



# GRAND THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Edited by  
HOWARD J. WIARDA



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## PREFACE

I have long been interested in Grand Theory and Ideology. In elementary school (fourth grade) I was introduced to geography and did a fifty-page (!!!) report (including pictures) on Latin America. In high school my favorite subjects were history, English, social studies, and, as it was known then, civics. At university (Michigan) I majored in history, political science, and interdisciplinary studies.

At Michigan I took a wonderful course with Professor Carl Cohen in the Philosophy Department that set me on my future academic career path. The course was called “The Philosophical Basis of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy.” Not only did we read all the major authors undergirding these grand theories in the original (respectively, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Pareto, Mosca, Mussolini, the corporatists, Hitler, Locke, Madison, Tocqueville, and Mill), but, since it was a philosophy class, we were asked to write a weekly paper critiquing their logic as well. The course gave me a fascinating introduction to Grand Theory and Ideology from a comparative perspective, and it also taught me analytic and logical skills—for example, how to spot logical flaws and biases even in the most elevated political writing—that have stayed with me for a lifetime.

For several decades now, I have been teaching in the political science subfield of comparative politics. I teach courses and seminars on such topics as Latin America, Southern Europe, the politics of developing areas, Eastern Europe, introductory comparative politics, comparative labor relations, comparative theories of social change, and comparative democratization. So I am interested in how different countries and regions in the world develop, modernize, and build institutions, and the theories and conceptual frameworks they use to do so. I am still interested in the differences between socialist routes to modernization, authoritarian and statist routes, and democratic paths, although the collapse of the Soviet Union has discredited the socialist route and perhaps the authoritarian one as well. In addition, I am interested in non-Western and indigenous models of change, and the degree to which these have adapted to Western ways, or

alternatively continue to follow their own course. All this has led me to *Grand Theory and Ideology* and the questions of its use in the social sciences.

By *Grand Theory and Ideology* we mean those large, overarching explanations of social and political behavior—liberalism, Marxism, socialism, positivism, corporatism, political culture, institutionalism, psychoanalysis, rational choice theory, environmentalism (Jared Diamond), sociobiology, and now chemistry and genetics—that give coherence to the social sciences, help us to organize and think about change and modernization, and give us models to understand complex behavior. The reemergence of Russia as a major global player coupled with recent bank nationalizations and the fact that democratization is incomplete or in the process of being reversed in many countries make the old arguments about the merits of socialist, statist, and liberal routes to modernization and development open once again.

That is what this book is all about. Here we present the leading Grand Theories and Ideologies in the social sciences. Our goal is to explore which of these provides us with the best approach, the best “handle,” the best conceptual framework to understand modern reality. We focus on both developed and developing countries. Our approach in examining competing Grand Theories and Ideologies is to see which offers us a better understanding of reality, what are the contributions as well as biases and limitations of each, and what final assessments we reach about the contributions of each. Toward the end of the discussion we begin to explore if some of these Grand Theories can be combined and reconciled; alternatively, can we now say that there is an approach that offers us more explanatory power than the others?

Following the general introduction, in each succeeding chapter, we, the authors, examine one of the main Grand Theories and Ideologies. To facilitate discussion, comparison, analysis, and critique, each theory is examined by using the same outline and analytic framework. For each Grand Theory and Ideology, we will want to know its background, the history and development of the concept, its main spokesmen and traditions, the different schools of thought within that theory, the contributions of the approach as well as its biases and limits, and our overall assessment of the theory. The concluding chapter sums up our findings on the individual Grand Theories and Ideologies, looks for comparisons and contrasts in time, and explores both the possibilities for building bridges among the several islands of theory *and* the issue of whether there is one particular theory that subsumes all the others.

This book is meant to be a serious, scholarly examination of the main Grand Theories and Ideologies “out there” in the field, but it also has important policy implications. As a book, it has textbook possibilities in courses on social change, political development, the Third World, comparative politics, and developing areas. It would also be appropriate in introductory graduate seminars on approaches and methods in the social sciences, comparative politics, and “the discipline,” whether that be political science, philosophy, political sociology, or development studies. Note that with its fourteen chapters (including the introduction and the conclusion), it is designed specifically to fit a semester-length course.

The book has clear policy implications as well. Obviously it would be comforting to U.S. policy-makers if they knew, à la Fukuyama, that history indeed was “over” and that the world would turn out to look just like we are, or as we imagine ourselves to be—liberal, democratic, open, a modern capitalistic or mixed economy. But suppose there are multiple endpoints, not all of which are compatible with American goals. Or that one of the major alternatives—socialism, statism, corporatism, mercantilism, authoritarianism—stages a comeback, and emerges triumphant in more than a few countries. Then we will surely have to reexamine many of our democracy-promotion and free-market initiatives of the last twenty years. For in our present troubled financial and political circumstances, the so-called Washington Consensus of the last two decades on which so much of U.S. foreign policy has rested—democracy, open markets, free trade—looks increasingly fragile, if not dead altogether.

This book grew specifically out of the seminar on Grand Theory and Ideology that I offered at the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, in the fall of 2008. Each of the twelve students in the seminar reported on and wrote about one of the Grand Theories. Their papers have been worked and reworked, written and rewritten; I have closely and tightly supervised the entire process. Kathryn Johnson did yeoman service on this and other projects in preparing the manuscript for publication; my research assistant, Ann P. Kryzanek, was instrumental in ensuring that the chapters were well coordinated and had a common format. We are grateful to all those who contributed to the manuscript; however the final conclusions, assessment, and recommendations are mine alone.

Howard J. Wiarda  
Athens, Georgia

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## INTRODUCTION

*Howard J. Wiarda*

The purpose of this book is to examine the bases and biases of Grand Theory and Ideology in the social sciences. By Grand Theory we mean those large, overarching, all-encompassing explanations of social and political behavior that give meaning to existence, enable us to order our lives, and provide us with conceptual frameworks to think about reality. The Grand Theories and Ideologies considered here include liberalism and developmentalism, Marxism and dependency analysis, culture theory, sociological explanations, psychology and psychoanalysis, institutionalism, rational choice theory, environmental determinism, sociobiology, explanations from chemistry and physics, and non-Western or indigenous concepts of change.

Grand Theory offers coherence, methodology, and an approach to the social sciences. It operates at the level of the Big Picture, as compared to individual or mid-level theory. Here we are interested in those major paradigms, conceptual models, and intellectual frameworks that have dominated the social sciences over the last two or three centuries, as well as in newer models. Theories of liberalism, socialism, and authoritarianism have of course been around for a long time; the other Grand Theories and Ideologies we cover emerged in the post-World War II period; still others, such as sociobiology and the theories that we are nothing but chemicals and electrical impulses, are of very recent vintage. All of these theories compete to explain the behavior of men, societies, and nations.

Almost two decades ago, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the liberation of Eastern Europe,

Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed that history was “over.” Both socialism and authoritarianism were thoroughly discredited; democracy, “the only game in town,” seemed to be everywhere triumphant. But by now we know that Fukuyama’s triumphalism was at best premature, at worst simply wrong. Globalization, which seemed to carry with it the universal spread of open markets (capitalism), free trade, and democracy, may have triumphed, but it did so only partially in many parts of the world, and it means different things and occupies different priorities to different peoples. The “clash of civilizations” has replaced the “end of history.”

The “end of history” always seemed to apply more to the developed than to the developing world. In North America, Western Europe, and Japan, democracy, open markets, and a modern, mixed (private and public) form of capitalism seemed to have triumphed. In the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the “Washington Consensus,” that seemed to have been the agreed-upon formula. But recently the United States and Europe have pulled further apart. In the state’s seizure and nationalization of banks and financial institutions, the specter of a new form of socialism or at least statism looms. Meanwhile in Putin’s Russia, authoritarianism has reasserted itself; Marxism-Leninism or “twenty-first century socialism” is alive and well in China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador; almost everywhere the celebrated “third wave” of democracy is over, slowed, incomplete, or in reverse. In seeking to explain these important social and political phenomena, Grand Theory is similarly making a comeback.

The issues we wrestle with in this book are the following: What is Grand Theory? What are the main alternative Grand Theories and Ideologies? Does any one of them provide a full and complete explanation of social change and political development? What accounts for the popularity and explanatory power of a particular Grand Theory and Ideology at one point in time, and its decline and the rise of other Grand Theories and Ideologies at another? What are the biases and assumptions as well as the contributions to our understanding of each of these Grand Theories and Ideologies? Are any of these Grand Theories and Ideologies complete explanations? Are they sufficient unto themselves, or should they be supplemented by other explanations?

Should we therefore be pragmatic and eclectic in picking and choosing among several explanations, combining them to form a more complex multicausality, or does one of these explanations (class analysis, culture, psychology, rational choice, sociobiology, and

the “new institutionalism” are among the claimants) have greater explanatory power and is it all-encompassing? Is the pursuit of Grand Theory and Ideology still useful, or, in this new, more scientific, and empirical era driven by demands for hard data, should we now focus on smaller, more manageable issues amenable to clear empirical research? But then, how do we do our empirical research if our larger ideas are still unclear, inchoate, and fuzzy? If Grand Theory and Ideology are still relevant and useful, how do we decide which Grand Theory or Ideology to use? These are among the big issues discussed and analyzed in this book.

In the social sciences generally and in policy circles over the last two decades, the assumption has been widespread that the era of Grand Theory and Ideology has ended, that we already know the answers. Democracy after the Cold War seemed to have emerged triumphant; the so-called Washington Consensus seemed to have arrived at a final solution: free trade, democracy, and private enterprise. The Fukuyama thesis, however, seemed more relevant to the highly developed, postindustrial nations than to the developing ones. Surely we would be hard-pressed to say that in China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Venezuela, Bolivia, even Brazil or Mexico, history is, definitively, “over.” Actually, political, ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal, and other rivalries and conflicts signal that “history” is alive but not necessarily well; revolution, civil war, and failed states are with us too, with no happy or final ending in sight.

Even in the developed or “First World”—think of conflicted Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, maybe even the United States with its hardening cultural and political divisions between Red and Blue—history may not be quite as terminal as we had thought. In many areas of the globe, with considerable disillusionment over democracy’s failure to deliver higher living standards and the collapse of global markets, the old arguments about the benefits of “strong government” (often a euphemism for authoritarianism) or a statist economy are being revived. Even among the modern, Western states where Fukuyama’s case was the strongest, we see vast gaps between the social-democratic or “social model” countries of Western Europe and the much more individualistic, private sector–dominated economy of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

This book reexamines the role of Grand Theory and Ideology in helping us to understand human behavior and the development of nations. It explores not only the older paradigms of liberal developmentalism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, culture studies, and



institutionalism (old and new), but also more recent approaches, such as sociobiology (Edward Wilson), environmentalism (Jared Diamond), genetic and chemical explorations (from our biology and chemistry departments), and evidence from physics that we are merely a collection of nerve endings and electrical impulses. The issues are: Which of these conceptual frameworks or Grand Theories, in a time of rising uncertainty and conflict about the future, still carry validity and explanatory power? Which of these are still useful in understanding our present condition? Is any one of these Grand Theories or Ideologies sufficient unto itself, or does it have the possibility of developing in that direction in the future, or must we be eclectic, choosing the most useful and relevant aspects of several theories? Can we thus combine several theories into a more all-encompassing explanation; alternatively, could we devise a technique of multivariate analysis and complex multicausality that helps better than competing paradigms to get at that complex, ever-changing phenomenon called truth?

### THE END OF IDEOLOGY?

If the seventeenth century is often considered the Age of Reason and the eighteenth the Age of Enlightenment, the nineteenth (extending to 1917) is dubbed the Age of Ideology. It was during this century that utopianism, Marxism, socialism, communism, positivism, anarchism, corporatism, and the forerunners of what would later be called (by Mussolini) fascism all emerged. Marxism, socialism, communism, anarchism, and fascism are all familiar to us, even though a little refresher course would probably be useful. For that I recommend my old teacher Carl Cohen's excellent book, *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy*.<sup>2</sup> Positivism and corporatism, however, had less impact on American society and politics, are less familiar to us, and therefore require at least a word of explanation, not least because these ideas come up at several points in the book.

Positivism was a philosophy—we could call it a Grand Theory—formulated by the French philosopher and sociologist Auguste Comte (1798–1857). Writing at the mid-nineteenth century (at about the same time Marx was writing his *Communist Manifesto*), Comte proposed an alternate theory to Marxian class analysis that was based on the development of culture, ideas, and religion. Comte's was an elitist orientation in which society's best-educated persons, social engineers, would lead the transition to modernization. Comte saw history and society as evolving through three stages: the supernatural (primitive law and religion in essentially tribal societies), the metaphysical (more

organized religion and the emergence of the modern nation-state), and the positivist in which society's intellectuals and scientists would rule. We could spend more time discussing Comte's philosophy or Grand Theory; suffice it here to say that he is considered the founder of sociology and that, while his ideas had little impact in the United States or Great Britain where dominant liberalism reigned supreme, in Latin America and Continental Europe Comte had, and still has, enormous influence. Among the reasons for his popularity there and not in the United States was that Comte was an elitist; he believed in top-down rule and a society governed by its intellectual elites, and he had little use for democracy, mass participation, or grassroots activity.<sup>3</sup>

Corporatism emerged at about the same time as positivism and liberalism (at least that of the John Stuart Mill variety), shortly after the emergence of Marxism, and as an answer or reaction to all three. Whereas positivism was a secular and even antireligious philosophy, corporatism in its early incarnations was born of Catholic political thought; while Marxism stressed class conflict and struggle, corporatism emphasized the organic harmony of labor and capital under state direction; while liberalism emphasized individual rights and responsibilities, corporatism focused on group or communal rights. In contrast to the totalitarian state that emerged out of Marxism with no subsystem autonomy, and to the inorganic one-person-one-vote and individual representation of liberalism, corporatism institutionalized representation by distinct groups or "corporations"—hence the name "corporatism"—business, labor, the Church, armed forces, farmers, etc. Portugal in earlier times may have been the "purest" corporatist system extant; in recent decades Austria has gotten the prize as the world's most corporatist system. We treat of corporatism at various points in the book; although corporatism may yet rise to the level of constituting a Grand Theory or Ideology in its own right, we have not included it here as one of the main Grand Theories discussed as we have written on that theme extensively elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

While the nineteenth century was the century of ideology, it was in the twentieth century that these Grand Theories and Ideologies found expression in actual regime types. The Soviet Union was the first state founded on explicitly Marxist-Leninist principles, and was followed over time by Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, and other bedraggled Third World countries. The heyday of fascism was similarly in the interwar period, as exemplified by Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and, arguably, Franco's Spain. Salazar's Portugal, and other short-lived regimes in Greece, Romania,

Hungary, Croatia, and Poland were quasi-fascist. Liberalism was concentrated in “the West,” meaning North America and Western Europe, which was designated as the “Free World” even though that designation sometimes included some embarrassingly unfree countries, such as Franco’s Spain and the military dictatorships of Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.

In the post-World War II period, which also corresponds to that of the Cold War, the world was similarly divided into three distinct blocs. In keeping with the emphasis on national development in this period, these blocs were referred to as the “three worlds of development.”<sup>5</sup> The “First World” consisted of the familiar group of the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but it has now expanded to include Japan as well. The First World was made up of developed, industrialized, and, above all, democratic nations. The “Second World” consisted of developed communist states, a misnomer since we discovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union that these states were far poorer and far less developed than we had thought. The Second World included the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, and the other communist states listed earlier. The “Third World” included all the rest, all the poor, underdeveloped, or “developing” countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Of course these designations were not perfect—China was both Second World and Third World, and South Korea and Taiwan were coming closer to First World—but they served as a convenient classificatory scheme for over thirty years, from roughly the early 1960s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the period 1989–1991.

In 1958, at the height of the Cold War and the “great systems debate” between communism, authoritarianism, and democracy, the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell published an important and prescient book entitled *The End of Ideology*. In it, Bell analyzed the rise of a new and large middle class, the growing prosperity of the working class, rising literacy, rising consumption, growing affluence, and the corresponding decline in intense, extremist, strongly ideological political parties and movements. On the basis of what Bell saw as the growing *embourgeoisement* of North America and Western Europe, he predicted a decline in intense ideological differences and conflict. I recall some of my more radical teachers and later colleagues were strongly critical of Bell because they preferred that ideological (and other) conflict continue, not “end.” And at the time, on the face of it, and at the height of the Cold War, it seemed far-fetched that ideological conflict would end anytime soon.

Around the same time, and echoing, even if indirectly, Bell's themes, one of the Grand Theories treated in this book, developmentalism, emerged. Developmentalism was associated with some of the great names in the economics, sociology, and political science fields: W. W. Rostow, Karl Deutsch, Seymour Martin Lipset, C. E. Black, and Gabriel A. Almond.<sup>6</sup> It posited that there were various stages of growth, that there were common processes of change through which all societies went, and that the final outcome of this process was societies that were democratic, developed, and socially just. All we needed to do was pour in economic aid, stimulate social modernization, and, devoid of any ideological conflict, democracy would inevitably follow. Surely it was comforting, at the height of the Cold War, to *know* that the final outcome of development was countries that looked just like we do—democratic, middle class, and socially just—and that ideological conflict would play no role in national development. Alternative models such as socialism, communism (Rostow called communism a “disease of the transition”), populism, or corporatism were thus ruled out. This formulation, which paralleled Bell's “end of ideology” theme and served furthermore, however hopeful the endpoint was, as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, was remarkably parallel to the “end of history” theme developed by Francis Fukuyama, the transitions-to-democracy literature formulated in the 1980s and 1990s, and the “Washington Consensus” during the same period.

The Soviet Union's collapse, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the tearing down of the Iron Curtain meant the old designations were no longer useful and needed to be revised. Especially now, as Russia and Eastern Europe embarked on a course seemingly leading to democracy and a market system, the line between First and Second Worlds appeared useless. Actually, having lived and traveled widely in Eastern Europe and Russia during this period, I continued to use the Second World category, no longer as a way ideologically to designate communist states but because these countries were still poor, disorganized, inefficient, and had a very long way to go to catch up with the First World. Meanwhile other countries in Asia *did* catch up, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan earlier, as well as Hong Kong and Singapore now. Clearly, with these and other anomalies, the social sciences needed a new set of categories, a new language, to deal with the new contingencies of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century realities.

The social sciences found that new language in the “transitions-to-democracy” and the “Washington Consensus” literature. The transitions-to-democracy literature was based on the notion that since the Soviet Union, and socialism in general, had proved

ineffective—unable to deliver goods and services, let alone democracy and human rights to its people—and since authoritarianism had similarly been discredited by widespread human rights abuses, democracy was the only system left standing, the “only game in town.” The presumption was that all countries and peoples everywhere were clamoring for democracy and would clearly recognize its obvious benefits. It did not seem to matter anymore if the countries were formerly communist or formerly authoritarian, if they had a political culture supportive of democracy or wanted it all that much, or if they had the “prerequisites” for democracy that the social sciences had long recognized—a certain educational and literary level, a considerable level of social modernization (urbanization and the like), and a sufficient level of economic development and industrialization. None of these things mattered; instead, the United States accepted the romantic idea that all countries and peoples wanted democracy; more than that, they wanted it in our (the United States’) form and image.<sup>7</sup>

Closely related to this conception, but more at a policy level, was the so-called Washington Consensus. The name derived from the fact that the “consensus” was agreed to at a meeting of the United States and (mainly) Latin American countries in Washington, DC, but it could also be called that because it represented Washington’s, or the United States’, policy view of the world and was designed to serve U.S. interests. The Consensus consisted of three main elements: (1) democracy, (2) free trade, and (3) open (or privatized, capitalistic) markets. Obviously, the promotion of this policy would serve U.S. interests in a stable, democratic, peaceful, and capitalistic world; and as the most open and liberal big economy in the world, the United States was also in a position to benefit most from a free trade regime. But the U.S. officials involved also genuinely believed that the tripartite policy (democracy, free trade, open markets) would also best serve developing countries, lifting them out of poverty, and up to First World levels. In the familiar metaphor of the day, the rising tide would lift all boats.

But it has not quite worked out that way. There are too many exceptions, in social science terms, too many “outliers.” When there are sufficient exceptions, you have to go back and reexamine the assumptions that went into your Grand Theory. Among the indicators that we may have gotten it wrong are the following:

1. Russia and other countries have reverted to authoritarianism.
2. Elsewhere in the developing world, the march to democracy has stalled.

3. China's communist regime has consolidated its power and is *not* moving toward democracy.
4. Corporatism, including state control of emerging civil society, has made a comeback in much of the Third World.
5. Neither in the Islamic Middle East nor in Africa has there been much progress toward democracy.
6. Latin America has moved increasingly toward radical-populist regimes.
7. Socialism and anti-Americanism have become viable options in many parts of the Third World.
8. If socialism reemerges, authoritarianism usually reemerges as well, and not far behind.
9. Chaos, bloodshed, civil war, revolution, breakdown, and failed states are spreading in the Third World, instead of the peaceful march toward democracy.
10. Even in the developed world (North America, Western Europe, Japan), there are immense differences over social welfare, economic policy, and the state's role in the economy, to say nothing of foreign policy.

These trends are worrisome. More than that, they challenge the prevailing Grand Theory and Ideology of the last twenty years. It is very hard, à la the transitions-to-democracy literature, to believe, in the light of the trends listed above, that democracy is inevitable, let alone that it will be universal, although I do have a colleague who insists the whole world will be democratic in two hundred (!) years. Twice as long as John McCain predicted we would be in Iraq! Similarly, with regard to the "Washington Consensus," based on the triple play of democracy, free trade, and open markets. Throughout the Third World, (1) democracy is either in trouble or else much less consolidated than we would prefer; (2) free trade is being vetoed, as much by the U.S. Congress as by other governments; and (3) it is hard to argue for open markets when our own market system has just crashed down, dragging much of the rest of the world with it.

So is ideology "dead" as Daniel Bell predicted? Has history "ended," as Francis Fukuyama claimed? I do not think so, on either count. In fact, ideology—and, hence, part of the reason for this book—is making a comeback, not just in the Third World but even in the United States. And surely we would be hard-pressed to say that history has ended almost anywhere. Instead, the consensus of the last twenty years, if it ever existed, is breaking down; division, clash, and conflict are spreading. We are relearning what should have been

obvious all along: that there are different paths to modernization and multiple outcomes as well.

If ideology is not quite dead and history not quite ended, it provides renewed justification for this book. If there is no longer just one but multiple routes to modernization, then there is also room for multiple Grand Theories and Ideologies. If liberalism, pluralism, and democracy, however desirable by our preference, are not the only outcome, let alone the inevitable one, then we need to open our eyes as well as our conceptual frameworks to other possibilities, other models. Wishful thinking, wishful sociology, and wishful political science on behalf of democracy, regardless of our private preference, are no substitute for hard thinking. If there are multiple paths to modernization and multiple endpoints, then we may also need more than one Grand Theory or Ideology to help us understand the processes involved.

There is an ambiguity here that is recognized and discussed, but never fully resolved in our book. And maybe, because of the issues involved, it cannot be fully resolved. On the one hand, we are here, in this book, talking about the great “systems debate” between democracy, socialism, authoritarianism, and other models as well that, we argue here, has never been fully settled and has now come back—especially in the Third World, but not exclusively there—to haunt us. On the other, we are also talking about the best and most appropriate *approach and methodology* (Grand Theory) for comprehending these large regime changes and differences. The two issues are separable on one level but closely intertwined at another, for you cannot talk about the great systems debate without analyzing the Grand Theories and Ideologies that undergird them. We proceed on the assumption that these two large issues are interconnected, must be treated in tandem, but also need to be separated at various points as the analysis goes forward.

## THE VARIETY OF GRAND THEORIES

We have argued above that the great systems debate of the past—authoritarianism, socialism in its many forms, statism and corporatism, populism, democracy and liberalism, and others—has made a comeback of late, indeed was never really ended or superseded. At the same time, the interest in the Grand Theories and Ideologies underlying and explaining the systems debate has also been stimulated by new conceptual, philosophical, and, yes, ideological controversy. In this section we summarize the main Grand Theories and Ideologies

treated in this book and highlight some of the controversies that swirl around them. In the book's conclusion we return to these themes, not only assessing the various Grand Theories but seeing if we can build bridges between them, or if there might still be one Grand Theory that outshines and subsumes all the rest.

The first Grand Theory treated here is developmentalism. It goes back to the eighteenth century idea of progress, to the notion that the world is improvable or even perfectible. In modern times developmentalism has been closely associated with the ideas of the economist W. W. Rostow, the sociologist S. M. Lipset, and the political scientist Gabriel Almond. They posited an idea of progress as applied to the developing world in which economic development served as the motor force of growth that in turn stimulated social mobilization (rising literacy, urbanization, and the like) that then gave rise to democracy. This approach or Grand Theory dominated both academic thinking on and U.S. policy toward the developing world in the 1960s. But since then, because of Vietnam and other causes, developmentalism has been strongly criticized and fallen on hard times. We will need to see if the recent academic interest in "transitions to democracy," and, on the policy front, the focus on "democracy promotion" represents something new on the developmentalism front or if it is just new wine in old bottles.

Whereas developmentalism represents what we call a "consensus theory," Marxian class analysis is a "conflict theory." Marxism has been with us for a long time, at least since Marx's famous formulation in the mid-nineteenth century, and is, thus, both almost as old as developmentalism *and* an answer to it. Although Marxism was generally discredited as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has recently made a comeback as a result of the failures of both developmentalism and capitalism in the recent market crash. Some people continue to find inspiration in Marx's message of socialism, and probably all of us can agree that class analysis is one of the key factors in explaining political behavior.

The first task is to understand Marx and the various versions and permutations of his ideas over the last century and a half. What, if anything, is still valuable in his Grand Theory, what can be salvaged, what is worth saving? Do Marxist class analysis and his socialist vision of the future still serve as viable alternatives to developmentalism, the democracy initiative, and a free market system? In answering these questions, we will also want to assess the more recent permutations of Marxism in the form of dependency analysis and the "world systems approach" of Immanuel Wallerstein.



What explains behavior? What holds back, or, alternatively, stimulates change? Is it mainly the level of economic development, is it the class system and social structures, or is it culture? This debate has animated the social sciences for over a century. What do we know now that we did not know then?

At least since Max Weber, cultural explanations have been the great alternative to Marxian class analysis. We begin here with the cultural anthropologists of the 1930s: Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict. We then look at the largely discredited “national character” explanations of that time period that may have contributed to fascism and genocide. In the 1960s we had a number of pathbreaking studies of what was then called “political culture”; in the 1980s and 1990s there was a virtual “renaissance” of political culture studies. More recently in the writings of Peter Berger, Samuel Huntington, Ronald Inglehart, and David Landes,<sup>8</sup> among others, the evidence has been put forward that culture is *the* most important factor in explaining both development and underdevelopment. We will want to evaluate these claims as well as the arguments of the critics of culturalist explanations very carefully.

From economic (*both* Rostow *and* Marx) and cultural determinism, we now proceed to examine sociological determinism. We examine the foundations of sociology in Comte, Durkheim, and Weber; we then proceed to such moderns as S. M. Lipset, Karl Deutsch, and C. E. Black. We find it interesting as well as disturbing that both economic determinists and sociological determinists tend to subsume political outcomes under, respectively, economic or social variables. While both Marx and Rostow see political outcomes as driven by patterns of economic growth, the sociologists also tend to assume that politics is a “dependent variable” driven by such large social changes as industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and demography. As applied to the developing world, this meant that if social mobilization and greater pluralism were stimulated, democracy would presumably follow automatically from that.

But experience from the 1960s showed that, rather than giving rise to democracy, social mobilization in weakly institutionalized countries could instead stimulate a conservative reaction in the form of a whole wave of military-authoritarian regimes that swept to power in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. The mobilization of peasants, workers, the indigenous, and other marginalized groups provoked a revolt by the elites and the middle class, who then turned to the military for support. Samuel Huntington weighed in with an important book at the time,<sup>9</sup> indicating that, instead of social mobilization,

we should concentrate on building strong institutions of stability, such as political parties, bureaucracies, and government agencies. The issue was again joined: what counts more in development—economic growth, culture, social change, or institutions?

Freudian psychoanalysis was another of the great social science breakthroughs, or Grand Theories, of the twentieth century, comparable to Marxism in the nineteenth. By this time it is widely accepted that we act and behave in part as a result of unconscious or subconscious forces of which we are only barely aware. But Freud and his followers said more than that; they claimed to have discovered a new *science* of behavior, another Grand Theory comparable to economics or sociology.

But is psychoanalysis a science? Recent analysis has focused more on Freud's biases than on his contributions. What were his prejudices? Were his patients really representative of humankind? How did his biases influence his supposed "science"? How did Freud and his successors seek to meet these challenges? Our assessment in this chapter seeks to analyze what is left today of psychoanalysis. We try to distinguish what is useful from what is not so useful in his Grand Theory. What can be salvaged and where does psychoanalysis now fit in with these other Grand Theories as a major paradigm for understanding human behavior?

Institutionalism or institutional analysis is a rising approach in political science. There is the "old institutionalism," largely focused on such formal-legal structures as the constitution, the workings of government institutions, and the laws, and the "new institutionalism" that includes a much broader spectrum of subjects, such as political parties, interest groups, even public opinion and political culture. Many institutionalists believe their Grand Theory encompasses the entire discipline, but they can only reach that goal by having such a broad definition that, like the proverbial kitchen sink, it includes everything and every other approach. Is culture really an "institution," now subsumed under the institutional approach, or is it a quite distinct approach and Grand Theory of its own, with, like institutionalism, its own claims to preeminence as an explanatory device? Is the institutional approach exercising "imperialist" or "hegemonic" claims over the rest of the discipline by incorporating everything in its ranks to such an extent that it has now rendered the term "institutionalism" meaningless? Should we not, instead, see culture and institutions interacting separately in all sorts of complex ways, with culture shaping how institutions operate and institutions in turn changing culture over the long term?

From institutionalism we move to its twin, or offshoot, depending on which theorist you ask—rational choice theory. Rational choice (or "Rat

Choice,” as it is sometimes called) has its origins in economic theory and the assumption of a rational, calculating, self-interested individual. As adopted in political science, the assumption is that voters, political parties, parliaments, even armies and guerrilla groups operate from the same calculating, self-interested perspective. Much of the debate in the subfield of comparative politics, where rational choice has had less influence than in other areas of the discipline, is whether that approach is universal across cultures and applies in all times and places. If it does not, then culture again becomes important as an explanatory device; but if it does, then rational choice may lay claim to being the one explanation of behavior for which political science has long been searching.

As social scientists, we are used to going back a century and more to Marx, Comte, Durkheim, and Weber for concepts, insights, and alternative Grand Theories. Or to the sixteenth century (Landes, Braudel), since that is when (1) Europe and “the West” forged ahead of other areas, and (2) some of the main differences began appearing between Northwest Europe (Protestant, Enlightened, entrepreneurial, rationalist, modern) and South or East Europe (lagging behind). But now social scientists like Jared Diamond<sup>10</sup> are pushing us back even farther (10,000 years) to the very origins of humankind. He argues that the determining factors were actually climate, geography, rainfall, topography, latitude, longitude, and what he calls the east-west or north-south “axis.” Diamond’s best-selling books seem to advance a geographic determinist perspective, but toward the end he has some curious passages in which he seems to be saying that it is really culture and human agency that are all-important. We await a further explanation from Professor Diamond.

If Diamond takes us back 10,000 years, Edward Wilson and his fellow sociobiologists want us to go back millions more.<sup>11</sup> Wilson is a specialist in ants, most particularly in the rising scientific field of genetics, inheritance, evolution, and behavior. Wilson believes, backed by a wealth of scientific data in recent decades, that it is “all,” or mostly, in our genes and genetic makeup. In the nature versus nurture debate, Wilson’s evidence puts him solidly on the side of nature, genes, and inherited traits in explaining human behavior, although he is smart enough to acknowledge that culture, society, and environmental factors also play a role and that our genetic makeup can be altered over time. But if it is “all,” or mostly, in our genes, what happens to all those social programs since the New Deal and the Great Society aimed at raising people up “by the bootstraps”?

Ah, therein lies the rub, and that is why Wilson and sociobiology have been so strongly attacked. For if Wilson is correct, then most

of those social programs are fruitless or nearly so, since you cannot more than marginally change your genetic makeup, your IQ, or your capabilities. Wilson's Grand Theory challenges the myth that every little child, by hard work and diligence, can grow up to be president or at least successful. Instead, you are "stuck" with the genetic makeup you have and cannot much alter it. But this is unacceptable on political grounds to those who believe in social engineering; it has also subjected Wilson to the charge of "racism." Here, then, we have a Grand Theory that has become especially sensitive politically, that is supercharged with controversy, and that is a lightning rod for protests and demonstrations. So much so that some people would rather not talk about it at all, even going so far as to ban the subject matter; but that is hardly a scientifically acceptable posture although it may be politically acceptable.

Wilson and the sociobiologists would have us go back millions of years, but recent experimentation in chemistry and physics would take us back still further, to the very origins of cells and organic matter. Going a step beyond, or before, sociobiology, chemists, and physicists are now saying we are all just a bundle of chemicals, nerve endings, and electrical impulses. Talk about demeaning! Not only do humans have no souls, or at least none that can be discovered by scientific measures, but we have no free will, no reasoning power, or capacity to make decisions either. All we are is a bunch of cells, or organic matter, with chemical and electrical reactions going on inside. This may strike us as a joyless "Grand Theory," but the response from the chemists and physicists would be that even "joy" is an artificial construct that has no basis in the science that they are doing.

The natural scientists, in short, the biologists, chemists, and physicists, are increasingly imposing on our social science turf. And they are doing that with research tools—the laboratory, experimentation, DNA, the scientific method—that are much more sophisticated than any available to economics, sociology, or political science. Their arguments are that modern science and our decoded DNA show us to be not much different from other organisms: ants (Wilson), chimps, mountain gorillas, just a mass of protoplasm.

So what do we make of this research? Does it leave you uncomfortable? For the line between nature (genes) and nurture (environment) seems to be shifting toward the nature side. More and more features, we are discovering, including both intelligence and proclivity to disease, are derived from our genetic makeup. But if it is all or mostly or a lot in our genes, how can reform efforts be justified? Should we just accept what we are and what cannot be changed very much? And is that not racist

and, if not racist, then certainly discouraging of liberal reform? So should we shut the scientists up? And what kind of open-mindedness is that?

Although both sociobiology and the Grand Theory emanating from chemistry and physics are now finding their way into the political science literature,<sup>12</sup> most of us in the social sciences are not equipped to deal with these kinds of issues. How many of us have gone much beyond Chemistry or Biology 101? We do not know how scientifically to evaluate the newer research or its findings. One perfectly reasonable reaction to this new genetic and DNA research is to say that it is beyond my capacity, it goes too far back in time, and that I have no social science terms to deal with it. Another reaction, as is becoming increasingly more prevalent, might be for political scientists to retrain in the relevant natural sciences. Whatever we do, it seems clear that research findings and Grand Theory from biology, chemistry, and physics will increasingly impact the social sciences.

We now step forward in time again to deal with a new global phenomenon: the worldwide “wave” of democracy that has swept over many areas. In one sense, this subject is an extension of the earlier discussion of developmentalism, for at many levels the recent transitions to democracy theories represent a working out of the developmentalist models set forth earlier by Rostow, Lipset, and Almond. And at this stage, I am not sure if the by-now quite extensive literature on transitions to democracy can be elevated to the level of Grand Theory. It is an important development and phenomenon, but is it Grand Theory? Maybe it can properly be considered a part of some other Grand Theory.

Finally, we have a chapter on indigenous or non-Western theories and models of change. It is striking that all the Grand Theories and Ideologies considered so far derive from the Western tradition and the Western experience of development. This includes Marxism, positivism, liberalism, and all the rest. One solution to this problem is to assert and seek to demonstrate that all these theories have *universal* relevance. That what works in one country or a group of countries, like democracy, civil rights, or human rights, is equally valid in all other societies. I myself, as a comparative politics specialist, do not believe that for a moment and have devoted a considerable amount of academic and policy writing to the subject.<sup>13</sup> A full exploration of this subject would require a full book (or books) and not just one chapter. But we want to introduce the theme here as a way of indicating that in Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and other non-Western traditions of thought there may be at least as much and as interesting Grand Theory as there is in the West.

## THE BOOK: A LOOK AHEAD

Each of these Grand Theories and Ideologies is treated in successive chapters in the book. Each of these Grand Theories and Ideologies is evaluated in its own terms. A common outline is used for treating each of these grand theories. For each of these we will want to know the background of the theory, the development of the concept(s), the main spokesmen and ideas, the different schools of thought, the contributors of the theory, as well as its biases and limitations. Each chapter then concludes with an overall assessment of that particular Grand Theory or Ideology.

That itself makes for a fine and interesting book, but we want to do more than that. First, while each of these Grand Theories and Ideologies is considered as a separate subject area and a distinct body of thought, are there also interesting relations between them? For example, the new institutionalism and rational choice theories seem to be related in many interesting ways, so do psychoanalysis and political culture studies, the biology and chemical bases of society, and development theory and its Marxian and sociological roots. Is it possible, therefore, to combine and reconcile some of these Grand Theories and Ideologies in ways that are richer as well as more parsimonious than continuing to treat them as wholly separate theories?

A second frontier is to do multivariate analysis. Can we decide, using statistical evaluations, which of these theories carries more explanatory power and by how much? My own orientation is to see in all these Grand Theories the possibilities for complex multicausality, and I am quite comfortable with that way of viewing the world. But it may also be possible, using statistical measures, to say that development, for example, is due by such-and-such a percentage to economic factors, by such and such to sociological factors, by such and such to geography, and by another percentage to culture. To be able to quantify all these factors and then run a multivariate analysis would be quite an accomplishment and would doubtless generate its own set of controversies; nevertheless it is not beyond the realm of statistical and methodological possibilities.

A third possibility is that one of the Grand Theories or Ideologies examined here emerges as dominant among all the others or is able to incorporate the other explanations and approaches into its own ranks. There are several claimants to that throne: certainly Marxian theory makes such a claim, so do some cultural explanations, as well as some sociological theories, and the environmental claims of Diamond. Rational choice has conquered some political science departments,

while institutionalism has by now reached out in its hegemonic ways to encompass virtually everything else within the discipline. And certainly, sociobiology as well as chemistry and physics, if one wants to go back that far, lay claim to being at the root of it all. I personally remain skeptical that any one single-cause explanation can capture all of the world's incredible diversity and complexity within one all-encompassing Grand Theory or Ideology, but I am open-minded and could be convinced.

Meantime Grand Theory or Ideology is an exciting and important subject area and a vigorous debate with major implications. At this stage we urge you to read on; in the concluding chapter we return to many of these main themes, seek to assess where we and our main Grand Theories and Ideologies are now, and maybe even try to achieve that overarching synthesis hinted at here.

## CHAPTER 1



# DEVELOPMENTALISM THEN AND NOW: THE ORIGINS AND RESURGENCE OF AN ENDURING GRAND THEORY

*Kelley Johnson*

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the Grand Theory known as developmentalism. Named for its emphasis on the process of economic, social, and political development across the world, developmentalism's philosophical roots date back to ancient Greece and the Enlightenment, but also include early twentieth-century historians and post-World War II academics and policy-makers. Currently, the developmentalist school of thought involves a number of academics, policy-makers, and American and international institutions.

Developmentalism's core assumptions are that economic development is necessary and that economics drives social and political progress. More specifically, economic development (via capitalism) should propel a society away from its "traditional" (i.e., tribal or clan-based) structure toward a more "modern" configuration. As society is transformed it will, according to developmentalism, create movements in the political sphere that will eventually coalesce as democracy. Developmentalist scholars argue that this progression is good, that it should be encouraged, and that this sequence will be observed across cultures.

This chapter explores the origins of developmentalism's ideas, the advent of developmentalism in comparative politics, the main



spokesmen, other contributors, the decline of developmentalism, the resurgence of developmentalism as the Washington Consensus, the most recent advocates of the theory, its contributions to comparative politics, its limitations, and its overall value as a Grand Theory.

## BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY

The philosophical foundations of developmentalism are found in the generations of ruminations on the ideas of “progress,” “development,” and “advancement.” These concepts have been questioned, analyzed, and critiqued by ancient Greek philosophers, religious scholars, Enlightenment thinkers, twentieth-century scholars, and modern-day political scientists and policy-makers. This section focuses on the early musings on development by scholars who preceded the modern-day political scientists and policy-makers; it focuses on the vibrant flow of ideas that paved the way for the Grand Theory of developmentalism.

Scholars like J. B. Bury (1920) and Robert Nisbet (1980) have traced the evolution of the “idea of progress” from the time of ancient Greece until the twentieth (and twenty-first) century.<sup>1</sup> They address questions such as the following: If development means progress and advancement, how can progress be measured, and what are societies advancing toward? While a society may change, it may not always be developing. Bury, using some now-unacceptable terminology, says a society moving away from a “low, savage state” is progress. As a society evolves, digression back into “savagery” and “backwardness” does not constitute progress. Nisbet says, “Simply stated, the idea of progress holds that mankind has advanced in the past—from some aboriginal condition of primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity—is now advancing, and will continue to advance through the foreseeable future.”<sup>2</sup> Development is the slow, gradual, and continuous movement toward a future goal. The goal is multifaceted and broad: to pursue knowledge, to ensure humankind’s future on earth, and to make humanity as happy as possible (physically, emotionally, and spiritually). The Enlightenment, and subsequent analyses of progress, brought a restored confidence in human capabilities to achieve that goal.

Bury contends that Christianity (and related afterlife-minded religions) are anathema to progress, because, he argues, progress derives its values from the society-wide expectation of an *unlimited* future for humankind on earth. Christian ideas of original sin, an afterlife, or Armageddon should hinder a society’s desire for constant, stage-by-stage, advancement by convincing individuals that life on earth is not of primary concern. Nisbet, on the other hand, argues that Christian principles

share (with Greek philosophy) the philosophical underpinnings of the idea of progress. Christianity says God has ordained humans to live and survive on earth, so out of necessity and obedience we will endeavor to pursue knowledge, to ensure our future on earth, and to make ourselves as happy as possible. In essence, the philosophical underpinnings of developmentalism emphasize knowledge, study, hard work, industry, rationality, individualism, and education.<sup>3</sup>

Societies are expected to always have an eye on the future, to continuously pursue new knowledge, to desire beneficial changes to the status quo, and to search for material, emotional, and spiritual happiness. However, there is a catch: the philosophical roots of this theory come from the Enlightenment, Christian Biblical principles, and largely American and Western European scholars. While these ideas of progress, development, and advancement were thought to apply to societies in general, there was little attention paid to an important historical detail: most societies outside of the West (North America and Western Europe) do not have this legacy of Christianity or the Enlightenment and have neither heard the names nor the ideas of J. B. Bury and Robert Nisbet. Nevertheless, the same stage-by-stage progression and development over time was expected to be universally valid.

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

Although the philosophical foundations of developmentalism had existed for some time, the contemporary theory of development in comparative politics emerged only in the 1950s. In the early decades of the 1900s, the emphasis among comparative scholars was on the formal institutions and legal processes at work in various state governments. Stable and well-defined laws, constitutions, and government procedures were found almost exclusively in the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, most, if not all, of the early comparative political scientists originated from these areas and studied only these areas. This formal-legal approach (also known as “old institutionalism”) was not unimportant, but made significant contributions to scholarship and generated valuable knowledge regarding constitutions, procedure, and law.

However, the formal-legal approach was not equipped to explain the world that existed after World War II. The first major crack in the formal-legal approach was Roy Macridis’s *The Study of Comparative Government* (1955).<sup>4</sup> He lowered the boom at old institutionalism: first, he said the approach was fundamentally noncomparative; second, it was purely descriptive in that it primarily chronicled laws

and procedures; third, it was parochial due to its inherent exclusion of non-Western areas; and fourth, it was static and unable to respond to changes in the world's political sphere. Macridis then offered what comparative politics *should* be: genuinely comparative, analytical rather than descriptive, open to all regions and government types, and a dynamic field that can evolve as the international system evolves. The agitation for a major shift to studying non-Western nations began at the end of World War II and continued through the 1950s. In tandem with Macridis's accurate, yet damning, critique, Wiarda explains seven additional reasons for the decline of the formal-legal approach and the shifting focus to developing nations.<sup>5</sup>

First, political scientists had begun to emphasize the informal aspects of politics (such as interest groups or patronage networks) rather than the formal aspects (like constitutional procedures). Informal political processes are decidedly important in developing countries, because their formal structures are often gravely ineffective.

A second reason for the interest in developing countries was that the number of new nations more than doubled in the 1940s through the early 1960s. World War II spawned a number of new states, while the end of colonialism birthed even more. Political scientists were energized by the many opportunities for new research and new insights.

Third, the focus on developing nations, and later on developmentalist theory, was encouraged by former colonial powers. They preferred the developmentalist approach, which emphasized progress toward economic development and democracy, because they hoped that by following this sequence their prior colonies would remain (or become) friendly allies. Fourth, since developmentalism emerged during the Cold War, the U.S. government supported developmentalism's ideas as a strategy to prevent communism from taking hold in other nations. The logic was to cultivate more economically successful, more democratic societies that would be less vulnerable to the Soviet Union's influence (and that would remember that the United States aided them).

Fifth, academia was changing: the social science disciplines, such as anthropology, political science, sociology, and even economics were merging and evolving. Hybrid fields of study emerged, such as political sociology and political economy, which became useful for understanding the developing world. Sixth, academic researchers were just plain excited about the possibilities in unexplored nations and ideas. Seventh, modern jet travel and other technological innovations opened up greater research opportunities for scholars.

In sum, developing areas like Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East—places that had generally been ignored in the earlier

formal-legal studies—became the prime focus of comparative politics. Academics and policy-makers were interested in the economic, social, and political development of various polities around the world. Thus, a Grand Theory of developmentalism emerged to explain how non-Western nations could become more developed. Relying on the philosophical foundations that they knew so well, the West began to push for underdeveloped, non-Western nations to progress and modernize. Developmentalist thinkers focused on how to help poor countries break free from backwardness and grow into economically successful (and democratic) states.

### MAIN SPOKESMEN AND IDEAS

Following the advent of academic and policy interest in developing nations in the 1940s and 1950s, developmentalism as a Grand Theory in comparative politics was finally articulated. Economists were the first to clearly define the developmentalist theory, and sociologists and political scientists followed. W. W. Rostow, S. M. Lipset, and Gabriel Almond, among others, generated the most important scholarship on developmentalism.

The key individual in developmentalist economics is named after a famous American poet and is the figure most associated with developmentalist policy-making. Walt Whitman Rostow held numerous government and academic positions: he taught at Oxford, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and eventually, at the University of Texas. During World War II he was a member of the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency), and after the war he worked on the Marshall Plan. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson appointed him to various positions, including that of the national security advisor under Johnson, allowing him a prominent role in Vietnam War decisions. Rostow designed the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and the Alliance for Progress. His influence in academia and the policy world is still felt today.

Rostow, in *The Stages of Economic Growth*,<sup>6</sup> proposed that there are five stages through which nations progress in the process of economic growth from traditional to modern society. Across cultures, each society should be able to fall into one of the five categories. The first stage, “traditional society,” is primarily based on subsistence agriculture, kinship ties, and pre-Newtonian technology. In the second stage, the “preconditions for take-off,” external influences infiltrate society and push it out of the traditional category by

bringing in modern agricultural practices and newer technologies. Banks, capital, and investment appear. Trade expands and modern manufacturing arises. The traditional elements still exist, but there is a shift in social and political values in favor of modernization. In the third stage, the “take-off,” traditional elements are overcome, steady growth is normal, new industries expand, urbanization occurs, and agriculture is commercialized.

During the fourth stage, the “drive to maturity,” economic progress is sustained even if it has brief moments of fluctuation. The economy finds its place in international markets, and increases and improves the application of technology. Maturity is attained when the economy proves that it can produce anything it chooses to, and is not restricted to the industries it had during the “take-off.” The fifth and last stage, the “age of high mass consumption,” was first reached by the United States, according to Rostow. This stage is marked by leading sectors of the economy shifting toward durable consumer goods and services. Incomes per capita are high enough that the average person can afford more than their basic needs. The composition of the workforce changes to more urban, service-oriented sectors with more skilled factory jobs. Also, surplus tax revenue generated in societies at the stage of “high mass consumption” is used for social welfare and security.

Rostow’s stages of economic growth are assumed to apply to any developing or developed nation. A student of world politics could spin a globe, let her finger land on any country, and determine which of Rostow’s stages fits the country’s current circumstances. In essence, he argues that traditional societies, when confronted with pressures to modernize, will shed their backwardness and begin mobilizing toward greater economic diversity and greater social integration. As more economic growth occurs (by way of free trade and open markets), the country will overcome inefficient traditions in favor of a chance at maturity and high mass consumption. Concurrently with capitalist economic growth and social change, the need and desire for democratic governance will arise. Certainly, he may be right about the sequencing in Western developed nations. By and large, they did follow this path—particularly his own country, the United States. However, applying this sequence of events in a non-Western context eventually resulted in major challenges to developmentalism.

Rostow and other economists, including Karl Polanyi,<sup>7</sup> Everett von Hagen,<sup>8</sup> and Bruce Morris,<sup>9</sup> were some of the first contributors to the developmentalist school of thought. But sociologists quickly added their expertise to the literature, arguing that economic growth would inevitably produce social modernization and lead to

democracy. Talcott Parsons gave us “pattern variables” that were used as a background for much of sociology’s scholarship during the developmentalist wave.<sup>10</sup> He compared traditional and modern societies, and suggested the following characteristics for each society: first, traditional societies are based on ascription (the social hierarchy is based on family or tribe), while modern societies are based on merit; second, traditional societies are particularistic (closed and limited), while modern societies are universalistic; third, traditional societies are functionally diffuse (political, military, economic, social functions are often performed by one entity), while modern societies are functionally specific (a different entity performs each type of function).

Seymour Martin Lipset<sup>11</sup> (1959) built from Parson’s pattern variables to focus, in *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*,<sup>12</sup> on the social and organizational factors necessary for democracy to develop. He argues that the following factors seem necessary for a democracy to arise: industrialization, urbanization, better education, and higher overall wealth. Further, Lipset said two factors particularly influence the stability of a democracy: economic development and legitimacy. Again, we see the argument that economic development is a necessary prerequisite for social and political development.

Lipset focused in more detail on how economic development changes the social structure. In less developed societies, the system of social stratification looks like a pyramid, with a small number of elites dominating a very large lower class. Lipset argued that economic development changes the social structure to a diamond shape, rather than a pyramid, with a large middle class outnumbering the very rich and the very poor. In countries with a large middle class, Lipset contends, the poor are less likely to radicalize and the citizens are less likely to favor communism. In essence, economic development and social restructuring (to a large middle class) will reduce the propensity for conflict and will facilitate the transition to democracy in a given country.

Karl Deutsch, another political sociologist, was similarly interested in the transition from traditional to modern societies. His essay “Social Mobilization and Political Development,”<sup>13</sup> in 1961, concluded that as people are exposed to modernity, they will mobilize and pressure their traditional social structures to provide services. If these services are not provided, peasants, workers, and the middle class will begin to mobilize. They will pressure the traditional society until it is unable to sustain the pressure, and the society will give way to modernization and democracy.

Across disciplines, the developmentalist literature had begun to reflect the consensus that economic development (via capitalism)

produces greater social integration (and a middle class) that leads to democracy. And Protestantism certainly does not hurt the process, with its emphasis on determination and hard work.

In addition to the economists and sociologists, political scientists added to the theoretical foundation of developmentalism. Gabriel Almond was the key political scientist in developmentalism's heyday. His hailed masterpiece, *The Politics of Developing Areas*,<sup>14</sup> was unfortunately based on a dirty little secret: Almond had never actually visited a developing country prior to writing about the politics supposedly found there. James S. Coleman was the coauthor of the book, but did not seem to receive as much credit or blame. He was a sociologist and is actually more famous for his studies on racial segregation and integration of schools. Nevertheless, *The Politics of Developing Areas* is one of the best-known works of developmentalism.

Almond and Coleman used Parson's "pattern variables" and David Easton's "systems theory"<sup>15</sup> (inputs go into government decisions that create outputs) to form their theory of "structural-functionalism." They argued that all societies have similar structures and similar functions, just different ways of organizing and performing them. To bolster the structural-functionalist argument, Almond and Coleman described how all polities should work. First, all polities have inputs that go into the political structure. They are: political socialization (the process through which citizens develop political attitudes, usually via family, church, school, etc.), interest articulation (the way citizens articulate political interests or claims), interest aggregation (how similarly interested citizens bring their interests together), and political communication (how the system communicates from outputs back into inputs). Second, after inputs flow into the political system, all societies have three types of structures for processing them (called outputs): rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication. Outputs come out of the system in the form of public policies. Almond and Coleman argued that this system of inputs and outputs can be observed across cultures.

Political scientists like Almond, who contributed to the developmentalist literature, echoed the economists' and sociologists' ideas of universality. That is, developmentalism meant that in all social science disciplines, the process of economic, social, and political change would happen essentially the same way even in non-Western contexts. Almond's theory of structural-functionalism implied that since all societies have parallel structures and functions, all will be able to follow the stages of growth from traditional to modern.

At few times in the history of comparative politics have we seen such a marriage of the academic and policy worlds. Especially in

the United States, developmentalism had a huge impact intellectually as well as at the policy level. The 1950s and 1960s were a time of hope—a time that people were convinced that economic development was the key to social modernization and democratic politics. The Cold War was the primary concern of U.S. policy-makers, who considered developmentalism a good way to spread democracy and thus contain communism. Rostow even titled his book *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*.

An example of this integration of academia and policy-making is the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (CCP/SSRC). Funded by the Ford Foundation and others, this Committee came together to commission and produce studies on development across the world. Almond chaired the CCP/SSRC, which brought over 200 scholars together and was responsible for an exponential increase in developmentalist literature and policy recommendations. The U.S. government took these publications and recommendations seriously, and used them to guide many foreign policy decisions.

