


History Without Borders

The Making of an Asian World Region, 1000–1800



Geoffrey C. Gunn

History Without Borders

History Without Borders

The Making of an Asian World Region,
1000–1800

Geoffrey C. Gunn



香港大學出版社

HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS

Hong Kong University Press
14/F Hing Wai Centre
7 Tin Wan Praya Road
Aberdeen
Hong Kong
www.hkupress.org

© Hong Kong University Press 2011

ISBN 978-988-8083-34-3

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed and bound by Condor Production Ltd. in Hong Kong, China

Contents

Tables and Figures	ix
Maps and Illustrations	ix
Preface	xiii
Acknowledgments	xv
Introduction	1
<i>The East Asian Regionalism School; “A Hundred Frontiers; A Hundred Horizons”; Writing a Decentered World Regional History?; Oriental Globalization Explained; A “Long Orient-first” Periodization (From Song to the Opium Wars); Southeast, East, or East-Southeast Asia?; The Framing of an East Asian History</i>	
1. Southeast Asia Between India and China	21
<i>The Southeast Asian Environment; From Hunter-Gatherers to Bronze and Iron Age Civilizations; The Austronesian Dispersion Theory; The Indian Trade and Civilizational Transfer; Arab Trade and Islamic Conversion</i>	
2. Rise and Fall of the Southeast Asian “Charter” Kingdoms	51
<i>Srivijaya on Sumatra; Java-centered Majapahit; The Cambodian Kingdom of Angkor; The Court of Phnom Penh; Tai Pluralism (c. 1250–1440); The Kingdom of Vientiane; The Tai Kingdom of Ayutthaya; The Burmese Kingdoms; The Trinh and Nguyen in Vietnam; The Hinduized Coastal States of Champa; The Court of Hue</i>	
3. Islamic Courts and Maritime Trading Ports	79
<i>Islamic Courts of Southeast Asia; The Sultanate of Aceh: Indian Ocean Gateway to Southeast Asia; The Melaka Sultanate; Banten</i>	

- (1526–1813); *Mataram: Muslim Court/Javanese Tradition; The Sultanate of Brunei: Across the China Seas; Moro-land: The Sulu Sultanate at the Frontier; The Patani Sultanate: Facing Down Siam; Makassar: Cosmopolitan Court on Sulawesi; Johor: Sultanate with Strategic Alliances*
4. The Tribute Trade System and Chinese Diasporas 103
The China-centered Tribute Trade System; Merchants, Smugglers and “Pirates”; The Historical Patterning; An Early 15th-Century Chinese Diaspora on Sumatra; The Rise of Chinese Totok Communities on Java; The Melaka Chinese: Rise of a Baba Community; The Chinese of Manila: Under the Spanish Gaze; The Teochiu Chinese of Bangkok: Royalists and Retainers; “South of the Clouds”: The Yunnan Frontier; The Chinese of Vietnam: Pioneers of the Expanding Frontier
5. Commerce, Currencies, and Commodities 133
Indigenous Southeast Asian Coinage; The Chinese Currency Tradition; Shifting Currency Standards; East-Southeast Asian Commodity Chains
6. The Iberian Maritime Networks 159
Portuguese Trading Networks; Goa under the Portuguese: Seat of the Estado da India; Portuguese Melaka: Crossroads of the Malay World; Portuguese Macau: City-state under Chinese Sufferance; Nagasaki and the Portuguese: Missionaries and Traders; Portuguese Tribulations in the Spice Islands; The Solor-Flores-Timor Zone; Portuguese “Shadow Empires” in the Bay of Bengal; Spanish Manila
7. Hegemonic Sequence: Enter the Dutch and English 185
 Trading Companies
Rise of the European Trading Companies; The Dutch East India Company Operation; Batavia Under the Dutch; Dutch Control over the Spiceries; Makassar from 1669; Melaka Under the Dutch (1641–1824); VOC at the Cosmopolitan Court of Ayutthaya; The Dutch and English in Japan; The Dutch and English Interactions with Trinh Vietnam; Zeelandia on Taiwan (1624–61); VOC in the Bay of Bengal; The English East India Company Focus on China; The European Companies and the Guangzhou (Canton) Trade

8. *Nihon-Machi*: Japanese Diasporic Communities of Southeast Asia 211
Early Japanese Trade in Prestige Goods; The Red Seal Trade; Japan, Choson Korea, and the Southeast Asia Connection; Ryukyu in the Southeast Asian Trade; The Swashbuckling Japanese of Ayutthaya; The Japanese of Manila: Good Reception, Uncertain Fate; Cambodia: "Bandits Who Dare Not Return to Their Country"; The Nagasaki Trade with Vietnam; The Japanese of Macau: Mixed Receptions; Japanese Mercenaries on Ambon; The Japanese of Batavia (Jakarta)
9. The Intra-Asian Bullion Trade Economy Networks 237
Gold and Silver Mines in Japan; Nagasaki-Macau and the Silk-for-Silver Trade; Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans in the Japanese Bullion Trade; Japan and the Global Copper Trade; The Special Role of Yunnan in the Imperial Chinese Monetary System; Declining Japanese Copper Reserves and Responses; The Early 18th-Century Crisis in Japan; Impacts of the Bullion Trade on the Southeast Asian Polities
10. East-Southeast Asia in the Global Ceramic Trade Networks 263
Chinese Ceramics Production; The Marine Archaeological Evidence; The Siamese and Burmese Ceramics Trade; The Vietnamese and Cham Ceramics Trade; The European Ceramics Trade; The Zheng Family Ceramics Trade; The Guangzhou Ceramic Export Trade; Japanese Ceramic Trade Networks; The Dutch Ceramics Trade at Nagasaki; Primary VOC Trading Networks; European Demand and the Rise of Delft; Cycles of Japan-Dutch Ceramic Trade Networks; Secondary Destinations: The Intra-regional Trade; The Chinese Junk Trade in Ceramics
11. Knowledge Transfers: A Regional Technology Complex? 291
Ptolemaic, Arab, Indian, and Chinese Knowledge Exchanges; The Indian Transfer; Islamic Transfers; Diffusion of Chinese Technologies in East-Southeast Asia; Military Technology Transfers; East-Southeast Asian Military/Science/Technology Balances; An Emerging Southeast Asia Material Culture-Technology Complex?

Conclusion	315
<i>A Greater East Asian Region; Decline of the Tribute Trade System; East-Southeast Asia in the World Economy: Retreat or Subordination? Reading Back Regionalism Today; Divergent Paths to Modernity</i>	
References	327
Further Reading	369
Index	383

Tables and Figures

Table 9.1	Portuguese and Japanese Red Seal Trade Silver Exports in Millions of Taels (1546–1637)	241
-----------	--	-----

Maps and Illustrations

Map 1.1	Austronesian Migrations	32
Map 1.2	Asian Maritime Zones and Trade Circuits, c.13th–16th centuries	47
Map 9.1	Japanese Silver Mines and Trade Ports, c.16th–18th centuries	240
Map 10.1	Ceramic Production Sites and Junk Trade Ports, c.16th–19th centuries	277
Plate 1	Dongson culture Bronze Drum, Song Da valley, northwest Vietnam, 1st millennium BCE. (Source: Guimet Museum in Paris)	26
Plate 2	Candi Bima, Dieng plateau, central Java, c.9th century CE. (Source: author 1980)	42
Plate 3	Prambangan, mother temple dedicated to Siva, central Java, c.850 CE. (Source: author 1980)	42
Plate 4	Ayutthaya, late period. (Source: author 1978)	62
Plate 5	Pha That Luang, Vientiane, erected over an earlier Khmer monument, 16th century; destroyed by the Thai in 1828; restored by the French in 1900, made over as a national symbol after 1975. (Source: author 2007)	61

Plate 6	Arrival of the Imperial envoys in Ryukyu, a rare image of the tribute trade in action, undated. (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Museum)	219
Plate 7	Departure of a trading junk. (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Museum)	220
Plate 8	Jorge Alvarez bottle. Jianjing period (1522–66) with Portuguese letters and the Chinese inscription [tianxia taiping (peace to the world)]. (Source: Guimet Museum in Paris)	274
Plate 9	Decorated plate of Wanli period (c.1580–1620) with coat of arms of the Almeida family of Portugal. (Source: Guimet Museum in Paris)	265
Plate 10	Rare Japanese image of Nagasaki harbor showing newly constructed Deshima along with Portuguese and other ships, c.1640. (Source: Nagasaki Prefectural Museum)	174
Plate 11	Chinese trading junk by Japanese artist, late Edo period. (Source: Nagasaki Prefectural Museum)	286
Plate 12	Nhi Pu pagoda, Saigon-Cholon, Vietnam, dating from early 18th century. (Source: author 2009)	130
Plate 13	“Koshi-byo” or Confucian shrine, Nagasaki, built in 1893 under Qing patronage and remaining under Chinese control. (Source: author 2007)	113
Plate 14	VOC graveyard, Inasa, Nagasaki. (Source: author 1994)	201
Plate 15	VOC cannon presented to Johor sultan, in turn acquired by Aceh, with Jawi inscription, Fort Cornwallis, Penang. (Source: author 2009)	187
Plate 16	Nova Tabula Insularum, Sumatrae, Borneonis et ali, by Theodore de Bry, Frankfurt, 1596. (Source: Nagasaki University library)	16
Plate 17	“The uses of history”; Hanoi’s iconic Flag Tower, sole remaining relic of a fortress constructed by Emperor Gia Long, 1802–12, currently sharing space with the Military History Museum. (Source: author 2006)	71

Plate 18	Achen Street mosque, Penang, in the heart of a once dynamic Muslim quarter founded in 1808 by Acehese residents, today a World Heritage protected site. (Source: author 2009)	85
Plate 19	Makassan “prauh pinas” or sailing vessel, Tanjong Priuk, Jakarta. (Source: author 1978)	196
Plate 20	Hybrid Chinese-Sumatran junk, Straits of Melaka, offshore Medan. (Source: author 1978)	117

Preface

Astride the historical maritime silk routes linking India to China, East-Southeast Asia can also be viewed over the *longue durée* as a global region-in-the-making. This can be read out of the intense intra-Asian commerce in spices, silks, ceramics, and silver, placing the Asian world region in the forefront of global economic history at least prior to the age of imperialism. But alongside the correlated silver trade, in which Japanese, Europeans, Muslims, and others participated, it was China through its age-old Tributary Trade Networks that provided the essential stability and continuity enabling a brilliant age of commerce.

Stubbornly, however, national history dominates the writing of Asian history. This might appear as natural in the context of states with long central state bureaucratic traditions. This book, however, situates itself within a new genre of writing on zones between nations, especially prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state. Coming under the broad rubric of borderland studies, even powerful state-centric narratives have to be re-examined with respect to shifting and contested boundaries and identities.

The rising discipline of world or global history offers both method and lessons, especially in the way of privileging cultural alongside economic exchanges. By challenging Euro-centric versions of history, world historians have elevated even relatively obscure zones to the mainstream. This book, accordingly, is cognizant of both the spatial and temporal considerations in which the various peoples and polities of the meta region came to be bound up with the rest of the globe on whatever terms.

History Without Borders seeks to bring civilization back into the discussion of the fabulous centuries-long global trade in Asian commodities, both rare and everyday, raising a range of questions as to unequal

development, intra-regional technological exchanges and advances, as well as the emergence of new Asian hybridities and identities within and without the conventional boundaries of nation-state.

Acknowledgments

A broad gauge history calls down many intellectual debts. My first exposure to Indonesian history was at Melbourne University in the late 1960s under the late Jamie Mackie. I also gained a first taste of East Asian history from the late C.P. Fitzgerald, a guest lecturer at Melbourne on Tang dynasty. Also at Melbourne, I acquired some sense of political geography from Victor Prescott. At some remove, I studied Indochinese history at Monash University under the supervision of Cambodia-specialist David Chandler. Such research led me back to fieldwork in Laos as well as to libraries and archives in France. As for Islamic world exposure, hard travel along certain of the silk roads described in this book aside, I also held teaching posts in Libya and Brunei. Another cycle of research stemmed from my concerns for Portugal's unrequited decolonization of East Timor (then under Indonesian occupation), as well as Macau facing down reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Research pursuits including Nagasaki history also took me to Portuguese libraries and archives. Books followed.

I have been fortunate to engage first hand, however briefly in some cases, many of the practitioners of East-Southeast Asia history writ large, some whose names appear in the text of this book. They include, in no particular order, Abu Talib Ahmad; Paul Kratoska; Martin Stuart-Fox; Mark Selden; Hamashita Takeshi; Anthony Reid; Leo Suryadinata; the late Ishii Yoneo; Jean Berlie; Geoff Wade; George Souza; Li Tana; Leonard Blussé; Khien Theeravit; Frédéric Durand, Barbara Watson Andaya; James Chin Kong; Roderich Ptak; Luis Filipe Thomaz; Jean Berlie; Cynthia Vialle; R. Bin Wong; Paul Van Dyke; James Warren, alongside many other country specialists. I have learned a lot. Thank you.

I am also obliged to the Nagasaki University Faculty of Economics Southeast Asia Research Center Studies Series, which published an earlier version of this work. In turn, I am indebted to the Kakiemon-style Ceramic Art Research Center of Kyushu Sangyo University which earlier commissioned a version of Chapter 10. Anonymous readers of the mss for Hong Kong University Press also helped me to focus the scope of this work. Thanks also owe to geographer and Asia-specialist Frédéric Durand who expertly drafted the maps.

Geoffrey C. Gunn
Nagasaki/Macau



Plate 1. Dongson culture Bronze Drum, Song Da valley, northwest Vietnam, 1st millennium BCE. (Source: Guimet Museum in Paris)



Plate 2. Candi Bima, Dieng plateau, central Java, c. 9th century CE. (Source: author 1980)



Plate 3. Prambangan, mother temple dedicated to Siva, central Java, c.850 CE.
(Source: author 1980)



Plate 4. Ayutthaya, late period. (Source: author 1978)



Plate 5. Pha That Luang, Vientiane, erected over an earlier Khmer monument, 16th century; destroyed by the Thai in 1828; restored by the French in 1900, made over as a national symbol after 1975. (Source: author 2007)



Plate 6. Arrival of the Imperial envoys in Ryukyu, a rare image of the tribute trade in action, undated. (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Museum)




Plate 7. Departure of trading junk. (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Museum)



Plate 8. Jorge Alvarez bottle. Jianjing period (1522–66) with Portuguese letters and the Chinese inscription [tianxia taiping (peace to the world)]. (Source: Guimet Museum in Paris)



Plate 9. Decorated plate of Wanli period (c.1580–1620) with coat of arms of the Almeida family of Portugal. (Source: Guimet Museum in Paris)



Plate 10. Rare Japanese image of Nagasaki harbor showing newly constructed Deshima along with Portuguese and other ships, c.1640. (Source: Nagasaki Prefectural Museum)



Plate 11. Chinese trading junk by Japanese artist, late Edo period. (Source: Nagasaki Prefectural Museum)



Plate 12. Nhi Pu pagoda, Saigon-Cholon, Vietnam, dating from early 18th century. (Source: author 2009)



Plate 13. “Koshi-byo” or Confucius shrine, Nagasaki, built in 1893 under Qing patronage and remaining under Chinese control. (Source: author 2007)



Plate 14. VOC graveyard, Inasa, Nagasaki. (Source: author 1994)



Plate 15. VOC cannon presented to Johor sultan, in turn acquired by Aceh, with Jawi inscription, Fort Cornwallis, Penang. (Source: author 2009)



Plate 16. Nova Tabula Insularum, Sumatrae, Borneonis et ali, by Theodore de Bry, Frankfurt, 1596. (Source: Nagasaki University Library)



Plate 17. “The uses of history”; Hanoi’s iconic Flag Tower, sole remaining relic of a fortress constructed by Emperor Gia Long, 1802–12, currently sharing space with the Military History Museum. (Source: author 2006)



Plate 18. Achen Street mosque, Penang, at the heart of a once dynamic Muslim quarter founded in 1808 by Acehnese residents, today a World Heritage protected site. (Source: author 2009)



Plate 19. Makassan “prauh pinas” or sailing vessel, Tanjung Priuk, Jakarta.
(Source: author 1978)



Plate 20. Hybrid Chinese-Sumatran junk, Straits of Melaka, offshore Medan.
(Source: author 1978)

Introduction

The global trends that have seen the dramatic rise of Asian economies suggest a turning of the wheel. Students of world history will recall that China, Japan, and India held a central place in the premodern world as producers and exporters of silks, ceramics, and cottons, while their populations and economies vastly dwarfed those of medieval Europe. The sprawling tropical zone of Southeast Asia, known as a prime source of spices and natural commodities, also boasted impressive civilizations. Visitors to the temple complexes of Angkor and Borobudur, in Cambodia and Java respectively, still find themselves awed. Still we are perplexed as to how this historical region, boasting internationally known trade emporia, dropped off the center stage of world history. Did colonialism and imperialism turn the tide against indigenous agency? Or was stagnation an inevitable feature of life? Indeed, is it even desirable to write an autonomous history of a broader East-Southeast Asian region?

We acknowledge that a discussion of maritime trade in the development of modern economies in Southeast Asia is still controversial, especially with respect to the mix of social, economic, and cultural influences. But we seek to go further by asking a series of interrelated questions, as to whether nascent capitalism ever developed in this region, or whether the region remained peripheral to the European (and Chinese) core? We also wonder about the timing and nature of change called up by the European intervention. We wish to identify local production centers, such as for metallurgy, porcelain, and textiles, just as we seek to investigate the exchange dynamics between indigenous and foreign merchant communities? Allowing for an “age of commerce” fired up by the European intervention, can we adduce a 17th-century crisis in the broader East-

Southeast Asian world region from which it would not recover until modern times? (Reid 1993).

As with my earlier book, *First Globalization: The Eurasian Exchange (1500–1800)* (2003), the present book seeks to capture the fluidity and ambiguity of boundaries, both physical and cultural, especially prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state system. Even so, and reflecting newer concerns with the writing of global history, the present book seeks to position this sprawling tropical zone situated between India and China as both a globally connected and temporally correlated “world region.” While *First Globalization* stresses an intrinsic cultural or intellectual dynamic whereby Europe, emerging out of the intellectual crucible of the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation, trumped Asia in achieving early industrialization and modernization, the present work seeks to push an argument favoring early Asian economic precocity across an interconnected macro-region: one that trade built, but also one that stumbled toward the end of the 1000–1800 time frame, in large part owing to extrinsic factors, notably the rise of the West.

The East Asian Regionalism School

In so doing I am guided by a revisionist bloc of writing that departs from conventionally Eurocentric history by allowing that, at its height in the 18th century, East Asia achieved high levels of peace, prosperity, and stability. In this view, China and its tributary trade system underwrote this prosperity just as it provided a geopolitical framework in which non-official trade across the vast East-Southeast Asian region could also flourish. While it might be objected that both the Qing in China and the Tokugawa in Japan imposed strict maritime restrictions on overseas trade, trade nevertheless continued on the margins. Notably, the Fujian connection linked coastal China with the Ryukyus, Japan, and Southeast Asia, just as Japan (and Korea) maintained a window on the world, at various points on or off the shores of Kyushu, notably in Nagasaki where, successively, Portuguese, Dutch, and Chinese conducted mostly uninterrupted trade (Selden 2009).

Since Adam Smith, the importance of the global silver trade has always been acknowledged. But, in the new East Asia regionalist paradigm, an understanding of the Asian silver flows that preceded even the European

capture of American silver comes to the heart of an understanding of the exchange mechanism. Across the 1000–1800 period highlighted in this book, great volumes of Japanese silver (and later copper), rivaling even exports from Spanish America, were exchanged for Chinese and Vietnamese silks, aromatic woods, and other tropical zone commodities, just as newly arriving Iberians and northern Europeans traded a range of mostly indigenous Asian commodities, including Indian cottons and later opium, to acquire the silver to purchase coveted Oriental silks, ceramics, and, at a later stage, tea.

Setting aside East Asian Confucian heritages in favor of an analysis stressing interdependencies and interactions between groups of contiguous countries, we find that East Asia emerges as a super region, with China as the center of an interstate system bringing into play, besides Southeast Asia, Inner Asia and Northeast Asia. The impetus behind the emergence of an “East Asia Regionalism School” has come not from China but rather from a group of international scholars, including Japanese researchers.¹

“A Hundred Frontiers, A Hundred Horizons”

But why the need for a supra-national history or yet another history of Southeast Asia, however defined? Notwithstanding the challenges thrown up by the burgeoning field of prehistory, and by the globalization of knowledge via various new media, national history still dominates the writing of East-Southeast Asian history. Reaching back to James Warren’s pioneering study of the “Sulu Zone” (1981), a newer genre of writings has sought to re-center national narratives to fit longer-term patterns prior to the rise of nation-states. Coming under the broader rubric of borderlands studies, even powerful Chinese narratives have been re-examined with particular respect to the expanding frontier. For example, Giersch (2006) places the Tai people at the center of his study of the expanding Qing frontier, finding that multiple players from states and

1 These individuals include Hamashita Takeshi (1998; 1989; 1994) and Sugihara Kaoru (2005), along with North America-based scholars R. Bin Wong (1997), Kenneth Pomerantz (2001), and Mark Selden (2003). The late André Gunder Frank (1998) and Giovanni Arrighi (2003; 2007) also take their place within the “school.”

ethnic groups contested Han encroachments but also entered into hybrid relations as Chinese acculturation deepened. As Cooke and Li (2005) write of the “water frontier” of southern Vietnam and the Gulf of Siam region, there was always much fluidity in the shifting frontiers between peoples and states.

As James C. Scott (2009) has highlighted, the non-state people of this world, notably highland-dwelling ethnic minorities, often exist in “anarchic” relationship to local power constellations. But, in deliberately demarcating their separateness, they also challenge the civilizational narratives of the lowland states. Such conflicting visions of statehood have persisted over long periods, just as rebellion or flight was long the recourse of the marginalized at the hands of predatory states. Even today, we cannot ignore the faultlines within nation-states that threaten to tear them apart. It is no coincidence that modern Southeast Asia is riven with secessionist and autonomist movements, as modern states seek to consolidate territorial boundaries at all costs.

To be sure, the modern conception of the nation-state is a far cry from that with which rulers of the Indianized court centers of Southeast Asia sought to control their realms. Whether or not the kings of Angkor and Borobudur placed premium upon the control of manpower, resources, or territory is part of an extended discussion by specialists in the field. The influence of postcolonial studies on more recent research has led to characterizations of mainland Southeast Asian realms that bypass strictly Western geographical conceptions. Notably, Thongchai Winichakul (1997) has postulated a discourse of the “geo-body” to explain Siam/Thailand’s experience — essentially, an enduring cosmological view of space at great variance with the Cartesian understandings emerging in early modern Europe. Archaeological discovery can of course be harnessed for national projects, but can also be unsettling to official verities (Glover 2004).

By seeking to “decenter” national narratives in the framing of a world region, this work also seeks to de-territorialize such fixities as frequently accompany national narratives of state and boundary. At a more general level, this book acknowledges that key concepts at issue in the framing and writing of a world region narrative are a sense of porosity, permeability, connectedness, flexibility, and openness of spatial and temporal boundaries and borders. The world confronted by early travelers

and navigators is well captured in the Braudelian metaphor, at least as embroidered by Bose (2006): “one hundred frontiers, one hundred horizons” (Vink 2007: 52).

Rooted in the Cold War, with its nation-building concerns, Southeast Asian area studies have been painted by Kratoska et al. (2005: 10) as standing in “stark” opposition to the rising fashion of globalization studies. The present work would not deny this view; indeed, it would argue that the globalization perspective actually helps to rescue this inchoate collection of cultures, peoples, and “nations” by assigning and/or elevating them to world region status. In other words, this book seeks to tap into a trend in globalization studies that re-appraises not only the construction of national history, but also the history of region. Although the pivotal role of Asia in the early modern world economy is the subject of a considerable body of literature, the following pages also seek to set the record straight, especially where this literature is deficient as to meeting the criteria of world region/world history analysis and, especially, where it falls into the trap of nationalist narrative or worse, in the eyes of world historians, Eurocentric or Orientalist error.

Writing a Decentered World Regional History?

A broad consensus holds that world history prioritizes connections at the macro- and micro-levels, even above the level of civilizations (Manning 2003). In this sense, even an African tribal community could be brought into the picture, through an elaboration of the mesh of connections that draws this community into an ever-expanding hierarchy of relationships (commercial or cultural) with the wider world.

As Lewis and Wigen (1997: 157) have argued, even drawing attention to a Southeast Asian world is problematical, as continents and regions alike are metageographical constructs, subject to intellectual fashion and manipulation. The way that regions are framed and reframed in Washington, for example, are also grasped by local elites and socialized as such. Notably, modern Southeast Asia as a rigidly delimited macro-region came into being as a product of the Cold War. Still, these authors argue, a sense of world region is preferable as a unit of analysis to that of continents and civilizations. In their definition, world regions are “large

sociospatial groupings delimited largely on the grounds of shared culture and history.”

World history perspectives have been applied to such global or world regions as the “Atlantic World” (Thornton 1992; Canizares-Esguerra and Seaman 2007); Africa (Manning 1982; Gilbert and Reynolds 2004); and the Indian Ocean region (Kearney 2004), as well as to oceans in general (Buschmann 2007). The broader East Asian region, however, has not been examined in this light. To be sure, a limited number of regional histories of Southeast Asia have been attempted, though on a country-by-country basis. The multi-authored *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History* (Steinberg ed. 1987) was innovative for its part-thematic, part-chronological approach. Also deservedly celebrated is the *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia* (1992). Highly conscious of a sense of region and to the risks of imposing periodization, the Cambridge approach nevertheless steps back from a coherent historical “world region” perspective.

My own sense is that writing on the global past answers the imperative to correlate over time and space the meeting and mixing of civilizations. In so doing, we observe the fascinating chronicle of the reception and rejection of practical technologies and innovations that pushed some societies and polities further ahead, while relegating others to obscurity. Viewed this way, even prehistory can reveal underlying constants of language and culture. Across East-Southeast Asia, exciting new developments in linguistic theory and archaeology (including in marine archaeology) allow a picture to be assembled, albeit one subject to constant debate and revision, stressing an underlying unity, later to be fragmented under the sway of external civilizational influences.

On a didactic note, Euro- and Americentrism is the conviction that Europe and/or America are blessed (even divinely, in some versions) with a higher form of civilization. We can see how legions of conquistadores, missionaries, slavers, and colonialists were guided by such superior and patronizing attitudes. All the European powers upheld some version of the civilizing mission in their quest for colonial domination. Even so, such notions are not specific to Europe, but found — and find — their echoes in all the great civilizations reaching back to ancient Greece, Rome, and China. Euro-Asian encounters over the millennium called up a number of centric views on the part of different civilizations. As recalled by the Reconquista and the crusades, Islamocentrism posed the

gravest challenge to medieval Christendom, just as the crusades became a byword in the European othering of Islam. In their first encounters with China, Europeans incredulously faced down a self-sufficient empire that placed itself squarely at the center of the world. Today, a rising China (and India) challenge views and attitudes associated with America's own rise to superpower hegemony.

In other words, the new world history method privileges a “decentered” perspective on the world, insofar as that is possible, given the obvious bias toward non-indigenous sources. Such a perspective allows us to transcend essentializing views of civilizations, by teasing out the crossover elements in peoples and cultures. Constructionism and post-modernist critiques allow us to see in cultural diffusions and borrowings a rich array of hybrid experiences and forms. World history also draws out the processes of interaction, migration, and conversion typically veiled in conventional history-writing. In contrast to national narratives, the new history actually celebrates the crossing of boundaries, not only between nations and peoples, but also across the social science disciplines. Only through a close study of such interactions can we attempt to construct our own notions of self and “other.” If that self is Europe or North America, then such understanding allows us to become that much less Euro- or Americentric. The same holds true for Sino- or Islamocentric or other essentializing views of self and “other.”

We may well ask what separates world-centric history from the great travel collections, from that of the Venetian Ramusio in the late 16th century to those by Hakluyt, Purchas, the great French compilers, and the encyclopedists of the Enlightenment (see Gunn 2003, ch. 1). Subrahmanyam (2005), for instance, finds that world historians of the 16th century were “handmaidens” of the European expansion. First, there is a consensus that the new world history is not national history, even if it can be harnessed to a national project or educational curriculum. Another difference is Immanuel Wallerstein's advocacy of the method of historical sociology applied over the *longue durée*. In this respect, connected histories of events have a long pedigree; we may recall Voltaire's pioneering global history, *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756), critically pronouncing upon the general crisis of 17th-century Europe, but also remarking upon parallel uprisings in Europe, India, China, and Japan.

The new world history does not stand outside of Western academic and publishing conventions. It seldom acknowledges local historiographies and operates at the level of meta-narrative, oblivious of local languages and national scholarship. Closing the gap is easier said than done. I am aware that indigenous sources are almost always superior to European ones, especially in declaiming upon dynastic affairs and philosophies, where they survive. But the truth is that European sources often supply the only extant records of commercial transactions and of daily life across the centuries.

Oriental Globalization Explained

“Globalization” has a number of resonances. It is commonly linked with the rise of modern capitalism or Western modernity (Giddens 2000), but its origins are traced back to antiquity, with the flow of peoples, trade, and ideas across the Afro-Eurasian landmass. Such studies invariably emphasize civilizational exchanges, including the complex crossover of ideas, languages, and philosophies. Globalization, in this view, emerges out of the increasing interconnectedness of cultures across the continents, sometimes described as a “human web” (McNeil and McNeil 2003).

The hybridization of cultures is much remarked upon, especially with the advent of the Columbian, Vasco da Gama, and Magellan revolutions. Not only did the great discoveries herald the making of a modern “world-system” (Wallerstein 2004), they brought to Europe a wealth of riches, from new foodstuffs to new philosophies and even forms of governance that would change Europe forever. In a word, tracing globalization back in time helps us to understand how much we owe to each other in civilizational terms.

Not all historians of globalization agree on origins or time frames. Some emphasize prehistory (Christian 2002), some a long “Orient-first” period (Wong 1997; Frank 1998; Hobson 2004), and others the reconnection of the Americas to the rest of the world (Flynn and Giráldez 2006). Still others — actually in the mainstream — stress an “early modern” period with a rising West and a laggard or stagnant East. As correlated history, the new discipline of global history seeks to eschew the biases of traditionally Eurocentric history. As multipolar or multicentered history,

it unsettles our sense of a binary East-West divide, while challenging the notion that Europe alone was exceptional in its accomplishments.

In the Orient-first view of globalization, both terrestrial and maritime silkroads linked the Afro-Eurasian landmass, bringing paper, gunpowder, the compass, and the trapezoid lateen sail to Europe, along with a host of other technologies, philosophies, and world religions. From the west, Hellenic culture penetrated east; with the advent of Islam, Muslim traders forged “Sinbad routes” as far as the coast of China. In this view, the Middle East played a bridging role, as Mecca and Baghdad emerged from the 9th century as global trade hubs linked, respectively, to the Mediterranean world and to China. China and India, in this view, are seen as being even more central to the premodern world economy, having dramatically larger economies and populations than anywhere else, and with highly advanced scientific and technological achievements.

With the foundation of the Song in 960, China entered a phase of economic growth unprecedented in global history. Relative peace was important, as was the existence of a large internal market connected by impressive canals such as the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal. Increased foreign trade, expanded commercialization, urbanization, and industrialization (including the development of an iron and steel industry) turned Song China into a world leader in terms of productivity. Such innovations as paper, woodblock printing, and the compass were all put to use. Under the Song, Chinese ships ventured directly to Southeast Asian ports, trading silk and other textiles and iron and steel, in return for spices, sandalwood, and other tropical goods (Curtin 1984: 109–10; Wink 2002: 329).

The Orient-first argument stresses the predominance of cultural flows from East to West over several thousand years. By contrast, the Western ascendancy of the early modern period spanned but a few hundred years, with Europe catching up with China only by 1800 or, in some versions, 1870 (Hobson 2004: 36). Not surprisingly, some such as Pieterse (2006: 411) have pondered whether the Orient-first literature risks reversing the current of Eurocentrism by marginalizing the West and centering the East.

Crucially, however, Europe’s discovery and incorporation of the Americas, along with its engagements and conquests across the Afro-Eurasian landmass, truly ushered in the era of “first globalization,”

especially if the revolutionary economic, epidemiological, ecological, and demographic consequences stemming from these events are considered (Flynn and Giráldez 2006: 18). This was a Eurocentric world, as confirmed by the apparent lack of rationality and scientific logic in Asian courts of the time. Although some Enlightenment thinkers saw merit in Confucian government, early European praise for China turned to scorn for its despotic and other practices. Islam and Confucianism together were seen as barriers to economic advancement.

The reasons for the eventual “divergence” between rising Europe and “stagnating” Asia has spawned a body of literature, especially by economic historians (Pomerantz 2001). But far from stagnating and withdrawing completely from global commerce, China, through its active participation in the bullion trade in Japan, in Manila and other Southeast Asian ports, actually helped to dynamize the region, creating many pioneer industries just as Chinese settlers from the prosperous coastal provinces brought unprecedented commerce to Southeast Asian lands. These settlers introduced a range of practical technologies and commercial practices, in some cases even more sweeping than parallel transfers from Europe.

A “Long Orient-first” Periodization (From Song to the Opium Wars)

This book takes a “long Orient-first” periodization (c.1000–1800 CE), allowing for significant cultural and commercial synergies between, respectively, India, the Islamic world, and China, prior to the arrival in the East-Southeast Asian region of Europeans around 1500. By 618, at the start of the Tang dynasty, the maritime silkroad connecting Arabia and China was well established, undoubtedly contributing to the cultural and economic florescence of such maritime Southeast Asian empires as Srivijaya on Sumatra and the coastal urban site of Oc Eo in the lower Mekong delta. By 800, Indianization heralded the rise of the great charter kingdoms on mainland Southeast Asia as well as in the archipelago, establishing a Sanskritized community or identity among religious elites from Java to Champa. Meanwhile, dating back to Han times (111 BCE), northern Vietnam was a veritable Chinese outrider and did not regain its independence until 938 CE.

Under the Southern Song (1127–1279), commercial shipping became the major economic base of China, ushering in an era of even more intense linkages across the seas. With imperial support, private overseas trade also flourished and transformed the nature of tribute trade. Trade networks linking central and south coastal China with Southeast Asia via the South China Sea were entirely independent of the tributary trade system itself. Chinese marine technology reached a new level of refinement (Arrighi et al. 2003: 269–70). Meriting the status of an “early-modern” development state, the rise of Song China coincided with a radical increase in the scale of international trade, with parts of the Chinese rural economy directly linked for production for the overseas market (Elvin 1973: 171–77, cited in Abu-Lughod 1989: 11). By late Song, Chinese junks ranged beyond the Malacca Straits to the Indian coast, filling in the vacuum created by the end of Arab-Indian hegemony in the west (Abu-Lughod 1989: 274).

Although the Mongols under Khubilai Khan (1215–1294 CE) demonstrated their mastery of land and sea power from Burma to Java, it was under the Ming (1368–1644 CE) that the tributary trade system reached its apogee, just as large diasporic Chinese communities took root in Southeast Asia, such as those on Java and in the Malacca Straits zone that were touched by Admiral Zheng He’s famous fleets of “treasure ships” (1405–1433 CE). While China may not have been the dominant force in determining dynastic or political outcomes across the maritime world, its presence was felt from Melaka to Brunei and Java.

Outside of essentially Chinese dynastic reckonings of the East-Southeast Asian past, are there alternative, indigenous starting points? As discussed in Chapter 1, the advent of the bronze or metal age might be considered as foundational, especially as this cultural complex linked northern mainland Southeast Asia with a broader region outside conventional boundaries. Or, could the complex migrations of peoples, especially the “Austronesian dispersion” out of Taiwan, be considered to bind the macro-region? Or, the advent of the “Sanskrit complex,” as the Indianization process has been called? Islamicization might be another discrete marker of time. Still, these possibilities all appear as long-term processes shading into hybrid outcomes as opposed to discrete new eras. The decline of Pagan and Angkor, from c. 1300 to the 1500s, has been noted as a significant turning point on mainland Southeast Asia. As

historian Victor Lieberman (2003: 122) has highlighted, this “post-character era of fragmentation” also coincided with the rise of powerful new Tai states in the central mainland, witnessing a period of state consolidation. Within this time frame, in a complex process played out across maritime Southeast Asia, notions of Islamic kingship and governance replaced Hindu-Buddhistic ones, albeit in highly eclectic form.

While a “long Orient-first view” should not ignore deep historical precursors ranging back to earlier epochs, we highlight Song China as marking the advent of an East Asian commercial revolution. In particular, Southern Song China’s maritime orientation across and beyond the greater China seas best fits to our understanding of an emerging trade-oriented region binding East and Southeast Asia.

But nor should we neglect the impact of the West in shaping historical outcomes across Eurasia. Europe’s early modern period (1500–1800), broadly coterminous with the Ming-Qing transition in China, captures a long period of metamorphosis reflecting the ebb and flow of ideas, and their uneven receptions and adaptations across the vast Eurasian space. Few then could have foreseen outcomes, especially as Europe appeared weak and divided against the impressive achievements in Asia under the China-centered interstate system. But even by the 18th century, no part of the world save the most remote and isolated zones was outside some form of globalization and creolization of culture. By 1800, in the conventional understanding, the Mughal empire had submitted to English East India Company rule and the European powers, led by Great Britain, were chafing at the restrictions imposed by the Guangzhou (Canton) trading system.

Of no less consequence for future outcomes across the broader East Asian region was the First Anglo-Chinese or Opium War (1839–42), which saw the British navy defeat its Qing counterpart in a number of running engagements. By ushering in the era of “unequal treaties,” a succession of European powers, followed by Japan, sought and obtained “extraterritorial” rights, effectively ending the system of paying tribute to China for the right to trade. France, a relative latecomer to Southeast Asia, also entered this picture by wresting eastern mainland Southeast Asia from its traditional Chinese orbit. With the advent of the treaty port system in China (also Korea and Japan), East and Southeast Asia entered a new era (Gipouloux 2009: 173–203).

