'organisation de l'univers, idées qui ne sont pas moins la conséquence du principe de la sensation que toutes les autres. Si l'on songe que Hobbes rattacha au même principe, avec une rigueur logique incomparable, un système complet de morale et de politique, on sera forcé de convenir qu'aucun autre philosophe, à l'exception d'Epicure,

n'a donné au matérialisme de plus larges développemens, et qu'il en est peu qui aient embrassé plus d'objets dans leurs spéculations, et construit avec plus de conséquence un plus vaste système."—*(Cousin.)*

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NOTE L.—Page 251.

“ La révolution qui était appelée par tous les bons esprits, que des penseurs hardis avaient tentée sans succès, que Bacon même n'avait pu exécuter, il était réservé enfin à Descartes de l'accomplir.

“ Comme Bacon, Descartes a reconnu la nécessité de reconstruire dans ses premiers fondemens l'édifice de la science, et de rejeter sans distinction tout l'enseignement établi ; comme Bacon, il oppose à l'autorité des traditions les droits et l'indépendance de la raison ; comme Bacon, il a senti que ce grand ouvrage devait commencer par la réformation des méthodes ; comme Bacon, il a voulu donner à l'esprit humain une méthode nouvelle et sûre pour l'investigation de la vérité ; comme Bacon, c'est aux sciences déjà constituées qu'il a emprunté les procédés dont il a voulu doter la philosophie. Les reproches que fait Descartes à la dialectique de l'école sont les mêmes que ceux qui lui étaient adressés par le chancelier d'Angleterre. Tous deux font la même critique du syllogisme. Du reste, il n'y eut rien de commun entre ces deux esprits supérieurs que le point de départ et le but qu'ils se proposèrent, si ce n'est la franchise, la droiture, l'austérité qui présidèrent à leurs recherches. Les exemples que Bacon avait demandés aux sciences naturelles, Descartes les demande aux sciences mathématiques. Le premier saisit le flambeau de l'expérience ; le second s'attache à la chaîne des déductions rationnelles. Le premier invoque l'autorité des faits, assemble, compare, co-ordonne les observations ; le second invoque l'évidence intuitive des principes abstraits, et d'une seule proposition fait sortir la suite entière des démonstrations dont il compose la science. Ce que le génie de Bacon avait en étendue, celui de Descartes l'a en persévérance. Le premier, avide de connaissances positives, se plaçait toujours en présence des réalités ; le second, avide de combinaisons, s'isole de l'univers entier et se replie en lui-

même, se confiant aux seules forces de la méditation. Le premier suppose convenu, précisément, ce même témoignage des sens auquel la philosophie du second se termine comme à un corollaire. Le premier ne s'adresse guère qu'aux savants, sans être assez constamment leur égal en instruction ; le second descend des hauteurs de la science qu'il a enrichie de ses propres découvertes, et se met à la portée de l'ignorant lui-même. Le premier se borne à dresser des cadres, à semer des germes ; le second crée un corps complet de philosophie qui embrasse les domaines de l'intelligence, ceux de la matière, et le système entier de l'univers.

“Descartes avait connu les belles expériences de Galilée, de Torricelli, et les ouvrages de Bacon. On a commis une erreur lorsqu'on lui a reproché de n'avoir jamais parlé ni du premier, ni du dernier de ces grands hommes. Il a cité souvent Galilée ; il a partagé l'opinion de l'illustre victime de l'Inquisition sur le mouvement de la terre autour le soleil, &c. ; mais en rejetant plus d'une fois les théories de ce créateur de la mécanique moderne. Il a parlé à diverses reprises de Bacon, et annoncé qu'il avait travaillé lui-même d'après quelques vues du chancelier d'Angleterre sur les sciences physiques. Mais ni Galilée, ni Bacon, ne paraissent avoir exercé la moindre influence sur la direction qu'ont suivie les idées de Descartes ; ils ont pu seulement entretenir son émulation dans quelques recherches relatives à des applications spéciales. Descartes a été également accusé de manquer d'érudition, parce qu'il négligeait, avec une sorte de dédain, ce luxe et cet appareil de citations qui était la manie de son siècle. Il mettait peu d'importance, en effet, à s'enquérir des opinions de ceux qui l'avaient précédé ; il n'a pas cru avoir besoin de s'appuyer sur l'autorité des anciens ; il n'a pas jugé nécessaire de faire précéder l'établissement de sa doctrine par la réfutation de celles auxquelles il voulait la substituer. Une fois, cependant, il projeta de rédiger et de publier une réfutation méthodique de la philosophie scholastique telle qu'elle était alors enseignée par les jésuites ; il rassembla même quelques matériaux pour cette entreprise, mais il y renonça bientôt, justement persuadé que le système contre lequel elle était dirigée croulerait bientôt de lui-même. On a pris beaucoup de peine pour découvrir divers rapprochements entre certaines vues de Descartes et des idées déjà émises par des penseurs anciens ou modernes. Pour disputer