Another sign of the marriage of the academic and policy worlds is the role Rostow played in the structure of U.S. financial assistance to other countries. U.S. policy-makers wanted to help underdeveloped countries without sacrificing strategic security interests. Rostow's plans for the United States' Agency for International Development (USAID) offered the perfect solution. USAID was created in 1961 by the Foreign Assistance Act, which separated all foreign assistance programs into military and nonmilitary aid.<sup>16</sup> USAID, the nonmilitary aid, is explicitly focused on encouraging economic growth abroad, as long as the recipient countries are working toward democracy. Recall that Rostow's five stages of economic growth predict that after enough money is pumped into a country, the economy will shake loose from its traditional inefficiencies and take off to modernization. Also recall the assumption that as the economy modernizes, social change and democracy will inevitably follow. The U.S. government, through the work of USAID, intended to encourage market capitalism and democratic policies in developing countries by making its aid conditional on cooperation with those goals. One of the first programs USAID embarked upon in 1961 was the Alliance for Progress, also influenced by Rostow's theory of economic growth. The Alliance for Progress focused specifically on Latin America's underdevelopment, and had as its goals both development and the prevention of communist takeovers.

Also in developmentalism's heyday came the creation of the Peace Corps. Established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, the Peace



Corps has three goals: helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served, and helping promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.<sup>17</sup> The Peace Corps concentrates on development projects and carries on the idea of progress as it works to improve conditions in underdeveloped countries. It is both idealistic and conducive to U.S. policy goals.

The 1950s and '60s were a time when the Western ideas of progress and development were adopted into the academic literature and put into practice via government policy decisions. Developmentalism swept economics, sociology, and political science, and led to the creation of the CCP/SSRC, USAID, the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, involvement in the Vietnam War, and regional development banks in the non-West. People genuinely believed, as Rostow had argued, that if poor countries could just get enough money and investment, then their economies would grow, their social structures would modernize, their political systems would democratize, and their population would reap great benefits from the changes. And, not by accident, the goal of anticommunism would be served as well.

### A DIFFERENT SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Although most developmentalist literature echoed similar claims, *The Great Ascent*<sup>18</sup> by Robert Heilbroner is not the same cookie-cutter developmentalist argument as presented by Rostow, Lipset, and Almond. Heilbroner was actually an outspoken socialist for much of his career, though later in life he wrote that capitalism had triumphed over socialism. Before he admitted capitalism had bested the other economic systems, his 1963 volume imagined a "great ascent" toward a future in which the combined forces of economics, society, and politics would shape mankind. He made the argument that economics was not the primary factor in growth and development and that social and political processes are also part of the original equation. Heilbroner agreed that economic development was important, but preferred that the United States and the West not insist that it be undertaken as a form of democratic capitalism. He said that to really help developing countries we must understand *their* perspective on *their* development, not *our* perspective on *their* development.

In contrast to much of the developmentalist literature, and especially in contrast to policy-makers like Rostow, Heilbroner advocated development without the requirement that it be done through

capitalism and democracy. His argument, although vastly less popular than Rostow's, may prove to be the stronger one. This is especially true when considering the critiques of developmentalism presented in the following section.

## THE DECLINE OF DEVELOPMENTALISM

Faced with better transportation and technology, the proliferation of new countries born from the 1940s to the 1960s, and the expectations of progress based on developmentalist theory, many comparative political scientists went out to non-Western regions in the 1960s and '70s to see what was happening. They went to see how the structural-functionalist theories, the stages of economic growth, and the pattern variables would play out in the non-West. They went to see how economic aid and efforts at economic development were affecting countries across the world. By the late 1960s, researchers began echoing a different consensus than they had in the past; they began to argue that developmentalism is flawed.

Wiarda, in *Introduction to Comparative Politics*, elaborates on twelve reasons that the Grand Theory of developmentalism declined in the late 1960s. First, as alluded to in the previous paragraph, much of the developmentalist literature was written by Western (often American) scholars who had little or no field experience in underdeveloped non-Western regions. When researchers tried to apply the classification schemes (like Parson's pattern variables) to non-Western societies, the literature often could not describe these other societies.

Second, the United States faced a major challenge as the war in Vietnam raged and more Americans were killed. The Vietnam War represented an application of Rostowian policies, in that the U.S. government (and Rostow) expected to be able to install capitalism and democracy and observe the successful development of another country. However, the American public, including political scientists, became more frustrated and more disgusted with the Vietnam War and its failure to unfold as developmentalism had predicted.

Third, in 1968 Samuel P. Huntington published *Political Order in Changing Societies*,<sup>19</sup> which made a formidable case against developmentalism. Recall that developmentalism predicts that economic growth, social mobilization, and democracy will work together to produce a successful polity. In contrast, Huntington argued that rapid economic growth and social mobilization will produce great *instability* rather than stability. Fourth, and related to Huntington's argument, developmentalism assumed that traditional elements would

fade away as the desire for modernity became more salient. However, in most developing countries traditional aspects were not fading: in fact, traditional institutions (like tribes and castes) were very resilient to the pressures for change.

Fifth, many scholars began to call developmentalism ethnocentric. They realized that the philosophical foundations of the theory were based only on the West's historical experience. Further, particular policy prescriptions for non-Western countries were derived from the West's pattern of development. Sixth, and related to the former point, the world was very different in the 1960s from what it used to be in the earlier decades and centuries when the Western world had developed. Developmentalism made largely the same predictions for underdeveloped countries in the 1950s and 1960s that it had for developing countries in the 1700s and 1800s. Political scientists realized that in such a fast-paced, technologically advanced, integrated world as the present, development would surely be different.

Seventh, the sequence of development (i.e., Rostow's stage-by-stage progression) could not be exactly replicated in the non-Western world. Underdeveloped countries in the twentieth century did not have the time to develop that the Western world had had in earlier centuries. The slow, determined progress that Rostow predicted was not as practical or realistic in a world where people desired quick economic, social, and political success. Eighth, and related to the former critique, developmentalism expected that as money was injected into a country, the economy would develop and other social and political changes would take place. However, some scholars argued that this created false expectations and unrealistic goals for underdeveloped nations; in particular, it did not take into account the conflict and violence that often resulted from economic, social, and political change.

Ninth, many scholars criticized the methodology of developmentalism. Specifically, political scientists questioned the wisdom of, for example, using Parson's pattern variables or Almond's structural-functionalism to apply to all societies across all cultures. Tenth, Almond's Committee, the CCP/SSRC, included and published scholars who generally agreed with the core assumptions of developmentalism. They did not include enough varying perspectives and were not able to keep developmentalism salient when the criticism started mounting.

Especially in the policy world, an eleventh criticism arose: U.S. aid and efforts at developing poorer countries often ruined traditional structures that had historically governed these nations. Critics said developmentalist policies were doing more harm than good by disrupting known structures, creating instability and conflict, and taking

away possible partners for further development. Also, economic aid often went to harsh leaders or military groups who ruled oppressively, pocketed the aid money, and ignored the general development goals that policy-makers intended to encourage. Twelfth, some critics even argued that all this development “nonsense” was a strategy for the United States to keep its position of international power and to continue dominating and controlling the Third World.

In sum, by the end of the 1960s, comparative politics was frustrated and dissatisfied with developmentalism as a Grand Theory.<sup>20</sup> Sidney Verba eloquently characterized the decline of developmentalism:

In the old days graduate students might have gone into the field as barefoot empiricists. Today they go equipped with elaborate systems models. These models are important as part of the intellectual equipment of the students of political systems, but they are not exactly appropriate footgear to replace the barefoot empiricism. To extend the metaphor: the barefoot empiricists didn't know where they might step; the recent students have trouble getting their feet on the ground.<sup>21</sup>

So, in the late 1960s and 1970s, new Grand Theories arose to try to explain what developmentalism could not explain. These subsequent theories, like dependency theory, state-society relations, and political economy, are discussed in the chapters that follow. It is important to recognize, though, that the policy world did not necessarily share the academics' shift away from developmentalism. However, this is not the end of developmentalism's story in academia or policy. In the 1980s and 1990s, similar notions of economic, social, and political development gained prominence in the academic and policy worlds. This resurgence of developmentalism is explained in the following sections.

## THE RESURGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTALISM AS THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

Recall that developmentalism emphasizes the importance of economic growth that spurs, then works in tandem with, social and political change. Recall that developmentalist theorists predicted that, regardless of whether a country was Western or non-Western, the fundamental process of change from traditional to modern society was universally possible. Recall that scholars expected economic growth to be a necessary and supportive condition for democracy to develop. These expectations and predictions were not well supported in the 1960s and 1970s when fledgling democracies in Africa and Latin America, for example, were overwhelmed by a wave of military-authoritarian

regimes. However, disappointment began to wane in the 1980s and 1990s, and hope revived again as developmentalism's expectations began to be observed in various parts of the world.

In the late 1980s and on into the 1990s the expected correlations between economic growth, social mobilization, and democracy began actually to correlate in various regions of the world. Brazil, Mexico, and much of Latin America, for example, experienced striking economic growth that began, by the late 1970s and '80s, to produce democratic breakthroughs. Further, many other developing countries transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy, bolstering developmentalism's claim that economic development will eventually lead to social change and democracy. The most surprising and successful developers were Japan and the Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), who sprinted ahead (economically) of all other developing nations in the late 1980s and 1990s and then democratized as well.

In response to the growing number of success stories apparent in developing countries, combined with the discrediting, decline, and collapse of many alternative authoritarian and Leninist regimes, scholars and policy-makers were again energized by developmentalism's core ideas. Although developmentalism's predictions had not been borne out in the short term, this Grand Theory would possibly still prove right in the long term. So, academics and policy-makers again merged their ideas into a reincarnated form of developmentalism that was termed the "Washington Consensus."

The Washington Consensus, like developmentalism, is an agreement in the Western world of how countries should best pursue development. The core principles of the original developmentalism remained intact in the Washington Consensus—economic growth via open markets and free trade (capitalism) would shake loose the burdens of traditional society and push a country toward modernity. Social mobilization will eventually follow and the population will desire and work for democracy. Like developmentalism of the 1950s and '60s, the Washington Consensus considered capitalism and democracy unquestionable needs in each and every developing country. Since the Cold War was ending and communism and socialism were discredited across the globe, many argued that capitalism and democracy were now the "only game in town."

The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 by John Williamson, an economist,<sup>22</sup> although the consensus was actually worked out at a meeting of the United States and (mainly) Latin American countries in Washington, DC. The term reflects the Consensus members, who include U.S. academics and policy-makers,

American think tanks, and international economic institutions based in, or highly influenced by, the United States.

In Williamson's initial explanation of the Washington Consensus he laid out ten policy prescriptions for developing countries. First, fiscal discipline was to be adopted because large and sustained fiscal deficits contribute to inflation and capital flight. Therefore, governments should keep them to a minimum. Second, subsidies need to be reduced or eliminated. Government spending should be redirected toward education, health, and infrastructure development. Third, the tax base "should be broad," and marginal tax rates "should be moderate." Fourth, domestic financial markets should determine a country's interest rates. Positive real interest rates discourage capital flight and increase savings. Fifth, developing countries must adopt a "competitive" exchange rate that will bolster exports by making them cheaper abroad. Sixth, tariffs should be minimized and should never be applied toward intermediate goods needed to produce exports. Seventh, foreign investment can bring in needed capital and skills and should, therefore, be encouraged. Eighth, private industry operates more efficiently because managers either have a direct personal stake in the profits of an enterprise or are accountable to those who do. State-owned enterprises ought to be privatized. Ninth, excessive government regulation can promote corruption and discriminate against smaller enterprises that have minimal access to the higher reaches of the bureaucracy. Governments have to deregulate the economy. And, tenth, property rights must be enforced. Weak laws and poor judicial systems reduce incentives to save and accumulate wealth.

These exact recommendations have changed slightly over time, but the initial ten policy prescriptions represent the ongoing consensus that the best plan for developing countries should include capitalist reforms, often called "neoliberalism," "monetary orthodoxy," "structural adjustment," or "austerity" measures. Democracy is assumed to follow close behind, as a country stabilizes its economy.

The most parsimonious conceptualization of the Washington Consensus is provided by Wiarda in *Political Development in Emerging Nations*. He delineates three basic elements of the Consensus: first, human rights and democracy; second, free trade and economic integration; and third, open markets and privatization (or capitalism/neoliberalism). These fundamental assumptions were (and, arguably, are still) shared by the U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and USAID. Other countries have had little choice but to follow neoliberal economic programs because the IMF and the World

Bank have conditioned their loans on the adoption of Washington Consensus–inspired policies.

The manifestations of the Washington Consensus have been significant and numerous. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), effective since January 1, 1994, has been a substantial factor in U.S., Canadian, and Mexican relations since its inception. As evidenced by the creation and continuation of NAFTA, the Consensus was a force to be reckoned with in the policy world. Negotiations for other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have come out of the Consensus, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Middle Eastern Free Trade Area (MEFTA) that President George W. Bush proposed in 2003.<sup>23</sup>

The Washington Consensus is very much like the first era of developmentalism, but as a reincarnation it is more directed, more specific, and, arguably, more aggressive. Instead of making broad historical arguments like Rostow, Lipset, or Almond do, Consensus members accepted that logic, then added particular actions that should be followed in each and every underdeveloped country. Each struggling state must deregulate its economy—meaning the state should step back and let the “invisible hand” of the market guide the economy. Each country should control inflation and reduce the budget deficit. Every state should privatize state-owned economic enterprises and every state should curb corruption, wastefulness, and inefficiency (and cut back on subsidized social programs). All countries should seek free trade with other partners and should work toward egalitarian political systems (democracy with human rights protections).

Unfortunately, since the Washington Consensus was based largely on the developmentalist theories of the 1950s and 1960s, many of the same problems and critiques arose. Wiarda outlines the mistaken assumptions of the Washington Consensus in *Political Development in Emerging Nations*. First, the Consensus assumed that a dynamic entrepreneurial class would arise instead of the state dominating the economy. In general, developing countries produced few entrepreneurial groups. Second, the Consensus assumed that financial institutions would arise in developing countries that could help with continued economic growth. The expected institutions often did not arise, or were too weak or corrupt to encourage further development. Third, the Consensus assumed that the middle and lower classes would benefit from neoliberal policies (the “trickle-down” theory) as the wealthier classes grew richer. Often, the middle and lower classes did not reap benefits from neoliberal reforms. Fourth, privatization was supposed to lead to more honesty and efficiency in formerly state-owned industries.

However, corruption, patronage, and inefficiency continued. Fifth, the Consensus assumed that once the right administrative rules and practices were put in place in these economic and political institutions, economic growth would take off. However, new rules often did not affect the institutions' actual behaviors. Finally, the Consensus assumed all countries should, and could, use the same "cookie-cutter" model of development. However, what worked in one place did not necessarily work in another, and, like developmentalism of the 1950s and '60s, non-Western regions were generally not favorable settings for Consensus-inspired policy prescriptions.

Not only were the economic assumptions of the Washington Consensus questioned, but so were the social and political predictions. Democracy has been actively promoted by Washington Consensus supporters as the sister to economic growth. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, although liberal democracy and capitalism were the "only game in town," true liberal democracy was not often found. Many democratic façades came up to please the Consensus members (such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the United States), but "disillusionment with not only the existing government but also the *system* of government (democracy)"<sup>24</sup> has grown. Big questions hang over developmentalism and the Washington Consensus, yet the following section discusses the contributions of developmentalism as a Grand Theory.

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THEORY

Although this chapter has outlined a number of criticisms of developmentalism and the Washington Consensus, this Grand Theory has contributed much to comparative politics and continues to guide many foreign policy decisions. When developmentalism emerged as a relatively coherent theory in the late 1950s, it was the first time that comparative politics actually moved toward what Macridis had called for in 1955: "genuinely comparative, analytical rather than descriptive, open to all regions and government types, and a dynamic field that can evolve as the international system evolves." Developmentalism was the first Grand Theory to incorporate the non-Western world and to take steps to understand how those regions really worked. A *lot* of new research was done in areas that Western political scientists had never really known before—such as Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. This burst of new information and insight pushed the social sciences toward more analyses and better theoretical frameworks.

The developmentalist literature also gave scholars a clearer picture of how the West had developed. It reminded the Americans



and Europeans of why their societies changed, of what they are progressing toward, and of how they could measure advancement and development (in the West, at least). In essence, developmentalism laid out what the Western world has valued and pursued over centuries. It broke down how and when significant changes took place, like Rostow's explanation of the transition from the economic "preconditions for take-off" and the "take-off."

Further, although developmentalism may be criticized for thinking the Western process of development would apply to the non-West, developmentalist scholars were at least hopeful that wealthier, more egalitarian, and democratic polities could arise across the world. Using what they knew, they outlined theories of how economic, social, and political forces had to combine to make the changes they hoped would occur in the Third World. And even today, academics and policy-makers recognize that a certain level of economic development is necessary for many other social and political changes to happen—for example, as economic opportunities increase, family size tends to decrease.

In the policy world, developmentalism has not stopped contributing to foreign policy decisions since the early 1960s. Rostow and his colleagues—the key figures in developmentalism—had their hands in designing agencies like USAID that still operate under the same rationale of actively promoting economic, social, and political development across the world. Certainly, the United States and other Western countries have had strategic goals in mind with their economic development plans for the Third World—to make friendly democratic allies rather than allow communism to take over one domino at a time. But, strategic goals aside, U.S. foreign policy has been guided by developmentalist assumptions since the 1960s, even while academia has moved on to other Grand Theories. And, whether pushing for economic development is strategic or not, working to alleviate miserable poverty and repressive, corrupt governance is not a bad goal (although it has often been pursued in imperfect ways).

Perhaps the endurance of developmentalism in the policy world is responsible for the eventually observed correlations between literacy and democratization, social change and democratization, and economic development and democratization. When the Washington Consensus arose in the 1980s and 1990s, developmentalism's predicted correlations *actually* began to correlate in some countries around the world, giving hope to the promises of Rostow, Almond, Lipset, and others. Scholars once again championed the idea that economic growth, social modernization, and democratization would happen, because those relationships did appear after a time of disappointment in developmentalism.

The academics' revived hope in developmentalism rejoined the policy world, which had been supporting the developmentalist assumptions for decades. USAID, the IMF, regional development banks, the World Bank, and other U.S.-influenced international institutions required countries to pursue neoliberalism for stabilizing their economies and required at least the façade of democracy to show they favored egalitarianism and human rights. Thus, the most lasting contribution of developmentalism (and the Washington Consensus) is its hegemony. Capitalism and democracy are basically the "only game in town." Socialism and communism have been discredited in the developed world. No institution, policy-maker, or career-minded academic can come out and say they do not favor democracy, but would prefer authoritarianism in the developing world. No one can say they do not favor some form of capitalism, or perhaps a mixed form, with at least some free trade, privatization, and open markets. Certainly, capitalism and democracy have staying power and will continue to contribute to the policy world, even as academia finds many flaws with developmentalism as a Grand Theory. The problems with developmentalism are discussed in the following section.

## BIASES AND LIMITATIONS

The biases and limitations of developmentalism and the Washington Consensus can be summed up with one word: ethnocentrism. The assumption is that if the West's sequence of development worked for them, then it should work for other societies too. Developmentalist theorists ignored the "culture" variable, which proved to be a damning error.

Probably, developmentalism's early thinkers did not believe they were making that mistake. Economists in general tend to be uninterested in cultural differences, assuming that the "laws of economics" will hold anywhere. Further, when Rostow wrote his book about the stages of economic growth, he had already been a part of the Marshall Plan that probably influenced many of his colleagues toward developmentalism. The Marshall Plan poured money and resources into European countries that had been devastated by World War II, and saw that Germany, for example, was able to recover economically and grow stronger socially and politically as economic growth continued. However, these original developmentalists failed to acknowledge that redeveloping was easy for European countries that had already developed prior to World War II. Vastly different circumstances faced Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, yet Rostow and his contemporaries did not distinguish between the regions.

Also guilty are the many sociologists and political scientists who, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, wrote about the inner workings of developing countries *without actually visiting a single one*. While the economists could perhaps be forgiven for their lack of cultural sensitivity, sociologists and political scientists committed an inexcusable transgression. How could they assume, as Almond and Coleman did, that all societies have common properties, perform the same functions, have the same inputs and outputs—basically, that all non-Western societies are the same?

To assume that all countries will develop along the same stages from traditional to modern (or traditional to mature to “the age of high mass consumption”) is erroneous. The assumption that economic development via capitalism will create social modernization and democracy has also been challenged, with scholars like Huntington arguing that quick economic and social change creates instability rather than stability and democratization. These biases are the big stumbling blocks that developmentalism must overcome.

Since the decline of developmentalism in the 1960s, we know that culture varies greatly inside and between different regions of the world and that cultural differences have a *huge* impact on development. However, the Washington Consensus again made the ethnocentric mistake of assuming that its policy prescriptions (based on the original developmentalism, but more specific) were the best and universal route to development. Although correlations were observed between literacy, social change, economic development, and democracy, neoliberal structural adjustment often took place at the expense of the already poor people living in underdeveloped countries. While some states’ economies were able to get back on track and become more stable, neoliberal policies tended to leave the poor behind, and democracy has often been a façade for further authoritarianism.

In sum, the most damaging bias of developmentalism and the Washington Consensus is the “West is best” mentality that has intentionally or unintentionally influenced academic theory and policy-making. However, developmentalism has great possibilities as a Grand Theory if it can overcome the lingering ethnocentrism. The following section recommends what we, as political scientists, can get out of developmentalism and how it can prevail over its valid criticisms to become a more salient Grand Theory.

## OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Developmentalism made the egregious mistake of assuming that the Western legacy of economic, social, and political development would

(and should) unfold the same way even in non-Western regions. This assumption casts a pall over developmentalism and the Washington Consensus. However, we should not reject this Grand Theory; rather, we should pull out what can be used and leave the ethnocentrism aside.

Developmentalism's focus on economics provides useful and practical insight into comparative politics. Developmentalist theorists make a good case that economic growth is an important variable in political science phenomena and national development. Research has shown that in poor countries, the lack of economic opportunities often leads to more conflict, more criminal activities, and more social and political unrest. Wiarda says, "Growing popular discontent, massive social and popular movements, frustrated Islamists, vast numbers of unemployed persons, dissatisfied middle classes, peasants squeezed by lower prices for their goods, workers losing jobs, and rising inflation—all of these social and economic frustrations are combining."<sup>25</sup>

Although much of the developing world's dissatisfaction is with particular Washington Consensus policies (like requiring neoliberalism and democratic façades), the central issue is still economic development. Frustration with their economic circumstances is driving the "unemployed persons, dissatisfied middle classes, peasants squeezed by lower prices for their goods, [and] workers losing jobs." Thus, developmentalism is right that economics is an important variable in comparative politics. Economic circumstances or policies can drive people to join rebellions, radical religious groups, or support coups d'état.

Developmentalism is right to focus on economic development as a causal mechanism in comparative politics trends, but the specific directives for achieving development have been the least useful aspect of this Grand Theory. There is nothing wrong with working to rid societies of wretched poverty and oppressive governments. It *is* wrong, however, to assume that the Western way of doing that will, and should, work in all places regardless of cultural differences. Since many U.S. agencies and international institutions were founded on developmentalist assumptions (recall Rostow and USAID), policy-makers have tended to advocate the same fundamental strategies that work in the West for non-Western regions.

Currently, the biggest "West is best" problem is the emphasis on neoliberal economic policies. For decades, the IMF and the World Bank have required that countries undergo structural adjustment to receive any financial assistance; that is, they must open up their markets, deregulate, privatize, and reduce or eliminate obstacles to free trade. Leaders in developing countries often cried out that the neoliberal policies were hurting them, and people in those countries were often

not better off than before the change to capitalism. Nevertheless, the United States (in particular) continued to insist that too much state intervention was bad for an economy, that markets should be open, and that businesses and industries should be privatized.

However, in late 2007 the U.S. economy entered a recession. Banks, mortgage companies, and other financial institutions were drowning and in 2008 the U.S. government decided to step in and “bail them out.” The auto industry is failing and the U.S. Congress again decided in favor of a “bailout.” The United States—the strongest advocate of free trade, open markets, deregulation, and privatization—violated the very neoliberal principles it had required other developing countries to enact. This gives further credence to the argument that, yes, developmentalism is right about the importance of economic growth, but it may not be right about the importance of neoliberalism.

Another kink in the exportation of development to developing countries is the virulent anti-Americanism found in many regions, particularly following the war in Iraq (which began in 2003). Although developmentalism is right that economic growth and equitable social reform should be supported in the developing world, the United States has lost its credibility in many places. In the Middle East, for example, development initiatives brought (or even indirectly funded) by the United States are treated, possibly deservedly, with great suspicion and cynicism.<sup>26</sup> Since the first experience with developmentalism and its resurgence as the Washington Consensus, U.S. development efforts in non-Western countries have faced increasing levels of resentment and hostility.

The only way to overcome these problems is to capitalize on the most useful aspect of developmentalism—its emphasis on economic variables and their influence on social and political variables in political science phenomena. Developmentalist theorists would do best to heed Heilbroner, who agreed that economic development was important, but preferred that the United States and the West not insist that it be undertaken as a form of democratic capitalism. He said that to really help developing countries we must understand *their* perspective on *their* development, not *our* perspective on *their* development. In the end, development is a noble goal, but should be pursued within, not in spite of, cultural contexts.

## CHAPTER 2



# MARXISM, DEPENDENCY, AND THE WORLD SYSTEMS APPROACH: ARE THEY MAKING A COMEBACK?

*Braden Stone*

Marxist ideology was greatly discredited by the collapse of the Soviet Union, its utility as a basis for economic and political systems seemingly disproved as Western liberal democracy and capitalism emerged triumphant from the Cold War and the United States assumed the mantle of sole superpower. Geopolitical trends since the Soviet Union's dissolution have further marginalized Marxism—many former Soviet satellite states have experimented with democracy; China, the only remaining communist powerhouse, has successfully endeavored to transform its economy to a capitalist free-market model; and the few staunch bastions of communism, namely North Korea and Cuba, are impoverished and isolated states. The theoretical focus of comparative politics has reflected these empirical phenomena as new or more salient theories have largely eclipsed Marxian thought in the last two decades. Constructivism seeks to understand interests, values, and norms, and their role in international interaction; institutionalism examines the development, persistence, and influence of institutions at the multiple levels of analysis that have flourished in the wake of the Cold War (despite all realist predictions to the contrary); and numerous interdisciplinary approaches are attempting to bridge the gap between comparative politics and environmental determinism, neurobiology, and neurochemistry, and even quantum physics.

It would appear as though Marxian class analysis is obsolete both empirically and theoretically.

To claim that Marxist ideology has gone the way of the dodo would be premature at this time, however, as Marxism has been succeeded by *dependencia* and world-systems analysis, both robust theoretic approaches that owe a considerable debt to Marxist class analysis. Dependency analysis emerged in the 1960s as a response to the developmentalist approach, which *dependencistas* derided as having no theoretic mechanism to account for the role that economic forces have played in differential trajectories of nation-state development. World-systems analysis, the brainchild of Immanuel Wallerstein, is interested in the *longue duree* much as Braudel was, examining the manner in which historical processes over the last five hundred years have resulted in the current disposition of the international system, and how the form and function of that system have consequently affected development within nation-states and interactions between them.<sup>1</sup> Specifically these theories are interested in the international expansion and preeminence of industrial capitalism, and the concomitant division of labor that capitalist industrialization entails, as the defining characteristics of the modern world.

Naturally, as *dependencia* and world-systems analysis both incorporate central theoretic components of Marxian ideology, the relevance of these two approaches has likewise been challenged. Dependency and the global division of labor may not be normatively palatable realities, but they are being increasingly accepted as a *fait accompli* within scholarly and policy communities, and focus is subsequently shifting away from how and why these phenomena initially occurred and toward what can be done to facilitate development in dependent countries to integrate them more fully and equitably into the global economy. Lesser developed, dependent countries are no longer fated to remain impoverished sources of unskilled wage-labor to be exploited by First World countries, but have the opportunity to realize dividends from interaction with the global market economy if their development is properly managed, ultimately allowing lesser developed countries to pull themselves out of their deplorable state of underdevelopment and become affluent and equal members in the global economic order.

World-systems analysts and dependency theorists have demonstrated their continued salience by challenging many of these accepted assumptions, questioning the notions of perfect mobility and equity in the global economic order, proposing a more nuanced understanding of the role of state leadership in economic development, and

illuminating how transnational economic institutions function as impediments to rather than facilitators of economic development and integration.<sup>2</sup> The primary challenge to dependency theories and world-systems analysis, in my view, will be in loosening their theoretic assumptions to allow them the flexibility necessary to respond to and account for changes in empirical phenomena without completely distorting their Marxian ideological underpinnings.

### MARXISM: A (VERY) BRIEF DISCUSSION

Marx in his writings presented a nuanced and thorough analysis of the emergence of the modern capitalist-industrial mode of production in Western civilization, tracing traditions that developed in the European feudal system, as they transformed over time into the principles that characterize and underpin capitalism. Marx analyzed in considerable detail many of the facets of modern market economics and industrialization—value, labor, commodities, technology—but his ideas pertaining to the division of labor and the primacy of economic interests as the impetus for change proved to be the most durable and influential.

One of the central tenets of a Marxist interpretation of capitalism is the division of labor. Social stratification between landed nobility and peasants during the Middle Ages was challenged by ideas of representative government and equality that emerged during the Enlightenment. As monarchical systems of government collapsed, landowners found there was no longer any rationale to support their ownership of private property. Simultaneously, economic systems were changing drastically, shifting away from agrarian production and hereditary ownership of property toward industrial commodity production and commercial property. Eventually an upper class controlling the material inputs of commodity production emerged as the bourgeois capitalist class, while lower class citizens, the proletariat wage labor class, provided the manual labor necessary for commodity production. The social stratification between nobility and peasant that had existed during the Middle Ages was replaced during the modern era by social stratification based on the division between the bourgeoisie and the proletarians, those who control capital and those who provide the labor necessary to convert capital into profitable commodities. Class status in the modern era differs from class status in the Middle Ages in that class status in the modern age is much more fluid and is based on education and money; nonetheless class stratification persists.



Stratification between social classes based on the division of labor results in the materialist dialectic that Marx analyzes at great length. It is this dialectic, or the contradiction between two coexisting and interdependent but conflictive entities, that Marx argues is the quintessential engine for change. Economic interests and interactions themselves are not the propelling force behind social change in the Marxist orthodoxy. From one societal epoch to the next, economic functions and interests remain relatively static, although the form, the model that economic activity takes, is protean and manifests itself as drastically different systems over time. The dialectic itself is similar to economic functionality in that the purpose it serves and the dynamics undergirding it are immutable and inevitably reappear during each historical era. What distinguishes the dialectic from the economic milieu in which it develops, and imparts broad social transformative power to it, is the inherent conflict between the two most salient social groups, which are, by necessity, arranged in a hierarchical yet interdependent social relationship. Eventually grievances of the lower social stratum will manifest themselves as revolution, sweeping away the entrenched social, political, and economic order, leaving a blank slate for the emergence of a new historical epoch with a new mode of production.

According to Marx, Western civilization had moved through several sequential historical phases, each of which was characterized by a distinct mode of production. Society first moved through a phase of ancient communism, where individuals belonging to a designated and exclusive community shared ownership of land, livestock, tools, and other essential resources necessary for subsistence. The ancient era with its quasi-communal, agrarian mode of production gradually transformed into the feudal system, during which the mode of production was similar to the ancient era in that it remained agrarian and crops were intended for subsistence, but ownership of land was concentrated in the hands of a very small upper social stratum, the nobility, to whom serfs were required to pay a tithe or tax.

Following the Enlightenment, the feudal mode of production was replaced by capitalism, in which the concentration of capital in the hands of a small elite social stratum—the bourgeoisie—persisted, but advances in technology allowed for the production of high value commodities that could be sold at a profit, allowing for the further accumulation of capital by the bourgeoisie. Capitalism, as the modern mode of production, is most notably distinguished by the alienation that the lower social stratum—the workers or proletariat—experiences in its consciousness due to its lack of ownership over the outputs

of production. In ancient and feudal society, workers maintained ownership over the crops they produced, while in capitalist society their labor is purely a commodity for which they are paid wages that are commensurate with their skill, but ownership over manufactured commodities reverts to the bourgeoisie as they have ownership over all the capital inputs into the manufacturing process. Essentially the laborer becomes estranged from the products of his labor; this has a profound and negative impact on his psyche. This alienation within the proletariat that occurs under the capitalist mode of production manifests itself as the general discontent that provides the frictional energy behind the materialist dialectic.

Economic transformation during specific historical epochs galvanizes a commensurate transformation in political systems. Marx logically ties the development of the republican form of government and the growth of nationalism as necessary sociopolitical constructs that support the capitalist mode of production. Nationalism replaces religion in a modern, secular society as a motivating factor and social glue, while state institutions based on representation as the legitimizing principle serve to rationalize and safeguard the ownership and accumulation of capital that the monarchy once had.

Over one hundred years before Fukuyama proclaimed that civilization had reached “the end of history,” Marx predicted that history would end when the capitalist mode of production was inevitably supplanted by true communist society.<sup>3</sup> True global harmony would be realized not through the diffusion of liberal democratic ideals, as Fukuyama had argued, but through a global conversion to the communist mode of production, as formulated by Marx. The most distinguishing feature of Marxian communism is the abolition of the concept of ownership; all people would be provided with material goods according to their needs, disallowing for the gross accumulation of material as per capitalist doctrine. Two drastic transformations of civilization then logically follow from the abolition of ownership. First the division of labor disappears, as the grounds for distinguishing between capitalist and proletarian social strata—the possession of the lion’s share of capital—is no longer possible. Government then erodes and vanishes as its traditional role as the protector of the ownership class and its interests are obviated by the abolition of private ownership. The emergence of a communist society, following the demise of the capitalist mode of production, represented the final and most desirable phase in human history, a utopian future in which all of humanity could prosper, given that the causes underlying the materialist dialectic and alienation would have been extirpated.

There is a considerable disconnect, however, in Marx's analysis of Western capitalist society and his prediction of the emergence of a utopian communist society that would encompass all of mankind across the globe, signaling the ultimate phase of human history. Considering Marx was examining developmental trends at the state level and specifically in the context of Western civilization, how then could his ideas on civilizational transformation and development be applied on a global scale? Marx himself wrote very little on the application of his ideas either on a global scale or outside of the Western context.<sup>4</sup> The little that Marx had to say about the relevance of his theories to non-Western civilization appeared in his numerous newspaper articles and personal correspondence.

Inherent in Marx's logic is a contradiction that seemingly militates against the inevitable global expansion of capitalism and its successor, communism, as predicted by Marx. For capitalists to continue realizing profits despite a constantly declining marginal rate of profit, they must have new markets open to them in which to expand sales. As capitalism spreads and develops in countries outside of Western civilization, it will establish itself as the first truly universal economic system. However, for capitalism to develop and reach the full maturation necessary to establish the preconditions for a transition to a communist/socialist system, a country must experience a trajectory through the specific preceding modes of production that Marx identifies—any society must move from ancient, to feudal, and finally to bourgeois, modern (capitalist) modes of production. However, Marx claims that not all civilizations have or will be able to experience the same evolution in modes of production as Western civilization has.

In fact, there is another mode of production, the Asiatic mode of production, which poses a considerable obstacle to capitalist expansion. The Asiatic mode of production is a pseudocommunal economic system, in which ownership of land is centrally located in the emperor, but the peasants have greater control over management of the land in light of the absentee landlord. Consequently, the Asiatic mode of production stands in contrast to Western modes of production in that class stratification is largely absent, disallowing for the dialectic relationship that ultimately propels change and development. Moreover, as the peasants become so intimately tied with the land they work through the pseudocommunal nature of the imperial arrangement, peasants in Asian civilization tend to define their reality within the immutable and very narrow confines of their immediate surroundings, facilitating centralized authoritarian control under the auspices of the emperor. The epistemological underpinnings essential

for capitalism's development in a civilization are not only absent but are actively obstructed in Asian society.

How, then, is it possible for capitalism, which is supposedly the first truly universal mode of production, to spread to the insular and excessively parochial Asian civilization? Marx answers this contradiction in his logic by pointing to colonialism. Where capitalism is incapable of developing organically, colonial powers forcefully open boundaries and establish the necessary preconditions for capitalist development. Marx did not approve of colonialism, but saw it as a crucial expedient through which to spread capitalism to non-Western civilization, thereby creating the preconditions for transition to communism.

Another issue in Marxian thought that is not fully addressed in orthodox Marxist literature is the emergence of a large middle class comprised of highly educated, skilled workers, a trend that is strongly correlated with the maturation phase of developing capitalist states. Traditional Marxian thought is far too rigid in its conceptualization of class stratification, with only the bourgeois and proletarian classes, and the dynamics of the materialist dialectic between them, as salient to transformative processes. Marx acknowledges that industrialization will result in the growth of a small class of educated and skilled workers who primarily function in a managerial capacity and exist between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the social hierarchy. Nonetheless this class, which Marx derided as an essentially parasitic social entity, is not fully examined with regard to its role as an agent in historical development. Across the globe in postindustrial and modernizing countries, the growing middle class and service sector demographics, belonging neither to the bourgeois nor to the proletarian social stratum, have exerted considerable influence over developmental processes. A strictly Marxist conceptualization of social stratification, which perceives social cleavages along a dichotomous spectrum split between owners of capital and wage laborers, does not accurately capture the full array of social strata that participate in societal transformation; class structure could be better portrayed as a continuum to allow for more nuanced understandings of social identity and the manner in which it interacts with complex processes of industrialization and development.

Despite the theoretic shortcomings and logical inconsistencies in Marxism, it still has much to offer as a comprehensive and salient theoretic approach. Marxian thought has contributed greatly to theorizing on comparative politics through its discussion of the division of labor and its argument advocating the primacy of economic factors as an impetus for societal evolution. These theoretic tools have proved invaluable

to the development of dependency theories and world-systems analysis, which draw heavily from Marxian thought's class-based analysis of the division of labor and the economic processes responsible for wildly different trajectories of development between states. Dependency theorists and world-systems analysts have moved beyond Marxism, however, addressing some of the shortcomings in Marxian thought and introducing new analytic innovations to establish their approaches as wholly independent and empirically relevant theories.

### THE INDEPENDENCE OF *DEPENDENCIA*

Theories on dependent economic development emerged during the 1960s as a criticism of developmentalism, which was criticized by *dependencistas* for failing to recognize the importance of international economic interactions and the global capitalist order in altering the course of development in Third World countries. Originally dependency theories focused on development trends in Latin American countries, but the popularity of the dependency approach quickly spread throughout the Third World, gaining adherents among scholars and policy experts as far-flung as Africa and South Asia. The appeal of dependency theories did not stem only from their explanatory power in addressing causal factors responsible for underdevelopment in localized regions of the world. *Dependencia* removed the onus for stagnant or anemic development from underdeveloped countries themselves and placed it on highly developed, industrialized First World countries.

The dependency approach, while uniformly informed by Marxian ontology, never congealed into a uniform theory. It has no clearly expressed assumptions and therefore does not facilitate the formulation of hypothetical predictions for empirical testing. Dependency scholars have expressly eschewed creating a parsimonious theory, as evidenced by Cardoso and Faletto in their seminal work *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, where they adopt a structural-historical approach to understanding the development of capitalism in Latin America.<sup>5</sup> They argue that the environmental and historical context of any given country in which capitalism develops must be considered in conjunction with the sociocultural trends specific to that case at that point in time, and with how the confluence of all of those factors ultimately affected the trajectory of capitalist development in that country.

The dependency approach therefore defies the creation of a uniform theory of dependent development, because country conditions

will change so drastically on a case-by-case basis as to disallow for any *a priori* assumptions pertaining to the necessary and sufficient conditions that cause dependent development. Dependency approaches limit their case selection for analytical purposes to those countries that display dependency as an outcome of development, and then trace the unique causal factors specific to each individual country that culminated in the condition of dependency common among lesser developed countries. Multiple theoretic approaches have subsequently sprung up in the dependency vein, but there is no single parsimonious, rigid dependency doctrine to which *dependencistas* adhere.

Similar to Marx, Cardoso and Faletto, in agreement with the majority of dependency theorists, maintain that economics and economic development entail sociopolitical processes, and these auxiliary systems develop in such a way as to buttress capitalist expansion and growth. Consequently it is necessary to consider the historicity of sociopolitical processes underpinning the condition of dependency when studying development. Development is not solely a product of economic, social, or political dynamics, but is the outcome produced by the confluence of all three factors. Dependency theorists typically begin their analysis of historical processes that result in dependent development with an examination of the economic model, or “mode of production,” to use the Marxist phraseology, that directly preceded a country’s move toward capitalism. Analysis of economic trends in Latin America and throughout the Third World prior to the adoption of capitalism shows two basic economic models that dominated—national industrialization and import substitution industrialization.

National industrialization was primarily an agroexport economy where profit from the export of agricultural goods was reinvested in the national economy to finance industrialization. There were two fundamental problems with this path to industrialization. First, the prices of agricultural products had to be maintained at stable, consistently high levels, which was impossible due to the constant fluctuation in the value of agricultural products in the international market. Second, the government had to implement intelligent and progressive industrialization programs, which often proved difficult for any number of reasons, ranging from government corruption to popular dissent among domestic constituencies.

Under import substitution industrialization, the government would establish a protected national industrial sector to produce manufactured goods that would serve as substitutes for imported commodities. Often trade barriers set up around the national industrial sectors were nonetheless penetrated by foreign economic

interests through direct corporate investment rather than through market interactions, fostering dependence of the inchoate industrial sector on infusions of foreign capital to bolster fledgling nationalized industries. Import substitution industrialization also failed for two reasons. Nationalized industry, being an indigenous industrial base, did not have the benefit of technology transfer through direct market interactions with more technologically advanced countries, and the technology deficit hindered industrial diversification and prevented the production of high-value commodities. Simultaneously, as protected industrial sectors did not have to compete for market share, there was no incentive for improvement or innovation in manufactured commodities; indigenous industrial sectors in Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) countries became grossly inefficient and outdated, producing inferior quality goods for sale to a captive market that was steadily growing more displeased with the limited and substandard consumer goods offered.

With the failure of both agroexport and import substitution economic models, many less developed countries resolved to integrate themselves into the global market economy. However, as they entered the global economy and adopted capitalism at a relatively late point compared to Europe and the United States, less developed countries found that there were numerous rules and regulations already in place that in effect relegated them to a dependent, subservient status. The internationalization of the market in effect served to erode the autonomy, both political and economic, of newly industrializing states as they were forced to align their policies and practices with those already established by the international market and the multinational corporations that had been operating globally for some time.<sup>6</sup>

*Dependencia* diverges from its Marxist roots with regard to the impact that capitalist development has had on political transformation. In contrast to Western Europe and the United States, transitions to capitalism throughout the Third World were often accompanied by a reversion to authoritarian, particularly military, forms of government rather than a movement toward representative democracy. Strong control by the government over civil society was necessary to quash social dissent aroused by the economic upheavals and hardships correlated with rapid transitions to capitalism.<sup>7</sup>

Social change within a dependent country also takes a very different form from that predicted by orthodox Marxism. As industrialization gains momentum in a less developed country, it does not diffuse throughout the entire country but becomes increasingly localized in urban centers. Parochial, isolated, and typically agrarian indigenous

society in rural areas remains unaffected by industrialization, while urban locales transform into densely populated (and often impoverished) pockets of modernity. This social schism is reminiscent of the social stratification resulting from the division of labor that Marx identifies, but differs from it fundamentally in that both social strata are proletarian in their origin, and the line of cleavage between the two groups has more to do with geography and modernity than labor associations.

Divergence between the anachronistic rural economic sector and the industrializing modern economic sector results in what dependency theorists refer to as the dual economy. Social stratification caused by the emergence of a dual economy displays a dialectic dynamics that is wholly distinct from the traditional Marxian materialist dialectic. Swelling urban, modern, industrial enclaves in a developing country consume a disproportionate share of the resources and agricultural products essential for the traditional economic sector. Yet, because the industrial sector is export-oriented, few, if any, of the goods it produces spread to the traditional economic sector, while all of the wealth generated through manufacture is immediately reinvested in more capital to fuel the modern industrial sector's growth. Not only does the gap in income inequality between modern and traditional economic sectors widen at an alarming rate, but the ability of the traditional sector to sustain itself declines rapidly as modern enclaves parasitically leech their resources. The effect that this "identity dialectic" has on developmental processes within a less developed country has yet to be fully explored in the extant literature. As a distinct and new type of social dialectic, this form of class friction may alter transformative processes within a country in a manner that Marxian theory cannot predict, and there are numerous cases, including China as well as countries throughout South Asia and Latin America, that would present fertile territory for empirical analysis of this unique dialectic.

Theories on dependent development also attribute more importance and influence than does Marx to the third social stratum positioned between the bourgeois capitalists and proletarian wage laborers. Cardoso and Faletto argue that the condition of dependent development in Latin American countries is not exclusively a function of external dominance by mature capitalist states.<sup>8</sup> As Peter Evans demonstrates in his analysis of development in Brazil, powerful interests residing within less developed countries, typically the political or social elite, had a vested interest in promoting the transition to capitalism as it allowed them an opportunity to seize a disproportionate share of whatever wealth was generated in their country through



industrialization.<sup>9</sup> Framing this with reference to class analysis and social stratification, this opportunistic elite, as it emerged in economically dependent countries, was positioned between the dominant advanced capitalist countries and the dependent less developed proletarian countries. This stratum of the proletarian elite is akin to the educated managerial class that Marx recognizes, but is far more influential in its roles as supporter and facilitator of the capitalist transformations that galvanized dependent development. In a sense this indigenous proletarian elite is displaying rent-seeking behavior, allowing industrialized capitalist countries access to natural resources and labor resources for which it extracts a rent. Integration of dependency theories with rentier economic models could prove to be a fruitful and innovative avenue for future research, potentially allowing for the application of Marxist ideas on the commodification of labor within the context of the global economy.

Dependency theories already have many theoretic innovations—a new dialectic, a more diversified class structure, a more functionalist rather than determinist understanding of political transformation in developing societies—to recommend them as viable and sufficiently independent from their Marxist foundations. *Dependencistas* have not been content to rest on their laurels, however, and have continually sought ways to improve the theoretical and empirical relevance of their approach. Scholars working in the dependency milieu have begun examining four avenues of research in response to criticisms of the traditional dependency approach, inadvertently creating a new dependency approach in the process. Under this new dependency approach, less developed countries are no longer fated to remain underdeveloped historical anachronisms, but may in fact successfully develop into mature and stable industrialized states, loosening, although perhaps not entirely severing, their bonds of dependency. If *dependencistas* were to concede that less developed countries may move beyond their dependent economic origins, the entire theoretic approach would be shooting itself in the foot.

It is necessary, therefore, for dependency scholars to construct theory on how industrialized First World countries stay ahead of the development curve of dependent economies, maintaining some form of advanced, superior economic practice with which they can continue to exert leverage over developing countries and thereby perpetuate dependency. One method advanced states have increasingly employed to foster and preserve dependent economic ties is transnational organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and a multitude of

institutionalized trade agreements and trade blocs. Dependency theorists working in the new dependency vein have begun to shift focus away from First World countries as the evil masterminds behind dependent economic development, and are increasingly concerned with the role that transnational institutions play in forging economic dependence in developing countries. This line of research suggests that dependency theorists should work more closely with institutionalists to understand better how transnational organizations influence development in Third World countries, how institutional design can more effectively account for Third World concerns and interests, and what can be done to convince these institutions to craft policy more appropriate to newly developing countries.

New *dependencistas* themselves are increasingly more capable of tailoring policy to meet the needs of specific developing countries, as the new dependency approach stresses the considerable diversity among developing countries. Class divisions alone do not dominate transformative processes in a country; instead such factors as ethnic fractionalization, resource endowment, preexisting civil society, and embedded political institutions may significantly alter the developmental trajectory of a specific country. Differential paths toward development can also be greatly affected by the fourth factor that new dependency scholars have (re)introduced in their research, the state. The state is no longer relegated to the role of a byproduct or bystander in development under the new dependency approach, but is in fact an autonomous and powerful actor capable of harnessing and guiding development to promote beneficial change throughout a country.<sup>10</sup> In fact it is the state, more than any other actor involved in development, that can prove crucial to preventing the emergence of the detrimental dual economy in developing Third World countries, and further research should be conducted into how social and economic planning at the state level can serve to ameliorate the hardships concomitant with development.

### WALLERSTEIN'S WORLD

World-systems analysis, originally created by the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, emerged in the early 1970s as an alternative to dependency theories in challenging developmentalism. While world-systems analysis draws on Marxist theory to a certain extent, although by no means as explicitly as the dependency approach, it differs significantly from theories on dependent development in two fundamental ways. Whereas dependency theory places its focus on the very finite phase

during which a specific Third World country shifts from an antiquated to a capitalist mode of production, world-systems analysis is interested in examining how long-term historical processes within the global system have culminated in a capitalist world order. Similar to dependency theories, world-systems analysis, however, disdains rigid theoretic parsimony. Central to the world systems approach is an effort not to simplify historical processes of change and development, but to “complexify” and elaborate on them to better capture the actual dynamics of empirical reality. This places world-systems analysis in direct opposition to positivist scholars who seek to find laws and universal truths in developmental trends through an intense focus on very narrow aspects of empirical reality—specific variables, actors, and levels of analysis. World-systems analysis therefore tends to employ deeper, more comprehensive methods of analysis in its research.

There are nonetheless several fundamental axioms that undergird world-systems analysis, which contends that the nation-state is not the primary unit of analysis, but simply one unit of analysis among many. For any accurate representation of global interactions and processes, analysis must begin at the global level itself. The global system is very complex, comprised of several interlocking subsystems—political, social, and economic. While these subsystems are each significant in their own way, the defining characteristic of the world-system is the capitalist world economy. The dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the global arena is perhaps the single most important axiom of world-systems analysis. There is considerable variation in social and political subsystems, but the capitalist economic model, with its characteristic division of labor, is the preeminent feature of the world-system. Capitalism is the only truly universal subsystem, resulting from ongoing capitalist expansion to create new markets. Finally, world-systems analysis maintains that state institutions and social identity are critical factors in developmental processes, but only insofar as they support, promote, rationalize, and legitimize economic interests.

Capitalist dominance within the international system has naturally resulted in a global division of labor, but according to world-systems analysis it is not along the traditional Marxian bourgeois/proletarian axis; the axial division of labor in the world-system is between the core and the periphery. The division between core and periphery arises from the relative difference in profitability of production processes prevalent within each stratum. Obviously there is a greater density of highly profitable, technologically sophisticated production processes in core states, while periphery states have a greater proportion of industries producing low value commodities of a rather

simple nature. Wallerstein points out that core states, which are the most vocal proponents of “free” market economics, paradoxically, also have a greater tendency to intervene in economic matters to regulate and reduce competition, and thus maintain the profitability of their industrial sectors; periphery states have considerably more competitive markets.<sup>11</sup>

A third category of states exists within the world-system, the semi-periphery. States belonging to the semi-periphery have begun to assimilate much of the technology introduced to them through international trade, allowing them to improve and diversify their economic sector. Diversification and sophistication of the economic sector enables a state to move from peripheral status to semi-peripheral, but core states continue to block their ascent from semi-periphery to core. What is interesting about this is that under world-systems analysis, the axial division of labor is not rigid but fluid, and states are just as likely to move to the lower stratum as they are to progress to the upper stratum. Over time a single state may shift several times between core, periphery, and semi-periphery. Just what dynamics cause states to shift from one stratum to another are unclear, and no consideration is given to the repercussions of backsliding to a lower stratum. Another critical issue that is left unexamined is the manner in which core states block semi-periphery states from joining the core. This issue also entails the incentives that core states utilize in preventing the semi-periphery from joining them, as well as what factors core states rely on to differentiate themselves from the developing semi-periphery. Questions pertaining to the dynamics involved in the fluid axial division of labor represent perhaps the most innovative direction for future research under the world-systems rubric.

As the capitalist system developed and expanded its dominance across the globe, the formation of nation-states, as codified in the Treaty of Westphalia, was the logical configuration for political systems to take. Wallerstein identifies seven ways in which states have developed as authoritative structures to ensure economic interests: (1) states set the rules regarding whether and under what conditions commodities, capital, and labor may cross their border, (2) states create the rules concerning property rights within their states, (3) states are responsible for the guidelines concerning employment and the compensation of employees, (4) states decide which costs firms must internalize, (5) states decide what economic sectors may be monopolized and to what degree, (6) states tax, and (7) states safeguard the interests of their industrial sector by exercising power externally to influence the actions of other states.<sup>12</sup>

Wallerstein also examines social transformation globally to discern how it has served to reinforce the capitalist economic world-system.<sup>13</sup> He recognizes two seemingly conflicting trends in social transformation that have occurred over the last century-and-a-half—the simultaneous development of universalist and of particularist strains of social identity. Universalism is a principle that grew out of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and advances the notion that all people are equal and that some aspects of the human experience are common to all persons. In stark contrast to universalism, particularism emphasizes differences between unique social groups that are differentiated by religion, ethnicity, history, and similar factors. Universalism and particularism initially appear contradictory, with the conflict between these two facets of social identity potentially hindering the expansion of capitalism globally as a universal mode of production.

However, as Wallerstein contends, these two social movements are in fact beneficial to the spread of capitalism. Universalism supports recognition and familiarity among different civilizations, which facilitates the movement of capitalism between cultures. Particularism offers social belonging and identity other than class identification, which reduces friction between social strata, thereby assisting the growth of capitalism within a country. Wallerstein's logic regarding the effect of particularism on the expansion of capitalism seems somewhat flawed in light of the numerous ethnonationalist and religious conflicts that have flared up in the wake of the Cold War. Perhaps Huntington's appraisal of civilizational clashes is more astute than we would like to give him credit for.<sup>14</sup> If world-systems analysis wants a more accurate understanding of how social identity has affected the global expansion of capitalism, it needs to reassess the notion of particularism and the logic underlying its role in world-systems development. Particularism may in fact display the dynamics that Wallerstein attributes to it in certain circumstances, but by no means in all circumstances. More research should be conducted into the effect of particularism within states dependent on their position within the axial division of labor, as well as into the stage of development that they have achieved or are moving toward, given the fluid nature of the axial division of labor.