The age of Asian autonomy now shaded into the age of European imperialism. In many world histories, this book included, these events mark the end of an epoch, or at least the dawn of a new one. The age of piecemeal colonization of the globe now began in earnest, as markets became truly global. In Southeast Asia, only Siam/Thailand would stand outside of direct European colonization.

Southeast, East, or East-Southeast Asia?

The Japanese scholar Hamashita Takeshi (1994) has raised doubts as to the validity of a bounded Southeast Asia separate from East Asia. In his opinion, the East-Southeast Asian zones should be viewed as part of an integrated silver trading or tribute zone beholden to the Sinocentric tribute trade system. In this millennium-old trade system, many countries participated, from all over the southern oceans. This is not necessarily an “indigenous” perspective — after all, it is an attempt at social science concept-building — but it does offer yet another optic on the world region approach. The notion of China at the head of an Asian interstate system, long before the European concept of state sovereignty was institutionalized at Westphalia in 1648, is also heralded by Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden (2003).

In reality, there was no system of equal, competing states in the pre-modern East-Southeast Asian world. In the absence of records on inter/intrastate relations, it is often only the Chinese record that remains on many of the Southeast Asian polities, with the exchange of envoys or trade missions substituted for diplomatic relations. Looking back reflectively on the scores, if not the hundreds, of polities (many ephemeral) that once ruled larger or smaller domains across this vast equatorial zone, there is reason to borrow from Hamashita’s tributary trade system model, while acknowledging that it is a late 20th-century model.

But even in bounding Southeast Asia, we would be advised, pace Victor Lieberman (1990: 70–90), to observe fundamental differences between island and mainland Southeast Asia that underlie variations in cultural and mercantile penetration. Contra Wallerstein, Lieberman contends that peripheralization proceeded at differential rates in island and mainland Southeast Asia. To greatly simplify, he argues that whereas the Dutch (unlike the Portuguese) had successfully imposed their hegemony

over large swathes of island Southeast Asia by the late 1600s, simultaneous attempts by, variously, the English, the Dutch, and the French to oust local competitors on the mainland were checked. Instead of a Wallersteinean world-economy, what we find on the mainland is a thriving multi-country trade involving the entire China coast through to the Indian subcontinent. Items traded ranged from Indian and Chinese textiles to — crucially, for the survival of the dominant mainland states — Japanese and New World silver and copper.

French historian Denys Lombard (1997: 125) has also remarked upon a basic opposition between maritime and terrestrial Southeast Asia, broadly analogous to that between continental Europe and the Mediterranean. Even so, he hedges, it is not a true dichotomy, as there were no terrestrial kingdoms without some elements of trade and no harbor cities without need for agrarian products or without some hinterland. Accordingly, we should be careful not to gloss all regional trade as maritime trade, because trading networks were equally maritime and terrestrial, especially considering the cross-border exchanges between the mainland Southeast Asian states, the Yunnan-Guangxi periphery, and the Chinese core.

The maritime trade-oriented eastern mainland (Vietnam and Champa), which tapped into the dynamic South China Sea trade networks, was also distinct from the relatively isolated central mainland states (the Tai kingdoms), which were nevertheless part of a broader, Yunnan-connected trading complex. Still, we acknowledge that the Chao Phraya, or Menam, River facilitated Ayutthaya's rise as a magnet for the maritime trade, just as the Lao and Cambodian kingdoms were connected with the maritime trade via the Mekong River. But, with the shift of the Burmese capital from the lower Irrawaddy River to Ava, the western mainland became less accessible to the traditional maritime trade. As demonstrated later in this book, such differences with respect to location and relative integration into a regional world economy would also translate into future autonomy in facing down external threats.

While the tropical-subtropical Southeast Asian zone tends to fall through the cracks in world regions literature, this book argues that a broader conception of East Asian regionalism opens up a range of additional inquiries, such as the question of European exceptionalism; of Euro- versus Asia-centrism — particularly Sinocentrism — in shaping the

modern world-system; of what the motor of capitalism or at least pre-capitalism is in this part of Asia; of Asian “stagnation” versus European dynamism; of the phenomenon of cross-cultural interactions; and of the origins of globalization.

An Oriental Mediterranean?

Unquestionably, the maritime world has held a fascination for students of world history; Fernand Braudel’s understanding of the Mediterranean Sea has added impetus to this focus. Again, as Lombard (1997: 125) suggests, even if Southeast Asia lacked the equivalent of the Roman Empire, which succeeded in unifying both shores of the Mediterranean politically during four or five centuries, there were sufficient shared linguistic, cultural, and even political features in Southeast Asia to suggest an Oriental Mediterranean. For Lombard, it is only by making use of a supranational framework and adopting an “integrated approach” that we can apprehend this reality (Wong 2001; Sutherland 2003; Brummet 2007).

François Gipouloux, in *La Méditerranée asiatique* (2009), has trained a Braudelian lens on a region that extends from the Yellow or East China Sea to the Sulawesi Sea. For our purposes, the Mediterranean analogy is another way of appreciating this region of shifting frontiers outside of any fixed conventions of nation-state. Although we have not sought to provide detailed or even selective cross-global comparisons à la Lombard or Gipouloux, the world history method does not ignore a second-tier analysis that accounts for major global conjunctures or correlated events.

What is compelling about the Mediterranean analogy is the notion of a partly enclosed sea or seas (if we separate the China seas from the Java seas). Both comprised complementary trading or commercial systems as well as discrete meteorological zones. But above all, they were interconnected maritime zones in which multiple actors participated. All participants in the China sea trade were in thrall to the regime of typhoon conditions; all who traded through the Malacca Straits were restricted by monsoons and raging tides. These conditions held for the merchant-pirate bands that plagued the coast of China from the 13th century; for the first Arab traders that arrived and for the Chinese fleets that ventured south. They held for the first arriving Europeans; the Fujianese fleets

testing Spanish power in Manila; and the Chinese Ming-loyalist outcasts on the coasts of Sumatra and Vietnam.

Even today, the modern traveler to the vast Indonesian archipelago will be astonished at the scale and scope of maritime activity, the varieties of hulls and sails. Buginese and other sea nomads figure in our narrative, but we cannot ignore the bit parts played across the region by innumerable *orang laut* (Malay for sea people), who even today depend on the sea for their livelihoods. Just as huge multisailed craft are but a recent memory in the Java Sea and along the coast of China, so modern East Asian cities such as Macau earned their living from fishing into the mid-20th century.

Whether above or below the wind (a reference to the crucial monsoon regime governing the safe departure of ships), the so-named Southeast Asian region was never framed in any way analogous to modern geographies. Peering over an ancient map — say the pioneering freehand charts of the archipelago and the coast of China executed by the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues in 1515, or the more elaborate and nuanced charts entering Portuguese and Dutch atlases of the 17th century — we find no boundaries. On close examination, there are some half-familiar toponyms: Sunda Kelapa (modern Jakarta), Cingapura (Singapore), and Malacca. Stand back, and Java, Cumatra (Sumatra), India extra Ganges, Mare Sinar, and Cipangu (Japan) all swim into view (Plate 16). In turn, Arab or Chinese maps of this southern world offered their own cultural constructions of place firmly embedded in their respective civilizational understandings.

The Framing of an East Asian History

Ten broad historical understandings inform the way I have conceptualized this book. They are, I contend, essential to the writing of East-Southeast Asia from a world history perspective. First, we must allow that even the study of proto-history is vital to comprehending certain shared anthropological givens. Second, we cannot ignore civilizational transfers — the Indic, the Islamic, and the Sinic (in the case of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam) — where they have contributed to the formation of larger communities. Third, we acknowledge the role of powerful regional tributary systems (which in the East Asian regional world system placed

China at the center). Fourth, we allow for the continuity of (Asian) historical processes transcending the formation of a (European-dominated) world-system. Fifth, we especially appreciate the role of diasporic trading communities as transmitters of cultures and regional (Asian) technologies. Sixth, we reject the notion of totally closed political economies in East Asia, such as Japan under the Tokugawa. Seventh, we underscore the crucial role of flows of bullion — East Asian bullion no less — in lubricating the “early modern” East Asian economy. Eighth, we reject crude versions of the Western “push theory,” implying that only Western imperialism jolted peripheral regions out of their stagnation. Ninth, we are at pains to emphasize transboundary relations over strictly international links, no matter the sway of powerful national narratives. Tenth, we allow dynamizing roles for regional world systems (the East Asian world system) in the emergence of the (European-dominated) capitalist world system.²

Historical studies — world history approaches included — are not frozen in some time capsule, but reflect a constant dialogue between what is conventionally known, or at least asserted, and what remains to be confirmed in frontier research, in itself often contestatory. Where possible, this book seeks to highlight the most recent research relating to world regional historical studies as well as empirical studies on the many polities and peoples that comprise the East-Southeast Asian zone.

Scope of the Book

The scope of this book is deliberately broad. Seeking to frame a region with no fixed geographical boundaries, we are obliged to range over a macro-region, from the Indian Ocean–Bay of Bengal in the west, to the Java, South China, and East China seas in the east, alongside a complex of smaller seas and straits at the western extremity of the Pacific Ocean. With the expansion of Chinese sea trade under Song China, and the retreat of Arab and Indian commercial activity from the broader China Sea area, we begin to see a more China-centered configuration of East-Southeast Asia, which held under the Mongol-Yuan and their Ming

2 Some of these understandings owe to the essay by Ikeda Satoshi, “The History of the Capitalist World-System vs. the History of East-Southeast Asia,” *Review* 19, no. 1 (1996): 49–77.

successors, albeit with frequent restrictions imposed on private trade until the Qing lifted the ban on overseas trade in 1684. As explained below, the focus is on the water world of Southeast Asia, as well as the important interconnections with East Asia. Having established the broad parameters of this East Asia dynamic, which includes parallel commercial activities radiating out of the Ryukyu and Kyushu island ports in Japan, coastal Vietnam, and other commercial and/or production sites, we also wish to investigate the kinds of synergies produced in the trading ports and markets of both maritime and mainland Southeast Asia.

Ending our narrative with the Opium Wars, this work also treats a European dynamic, variously Iberian, Dutch, and English. Progressively, under this dynamic, the number of ports and trading centers across maritime Southeast Asia increased dramatically. The bullion, copper, and ceramics trade not only fired up regional and European demand, but fed back into a veritable “industrious revolution” in the major production sites of Ming China and Tokugawa Japan. We examine indigenous, Indian, Muslim, Chinese, Japanese, and European contacts and how each group impacted upon the region.

To recapitulate, this is a *longue durée* perspective. The emphasis is on economic history (especially trade) and development of the region as a whole. As this work establishes, the years between 1000 and 1800 were formative in shaping the modern era that followed, prior to the full swing of Western imperialism.

A Water-Centered Approach

We take a maritime history perspective, viewing the larger world of East and Southeast Asia from the sea, not just from the land. Looking beyond geopolitical boundaries, we discover a highly porous region through which a variety of peoples passed, one that was peopled by sojourners and traders, in which new ideas and technologies were filtered and adapted to local conditions. This was a region of constant flux and oftentimes conflict, but there were also long periods of state consolidation and monument-building. But whether with regard to ancient migration, trade, or technology transfer, we feel that the water-centered approach best captures the spirit of this zone, plausibly fitting even classical Chinese, Arab, and Ptolemaic representations of open seas and narrow straits. By

placing the seas and maritime trade routes at the center rather than at the margins, the interconnectedness of the entire East-Southeast Asia region literally swims into view. In the words of Hamashita:

Looking at Asia from the viewpoint of the seas brings into focus the features that identify Asia above all as a maritime region par excellence. The seas along the eastern coast of the Eurasian continent form a gentle ‘S’ curve continuing from north to south. The chain formed by the seas that outline the continent, its peninsulas and adjacent islands can be seen as shaping the premises of Asia’s geographical space (through history). (Hamashita 2003: 17)

Taking a dawn-of-history perspective, a first chapter offers a civilizational framing of the region, stressing prehistoric indigeneity, as well as broad macro-regional commonality, going back to a shared Iron Age. This chapter also calls attention to early arriving Indian, Muslim, and Sinic influences. The next two chapters showcase the Southeast Asian world. Chapter 2 traces the rise and fall of the major “charter” polities of Southeast Asia. Chapter 3 focuses on the key Islamic courts with which the Europeans related or sometimes sought to usurp, in their struggle to achieve monopoly status over coveted trade commodities. Chapter 4 sketches the origins of Chinese settlement in Southeast Asia, whether inside or outside the officialized tributary trade system, as Chinese communities would take on a permanent character across the region by the “early modern” period. Chapter 5 identifies the major commodities traded across the East-Southeast Asian world region, drawing the contours of exchange and trade mechanisms. Then three chapters profile the European (and Japanese) traders and settlements. Chapter 6 outlines the Iberian maritime trade networks, drawing attention to the key strong points and establishments of the Portuguese and Spanish empires. Chapter 7 explains the *modus operandi* of the powerful Dutch and English trading companies in Asian lands. Although not equal in impact to the European interlopers or Chinese sojourners, the Japanese diasporic communities of Southeast Asia are examined in Chapter 8, up to the point when Japan withdrew from direct participation in the Southeast Asian trade. Two thematic chapters together draw attention to individual traded items. Chapter 9 describes the pivotal role of the Asian bullion trade in early modern East-Southeast Asian economies, while Chapter 10 offers a case study of the complex Asian ceramics trade, both

as an index of early globalization and as an example of proto-capitalist endeavor, at least as it related to China and Japan. The final chapter summarizes what contributions India, the Islamic world, and China made to the East-Southeast Asian “regional technology complex,” alongside evolutionary trends in indigenous knowledge (outside of better-known Western technology transfers).

1

Southeast Asia Between India and China

The fast-moving field of archaeological research, especially on mainland Southeast Asia, has thrown new light upon the complex evolution of early states out of Neolithic hunter and gatherer societies (Higham 1989: 2002a). As this chapter argues, the elusive unity of East-Southeast Asia may be attested by the Bronze and Iron Age societies that emerged in a prehistoric period, wedding the macro region with China, via river valleys and high passes through which filtered an array of ideas, material goods, and technologies, just as Han China (206 BCE–220 CE) imposed its control over northern Vietnam. This is not to suggest an entirely derivative civilization, but also to draw attention to the creativity and adaptivity of the peoples who created such Bronze Age icons as the Dong Son drums, iron implements, trademark ceramics, innovative textile art, multi-sailed boats, and other evidence of autonomous cultural advance.

Just as the ancient silk roads — both maritime and terrestrial — have come to symbolize the ebb and flow of civilizational influences across the Eurasian zone, so too the contours of the pre-modern trading systems that linked up this in-between region with the Middle Eastern, Indian, and Sinic worlds. The rise of states, particularly the Indianized states of both mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, is part of this exploration. As explained, the great Southeast Asian charter states emerging during the first millennium CE not only entered into elaborate tribute trade networks with China, but — in their post-charter incarnations — they also became foundational to future nations, however imagined. Especially from the 12th century CE onwards, with the coming of Islam to East-Southeast Asia and the localization of merchant communities and diasporas, we wonder whether the period c.1000–1500 also merits an early “age of commerce” label? (Wade 2009). In such a diverse and

geographically fragmented zone, constant revisions to received wisdom are required by breaking archaeological discoveries and interpretations.

The Southeast Asian Environment

Essentially a construct of the southeastern rim of the Asian continent, broadly astride the Bay of Bengal to the west and the China seas to the east, the Southeast Asian area was known to the ancient Greeks as the Golden Chersonese. At the center of this world stood the southward thrusting Malay or Indochinese Peninsula. The volcanic islands of Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, Hainan, the Philippines, and the Indonesian archipelago also appeared in Ptolemaic representations as a string of misshapen islands off the east and southern coasts of China. Known to Arab navigators since antiquity, this humid southern world, dubbed the Nanyang or “south seas” in China, was also matched in Arab navigational texts as well as in Chinese dynastic histories by a full repertoire of toponyms. European cartographers, who would subsequently map this largely borderless world, recognized Southeast Asia, alongside the Amazon basin and central and west Africa, as one of three great tropical regions of the world bisected by the equator, and the only substantial tropical region facilitating maritime passage.

Straddling the southern edge of continental Asia, the soil and relief of mainland Southeast Asia reflect these continental origins. The principal mountain chains running north-south, namely the Arakan Mountains, the Annamite (Truong Son) Cordillera, and the highland areas of Yunnan, constitute barriers to settlement, just as sweeping valleys and rivers have formed historical routes for the mostly north-to-south migration of peoples. From prehistoric times through to the modern period, there has been population movement from what is today southern China southward into mainland Southeast Asia. The large-scale, southward migration of Tai-speaking peoples some time before the 10th century CE was notable. Especially important for human settlement are the great valleys of the south-flowing Irrawaddy and Salween rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal; the Chao Phraya (Menam); the Mekong; and the east-flowing Red (Song Koi) River, entering the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea. As sources of sediment and water for irrigation, these rivers and their respective deltas still support the densest population concentrations, just

as, historically, they formed the crucibles for civilization. The mountain ranges not only made the movement of peoples difficult, but also tended to separate peoples along different paths of social and cultural development. The most recent migrants from southwestern China into northern Laos and Vietnam are the Yao and Hmong, who followed the mountain ridges (Keyes 1977: 14).

The Southeast Asian region was not always divided between continental and maritime. The Holocene rise in sea levels drowned extensive tracts that had formerly belonged to the mainland. Before that, at the height of the last Ice Age 15,000 years ago, the islands of Sumatra, Borneo, and Hainan would have been connected with the mainland. Some 10,000 years ago, Southeast Asia consisted of extensive mountain ranges and a vast region of low-lying marshy land, dissected by rivers and numerous tributaries. In fact, the sea bottom still reveals the channels of drowned rivers. The lowering of the sea level to the current shore began only about 4,000 years ago and accompanied by minor oscillations, leaving the major rivers as truncated versions of their ancestral channels. Higham (2002a: 7–8) confirms that we can pick up the story of prehistoric coastal settlement only when the sea level stabilizes. Over the millennium, however, the major river deltas have been subject to significant geomorphological change, including siltation in the recent past. As André Wink (2004: 11) points out, hydrology and geology are important auxiliary sciences, alongside archaeology, in the study of these changing landscapes.

The ability to cross significant water barriers is now believed to reach back 50,000 years (Glover and Bellwood 2004: 337). Presumably, early people resembling modern Papuans (Australoids) could sail primitive rafts. These early communities typically made use of cave or open river sites, which have yielded important data on dating as well as economic and social activities (King 2004: 494). But even with sea levels rising from around 3000 BCE, waves of newer immigrants (broadly southern Mongoloid and speaking what have been identified as Austronesian languages) pushed the earlier hunter-gatherer immigrants further into the interior. They brought some cultivated plants, domestic animals, and technology, and had improved their rafts and canoes.

Then, as now, the seas were a rich source of protein, and coastal fishing became a major human activity alongside agriculture. Generally,

however, precipitation is greater in the western archipelago than in the east. The British naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), lent his name to a broad biogeographical division of the archipelago, with the islands east of Lombok falling into an Australian pattern and the islands west conforming to a tropical Asian regime, with, in some versions, the Philippines as a transitional zone. While the dispersal of plants by humans has tended to blur this sharp division, the moist western zone is better adapted to irrigated rice cultivation, as on the volcanic soils of central and north Java, the lowland areas of Sumatra, and on the island of Luzon (Cleary 2004: 591–96).

While many indigenous farming practices remain in the more sparsely populated upland regions of both island and mainland Southeast Asia, lowland people almost invariably prevailed in a civilizational sense. Basically animist and impervious to broader civilizational influences, the uplanders adapted to so-called slash-and-burn agriculture, which offered small yields and necessitated the frequent relocation of homes and fields. Through gradual adaptation of such Chinese practices as the drainage of fields, the transplantation of rice seedlings in irrigated fields, and the domestication of the water buffalo for plowing, lowland peoples across Southeast Asia were better positioned to accumulate food surpluses, necessary for trade. On the mainland, river valleys, plains, and — in the case of Vietnam — river mouths became the sites of trading centers, cities, and political capitals (Keyes 1977).

Ships moving between the Indian Ocean and the China seas were often obliged to ride out the change of monsoon in the “land below the winds.” The less predictable typhoon regime of the South China Sea imposed an even stricter seasonality upon sailors. As Michel Jacq-Hergoualc’h (2002: 18–22) has observed, the principal characteristic of the monsoon system is that the winds reverse themselves at mostly predictable times. Obviously, the regularity of the monsoon system and of surface currents was a feature of great importance for long-distance navigators.

The predictability of monsoon rains was also crucial for local agriculture and the construction and control of irrigation and higher-order hydraulic systems. In line with Brahmanic lore, modern-day Thailand and Cambodia still uphold annual sacred plowing ceremonies reaching back 700 years. Marking the beginning of the rainy season, the ceremo-

nies seek, or at least sought, to prophesy the right balance of rain and water supply needed to achieve abundant harvests.

The impact of man upon the East-Southeast Asian environment was considerable. As Peter Boomgaard (2006, chap. 7) emphasizes, population growth and the pressures of international trade together made environmental impacts. Perhaps 85 to 90 percent of the Southeast Asia area was covered with forest in 1400. But, by the mid-1800s, the loss of forest cover was dramatic, with only 50 percent of forest remaining in Java by the 1840s. The depletion of teak and sandalwood groves in maritime Southeast Asia is symptomatic of this trend toward deforestation. Urbanization and shipbuilding further increased the demand for timber. Under pressure from hunting and settlement, several types of animal became rare or extinct by 1800. New plant introductions also had secondary environmental effects. So did mining and the extraction of salt and even coral.

From Hunter-Gatherers to Bronze and Iron Age Civilizations

Proto-History of the Mainland

Working from recent archaeological evidence, especially in the excavation of burial mounds in the central mainland, Higham (2002a) offers five interconnected phases in the prehistory of Southeast Asia. The earliest involves the occupation of the interior highlands by small bands of hunters and gatherers. Generally known as Hoabinhian after the Vietnamese province where they were first discovered, their remains are found near the mouths of caves. As suggested above, various isolated examples of this type still exist in Southeast Asia. The second involves the occupation of the coastline; many settlements survive on old raised beaches formed during periods of higher sea levels. Recent excavations have revealed the remains of large, permanent hunter-gatherer societies. A distinct but short Neolithic period coincides with the domestication of rice, which reached the Red River Valley and the Khorat Plateau of Thailand from southern China around 2500–2000 BCE. Higham (2002a: 351) rightly hails this as one of the most critical changes in Southeast Asian prehistory. The Neolithic period also saw the occupation

of inland tributary valleys, where rice cultivation was undertaken along with the raising of domestic cattle and pigs, hunting, fishing, and gathering. Undoubtedly, in this formative period, dwellers of marshy areas pioneered the distinctive “Southeast Asian house,” even today characterized by an elevated platform on stilts. In this age, as mentioned in Chapter 11, we also begin to see the construction of spectacular and enduring mountain rice terraces, as found in central Luzon in the Philippines.

A Southeast Asian Bronze Age (sometimes glossed Dongsonian) can be recognized from c.1500 BCE, just as knowledge of bronze casting had earlier developed in the Lingnan region of China. Sites with similar casting techniques have been found across the mainland, and excavations of primitive copper mines have revealed new facts about social conditions and the state of metallurgy. The discovery by French researchers of the Dong Son site beside the Ma River in the Viet Bac region of northern Vietnam was the first made of a bronze-using society in Southeast Asia. Dating back at least 3,000 years, massive Dong Son bronze drums, some finely decorated with maritime scenes and other symbols, have been attested across Southeast Asian societies, including remote parts of the archipelago. Obviously, the drums evidence quite sophisticated processes in mold-making, casting, and decorating (Bui Van Vuong 2008). As prestige items, the drums also represented a transition to a system of centralized chiefdoms in Southeast Asia (Higham 2002a: 178–79) (Plate 1).

Lasting just one millennium, the Bronze Age was succeeded by the Iron Age, as iron came to be employed for weapons and agricultural implements. As Higham (2002a: 26–27) explains, the origins of iron smelting are not known, but it would be surprising if the advent of iron in Southeast Asia was not related to that in China. In any case, the Iron Age societies of Southeast Asia underwent a rapid growth in population, increased participation in international trade, and the development of more complex societies, all prior to the emergence of the early state in the Mekong Delta, c. 100–200 CE.

From the first millennium BCE, with the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, a series of coastal centers on the eastern seaboard of India began issuing coinage, including bronze coins with high tin content revealing of a dynamic period in the Metal Age of Southeast Asia (Matheson 2003: 56–57; Bulbeck 2004). As archaeological data, especially of the last two decades, confirms, from 3 CE, maritime contacts across the Bay of

Bengal and Andaman Sea were well extended; Indian texts start to refer to sailing routes to and from Suvarnabhumi, or the land of gold.

In fact, gold mining, smelting, and ornament-making was also part of the Metal Age in Southeast Asia. For example, between 226 and 649 CE, Funan (a kingdom associated with the lower Mekong) sent tribute missions to China, including gifts of gold (Higham 2002b: 25). According to Higham (1989: 340), archaeological work at the site of Oc Eo, the maritime capital of Funan, in present-day An Giang province, Vietnam, yielded so much gold that it attracted looters. Research from Iron Age burial mounds has also yielded gold and silver beads, along with gold leaves, disks, and flowers. Evidence of Metal Age gold-working is thinner from the archipelago, but at Butuan in northern Mindanao Island in the Philippines, gold tools for gold purification and processing of ornaments have been recovered — evidence of a gold ornament industry reaching back 1,000 years (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2006).

Archaeology continues to offer revelations, as with the Ban Chiang discoveries made in north-central Thailand in the late 1960s and early 1970s, testifying to the presence of Mon-Khmer speakers in the region long before the arrival of Tai speakers in historical times. Mon culture dates from at least the beginning of the Common Era, and the Mons began to create city-states in the Menam-Chao Phraya area in the 5th to 6th centuries CE. Some art historians associate the ethnic Mon identity with Dvarawati culture (Briggs 1945) and Dvarawati as an “initial phase” in the history of Siam (Dhida Saraya 1999). In any case, Mon culture survived, with Indianized Mon states forming at Thaton, Pegu and Martaban in Burma. Although no independent center of Mon power has existed in Burma or Thailand since the 18th century, Mon cultural influence remains strong (Sadan 2004: 907–8).

Recent applications of radiocarbon dating in Laos have added to our understanding of this interior zone, during periods when stone tool-making, pottery, agriculture, and metallurgy were spreading across mainland Southeast Asia. Notable sites are the caves in Luang Prabang, first occupied during Hoabinhian times; Lao Pako, a site in Vientiane province revealing burial and habitation between 500 BCE and 500 CE; and sites on the “Iron Age” Plain of Jars complex in the northern province of Xieng Khouang. Madelaine Colani, who produced the definitive study of the huge urn-like stone jars under EFEO auspices (1935), theorized that

the megalithic jars served as mortuary vessels. She also found affinities with megalithic complexes 600 miles northwest in India, and a coastal site near Danang in central Vietnam even suggests a physical connection, perhaps through salt traders (Sayavongkhamdy and Bellwood 2000).

Intense maritime activity also spawned port cities and polities, especially at the chokepoints of the archipelago, such as at Old Palembang, Temasik (Singapore), Melaka, and Banten off the Straits of Sunda. As Wink (2004: 43–57) claims, these were “river mouth states” with maritime orientations. Defined by infertile or forested hinterlands, low population densities, and restricted economic production, they were by necessity trade-oriented. Leaving behind few political-religious monuments, they were also highly ephemeral, owing to warfare and environmental factors.

Transshipment points on both sides of the Kra Isthmus served as beachheads of Indianized cultural transfer. Research from the Klang Valley in modern Malaysia reveals this area as linking the Bay of Bengal with the China Sea, in terms of early trade and the transmission of Indianized culture. The Klang site, dating from 500–200 BCE, was undoubtedly connected with the mining and export of tin, traded along a string of ports around the Bay of Bengal. Burial sites in northern Kedah have also yielded important discoveries of bronzes with a high tin content and iron artifacts. Notably, prehistoric cave paintings found in Kedah provide the earliest evidence of links with the oceangoing trade (Jacq-Hergoualac’h 2002; Matheson 2003: 41–43).

Through maritime contacts with India came such technological transfers as glass- and bead-making (Indo-Pacific beads), just as India began to tap gold, tin, aromatics, and forest products from Southeast Asia. Inexorably, the embryonic centers of state power in Southeast Asia began to adopt and filter such elements of Indian civilization as writing, state ideologies, urban planning, architecture, art styles and iconography, calendrical systems, epic themes, and literatures, along with Hinduism (Brahmanism) and Buddhism. By the 1st to 5th centuries CE, such contacts across the seas became particularly intense. Notably, sites in Kedah have also yielded Sanskrit inscriptions from the 5th to 6th centuries CE (Jacq-Hergoualac’h 2002; Matheson 2003: 41–43). While the conversion of commercial settlements into larger Indianized states was obviously a complex process, Hinduism undoubtedly helped rulers to

sanction their right to rule, just as Indians themselves may have married into local ruling families to legitimize their rule (Gupta 2006; Narayana 2008: 8–12).

Proto-history of the Archipelago

While this chapter does not attempt to assay the dawn of mankind in broader Southeast East Asia, we nevertheless note the presence of certain groups sometimes dubbed Australoid, who clearly preceded the later-arriving “Austronesians.” Among them are Australian aborigines, Papuans or speakers of the Papuan phylum of languages, various negrito populations, including the *orang asli* of the Malay Peninsula, as well as Andamanese islanders. As Blench (2009: 14) summarizes, most researchers would agree that they are descendants of early migrants. Although recent discoveries complicate the picture, Blench also asserts that their presence reflects an initial dispersion of human beings “out of Africa.”

Until it was eclipsed by discoveries in the Rift Valley in East Africa and subsequently in such places as Dmanisi in Georgia, the Sangiran Cave in central Java, and Longgupo Cave in central China, the oldest humanoid was long considered to be Java Man, or *Pithecanthropus erectus*, discovered in 1861 on the banks of the Bengawan River, near Solo in central Java, by the German paleontologist Eugene Dubois. Later discoveries, including Peking Man, confirmed the importance of Dubois’ find, though his evolutionist theories remained dogged by controversy. Fossil finds associated with cave dwellers, such as in Borneo and Timor and elsewhere in the archipelago, have yielded a wealth of usable data on the human evolution out of Paleolithic and Neolithic societies.

Notably, the explorations by Tom Harrisson (1957) in the Niah caves of Sarawak yielded a 35,000-year-old skull, besides providing a wealth of information on the Australoids, or the first Paleolithic cave-dwelling *Homo erectus* hunter-gatherers that populated Southeast Asia, New Guinea, and Australia. More recent research conducted by the Malaysian Pusat Penyelidikan Arkeologi at sites in Lenggong, Perak, has yielded a 74,000-year-old Paleolithic stone tool workshop at Kota Tampan. A 10,000-year-old skeleton discovered in the Lenggong Valley, dubbed Perak Man, has been declared the earliest complete skeleton yet found in Southeast Asia. In early 2009, the same research group discovered stone

axes dating back 1.8 million years — the world’s oldest. The emerging consensus is that *Homo erectus* was actually endemic to Asia and not “out of Africa.” A cave site (Lene Hara) near Tutuala in East Timor, first researched by Portuguese archaeologists, likewise offers exciting new data on human occupation going back to 42,000 BCE, including one of the largest assemblies of rock art in Southeast Asia (O’Connor, Spriggs, and Veth 2002; O’Connor and Veth 2005).

Insular Southeast Asia, including Sumatra, Nias, Borneo, Java, Bali, Sumba, and the southern Philippines, also hosts a number of significant “Bronze-Iron Age” sites (Boomgaard 2006: 48) that are counterparts to the megalithic jar burial sites of northern Laos. Recent ethno-archaeological investigation on Sumba Island has recalled a “living” megalithic tomb culture (Adams 2007). Investigators link these cultures with Dongsonian influence, though much remains enigmatic. In any case, the emergence of Iron Age societies in the archipelago, in tandem with the introduction of wet rice cultivation and water buffalo by the first millennium, represents a significant evolution toward complexity (Oliveira 2008).

Recent evidence from Java and Bali also attests to Metal Age long-distance trade routes. A site in Sembiran in northern Bali has yielded evidence of visits by Indian traders 2,000 years ago, notably a potsherd with an incised Indic script, rouletted-wheel ware from south India, and a mold used in the making of elongated bronze drums (Ardika and Bellwood 1991). Numerous Metal Age sites on Java, particularly the 5th century CE site of Taruma in the region of Jakarta, have also yielded evidence of the local production of bronzes, iron ware, and wheel-made pottery. As Bulbeck (2004: 878) elaborates, contemporaneous developments in central and eastern Java paved the way for the flowering of future Indianized states. The emergence of fortified settlements in the eastern archipelago has also gained recent scholarly attention, with new understandings emerging from Banda and East Timor, leading some to declare a link between wider social and environmental factors occurring some 800 years ago (in the late Holocene) (Lape 2006; 2008).

The Austronesian Dispersion Theory

In a protohistorical time when sea levels were far lower than today, the last great migrations of peoples, along with flora and fauna, crossed

land bridges, it is believed, southwards from China. The Neolithic cultures of southeast China (especially the Lower and Middle Yangtze) and Taiwan take on an increased significance in the light of the search for Austronesian origins. Austronesian is one of the world's largest language families, with around 1,200 spoken in a region spanning much of island Southeast Asia with outliers across the Pacific and even Indian oceans. Neolithic-era contact between the Penghu Islands, in the Straits of Taiwan, and Taiwan Island around 6,000 years ago was a plausible precursor to open-sea voyaging (Rolett, Tianlong and Gongwu 2002), such as would lead to the dispersion of Austronesian speakers across the oceans. Such broad understandings date back to the early 18th century, with the writings of Hadrianus Relandus (1676–1718) and Lorenzo Hervás y Panduro (1735–1809), but have been much refined with major advances in both archaeology and linguistics.


Modern research thus relates the indigenous people of Taiwan to Southeast Asia, not China, especially as southward-migrating Sinitic peoples displaced the indigenous peoples of Fujian over 2,000 years ago. Today, there is broad consensus that the island of Taiwan is the homeland of the Austronesians (Fox 2004) and that the top-level structures of the Austronesian dispersion are to be found on Taiwan (Blust 1999). Even so, as Thurgood (1999: 32) points out, it would be erroneous to claim that Austronesians originated in Taiwan as opposed to the Chinese mainland. The evidence of an older Austronesian ancestor on the mainland is provided by identifiable Austronesian borrowings in two branches of Tai-Kadai languages, suggesting an overland connection with non-Austronesian areas to the west.

The Austronesian Dispersion Theory, as articulated by Bellwood (2004: 26–27), contends that proto-Austronesians, having mastered the art of sailing, and taking advantage of seasonal shifts in winds and ocean currents, expanded south from Taiwan into maritime Southeast Asia, including the Sulawesi maritime zone, by 3000 BCE, moving eastward across the Pacific, probably arriving in Easter Island around 2,000 years ago. This neolithic migration of Malayo-Polynesians is also associated with a specific type of decorated pottery and traded item called Lapita ware (Gupta 2006: 113). The Yani of Orchid Island in Taiwan still build sailing craft that bear a resemblance to outriggers of the South Pacific.

Such craft, as witnessed by the first arriving Europeans in Southeast Asia, were of lashed-lug construction as opposed to dugout style.

From the Sulawesi maritime region, the Austronesians also sailed west toward Borneo, inter alia, bringing their languages to the Malay Peninsula, Java, and Sumatra (western Malayo-Polynesian). In the last great migration, about 2,000 to 1,500 years ago or around the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, the Austronesian sailors crossed the Indian Ocean to Madagascar, facing the eastern seaboard of Africa. Indirectly, they also brought to Africa cinnamon and cassia along with such cultigens as plantain, taro, and water yam (Gupta 2006: 116–17). As established by DNA testing, ancestors of the modern Malagasy share both African and Southeast Asian lineages, just as the Malagasy language most closely resembles the Ma'anyan of the Barito valley of southwest Borneo (Hurles et al. 2005). (See Map 1.1)

As Horridge (1986: 2–3) relates, not only did the migrants use outrigger canoes for transporting fire, families, pigs, chickens, and dogs,



Map 1.1 Austronesian Migrations

they also brought fishing techniques and established shoreline settlements, later spreading inland. Only New Guinea and the Halmaheras stood outside the domination of the Austronesian family of languages, although Timor represents a transition zone where Austronesian and Papuan language groups coexist (Hull 1998; Souto et al. 2006). It should be clear, however, that Austronesian speakers today are not a single type in terms of biological affinity or even society and culture. In line with the theorizing of Peter Bellwood, the maritime and non-maritime were constantly mixing genetically, culturally, and linguistically.

Sea Migrations

It is remarkable, although not surprising, that many upland people in maritime Southeast Asia preserve origin myths relating to some past nautical migration, just as “ships of the dead” are a recurring motif in indigenous Southeast Asian art. In the eastern archipelago, boat metaphors are commonly used in relation to houses. The Lampung ship-cloths of southern Sumatra are not just representations of ships but are affirmations of procreation. Early Spanish visitors observed that *barangay*, or village community, in the Philippines was a synonym for boat. Recent analysis of rock art depictions of sailing craft found in the Tutuala region of East Timor likewise offers graphic insights into past maritime technology: the boat motifs bear striking resemblance to the “dragon boat” imagery found on Dongsonian bronze drums (Lape and O’Connor 2007). Bronze drums have not only been attested in Flores, Alor, and Timor in the eastern archipelago but, more recently, have been excavated from archaeological sites on the Malay Peninsula (Matheson 2003: 56–57; Bulbeck 2004: 878). Barbara Watson Andaya (2006a) has provided a wealth of examples confirming the symbolism that links the land to the sea.