ainsi au réformateur français le mérite de la nouveauté dans une partie du moins de ses théories, Huet a été jusqu'à l'accuser d'un plagiat universel ; mais Descartes est bien éloigné de prétendre au titre de novateur ; il reconuait expressément lui-même ' qu'il ne se sert d'aucun principe qui n'ait été reçu par Aristote et par tous ceux qui se sont jamais mêlés de philosophie.' Il se félicite même de se trouver en accord avec les pères de la science parmi les Grecs ; il réclame seulement pour lui-même l'honneur d'avoir mis en œuvre les éléments déjà connus. Descartes s'est persuadé d'ailleurs que sa philosophie se légitimerait suffisamment par elle seule, subsisterait par ses propres forces." (*De Gerando, Histoire Comparée*, Vol. 6, p. 153.)

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NOTE M.—Page 423.

"Toutes nos idées, ne sont qu'une façon d'être de notre âme : nous ne connaissons immédiatement et véritablement que ces idées ; comment donc pourrait-on distinguer celles qui représentent la matière et les choses qui sont hors de nous, de celles qui représentent seulement ce qui est en nous ? Car ces deux sortes d'idées nous appartiennent également, et ne sont, à proprement parler, que notre âme disposée d'une telle ou d'une telle manière. Nos sens ne nous font point connaître les choses qui sont hors de nous, mais seulement les effets que les objets produisent en nous, et auxquels ces objets ne sauraient avoir rien de semblable. Nous ne devons pas en juger davantage par les idées que nous en pouvons avoir par l'imagination ou par la pure intellection ; car l'imagination ne fait que reproduire les idées que nous recevons par les sens. Ce n'est pas davantage à la pure intellection que nous pouvons rapporter, quoi qu'en dise Malebranche, ces idées représentatives ; car cette pure intellection est une hypothèse démentie par notre expérience intérieure habituelle, et d'ailleurs le seul motif que l'on allègue pour attribuer cette prérogative à la pure intellection est qu'elle seule peut expliquer et justifier le caractère représentatif attribué à nos idées, ce qui est, au fond, supposer avant tout la question qu'il s'agit de résoudre. Les mots que nous employons pour signifier les choses les plus abstraites et les plus spirituelles, ne signifient ces objets que parce qu'ils sont joints à

des images qui en représentent les idées. Les idées étant des modes de notre âme, notre âme étant immatérielle, on ne saurait admettre aucune ressemblance entre nos idées et les objets matériels. Comment cependant peuvent-elles les représenter sans leur être semblable ? Comment nous feront-elles connaître des objets dont elles ne retracent aucun trait, avec lesquels elles n'entretiennent aucune analogie ? Elles ne nous les feront pas connaître en eux-mêmes, et par eux-mêmes, d'une manière semblable à celles dont les mots excitent en nous les idées ; car elles n'ont aucun moyen pour les rendre effectivement présents à notre esprit. C'est même une supposition gratuite qu'attribuer à nos sens le pouvoir de nous faire percevoir l'existence de l'étendue." (Foucher, Réponse pour la Critique, p. 42.)

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NOTE N.—Page 489.

" Indeed Locke appears to owe his popularity and influence as a popular writer, mainly to his being one of the first to express, in a plain and unhesitating manner, opinions which had for some time been ripening in the minds of a large portion of the cultivated public. Hobbes had already promulgated the main doctrines, which Locke afterwards urged, on the subject of the origin and nature of our knowledge ; but in him those doctrines were combined with offensive opinions on points of morals, government, and religion, so that their access to general favour was impeded ; and it was to Locke that they were indebted for the extensive influence which they soon after attained. Locke owed his authority mainly to the intellectual circumstances of the times. Although a writer of great merit, he by no means possesses such metaphysical acuteness, or such philosophical largeness of view, or such a charm of writing, as to give him the high place he has held in the literature of Europe."—(Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. 2, p. 257.)