## CONCLUSION, OR JUST THE BEGINNING?

As geopolitics has continued to change in the twenty-first century, scholars in both the comparative politics and international relations fields have begun to revisit Marxian class analysis and its most

capable successors, dependency theories and world-systems analysis. Particularly in light of the recent global economic crisis, Marxian thought may experience reinvigoration. Dependency theory and world-systems analysis both provide useful insight into the dynamics of global economic interactions, and such insights may prove invaluable to understanding the causes, ramifications, and potential palliatives for the current economic downturn. The manner in which industrialized nations react to the economic crisis, either through implementing greater protectionist measures or seeking economic stimulus through increased international trade, will have a profound impact on the economic well-being of less developed countries. Network dynamics of global economic ties and their impact on state growth and stability are a central component in the research agendas of both dependency theory and world-systems analysis.

Theoretic principles pertaining to class analysis, the division of labor, and the power of economics as an agent of civilizational change have proven to be considerably more durable than the communist political apparatus they had spawned. However, for these approaches to retain their salience, efforts at sustained theorizing and empirical analysis must be undertaken to redress weaknesses and criticisms, and thereby assure their constant improvement. Without compromising their Marxian theoretical underpinnings, class-based analytical approaches in comparative politics must account for the rise of the middle class, the voluntary implementation of capitalism throughout non-Western civilization, the increasingly important role of nongovernmental organizations in global trade dynamics, state autonomy, and the significant strides in development being made by many newly industrialized countries. Despite the shortcomings of the various research programs operating in the Marxian class analysis rubric, these theories have nonetheless been cited as some of the most innovative and original; Gourevitch refers to them as some of the frontrunners of “second-image reversed” theories that examine the influence that systemic factors can have on domestic politics, contrary to much of the extant literature that looks exclusively at the manner in which domestic politics guide state decision-making to affect systemic trends.<sup>15</sup>

The most daunting challenges for dependency and world-systems theories will lie in broadening the scope of causal factors they consider and in loosening their assumptions regarding preexisting factors. Some potential directions for innovative research have been proposed in this chapter, especially with regard to theoretic cross-pollination with other approaches such as constructivism and institutionalism.

Social identity, transnational institutions, and state autonomy are just a few of the factors that dependency and world systems scholars are beginning to examine; these factors have been either absent or marginalized in much of the orthodox literature. The difficulty with incorporating new factors into an established theory is how to do so to improve the theory without undermining or diluting the axioms that imparted significance to it in the first place. Scholars working on dependency theories are therefore faced with a conundrum: they must revise and improve their theories to assure the continued salience of their approaches as analytic tools, but they must avoid cramming irrelevant, or, worse, logically inconsistent factors into their theories. Perhaps the best place to start any efforts at improving dependency and world-systems theories would be at the beginning, with a reexamination of the Marxist thought upon which both theories rest.

## CHAPTER 3



# POLITICAL CULTURE: EXPLANATORY VARIABLE OR RESIDUAL CATEGORY?

*Holger Meyer*

## INTRODUCTION

*Both social analysis and social policy would be much simpler if people from different societies were interchangeable robots. But a large body of evidence indicates that they are not.*

—Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, 1990, 64

This statement by one of the key figures in modern political culture studies succinctly summarizes the basic tenet of the concept that members of different societies tend to be characterized by enduring cross-cultural differences that can have major political and economic consequences. As a result, adherents to the political culture approach analyze and interpret it as a general framework for political activity in a given country or group of countries—a social road map, outlining which behavior is acceptable in a given society and which is not. In the words of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, regarded by many as the founders of modern political culture studies, “political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system. It is the subjective realm that underlies and gives meaning to political actions.”<sup>1</sup>

These propositions necessarily put the study of political culture at odds with other overarching explanatory attempts portrayed in this



volume. The assumption that “culture matters” not only challenges structuralist approaches such as traditional formal legalism, the new institutionalisms, or Marxism, but appears to be equally difficult to reconcile with the central assumptions of rational choice approaches as well. Emphasizing the differences between societies, culturalists inevitably reject the unqualified applicability of these “grand theories,” which are deemed ill-suited to account for diverging developments with regard to different countries, regions, or continents. Instead of striving to explain political development on a generalized, global scale by providing a “one size fits all” framework of interpretation, they try to correct the shortcomings of universalistic approaches by explaining political development within an “indigenous” or “home-grown framework.”<sup>2</sup>

In this context it is important to note that scholars of political culture are not very interested in ephemeral attitudes toward specific topical issues, but instead attempt to uncover deep-seated, long-held values characteristic of a society (e.g., religious beliefs, ideas, attitudes, and orientations toward respective political systems), which may crucially impact regime type, political participation, and ideology in a given country or region. Scholars of political culture interpret the demands made upon a system, the responses to laws and to appeals for support, and the conduct of individuals in their political role, as being shaped and conditioned by specific cultural orientation patterns. In short, cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations form the latent political tendencies and propensities for political behavior. Summarizing their conceptual understanding of political culture, Almond and Verba hold that it “refers to the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes [ . . . ] The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of a nation.”<sup>3</sup> It is the very understanding that differences in political cultures are enduring and substantial that lends the concept—in the eyes of its disciples—great leverage in the analysis of political outcomes and makes it a potent explanatory variable.

This chapter invites the reader on an informative excursion trip into the exiting world of political culture studies. Following a short explanation of the intellectual roots and conceptual origins of the approach, it will trace the development of the concept, introduce its main spokesmen and traditions, and present the major existing schools of thought. In doing so, it will explore how adherents to the

approach define the cultural prerequisites for democracy, what aspects of political culture are regarded as facilitating democratic politics and governmental performance, and what factors form and reform a political culture. It will further outline the major contributions of the political culture literature to the field of comparative politics and contrast these, where appropriate, with other approaches presented in this book. A brief appreciation of the major criticisms leveled against the approach and its methodological limitations will be followed by an overall assessment of the usability of the theory and its prospects as a serious contender as a grand theory in comparative politics.

### INTELLECTUAL ROOTS

Since at least the time of Plato, practically all political thinkers have acknowledged the importance of what Alexis de Tocqueville famously called “habits of the heart”<sup>4</sup> in making a society’s political system work as it does. The usage of the term “political culture” to describe these predispositions can be traced back at least to the mid-eighteenth century, when the philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder used it in his work *On Social and Political Culture* to make the point that “human nature under different climates is never wholly the same.”<sup>5</sup> Over the following century, impressive interpretative cultural analyses such as those by Alexis de Tocqueville<sup>6</sup> paved the way for the acceptance of cultural approaches in the emerging social sciences.

The major breakthrough occurred in the late nineteenth century, when the political economist and sociologist Max Weber pioneered the systematic study of political culture (although he did not use this terminology). Setting up an extensive comparative research agenda that focused on the interrelation between religion and culture, Weber explored why the countries of Europe had so far outdistanced those of Asia and the Middle East in terms of economic growth. Simultaneously, he investigated why the Protestant countries of Northern Europe had done better than the Mediterranean countries of the South. The central result of this research project, published in Weber’s famous work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*,<sup>7</sup> later came to be known as the Weber thesis. The main tenet of Weber’s argument is the idea that central characteristics of ascetic (Calvinist) Protestantism—for example, the God-ordered emphasis on hard work, honesty, and seriousness, and the thrifty use of money and time—were particularly conducive to the development of capitalism, bureaucracy, and the rational-legal state in the West. Making a strong case for the identifiable impact of different sets of

values on the economic development of distinct cultural entities, Weber thus laid the foundations for the scientific study of political culture. Drawing the conclusion that culture is not simply a consequence of economics but that it can by itself significantly impact the basic nature of economic and political life, the Weber thesis obviously represented a serious challenge to the dominant purely economic or institutional approaches of the time and a strong anti-Marxian argument.

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

Although Weber had laid a solid foundation for the approach, it was not until the interwar years that political culture studies finally achieved widespread acceptance and popularity as a scientific field of inquiry. This development was triggered by the emergence of a distinct field of anthropology, cultural anthropology. The branch was pioneered and initially dominated by Franz Boas, the “father” of modern anthropology, and his disciples, most notably Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. These scholars pioneered the application of scientific methods to the study of human cultures and societies, a field that until then was dominated by the formulation of grand theories around anecdotal knowledge and interpretative analyses.

Their principal goal was to develop and promote “culture” as a meaningful scientific concept, on a par with structural, geographical, climatic, economic, and other explanations of discrepancies in human development. In the words of Clifford Geertz—who, until his death in 2006, was one of the leading contemporary scholars in the field—culture is, after all, “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”<sup>8</sup> Consequently, these scholars set out to study cultural variation among societies and examined the impact of global economic and political processes on local cultural realities. Most notably, they studied distinct cultures on their own terms, in their own languages, and within their own setting—without ethnocentric value judgments. The emerging notion of culture as fluid and dynamic again challenged the structuralist and institutionalist approaches of the time.

Methodologically, the Boasian anthropologists relied heavily on empiricism. Engaged in ethnographic fieldwork, they resided for an extended period among the people being researched, conducted research in the native language, and collaborated with native researchers as a method of collecting data. This new and innovative method of

scholarly inquiry set them apart from adherents of other approaches who had never actually been to the countries they wrote about. Cultural relativism became one of the most important methodological tools while conducting fieldwork as well as a central heuristic tool while analyzing data. Cultural anthropologists' books on the culture of exotic places, such as *Anthropology and Modern Life*<sup>9</sup> and *Coming of Age in Samoa*,<sup>10</sup> became best sellers. The central argument of the latter proposes that each culture, despite being formed by fragments of different origins, develops a specific "style," capable of unifying the culture as a synthetic whole and of distinguishing it from other cultural units at the same time. The notion of "cultural pattern," then, allows for the description and differentiation of human cultures through the use of categories borrowed from psychiatry and the philosophy of history.

The approach became increasingly attractive not only to scholars, but to policy makers as well. Cultural anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and Nathan Leites were, for example, commissioned by the U.S. government to write books on Japanese culture during World War II<sup>11</sup> and the Soviet Union's elites at the beginning of the Cold War.<sup>12</sup> In such studies, researchers used the techniques they had developed in small-scale studies of particular societies to analyze the "national character" of so-called complex societies. By gathering information from immigrants to the United States, as well as from published sources and films, they now studied culture "at a distance." Such research was used to guide government and military policy, to further cooperation among wartime allies, and to plan for the postwar world.

Throughout the 1950s a number of influential studies using a political culture approach appeared simultaneously with the upcoming behavioral studies. They were motivated in part by a desire to understand the rise of totalitarian regimes during the twentieth century in Russia, Germany, and Italy, with most works focusing on Nazi Germany.<sup>13</sup> One influential—and at the time controversial—work by Edward Banfield<sup>14</sup> argued that poverty in southern Italy grew out of a psychological inability to trust or to form associations beyond the immediate family. Until today, cultural anthropologists, in their role as interpreters of the guiding symbols of a specific culture, continue to inform and influence the political culture studies in the social sciences.

In the late 1950s, however, national character studies, those of so-called complex societies in particular, became increasingly exposed to scholarly critique based on accusations of erroneously implied homogeneity and overgeneralization. Moreover, badly researched journalistic popular pieces began to supplant serious scholarly studies

of cultural anthropology in the press and in popular books of the postwar era. They often involved dangerous stereotyping and broad and flawed generalizations. In a climate of mounting scholarly criticism and rejection of the approach, even established cultural anthropologists saw themselves confronted with such accusations.

Although many critics credited the cultural anthropologists with introducing scientific methods into the study of different cultures, they claimed that logical fallacies in works such as Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* revealed that they had so far failed to develop adequate and recurrently verifiable data collection methods. These problems of data compilation were and continue to be among the most daunting challenges faced by scholars of political culture, as we will see later on. A second point of critique was the problematic reliance on "from the distance" observations. In the words of Dante Moreira Leite, these issues can be summarized in the following way:

From a methodological point of view, these theories and studies are inevitably marked by a confusion between the supposed deep character of a society being analyzed and the observable behavior of a small section of that society. Thus, they offer accounts of German national character when in fact they are talking only about Nazis; they imagine that they are getting at the deepest parts of being Japanese when in fact they refer only to the military who dominated Japanese politics for a certain period; they believe they have grasped the "Brazilian" when they only have described some rural elite. [. . .] From a political point of view, theories of national character are no more than ideologies, in the traditional Marxist sense of the word: discourses destined to disguise reality, whether through ethnocentrism, fully compatible with the replacement of European colonialism by U.S. imperialism, or through the omission of politics, economics, or history as the genuine reasons for the differences and inequalities between societies. The result of this process is a kind of substantialization of differences, located in a tradition and at a psychological level so deep that they become almost indistinguishable from the biological rootedness of diversity which racism promoted, and from which culturalism is supposed to have distinguished itself so clearly.<sup>15</sup>

These ongoing and not entirely unjustified critiques did not go unnoticed in the field, leading to a temporary discrediting of the cultural anthropologists' approach. Remedy came in 1963 with the publication of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Published in a time of decolonization and major restructuring of the global scene, the work represented the introduction of systematic empirical cross-national studies in the

field. Like Weber's or the cultural anthropologists' works before, *The Civic Culture* can be regarded as the next evolutionary step in the field, radically changing the perception and application of the concept of political culture in academia. To appreciate the impact of the book it is important to understand that it was written in times of vigorous debate between and within different schools of thought and disciplines about how to best foster democracy in the postwar, decolonizing world.

On the one hand, economists (like W. W. Rostow in his seminal work *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*<sup>16</sup>) forcefully promoted the conception that economic growth is the central prerequisite for modernization and finally democratization. On the other hand, sociologists like Seymour M. Lipset in his compelling article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy"<sup>17</sup> emphasized the importance of the existence of certain social prerequisites to ascertain the long-term success of democratic regimes in the newly independent countries. Moreover, dependency theorists like Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson,<sup>18</sup> and classic Marxist writings offered attractive alternative ways of interpretation and inspiration to the leaders of the former colonies that were confronting tremendous economic and social challenges.

In stark contrast to these approaches, *The Civic Culture* postulated that to achieve modernization it was not sufficient to simply change the economic structure or social and political institutions of a country; a value transformation and a change in the political culture had to be fostered as well. In essence, Almond, Verba, and a number of their disciples argued that the evolution and persistence of mass-based democracy, apart from the establishment of democratic institutions, requires the emergence of certain supportive habits and attitudes among the general public, one of the most basic of these attitudes being a sense of interpersonal trust. The authors concluded that the latter is a crucial prerequisite to the formation of secondary associations, which in turn are indispensable for ensuring effective political participation in large democratic societies.

Moreover, a sense of trust is required to ensure the maintenance of the democratic rules of the game. After all, the perception of opposition parties as competing but nevertheless loyal, law-abiding, and reliable elements within one's own society is essential for maintaining democratic order. Despite these differences, the early developmentalist approaches of political culture and political development remained closely intertwined, not least by their common intent to present countermodels to the competing Marxian model of class conflict.

Methodologically, *The Civic Culture* truly revolutionized the field. As outlined above, previous works that attempted to deal with the impact of culture on politics relied heavily on impressionistic evidence. Cultural influences on the distinctive political behavior of a given people were interpreted in terms of vague but presumably indelible characteristics. As Wiarda points out, “the concept of political culture was generally linked to nations, thus representing in part a resurrection of hoary discussions of ‘national character.’”<sup>19</sup>

Almond and Verba approached this shortcoming by providing a well-developed theory of political culture that was based on cross-national empirical data, derived from 1,000-person samples in five different democratic nations. Based on survey results from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, they provided evidence for the relationship between public opinion and political symbols and beliefs that provided the backdrop for political action. Based on these findings they established a connection between political attitudes and regime type. To quantify democratic ideals, respondents in all five nations had to state whether they felt they could influence local and national government, and at which level their influence was most effective. It was discovered that the respondents in all five nations felt they were more able to influence local government as opposed to national government. But upon closer inspection, the levels of political competence varied between nations.

Based on these results, the scholars placed the respondents in one of three categories of political culture: a “parochial” political culture, which is generally found in poor, illiterate, underdeveloped societies, where people may focus on their own narrow family, village, or tribe, but have little sense of, or participation in the larger national political system; a “subject” political culture, in which people are becoming aware of the larger political system but are not themselves participating in it (being “subjects” of the state, which is usually top down and authoritarian, they have few rights of involving themselves in decision-making processes); and finally, a “participatory” or “civic” culture, a democratic political system, where citizens can vote, have rights that are protected, and participate fully in the political process. Most importantly, however, they found that there is no simple formula for the development of a political culture conducive to the maintenance of democracy, but rather that “the civic culture is not a modern culture, but a mixed modernizing-traditional one.”<sup>20</sup> The authors concluded that democratic stability arises from a balance or mixture of these cultures.

Moving from the realm of literary impressions to that of testable propositions, the book represented a sophisticated discussion, employing systemic and precise quantitative measures and thus diminishing (although not overcoming) the dangers of stereotyping and misinterpretation, which impeded the scholarly value of impressionistic national character studies. Moreover, it was a genuinely comparative study, involving respondents from five different nations, including Mexico, a non-Western country. From now on, it was no longer acceptable to base political culture explanations of different countries' development on the researcher's impressions alone. The concept of political culture and quantitative cultural studies had finally gained widespread appeal in the academic community and was bound to remain a recurring source of debate and new research initiatives.

In the 1960s and early 1970s studies of political culture blossomed. Almond's prominent position in the newly founded Social Science Research Council/Committee on Comparative Politics (SSRC/CCP), which decisively influenced the intellectual direction and research agenda in the field of comparative politics, certainly fostered this development. Ideas, values, beliefs, religion, regional cultures, the impact of the family or school system on transmitting political culture, the relationship of literature and political culture, types of legal systems, and the clash and conflict between different political cultures all came to be regarded as important subjects of inquiry. Adopting what became known as the path-dependent development approach, advocates of the historical-cultural school maintained that contemporary society is a reflection of society in ages past.

In the late 1970s and early '80s, however, political culture studies became—again—relatively discredited. Disillusionment with the U.S. role in the world, triggered by events like the disastrous development of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, and a subsequent loss of faith in the United States' future led many researchers to deny the United States the "model status" that the country had previously held in many scholarly accounts. Alternative approaches reflected, in part, the protest movements of the time, focusing on "structural" rather than political factors. Not surprisingly, dependency theory, Marxism, and political economy again took precedence over political culture approaches in the field of comparative politics.

In the 1980s political culture studies began their slow renaissance with the publication of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture Revisited*,<sup>21</sup> which not only provided answers to the methodological criticism raised since the publication of the initial work, but included



contributions by critics of the approach. While the United States underwent a powerful political recovery and ideological reinvigoration, a variety of new studies by renowned scholars were published, reviving the approach once again.

### MAIN SPOKESMEN AND IDEAS

The new studies not only expanded the range of topics explored by political culturalists but developed new and distinct branches of research as well. Attempting to explain the astonishing economic development of a number of East Asian countries, a group of scholars, for example, advanced the idea that the rapid economic growth and democratization that took place in these societies in the second half of the twentieth century was facilitated by certain aspects of a Confucian political culture. In Africa and Latin America, on the other hand, the absence of a culture that valued hard work and capital accumulation was deemed to be responsible for the stagnation of many countries. Spearheading this school of thought, Lucian W. Pye, in his 1988 work, *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures*,<sup>22</sup> developed the argument that traditional Chinese political culture, founded on the Confucian belief system, had persisted into the modern era. According to Pye, it continued to bind and limit China's Marxist-Leninist leadership from changing the system as rapidly as they wished and to put psychological constraints on Chinese political behavior. The idea of "Asian values" came to be seen not just as a smokescreen for corrupt politicians but as an Asian assertion of the importance of its own traditions. Like Edward Said's *Orientalism*,<sup>23</sup> in which the author asserts Islamic cultural and political values and argues that the West's image of the "Orient" is a fabricated construct aimed at establishing imperial control of "the other," Pye's book thus greatly advanced our understanding of the tremendous and lasting effects of indigenous institutions and cultures that were outside of, and sometimes in opposition to, the concepts and belief systems of Western societies.

The end of the Cold War predictably provided the field with a number of new impetuses and opportunities: the (assumed) decline of strategic factors in international politics at the end of the bipolar era not only made room for, but outright required further scholarly concentration on political differences, as ethnic, cultural, and nationality issues long bottled up by the superpowers' contest for dominance came to the forefront. The general—if temporary—discrediting of Marxist and other structuralist explanations additionally benefited the

cultural approach. In this context, Robert D. Putnam revisited the concept of political culture in 1993, following a rather Tocquevillian approach. His *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* investigates the influence of Italy's different regional historical cultures on the current political situations in the individual regions of the Mediterranean country. According to him, variations in the performance of the different regional political systems are due to the interaction of two sets of factors: socioeconomic modernity and civic community. He argues that institutional performance in northern Italian regions is more efficient and productive than in the southern regions, demonstrating a correlation between institutional performance and development.

Although this correlation might be spurious, the fact remains that all Italian regions got identical institutions in 1970, and yet the performance of these institutions varies widely across the country. These findings shed further doubt on the assumptions of structuralist theories that formal institutional design itself is a primary determinant of government performance. Putnam cautions, however, that his "simple analysis cannot reveal [. . .] whether modernity is a cause of performance [. . .] whether performance is perhaps in some way a cause of modernity, whether both are influenced by a third factor [. . .] or whether the link between modernity and performance is even more complex."<sup>24</sup> In his take on what makes democratic institutions stable and effective, he argues—very much in the tradition of Almond and Verba—that a "civic community" is necessary to make democracy work; social cooperation needs to be based on trust, tolerance, and widespread norms of active citizen participation. In essence, Putnam makes a strong case that social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions, thus formulating—at the least—heavy caveats against the general validity of any structuralist or institutionalist interpretation.

Pursuing very different research interests, namely the investigation of the future prospects of global relations in the post-Cold War world, Samuel Huntington published his groundbreaking and highly controversial work *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*<sup>25</sup> in 1996. He argues that violent conflict will emerge and wars will be fought no longer primarily for ideological reasons, but instead along cultural/civilizational fault lines. According to Huntington's definition, the principal civilizations include the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American, and African civilizations. He bases his thesis on the argument that in the post-Cold War era cultural differences are far greater than political,

ideological, or economic dissimilarities and on the observation that ethnic and religious conflicts are on the rise in virtually all areas of the globe. Moreover, he forcefully promotes the argument that modernization does not necessarily mean Westernization. The Huntington thesis remains one of the most debated and cited arguments in the field.

## DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Besides dividing the literature up into the works of area specialists and global comparativists, another—methodological—division between broad interpretative analyses and modern empirical studies is worth undertaking. Broad interpretative analyses generally provide multi-causal explanations, examining a host of factors that might in their entirety explain differences in production, power, and social patterns in different societies. David Landes's book *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are Rich and Some Are Poor*<sup>26</sup> is a representative of this category. In the Weberian tradition, Landes investigates why some countries have done so well in the last century while others have remained less developed. He explores the causes for the divergent destinies and relative prosperity levels of different national economies, trying to explain the "European Miracle" or the question why European societies experienced a period of explosive growth when the rest of the world did not.

The author attributes the vast economic growth of Western societies during the Industrial Revolution not to accident but to several particular qualities of (Northwestern parts of) Europe, most notably its climate, its inhabitants' internal political competition, and their attitude toward science and religion. In his view, the relative poverty in the world today is the result of failure on the part of political, religious, and mercantile elites elsewhere to pass the tests (rigged very heavily against them) of maintaining or regaining independence from and assimilating the technologies demonstrated by the people of Europe. According to Landes, there are three main (cultural) reasons for the industrial revolution that happened first in Europe: autonomous intellectual inquiry was allowed to flourish regardless of any religious orthodoxy; Europe was the leader in scientific experimentation that combined empirical observation and measurement; and independent research was routine, respected, and rewarded there as nowhere else. Similar to Weber, Landes regards ideas, values, and culture—not economic or institutional factors—as the driving forces behind change and as key explanatory variables when investigating the differences between countries. While broad interpretative analyses

like Landes's have an intuitive appeal as attempts of accurately representing and explaining reality, they are often—due to a supposed lack of empirical foundations and methodological rigidity—accused of being confused, contradictory, or lacking in theoretical parsimony.

A subset of these broad interpretative studies is represented by case studies and case comparisons, exemplified by Larry Harrison's *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind—the Latin American Case*.<sup>27</sup> Investigating Latin America's poverty relative to the United States, Harrison argues that classic dependency theory explanations are wrong. The principal explanation for the regional disparities in economic growth can be explained, according to Harrison, neither by the exploitation of poor countries by imperialist powers, nor by a lack of some resources, inhospitable geography, or a world economic system stacked against poorer nations. Instead, he argues that the legacy of the Spanish and Catholic influences has produced an "anti-progressive" culture and that development must be viewed relative to the traditional Hispanic culture. Following this argument he explains that Costa Rica, which was settled by pioneering farmers, was more successful economically than Nicaragua, because the latter was settled by the *conquistadores*, who were primarily searching for gold and slaves without any intention of developing a viable political society. He cites similar reasons for the diverging development in Argentina and Australia—both resource-rich, underpopulated, and remote countries. However, while Argentina's growth has been paralyzed by political instability and a failure to maintain durable and progressive institutions, Australia has become a thriving nation with a long tradition of democratic capitalism, despite its start as a prisoners' colony.

Modern empirical studies represent an alternative approach in political culture studies. They aim at overcoming the serious problems of impressionistic interpretations, especially the issue of nonfalsifiability. These works generally employ quantitative methodologies that allow for the empirical testing of hypotheses. The data used are primarily derived from standard data sources like the Eurobarometers, the World Values Survey, and other regional or global survey results. Ronald Inglehart's *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*,<sup>28</sup> for example, uses a large body of time-series survey data from twenty-six nations gathered from 1970 through 1988. In this work, Inglehart analyzes the cultural changes that are occurring as younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population of Western societies. Intending to explain political reorientation in postmaterialist societies, Inglehart argues that postmaterialists, having enjoyed relative economic security during their formative years, are less

preoccupied than materialists with personal economic advancement and more politically concerned with issues such as the environment and disarmament.

According to Inglehart, economic, technological, and sociopolitical shifts have been changing the cultures of advanced industrial societies during the past several decades, including changes in religious beliefs; work motivation; political conflict; attitudes toward children and families; and attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. Better-educated, more affluent voters who form the core of the postmaterialist subculture, are diminishing, if not reversing the long-standing inverse relationship between income and support for left-of-center parties in Western Europe. Basing their research on large, publicly accessible survey results,<sup>29</sup> Inglehart and his colleagues' take on political culture research presents a promising avenue for overcoming the problem of nonfalsifiability that continues to haunt large segments of political culture scholarship.

### CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THEORY

The discussion above has shown that scholars of political culture—no matter which school of thought or methodological approach they prefer—generally agree that different societies are characterized to very different degrees by specific syndromes of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and that they have major political consequences. Moreover, it is generally agreed that they are closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions. While no serious scholar of comparative politics denies the political importance of economic factors, political culturalists believe them to be only part of the story. To them, contrary to any simple-minded economic determinism, regional continuities in political culture are strikingly greater than continuities in economic structure or social well-being. The empirical studies in political culture à la Inglehart in particular find a broad syndrome of related attitudes that show substantial and consistent cross-cultural variation. Some societies are characterized by satisfied and trusting attitudes to a much greater degree than others. These cross-national differences show remarkable stability over time. Though they can vary, they tend to be relatively enduring cultural characteristics. Finally, this syndrome is linked with the persistence of democratic institutions. A majority of studies suggest that political culture is a crucial link between economic development and democracy. In his essay "The Renaissance of Political Culture,"<sup>30</sup> Inglehart,

for example, demonstrates that a given nation's level of economic development is closely linked with a set of characteristics that he, like Almond and Verba, labels the "civic culture." These cultural patterns show a strong empirical linkage with stable democracy, even when controlling for related aspects of social structure and economic development.

In other words, a body of evidence that not only is much larger than that available to Almond and Verba but also now extends over several decades tends to confirm the basic thesis of *The Civic Culture* and of those political culture studies succeeding and refining it. In short, political culture studies of the recent years have delivered evidence that political culture indeed represents a powerful tool to account for national, regional, and continental differences that tend to be overgeneralized or ignored by other more general approaches and theories. To Stephen Welch then, the main benefit of the concept of political culture is its inherent "potential to transcend the dichotomy of culture and social structure."<sup>31</sup> While it delivers convincing answers to major questions in political science (like: What produces political change? Why did modern capitalism and democracy develop in the Judeo-Christian West? How and to what degree are religion, politics, and economic development interrelated? Do institutions shape and determine culture or is it the culture that determines what institutions look like?), the concept's most important contribution to the field of comparative politics is probably its power to offer much needed qualifications and caveats to the more rigid and parsimonious "one size fits all" approaches presented in the other chapters of this volume.

### BIASES AND LIMITATIONS

While its intuitive attractiveness, and the significant advances in the discipline make political culture, according to Welch, "one of the most popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and confused."<sup>32</sup> Almond and Verba's dramatically innovative undertaking to reform political culture studies—and those of their disciples—was inevitably accompanied by serious flaws. Initially, comparativists justly challenged the cultural approach advanced in *The Civic Culture* as being classificatory and static. Additionally, critics have argued that political culturalists' focus on domestic values and perceptions has made them ignore international influences on any given political system.

Most notably, within the debate whether certain cultural prerequisites and supportive habits need to be fulfilled to secure the evolution

and persistence of mass-based democracy, political culture scholars continue to be repeatedly accused of ethnocentrism and stereotyping—sometimes justly, most often not. This is primarily to be ascribed to the “progressive element” in political culture studies that suffers from the same problematic as political development studies: “most modern” and “most developed” are values and ideas stemming from and still used as labels with reference to Western systems. This issue is currently visible within the ongoing debate on whether some cultural systems, like Islam or Confucianism, are inherently incompatible with Western notions of individual rights and democracy.

Moreover, there was and is a persistent perception that the typologies raised by the early culturalists were inadequate for scientific explanation. The study of political culture is based on the implicit assumption that autonomous and reasonably enduring cross-cultural differences exist and that they can have important political consequences. Intuitively, these assumptions seem plausible. But critics of cultural explanations have questioned them on the ground that very little empirical evidence has been presented to support them so far. To others the concept’s alleged insufficiency as a full-fledged explanatory theory and its limited usefulness as a “qualifier” for existing theories was and is its greatest weakness. Ronald H. Chilcote, for example, argues that “orthodox political culture in itself lacked explanatory power, being classificatory and descriptive rather than analytical.”<sup>33</sup> Instead of *explaining* aspects of the political system, political culture appears to him—and to many other observers—as *dependent* on the system.

In Almond and Verba’s edited volume *The Civic Culture Revisited*, several authors demonstrated that political culture in each of their subject countries was undergoing major change, little of which was predictable from the original study. This in turn suggested that political culture, while more durable than mere public opinion, is never static. Critics of *The Civic Culture* also pointed out that political structure can indeed affect culture. The effective governance and economic policies of West Germany’s government made that country’s citizens embrace democracy, whereas Britain’s economic decline made Britons more cynical about politics. Consequently, one of the central problems remains the determination of causality.

Political culture was and still is consequently deemed by its critics to be a response rather than an explanatory variable. Moreover, the enormous variety of different intellectual perspectives within the approach strengthened the conviction in many observers that there were analytic and scientific weaknesses embodied in the prevailing application of cultural elements. This makes the appliance of the

concept of culture an often-frustrating task for the social scientist, running counter to the proclivity to generalize. The problem is further aggravated by the continuing need to overcome serious data issues. The updating of existing datasets and the generation of new ones remains—even in the age of computer surveys—a tremendously costly endeavor. Moreover, data are difficult to obtain because the task both requires a long-term data-gathering process in many countries, lasting many decades, and because the governments of nondemocratic societies usually make it difficult to carry out survey research.

Summarizing the state of the “tricky concept” of political culture, Samuel Huntington concludes that it is simultaneously easy and unsatisfying to use<sup>34</sup>—being in the worst case simply a “residual category.” If no other causes can plausibly explain significant “abnormalities” like German Nazism, Balkan blood feuds, Japanese diligence, American exceptionalism, or Latin authoritarianism, it appears inviting to attribute them to culture. In short, to many skeptics, political culture is too vague a concept, lacking causal specificity, and that by seemingly including “everything” loses a great deal of explanatory power. In view of these strong and convincing points of critique, it is not surprising that political culture approaches time and again were in danger of being disregarded or cast aside completely as both unscientific and substantively irrelevant, notwithstanding their intellectually intriguing character.

## OVERALL ASSESSMENT

For any sophisticated evaluation of the pros and cons of a scholarly concept, it is essential to understand that there is no single approach that in itself can adequately pave the royal way to understanding. However, according to Harry Eckstein,<sup>35</sup> only two viable approaches to political theory and explanation have been offered in the last third of a century to replace traditional formal-legalism: the culturalist and the rationalist. Certainly, rational choice models, in the view of many observers, might come closest to this ideal, constituting one of the most promising tools now available for political analysis. This approach has made major contributions to our understanding of how politics works.

However, it underestimates the significance of cultural factors, if only because while economic indicators are readily available for statistical models, cultural data generally are not. Then of course we need to ask ourselves if we should give up on studying something just because it is hard to frame or because data are—not yet—available.



In this respect, it is worthwhile to look back at the fate of *The Civic Culture* over time. It was repeatedly charged that political culture was a static concept and that Almond and Verba had ethnocentrically asserted the (presumably permanent) superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture over that of other nations. Although their theoretical interest concerned possible changes in political culture, their analysis was based on data from a single time point and was therefore necessarily static (this shortcoming was eventually addressed in their "revisited" volume, in which the authors study cultural change over time).

Empirically, the political culture of a given country could in previous accounts only be treated as a constant. Variables like interpersonal trust, pride in their political institutions, and feelings of political competence were in fact constants for each country; it was impossible to analyze their relationships with other macrophenomena or to trace changes over time. However, much has been achieved since the 1960s to remedy this shortcoming. Large-scale data collection endeavors like the World Values Survey project can now look back on three decades of gradual expansion and refinement. This development shows that—at least in principle—it is possible to acquire the relevant data for political culturalists, and this is a goal worth striving for. Even if scholars will never attain the optimum, there is certainly room for improvement. In this respect, the development, maintenance, and expansion of the World Values Survey project appears to be a very promising approach to tackle the data issue that so prominently impedes the radius of political culture studies.

As currently applied, rational choice approaches are, as Inglehart points out, effective in analyzing short-term fluctuations within a given system, taking cultural and institutional factors as constant. However, these factors are not constant, either cross-nationally or over time. And current rational choice models cannot deal with long-term changes in the basic goals and nature of a system. One of the central debates in the field of political economy seems to reflect this fact. When it was found that political support responded to fluctuations in the economy, it was taken for granted that this reflected the workings of economic self-interest among the electorate. Subsequent research has made this interpretation increasingly doubtful, indicating that the linkage between economics and politics seems largely shaped by sociotropic concerns.

The classic model of economically determined behavior has a strong grip on the minds of social analysts, probably because, throughout most of history (of modern societies at least), it provided a relatively accurate description of human behavior. Inglehart argues,

however, that in recent decades, the rising role of postmaterialist concerns may have helped make sociotropic concerns increasingly important, particularly among the politically more aware segments of the electorate. Though mass democracy is almost impossible without a certain amount of economic development, it should have become obvious by now that economic development by itself does not produce democracy. Unless specific changes occur in culture and social structure, the result may not be democracy but a variety of autocratic alternatives. A large body of cross-national survey evidence indicates that enduring cultural differences exist. Though these differences may be related to the economic level of a given nation, they are relatively independent of short-term economic changes. These cultural factors have an important bearing on the durability of democracy, which seems to result from a complex interplay of economic, cultural, and institutional factors. The prospect of less reductionist explanation attempts, erected on multivariate sociopolitical analysis, may well provide a level of scientific insight currently absent from theoretical efforts to dissect contemporary political reality.

A close look at the world today provides strong incentives to strive for this goal. Despite—or because of—the tendencies of economic globalization, differences in cultures and regions are once again coming to the forefront of public awareness. As Benjamin Barber explains, tribalization as a counterforce to “the great equalizer” globalization is increasingly gaining momentum.<sup>36</sup> The incompleteness of models that ignore cultural factors is becoming increasingly evident. In Catholic societies from Latin America to Poland, the Church plays a major role despite the demise often predicted by economic determinists. In the Islamic world, Muslim fundamentalism has become a political factor that neither East nor West can ignore. Consequently, there is an urgent need to foster political culture studies, no matter how dissatisfying the data background might still be.

In this ever-complex environment, rational choice models are useful for short-term fluctuations but intrinsically inadequate without cross-national cultural elements. Cultural differences are durable, and they themselves do influence the durability of democracy. There is today strong empirical reason to believe that political culture constitutes an important intervening variable that is logically linked both to economic development and to modern mass-based democracy. In the words of Wiarda, “because it filters perception, determines attitudes, and influences modalities of participation, culture is a major component of the political game.”<sup>37</sup> Yet, the relationship between culture, modernization, and democratization still resembles the

causal ambiguity of the chicken-versus-egg question: For example, does southern Europe have low levels of trust because it has not yet developed modern organizational structures? Or, (in a variation on Weber's Protestant ethic thesis) did southern Europe industrialize and develop modern organizational structures later than northern Europe because its traditional culture was relatively low on interpersonal trust? Although a reciprocal causal relationship seems to be likely, we cannot answer this question conclusively with the data and methods now available.

Most studies of particular locales or particular cases do not add up to much in a scientific or comparative sense and are not germane to a coherent program of generalization. Yet more general works that deal with data across a large number of nations often seem to be superficial and inadequate in their treatment of individual nations or actors—or worse than inadequate, sometimes they are outright distorted. The researcher in comparative politics who attempts to deal with a number of political systems is inevitably at a disadvantage compared with the true specialist. This matter becomes especially obvious when academic studies are expanded to encompass political advice. Clearly a better blend of overlapping or theoretically interesting case studies and broader comparative ones is called for.

## CONCLUSION

The continuous appearance of political culture articles in major disciplinary journals bespeaks the vitality and unbroken appeal of the culturalist renewal or "renaissance" in comparative politics. There seems to be a serious and continuing commitment to wrestle in one fashion or another with the cultural dimension. Moreover, researchers should always try their best to look at political culture from different angles, keeping its characteristics and limitations in mind. The most important of these are: its dynamic and permanently changing nature, its variety and rich diversity (implying that a single country or society can easily contain various overlapping or competing political cultures), and its vulnerability to manipulation by political elites. The quintessence to be drawn from this short explanatory excursion into the world of political culture then, nevertheless, should be that, no matter how convincing political culture explanations appear to be, they need to be applied with extreme caution in a balanced and non-prejudicial way. As the above discussion has shown, political culture certainly is a useful but only partial explanation for political development; it should never be used as the single explanatory variable.

Instead, it needs to be regarded as part of a larger explanatory system, including such factors as class and social structures, institutions, and the level of economic development. In short, it remains a necessary subject of inquiry, but not a sufficient one.

These observations lead of course to the conclusion that—although political culture definitely matters—the political culture approach in itself does not qualify as a serious contender for an all-explaining grand theory in political science. To increase the concept's leverage in comparative politics in the future, a number of serious problems need to be overcome or at least diminished. Among the most important ones are certainly the collection of more and better data and the development of methods to deal with complex multicausality and measurement problems.

In the absence of a comprehensive theory and more precise ways of defining the problems addressed, comparative politics remains dependent upon in-depth knowledge of the particular system being studied. Despite its—at times serious—shortcomings, the concept of political culture has served the field well in generating and delivering such knowledge so far. As the field remains fragmented and appears somewhat disorganized, it is hardly conceivable that an all-encompassing theory or paradigm will be seen on the horizon anytime soon. The approach is likely to maintain its heterogeneity, and it appears that most of its practitioners will continue to view this as acceptable and healthy. While it appears obvious that political culture by itself should not be treated as the sole explanatory variable, it should at the same time neither be undervalued nor ignored.

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## CHAPTER 4



# SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES: OLD AND NEW IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

*Ann P. Kryzaneck*

A suitable place to begin exploring grand theory in the social sciences is the paradigm that has been provided by the sociologists. Sociological explanations posit that underlying social structures and patterns of social change have directed the course of human history. They highlight the saliency of interaction, stratification, conflict, and consensus in behavioral phenomena, thus filling in the gaps that Rostowian economic development, Marxian class conflict, or cultural anthropology have left behind.

This approach derives from a group of nineteenth-century European thinkers, Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. Each of these thinkers descended from the rationalist and humanist philosophical traditions of the Enlightenment Era. Concurrently, their intellectual development was profoundly shaped by the experience of an industrial revolution that was ushering Europe out of the feudal era and into entirely new forms of social and economic organization. Their grand theories, therefore, were born out of their own experiences of great social change.

Their writings were later translated and applied by a group of postwar sociologists and political scientists working in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Like their intellectual predecessors, these scholars were observing enormous political and social change throughout the Third World. After the UN Atlantic Charter of 1941 set out normative dictates of sovereignty, the system of nineteenth-century colonialism began to

disintegrate. A host of new, independent countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were formed. Comparativists were witness to these countries' struggles, as they attempted to meld disparate tribal and ethnic affinities, form cohesive national identities, develop infrastructure, modernize traditional and agrarian societies, and build functioning political institutions. In the midst of such change, these scholars attempted to make sense of what they saw by applying the approaches of Comte, Weber, and Durkheim to Third World development.

This chapter will explore the theoretical foundations of sociology's "founding fathers," and then survey modern applications of these theories as they relate to the developing world. In many respects, sociological explanations of behavioral phenomena are as deterministic as the explanations of Rostowian developmentalists or the Marxian theorists explored in the previous chapters. However, while those two approaches present economically driven grand theories, the sociologists tend to provide a more holistic and comprehensive approach. In many ways, sociological explanations subsume many of the economic and cultural factors that other theorists have posited as central. The essence of this approach is perhaps best summed up by Cyril E. Black, one of its modern contributors. He explains:

Sociologists have made great progress in analyzing the social structures that form the basis for all human action, and the ways in which the wide variety of structures created by the different peoples of the world perform the functions essential to social cohesion and development.<sup>1</sup>

## THE FOUNDING FATHERS

Comte, Durkheim, and Weber are regarded as the founders of modern sociology. Their theoretical framework, however, has influenced scholars far beyond this field, including political scientists, anthropologists, methodologists, and even organizational theorists. These thinkers hailed from different family, social, and religious backgrounds, as is reflected in their writings. Auguste Comte was a French logician and a product of Paris's Ecole Polytechnique. Emile Durkheim was a French philosopher and sociologist, who led an entirely secular life, despite descending from a line of devout Jews. Max Weber was a jurist and historian by trade, who was brought up in a devoutly Protestant family and whose theoretical orientation was much inspired by his own religious upbringing.

Despite their differences, Comte, Durkheim, and Weber recognized the profound impact of industrial development, scientific

advancement, and capitalist organization on society. Each thinker discerned that transitions to modernity were inducing procedural and existential changes in human society, and that such changes would inevitably produce a new, perhaps destabilizing, social order. Thus, each thinker attempted to make sense of these societal shifts and their consequences for social cohesion and stability.

### Auguste Comte

Born in France in 1798, Auguste Comte was very much a child of revolution and change. He was brought up in the wake of the 1789 French Revolution, which abolished France's feudal society and monarchical polity and delivered the country into a modern, constitutional, and rights-based system. Moreover, Comte was a witness to the Industrial Revolution, which had transformed the very basis of economic production and had reorganized traditional social orbits.

Consequently, Comte was intensely aware of an emerging social order and the crisis that it was producing. He recognized the presence of two conflictual societies. One society—grounded in theological explanations of human nature and centered on large-scale military action—was dying. Another society, based on industrial organization and rational thought, was being born. Comte theorized that the only solution to this conflict was to create a system of scientific ideas that would govern the new social order. As such, he formulated his philosophy of positivism, which declared the primacy of scientific knowledge.

Comte's theory of positivism is straightforward. Human societies, he argues, experience three distinct phases in their search for the ultimate and exemplary order. The first is a theological phase in which God serves as man's primary reference point. This "supernatural stage" includes pre-Enlightenment era societies and many modern tribal societies. The second is a metaphysical phase and is characterized by Enlightenment era rational thinking, whereby man comes to understand natural, as opposed to supernatural order. The third is the positivist phase in which society is governed by science and reason and in which individual rights comprise the central moral dictates.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of progress was central to Comte's philosophy. Like many of his contemporaries, Comte's theories were fundamentally teleological. He conceived of human history as an evolutionary process, with the final stage marked by positivist thought. Ultimately, societies will converge on this exemplary order that will be based strictly on science and reason.



Comte's paradigm provided the intellectual foundation for modern-day sociology, and his contribution to grand theory is most valuable. However, his theories have been subject to the criticism of elitism, as his views of social change are entirely elite-driven. Comte believed that elites, as opposed to the common masses, would lead the transition to modernity. Scientists and other social engineers will rule in a positivist society, because their intellectual capacities provide the basic conditions needed for social change. Essentially, those who hold power within society provide the model for the dominant mode of thought. While Marxian analysis decries the concentration of power and wealth, Comte believed it to be an inevitable, if not desirable, reality.

Comte's elite-driven model of social reform informed nearly all of the great European thinkers who followed him. Similarly, Comte's writings were highly valued in Latin American intellectual circles and other regions with European roots. However, as a thinker, Comte has had little relevance to scholarship in the United States. His philosophies are contrary to the intellectual traditions of egalitarianism and individualism that so mark the American ethos. Historically, Europeans and their colonial offshoots have not been as hostile to elitism, intellectually or procedurally, as their American counterparts.

Furthermore, Comte's theories suffer from a kind of ethnocentrism, a theme that will reoccur throughout this chapter. In his view, human progression is constant across all cultures. Because of this perspective, Comte had difficulty accounting for diversity, as his theoretical framework conceives of human history as a single entity. But other societies, many of them non-Western, have exhibited a different trajectory on the path to modernity. Such diversity of experience, however, cannot be accounted for in Comte's unified and coherent view of social order.

### **Emile Durkheim**

Intellectually, we can consider Emile Durkheim as a direct descendant of Auguste Comte. In his writings, Comte expressed the view that every society is united "by means of the agreement of minds." The veritable French sociologist Raymond Aron articulates this view precisely: "Society exists only to the extent that its members share the same beliefs."<sup>3</sup> As a philosopher and sociologist, Durkheim grounded his thinking on such a notion, emphasizing groups, communities, and social class behavior.

Born in France in 1858, Durkheim was a descendant of the societal conflict that had gripped his country following the 1848 uprisings.

Consequently, he was occupied with the notion of social consensus for the length of his career, pondering how societies might achieve consensus in an age of rapid social change. As a secularist Durkheim was searching for a secular alternative to religious morality, akin to the ethics of Immanuel Kant, which could guide a segmented and disparate modern society. Aron articulates the questions that defined Durkheim's intellectual development:

How can a multiplicity of individuals make up a society? How can individuals achieve what is the condition of social existence, namely a consensus? How are we to ensure that a society divided among innumerable specialists will retain the necessary intellectual and moral coherence?<sup>4</sup>

Like Comte, Durkheim's philosophy emphasized the entity over the element. Durkheim believed that individuals are born of society, not society of individuals. In essence, society is, not as a collective aggregation of individuals but rather as a whole, greater than the sum of its parts. From this idea, he posited that behavioral phenomena are fundamentally products of the social order from which they arise. Interestingly, we see the antecedents of an intellectual tradition of collectivism, as opposed to individualism, which greatly appealed to European thinkers, more so than to their American counterparts.

Durkheim's systemic philosophy was explicated in his seminal *De la Division du Travail Social* (*The Division of Labor in Society*). In this work he presents a history of human societies, categorizing them into two distinct spheres (or phases). Durkheim describes the first society as "primitive" or "simple"; it is one in which individuals take on similar operative roles. Societal units are "functionally undifferentiated," and individuals are highly substitutable.

This type of social organization leads to what Durkheim terms "mechanical solidarity," which is characterized by collective norms that hold primacy over individual volition. These societies possess a "collective consciousness," and their members largely share the same values, feel similar emotions, and worship the same sacred ground. Moreover, these societies are governed by a particularized system of law. Crime is an act that violates the social imperatives of the collectivity, and so justice is aimed at satisfying the common consciousness. Punishment, therefore, is often "repressive" and associated with a loss of honor.

Durkheim's second society is modern and industrial. It is characterized by a division of labor in which social roles and employment functions are specialized. As a result of functional differentiation, individuals are tied to one another by virtue of their

mutual dependencies. Durkheim argues that differentiation does not originate in capitalist imperatives to increase production, as Marxian analysts purport. Rather, it is social in origin, resulting from what he terms material and moral density. The former refers to the volume of people in society, the latter refers to interaction and communication between individuals and groups. As theories of social Darwinism indicate, increased interaction heightens competition between groups. Social differentiation is, in large part, a peaceful solution to this problem. To circumvent unrestrained competition, man occupies his own space and performs his own designated function.

These societies are marked by a kind of “organic” solidarity, whereby the sphere of the collective is reduced and the sphere of the individual is expanded. The diversity of roles allows for greater tolerance of differences, freedom of decision, and greater margin for individual interpretation of social imperatives. In societies characterized by organic solidarity, law is universal and aimed at inducing cooperation among differentiated peoples. Punishment for crime provides a restituting function in these societies, as the system of law has already laid out the “permissible” and the “forbidden.”

Durkheim’s framework expresses the idea that behavior is inextricably linked to the realities of societal differentiation, organization, and change. Essentially, each part of society performs a function that serves to maintain social integration and order. Therefore, sentiments, norms, and morality are, in fact, responses to social forms and needs. As such, Durkheim laid the groundwork for more recent theories of functionalism that developed long after his death.

### Max Weber

Like Comte and Durkheim, Weber was a witness to the industrial revolution and the rapid social change that it induced. More importantly, Weber was reared in a deeply religious family. His upbringing had a profound effect on his intellectual development, as he sought to understand how religion, and meaning in general, functioned in society. A strict antipositivist, Weber believed that modern life had lost some of its deeper purpose. Instead of supposing that science would deliver the highest form of human progress, Weber believed it had the potential to disillusion mankind.

The Weberian model attempts to find the subjective meanings, or what is identified as *verstehen*, that lead to human action. Instead of serving Durkheimian functional roles, Weber asserts that individuals are meaning-driven. He identifies two contrasting types of

action: *wertrational* and *zweckrational*.<sup>5</sup> The former is classified as value-oriented behavior that is largely driven by cultural beliefs or dictates. The latter is identified as goal-oriented behavior; it is purposive, instrumental, and driven by norms of efficiency.

Weber argues that the development of capitalism is increasingly replacing value-driven behavior with goal-oriented behavior. The “iron cage” of capitalism has replaced value orientations with rational, bureaucratic forms of social integration and organization. In his *Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft)*, Weber asserts that society as a whole tends toward this kind of organization to fill the requisite needs of economic production. While positivists view rational society as desirable, Weber sees a kind of “fatal element” to the bureaucratization of modern society. As such, he sought to define that sector of society, “in which another type of action can and should exist.”<sup>6</sup>

These ideas were brought to bear in his most famous study *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus)*. In this work Weber explores how religion and religious conceptions have operated throughout human history. His thesis posits that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination shaped the development of capitalism in northern European Protestant societies. He argues that the dictates of Calvinism encouraged the rational pursuit of economic gain to achieve salvation. A strong, aesthetic work ethic, Weber contends, led to a vigorous commercial spirit in these countries, and planted the seeds of the modern capitalist system.

With this thesis Weber demonstrates how a man’s conception of himself and the world around him (whether it be a religious conception or otherwise) may orient his action. In this way, Weber was wedded to the idea that values, ideas, and beliefs can shape human behavior. On a systemic level, he was exploring the relationship between the meaning men give to their existence and the way in which they organize their societies. Interestingly, Weber was concerned with these “existentialist” questions before such a term was associated with the philosophies of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.

Many scholars have pitted the theories of Weber against those of Marx, claiming that his theories essentially refute Marxian class analysis. But Aron argues that while Weber’s thesis inverted Marx’s purely materialist conception of history, Weber did not substitute a causality of religious factors for economic ones. Weber was merely arguing that religious conceptions may undergird economic behavior. Aron explains, “He does not suppose that man prefers his ideas to his

interest, but to understand that interest is determined by our image of the world.” In this way, Weber was positing that ideational factors are perhaps more central than economic determinists will acknowledge.<sup>7</sup> As such, Weber laid the groundwork for the culturalist theories of the latter half of the twentieth century, which insert cultural variables into explanations of behavioral phenomena. Culturalists use the foundations of Weber to assert that values and cultural meaning condition political outcomes.

The Weberian model differs significantly from the paradigms of both Durkheim and Comte. Weber assigns more autonomy to the individual, rejecting the notion that society subsumes individual volition. He argues, rather, that the creation of values is both a collective and an individual process. Values are neither universal nor hierarchical; each individual is obliged to choose his or her own values. In the modern era, man is pulled by a number of different identities—class, nation, God. It is up to him to choose among these conceptual ideas. For Weber, society is not the entire “value-creating subject.”

Moreover, Weber’s writings are not tinged with the same kind of determinism that define the Durkheim and Comte models. Trained as a historian, Weber had a keen understanding of humanity’s historical course. As such, he did not assume a progressive, teleological vision of history. Neither did he assume an optimistic view of history, as did Durkheim. Weber largely rejects the notion of social consensus, leaving room for conflict between groups, parties, and individuals in society. Conflict, according to Weber, is a basic externality of social interaction. Consequently, Weber’s theories seem particularly suited to the study of political development, as such a process is almost never linear and is often filled with conflict, as opposed to consensus.

## MODERN APPLICATIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

A more modern group of scholars have explored the relationship between political and social development, drawing inspiration from the philosophies of Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. The theories and approaches articulated above have served as a foundation for a number of prominent social scientists in recent decades. I will focus here on Seymour Lipset, Karl Deutsch, and C. E. Black. These scholars represent some of the main proponents of the “theory of modernization” that applies nineteenth century European frameworks to twentieth century Third World issues. Although their works differ in substantive content, they show

agreement in their notion that political development is a function of underlying social structures and processes of societal change.