The relatively new and exciting field of maritime archaeology has redirected attention to the antiquity, scale, and importance of sea links, not only between great civilizations such as China and the Arab world, but also in the peopling of the archipelagic regions and the diffusion of linguistic and cultural traits (Wade 2003). Undoubtedly, forms of sea travel in the archipelago evolved over many millennia, as can still be witnessed from the simple bamboo rafts (northern Borneo) and dugouts (Timor), used for coastal travel or fishing, to more complex outrigger

vessels (the Coromandel coast of India, eastern Indonesia, and the Sulu Sea). According to Horridge (1986: 8–9), the “lashed-lug” construction technique was an “outstanding technological advance made by the early Austronesian-speaking peoples.” Undoubtedly, external influences came into play, as with the arrival of large, seagoing stitched-hull multi-sailed vessels of Indian or Arab provenance and Chinese hulled vessels with their trademark watertight compartments.

Archaeological work conducted in modern Malaysia, the Philippines, and elsewhere has also brought to light a rich tradition of indigenous shipbuilding. Sites from the 3rd to 12th centuries CE, notably at Butuan in northeast Mindanao Island, have yielded remains of the hulls of *balang-hai*, or large seagoing boats, made of tropical hardwood planks fastened by dowels or stitched with fiber, some 30 meters in length (UNESCO World Heritage Centre 2006). The stitched technique survives today in Lomlem whaleboats, while side rudders remain a feature on Buginese and Javanese vessels. The first Portuguese visitors saw huge Malay or Javanese *jong* steered with side rudders, hulls held together with wooden dowels, and employing lug sails of mat along with a bowsprit sail (Manguin 2004a: 1194–95). Accommodating hundreds of people, they carried cargoes of up to 500 tonnes.

Austroasiatic Languages

Dongsonian culture, with its heartland in northern Vietnam, is linked with the emergence of three interlinked linguistic groups: Tai-Vietnamese, Cham, and Mon-Khmer. Taken together, the Vietnamese, Mon-Khmer, and Bahnaric languages of the southern highlands of Vietnam (but not Cham, which is regarded as Austronesian), have been termed Austroasiatic languages. Believed to be native to the region, this family has a disjunct distribution. Austroasiatic-speaking groups include the Munda of southern Bihar, West Bengal, and Orissa in India; the Palang-Wa of Burma; and the Nicobarese, suggesting significant migratory activity along an east-west corridor. While the Austronesian dispersion is noted for its maritime prowess and pioneer skills, developed in foraging and rice cultivation, the Austroasiatic dispersion is associated with Neolithic agricultural skills — specifically rice cultivation — and also high skills in bronze- and iron-making. As Gupta has demonstrated, Austronesian-Austroasiatic

minglings in the Bay of Bengal area were undoubtedly significant. One example noted by linguists is that Nancowry, an Austroasiatic language spoken in the Nicobars, has an archaic Austronesian substratum (Gupta 2006: 113–15).

Another way of looking at this complex dispersion of languages is to distinguish between tree-like patterns of development, which seem to fit the Austronesian dispersion across the oceans, and the net-like blending and diverging pattern, which seems to characterize the Austroasiatic minglings in complex continental situations involving acculturation with neighboring groups. Even so, the case across the Southeast Asian region would appear to be intermediate between the two (Dewar 1995: 301–2).

Summarizing, Gupta (2006: 115) argues that the Austronesian-Austroasiatic peopling of the Malay Peninsula, including the Bay of Bengal area, was complete at the turn of the 1st millennium CE, giving way to a “commonwealth of agricultural, metallurgical and maritime knowledge.” The way was open for intense future contacts across the Indian Ocean. The evidence comes, *inter alia*, in the discovery of widely dispersed stone and glass bead depositions of Indian provenance, at Ban Don Ta Phet in Kanchanburi province of Thailand, dating from 4 BCE; further south on the Malay Peninsula; and in the Sulu-Sulawesi area. Indo-Pacific beads found in early to middle Yayoi mortuary complex sites in western Japan, dating from 300 BCE, offer further evidence of transfers from the Bay of Bengal region to the western Pacific (Gupta 2006: 122).

In sum, advances in sociolinguistics, archaeolinguistics, and genetics help us to understand the prehistoric patterning of the island world. Reaching a peak of activity well before 1000 BCE, this was an entirely stateless and borderless world where the mariners were indigenous Southeast Asians as opposed to the later Indian, Arab, Chinese, and other sailors entering these seas.

Political Patterning and Models

One way to view the political patterning of prehistoric Southeast Asia is through the construction of models. One of the more sophisticated and convincing elaborations is that of historian O.W. Wolters (1967: 16; 1982), who described the Indianized polities of Southeast Asia as

networks of small settlements conforming to a multicentered patchwork of overlapping mandalas. In each mandala, a king, identified with the divine or universal authority, claimed personal hegemony over other rulers, who in theory were his obedient allies or vassals. In practice, Kulke (1986: 7) explains, the mandala represented an unstable political configuration spanning a “vaguely defined geographic area without fixed boundaries.”

As Wolters (1982: 9) elaborated, the relative stability of continuously occupied sites was achieved by exploiting local environmental resources. In practice, small, isolated cultural groups were separated by thick forests. One shared feature across Southeast Asia was cognatic kinship or descent reckoned equally between male and female, and an indifference toward lineage descent (as in Chinese social systems). It was in this setting that Indic influence arrived and the cults of Vishnu and Siva took off. Even so, as Watson Andaya (1999: 61) has pointed out, localized areas of authority also reflected a fragmented geography where communities were linked to ancestor spirits, associated with trees, rivers, caves, rocks, and supernatural deities. The *lulic* or spirit culture of the Timorese, along with the *pi* culture of the Burmese, Lao, and Tai are emblematic of such localism surviving even into the present.

Attempts to model the prehistorical state systems of Southeast Asia have been as varied as they have been controversial. As Jan Wisseman Christie (1986: 65–95) has written, such models have not only been prey to intellectual fashions but also reflect the biases of their proponents. Certainly, the “Farther India” model or Lieberman’s (2003: 6–15) “externalist historiography” favored by Coedès and other colonial savants, have undergone much revision in the interest of “autonomous historiography.”

The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1981) was one who sought to acknowledge the reality of endogenous change, in his elucidation of Bali as a *negara* or theater state, whose geography is explained in terms of the ruler’s radiance. As such, his work was part of a reaction against the economics-oriented theories of the 1950s and 1960s, of which Karl Wittfogel’s “hydraulic society” is the best known. In addition to Wolters’ mandala model, Tambiah (1976) has also elaborated a “galactic polity,” or cosmological model of the universe, to describe the early Burmese state. Christie believes that the early Javanese state, at least, was more

coherent than that predicted by either the mandala and galactic polity models. Craig Reynolds (2006: 27) is even more dismissive of attempts to apply Western notions of statecraft to Asian polities better known for their shifting centers, lack of territorial sovereignty, and inchoate boundaries.

The Indian Trade and Civilizational Transfer

As long understood (Mookerji 1912; van Leur 1955), the Indian Ocean trade, involving Indians, Arabs, Turkish, and other merchant groups, was carried out through elaborate sets of trade routes linking coastal China with the Mediterranean region via the Java Sea, the Malacca Straits, the Bay of Bengal, the coasts of India, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. Dating back to Rome (50 BCE–500 CE), the “maritime silkroad” trade is also of great antiquity, as confirmed by the discovery of Roman coins at sites in Kerala (Logan 1887; 1989: 261) and southern Vietnam. It is believed that, long before the age of Islam, Arabs also participated in the Indian Ocean trade.

The antiquity of Indian trade and civilizational transfer has also been hailed by Joseph Needham (1971: 499–500). In his colorful metaphor, for two millennia the Mediterranean region acted as a kind of pump continually piping toward the east all the gold and silver that entered it. But the Arabs, Indians, and Chinese were largely indifferent to European staples, leaving Europe with a “large perennial insoluble deficit.” India also supplied to Rome fine cotton and silk products, precious stones, porcelains, and other goods collected from marts in Africa, the Middle East, and even China, in exchange for the silver and gold that the Europeans and others supplied.

Modern scholarship (Abu Lughod 1989; Chaudhuri 1990; Barendse 2002) has confirmed the salience of the Indian Ocean trade. Ming China specialist Geoff Wade (2009) has gone as far as to herald an “earlier age of commerce” during 900–1300 CE that was sufficiently intense to induce significant political, social, and economic changes throughout the region. In so doing, Wade is taking issue with Anthony Reid’s celebration of a Southeast Asian “age of commerce” spanning 1450–1680. Whatever the veracity of these competing claims, in the following pages

we explore the scope and nature of Indian contacts with Southeast Asia that constituted a civilizational transfer.

The Indian Transfer Reprised

During the first centuries of the second millennium CE, the political map of Southeast Asia began to change, with the emergence of supraregional powers dominating large areas. Specifically, as discussed in Chapter 2, this process began with Angkor (a corruption of *negara*) in the 9th century CE and was perfected by Ayutthaya from the 11th-13th centuries, with Pagan ruling over the western mainland zone. By the 13th century CE, Java was also part of this suprapolitical community with Majapahit, the last kingdom and empire of the Hindu-Buddhist period of insular Southeast Asia. But Angkor was the most successful at transforming autonomous centers into provinces and building up a central bureaucracy (Kulke 1986: 7–8, 17).

The major Indianized kingdoms were Sumatra-based Srivijaya (670–1000?) linked with the Sailendra dynasty, builders of the Borobudur complex; the Hinduized east Java-based kingdom of Kediri (c. 1042–1222), which was succeeded by the Buddhist kingdom of Singasari (1222–93); and Majapahit (1293–1527) with its capital in Trowulan in east Java. On the western mainland were Pagan (c. 850–1287), Ava (1364–1527), and Toungoo (1531–1752). In the central mainland were Angkor in Cambodia (802–1441), the Tai-Lao kingdoms of Sukhothai (1300s–1438), Ayutthaya (1351–1767), Luang Prabang (1353–1975), Vientiane (1563–1778), and Bangkok (1782–). On the south-central coast of Vietnam stood the Cham kingdoms (c. 400–1653) with various outliers, possibly including sites in the Philippines.

Although the Dai Viet was brought within the orbit of China with the conquest of the Red River delta in 221 BCE, it should be included among numerous precursor kingdoms and smaller polities, especially of the Tai-Lao prior to their consolidation into larger political entities through conquests or alliances. Another political constellation was formed by the six or more polities that emerged in the Dali region of southwest Yunnan, including Nanzhao (737–902) and Dali (937–1353). The Theravada Buddhist kingdom of Nanzhao imposed its own overlordship over adjacent polities in present-day Burma, even as it benefited

from the patronage of Tang China (618–917 CE) until it rebelled in 750 (Backus 1981).

Typically, as Lombard (1997) cautions, agrarian-based kingdoms, like their maritime counterparts, were woven into complex trading networks. As today, certain trade routes were on land, as those connecting the Burmese and Tai-Lao kingdoms with Yunnan and Vietnam respectively, but other networks were aggressively maritime, such as that plied by the Trinh and Nguyen kings of Vietnam as well as their Cham predecessors and rivals, who were active even in the long-distance Arab trade with China. As attested by Portuguese seafarers, the Austronesian-speaking Cham deliberately sited their capitals at a series of river mouths along the south-central coast of Vietnam to partake of the transoceanic trade. There may also have been broader dynastic connections, as between Srivijaya and the founder of Angkor, Jayavarman II (802–60), but interstate links in this age are not well recorded.

All these kingdoms were to degrees hydraulic-based kingdoms; Angkor, astride the Tonle Sap or Great Lake, seasonally flooded by the Mekong River, was paradigmatic. As revealed on a relief at Angkor Thom, Khmer and Cham warriors engaged in naval battles, using galley-like vessels with massed rowers. But unlike in maritime Southeast Asia, where sea-raiding and naval predominance was crucial, mainland armies marched on land. As wonderfully illustrated on the bas-relief of Angkor (and Borobudur on Java), elephants bore weapons and were often crucial in determining martial outcomes.

Indian Civilizational Influences

From the beginning of the first millennium, the major external civilizational influences were from India. The major exception to this pattern was northern Vietnam, a virtual Chinese outlier from the early Han and firmly within the Chinese orbit from around the 11th century CE. Indeed, modern travelers to Java or Thailand today cannot but be struck by the frequency of Indian placenames, derived, respectively, from Pali and Sanskrit and bearing such suffixes as *pura* for town or *nagara* for state (Raman 2006).

As Pollack (2006: 123) has highlighted, an entire “Sanskrit cosmopolis” took root in the places now known as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia,

Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where inscriptions written in Sanskrit began to appear from around the 4th century CE. The oldest Indian inscription in the archipelago, discovered at Kutai in west Borneo, is a Pallava script written in Sanskrit, dating from 400 CE. On the Malay Peninsula, Old Malay or *kawi* was also written with an adapted Sanskrit script. Indian-derived scripts; the Ramayana and Mahabaratha epics; musical and dance forms; Indianized forms of kingship and governance (the *negara* states of the Malay world); titles such as Baginda, Duli Paduka, and Ianda for sultans in Brunei — all are survivals from this transfer, even if grafted upon local traditions, cultures, and situations.

Experts are divided as to why and how such a transfer found root in Southeast Asia. Some have speculated that a relatively large mass of people arrived from South Asia. In the absence of any noted event forcing such a migration, some such as Coedès (1966) have suggested the inducement of commerce and the quest for gold. Refuting the colonization thesis, van Leur (1955: 109) argues that local rulers actually sought out sacral legitimation from India, along with a mythological Indian genealogy. The authority and hierarchy it endowed enabled the rulers (now wedded to Indian Shaivism) to exploit, respectively, agrarian civilization (as on Java) or international trade (as on Sumatra). Some have also theorized that the long periods involved in waiting out the change of winds offered opportunities for the western visitors to sink cultural roots and transmit Indian ideas on a large scale (Mazzeo and Antonini 1978: 19–20). In any case, as Pollack (2006: 123) summarizes, there is no evidence of Indian colonization as a result of a large-scale state initiative (the 11th century Chola expedition is an exception). Rather, Indianization (Sanskritization) was more the work of traders, adventurers, and religious professionals.

Of the many Indianized kingdoms found in Indochina, the pre-Angkorian kingdom of Funan was probably the most ancient, with its origins in the 1st century CE. Based in the Mekong delta zone, Funan, notably the ancient port city of Oc Eo, undoubtedly served as a gateway for the long-distance trade between India and China, which included both goods and pilgrims. The discoveries made by Louis Malleret of Roman medallions and jewelry of Mediterranean origin or inspiration confirm this (Higham 2002a: 236). As attested in Chinese chronicles, Funan was superseded by Chenla (a collective term) in the 7th century. Also, from the beginning

of the 1st century, the Nha Trang area in southern coastal Vietnam was penetrated by Indian civilization (Briggs 1951: 12, 20; Chandler 1992: 14–18; 26). Dvarawati, as mentioned, was a kingdom and culture identified with the Mons, who flourished from the 6th to 9th centuries, particularly at the site of Nakhon Pathom and the walled citadel of U Thong in present-day central Thailand. Archaeological investigation confirms the importance of Theravada Buddhism in this culture (Southworth 2004b: 442–43).

Around the 4th to the 5th centuries, rulers of South Indian origin (or inspiration) ruled in Cambodia (the pre-Angkorian kingdoms), Champa, Sumatra, and Java. With the exception of Burma, the prevailing religion was Brahmanical (Saivite) (Coomaraswamy 1969: 65). Both Funan and Champa adopted the worship of the Sivalinga as a state cult around this time, as an Indian alphabet, the honorific title *varman*, era names, the *naga* principle, and other typical Indian features were adopted.

South Indian trade connections with Southeast Asia and even China date back to the 3rd century CE. But the rise of the Chola kingdom on the Tamil coast of south India during the 10th century added a new dynamic in the extension of merchant guilds, Brahmanic temple communities, and Indianized forms of statecraft into Sri Lanka and eastward across the Bay of Bengal. Throughout this period, we have numerous notices in Chinese annals of Indian Buddhist devotees visiting China, matched by those of Chinese Buddhists visiting India. Notably, the Chinese traveler Yijing (I-Tsing), who visited India in 673, recorded the itineraries of 60 Chinese who reached India by sea. In the 7th century CE, way stations on Java and Srivijayan ports on Sumatra connected up the pilgrimage route. Chola also dispatched two embassies to China, one in 1033 and another in 1077–1118, the last consisting of 72 ambassadors-cum-trading mission shareholders (Mookerji 1912: 177). Chola links with China appear to have reached a zenith between the late 12th and mid-13th centuries, as testified by a Chinese-sponsored pagoda in Nagapattinam founded in 1267, and the presence of a Tamil temple in Quanzhou (Fujian province) dated to 1281, with architectural features consistent with the south Dravidian style of the late Chola period (Guy 2001: 296). Chinese texts also confirm strong trading links between south China and southern India during the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368 CE) in ceramics traded against textiles and pepper (Wade 2006: 48).

The cubic temple architecture of Dieng Plateau on Java (Plate 2), scattered sites in Siam and Cambodia, and the “Cham coast” of Vietnam are remarkably Indian in character (Coomaraswamy 1969: 65). The great period of monument-building in Southeast Asia, broadly from 750 to 1200, coincided with the construction of Pagan (late 11th century); Angkor Thom (9th century); Angkor Wat (10th century); Champa (9th century); Candi Mendut and Borobudur (late 9th century); and Prambangan (ca. 900 CE) (Plate 3).

A cult of the *devaraja*, or divine royalty, became prominent in Java and Cambodia at the beginning of the 9th century, at least until eclipsed in the 10th and 11th centuries by a cult of royal *linga*, as in the “temple mountains” of which the Bayon of Angkor is an example. But even the Hindu symbol of the “mountain of the gods” was uprooted in the confusion of the conflict between the Cambodian and Cham armies in c. 1177 (Vickery 2005b: 75). Jayavarman VII (1181–1220?) turned to the esoteric Mahayana Buddhist Lokeshvara cult, though the meaning of this was presumably lost upon a people afflicted by wars and forced labor (Kulke 1978: 4). Mahayana Buddhist influences later became syncretic, as Theravada Buddhism subsequently became dominant (Briggs 1951: 25). Unlike the more rigid caste system of the Hindu tradition, by the 14th century CE, Sinhalese Buddhism had touched the masses of Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Siam. With justification, Coedès (1966: 226) terms this transfer “the last direct cultural contribution made by India to Indochina, and the one which had the deepest influence.”

As Guy (2001: 287–88) explains, the maritime state of Srivijaya (*Sanfoqi* in Chinese) athwart the Malacca Straits was pivotal in the interocean exchange; Srivijaya entered into a tributary relationship with Tang China in 878. Both Chola and Song China (968–1279) — especially Southern Song, which in 1127 established its capital at Hangzhou on the eastern seaboard — emphasized international trade, leading to an extraordinarily lively cultural and commercial exchange. Various drivers were behind this trade. Notably, the popularity of Buddhism in China created an enormous demand for such products as aromatics. But the outflow of silver from China also created such a crisis that the state authorities intervened to encourage outward trade in ceramics and other commodities in an attempt to correct the trade balance. Designated ports were also established to handle the new commerce. Song and Yuan

(1271–1368) together took measures such as creating a superintendent of foreign trade at Guangzhou in 871 and a parallel office in Quanzhou the following century, reflecting a rising awareness of the importance of Southeast Asia as a source of aromatics and other products. Another factor influencing changing patterns of trade was the transition of south China, particularly during Southern Song times, from frontier zone to settled region, with a rising market and urban population (So 2000; Schottenhammer 2001).

Following four or five centuries of power and splendor, the foundation or charter kingdoms faced exhaustion, both environmental and political. Notably, the Mongol Yuan ascendancy in China led to the capture of Dali in 1253 and the invasion of Pagan in the late 13th century. The Cham kingdoms, in turn, began to bear the brunt of pressure from the Dai Viet people moving south. Even so, Brahmanical-Buddhist traditions continued to flourish in Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Bin Dinh (the Cham capital from 1100 onwards) and at Angkor, until its eclipse in 1431. Turning to the maritime world, in 1025 the Chola kings of south India attacked and destroyed Pengakalan Bujung on the Malay Peninsula (Matheson 2003: 41–43). Evidence that Chola raids led to the downfall of the Srivijayan empire can also be found in the *Sejarah Melayu*, or Malay annals (Wolters 1975). The end of Majapahit and its outrider at Pajajaran, coinciding with the rise of Islam along the northern *pesisir* coast of Java (Demak), also signaled the end of Java's Nusantara or Hindu-Buddhistic sense of seaborne empire. It is notable that no great Hindu-Buddhistic monuments outside of India and Sri Lanka date from after the 14th century.

Arab Trade and Islamic Conversion

Just as the Muslim empire rapidly expanded in the 7th century from its heartland in the Arabian Peninsula westward into the Maghreb and Al-Andalusia, in respectively North Africa and Spain, so Islamic traders and missionaries began to infiltrate the ancient terrestrial silk roads leading to China during the Tang dynasty. Undoubtedly, such central Asian cities as Kabul and Samarakand were key points on a route leading to Kashgar and China itself. But the Chinese seaborne trade is also attested in the Persian Gulf area by the 9th century, as Arab traders

plying coastal routes ranged as far as China (Abu-Lughod 1989: 306–10). Tangentially, the trade also touched Japan, as evidenced by the discovery, at Old Port Hakata on Kyushu and at the ancient Nara capital, of ceramic shards linked with the late 8th-century Islamic Abbasid empire, with its capital in Baghdad.

Particularly during the Mongol Yuan ascendancy of the 13th century, Muslim-controlled trade reached the Mediterranean, connecting with Venice and beyond. In these exchanges, Arab lands, southern India, Sri Lanka, and such maritime trade-oriented polities as Srivijaya, Champa, and Brunei (from around the 12th century) were all connected with coastal China via Muslim trading networks. Trade was conducted on large, many-sailed ships capable of carrying immense cargoes and many passengers, Indian traders among them (Briggs 1951: 23; Sarkar 1986; Glover 1989). Even so, the extent to which Southeast Asian agrarian polities were Indianized is impressive.

Most places mentioned in Arabic geographies and navigational tracts cannot be identified with certainty. After about 1000, Arabic geographical knowledge was not renewing itself and, at the time when Portuguese seafarers were entering these waters, the Arabic concept of Southeast Asia had virtually stagnated for 300 years. Although Persian and Turkish geographers were advancing their knowledge, Arabic mapping began to incorporate Western sources in the late 17th century. Still, as Suárez (1999: 50–52) allows, Arabic navigational texts (perhaps as used by Ahmad bin Majid, the presumed pilot who accompanied Vasco da Gama to India) were accurate and facilitated navigation to Melaka and all the major points en route to Java, Borneo, and China.

The process is not well documented, but Muslim sailors arriving from Gujarat and the eastern seaboard of India were undoubtedly among the most active in the Southeast Asian trade, though Arab seafarers were also pioneering in pushing their trade links as far as the coast of China. While obviously the evidence is not readily identified by archaeological research, as in the case of Chinese ceramics, it should be recalled that from an early age India was the leading producer and exporter of textiles — in high demand in the courts and marketplaces of Southeast Asia — and would remain so until the British eclipse of the Mughal empire.

To date, the oldest verified Islamic inscription found in the archipelago — although not of local provenance — is the Leren stele, dated 1082,

excavated from the Leren site (Gresik) near modern Surabaya on a dead estuary of the Bengawan Solo River, believed to have been an important port from the 9th century (Kalus and Guillot 2004). Nevertheless, as confirmed by the discovery of an Islamic inscription dated 1211 at Lamreh, Islam had established a beachhead in Aceh. Islam, also attested in northern Sumatra by Marco Polo in the 13th century, undoubtedly made rapid conversions from among the formerly Indianized princes, especially in zones astride maritime trading routes. While the process was not even and remained highly syncretic, across the archipelago rajas turned into sultans while their populations converted en masse. A ruler of Champa may have been the first of the Hinduized kings to convert to Islam; Islam may also have arrived in Brunei from a northern route. By the end of the 18th century, Islam had more or less reached the limits of its geographical expansion in the Malay world (Riddell 2001: 168).

The island of Bali and the western part of neighboring Lombok remain a notable exception where Hinduism not only survives but offers a semblance of a pre-Islamic past in island Southeast Asia, even if the Balinese *negara*-state did not survive the final onslaught of Dutch colonialism in the late 19th century. While a more orthopraxic Islam would develop over time in Aceh, in the Malay sultanates, on the northern *pesisir* coast of Java, and in Brunei on Borneo, it is understood that sufi or mystical interpretations of Islam eased the way for conversions in Southeast Asia: Islam in much of Southeast Asia reflects local syncretic practices. In any case, how and why Islam was received in the major Hindu Buddhist kingdoms of maritime Southeast Asia will be reserved for discussion in Chapter 3.

Muslim Networks on the China Coast


Having mastered the maritime route from Persia across the Indian seas and through the Malacca Straits, Muslim communities then developed in a crescent of southern Chinese coastal locations, as on Hainan and in Guangdong. Guangzhou developed into a virtual Arabic-Muslim port, with its famous and still extant Huaisheng or Lighthouse Mosque, plausibly dating back to c. 630, undoubtedly the earliest in China. The Muslim community of Guangzhou also hosted a *qadi* to rule on law.

While Guangzhou had long been the premium Chinese port of embarkation for long-distance trade, in 1087 the Song established an office to regulate trade at Quanzhou on the coast of Fujian, which soon exceeded Guangzhou in the collection of tax receipts. By the early Ming, Fuzhou and Suzhou would also serve this role. Quanzhou hosted numerous mosques alongside, as mentioned, Buddhist and Hindu temples. Inscriptions found in local cemeteries include scripts written in Arabic, Persian, Syrian, and Tamil, attesting to the cosmopolitan nature of the Chinese trading port. Especially during the trade-oriented Southern Song, the director-general of shipping was consistently a Muslim, as Muslims virtually dominated China's long-distance trade during this period. Although the Yuan invasion of the south scattered many Muslim communities, in Ming times, Muslims achieved social integration as well as privilege in Han society. The Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta visited Zaiton (Quanzhou), Fuzhou, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou in 1345.

Confirmation of the maritime trade between Indian and Arabian ports and the ports of Southeast Asia and coastal China continues to be revealed by marine archaeology, as in the investigation of a number of shipwrecks. As discussed in Chapter 10, ceramic assemblages located in marine wrecks offer rare evidence of East-Southeast Asian trade and production cycles. In reflecting upon the Persian and Arab commerce with China, van Leur (1955: 111) was undoubtedly correct in his assertion that "the complete internationality of trade from the earliest times on is certain" (See Map 1.2).

Conclusion

The foregoing presents a picture of a region fragmented by geography and fundamentally divided between the continental and maritime worlds. Even so, we have also emphasized the commonalities stemming from distant ancestral roots reaching back to Neolithic times. The increasing complexity of Dong Son Age societies in terms of the mastery of metals, ceramics, domesticated rice, boat-building, and navigation suggests, as discussed in the final chapter, the emergence of a regional technology "commonwealth." But this was also a region layered by the entangling "nets and trees" associated with the complex and, in part, overlapping



Map 1.2 Asian Maritime Trade Circuits, c.13th–16th centuries

Austroasiatic and Austronesian migrations and linguistic dispersions (Gupta 2006).

The present geological map of Southeast Asia is ancestral to the last major oscillation in sea level from about 4,000 years ago, which is important as a baseline by which to understand the evolution of coastal communities. But notwithstanding the fragmentation of the region, the archaeological evidence increasingly points to a broad unity in the transition from Neolithic cultures to a Bronze and Iron Age. Archaeological advances and refinements in linguistic theory offer compelling new evidence in support of both the Austronesian dispersion theory (Bellwood) and a theory in support of the indigenous origins of the early mainland cultures (Higham). Such theories of long human settlement is also supported by evidence emerging from cave excavations in East Timor, establishing human occupation at least 30,000–35,000 years ago (Glover; O'Connor; Lape), alongside ongoing archaeological research in Malaysia, Laos, and elsewhere.

With the exception of certain fertile pockets supporting high population densities, namely eastern Java, parts of Burma, and the Red River valley, the prehistoric-premodern Southeast Asian world was one of low population densities alongside the highly urbanized societies emerging in Japan and the coastal zones of China. Another dichotomy suggests itself, namely the contrast between the strong central bureaucratic traditions of the Sinic world (including Japan, Korea, and Dai Viet) and the loose constellations or mandala-like configurations of polities characteristic of Indianized Southeast Asia. While certain of the Southeast Asian kingdoms achieved major mobilization capacities, geography was an important constraint on the power of central states. Anthony Reid (1988: 23–38) has pointed to a mix of biological diversity, dense forests, flood-prone rivers, relatively poor soils, the prevalence of hunter-gather societies alongside wet rice cultivation — all impediments to imperial constructs. Add to that the borderless feature of the archipelago, with its isolated communities speaking a myriad languages, and it is easy to see how, then and even now, the region was resistant to large-scale political formations. We recall that, despite an impressive degree of Indianization and the development of scripts, most languages in use in Southeast Asia were unwritten, just as oral traditions remain strong across the region.

More generally, the evidence presented of a lively East-West maritime trade reaching back to 1000, if not before, suggests a bold revision of Reid's celebration of the late 15th century as signaling the arrival of an "age of commerce" in Southeast Asia. Unquestionably, the intensity of trade exchanges mediated by merchants arriving from the Indian subcontinent drew an increasing number of interlinked Southeast Asian polities into an early "age of commerce," as suggested by Wade (2009). This is all the more so, if we accept the salience of the civilizational part of the transfer. Still, in the *longue durée* perspective, we will look ahead to the processes whereby this "in-between" region emerged, especially after 1500, as a world region in its own right, or at least from within a world history perspective as we have defined.

2

Rise and Fall of the Southeast Asian “Charter” Kingdoms

Having described intra-Asian state diplomacy as part and parcel of an Asian Tributary Trade System, this chapter seeks to offer a series of snapshots of these mostly mainland Southeast Asian royal centers as they existed prior to or on the cusp of their “discovery” by European agents. The story is also one of the rise and fall or reconstitution of the Southeast Asian “charter” or foundation kingdoms. Lieberman (2003) has offered a useful tripartite delineation of the mainland states: western, central, and eastern. He also makes an important distinction among the charter states, often foundering; the newer states, which proliferated c. 1250–1440; and the period of state consolidation, more or less contemporaneous with Tokugawa Japan.

More generally, there is also a distinction between courts that developed as products of maritime trading activities (Srivijaya) and terrestrial courts (Angkor), typically agrarian-based centers that were less dependent upon international maritime trade, although the line is blurred in the case of the Hindu-Buddhistic polities of Java, Champa, and even Ayutthaya. Nevertheless, foreign trade and the acquisition of new technologies, especially cannons, were often crucial in maintaining dominance, defeating rival centers of power, and keeping predatory European interlopers at bay. From within the Sinic world, Dai Viet and successor kingdoms came to shape outcomes on the eastern mainland. The acquisition of military skills and technology from the European actors would hasten state consolidation, just as royal patronage eased the way for European traders to connect with local commerce. The European impact on mainland Southeast Asia was also distinct from that on the archipelago, especially as Europe never controlled in the early modern period

the mainland states, far more populous, hierarchical, and mobilizational relative to large parts of the maritime world.

These snapshots do not offer an entirely synchronic history, especially between unconnected and distant polities, but certain conjunctures are highlighted: “Indianization,” “Sinicization,” and the recorded arrival of Islam, along with such world-regional historical events as the Mongol invasions, the Ming invasion of Vietnam, the Angkor-Champa wars, Ayutthayan expansion, conflict between Dai Viet and Champa, Burma’s invasions of Ayutthaya, and the arrival of Westerner traders and military specialists.

Srivijaya on Sumatra

The last two great Hindu-Buddhistic empires of maritime Southeast Asia, Srivijaya (c. 680–1400) and Majapahit (c. 1293–1500 CE), were long in eclipse by the time Europeans entered these seas. Because of its location athwart the major historical maritime route between the Arab world, India, and China, Srivijaya’s fame was also entered in Chinese records during the Tang. Even so, the locus and even the name of the kingdom long eluded even modern scholarship, as Srivijaya lacked monumental remains.

As Manguin (2004b: 1245) explains, going back to the 2nd or 3rd centuries CE, coastal polities on the southeastern shores of Sumatra had taken advantage of their location astride the maritime route between India and China, especially as Sui (581–618) and Tang China swung their attention to Southeast Asia as a source for spices and aromatics. As these small, dispersed polities coalesced into one single state after 670, the polity later identified as Srivijaya became known to China at that time as Shilifosih. The last recorded embassy sent to China from Shilifosih/Srivijaya dates from 742, but the record from Chinese sources grows dim after that date.

Known as a pilgrimage center, Srivijaya assumed Buddhism as its state religion. Srivijaya’s foundation also coincided with the rise of the Mahayana Buddhist Sailendra dynasty on central Java, promoters of such monuments as Borobudur. Some scholars believe that Sailendra and Srivijaya upheld a dynastic link. Epigraphy reveals that, in the 830s, a Sailendra prince from Java appeared as ruler of Srivijaya. Then known

in China as Sanfoqi, Srivijaya again sent a number of emissaries to the Chinese court, heralding the rebirth of the polity, as Chinese trade in ceramics flourished (Manguin 2004b).

The first to publish the name of Srivijaya was Dutch scholar Hendrik Kern (1913), drawing from the 686 Kota Kapur inscription in Old Malay. The first to link Srivijaya with an empire and to center that empire on the banks of the Musi River at Palembang was Georges Coedès, writing in 1918 with numerous later embellishments. For a long time, Srivijaya has been an enigma, especially owing to the absence of archaeological evidence and corroborating documents. As scholars canvassed alternative sites, especially on the Malay Peninsula, Palembang was only posited as the center of this empire (Wolters 1967; Christie 1990). The first professional excavations in the Palembang area were launched in 1973 by a joint American-Indonesian team. As Manguin (2004b: 1246) notes, their activities yielded “substantial evidence of religious and economic activity,” consistent with a large settlement scattered some 12 kilometers along the northern bank of the Musi River. Buddhist and Hindu sanctuaries were also discovered upstream from Palembang. By the 1980s, textual data conclusively demonstrated a link with Palembang and south Sumatra, and that the empire had been founded in the 680s.

The new scholarly consensus on Srivijaya, as summarized by Manguin (2008), broadly confirms the findings of the European Orientalists, namely that Palembang and southern Sumatra were once the center of a powerful polity named Srivijaya, at least during the foundation period of the late 7th to 8th centuries and again during the economic boom of the 9th and 10th centuries. Under threat from Java, the capital moved to Jambi toward the end of the 11th century, survived there until the 13th century, then moved inland to the Minangkabau highlands. Palembang’s fortunes revived only in the 16th and 17th centuries with the installation of a sultan during a new economic boom.

Manguin (2004b: 1247) writes that Srivijaya was composed of a network of harbor cities exacting taxes over maritime routes. However, it was hardly an empire ruled from Palembang as colonial-era interpretations believed. What is clear is that the Palembang-based polity exercised control over the vast Musi River basin as well as upstream and downstream societies, a pattern replicated by other polities on the Malay Peninsula that, for a time, were included in the Srivijayan orbit.

Java-centered Majapahit

While Majapahit (c. 1293–1500) predated the arrival of Europeans on Java, echoes of its grandeur entered the writings of Antonio Pigafetta, the scribe aboard Magellan's ship, who learned of Majapahit from his Javanese pilot. Specifically, Pigafetta (1969: 142) records Majapahit as the capital of Java under Raja Patinus (?). He also writes of a Hindu funeral practice on Java and the Hindu mythological bird, the Garuda. He duly registers the new rising centers of Muslim power on the Javan *pesisir* coast, namely Sunda, Demak, Japara, Tuban, and Gresik, whose courtiers were hosted at the Majapahit capital. In any case, Majapahit was the greatest of the pre-Islamic states of maritime Southeast Asia. Based in eastern Java, Majapahit was also the last of the great Hindu empires of the Malay archipelago; its influence was felt over large swathes of Borneo and Sumatra, although the extent of its power remains disputed. Its power was likely focused upon the religious-political capital Trowulan, Mojokerto, in east Java. Something of the splendor of this Buddhist-Hindu-Saivite-Vishnite court can be witnessed in the remaining monuments.

As Ricklefs (1981: 16) summarizes, the detailed history of Majapahit is unclear, as the interpretation of the main Old Javanese source, the *Negarakertagama*, written in 1367, is contested. Nevertheless, the names of rulers are known, beginning with King Kertarajasa Jayawardhana (1294–1309) down to 1478, when, as some chronicles record, Majapahit fell to Islamic Demak. The golden age of Majapahit is seen as the rule of Hayam Wuruk (1350–89).

As an agrarian-based kingdom collecting tax from a Javanese perimeter that included rich, irrigated rice lands, Majapahit was also outward- and trade-oriented through its control of strategic swathes of the north Java coast, thereby tapping into the lucrative coastal trade in spices. This included the westward movement of sandalwood from Timor, and tribute collected from outlying polities throughout the archipelago no doubt extended Majapahit's control over the trade lanes. Ricklefs (1981: 17) confirms that Majapahit was both a land-based and a trading empire, but doubts that it ever exercised centralized control over outlying zones in the form sometimes asserted. It did, however, command a navy, sending in 1377 a punitive mission to Palembang. Majapahit also

upheld relations with Champa, Cambodia, Siam, southern Burma, and Vietnam, and sent missions to China.

A trade connection between Majapahit and Vietnam is evidenced by the presence in the Majapahit capital of Vietnamese glazed tiles. Majapahit was also connected with Chinese overseas trade networks. In 2008, large quantities of Chinese copper coins were uncovered by a government-sponsored excavation, suggesting either increasingly complex domestic markets or the use of coins for foreign transactions as part of a prestige goods trade.