"Ce qui forme le caractère distinctif et le mérite essentiel de la philosophie de Locke, c'est d'avoir entrepris une histoire à peine ébauchée avant lui, l'histoire de nos idées. Il a voulu marquer leurs origines, exposer leur formation graduelle et successive, tirer

de leur génération, avec leurs titres de famille, si l'on peut dire ainsi, et leurs rapports de consanguinité, la règle de leur classification, la détermination de leur nature et de leurs propriétés constitutives. Il a porté dans l'étude et la description de ces phénomènes, aussi curieux que délicats, de l'intelligence humaine, sinon cette exactitude rigoureuse qu'on ne pouvait guère attendre d'une première tentative, du moins une persévérance, une patience jusqu'alors sans exemple. La diffusion même qu'on lui reproche est une suite de cette application qui l'a porté à explorer les moindres détails, et à donner une sorte de corps et de fixité à des phénomènes qui sont extrêmement subtils et fugitifs par leur nature.

“ Quoi qu'aient pu dire, à cet égard, quelques philosophes plus récents, particulièrement en Angleterre, l'importance et l'utilité de cette histoire des idées et des explorations qui s'y rattachent, ne seront point diminuées par les rectifications qui ont été apportées à la définition de l'idée elle-même, et il sera toujours du plus grand intérêt de savoir sous le concours de quelles circonstances, par l'action de quelles causes, dans quel ordre, et dans quelle dépendance, chaque idée vient à éclore dans l'entendement, soit qu'on emploie, ou non, le mot origine, pour désigner le premier moment de son apparition.

“ C'est dans ce mérite propre et caractéristique de *l'Essai sur l'entendement humain*, et non dans diverses circonstances accessoires, qu'il faut chercher, si nous ne nous trompons, la vraie cause du nombre prodigieux de lecteurs qu'a obtenu cet ouvrage, et du succès durable dont il a joui, malgré sa longueur et ce qu'il y a d'abstrait dans le sujet sur lequel il roule. Locke a offert à l'esprit humain une sorte de miroir qui lui réfléchit ses plus secrètes opérations; il excite et entretient, chez les penseurs, la même curiosité que nous éprouvons tous naturellement lorsqu'on nous annonce notre propre portrait, même alors que nous ne trouvons dans ce portrait qu'une ressemblance imparfaite. Il a par le même motif, multiplié le nombre des penseurs, en donnant à l'étude de l'entendement humain un attrait aussi nouveau que légitime.

“ Le succès, aussi général que solide, obtenu par Locke, s'explique encore par la confiance qu'inspirait naturellement un esprit aussi sage, aussi calme, aussi lucide, par la bonne foi qui respirait dans ses recherches, par l'espèce de caudeur avec laquelle il en rendait compte, par son éloignement pour toutes les subtilités de

l'école et pour toutes les ambitions du dogmatisme. Sa philosophie avait le bon sens pour génie, la prudence pour guide, la simplicité pour costume. Il n'imposait aucune opinion ; il aidait chacun à s'en former une, et surtout à se garantir des vaines tentatives et des écarts téméraires."—(*De Gerando, Histoire Comparée*, vol. 7, pp. 6. 9.)

It has become of late years somewhat fashionable to accuse Locke of taking the chief materials of his *Essay* from Mr. Hobbes. Though both writers lay down a certain general principle as to sensation, (and Hobbes has undoubted claim to the priority of statement,) yet no two books can be more opposite in all their leading features, as to the nature and operations of mind, than the *Leviathan* and the *Essay*. The written testimonies on the point in dispute are very meagre and inconclusive. Dugald Stewart is of opinion that Locke had carefully and profoundly examined the writings of the philosopher of Malmesbury ; but still the Edinburgh Professor is far from accusing Mr. Locke of plagiarism.\* In the Letters to the Bishop of Worcester, the author of the "Essay" twice mentions the name of Hobbes, but in such a manner as certainly implied that he knew little or nothing of his peculiar speculations on mental philosophy.

Sir James Mackintosh makes the following remarks on this subject :—"Locke and Hobbes agree chiefly on those points in which, except the Cartesians, all the speculators of their age were agreed. They differ on the most momentous questions, the sources of knowledge, the power of abstraction, the nature of the will ; on the two last of which subjects, Locke, by his very failures themselves, evinces a strong repugnance to the doctrines of Hobbes. They differ not only in their premises and many of their conclusions, but in their manner of philosophizing itself. Locke had no prejudice which could lead him to imbibe doctrines from the enemy of liberty and religion. His style, with all its faults, is that of a man who thinks for himself ; and an original style is not usually the vehicle of borrowed opinions."—(*Edinburgh Review*, 1821.)