Lipset, Deutsch, and Black view political development from a functionalist perspective. Functionalism posits that institutions act to regulate inputs and outputs and respond to various social demands for the maintenance of system equilibrium. It has its roots in Durkheim's social differentiation framework, and was first articulated by the sociologist Talcott Parsons.<sup>8</sup> The functionalist/developmental approach was largely a response to the earlier emphasis placed on the formal and legal processes of government within the field of comparative politics.<sup>9</sup> The developmentalist approach was thought to be more comprehensive, more comparative, and less ethnocentric than the strictly constitutional studies. Functionalism informs the theories of these three scholars, as each is concerned with systemic change and the overall stability of social systems.

I will begin with the work of Seymour Lipset. In his seminal article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," Lipset posits that a democracy has a better chance at surviving if it holds certain "requisites" of socioeconomic development. He demonstrates a significant correlation between levels of socioeconomic development—wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education—and the stability of democratic systems. Although he includes regions across the globe, his main point of comparison is between European or English-speaking systems and Latin American polities. He looks specifically at stable and unstable democracies as well as at dictatorships.

Lipset's causal arguments are straightforward and persuasive. He argues that socioeconomic development mitigates the potential for destabilizing extremism. A democracy will stabilize with balanced degrees of wealth and education, as the "lower strata will be exposed to cross pressures, which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremist ones."<sup>10</sup> Essentially, Lipset argues that social requisites facilitate an integrated national culture, as opposed to isolated lower and upper class divisions. It is here that we discern the theoretical foundations of Durkheim. Lipset is suggesting that *social requisites*, like education or urbanization, will produce a Durkheimian "social consensus."

In addition, Lipset argues that increased wealth changes social structures within countries, specifically the shape of social stratification, and that this in turn influences political development. Countries without social requisites can be represented as a pyramid, with a large lower class strata and a small number of wealthy "elites." The processes of

social change, however, transform this pyramid into a diamond shape, as a middle class begins to form. The middle class subsequently plays a mitigating role in politics and society at large. The “bulging” middle moderates conflict between the lower and upper strata, thereby contributing to the stabilization of democracy. We have observed the pivotal role of the middle class in democratic transition and consolidation across East Asia, and specifically in South Korea. Here, the reform-minded middle class helped “tip the balance” toward democracy by joining oppositional movements during the 1989 protests.<sup>11</sup> Heretofore, they have remained a democratic stronghold within the country and a driving agent of social change.<sup>12</sup>

In many respects, the experiences of a country like Costa Rica corroborate Lipset’s social requisites theory. Nestled in a region of coup d’états, military regimes, and dictatorships, Costa Rica has maintained a stable democracy and a competitive party system continuously since 1948.<sup>13</sup> Many scholars have attributed the stability of Costa Rica’s democracy, a clear anomaly in Central America, to processes of social modernization. Testing the relationship between development and democracy, Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán find that levels of development have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of democratic outcomes in this, and other, Latin American “exceptions.”<sup>14</sup>

Karl Deutsch’s social mobilization theory presents a paradigm similar to that of Lipset. According to Deutsch, social mobilization is “a name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life.”<sup>15</sup> In such a process, traditional socializations fade away and old patterns of behavior give way to new patterns. The cumulative effect of social mobilization can alter political behavior, transforming political organization and even entire political systems. In short, Deutsch posits that social change induces political change.

Analytically, Deutsch breaks down social mobilization into phases that are admittedly highly correlated and not entirely separable. These include the percentage of the population exposed to the mass media, the percentage of the population in nonagricultural occupations, the percentage of the population that is literate, and others. These characteristics are similar to Lipset’s factors, except that they are historical processes and not fixed requisites. The essence of his argument is this: when a society goes through phases of social mobilization, the “politically relevant strata” of the population begin to expand. Social change widens the scope and the membership of politics, and increases

interactions between the governing and the governed. As the number of “wage earners, market farmers, radio listeners, and bank customers” increases, so do the numbers of relevant political actors.

The growth of the political constituency puts pressure on national institutions and political processes. Essentially, social mobilization expands the range of “human needs” that is imposed on the political system. Individuals are effectively uprooted from their localities or their old traditions and habits; they may need provisions for housing, medical care, and social security. Thus, there are pressures for the expansion of government services and the public sector in general, as traditional forms of government quickly become overwhelmed and ineffectual.

Both Lipset and Deutsch present persuasive theories of modernization and development. However, both suffer from limitations and considerable biases. We can question whether the relationship that Lipset posits is merely correlational, as opposed to causal. It is possible that democracies consolidate and societies modernize simultaneously, without labeling one or the other as a catalyst. Deutsch, and to an extent Lipset, presents a theory that is entirely linear, in that nations undergo sequential, Comtean phases of social mobilization. Such a framework fails to account for reversals, conflict, or static development. Moreover, neither seriously considers political factors in their development trajectories, assuming the centrality of social change. We can perhaps reverse Lipset’s causal arrow and ask to the contrary: do democracies encourage educational advancement, wealth aggregation, industrialization, and urbanization? In recent decades, a number of scholars have considered such a question.<sup>16</sup> Lastly, both these developmentalist scholars suffer from ethnocentrism. One can question how universal the processes they present are. Few countries of the developing world are exact blueprints of the West, culturally, socially, or politically. The theories of Lipset and Deutsch, for example, cannot account for East Asian development models in which modernization has been mainly state-directed and in which social change has largely been a consequence or by-product of state-led growth. It is clear that development paths in the Third World are often different from Western experiences.

In his 1966 book, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, Cyril Black addresses some of these issues.<sup>17</sup> Like Lipset and Deutsch, he presents a theory of modernization in his work. But he uses a broad comparative method to create a more comprehensive, non-Western-specific model of social modernization, thus correcting some of their ethnocentric pitfalls.

Black categorizes a society’s transition to modernity into the following four phases: (1) the challenge of modernity, (2) the consolidation of



transformative leadership, (3) economic and social conversion, and (4) the integration of society. More specifically, Black argues that a given society will first undergo an intellectual revolution. This phase is marked by the application of science and technology to human affairs. Secondly, a society reaches the stage of political revolution, where the state's institutions become more centralized as a result of technological sophistication. Next, a society will undergo an economic revolution, characterized by greater savings and investments that stimulate economic development. After societies have experienced intellectual, political, and economic transformation, they will reach social revolution. In such a phase, rural societies become urban and large extended families become modern and nuclear. Lastly, societies undergo a psychological revolution, whereby collective norms are replaced by values of individualism.

Unlike his contemporaries, Black rejects the idea of a universal path to modernization. In fact, he recognizes that there have been seven different patterns of development. The first and second patterns include the earliest European modernizers, and their English-speaking colonial offshoots (i.e., the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). The third pattern characterizes the European descendants of the French Revolution; the fourth pattern includes those countries of Latin America who modernized late and under a great deal of foreign influence. Countries like China, Japan, Turkey, Iran, and Russia make up the fifth pattern, as their impetus for development was a sense of foreign encroachment. Black thus terms their trajectory as "defensive modernization." Lastly, the sixth and seventh patterns are those countries of Africa, Asia, and the Americas that have had a long experience with colonialism and whose development has been largely defined by its borrowed institutions.

In many respects, Black's paradigm is more inclusive than either Lipset's or Deutsch's. He has made an important theoretical innovation in recognizing that developmental paths are not universal across all regions and cultures. As a historian of modernization, Cyril Black took issue with the way in which historical material was presented in the social sciences, that is, from an ethnocentric perspective. He argues that both sociological and economic approaches pay inadequate attention to the diversity of cultural heritages and institutions, assuming that all societies are merging as they modernize. He explains:

There are certain characteristics that must be present if a society is to take advantage of the advancement of knowledge for human welfare, but these characteristics do not necessarily embrace all of the institutional means employed by Western societies.<sup>18</sup>

Black argues that the diverse societies of the world should be studied on their own accord, and not in relation to their Western influences. While this innovation is to be lauded, Black suffers from the same kind of linear pitfalls as do his peers. It is entirely possible that structural constraints or imbalances, borne out of the processes of globalization, prevent “economic revolution” and keep developing countries in perpetual stagnation. In this sense, a subsequent “social revolution” would never materialize. Moreover, our cultural sophistication leads us to be skeptical of Black’s “psychological revolution,” whereby modernization will purportedly produce individualistic norms. In many countries of the Global South, cultural traditions of collectivism and communalism are far too entrenched in society to ever disintegrate. So while we have addressed issues of ethnocentrism, we cannot seem to shed our deterministic frameworks.

It is important to note that the work of these scholars, and others in the developmentalist field, had significant policy implications. Their theories helped to justify U.S. foreign policy in the Third World, specifically the massive amounts of foreign aid that were channeled to distant governments.<sup>19</sup> Policy makers attuned to the theories of Lipset and others assumed that pouring U.S. currency into these nations would stimulate economic growth, create a middle class, build infrastructure, construct thriving civil societies, and, ultimately, induce democracy.<sup>20</sup> In many respects, U.S. foreign policy toward much of the Third World is still based on the developmentalist theories of modernization highlighted above.

## COUNTERVIEWS AND CONCLUSIONS

Important counterviews to the opinions of modernization theorists have come from inside and outside the developmental approach. One such critic is Samuel Huntington, who himself was a proponent of functionalism.<sup>21</sup> He argues that instead of democracy and stability, rapid social mobilization may induce political chaos and eventual breakdown. He starts by suggesting that modernization leads to rising expectations within society. Weak political institutions may not have the capacity to respond to increasing societal demands, resulting in social frustration and political disorder (i.e., system disequilibrium). He argues that, instead of concentrating on processes of social change, we should perhaps focus our attention on building effective institutions throughout the developing world.

In many respects, institutions are undervalued in the sociological approaches, even among the functionalists. Few of these scholars

recognize that institutions may fundamentally change the “rules of the game,” by directing the course of social and political change. The constitutional engineers of the comparative field have debated how various institutional arrangements (consociationalism or parliamentarianism, for example) can diffuse social conflict at the political level.<sup>22</sup> Such ideas have particular applicability to the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, where tribal and ethnic affinities often impede social consensus. Lipset himself posited that democratic stability rests on the mechanisms developed to reduce the intensity of political cleavages. However, he argues that basic differences in social structure hold more explanatory power than does institutional variation. But is Lipset’s viewpoint perhaps too narrow? Institutional explanations of political development go beyond the confines of this chapter, but we can posit that they are an essential variable that must be explored in any review of grand theory.<sup>23</sup>

Another counterview to the sociological approach stems from the structuralist camp, which has largely been influenced by Marxian analysis. In essence, structuralists posit that political outcomes are conditioned by natural or social realities that constrain human behavior. The most prominent proponent of Marxian structuralism is the Dependencia School. Immanuel Wallerstein similarly argues that the capitalist economy is one such structure that constrains both nations and social groups.<sup>24</sup> The developed “core,” comprised of OECD (the Organisation for Economic and Co-operation Development) industrial democracies, has profited at the expense of the Global South “periphery,” thus stifling their economic and social progress. Faletto and Cardoso applied this framework to the experiences of a number of Latin American countries, positing that their own development has become *dependent* on the industrialized nations because of the international capitalist system.<sup>25</sup> Such a paradigm suggests that political outcomes are not the result of social change, but rather of agrarian capitalism, industrialization, economic interdependencies, and international capital. While this model appears reductionist at times, it does offer a persuasive counter to the sociological approach. Unfortunately, it seems that these two frameworks are somewhat mutually exclusive, which leaves little room for theoretical integration.

These counterviews encourage us to think critically about the applicability of the sociological approach today. In many ways, today’s world is entirely different from what the founding fathers or postwar scholars had experienced. For one, technological advancement and economic interdependence have disrupted the stages of modernization posited by Deutsch and Black. Such phases no longer follow each

other in sequence, but often pile up—for example, capitalism on top of feudalism. Moreover, some of Lipset's social requisites are not necessarily desirable in today's Global South. Preindustrial urbanization, for example, produced massive urban slums in places like Cairo and Rio de Janeiro, as weak infrastructure became overstretched. Finally, the notion of "disproportionate development" is more applicable today than ever before. The disparities in wealth between the Westernized elite and the working masses in many developing countries are gaping and tangible. In South Africa, for example, the average income of the top-earning 20 percent of all South African households is nearly forty-five times that of the bottom earning 20 percent.<sup>26</sup> The realities of such imbalances must be taken into account when utilizing this approach.

Moreover, the timing of the development process is speeding up in today's world. Many developing nations are impatient and want to achieve the same kind of development as the industrial democracies sooner rather than later. As Huntington had predicted, many Third World societies have rising expectations that put pressure on the government to speed up the processes of change. Moreover, pressure for development is external as well as internal. Many low-income countries are experiencing enormous pressure from the international community, governments, and nongovernmental organizations alike to develop (sustainably at that!). In fact, most foreign aid packages are now attached with all sorts of conditions and stipulations that are to be followed in exchange for developmental assistance.

Lastly, we must take into account how foreign policy has affected the applicability of the sociological approach today. In recent decades, the democratization imperative spearheaded by the United States has imposed itself on the Third World. U.S. policy, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, has attempted to create Durkheimian civil societies in places that have little experience with Western, Tocquevillean engagement. These top-down, external policies have greatly impacted political development in these countries, often detrimentally. In some cases, U.S. meddling has incited long-held ethnic and tribal rivalries, creating political chaos and violent conflict.

Today's world is indeed a different place. But my instinct tells me that, in many ways, it is just the same. While we are in a period of great change, it is by no means different in scale from that which occurred in the nineteenth century. The social change that Comte, Durkheim, and Weber experienced was a consequence of the Industrial Revolution; the change we are experiencing is a consequence of the processes of globalization and modernization. The human problems they induce,

however, are quite similar across time. Instant communication is changing the scope of human interaction, and, thus, conflict. The easy migration of peoples across borders is degrading social consensus in many countries. Hyperspecialty in society is creating isolation and anomie, and bureaucratization in professional life is degrading value-oriented action. The question we must ask is: should we make changes to the sociological approach to accommodate the developments I highlighted above? This is largely up to a new generation of scholars to decide. Until then, it is perhaps wise to ground our thinking, at least partially, in the paradigms set forth by the sociologists, who were indeed some of the greatest scholars of grand theory.

## CHAPTER 5



# PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

*Shelliann Powell*

## INTRODUCTION

Encompassing the entire range of human experience, psychoanalysis is the quintessential Grand Theory, bridging the fields of the humanities and the natural and social sciences.<sup>1</sup> It is an outgrowth of psychology and neurology, and through the genius of Austrian physician Sigmund Freud, offers a scientific alternative to the intellectual gray area that was previously filled by art and theology.<sup>2</sup>

The main contribution of psychoanalysis to our understanding of politics and culture is the assertion that human nature is susceptible to rational inquiry and that it is flexible, meaning that by understanding people, we are able to help them change.<sup>3</sup> Contrary to the opinions of its critics, psychoanalysis is far from being outdated or irrelevant, especially in the field of comparative government and international relations. Rather, psychoanalysis is a broad discipline that struggles with issues and implications that are oftentimes incalculable but that still engender a rich dialogue with conflicting conceptualizations that serve as a lens through which to study politics.

I argue that psychoanalysis is an untapped resource for both the novel and advanced social scientist. Its ideas and methods can be applied, in part or in whole, to almost every aspect of the human condition. Unfortunately, psychoanalysis has been a mostly insular discipline that has been slow to incorporate findings from other

research fields, notably anthropology, and has also been hesitant to engage other social theorists in constructive dialogue.

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate psychoanalysis into the study of social and political theory. I take on this formidable task by dividing the chapter into seven sections. The next section gives the historical antecedents of psychoanalysis and discusses Freud's contribution to the field and its post-Freudian intellectual development. The second section delves directly into the use of psychoanalytical theory in political culture.

The third section discusses Lacanian psychoanalysis and its application in Marxism. The fourth section uses the tools of psychoanalysis to explain national trauma. The fifth section contrasts psychoanalytical approaches to politics with the rational choice model. The sixth section explores the evolution of postdemocratic societies and what this means for psychoanalysis. Finally, the conclusion discusses psychoanalysis in the context of the Grand Theories of the social sciences and establishes whether psychoanalysis can successfully compete with other theories of government in explaining cross-cultural, political, and economic differences among societies.

## PSYCHOANALYSIS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

An exposition on the birth of psychoanalysis would be incomplete without a discussion of its roots in psychology and the historical context in which it existed. By the nineteenth century, France had already established itself as the center for psychological research. At the time, psychology was considered a branch of philosophy and not a science. However, Théodule Ribot, the pioneer of a new method of psychological research, *psychologie nouvelle*, was determined to divorce psychology from its theological and descriptive past and to transform the discipline into a new science that would be amenable to scientific inquiry.<sup>4</sup>

In his 1870 manifesto, *Contemporary English Psychology (The Experimental School)*, Ribot attacked psychology's philosophical ancestors like René Descartes and Victor Cousin, and insisted that the new science could not comment on questions of metaphysics or religion.<sup>5</sup> However, Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, would become the foremost critic of Ribot's efforts at transforming psychology into a natural science. Comte posited that psychology could not be a science since it relied on "self-observation to get at things like thought, feeling and desire."<sup>6</sup>

Comte argued that internal observation, meaning knowledge that was attained by introspection, was too subjective. Therefore, psychology could not be a natural science because it could not be objective and did not use the scientific method. Comte stated that psychology should confine itself to the study of observable human behavior and characteristics, and argued that the future of psychology lay in phrenology.

In response to this damaging criticism, Ribot developed a robust framework for psychological inquiry that would last for the next thirty years. This framework was based on the tenets of associationalism—a theory of the mind that states that to know another’s inner world, it is necessary to explore and draw associations about another person’s associations. Secondly, claims regarding extrasensory abilities would be based on hereditary theory. Finally, Ribot’s psychological framework would develop an experimental arm that would examine mental disease.

Jean-Martin Charcot is the second forerunner in the development phase of psychology and its offspring, psychoanalysis. A trained Parisian physician, Charcot used Comte’s positivist methodology coupled with careful observation as a way of classifying new mental diseases. During his time at the Salpêtrière, a medical facility that housed thousands of mentally ill women, Charcot began studying the oldest and most mysterious of all mental diseases, hysteria.

However, hysteria was just one of a number of mental disorders that demonstrated no physiological indicators, such as brain or spinal lesions. Charcot was able to uncover the mystery behind hysteria through objective observation, without relying on the subjective analysis of thoughts or feelings. He argued that all mental states were the result of neurological disruption and that “causality was a one-way street that ran from body to mind.”

Nonetheless, a paradox occurred whenever a hysteric was placed under hypnosis. Apparently, a suggestion to a hysteric that his/her arm was paralyzed would result in paralysis of the limb. This was puzzling since it pointed to the fact that a supplanted idea could dramatically affect the body. In other words, positivist science was unable to explain this enigma, and the only “science” that provided the tools to study this phenomenon was psychology.

It was during this time that Sigmund Freud, a young Austrian doctor, arrived in Paris to study with Charcot at the Salpêtrière. But instead of using Comte’s positivist science to explore the relationship between ideas and the body, Freud used Ribot’s associational psychology along with hereditary explanations.



Freud found that in a hypnotic state, ideas entered the mind in a disassociated and unconscious state. These suggestions were stored in an area of the brain separate from the area in which conscious associations were saved. It was in this unexplored region of the human mind that hypnotic suggestions or supplanted ideas were able to act freely and involuntarily on the body.

Eventually, psychological theory and methods were being used to treat a variety of neuroses. It was argued that if an idea could create a paralysis, then conversely an idea could possibly cure a paralysis as well. Nevertheless, Charcot never wavered from his belief that therapy could only alleviate the symptoms of traumatic neuroses and could not cure them, since these illnesses were caused by degenerative heredity.

Not long after these breakthroughs in clinical psychology, it became apparent that Charcot had himself succumbed to hysteria. This put his entire work into disrepute and led to his work on hysteria and hypnosis being discredited. However, Freud was able to salvage some of Charcot's findings and used them to formulate a new method called psychoanalysis, which would place ideas and suggestions at the forefront of psychological thought.

Although Freud rejected Charcot's claims that heredity was the biological cause of psychopathology, he continued using the cathartic method and psychical analysis as a means through which to relieve hysterical symptoms. The effectiveness of therapy reinforced Freud's theory that ideas were a powerful two-way street running between mind and body and that ideas had the power to cure neuroses.

Freud had great ambitions for psychoanalysis; he hoped to create a new science of the mind that would integrate the natural sciences, biology, physics, and neurology with psychology. To defend psychic causality, Freud found himself entangled in numerous debates, including those on dreams, sleep, and the nature of desires. However, more relevant to the field of political science was his book on culture entitled *Civilization and Its Discontents* that was published in 1929.

In this seminal work on the tense relationship between the individual and society, Freud argued that it was difficult for mankind to be happy due to the effect of the three sources of human suffering: the superior force of nature, the disposition and decay of our bodies, and the inadequacy of the methods of regulating human relations in the family, the community, and the state. He argued that it was only through culture (a term he used interchangeably with civilization), and not religion as many have claimed, that man can hope to achieve happiness.<sup>7</sup> At the time, this was a revolutionary hypothesis.

Freud described culture as the sum of achievements and institutions that differentiate our lives from those of our animal forebears and serve two purposes, namely, that of protecting humanity against nature and of regulating the relations of human beings among themselves. However, one feature of culture that characterizes it better than any other is the value it sets upon the higher mental activities—intellectual, scientific, and aesthetic achievement.

Another important component of culture is the way in which social relations are regulated. In other words, human life in communities only becomes possible when a number of men unite together in strength superior to any single individual's, and remain united against all single individuals.

The substitution of the power of a united number for the power of an individual is the decisive step toward civilization. The essence of civilization lies in the circumstance that the members of the community have restricted their possibilities of gratification. He argued that the first requisite of culture, therefore, is justice—that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor of any individual.

Cultural development appeared to tend toward ensuring that the law shall no longer represent the will of any small body but rather that the end result would be a state of law to which all have contributed by making some sacrifice of their own desires, leaving none to the mercy of brute force. Civilization obtains mastery over the dangerous love of aggression in people by enfeebling and disarming it and setting up an institution within their minds to keep watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.

Freud held that in individual development the main emphasis falls on the egoistic trend, striving for happiness, while the other tendency, which may be called the *cultural* one, usually contents itself with instituting restrictions. But things are different in the development of culture: here, the most important aim is that of creating a single unity out of individual men and women, while the objective of happiness, though still present, is pushed to the background.

For Freud, individuality is a historical development, at odds with our nature as tribal or social creatures. Moreover, we are chauvinists and narcissists, with a tendency to pick leaders who resemble us. The result is that via identification, projection, and introjection, we enter into the excesses of mass behavior. Although others had predicted earlier than Freud the dangers of nationalism, modern dictatorship, and war, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, which was published in 1921, Freud gives the warning that can only be called

prophetic—that totalitarianism, fueled by bigotry, would dominate the century.<sup>8</sup>

*Civilization and Its Discontents* stands as a demurrer against political utopianism. No form of social organization can make us happy, because group life requires the inhibition of instinct. At the same time, no attempt at suppressing the aggressive instinct is likely to succeed, so no government can make us secure.<sup>9</sup>

Although Freud's argument is peculiar, in that it combines his belief in the central importance of sexual desires in motivating human action with political philosophy, his strangely offbeat reasoning contains nuggets of wisdom. His emphasis on the role of conscience and introspection, referring to the unconscious adoption of the opinions or ideas of others, points in the direction of the advanced self-censorship that characterizes totalitarian societies.<sup>10</sup> However, Freud's underlying premise was correct—individuals should only expect relief from the worst suffering when they are part of a society, but this of course comes at a price.

However, Freud was not without his critics, and as early as 1913, there were attacks on the directions in which he was taking psychoanalysis. These critics became increasingly vocal, and even prior to his death in 1939, psychoanalysis splintered into its many component parts. One of these reformers was Karen Horney from the Berlin school, who supported the dissolution of ties between psychoanalysis and the unconscious libido.<sup>11</sup>

Horney, among others, would seek to ground psychoanalysis in a study of social environments, thereby creating a new sociology of character. In 1937 Horney published *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, in which she posited that cultural forces could also bring about neurosis. In the book, she defended her emphasis on cultural factors as still belonging to the field of psychoanalysis:

If one believes that it [psychoanalysis] is constituted entirely by the sum total of theories propounded by Freud, then what is presented here is not psychoanalysis. If, however, one believes that the essentials of psychoanalysis lie in certain basic trends of thought concerning the role of unconscious processes and the way they find expression, and in a form of therapeutic treatment that brings these processes to awareness, then what I present is psychoanalysis.<sup>12</sup>

Two years later, in 1939, Horney published another book *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* in which she rejected most of Freud's theories of the mind: the libido theory, the Oedipal complex, the childhood origins

of neurosis, the notion of a repetition-compulsion and transference, as well as the minor theories of the super-ego, ego, and id.<sup>13</sup> For Horney, personality and neurosis were due to environmental influences that disturbed a child's relation to self and other.

Psychoanalysts argued that politics and all relationships, either among groups or individuals, have an emotional component.<sup>14</sup> In other words, individuals have positive and negative feelings that are invested in self and others and that are subject to change. Therefore, the emotional significance of thought and action develop in a social context.

A psychoanalytical approach to culture and society argues that emotional responses are linked to a valuation process that allows individuals to interpret actions in a positive or negative light. Psychoanalysts argue that it is difficult to speak of a theory of culture or the ways in which culture affects individual action without relating these discussions to theories of emotion and cognition.

However, Horney's contributions were not appreciated by leftist psychoanalysts, who viewed her work on cultural explanations for cognitive processes as particularly dangerous to the discipline and as an abandonment of Freudian thought.

## PSYCHOANALYSIS AND POLITICAL CULTURE

The most useful psychoanalytical insights into the study of comparative government remain in the area of political culture. When viewed as a social activity, psychoanalysis is one of the many social discourses in which issues of culture are analyzed.<sup>15</sup>

For psychoanalysts, culture is not a deterministic force that compels individuals to act in a certain way; rather, it is the individual who both represents and carries culture. When viewed this way, culture interpolates from the outside in and from the inside out. Culture works from the outside in by formulating and enforcing aspects of social norms and beliefs that are embedded into the individual consciousness. On the other hand, culture works in the opposite direction through representation and domination.

Culture also affects psychoanalytic theory by imbuing it with assumptions, values, and metaphors that are a reflection of the society in which it is surrounded. An example of this is the interpretation and the application of Freudian psychoanalysis in France and the United States during the 1940s and 1950s.<sup>16</sup>

In the United States, the combination of optimism, individualism, and volunteerism contributed to the acceptance of psychoanalytic

therapy. The discipline found its most fertile soil in a society that held the cultural belief that people can change themselves by their own efforts if they so desired. The political culture of the United States views the individual as an inventor of his or her self; in other words, in American culture there is no assumption of “an inviolable inner core that constitutes human nature.”

On the other hand, French culture tends to focus on individual boundaries and isolation from others. French views on the individual do not lend themselves to psychoanalytical interventionism, since human nature is difficult, if not impossible, to change. Therefore, in France, psychoanalysis is an interpretative science in that the importance of listening and understanding the patient is more important and will yield more fruitful results than attempting to change him or her.

In contrast, Americans are taught that to become successful, one has to learn, or be taught, how to adapt, and this requires the commitment to change. Americans, unlike their French counterparts, believe in the malleability of the individual, and are often dismissive of those who are unwilling to change. This optimistic version of Freudian psychoanalysis that centered on virtue and societal conformity reinforced the American ideal that self-improvement was possible without calling society into question.

Scholars have claimed that the sanguine American revisions of Freud can be attributed to the lack of an intellectual tradition on the political Left. In France, on the other hand, psychoanalysts became heavily involved in radical social and political criticism. The close relation between psychoanalytical theories on individual consciousness and social and political issues have led to the usurpation of some of its premises by communists, Marxists, anarchists, and radical anti-Marxists that came to define the French political landscape.

Freud's emphasis on biological needs and drives attracted a wide audience in the United States and was also adopted by the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Feminists understood Freud as stating that passive and subordinate femininity was a consequence of biological differences between the sexes that could not be altered. Additionally, American individualism and conformist ideology transformed psychoanalytical theory into one that was supportive rather than subversive of existing institutions.

## PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MARXISM

Freud often spoke in terms of conflict theory but did not integrate Marx's socially based conflict theory into psychoanalysis. Freud

referred to the super-ego as a “garrison occupying a conquered city,” meaning that in every civilized man, there existed a wild man that was desperate to escape.<sup>17</sup> Conflict existed on both an individual level and on a societal level; therefore, society was the analog of the individual.

Karl Marx was also interested in conflict on both the individual and societal levels. For Marx, the linkage between social order and the individual’s destiny was established through the class struggle. However, Marx viewed social organization as the explanatory variable in his theory, while Freudian psychoanalysis explained social phenomena in terms of the characteristics of human nature. Although Freud acknowledged that changes in property relations would mitigate human aggression more than ethical precepts, he thought that only Marxists would be naïve enough to believe that these changes would be the only factors that explained social conflict.

A new version of psychoanalysis emerged in France after the 1968 riots from May to June that would bridge the gap between “a politics of social activism and a politics of the person.”<sup>18</sup> This made French psychoanalysis more receptive to political realities and politics more receptive to psychoanalysis. Students of the 1968 revolution in France focused on transforming the boundaries of society and on blurring the line between psychology and politics. As part of this radical reformulation of French society, psychoanalysis would take a more subversive position in relation to its cultural and political environment. It would call into question former definitions of personal and public domains as well as how people communicated with each other.

However, it is important to note that the French, unlike Americans, have always had a tumultuous relationship with Freudian psychoanalysis. But a distinctly French reinterpretation of Freud, led by Jacques Lacan, would allow for this science of the mind to create new theories of the individual and society that would allow for new social criticisms.

Lacan’s approach to psychoanalysis was both radical and unconventional. In his Freudian School of Paris, there were no formal requirements for admission, no standard curriculum, and no prescriptions on how to conduct psychoanalysis. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the decision to become an analyst was viewed as a calling, and institutions were not allowed to prevent someone from fulfilling their calling.

The anti-institutionalism that characterized Lacanian psychoanalysis made it easier to filter through the radical French political landscape. This marriage of psychoanalysis and politics was facilitated by Lacan’s well-known dislike of bureaucracy. His theory addressed the concerns

that many Marxists had against the application of psychoanalysis to politics.

Previously, Marxists argued that psychoanalysis adapted people to bourgeois society, thus delaying the communist revolution. However, analysts of the Lacanian school held that only a perversion of psychoanalysis would result in an individual adapting himself or herself to the social status quo. This interpretation of psychoanalysis as a form of truth-seeking was quickly integrated into French Marxist ideology as the science of the mind, and unconscious processes were viewed as eventually raising political consciousness.

The second Marxist critique of psychoanalysis was that in the midst of the human misery that arose from capitalist society, psychoanalysis still remained a theory of an individual's inner processes and not that of society. In other words, if psychoanalysis could potentially cure individual neurosis, why had it not attempted to solve societal neurosis like capitalism?

In Lacanian psychoanalysis the autonomous individual is an illusion, but the goal of this new strain of psychoanalysis as a science is to explain psychological and social construction. This reinvention of psychoanalysis places Freud's contribution, similar to Marx's, at the center of interest for those who want to understand the individual's role in society.

The final Marxist critique of psychoanalysis was its biological determinism. This contrasted with Marxist ideas that it is the system of production and distribution that determines individual and societal destinies. However, Lacan's interpretation of Freud's writing was virulently antibiological. He argued that when Freud was talking about anatomy, he was actually talking about how culture imposes meanings on anatomical parts.

However, not all analysts agree that psychoanalytical theory can be applied to political systems and Marxism in particular. In fact, Robert Young argues that to apply psychoanalysis to Marxism overlooks the fact that psychoanalysis is a theory of the impossibility of the subject's relation to society.<sup>19</sup> Young states that if Marxists desire to add a theory of the individual to their ideology, they need to rethink the dichotomy in which Marxism's relationship to psychoanalysis is based.

However, Young's critiques of psychoanalytical approaches to Marxism ignore the fact that psychoanalysis also examines the individual's relation to society and how cultural norms are internalized. Young contends that Marxists desire to include a theory of the subject that can be molded to suit their ideology. But it is difficult to claim that

Marxism can integrate psychoanalytical theory, where the individual is the basis of analysis, and still be called Marxism. Nevertheless, Hall defends the use of psychoanalysis in Marxist theory, and claims that providing a theory that combines a study of the individual and the society would open up both Marxism and psychoanalysis to “the possibility of discovering new forms of knowledge in the margins of, and spaces between, Marxism and psychoanalysis.”<sup>20</sup>

## PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NATIONAL TRAUMA

At first, Freud focused primarily on individual neuroses, but later in his career he began to wonder if groups of people or societies could also develop neuroses. National complacency during the Holocaust, Rwandan genocide, and other traumatic events indicate that this may not be a far-fetched idea.

A trauma is defined as any unexpected experience in which the subject is unable to assimilate.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, it is any experience that is mastered by the use of defenses. In this sense, trauma may be followed by unprompted recovery or the development of a psychoneurosis. However, the question for psychoanalysis is whether national traumas are aberrations or if “there is something in our conception of the ‘social contract’ that leads to an illogic of annihilating what is deemed unfamiliar or strange.”<sup>22</sup> McAfee argues that these individual and collective traumas circulate in the sociosymbolic public sphere, and operate through repression, oppression, and media.

McAfee suggests that national trauma can only be treated by using modified psychoanalytical methods, such as political talk, testimony, and deliberation as ways of dealing with national crises. She is careful not to equate nations with individuals, because the unconscious of the former is much different from that of the latter. However, she argues that there is a connection between how consciousness arises and functions in nations and individuals, thus making the application of psychoanalysis more plausible.

McAfee posits that the traumas and consequences that beset individuals show up in the public sphere and circulate there, creating ripple effects upon others. These effects move between and among people until they become shared phenomena. The conclusion that is drawn from this theory is that the development and behavior of a traumatized individual closely mirrors how trauma develops and functions in society.

The social and political trauma that follows conflict offers strong evidence that psychoanalytical insights apply. Society uses the same



defenses used by the individual—reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, and turning against the self. Reaction-formation is a defense mechanism that renders unacceptable impulses unconscious. Isolation results when the subject psychically separates an occurrence from its effects.

Undoing denies not only the effects of a trauma but the trauma itself, whereas projection imagines a mental phenomenon as the actual phenomenon, often by locating it in some object or person other than oneself. The final defense mechanism for nations and individuals experiencing trauma is that of turning against the self, which occurs when the “torturer begins to torture himself.”

In the case of national trauma, the subject is the political body, and it puts up its defenses and resists confronting and resolving problems, much like individuals. This is especially true in cases where there has been a previous national trauma that shapes current reactions, such as Germany’s defeat in World War I and the rise of Hitler’s Germany. In other words, any subsequent war or act of terror is both the result of an unresolved trauma and a new instance of it.

Moreover, psychological trauma does not necessarily have to come from outside of the state; it can also be used by the state as a means of political repression. Through torture and terrorism, repressive political regimes stifle democratic movements within their borders and deprive some members of society of the ability to be effective members of the community.

Although there is no panacea for all types of trauma, the aim of terrorism is to dismantle the psychic bonds that allow members of a society to participate in national discourse, or political consciousness, by degrading, humiliating, and silencing them. McAfee states that the only documented way to counter political terror is by refusing to remain silent, or, in other words, by engaging in political talk.

However, national trauma can also affect the international community. McAfee uses the national trauma of 9/11 to explain the subsequent U.S. military invasion of Iraq. The United States used all defense mechanisms “in trying to cope with unresolved trauma by acting out, rather than working through, what it [had] experienced.”<sup>23</sup> In contrast, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committees were a means through which society was enabled to work through the trauma of Apartheid and establish a democracy that respected human rights. The truth and reconciliation process, which focuses on working through trauma, may be more effective than international criminal tribunals, which focus more on punishing human rights violators.

It is important to note that while countries that are attempting to recover from brutality need to restore social justice to reconstitute community, this process may take many generations. This is not surprising as even individuals that have experienced trauma need more than one psychoanalytical session in which to restore a sense of self and identity.

### PSYCHOANALYTIC CHALLENGES TO RATIONAL CHOICE

Since we have established the link between psychoanalysis and the study of political science, we now turn to the approaches that provide us with the tools to understand how individual consciousness plays into political decision-making. Cognitive approaches emphasize the ways in which human cognitive limitations distort decision-making by utilizing simplifications in problem representation and information processing.<sup>24</sup>

This approach argues that people process and interpret information according to a set of mental rules that bear little relationship to the formal logic that rational choice theorists presuppose. Cognitive approaches to political decision-making employ the principles of “psycho-logic” that point to the conclusion that people try to keep their beliefs, feelings, actions, and cognitions mutually consistent.

Psycho-logic is an example of cognitive consistency, which is an economic way of organizing mental processes because it facilitates rapid interpretation and categorization of information. Therefore, people’s prior beliefs strongly affect and distort information processing. The idea of prior beliefs affecting policy-makers’ decision-making builds on Freudian psychoanalysis that the individual conscience or ego is the product of society. In other words, society’s perceptions of a crisis or trauma are reflected in the decisions of policy-makers.

Additionally, the motivational theory of politics stresses that human beings have a strong need to maintain images of self or their societal environment that are conducive to their emotional well-being.<sup>25</sup> This instinctive need interferes with an individual’s ability to act rationally. Motivational theorists take the human need to avoid shame and guilt as well as the need for self-esteem, social approval, achievement, and control as the driving force behind all individual decision-making.

Attribution theory is another psychoanalytical approach to the study of individual decision-making in politics. It emphasizes the importance of “schemata” in determining how people interpret new information in light of their preexisting beliefs. Once formed, these schemata are resistant to change. Attribution theory highlights

the importance of resolving and working through national trauma as it provides the basis upon which the affected society interprets, categorizes, and acts when faced with a similar situation in the future. In other words, attribution theory discusses how societal neuroses develop into a schemata thereby affecting culture.

Finally, prospect theory offers a behavioral alternative to rational choice theory that is derived from empirical observations of a subject's choices. From a societal perspective, a nation that is dissatisfied with an emerging status quo will take great risk to reach what they consider an acceptable state of affairs. Prospect theory offers an alternative explanation of the United States' reaction to 9/11 by looking at the choice to invade Iraq. The United States, which emerged as the world's sole superpower after the end of the Cold War, was traumatized by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. These traumas led to a perceived change in the status quo and resulted in a war to reserve U.S. supremacy in the world.

### PSYCHOANALYSIS, DEMOCRACY, AND POSTDEMOCRACY

Lacanian psychoanalysis and radical democracy have long been faithful, albeit strange, bedfellows. Contemporary Lacanian scholars claim that most industrialized countries are postdemocracies, meaning that they have effectively removed negativity from the political domain in an effort not to exclude or offend any group. This leads to a political system that retains "token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism," meaning those who espouse offbeat opinions or ideals are ostracized.<sup>26</sup>

The situation is quite different in the newly democratizing nations, where popular sovereignty and political participation, in most cases, are combined with assaults on other aspects of democracy, like equality and civil liberties. Crouch argues that although the formal aspects of democracy remain in place, politics and government are gradually being concentrated in the hands of the privileged, much like in predemocratic times.<sup>27</sup> Although elections still change governments, they are strictly managed by professional experts and restricted to issues that have been selected by them. In newly democratized societies, citizens play a minor role in the political process, while in the postdemocratic world, citizens play a passive, apathetic role.<sup>28</sup>

It is well understood that democracy cannot rely solely on transplanted abstract ideals or formal legalism. Stavrakakis argues that without mobilizing passions around strong democratic identifications, the democratic ideals that were sustained by consensus would

disintegrate before the first obstacle that they encountered. The national trauma of 9/11 was one such obstacle and has resulted in security overshadowing all other social and political priorities.

The predicament of modern democracy is that it engenders both antagonisms against perceived injustices and negativities toward increased institutionalization. For democracy to create and retain strong bonds of attachment among individuals, society, and government, it needs to eliminate social division and generate political subjectivity.

The crisis of postdemocracy has left Lacanian psychoanalysis in shambles. Since the marriage of psychoanalysis and radical politics, the assumption was that psychoanalysis would lead to greater government responsiveness to the needs of individuals. However, the postdemocratic world has left Lacan psychoanalysts with the question of whether it is possible to be radical democrats in theory but not in practice.

The puzzle for many radical psychoanalysts is why postdemocratic nations do not resemble the utopian society that they had envisioned. The disillusionment of these revolutionaries has led to a lack of ideas and proposals of ways in which to reformulate democratic ideals. To reorient and restructure social and political identities, individuals will have to assume this responsibility and respond to the challenges of postdemocracy in one's own way.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have argued in favor of the inclusion of psychoanalysis in the study of politics. Previously, theories on conditions that bring about societal change have been dichotomized. One group of scholars focused on institutional change and another group emphasized revolutions as being fueled by mentally liberated and symbolically purified individuals.

Psychoanalytical politics, however, has erased this dichotomy by arguing that society exists both within and outside of an individual's consciousness. This idea makes it difficult to imagine a Marxist revolution in which an individual comes into violent conflict with a society and culture that has been internalized. This problem plagued all Marxist psychoanalysis until Lacan's reformulation of Freud. Lacanian psychoanalysis offered a framework in which both the individual and society interacted.<sup>29</sup> Secondly, Lacan's theory helped to move psychoanalysis from academic circles to being a cultural phenomenon that would define French politics from the 1960s to the present.

Critics have held that psychoanalysis cannot be a force of political or social change because politics cannot be reduced to therapy.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, critics hold that psychoanalysis is simply political cultural arguments in scientific garb. Others doubt whether psychoanalysis is a science since it relies mostly on observational study rather than on experiments. More importantly, what does the international system do when it is faced with a country that refuses to change despite military weakness and economic sanctions, for example, North Korea or Iran? Or, how long does it take for a country to be cured of a national trauma?

Although these questions are difficult to answer, psychoanalysis is an important component in both measuring and encouraging societal progress as it is based on the premise of universal applicability. It can alleviate individual distress as well as reveal the forces that have produced the stress in the first place. In this sense, it provides a general commentary of social change and political development by looking at the effect on its most fundamental element, individual consciousness.

Psychoanalysis relies on the idea that the purpose of social and political development is to improve the quality of people's lives and to make their conditions of existence more fulfilling and egalitarian. In this regard, I argue that psychoanalysis stands as the overarching Grand Theory since it is a discipline that utilizes the scientific method to identify the needs and desires of individuals.

## CHAPTER 6



# INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONALISM

*Sonal Sahu*

### INTRODUCTION

The first systematic thinking about political life was concerned with the primary question of the nature of governing institutions that could structure the behavior of individuals—both the governing and the governed—toward better end goals. The need to direct the mercurial and fickle nature of humans toward collective purposes required the formation of political institutions. For instance, Hobbes, who lived through the breakdown of political life during the English civil war, argued for the necessity of strong institutions to save mankind from its worst instincts. Montesquieu<sup>1</sup> identified the need for balance in political structures and served as an inspiration for the American separation of power doctrine that was required, he argued, for the weakening of potentially autocratic governments.<sup>2</sup>

### OLD INSTITUTIONALISM

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, political science began to differentiate itself as an academic discipline. As the discipline began to emerge, its principal questions remained institutional and normative. Political science was about the formal aspects of government, including the legal aspect, with its focus on the governing system. Most of its aims were normative—what institutions will work best,

given the goals of the political system—and political science was at the service of the state. Woodrow Wilson, the only political scientist to become the president of the United States, was an intellectual leader of the progressive movement, which was geared toward reforming the institutions of the U.S. government with the specific aim of trying to remove the deleterious effects of partisanship.

### Characteristics

The first defining characteristic of old institutionalism was that it was concerned with law and the central role of law in governing. The second characteristic was the emphasis on structures, which determined behavior. The behaviorists criticized this approach as it left no room for the impact of individuals' influence on the governing system. The institutional approach discussed major institutional features of the political systems, for example, whether they were parliamentary or presidential, federal or unitary, et cetera. There was no attempt to incorporate other structural aspects of a system like corporatism or consociationalism that linked state and society.

The next important characteristic of old institutionalism was its holistic character. Old institutionalists were comparativists who tended to compare whole systems rather than to examine individual institutions such as legislatures. This holism meant that countries were not so much compared as described one after another. This approach also made generalizations difficult, because if scholars can only understand a political system in its entirety, then it is difficult to compare, and comparison is a fundamental source for theory development in political science.

The final characteristic of old institutionalism was its pronounced historical nature. It tended to have a major historical foundation for its analysis, which was concerned with how contemporary political systems were embedded in their historical development as well as in their socioeconomic and cultural present. To understand fully the manner in which politics was practiced in a country, a researcher had to understand the development pattern that produced the system. The actions of the State influenced society as much as society shaped politics. This was inspired by the notion that there was a correct constitutional formula that, once discovered, would bring stable, effective, and democratic government to all polities.

Herman Finer's work *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* was one of the leading books in the field to be published on this subject.<sup>3</sup> It incorporated the results of a far-reaching study. It cut a wide swath through the entire field of political science, beginning with

the origins of the state and ending with contemporary problems of civil service reform. Finer argued that one of the important factors that caused government to originate and be maintained over long periods of time was economic development. He likened the state to a machine, or a converter of energy. Taking the psychological and physical qualities of the people, as well as their resources, the State developed from these whatever was deemed to be at the moment desirable.

The possibilities in this approach are immense, but the processes are necessarily complex. So the author took certain examples of state enterprise and sought to discover the conditions of their success or failure. Following this analysis of conditions, there was a long and thoughtful discussion of governmental forms, more especially of the forms that democracy assumes. The principle of separation of powers was carefully examined in the light of political experience, with a general conclusion that "all government is a simple process, the division of which into parts, and their relative power, depends upon the purpose of government and the relative technical capacity of the various bodies of men and women who are employed in its realization." Passing from the category of governmental forms, there was a general survey of constitutions, written and unwritten, that stressed the shortcomings of the former. The narrative here was confined to England, France, Germany, and the United States.

Similarly, Karl Friedrich's book *Constitutional Government and Democracy*<sup>4</sup> was another leading institutional work of this period. This book discussed the core of modern democratic government, which was derived from its constitutional basis. As the constitution was the cornerstone of the aspiration of the people, they reasonably expected the constitutional mandate in their life, and there was a contingent relationship between constitution, government, and democracy.

### **Decline: 1930s–1950s**

A number of factors led to the decline of old institutionalism. Roy Macridis was one of the first scholars to criticize the formal-legal approach of old institutionalism.<sup>5</sup> He addressed three major shortcomings of the formal-legal approach. First, he argued, it tended to be noncomparative, since the study focused on the structure of the state, the location of sovereignty, electoral provisions, and political parties (ideology, programs described). Second, he found it to be purely descriptive, which meant that it simply studied political anatomy; it described and did not compare. Third, he found it to be parochial, static (formal and legalistic), and essentially monographic, with



the focus only on one country or institution (the U.S. presidency, the British parliamentary system). There was no discussion of non-Western forms of government.

His preliminary proposition for improvement was that largely descriptive study should give way to explanatory study, while studies that were limited to Western politics should shift to comparisons of politics in various societies—for example, the Third World nations or developing countries. He concluded that a real contribution could be made by shifting the emphasis from a static comparison of institutions to a dynamic comparison of political processes in various systems, political parties, et cetera.

Next, the study of old institutionalism was clearly inspired by the notion that there was a constitutional formula that, once discovered, would bring stable, effective, and democratic government to all polities. The inevitability of democracy and constitutionalism was disproved in the 1930s and 1940s by the fall of democracies to fascist regimes. The effectiveness of institutions in providing inevitable democracy was similarly disproved by the fall of democracy to fascist regimes. The effectiveness of good institutions in defending democracy was challenged by the experience of several countries. For instance, in Germany, an ideal constitution, that of 1933, paved the way for Hitler to come to power legally. Semantic institutions provided only a democratic façade for oppressive regimes. The Soviet Union's constitution provided a set of democratic institutions and perhaps the world's most extensive set of human rights, but did nothing to prevent Stalin from coming to power and massively abusing human rights.

Finally, during World War II social scientists of all varieties worked together for plans for peace, and this interdisciplinary experience ushered in a new era of interdisciplinary and behavioral comparative politics. Political scientists started incorporating the systems analysis and structural functionalism of sociology and anthropology and sought to make the discipline more scientific by seeking ways to quantify and measure political phenomena. For the next two decades the study of political institutions was pushed off the cutting edge of comparative politics, and was replaced by searches for general theories of politics, the study of political behavior, and the efforts to quantify the study of politics. Formal political institutions came to be seen as arenas within which political behavior driven by more fundamental factors occurs. Furthermore the prevailing paradigms such as pluralism, dependency theory, or Marxism accorded little autonomy to the state and even less importance to its formal institutions. Pluralists limited the role of a state to that of a neutral arbiter in the highly fluid conflict of group

interests; dependistas saw the state as dominated by a small number of private monopolistic groups; and Marxists perceived the state as the tool by which the ruling class dominated society.

### **Resurgence of Institutionalism: 1970s–1980s**

Some comparative politics scholars in the 1970s and 1980s began reacting against the neglect of political institutions and sought to bring the state back in. They challenged paradigms that denied the autonomy of the state or failed to recognize the importance of the state and its institutions in history and in contemporary political processes. They pushed for a new institutionalism that would refocus political science on the independent role of political institutions in the life of the polity.

The phrase “new institutionalism” and much of the impetus toward redirecting the focus of contemporary political science is derived from the work of James G. March and Johan P. Olsen.<sup>6</sup> These scholars argued that political science was devoting too much of its theoretical and conceptual energies in directions that would diminish the centrality of political values and collective choices. They argued that the centrality of values in political analysis was being replaced with individualistic, and largely utilitarian, assumptions and methodologies, that is, rational choice theory. New institutionalism argues that political actors reflect the values of the institutions with which they are associated rather than being atomistic individuals reflecting only their socialization and psychological makeup or acting to maximize personal utility.

Finally, the wave of democratization that swept the globe from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s was another reason for renewed interest in formal institutions. Democracy reemerged as the most likely form of governance with dozens of new or reformed states seeking to build new political institutions. Scholars and interested citizens sought the institutional arrangements that would most likely produce effective and durable democracies.

### **NEW INSTITUTIONALISM**

The definition of “new institutionalism” is broader in scope. The word “institution” is used loosely to mean everything from formal structures like parliament to very amorphous entities like social class, law, and markets.<sup>7</sup> March and Olsen describe it as a collection of norms, rule understandings, and, most importantly, routines.

It encompasses more than just parliament, executives, and courts, and includes other formal organizations, such as military institutions, corporatist bodies linking political leaders, governmental bureaucrats and affected interest groups that dominate decision-making in specific areas, and powerful political party leaders that control the state and society. In other states, in still other polities, the formal institutions are supplanted by ad hoc arrangements that may vary from issue to issue or time to time—these are also called “institutions.” It also includes patterns of political action and routines and rules of the game, which may or may not be established by the constitution. In some formulations, even political culture is described as an “institution.”

The most important feature of March and Olsen’s conceptualization is that institutions are argued to have a logic of appropriateness. If an institution is effective in influencing the behavior of its members, those members will think more about whether an action conforms to the norms of the organization than about what the consequences will be for themselves. There is a mechanism through which institutions shape the behavior of individuals and there is a mechanism through which individuals are able to form and reform institutions. This is another statement of the familiar structure-agency relationship in social sciences, and it is clear that it need not be unidirectional.<sup>8</sup> Under normative institutionalism, institutions have their own logic of appropriateness that defines what behavior is appropriate for members of the institution and what behavior is not.

For this logic of appropriateness to be effective, there must be some form of enforcement. For example, some members of parliament who violate norms about party loyalty may have their seats withdrawn and essentially be expelled from the parliamentary system. Although it is clear that institutions can shape the behavior of individuals, the reciprocal process is not nearly as clear. In the extreme, the leader of an institution, especially a small and hierarchical institution, can produce apparent change in the behavior of the institution.

### Theories

Three kinds of new institutionalism have been identified in the literature. The rational choice institutionalism views actors as self-interested maximizers who engage in a highly sophisticated strategic calculus and institutions as the product of this rational thinking. Rational choice institutionalists consider that institutions affect political outcomes primarily in a strategic context. They argue that

institutions shape strategies, choices, and political behavior; the expectations that rational actors have regarding the behavior of other actors are conditioned by the institutional environment. In short, institutions impose constraints on political actors, or they offer them opportunities for action.

Second is sociological institutionalism, which does not take identities and preference as “given,” but views them as the product of “the institutional forms, images, and signs provided by social life.” It holds that institutions embody the cultural practices and symbolic content of a particular context and produce symbolic codes, cognitive scripts, models, and categories that have a great influence on political behavior. Sociological institutionalists extend the definition of institutions beyond formal-legal structures to include cultural and symbolic systems. Consequently, it is not the most useful perspective for those attempting to adopt a political rather than a purely cultural approach to identity politics.

Third, is historical institutionalism, which is the branch of new institutionalism that developed most specifically as a reaction to the debates in political science between pluralists, neo-Marxists, and structural-functionalists. Historical institutionalists opposed the conceptualization of the state as a neutral arena where groups struggled, an instrument in the hands of a dominant class, or the natural product of social needs. They argued that the state was a set of potentially autonomous institutions that could affect the structure and outcome of competition between groups. This focus on the state explains why historical institutionalism is mostly interested in political institutions. Indeed, contrary to sociological institutionalism, it defines institutions primarily as formal organizations, rules, and procedures.

There is a general agreement among historical institutionalists that institutions are structures, such as the rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure and organization of economic actors like trade unions. This definition is particularly appropriate for an approach that seeks to highlight the theoretical importance of political institutions. The historical institutionalists’ view of interests and preferences differs substantially from that of rational choice institutionalism. While historical institutionalists readily accept the idea that institutions shape actors’ strategies, they insist that preferences and goals are also affected by institutional frameworks. For historical institutionalists, preferences, goals, interests, and even identities are politically constructed. They are not “givens,” but represent something to be explained.

Next, the historical institutionalists' emphasis on power also distinguishes them from other approaches. This approach stresses the idea that power is at the center of politics, and that power relationships are a key engine of social and political outcomes. This angle is essential to locating the origins of identity creation, transformation, politicization, and mobilization. Historical institutionalism holds, however, that these power relationships are structured by institutions, and that, therefore, struggles for power follow different patterns and produce different outcomes, partly as a result of institutional factors.