Majapahit and Srivijaya together have served Indonesian nationalists seeking to glorify precursor empires to the Republic of Indonesia. As Pierre Manguin (2008) explains, Coedès' hypothesis did not prevent Indonesian nationalists, including Muhammad Yamin, minister of education and culture in the Republic of Indonesia (1953–54), from situating Srivijaya within Indonesian historiography as a powerful precursor to the modern Indonesian state.

The Cambodian Kingdom of Angkor

The most prosperous and powerful of the charter agrarian court centers of Southeast Asia, dating from the 9th century through to its fall in 1431 at the hands of Tai invaders, was the central mainland Cambodian kingdom of Angkor. Angkor may well have been the world's largest pre-industrial settlement, spread over 1,000 square kilometers and supporting, through hydraulic works, a large albeit low-density population. Thereafter, the political center of power shifted toward the lower Mekong River zone. No longer a dominant political-religious center, though there were periods of revival in the last quarter of the 16th century, Angkor's magnificence was nevertheless recounted by the first Europeans to learn of, if not actually to witness, this monument, in the Eurocentric tradition of ascribing fallen grandeur to Asian civilizations. Angkor was more or less contemporaneous with many Gothic cathedrals. The construction of Angkor Wat dates from 1113–50; Notre Dame cathedral was begun in 1163.

Constructed over several centuries and ruled by a peerless Hindu-*raja* turned Buddha-*raja*, Angkor grafted profoundly Indianized concepts upon indigenous elements. As described by Briggs (1951), Angkor drew

upon and elaborated the traditions of such worthy precursor kingdoms as Funan (84–630) and Chenla (550–802), even if Chinese sources exaggerated these kingdoms in their depictions. Not until the mid-10th century, more or less contemporaneously with Pagan's expansion to northern Burma, did the notion of a single Khmer kingdom become apparent. A new phase then began, with the extension of administrative and ecclesiastical structures into what is now eastern and central Thailand.

With the reign of Suryavarman II (r. 1113–45/50), builder of Angkor Wat and devotee of Vishnu, Angkor was at its height, holding various degrees of authority over the Chao Phraya, or Menam, River basin, Champa, northern and southern Thailand, and Laos. Suryavarman also established diplomatic relations with China (Chandler 1992: 49; Lieberman 2003: 217). From the 10th to the 13th centuries, Angkor produced an unprecedented burst of temple construction, marking it off as the principal charter kingdom of central mainland Southeast Asia, though it had serious rivals (Lieberman 2003: 232–33).

Water management at Angkor has long fueled a debate between those emphasizing the essentially ritualistic functions of the massive monuments and those seeing more functional attributes in the canals (Groslier 1958). Arguably, Angkor was the quintessential hydraulic kingdom, as measured by its monumental architecture, its canals, reservoirs, and strategic location near the virtual inland sea of the Tonle Sap. Such grand hydraulic and agricultural projects, along with the appropriation of surpluses by a bureaucratic state in turn personified by the king, have led some to describe Angkorian civilization, after Marx, as a version of the Oriental Mode of Production (Mazzeo and Antonini 1978: 74–75; Chandler 1992: 53–54). Others, such as Higham (2002a: 355), have asserted that, unlike in Sri Lanka where huge tanks served irrigation purposes, those of Angkor fulfilled only a “symbolic and religious role.”

Ecological factors — namely the siltation of the canals from deforestation, caused by the expansion of ricefields to support a population of about one million — may also have contributed to the fall of Angkor (Greater Angkor Project 2005). The study of tree rings at Dalat in 2009 shows a multi-decade drought in the late 1300s and early 1400s; Brendan Buckley of Columbia University's Tree-Ring Laboratory has speculated about related impacts on such vulnerable hydraulic societies as Angkor (Buckley et al. 2010).

Well attested in Chinese chronicles from the 13th century, Angkor was also visited and described by the Yuan dynasty envoy Zhou Daguan (Chou Ta-Kuan) in 1296–97. In his long and detailed account, Angkor emerges as a walled but nameless city of striking architectural features, in which Brahmanist, Theravada Buddhist, and Shaivite communities all coexisted. Zhou also observed that three or four rice crops were produced annually, owing to the annual overflow of the Great Lake, which acted as a natural fertilizer. His point of reference was of course China, but he also observed many specific agricultural and other practices in Angkor, including the use of forest products and wild animals (Briggs 1951: 246–47; Chandler 1992: 71–76).

Notably, Jayavarman VII (1181–1220?) constructed roads from Angkor to Champa, Siam, and Laos, and opened new relations with China at a time when the Song was encouraging new maritime links with Southeast Asia. He attacked Vietnam and Champa (depicted as a naval battle in bas-reliefs at the Bayon) and expanded into the Chao Phraya valley (Lunet de Lajonquière 1902: 12; Chandler 1992: 59–61). Cambodia specialist Michael Vickery (2005b: 5) links Angkorian expansion with Chinese diplomacy. He also claims that the evidence for this development is even stronger for the 14th and 15th centuries, as chronicle records reveal more than in the preceding 500 years. While never directly engaging the European trading companies, Angkor nevertheless cast a shadow over mainland Southeast Asia when Europeans were engaging its former rivals or successors in Champa, Siam, and Cambodia itself.

The Court of Phnom Penh

As Angkorian power contracted, the center of gravity of the Khmer polity shifted toward the lower Mekong River. Beginning in the 1300s, a number of polities were established in the vicinity of Phnom Penh, namely Lovek from c. 1504, and Oudong by the early 1600s. As such, the new centers of Cambodian royal power were better able to tap the maritime Chinese trade, while also establishing control over the Lao trade coming down the Mekong River. The new centers of Khmer royal power were well served by ricefields in the delta zone and fish from the Tonle Sap. To be sure, as Kersten (2003: xii) summarizes, since the

transfer of the capital from Angkor, Cambodia had become a more outward-looking trading kingdom. But, with the capture of Lovek by Siam in 1587, Cambodia entered a period of uncertainty and confusion with no fewer than five pretenders to the throne vying for power up to 1602. According to French colonial-era scholar Etienne Aymonier (1900–04: 789), the occupation of the capital by Siam reduced the country to vassalage. Another consequence of the turmoil was the loss of court chronicles. The fall of Lovek also saw the intervention of two Iberian soldiers of fortune in dynastic politics, namely the Portuguese, Diego de Veloso, and the Spaniard Blas Ruiz de Herman Gonzales. The entry of various Europeans vying for influence, notably the Dutch from 1620 on, also led to a revolution in the methods of warfare, particularly the introduction of the naval cannon.

Tai Pluralism (c. 1250–1440)

Lieberman (2003: 242–44) has drawn attention to the rise of new elites and states in the central mainland region through 1250–1440, more or less coinciding with the decline of Angkor and the original charter states. In so doing, he adopts Charnvit Kasetsiri's (1976) notion of “*muang* pluralism,” referring to the rise of a myriad Tai principalities based on *muang*, a territorial concept usually based on irrigated rice land, as in a river valley where people owe allegiance to a *chaomuang* or lord. He identifies some 13 such independent kingdoms that drew upon, respectively, Angkorian, Mon, and Tai (Dai) traditions, with Tai influence stronger in the north. Along the upper and middle Mekong, Tai newcomers seized or founded hundreds of small principalities, including Luang Prabang (Lane Xang), and Vientiane. Further west, Kenghung in Sipsongpanna (Xishuangbanna), Chiang Sen, Phayao, Nan, and, importantly, Lanna, including Chiang Mai (c. 1222–96), Chiang Rai and, in turn, Sukhothai (c. 1219), Lopburi, and, eventually, in the lower Chao Phraya River, Ayutthaya, all fit the pattern. Early European visitors and cartographers often conflated and confused these toponyms, especially as they lacked knowledge of local political structures (Mayoury 2002: 99).

Gradually, Mon and Khmer legends became subordinate to Tai legends and spirits. The notion of a Cakravati or universal monarch of great merit also gained acceptance in Tai polities. Rather than seeing a

definitive break with the Angkorian tradition, Chandler (1992: 80–81) sees such polities as Ayutthaya as participating in a hybrid culture containing elements of Hinduized kingship, traceable to Angkor and to Theravada monastic “accessibility.” Such traditions, in turn, are traceable to the Mon kingdoms that had practiced Theravada Buddhism for almost a thousand years, as well as to remnants of village-oriented leadership descended from the ethnic forerunners of the Tai, namely the tribalized peoples with possible origins in southern China. Even so, Chandler adverts, the blending of cultures between the polities was rarely peaceful.

Muang-based polities, such as represented Tai political space, were also steeply ranked among lords, lesser lords, commoners, slaves, and — receding into darkness as it were — non-Tai ethnic minorities. Typically, in the Tai Buddhist kingdoms the *chaomuang* achieved legitimacy through the acquisition of palladium or sacral objects and other displays of royal power; religious authority was also on grand display on ceremonial occasions. In the larger polities such as Ayutthaya, a graduated *sakdina* or feudal system assigned both rank and land, as regulated by law under King Trailokanat (r. 1448–88). Even so, it was the king who, in theory, owned the land. However, control of manpower, as opposed to control of territory, enhanced the potency of the state; slaves and captives were pressed into service in the victors’ army. The slave-corrée system continued in Siam into the modern period (Charnvit 2004: 194–95).

The Hinduized Kingdom of Champassak

Located in southwestern Laos, bordering modern Cambodia and Thailand on the middle Mekong River, historical Champassak emerged in an early period as an independent kingdom separated by geography and tradition from the northern Lao kingdoms. With its origins reaching back to the 5th century CE and occupying the territory of the ancient state of Chenla, Champassak entered Khmer lore as the fount of the Angkorian kingdom from the 9th to the 12th centuries. This correlation is attested by Sanskrit inscriptions and other evidence associated with the Vat Phu Hindu temple and the hill flanking the sacred mountain of Bassac (Briggs 1951). Champassak was eventually eclipsed by Vientiane under Souligna Vongsa (r. 1637–94) and its status under Vientiane was reduced by vassalage imposed by King Taksin (r. 1767–82), ruling from Bangkok.

Such historical and dynastic differences were understood by the French, who separated Champassak from the protectorate they imposed upon Luang Prabang (and Vientiane) in the late 19th century.

Lane Xang (Luang Prabang)

Located on a peninsula formed by the confluence of the Mekong River with the smaller Khan River, the northern Lao city of Luang Prabang (today a UNESCO-protected site) exudes a majestic presence and appeal. Known for its numerous Buddhist temples and pristine natural setting, Luang Prabang today enjoys a tourist revival. Under French colonial protection from 1893–1954, the kingdom survived until 1975.

First known as Muong Sua and later as Xieng-Dong Thong, Luang Prabang is closely associated with the role of King Fa Ngum, who in 1353 founded the kingdom of Lane Xang Hom Khao (Kingdom of a Million Elephants and the White Parasol). His son Sam Senthai (Three Thousand Thai) deposed him in 1493. According to local belief, Fa Ngum married a Khmer princess, and is believed to have introduced Theravada Buddhist concepts of power and religion to his capital. As a Lao monarch, he stamped his *muang* or bounded realm with the quintessential elements of Lao Buddhist political rule, notably incorporating Indianized elements of kingship. Nevertheless, the enduring presence of pre-Buddhist elements, especially among the non-Lao indigenous population, was acknowledged in court rituals and ceremonies until the end of the kingdom. Proximity to China also saw the incorporation of certain Chinese elements. There is no doubt that the ability of Fa Ngum to attract overland trade laid the economic foundations for the kingdom at its apogee.

About the year 1560, pending a shift of the capital to Vientiane by King Sethathinat, the city became known as Luang Prabang in honor of the sacred Phra Bang, the most venerated Buddhist image in Laos. Believed to be of Sri Lankan provenance, the Phra Bang was undoubtedly imported from the Angkorian capital.

Throughout its history, Luang Prabang suffered numerous foreign incursions and invasions. In 1753, a Burmese army invaded, returning in 1771 in league with Vientiane, hence opening up a rift between the two Lao royal centers. In 1778, King Taksin carried away the palladium of the city, the Phra Bang, to Bangkok. Vientiane invaded Luang Prabang again

in 1791 and annexed the northern provinces of Houa Phan. Thereafter Luang Prabang underwent a long period of decline.

The Kingdom of Vientiane

The landlocked Kingdom of Laos, with its capital in Vientiane (City of Sandalwood), became known to Europe with the visits in 1596 of Veloso and Ruiz, by way of Fai-fo (Hoi An), in search of the deposed king of Cambodia. Their visit was reported to Spanish officials in Manila and their brief account printed in 1609 (Mayoury 2002: 96).

The first authentic record by a visitor to Vientiane was that of Gerrit van Wuysthoff, head of a party of Dutch merchants who, in 1641, traveled up the Mekong from the Dutch trading post in Phnom Penh, in search of trade prospects. The Dutch with Lao merchant support sought unsuccessfully to break the monopoly in the lower Mekong of Portuguese and Spanish merchants on such forest products as insect sticklac and gum benjamin. Intriguingly, van Wuysthoff encountered unspecified Muslim merchants in Vientiane retailing Indian cloths (brought by an overland route via Tenasserim) in competition with textiles offered by the Dutch to Lao merchants visiting Cambodia (Mayoury 2002: 116, 126). The following year, Laos was visited by the Italian Jesuit Giovanni-Maria Leria, who sojourned for five years, describing King Surinyavongsa’s palace as “of prodigious extent, and so large that one would take it for a town” (Stuart-Fox 1997: 13). Leria’s account was printed in Europe in 1663, while the Dutch account was published in 1669 (Plate 5).

For most of the 1600s and 1700s, Vientiane maintained a loose tributary relationship with both the Trinh lords in Hanoi and the Nguyen in the south. Military intervention in 1779 by the Chakkri kings led to the sacking of Vientiane and the depopulation of the once lively court city, as witnessed by the first European visitors. Reluctantly, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak together were obliged to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Bangkok dynasty, which also backed the southern Nguyen. Nevertheless, the ascendancy of the Tay Son in Vietnam (in control of Hue in 1786–88) reversed the policy of its Le-Trinh predecessors by offering support to Vientiane and opening a trade route across the Trung Son mountain range at western Nghe-Tinh (the Quy-Hop trail). Chastised by Vientiane’s military adventures against Luang Prabang

(1788) and the Phuan country on the high plateau, the Tay Son mounted an unprecedented if short-lived raid into Laos, reaching the Mekong river in 1792 (Breazeale 2002: 261–74).

Dynastic struggles following the division of Laos into two kingdoms — Luang Prabang and Vientiane — as much as inaccessibility doubtless deterred further European visitors until the arrival 200 years later of the French empire-builder, Henri Mouhot (Mayouri 2002: 97). Not surprisingly, Laos began to appear on European maps as an “ill-defined separate kingdom” only in the latter part of the 17th century (Fell 1988: 93).

The Tai Kingdom of Ayutthaya

From its foundation in 1351 until its eclipse in 1767 at the hands of the Burmese, Ayutthaya offers itself as the exemplary charter — actually post-charter — polity dominating central mainland Southeast Asia after the decline of Angkor. Throughout its 400-year history, 34 kings from five different dynasties ruled from Ayutthaya. While the population embraced a Theravada Buddhism laced with certain Mahayanist elements, the animistic world was never far away, then or now. At the court, both Hindu and Brahmanic rites were celebrated (Charnvit 1976; Dhiravat 1993) (Plate 4).

Also known as Siam in Europe, Ayutthaya sat astride the middle Chao Phraya River, forming a secure island hosting royal palaces and temples along with merchant quarters; it also participated in the maritime trade spanning the Red Sea to Japan. While it was a self-sufficient agrarian kingdom sited in a large and fertile plain supporting wet-rice cultivation, new interpretations view precursors to Ayutthaya as deeply involved in maritime networks in the Gulf of Siam and the Malay Peninsula, dating from the decline of Srivijaya (Baker 2003). From the earliest days, Siam was linked with China via the tribute trade; its royal junks, also sailing to Japan, were manned by Chinese seafarers. In this view, Ayutthaya enjoyed a hybrid maritime-territorial political-economic system at least until northern influences came to dominate.

Ayutthaya emerged out of a union of two kingdoms, Suphanburi and Lopburi, legatees of the Dvarawati Kingdom (6th–11th centuries CE), then under the influence of Angkor in the age of Suryavarman I (c. 1181–c. 1220) and thereafter. Charnvit Kasetsiri (2004: 193) sees three

broad contextualizing events facilitating the rise of Ayutthaya. First, the decline of Angkor under Jayavarman VII (1181–1220). Second, the shift at the royal center from Brahmanic Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism to Hinayana (Theravada) Buddhism. Third, the change of dynasty in China from Song to Yuan (1271–1368). Given these events, it seemed propitious for U Thong to found the new kingdom.

The early period saw Ayutthaya launch invasions on Angkor in 1369, 1388, and 1431, eventually forcing the Khmer to relocate their capital. Ayutthaya also came to dominate Sukhothai in the north and Nakhon Si Thammarat in the south, with pretensions over the Malay Peninsula. The expansion of Ayutthaya’s domain brought it into conflict with Burma, especially over the control of Chiang Mai and the kingdom of Mon. Ayutthaya suffered a temporary setback at the hands of the Burmese in 1569, but recovered control of access to the Indian Ocean at Mergui and Tenasserim, today part of Burma. Conflict over Chiang Mai infamously led to Ayutthaya’s defeat and destruction at the hand of Burmese armies in 1767. Yet the sway of Ayutthaya continued, as a younger generation of power-holders around Phra Chao Taksin (r. 1767–82) relocated their capital to Bangkok, even closer to the source of maritime trade, just as they initially linked their heritage back to Ayutthaya (Charnvit 2004: 193).

Not surprisingly, the first European visitors to Ayutthaya were Portuguese, as Afonso de Albuquerque, Governor of “Portuguese India,” had received an envoy from Siam even prior to the conquest of Melaka. The first Portuguese to visit Ayutthaya, Duarte Fernandes, arrived in October 1511 by Chinese junk. Seeking the support of Siam for an attack on Melaka, he also set up a *de facto* alliance between the Portuguese and King Ramathibodhi II (r. 1491–1529). Under a treaty of 1518, the Portuguese were permitted to reside in Siam, gradually losing their influence only from the mid-17th century. Their tenure coincided with the rising prosperity of Ayutthaya, in part owing to the connection with Portuguese Melaka, but also through royal-sponsored trade with the broader region (Villiers 1991: 59, 62–33). Notably, at the request of the Macau Senate, King Phra Narai (r. 1656–88) granted a loan to the Portuguese to pay for an embassy to the Emperor of China. To service the loan, Macau helped to facilitate Ayutthaya’s royal junk trade to Guangzhou, with the last installment on the loan paid off only in 1722 (Seabra 2005: 1–20).

Ayutthaya, first visited by the Dutch in the last years of the 16th century, dispatched a mission to the Hague in 1609, arguably making it the best known of the Southeast Asian kingdoms in Europe. Not far behind the Dutch were the English, who, from 1612, established trading posts at Ayutthaya and Patani. However, it was the French who made the greatest political impact, starting with the visit in 1662 by the French missionary Pierre Lambert de la Motte and culminating with an exchange of embassies between Versailles and Ayutthaya in 1687.

Engelbert Kaempfer first published his account of the kingdom in 1727. A German doctor employed by the Dutch East India Company, Kaempfer first arrived in Ayutthaya via Batavia in late 1689 — that is, one year after the “1668 revolution” in Siam. As H.K. Kuløy (1987: *x*) remarks, the value of Kaempfer’s account is that it was by “a non-French, non-Catholic observer, who personally did not have any attachment to any factions in Siamese society nor any responsibility to further the Christian faith or any European national interest in Siam.” Notably, Kaempfer (1987) remarked upon “many suburbs and villages, some of which consist of inhabited ships or vessels, rather than homes.”

In fact, Ayutthaya’s “internationality” has compensated for the dearth of local documentation on the kingdom, leading even indigenous scholars to resort to Western sources, just as a modern Western audience has come to view the kingdom through the optic of early French, Dutch, and English accounts.

The Burmese Kingdoms

Lieberman (2003: 85–88) treats the Burmese kingdoms under the rubric of the western mainland. Burmese history, he explains, had a cyclical character, with Lower Burma exploiting Upper Burma (1280s and 1740s) and vice versa (late 1500s). The south was the homeland of the Mons while the Burmese dominated the north, leading to a fluid tension between the two. Over the long term, the acquisition of firearms well into the 19th century and external trade links, including both coastal and overland trade with China, led to centralization, rendering interregna shorter and shorter. The expansion of agriculture, including of cotton and new rice strains, created a commercial synergy linking north and south as well as enabling further centralization.

The charter polity of Pagan, founded in 849, was centered upon the dry upper zone of Burma until overrun by the Mongols in 1287. Pagan developed intensive irrigated rice cultivation, featuring canals. Theravada Buddhist principles from Sri Lanka were well established in this period. The earliest temples showed north Indian Mahayanist and Brahmanic influence, but Pagan’s kings sought to encourage the people’s support for Theravada Buddhism in the style of stupas and temples (James 2004: 1012). While colonial scholars emphasized the centrality of Mon culture at Pagan, more recent scholarship attests to the importance of the Tibeto-Burman Pyu culture (especially in architecture) (Aung-Thwin 1985). James (2004: 1012), however, contends that Mon culture was important also in its bequest of literary traditions.

The traditional seat of Mon power in Burma was Pegu, which emerged as the center of a polity in Lower Burma following the eclipse of Pagan. Following the Mongol incursions, a Shan related to King Ramkhamhaeng (r. 1279–98) of Sukhothai held power in Lower Burma, which may also have been subservient to Siam. The rise of Pegu is associated with the rule of Razadarit (r. 1385–1423), who brought the small city-states of Lower Burma together. He also engaged in wars against the Burmese kings of Ava. Pegu’s prominence was aided by its proximity to maritime commerce and international trade (James 2004: 1044).

The post-charter phase (1300–1550) in Burma, as described by Lieberman (2003: 123–31), shadows Pegu’s slow decline and political fragmentation between, variously, the Shan realm, Upper Burma, Arakan, and Lower Burma. The Toungoo dynasty (1486–1752) revived Burman power and took Pagan as its capital from 1544. The Toungoo kings also spearheaded political reunification.

The First Toungoo Empire (1486–1599) encompassed the strategic maritime provinces of Bassam, Rangoon, Henzavadi, Martaban, Prome, Tongo, and Sirlao. Seeking to dominate both the Shans in the north and the Mons of the south, it was also a rival of Ava in Upper Burma. As Lieberman (2003: 150) confirms, Toungoo conquests benefited directly from the acquisition of European-style firearms and “Indian Ocean mercenaries.” Portuguese, Chinese, and Muslims all entered this trade in cannon and matchlocks. Even elephant units were equipped with guns, as brick and stone fortifications began replacing wood.

At the time of the arrival of the first Europeans, Pegu, the Toungoo capital under Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–50) and Bayinnaung (r. 1551–81) traded with India, the Malay world, Indochina, and even China. Making direct contact with traders from Pegu at Melaka, the Portuguese established relations with the king of Pegu, sending a mission led by Antonio Correa in 1519 to Martaban, gateway to the kingdom (Caetano 1990). The Portuguese established a trading base at Syriam, across the river from present-day Rangoon; Portuguese adventurers and mercenaries would play a key role in the dynastic struggles and military adventures besetting the courts. From 1560, Salvadore Ribeiro de Souza and his party founded a trading post and fortress on the Pegu plain, where, to the admiration of the Pegu kings, they defeated an invading force of some 6,000 Malay Muslims. Just as de Souza began to act as a little king outside of official Portuguese command, so he was rewarded with the local title of Massinga (Maha Singha), or Great Lion. Before returning to the Portuguese fold, he received foreign ambassadors and passed treaties (Cabaton 1913: 82). In 1569, the Toungoo kings marched on Ayutthaya and, using Portuguese mercenaries and cannon, occupied the lower Chao Phraya River basin. Notably, Pegu figured along with Siam and Bengal in the Fernão Vaz Dourado map of 1570.

The Englishman Ralph Fitch, who in November 1586 sailed up the Irrawaddy River to Pegu, having arrived from India by boat from Bengal, was greatly impressed with the city and its merchant activity (Foster 1921: 30–31). The Venetian traveler and merchant Casparo Baldi had visited Pegu three years prior to Fitch. Baldi, who achieved an audience with the king, was also impressed, but found two cities in Pegu, an older city inhabited by merchants and a newer city housing the royal residence. Baldi also observed a “street of Portugals” in Pegu, testament to the prior Portuguese contact with the kingdom (Purchas 1905: 158).

Even so, from 1584 to 1599, the First Toungoo Empire disintegrated as rapidly as it had been constructed. Lieberman (2003: 155) relates that a succession of punitive expeditions by Pegu against Siam all failed. Bereft of support from Shan and Tai allies, Toungoo pushed harder against the Mons. Weakened by desertions, the capital at Pegu was besieged in 1599 by armies from Siam, Toungoo principalities, and Arakan, with the latter two besieging and burning the capital, “once one of the wonders of Asia.” Lieberman (2003: 157) ascribes this collapse

to a series of ecological-economic crises that strangled the “overheated” First Toungoo Empire.

In contrast, what became known as the Restored Toungoo Empire (1597–1752) made a fast comeback. In the intervening period, the last of the Portuguese mercenary-adventurers were removed from the scene. In 1612, Philippe de Brito Nicote, a former mercenary on the side of Arakan who commanded coastal commerce and warfare at Syriam, was besieged and defeated by sea and land forces mustered by the kingdom of Ava. Refusing to submit, he was killed. It would be a century before Europeans tentatively returned to the area (Cabaton 1915 citing Duarte Barbosa, 83). The following year, a branch of the fallen royal house succeeded in reuniting the valley and adjacent highlands, creating a political system that would endure until the late 19th century under the Konbaung dynasty.

In 1634, the Dutch East India Company set up in Lower Burma, operating a trading post until 1680. According to Dijk (2006), surviving Dutch documentation offers probably the best account of the relatively tranquil Restored Toungoo period at a time when the kings of Pegu transferred their court and capital to Ava. As Lieberman suggests (2003: 158–66), such longevity matches that of Tokugawa Japan, Bourbon France, and Romanov Russia. Toungoo administrative reforms eased their control over manpower, just as the long peace contributed to demographic growth and imperial stability. Again, the acquisition of guns was crucial to this 200-year-long consolidation. Not only did the Burmese kings continue to import the weapons, they also manufactured matchlocks and gunpowder. In short time, the flintlock replaced the matchlock, as the percentage of armed infantrymen soared by the late 18th and early 19th century.

In 1685, Pegu was attacked by Ava and forced into a union. In 1740, the Mons at Pegu recovered their independence with violence matching that of Ava’s victory over Pegu. Ava finally fell to the Mon in 1752. Emerging out of the crisis, the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885) was the “most administratively penetrating and commercially sophisticated in the history of the western mainland” (Lieberman 2003: 87).

The Trinh and Nguyen in Vietnam

With recorded history in Vietnam beginning in the 3rd century BCE, the following 12 centuries under Chinese domination saw the transformation of Vietnam from a preliterate “south seas civilization” to “a distinctive member of the East Asian cultural world.” As Taylor (1991: xix–xxi) has explained, Chinese domination up until the 10th century CE affected Vietnam in two ways. First, it fostered a receptivity to Chinese cultural leadership on the part of the elite, manifest in language, philosophy, notions of kingship, and other Sinic norms. On the other hand, it also bred in the Vietnamese a resistance to Chinese and other foreign influences. This period of Vietnamese history can be divided into various phases. The first commences with Dong Son or Lac-Viet civilization, as discussed in Chapter 1. A second phase may be described as the Han Viet, in which the Chinese military supported a new mixed Sino-Vietnamese elite alongside Vietnamese Buddhism. The third phase, or Gao-Viet, saw the establishment of a Gao state within Vietnam, led by men with allegiances to northern dynasties. The Cham to the south were now the enemy. In a fourth phase spanning most of the 6th century, China momentarily withdrew, as local heroes “experimented with different forms of self-expression.” The fifth, or Tang-Viet, phase saw the political and cultural boundaries of Vietnam tightly drawn by Tang military power, notwithstanding attempts at rebellion. Eventually, in the 10th century, the Vietnamese were successful in drawing a frontier between themselves and China. Taylor notes that Vietnam found itself on the very boundary between East and Southeast Asia. In this complex positioning between the two worlds, the Vietnamese “learnt to articulate their non-Chinese identity in terms of China’s cultural heritage.”

Following wars with the Nanzhao (Nan Chao) kingdom in Yunnan, Song armies again prepared to assert China’s dominance over Vietnam. Under Commander Le Hoan, Vietnamese armies repulsed the Song, giving Vietnam a century of relief from Chinese pressure. Importantly, in 1010, a palace guard named Li Cong Uan was raised to the throne as founder of the Le (Ly) dynasty, which endured for the next two centuries. In 1076, the Vietnamese defeated a second invasion by the Song, the last war with China until the Yuan invasions of the 13th century. Early in the 15th century, Ming armies attempted to take over Vietnam again

but were driven out within 20 years. Even so, this period was important in introducing Ming notions of neo-Confucianism, as Vietnamese Buddhism began to wane (Taylor 1991: 295–96).

Undoubtedly, the dominant polity of the eastern mainland, at least when Europeans arrived on the scene, was the charter Dai Viet state, with its ancient capital in Thang Long or Hanoi. For good reason, Lieberman (2003: 338) declares Vietnam “the least coherent territory in the world.” This is a reference, in part, to Vietnam’s geography, notably the narrow coastal plain separating the Red River Valley in the north from the sprawling Mekong delta in the south. But it is also an allusion to the millennium-long contest between the Confucianist and expansionist “charter” Dai Viet state in the north with the Hinduized Cham dominating the river mouths and coastal plains leading to the south.

Following the collapse of the Dai Viet state in the 14th century, a split in 1546 in the Le dynasty between the Nguyen and the Trinh led, in the early 1600s, to the establishment of the Nguyen kingdom in the south (Dang Trong) on the former lands of Champa, and the Trinh and successors in the north (Dang Ngoia). But as the Le-Trinh maintained their court in the north, so Nguyen Hoang (r. 1558–1613) and his successors pushed the frontier deeper into the Mekong delta area and even into the Khmer homeland. Indeed, the first European visitors were confused as to the exact political center of the Vietnamese polity. But, from the 17th century, another political center emerged at Hue in central-south Vietnam. In turn, the Tay Son rebellion of 1771–1802 was centered on Quy Nhon and destroyed the southern Nguyen and the Le-Trinh. But before losing power between 1792 and 1802 to the future Emperor Gia Long, a scion of the Nguyen dynasty, the Tay Son reorganized the Vietnamese world (Dutton 2006). As intimated, the court of Vientiane was perplexed by these dynastic fluctuations.

As Li Tana (1998: 12–13) observes — contrary to mainstream Vietnamese historiography, which is somewhat dismissive of the Nguyen state insofar as it compromised national unity, the southern state possessed distinctive characteristics enriching Vietnamese culture over a long period. In part, this is an allusion to the assimilation of the southward-migrating Vietnamese to Khmer, Cham, and even pre-Cham social mores. As Lieberman (2003) elaborates, such practices included tattoos, betel-chewing, communal houses built on poles, and pronounced female

autonomy. The moving frontier of the south, which came to include Chinese merchant groups, deepened the Nguyen state's links with the Southeast Asian world. In Lieberman's (2003: 347) view, the perennial question as to whether Vietnam should be viewed as part of the Sinic or the Southeast Asian world has no answer, because it has properties of both.

As Hoi An emerged as the Nguyen's major window on the world in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, attracting Portuguese, Chinese and Japanese merchants alike, so Nguyen Hoang actively solicited Japanese trading vessels by communicating with the Tokugawa from 1601. The fruits of the trade were various, but included the massive import of Japanese copper and copper coins, serving as the *de facto* currency of the kingdom but also used to forge cannon. Li Tana (1998: 98) confirms that maritime trade greatly stimulated Nguyen state formation, as the acquisition of advanced weaponry gave it an edge over the Trinh. But such dependence upon fluctuating foreign markets also created external vulnerabilities, as when an appreciation in the price of imported Japanese copper caused a money supply crisis.

Thang Long (Hanoi)

Vietnamese nationalist historiography hails Hanoi as a city with a history reaching back one thousand years to its origins under the name of Thang Long (Soaring Dragon), bearing witness to the Mongol invasion of the 13th century, the Ming invasion of the 15th century, the French invasion of the late 19th century, and the American invasion of the late 20th century (Tran and Nguyen 1977: 5). That would make Hanoi the oldest capital city of our bounded Southeast Asian region. It is also undoubtedly the best documented in indigenous sources.

Vietnamese researchers have traced the origins of Hanoi, located east of the confluence of the Red River and the Duong River, back through time. The history of settlement on the Red River mirrors the emergence of Viet civilization, but undoubtedly the emergence of Thang Long as a capital of the Ly dynasty in 1010 represented a trend toward centralization by the feudal state. Founded on a north-south, east-west grid, Thang Long reproduced key features of Chinese geomancy, including a royal "forbidden" city with access via four gates and a commoners' city. Dike

construction to protect the city from the periodic flooding of the Red River was advanced. While Confucian precepts advanced, the Ly and Tran (1225–1410) kings were also patrons of Buddhism; the city reached its peak after three centuries of construction.

The first extant map of the city (1490) dates from the Le Loi period (1428–1527), though the first Western descriptions date from the Tay Son period. In 1666, Italian Jesuit Giovanni Filippo de Marini observed two-story houses in Thang Long and a lively palace scene. Comparing Thang Long with a middle-sized Italian city, Marini was impressed by the craft quarters, still evident today in the old city. Thang Long’s fame as a center for the production of raw silk and lacquerwork attracted foreign trade. In this period, quarters housing English and Dutch merchants were developed.

Nevertheless, with the selection of Hue as capital of the ascendant Nguyen dynasty, Thang Long was reduced to the status of citadel city — one kilometer square, its fortifications obliquely influenced by the French military engineer Vauban. Ironically, when the French conquered Hanoi in 1882, the citadel was demolished to make way for a transplanted French city, while a renowned pagoda was razed to make way for a Catholic cathedral, still there today. All that remains of the citadel is the north gate, an iconic watchtower, and some other fragments (Plate 17). Vietnamese historians concede that, owing to onerous taxation and other restrictions on trade, Thang Long never emerged out of feudalism into a capitalist system (Tran and Nguyen 1977: 84). Undoubtedly, this held across Southeast Asia, yet the high degree of craft specialization, urbanization, and sophistication in this royal center was part of a brilliant civilization that today attracts more and more foreign visitors.

The Hinduized Coastal States of Champa

Travelers along the coastal strip of central-south Vietnam will not fail to be impressed by the striking Cham towers that are the remains of the former Hinduized coastal states of Champa. Even today, Vietnamese historians acknowledge the pioneering research of colonial-era scholars, such as Henri Parmentier’s *Inventaire descriptif des monuments Cams de l’Annam* (1909–18), in both “rediscovering” and documenting this herit-

age, a large part of which is lost today through neglect in addition to the ravages of the French and American wars (Ngo Van Doanh 2006).

Contrary to the views of French Orientalists on the mainland origins of the Cham, Michael Vickery (2005b: 81) affirms that Champa was founded by Austronesians “who arrived by sea [possibly from Borneo] and established themselves in river port areas, and the rise and decline of one or other region depended on the vicissitudes of the international maritime trade networks from China through what is now northern Vietnam, along the Champa coasts and on to southern Cambodia, Nusantara and India.” By the 11th century, the Cham may even have had an outlier at Butuan on the coast of northern Mindanao, making that the only “Indianized” polity in the Philippines (Wolters 1999: 133–34).

The first of these Hinduized centers was founded in the 2nd century CE, with the last being absorbed into the southward-expanding Vietnamese empire during the first half of the 19th century. Typically, a series of small states developing on river mouths along the coast of Vietnam participated in an active trade with each other, with Guangzhou, and in the South China Sea trade commencing during the early Tang. The Champa kingdoms gradually became unified through a complex system of kinship and marital alliances. As speakers of an Austronesian language, the Cham were entirely distinct from their Vietnamese neighbors on the eastern littoral of mainland Southeast Asia.

Brick temples and sandstone sculptures attest to a flowering of Hindu and Buddhist influences during this period. By the mid-8th century, with the temporary decline of Guangzhou, the center of gravity of the kingdoms moved south to modern Nha Trang (Kautara) and Phan Rang (Panduranga), where Cham towers can be observed today. By the 11th century, Bin Dinh province in central Vietnam became the locus of the powerful Vijaya kingdom, which came into conflict with the Dai Viet, centered upon at Thang Long, and Angkor. Vijaya survived these raids and depredations, including a Mongol invasion in the 13th century. Vijaya fell to Dai Viet in 1471 and Kautara in 1653. Panduranga held out until 1832. As Lieberman (2003: 393) explains, the Cham armies were no match for the Vietnamese, who had acquired military technology in the form of handguns and artillery from the Ming, if not the Yuan.

In a major reconsideration of Georges Maspero’s influential 1928 book, *Le Royaume de Champa*, Vickery (2005) questions whether there

was ever a unified Cham Negara, as depicted in classical scholarship. Rather, the reality was separate rival polities. Notably, Southworth (2004: 321–22) has likened the polycentric character of the Cham *negara* to an archipelago. Vickery also stresses the need to pay careful attention to the river-mouth sites of former Cham citadels and structures. Modern Nha Trang, astride an ancient maritime route linking China with India, and site of the oldest Cham inscription dating from the 2nd to the 4th centuries CE, is a case in point. For Vickery, even the location or existence of the supposed Cham capital of Vijaya-Binh Dinh is contested, at least until it enters the epigraphic record in the mid- to late 12th century. And so, Maspero’s evocation of a Vietnamese attack on Vijaya in 1044 (1069) remains a fictionalized account. All in all, Vickery sees Maspero’s insistence on a single Cham kingdom and his confused references to Vijaya as misleading and not supported by the epigraphic evidence, which otherwise alludes to the importance of the southern polities of My Son, Nha Trang, and Phan Rang. In the north, the enemy was most likely Cambodia and, in the south, the threats were local. Vickery also contends that the alleged Cham conquest of Angkor in 1170 is not matched by the epigraphic facts. Nor does he credit Bernard Groslier’s interpretations of bas-reliefs on the Bayon depicting battle scenes. Simply, the Cham inscriptions are silent as to the supposed great victory over Angkor in 1177.