Mr. Mill is very explicit on the same question. He says, "Few among the great names in philosophy have met with a harder measure of justice from the present generation than Locke, the

\* Dissertation, p. 114.



unquestionable founder of the analytic philosophy of mind, but whose doctrines were first caricatured, then, when the re-action arrived, cast off by the prevailing school even with contumely, and who is now regarded by one of the conflicting parties in philosophy as an apostle of heresy and sophistry; while among those who still adhere to the standard which he raised, there has been a disposition in latter times to sacrifice his reputation in favour of Hobbes—a great writer and a great thinker for his time, but inferior to Locke, not only in sober judgment, but even in profundity and original genius. Locke, the most candid of philosophers, and one whose speculations bear on every subject the strongest mark of having been wrought out from the materials of his own mind, has been mistaken for an unworthy plagiarist, while Hobbes has been extolled as having anticipated many of his leading doctrines. He did not anticipate any of them, and the present, (relative to essences), is an instance in what manner it was generally done. They both rejected the Scholastic doctrine of essences; but Locke understood and explained the distinction between essential and accidental properties, and between essential and accidental propositions, while Hobbes jumped over it, and gave a definition which suits at most only essential propositions, and scarcely those, as the definition of proposition in general.”—(*System of Logic*, vol. 1, p. 50.)

Henry Lee, an antagonist of Locke's, makes the following mention of the style of the “*Essay on the Human Understanding*.” “The celebrated author of the ‘*Essay on the Human Understanding*’ has all the advantages desirable to recommend it to the inquisitive genius of this age; an avowed pretence to new methods of discovering truth and improving learning; an unusual coherence in the several parts of his scheme; a singular clearness in his reasonings; and *above all*, a natural elegance of style; an unaffected beauty in his expressions; a just proportion and tunable cadence in all his periods.”—(*Anti-Scepticism*, *Preface*.)

“The misapprehensions so prevalent on the Continent, with respect to Locke's doctrine on this most important of all metaphysical questions, (relative to reflection) began during his own life-time, and were countenanced by the authority of no less a writer than Leibnitz, who always represents Locke as a partizan of the Scholastic maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*. ‘Nempe,’

says Leibnitz, in reply to this maxim, ‘nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus.’ The remark is excellent, and does honour to the acuteness of the critic; but it is not easy to conceive on what grounds it should have been urged as an objection to a writer who has insisted so explicitly and so frequently on *reflection* as a source of a class of ideas essentially different from those which are derived from *sensation*. To myself it appears, that the words of Leibnitz only convey, in a more concise and epigrammatic form, the substance of Loeke’s doctrine. Is anything implied in them which Loeke has not more fully and clearly stated in the following sentence? ‘External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.’” (Works, Vol. 1, p. 79.) —(*Stewart’s Dissertation*, p. 114.)

We have had the pleasure of perusing the original “Essay of the Human Understanding,” in the handwriting of the author, now in possession of Dr. Forster, (now of Bruges), who became possessed of it in the following manner. Mr. Loeke gave it into the hands of Mr. Furly of Rotterdam, about the year 1700, together with a valuable collection of MSS. On the death of Mr. Furly, these MSS., with a great number of original letters from Mr. Loeke to him, were bequeathed to Edward Forster, Esq., of the family of the Forsters, of Bamburgh Castle, Northumberland. This gentleman’s father had settled in London after the defeat of the Stuart forces in the North of England; and his son Edward, who subsequently engaged in mercantile pursuits, became Governor of the Russia Company, and was frequently consulted by his personal friend Mr. Pitt, on the commercial relations of that country. Mr. Forster being in possession of a large collection of MSS., augmented by those of his brother, the Rev. Benj. Forster, of Boconnoc, in Cornwall, he left them as a heir-loom to his son, Thomas Furly Forster, of Walthamstow, the well-known botanist, and one of the founders of the Linnæan Society. These MSS. were considered so curious and interesting—particularly those appertaining to Mr. Loeke—that he left them to his son, the present Dr. Thomas Forster, F.R.A.S., on condition that if he had any male heirs of his body, they should be continued as the inheritance. Some of these familiar letters of Mr. Loeke, out of this collection, were published

by this gentleman in London, at the press of Messrs. Nichols and Co. in 1830, in large duodecimo, with some letters of Lord Shaftesbury and Algernon Sydney, to which is prefixed a long metaphysical preface.

In this "Essay," there is an alteration in that paragraph in which the author defines what he precisely means by the word *idea*. There is an erasure; and the words "or whatever else it may be called," are parenthetically inserted, as a fuller expression of his opinion. The MSS. is very beautifully and correctly written, and is bound up in the book form.



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