Indeed, a central preoccupation of historical institutionalists has been to show how institutional designs favor some groups at the expense of others while paying particular attention to cross-national and historical variations. In addition, historical institutionalists also emphasize the contingencies and irregularities of history. This approach opposes the idea of an inherent logic to history. It does not view history as a coherent sequence of events resulting from the behavior of rational self-interested maximizers but rather as the contingent product of the interactions of a diversity of actors and institutions. Historical institutionalism stresses the interactions between actors and institutions, focusing not only on the many ways in which institutions shape the behavior of political actors, but also on how institutions are shaped and reshaped by these actors.

## ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS

In this section I will discuss forms of institutional arrangement, decision-making, and their respective merits and demerits to provide a brief overview of the topics covered in the study of political institutions.

### **Presidential and Parliamentary Frameworks of Government**

Parliamentarism emerged in Western Europe, particularly in Britain, wherein parliaments became the exclusive holders of political power, their voices were supreme, and they delegated the executive and administrative powers to other bodies, usually to cabinets or governments made up of their own members. There was no separation of power, but there was a concentration of all political power in parliament.

The presidential systems emerged in America as a reaction against the concentration of power inherent in the British model, whether in the hands of the monarch or of a parliament. It sought to divide power and create a system of checks and balances that would prevent

tyranny and abuse of power. It involves a popularly elected president serving a fixed term of office, two competing legislative chambers, and an independent judiciary. The president is both head of state and head of government.

Parliamentary systems are often thought to be better because they allow the concentration of power in a single institution where it can be effectively administered and controlled. A parliamentary system allows for more responsive shifts in public opinion, since the government does not have a fixed term of office but serves at the discretion of parliament that can be changed at any point. Unpopular leaders can be dumped at any point of time rather than waiting for the expiration of their mandate.

On the other hand, popularly elected presidents may have little experience and few scruples about how they gain power. In presidential regimes powerful outsider presidents sometimes have so little respect for the institutions of democracy that they soon assume dictatorial powers. Representative democracy means that at election time voters will be able to hold accountable those who served well and ill. In a presidential system, the separation of powers and the need for compromise and accommodation at many points in the policy process make it difficult for voters to determine who should be sanctioned at election time. If something goes awry, the president blames the Congress and vice versa.

However, the problem of stalemating is often worse in a presidential system where one party controls the government and the other Congress. The problem is aggravated when the government's majority in Congress crumbles or is fragile because that sometimes leads to policy-making gridlock.

### **Unitary and Federal Frameworks**

Constitutions not only allocate power among various national political institutions, they also establish the relationship between governments at the national, regional, and local levels. Under unitary systems all power is held by the national government. Powers exercised by local governments are specific grants from the national government rather than inherent powers. This system was predominant throughout most of the twentieth century because it ensured unity and sanctity of the state. By the end of the twentieth century, however, unitary structures came under attack, and pressures for decentralization increased for two reasons. First, the strong presence of the state in all aspects of life and the very size of the state made citizens uneasy about government

control exercised from afar with little concern for local needs and differences. Second, globalism led to vast multinational corporations making economic, cultural, and political decisions once made by states. It led to concerns about maintaining local identities and reduced the role of the nation-states, so popular movements for greater local autonomy emerged and attracted large followings at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. Under federalism, specific constitutional allocations of power are granted to the various levels of government, with the regional units usually accorded all powers that are not specifically granted to national governments.

### Decision-Making Styles

Majoritarian decision-making emphasizes the determination of public policy and state action through the clash of interests and opposing political parties. The coalition of interests and/or parties that achieves a majority is then expected to impose its will and stand accountable for what the state does and does not do.

The consensual pattern emphasizes the achievement of state action and public policy through accommodation and compromise. Most groups and political parties are included in the policy processes. That participation may come through broad coalition governments, or through neocorporatist bodies, or by extensive but informal cooperation and consultation among most groups and parties.

Contemporary comparativists are interested in the effect of such differences in style, which often explain the content of public policy and state action. There is some correlation between types of political systems and government stability and the management of conflict. Even though one study found that democratic systems based on consensual structures outperform majoritarian systems in managing ethnic conflict, there does not appear to be any consensus that one style or the other is likely to lead to certain policies or to the better resolution of conflict.<sup>9</sup> Another study found that the style of governing influences citizens' feelings of satisfaction with democracy; winners are more likely to be satisfied with democracy, but the gap between satisfied losers and satisfied winners is smaller in consensual systems than in majoritarian ones.

### ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONS

While institutions never completely disappeared from the agenda, few theorists seriously considered their role in shaping political

outcomes. Indeed, most studies that dealt with institutions, particularly in developing areas, conceptualized them as being ultimately dependent upon societal factors. The initial "new institutionalist" work was a reaction to this societal bias of comparative politics as it sought not only to make more room for institutions in the study of politics, but also, and more importantly, to give them theoretical importance. These studies defined the general objective of the movement: to conceptualize institutions as a variable affecting political outcomes. In this section I will discuss how institutions can be both an explanatory variable and a response variable.

One of the important issues to be explored is the relationship between economic growth and political institutions. The relationship between regime type and economic development can be explored from two directions. The first involves asking whether the level of development or economic growth of a particular sort helps account for differences in regime type, or whether differences in regime type account for differences in level of economic development.

The causal connection between growth strategy and political regime may be made in either a strong or a weak form. The strong form argues that there are political prerequisites for the pursuit of a particular growth strategy. The weak form holds that authoritarian politics is functional for a particular strategy even if economic objectives are not sufficient in themselves to explain changes in regimes. It is difficult to find a simple correlation between development strategy and regime type, because basic political structures have numerous determinants. There are two contradictory bodies of empirical evidence available for the above question. First, the association between industrial strategy and authoritarian rule in Latin America appears to be weak. On the other hand, the link between industrial strategy and authoritarian policies is more plausible in the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).

The functional form of the argument leads directly to the second broad question: Are certain political systems better than others at promoting growth? Is there an inevitable trade-off between democracy and growth?

## ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REGIME TYPE

Is a certain level of economic growth required for democratic institutions to survive? Both Karl Friedrich and Herman Finer, in the old institutionalism literature, focused on economic development as necessary for constitutional governments to emerge and be maintained.



Does that imply that economic development is a necessity for a Western democratic form of government?

Sociological interpretations of politics have, at least since de Tocqueville, linked successful democratic experiments with features of the social structure. Democratic institutions rested on such preconditions as literacy, mass communication, income equality, and political stability that could be met only at a certain level of development. Both an adequate level of economic development and sufficient growth rates were required to sustain the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Cross-national statistical studies have found significant correlations between level of development and democratic rule even when tested against other hypotheses.

However, a wave of bureaucratic and authoritarian regimes in the developing world in the 1960s and 1970s cast doubt on a simple correlation between the level of development and democracy. The new authoritarianism afflicted not the poorest developing countries but relatively advanced ones in which growth was rapid and the level of industrialization relatively high.

Similarly, Fernando Henrique Cardoso argued that the accumulation processes of associated dependent development "required that the instruments of pressures and defense available to the popular classes be dismantled."<sup>10</sup> Peter Evans argued, "In the context of dependent development the need for repression is great while the need for democracy is small."<sup>11</sup>

Cardoso's central hypothesis took the same functionalist form: authoritarianism was linked to the deepening phase of import substitution institutionalization (ISI). One of the argument links ISI to authoritarianism through the need to attract foreign capital. Multinationals, banks, and such multilateral institutions as the IMF and the World Bank are more likely to invest where labor and the Left are controlled. Yet it is also important to bear in mind that the possibility cannot be ruled out that they may accept or even support democratic forces where the threat from the Left has been ameliorated and where continued authoritarian rule is itself the cause of political instability and uncertainty, or where democracy would allow greater business access to decision-making and limit unwanted state intervention.

A second argument about the relationship between economic development and institutions provides an explanation for coups. Recession and inflation exacerbate distributive struggles, providing incentives for groups to mobilize to protect their income shares. This pattern was visible not only in Brazil but also in Argentina (1966 and 1976),

Turkey (1971 and 1980), Chile (1973), and Uruguay (1973). It also appeared to fit Korea in 1961, 1971–72, and 1980, and the consolidation of authoritarian rule in Singapore in the early 1960s. However, if similar outcomes are visible across countries pursuing different development strategies, then such findings would undermine the link between a particular industrial strategy, such as export-led growth, and authoritarianism.

The next question I will explore is whether authoritarian institutions are functional for economic growth even if their original determinants are not primarily economic? One way of linking political institutions to economic performance is to examine how institutions reconcile individual and collective rationality. Collective action states that groups will organize not to advance collective welfare but to guarantee a disproportionate share of societal income for themselves. Institutions can overcome these collective action dilemmas by restraining the self-interested behavior of groups through sanctions; collective action problems can be resolved by command.

Authoritarian regimes increase the government's ability to extract resources, provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with economic adjustment. Korea provides a particularly stark contrast between performance under democratic and nondemocratic rule. The governments of Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon were completely unable to formulate and implement clear development priorities. The military, in contrast, instituted wide-ranging reforms of the bureaucracy and of state-society relations, permitting a more coherent economic policy. Singapore also shows stark contrasts in economic performance between the intense party conflict in the late 1950s and the period following the consolidation of authoritarian power when a coherent economic strategy emerged. Taiwan appears to present the clearest case of the capacities of authoritarian regimes, particularly in the sweeping land reforms of the early 1950s.

A series of important objections can be raised against this line of analysis. First, it is not clear why the policies that emanate from strong states should be optimal or efficient. It is argued that states can raise the costs of transacting and can specify and enforce property rights to capture the resulting gains for itself. So an institutional argument needs to focus on why politicians have an incentive to promote economic efficiency.

A second objection concerns the pertinent question of making a distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes, since the authoritarian category is so diverse. This is one reason why cross-national evidence on the relationship between regime type

and economic performance is weak. The authoritarian label covers technocratic autocracies and patrimonial autocratic states, such as Zimbabwe and Haiti, that have proved incapable of pursuing any coherent policy at all.

A look beyond NICs suggests that there are no unique institutional solutions for reducing the political constraints on economic policy. Authoritarian rule may have facilitated reform in the past but a variety of institutions may be functionally equivalent in their ability to induce restraint from competing social groups. The literature on Western European corporatism suggests that peak associations, with a secure place in the political process and clear access to decision-making, can guarantee mutual restraint and efficient decision-making in a democratic setting. Democratic corporatist structures can mitigate the collective action dilemmas that characterize state-labor and labor-management relations by institutionalizing bargaining and changing the rate at which labor discounts future advantages.

## CONCLUSION

It is clear that new institutionalism is not a single animal but rather is a genus with a number of specific species within it. This internal differentiation of the institutionalist approach implies several additional things about contemporary theoretical developments. But it is clear that the institutionalist approach is a powerful tool and set of explanations for various political outcomes. At the same time they reflect and are molded by other factors that may range from cultural and economic to individual ones. Any explanation of social science phenomena is incomplete without taking into account both institutions and the other factors.

## CHAPTER 7



# RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: WHY IRRATIONALITY MAKES MORE SENSE FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS

*J. D. J. Nakaska*

### INTRODUCTION

Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has emerged as one of the leading methodologies in political science. RCT studies have permeated the field since the 1950s. With the increasing quantification of the social sciences, RCT provided the way in which economic models and approaches were transferred to political science in an attempt to improve consistency and analysis. Economic theories prior to this were generally applied to the economic policies and behaviors of countries related to trade and commerce.

RCT is a utility-maximization methodology, by which choices are made on the basis of the “best interest” of the actor making the selection. Gerardo L. Munck summarizes RCT quite nicely. He states that “it bears stressing that RCT is first and foremost a theory of decision-making that rests on the expected utility principle, which states that individuals make decisions that maximize the utility they expect to derive from making choices.”<sup>1</sup> Simply put, RCT presupposes that given the option between two choices, one of which will maximize potential gains and the other of which will produce a suboptimal gain, individuals will choose the option that serves their individual needs best.

The two main features of rational choice theory are that it is a theory of decision-making based on expected utility and that it is an (actor)

agent-based theory. There are two main branches of RCT: decision theory and game theory, which is generally considered the most appropriate for politics. In this context, true rationality occurs when actors, be they individuals or nation-states, make choices based on expected utility. Simply put, RCT posits that choices will be made that bring the greatest return and the least cost.

## BACKGROUND OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

RCT has a multitude of definitions that tend to confuse the issue. I will address these and then attempt to develop one, consistent set of definitions for use throughout this chapter. Anthony Downs described politics in the following way: "Parties are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. So as to attain their private ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products they believe will gain the most profits for the same reason."<sup>2</sup> Political parties, in this case, are like any other business. They seek out the largest number of customers by offering the best available product. Political parties' "customers" are voters and their "business" is being elected. The party with the best policies—in the minds of the voters—will win the election.

George Tsebelis, on the other hand, stated that: "Rationality . . . is nothing more than an optimal correspondence between ends and means."<sup>3</sup> David Collier and Deborah Norden offer: "Rational choice analysis may be understood as a broad label for approaches which assume that actors make choices in light of an assessment of costs and benefits."<sup>4</sup> Ian Green and Donald Shapiro offer that rational choice "explains politics by assuming that both voters and politicians are rational maximizers of interest or utility."<sup>5</sup>

Rational choice will be defined in this chapter as the following: "political decisions made using expected utility maximization under conditions of imperfect information in which gains are maximized and costs minimized." It is important to note that this is a general definition and will not account for every possible variation or deviation. Such instances are addressed throughout the chapter.

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

In the case of comparative politics, the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by sociological theory. RCT emerged as a dominant approach in

the field in the 1990s, with proponents such as Ronald Rogowski and Robert Bates. Earlier, Anthony Downs is credited with introducing RCT into political science. His seminal work of 1957, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, introduced the systematic application of economic analysis into the study of government. Economic analysis usually depends on what ends are being pursued and on which means are most reasonable for that attainment. Downs felt that economics translated well to politics because of “the competitive struggle for power and office and realize that the social function is fulfilled, as it were, incidentally—in the same sense as production is incidental to the making of profits.”<sup>6</sup>

### **Main Spokesman and the Ideas of Rational Choice Theory**

The main question that Anthony Downs tried to address in his work was this: is it possible to use economic theory to better understand and interpret government, particularly democratic states? The book was his attempt to provide a generalized, yet realistic, set of behavioral rules for rational government (similar to the ones used for rational consumers and producers) and apply it to democratic government and trace its implications. The best way to apply economic theory to politics was to use utility maximization. This is the process by which limited resources are distributed. In a political example, parties seek power from voters, who possess the legitimacy of political power. However, voters are disorganized. Political parties, however, are organized. They therefore create ideology and a party platform to differentiate themselves and appeal to the greatest number of individual voters. Accordingly, political parties seek to operationalize the power that the voters possess. They do this by appealing to the largest possible number of voters. In this way of thinking, everything has a value and/or cost. Votes, parties, information, choices, all of these have a value that may be assigned. However, despite great value, great costs can and do marginalize expected or desired outcomes. Not all voters will vote with their head; some will vote with their heart and possibly against their own best outcomes.

Downs’s model was “based on the assumption that every government seeks to maximize political support. We further assume that the government exists in a democratic society where periodic elections are held, that its primary goal is re-election, and that election is the goal of those parties now out of power.”<sup>7</sup> Downs’s model was dependent upon free and fair elections; if these are biased or rigged, the model cannot apply. He was very explicit about this.

Self-interest is the unifying factor in RCT for governments, political parties, and voters. Governments want to stay/obtain power, parties are the means/mechanisms by which this may be obtained, and individual voters pick and choose those parties that best achieve this *and* meet their own interests and goals. Benefits or utilities, of which the recipient—the voter—may not be conscious, may be received overtly or covertly. He may only become aware if a problem arises or benefits cease being delivered. Political ideology emerged as a way to get votes. It is also a sure way to distinguish one group from another and it attempts to appeal to the largest number of voters. This is a means to an end, not the end itself. The goal, of course, was to win political power.

There are two vital tenets in Downs's model. First, uncertainty abounds. This applies to voters and rulers alike. Uncertainty exists about outcomes, motivations, behaviors, and perhaps most importantly, information. Perfect information does not exist. As such, information is at a premium. This is the second tenet of Downs's model. Information-gathering in a democracy is much too time- and labor-intensive for voters to become concerned with all but their most valued issues. Thus, information-providers emerge—media, interest groups, policy wonks, and party organs—to simplify and transmit a concentrated message to the voters. Because of this, however, the information received has been filtered, changed, and manipulated.

Problems may arise in cases of uncertainty, when issues, interests, and party stances are very similar, or where responsibility cannot be ascertained. Also, multiparty elections present the possibility that utility may not be exercised in voting. Uncertainty also affects political parties and other actors inside and outside of the formal government structures. Uncertainty can divide voters, and, in some cases, give rise to persuasion. This is directly related to a decrease in rational behavior. As the amount of imperfect information increases, the voters cannot sort out the available options from the political parties, and this in turn decreases rationality. Put another way, increased imperfect information causes increased irrationality. This is not good for the government, the political parties, or the voters themselves.

It is important to understand that utility maximization in a government setting is not the same as a true free-market situation. Nor are the costs/benefits the same. Governments collect and allocate according to different agendas and different expected and desired outcomes. For instance, they do not interact at the individual consumer level like a business might.<sup>8</sup> It is very important to realize that

by design a disparity exists between the collective—the body politic or the government—and the individual or voter. We must remember: “The government acts to maximize votes but its actions have repercussions on individual utility incomes. Although individuals’ actions, which are aimed at maximizing utility, include a voting decision, individuals cannot coerce the government the way it can coerce them.”<sup>9</sup> Governments overvalue some votes while diminishing others; this is the very nature of politics—the allocation of energy and resources among competing interest groups. Since political parties are concerned about achieving and maintaining power, and political ideologies are but one of the best ways to achieve this, Downs could be rightly called a cynic. He also believes that these will “converge ideologically upon the center” in an effort to attract the greatest possible number of voters.

George Tsebelis, in his work *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, offers an excellent companion piece to Downs’s work in his attempts to explain suboptimal voting behavior seen now from a comparative perspective. He sought to answer the question “Why are suboptimal (irrational) choices made?” Voters do not always make “rational choices.” In fact, they often act in complete opposition to rationality. In this way, he “analyzes cases in which an actor confronted with a series of choices does not pick the alternative that appears to be the best.”<sup>10</sup>

It is common for individuals to make suboptimal choices, especially given the multitude of decisions made daily. Nonetheless, suboptimal decision-making directly contradicts RCT. Given that Tsebelis’s goal was “to provide a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently suboptimal choices.”<sup>11</sup> He begins with a rationality assumption that human activity is goal-oriented and instrumental and that actors seek to maximize goal achievement. In this case, voting may be strategic. Much like Downs, he argues that if adequate information is provided and “an actor’s choices appear to be suboptimal, it is because the observer’s perspective is incomplete. The observer focuses attention on only one game, but the actor is involved with a whole nest of games.”<sup>12</sup> He called these “nested games.” There are two types of nested games: multiple arenas and institutional design. In the first case, political rational choice is flawed because it has oversimplified the playing arena. Rather than existing in a series of one-to-one interactions, he suggests that multiple games are played simultaneously in any given situation. In the second case, the design of the institution itself may contribute incomplete information.



George Tsebelis used game theory to answer his question. According to him, Game Theory (GT)

is defined as a triplet composed of a set of players, a set of strategies for each player, and a set of payoffs for each player. The payoffs for each player are a function of the strategies each player selects. In their turn, the strategies available to each player depend on the moves available to each player, on the sequence of these moves (the order in which the players move), and on the information available before each move. I call the rules of the game the set of players, the set of permissible moves, the sequence of these moves, and the information available before each move is made.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, “if a game varies it is because of variations in either the payoffs or the rules (or both). Games in multiple arenas focus on the first kind of variation; institutional change deals with the second.”<sup>14</sup> He utilized four two-person games—Prisoner’s Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken, and Assurance/Stag-Hunt—and other multiple-player games. Also included were iterated games (IG)—those interactions that occur over multiple moves (time), and thus single events can have suboptimal decision-making. The number of rounds or moves known or unknown to the players (or political participants) changes outcomes because as the length of game time is known to be limited, the level of rationality increases artificially because players know that they must achieve their expected utility now. Much like Downs before him, Tsebelis acknowledges that uncertainty and information disparity increase the likelihood of irrational choices.

Tsebelis examined three Western European cases. He looked at the earlier self-defeating nonelectability of the British Labour Party, Belgium consociationalism, and French coalitions. His example of the British Labour Party activists constantly changing members of parliament (MPs) is the best and so it is provided here. It is also an excellent case of an IG. These activists would sometimes vote in direct contradiction to the needs of the party as a whole. In certain cases this directly led to the Labour Party being unable to raise substantial opposition. These constant changes of MPs resulted in repeated electoral defeat. If this seems so contradictory to RCT, then why include it? Tsebelis found that in the short term, immediate political defeat occurs. In the long term, however, constituents benefited because their respective MPs became much more responsive to their needs. They had to be lest they risk political defeat. These voters had traded a temporary perceived higher utility—election victory—for a more permanently responsive MP.

David Collier and Deborah Norden, in their article “Strategic Choice Models of Political Change in Latin America,” seek to answer the following question: what role could the rational choice perspective “strategic choice analysis” models play in understanding the relations between causal regularities, uncertainty, and choice in the study of development? They offer the following definition: “The strategic choice approach is an analytic perspective, based on individual choice models that focuses on strategies for shaping the context of decision making.”<sup>15</sup> Strategic choice has two components—choice and strategy. This model is also dependent upon uncertainty. In this case, uncertainty must exist for strategic choice to work. The authors note that “choices and strategies can have an impact only if outcomes are not known and predetermined and if decisions are not so tightly constrained as to eliminate discretion.”<sup>16</sup> They seek to apply this to Latin American politics, which they state “have been lacking . . . systematic procedures for linking this ordinary give-and-take of politics to social science theorizing about the region.”<sup>17</sup>

They examine three models of strategic choice. The first one is Albert O. Hirschman’s “reform-mongering model” (RMM), as it applied to the 1960s. The RMM uses a preference-centered approach and identifies participating actors by their strategic posture. This model looks at whether political leaders increase the probability of reforms. It is highly influenced by perceptions of those very same leaders. Revolution is an important component. The authors conclude that the RMM may be antiquated in using revolution as the engine that drives reform-mongers and find it most appropriate for the 1960s, though fear of economic decline might be a more useful 1980s iteration.

The second model of strategic choice the authors examine is Adam Przeworski’s “threshold model of regime transition” (TM). Used in the late 1970s and early 1980s, TM examines the breakdown of authoritarianism by looking at the risk of promoting such a breakdown. Risk aversion is the key variable. The “key threshold is the point at which the coalition includes ‘the number of actors necessary and sufficient to make a move toward liberalization successful.’”<sup>18</sup> The authors found that the rapidly changing political landscapes in Latin America may be simply too dynamic for this model to apply. On the other hand, it may demonstrate why “risk-averse actors do not, under these conditions, participate in a democratizing coalition: their chance of success appear nil.”<sup>19</sup> This actually dovetails nicely back with the original conceptions of RCT: no government official will knowingly seal their political fate, especially in a region known for violent regime change.

The third model of strategic choice they examine is Guillermo O'Donnell's "model of consolidation" (MC), which applies to the 1980s and 1990s. The MC examines the period after transition from authoritarianism, and explores strategies for consolidating democracy and preventing authoritarianism backsliding. In this way, this model is very similar to Samuel Huntington's work on democratic transitions—waves in which nations rapidly democratize after authoritarian rule, then backslide toward repression. The waves themselves are repeated with a net gain toward democracy after each earlier wave. (See Huntington's *The Third Wave* for additional information.) The MC also uses a preference-centered approach and possesses some risk aversion in the model. Democratization can benefit from group cohesion and a bandwagoning effect. Avoidance of opposition is the key to a successful democratic transition. Groups and organizations such as military elites can kill democratic consolidation and precipitate the backslide toward authoritarianism.

Subjective probability is vital to an actor's decisions to join a particular coalition. This is particularly important with regard to revolutions. Costs and benefits matter in terms of willingness to participate in democratic transitions and willingness to oppose them. Benefits do not need to be very high to entice cooperation, but very mild costs can discourage active opposition. Communications and signals are able to be manipulated, controlled, and subjectively interpreted. They can also serve to change perceptions about possible costs or benefits. In this way the specific perceived value of the signals themselves is important. As might be expected, misinterpretation and information uncertainty abounds and threatens to destabilize regions. Additionally, the source of the signals may not be trusted or need to be vetted. Ultimately, Collier and Norden conclude that strategic choice does not have to overwhelm the other useful research traditions in Latin America, such as bureaucratic-authoritarianism or other structural approaches. It can be a complimentary research tool.

John W. Sloan in an article "Comparative Public Choice and Public Policy in Latin America" seeks to answer questions about Latin American development based around two central tenets. First, Latin American governments, like most governments, have finite limited resources. Second, public policy involves trade-offs between goals and opportunity costs. Sloan's question is then: how can development be achieved when there are a myriad of competing interests and increasingly limited resources?<sup>20</sup>

Latin America is dominated by uncertainty and insecurity. This is different from the developed world where institutional rule and

political stability dominate. In Latin America, policy failures can result in death or imprisonment for their members. As such, a great deal of effort goes to placating elites necessary for regime survival at the expense of allocating resources toward modernization. Resources are used as often to obtain survival as well as legitimacy. As such, short-term goals designed around regime survival often dominate. This is a direct hindrance to development. The regimes lack the institutional structures and parties' political ideologies that would permit the stability necessary to successfully develop. Insecurity is itself antithetical to good policy decision-making. Tsebelis would say that Latin American regimes have little use or application of "iterated games." In fact, it might be completely "irrational" to operate under an IG context in Latin America, since doing so can lead to removal from power, which itself is "irrational."

Like all states, there are competing interests within Latin American countries. The upper classes want to maintain control, while the lower classes want social services. The latter has vast economic and resource costs that are realistically untenable. The lack of political legitimacy and institutional stability means that both groups are deprived and unsatisfied. One mechanism by which this might be improved upon is through the bureaucracy. Latin America, historically at least, seems to lack a coherent model of development. Latin American ruling elites have a vast array of choices and complications, much like the captain of a naval vessel. Competing interests, competing audiences, incomplete information, and a desire to survive are common attributes of both. Sloan concludes that RCT may not be an appropriate methodological tool to use for studying Latin American states. But in theory at least, one could posit that you can study revolutions and coups d'état, using the same RCT logic as Downs did in studying electoral behavior.

The goal of Gerardo L. Munck's chapter "Rational Choice Theory in Comparative Politics" is to assess and "analyze RCT in some depth and arrive at an informed and balanced assessment of this new theoretical perspective within comparative politics."<sup>21</sup> He defines two branches of RCT: decision theory and game theory. Game theory has three components: specification of the rules of the game, choices based on the expected utility model, and the concept of equilibrium—the last component is challenged by suggestions of indeterminacy. In response, the theory could be saved by changing the model, in the cases of RCT purists or by the application of segmented or partial universalism. Munck found this to be a problematic since pragmatists are intractable. They do not devalue game theory to the point where they seek alternative explanations or develop

better theories. Instead, they develop caveats and exceptions that allow the theory's continued existence, but do not improve or test its reliability. In this way, RCT theorists are weakening themselves and the field of comparative politics.

Choice remains the cornerstone of game theory. Munck remarks that "the most important reason why traditional game theory is appealing is because it puts actors and choice at the center of analysis and thus offers as its key programmatic promise the development of a theory of action, an essential task of the social sciences."<sup>22</sup> In the end, rational choice is but another tool available for study. He warns about overvaluing economic rationality to the point of marginalizing or dismissing the insights that have been gained from sociological theory. A choice of one or the other is a false choice.

### DIFFERING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, in their book *Pathologies of Rational Choice*, attempt to discover if the challenges to rational choice theories have been adequately addressed or incorporated. They argue that early rational choice was crude or not empirical enough. They note the following: "Empirical failure is also importantly rooted in the aspiration of rational choice theorists to come up with universal theories of politics. As a consequence of this aspiration . . . the bulk of rational choice-inspired empirical work is marred by methodological defects."<sup>23</sup> There has been insufficient empirical testing of rational choice theoretical conjectures. As such, the theory and its proponents are vulnerable to mistakes and methodological shortcomings. RCT has not derived a universal theory of politics, precisely because the empirical research has been theory-driven rather than problem-driven. Accordingly, the test cases have been selected based on the outcome rather than on the explanatory power of rational choice. Furthermore, "research is seldom designed with an eye toward rejecting a credible null-hypothesis."<sup>24</sup> Green and Shapiro address a commonly mentioned problem of rational choice—the applied suppositions that exist, for example, the application of psychological aspects to groups. Choices that an individual may make, such as voting, do not necessarily translate well to the same behavior across groups. Nor do the choices made by individuals necessarily coincide with the same outcomes made by nations.

Ultimately, Green and Shapiro find that rational choice strives to do too much with too little. It overreaches and collapses under its

own weight. It does not challenge other theories in the ways that it should. It fails to explain concurrent problems such as low voter turnout/low jury turnout/high voter efficacy, or contradictory actions by individuals. RCT does not have the answer for the sub-optimal voting that Tsebelis tried to account for in his work. They articulate their concerns and the concerns of many comparativists, when they state that the “methods successful in economics are not necessarily appropriate in politics.”<sup>25</sup>

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

The most important thing that RCT has done for comparative politics is to unify multiple behavior outcomes under one framework. By applying utility maximization, it is clear how political decisions are made. This can apply to the individual voter in a liberal democracy, an authoritarian ruler in Latin America, or to a nation-state itself. In fact, it is in this delineation itself that RCT has contributed the most to international relations. Nation-states, themselves disposed of many dissenting opinions and multiple voices even in the most repressive regimes, do nonetheless behave dispassionately. Even when poor national or strategic choices are made, the culprit is not emotion, but rather as Downs and Tsebelis made so abundantly clear, imperfect information. Nation-states are only able to make their choices based on available information that is never perfect. As such, poor decisions are still made. This does not invalidate all of RCT, but rather puts the emphasis back on the importance of information-gathering. In this way, individuals and nation-states are similar. Both must contend with a wide array of information sources, trying to sort out the most significant and appropriate, with limited time and resources.

Comparative politics has generally been characterized by deep historical analysis, regional understanding, and cultural immersion. This often results in excellent area studies but makes large-N (large number) analysis next to impossible. RCT, on the other hand, seeks to generalize political decision-making. This leads into the second thing that RCT has done for comparative politics, which is to spur on the development of several common datasets. Comparative politics has long been the lone holdout regarding quantitative analysis, not because of an unwillingness by the scholars, but rather because of the specific, esoteric, and by necessity, qualitative nature of research in the field. To be a most successful comparativist, years were often required to develop the linguistic, cultural, and historical background necessary to complete the extensive on-the-ground field research required.

This is still the preferred method, and for the time being, the best way to conduct comparative political research. However, this type of qualitative research can only benefit from the development of a quantitative framework or template that may be utilized to provide a consistency in the interpretation of information gathered. In fact, chances are that comparative politics may never go beyond a “mixed-methods” approach, but that is fine. As long as the theories used and the assumptions made can be understood, tested, and replicated as much as possible, then the study of comparative politics will be the better for it just as we, the students of it, will be better scholars.

### BIASES AND LIMITATIONS OF RCT

RCT is and was designed as an individual-level methodology used to demonstrate decision-making behaviors regarding consumer purchasing. It was thought that similar reasoning goes into political decisions, a reasonable assumption. However, just as the number of potential purchases could be infinite, so could the number of reasons for such a purchase. Politics is the same way. Since RCT and psychological theories of politics are both concerned with the mechanisms by which voters make choices and the way they operationalize the ruled and the rulers, they do not really seem so far apart in their aims. However, it is most likely that much of individual decision-making is simply too complex for RCT to ever explain.

RCT has several major problems that come to light, especially when considering its application in comparative politics. First, RCT assumes that all decisions are made within the utility-maximization framework. Let us examine this at the individual level, and then at the state level. Individually, this is simply not the case. While decisions of an economic nature may by design require a cost-benefit analysis, political decisions, as Freud insisted, are often besotted with factors such as emotion, culture, history, and tradition. There are simply too many variables interacting, so one cannot expect RCT to explain most political decisions. While some voters may ask and make voting choices based on a “what candidate will benefit me the most?” mentality, in most situations there is a sliding scale of importance. For instance, with regard to vote selection, a candidate is processed on the basis of a variety of factors such as military experience, past government training, professional success, personal success, or looks, along with intensely personal issues such as a pro-choice/pro-life stance, foreign policy goals, and others, which could all play a role in voting choices. There are simply too many potential variables for RCT to operate with.

Second, for RCT to work, the theorists all agree that information must be perfect. In reality the opposite exists—imperfect information—particularly in relation to politics. Anytime information is handled through a mediator like the type that Downs suggested, the accuracy of the information is further diluted and increasingly imperfect. Information is never perfect and never complete. It is always being changed, altered, represented, or manipulated.

The third major problem related to RCT is the highly precise nature of its definitions and premises. For instance, game theory and rational choice are highly dependent upon precise definitions and tautological assumptions. Given that there is a great deal of laxity regarding some of these assumptions as they apply in the real world, for example, the idea of a truly independent choice or decision, RCT may fall victim to suggestions that it is inflexible and unable to accommodate changes or modifications to which other comparative politics theories, though less methodologically rigorous, are able to successfully adapt.

### OVERALL ASSESSMENT

It might be assumed by this point in the chapter that I am completely against the application of RCT in comparative politics. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am all for additional methodologies and approaches that expand the toolbox for qualified researchers. In fact, the importance of RCT cannot be understated. George Tsebelis gave four reasons why rational choice is important. These were theoretical clarity and parsimony, equilibrium analysis, the extensive use of deductive reasoning, and the interchangeability of individuals.<sup>26</sup> These happen to coalesce perfectly with what makes a good research theory and a good researcher. RCT is testable, falsifiable, replicable, and parsimonious; this is the reason for its application and success in so many areas outside of economics. RCT also presents a way of operationalizing behavior, political and otherwise, that makes a great deal of cognitive sense. For these reasons I think RCT will continue to grow and develop alongside other theories in comparative politics.

I do think, however, that a potentially fatal flaw lies in RCT if the comparative politics field becomes too enamored with it. RCT presumes, perhaps fatally, that individuals and groups, no matter how small or large, concentrated or disparate, can behave in rationally economic ways. Downs believed that everything had a quantifiable value, something that could be measured in value or cost. This is a highly refined way of examining politics. Unlike the fields of U.S. politics or international relations, comparative politics for the most part does not



possess the type of datasets necessary to successfully test RCT. In the future, the situation may change; at the moment it has not.

Tsebelis's four advantages for RCT (as above) are all necessary for good theoretical generation and replicability. But these are not sufficient for comparative politics. There are too many individual factors, too many unquantifiables that exist in each culture, that permeate each nation-state. This does not mean that rational choice does not offer anything to the field; it is just another tool in the methodical toolbox, and in many cases, the least functional one at that. It may be time for the other approaches to be refined into a meta-approach that would encompass more of these state-based differences. The goals of the disparate methods available to comparative politics are the same—a universal explanation for political behavior across borders. Maybe the time has come to recognize that this is impossible and to celebrate that difference.

The best suggestion offered came from Gerardo L. Munck, when he stated “that students of comparative politics should strive to assimilate the emphasis on actors and instrumental rationality that are a characteristic of RCT, but go beyond RCT and build a broader, more encompassing theory of action.”<sup>27</sup> This is what comparative politics needs to do: it needs to take the best of what RCT offers—consistency, replicability, testability, falsifiability—and adapt that to what the current comparative political study does best—offer highly detailed, insightful, and in-depth observations—to create a mixed-methods approach to make the study of comparative politics better.

## CHAPTER 8



# ENVIRONMENTAL AND GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINISM: JARED DIAMOND AND HIS IDEAS

*Sukhoon Hong*

### INTRODUCTION

The relationship between man and his environment has been a persistent theme through several centuries of geographical work. This relationship has now developed into a major social issue, as the planet faces deepening environmental problems. To recognize geography's contributions to current environmental problems, it is necessary to understand past and current theories on the complex interaction between humankind and the environment. Numerous studies have been carried out to clarify this relationship, but there has been no synthesis of these perspectives on the past and present.

Achieving the integration of high quality natural science research with the social sciences has proven difficult. In the social sciences, grand theories become "science" when they accurately comprehend the structure and dynamic of a part, or an aspect, of reality. Recently, Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel* has enjoyed remarkable success at both the popular and academic levels. It argues that the distribution of wealth and power among societies around the world has been determined by biogeographic and environmental factors. His approach, from the point of view of geographic determinism, was to evaluate why societies located in different parts of the world

develop in different ways. Therefore, this chapter presents the historical context and main concepts of environmental determinism, and examines environmental determinism's claim to universal validity and its inclusion as a Grand Theory in the social sciences.

## HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINISM

From the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, human geography was dominated by what is known as environmentalism. This field was concerned with documenting the "influence of the natural environment on human geographies and, in particular, civilizations." Environmental determinism, however, is the notion that the environment controls or determines the course of human action. Keith Buchanan describes "the old environmentalist approach as the belief that the natural environment firmly molded man and his activities, a belief that in its extreme form postulated an inevitable, almost fatalistic, relationship between man and environment."<sup>1</sup>

A student of the German scholar Friedrich Ratzel in the 1890s, Ellen Churchill Semple is also widely interpreted as having introduced Ratzelian ideas into the mainstream of the subdiscipline of U.S. geography.<sup>2</sup> She dominated the environmentalist period of the discipline in the early twentieth century and trained a large number of those who became leaders of the profession during the period between the two world wars.<sup>3</sup> She was exploring some major ideas, and her theories served significant sociopolitical interests. In her work she has argued that the physical environment, rather than social conditions, determines culture, defining geography as the "scientific investigation of the physical conditions of historical events."<sup>4</sup> Another prominent environmental determinist, William Morris Davis, found that "a relation between an element of inorganic control and one of organic response" stated in terms of a "causal or explanatory relationship" was the "most definite, if not the only, unifying principle that I can find in geography."<sup>5</sup>

Shortly thereafter, Gordon R. Lewthwaite argued that environmental determinism is "the view that the physical, natural or geographic environment rigidly controls human action." He stated that "the definition of geography is the study of relationships between the environment and man." Finally, "determinism, in geography," is "frequently an abbreviation for the particular determinism which selects the geographic environment as the primary control of human life."<sup>6</sup>

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

Geographical research after Darwin's famous treatise was primarily concerned with recognizing the laws of nature. In human geography this approach led to a rather deterministic view of struggle and survival. Nature was studied with open eyes, seeking as objectively as possible to identify the forces or processes that governed the formation of valleys, uplands, and coastlines. Nineteenth century scholars held similar views with regard to human activity, as man's achievements were considered the consequences of natural conditions.<sup>7</sup> The biological roots of geography enabled it to serve as a significant component of legitimation theory in the post-Darwinian "naturalism" period, when science, as distinct from religion, legitimated social actions. Geography became a modern, mass-produced science, as it fulfilled ideological functions as well as provided practical skills (like exploration, inventory, mapping, and boundary drawing).<sup>8</sup>

One of the key environmental determinists during the Darwin/Spencer era in the 1880s was Friedrich Ratzel. Trained in zoology, geology, and comparative anatomy, Ratzel was ideally positioned to establish geography as a modern science.<sup>9</sup> His biographer Harriet Wanklyn noted that although he was unwilling to accept the entirety of Darwin's theories, Ratzel was "convinced of the importance of the idea of evolution, and much of his thinking and writing about the application of the idea of organic evolution to human society derived from this absorption of contemporary science." In short, Ratzel regarded cultural forms as having been adopted and determined by natural conditions.

Ratzel's organic conceptions of human society are clearly evident in his writings. Ratzel conceives of the "state" as an earth-bound living organism subject to the same laws that governed the evolution of all organisms. He identifies the main cause of historical development as the "space motive," which he explains as a tendency toward enlargement that depends on the natural-mystical cohesion between state and soil. Andreas Dorpalen explains his theory, "Geographical, and still more, political expansion have all the distinctive characteristics of a body in motion which expands and contracts alternatively in regression and progression."<sup>10</sup> A number of these organic conceptions of nature and society were incorporated into state-building ideologies in the early twentieth century.

Ratzel's ideas laid the foundation for the modern field of geopolitics. Geopolitics is essentially the study of how geography influences political phenomena. It encompasses both spatial and environmental

relationships between man, society, and the environment. The German scholar Karl Haushofer defined geopolitics as “the science of the earth relationships of political processes. Geopolitics is based on the broad foundations of geography, essentially on political geography which is the science of the political organism in space and their structure.”<sup>11</sup> In a similar vein, the American scholar Nichollas Spykman (1893–1943) noted that geopolitics offers an analysis of the position of a country in terms of geographical realities and all forms of national power.<sup>12</sup> These perspectives indicate that the purpose of studying geopolitics is to furnish the tools for political action and directions for political life as a whole. In this sense, geopolitics can be considered both a science and a kind of art, as it is used to guide practical political concerns.

Several theories of geopolitics have been put forward. These include the organic theory of the state (Ratzel), the empirical concept of the state area as a living body (R. Kjellen), the theory of living space (K. Haushofer), the heartland theory (H. MacKinder), the sea-power theory (A. T. Mahan), and rimland theory (N. Spykman).

Among these students of geopolitics, Halford John MacKinder (1869–1947) argued that a state’s geography was the only aspect that helped it to develop and grow. His famous “heartland theory” maintains that “who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World Island commands the world.”<sup>13</sup> MacKinder believed that geography gave states the ability to utilize their natural resources to attain status. Moreover, manpower has enabled states to harness the geographical resources at its disposal. Thus, by mobilizing their manpower, states could effectively harness their natural features and achieve greatness. In MacKinder’s view, the physical features of the world and man’s ability to take advantage of them have affected global power balances both then and now.

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s position was that physical geography and human geography are complementary, inseparable, and essential parts of a unified subject matter. He has explained that men form communities within society. There exists a kind of symbiosis in which the natural environment influences these communities that in turn influence the natural environment. As nature influences communities, it encourages the development of new ambition. Mahan’s views were very popular during the early twentieth century, but have since lost their luster. In many respects, his framework is too narrow and primarily centered around England and Russia. His entire philosophy was based on the notion that Russia constituted a future threat to the world. He feared, presciently, that Russia could use the vast territory it controls to exploit mineral resources that it would, in turn, use to further its global ambitions.

## AN ANALYSIS OF DIAMOND'S *GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL*

Jared Diamond is in this tradition of geographic and evolutionary determinism. He is an American author, evolutionary biologist, physiologist, and biogeographer. His best-known work is the Pulitzer Prize-winning book, *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (1997), which describes the processes of "human development," mainly in Eurasian civilizations, and their legacies of intrusion upon simpler civilizations around the world. Diamond's purpose is to systematically explain why advanced civilizations developed in this region of the world, thus avoiding any ethnocentric myths. He identifies the main processes and factors involved in the development of different Eurasian civilizations, tracing the commonalities between them. He leaves open the question of why Europe, in particular, came to supersede other world civilizations after the nineteenth century.

Diamond's specific goal is to discover why white Europeans have conquered, displaced, or decimated indigenous peoples throughout the Americas, Australia, and Africa throughout history. In Diamond's theory, the causation runs as follows: the east-west axis of the world determines the ease of species spreading; the more easily a species can spread, the more likely it will be that they will be domesticated; the more the number of plant and animal species that are domesticated, the larger the food surpluses and food storage; the more the food that is stored, the easier it is for large, dense, sedentary, stratified societies to develop that then produce the "proximate" factors for development, namely technology, the eradication of epidemic diseases, writing, and political organization.

### **The Ultimate Factor: Food Production**

Plant and animal domestication in Eurasia meant that these societies enjoyed an abundance of food, and, subsequently, had a much denser population than their counterparts. The food surpluses, and the animal-based means of transporting those surpluses, were a prerequisite for the development of settled, politically centralized, socially stratified, economically complex, and technologically innovative societies. According to Diamond, food production processes ultimately explain why Eurasia was the first to develop empires, broad-based literacy, and steel weapons. Diamond provides three explanations for the differences in food production trajectories throughout the world: plant domestication, animal domestication, and axis orientation.

*Plant domestication*

There were a limited number of regions, such as the Fertile Crescent, New Guinea, and parts of the Americas, that enabled plant domestication. The Fertile Crescent, in western Eurasia, was the earliest center of food production because of its advantageous climate, its high percentage of annual plants, and a wide range of altitudes. On the contrary, domesticated local crops in New Guinea and the eastern United States were very few. Therefore, differences between the Fertile Crescent, New Guinea, and the eastern United States followed from the differing kinds of wild plant and animal species available for domestication, not from limitations of the people themselves who had settled there.

*Animal domestication*

Eurasia was able to domesticate great numbers of large mammals for two reasons. First, it was the continent with the most candidate species of wild mammals to begin with, and had lost the fewest candidates to extinction over the last 40,000 years. Secondly, the ancestors of thirteen of the ancient fourteen wild mammal breeds were found in Eurasia. For the most part, the unavailability of local wild mammals explains the lack of native mammal domestication in regions outside of Eurasia. This is in contrast to explanations that suggest that human deficiencies accounted for these trends. Finally, Eurasians inherited more species of domesticable mammalian herbivores than did peoples of other continents. That outcome, with all of its momentous advantages for Eurasian societies, stemmed from three basic facts of mammalian geography, history, and biology. First, Eurasia, given its large area and ecological diversity, started out with the most candidates. Second, Australia and the Americas (but not Eurasia or Africa) lost most of their candidates in a massive wave of late-Pleistocene extinctions. Third, a higher percentage of the surviving candidates proved suitable for domestication in Eurasia than on the other continents.

*Axis orientation*

Eurasia has an east-west axis. Localities distributed east and west of each other on the same latitude share similar day lengths and seasonal variations. To a lesser extent, they tend to share similar temperatures and precipitation patterns, habitats and biomes, and even diseases. Consequently, plants and animals were already well adapted to the climates of the regions to which they were spreading. Contrast the ease of east-west diffusion in Eurasia with the difficulties of diffusion along Africa and America's north-south axis. The spread

southward of Fertile Crescent domestic animals throughout Africa was stopped or slowed by the harsh climate and infectious diseases. Moreover, most crops and domestic animals failed to spread between Mesoamerica and South America. The cool highlands of Mexico (which provide ideal conditions for specialized crops) transition into the hot lowlands of Central America, creating similar transportation problems. According to Diamond, latitude is a major determinant of climate and agricultural conditions, and subsequent food production. But continental differences in axis orientation not only affected the transportation of domesticated animals, but also the diffusion of other technologies, such as wheels and writing techniques.

### Proximate Factors

#### *Technology: Military technology and maritime technology*

According to Diamond, technology, in the form of weapons and transport, provides the direct means by which certain peoples have expanded their realms and conquered other peoples. Why did all of these inventions originate in Eurasia? Diamond explains that technology, for the most part, develops cumulatively, rather than in isolated heroic acts. It finds most of its uses after it has been invented, rather than being invented to meet a foreseen need. Once an inventor has discovered a use for a new technology, the next step is to persuade society to adopt it. There are four factors that influence acceptance: relative economic advantage, social value and prestige, compatibility with vested interests, and the ease with which their advantages can be observed. All other things being equal, technology develops fastest in productive regions with large human populations, with many potential inventors, and where there are a number of competing societies.

#### *Infectious diseases endemic in Eurasia*

According to Diamond, there are three factors that contributed to the development of infectious diseases. First, the rise of agriculture began to produce disease, as sedentary farmers became surrounded by disease-transmitting rodents and human sewage. Secondly, urban areas encouraged infectious disease, as more densely packed human populations began to fester under poor sanitary conditions. Lastly, world trade routes contributed to the spread of disease. The Roman Empire, for example, effectively joined the populations of Europe, Asia, and North Africa into a giant breeding ground for microbes.

The European conquest and the depopulation of the New World illustrates the place of lethal microbes in human history. Old World germs, to



which indigenous peoples had never been exposed, were transported to New World colonies. American Indians had neither immunity nor genetic resistance to these microbes, and consequently, many were killed. A dozen major infectious diseases of Old World origin became established in the New World; more than one killer reached Europe from the Americas.

Interestingly enough, these awful germs did not await European conquerors in the New World. Why is this so? Diamond explains that, for one, the rise of dense human populations that breed disease began later in the New World than in the old. Secondly, most populated centers in the Americas were never connected by expansive trade routes in the way that Europe, North Africa, India, and China were linked in Roman times, thus avoiding the “giant breeding grounds.” Moreover, animal domestication was far less extensive in the Americas; the few domesticates that had been tamed by Native Americans were unlikely sources of large-scale disease. Diamond explains that while Europeans used weaponry, technology, and political organization to conquer non-European peoples, their strongest weapon seemed to be the infectious diseases they carried to these distant lands.

### *Writing*

Writing brings power to modern societies, by making it possible to transmit knowledge with great accuracy and detail. Early writing, in the form of record-keeping and royal propaganda, served the needs of political institutions. The “writers” were full-time bureaucrats, who were nourished by the stored food surpluses produced by peasant populations. Writing was never developed or even adopted by hunter-gatherer societies, because they lacked both the institutional uses of early writing and the social and agriculture mechanisms needed to generate the food surpluses required to feed scribes.

### *The centralized political organization of European states*

Diamond characterizes “states” as those entities with the following attributes: over 50,000 people, a number of villages and a central capital, class- and residence-based relationships, one or more languages and ethnicities, centralized government, multiple levels of bureaucracy, monopolies of force and information, formalized laws and judges, intensive food production, division of labor, taxes, and public architecture. States are especially good at developing weapons of war, providing troops, promoting religion, and encouraging the patriotic fervor that makes troops willing to fight or sacrifice their own lives. According to Diamond, Eurasia had all the features necessary for centralizing political organization. Other regions of the world simply did not.

## THE APPLICATION OF DIAMOND'S PERSPECTIVE

### Australia

Diamond's book argues that Australia provides a crucial test of these theories about intercontinental differences in societies. How else can one account for the fact that white English colonists established a literate, food-producing, industrial democracy, within a few decades of colonizing a continent whose inhabitants had been illiterate hunter-gatherers for over 40,000 years? First, the natives of New Guinea and Australia had several geographic limitations, including few domesticable native plants and animals, an inhospitable climate for agriculture, and a relatively small population. Second, white English colonists essentially imported all of the elements needed to produce a literate, industrial democracy from outside of Australia. All of these elements were the end products of 10,000 years of development in the Eurasian environment. In conclusion, Diamond contends that the aboriginals themselves were unable to develop a modern society because of the restrictive features of the Australian environment.

### China

Diamond explains how geographic features helped China achieve early cultural and political unification. He notes that China contained diverse racial and ethnic groups, a contrasting environment and climate between North and South, and over 130 mostly obscure and isolated languages. Nonetheless, Diamond describes a number of reasons for unification that fit into his theoretical framework. First, China was one of the world's first centers of plant and animal domestication. Second, China was the site of many early technological inventions, including bronze metallurgy and cast-iron production; it also had class differentiation that enabled it to mobilize a large labor force. In addition, it had geographic features like the east-west axis that enabled exchanges of domesticates between diverse regions in China. All these geographic factors contributed to the early cultural and political unification of China.

### Pacific Islands (Polynesia)

Polynesian political, economic, and social organization had developed considerably, but it had taken different pathways than its global counterparts. The Europeans' technological advantages enabled them to establish temporary colonial domination over most of tropical

Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. However, indigenous germs and food producers prevented Europeans from settling most of this region in significant numbers. Unlike Australia and the Americas, East Asia and most of the Pacific Islands remained occupied by East Asian and Pacific peoples, not by Europeans.

### Americas

Diamond asks an intriguing question: why did Europeans conquer the lands of Native Americans, instead of vice versa? Why were the trajectories of all key developments shifted to later dates in the Americas than in Eurasia? Diamond describes several factors that led to the European conquest of the Americas. These include better food production, better domesticated plants and animals, better metallurgy, better weapons and cavalry, better transport and communication via writing, and better political institutions. Society in the New World was more primitive because of later human arrival and animal domestication, as well as certain geographic and ecological barriers. The isolation of the native society also played a role in the European conquest of the Americas. The wheel had not been invented except as a toy in the New World, and writing was limited to a few locations.

### Africa

Africa has a great diversity of peoples and languages due to its diverse geography and long prehistory. The Bantu farmers dominated South Africa due to superior plant and animal domestication as well as their reserves of iron and bronze. They extended their range to Natal on the East coast. The Xhosa people extended their reach to the Fish River 500 miles east of Cape Town. Meanwhile, white Dutch colonists in South Africa, who began colonizing the region in the 1650s, were highly successful, as they faced competition only from the poorly defended Khoisan tribes in the area. Moreover, the Dutch were successful because they brought crops well adapted to the climate. In short, white colonization of South Africa succeeded because of better food production and stronger arms.

### Assessment and Limitation

In assessing Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, I find the title to be misleading. Guns and steel are scarcely mentioned in comparison to his geographic and environmentally determinant factors of societal

development. Moreover, in his curious conclusion, Diamond seems to switch gears, insisting on the importance of cultural and individual idiosyncrasies over geography and environmental factors. Second, Diamond does not provide us with an adequate answer as to why a relative minority of Europeans were able to conquer large territories throughout Eurasia in the period from 1500 to 1900. This is a book about why Eurasians conquered the world in the past half-century, not a book about why Europeans conquered the world in the past half-millennium.

Third, the scientific bases of his argument are still subject to reevaluation. Recently, remnants at an archeological dig in Chile indicated that populations inhabited the Americas over 1,000 years before Diamond's calculations. Such new findings raise doubts about Diamond's theory. Specifically, it impacts his argument concerning the extinction of larger mammals by the first Eurasians to colonize the Americas, and their consequent unavailability for domestication.

Fourth, pathogens were the *sine qua non* behind the Europeanization of the New World and Oceania. Africa and Asia were not amenable to Europeanization because these areas had their own deadly pathogens that more than offset those that the Europeans carried with them. European military superiority enabled them, temporarily, to conquer vast parts of Africa and Asia. It was a temporary conquest, however, because the excessive mortality of Europeans in those areas prohibited Europeanization. High mortality rates had the direct effect of reducing the European population, and the indirect effect of inducing sensible Europeans not to migrate to these regions.