Linguistic research, as carried out by Thurgood (1999), reveals that, from their origins some 2,000 years ago, the Austronesian-speaking Cham were not yet entirely differentiated from the speakers of Malayic languages of western Indonesia. Notably, the Tra Kieu inscription found near the old Cham capital of Indrapura, dating from the 4th century CE, is not only the oldest known Malayo-Polynesian text, it is also remarkably consistent linguistically with Malayic form. Thus, new evidence from linguistics helps to establish that the Cham were early navigators arriving on the southern Vietnam coast, initially in small numbers in the last centuries BCE (Thurgood 1999: 4–6). Such understandings also obliges us to revise our notions of the political-economic status of the early Cham kingdoms.

While early French scholarship tended to perceive Champa as a unified polity, as Lieberman (2003: 350) has summarized, recent research has also brought into focus the polyethnic nature of Cham society: lowland

Chams and a range of Austronesian and Austroasiatic language speakers among montagnard elements were linked not only ritually or through marriage but also by trade relations. Such mythic links between the Khmer and Vietnamese courts and the “kings of fire and water,” said to repose among the Austronesian-speaking, animist Jarai of the southern Vietnam uplands, first entered European observation in the account by Marini and were confirmed by early French visitors. Sacred talismans were believed to have been bequeathed by long-disappeared Brahman or Cham ancestors (Hickey 1998: 69–72). From his research among the Rhades, anthropologist Georges Condominas (1980: 56, 155) confirmed belief in a third shaman, notably a king of the wind or air.

Islam was attested in Champa from the 11th century. But at a point when the kingdom was reduced by the Vietnamese to a small area around Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri (Panduranga), it is believed that certain Cham rulers, namely one Po Saut (1660–92), converted to Islam. Still, the Cham engaged in international trade, with a community established in Melaka as early as the late 15th century. In May 1687, William Dampier (1697: 272) encountered a Cham trading vessel in the Gulf of Siam bound for Dutch-controlled Melaka. With Nguyen rule imposed in 1693, the Cham under their sponsored king were consigned to tributary status. Nevertheless, the Cham made many attempts to break away from Vietnamese rule up until the final annihilation of the kingdom in 1832–35. Malay networks and Islamic missionaries arriving from Kelantan on the Malay Peninsula also made their impact on Cham society. With the progressive annexation of the kingdom, Muslim Chams migrated south into Cambodia around Kompong Cham, with others arriving in Trengganu and still others arriving in Hainan Island (Wong 2004; Taylor 2007).

But, in absorbing the Cham kingdoms, the Sinicized Vietnamese state also incorporated certain Cham elements into their court rituals. Even today, as Charles Wheeler (2006: 163–64) has demonstrated with respect to the Hoi An region, officialized Vietnamese narratives segregate or collide with Cham history. In any case, the brilliance of Cham culture from an esthetic and civilizational perspective is attested by sculptures collected and classified by the French School, now appropriately in the Vietnamese National Museum in Hanoi and the “Cham” museum in Danang. The end of the Vietnam War led to a revival of archaeological

research on the Cham kingdoms by Vietnamese as well as international researchers, just as certain monuments have gained UNESCO protection (Hardy et al. 2008).

The Court of Hue

The creation of the Nguyen court in Hue not only symbolized the successful reunification of the country but also the relocation of the imperial capital from Hanoi. The choice of Hue appears to owe to a set of compromises and not necessarily to the fact that it was the homeland of the Nguyen. Certainly, the cession of the region by Cham king Sinhavaraham II in 1301–06 to the Trinh court facilitated this future development, as it signaled the demise of the Cham empire at the hands of Vietnamese invaders (Woodside 1988: 126).

Located north of the Perfume River (Huong Giang), itself linked to the maritime trade, the court of Hue actually comprises three cities in one: the “Forbidden City” at the core, the encircling Imperial City, and the capital city, known to the French as the citadel. This much is evident even from tourist maps. Dating from 1697, when Nguyen Phuc Tran built the citadel city in the village of Phu-Xuan in the southeastern part of the present-day city, Hue emerged in 1744 as capital of the southern part of Vietnam under the Nguyen lords. Occupied in 1786 by the invading Tay Son, it also served as their capital until 1802, when Emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–29) retook the city and named it Hue. Gia Long officially took office as emperor at Than Long palace in June 1806. The basic form of the city today, although badly damaged during the American war, owes to Gia Long and his successors, who constructed palaces, pavilions, buildings, pagodas, temples, gates, and walls, including the Forbidden City, reserved for the emperors’ activities. Later, six imperial tombs belonging to the Nguyen dynasty were added, including those of Gia Long and Minh Mang (r. 1820–49). Other touches, such as the casting of huge dynastic urns consecrated to Gia Long and weighing up to 2,500 kilograms, suggested to Woodside (1988: 190) that, not content to mimic the Qing, Minh Mang sought to recreate the golden-urn style of the Xia (Hsia), Shang, and Zhou (Chou) dynasties, as though writing a dictionary of cultural and political reigns.

Oriented south in the Chinese tradition, the imperial city was surrounded by a moat and wall, actually more French than Chinese. As in Beijing, all ceremonial buildings were aligned north-south. Hue also exercised monopoly over the printing of Chinese classics, replacing the role of the Temple of Literature in Hanoi. Chinese terms such as “Supreme Harmony” were taken on board, like other clichés from the Chinese classical world. Chinese influence was also direct insofar as Chinese tile artisans were recruited from Guangzhou. In deliberately reproducing classical Chinese geomantic and cosmological imperial design, the Nguyen were reinforcing their own mandate of heaven. But, in heavily ornamenting the imperial palace, Woodside (1988: 126–32) suggests, the Nguyen may have been seeking to offset the Western cultural influences penetrating the coast. Also, as Woodside reminds us, as Vietnam imported Chinese written codes, so it had to import the architecture of Chinese imperial politics, if on a miniature scale compared to the grandeur of Beijing.

The court of Hue entered an expansionist phase, setting up another frontier, albeit a highly contested one. Beginning with the Nguyen in 1626, Saigon was removed from the control of Cambodia, effectively cutting off its maritime access, as large numbers of Khmer were removed from Cambodian jurisdiction. Under Emperor Minh Mang, Hue in the mid-1830s annexed what is now eastern and central Cambodia, not only enfeebling the Khmer court but aggressively promoting Vietnamese civilizational norms, from speech to clothing to administrative practices. The Khmers revolted and, backed by Siamese interlopers, forced Hue in 1845–47 to concede to a division of Cambodia that was favorable to Siam (Chandler 1992: 95, 126, 130).

Such cross-cultural colonization was also directed against other non-Vietnamese lowlanders, namely the émigré Ming Chinese of Ha Tien and the rump of the Cham *negara*. The Muslim-led Cham revolts of 1833–35 failed, leading to further assimilation, colonization, and “economic ghettoization of survivors” (Lieberman 2003: 430). In complex ways, Hue sought to bring the court of Vientiane within its tributary orbit, just as the southern montagnards continued to pay dual tribute in forest products and birds’ feathers to, respectively, Hue and Vientiane up to modern times (Gunn 1990: 133). As mentioned, the Jarai of the southern Vietnam uplands uphold a legend of the *sadet* or kings of fire, water, and

air. As such, over centuries, the Jarai have been ritually linked with both Angkor and the Cham lords. But with the decline of the Hinduized polities, they were also drawn into a tributary relationship with Hue, as Hue expanded its frontiers into and across the Trung Son mountain range.

Conclusion

The foregoing study of the mainland polities of the post-charter era at the point of contact with European merchants and mercenaries confirms important findings made by Lieberman (2003), that across Southeast Asia, Japan, and China, the introduction of firearms aided the stronger, more commercial, and open polities, as foreign mercenaries guided the construction of fortifications, introduced new concepts of warfare, and emboldened adventurers and foreign conquests. Almost everywhere, the result was territorial consolidation, expanded bureaucratic control, and the dissolution of peripheral polities. Almost everywhere, such technological transfers followed a maritime route, as ship-borne cannon and armed galleys proved devastating in coastal zones. One difference was that the mainland also benefited from Chinese technologies dating from an earlier age and arriving over land. After long periods of fragmentation, by 1800 powerful new dynasties ruled in Burma, Siam, and Vietnam, making Western intervention appear less rather than more likely, especially if compared to developments in the archipelago. Of course, in the case of Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, apparent dynastic unity did not prevent eventual Western intervention and control.

This we saw in the case of the Ly of Vietnam and Pagan/Pegu/Ava in Burma. Even so, proximity to rivers and strategic natural harbors was often critical in ensuring the survival of land-based empires, especially at the hands of predatory neighbors. Obviously, the hybrid terrestrial-maritime Cham were losers in this game. Fighting elephants proved no match for the kind of arsenal that the Dai Viet state had acquired and mastered. The kings of Cambodia, squeezed between the two rising terrestrial kingdoms of Siam and Vietnam, desperately sought out a maritime solution for commercial and military survival.

Across the western, central, and eastern mainland, we also saw an assertion of ethnic identity and orthodoxy in religious affiliation. This was seen in the Restored Toungoo (Lieberman 2003), where Burmanization

went hand in hand with an invigoration of Theravada Buddhist communities. At Ayutthaya, divine kingship, Tai-ness, and Theravada Buddhism crystallized as the foundation of the state, and was in turn reconceptualized by the post-charter Chakkri at Bangkok. In Vietnam, Viet or Kinh trumped Cham, as Vietnamese Confucianism entered a missionary phase. Everywhere, peoples on the boundaries of empires, whether highlanders or far from the focused centers, became not only marginalized but fair game as slaves or would-be conscripts. Certain of these communities, like the montagnards of Vietnam and Laos, survived in dual tributary relationships or in a symbolic relationship with the dominant courts of Luang Prabang or Hue.

As taken up below, the Portuguese encounter with Hindu-Buddhist Kingdoms was singular, although it had major sequels in the Dutch attempt to subdue by force the last remaining traditional kingdoms on Java. In any case, the Portuguese historical bequest was to set up a complex, checkered pattern of Muslim-Christian communities across the archipelago. As discussed in subsequent chapters, such Muslim-Christian contests would also be played out in the Philippines and the Maluku by the Spanish. Christian converts on the eastern mainland would also be won with the arrival of Catholic missionaries — many dispatched from Macau — although surprisingly, only in Vietnam (and Japan) did large-scale conversions to Christianity occur, albeit often in highly eclectic ways.

3

Islamic Courts and Maritime Trading Ports

The first Europeans to arrive in the Indian Ocean zone were obliged to deal with an array of Islamic centers and kingdoms, from Mombasa to Diu, from Calicut to the island chain of the Maldives. The experience was repeated in Southeast Asian waters, where Islamic kingdoms were well entrenched: Aceh in the west, Melaka at the core, Brunei and Sulu in the east. A complex pattern of governance existed on Java, where Islam had gained major beachheads on the *pesisir* coast. Even so, Islam still remained contested in west Java (Sunda) or entered highly syncretic forms, as in the Javanese kingdom of Mataram. Large parts of maritime Southeast Asia remained outside of Islam, including Makassar on Sulawesi, most of the islands east of Hindu Bali, and the Philippine islands, outside the sway of Sulu. Obviously, the arrival of Islam in maritime Southeast Asia impacted in major ways upon the original charter polities and their populations, especially in throwing up new models of kingship and authority. Control over resources and manpower was still central to survival, but the Islamic connection also opened up vast new international opportunities, not only in trade but in the acquisition of new science and technologies, including military. Foreign merchant communities played far more significant roles in the Islamic port cities than in the agrarian polities. The Malay language emerged in this era as a lingua franca connecting the Malay world of little sultanates and maritime trading centers. In turn, European expansion both accommodated and disrupted age-old Asian forms of diplomatic communication between these royal centers, in a age long before a nation-state system of equals came to be accepted either by European interlopers or by Asians themselves. Nor was there any higher level unity bonding the disparate

dynastic centers of Islamic power, such as the Sunni Islamic ideal of the caliph as leader of the community.

This chapter offers a panoramic view of a selected number of Islamic courts and cosmopolitan trading centers, typically astride the maritime trading routes of Southeast Asia. We seek to investigate how foundational Islamic states came to be established in Southeast Asia; how — more typically — Islamic states emerged out of Hindu-Buddhistic kingdoms; how Islam accommodated local forms of authority in such syncretic environments; and how Islamic states coped with the advent of Christian missionaries alongside that of European merchants and empire-builders.

Islamic Courts of Southeast Asia

Early Western accounts of the Islamic courts of Southeast Asia are doubtless filtered through a European stereotype of Islam reaching back to the crusades. For the Muslim faithful, the Islamic world spanning Morocco to modern-day Indonesia offered — and offers — its own world-historical perspective. This is not only a reference to the present-day global *ummah*, or community of believers, but to the historical Afro-Eurasian terrestrial and maritime trade links that spread the religion to the limits of the known world by the 13th century, if not earlier. Above all, Islam offered its own sense of spatiality, through astronomical and navigational knowledge, use of the compass, cartographic prowess, the need felt everywhere to know the direction of Mecca, and the impulse to visit the birthplace of Muhammad. Even the language of the Holy Quran, Arabic, forged a bond between believers across races and cultures. But the Dar-ul-Islam, or world of Islam, also had its counterpart in the world of unbelievers, *kafirs*. Muslims could form majorities in the heartlands but also formed minorities on the peripheries, as in large parts of Southeast Asia and China today. The golden age of Islam, which saw the conquest of Spain at one end of a crescent reaching even to coastal China, saw decline even prior to our time frame. The Abbasid capital of Baghdad was attacked by the Mongols in 1258, the Reconquista of Spain in 1487 was accomplished just years before Columbus sailed to the Americas. Islam, boasting a still extant mosque in Guangzhou, was just about extirpated from coastal China.

The embrace of Islam in island Southeast Asia, notably of the Sunni school, reached back over a period of eight centuries. As André Wink (1996: 85) argues, while Arab traders first brought Islam to island Southeast Asia, the actual translation of Islam to local societies broadly fell into an “Indian-Islamic pattern.” By this he means that the first Muslim contacts undoubtedly arrived via Shafi-ite Muslim networks in Sri Lanka along with Muslim communities from the two coasts of India. Gujaratis, arriving much later, were also an important conduit for the faith. In any case, there had been Muslim trade and settlement in Southeast Asia centuries before substantial conversions. By the 14th and 15th centuries, trade was no longer a major factor in conversions. Islam was a political force, further strengthened by the threatening arrival of the first Iberian traders.

As Indonesian scholar Iik Arifin Mansurnoor (2009: 217) points out, Sunni Islam in Southeast Asia initially spread outside of state patronage, at least until the formation of the first local Islamic states in the 13th century. Nor was any conquest of Southeast Asia ever entertained by the caliphs in Medina, Damascus, or Baghdad. Rather, Islam progressed by both formal and informal means. As Merle Ricklefs (1981: 1, 11–13; 2006) explains, it was not a rolling wave nor entirely pacific, and it is certainly problematic that Islam was adopted by significant numbers in the archipelago only in the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. Scholars are not in agreement as to the means of conversion. Certainly, seaborne traders were initial agents, especially those awaiting the change of monsoon winds in trading ports. But, in an argument pioneered by A.H. Johns (1961), following the Mongol conquests in west Asia, Islam underwent an inward or mystical turn. By the 17th century, mystical interpretations of Islam had achieved large followings in Southeast Asia, especially under the auspices of various Sufi brotherhoods. Almost coincidentally, Islam was embraced by the Malay world of city-states and trading polities; Malayness over centuries would come to be identified with Islam.

Islam was attested in northern Sumatra by Marco Polo, who likely visited Pasai in 1292, and Ibn Battuta (1304–77), who visited Sumatra in 1354 and 1346. The first documentation of royal conversion is the tombstone dated 1211, of Sultan Sulaiman bin Abdullah al-Basri, at Lamuri on the northern tip of Sumatra. Aceh is believed to be the earliest point of arrival in the western archipelago, in the 8th century. The Malay annals

ascribe the conversion to Islam of the ruler of Kedah to 1136; Kedah was on a strategic transpeninsular route.

As Islam followed the trade routes, so the major historical Islamic polities emerged in such harbor or river-mouth locations as Samudra-Pasai, Aceh, Kedah, Melaka, Banten, Johor, Patani, Sulu, and Brunei; in fact, all the historic “Malay” sultanates: Pahang, Perak, Selangor, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, and Lingga-Riau. Some of these survived, others were eclipsed. The mainland polities of Champa and, briefly, Cambodia, also came under the sway of Islam. Mataram was an important sultanate located in central and east Java. Almost invariably, the Malay Muslim harbor states and polities were highly cosmopolitan, hosting foreign merchant communities of Arabs, Persians, Chinese, Gujaratis, and other nationalities and language groups. Van Leur (1955: 3–4), who was visionary in recognizing the antiquity of Asian trade, begins his own world economic history narrative by recounting how surprised the first Dutch voyagers to Banten on Java in 1596 were to learn of the presence of Muslim merchants from Turkey, Delhi, and even Fez in Morocco. Almost everywhere in island Southeast Asia, commencing with the Portuguese and Spanish in the late 16th century, the European powers eroded the sovereignty of the sultanates. Inadvertently, they may have hastened conversions as well.

The reception of Islam in Southeast Asia was moderated by pre-Islamic practices and codes, just as Buddhist and Hindu cultures were subject to new demands, incorporating Islamic literatures arriving from Persia and the Arab world. The following heralds a select number of Islamic sultanates as they were encountered by Europeans, whether as traders, conquerors, crusaders, or colonizers. In so doing, I not only seek to throw new light upon the world-historical incorporation of these scattered polities but, in the process, highlight their separate and collective historical trajectories in the making of a global region outside of powerful, rationalizing national histories and discourses.

According to Kratz (2000), the Malay world in general lacks indigenous sources, at least in the Western sense. Even where they exist, they seldom mention the obvious, namely, the looming presence of Europeans. In fact, the 1511–1800 period, the period of Western penetration, is particularly devoid of Malay texts. Moreover, many Malay manuscripts with historical themes are actually handed down from the 19th century.

It is true, however, as Kratz demonstrates, that Malay manuscripts relating to Brunei offer keen insights into the status of Brunei Malay Islamic institutions in the eastern archipelago relative to Melaka-Johor-Aceh in the west.

The Sultanate of Aceh: Indian Ocean Gateway to Southeast Asia

An Islamic center on the northern tip of Sumatra, Aceh was preceded by other polities (such as Lamuri), as recorded in Arab and Chinese accounts, although, as mentioned, it is believed to be the earliest point of arrival of Islam. Much remains obscure about the early history of northern Sumatra but, undoubtedly, its location astride the trade routes westward to India also made it a reception point for Hindu influence, just as Srivijaya commanded dominance of the Malacca Straits zone. In any case, no obvious Hindu monuments remain. Besides Lamuri, a number of other polities emerged in close proximity in northern Sumatra. The kingdom of Samudra-Pasai (Guillot and Kalus 2008), believed to be the first in Southeast Asia to convert to Islam, is now understood to have hosted rulers of “Turkish” origin. A 1297 royal tomb discovered in Pasai is said to be that of Sultan Malik al Saleh (r. 1285–97). The two other major Islamic kingdoms of northern Sumatra were Perlak and Aceh Darussalam. When Ibn Battuta set foot in Sumatra in 1345, Aceh was under Sultan Malik Al-Zahir. This monarch initiated a tradition of issuing Arabic script-embossed gold *kupang* coins.

By 1540, Aceh had achieved prominence, especially as a result of the export of pepper and spices to the Red Sea. Pepper exports alone amounted to 1,800 tons per annum. Because of this, Aceh’s reputation also reached as far as Constantinople, to which it sent an ambassador. With the arrival of an Ottoman trade representative in 1562, the Aceh sultan entered into a tributary relationship with the Porte. Sultan Iskander Muda (r. 1607–36) maintained a palace guard of military slaves, similar to Ottoman Janissaries captured in war. He also employed Abyssinian slave officers alongside Turkish soldiers supplied by the Porte. The Ottomans became a crucial supplier of military technology to the Sumatran sultan (Boxer 1969; Reid 1969; Manguin 1999; Wink 2002: 16; Casale 2006: 194).

The pepper trade linked Aceh to Java and further afield in the archipelago. The Portuguese were drawn into commerce and war with Aceh, and it is to Portuguese sources that we look for the first writings on and visual images of Sumatra. Notably, Aceh figured in the *Planta Dacheim* of Fernão Vaz Dourado (1568), the *Planta Achem* of Manuel Godinho de Eredia (1610), and the *Planta Demonstração da Forteleza do Achem* (c. 1636). From the evidence, Aceh boasted a population of 80,000 in the pre-1580 period, with the ability to muster up to 30,000 soldiers on short notice. The sultanate came under siege on numerous occasions, especially in the late 1560s and 1570s. But, at the time of the Portuguese arrival, Aceh was emerging as a major power, especially under Sultan Ali Mughayat Syah (r. 1514–30), who made a series of conquests down the east coast of Sumatra, taking control of such pepper- and gold-producing areas as Deli, Aru, Pedir, and Pasir. In 1524, when the captain of Melaka, Jorge de Albuquerque, plotted an invasion of Aceh, Sultan Ali defeated a Portuguese fleet. In 1580, the Portuguese Crown even created the office of Capitão-mor de conquista do Achem, or the Captain-Major for the conquest of Aceh (Santos and Manguin 1997: 14). The backdrop to these battles was the contest between Aceh and the Portuguese for the control of Melaka. As Aceh reached the height of its naval prowess under Sultan Iskander Muda, successfully attacking and defeating Johor in 1613, it was nevertheless checkmated in a disastrous battle against the Portuguese at Melaka in 1629. Still, Aceh remained a formidable military force in the Straits, down into the late 16th century (Lombard 1967; Ricklefs 1981: 30–31).

Aceh's prominence stemmed not only from its strategic location but also from its status as a font of Islamic learning and transmission across the Malay world. As Leonard Andaya (2001: 63) observes, not only was the Middle-Eastern-modeled kingdom admired and emulated by such other Malay states as Perak and Pahang, but they also acknowledged Aceh's overlordship in the first half of the 17th century. As Riddell (2001: 139) elaborates, the great majority of theological texts still extant in the Malay world originate from Aceh. These cover theology, dogma, and mysticism, in the form of handwritten manuscripts or copies; none date before the end of the 17th century, leaving a gap of some three centuries in our knowledge of Islamic theological activity in Southeast Asia.

Without question, one of the most detailed accounts of early-17th-century Aceh was penned by the young French captain Augustin de Beaulieu (Lombard 1996). Arriving in early January 1621, Beaulieu learned that the English and Dutch (and the Portuguese before them) had been expelled two years prior. Nevertheless, he sought an audience with Sultan Iskander Muda, the self-declared Mahkota Alam or “Crown of the World,” to obtain a trading license and erect a trading post. At stake was a slice of Aceh’s command over precious pepper deliveries. He duly saw the Sultan, accompanied by the *shahbandar*, or chief harbor master, and four of the principal *orangkaya*, or leading merchants. Even so, France did not gain its trading post. Of the physical city, Beaulieu relates that Aceh “is more like a village than a City being an open place without walls, and the castle is not more fortified than an ordinary gentleman’s house.” He also observed ramparts “backed with a terrace, with several brass guns upon it,” which he took for the king’s arsenal (Churchill 1704, 25: 717–52).

With its Ottoman and Mughal borrowings, Aceh under Sultan Iskander Muda was described as reminiscent of a Middle Eastern state. As Laffan (2004: 667–68) summarizes, besides instituting the formal Islamicization of governmental structures, Sultan Iskander also conducted a vigorous and vainglorious diplomacy with Ottoman sultans and European monarchs alike. At home, Iskander continued his three-way struggle for control of the Straits with the Portuguese at Melaka and Johor. Notwithstanding the decline in its fortunes, especially after the loss of the fleet at Melaka in 1629, Aceh nevertheless remained an independent sultanate until the Dutch-Aceh wars of 1873 (Plate 18).

The Melaka Sultanate: A Malay Muslim Template

As confirmed by European sources, the most important entrepôt polity in 15th- and 16th-century Southeast Asia was Melaka, commanding the lower end of the Straits that bears its name. Malay legend, as confirmed in the *Sejarah Melayu*, ascribes the origins of Melaka as a royal center to the arrival of Parameswara, a Hindu Srivijayan Sumatran prince. Having converted to Islam, he is acknowledged as the first ruling Muslim Malay prince and known as Sultan Iskander Shah (d. 1424). While the record on pre-Islamic Melaka is scant, we may assume that his subjects also

converted to Islam, as Melaka became another dissemination point for Islam across the archipelago. Even so, as Andaya (2001: 63) points out, compared to Aceh, which was founded as an Islamic kingdom, Melaka's relatively late mid-15th century conversion meant that Islam had to compete with a "deeply embedded amalgam of Hindu-Buddhistic and indigenous beliefs."

Melaka, the port city, begins to enter recorded history as a cosmopolitan place attracting Arabs, Indians, Javanese, Chinese, and other regional and long-distance traders. Gujarati Muslims held a special place in 15th-century Melaka, especially as their commerce in Indian cotton, traded against Chinese products, connected not only with India, but with Mamluk Egypt (Aden and Hormuz), and the Persian Gulf area. Certain Gujarati merchants married into the Malay aristocracy, holding the traditional title of *adhiraja*. Hindu Kelings, a term referring to Indians from the present-day Orissa area, also gained favor at the Melaka court. Like the Gujarati elite, the Kelings lived in the Upeh area of Melaka, though dominating the coastal zone. Javanese mostly resided in the Bandar Hilir precinct, with another group living in the Upeh quarter. Javanese merchants at Melaka were well connected with the *pesisir* ports and, as such, supplied spices to Melaka's markets. As rice merchants, they also fed Melaka. The Chinese community (or communities) resided in the Kampong Cina residential quarter. All the communities were represented by their respected *shahbandar*, a term of Persian origin, roughly equivalent to harbormaster (Hall 2006: 467–68).

Sultan Mansur Shah (r. 1456–77), whose name is recorded in Chinese annals, brought Melaka into its golden age as maritime mart extraordinaire. Melaka also held sway over large swathes of the coastal zones of the Malay Peninsula and undoubtedly extracted tribute from the interior. Even so, Melaka was squeezed between Siam to the north and the declining Majapahit on Java. It was during Mansur Shah's reign that Portuguese seafarers learned of Melaka's fame and strategic importance.

Chinese sources on Melaka date from the 15th century. Wade (2006) lists 105 records of Melaka in the *Ming Shilu*, commencing in 1403. The kings of Melaka were recognized as tributaries; their envoys were honored in the Chinese court with presents of silks, robes, paper money, and copper coins, in addition to seals and patents. Ming China offered protection against Siam, which attacked three times. In 1408, Admiral

Zheng He likewise presented gifts to the Melaka court when his fleet passed. According to legend, Mansur Shah married a Chinese princess named Hang Li Po (Han Libao).

In 1509, during the reign of Mahmud Shah (r. 1448–1528), the last sultan of Melaka before its fall, a Portuguese fleet under the command of Diego Lopez de Sequeira sailed into Melaka, ostensibly to broker diplomatic and trade relations. In 1511, the Portuguese returned with a larger fleet under Alfonso d'Albuquerque, decisively defeating the sultanate in an ensuing invasion. In 1528, the Johor-Riau sultanate, based on the lower Johor River and loosely incorporating Singapore and other islands of the mini-archipelago south of the Singapore Straits, succeeded Melaka, although under attack from Jambi in Sumatra and the seafaring Bugis.

The Melaka sultanate was not just a highly structured polity; it became a template or archetypal Muslim Malay monarchy replicated by other Malay Islamic polities such as Johor and Brunei. The sultan was assisted by a *bendahara*; the next ranking officials were, in order, *laksamana*, *temenggong*, and *penghulu*. As mentioned, the position of *shahbandar* was also crucial in mediating trade matters. The *Hukum Kanun*, or register of laws, emerged over time, reflecting pre-Islamic *adat*, or custom, and an increasingly orthopraxic set of Islamic precepts. The fortunes of Melaka under the Portuguese and European successors will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Banten (1526–1813): An International Islamic Trading Port on Java

Strategically located on the northwest extremity of Java and commanding access through the Sunda Straits, Banten also controlled the port of Sunda Kelapa (future Jakarta). As alluded to in Chapter 2, Banten was the major commercial center in control of the pepper trade in west Java, even prior to the Portuguese conquest of Melaka. With the eclipse of the Hindu-Buddhistic kingdom of Pajajaran, Banten emerged as an Islamic kingdom under Hasanuddin (r. 1552–70), also extending its authority into the pepper-producing area of Lampung in south Sumatra (Ricklefs 1981: 35). From 1522, Portuguese merchants insinuated themselves into the port city alongside other merchant groups. As Guillot (1991: 80–95)

has written, the Portuguese used pepper from Banten to enter the Chinese market. With the arrival of the first Dutch fleet in Banten in June 1596, the Portuguese trade was interrupted, though, by the second half of the 17th century, the Portuguese re-entered the trade, introducing Spanish reals as a new monetary standard. Private merchants from Macau also participated in this trade, at least until the Dutch conquest of Banten in 1682 pre-empted the Portuguese presence.

The accounts of Banten by the first Dutch and English visitors offer a snapshot of Javanese society before the formidable Dutch East India Company imposed its imprint. One of the first accounts in English that of the voyage of Sir Francis Drake, who briefly touched west Java before sailing through the Straits of Sunda and home:

The Javanese are a stout and warlike people, go well armed with swords, targets and daggers, all of their own manufacture, which is very curious, both as to fashion and to temper of the metal.

They wear Turkish turbans on their heads; the upper part of their body is naked, but from the waste downwards, they have a *pintado* of silk trailing on the ground, of that color which pleases them.

From the account of the first Dutch voyage to the archipelago, we learn that Banten commanded the most commerce on Java. It supported a walled city with ramparts and was defended by cannons. The town was divided into various quarters, each headed by a “governor,” with responsibility in case of war, fire, or other emergency. The great mosque, surrounded by a palisade, was seen “in the marketplace.” Certainly, many of the merchants attracted to Banten would have been Muslims. As noted, the marketplace brought merchants “of all nations, Portuguese, Arabs, Turks, Chinese, Quillons, Peguans, Malays, Bengalis, Gujarats, Malabars, Abissins and all parts of India.” Distinctions were made, however, for the Chinese on the western side of the town, adjacent to the Portuguese and Dutch quarters. The Chinese, sailing junks of 50 tons, came to Banten every January in groups of eight or ten, selling silk, satin, velour, and porcelain. Bengalis were also active in selling cloth. Women were observed to play an active role selling betel, areca, watermelons, bananas, and especially pepper, sold by the *gantang* (a measure). Pepper was the commodity to which Banten owed its prominence (Harris 1744–48: 9–16).

Even after the Dutch foundation of Batavia, Banten continued to attract English, Danes, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch (renegades?), who, in the words of the Dutchman Fryke, “made it a very troublesome and dangerous neighbor to the Dutch East-India Company.” Moreover, as Fryke explains, the king of Banten made several land and sea attacks on Batavia, forcing the Dutch to lay siege on Banten (Fryke 1997: 55). While it was eventually eclipsed by Batavia, which was founded on the ancient port of Jacatra or Sunda Kelapa in 1619, Banten continued as an important trading port through most of the 17th century (Vlekke 1965: 130). This is reflected in two contracts signed between the Dutch and the Banten sultan in 1681 and 1684, respectively.

Mataram: Muslim Court/Javanese Tradition

A number of Islamic kingdoms emerged on the *pesisir* coast of Java in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. Besides Banten, they included Demak, Kudus, Jepara, and Surabaya. Possibly founded by a Chinese Muslim, Demak was the most important: it dominated the ancient port of Tuban and, in 1527, secured control over the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Kediri. Demak also sponsored the rise of Cirebon and, as discussed in Chapter 2, went on to conquer Banten and Sunda Kelapa, ending the last significant Hindu-Buddhistic presence on the Java coast. Demak even expanded to Palembang in Sumatra and Banjarmasin on Borneo, but by the 1550s its power was challenged by rivals (Ricklefs 1981: 34–35).

With the rise of Islamic kingdoms in Cirebon in the late 15th century and Demak in the early 16th, Javanese culture entered a long cultural metamorphosis. By the time the VOC was reconnoitering the coast of Java in search of trade and allies, Banten and Mataram were the two principal contenders for supremacy over Java. Just when the ruler of Mataram converted to Islam is a matter of conjecture, but under Sultan Agung (r. 1613–46) Mataram extended its sway over the northern coast of Java, elevating Jepara as its main commercial center. According to Ricklefs (1981: 44), at the time of his death, Sultan Agung was the greatest conqueror on Java since the age of Majapahit. He was overlord of east and central Java and Madura, and with allies in Sumatra and Kalimantan. On Java, he failed only to conquer Banten.

The newly occupied Dutch base at Jacatra (Batavia) also faced down attacks from Mataram. But, in 1677, the ruler of Mataram, Amangkurat I (r. 1646–77), sought Dutch assistance to quell a rebellion, an event that led gradually to Dutch usurpation. Not only did the Dutch expand their territorial conquest of Java, but Mataram was obliged to pay deliveries of wood and pepper to Batavia. In 1740, however, dissident Chinese joined with Mataram ruler Paku Buwano II (r. 1726–49) in besieging the Dutch stronghold of Semarang and, in 1742, a Dutch garrison at Kartasura. Mataram eventually endured three so-called wars of succession (1704–08; 1719–23; 1746–57) that led to the death of Paku Buwano II and the rise of Mangkubumi (later Sultan Hamengko Buwono I, 1749–92). Meanwhile, the declared Susuhunan of Solo also laid claim to the throne. Notwithstanding Turkish and Dutch mediation, the kingdom remained split, and the two courts developed separately.

Following the Treaty of Gianti of 1755, Mataram was dissolved, creating the court of Yogyakarta. Mangkubumi accepted half a kingdom and recognized VOC rule on the coast, receiving rent from the Dutch. Relative peace was established for the first time since the early 16th century. Nevertheless, the overall trend saw increasing Dutch intervention in court affairs. Even so, many problems were left unsolved during the Napoleonic interlude, which saw the British conquest of Java in 1811. Major sequels followed, with the revolt by a son of the ruling family in 1825, leading to the massively disruptive Diponegoro wars (Smithies 1986: 8–9; Miksic 2004: 866).

Visitors to the *kraton*, or sultan's palace, in Yogyakarta today cannot but be struck by the eclecticism of architectural and cultural style. Founded by Mangkubumi in 1756, it appeared to British governor Stamford Raffles as a fortified structure, with drawbridges across moats on the European model. But the interior reflected Javanese cosmographical space. While a grand mosque stood within the walls, two gamelan orchestras were frequently on call. Of the elaborate brickwork pleasure gardens within the *kraton*, Smithies (1986: 23–25) observes that Islamic and Hindu-Buddhist ideas coexisted. As an alcove to the west faced Mecca, so the sultan was identified with Vishnu. Consistent with eclectic Javanese Muslim-Hindu-Buddhist-animist traditions, the *Serat Surja Raja* manuscript kept in the palace relates how the Goddess of the Southern Ocean returns to meditate in the garden.

The Sultanate of Brunei: Across the China Seas

While Brunei's origins remain imprecise, historians agree that a powerful pre-Islamic kingdom known to the Chinese as Po-ni existed on Borneo. One candidate site for Po-ni is near Kuching on the Sarawak River. Another is at Kota Batu ("stone fort") on the Brunei River, dating back to the 7th or 8th century. Archaeological excavations at Kota Batu in 1952–53 by Tom Harrisson (1974: 19) revealed a sculpted laterite platform, bearing Hindu cosmological features suggestive of Srivijayan or Majapahit influence. With reason, Harrisson described Kota Batu as "unique among known Southeast Asian sites" for continuous occupation within a limited space, a reference not only to discoveries of Chinese stoneware and porcelains dating from the Tang dynasty, but also to prehistoric stone walls, cut or shaped wood, and associated vegetable materials.

"Proto-historical" archaeological research at other selected sites in Brunei (Kupang and Lumut), conducted in 1968 and 1978, deepen our knowledge of ceramic trade connections with Song China and even Siam (Sukhothai and Sawankhalok). Finds of local pottery, with its characteristic impressed designs, link this trade item with a wide distribution, if not from the Hong Kong area then other parts of coastal Borneo. The evidence suggests that (Kuala) Kupang had its origins as a Song site, though it was eclipsed by Kota Batu, at least until the Spanish invasions of the late 16th century, when it again began to attract trade from Qing China (Matussin 1981).

A sea-oriented empire, Brunei achieved considerable political-commercial strength on the northern coast of Borneo until a decline set in during the 14th century, possibly owing to outright invasion by Majapahit. Integrated into China's tribute-trade zone and, accordingly, well documented in Chinese chronicle sources (Wade 1986), local Brunei sources are nevertheless wanting. According to Horton (2004: 270) Brunei was not a bureaucracy that recorded events. Nor did it issue coinage, maps, or personal papers. It is not known how many sultans there were, nor can the reigns be dated accurately. The first conversion of a king to Islam cannot be accurately dated, although assertions have been made.

In any case, under King Karna (Ma Je Ka Na), Brunei appears to have rebounded. Having established tribute relations with China, in 1408

Karna, with his royal consort and entourage, visited Nanjing, where he died and was buried. A stele, recovered only in 1958, records the ruler's title in Sanskrit. But whether the king was Hindu or Muslim remains contested. Current Brunei historiography assigns Ma Je Ka Na the name Abdul Majid Hassan, the second reigning sultan of Brunei (r. 1402–1408). Further tribute missions followed, at least up to 1425, when they ceased. There is also a tradition passed down from this period that a Brunei king married a Chinese princess. As Nicholl (1989: 21) affirms, links with China during this period were evidently close, allowing Brunei to recover part of its lost glory.

There is no question that Pigafetta's early-16th-century description of the court of Brunei — undoubtedly the Kota Batu site — is seminal, confirming the court's conversion to Islam. The Italian also offered up a crude map of the island, which he labeled "Burne." He described another city in Brunei Bay, inhabited by heathens "larger than that of the Moros, and built like the latter in salt water," a reference to Brunei's famous water village. Pigafetta's account was first published in French in Paris about 1525, in summary form (Nicholl 1975: 10).

At the center of the realm stood the raja or sultan, a hereditary ruler who could confer titles and appanages. This was — and remains — a highly stratified system of honorific titles and linguistic etiquette. With numerous imports from the Melaka sultanate, the system was Hindu in origin, as suggested by the royal color yellow, the names of officials, and other royal regalia dating from a pre-Islamic era (Brown 1970). Even today, in the modern nation-state of Negara Brunei Darussalam, Malayness, officialized Islam, and the correct interpretation of Malay monarchy are instilled as part of national culture.

Pigafetta described the *juru tulis*, or secretaries, signaling the rise of a literate court center from an early period. By the mid-16th century, as attested by correspondence of the sultans of Brunei with the Spanish in the Philippines, Arabicized Malay written in Jawi script had emerged as the language of state. Not only was Jawi appropriated for use in correspondence with the outside world, it was also the sole medium through which Malay manuscript culture, notably *syair* and poetry, were visually consumed. Arabic, the language of the Quran, remained largely inaccessible to all but a restricted coterie of religious practitioners. On the other hand, Malay written in Jawi or Arabic script mediated the language of

the Quran to a wider circle of believers. Furthermore, it was Malay in its oral form that served as a language of Islamic proselytization, especially along the coast of Borneo and into the Philippines (Sweeney 1987; Gunn 1997: 45).

While information on the local process of Islamic *dakwah* or missionary activity is slight, Spanish sources in particular reveal the external dynamic of the sultanate, not only in expanding its maritime influence and tribute-collecting capacity, but also in proselytizing. The influence of Brunei — especially under Sultan Bolkiah — expanded in Borneo itself from the northernmost part of the island to Cape Datu in the southwest, while Islamic missionaries left for Sulawesi, Tidore, and Ternate in the Maluku (Gunn 1997: 46). Even so, Brunei's authority waxed and waned; control focused upon the rivers and coastlines and never touched the interior of the island.

Through the 17th century, civil war and dynastic contention weakened Brunei's sway over adjoining territories. The royal line was confirmed with the person of Sultan Ali Saifuddin I, who was reigning by 1762. The 18th century is not well documented, but Brunei, like other Malay Islamic communities, welcomed the newly propagated *tariqa* or Sufist orders, such as Khalwatiya, Sammaniya, and Shadiliya. By 1807, a Brunei House (*rumah wakaf*) was established in Mecca; a Jawi community of believers from across the Malay world made the pilgrimage or stayed as students (Iik 1992: 55). Nevertheless, Wahhabist reaction would set in during the following century.

Moro-land: The Sulu Sultanate at the Frontier

By 1457, if not earlier, a powerful sultanate was established at Jolo, an island in the sprawling Sulu Sea archipelago in the southern Philippines. The earliest accounts of Jolo-Sulu are found in Yuan dynasty records, testifying to early Chinese trade with the archipelago. Majul (1966: 145–47) asserts that Chinese Muslims and Arabs aboard vessels arriving from China during the 13th and 14th centuries may have been among the first Islamic missionaries to Sulu, antedating the coming of Islam to even Melaka and possibly Java. According to the *Ming Shilu*, in 1417 Sulu sent a large tribute mission to China, from both a western and an eastern ruler, with repeat missions that abruptly ended in 1424.

Some chronologies assert that a Johor-born Arab (Hashem Abu Bakr) from Melaka created the first of a line of sultans. But, as Majul (1973: 1–6) explains, establishing chronologies or *tarsila* (from the Arabic *sil-silah*, “chain” or “link”) is a common practice across the archipelago. Royal *tarsila* usually specify the reigns of sultans as well as asserting descent from the Prophet Muhammad through a *sharif* who has traveled and established a local dynasty. Moreover, some *tarsila* go further and seek to establish relations between the local dynasty and neighboring sultanates (such as Brunei-Johor-Sulu) and the Dar-ul-Islam at large. Some *tarsila* contextualize foreign elements with reference to a pre-Islamic past, the process of introduction of Islam, and the influence of great neighboring empires.

At its peak, the Sulu sultanate held sway over parts of Mindanao, Palawan, and coastal zones of Sabah. It may have had family links with branches in Brunei and an outpost in Manila Bay on Luzon, prior to the Spanish conquest. Brunei in turn posted an *adipati* or viceroy to Sulu, at least until the 1660s. Maguindanao on Mindanao was a contemporaneous Islamic center of power linked to Sulu by dynastic marriage. In the late 16th century, Spanish power in the Philippines collided with the extremities of the dual Brunei-Sulu sultanates, whose outposts and settlements were firmly established not only in Manila Bay but on Mindoro, the Keramien islands, Cebu, and Mindanao.

Under orders from Spanish governor Francisco de Sande, the first direct Spanish contact with Sulu was made in June 1578. Successive Spanish raids against Jolo continued through the 17th century, but without decisive outcome. While the Spanish never entirely pacified the Islamic south, they nevertheless fortified Zamboanga (1635; 1719) and even Jolo in the Muslim heartland. Attempting to recapture some of their former glory, the Sulu sultans resumed tribute links with China (1726 and 1733) after a gap of some 300 years (Majul 1966: 150–51). Warren (1981) has noted the importance of the “Sulu zone” as a strategic collection point for local (Tausug) maritime and jungle produce, exchanged with China for ceramics and other products.

Facing down piratical raids, kidnappings of priests, aborted agreements, failed missions, attempts at missionization, and militarization, through the 18th century the Spanish repeatedly attacked Moro-land, or the land of the Moors, as it was glossed. Between 1763 and 1805, to the

ire of local Muslim powers, the British also sought to raise their flag on Balambangan Island off northwest Borneo. In February 1842, the United States signed a documented peace and trade treaty with the Jolo sultans (Jamul ul Kiram I). France followed the next year, seeking to purchase Basilan Island. This and other attempts ended in failure.

The Patani Sultanate: Facing Down Siam

Founded c. 1350, the Muslim sultanate of Patani (Patane) on the eastern side of the Siam/Malay isthmus was, in its time, the most powerful of all the peninsular Malay principalities.

Plausibly founded on the site of an earlier Buddhist trading polity known as Langkasuka, dating back to the 7th century CE (as confirmed by the *Hikayat Patani*, compiled from c. 1690), the sultanate converted to Islam in the late 14th to early 15th centuries, an act attributed to settlers from Pasai on Sumatra (Bougas 1992). A striking feature of Patani rule, as noted by the French missionary Simon de la Loubère (1691), was the practice in the 17th century of appointing queens selected from the same family and appointed beyond childbearing age.

Patani was a port with which the Europeans and, before them, the Ryukyuan traders. Although claimed by Ayutthaya, around the time that Islam gained sway, Patani also came within the orbit of Melaka. However, as the Islamic kingdom nearest to Ayutthaya, Patani continued to pay tribute until the late 16th century. When Ayutthaya suffered defeat by the Burmese in 1564, Patani broke away, with the raja making an attempt on the throne for himself. When the usurper Prasat Thong (r. 1629–56) took the throne, Patani refused to acknowledge Ayutthaya. In 1636, Patani sent the customary *bunga mas*, or gift of gold flowers, to the king of Siam, but this was another period of independence until the tribute was resumed in 1679.

With the fall of the Melaka sultanate, Patani's importance revived, especially as it attracted the Chinese junk trade. Reportedly the source of gold and pepper as well provisions for visiting ships, Patani attracted a cosmopolitan group of traders, both Asian and European, to its sheltered harbor. Patani lay at the strategic eastern terminus of the overland route from Kedah, thus obviating the long marine passage through the Singapore Straits. Ships from China, Cambodia, Trinh Vietnam, India,

and Japan all called at Patani. The Portuguese began trading there in 1517 and the Dutch and English established trading posts in, respectively, 1602 and 1612. Under Dutch pressure, the English were forced to withdraw in 1623 (“The Malays of Siam” 1949). Old Patani also hosted a distinct Kota China and cemetery to match (Bougas 1990).

Occupying an ambivalent position within the Malay and Siamese worlds, according to Ishii (1998: 103–5), the system of female rule continued until at least 1694, although in increasingly token form. Commercially, Patani began to decline after 1697, when the Kelantan dynasty achieved dominance.

As with such other northern Malay states as Kedah, Patani continued to pay tribute to Siam until the mid-18th century. The crushing defeat of Siam by the Burmese in 1767 gave respite to Patani but, following more assertive measures imposed by the early kings of the Chakkri dynasty, the triennial tribute of *bunga mas* continued after 1786. Following a minor war in 1830–32 and the flight of the raja to Kelantan, Siam imposed a governorship over Patani and virtually dissolved the state as formerly constituted, although the vassal families of Patani were retained as tributaries.

Makassar: Cosmopolitan Court on Sulawesi

Makassar (renamed Ujung Pandang in 1971) on the southern extremity of Sulawesi, astride the Gowa River, was a thriving cosmopolitan port even prior to conversion to Islam in the early 1600s. We can assume prior Javanese commercial contacts even though Sulawesi largely stood outside the great Javanese empires. It is generally understood, however, that Makassar first emerged as a viable trading polity as the result of its location with respect to the spice trade in the Malukus. Sited at the center of the island world, it straddled east-west maritime communications across the Flores, Java, and Banda seas, linking the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra with Ceram and New Guinea. North through the straits lay the Philippines and the South China Sea, and southward lay the Lesser Sunda Islands, where a Makassan or Buginese diaspora would take root, as on Sumbawa (Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 3).

According to Reid (2000: 100–125), the first political center of consequence in the region was Gowa, from around 1500. Portuguese

sources from the 1540s tell of a state of Siang to the north of Gowa that Portuguese missionaries visited. This may have pushed Malay Muslim traders to seek allies elsewhere, namely the Gowa-Tallo area; they eventually gravitated to Makassar under the reign of Tunipalangga (r. 1548–66). The Malay community expanded in Makassar, which developed into an export center as the trade with Maluku developed. Eventually, the growing importance of Makassar as a source of spices and a market for Chinese and Indian goods attracted European traders.

After the fall of Portuguese Melaka to the Dutch in 1641, Portuguese traders relocated to Makassar. The 3,000 or so Portuguese living in the city were joined in 1642 by the merchant-diplomat Francisco Vieira Figueiredo (Boxer 1967). The English established a post in 1613 and the Danes in 1618. Spanish traders from Manila and Chinese also frequented the port. The attraction of Makassar to foreigners was not just trade but the relative freedom and security granted by the ruling house long before conversion to Islam. Under King Ala'ud-din (r. 1593–1639), Makassar developed into the most powerful state between Java and Luzon, with hegemony over coastal zones of Sulawesi, eastern Borneo, Lombok, and Sumbawa. Makassar's fleet and political-military sway also increased as the Bugis states of southeastern Sulawesi converted to Islam. The incoming Sultan Pattingalloang (r. 1639–54) reduced the Bugis of Bone to subservience in a series of wars in 1643–46 (Reid 2000: 133, 153).

Be that as it may, a more “humanist” model of Islamic authority in Makassar also emerges from missionary narratives, especially under Sultan Pattingalloang, prior to the orthopraxic turn in Islamic practice described by Gibson (2005). According to a Jesuit account of Makassar from the early 17th century:

it has rice, palms, no pigs, numerous cattle, an infinity of chickens, many kinds of fish, a moderate air. Men go the upper part of the body nude, women are modest.

Formerly people were pagans; they decided to take one of the great religions and sent envoys to Melaka for priests and to Aceh for Muslim preachers. The latter came first and so people accepted Islam.

The Kingdom's governor is Pattingalloang who knows all about Christian faith and history and possesses a rich library of western books on mathematics. He was proclaimed king but he refused this dignity and was content with being the governor of the realm.

He saw to it that the Portuguese who were chased away from Melaka got a suitable dwelling place and the liberty to practice their faith, assisting sometimes at their ceremonies.

He always spoke respectfully of the Pope and of the saints and so could easily be taken for a Catholic.

He mocked the protestant Dutch who pretended to have a visible church without acknowledging its visible head. In this way a Muslim put the heretics to shame ... (Jacobs 1988)

The cosmopolitanism of Sultan Pattingalloang (d. 1654) is much remarked upon. Makassar did not formally adopt Islam until 1605 or 1606; Islam obviously coexisted with a number of startling animist practices. Both Christianity and Islam existed in a contestatory state, even in court circles. This situation prevailed under Sultan Matoaya (r. 1593–1610), whose reign coincided with the rapid growth of the city, including its foreign quarters of both Malay and Portuguese traders. The evident sophistication of the court and city was continued by his son, Pattingalloang.

The contest for the soul of Makassar, whether Christian or Islam, has been much recounted in the literature, including the work of French Catholic missionary Nicolas Gervaise (1662–1729), *Description Historique de la Royaume de Macassar* (1688). Gervaise not only sought conversion of the kingdom, but returned to France with two Makassan princes with a view to their Christian education. It was from them that he derived his basic information on Makassar.

As a speaker of Portuguese and a man of considerable learning and talent, Pattingalloang sought out foreign visitors; he entered missionary accounts such as that of Alexander Rhodes in the most laudatory terms. Famously, he collected a library of European books, and sought knowledge on mathematics and world affairs. Unusually, he commissioned a translation into Makassarese of a Spanish treatise on gunnery, along with a number of related works in European languages (Reid 2000: 146–49).

Even so, we should not be blinded by Renaissance visions of high learning. As William Cummings (2002; 2007) reminds us, the 16th and 17th centuries were a period of transformation from oral to literate culture (on the part of court elites) — still ongoing in anthropological contexts. Manuscripts that emerged in Makassar in these centuries tended to be

venerated as sacred objects rather than founts of knowledge, a caution that applies to manuscript culture generally across the Malay world.

A measure of Makassar's pre-conquest glory was recorded by Cornelis Speelman, the VOC conqueror of the kingdom-turned-sultanate. He writes that Makassar traded with Mindanao, Sulu, Macau, Manila, Cebu, Cambodia, Aceh, Banjarmasin, and Sukadana; Pasit and Kutai on the east coast of Borneo were reserved for Gowa and Talo royal voyages. Portuguese shippers handled the Macau voyages. But the most lucrative trade, partly under the charge of the court, was the Manila trade. Intermittent trade was also conducted with Timor, Bima on Sumbawa, Buton, Tambuka, Banggai, Ceram, Java and Bali, Palembang, Jambi, Johor, and Melaka. Altogether, some 250 trading voyages a year serviced the Makassan marketplace at the height of its pre-conquest glory. Thus, while Makassar's rise was linked with its *entrepôt* role in trading spices (cloves) with Ambon and nutmeg and mace with Banda, the gradual Dutch chokehold over Makassar from the 1640s saw its commercial prosperity (temporarily) diminish (Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 18–19).

Makassar eventually fell to the Dutch after a bloody naval siege between 1666–69. As recounted by Speelman (1669), who led the Dutch expedition, *Pattinallong's* successor, Sultan Hassanuddin of Gowa, had fortified Makassar and started to build a navy. Specifically, the sultan was distrustful of the actions of Dutch Calvinist missionaries and wished to avoid a Dutch monopoly by keeping Makassar open to all nationalities. Such a stance was inimical to Dutch goals of forcing a monopoly on trade in cloves and other spices. After a naval siege lasting three years, and assisted by Arung Pallaka, a Bugis ally, the sultan capitulated and, under the Bongaya Treaty of 1667 (done in Arabic script and Dutch), was forced to cede to the Dutch exclusive rights to trade. The sultan was also obliged to deliver up his pretensions to Bone, Flores, and Sumbawa, while the Dutch built Fort Rotterdam, the VOC's formidable new headquarters in Makassar. The sultan died one year later; Speelman went on to serve as Governor General of the Dutch East Indies (1681–84). The Gowa War, as it was dubbed, did not pacify the Bugis; they continued to wage sporadic warfare, just as their diaspora through the archipelago would make ripples from Samarinda on Kalimantan (Borneo) to Johor and the Malacca Straits area (Nordin Hussin 2008).

Modern anthropology, as with Gibson's (2005: 233) study of a single south Makassan community, confirms that pan-Austronesian myth, distant Majapahit influence, and Buginese cosmology must all be recalled in consideration of the way that Islamic political authority is exercised in such Java Sea/southern Sulawesi settings as we have considered here, through the prism of historical texts.

Johor: Sultanate with Strategic Alliances

The Sultanate of Johor at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula enters this narrative with reason. First, Johor Lama (Old Johor) owes its foundation as a sultanate to the son of Sultan Mahmud Shah I (r. 1511–28), who fled the Portuguese attack on Melaka. Along with Kedah, Johor is deemed a successor state to the Melaka sultanate. Second, its hybrid genealogy — a product of strategic dynastic alliances, including the Buginese in the Singapore Straits and the Minangkabau on Sumatra. Holding sway over a large swathe of the Malay Peninsula, including Pahang, Johor emerged as the seat of a maritime empire based on its command of vital maritime trade lanes. Third, its balancing role in the long drawn-out wars between Aceh and Portuguese Melaka. Not only did Johor threaten the existence of Melaka, but it also attacked Portuguese ships sailing from China to India, and itself became a frequent target of raids. Fourth, its ability to enter into alliances with erstwhile European enemies such as the Dutch from 1602, enabling them to drive the Portuguese out of Melaka in 1641.

The Johor River even became the site of a naval confrontation between the Dutch and the Portuguese, leading to the controversial capture in 1603 of the Portuguese caravel *Santa Caterina*. According to Borschberg (2002), Dutch-Johor cooperation, as in the capture of the *Santa Caterina*, attracted the attention of the young Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who used the incident to formulate his thinking on issues of sovereignty, trade, just war, and alliance-making, developed in *De Jure Praedae* (On the Law of Prize and Booty), composed in 1604–05.

Owing to internal strife, Johor Lama reverted from trade entrepôt to backwater under Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1685–99). A rare European account of Johor, some two decades later, comes from João Tavares, captain of a Portuguese vessel conveying the governor-elect of Macau,

Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho, on a voyage from India. Navigating upriver, the Portuguese party were surprised to see a substantial floating village of sorts. They also encountered Danish and English ships along with a small community of Indians and Christians. Their visit coincided with a period of intrigue by the *bendahara* (chief minister) and the *raja kecil* (the pretender) against the legitimate sovereign, Muda Mahmud. Taking sides in this conflict, ostensibly to win some Christian privileges, but badly lacking in court protocol, the Portuguese were fortunate to extricate themselves alive. The *datubandar*, they observed, wielded some 5,000 men under arms, 1,000 sailing *prahu*, along with 1,000 pieces of artillery, mostly bronze, and some large. While Johor was still the dominant Malay kingdom along the coast, the Portuguese also observed a court in decline (Tavares 1732). In 1819, when the British settled and colonized Singapore, they dealt primarily with Johor-Riau-Lingga, acknowledged as a successor state to the old Johor kingdom.

In part owing to its engagements with European powers, Johor is better documented than other Malay sultanates. Major indigenous sources include the *Asal Raja-raja Melayu* and the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, consulted by the colonial-era scholar Sir Richard Windstedt and, more recently, Leonard Andaya (1975). The non-local scholarship on the Muslim Malay world does not detract from the active production on Malay history by local (and localized) scholars writing in both English and Malay, sometimes under official patronage.

Conclusion

Throughout Southeast Asia, it is striking that Muslim “Malay” rulers emerged in ancient trading centers almost invariably Hindu in provenance. From Melaka to Sunda and Brunei we find rajas turned sultans, assuming the mantle of power, constructing elaborate genealogies, and adjusting court paraphernalia and royal regalia accordingly. Following the Melaka sultanate template, Malayness was also in the process of being contrived around some sense of proprietary ownership, Islamic identity, and loyalty to a sultan. While the Dutch and British division of the archipelago would disrupt the historical unity of the Malacca Straits zone, the ethnic homogenization of Malays was noteworthy, especially under British colonialism, although far more fluid regional ethnic

identities continued to exist in those parts of the archipelago under VOC control.

Whether as tributaries with China (Melaka, Brunei, and Sulu), as contrived outposts of the Ottoman Empire (Aceh), or as decadent inheritors of ancient Hindu-Buddhistic kingdoms (Mataram), the Islamic courts of Southeast Asia enjoyed their golden ages, as written into manuscripts and orally received. But everywhere in Southeast Asia, by the end of the 16th century, Islamic courts were on the defensive. This became apparent with the Portuguese eclipse of the Melaka sultanate. But the agency of Muslim courts should not be dismissed — witness Aceh and a revived Johor, although there is a sense that these once powerful royal trading centers were being marginalized as more dynamic trading hubs emerged under European auspices. Brunei and Sulu together would barely survive Spanish invasion, but shifting trade networks would also relegate these once powerful polities to marginal status. Makassar, subdued by the Dutch within some 60 years of its conversion to Islam, also went into commercial decline. But, as discussed in Chapter 7, the southern Sulawesi kingdom would also rebound, owing to new commercial opportunities fitting its central location in the archipelago and to local industriousness.

As ancient adversaries, European travelers in Islamic courts were on relatively familiar terrain. Islam followed the sinews of the trade routes. Arab knowledge guided the Portuguese to Melaka and beyond. Magellan brought a Malay interpreter on his globe-girding voyage, which proved useful but fatal when he arrived in the Philippines. Following the practice they pioneered on the coasts of Africa, the Persian Gulf, and India, the Portuguese captured key Islamic trading centers in a zero-sum game to wrest control of the trade routes. The Iberian powers played an even more deadly game when, in the early 16th century, they zeroed in on the spice trade at the source. But the spiceries were also zones of contest in civilizational terms as well.

Brunei actually inflicted a defeat on the Spanish, while Sulu held its own. The Dutch and English were less concerned with missionary activity in maritime Southeast Asia, but were no less bogged down in military campaigns against Islamic enemies (Banten, Mataram, Makassar), as in wars of pacification (Aceh) and in suppression of “piracy” (the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the Brunei coast, and wherever their ships ventured through the archipelago).

4

The Tribute Trade System and Chinese Diasporas

There are large or even dominant Chinese communities in all the Southeast Asian nations today, legacies of historical trading contacts and immigration under European colonialism. Some of these communities fall into the mold of enclaves, or originated as distinct, ethnically bounded communities. Others, through intermarriage or as part of a defensive mechanism against hostile indigenes, became “creolized,” assuming complex bi- or even tri-cultural identities. The Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Thais, and Sino-Khmers, the *peranakan* or *baba* Chinese of modern Indonesia and Malaysia — all are examples of highly indigenized communities. Then as now, Han Chinese often found themselves on the borderlands of the southward-expanding Ming polity, as on Taiwan. Ming loyalists cast adrift in Japan and Vietnam became subject to fierce cultural contestations in the host societies. The Qing pushed even deeper into “barbarian” lands, ruling over a vastly expanded, multicultural empire now including Yunnan and Tibet. In any case, Song and Ming dynastic records are eloquent on China’s historical trading links with the various polities of the Nanyang, even if lacking on specifics.

The China-centered Tribute Trade System

For over two millennia, China was wedded to the East-Southeast Asian world via elaborate and highly formalized tribute trade networks — a China-focused trade system in which almost all the regional maritime polities participated. The Nanhai or South Sea trade, spanning the 11 centuries before the foundation of the Song dynasty in 960 CE, was, as described by Wang Gungwu (1958), a multifaceted trade. Much of it was also outside of the officialized China-centered tribute trade.

As Martin Stuart-Fox (2003: 53–54) has summarized, tribute in the Southeast Asian context was very different from that demanded by Chinese emperors of vassal kingdoms. Tribute was not an economic transfer that necessarily benefited China, especially as the emperor consistently offered higher value goods in return, but amounted to the symbolic submission of the tributary state and reinforcement of China's superior status. Over a long period, the Southeast Asian polities, different as they were from the Chinese center, operated a culture of compromise in establishing acceptable bilateral relations with the Central Kingdom.

Obviously, southwest China and Vietnam were exceptions, as Wade (2006b) argues in an essay on Ming colonial armies. Over a period of 21 years from 1406–23, Ming China attempted to colonize Vietnam: they established a colonial administration and economic exploitation ensued. Eventually, the practice of recruiting Vietnamese soldiers into the colonial army backfired; they revolted and drove out the Ming. All the major polities of Yunnan came under Ming subjugation from the last decades of the 14th century until 1444. In the 1430s and 1440s, large Ming armies invaded peoples of different ethnic origins, broke their territories into smaller administrative units, and appointed pliant rulers, while exploiting the occupied areas. Wade observes that ethnic Tai defenses were no match for Ming armies armed with firearms and cannons, although the Dai Viet assimilated these new technologies.

The great Ming voyages of the early 15th century by the Muslim admiral Zheng He — seven fleets of large oceangoing junks carrying thousands of sailors (1371–1435) — enlarged the tribute trade to the Indian Ocean zone, including Sri Lanka, the Malabar coast of India, the Persian Gulf, and the “Swahili” coast of Africa, without dislodging the age-old Asian maritime trade networks. The Zheng He voyages were initiated by the Ming authorities to stimulate the tributary trade while also announcing China's world-regional pre-eminence. According to Wade (2006b: 79), the Zheng He expeditions were not about control of territory but about control of ports and shipping lanes.

The shift of the Ming capital from Nanjing to Beijing in the arid north, made official by the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402–24) in 1421, heralded a shift in attention away from the southern ocean to historical threats from across the central Asian frontier. Ambivalence also existed within the Ming court as to the value of an open maritime trading policy, especially

with the rise of Japanese piracy in the 15th century and, in its wake, the arrival on the coast of China of a new unknown in the form of European traders. With Qing ascendancy, and the rise of powerful Ming loyalists across the Taiwan Straits, China's anti-maritime policy reached its nadir with the clearing of population from the coast in a band 50 kilometers deep to prevent clandestine trade. Even so, the maritime trade continued via the sanctioned Portuguese port of Macau, which weathered the Ming-Qing transition peacefully, and via the clandestine junk trade with Japan and elsewhere.

At a time when the Portuguese had begun to trade in the China seas, mixed Japanese and Chinese pirates, known as *wako* in Japan, were a destabilizing element. Whether through diplomacy or an attempt to contain the *wako* threat, in 1557 the Portuguese and Chinese officials in Guangzhou agreed to the permanent presence of the Iberian traders on the small peninsula of Macau, on the western approach to the Pearl River delta. The "Macau formula," as described by Fok Kai Cheong (1978), also led to the emergence of a new trading system: a dual Guangzhou-Macau trading system, connected with the silver trade with Japan. With its semi-annual trade fair in silks, Guangzhou came to complement Portuguese Macau, both financially and institutionally.

As Roderich Ptak (2008: 310) explains, under the Ming, a *shibo* or license system governed all incoming vessels. Guangzhou was the chief port responsible for all ship arrivals from Southeast Asia. Fujian, by contrast, long engaged with the Ryukyu merchants and their overseas ventures, developed the Yuegang System (after the port of that name), which enabled merchants from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou to go abroad. This system, which encouraged Chinese trade abroad but kept foreign players (especially the Dutch) at a distance, became a dominant feature in Fujian. Thus, while Fujian came to play a more active role in overseas trade in the late Ming period, Guangzhou played a more passive role by accepting foreign traders outside of the old tribute regulations. Eventually, the old *shibo* system broke down as many local ports besides Guangzhou also opened up to external trade.

Merchants, Smugglers, and “Pirates”

Not all maritime trade was legal. The Ming and early Qing, at least until it lifted maritime restrictions in 1684, long took a negative view of overseas trade outside the tribute system. But private trade was significant. Licit and illicit trade and smuggling were often connected. In the later period, Europeans smugglers also entered the picture. Whether off Tsushima and Hirado in western Japan, the Zhejiang and Fujian coasts, the Gulf of Tonkin, around the islands at the mouth of the Pearl River near modern Hong Kong-Macau, the Malacca Straits, or the Sulu-Borneo zone, piracy-smuggling was not limited to any one particular geographical space.

However, as recent scholarship has highlighted (Antony 2010; Kleinen and Osseweijer 2010), piracy is a Western construct. As Reid (2010: 16–19) reports, there are no ready equivalents for the English term “pirate” in Chinese or Malay, just as Western uses of the term in translating Ming sources have frequently obscured the true nature of merchant-pirate alliances. With respect to the Malay world, Reid has suggested a need to rethink the legitimacy of “piracy” in the light of local statecraft. “In maritime regions, such as much of Southeast Asia,” he observes, “states depended more on their control of the sea than of the land.” Violent seizures at sea were part of the game in funneling trade to designated ports and polities.

Re-evaluating piracy in the greater China Sea area, Antony (2010: 9–10) argues that piracy and smuggling were part of the process of commercialization and economic development. Although piracy may have had a negative effect on local political and social order, it often led in complicit coastal communities to the creation of a viable “shadow economy.” Moreover, during the 16th and 17th centuries, when maritime trade was subject to recurring bans by successive Chinese governments, it became almost impossible to distinguish between trader, smuggler, and pirate. Often, smugglers spawned new ports; some of these, like Tsushima, Xiamen, and Yuegang, evolved into legitimate ports.

In the 15th century, Palembang in the southern Malacca Straits hosted a major Chinese community, deemed illegitimate by the Ming. As alluded to, the *wako* critically affected trade along the China coast in the mid-16th century, also incurring the wrath of Ming authorities. Besides

Japanese, the *wako* included large numbers of Chinese from the Fujian area and Southeast Asians; their zone of activity reached from Korean to Southeast Asian waters. Attested by the first Portuguese visitors off the China coast and by the Dutch off Patani and Manila, the *wako* ranged wide from their various “lairs,” as at Hirado off Kyushu Island, or off the Zhejiang coast. The Hirado-based merchant-pirate Wang Zhi even assisted the first group of Portuguese to arrive in Tanegashima in the island chain south of Kyushu (Chin 2010: 50–51).

By the 17th century, the Fujian coast had emerged as the major locus of organized piracy or, at least, contraband trade, feeding into local prosperity. Threatening newly founded Spanish Manila, one of the most notorious pirate fleets was led by Limahon (Lim Feng), who commanded a vast commercial network (Igawa 2010). Emerging during the turbulent Ming-Qing transition, the Zheng family formed a huge maritime empire with bases in Taiwan and Xiamen, ranging as far as the coast of Vietnam and even Patani and Pahang on the Malay Peninsula (Chin 2010: 50).

Antony (2000: 100–101) links the resurgence of piracy in the late 18th century with the vibrant commerce ushered in once the Qing had lifted the sea ban in 1684. Alongside the thriving Guangzhou Trade System, an even more dynamic junk trade developed in servicing the increasingly prosperous overseas Chinese communities. In 1802–20, new pirate leagues emerged on the China coast from Zhejiang in the north to Vietnam in the south. At the same time, a “plunder”-based political economy emerged in such zones as the offshore islands at the mouth of the Pearl River and at Giang Binh, a pirate haven and black market on the poorly defined Sino-Vietnamese border.

The Wang-Hamashita Debate

Much of what we know about the China-centered Tribute (Tributary) Trade System owes to the work of two scholars, Wang Gungwu and Hamashita Takeshi (Curley and Hong 2002). While the former seeks to explain the evolution and eventual decline of the system over two millennia, the latter offers a schema of how it actually worked, through describing the operational aspects linking tribute *and* trade.

Wang Gungwu

As Wang Gungwu (1968a: 61; 2004: 350) expounds, while the notion of paying tribute to superior rulers was globally common in interstate relations, the Chinese developed the concept to its fullest extent over 2,500 years. Allowing that the Chinese sense of their own superiority was not unique, Wang offers a picture of a Chinese world order presided over by the “son of heaven,” in which Southeast Asians were confirmed as barbarians outside the Chinese cultural world. Wang’s understandings are of course not confined to Southeast Asia, but a large part of his scholarship is concerned with diasporic ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. The system was well recorded in official annals. Beginning with the unification of the empire in 220 BCE, it reached well beyond China’s boundaries. But while it may have been used as an instrument of defense and diplomacy with respect to China’s overland relations, as far as Southeast Asia was concerned, no military threat was forthcoming. Rather, it functioned more as a regulator of foreign trade, a flexible institution combining diplomacy, defense, and commercial advantage. As explained above, while China’s relations with Vietnam were primarily concerned with extracting political loyalty, for the rest of Southeast Asia, trade and cultural relations were the key features.

The system was not static; it evolved with China’s own dynastic history. Under the Tang (618–916), especially in the 7th and early 8th centuries when Indian, Persian, and Arab merchants were active in the tribute trade touching China, an office of the superintendent of trade was opened in Guangzhou. Under the Song (960–1279), which revived many Tang practices, tribute missions from Southeast Asia arrived regularly, undoubtedly facilitated by the rise of Srivijaya.

As Wang (2004: 352) further explains, private Chinese overseas trade flourished over the following two centuries outside of the official trade. The Yuan (1279–1368), however, subverted the Tribute Trade System away from commercial ties into an instrument of submission. In the 1290s, Vietnam, Champa, Burma, and later Java, were all deemed subordinate and subjected to invasion, either by land or through the deployment of huge fleets of war junks. In 1274 and 1281, Mongol fleets (900 ships) unsuccessfully raided northern Kyushu Island in an attempt to reduce Japan to tributary status. The seven expeditions by Zheng He to

the southern and western oceans merely confirmed Chinese power and reaffirmed that all relations be conducted via tribute. While the first three Ming emperors, with their capital in Nanjing, paid considerable attention to maritime links with Southeast Asia, the removal of the capital to Beijing in 1421 saw a new emphasis on political and security concerns.

Other tributary countries, including Korea, Vietnam, Siam, Champa, Java, Melaka, Brunei, Cambodia, and Japan, regularly sent missions to China bearing obligatory gifts, cementing diplomatic relations, facilitating trade, and confirming China's sense of imperium and majesty as the Central Kingdom (Wang 1970: 375–401). Even so, a large informal trade was conducted with China along the frontier zones with Burma, Laos, and, especially Vietnam, where market towns developed along mountain passes and river valleys, engaging minority peoples and Han Chinese alike.

Hamashita Takeshi

How did the system cope with new challenges in the form of Western interlopers? In framing East Asian regional history outside Eurocentric (nation-state) understandings, Hamashita traces the system to its origins. To comprehend Western trade with Asia, he argues, we must be mindful of how the Portuguese and Dutch (and Russians) were obliged to adapt to and work within the most powerful of the regional world-systems, namely the Chinese Tribute Trade System. By highlighting an East-Southeast Asian regional world-system, Hamashita is answering the Wallersteinian conception of a bifurcated world, where, historically, local economies are simply incorporated into a European-centered capitalist world economy (Hamashita 1994; Ikeda 1996: 52).

Hamashita offers a compelling geohistorical picture of the tribute trade. Spatially, the system comprised three distinct elements. First, it was a land-sea system, shaped and defined by the East China and South China seas, although other seas, such as the Sulu, Java, and Sulawesi seas, were also important. Coastal populations were pivotal in this maritime world, while also interfacing with the hinterlands. Second, it was a sea-rim zone where ports and cities were linked, not only to hinterlands but to other ports by trade. Third, certain ports serviced the long-distance trade. As he emphasizes, the major historical principle that loosely unified the

maritime world was encapsulated in the China-centered tribute-trade relation (Arrighi et al., 2003: 19).

Hamashita offers a rendition of the Ming and Qing codes, which ranked and modified, according to circumstance, the various geographical groupings or tributaries. This leads him to elaborate a separate, Chinese-based world economy, a unified system of internationalized tribute-trade relations, with China at the center and a periphery formed by southeast, northwest, central, and northeast Asia, connected with the adjacent India trade area. As Hamashita affirms, the Tribute Trade System did not necessarily exclude competitive merchant trade; indeed, it often masked such trade (Hamashita 1994, cited in Frank 1998: 114).

As elaborated in Chapter 8, the Ryukyuan kingdom participated in this long-distance trade, linking Northeast Asia with Southeast Asian ports. Official Japanese “red seal” traders participated in voyages to a variety of Southeast Asian destinations, at least until the Tokugawa forbade direct Japanese participation in the trade, considered contraband. As Hamashita acknowledges, the Tribute Trade System can be viewed as part of an integrated silver zone in which silver was used as the medium of settlement of China’s perennial trade surplus (Hamashita 1988: 17, cited in Frank 1998: 114).

While the Tribute Trade System is a late-20th century academic construct standing outside indigenous perspectives, such historians as Wang Gungwu and Hamashita Takeshi have offered a useful explanatory framework in which several hierarchies and subsets of ideas can be ordered, especially the spatial dimensions of the tribute trade (including Japanese and Vietnamese emulators), commodity trade networks, the major agents servicing the trade, the major ports and trade routes, shifting demand and consumption patterns, trade cycles, and even the rise and fall of dynasties.

At the risk of simplification, Wang Gungwu is more concerned with the Central Kingdom’s othering of non-Confucian people, especially on the Southeast Asian periphery. He tends to read dynastic histories as mirrors of the Chinese sense of the universal. As a Southeast Asia-based scholar, his concerns include the ethnic Chinese diaspora, and the ideological or cross-cultural components that bound these communities to the homeland. By contrast, the Hamashita version is both a geopolitical and historical reconstruction, more self-conscious as to the economic than the

ideological features of the system. Hamashita also highlights the spatial aspects of the Tribute Trade as a sea-rim zone, with operational dynamics outside of Western conceptions. Both Wang Gungwu and Hamashita share a historical regional order view of Asia; the lens of the former tends to be focused upon Southeast Asia, while that of the latter is trained upon East-Northeast Asia, including the important Ryukyu trade, allowing for Japanese “exceptionalism” within the “system.”