Finally, as a criticism, Diamond assumes that the "game" is over. He has assumed that the dominance of Europeans and their descendants is a permanent fixture. However, the East Asian countries, with their open and dynamic capitalist systems and large populations, have several advantages over the West. We may see a kind of reranking of regional economic advantages in the future. Diamond curiously ignores this farsighted approach to history when looking into the future.

### DIAMOND'S COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED

With *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, Jared Diamond explores a more constant and more currently relevant issue, that is how and why societies defeat themselves and disintegrate. In *Collapse*, he continues his consideration of earlier themes, but this time explores the choices societies make that lead to either their success

or failure. *Collapse* is mostly about the basic elements of the earth's ecosystem—flora, fauna, climate, and geology—that, when preserved, sustain our populations. Societies fail, in Diamond's view, when they mismanage these resources.

Diamond examines the lost civilizations of Easter Island, the Maya, and the Norse colony of Greenland. He demonstrates how a combination of cultural and population factors coupled with a general disregard for natural resources contributed to these societies' collapse. Extending those lessons, he shows how environmental and population pressures are affecting present conditions in Haiti and Rwanda, and how events in China, Australia, and even Montana could follow the same path.

Diamond then identifies twelve ominous environmental problems: natural habitat destruction (mainly through deforestation), wild food reduction, biodiversity loss, soil erosion, natural resource depletion, freshwater pollution, natural photosynthetic resource maximizations, the human introduction of toxins and alien species, climate change induction, and finally, overpopulation. It is striking that the World Business Council for Sustainable Development has spelled out a similar list of ten environmental issues that threaten the viability of the planet's ecosystem: crop and grazing land loss, tropical forest depletion, species extinction, rapid population growth, fresh water resource shortages, overfishing, habitat destruction, marine pollution, human health threats, climate change, acid rain, and energy resource pressures.

Throughout *Collapse* Diamond's criteria for societal failure are as follows: inadvertent environmental damage and its possible reversibility, climate change, hostile neighbors, decreased support by friendly neighbors (e.g., Greenland's potential fall will be hastened by its failure to maintain relations with Europe), and society's response to its problems. According to Diamond, "a society's responses depend on its political, economic and social institutions and on its cultural values. Those institutions and values affect whether the society values (or even tries to solve) its problems."

Diamond lauds Japan and the European countries for preserving their forests. Europe's total forest area, he writes, "has been increasing since around 1800." Moreover, he reports that 80 percent of Japan is made up of sparsely populated forested mountains, with most of its population crammed into its coastal plains. He argues that the shogun Hideyoshi in 1582 contributed to the preservation of Japan's forests by limiting the amount of timber that the various fiefdoms could consume.

Although Diamond acknowledges that the genocide in Rwanda was connected to population growth and land competition, he falls short

of ecodeterminism, refusing to claim that these factors made the genocide inevitable. Furthermore, he illustrates the differences between the two nations of the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, as an example of the effect of choice in managing resources, as opposed to ecological determinism. The Dominican Republic had advantages that Haiti did not—rainfall being one. However, the Dominican Republic preserved more of its forests than did Haiti.

In Part 4 of *Collapse* Diamond examines why some societies make bad decisions. He discusses a failure to anticipate or perceive problems, to discourage bad behaviors, and to oppose disastrous values. Diamond had touched on these before, but here he recapitulates and addresses these factors in detail as well as other irrational, destructive choices that lead to environmental and societal collapse. He maintains, “Perhaps a crux of success or failure as a society is to know which core values to hold on to, and which ones to discard and replace with new values when times change.”<sup>14</sup>

Diamond has an incisive chapter on big business and the environment, discussing the good, the bad, and the truly ugly. He astonishingly concludes that since businesses are really there to make money for owners and stockholders, and not to follow the environmental practices of the enlightened, the ultimate responsibility for environmental disaster lies with the public. He concludes that the idea that “the public has the ultimate responsibility, for the behavior of even the biggest businesses is empowering and hopeful, rather than disappointing.” Also, he predicts that “in the future, just as in the past, changes in public attitudes will be essential for changes in businesses’ environmental practices.”

### Assessment and Limitation

Interestingly, in his final chapter Diamond claims that he is a “cautious optimist.” But why is he optimistic for the future given the problems that he outlines? Diamond concludes that the problems identified in the book are entirely human-made. We can solve all the social problems leading to collapse if we have the “political will.” We can learn from the mistakes of others. Such a viewpoint is very optimistic indeed. History may actually be teaching us that the most difficult problems to solve are exactly those that are “man-made.”

The historical fate of Easter Island, Diamond argues, presents a challenge to our own civilization. One day in the middle of the seventeenth century, the very last tree on Easter Island fell. Diamond asks, “What went through the mind of the person who cut down that

last tree?” What indeed went through the mind of the person who killed the (second) last Tasmanian Tiger (the last one died in captivity)? And what will the person who uses the last gallon of petrol be thinking? To reiterate an old Cree Indian saying, “Only after the last tree has been cut down/only after the last river has been poisoned/only after the last fish has been caught/only then will you know/that money cannot be eaten.” This is the lesson that the book provides.

Otherwise, his discussion of future solutions to the issues raised in the book is perhaps unrealistic, too skeptical of technology, or too trusting of human initiative. One of the greatest problems is that there is not enough will (political and otherwise) to deal with long-term problems; just as the commercial world lives from one quarter to another, governments also have a short focus. Elected governments who must face the voters in the short term find it difficult to do long-range planning. Diamond’s theories are not perfect or all-encompassing. His occasional glib dismissals of competing archeological and other theories serve mostly to make his own statements sound less certain.

### AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: FERNAND BRAUDEL’S *THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE AGE OF PHILLIP II*

Fernand Braudel (1902–1985) was the foremost French historian of the postwar era. His first book *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l’Époque de Philippe II* (*The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*), published in 1949, was his most influential.<sup>15</sup>

#### **Review of Braudel’s book**

In this book the author attempts to evaluate how the Mediterranean Sea had an influence on the growth and development of numerous civilizations in the area. His primary aim is to illustrate how France, Spain, and England rose to preeminence as world powers. Braudel argues that the geography and topography of the area helped produce strong institutions and regimes and brought prosperity to the regions. Braudel presents an alternative, less deterministic, and multi-causal explanation than does Diamond.

From Braudel’s perspective there is no single Mediterranean sea. There are many seas—indeed a “vast, complex expanse” in which man operates. Life is conducted on and around the Mediterranean: people travel, fish, fight wars, and even die in this sea that in turn gives

way to plains and islands. Life on the plains is diverse and complex; the poorer south is affected by religious diversity (Catholicism and Islam), as well as by intrusions—both cultural and economic—from the wealthier north. In other words, the Mediterranean cannot be understood independently from what is exterior to it. Any rigid adherence to boundaries is a way of falsifying the situation.

Braudel conceives of three time levels. The first level, geographical time, is that of the environment, with its slow, almost imperceptible change, its repetition and cycles. Here Braudel's framework comes close to that of Diamond in its determinism—change may be slow, but it is irresistible. The second level of time comprises social and cultural history, including social groupings, empires, and civilizations. Change at this level is more rapid than that at the environmental level. Braudel looks at the span of two or three centuries to spot a particular pattern, such as the rise and fall of various aristocracies. The third level of time is that of events. This is the history of individuals with names: kings, nobles, landowners, religious, military, and many others. This, for Braudel, is the time of surfaces and deceptive effects.

Braudel's Mediterranean is a complex of seas, but also consists of the neighboring desert and mountains. The desert, as in North Africa, creates a nomadic form of social organization where the whole community moves; mountain life, as in Switzerland and Austria, is sedentary. Transhumance is also a factor—that is, the movement from the mountain to the plain (or vice versa) in a given season.

Braudel describes the mountains and the role that they play in the development of society. He states that civilization in these regions is seldom stable, and hence it is very difficult to tame. Due to topography, no landed nobility has developed in mountainous regions, and hence it is difficult to subdue these people or govern them effectively as a single political unit. However, unlike the Himalayan Mountains in Asia, the European ranges are not unsurmountable and can be captured when required.

When we talk about plains, we presume that these regions represent wealth, development, and the modern world. But in the Mediterranean this perception can be misleading. In the Mediterranean a large majority of the plains were marshes and hence a location of sickness and other forms of misery. One of the biggest scourges of the period was malaria. He proposes a theory that states that the Roman Empire, to extend its reach, expanded in these plains. This resulted in sickness; people left these new lands to come back to the old cities. As such, the pressure of population on the land increased and the economy eventually collapsed. The military could not be sustained and hence the gates to Rome were left unguarded, enabling Hannibal to attack



Rome. Braudel is of the opinion that the civilization that developed in the Mediterranean was traditional as compared to that of the North, because the newly acquired land was under the control of the wealthy.

Transhumance and nomadic life is a theme that Braudel often comes back to. He argues that due to the continuous movement of people from the mountains to the plains, a system of trade developed as the precursor to sea trade in later years. Furthermore, the type of lifestyle that this provided did not make for a comfortable existence. In these conditions, agriculture developed over time. He next discusses how the seas and coasts of the Mediterranean influenced the growth of the society. The influence of the Mediterranean is not confined merely to the region immediately bordering the Mediterranean Sea, but also stretches from the borders of Arabia to the edge of the Sahara Desert and all the way along the borders of Russia to England.

As the Mediterranean waters were more productive than the land, it is but natural that man took to the sea in great numbers. Out of these initial ranks of fishermen came the great ranks of sailors who represented the Western world and who opened up the sea routes to places all over the planet, enabling countries such as England, France, and Spain to extend the borders of their civilizations.

Due to the presence of natural inlets and coves along various points on the Mediterranean, small fishing villages slowly developed into trading ports. Gradually, ports grew into cities and became hubs of trade and commerce in the region. The growth in prosperity in the Mediterranean lands resulted in the growth of prosperity in Europe, enabling European states to effectively develop their natural resources. Due to warmer temperatures along the Mediterranean, there were movements of people from central Europe to the coasts. Also, nomadic tribes from Arabia migrated to the coast, furthering the development of ports around the Mediterranean. Such movement greatly increased trade and commerce in the region, making it one of the richest and most prosperous during the 1600s. The influence of the Mediterranean also spread across the Atlantic and far beyond because of the flourishing sea trade in the Mediterranean. The number of sailors willing to explore further lands greatly increased, leading to the exploration of the Atlantic Ocean, the voyage by Columbus to the Americas, and the conquest of the Americas by the Spanish.

### **Assessment and Limitations**

Because of similar climates around the Mediterranean, there was a similarity in the type of vegetation, and consequently, in the type of

produce. The result was that Mediterranean mariners, to increase their wealth, explored around the globe to increase their prosperity (exotic foods and spices). Braudel discusses the frosts in the 1600s (the little Ice Age) that destroyed the trees. This resulted in the migration of the people to the Mediterranean region; soon there was an increase in trade as well as attempts to explore other parts of the world.

Another result was the collapse of Spain as a major power. The reason is that Spain was primarily an agricultural economy. It used its colonies to extract gold or agricultural wealth, and thus fell into debt, losing its preeminence of power. On the other hand, England was a commercial and an industrial economy. Due to the proximity between the coal fields and industrial belts within the country, England was able to utilize its resources more effectively and prudently than France and Spain, and was able to succeed as a global power. Moreover, the environment and the geography of the regions played a role in the development of the society and class structure.

Because the sea was the major area of growth and prosperity, there were large numbers of wars that were fought in these regions. However, with the discovery of new continents and places such as India and America, the imperial conflicts moved to other areas. The first shot of the Thirty Years War was fired because of reasons other than Mediterranean influence. Power had shifted away from the sea. The same was true for the Hundred Years War when England felt that it could dominate France.

## CONCLUSION

In terms of "geopolitics," Mackinder argued that the only aspect that helped states to develop and grow was their geography. Geopolitics has investigated the relationship between politics and the geographical environment in the same way that the relation between history and geography has long been studied.

In many ways, modern man still remains limited by nature. The geographical environment molds men's characters and the means of earning a livelihood in ways that make people prefer one kind of political regime to another. Most of the contemporary geopolitical schools have abandoned the idea that geopolitical conditions can determine, to any significant extent, the nature of man. But some geopoliticians try to read from the map certain compelling dictates of foreign policy, though they are seldom concerned solely with geopolitics per se. They may combine geopolitics with certain ideas or theories, namely the now discredited idea of a master race, or of the necessity for autarky to combat or spread religious or political gospel.

Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel* argues that the distribution of wealth and power among societies around the world has been powerfully shaped by geographic factors and that environmental endowment has sharply favored some societies, indeed some continents, over others. His idea was to try evaluating why states located in different parts of the world develop in a different manner. It is remarkable that his book takes on the very big picture, treating the human experience as a whole, and that it suggests the possibility of a genuinely scientific history based on geographic and environmental factors.

But this work is critiqued on the grounds that, first of all, it covers a time span of 10,000 years—too long to be very scientifically precise. Also, his work has been scientifically debunked on numerous grounds. For example, he talks about the fact that the domestication of animals was first done in Europe, but no real proof of that exists. Diamond has, in addition, oversold geography as an explanation for history.

The question must also be raised: is Diamond really a geographic determinist? In his conclusion, he stresses the importance of culture and individuals, thus contradicting his own thesis. In his focus on geographic and environmental factors in explaining development, Diamond is clearly onto something. He stands in contrast to some recent institutional and rational-choice writing in political science that debunks history, geography, and culture as explanatory factors. So we need to take Diamond, especially his *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, very seriously. On the other hand, I am disturbed by Diamond's last-minute and unelaborated elevation of cultural factors to preeminence in the last pages of his book, seemingly contradicting all the explanations from geography and the environment that have gone before. We need some clarification from Diamond on this score. At the same time, I much prefer the complex, layered, multicausality that Braudel sets forth in his analysis of the Mediterranean, to the rather mechanical and simplistic determinism that Diamond advances.

In the early stages of societal development, humans were largely passive subjects of environmental influences. But in interacting with the environment, humans not only transform external nature but also find and develop their own inner natures. The experience of nature becomes part of one's internal consciousness, which in turn alters how we interact with nature. Elucidating this process would make possible a science of human-environmental interrelations, capable, quite possibly, of accurately guiding political practice.<sup>16</sup>

## CHAPTER 9



# SCIENCE OR IDEOLOGY?: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND ITS AFTERMATH

*Murat Bayar*

### INTRODUCTION

Sociobiology is “the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.”<sup>1</sup> The term was popularized by Edward O. Wilson’s 1975 book—*Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*—that developed an evolutionary perspective on group selection, behavior, and functions in social species, such as insects, birds, and mammals.

The final chapter of Wilson’s book focuses on *Homo sapiens*. He has argued that humans, like other organisms, have evolved both physically and behaviorally in a way that maximizes their chances of survival. As some behavioral traits, such as parental care, territoriality, and incest avoidance, have been “selected” by nature due to their survival advantages, these traits have become dominant in the population over time. In other words, sociobiology has suggested that certain behavioral, as well as physical, traits are adaptive and heritable in human and animal populations. Wilson has also stated that there is no reason to think that evolution suddenly stopped thousands of years ago when small groups of humans started emigrating from their original homeland in East Africa but perhaps continued even after their separation from each other and during their adjustment to different parts of the world.

While Wilson’s arguments on animal behavior are generally accepted in academia, his analogy on humans has created massive controversy

since the publication of *Sociobiology*, and the debate has been intensified with subsequent studies on genetic differences among ethnic and racial groups. In this regard, some of his critics, such as Gould and Kamin, have accused Wilson of being racist and sexist and for legitimizing inequality and colonialism. In response, Wilson has suggested that genetic inheritance is not deterministic but probabilistic and that there is continuous interaction between human nature and environment. This chapter reviews the arguments of Wilson and his critics and presents the current state of the debate, including the implications of sociobiology for political science.

### BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY

Darwin has theorized that the hereditary traits that increase the chances of survival and reproduction of individuals would be selected for and become dominant in subsequent generations.<sup>2</sup> This “natural selection” process constitutes the basis of the theory of evolution, which posits that all species have evolved from common ancestors. Wilson has underlined that Darwin’s theory is supported by fossil records, which indicate that *Homo sapiens* dates back around 200,000 years and has evolved from *Australopithecus africanus* (three million years ago) and *Homo erectus* (two million years ago) in East Africa.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the parsimonious explanation of natural selection, the prevalence of altruism among social species posed a puzzle, because by definition helping others in times of danger or sharing food reduces the individual fitness of the performer much more than it does the recipient’s, so the “altruistic genes” would not have survived the evolutionary process. An example that Darwin has given of this phenomenon is worker ants, which are sterile but still have managed to appear in subsequent generations. In retrospect, Darwin has put forward the idea of natural selection operating at the family level rather than at the individual level: as the altruistic members contribute to the fitness of their kin group, their genes continue to survive.

A hundred years after Darwin, Hamilton constructed a mathematical model to explain inclusive fitness and has suggested that the greater the kinship proximity (i.e., the more genes shared) the higher the benefits of altruistic behavior over the costs. Furthermore, Trivers has made a substantial contribution to this debate with the notion of reciprocal altruism, which indicates that altruism is possible even between nonkin individuals if the future cost of not reciprocating (i.e., cheating) reduces the inclusive fitness of the recipient.<sup>4</sup> As nonaltruistic individuals are punished and perhaps isolated from society because

of their cheating, they fail to benefit from the altruistic exchanges between other members of the group and risk their survival.

A major breakthrough in the study of human biology came in 1953 when Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA, which is central to understand how inheritance works. Based on this discovery, the Human Genome Project has identified the 20,000–25,000 genes in the human genome in 2003 and opened the door to understand the genetic causes of certain diseases, and perhaps of human behavior.

Finally, based on the facts that the Y chromosome is passed from the father to the son and that a part of DNA called mitochondria is inherited exclusively from the mother, scientists have traced back the common male and female ancestors of all humans living today. They were metaphorically called “Adam” and “Eve,” who lived around 60,000 years and 150,000 years ago in East Africa, respectively.<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that this finding does not mean that “Adam” and “Eve” were the only males or females living in their times, but that their genes were selected by nature due to their survival advantages.

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

In the last chapter of *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Wilson draws implications from animal behavior for human behavior. He has suggested that certain traits, such as parental care and territoriality, have provided social species with survival advantages, so these behaviors have been selected by nature. As the individuals that possessed these adaptive traits have had more surviving offspring, their genes, and, accordingly, their behavior have become prevalent in the population over time. Wilson has clarified his understanding of individual fitness as the following:

There are three basic components of genetic fitness: increased personal survival, increased personal reproduction, and the enhanced survival and reproduction of close relatives who share the same genes by common descent . . . If the possession of certain genes predisposes individuals toward a particular trait, say a certain kind of social response, and the trait in turn conveys superior fitness, the genes will gain an increased representation in the next generation. If natural selection is continued over many generations, the favored genes will spread throughout the population, and the trait will become characteristic of the species.<sup>6</sup>

As mentioned in the introduction, Wilson’s analogy between animal behavior and human behavior and his suggestion of the heritability of some behavioral traits have created a massive controversy in

academia. The criticisms against sociobiology have been partly based on Wilson's racist and sexist examples from humans and other social species. For instance, Wilson has observed that worker ants attack the nests of neighboring ant colonies and kidnap pupae to their own nest to use them as worker ants for foraging, nest building, and other functions. Second, he has indicated that males are usually dominant over females in animal societies. He has stated,

Anatomy bears the imprint of the sexual division of labor . . . Pound for pound, they [men] are stronger and quicker in most categories of sport. The proportion of their limbs, their skeletal torsion, and the density of their muscles are particularly suited for running and throwing, the archaic specialties of the ancestral hunter-gatherer males. The world track records reflect the disparity . . . The gap cannot be attributed to a lack of incentive and training. The great women runners of East Germany and the Soviet Union are the products of nationwide recruitment and scientifically planned training programs. Yet their champions, who consistently set Olympic and world records, could not place in an average men's regional track meet.<sup>7</sup>

Third, Wilson has argued that it is unlikely that evolution suddenly ended thousands of years ago. He has suggested,

There is no reason to believe that during this final sprint there has been a cessation in the evolution of either mental capacity or the predilection toward special social behaviors. The theory of population genetics and experiments on other organisms show that substantial changes can occur in the span of less than 100 generations, which for man reaches back only to the time of the Roman Empire. Two thousand generations, roughly the period since typical *Homo sapiens* invaded Europe, is enough time to create new species and to mold them in major ways. Although we do not know how much mental evolution has actually occurred, it would be false to assume that modern civilizations have been built entirely on capital accumulated during the long haul of the Pleistocene.<sup>8</sup>

Fourth, Wilson has advocated that human beings are not "rational" in an economic sense, but are partly driven by emotions. He has suggested,

The less rational but more important the decision-making process, for example, the more emotion should be expended in conducting it . . . much of mental development consists of steps that must be taken quickly and automatically to insure survival and reproduction. Because

the brain can be guided by rational calculation only to a limited degree, it must fall back on nuances of pleasure and pain mediated by the limbic system and other lower centers of the brain . . . Consider the phobias [e.g. evoked by snakes, heights, etc.] . . . In early human history phobias might have provided the extra margin needed to insure survival: better to crawl away from a cliff, nauseated by fear, than to walk its edge absentmindedly.<sup>9</sup>

Wilson's argument that humans show evolutionary psychological adaptation that may contradict economic rationality has faced not only significant criticism but also support. Blank and Hines argue that "we are not the fully rational, entirely conscious creatures whose actions are determined solely by logic and reason . . . Humans are constrained by brains that have evolved from primitive times where emotions of fear and aggression were crucial to survival."<sup>10</sup> This is so despite the expectations of positivists and also of Rousseau, who wrote "man is born free." Similarly, Pinker has stressed, "These mental systems work with limited amounts of information, have to reach decisions in a finite amount of time, and ultimately serve evolutionary goals such as security."<sup>11</sup> Finally, the (cumulative) prospect theory has shown that individuals overweigh losses relative to comparable gains and certain outcomes relative to probable outcomes, an empirical finding that contradicts the rank-ordered, transitive, and consistent preferences assumption of the rational choice theory.<sup>12</sup>

Fifth, Wilson has advocated the biological foundations of kinship favoritism and altruism that have contributed to the controversy around sociobiology for "legitimizing nationalism." He has argued,

[From an evolutionary perspective] Kinship systems provide at least three distinct advantages. First, they bind alliances between tribes and subtribal units and provide a conduit for the conflict-free emigration of young members. Second, they are an important part of the bartering system by which certain males achieve dominance and leadership. Finally, they serve as a homeostatic device for seeing groups through hard times. When food grows scarce, tribal units can call on their allies for altruistic assistance in a way unknown in other social primates.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, Wilson has suggested that animal behavior, especially the behavior of species that are relatively close to humans in the evolution (e.g., chimpanzees), can provide substantial insights about human behavior. Thus, "the question of interest is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent."<sup>14</sup> Yet, he has added that humans display some unique



behaviors that are driven by their intelligence and cultures, implying that human behavior is affected by both nature *and* nurture.

### DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Immediately after its publication in 1975, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* started an intense debate that has gone to such an extreme that the parties have accused each other of pursuing ideological rather than scientific agendas. In response to sociobiology's assertions about human nature, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin stated in the first paragraph of *Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature*:

Over the past decade and a half we have watched with concern the rising tide of biological determinist writing, with its increasingly grandiose claims to be able to locate the causes of inequalities of status, wealth, and power between classes, genders, and races in Western society in a reductionist theory of human nature. Each of us has been engaged for much of this time in research, writing, speaking, teaching, and public political activity in opposition to the oppressive forms in which determinist ideology manifests itself. We share a commitment to the prospect of the creation of a more socially just—a socialist society.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin argued in 1984:

The central assertion of sociobiology is that all aspects of human culture and behavior, like the behavior of all animals, are coded in the genes and have been molded by natural selection . . . Sociobiology is a reductionist, biological determinist explanation of human existence . . . The general appeal of sociobiology is in its legitimation of the status quo . . . It also serves at the personal level to explain individual acts of oppression and to protect the oppressors against the demands of the oppressed . . . we cannot think of any significant human social behavior that is built into our genes in such a way that it cannot be modified and shaped by social conditioning.<sup>16</sup>

Although Wilson has claimed that most of the criticisms are based on ideological, especially Marxist, rather than scientific grounds, theoretical challenges to the biological foundations of human behavior are manifold in the literature. For instance, Durkheim has argued, "Every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false . . . The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of

individual consciousness.”<sup>17</sup> Another critic of sociobiology, Gould has argued, “the statement that humans are animals does not imply that our specific patterns of behavior and social arrangements are in any way directly determined by our genes. *Potential* and *determination* are different concepts.”<sup>18</sup> He continues, “Biological determinism is the primary theme in Wilson’s discussion of human behavior,” and suggests, “even if we can compile a list of behavioral traits shared by humans and our closest primate relatives, this does not make a good case for common genetic control. Similar results need not imply similar causes.” Gould has stated that the brain has no predisposition toward any behavior (i.e., it is a blank slate or *tabula rasa*) and that adaptation does not take place at the genetic level but at the cultural level, although he has noted that neither genetic nor cultural assumptions are disprovable. He has concluded, “its [genetic determinism’s] continued popularity is a function of social prejudice among those who benefit most from the status-quo.”

In response, Wilson argues, “in the creation of human nature, genetic evolution and cultural evolution have together produced a loosely interwoven product.” For instance, “a form of group selection also operates in the competition between religious sects. Those that gain adherents survive; those that cannot fail. Consequently, religions, like other human institutions, evolve so as to further the welfare of their practitioners.”<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, Thayer has suggested, “genes impact behavior, to be sure. But this impact most often is probabilistic, not deterministic . . . no prominent contemporary evolutionary theorist, including . . . E. O. Wilson, has argued that human behavior is solely determined by genes.”<sup>20</sup>

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THEORY

*Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* has underlined heritable traits as a key determinant of human behavior and has made significant impact on the study of political science. Masters has argued that “the old academic controversy of nature versus nurture needs to be replaced by research on the complex interactions between cultural and biological factors.”<sup>21</sup> Similarly, Brown has maintained that human affairs are outcomes of the interaction between human nature and culture despite the anthropological proposition that they are two distinct phenomena.<sup>22</sup>

A ramification of the debate on nature versus nurture, the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences (APLS) was founded in 1981 and has fostered the study of biopolitics as a subfield of

political science. The APLS publishes an academic peer-reviewed journal called *Politics and the Life Sciences* (PLS), whose topic range includes evolutionary and laboratory insights into political behavior. According to Blank and Hines, the approach of biopolitics to the discipline of political science is “a new *naturalism* that purports to carry the discipline beyond the sterile separation of facts and values and challenges the discipline to move decisively beyond the limitations of modernism with its emphasis on disembodied rationalism.”<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, Fehér and Heller have pointed out that biopolitics is related to a broad range of political and social issues, including ethics, health, environmentalism, sexual politics, and the politics of race.<sup>24</sup>

Although biopolitics is still a nascent approach, “human nature” is not a new factor in political theory. Goldgeier and Tetlock have underlined,

At first glance, the central macro-level theories of international politics appear to rely on minimal assumptions about human cognition and motivation. For realists, states are power or security maximizers; for liberals and neoliberal institutionalists, they are wealth or utility maximizers. For constructivists, human nature is itself a social construction and the appropriate focus is on the intricate webs of normative understanding that shape and are shaped by international actors.<sup>25</sup>

Yet, biopolitics differs from other approaches/theories by examining human nature from an evolutionary perspective. Wiegele has suggested, “human beings might be genetically programmed to respect authority, which is associated with enhancing security.”<sup>26</sup> In parallel, Brown has argued that it is universal that humans live in groups, claim a territory, and develop group identities, all of which are needed for (the sense of) security. For instance, Green has found that ethnic attachments are stronger when the group is attached to a territory.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, Somit and Peterson have underlined that the human intellect has also evolved a capacity to develop and act upon beliefs and values (i.e., capacity for indoctrination), despite our tendencies for dominance, hierarchy, and obedience that are shared by other social primates.<sup>28</sup>

The students of biopolitics have also applied this concept to institutions. “The state, like other institutions, emerges in response to historical and ecological conditions that serve as a stimulus to human beings to create and pursue alternative strategies for survival and for the attainment of other values and goals as reflected in human culture.”<sup>29</sup> In parallel, Masters has pointed out, “The interaction of

inter-group competition and intra-group cooperation is particularly relevant to the explanation of those states in which a complex bureaucratic apparatus engages in policy implementation as well as coercive rule enforcement.”<sup>30</sup>

Finally, students of biopolitics have highlighted the impact of genes and environment on violence. Blank has pointed out that male genotype is a good predictor of violence, as males are on average more aggressive than females, and males with high testosterone levels are likely to be more aggressive than males with low testosterone levels.<sup>31</sup> Environment also has impact on behavioral traits, since

in six studies comparing levels of heavy metals in violent offenders and nonviolent offenders in the same jails, either lead or manganese was significantly higher in violent offenders than in nonviolent offenders . . . Controlling for social variables usually associated with crime (population size and density, socioeconomic status, income, etc.), crime rates are higher where the population is exposed to the neurotoxins that destroy inhibitory neurotransmitter function.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the students of biopolitics investigate the impact of genes and environment on social, economic, and political outcomes. Last but not the least, these assertions raise the question of moral responsibility—if behavior is determined (at least to an extent) by the genes, do individuals have responsibility for their acts? In response, Arnhart has advocated, “Knowing that some people have a biological propensity to alcoholism or any other disruptive behavior does not lessen their moral responsibility . . . such knowledge enhances their responsibility to control their bad propensities through medical treatment or proper habituation.”<sup>33</sup>

## BIASES AND LIMITATIONS

Probably the most controversial area in the nature versus nurture debate is the study of intelligence, especially among ethnic and racial groups. The American Psychological Association (APA) has defined intelligence as the ability “to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought.”<sup>34</sup> Overall IQ (Intelligence Quotient) scores are converted to a scale in which the mean is 100 and the standard deviation is 15.

Considering the sensitivity of the issue, the APA established a task force of eleven scholars in 1996 that prepared a comprehensive report

called *Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns*. Neisser et al. have pointed out that IQ scores are the best single predictor of a person's years of education, GMAT, SAT, MCAT scores, and occupational status. They have also stressed that individuals with higher IQ are significantly less likely to engage in juvenile crime than otherwise.

Neisser et al.'s report points out that the heritability of IQ can be tested by holding genes constant and looking at the impact of environmental factors, such as the socioeconomic conditions of the rearing family, on intelligence. These experimental designs become possible by the investigation of identical twins, who share one hundred percent of their genes. Conducting a comprehensive literature review, Neisser et al. have argued that the correlation of IQ between identical twins that were adopted by different families at birth ranges from .68 to .78 at adulthood. On the other hand, the correlation of IQ between genetically unrelated children reared together in adoptive families, which directly estimates the family variance, is close to zero at adulthood.

Neisser et al. have also emphasized that the correlation of IQ and genes increases with age, so the IQ studies that present findings only on children without follow-ups at adulthood are incomplete. They have theorized: "One possibility is that as individuals grow older their transactions with their environments are increasingly influenced by the characteristics that they bring to those environments themselves, decreasingly by the conditions imposed by family life and social origins."<sup>35</sup> Similarly, Jensen has indicated, "The broad heritability of IQ is about .40 to .50 when measured in children, about .60 to .70 in adolescents, and approaches .80 in later maturity."<sup>36</sup>

Here, it is important to note that "heritability does not imply immutability . . . This has evidently happened for height: the heritability of stature is high, but average heights continue to increase . . . Environmental factors also contribute substantially to IQ, but we do not currently know what those factors are or how they work."<sup>37</sup> For instance, Ceci and Williams have pointed out that, "American-reared sons of tall Japanese fathers tended to be both taller than American-reared sons of short Japanese fathers, and, more importantly, taller than the sons of tall Japanese fathers who were reared in Japan" and "both American and British teenagers were a half-foot taller, on average, than their predecessors a century earlier."<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, Diamond has indicated that the famine that was imposed by Nazis on the part of the population of the Netherlands and that reduced 40,000 pregnant women to near starvation has inflicted more damage on the starved women's grandchildren than on children, especially

in terms of being underweight, compared to the other part of the Dutch population that was not affected by the famine.<sup>39</sup> In other words, disadvantageous environments can restrain the capabilities of populations for generations, a finding that may have repercussions on foreign aid programs in terms of improving the quality of nutrition for pregnant women and infants.

Perhaps the most controversial finding is that the IQ scores of African Americans are found on average to be about one standard deviation lower than that of White Americans even when socioeconomic factors are controlled. *Mainstream Science on Intelligence: An Editorial with 52 Signatories, History, and Bibliography*, another comprehensive report that was signed by fifty-two experts on intelligence studies, has stated:

Intelligence tests are not culturally biased against American blacks or other native-born, English-speaking peoples in the U.S. Rather, IQ scores predict equally accurately for all such Americans, regardless of race and social class. Individuals who do not understand English well can be given either a nonverbal test or one in their native language . . . The bell curves for some groups (Jews and East Asians) are centered somewhat higher than for whites in general. Other groups (blacks and Hispanics [Hispanics score higher than Blacks, on average]) are centered somewhat lower than non-Hispanic whites . . . Individuals differ in intelligence due to differences in both their environments and genetic heritage . . . Racial-ethnic differences are somewhat smaller but still substantial for individuals from the same socioeconomic backgrounds. To illustrate, black students from prosperous families tend to score higher in IQ than blacks from poor families, but they score no higher, on average, than whites from poor families.<sup>40</sup>

These studies conclude that intelligence is partly genetic and that like any other genetic trait it is influenced by the environment. In fact, Flynn<sup>41</sup> has pointed out that African Americans have gained five IQ points on Whites in the past thirty years, a finding that demonstrates the mutability of intelligence among groups. Neisser et al. have concluded, "The study of intelligence does not need politicized assertions and recriminations; it needs self-restraint, reflection, and a great deal more research."<sup>42</sup>

Finally, there are studies that have investigated IQ and its correlation with socioeconomic indicators on the global scale.<sup>43</sup> For instance, Lynn and Vanhanen have suggested that the correlation between the average national intelligence score and the gross national income per capita (purchasing power parity) for 113 nations

is 0.68. Nevertheless, Cronshaw et al. have pointed out that the methodologies of these studies are “biased against Black Africans. We briefly review Rushton’s racial-realist research agenda and show that the assumption of test bias is central to advancing that agenda.” In parallel, Kamin has suggested that the studies of Lynn and Vanhanen and of Rushton and Jensen suffer from serious methodological flaws, especially in sampling populations. He has concluded that “Africans were at length able to shake off Western colonialists. Perhaps the day will soon come when they shake off such Western IQ testers.”

### OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Aristotle wrote, “Man is by nature a political animal.” Twenty-five hundred years later, sociobiology suggested, “Yes indeed.” The main argument of sociobiology is that certain behavioral and physical traits have evolved and become dominant in animal and human populations due to the survival advantages of those traits. According to the theory, animals and humans, who have evolved from common ancestors, share some behaviors, such as altruism, dominance, and territoriality, although human behavior is also influenced by the unique human intelligence and capacity for indoctrination. Students of biopolitics have investigated the impact of (supposedly) heritable behavioral traits on issues as broad as state-society relations, institutionalization, and foreign policy-making.

Due to its assertions on the origins and heritability of human behavior, sociobiology has received considerable criticism from many biologists, cultural anthropologists, psychologists, and political scientists. The critics have maintained that sociobiology makes overarching assertions with incomplete observations and little empirical evidence, carries strong racist and sexist connotations, and pursues an ideological rather than a scientific agenda. Overall, sociobiology can be credited for, for better or worse, transforming the old “Nature or nurture?” question into “How do nature and nurture interact?” The debate is unlikely to be settled, if it ever is, without further research in genetics, cognitive neuroscience, and other related disciplines.

## CHAPTER 10



# NEURONOPOLITICS: THE BRAINY APPROACH TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

*Josh Dix*

*We decide which is right, and which is an illusion.*

—Graeme Edge

### INTRODUCTION

A brown pipe with a black handle suspends in the air. Underneath the pipe, a sentence states, “Ceci n’est une pipe”<sup>1</sup> (“This is not a pipe”). This 1927 painting was René Magritte’s first in his *La trahison des images* (“The Treachery of Images”) series. Though the caption seems to be false, it is actually true. The pipe is not a pipe. It is merely paint arranged on a canvas. One cannot handle or use Magritte’s pipe. It is merely a representation. Magritte opined that had he painted “This is a pipe,” it would have been a bold-faced lie.<sup>2</sup>

Not only is the aforementioned pipe a representation, but so is every symbol or letter you see upon this page, read in this book, see on your computer monitor, and on your television. The written word holds meaning, but we only understand it through the groupings of symbols that represent sights that our brains translate. Spoken language also sounds familiar to us. However, it too is just a bunch of noises, short and long, that our brains interpret.

What is truly remarkable is that no brain is exactly the same, and therefore the images conjured while people talk are not the same either.



However, the conversation continues and both parties understand each other. Think about Magritte's pipe. You probably understood that I was describing a traditional smoker's pipe, not a metal pipe. How? The answer to that question is language and inference.

Human language is one of the fundamental elements that separates our species from every other on the planet. While other animals may have the ability to communicate, the *homo sapiens* variety of language requires an extraordinary amount of brainpower and function. In addition to the ability to communicate with one another, humans must be able to project meaning to whomever they are speaking and be able to interpret the speaker's meaning as well.<sup>3</sup> In a sense, language is part of what we are. Without it, humans would not be what they are today.

With language, with words, with symbols, and sounds, we have the ability to impact the future and change the way people think of the past. While language can be defined as cultural, it originates from our brains. Therefore, it is also part of our biology.<sup>4</sup> Language is an extension of humanity. This, of course, is the key to everything. We are biological creatures. Our DNA shows that we are mostly mouse and nearly all chimpanzee. Consequently, we are confined to the rules of nature. The question then becomes, is the will we possess free?

Writing this introductory piece, I am aware of my surroundings. I am in my study in my house, typing on a keyboard, looking at the symbols on my screen, feeling the hot air of the heater at my feet blow on my legs. I am aware of who I am, and I think that what I am doing is of my own free will. I am also aware that who I think I am and who you think I am are not specifically what you see when you look at me. To see me, you would have to look inside my brain. There, you would find blood, spongy flesh, and 100 billion neurons. Each neuron connects to 10,000 others through synapses. Somewhere inside that net of neurons and 100 quadrillion synapses, I exist.

The question then is not whether or not I exist. The question I need to ask is whether or not the "I" in the neuronal net is responsible for my thoughts and actions. If it is not, then consciousness is just an illusion, and all I am is electricity firing across a bunch of organic material. All my actions are determined by the makeup of my brain and the randomness of my environment. If this is true, I feel very uncomfortable . . . or do I?

There is a new field emerging in political science that is centered around the chemistry, biology, and physics of the human brain. The goal is to determine how our brains impact domestic and international relations. Most people that I interviewed while working on

this chapter were doubtful that there would be any impact. Is this not irony at its core? Aren't there 6.7 billion human brains in the world, interacting with each other to form villages, towns, cities, regions, states, countries, and unions?

The reason why we tend to want to disregard this new frontier is that it calls into question the separation between human and animal. It reminds us that we are genetically 85 percent mouse and 98 percent chimpanzee. It reminds us that that when we take away our technologies and our languages, we are not much different than gorillas and orangutans. And if we are only genes and nerve endings, then Descartes was wrong, and no matter how much we think we are, we really are not.

This chapter is concerned with a new field of political science. This field consists of brain chemistry, physics, biology, and the social sciences. The earliest literature dates only to 2004. In fact, the field is not yet named. Therefore, for lack of a better word, I will refer to it as neuronopolitics. After this introduction, I will discuss the background and development of the theory. Then, there will be a section on the spokesmen, ideas, and schools of thought in the field of neuronopolitics. And finally, I will conclude with the biases, limitations, and an assessment of the theory.

## BACKGROUND AND SPOKESMEN: FROM FREE WILL TO THE ETHICS OF THE FUTURE

In the last chapter, we looked at sociobiology. Neuronopolitics is in part an extension of that field. Neuronopolitics theorizes that the human brain drives human society. Going back to the power of human language for a moment, one should notice that while the last sentence seems obvious and simplistic, it is written in the third-person perspective. One of the big questions this chapter will wrestle with is the idea of free will. Are we driving society using our brains as the vehicle or are our brains driving society with us (our consciousnesses) strapped to the luggage racks on the roofs of our cars? The science of neuronopolitics is not encouraging. Still, we stay hopeful that maybe there is a chance that we are the ones at the wheel. This being said, there are two ideologies in the field, those that believe in free will and those that do not. In the grand scheme of things, the reason why ideology is important is everything.

Most of the background authors listed in the last chapter use neuroscience as a basis for their larger sociobiological theory. It should be noted in advance that the application of neuroscience to

international relations is still in its initial stages. Contributors to the field of neuronopolitics are chemists, biologists, physicists, medical doctors, psychologists, and philosophers. Because everyone, regardless of field, has something different to say about neuronopolitics, the next section will take us through a sampling of some of today's major contributors.

Neuronopoliticians are still struggling to determine just what the field is and what the rules are. Rose McDermott's 2004 paper "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science"<sup>5</sup> looks at the roots of rationality and concludes that emotions are what drives our decision-making process. It is important to note that the emotions discussed in neuronopolitics are primal feelings, such as fear, anxiety, trust, and happiness. While this can be compared to our earlier chapter on Freud, McDermott's theory is groundbreaking, because she was one of the first to apply hard neuroscience to political science.

American philosopher John Searle has asks us to consider free will. In his 2006 book *Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power*, Searle says that the world is nothing more than particles reacting or not reacting with one another, yet human consciousness is a subjective, individual experience. The book gives us two options when it comes to free will: either it exists or it does not. Dutch primatologist Frans de Waal takes us back to the realm of sociobiology, and argues that the traits of our human consciousnesses (fairness, reciprocity, and altruism) developed as a result of evolution.<sup>6</sup> He looks at the behaviors and brains of our closest relatives, chimpanzees, and discusses the evolution of human morality.

American behavioral biologist Lee Dugatkin discusses the history of the search for altruism.<sup>7</sup> Anne and Paul Ehrlich argue that the brain is just a conduit for human culture, and it is that culture that has made us the dominant animal on the planet. British psychologist Susan Blackmore asks twenty of the world's leading neurologists, psychologists, and biologists about what consciousness really is.<sup>8</sup> Neurologist Richard Restack looks to the present and the future, and argues how neuroscience will affect us in the future.<sup>9</sup> Ronald Green looks to the kind of ethical challenges we will face in our future, our brave new world where genetic modification of humans is the norm.<sup>10</sup>

What we learn from the literature is that, until it ends in death—though perhaps it does not, according to philosopher of the mind Stuart Hameroff—human life is a continual progression forward through time on a path of decisions. A decision can be anything from the subconscious movement of a finger to the conscious going for

a walk, and from voting in an election to going to war with a country. Not only is each decision caused by and influenced by the succession of each decision that followed it, but also each newly made decision affects the way each past decision is perceived. The question we are concerned with as political scientists is how those decisions (instances of free will) are made, what affects the process, and, if at all there is a way to alter or direct those decisions. If the latter is possible, then perhaps again, free will is just in the eye of the beheld.

## MAIN SPOKESMEN AND IDEAS AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

As mentioned above, the field of neuroscientific political science is so new that it does not have a name—only entitled here as neuronopolitics for lack of a better word. Because the field is in its infancy, what it constitutes, what is part of the field, and what is not is at best erratic. As with any theory, there are some issues that have to be dealt with. However, the two major issues the neuronopolitics field faces is its areas of operation and its acceptance within the broader realm of political science.

Searle says that we live in two worlds, one is made up of “mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles,” and the other is made up of us, “mindful, meaning-creating, free, rational” creatures. That is, there is the all-encompassing universe, and there is human society. Naturally, we are part of the universe, but with our brains, we have created relationships and societies. It would seem then that everything that originated from our brains is part of our brain chemistry and part of our biology.

If that is the case, then everything studied about human behavior would be contained in the field of neuronoscience; and to explain decision-making, it would be prudent to take any known information by using neuroscience. One could make the argument that sociobiology and psychology are both part of the field then. However, to apply aspects from those fields, the data used has to be seen specifically in a neurobiological manner. Neurobiology thus has the potential to be *the* core approach in the social sciences.

The second issue is the acceptance the political science community has shown for neuronopolitics. Actors in the field use scientific tests like functional magnetic resonance images (MRIs) to test their models. Some researchers use biology, chemistry, and physics to explain their theories. Is neuronopolitics political science? I will look at this question more thoroughly in the conclusion of this chapter.

## FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE BEYOND: A LOOK AT THE MAIN CONTRIBUTORS TO THE FIELD

Are we just electrified flesh or are we sentient beings? Are we, as King Lear put it, “no more [than] a poor bare, forked animal”?<sup>11</sup> Can we make decisions freely or are all our actions taken by our brains and our bodies determined purely by physical causality? What these questions are really asking is whether or not humans have free will.

People have been searching for the answer for centuries. Western philosophy gives us many perspectives on free will. The compatibilists are a group of philosophers who believe that both free will and determinism (the lack of free will) can exist in the same system. Thomas Hobbes tells us that people act freely only when they wish to, and there is an option to do otherwise.<sup>12</sup> Another group is that of the incompatibilists, a group that says that either free will exists or it does not. If free will does not exist, then everything is determined. In this case, everything we base our societies on falls apart. There is no right; there is no wrong.

Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher in the 1800s, wrote about the idea of responsibility. He said that we all think we are free, but also that we are affected by our experiences.<sup>13</sup> David Chalmers, a professor of consciousness studies, says that people think they have free will because, like Hobbes said, they can choose how to act in any given situation to get what they want. However, people do not have the ability to choose what they want.

While it is true that the world will go on whether or not we know we have free will, knowing gives us the ability to create models and perform experiments. Through recent scientific developments, quantum physicists and neuroscientists are getting closer to the answer. As it currently stands, the outlook for humankind’s idea that it is completely free is not good. Though disheartening, the lack of free will may be great news for political science, as it would mean that some form of rationality rules the system.

In neuronopolitics, there seem to be three general perspectives one can take regarding the free will dilemma. The perspectives act as a background for arguments. In the first perspective, free will is a phenomenon applicable to humans only via a cosmic accident or divine intervention. In this frame, the perfect system for life and free will was created by a divine hand or the right particles being in the right place at the right time. This frame poses a problem for political science. If only people are free, then it is very difficult, if not impossible, to develop models that can accurately predict how people and countries will act over vast periods of time.

In the second perspective, free will is nonexistent. It is merely an illusion. This frame is perfect for political science because it would mean that one could hypothetically predict the future (if the appropriate information was available) and explain the past through a model. In this frame, we have determinism. That is, from the creation of the universe, every action has been determined by the action that directly preceded it, as well as all the actions that came before it. By finding an equation that works backward to predict passed actions and therefore future actions in a system, we might be able to model a system that works for both today and the future.

The third perspective is something of a hybrid of the first two. In this perspective, for the property of free will to exist, it cannot be held by just people. Princeton mathematicians John Conway and Simon Krochen's free will theorem states that for people to have free will, elementary particles have to have free will as well.<sup>14</sup> Their research has shown that particles choose their spin when studied.

The problem here is constraint. As matter gets infinitely small, particle after particle disappears, and we are left purely with waves and relationships. In the universe, even though the particles themselves may be free, they interact with other free particles and begin to constrain each other to build new objects. To illustrate this idea, pretend I have an empty glass on my desk. The glass is made up of an inordinate amount of particles that are free; however, they are all constrained by one another. Though we cannot predict the movement and behavior of each particle, we can predict the behavior and movement of the constrained object (the glass).

The probability that we are free, considering the fact that all the particles in our brains constrain one another, is extremely low. Still, it is possible. Like particles and objects, we can apply this same line of thinking to people and countries. The third perspective shows us that it is possible that individuals are free. However, they become less free the more they encounter other free individuals. Take the United States, for example. While we cannot predict what people will do because they have free will, we can predict a country's behavior on the basis of its construction and constraints. One could make the argument that President George W. Bush attempted to use his free will to shift the United States into a fundamentalist belief system, where his administration's definition of moral authority and values was more important than personal rights. From the third perspective, one could predict that the attempt was doomed to failure because the shift was too radical. It may have worked for a while, but that was only because of the policy of fear. To illustrate this idea, the first slave landed in

Virginia in 1607, and it took almost 260 years to abolish the slave trade.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, it took another 150 years after that to elect an African American president. From these two events, the third perspective holds that individuals cannot alter the state in short periods of time; change has to occur over long periods of time.

While the first and third perspectives are the most appealing, the reality is that the second is probably true. Take the example above, if we have free will, and someone tries to take it away, and we fight to keep it, is that an exhibition of free will or further proof that it does not exist?

How else are we free? How about religion? How about politics? Some people align more with conservative or liberal politics in the United States, but do they really have a choice?

Recent research has shown that the degree to which people are religious is genetically linked. Furthermore, with electrodes, a functional MRI device, a television screen, and some computers, Dr. John Hibbing at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, can tell whether someone is a liberal or a conservative, simply by having the test subject look at scary images.<sup>16</sup> Hibbing's research shows that conservatives tend to have a more negative reaction to scary images than liberals. Through his experiments, he is also able to tell the degree of political fervor the subject has.

This might be hard to take in, considering the traditional idea is that our upbringing (nurture) determines our political and religious ideology, not our genes (nature). Yet, Hibbing's experiments show that social conservatives sweat and blink more when they see shocking images and hear sudden noises than social liberals do. People who take the test and sweat a lot and blink firmly unknowingly show the researchers that they support the defense budget and torture.

If conservatives are predisposed by nature to be more affected by threats than liberals, it would make sense that the Republican Party is known as the party of national security. The further implication though is that elected officials who are conservative may overreact to the threat of violence. Likewise, a liberal may not react enough. Either way, Hibbing's research can finally show us why it is so hard to get liberals and conservatives to agree with one another on the issues.

It is interesting that Hibbing chose fear in his research. Rose McDermott, a political scientist at Brown, applies neuroscience to political science. Our basic survival system, she says, is the limbic system in our brains. The limbic system is composed of the sensory organs, the hippocampus (for long-term memories), the hypothalamus (to regulate blood, heart rate, sexual arousal, hunger, and thirst), and the amygdala (the reward and fear center of the brain).

McDermott believes that judgment and decision-making are affected by emotions, specifically by the emotions controlled by the amygdala. McDermott's research shows that when leaders are anxious, they tend to be more sensitive to their enemy's war rhetoric. As a result, they might start building up their own army, preparing for war. On the other hand, leaders who tend to be more optimistic will come up with creative strategies that satisfy many people when they make decisions.

Because the limbic system is about survival, the feelings of fear that people have as a result of negative experiences take precedence over other feelings. However, the desires leaders have when going into situations affects the reactions those leaders have. For example, if leaders see something as beneficial to their country, and they decide they want it, they are more likely to consider the risks of attaining that goal as low.

However, fear does save lives. There are two pathways of fear in the brain. The first goes through the amygdala. When people hear loud bangs resembling gunshots, they duck and cover. The amygdala sends a quick message to the rest of the body, and the people fall to the ground. The second pathway is through the cerebral cortex, which handles reasoning. If our bodies wait for the cerebral cortex to respond, people could be shot.

The amygdala also handles facial recognition, with regard to safety. When we see a happy face, our brain recognizes it as being safe. When it sees sad and wide-eyed looks, it considers these dangerous. Similarly, the amygdala lights up differently for different people. For example, a staunch social conservative who sees a picture of Obama might have a fear-activation response. Likewise, a liberal who sees a picture of Sarah Palin might display the same behavior. A functional MRI is a test that researchers do that shows which part of the brain is being used at any given time. Using one of these machines, researchers are able to perform tests to see how people react. The fear tests show that fear is very strong in everyone.

The implication that we get from combining McDermott's and Hibbing's research is that nature, genes, and the brain all play huge parts in our lives. If we disregard these issues, we are then hurting our chances of success in the future. One of the problems, though, with acknowledging that opinions, positions, and preferences in politics are neurologically predetermined is that politicians and leaders can be terribly wrong about the kinds of policies they have, yet always be confident that they are on the right path.

This can happen to large populations as well. The issue then becomes justification. Clearly, if people are genetically predisposed to



have a belief or believe something so fervently to the point that they lack the ability to change their minds, can we punish them for the pain and suffering that they cause? If we take the position that it is our biology that is making the decisions and carrying out our actions, that our brains are on autopilot and our consciousness is an illusion, why are we altruistic?

Traditionally, we are taught that we have to be good to others because it is the right thing to do, that societies cannot exist if people are not good to one another, and that being good in life is the way to a better afterlife. However, Frans de Waal, a primatologist at Emory, believes that humans are biologically good. He dismisses the Veneer Theory of Thomas Henry Huxley that states that humans are born selfish. The idea of the Veneer Theory is that morality is something humans cover themselves with—it attempts to disguise their true nature.

One of Darwin's hallmark claims was that the most beneficial traits that help an organism to survive will be passed on from one generation to another. Where does altruism and morality fit then? Evolution favors animals that assist each other. Through assistance, animals and species are able to survive longer. In a competition, there are always losers. By helping each other out, animals form a camaraderie.

At some point in time, this trait, the willingness to cooperate, was passed onto future generations. De Waal says that goodness is biologically inherited by humans, chimpanzees, and even nonprimates. However, this is not the question we need to ask. It does not really matter if animals are good to each other. What matters is their capacity for revenge, reciprocity, the settlement of disputes, empathy, sympathy, and the enforcement of societal rules. By looking at our nearest animal relatives, we are able to learn a lot about ourselves as a species.

De Waal says that with the ability to hold these traits comes emotion. He says that the purpose for emotions is to help people reason. If emotions do not take part in the decision-making process, people will never reach a decision. Regarding empathy, de Waal tells us that there are two mechanisms associated with it. The first is sympathy and the second personal distress. Sympathy, as we know, is a response of sorrow or concern for someone in distress or in need. This feeling of sympathy is altruistically motivated. Personal distress, however, is much different.