The Historical Patterning

Chinese sailors, traders, and sojourners had obviously been going to Southeast Asia for over a thousand years. In a much-cited passage, Zhao Rugua (Chau Ju-kua), the superintendent of trade in Fujian, recorded interviews with sailors from countries with which China traded in the latter half of the 12th century CE, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Kuantan on the Malay Peninsula, Brunei (Po-ni), sites in the Philippines, Sunda, Palembang and Kampar on the east coast of Sumatra, and Java. Song dynasty records offer a parallel list of trading ports linking Guangzhou and the China coast with ports across the Southeast Asia zone. The *Ming shilu* is even more eloquent, offering over 4,000 references to topoi in Southeast Asia and Yunnan (Wade 2006a; 2008, 580).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Palembang-based kingdom of Srivijaya was visited by Chinese merchants and Buddhist monks traveling through the Malacca Straits from this time. Dating the first Chinese colonies outside the mainland is problematical, but, as attested in *Zhenla feng tu ji* by Zhou Dagan (Chou Ta Kuan), who accompanied a Yuan mission to Angkor in 1296–97, “Chinese who follow the sea like this country, where little clothing is necessary. Rice is easy to gain, women easy to find, houses easy to manage, furniture easy to obtain, commerce easy to direct” (Briggs 1951: 247).

Even so, by Ming times, China followed “highly divergent, even mutually contradictory policies” vis-à-vis overseas trade. While actively promoting the Tributary Trade System, as by the dispatch of Zheng He’s fleets, the Ming Court forbade its own subjects from private trading. The policy of “not even allowing a wooden plank to drift at sea,” was formulated in 1372 and periodically enforced until finally abolished in 1576. Even so, a large group of private Chinese merchants and seafarers

ventured into Southeast Asia in Zheng He's wake. In the face of the official restriction, a lively illegal trade developed, especially off the Fujian coast, eventually stretching to Japan, outside the tribute trade, to Taiwan and Southeast Asia (Blussé and Zhuang 1991: 140–41).

The Fujian Networks

The historical movement of, in particular, Hokkien (Minnan) speakers from Fujian into Southeast Asia, as described in Song records c. 1000, must be viewed against agricultural changes in southern China as much as new trade opportunities across the seas (Wade 2006b: 36–37). The Southern Song marked a period of expanded population matched by the opening of new agricultural lands. New rice varieties, including “Champa rice,” helped to boost yields. Song China was also more trade-oriented than its predecessors, entering the maritime trade with Southeast Asia and beyond.

In his study of the overseas Hokkien trade networks, James Chin (1998: 2006) relates how, in the period 1013–91, large groups of Hokkien merchants sailed to Korea to engage in commerce. He also identifies Chinese traders at Champa in the 1170s. In the 11th and 12th centuries, Chinese established fortified trading posts at sites in Laguna, Mindoro, and Cebu in the present-day Philippines (Hall 1985: 24). By the 13th century, Chinese were even sojourning on the Coromandel coast of India. Chinese communities on the coast of Sumatra were contacted by the Zheng He voyages, just as significant Chinese communities began to emerge on the *pesisir* coast of Java, and at Melaka, Pahang, and Kelantan on the Malay Peninsula. A Chinese presence in Vietnam dates from an earlier period but, under Chinese rule for ten centuries, Vietnam was singular. Numerous degree holders in the Li (1010–1225) and Tran (1225–1400) held Chinese names; an ancestor of a 13th-century Tran ruler was an immigrant from Fujian.

Even in the face of Ming restrictions on overseas trade, certain ports on the remote Fujian coast emerged as clandestine smuggling headquarters, supporting a lively maritime commerce. Yuegang was one such port (Blussé and Zhuang 1991: 141). In Ming times, from the late 14th century, Fujianese families established an enclave at Kumemura in Ryukyu, attending to diplomatic and maritime activity. Resident experts,

known as the *binjin 36 sei*, largely adhered to Chinese customs. After the coming to power of the Qing, whose customs they refused to follow, the Chinese community gradually assimilated into Ryukyuan society (Hamashita 2003b). During this general period, Chinese not only traded seasonally at various ports in Kyushu and adjoining islands, but formed a series of Chinatowns of which Hakata was most prominent. Such communities are not to be confused with the diasporic communities that later developed in Hirado and Nagasaki, on the back of the Portuguese and Dutch trade. In any case, China banned all direct trade with Japan in 1560, a period during which bands of smugglers, many based in Hirado and deemed pirates by the Ming, emerged off the Fujian coast (Plate 13).

By the 17th century, with the re-officialization of Chinese maritime trade, Yuegang emerged as the focal point for all the China sea ports from Japan to Southeast Asia, every year fitting out several hundred vessels for the overseas junk trade, serving the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch-controlled ports along with other destinations. In turn, taxes skimmed from Yuegang port enriched local Fujian as well as imperial coffers. Details of the Yuegang trade are recorded in the *Dong xi yang kao* (c. 1617), authored by local worthy Zhang Xie (Chang Hsieh) to provide local officials with better knowledge of the maritime world. The text describes some 45 nations. Although somewhat flawed, it is the first Chinese text to describe in remarkable detail the activities of the European nations in Southeast Asia (Blussé and Zhuang 1991: 145–47).

Between Sinicization and Localization

The acculturation of Chinese communities in host settings is at the heart of a range of literatures from the classical to the modern. Obviously, it concerned the Ming envoys to Melaka (and Palembang, where unruly Chinese pirates had established a base), that the overseas Chinese were loyal subjects, followed the rituals, and delivered trade to China through Chinese networks. Nevertheless, as Stuart-Fox (2003: 98) has noted, the communities played no part in official Ming policy, even if individual merchants accompanied tribute missions. Because they were not seen as children of the Son of Heaven, they were not used to exert Chinese influence. In contrast, it concerns nation-builders in postcolonial Southeast Asian states that Chinese be not just sojourners but loyal citizens. Confusion

over loyalties and identities has dogged these communities down to the present. Even so, “mixedness” became a major feature of Chinese communities lodged in Southeast Asia. Some also fit Philip Curtin’s (1984) broad definition of “trade diasporas.”

As Hall (2006: 455–58) and others have shown, describing the localization of Chinese diasporic communities is not only problematical but also definitional, especially if we view such communities as by nature “impermanent and non-attached.” Hall creatively describes a “layering” of Chinese diasporic communities in Southeast Asia, wherein some settled and acculturated while others were more likely to repatriate at some future time. He explains that, in contrast to the Song and Yuan encouragement of maritime trade, the early Ming trade policy was to encourage Chineseness among overseas sojourners, especially as adjuncts of the Tribute Trade System that funneled trade to a restricted number of Chinese ports. But, in the post-1430 era, when the Ming voyages were suddenly terminated and the capital was moved north to Beijing, the Ming restricted the tribute trade. In response, Chinese residents in such places as the north coast of Java looked to themselves by assimilating to local culture, intermarrying with locals, and networking with local Muslim merchant groups. A reversal of Ming policy in the 1560s again saw a revival of the Chinese junk trade, reinvigorating the overseas communities, as the newly arriving Dutch encountered, in Banten and other locations.

French scholar Jean Berlie, researching the eastern Tai (Kam) or Dong in Guizhou and Guangxi in the 1990s, developed a thesis of “Sinicization” to explain long-term historical trends. Berlie sought to demonstrate that the process was as much cultural as political. “In effect, Sinicization has no frontiers, it is not concerned with the concept of the nation-state. It persists over the centuries” (Berlie 1998: 22; author’s translation). We concur, and this finding has more general application even outside of China’s formal boundaries.

Notions of Chinese patriarchy were clearly involved in contracting local marriages and setting down roots. Confucian codes, clan associations, and other transplanted institutions would set the Chinese communities apart from native societies. As Barbara Watson Andaya (2006b: 12–16) comments, in contrast with traditions offering higher status to women, or at least freedom outside of strictly gendered roles,

“‘Chineseness’ came to be intimately associated with notions of how men and women should interact.” Confucian understandings of “moral virtue” also conflicted with the cultural norms of southerners, who, for instance, placed a greater priority on women’s participation in agricultural labor, not to mention the marketplace. Her research reveals a range of situations where Chinese males had contact with women of other ethnicities, including Miao, Cham, Vietnamese, Dyak-Iban, Javanese, and native Taiwanese; the dress codes, free choice of partners, easy divorce, remarriage of widows, and other local social practices offer negative examples from a patriarchal Chinese viewpoint. But, as the Yuan envoy to Angkor observed, the engagement of local women was easy. To be sure, the first Chinese males to arrive contracted slaves, temporary wives, and concubines, as well as “legal” wives.” Even so, for later arrivals, marriage preference in the absence of Chinese brides was almost invariably in favor of acculturated, mixed-race spouses, just as their offspring became “Chinese.”

An Early 15th-Century Chinese Diaspora on Sumatra

Under the Ming, those coastal merchants who defied the prohibition on overseas trade were automatically placed in permanent exile. Large communities of merchant-pirates developed in Southeast Asian and Japanese waters. James Chin (2006: 137) brings new light to bear upon a little-studied Chinese diaspora on the Sumatran side of the Malacca Straits. From the late 14th century, Chinese merchants began to sojourn at a site identified with Old Port Palembang (Jiugang). Headed by Cantonese merchants, the community comprised several thousand former soldiers and civilian runaways from coastal Fujian and Guangdong. But, to the Ming authorities’ annoyance, these runaways resorted to piracy in the Straits, effectively blocking maritime passage for several years and interrupting the flow of trade missions. To end the piracy and to seek the return of the sojourners to China, the Ming court dispatched two envoys to the region in the early 15th century. But rather than return, the community leaders offered to pay tribute to Emperor Yongle (r. 1402–24). Under the leadership of one Chen Zuyi, a new wave of piracy surged in the Straits, leading in part to Zheng He’s voyage of 1405. Under Zheng He, according to Ming sources, over 5,000 sojourning Chinese were killed in naval

skirmishes; merchant-pirate junks were capture or destroyed and, back in China, Chen Zuyi and his assistants were beheaded. Under the new peace, the Ming appointed a Pacification Mission for Palembang, headed by a loyal merchant from Guangdong. Wade (2008: 594) contends that, with Ming support under the Yongle reign, Melaka actually sought to control Old Port Palembang.

Aside from Palembang, Melaka, Patani, Pahang, and Siam were all bases for Chinese merchant-pirates, as indeed were numerous isolated harbors in western Japan. A number of prominent trading families would emerge from these sites, not only running long-distance trading operations but sometimes collaborating with the first Portuguese to arrive and other European merchants. Further evidence of the patterning of Ming “refugee” communities in the archipelago comes from the pioneering research of Wolfgang Franke and Claudine Salmon (1997; 2004), based upon analysis of numerous Chinese temple inscriptions dating from the mid-17th century.

The Rise of Chinese Totok Communities on Java

The emergence of Chinese communities on Java is not well documented, but can be pieced together from our understanding of how Java fit into the Chinese Tribute Trade System. The Yuan invasion and Zheng He missions also led to early transfers of Chinese to Java. But as the would-be sojourners were stranded in Java during long periods between missions, they became increasingly indigenized or at least acculturated to local Javanese *pepesisir*-north coast tradition. Known as *totoks* (or *peranakan*), this community reaching back many generations must be distinguished from later Chinese immigrants who formed distinct communities, at first in such places as Banten (and Melaka), and later Jakarta and other centers under Dutch control. An intriguing question is whether Chinese Muslims arriving in Java transmitted Islamic culture.

Some historians, Reid (2000: 63–64) included, directly attribute the presence of Chinese merchant communities on the Javanese *pepesisir* to the Zheng He missions. This is feasible, especially as the first five voyages (1406–18) and the seventh voyage (1432), sojourned in the Gresik-Surabaya area, refitting and waiting out the change of winds. Many of these stragglers would also man the tribute missions from Java to China,

which reached a peak between 1369–1430. Reid (2000: 73–74) infers from chronicle sources that *peranakan* Chinese either helped to found Gresik and/or Japara or were dynastically embedded as Muslims. It is striking that prominent mosques on the *pesisir* coast reflect Chinese pagoda influences. Modern scholars have also weighed evidence as to whether the Zheng He missions actually proselytized Islam of the Hanafite school, then prevalent among Chinese officials from Yunnan on the Ming fleets (Suryadinata 2005: 97). Whatever the case, by the early 15th century, Chinese merchants formed an important element of the *pesisir* trading culture of Java. Even so, as Wade (2008: 595) argues, the arrival of Zheng He's fleet in Javanese waters was not especially pacific in intention or deed. Especially, the fleet sought to discipline the polity of Majapahit, "Ming's major competitor for regional hegemony in maritime Southeast Asia." After 1450, following the Ming withdrawal from "south sea" trading, the isolated Chinese communities of the *pesisir* coast married into and blended into the local culture. Only a revival of the Fujian junk trade after 1567 brought new Chinese blood to Java (Plate 20).

This episode in history has been incorporated into local lore. Across maritime Southeast Asia, the Zheng He missions have been celebrated, at the Sam Bao Gong temple at Semarang in Java, at Batu Maung on Penang, and the Zheng He mosque in Surabaya. Still, as Suryadinata (2005) acknowledges, there is much slippage between legend and history in interpretations of these events, especially as the Chinese annals have little to add. Worship of the Mazu or mother deity, gaining popularity during the Song dynasty in southern China, was also spread out of China by Zheng He and other mariners who followed in his wake. As can be viewed today in the iconic A-Ma temple in Macau, Mazu deity temples transplanted in Southeast Asian coastal settings recreated veritable "sisterhoods" of port cities (Widodo 2005).

Banten on Java

The Muslim-controlled trading center of Banten hosted a Chinese community, some 3,000 strong at the time of Dutch contact and expanding further under Sultan Abdulfatah Agung (r. 1651–83), under whose reign the kingdom reached its height. A diverse community of merchants, artisans, sailors, agriculturalists, scribes, and accountants, among others, the

Chinese of Banten lived in a distinct quarter named Pacinan, distinguished by its brick houses. They maintained their language and customs, and remitted their profits back to China. Pacinan was near the harbor and the marketplace. The Banten Chinese maintained a cemetery (still extant), built a mosque in distinctive hybrid style, and leased land to grow sugar (Salmon 1990). In contrast with the *totoks*, described above, the Chinese of Banten apparently lived in some friction with the local population. Even so, insofar as some took local concubines and even adopted Islam, they could still be described as *totok* relative to later arrivals who may have been even more China-oriented. Chinese converts to Islam gained stature within the court, but ordinary Chinese were treated as *kafir*, or unbelievers, like Europeans, and kept at a distance.

One role performed by the Chinese of Banten, at least from the 17th century, was that of *shahbandar*. In 1656, a Chinese named Abdul Wakkil served as *shahbandar* and Kapitan Cina; he was replaced in 1657 by Kiyai Ngabehi Kaytsu, who held this position until 1674. As Rantoandro (1999: 262–84) relates, Kaytsu, a wealthy merchant in his own right, acquired a small fleet of ships at the service of the sultan, ranging not only to harbors on Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra, but as far as Siam, Cambodia, Vietnam and even Manila, Macau, and Nagasaki. Such was his authority, alongside the *menteri*, or ministers, that he emerged as a veritable “foreign trade minister.” Going by the Javanese honorific *kiyai*, it is certain that he won local acceptance. Following the foundation of Batavia, however, many Banten-based Chinese migrated there, especially those involved in “illegal” business with the Dutch. In turn, the office of Kapitan Cina was created in Batavia, with Biangan (1645–63) as the first incumbent. The sultan of Banten was gradually brought under Dutch control and, as observed by the Chinese visitor Ong Tai-Hae in 1791, reduced to living in a distant but elegant palace, guarded by Dutch troops. The Dutch controlled the succession of the royal line (Ong 1849: 14).

Batavia

China’s tributary trade contacts with Java greatly antedate the arrival of the Dutch; undoubtedly, Chinese traders preceded the Dutch to Sunda Kelapa, or Batavia. As Yuan Bingling (2009) has written, the Chinese

minority in colonial Batavia outnumbered not only the Dutch but even the ethnic communities of Balinese, Timorese, Javanese, Malays, and Ambonese. It was also by far the wealthiest community, with trading links reaching not only to Fujian and Guangdong, but also to Sri Lanka and even Madagascar. When VOC (Dutch East India Company) Governor Jan Pieterszoon Coen fortified Batavia, the Chinese were invited to live within the walls. Many obliged and, in a short time, Coen had chosen a *kapitan* and put him in charge of civil affairs.

Within a century, the Chinese began settling in the surrounding country, especially as planters of sugar. Infamously, in 1740, in what Yuan (2009) describes as an example of “ethnic cleansing,” all the estimated 4,000 Chinese residing within city walls were massacred, along with many outside. The “Chinese war,” also drawing in other towns along with the Javanese nobility, continued until 1743. News of this affair reached Japanese authorities in Nagasaki, as VOC exports of sugar tapered off.

But the Dutch needed the Chinese farmers; the result was the reinvention of the *kapitan* system along with the Chinese Council, invested with judicial functions. Contrary to Dutch prejudice, many Chinese immigrants were highly cultured. Alongside the mass of immigrants from Fujian were a number of mandarins and moneyed people. Invariably male, their wives were local-born, by preference Balinese (Hindu) or even Thai. Their offspring were *peranakan* and achieved free and equal status, even if their mothers were slaves. By the 1820s, the Chinese population of Batavia had risen to 30,000–40,000. Chinese women in Batavia acquired a special status (legal and sexual) when compared with those in traditional China (Yuan 2009; Salmon 2006).

The Chinese community in Batavia is one of the best documented, especially in the records of the still extant Batavia Gong Guan (Kong Koan in Hokkien) and the Chinese Council archive (1788–1957), written in classical Chinese with Hokkien, Dutch, and Malay admixtures, on births, deaths, marriages, divorces, censuses, and court cases, down to 1918 (Blussé and Chen 2003). These records are revealing of Chinese economic activity on Java, even on a very personal level, as well as of the specific function and hierarchy of the Kapitan Cina or Chinese community headmen across the region (Wade 2007b). From 1792, the Chinese Council (Chineschen Raad te Batavia) was housed in a building

on Pabuan Street. Parallel archives on other Chinese communities may have been lost. But, according to Yuan (2009), no comparable archive is known for other Chinese communities, the mainland included. Another mirror on Chinese migration to Java is provided by careful reading of Chinese temple inscriptions, as those in Jakarta studied by the late Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon (1960).

A Chinese View of North Java

As the visiting Hokkien literatus Ong Tai-Hae observed in 1791, the port city of Semarang hosted a large Chinese population, headed by a Kapitan Cina anointed by the Dutch in an elaborate ceremony. Visiting the *kapitan*'s house, he remarked upon elegant dress and food, and scores of females in attendance. As Ong remarks, "The power of the Kapitan in Batavia is divided, and the profits of the situation are uncertain; but the authority of the Semarang Kapitan is fixed, and the profits more regular in their returns. The boiling of the sea to make salt, and the cultivation of the fields to produce revenue, are all the perquisites of the Kapitan. Thus it is that this person can amass wealth." Master-servant relations are strictly enforced. Sons-in-law from China are preferred. Wives are called *ngai*, or mistress, and the men are very much afraid of them; "Female slaves carry umbrellas to screen their mistresses from the sun." West of Semarang, the port city of Pekalongan also hosted a large Chinatown called "Pa-China-an": "The Chinese town faces the hills, and borders on the sea; it consists of a row of dwelling houses, amounting perhaps to fifty or sixty. The houses are joined together, with high stories; towards the west is the Kapitan China's residence, to the right of which is a garden ..." He also describes a *sireh* or betel nut plantation, a cemetery, a temple dedicated to "the fairy that favors the seas," a customs house where import and export fees were collected, an outer customs house across the river as a second check and, on a prospect facing the sea, the grave of a holy man where (Chinese) boat-people present incense and offerings. Some ten miles to the south stood two sugar mills. This was a self-contained Chinese world, even though the place was north Java and the Chinese resided under Dutch sufferance. For Ong, such scenes as that of fishermen rowing home to Pekalongan in the sunset, within

the natural scenery of high mountains and mighty rivers, evoked not so much his native Fujian but Suzhou and Hangzhou (Ong 1849: 14).

The Melaka Chinese: Rise of a Baba Community

By the middle of the 15th century, Melaka became the locus of China-Southeast Asia maritime contacts. The strategically sited port had been visited by the second (c. 1408–11) and fourth Zheng He (1416–19) voyages. Reid (2000: 69–70, 79–80) believes this owed to the lack of a political center on Java, turmoil on the island, and the fact that the Melaka kings were more assiduous with the tribute trade. As Hall (2006: 476) explains, while localized Chinese communities were then developing on the north coast of Java, through the 15th century, Melaka's Chinese communities retained their Chineseness.

The Chinese formed a distinct community in Melaka long before the Portuguese conquest; the first reference to the port city appears in the *Ming Shilu* from 1403. As ruler of a tribute-bearing country, the sultan of Melaka was rewarded with seals and patents, silks and special clothing. The *Ming Shilu* (August 31, 1521) tracked the usurpation of the Melaka sultan by the Felanghi or Portuguese, “not a tribute-bearing country.” A *shahbandar* held jurisdiction over Chinese ships arriving from such diverse destinations as Champa, Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Ryukyu (Wade 2006a).

According to Thomaz (n.d.: 77–78), during the conquest of the port in 1511, the Chinese sided with the Portuguese against the sultan. By the end of the century, many Chinese traders settled in Melaka under their own laws. Cantonese and Hokkiens established separate community halls and temples. A minority became Christian, and many Fujianese became Muslim. Melaka's Trankera mosque (from the Portuguese *tranqueira*, or crude stone wall), built in 1728 and still extant, is striking for its Chinese three-tier pagoda-style architecture. Undoubtedly, early Melaka hosted rich Chinese merchant families alongside sailors and transients.

A special feature of the Melaka Chinese was their ability to assimilate elements of the Malay language and culture while keeping Chinese tradition intact. To be sure, for the minority of Chinese who converted to Islam, acceptance into the broader host community was even greater. Chinese patriarchal traditions, as much as the temple and *bang* (congregation)

structures, served to reproduce the Chinese community over a long time. Nevertheless, as still evident in the Baba or Nyonya culture of Melaka, attire, cuisine and, above all, patois offered these sojourners an identity distinct from newer arrivals. Acculturation to local ways and a hybrid lifestyle also gave a form of protection in a borderland society where newcomers were not always welcome.

The Chinese of Manila: Under the Spanish Gaze

While direct Chinese trade with the Philippines long predated the Spanish conquest, the formal establishment of Manila in 1571 by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi attracted fleet after fleet of Fujianese ships. The junk fleets, numbering between 30 and 50 ships and carrying 100–300 tons of cargo, would arrive in Manila in November after a 15-day voyage from Fujianese ports. In addition to their cargo, they could also carry up to 300 passengers, including merchants and immigrants. Despite the restrictions imposed on their livelihood, religion, and conduct of trade, not to mention the periodic persecutions, killings, and even pogroms, the Chinese, known as “Sangleys” to the Spanish (plausibly after the Hokkien term *seng li* for trader), were indispensable to the Spanish trade.

The Chinese presence was also vital for the colonial economy, even if their textiles and pottery imports may have deadened local industry. As described in Chapter 4, the galleon trade is not comprehensible without reference to the Chinese at Manila. From 1582, Chinese traders no longer bartered their silks, but demanded silver as the standard for payment. The importance of the Chinese in the silk-for-silver trade is matched by shipping statistics. In 1577–1612, a total of 584 Chinese vessels arrived in Manila compared with 45 Japanese and 25 Portuguese arrivals (Souza 1986: 67).

English sea captain Sir Thomas Cavendish, who made contact with Manila on January 14, 1687, offered a highly positive appraisal of the Chinese of Manila:

The Sanguelos are Chinese merchants, very sharp and sensible men in all matters of trade and merchandise, extremely ingenious in mechanical contrivances, and the most expert embroiderers in silk and satin that are in the whole world; they work any form of beast, or fowl or fish, in gold, silver or silk, with all the just proportion and

color in every part and giving it all the life and beauty that an excellent painter can do, as nature herself bestows on the living original. And 'tis plain, that these men must bring a very gainful trade to Manila since they made no more of gold than they did, as they brought great quantities of that precious metal along with them, so they exchanged it there weight for weight for silver (Harris 1745: 22–31).

The Chinese of Manila constituted a significant community and controlled the major marketplace. This was the *Parián*, or silk market, founded in 1582, probably in the northeastern part of Manila, destroyed by fire the following year and relocated by Governor Diego Ronquillo to a marshy site on the Pasig River. The second site is described in a letter by Bishop Domingo de Salazar to Fray Sánchez on June 2, 1588:

Inside this city is the silk-market [*Párian*] of the Sanglely merchants, with shops to the number of one hundred and fifty, in which there are usually about six hundred Sangleys — besides a hundred others who live on the other side of the river opposite this city; these are married, and many of them are Christians. In addition to these there are more than three hundred others — fishermen, gardeners, hunters, weavers, brickmakers, limeburners, carpenters, and iron-workers — who live outside the silk market, and without the city, upon the shores of the sea and river. Within the silk market are many tailors, cobblers, bakers, carpenters, candle-makers, confectioners, apothecaries, painters, silversmiths, and those engaged in other occupations. (cited in Ch'en Ching-Ho 1968: 91)

As described, the *Parián* was more than just a silk market — it was a veritable supermarket on a grand scale, as the Chinese imported livestock, horses, geese, chickens, and a range of Chinese fruits and products. The Chinese arriving in Manila also brought certain technological exchanges, especially as measured by the kinds of craft occupations they practiced. Their imports, including iron, gunpowder, and saltpeter, were indispensable for the Spanish galleon and fortifications. They advanced loans to the Spanish, as the trading junks were collectively owned in Fujian by groups of wealthy merchants, each taking out shares in the venture (Quiason 1966: 167).

The rapid increase in the number of Fujianese and Cantonese in Manila and surroundings to 10,000 by 1588 created intercommunity problems, not only with the Spanish authorities and friars, but also with

native peoples. Spanish opinion favored the assimilation of the Chinese through conversion to Catholicism. From about 1581, the Dominican orders began to win over Chinese converts; in a short time, churches were constructed in the Chinese quarters with a view to conversions. Government injunctions that converted Chinese should cut their queues met with firm resistance, however. Royal opinion on the matter held that the ruling was not expedient, as it actually retarded baptisms and conversions (Ch'en 1968: 87).

The number of immigrants continued to rise, especially between mid-1590 and 1680, despite a series of bloody incidents. In 1603, the Chinese of Manila revolted in a situation of mutual suspicion and misunderstanding, leading to a massacre by the Spanish, assisted by loyal Japanese and locals; some 23,000 died, with the rest condemned to the galleys. Other massacres occurred in 1639 (an anti-tax rebellion); in 1662 and 1686 (linked to political conditions in China); in 1762, during the British invasion (in which many Chinese sided with the British); and in 1819 (provoked by discriminatory Spanish legislation). Each massacre had its separate origins but a shared feature of the rebellions was a reaction to governmental pressure and repression (Bernal 1966: 56–57; Ch'en 1968: chap 5).

The Teochiu Chinese of Bangkok: Royalists and Retainers

Even today, Yaowarat, Bangkok's Chinatown bordering the Chao Phraya River, is a discrete community embedded in a larger social fabric. Wandering through this teeming urban space, one is struck by the tenacity of Chinese tradition — the temples, the clan associations, the cuisine, the craft and business concentrations, and the ubiquitous shophouse. In contrast to the Chinatowns of Malaysia, for example, there is a hybridity of language, custom, and style. The social and economic role of the Chinese in the modern Thai economy is a separate story; but how this community emerged offers another insight on the shaping of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.

Small-scale Chinese immigration into Siam goes back to the Ayutthaya period, if not much earlier, as Siam communicated with China through the tributary trade. The royal junk trade was not only crewed by Chinese but frequently returned from China with immigrants. Large-scale

immigration, however, only took off after the fall of Ayutthaya (1767) under the reigns of King Taksin (r. 1767–82) and King Rama I (r. 1782–1809). King Taksin, himself the son of a Chinese immigrant, encouraged Chinese immigrants to his new capital at Thonburi, as they were indispensable in agriculture and other occupations in the then underpopulated city. Chinese private merchants were active in the junk trade, then the mainstay of the external economy, and also served as the primary source of state revenues for the defenses of the capital and other expenses. As a Teochiu, Taksin actively encouraged immigrants from that speech group, alongside Hokkien and Cantonese. A privileged group known as the “royal Chinese” even lived in a special quarter. King Rama I, founder of the Chakkri dynasty, was also of Chinese descent on his mother’s side, and continued this policy of favoring the Chinese. He even encouraged the translation into Thai of certain Chinese literary classics.

Jennifer Cushman (1993: 3–5) has gone further in examining the Siam junk trade. Chinese traders began frequenting Siamese ports in greater numbers from the early 18th century, especially to tap the “Straits produce,” or imports from the archipelago. According to Cushman, the dominant feature of the trade was that the ships and crews were Chinese, and the trade itself was treated as “domestic” by the Chinese authorities. The junk trade thus fell under the rubric of native trade as opposed to official tribute trade. But while the tribute trade from Siam was channeled exclusively through Guangzhou, the native junk trade touched a range of ports along the southwest and eastern coasts of China, from Hainan to Tianjin. Besides bringing textiles, ceramics, and other items of popular consumption, junks arriving from ports in Fujian and elsewhere brought immigrants, including artisans and entrepreneurs alongside merchants. A large and growing community of Chinese merchants in Bangkok facilitated this trade as the Siamese nobility aggressively sought to promote trade with China.

Citing the work of William Skinner, Malinee (1985: 62), asserts that the Chinese population in Bangkok in the early period approximated 200,000, while that in the entire country was about five million, with important concentrations in tin-mining towns in the south and in coastal towns. A significant percentage were by this stage local-born, although considering themselves Chinese. As the sole privileged foreign community, the Chinese were free to intermarry with locals; there were no

restrictions as to use of Chinese names or other markers of Chinese identity. Unlike the mass of Thais, they were free from *corvée* labor, albeit in return for an annual poll tax. Through intermarriage, Chinese were constantly incorporated into the Thai nobility, and the number of mixed Sino-Thai offspring expanded over time. The Chinese impact on lifestyle, architecture, literature, and many other spheres of public life became profound, in Bangkok especially. Such was the influence of the Chinese presence during the Thonburi-early Bangkok period, including on the royal bloodline, that some observers mark this period off from the early Ayutthaya period as a more novel and dynamic age.

“South of the Clouds”: The Yunnan Frontier

Sharing a natural frontier with Burma, Laos, Vietnam, and Tibet, China’s sprawling western province of Yunnan is a porous zone through which people, goods, and ideas historically moved — south across strategic passes to Southeast Asia, northwest to Tibet, north to the Mongol world, and east to China. Not surprisingly, contestations provoked over modern boundaries imposed by colonialism have continued down to the present. In any case, consistent with our theme of Chinese diasporas, Yunnan offers a *tableau vivant*. What struck this author in 1983 during fieldwork in the Dai minority zone of Xishuangbanna, straddling the middle Mekong River on the China-Laos border area, was the character of Han settlement — very recent in the case of many, frugal in the classic nature of pioneer settler colonialism, and overweening in a political-cultural sense. Dai (Tai) culture was already in an advanced state of acculturation and, as a result of still visible Cultural Revolution impacts, actually disoriented.

As Chinese researcher Bin Yang (2008) elaborates, scholars of Southeast Asia have unjustifiably imposed an “artificial boundary” over Yunnan, given the history of interaction. Working from western sources and especially the *Yunnan Shiliao Congkan*, a collection of Yunnan historical sources, he has gone far in rectifying this anomaly.

As described by Bin Yang (2008: chap. 5), large-scale Han immigration into Yunnan was initially fostered under the Western Han (206 BCE–24 CE). The Nanzhou period of the 8th and 9th centuries also witnessed the arrival of military colonists resettled by the Tang court, as wars between

Nanzhou and China further increased the tempo of Han immigration. However, the Mongol invasion of the 13th century decisively led to the incorporation of Yunnan into China, and also introduced an enduring Islamic element.

While up to the 13th century, outsiders were gradually absorbed into local society, reverse assimilation became the practice following the Ming conquest of Yunnan, as colonization by Ming armies became part of state policy. Following numerous pacification campaigns, the Ming established a system of garrison towns and encouraged peasant immigration. Merchants too found their niche. Rising to above a million settlers by the end of the 16th century, the Han element had obviously contributed to a general Sinicization. Once the turmoil occasioned by the Ming-Qing transition had receded, immigrants flocked into Yunnan, tipping the demographic balance absolutely in favor of Han immigrants. Importantly, immigrants arriving under the Qing moved into the hilly districts, including the “barbarian” southern zones, introducing rice terraces and other practices, such as the introduction of New World crops (Bin Yang 2008: 59). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Qing also looked to Yunnan as the prime source of copper for its monetary system; the province became a vital component of Qing China’s regional and global economy (Bin Yang 2008: chap. 6).

The Chinese of Vietnam: Pioneers of the Expanding Frontier

As a mature Confucian kingdom by the 18th century, Vietnam, like Korea and Japan, deeply assimilated Chinese tradition. Vietnam spent ten centuries under Chinese rule, from the Han through to the Tang, and nine centuries of more autonomous rule, but still within the Chinese cultural orbit. Sometimes glossed as the “little dragon,” successive courts in Vietnam adopted the trappings of Chinese civilization: the institution of the emperor, the bureaucracy, the examination system, the classical Confucian classics, and Chinese script (*chu nom*). Vietnam also fell into the tribute trade orbit. For example, during the Nguyen reign (1802–40), missions were sent to China almost every three years. Of course, how these imported institutions were grafted onto the local landscape is subject to much interpretation, especially as a wide gap existed between

village and court. Moreover, the Sinic world met its nemesis in Cham civilization, which it both absorbed and conquered.

The Sinic world also faced down an ethnic barrier across the porous Sino-Vietnamese frontier zone, homeland of a patchwork of ethnic minorities of which the Tai were the most prominent, even in medieval times. As James Anderson (2007) has highlighted in his study of loyalty and identity across this frontier, with special reference to the early 11th-century rebellion of a Tai-speaking chieftain, conflict as much as “negotiation” defined the relations between border communities and imperial court representatives. Even after an independent Vietnamese polity emerged in 968 CE, upland leaders in the frontier zone envisioned separate domains of authority outside the orbit of the courts, though on occasion adopting Sinic leadership titles and entering into tribute relations. After bilateral negotiations in 1078 fixed a line of demarcation between the Vietnamese and Chinese domains, from this point on the Tai-speaking communities north of the border became Sinicized, while the Tai residing in Vietnam resisted full integration, though entering into patron-client relations with the Vietnamese court.

Traditionally, Li Tana (1998: 70–71) writes, Vietnamese rulers in the north tried to keep Han Chinese traders at a distance, especially in the capital. From 1114 CE, Li Anh Ton opened Van Don (Van Hai) Island as the exclusive place of trade for Chinese; it remained so for several hundred years until Pho Hien to the south was opened for the same purpose in the 17th century. Nevertheless, Hanoi later attracted immigrants from Guangdong and Fujian, with the former congregating on Huanh Buam Street and the latter at Lan Ong Street. Hang Ngay, with its solidly constructed houses, became the domicile of wealthy Cantonese rice merchants. Both communities supported congregation houses.

But in Dang Trong, or the “inner region,” also dubbed Cochinchina by early European arrivals, the Nguyen realized that they needed Chinese (and Japanese) traders in order to survive, facilitating their residence and even their participation as government officials. Dang Trong prospered on the Chinese trade, laying the foundation for Chinese domination over the southern Vietnamese economy through the 16th and 18th centuries. A number of ports facilitated this trade, including Quang Nam, Hoi An, Pho Hien, and Hue. Italian missionary Christoforo Borri, who lived in Dang Trong from 1618–21, observed of Hoi An: “one part belongs to

the Chinese, another to the Japanese; they live separately, each having their own governor, the Chinese living according to the laws of China, the Japanese according to the laws of Japan.” Nevertheless, with the eclipse of the Japan trade, the Chinese became dominant by the end of the century. A Chinese visitor in 1695 observed a busy port city where merchants from many countries resided. Chinese from Fujian dwelt in closely built houses along the river, wore clothing of the previous dynasty (Ming), and married local women to assist in commercial dealings. Minh Huong or Ming loyalist villages in Hoi An, notably Cu Lao, Chiem, Cam Pho, and Lang Cau, were overseen by a mandarin (Nguyen Dinh Dau 1993: 118).

Wide-scale Han Chinese emigration to Vietnam would not take place until the Qing period, but, with the fall of the Ming dynasty, substantial numbers of Ming loyalists put down roots in the sprawling southern Mekong delta frontier lands, joining earlier Chinese arrivals on the Cambodia side and marrying into the local population. Around 1700, a Cantonese adventurer, Mac Cuu (Mo Jiu), established a port state at Ha Tien, a virtually autonomous zone within what Cooke and Li (2005) describe as a vast “water frontier,” embracing the Mekong delta zone and connected by the junk trade to the Malay Peninsula and back to the Chinese mainland (Chin 2005: 62–63). As Japanese scholar Sakurai Yumio (2005: 43–46) elaborates, from the late 18th century onward, Teochiu Chinese settled along the Gulf of Siam at Chantaburi and Trat, gravitating around the new Siamese king, General Taksin. Taksin and his army successfully invaded Ha Tien in 1771. With Ha Tien abandoned, the Mac family moved their base to Can Tho, effectively making the “last stand of the semi-autonomous western Water Frontier.”

While taking Vietnamese wives, the immigrant Chinese maintained their Chinese way of life. As Woodside (1988: 116–17) recounts, they lost their Chinese status only when their sons entered the Vietnamese bureaucracy. Such a rite of passage was impossible for members of the Chinese merchant classes. Compared to the racially mixed Minh Huong class, the merchants typically became members of congregations (*bang*), organized along regional lines. Still, a second- or third-generation male Chinese in 19th-century Vietnam could gain this more esteemed status if he determinedly maintained his Chinese attire, including his queue. Such

Minh Huong types acted as important bicultural brokers between the courts and the Qing in China.