Personal distress occurs when an animal attempts to alleviate the distress of the other animal in a selfish attempt to get rid of its own distress. For example, young children respond when their parents are sad

and sobbing, in pain and crying, and in distress and choking. Other animals exhibit the same properties. A 1959 experiment showed that rats, which have 85 percent human DNA, could be taught that they could push a lever to get food. However, the result of the lever being pushed was an electric shock to a neighboring rat. A similar study was done with rhesus monkeys in 1959. In both experiments, the animals avoided touching the lever to avoid causing pain to others.

While one might look at these experiments and say that the animals portray uniquely human traits, can the same be said for humans? Though psychological in nature and not really associated with neuronopolitics, the Milgram experiments in the 1960s and 1970s showed that people, unlike animals, were willing to inflict inordinate amounts of pain on each other if they were told that it was okay by a researcher.

One way we can explain the differences between the Milgram experiments and the rat tests is by kin loyalty. The monkeys and rats in the altruism experiments “knew” each other, whereas the people in the Milgram experiments did not know each other. If morality and altruism are passed from one generation to the next genetically, then perhaps xenophobia and kin protection are as well. De Waal shows that like other animals humans treat outsiders way worse than they do members of their own communities. Also, like animals, humans are loyal to their families first.

When it comes to altruism and morality though, what separates us from the other animals is the move from interpersonal relationships to protection and concern for the greater good. This can be best seen in Hamilton’s Model, which says that blood relatives have very similar genes, and by aiding kin, people are helping themselves, even if they do not know it. While Hamilton’s model says that humans are basically selfish because they are trying to protect their genes by helping their families, he also says that the family unit is the cornerstone of goodness.

What we have so far is that humans are altruistic, yet brutal, semi-hairless, big-brained animals that are 85 percent rat and 98 percent chimpanzee. Paul Ehrlich, a renowned entomologist at Stanford, believes that what makes humans the dominant animal on earth is culture. He says that to have the kinds of culture we have, we need big, complex brains. These brains allow us to comprehend and understand the thoughts of others, as well as to communicate in such a way that others understand us.

How does this happen? Mirror neurons hold the key. Mirror neurons help us read other people’s expressions and help us predict what

we think they will do, based on those expressions. For example, if a group of people were eating together, and one person reached for food, the mirror neurons in everyone else would get activated, and on a minuscule level, their muscles would as well. Interestingly enough, the mirror neurons and muscles activate and process information before the people actually think about it.

The physiologist Benjamin Libet tested prebrain decisions in his research. Subjects were hooked up to electroencephalography (EEG) machines, which measured the responses of their motor cortex, while their wrists were hooked up to an electromyograph (EMG), which measured movement. Using a clock hand on a screen, the subjects had to flick their wrists when the spot hit a certain target. When they completed the action, they had to tell the researcher where the spot was on the screen. Libet found that brain activity started half a second before the will to move occurred. Libet did his research in the 1970s. A recent paper<sup>17</sup> reports that scientists have determined that some answers to decisions were found in the parietal cortex ten seconds before the subject “made” the decision.

Our brains consist of just 2 percent of our total body weight, but they use 20 percent of our body energy. They also have the ability to compensate for partial damage. The frontal cortex regulates behavior. Ehrlich notes that bad behavior is actually dominant, but it is the frontal cortex that has the ability to override it. The brain regulates hormones, and in turn, hormones regulate the brain. As we can see, the brain has built many protections for itself in case of system damage.

Thanks to natural selection, our brains rely on military strategy as well as myth creation to survive. Even when given sufficient reason for disbelief, the brain still tends to believe what it wants. Ehrlich is of the belief that we do have free will, to an extent. He says that our brains provide us with the ability to possess and transmit traditions and ideas. We become who we are in our postnatal months as a baby, adjusting to our surroundings and learning. In a way, our brains are blank slates, acclimating to the environment.

When it comes to language and memories, the brain tends to fill in details, even though it does not remember exactly all that happened. Going back to the limbic system for a moment, the brain tends to succumb to suggestibility very easily for survival purposes. Take, for example, apple seeds. They contain amygdalin, a chemical compound made of sugar and cyanide. When digested, the compound breaks down and becomes hydrogen cyanide, more commonly known as Zyklon B, which the Nazis used in the gas chambers during the

Holocaust. Chances are that after reading this, one would not eat apple seeds, even though the amount of cyanide one consumes in an apple is negligible.<sup>18</sup>

Politicians often use suggestibility to sway public opinion. For example, during the 2008 election, commercials from the right used key words to strike fear, using their amygdalas against them: Obama, Osama, terrorist, Ayers, and Hussein. Likewise, the Left used similar key words to sway public opinion as well: McCain, cancer, seventy-two, old, and temper.

Whether or not these tactics affected the election can be debated. What is interesting about suggestibility tactics is that they fly in the face of how decision-making is perceived to be carried out. Normally, we think of decision-making as occurring in four steps: perception, gathering of options, calculation of the options, and following through with the decision. The third step is usually hailed as the most important. However, with suggestibility and cultural differences in mind, perhaps the most important step is the first, perception. Surely, there were some people who voted against Barack Obama and others who voted against John McCain purely because of the negative suggestions from parties about the opposite candidate. Perception affects what kinds of options we gather, and, thus, the kinds of calculations that we make and the actions we take.

As we have seen up to this point, neuronopolitics is much more a hard science than is political science. One might think that we should dismiss the field and not waste our time. However, there will come a time when neuronopolitics is deployed in our lives. One day, our science and technology will be good enough for us to manipulate our own DNA. Medical advances will allow us to create the “perfect” human being.

Ronald Green, an ethicist at Dartmouth, predicts that in the not too distant future, women will take their daughters to the egg bank when they are nine to have their eggs extracted for their adulthood. In this new world, possibly similar to that of *Gattaca*, intercourse will be for pleasure only, and children will be perfected in laboratories.

The science is getting closer everyday. Joe Tsien created smart mice at Princeton.<sup>19</sup> He treated them for memory disorders and gave them super intelligence. For the mice, the drawback to intelligence was an increased sensitivity to pain. If it is possible in mice, and we are 85 percent mouse, then perhaps it is possible to make humans smarter with the tweak of a gene here and a tweak of a gene there.

For many people, genetic manipulation is a horrifying idea. However, it does offer amazing possibilities. To illustrate, one of

the most horrible diseases a child can get is called X-SCID. The disease is a genetic disorder that basically renders the immune system useless. The most famous person with the disease was David Vetter, commonly known as the “bubble boy.” A study in France took ten children with the disease and created a disabled virus with normal DNA. The virus was used to infect patient cells that were missing the required protein. One child died, and nine got better. Two years later, two of the cured children developed leukemia. Green says that the experiment was a success. Though he admits that leukemia is a terrible result of the gene therapy, the chances of survival with leukemia are much higher than with X-SCID.

The Bush administration fought against gene therapy and modification because it worried that the science could lead to indefinitely prolonged life (somewhere down the line) that would ultimately halt the progress of the United States. It also predicted that people would stop having families and postpone marriage until they could no longer have children. Finally, it believed that programs such as Social Security and public health care would be abused and eventually fall apart.

These are legitimate concerns, as we do not know what the future holds. Unfortunately, we cannot stop the future from coming. The technologies *are* going to advance. If the United States does not have the science to manipulate DNA, another country will. We can only imagine what kind of research will be done by countries where morals and ethics are off the table and money and power are on the table.

What we fear the most can best be summed up by Friedrich Nietzsche, “And whoever wants to be a creator in good and evil, must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the greatest goodness: but this is—being creative.”<sup>20</sup> Perhaps we see images of H. G. Wells’s *Time Machine*, with the great divide between the Eloi and the Morlocks.

Green points out that we might see the rise of a “Genobility,” the genetically modified new nobility. Bred with superior intelligence and manner, the unenhanced would capitulate to them, because they would have the brains to lead the country to a better place. Eventually the unenhanced will become enraged and revolt. Perhaps a new leader would rise, an unenhanced person who promises that life will go back to normal, back to a time where people are birthed naturally and genetic modifications are not performed. Francis Fukuyama has similar fears. He worries that we will change human psychology by creating genetic elites. Will humans enslave each other? Fukuyama thinks so. He believes that we will create some people with saddles and the others with “boots and spurs.”

While it is true that genetic modification will have the ability to create monsters, it can also enhance our humanity. It seems as though we could engineer people to practice diplomacy, rather than war. What if we engineered people to be more altruistic? It also seems that one of the problems we still face today is that we are too animallike.

With that, however, comes great responsibility. What is scary about genetic modification is not who we create, but rather what we deny. Everyone has a general idea about what is the perfect human being. By creating people who we *perceive* as being perfect, we indirectly decide who is not. Public opinion, regardless of whether or not it is right, will decide who is legitimate and who is not. For example, through genetic manipulation it would be possible to remove perceived “unwanted” traits such as shortness of height, the capacity for being overweight, homosexuality, etc.

One of the biggest struggles America has faced throughout its history has been bigotry. As children are created in laboratories, and once the unwanted traits start to disappear, other countries that look up to Americans as being the guiding light may start to do it as well. Furthermore, once we have the ability to make these “perfect” people, and some parents decide that they want naturally born children, it would seem that they would be looked down upon. As in the film *Gattaca*, non-laboratory-modified people may find themselves working at very low paying jobs because they have not been engineered to last. It would make sense that companies and governments would not want to give the good jobs to people who are genetically inferior in everything from intelligence to health.

If there is a perception that a technology exists that could provide enormous benefits to humankind, yet cause destruction in the wrong hands, it is not logical that the technology could be held back forever. Going back to gene therapy for a moment, the Bush administration fought against it because of perceptions that it did not work. Two children, who would have died as a result of one disease, developed leukemia as a result of genetic miscoding. The administration also feared that the technology would lead to a society of people who refused to die and refused to progress. The big question is who has the right to decide. Obviously, in the grand scheme of things, the individual does. It might take some time, but ultimately, the technology will be available.

While some may say that genetic alterations like the ones discussed in this paper are hundreds of years away, we do practice genetic alteration today—only, we do so without thinking about it. For example, people in the United States today decide who they want

to marry. However, back in the old days, in the days of betrothals, those choices were not available. Today, people tend to marry people similar to them: similar in intelligence, character, health, attractiveness, and stature.

In more specific and technical terms, targeted genetic manipulation—on the larger scale—does exist today. Tay-Sachs Disease is a fatal, genetic, neurological condition that kills children around the age of five. The disease stops the body's production of hexosaminidase A, an enzyme that breaks down fatty compounds. As a result, fat builds up in the brain and nerve cells, prohibiting normal function. Over a period of a few years, the body loses its motor functions, blindness occurs, and then paralysis, and eventually death occurs. To pass Tay-Sachs to a child, both parents have to be carriers. If this occurs, there is a 25 percent chance that the child will get the disease. Thanks to modern genetic screening, parents can get tested before they get married. If both parents are carriers, during pregnancy, a sample of the placenta can be taken to determine if the child has the disease.

For the people who ascribe to the idea that genetic manipulation is unnatural, it would be interesting to test whether they believe that Tay-Sachs testing is unnatural as well. Certainly, they would not. It is interesting to note that there is a name for the science of purposely improving genetics or rather the “self-direction of human evolution”:<sup>21</sup> eugenics.

While Hitler used eugenics in attempts to create his perfect race, it should be noted that there were eugenics laws long before World War II in the United States. In 1896, Connecticut enacted a law prohibiting people with epilepsy from getting married. Sterilization was required for patients in mental hospitals in the early 1900s. Furthermore, eugenics laws in the United States continued until 1967 with the *Loving v. Virginia* verdict, which overturned the antimiscegenation laws (prohibition of interracial marriage).

## PRESENT AND FUTURE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THEORY AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

John Mearsheimer went out on a limb and attempted to predict the future in his 1990 paper “Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War.” Few political scientists are so bold. It is probably safer to make predictions for the future, using the theory of neuronopolitics because it is largely based on the hard sciences, as opposed to social scientific theory. Neuronopolitics has a lot to offer the political science realm, but perhaps only as a tool—at least for now. In this

section, I will discuss some of the contributions already made and where it seems the field is going.

As we have seen, the field has already produced a form of the thought test via the Hibbing's political-identification test through fear. Richard Restak, a neurologist at George Washington University Medical Center, Washington, DC, says that these tests will continue, and soon other tests will be able to reveal to researchers their subjects' thoughts and proclivities through a simple head scan. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 prohibits employers (save for government intelligence agencies) from making their potential employees take lie detector tests before they get hired. However, there may soon be a brain scan imaging test that employers may be able to use to determine if their top choices are acceptable.

Free will or not, the brain is electricity and spongy flesh. As neuroscientists learn more about the brain, they will learn more about what makes it work. Oxytocin is the hormone most associated with trust. Recent tests in Zürich found that when a crowd of people were dosed with the chemical via a spray, they were much more likely to trust the researchers. If there was a trust elixir, anyone who held it could have ultimate power.

We have discussed the manipulation of genes and DNA at birth and the possibilities of genetic therapy during life, but in the future, we may use DNA testing as a measure of precrime prevention. Science has already shown that there are about five genes that together are associated with aggressive behavior.<sup>22</sup> One would think that the removal of these genes from an embryo's DNA would remove the aggressiveness. However, genetic prediction is not exact. One can use a Punnet Square to predict the possibilities of progeny traits, but a lot of the outcome is up to chance. There is a good possibility that DNA testing will become more exact before the science needed to manipulate genes, as in *Brave New World*, comes about. Before we decide to cast off all aggressive behavior, it is important to note that aggressiveness in genetics can lead to either criminal behavior or socially active behavior. Thus, it is possible that a renowned humanitarian and a criminal on death row may have the same genetic sequence for aggressiveness.

Genetic modification can and will be used in military situations. Most people see countries creating huge armies of cloned soldiers to dominate the world. Once we understand what each gene in the human genome does and know where the evolutionary traits that we developed over time are, we should be able to alter human DNA at will (perhaps through the same virus technology seen in X-SCID patients or something we have not yet thought of). Why spend time,



energy, and money on cloning people when, in a few days or weeks, we could effectively turn off the will of an entire army to fight?

Neuronopolitics is paradoxical in that given the technology needed to compute models for predicting human behavior, it would ultimately be *the* grand theory for political science. However, it would only work if one state had it. If two states or more states were to have it, the model would be useless in using it against one another and would always produce a stalemate.

These are only a few of the possibilities. In the future, we can expect life to be very different. We can expect that if the United States does not employ these techniques and dabble in the more powerful *1984*-type fields, then someone else will.

### BIASES, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSESSMENT

As noted in the introduction, neuronopolitics is still in its infancy. However, the advances we have made in technology over the last twenty years have brought many of the ideas expressed here into the realm of plausibility. It is important that we take the burgeoning field seriously, even if it is just to thwart the possible future dangers. Just because the science is too expensive, and simply not yet in existence, does not mean that one day televisions will not have ears. As the results of the Patriot Act have shown us, Big Brother is all around.

In the meantime, we should look at neuronopolitics as a tool, rather than as a theory. We should use it to enhance our current theories. As seen in *The Dominant Animal*, culture is what propels us forward. Perhaps countries should take people's culture and their neural attachment to it into consideration before they go to war. One of the biggest criticisms of the Bush administration's handling of the war in Iraq is that Middle Eastern politics is unlike anything we have ever come in contact with. Had we taken culture into consideration before the war and had a plan for dealing with it during and after, the region might be less of a mess than it currently is.

The most useful and dangerous applications I see for the field are in Green's book. We can say that we will not genetically modify people, but I think we eventually will. When the technology becomes safe and available, we will first use it for curing diseases. Perhaps we will create an HIV/AIDS vaccine through gene therapy. We will slowly move to more dramatic gene manipulation. Green says the first to opt for experimentation will be athletes. Then, everyone will do it. The explanation will be that we want to be competitive. I think there will be an element of fear involved as well. Instead of that fear preventing

us from using the enhancements, it will propel us to them, so that we can have a genetic edge over others. Maybe genetic manipulation is the next logical step in our evolution.

Perhaps our new evolution will be a good thing. Not only would we be able to create people who are intelligent, but perhaps we could create people who are more apt to follow diplomacy and work together instead of fighting wars to accomplish goals. Imagine a human society that is purely human with no trace of chimpanzee or gorilla culture.

### A PESSIMISTIC, BUT REALISTIC LOOK TO THE FUTURE

Alasdair Roberts has suggested that neoliberal philosophy and the gradual distrust in the central government of the United States since the 1980s has led political leaders to ensuring the status quo and not demanding much from the American people.<sup>23</sup> He says that while many will claim that the legislation enacted as a result of the September 11 attacks that grossly infringed on our civil liberties was perpetrated by a group of individuals who had been secretly plotting it for years, much of the fault lies with the American people themselves for accepting it. Americans would rather be left alone, go shopping, or travel, as opposed to making sacrifices for their country. Maybe Roberts is partially right, but what he omits is the great deal of fear Americans have in these post-9/11 times.

Perhaps the one thing neuronopolitics can do for us now is to help us understand fear. Fear is a natural feeling. As we have learned, when we experience something terrible or are scared, our amygdalas go into overdrive. Survival is most important at that point. If, as Hibbing's research shows, some people are more fearful by nature than others; perhaps it makes sense that they would give up liberty for safety.

However, as people become more afraid, new leaders seeking extraordinary power, step up. As long as the amygdalas are in overdrive, the leaders can stay in power. With the kinds of technological advances being made everyday in the field of neuroscience, with the idea that free will does not exist and that that what happens is just the natural progression of life, and in a perpetual state of fear, we can become enslaved. The irony, of course, is that in this very possible situation, the slave master is not the leader, nor is he the proverbial Big Brother. If we want a picture of the person wearing that Orwellian boot and forever stamping on the face of humanity, we need only to look in the mirror.

Language truly is an extension of human biology and of human will. With language, we have the ability to influence people. With language, we have the ability to terrify people. With language—something that is no more than a series of short and long tones and pauses—we can reach into other people's heads and cause a wave of chemicals to rush out of their brains and saturate their bodies. If language has this much power, imagine what a chemical synthesized in a laboratory could do. Ultimately, if consciousness is just an illusion, there really is nothing we can do to stop any of this from occurring, as this is just our natural evolution. However, we have to assume that consciousness is not an illusion. We have to start giving credence to a future that is and will be, for a very long time, science fiction.

## CHAPTER 11



# TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: GRAND THEORY OR GRAND IDEA?

*Matt Clary*

### INTRODUCTION

The Transitions to Democracy approach has been around since the 1970s when the world saw a large number of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America give way to various transitions to democracies. Out of these seemingly successful transitions, optimism flowed freely among many scholars and decision-makers alike that democracy could be spread to any soil, including to areas that had no previous experience with it. Along similar lines, the success of so many democratic transitions in replacing primarily socialist and Marxist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe suggested that democracy had begun to win the ideological battle between the various regime-types. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the promotion of democracy to all corners of the world has become the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy—from U.S. involvement in Bosnia and Haiti to the most recent action in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fundamental idea is that communism and authoritarianism had lost out due to the collapse of their greatest proponent (the Soviet Union) and that democracy is now the “only game in town” that matters. Along these lines, a new body of literature has developed that has sought to analyze how best to help developing nations transition to democracy.

The development of this new literature in response to the growing number of transitioning democracies caused quite a number of

scholars to argue that such an overwhelming shift in the direction of democratization could be considered a deathblow (the “end of history”) to alternative development approaches such as Marxist-dependency theory, corporatism, and most assuredly, authoritarianism.<sup>1</sup> In 1992, Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed that the end of the Cold War was a victory for democracy as much as it was for the United States—thus declaring that we have reached the “end of history.” Obviously, this proclamation evoked a great deal of controversy because it suggested that democratization is the only approach to development that matters and that we as scholars could determine how and why democratic transitions succeed and/or fail.

The dilemma that this proclamation raises is that it is perhaps a little too early to declare an “end to history,” as cases such as China continue to confound the popular notion that democratization is the best means of helping developing nations to develop. China’s economic success under an authoritarian regime begs the question: is there an alternative model of development to democratization that better guides state development than corporatism, dependency theory, or organic statism? It seems quite obvious that the promotion of authoritarianism will not become a mainstream policy initiative, but the question remains as to whether or not there is another path (perhaps a true “third way”) to development out there that may fit some nations better than democratization can. While it may well indeed be the case that democratization will eventually spread to China, the simple fact remains that China remains in the grip of an authoritarian, Marxist-Leninist regime. As China continues to succeed economically and as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to maintain its unchallenged control over the government at the same time, these types of questions will continue to arise.

With questions such as these spiraling around the Transitions to Democracy approach, it seems logical to raise the question as to whether or not it can be considered a Grand Theory or rather a synthesis of borrowed ideas from other Grand Theories. Thus the debate that we are concerned with in this chapter is whether or not the Transitions to Democracy approach can stand alone and provide an explanation of social change and political development that “gives coherence, methodology, and an approach to the social sciences”—or, in other words, is the Transitions to Democracy approach a Grand Theory or a grand idea? Is this approach simply developmentalism redux (i.e., a new wine in an old bottle), or does it add something new to our knowledge about comparative politics and the world?

## DEVELOPMENT OF KEY CONCEPTS

The two fundamental concepts that have been developed within the Transitions to Democracy approach were developed to help answer the following questions: (1) What exactly constitutes a democracy? and (2) What exactly constitutes a transition to a democracy? The first question, what constitutes a democracy? is both an interesting and a necessary one to understand what exactly one should look for in a democracy. Are there necessary conditions for a democracy to exist or to develop? If so, what are they? Are there common characteristics that we should expect to observe in every democracy? Again, if so, what are they? The second question, what constitutes a *transition* to a democracy stems from the first question in that it requires us to be able to understand what a democracy is and to be able to call it such if we were to observe it. Along these lines, we must understand where democracies come from (i.e., what types of regimes or systems do they possess prior to their transition?) and what types of things cause a transition to occur. The following section sets out to explain how these questions have been answered by scholars in the field as well as the debates that have arisen as a result of these answers.

### Defining Democracy

The first step toward analyzing a theory of democratization is the definition of what exactly constitutes a democracy. Some scholars in the field such as Samuel Huntington<sup>2</sup> suggest that free and fair elections are a sufficient defining characteristic of democracy. This contention originates from Robert Dahl's two-dimensional definition of democracy that contends that competitive elections and certain basic freedoms are the core requirements of every democracy.<sup>3</sup> The importance of the addition of certain basic freedoms, such as (1) the freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) the right of political leaders to compete for support, and (6) alternative sources of information, is that it implies that competitive elections should be free and fair. In this sense, a democracy can be observed by allowing competitive elections as well as the freedoms mentioned above that allow for the free and fair participation of all citizens in elections.

While this definition is clear and helps to differentiate a democracy from a nondemocracy, it is insufficient as it allows for nations that are probably not truly democratic to be considered democracies.

For example, nations such as Russia and Venezuela would be considered democracies today because their leaders were elected through arguably free and fair elections. However, what these leaders do once they are in office also has a direct bearing on whether or not that nation would be considered a democracy. In these types of cases, leaders overstep delegated powers guaranteed to them by their nation's constitution by usurping power from other domestic institutions—such as legislatures or a free and fair media—that are intended to provide legitimacy to elections within that nation. At best, nations in which such leaders are in power can be considered limited democracies because they violate key democratic requirements such as the separation of powers and checks and balances that raise questions of legitimacy for future elections. Along these lines, free and fair elections are a necessary condition for every democracy, but are not the only characteristics that we expect to be present in any democracy.

These other conditions we would expect to see in any democracy include:<sup>4</sup> (1) a strong and independent parliament, (2) a strong and independent court system, (3) strong political parties, (4) strong interest groups able to get their viewpoints across, (5) strong grassroots participation in government, and perhaps most importantly (and invoking the most controversy), (6) a democratic political culture or what people often call a “civic culture” that consists of things such as (a) tolerance and respect for different points of view, (b) free speech, (c) most citizens' acceptance of the authority of the state, and (d) the willingness of citizens to participate in government (i.e., assume their civic duties). While we would expect a completely consolidated democracy to meet each of these criteria, there are various levels of democratization that meet various parts of these necessary conditions. Nations that satisfy only some of these criteria may be considered partial democracies, incomplete democracies, unconsolidated democracies, or democracies-in-the-making. Defining democracy can be an extremely difficult venture as what one may consider a democracy, another may not—or, a condition that one person considers necessary for a democracy may not be considered necessary by another. Also, even if various scholars can agree upon a reasonable definition of democracy, the realistic application of such a definition can vary greatly from nation to nation.<sup>5</sup>

### **Defining Democratic Transitions**

The second step in analyzing a theory of democratic transitions is to define what exactly constitutes a democratic transition so that one can better determine when a transition is successful and when it is not.

Enrique Baloyra defines the process of democratic transition as:

(1) a process of political change (2) initiated by the deterioration of an authoritarian regime (3) involving intense political conflict (4) among actors competing (5) to implement policies grounded on different, even mutually exclusive, conceptions of the government, the regime, and the state; (6) this conflict is resolved by the breakdown of that regime leading to (7) the installation of a government committed to the inauguration of a democratic regime and/or (8) the installation of a popularly elected government committed to the inauguration of a democratic regime.<sup>6</sup>

Within this framework, Baloyra specifies that a democratic transition is a process that sees a nation transition from a deteriorating incumbent regime to a new, more democratic government. It is important to note, however, that once a nation starts this process of transitioning to democracy, there is always the potential for a reverse, unless democracy is consolidated after the inauguration of a new regime. Otherwise, democracy may not gain enough of a stable footing to prevent calls for a return to authoritarianism if economic and social successes begin to fail.

In those cases where states fail to consolidate democracy, the possibility of a complete or at least partial return to authoritarianism is always a possibility. In this regard, no discussion of democratic transitions would be complete without some analysis of the role that illiberal or incomplete democracies play in democratic transitions. Fareed Zakaria suggests that more than half of the world's democracies today are what he terms "illiberal democracies."<sup>7</sup> Zakaria defines an illiberal democracy as a political system that has begun the process of democratization and held "free and fair" elections, but in which the elected regime ignores the constitutional limits on its power, deprives citizens of basic rights and freedoms, and violates what Zakaria calls constitutional liberalism, which is a combination of (1) the rule of law, (2) the separation of powers, (3) checks and balances, and (4) the protection of an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion from state, church, and society.

Zakaria suggests that the government must be willing to accept basic limits on its powers based on laws present in the Constitution. This leaves open the possibility that elected leaders will use democracy as a legal excuse to centralize power (which may be closer to authoritarianism than to liberal democracy). The trick for the successful consolidation of democracy is the establishment of democracy (i.e., free and fair elections) *as well as* constitutional liberalism. It is important to note that constitutional liberalism may lead to democracy,



but democracy rarely brings constitutional liberalism. The goal, according to Zakaria, should not be to push democratization; rather, it should be to consolidate democracy where it is growing and to push the gradual development of constitutional liberalism elsewhere.

### Samuel Huntington and the Third Wave

The most influential study within the Transitions to Democracy literature is Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, in which he theorizes that democratic transitions occur in "waves," where several nations democratize at or near the same time in response to particular influences.<sup>8</sup> A wave of democratization is based on the notion that there have been specific periods of time when an overwhelming number of nations transitioned from nondemocratic to democratic regimes (or in the opposite direction, which is called a reverse wave). These "transitions" usually result in the liberalization of domestic institutions and culture, but end short of the complete consolidation of democracy in the nations affected. Huntington posits that there have been three waves in the modern world, with the first two waves followed by a "reverse" wave in which some of the transitioning nations returned to their previous nondemocratic forms. Table 11.1 shows changes in the ratio of democratic to nondemocratic states from 1922 to 1990 that Huntington uses to show potential trends in democratization and to confirm the existence of "waves" and "reverse waves" over the last hundred years.

With the numbers presented in Table 11.1,<sup>9</sup> it seems likely that there must be some explanation for why the ratio of democratic to nondemocratic states as well as the percentage of democratic states has fluctuated so drastically since 1922. Huntington uses this historical analysis as well as specific cases of transitions to democracies to establish three distinct "waves of democratization" and two distinct "reverse waves," both of which are presented in Table 11.2.<sup>10</sup>

**Table 11.1** Democratization in the modern world

Year	Democratic States	Non-Democratic States	Total States	% Democratic of Total States
1922	29	35	64	45.3%
1942	12	49	61	19.7%
1962	36	75	111	32.4%
1973	30	92	122	24.6%
1990	59	71	130	45.4%

**Table 11.2** The waves of democratization

1st Wave:	1828–1926	<u>Nations:</u> Switzerland, France, Italy, the UK, Ireland
1st Reverse Wave:	1922–1942	<u>Nations:</u> Italy, Greece
2nd Wave:	1943–1962	<u>Nations:</u> West Germany, Italy, Japan
2nd Reverse Wave:	1958–1975	<u>Nations:</u> Taiwan, India, much of Latin America
3rd Wave:	1974–	<u>Nations:</u> Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Pakistan, Taiwan, Brazil, much of Eastern Europe

Out of these waves of democratization, it is the third wave that is of primary interest here because it has been the longest and most widespread of the waves. Along these lines, an interesting addition to Huntington's most recent "third" wave would be the potential for a third "reverse wave," which may have begun over the last several years and would include nations such as Russia and Venezuela, to mention a few—a list that is likely to grow in size as the effects of the current economic crisis continue to expand globally and affect the ability of nondemocratic regimes to meet the economic expectations of their citizenry.

Now that we know what "waves of democratization" are and the specific waves that have occurred over the past century, we can move on to the more significant question as to why such transitions to democracy and returns to authoritarianism have occurred, not to mention why they seem to occur in waves rather than as separate and mutually exclusive events. Huntington provides four potential explanations for "waves of democratization" that can explain the occurrence of a particular wave alone or in conjunction with one or more of the other explanations:<sup>11</sup>

- (1) *Single Cause:* All nations democratize in response to a single event. For example, the end of World War II spurred the occurrence of the second wave.
- (2) *Parallel Development:* All nations democratize more or less simultaneously because they reach a critical threshold at a similar time. For example, several nations achieving a particular level of per capita gross national product (GNP) that spurs economic and political development.
- (3) *Snowballing:* A particular cause of democratization in one nation leads to democratization in other nations via the transmission of the knowledge of significant political events, such as news coverage of political demonstrations or revolutions.

(4) *Prevailing Nostrum*: Different causes across nations create the necessity for national elites to respond using a similar method across the nations (due to the belief of the efficacy of that method), which leads to democratization for completely different reasons.

For example, the third wave can be explained by more than one of the explanations laid out above. First, a *single cause* for the third wave was the economic crisis of the 1970s (caused by the two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the decline of the prices of various raw materials). The crisis led to the decline of economic prosperity in these nations, which was blamed on the authoritarian leadership. Also, societies in these nations had developed from the rural, uneducated state that they once were in and had become more literate, more urban, and more politically aware, which led to the growth of a middle and entrepreneurial class that began to significantly challenge the rule of the authoritarian regimes. Secondly, *parallel development* helps to explain how dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regimes that came to power created popular discontent across the various nations that eventually led to the authoritarian regimes being overthrown and allowed for the possibility of democratic transitions.

Thirdly, *snowballing* helps to explain how knowledge of the successful revolutions in Portugal, Greece, and Spain spread to Latin America, which mobilized the newly established and expanded middle and entrepreneurial classes to oppose the military leadership and attempt to overthrow them. Finally, the prevailing nostrum helps to explain how the dominant pattern in most of these cases of democratic transition was not that the authoritarian leadership was to be “overthrown,” but rather that the military leadership had become disenchanting with governing (due to its lack of economic success and the growing hatred among the masses) and sort of faded out of the picture. Essentially, it was time for these authoritarian regimes to disappear and allow democracy to return as if it was always part of the greater plan.

In addition to his analysis of “waves of democratization,” Huntington provided a discussion of why some waves are followed by reverse waves (i.e., by returns to authoritarianism after a transition to democracy has already been attempted but has been ultimately unsuccessful at consolidation). During the 1970s, countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, the Philippines, much of Latin America, and much of the Middle East experienced a return to authoritarianism. In each of these nations, newly established “democratic” regimes were time after time supplanted by authoritarian regimes,

but why did this “reverse wave” seem to occur nearly simultaneously worldwide? First, Huntington suggests that democracy had failed to deliver what it promised—the delivery of key goods and services to the vast majority of the citizenry. Second, many of these nations experienced economic crises during the 1960s that gave rise to popular discontent. Third, the social mobilization that democratization provided gave rise to lower-middle-class challenges to elite-directed rule, who turned to the military establishment for protection.

According to Huntington, this analysis of “waves of democratization” and “reverse waves” shows five patterns of regime-change:<sup>12</sup>

- (1) Cyclical Pattern—alternation between democracy and authoritarian systems (i.e.—much of Latin America, Nigeria, Turkey).
- (2) Second-Try Pattern—transition to democracy, followed by a return to authoritarianism, followed by a second, more successful transition to democracy. (i.e.—Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, Venezuela, and Colombia).
- (3) Interrupted Democracy—transition to democracy, followed by a sustained period of stability (but no consolidation), which gives way to instability or polarization that leads to a return to authoritarianism—but due to the sustained period of limited democracy, the authoritarian leaders find it difficult to do away with democracy all together (i.e.—India, Philippines).
- (4) Direct Transition—Transition from a stable authoritarian regime to a stable democratic government, either through abrupt replacement or gradual evolution (i.e.—First-Wave nations)
- (5) Decolonization—democratic institutions spread by colonial powers to their respective colonies allow for a successful transition to democracy once the colony becomes independent (i.e.—India, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa).

## REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

### Southern Europe

Any discussion of democratic transitions in Southern Europe must surely begin with the transition from authoritarian regimes in Spain,

Portugal, and Greece during the mid-1970s.<sup>13</sup> In the cases of Spain and Portugal, the authoritarian regime in question existed in the form of long-standing dictatorships. Spain existed under the authoritarian rule of Francisco Franco (1939–1975) and Portugal under Antonio Salazar (1928–1968) and Marcello Caetano (1968–1974). These regimes ruled using the corporatist model, which uses well-established social and economic organizations, such as the Catholic Church or the military-industrial complex, to control the citizenry. Corporatism was popular with the citizenry until the spread of new technology and ideas, such as the development of the stark contrast between the old culture (corporatist) and the new culture (liberalism) due to the economic growth of the later years of the Franco and Salazar regimes, gave rise to social change and created calls for liberalism. Today, both nations have obviously transitioned to democracy, but the consolidation of democracy is another question. Many in both nations continue to have nostalgia for the past ways (particularly, the older generations) as well as hold many of the nation's democratic institutions in low esteem, suggesting perhaps that democracy has not been completely consolidated in either nation. Also important to note is the fact that both nations' transition to democracy acted as a catalyst for other democratic movements around the world, particularly in Latin America, during the 1970s and 1980s.

### *Portugal*

The democratic transition in Portugal began essentially with the death of Salazar and was accelerated during the rule of Caetano, who began the process of liberalizing the government, but many felt that the transition to a more open and democratic society needed to move faster than Caetano was allowing. These desires were only aggravated by economic, political, and social tensions that arose in the early 1970s (i.e., the oil crisis in 1973, and the ongoing African wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau during the 1960s and early 1970s). The African wars were particularly damaging to Caetano's legitimacy, because so many Portuguese soldiers were coming home in body bags, creating discontent within the citizenry as well as the military establishment. This discontent was catalyzed in 1974 during the Portuguese "Revolution of Flowers," which consisted of a combined effort of military and civil elements that was aimed at overthrowing the Caetano regime. Within two days of the revolution's initiation, the old regime (i.e., the party system, the corporatist system, and the secret police) fell *peacefully*. However, the revolution soon spread to the streets, which allowed for the citizenry to revolt against the corporatist structure of

society at the grassroots level and paved the way for a possible social revolution, but Portugal pulled back from the radical transition and gradually consolidated a more centrist democracy.

### *Spain*

The democratic transition in Spain was more evolutionary than revolutionary, meaning that it was more of a reform movement (led primarily by civilians) rather than a revolution (led primarily by armed forces). The Portuguese revolution, having occurred before Spain's, was very influential in the latter's case. In the case of Spain, the transition was less abrupt than that in Portugal, because Franco had already begun to relinquish power prior to his death, thus preventing the creation of a power vacuum. Under these circumstances, Spain was in a much better position to allow a transition to democracy to occur. Spain was culturally and economically more advanced and closer to the rest of Europe, and thus more open to the spread of economic and social liberalism from Europe. Spain had a monarch that provided for continuity during the transition, and Spain had also already experienced a bloody civil war during the 1930s, while Portugal had not.

In both of these cases, the transition to democracy was successful because the spread and establishment of democratic institutions was accomplished with relative ease. Previous economic development and success had led to major social changes (such as the growth of the middle class and the creation of a business-industrial class) and the spread of European ideals via tourism and emigration and the improvement of the educational system and literacy rates, all of which assisted the transition to democracy.

### *Greece*

The Greek revolution occurred about three months after the Portuguese revolution. Greece was controlled by a military junta that held power from 1967 until 1974, when it was removed from power. Military elements took control of the Greek government in a coup in 1967, which was the culmination of nearly three decades of division between leftist and rightist elements. These groups developed during the resistance to the Axis occupation of Greece during World War II and the period following the war, which saw a rightist-authoritarian regime come to power under cover of the United States (as part of the Truman Doctrine) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The military junta claimed that the coup was necessary primarily to prevent communist elements from taking over the Greek government in upcoming elections and that democracy would be

restored once political stability had been obtained, which followed suit with the military junta allowing broad freedoms in some areas, including increased tourism, and the permeation of Western music, art, and films. The most critical aspects of the junta's rule were that it (1) provided political stability that had been missing in Greece since before World War II and that (2) it provided for high rates of economic growth and low rates of unemployment and inflation during its rule. However, the junta eventually began a process of liberalization that began to weaken state limitations on freedom of speech, press, and assembly, which inevitably led to demands for more and more freedoms. This gradual process of liberalization, in conjunction with the Turkish army's invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 (revealing the miscalculations of the military junta), led to the eventual collapse of the junta and the restoration of democracy.

### Latin America

Latin America seems to be one of the primary regions of the world where the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism is constantly at a crossroads.<sup>14</sup> During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a wave of military coups that rendered the democratization of Latin America dead or dying—by 1978, twelve out of twenty Latin American nations were governed by military-led, authoritarian regimes, and only a handful (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) remained somewhat “democratic,” given that each was ruled by an elite-directed regime. However, the rise of military coups in the region was not just an unfortunate turn of events; rather, it was more a reflection of the structure of societies there (i.e., based on corporatism, elitism, and clientalism). Along these lines, democratic institutions such as checks and balances, the separation of powers, free and fair elections, and a free press were all viewed as extraneous and not functional in Latin American society. Thus it can be argued that the corporatist structure of Latin American society may be incompatible with Western notions of democracy (i.e., governmental power and authority is derived from the people and not from the elite).

With nineteen out of twenty Latin American nations (all except Cuba) achieving some level of democratization during the third wave, many scholars claimed that authoritarianism and corporatism would be completely replaced by liberalism in the region. However, this is not what we have seen over the past few decades. Instead, “while we have formal or electoral democracy in most countries, we do not have genuinely liberal or pluralist democracy.”<sup>15</sup> Along these lines, new

forms of corporatism continue to persist in the region, while calls for “strong government” and authoritarianism seem to be on the rise. Democracy seems to be waning yet again in Latin America—this is reflected in military coups or coup attempts in nations such as Haiti, Ecuador, and Paraguay over the past few years as well as by the low support for democracy in Latin American nations (support is publicly below 50 percent in some nations). While it is not yet clear whether or not this regional reverse wave of antidemocracy sentiments will again turn back, it does seem clear that democracy will likely continue to have a difficult time establishing itself successfully in Latin America.

### East Asia

Many of the nations in East Asia that we are interested in here—such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and China—each possesses an authoritarian background and an autonomous and strong state.<sup>16</sup> Much like in Latin America, there was top-down democratization led by the existing elite in most of these nations. The difference in the East Asian case is that of the influence of Confucianism—which is based on a hierarchy of roles (i.e., filial piety or loyalty to the emperor or government), and is sometimes considered an obstacle to democracy. Along these lines, the civil society and grassroots organizations from below (those who are not in the elite) remain weak so long as the government provides for stability and predictability, and, perhaps most importantly, for economic well-being.

#### *Taiwan*

It has a history of authoritarian rule (pre-1970s) but saw the deterioration of the “strongman” system that began under Chiang Kai-Shek, when Chiang Ching-Kuo began opening up the political system, expanded the scope of elections, revoked emergency rule, ended censorship of the press, and tolerated the creation of opposition political parties. The mid-1980s, under the rule of Lee Teng-Hui, saw a rapid transition from this limited democracy to a full democracy in the mid-1990s.

#### *South Korea*

South Korea’s democratic transition began after the assassination of General Park Chung Hee in 1979, but was delayed until 1987 when a military coup put General Chun Doo Hwan in power in response to social and economic disorder. In 1987 Chun submitted to popular discontent and called for free and fair elections for the post of the president of the nation.



*China*

China is an interesting case because it remains controlled by an authoritarian regime that has had great success in opening up its economy to free market forces without compromising political control. While there is a prodemocracy movement in China, these elements tend to push more for things such as economic and political stability and anticorruption—thus, the prevailing opinion is that as long as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can maintain the current economic successes (i.e., economic stability and growth for the Chinese middle class) as well as eliminate corruption within the party apparatus and government at every level, it may be able to prevent any significant calls for democratization anytime soon. If China were to begin any meaningful transition to democracy, one would expect to see the development of an effective rule of law, which would likely lead to the development of interest group politics, encouraging popular participation in the political system—but this is yet to happen.

### Eastern Europe and Russia

*Eastern Europe*

Dale Herspring<sup>17</sup> suggests that the primary defining characteristic of the politics of Eastern Europe is heterogeneity, which results in very different political cultures, such as a highly individualistic society in Poland or a highly collectivistic society in Serbia. These differing political cultures result in some Eastern European nations being closer to the “Western” or democratic model than others—some of the nations there are better suited for democratization than others. For example, Herspring argues that democratization is better suited for nations like the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, while nations like Bulgaria and Serbia are not as well suited. This categorization of the nations in the region results in the following groupings:

*Emerging Democrats:* Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia

*Potential Democrats:* Slovakia, Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria

*The Imponderables:* Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia

Herspring argues that there is such heterogeneity in the political cultures of Eastern Europe for four primary reasons:<sup>18</sup>

- (1) *Language:* Some languages in Eastern Europe are more closely related to Western languages such as Western Slavic languages,

which use the Latin alphabets (includes nations such as: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, and Croatia). Another language similarity is the predominant use of German in Hungary. Other languages in the region are not closely related to Western languages, such as Albania (which associates itself neither with the West or East), Serbia and Bulgaria (which use Cyrillic and are closer to the Russian language than any Western language).

(2) *Religion*: The division between Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox religions is evident in Eastern Europe. Again, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia tend to be Western oriented because they are primarily Roman Catholic, Protestant, or some mixture of the two; while nations such as Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, and Romania are primarily either Russian or Greek Orthodox (which links them closer to Russia and the East).

(3) *Economic Development*: Nations such as Poland, the Czech Republic and to a lesser degree Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary have been successful economically, while others such as Albania, Romania, Serbia, and Bosnia have lagged behind. While there may not be a direct link between economic development and political culture, it is interesting to note the similarities between nations who have Western oriented political cultures and those who have experienced economic success.

(4) *Ethnic Minorities*: The existence of ethnic minorities and a multitude of cultures makes it substantially more difficult to develop a single, clearly developed political culture. Poland and the Czech Republic for example are almost 100% Polish and Czech respectively, while nations such as Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia, and Croatia all have numerous ethnic minorities that may influence their ability to form a unified and coherent political culture.

### *Russia*

The case of democratic transition in Russia is one of the most well-known.<sup>19</sup> Russia (as the Soviet Union) was under the solidified control of the authoritarian rule of the Communist party, which eventually disintegrated after the end of the Cold War. After authoritarianism fell, the Russian transition to democracy was complicated by the continued election of former communist party members to parliamentary positions, not to mention the election of Vladimir Putin (a former

member of the KGB or the Soviet secret police) and the growing role of the Russian mafia and the Russian Orthodox Church as potential corporatist influences on government rule. On top of all of these other concerns, Russia shares many of the same problems that the nations in Eastern Europe face, such as language and religious differences with the West as well as declining economic development (at least over the past few years) and the existence of numerous ethnic minorities. During the past couple of years, Russia's transition to democracy has been slowed or possibly even reversed, with the growing influence of Putin and the return to authoritarian tendencies.

### BALOYRA'S FIVE-STAGE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

While Huntington's "waves of democratization" theory is well supported by historical observation of cases of democratic transition, it is not abundantly clear that the "trends" that he observes are more than just unique cases of a cluster of democratic transitions and part of a larger Grand Theory of comparative politics. This doubt is confirmed further when one begins to explore other analyses in the field. Enrique Baloyra, for example, suggests that analyses of democratic transition should focus on the internal processes of transition on a country-to-country basis rather than at a macrolevel, because "the similarities among the cases, at least those similarities observable at the national level of analysis, prove to be poor predictors of a democratic outcome."<sup>20</sup> He goes on to argue that comparativists should focus on the internal processes of a nation to better determine what separates success from failure during the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Baloyra suggests that instead of creating an overarching, macroview of democratic transitions, we should break down the chronological sequence of events into some more or less discrete, meaningful stages to create a framework in which to better identify when a transition occurs and to better understand when a transition from authoritarianism to democracy is a success or a failure. Along these lines, he proposes five stages of regime transition that will be described below:<sup>21</sup>

#### **Stage 1—Deterioration (or an Authoritarian Crisis)**

The process of political change begins as the authoritarian (or incumbent) regime loses its ability to cope with key concerns of its nation, such as economic security and prosperity, or when it is no longer

able to function at even minimum levels of efficacy, effectiveness, and legitimacy. This deterioration is further exacerbated by intense political conflict among actors competing to implement policies grounded on different, mutually exclusive conceptions of the government, the regime, and the state. Deterioration can be either stymied or completely stopped upon successful reequilibration of the regime. Reequilibration is the attempt by the incumbent government to maintain power and prevent a breakdown through the reestablishment of its authority by cracking down on challenging parties or by changing some of its policies to become more effective and to legitimize its power.

### **Stage 2—Breakdown**

This conflict is resolved by the breakdown of that regime (as denoted by the collapse of the incumbent government, followed by the discontinuity of the nature of the incumbent regime). It is important to note that a transition cannot occur without a breakdown, but that a breakdown can occur without deterioration—such as in the event of the sudden death or assassination of a leader.

### **Stage 3—Installation**

The breakdown of the regime leads to the installation of a new government interested in restoring the rule of law and implementing the electoral transition timetable. Transition governments exist primarily to assist in implementing a permanent, inaugurated government. Along these lines, several transition governments may be installed between the breakdown of the incumbent regime and the implementation of a new, more permanent replacement.

### **Stage 4—Implementation**

The time between the breakdown of the incumbent government and the new regime is often plagued by conflict over what the endgame of the transition should look like. In most cases, democratic rules regarding the electoral strategy of the transition are implemented within a very authoritarian context, suggesting that there will be disagreements between competing elements within the transition government over how best to establish the new regime. The most important element of the implementation phase of the transition is the timing of the endgame, as the time period between the breakdown

of the incumbent government and the inauguration of a new regime is heavily dependent upon how long it takes the competing parties to settle on a particular process for the successful inauguration of a new regime.

### **Stage 5—Inauguration**

The final stage of this transition process is the inauguration of a new regime, which is denoted by the consolidation of a pattern of relations among society, political community, government, and state that conforms to the democratic blueprint and results from the installation of a government committed to democratization.

Beyond this five-stage process of democratic transition, Baloyra concludes that (1) most impulses for transitions are endogenous rather than exogenous; (2) while most transitions occur in the middle of serious economic crises, economics does not predetermine the breakdown of the regime, but may contribute to its deterioration; (3) elections are critical to transitions (because unanticipated electoral outcomes can contribute to regime deterioration and they are necessary for the transition to be viewed as authentic); (4) transitions are conflictual (although not necessarily violent); (5) the military is frequently involved in the transition; and perhaps most importantly, (6) without consolidation of the transition, the transition is always reversible. These conclusions are significant because, in conjunction with his five-stage process, they provide a framework by which individual cases of democratization can be observed and analyzed.

### **BIASES AND LIMITATIONS**

Any approach that relies heavily on the Western conception of democracy and its spread to all corners of the world is likely to be subject to the charge of bias and ethnocentrism. One of the major biases of the Transitions to Democracy approach and literature is that it is heavily influenced by Western conceptions of democracy and transition dynamics that may not be compatible with non-Western conceptions of what democracy is or what constitutes success in transition dynamics. In this regard, some nations may find the Western conception of democracy, based heavily on individualism, as incompatible with their conceptions of the role of the individual, the role of society or community, and the role of the government.

Along these lines, it is important to ask tough questions of what exactly Western democracy entails. For example, is a democratic political

culture (i.e., a civic culture) a necessary condition for democracy? Must individualism go hand in hand with the promotion of democracy? Could a hybrid of a corporatist political culture and democratic institutions (as we have seen already in the Latin American case) ever be consolidated into a successful democracy? While these questions are likely to remain unanswered for some time, especially when the promotion of democracy is a top foreign policy priority for the United States, it is important that they are asked and potentially addressed by the Transitions to Democracy approach. Either the American or Western model of democracy is compatible with every nation in every region of the world, or there are simply some places where Western democracy may be inhospitable and thus may require some adaptation. If the latter is the case, then there may be hope for continuing the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy instrument in the future. However, if the former is the case, then the Transitions to Democracy approach will face serious limitations in its ability to sufficiently explain and analyze democratic transitions around the world without some sort of adaptation to non-Western notions of democracy.

Another critical limitation of this approach is provided by the differences between Huntington's "waves of democratization" theory and Baloyra's five-stage transition process. Baloyra correctly points out in his analysis that studies of democratic transitions are best conducted when limited to surveys of only individual cases, and not macrolevel analysis, as in the case of Huntington. While Huntington does not claim to have come up with one explanation for every democratic transition (a claim he actually refutes quite clearly), his study does attempt to conduct a macrolevel analysis that appears weak at best, primarily because it seems to provide only unique historical observation that is only applicable to the particular cases that he analyzes, as opposed to being applicable across time and space (as any solid theory should be able to do). In this sense, the Transitions to Democracy approach is hampered by its inability to provide any common explanation for either single cases of democratization or of waves of democratization *in general*. This is made clearer when one tries to compare the democratization of different regions of the world.

For example, when studying the democratic transitions of Taiwan and South Korea, the question of why the history of elite, top-down authoritarianism in these nations was successfully overcome, while so many nations of Africa or Latin America with similar regimes have been so unsuccessful at transitioning to democracy, is raised. Another concern that comes up is that of differences between transitions to democracy within specific regions. For example, a major question that

arises when studying East Asia is why the democratic transitions that occurred in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore have not influenced a popular movement toward democracy in China. How can an authoritarian regime remain successful in a region where so many transitions to democracy have been successful? At the point that this approach is unable to provide for a standard answer to such questions, it will continue to be faced with limitations to its explanatory power, which suggest that its potential as a Grand Theory may be in doubt.

### OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE GRAND THEORY

In his analysis of the third wave, Samuel Huntington suggests that the causes of democratization are likely different in most regions and nations. He continues by noting that:

The multiplicity of theories and the diversity of experience suggest the probable validity of the following propositions:

- (1) No single factor is sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all countries or in a single country.
- (2) No single factor is necessary to the development of democracy in all countries.
- (3) Democratization in each country is the result of a combination of causes.
- (4) The combination of causes producing democracy varies from country to country.
- (5) The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of democratization differs from that responsible for other waves.
- (6) The causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratization wave are likely to differ from those for later regime changes in that wave.<sup>22</sup>

These conclusions are important to our understanding of the Transitions to Democracy approach as a potential Grand Theory because they suggest that there are very few commonalities that can be drawn between various transitions to democracy or even various democratization waves. Without these commonalities, there is no way for a Grand Theory to develop because a Grand Theory requires coherence, methodology, and an overarching approach if it is to be useful as a paradigm in the social sciences.

The difficulty is that the Transitions to Democracy approach provides a lens by which to observe and analyze individual democratic transitions as well as waves of democratization, but it does not and

likely cannot provide a unifying explanation for every democratic transition or wave of democratization. If this approach was to be considered a Grand Theory comparable to others in this book, we would expect that we would be able to say that there are common factors sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all countries or in a single country. Since this is not the case, it seems more likely that the Transitions to Democracy approach would be more useful as a tool to analyze and better understand specific cases of democratic transition. In this sense, scholars would use the five-stage transition process that Baloyra created to systematically observe and compare democratic transitions within particular regions as well as between particular regions. If this is the case, then it is unlikely that the Transitions to Democracy approach serves as anything more than one tool of analysis, among many, for scholars who are looking at specific cases of democratization.



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## CHAPTER 12



# NON-WESTERN AND INDIGENOUS THEORIES OF CHANGE

*Leah Langford*

### INTRODUCTION

Explanations of change in political science have tended to be born in and defined by the West. These approaches originated with a foundation in Greek political philosophy, were refined in the European Enlightenment Era, and then realized in the post-Industrial Revolution rise of the middle class. However in the 1970s, non-Western and indigenous models of development caught on as it became clear that the imported Western models, Marxian and non-Marxian, were not working well in most developing countries; hence the idea for a homegrown or an indigenous route to development.

After Vietnam and Watergate, the United States appeared to “lose its way for a time” as it was unable to articulate a clear purpose as a nation; as a result it failed for a time to push very hard for its own development model.<sup>1</sup> The Cold War standoff allowed Third World leaders to play the United States and the Soviet Union off against one another while advancing their own indigenous or nationalistic models. In the 1990s, there were two events that changed the global situation, ripening the discussion of other, non-Western models. First and foremost, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in local, ethnic, and nationalistic groups that were no longer wedged between bipolar forces and were now encouraged, and almost required, to assert their own sovereignty, manifested through their unique

customs, identities, characteristics, and manner by which they chose to modernize and change. Serving as almost a counter influence to this assertion, new technological advances and the emerging hegemonic superpower, the United States, found their way into every household, bringing Coca Cola and cable (“globalization”) to even the remotest villages. As Western influences interacted with a growing indigenous cultural awakening, the issue of universality versus particularity became more and more pressing.

This chapter addresses the non-Western or indigenous theoretical models of change. First, we will explore competing frameworks for analyzing the non-Western theories of change as they interact with the models of change that are familiarly Western. Then, we will explore the components of particular non-Western theories, addressing briefly five main regions. Finally, we will explore the potential universalities present in these regional models, searching for a more encompassing “grand” model of change.

## FRAMEWORKS FOR NON-WESTERN THEORIES

This section will concentrate on explaining non-Western theories of change as well as the ways in which these non-Western models interact with Western ones. This section includes varying perspectives, from Frances Fukuyama’s view that all models of change are attempting the same goal of democratization to Howard Wiarda’s assertion that states fall along a continuum of change, with some adopting more components of Western democratization than others.

### **Liberal Democracy as Global Phenomenon**

Frances Fukuyama states that liberal democracy, though borne from the Western framework, is globally compelling. He shows that the end of the twentieth century turned out differently than expected, with democracy as the ideology of choice around the world. He notes that in 1790 there were three democracies, and today there are sixty-two. This process has not been linear, with instability, uncertain commitments to liberal values, and even complete lapses back into authoritarian rule being prevalent. Fukuyama suggests, however, that “these regions will eventually mature into a more tolerant and democratic direction.”<sup>2</sup> Nationalistic and other struggles are therefore precursors to the emergence of stable democracy, just as in Western Europe in the nineteenth century. Thus, Fukuyama posits that all states will trend toward a model of change that ends in liberal democracy.

### Clash of Civilizations

At the same time, culture and cultural identities—at the broadest level, these are civilizational identities (according to Huntington)—are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. Global politics, Huntington argues in *The Clash of Civilizations*, is multipolar and multicivilizational. Western universalism is not necessarily occurring; rather, some argue that the West is declining in relative influence. The influence of Asian civilizations is increasing, and an alliance between Islam and Sinic (or Asian) civilizations seems possible. As the West's universalist pretensions bring it in conflict with other civilizations, the "Survival of the West" depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and on Westerners accepting their civilization as unique, not universal, as Huntington argues, uniting to renew and preserve it against challengers from non-Western societies.

### Continuum of Countries

Wiarda refutes Huntington's "clash of civilizations." He posits that future development will bring forth many mixed forms and fusions as cultures both mesh and clash. Wiarda predicts that countries will choose aspects of democracy that they will adapt to their own way of doing things. Stronger states, such as Japan, will be able to choose more selectively than weaker ones. For weaker states, he suggests, Western influences may be more readily adopted without much discernment because of international pressures or the intensity of need.

## NON-WESTERN MODELS OF CHANGE

This next section will explore the components of particular non-Western theories, addressing five main regions. As this next section will explore geography-centered models of change, it is important to note that grouping individual nation-states into one regional model of change necessarily leads to oversimplification and generalizability. The purpose of this exercise is to attempt an appreciation of alternative models that are as complex as our own. This section will not successfully encompass all these complexities, but will highlight some key components of each. The regions addressed in this section are: Latin America, the Indian Subcontinent, the Islamic world, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

### Latin American Model

The components unique to the Latin American model of change are all very much linked to the particular historical context of Spanish colonization. The four key components of the Latin American model of change are: early urbanization, consolidation of power, industrialization, and co-optation.

#### *Urbanization*

For most states, the advent of industrialization brings urbanization as people migrate to the cities for higher paying jobs. But in 1890 when Rome had a population of 400,000 and Madrid considerably less, Buenos Aires and Mexico City both had populations nearing 600,000. A somewhat comical view of the Spanish preference for urbanization is described by Veliz:

Like British explorers in Africa, Asia and the island tropics, Spanish conquerors also had to ensure the travail of pioneering exploration, they crossed huge jungles and deserts, navigated the Amazon and the Orinoco . . . and hated every minute of it. They never stopped complaining, and at the first opportunity unfurled their flags, donned their finery, and , with all the pomp and circumstances allowed, founded cities in which to take refuge from the barbaric, harsh, uncivilized, and rural world outside.<sup>3</sup>

Though this portrayal appears a bit exaggerated, the ideal of the city as a perfect community is deeply rooted in Hispanic tradition; and the conquistadors found similar preindustrial community planning in pre-Colombian cities like Tlaxcala, Tenochtitlan, and Cuzco as well.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Spanish conquistadors arrived in areas that already had urban centers and vast populations, while English colonists settled on sparsely inhabited coasts. Urbanization, thus, preceded industrialization in Latin America, and did not coincide with a rise in the middle class.

#### *Consolidation of Power*

Latin America is by no means devoid of a rural population. However, it is in the urban centers that the colonial and indigenous elites were located, and that is where the power has remained. The rural population in Latin America comprised three groups, the indigenous population, plantation labor, and peasants, none of which are incorporated into the upper echelons of the power structure. Instead, those who had political power were centered in urban areas and founded and furthered their

own political power. Such political bureaucrats supported state policy that worked to strengthen their own power.

### *Industrialization*

The urban centralization of the population throughout colonial rule resulted in a consolidated elite who ruled from these metropolitan centers. Though most of the population relied on few luxuries, the elites in Latin America depended on goods imported from abroad. However, with the World Wars and the Great Depression, that changed. External events interrupted trade and disconnected the elite from the outside world. During the 1930s and '40s, the demand for goods combined with the fact that the economic elite was in control of the state led to the channeling of resources toward local, home-grown industrial development. Thus, preceded by urban ties and a consumerist demand for imported goods, industrialization in Latin America was not the result of natural economic growth but rather a "complex response to external stimuli."<sup>5</sup>

### *Co-optation*

The consolidation of power by elite groups discouraged the immediate rise of a middle class within Latin America. There was thus no response from a rising middle class to the bourgeoisie, as had been the case during the industrial revolution in Western countries. Instead, the power remained, for the most part, in the hands of a small group of political elites. Though industrialization resulted in the growth of "new-moneyed" elites, who made their wealth from business ventures and investments, this group was relatively small. As these business elites expanded their wealth, they were incorporated into the upper echelons of Latin American society by the political elites.

David Stuart Parker suggests in his book *The Idea of the Middle Class* that the existence of a middle class was not apparent throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Latin America. In 1910 an industrial proletariat only existed in the larger cities of São Paulo, Lima, Mexico City, and Buenos Aires. And even in the booming metropolises of the age, the numbers were modest; Buenos Aires, in 1920, was home to only 3,151 manual workers.<sup>6</sup> However, with the success of industrialization, the population numbers for the working class exploded, so that by 1960 factory employment counted for half of the total industrial force in countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Chile. Though the numbers and strength of consolidated middle and working classes varied across the country, with the growing industrial sector, the middle class expanded. For example, in 1950,

the middle class totaled 12.4 percent of the workforce in Chile with the working class at 25 percent. In Argentina, the middle class comprised 19 percent of the workforce and the working class 34 percent.<sup>7</sup> The rise of the middle class was more difficult to accommodate than that of the business elites, as it was a larger group and shared values that were different from the old elites' values. Eventually, though, this group was incorporated into the political process with the right to vote and access to positions in the military officer corps and in government. Its rise, however, served as a Faustian bargain. As the political elites responded by incorporating the middle class into the political process, the middle class gained more voice but began to imitate the styles and virtues of the elites, with a growing "disdain for the lower classes." Meanwhile, the top of the pyramid remained intact, with the historical wielders of power still in place.

Labor was the next group to organize against the system, thus threatening the structure of power. States attempted to avoid potential Marxist revolution by "taming" labor (i.e., by determining salary, workers' rights, etc.) while agreeing to consultations with labor groups. This strategy was successful and is still used today. By incorporating the middle and lower classes, the elites effectively made these groups toothless, as they bartered away their ability to change Latin American society by revolutionary means.<sup>8</sup> What is important to note is that the co-optive and corporatist strategies employed by the political elites in Latin America show that the traditional system, perceiving a threat, was able to bend, accommodate, and eventually absorb this threat. Co-optive models are still used in the majority of countries of Latin America, and new groups must still show a capacity to organize as well as abide by the rules dictated by the political elites to be incorporated into the system today.

### **Subcontinent Model**

India was particularly fortunate to have a strong national leadership that would provide the means of peaceful transition from a colonial political system to that of an independent nation-state. These leaders offered their own perspective on democracy as a salve for the wounds of social inequality and distrust for government that ran deeply in India following independence. For Gandhi, the aspiration for true democracy reached beyond representative government. It required representatives who were truly selfless, serving their community above all else. This perspective encouraged the political leadership of those who were not seeking material or economic gains. Gandhi

tended to glorify those who did not have economic ambitions and indicated that God was the "lord of the poor."<sup>9</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru had a different understanding of economic growth. He believed that poverty was India's greatest challenge and favored economic development. He argued that "poverty often destroys individuals, physically and morally." During his sixteen years as the prime minister, he introduced universal suffrage so that by 1980 India had 320 million people on her electoral rolls. Nehru's party, the Congress Party, had electoral control of India until 1977, based on its growing appeal as the party of independence. But this party also attracted the patronage and influence of all ruling groups and came to represent the upper-caste landed elites. Opposition parties often tried to mobilize the middle and lower castes, and during elections caste solidarity was the most important factor in voting behavior. One strong key component of the Subcontinent Model of change would be the inclusion of a traditional system of hierarchy in the new democratizing process.

### *Caste System*

Within a larger discourse on the counterforces in a culture of modernity and tradition, political analysts focusing on India have posited that the caste system actually provides a traditional structure in which people can modernize the political process. In her essay "Beyond Modernity and Tradition," Suzanne Rudolph notes that in India "a transformed version of this 'traditional' structure [that is, caste] had become a vehicle for representative and parliamentary democracy and was functionalizing as a democratizing force."

Rudolph joined with her husband to further her argument that the caste system transformed itself from below and within.<sup>10</sup> Originally serving as a natural vertical pyramid, the caste system aligned people of a common position with one another. After independence, as political parties were forming, these associations began to become politically consolidated. Thus, the authors suggest that the caste system has "helped peasants to represent and rule themselves by attaching them to ideas, processes, and institutions of political democracy."

Whereas most authors boast an associative relationship between caste and political parties, few attempt to create a causal link between the two as posited by Rudolph and her husband. Others suggest more of a normative relationship between an individual's identity as a member of a caste and his/her political participation. A. H. Somjee notes the particular problem of newly introduced democratic institutions conflicting with a deeply entrenched social hierarchy. He suggests that



caste associations encouraged voting patterns initially for all groups, with different segments of Indian society having “different access to political power and decision-making, [and thus] starting off with different potentials for political capacity.”<sup>11</sup> He notes that the political involvement of the former members of the “Untouchable Caste” was largely a product of group or communal involvement until recently, as the existing levels of social inferiority made them unable to fully exercise their rights. Fortunately, the tide is turning in this regard, as voters in the same caste have registered increasing diversity in election after election. Furthermore, because of the sheer number of individuals from the lower castes, they were able to get themselves elected to public offices within two decades of independence.

Though there is disagreement on the strength of the association between caste and political participation in India, it is clear that the country has now emerged as the world’s largest democracy. Whether or not the caste system serves as an inhibitor or catalyst in the democratization process, it has certainly laid the foundation on which a nation of diversity and tolerance has been built. Meanwhile, other groups in India are advocating uniquely Hindu models of society, culture, and politics.

### East Asian Model

Perhaps the most well-known, and certainly the most successful, of the non-Western visions of homegrown change comes from East Asia. The Confucian model applies to any country in which Confucianism has been the dominant or official system of thought. Confucius lived during a period of social change when China was divided into small warring dukedoms (551 to 479 B.C.). Because he deplored the collapse of order and justice, he taught ritual—the proper way to relate to others. According to him, each person should behave with love and justice to everyone else, but the specific content of that love and justice depends upon the circumstances and the relationship. Order, discipline, hierarchy, and education are emphasized.

Although the original cultures are quite different from each other, the “Confucian world” includes China (including Taiwan), Korea, Vietnam, and Singapore. It also includes Japan, though Buddhism and Shintoism are the dominant religions there. However, many suggest that the success of the Asian Tigers as well as Japan’s economic success bind these groups together more than the Confucian cultural influence does. Three key components of the East Asian model include Confucian culture, the strong role of the state, and the structure of society.

### *Confucian Culture*

During the phenomenal Asian financial success of the 1980s, many scholars and policy-makers argued for the importance of a model of development based on distinctively Asian values that speak of the essential traits of Confucian culture that provide for economic dynamism. Confucians focus on the positive aspects of knowing one's role in a society that is less stridently individualistic as compared with that of their Western counterparts. Ironically, as both Moody and Zakaria remind us,<sup>12</sup> decades earlier, Asia's economic failures were also blamed on Confucianism. At that time Confucianism was seen as prizing social inequality and discouraging entrepreneurial spirit. Zakaria put it best when he said that culture matters greatly but that in "culture's complexity [we can find] all that we are looking for."<sup>13</sup>

One might suggest that whereas cultural components are certainly not to be ignored, Zakaria is correct to warn against their primacy. As noted previously, were these states not experiencing great economic success, the question of a culturally induced phenomenon across a culturally varied region would appear to have little claim. The next two components do not dismiss culture entirely, but allow for economic and political factors to be included as well.

### *Strong States*

Asian states tend to be "strong," meaning that they are considerably autonomous from social and economic interest groups. As a result, they are able to enforce economic policies while maintaining order in society. To achieve their goals, modernization within Asian countries has not been about improving certain sectors to benefit private constituencies. Rather it is a process that has been state-led and its purpose is a restrengthening of the state.

Though some may argue that this does not guarantee economic development, by maintaining control of the political and social order, a state can prevent disruptions by strong influences that may seek to disrupt or slow economic development. Because development is sanctioned from the top down, the political system was not shaped by a more freely flowing economic market and growing interest groups as in the United States.

### *Structure of Society*

Within Asia, some states adopted modernization more easily than others on the basis of their societies' structures. Japan, for example, had an easier time than China at modernization. Both were strong states, but the Japanese were more ready for modernization. This had

a lot to do with hereditary practice. As a part of the political order in Japan, the warriors' rank was considered the highest in the social structure, while merchants were near the bottom. Chinese social status is traditionally based on achievement, and there is a stronger expectation of social mobility. Though China's social status appeared more liberal, allowing for more mobility, Japan was more successful in modernizing initially. In China when a merchant was successful, he would invest in land rather than in commerce, with the hope of achieving a higher status as a farmer than as a merchant. A Japanese merchant, however, could not change his position in society. Instead, he could only reinvest any profit from his business in improvements and growth. The argument is that this is why capitalism thrived.

Were one to develop a distinct East Asian theory of change, it would need to include a quite rigid political structure in which the state was strong and the social structure conducive to a reinvestment of capital in areas of growth without excessive social mobility. The difficulty with this Asian model, of course, is that as in China and Singapore, it may not be conducive to democracy and human rights.

## INHIBITORS OF CHANGE?

Unlike the first three regions mentioned in this chapter, the next two regions present difficulties for the scholar in developing a clear, home-grown model for change. For sub-Saharan Africa, the difficulty lies in determining the successful actions that may be taken to bring about change. For the Islamic world, political tension and a strong military presence in government make it difficult to discern a model of change that is distinguishably Islamic. Any attempt to formulate a model that is indigenous to Islam is yet to be successful. For these two regions, we will focus mainly on the barriers to developing a clear, distinct, culturally sensitive model of change.

### Sub-Saharan Model

While there are many analyses of the more or less successful models of change in Latin America, East Asia, and the South Asian subcontinent, those who focus on Africa are often perplexed as to why African democracies have been slow to develop and have often not been sustained. Africanists tend to focus on two key features of African society that serve as inhibitors of change—ethnic fragmentation and a weak civil society. As the two are causally linked, with the explanatory arrow arguably pointing either way, this section will combine the two aspects into one subsection.

*Ethnic Fragmentation and a Weak Civil Society*

Most African nations have inherited the political apparatus of the colonial state, but very few have citizens that have been able to establish the political capacity necessary to effectively participate in government. Many scholars have argued that this is due to a lack of a strong civil society at the national level, and the artificial divisions of boundaries and atrocities under colonialism that left Africa with a society that breeds distrust for outgroups.

Overcoming the collective action problem is difficult because of local biases. Zaire, in 1990, claimed to be a multiparty state, with 230 parties, but none of them had a nationally unifying agenda. Instead, each group defines itself against the other groups, and little cross-party coalition-building was achieved. As Yohannes Woldermariam suggests, "tribalism, ethnicity and kinship organizations cannot produce a democratic state, whether or not they are disguised as political parties."

A further difficulty in articulating an African model of change is that Africanists have borrowed many theories from other regions, but have failed to look within Africa for answers. Bienen and Herbst state that almost all theories applied to Africa "were developed in other areas of the world."<sup>14</sup> Dominant thinking thus denies that Africa's precolonial political culture is the answer from which to draw new development strategies.

Still there are a handful of thinkers that suggest African democracy must be rooted in its own past. For example, the allocation of parliamentary seats in Mauritius is based on ethnicity, mirroring the practices in existence in village assemblies. In Botswana, tribal chiefs continue to be respected members of the polity, and the traditional court system remains intact. What has not been present in the literature, however, is evidence of the viability of indigenous African models of change. Rather than discounting what seems counter to growth by a Western standard, à la democratic institutions based on ethnic representation, effectiveness must be judged within its own context. If these institutions can produce a stable, operating democracy, perhaps this can be seen as a success rather than as a failure. Potential options for Africa's future exist within her grasp, and Africa, no doubt, has much to say on the subject. The Western world would do well to listen to these local voices.

**Islamic Model**

Inherent in the discussion of an Islamic model of change is the question of religion and its interaction in and with the state. Two particular,

and often contradictory, perspectives in which one can consider the possibilities of an Islamic model of change are: (1) that the Islamic tradition contains inherently democratic features, and/or (2) because of the politically anti-West sentiment present in many parts of the Muslim world, democracy and Islam, even if compatible, will never be joined.

### *Interpretations of Islam*

Muslims view Islam as a complete worldview encompassing both religion and politics. Little, however, is said in the Quran about governmental organization. Prodemocratic groups suggest that a democratic polity is not only allowed but required within the interpretation of Islam. Syed states that “to deny a Muslim community its right to democracy makes Islam ‘null and void.’”<sup>15</sup> Others disagree that Islam can adopt a democratic system. They argue democracy is an instrument by which the West attempts to rule the Muslim world.

### *Political Tension, East versus West*

European interest in Islam, many argue, resulted not from curiosity, but rather from the fear of a powerful monotheistic competitor in the cultural and military field. This combination of fear and animosity continues. Said argues that he has “not been able to discover any period in European or American history since the Middle Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about outside a framework created by passion, prejudice and political interests.”

Esposito and Voll offer a thoughtful analysis on the dynamism and diversity within Islam. They remind the Western reader that “Islamic beliefs and institutions are relevant to the current debate over political participation and democratization.”<sup>16</sup> The Muslim world is not unique in its aversion to democratization and its position must be contextualized to achieve a sensitive analysis. Still others argue that democracy is an inappropriate system of government for the Muslim community. The best form of political regime within Islam is considered to be one that promotes the rule by the wisest, those who are usually considered to be the most perfect men. Democracy, the rule of law, and power in the hands of the people appears, except rarely, to have little success in the Islamic world.

## UNIVERSAL MODEL OF CHANGE

The Western world has essentially had two perspectives on non-Western theories of change. The first is to continue to uphold the

Western model as the universally valid set of norms to be applied around the world. After all, the Western world has developed and refined concepts of change and clear understandings of progress since classical Greece. Of all the world's areas, the West—and its model—has arguably been the most successful. Given this success, we may ignore the distinctiveness of experiences in the non-Western world and continue to apply those “global”—that is, Western—norms that have been used for centuries.

A second option is to question the need for universality. If we were to restrict the validity of norms to certain basic moral imperatives (i.e., the basic quality of public life) and then “supplement those norms” with context-relevant ones, we could allow each culture to develop its own norms beyond these basic moral imperatives. The scholarly debate might resume with questions of where we draw the line. That is left for another time. The question of whether there should be a line between universal and relativist norms at all must be established first.

A third option would be to allow a universality of norms to exist, but continually redefine and broaden our definition of what those are and what they mean in our lives. Many scholars argue that the Western model would provide a better fit for the world, if the definition and parameters of the term “democracy” were broadened to include non-Western understandings as well. Huntington defines democracy as a “form of government” with a “source of authority and procedures constituting it,” and steers clear of more ambiguous terms such as “the will of the people.”

Wiarda suggests that democracy has “core requirements” that give it global applicability:

1. Regular, fair, competitive elections
2. Basic civil and political rights and liberties
3. A considerable degree of political pluralism

He suggests that the United States and Western Europe differ in their own understanding of democratic government, with the Western Europeans including social and economic rights and welfare under the role of the government. The United States, on the other hand, considers that a matter of voter choice, not necessarily integral to democracy. Wiarda calls for a broader definition of democracy for those countries that have not gone through the same historical experiences and formed the same Western philosophical foundations. A broader definition, he suggests, might include: socioeconomic development,

a degree of tolerance and civility, a degree of egalitarianism, military subordination to civil authority, an independent functioning legislature and judiciary, and a degree of probity in the management of the public funds.

A final way to view the tension between the West and the non-West is for the non-West to stop looking for parallels in Western political experiences. Somjee argues that non-Western states have effectively “demonstrated their differences in spirit, mode of operation and, above all, in the quality of public life which emanates from them.”<sup>17</sup> He suggests that we should look at the reality or “actuals” in any given country to avoid ethnocentric presumptions. We should not see non-Western nation-states as “borrowing” from the Western model but rather selecting components that work, and indigenizing them.

Traditional societies are not like containers from which you throw out old contents to fill them with new ones. They are more like the multilayered earth, where the lower layers do not disappear. They stay there and continue to influence the life that goes on above them, for an unlimited span of time.

Perhaps, then, we can remove the dichotomy of the West and non-West altogether. For if Somjee is correct in his assertion that once a component from one context travels from its home, it becomes something wholly different; it then undergoes a transformation. Thus, whatever is “Western” becomes indigenous to that culture, as varied and complex as that is. And what is born in other areas of the world is wholly and uniquely new, Western and indigenous at the same time.



## CONCLUSION

*Howard J. Wiarda*

The purpose of this book is to explore the role and viability of Grand Theory in the social sciences. Grand Theory has been defined here as those large, overarching, all-encompassing explanations or models of social and political behavior that give meaning to existence, enable us to order our lives, and provide us with conceptual frameworks to think about society, polity, and maybe even life itself. The Grand Theories and Ideologies treated here include liberalism and developmentalism, Marxism and dependency analysis, culture theory, sociological explanations, psychology and psychoanalysis, institutionalism, rational choice theory, environmentalism, sociobiology, explanations based on the basics of chemistry and physics, transitions to democracy, and non-Western or indigenous concepts of change.

At least since the 1950s, social scientists have been arguing about “the end of ideology,”<sup>1</sup> and, more recently (and almost the same thing), “the end of history.” The Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell is the person most closely associated with the “end of ideology” thesis. He looked at changing class structures in Europe and America and found an emerging middle class that was upwardly mobile and not very ideological. He examined voting behavior and political parties, and found that the extremes were being isolated and wishy-washy middle-of-the-road parties (the Republicans and Democrats) were becoming dominant. He also found that both labor strikes and employer lockouts were being used less often as instruments of class conflict. From this and other data, Bell concluded—one suspects he



also hoped for—that ideological appeals were becoming less important and that ideology was losing ground. Bell's analysis provoked a storm of controversy, especially from the Left that had a vested interest not in the “end” but in the continuance of ideological conflict.

The most recent incarnations of this approach appear in Francis Fukuyama's “The End of History”<sup>2</sup> and in much of the globalization literature.<sup>3</sup> Fukuyama's approach—intellectual and political history—is much different from Bell's, but his conclusions are remarkably similar. He examines both the bankruptcy of fascism and authoritarianism as an intellectual idea and regime type, *and* the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and with them, the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism. With the collapse of both of these other alternatives, in Fukuyama's view, democracy is the only idea left, “the only game in town.” Hence his argument—again very controversial, especially for left-wingers—for “the end of history,” not in some stupid superficial sense that there is no more history, but in the Hegelian sense that in the great dialectic of historical development, democracy is the only *idea* left standing.

The end-of-history was greatly reinforced over the last twenty years by the literature on and practice of globalization. The argument, perhaps at its most superficial level, was that increased trade and economic ties would bind all nations together in ways that increased interdependence and prevented war. But globalization was more than economic; it was also cultural, political (modernization theory), and perhaps religious (rationalism, secularism). As a political formula, globalization was most effectively rendered in the so-called Washington Consensus that posited three essential pillars as part of a global formula for all nations: democracy, open markets (capitalism), and free trade. Note how closely the Washington Consensus prescription followed the formulations of Bell and Fukuyama.

But now, some twenty years later, we know that the Bell-Fukuyama Washington Consensus formula is not inevitable and certainly not universal. Among the indicators:

1. The “third wave” of democracy has slowed; in some areas (Russia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America), it may have been reversed.
2. The open market system in the United States and elsewhere is much more precarious than we had thought: Marxism and statism are now back as alternative possibilities.
3. Culture, geography, and history are all “back”; the world's political systems, shaped by these factors, show remarkable diversity, not uniformity.

4. Globalization and free trade have not lifted all boats; instead and predictably, there are winners and losers, both between countries and within them.
5. Environmental factors such as climate change and resource depletion are changing the face of the globe as well as our expectations from it.
6. Free trade and open markets have not led inexorably to greater integration and harmonization. Instead, discord, conflict, and polarization are increasing. There is as much a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington)<sup>4</sup> as there is the “end of history” (Fukuyama).
7. Science, including physics, chemistry, and biology or sociobiology, keeps advancing; we now know that we are products of our genes to a greater extent than heretofore recognized. And therefore that no amount of reform will lead, let alone inevitably, to human perfection.

We said at the outset that there was an ambiguity in our treatment of Grand Theory, and we return to that theme here in our conclusion. At one level, the Grand Theories and Ideologies examined here are intellectual constructs—models, abstractions, and simplifications—that are not exact mirrors of reality. At another level, however, thinking specifically of liberalism, socialism, or corporatism, many of the theories explored here *do* take on ideological characteristics and *do* correspond, more or less, to regime types. At still a third level, the Grand Theories treated in this book, even though not exactly corresponding to a specific regime type, do often, as with Marxism or developmentalism, provide justification for a particular kind of regime or outcome. Paraphrasing Keynes, even among those who claim to be the most practical of men, we quickly discover that they are also the prisoners of some obscure philosophy, philosopher, ideology, or Grand Theory digested only incompletely back in the seventh (or was it the tenth?) grade.

In short, in this book we are talking about both Grand Theories and regime types, as well as the processes of change from one type to another. This ambiguity does not overly bother us. For as Keynes’s statement reminds us, there is very often, sometimes unconsciously, an intimate link between ideas (Grand Theories and Ideologies) and practice (regime types). *All* of us are influenced by belief systems, theories, and, yes, even ideologies of which we are often only vaguely aware. Freud taught us that—one of the reasons his ideas are considered here among our Grand Theories. At this early stage of our inquiry, therefore, we choose to retain the ambiguity spoken of

above, aware of it but also recognizing that far more needs to be done beyond the scope of this book before the issue can be resolved.

## DISTINCT GRAND THEORIES

In this section we summarize and offer commentary on the findings of the chapters on the main Grand Theories and Ideologies analyzed in this book. In the next and final section we weigh, analyze, dissect, and examine the patterns as well as our own conclusions regarding Grand Theory.

Kelley Johnson begins our analysis with a treatment of developmentalism that she traces back to the eighteenth century idea of progress. The main spokesmen in the developmentalist school include W. W. Rostow,<sup>5</sup> S. M. Lipset,<sup>6</sup> and Gabriel Almond.<sup>7</sup> Johnson finds many flaws in the developmentalist approach that, particularly because of Rostow's influence, also undergirds—and continues to this day to undergird—the U.S. foreign aid program and the U.S. approach to development. That is, economic growth (Rostow) gives rise to social change (Lipset) that begets political development and democratization (Almond), presumably inevitably and universally.

Surprisingly, despite all its manifest flaws, developmentalism continues to provide the foundation for much of our thinking about modernization in the Third World—and even about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his efforts to convert Iraq and Afghanistan into stable, middle class, democratic countries, Barack Obama is a captive of his version of this ideology just as much as George W. Bush was. So developmentalism lingers on as both Grand Theory and Ideology, and features strongly in such political formulas as foreign aid and the Washington Consensus. It is a theory whose popularity can be explained in part because it is very American—positive, hopeful, based on our own experience, “as American as apple pie.” In the final analysis, Johnson urges us to take what is useful from developmentalism but to recognize its biases and discard the rest.

Braden Stone tackles the equally difficult task of assessing Marxism, class analysis, dependency theory, and world systems analysis in today's “Brave New World.” The sad and terrible experience of Marxism, which in its economic determinism is remarkably similar to Rostow's economics-driven “non-communist manifesto” (his words), to say nothing of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist regimes, led to a general discrediting of both Marxism as a Grand Theory and Ideology and of Marxism-Leninism as a regime type.

For nearly two decades since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Marxist theorists have been toiling in the wilderness. But now suddenly, as Stone points out, we are again talking about class conflict, the ownership (nationalization) of the means of production, and the crisis of and possible collapse of capitalism. While the United States goes through its economic crisis, European social democrats semi-gleefully (“semi” because their own economies are also in sharp decline) shake their fingers and say, “we told you so,” that American-style “rapacious capitalism” was bound to self-destruct. Stone refreshes our memory on the basic principles of Marxian analysis, shows how in a globalized economy Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems analysis”<sup>8</sup> has renewed relevance, and issues a plea for the continued usefulness of the Marxian paradigm.

Holger Meyer next analyzes the “renaissance” and continued usefulness of political-cultural explanations. Political culture as an explanatory framework has, like the other explanations offered here, gone through its ups and downs. Aristotle was the first to explore the relations between a nation’s underlying beliefs and culture *and* its regime type; Max Weber, the great German sociologist, was its foremost modern advocate.<sup>9</sup> Cultural anthropology also contributed mightily to our understanding of non-Western cultures, but in the aftermath of World War II, national-culture approaches were discredited as involving unacceptable stereotypes. More recently in the work of Almond and Verba<sup>10</sup> and of Ronald Inglehart,<sup>11</sup> political culture, based on systematic comparative survey research, has been given a solid empirical base that is distinct from the earlier impressionistic accounts.

Political culture has long been one of the main explanatory paradigms in the social sciences; recently it has also received a new lease on life. Because in much of the post-Cold War institutionalist and transition-to-democracy literature, the argument has been put forth that culture, history, and geography do not matter. That since history has ended (Fukuyama) and democracy is the only game in town, cultural differences are not important; the only issue, presumably, is to get your institutions correct. But as the democratic road has become rocky and uneven, cultural explanations of these differences have made a comeback. Some of us have always believed that culture has to be a part of the equation; now in the work of Huntington, Inglehart, Putnam, Landes, Berger, and others, the argument is being set forth that culture may be *the* most important explanation.

Another one of the main social science Grand Theories comes from sociology, particularly from the sociology of development.

The argument set forth by Ann P. Kryzanek goes back to the founding fathers of sociology, particularly Durkheim and Weber. The logic is remarkably close to that presented by such developmentalist economists as Rostow and Heilbroner: industrialization and economic growth are the main driving forces or “engines” of development; and economic development gives rise to urbanization, greater differentiation of functions, and social pluralism; and pluralism in turn produces liberal democracy.

In Kryzanek’s chapter the main focus is on such latter-day sociologists as S. M. Lipset,<sup>12</sup> Karl Deutsch,<sup>13</sup> and C. E. Black.<sup>14</sup> All posited a social requisites model of democratization that included education, literacy, legitimacy, and social mobilization. When all these features plus a certain minimum level of economic development were achieved, then presumably democracy could flower. But, as with Rostow, there is a certain determinism and inevitability to this process that does not seem to accord with the facts; in addition, among many U.S. foreign aid officials, the correlations that Lipset carefully set forth were confused with causation: pour in the aid, and social change will occur, and democracy will automatically follow.

Note additionally that for both the economists and the sociologists, politics or democratization becomes a mere dependent variable. Economic development and social change first that then produce democracy. But for most of us as political scientists, politics and political institutions have a life of their own as independent variables. While some sociologists continue to believe deterministically that social and class features *determine* political outcomes, political scientists tend to believe that they are only shaping forces and that political factors can be quite independent from economic and social ones.

In her chapter on psychoanalysis, Shelliann Powell argues that this Grand Theory has major but largely unexplored implications for the fields of comparative politics and international relations. Encompassing the entire range of human experience, she sees psychoanalysis as the quintessential Grand Theory, bridging the humanities and the natural and social sciences. In its modern form it encompasses both psychology and neurology and offers a scientific alternative to the intellectual gray area filled previously by a combination of art and theology. Contrary to its many critics, psychoanalysis is far from being outdated or irrelevant; in its updated form, this “science of the mind” helps create new theories of the relations of the individual and society, allowing for both new social criticism and social change.

But is psychoanalysis, Powell asks, a Grand Theory in the sense that these other approaches are? Is psychoanalysis even a science? Let

us make some distinctions here. The science of the mind is perhaps not at a level that some of the natural sciences are; rather, it seems closer to the social sciences—suggestive, analytic, systematic—and becoming more precise in its measurements. Fascinating to us as comparativists is Powell's analysis of how psychoanalysis differs in different parts of the world and between developed and developing countries. She is particularly fascinated by the works of Jacques Lacan<sup>15</sup> and his suggestion that psychoanalysis must be sensitive to distinct cultures. In such sensitive hands, psychoanalysis, the science of the mind, can take its place among other Grand Theories that focus on economics, sociology, culture, and institutions.

And that in turn gets us to the study of institutions, which has now taken its place as one of the main approaches—in some analysts' view, it is *the* main approach—in political science. In her chapter Sonal Sahu first analyzes the “old institutionalism,” what was then called the formal-legal approach, of Herman Finer<sup>16</sup> and Karl Friedrich<sup>17</sup> that focused on the study of laws, constitutions, and the formal or “institutional” aspects of politics. That approach was subjected to a withering critique by Roy Macridis, who accused it of being static, Eurocentric, descriptive, noncomparative, and parochial.<sup>18</sup> Particularly when applied to the study of developing areas—where the formal institutions seldom function as the laws or constitution state they should—the Macridis critique had a powerful impact.

But now institutionalism, the “new institutionalism,” has made a strong comeback in political science. This “comeback” relates to earlier themes: if ideology has “ended,” history is “over,” and all nations are on the path to democracy and free markets, then the main question left is to make sure that their institutions are designed correctly. But if culture, history, and geography still have a major impact as seems quite obvious, then other factors besides institutional design must play a role. Bolivia, for example, has had over forty, beautifully designed constitutions in its history, but does that make it a model democracy? Hardly. In Bolivia, culture, social structure, economics, and history all play a powerful role.

The institutionalists' answer to this dilemma is to include as an “institution” factors—such as political culture, political behavior, decision-making, and informal political processes—that have never been seen in that light before. Well, if you so broaden your definition of institutions that it includes all these other noninstitutional factors, perhaps you can get away with this form of methodological imperialism. But most of us tend to think that such ingredients as political culture have to do with informal values and belief systems and are

not, strictly or even loosely speaking, an “institution.” Moreover, political culture in our view should be seen à la Inglehart and others as an independent variable and not just subordinated to an overarching and too-broad definition of institutions. Although institutions are important and it is critical to get their design correct, institutional analysis should not be seen as the *only* thing that political scientists do. Other factors, other Grand Theories, are also important.

Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has swept quite a number of Political Science Departments in the United States recently. Largely derived from economics, RCT is based on the assumption of the self-interest-maximizing individual. As in economics, RCT rests on the utility principle that states that groups, individuals, and even nations make decisions that best serve their interests. Presumably, voting behavior, interest-group lobbying, election campaigns, political party platforms, and international relations can all be explained on the basis of self-maximizing assumptions. As explained by our contributor Jess Nakaska, the two main branches of RCT are decision theory and game theory.

RCT has been especially prevalent in the political science field of American politics and in explaining American political behavior. It is a quite elegant, simple (maybe too simple), and, as we say in the field, parsimonious theory that explains a lot, but maybe not everything. It also has a close relation with the previously discussed institutionalist approach, presumably because rational choice takes place *within* an institutional framework: the voting booth, Congress, the Supreme Court, the Oval Office.

Though rational choice makes claims to universality, it has been less successfully employed in comparative politics than in other sub-fields. That is because the culture (there is that troublesome political-culture variable again), values, and sociopolitical structures of other countries are different from ours, and therefore the same assumptions may not apply. But I see no reason to assume that other cultures, except perhaps those in Bali,<sup>19</sup> are any less grasping, calculating, and self-interested than ours. Therefore I see no reason to think that revolutions, general strikes, and *coups d'état* in the Third World cannot be studied using the same RCT principles as Congressional voting or political party activity. Hence RCT offers a fruitful avenue for further research; whether it constitutes *the* approach to which all political scientists must conform, as some of its advocates claim, is another matter. Once again, as with so many of these Grand Theories, the verdict seems to be: a useful approach, considerable promise, but still only one approach among several.

In Chapter 9 Sukhoon Hong examines environmental and geographic determinism. His contribution mainly focuses on the work of Jared Diamond whose popular books *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (1997) and *Collapse* (2005)<sup>20</sup> have had a major impact on our thinking. Diamond goes back to the origins of man and society to argue that such factors as topography, climate, latitude and longitude, rainfall, food production, and the nature and character of domesticated animals contribute more to explaining national and regional (why Europe was first and dominant for so long) differences than any other factors. Diamond presents a Grand Theory (even adapted for a national television miniseries) that, in accord with one of the more popular agendas of the time, elevates ecological factors to a deterministic conception of how and why societies rise and decline.

It is interesting and relevant for our discussion of the next two Grand Theories that while Rostow, Lipset, Almond, Deutsch, et al. take us back fifty years to the emergence onto the world scene of a host of new nations and while Weber, Landes,<sup>21</sup> Braudel,<sup>22</sup> et al. take us back five hundred years to Europe's emerging dominance and the distinct patterns of European development (the wealthy North versus the backward South), Diamond takes us back 10,000 years. I am not sure that the social sciences are prepared for that or that we (including Diamond) have the proper measuring instruments to go that far back in time to the very beginning of civilization. (On the other hand, as we know from the other chapters in this book, sociobiology takes us back even farther than that, and what Josh Dix calls "neuronopolitics" goes back to the very origins of organic matter itself.) Hence I find Diamond's arguments provocative, suggestive, and interesting, but by no means conclusive. We are also troubled by, and require clarification on, passages late in Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel* in which he seems to be arguing, after hundreds of pages devoted to ecological explanations, that it is really culture that is the all-important factor.

Sociobiology, according to Harvard's Edward Wilson,<sup>23</sup> that Grand Theory's foremost advocate, is "the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior." So now we are into biology instead of ecology, and how many social scientists are equipped to deal with that? In fact, Wilson is one of the nation's foremost biologists, but the findings of his lifelong research, as Murat Bayar points out, have profound—and often troubling—implications for the social sciences. Not only does Wilson trace his findings way back, to the origins of some of life's earliest and more primitive organisms, but he also argues that biology, and hence genetics, play a far more important



role in explaining human behavior than heretofore believed. In the great debate between nature (inheritance) and nurture (culture), Wilson's research comes out overwhelmingly on the side of nature.

These conclusions are worrisome for a number of reasons and help explain why Wilson's work is so controversial. Marxists are opposed to Wilson because he argues that genetics, not class conflict, is the main driving force in history. Liberals are opposed because if we are mainly, overwhelmingly, maybe even exclusively, a product of our genetic makeup, then most attempts at reform and social engineering are bound to be frustrating and most often unsuccessful. Still others, including Murat Bayar, worry that Wilson's and others' findings of inherent genetic differences between the races may reinforce racism and lead us to give up on reforming inner-city schools.

But Wilson himself is careful to state that nature and nurture, genes and the environment, inheritance and culture, are interrelated in all kinds of complex ways, and that until we understand these relationships better, we had better be very careful while venturing into this complex terrain. That is our conclusion as well: surely we do not want, as some do, to silence Wilson and terminate his research; on the other hand, with such a controversial field and with such potentially explosive findings, we need to be very careful about the use to which this research is put. For now, therefore, we continue to list sociobiology as one Grand Theory among many but with the potential—as we discover more and more features have a genetic base—to have greater influence in the future.

If Jared Diamond takes us back thousands of years and Wilson millions, then the newest Grand Theory, here baptized “neuronopolitics” by Josh Dix, takes us back to the very origins of organic matter. Its arguments, as compared with Wilson's studies of ant behavior, are that, beneath it all, we humans, or we human animals, are just a bunch of chemicals, neurons, and electrical impulses. How is that for a comedown? If the old arguments about whether we have souls or not, or free will versus predestination, are not long since dead, then these newer findings from chemistry, physics, and biology will surely bury them. For the natural scientists are saying that such arguments are totally meaningless; instead we need to concentrate on the basic building blocks of the cell and even smaller particles, all of which show us to be just a stew of amino acids, subatomic particles, and an electric “spark” that sets the “pot” to boiling. How demeaning that there is not much room for a soul, let alone free will or even nature versus nurture in such a formulation!<sup>24</sup>

It is difficult for us as political scientists to come to grips with what the natural scientists are doing. Even though there is a literature

beginning in our field, we still lack the language, the categories, and the concepts to incorporate the findings of biology, chemistry, and physics into political science. And there is nothing even remotely political that I know about the first amoebas. On the other hand, this, the evidence from sociobiology, and modern medicine, are all indicating to us that we are shaped more by our genes than had been previously thought.

So what do we do with Dix's "neuronopolitics"? My sense is that we need to deal with the issues Dix raises, meantime seeking to develop the *political science* language or nomenclature appropriate to the discussion. For the time that our author visualizes, when we will be able to manipulate our own DNA, store up human eggs at the local egg bank, and create blue-eyed, brown-eyed, and super intelligent people at our whim, may be closer than we think.

Meantime, I am intrigued by another idea that comes out of this science and is particularly relevant for the themes of this book. We already know from genome research that human beings are 98.6 percent alike in their genetic makeup. Now suppose we can agree on when the first *homo sapiens* emerged—let us say 150,000 years ago, or at "Point Zero." At that first time there were no contrasting cultures, no class structure, no institutions, no sociology, no psychology, no rational choice. All there was is nature (our common genetic makeup) and nurture (the environment). Does that mean we can sweep away all our other Grand Theories and Ideologies as "late arrivals" and only concentrate on these two, nature and nurture? I am not prepared to answer that question at this time, I am prepared only to raise the issue and urge others to examine its intriguing implications.

But now, back to the "real world," or at least one with which political scientists are more comfortable. One of the more recent Grand Theories revolves around the theme of transition to democracy. This current, ongoing effort to explain transitions to democracy, as Matt Clary explains, builds upon the development themes (Rostow, Lipset, Almond) of the 1960s; it also relates to the "end of history" thesis of Fukuyama. For if history has indeed ended, if democracy is the "only game in town," then it follows that the transitions of diverse nations to democracy is a subject worthy of study, maybe *the* most important subject. There are echoes here also of the institutional approach: if democracy is universal or becoming so, as well as the "only game," then the only things worth studying, apparently, are the institutional arrangements by which transition to democracy and its consolidation can be effected.

But there are BIG problems with, and BIG assumptions undergirding, this approach. Among others, it completely ignores culture,

history, geography, and, most importantly, *difference* (among societies and nations). It assumes that all countries are, more or less, on the same trajectory toward democracy, that its institutional analysis is applicable to all countries at all times, and that all countries will reach the same endpoint—democracy and open markets.

But as Clary stresses, the events of the last twenty years in Russia, China, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and South and Southeast Asia, to say nothing of the recent economic crisis that has revealed a lack of consensus on economic policy as well as on political change, indicate that the triumph of democracy and free markets may not be inevitable, let alone universal. In addition, I am not convinced that the transition-to-democracy approach rises to the level of being a Grand Theory, as are the other approaches treated in this book. Transitions to Democracy is a body of literature developed to deal with an ongoing, concrete, real-life issue or problem at a certain point in time—the apparent transitions in the 1980s and 1990s of a considerable number of countries, both former authoritarian and former Marxist-Leninist regimes, to democracy; but Grand Theory, I do not think so.

Finally, in Leah Langford's chapter on indigenous and non-Western theories of change, we open up the possibilities for a whole new range of Grand Theories. It is a theme I have addressed before, both theoretically and in a policy sense,<sup>25</sup> but it bears reiteration in the present context. For during the 1970s and 1980s, beginning with Iran and its revolution and reverberating widely throughout the Third World, the sense was widespread that neither the Western (Rostow) model of development nor the Eastern one (Marxist) was relevant to their needs. The argument, advanced by A. H. Somjee and others,<sup>26</sup> was that the countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America had so little in common with the West historically, culturally, geographically (in terms of resources), sociologically, and politically that they could not possibly imitate the developmental experience of the West. Since both developmentalism and Marxism were Western "implants" transferred only uncomfortably into non-Western soil, it was time for the non-West to formulate its own, indigenous ("we'll do it our way") theories or models of development. The idea was widely popular for a time among intellectuals and political leaders in the Third World, and hence the call went out for a distinctly East Asian (Confucian), South Asian (Hindu), Middle Eastern (Islamic), African, and Latin American model or theory of development.

There are numerous problems with the idea of an indigenous or homegrown model of development for each of the world's major

geographic or culture areas.<sup>27</sup> Not the least of these are the disparities between elite and mass wishes in this regard. Also problematic are internal disagreements over what constitutes *the* indigenous model; the use of such models for partisan, ethnic, or personal advantage; difficulties of implementation; and so on. On top of these difficulties came the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and other Marxist regimes, the discrediting and undermining of many authoritarian regimes, and the seeming triumph, at least temporarily, of democracy and hence of the transitions-to-democracy approach.

Taken together, these forces snuffed out the idea of local, home-fashioned models for a time. But as we indicated before, democracy has not quite triumphed so universally; and now, with the crisis and seeming collapse of markets, banks, whole financial and political systems throughout the world, all the old assumptions and institutions are under attack. All bets are off as to what the future (democratic, capitalistic, socially just?) will look like. And, just as quickly, the attractiveness of and debate over constructing an indigenous model—really, a whole series of them—have been revived.

Well, there we have it: twelve Grand Theories and Ideologies in search of reality. The question(s) now is: which of these theories, which combination of them, explains reality better?

## TOWARD THE FUTURE

What is the future of Grand Theory? Have we reached the “end of ideology” (Bell)? Is history “over” (Fukuyama)? Is democracy “the only game in town”?

Probably not, at least by the evidence presented in this book and by what we see and experience all around us in the current economic crisis. First, while Bell was correct to point to the increased political moderation of political parties, labor unions, and voters in the 1950s, he downplayed the divisions that still existed and completely missed the conflicts and polarization that would characterize the 1960s and 1970s, and domestic politics (red versus blue) to this day. Similarly with Fukuyama: while he was correct in emphasizing the declining legitimacy of both authoritarianism and Marxism, he missed the fact that there could be many forms of democracy, that democracy’s triumph was much more secure in the developed countries than in the developing world, that there were many mixed forms, and that there could be reversions to authoritarianism (Russia) as well as the reemergence of Marxism.

Obviously, in this book, we are not cheerleaders for authoritarianism or Marxism-Leninism. Our own preference is not necessarily to

see a revival of ideology or to prove the Fukuyama thesis concerning the triumph of democracy wrong. Nor do we necessarily wish to prove Huntington's "clash of civilizations" correct. Rather, our purpose here is to deal with the real world as we see it. And that "real world" indicates the still present and maybe increasing presence and competition of different *systems* of society and politics, and of the distinct models or paradigms (Grand Theories and Ideologies) used to explain them.

We have treated individual Grand Theories and Ideologies in the body of this book, and reviewed them from the editor's perspective in the preceding part of this conclusion. It remains for us now as students of Grand Theory to see where in our theory and model-building we go from here, what still needs to be done, and where the frontiers are in theory-building. We see at least five directions for future research in this field.

The first is to continue working in our own "separate islands"<sup>28</sup> of Grand Theory, doing more empirical research and/or case studies, refining the theories, and adding to and building upon the bodies of ideas we already have. That means the political-culturalists will continue to work in their field, the institutionalists and rational choice scholars in theirs, the psychoanalysts and sociobiologists in theirs. And so on, through this whole range of theories. New research and new theory construction will go forward separately in each area of theory, adding to our empirical knowledge and to the sophistication of our arguments.

A second approach, one that I particularly favor, is to build bridges among and between the distinct islands of theory. I see no reason, for example, why dependency theory with its emphasis on outside economic and political forces cannot be combined with developmentalism and its focus on society's internal dynamics. I see nothing that, in the proper hands, is incompatible between political-cultural and institutional explanations: think, for example, of racial integration in the United States where *Brown vs. Board of Education* (institutional) helped to change the culture, while the changing American culture also helped change American institutions. One can think of all kinds of useful combinations in this regard: psychological and sociobiological explanations, institutionalism and rational choice, chemistry and sociobiology, or, potentially more controversial, sociobiology and political culture. Whether controversial or not, the point is that much new empirical and theoretical work can be done at the points where these Grand Theories meet and overlap.

A third logical pursuit, which the editor also seeks to follow in his own research, is to be eclectic, borrowing useful theory from a variety

of approaches. Because of my research interests, I tend to borrow what I think of as useful ideas from developmentalism, political culture, political sociology, institutionalism, rational choice, and non-Western theories of change. Some of my writings have been identified with the political-cultural approach,<sup>29</sup> but actually in my empirical research, I pick and choose among a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches.<sup>30</sup> To me, these are purely pragmatic choices; I am interested in any theory or body of knowledge that helps shed light on the particular issue that I am investigating. Doubtless the Freudian in our research team would find deep psychological impulses in the choices I make, and certainly the sociobiologist would also find a subconscious cause. But at least in my own mind the goal is ever-deeper explanation, and I am willing eclectically to use any theory or approach that helps advance that goal.

A fourth approach is to use multivariate analysis to see which of several explanations or Grand Theories provides us with more fire-power. What explains the development of the “West” as compared with the East or the South since 1492? Is it culture, institutions, economics, sociology, topography, resources, the environment? What?

Diverse scholars have arrived at different answers to this question: Marx had pointed to the rise of capitalism as *the* cause, while Weber, and, more recently, David Landes have emphasized religious and cultural factors. Braudel has emphasized geography, and Diamond insists on the environment. But I am attracted more to the work of Ronald Inglehart and his team at the University of Michigan who have used multivariate analysis (the computerized measurement of numerous factors) to arrive at an empirically based conclusion.<sup>31</sup> In Inglehart’s analysis, a number of explanatory factors, including sociological and geographic factors, are useful, but one—political culture—stands out as offering more explanatory power than others. Until more or other evidence comes in, I am, again pragmatically, willing to go along with the Inglehart team’s conclusions.

A fifth possibility, not unrelated to the previous point, is that one of these explanations or Grand Theories may emerge as overwhelmingly dominant. There are several candidates already for that honor, including Marxian class analysis (at least in its own eyes), the New Institutionalism, rational choice theory, environmentalism (at least according to Diamond), sociobiology, and what our colleague Dix calls neuronopolitics. Whether any of these will in fact emerge as a dominant, single-causal explanation remains to be seen. If I had to place bets on any of these, I would bet on the more science-oriented explanations, sociobiology and neuronopolitics, because both of these,

or the two combined, have the *potential* in the long run to emerge as all-encompassing explanations. Another possibility, ultimately, is the Point Zero option, where nature and nurture come together.

Meanwhile, short of some pioneering breakthrough that, for all we know, may already be well underway, what should the rest of us who labor in the vineyards of present-day political science and comparative politics do? My collaborators and I are open to a number of the possibilities outlined above. I am personally interested in corporatism and political culture, and therefore I will surely continue to think and write about those approaches.<sup>32</sup> But I have never believed in single-causal explanations, and in my field research I have always employed an eclectic approach, borrowing from culture studies, developmentalism, sociology, institutionalism, and rational choice, as well as from non-Western theories. At the same time, I want to build bridges among these islands of theory; I am also fascinated by multivariate analysis and its efforts to weigh the relative explanatory power of these distinct Grand Theories.

I suppose it would be nice if we arrived someday at a single, all-encompassing, unifying theory and model. But I do not see that goal in sight yet. And quite frankly, I expect the world will be a more boring place if we do indeed reach that goal and no longer have these alternative paradigms and conflicting ideologies to argue over.

# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. It was also striking that in the great financial meltdown of 2008, when the Europeans nationalized parts of their banking systems, they also decided—corporatist style—to demand seats on the banks' governing boards. In contrast, the United States, which does not have a long history of corporatism, nationalized part of the banking system but did not concurrently require representation on the banks' boards.
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4. Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1981); Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); and Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).
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4. Roy Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (New York: Random House, 1955).
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9. Bruce Morris, *Economic Growth and Development* (New York, NY: Pitman, 1967), 10.
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12. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York, NY: Doubleday-Anchor, 1959).
13. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55 (September 1961): 493–514.
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19. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
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## CHAPTER 2

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  6. Peter B. Evans, *Dependent Development*; Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence*; and Moran, *Multinational Corporations: The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment*.
  7. Collier’s edited volume *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* examines in great detail the many cases in Latin America that demonstrate how social, political, and economic disjunctions and hardships caused by transitions to capitalism resulted in authoritarian regimes. See David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
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13. Theodor W. Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality: Studies in Prejudice* (New York: Norton, 1942).
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15. Dante Moreira Leite, *O Caráter Nacional Brasileiro: História de uma Ideologia*, Ensaios, 5a. ed., vol. 138 (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1992).
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19. Howard J. Wiarda, *An Introduction to Comparative Politics* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2000).

20. Of course, these policies were developed during the Cold War, and so the underlying motive was to quell the spread of Communism and reduce the Soviet threat. Interestingly, the father of developmentalism, W. W. Rostow titled his work "A Non-Communist Manifesto."
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