Even today, a visitor to Saigon's teeming "Chinatown" of Cholon can inspect a number of Chinese temples and community houses dating back to the end of the 17th century. Notable is the 275-year-old Nhi Phu or Ong Bong pagoda, originally catering to Fujianese immigrants from Tuyen Chau district of Anhui (Quanzhou) and Chuong Chau (Zhangzhou). As the community prospered under French colonial rule, an "Ecole de Foukien" was attached to the pagoda complex, still extant under a different guise (Plate 12).

Conclusion

The China-centric Tribute Trade System evolved over a long time. Various tributaries dropped off, others joined in, some remained loyal, others invariant, while Japan and — to degrees — Vietnam even sought to create tributary systems in miniature. We have tried to picture the general workings of the system prior to the entry of European interlopers and the pressures they imposed, both political and commercial, as a result of the new globalized trading networks their trading companies spun. While the system continued as a shell down to late Qing times, the Guangzhou (Canton) Trade System, and the era of Opium wars and Unequal Treaties, rendered it superfluous.

The emergence of Chinese communities across the Nanyang is not of a piece; indeed, as the example of Vietnam reveals, it is integral with the ebb and flow of Chinese imperial history over a long period. The tribute trading networks from Java to Brunei to Ryukyu were serviced by Chinese ships in both directions. Simply, Chinese marine design was paramount from Song times onward and, although marine accidents were frequent, Chinese seagoing vessels or their localized versions offered a degree of security to visiting envoys and tributaries. They were also capacious by European standards, offering space for merchandise and passengers alike. Obviously, without the active junk trade and relative political stability in the host countries, the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia would have been much more constricted.

But the emergence of discrete Chinese communities in cities under colonial control and, in the case of Japan, under Shogun rule, is a separate

development. First and foremost, these mostly Hokkien-speaking communities formed part of elaborate trading networks. As such, they were bound not only by the imperial edicts governing overseas trade as set down by the Ming and their successors, but, from Japan to Manila to Batavia, also by sometimes capricious and onerous local restrictions on their activities. The Thonburi and early Bangkok periods under the Chakkri dynasty were clearly an exception, even if the mass of Chinese immigrants were viewed as cash cows for the revenue department. The influx of Han Chinese into politically fluid borderlands as on Taiwan was treated as a special example of a hybridized frontier zone, but, progressively through the Ming and especially the Qing, the Chinese state pushed its boundaries deeper and deeper into aboriginal lands on the vast peripheries of its empire, especially in such semi-autonomous zones as Yunnan and Tibet.

Whether on Java or Timor, Manila or Melaka, Chinese communities were obliged to assimilate to local traditions. The mostly male immigrants took local wives, just as their offspring achieved a new albeit creolized identity as *peranakan*, Minh Huong, or *mestiço*, sometimes testing Confucian notions of patriarchy. But newer waves of immigrants preserved the *bang* or congregation type of political organization, just as temple organizations, language, diet, and tradition preserved a sense of Chinese identification that often ran counter to European forms of justice, administration, and “civility.” Almost everywhere, from Vietnam to Malaya to Borneo and Timor, Chinese communities were headed by *kapitans*, virtual mandarins in Vietnam, and erstwhile civil servants in the European colonies. The Ming-Qing transition produced its own complexities as to loyalty, identity, and fixity of residence, especially on the part of the Minh Huong communities of the Mekong delta region.

Such Ming-era Chinese settlements as on the *pesisir* coast of Java, at Banten, at Melaka, in Nguyen Vietnam, and in Spanish Manila conform to Curtin’s understanding of “trade diasporas.” Initially marked off by language, religion, and ethnicity, the immigrant communities — largely Fujianese Chinese from our examples — acted as cross-cultural brokers in importing significant elements of their material and social organization while also assimilating into the host communities.

5

Commerce, Currencies, and Commodities

The identification of common currencies across East-Southeast Asia tells us much about the way that polities and their ports were linked by commerce, not only with the China seas and the Indian Ocean but with Europe and the Americas. Distinguishing between indigenous and external currencies or forms of exchange would also be telling. Not unrelated to the circulation of currencies is the broader question of trade in commodities, and their differential value across cultures and societies. Where possible we should also identify the agents of commerce and trade, indigenous or external. Such concerns mesh with long-standing debates over the inability of Asian traders to maximize profits, compared with the large-scale capitalist organization of the European trading companies. Notably, van Leur (1955) was often interpreted in this light, although recent scholarship has sought evidence of precocious Asian capitalism from India to China and places in between (Markovits 2007).

This chapter seeks to explain the emergence of indigenous coinage in Southeast Asia, both as a measure of intensifying trade and commercial contacts and as evidence of a correlated regional trade. It describes the major traded items; this focus on commodities and on commodity chains linking producers with consumers conforms with a historiographical trend in the writing of world history (Pomerantz and Topik 1999; Gilbert and Reynolds 2005; Jacobs 2008; Topik et al. 2006). Hopefully, the study of traded commodities across the broad 1000–1800 time frame will throw light on specific production cycles as well as proto-industrial activity. Obviously, this was a mixed trade: distinctions should be made between the trade in natural products, which tended to antedate the trade in cultivated cash crops, and that in manufactured or value-added items, including their raw materials, many of which remained staples over a

long time. As Pomerantz (2001: chap. 3) has summarized, the circulation of everyday luxuries for popular consumption is an index of the emergence of proto- or even full capitalist development.

Indigenous Southeast Asian Coinage

Most local trade in premodern Southeast Asia was conducted by barter. Even today, less accessible parts of Laos, Burma, Borneo, Sulawesi, Timor, New Guinea, and southwest China remain premonetized. Prior to the emergence of metal-based coinage, cowrie shells from the Maldives became a medium of exchange, reaching such inland destinations as China's Yunnan province by at least the 2nd century BCE (Vogel 1993; Gupta 2006: 123–25); the future Maldivian sultanate would enter regional trading networks. Bin Yang (2004; 2008) has described Yunnan, especially during the Nanzhou-Dali period (7th to mid-13th centuries CE), as a strategic gateway connecting Southeast Asia with Tibet and India in the trade in cowries, metals mined in Yunnan, and horses. This he dubs the “Southwest Silk Road.” Not even the Mongol invasion of Yunnan managed to eliminate the cowrie trading network. It would not be until the 17th century that the Qing achieved the economic incorporation of Yunnan by replacing the cowrie with copper-based currency.

Just as gold (and silver) were mined across the region from alluvial sources and used as items of exchange or in the manufacture of ornaments, so indigenous silver and gold coin issues first appeared in Java at the end of the 8th century, namely the so-called sandalwood flower with *devanagari* script on the reverse, eventually spreading through the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and the Philippines. The initial Islamic coinage in Southeast Asia, first struck in the late 13th century at Samudra-Pasai in northern Sumatra, was a diminutive, epigraphic gold coin, later a standard commercial issue in Aceh known as the *kupang* (still the colloquial term for a ten-cent coin in modern Malaysia). By the end of the 13th century, however, these native traditions were partly supplanted by the wide-scale adoption of low-value, imported Chinese cash. A possible exception, at least in the Malacca Straits area, was the circulation of gold and silver dinars, the dominant currencies of the Muslim world, including the Indian Ocean zone (Wink 2002: 11).

Meanwhile, an indigenous tradition of tin-based issues emerged in the 14th century, especially in the ports of northeast Sumatra and the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Writing of early Melaka, the Dutch traveler Nieuhoff (1704: 215) observed that there was no other coinage except for tin “of great weight and little value.” According to Davidson (1977: 43–54), by the 17th century if not earlier, an indigenous Brunei coinage of soft tin alloy was in currency. The practice continued in the Brunei sultanate into the second half of the 17th century, where a tin coinage known as *pitis* was minted. This hybrid tin, Chinese-style coin was embossed with illustrations of cats, elephants, tigers, and camels, and an Arabic inscription on the obverse (Teh-Gallop 2005).

As Wicks (2004: 144) speculates, an intriguing question as to the emergence of coinage in Southeast Asia is why some regions achieved relatively complex monetary systems based on units of silver (or cloths), while others, notably Angkor and Pagan, did not adopt coinage in commercial transactions? To answer this question, we should have some understanding of the relative integration of this or that political-economic center within regional and global trading networks, as commercialization and marketization was differentiated across the vast East-Southeast Asian zone.

The Chinese Currency Tradition

The generalization of money in the East-Southeast Asian marketplace might be seen as an index of increasing sophistication in means of exchange and production processes. Modern scholars — such as von Glahn (1996; 2003) on the social side of Chinese monetary policy from Song times onward, Shimada (2006) on copper coinage, and Flynn and Giraldez (1994) on the silver trade — confirm such understandings. The striking of coinage reaches at least back to the Zhou dynasty (6th century BCE); paper currency was used from Song times. The regional circulation of Chinese coins expanded with the frequency of Chinese trade voyages, just as the ancient tributary countries of Vietnam, Korea, and Japan imported Chinese currencies from an early time.

As von Glahn (1996: 1, 233) explains, bronze coins were the fundamental form of money in imperial China; fiscal and monetary policy was premised upon bronze coins. In a pattern that would be replicated

to various degrees by Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, the authority to issue money was a closely guarded sovereign privilege. Monetary policy was seen by the state as the single most important economic management tool. Even so, Song China found it increasingly difficult to maintain a bronze coin-based monetary policy. Likewise, the Yuan and Ming tried to supplement coins with paper currency. But paper became defunct in early Ming, as the state reluctantly embraced the use of uncoined silver for exchange. Von Glahn argues that the transition from the early imperial coin economy to a late imperial silver economy “marked a crucial watershed in the evolution of Chinese society, economy, and culture.” But, in practice, no single monetary standard existed in China under the Ming-Qing; rather, a wide variety of regional and local currencies were used, fitting the resources and needs of local trading systems. Some currencies fit local transactions, while others were used to settle long-distance transactions.

As knowledge of metallurgy spread across East Asia, the Dinh in Vietnam (968–80 CE), the Koryo court (918–1392) of Korea, and the Nara court in Japan (710–84) began respectively to mint coins of a distinctly Chinese type. The Shuri kings of Ryukyu followed suit from at least the 15th century. Typically, these issues were round, square-holed copper alloy coins embossed with four Chinese characters indicating reign name. Unlike the Koryo, which exported coins to Japan and elsewhere (some have been located in Majapahit sites in Java), Japan would not become a copper or coin exporter until the 17th century.

Japanese Currencies

By the 8th century CE, twelve types of copper coins and a variety of silver coins were minted domestically in Japan (Asao 1991: 62). According to the Nara National Research Institute for Cultural Properties, a central mint was established at the ancient Nara capital of Heijo-kyo (710–84), where base coins called “seed coins” were minted for regional production. In this way, the authorities looked to the creation of a standard currency for widespread use. The first standard was the Wada Kaichin coin minted in 708. Other mints were located close to sources of copper, such as the present-day Yamaguchi and Kyoto prefectures of Japan. Undoubtedly, the discovery of “mother coins” used in coin molds helps

to explain the role of the unified state in the mass production of coinage (Watari 2008).

In early 1569, Oda Nobunaga (1534–82), the first of three proclaimed unifiers of Japan during the turbulent Sengoku period (roughly mid-15th to early 17th centuries), established official exchange rates for gold, silver, and copper coins, although market rates fluctuated. Between 1600 and 1700, the pattern was remarkably consistent. Nobunaga took over the control of strategic gold and silver mines. This was a complete departure from the policy of the Muromachi Shogunate (1392–1573), especially as it laid the foundation of the triple coinage system that would prevail through the Tokugawa period. As Japanese economic historian Asao Nachiro (1991: 64) remarks, the striking and issuance of gold and silver coins was an epochal event in Japan's monetary system.

Shifting Currency Standards

As a hugely populous nation (160 million by 1644) at the center of the Tribute Trading System, China's conversion to silver had global impacts, not only in increasing demand, but in causing silver's value to soar, even against gold. Fujian traders and Kyushu-based Japanese merchant circles all participated in this trade, licit and illicit; they sometimes even advanced loans to European shippers who plied the more regular and officially sanctioned routes, such as those radiating out of Manila, Macau, and Batavia. As modern economic historians have determined, China (with India) was by far the most significant end-market customer in the early modern world economy; it was, in the words of Flynn and Giraldez (1994: 75), the ultimate "sink" for New World and Japanese silver. The shift to a silver standard was accompanied by the collapse of the former paper-based standard.

Although the trend toward a silver-based currency was already apparent in China in the second half of the 15th century, silver pieces rather than coins were employed, especially in the commercial centers of Guangdong and the lower Yangtze River. Notwithstanding the high regional demand for copper coinage, taxes and even Japanese and Korean tribute payments were converted into silver. As von Glahn (1996: 255) argues, the monetary history of Ming-Qing actually confirms the tenets of modern monetary theory, that "precious metals were not simply

bullion, they were commodities, and trade in precious metals ebbed and flowed according to the prices they commanded and the profits they were expected to yield.” By the mid-17th century, the price of silver fell but, overall, he contends, “Imperial silver undoubtedly gave China’s money supply the liquidity it desperately needed.”

By the 17th century, Chinese-style copper coins had become a standard currency in East-Southeast Asia, from Java to Vietnam, especially as Japanese copper exports entered the China junk trade in larger volume. Known as *caixa*, the coins were produced as a debased mixture of lead and “scum of copper,” and were highly brittle. Typically, *caixa* were strung together for convenience, especially as their individual value was low. According to a contemporary source, cash coins for export were manufactured in Quanzhou (Beawes 1772: 911).

Eventually, the flood of Japanese copper coins into Nguyen Vietnam created such a dependency that fluctuations in their price also redounded upon the local economy. As Shimada (2006: 167) summarizes, “Japanese copper was more than an imported commodity in the intra-Asian trade, it was a key to sustaining economic stability in Asia” — a reference not only to the circulation of Japanese coins but to a heightened awareness of coin standards, and the broader question of monetization as the precondition necessary for a modern economy.

East-Southeast Asian Commodity Chains

Commodity chains are defined here as hierarchies of traded goods entering local, regional, and global markets: following the laws of supply or demand; stimulated by artificially created demand as in the trade in luxury goods (the early spice trade to Europe, the Chinese demand for certain medicinals from Asian forests); arising from new demands (for silk in Japan or ceramics in Europe); and, stemming from demands created by new technologies, as in metalworking or textile production (which required dyes and alum). Typically, such a sequential approach to historical commodity chains or networks decenters the nation-state and highlights the goods that people produce and consume. It also informs us about the technical and social organization involved in collecting or harvesting, transportation, processing, and distribution of the concerned goods (Topik et al. 2006).

The first reports reaching Europe on the broader trade in spices served to lure Western traders into the Asian marketplace. For example, as English traveler Ralph Fitch observed in 1586, Pegu conducted a vigorous maritime trade with Cambaia opium from northwest India, painted cloth of Madras, and white cloth of Bengal, among other cloths in high demand. Fitch also observed that ships from Melaka arrived at the port of Martaban on the coast of Pegu laden with “sandal, porcelain and other wares of China, and with camphor of Borneo, and pepper from Aceh in Sumatra.” Ships from Mecca, on the other hand, called at the port of Syrian, bringing “woolen cloth, scarlets, velvets, opium, and such like” (Forster 1921: 34–35).

In fact, early European travel books, like Tomé Pires’ *Suma Oriental* (1515) and Linschoten’s *Itinerario* (1596), tended to be catalogs of trade products. Chinese chronicles and such Japanese texts as Nishikawa Joken’s *Zoho Kai tsusho ko* (Commerce and trading between China and uncivilized countries) (1708) also documented the trade items along with their place of origin. Actually, we could say that lists of commodities compiled by early navigators and scribes were the first crude attempts to set down and understand commodity chains as they then existed. Modern scholarship has sought to identify the traded items entering the ancient Nanhai trade and the Song maritime trade (Wheatley 1959; Ptak 1991, 1993, 1999, 2008).

But trade in luxuries was complemented by an expanding trade in “everyday luxuries,” shading off into products of mass consumption (Pomerantz 2001). Certain traded items, usually bulk-trade items, entered proto-industrial activity, suggesting future paths of divergence for production centers though relegating other zones to the status of mere suppliers. (The bullion trade and the trade in ceramics are examined in, respectively, Chapters 9 and 10.) Below, the engagement of the European traders with Southeast Asian commerce will be acknowledged, but indigenous merchant groups will also be examined — precocious Asian capitalists, if that is what they were?

Reaching back to antiquity, international trade involved a range of commodities from the obscure and prestigious to the prosaic. Space does not allow a full enumeration, which would include exotic animals, temple bells, tombstones, bezoar stones, cobalt oxide, and a thousand other items best researched through the pages of the iconic *Hobson-Jobson*.

The items examined here are those that were traded intensely both locally and internationally. We will also examine the local agents of trade across the East-Southeast Asia maritime zone — variously, Arabs, Persians, Gujaratis, Chinese, Malay, Javanese, Cham, Vietnamese, Japanese, and other regional seafarers. As Philip Curtin (1984) has elaborated, “trade diasporas” or networks of foreign merchants sojourning in host societies, sometimes over generations, played important roles as both commercial agents and cultural brokers, even prior to the advent of the European trading companies.

The Textile Trade

Silk

In an industrial age, it is hard to believe that the great engine driving the East Asian bullion trade system involved the gathering of silkworms, the nurturing of cocoons, and the production and export of Chinese silks to Japan and, by the 16th century via Manila galleons, to Mexico and Europe (Cooper 1972; Flynn and Giraldez 1994). Where and under what circumstances was silk produced in China? As was known to 18th-century European observers, silkworms were bred in almost all provinces of China, though most were gathered in Nanjing and coastal Zhejiang, the two provinces with the highest output of manufactured silk.

Chinese silks and ceramics together entered the ancient “silk roads” as traded items. The ancient ceramic trade was also a trade in silks; only the archaeological evidence is wanting for such a vulnerable commodity. As Abu-Lughod (1989: 327–28) clarifies, long a luxury item in demand in Europe and the Middle East, Chinese silk production reached a high point under Southern Song (1126–1279). Entering the terrestrial silk roads as a high-value, low-bulk product, by the 6th century China lost its monopoly as supplier to Middle Eastern competitors, as silk came to be substituted or supplemented by trade in bulk ceramics once the maritime trade developed.

As Alvin So (1986) has described of silk production in southern China in the 18th and 19th centuries, a complex set of “agro-urban” links developed, based upon intense peasant labor and including significant female participation, especially in the delicate extraction of the fiber. So further

explains how the gentry and the state in South China controlled both the silk industry and the trade in silk. After 1581, as Bray (1997: 226–36) explains, under competition from cotton, silk production shifted from rural areas to suburban villages in the lower Yangtze. By late Ming, entire households were engaged in the business; producing silk cloth was no longer a female domain. The tightly controlled silk industry generated net inflows of silver into China, signaling China's early incorporation into the world economy, though it became peripheral as the opium trade progressed.

According to Beawes, a British merchant writing in the mid-18th century, "there not being one year in which they do not send to Peking near 400 barks laden with cloth of gold (or tissues), damasks, satins, and velvets, besides that made by the Emperor's orders, for presents to his ladies, princes and all the Court." He also noted that all the other provinces were required to pay their tribute in silk and silkstuffs, "generally resold on the Emperor's account." Even so, he concluded, that would still not account for half of Zhejiang's production. The most exquisite silks, however, were manufactured in Nanjing, home of the best artisans, though exclusively reserved for domestic consumption. The silk, raw or otherwise, entering European markets was manufactured in Guangzhou or the province of Guangdong (Beawes 1772: 790).

Cottons

Dating back to the Indus Valley civilization, India had a high reputation as a producer and exporter of cotton goods. Evidence of Indian cotton has been unearthed in Egyptian settings; it also gained favor in ancient Rome. Indian silks reached China across terrestrial routes. Although cotton was indigenous to many parts of Southeast Asia, the art of textile production was part of India's civilizational exchange with the region from the earliest period; Indian textiles were prized goods in Southeast Asia for elites and commoners alike (Sen 1962; Guy 1989; Riello and Roy 2009).

By all accounts, Southeast Asians were well clad in cottons. As Zhou Dagan (cited in Briggs 1951: 246) observed of Angkor in 1296, women and men alike wore a loincloth and, when going out, draped a large band of cloth over a smaller one: "The character of the cloth used depended

upon rank. Most of their cloth, especially silk, came from Siam.” While we can expect that coarser calicoes were sold in bulk, richer embroidered works were also prized as heirlooms or as magic regalia in court or religious settings. Royalties and aristocracies favored goldshot woven cottons and silks from India. As Green notes (2007: 439), sculpted images and bas-reliefs at Angkor visually affirm the use of plain and patterned textiles in daily use.

While, of course, no textiles have survived from this period, a range of Indian-derived cotton textile techniques became indigenized in Southeast Asia, including batik and ikat (Barnes 2005; Barrkman 2009). The use of a checked sarong worn pantaloons-style, as by males in Siam and Laos, was first adopted by the Khmer from the Indianized states and later used by the Siamese court. The Khmer created ikats based on Indian double *ikat patolas*. Certain designs were reserved for the king and courtiers; the king distributed the textiles accordingly. The Lao court produced its own designs alongside brocades imported from India and Persia. Changes in textile design, use, and symbolism are also useful for tracing the migration and settlement of diverse peoples, especially in mainland Southeast Asia (Naenna 1990: 10; Green 2000). Indian textile influences even extended to a Japanese form of ikat known as *kasuri*, evidently imported via the Ryukyus or the Philippines (Tanaka 1995: 5). Over time, Indian motifs, such as the mandala, elephant, *garuda*, and *naga*, were not only adopted across Southeast Asia but came to be reworked in a range of local traditions.

With the arrival of European traders, Indian cottons (glossed in English as *calico* or *chintz*, and in Japanese as *sarasa*) — along with woven goods from Gujarat, the Coromandel coast, and Bengal — entered the Portuguese trade to eastern markets, including Manila and eventually Mexico, in a big way. In turn, the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and English traders supplied markets in the archipelago. Without the textile trade, the Europeans could not pay for the spices they coveted (Reid 1988: 90). China was of course another source of cottons, with the advent of the regular junk trade from Fujian, shipping such items as white Nanjing linen, alongside Indian imitations (Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 110).

Even when the VOC was established on the Coromandel coast of India in the 1620s and 1630s, Portuguese merchants from Macau, Goa,

Cochin (Kochi), and Nagapatnam (Nagapattinam) still managed to buy up supplies of Indian textiles, leaving only the rougher varieties to the Dutch. Asian and Portuguese ships carried their trade items to such secondary destinations as Melaka, Aceh, Arakan, Bengal, and Siam, along with a short-lived resurgence in cotton imports from Coromandel and Bengal to Makassar (Souza 1986: 78, 103). Just as Indian chintz came into vogue in Europe, at least until the quantity of imports began to threaten English production, so the VOC carried Indian textiles as far as Japan, where it was known as *nanban sarasa* (Osumi 1963).

Indian textile production and exports connected not only with East-Southeast Asia but also with West Asia, Europe, and the Atlantic world. The scale of Indian textile exports also highlights South Asia's place in the 18th-century world economy. Obviously, the volume of these exports was vital for India's economy, just as VOC purchases for the intra-Asian trade helped fire up commercial activity from the coast to the hinterland, where the cotton was grown. Ironically, the English domination of Mughal India turned trading surpluses to deficits. As discussed below, the Asian textile industry satisfied consumption patterns of elites and ordinary people alike, and also had multiplier effects in associated activities such as the provision of dyestuffs and color fixers.

Dyes and Alum

Humans had discovered the potential of vegetable dyes for coloring textiles in antiquity. Even today, traditional and tribal societies in such places as Burma, Laos, and in the archipelago have a wide knowledge of natural dyes. Indigo was a favorite, as was deep red (from a resin); a rainbow of colors was produced from roots, leaves, stems, and pods. In Vietnam, a wild yam was used and traded for the production of a characteristic brown-colored cloth that became a vogue in the 18th century. Sappanwood (*Caesalpinia sappan*), native to tropical Asia, was a major import into Japan under the red seal trade. Also known as Brasilwood after its American counterpart, it was used as a red dye. Coloring of attire was not only decorative but served as a marker of rank in court societies across Asia.

The primary role of alum (double sulfate of ammonium) as a mordant or fixer in the Asian textile industry has been investigated by Souza (2004:

136–53). Developed in China as a color fixer by the 6th century CE, it was known in India by the 9th century. In the 17th century, Fujian in China was the principal source of alum. It was shipped from Guangzhou and other South China ports; this export connected China with India, the other major textile production center. As Macau-based Portuguese ships had exclusive rights to sail between China with India in this period, alum entered the cargo as ballast alongside more profitable goods like pepper and ceramics. The two coasts of India, including Surat and Bengal, took part in this trade. Later, with the Dutch conquest of Taiwan, the VOC would enter this trade to Surat, just as the Portuguese and Chinese junk trade also fed into the VOC trade at Batavia. The trend over time was for the price of alum to increase as its volume trended upward. Alum production and its use in textile production offers an example of early or proto-industrial production.

Spices, Medicinals, Drugs and Edibles

Highly mythologized through the ages, the “spice trade” in condiments, aromatics, and medicinals, many sourced in tropical Asia, dates back to classical antiquity. The demand for spices as luxury items drove ancient “spice” routes into the Mediterranean area in one direction and to China in another. The contest over terrestrial and maritime spice trading routes was at the heart of dynastic and civilizational struggles. Famously, Ottoman control over the Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean enticed the Portuguese to seek a maritime route to India; this was achieved with Vasco da Gama’s voyage to Calicut in 1498. Now, undercutting Islamic trading rivals, Portugal, Dutch, and other European players would muscle in on the “spice trade” at the source.

Oriental drugs, spices, and aromatics became known to Europe through the pioneering activities of such scholar-collectors as the Goa-based Jewish physician, Garcia de Horta (1501–68), whose work, *Conversations on the Simples, Drugs and Medicinal Substances of India*, published in Goa in 1563, revealed to Europe a wealth of information on tropical products and their medicinal qualities. The list includes marijuana, datura, opium, and a range of spices, fruits, and tropical plants, not excluding such “aromatics” as sandalwood. Importantly, Horta drew not only on Greek tradition, as favored in Europe, but also Arab;

he interviewed Brahman Hindus alongside other Asian informants. He offered basic trade intelligence relating to the availability of products. A derivative work published in 1578 in Spanish by Cristavão da Costa (*Tractadao de las drogas*) embellished upon Horta's classic.

Cinnamon and Cassia

As a medicinal and a condiment, cinnamon was one of the first spices to enter the European trade under its new organization. Portuguese interest in tapping the cinnamon trade at the source led to the virtual conquest of the coastal states of Sri Lanka (Silva 1991). Cinnamon, native to Sri Lanka and south India (*Cinnamomum zeylanicum*), and cassia (*C. aromatica*), with a wider distribution in Java, Sumatra, and Vietnam, are derived from the inner bark of a tree. Occurring naturally, under commercial conditions the outer bark is also harvested. For over a hundred years, the Portuguese exploited Sri Lankan cinnamon, using the Salagama (Brahmin) caste as exclusive cinnamon-peelers while extracting tribute in the form of cinnamon from the kings. By allying with the inland kingdom of Kandy from 1636, the Dutch expropriated the trade, eventually expelling the Portuguese from the "cinnamon coast" of southwest Sri Lanka by 1658. When the British took control in 1796, the more common cassia was gaining favor in world markets. From 1830, the Dutch made cinnamon one of their export crops under the so-called Cultivation System on Java.

The Pepper Trade

Indian pepper (*Piper nigrum*) would emerge in the 16th and 17th centuries as Southeast Asia's largest cash crop. With its origins in India, pepper is believed to have been grown in Vietnam by the third century CE. Chinese sources attest to the growing of pepper on Java by the 12th century; China would remain the largest client for Southeast Asian pepper up until 1500. But only in the 16th century would Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula start to produce exportable surpluses, rivaling and eventually exceeding the traditional production center of Kerala in India. "Pepper coasts" emerged in west, central, and south Sumatra, west Java, and the Malay Peninsula. Aceh traded its pepper across the Indian

Ocean, reaching markets in India, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, equaling in volume the Portuguese trade via the Cape. By the early 17th century, Southeast Asian pepper exports exceeded 5,000 tons, much of it from Banten. A peak of 8,500 tons was reached in 1670, as prices dropped sharply after 1650. Gradually, at the end of the 16th century, the English and the Dutch would transform the pepper trade by buying from growers, as the market in Europe outstripped that of China. Even so, Chinese pepper farmers emerged in such diverse locations as Riau, Johor, and Brunei in the 18th century (Reid 1999: 122; Bulbeck 2004: 1055–56).

Even prior to the British founding of Singapore in 1819, Chinese had established gambier plantations on the island. In fact, gambier and pepper grew symbiotically. Gambier (*Uncaria*), a large tropical vine with a wide distribution, was used in China for leather tanning, dyeing, and as a medicinal. Locally, gambier was used as a component in betel nut chewing; betel was widely traded, even entering markets in Fujian and Taiwan, where it remains a mild drug of choice. Reid (1999: 125) reckons that pepper cultivation must have engaged some 200,000 people, or some five percent of the population, adding to income and prosperity, with the multiplier effects on shipping and other activities “substantially adding to commercialization in the region.”

Mace, Nutmeg, and Cloves

The Portuguese gathered critical intelligence on the Asian spice trade from their bases in Goa, Melaka, and possibly even at Venice. From at least the first millennium, cloves (the dried flower buds of the *Syzygium aromaticum* tree) and nutmeg and mace (from the *Myristica fragrans* tree endemic to the eastern archipelago) were lucrative trade items reaching China, India, Mesopotamia, and Mediterranean markets. Ptak (1993) has sought to evaluate the importance of the Chinese demand for cloves from Song times, finding that cloves were imported in relatively low volume compared to India and the Middle East, but commanded high prices as aromatics and medicinals.

The quick exploratory voyage from Melaka to the spice islands in 1512 by Antonio d’Abreu enabled the Portuguese to map the sea route and establish their near-monopoly over supply at the source at Banda,

although this would be contested by Magellan on his circumnavigation voyage of 1521. The practical value of the spice trade, as recorded by Tomé Pires, the Melaka-based Portuguese scribe, would transform local and regional power relationships, especially once the more aggressive and colonial-minded Dutch and English entered the picture.

Nutmeg and mace were practically endemic to the island of Banda, while cloves grew in the islands off the southwest coast of Halmahera. Under the control of the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore at the time of the Portuguese arrival, the spice trade and the struggle over it drew in both Iberian powers, as well as the English and the Dutch. Such interventions not only led to the ouster of the Portuguese, but the massacre of the English colony at Amboina (Ambon) by the Dutch, the extermination of indigenous populations (Banda), and the religious conversions of newer populations. From the 1620s, the Dutch had established their own clove plantations on Ambon; with their occupation of Makassar in 1667, they had virtually driven out European competitors. Still, the Dutch monopoly did not prevent such European plant-hunters as Pierre Poivre from clandestinely collecting, in the 1750s, specimens that were used to establish clove plantations on French-controlled islands in the Indian Ocean. The VOC monopoly over the less valuable mace and nutmeg trade would also be broken in the 1790s.

Sugar

Although different cultures have long devised ways of producing sugar, as with sugar palm trees used across Southeast Asia to produce forms of “brown sugar,” cane sugar production for commercial export on Java developed only as a result of the adaptation of Chinese forms of refining after 1600, as arriving Chinese migrants took to newly formed sugar plantations. With its origins in India or Southeast Asia, sugarcane had been known in southern China from no earlier than the 3rd century BCE. Sugar developed as an export item to Southeast Asia under the Song, as Guangdong and Fujian emerged as the major regions of sugarcane cultivation in Asia, alongside Bengal and eastern India (Mazumder 1998: 9).

Under new conditions, sugarcane cultivation increased in Java under the Cultivation System (of forced deliveries), as the VOC found new markets for refined sugar in Japan and, eventually, Europe. During their

occupation of Taiwan, the VOC encouraged Chinese sugar cultivation, with refined sugar also entering VOC exports to Japan and westward. Fujianese, who had been exporting sugar to Manila within a short time of its foundation, brought sugar to Japan via the junk trade, undercutting both the Portuguese (and the Dutch). The Chinese revolt and its bloody suppression on Java in 1740 offered new opportunities for Portuguese merchants, especially as sugar production in Guangdong went through a “buoyant phase.” In meeting the strong demand for sugar on the Malabar coast of India, the Portuguese continued to outsell the VOC over the following decades (Souza 1986: 52, 65). By the early 18th century, Quang Nam province in south-central Vietnam became a major export center for sugar to China. Hang Duong (Sugar) Street in old Hanoi gained its name from Chinese brokers dealing with sugar producers further south in Quang Nai. Local dealers processed the sugar into dried sweetened fruit or vegetables (Nguyen 2006: 91). Somewhat earlier, Ayutthaya emerged as a producer and exporter to Japan (Reid 1988: 31). The trail leading from Nagasaki to Edo, known as the *tokaido*, became dubbed the “sugar road,” owing to the craze for the new import. Sugar entering Japan was put to use as a sweetener for cakes, such as consumed during the annual *obon* festival. Luzon and, later, Cebu and Negros in the Philippines became sugar export zones from 1830.

Salt

Salt is a commodity that is traded differentially across communities, often reaching premium prices in zones of scarcity. Its trade connected inland routes, typically linking lowland producers with upland clients via elaborate “salt roads.” For the highland-dwelling peoples of the mountain massifs of Yunnan and Indochina, salt was a commodity in great demand; horse and mule trains serviced this need. In Laos, salt was not only the object of intense trade but constituted an item of exchange between Lao and montagnard clients. It was treated by the aborigines as a prophylactic and vested with sacral qualities. Notably, the Ban Bo salt pits, 60 kilometers north of Vientiane, were subject to elaborate religious rituals and ceremonies down to recent times (Archaimbault 1973: 1–16).

Most coastal peoples in Southeast Asia developed techniques for salt production, especially as a fish preservative. The kings of Angkor

obtained their salt by evaporation on the seashore (Briggs 1951: 247). The north coast of Java was well supplied with salt pans servicing the inter-island trade. Salt pans at the head of the Gulf of Siam were exploited for trade but also for the benefit of the Thai kingdoms (Reid 1988: 28–29). Typically, salt was taxed at its source. China taxed rice from 900 CE, but the salt tax was the most important source of state revenue. Hang Muoi (Salt) Street in Hanoi, later renamed Rue du Sel by the French, attests to the importance of this commodity in the merchant and imperial Vietnamese economy (Nguyen 2006: 54).

The Opium Trade

Opium was used as a medicinal in China as early as the Tang dynasty and was known to the ancient Greeks, the Arabs, and Indians from an early era. However, it was not until the Dutch and English companies appeared on the scene in Asia that procurement and trade in opium became a highly orchestrated international commercial venture. Widely found in India and west Asia, *Papaver somniferum*, from which opium is harvested, does not appear to have had a natural distribution in the Southeast Asia region, though it was introduced by the French into northern Laos on a commercial basis in the late 19th century and flourished in northern Burma and southern Yunnan.

By 1688, the VOC were importing significant quantities of Indian opium into Java; opium eventually dwarfed all other commodities as a source of revenue for the Batavia comptoir through the long 18th century. As opium was eaten and, later, smoked recreationally in Java by the late 1600s, especially within the Chinese diasporic communities, so it entered Asia's political economy. Writing of the VOC trade on Java, Souza (2009a; 2009b) describes opium as a “transformational” commodity. From a system of public auction, the VOC then established a company within the company termed the Amphioen Society, a bonded or guaranteed credit organization entering into commissions with a carefully vetted group of merchants. While the VOC handled the supply side, Java-based Fujianese entrepreneurs, former VOC officials, Chettiars from the Coromandel coast, and indigenous agents handled the distribution. Opium came to be factored into local labor cost structures, as increasing numbers of coolies and others became consumers of the drug. It remains

unclear if the opium habit so acquired during this “first transformation” was then socialized back in Fujian, or whether mass addiction awaited future generations on the China coast.

Produced in British India in such favored locations as Malwa, opium began entering Portuguese Macau from the 1700s. Van Dyke (2005: 120–29) confirms that opium made a relatively late appearance in southern China, alongside Aceh, Java, Borneo, and elsewhere, but by the 1730s figured as a regular import on English ships sailing from Madras. By 1757, opium had gained a firm hold in China. As mentioned, quick sales of opium gave merchants the silver necessary to purchase tea. Portuguese traders sourced their Patna opium from Bengal or Malabar, until the English dominated Patna opium at the source. A variety of Asian agents, including Parsis, Muslims, Armenians, Cantonese, and others, along with individual Portuguese merchants, were involved with the trade in production and distribution. But it was the Dutch and English companies that worked the hardest to socialize, legalize, and sell the drug in their colonies as a prime source of official revenue, while condoning the illicit trade to Macau and, more brazenly, to Guangzhou. Eventually, the Qing attempts to stem opium imports and silver outflows led to the Opium Wars (1839–42; 1856–58). Paradoxically, opium cultivation in China itself was, by this age, meeting some local demand. The evolution of colonial opium farms and monopolies down to the mid-20th century, its eventual proscription, and the illegal drug trade, should not detain us here. Suffice to say that opium remains a medicinal among certain ethnic minority groups inhabiting the northern Vietnam-Laos-Burma area.

Exotic Edibles

The Chinese penchant for exotic edibles collected in Southeast Asia was recorded by European observers. Writing in the late 18th century, French encyclopedist Abbé Guillaume-Thomas Raignal (1780) observed that Chinese arriving in Java sought to make their fortunes out of trade in such items as black stag pizzles, shark fins, sea cucumber (also known as *bêche-de-mer* or *trepan* in Malay), and bird’s nest, “reckoned among the delicacies of the table in China.” The five-centuries-long Chinese trade in edible bird’s nest directly connected up southern China with a range of sites in Southeast Asia, and continues today.

As exhaustively studied by Claudine Salmon (2008), the consumption of edible bird's nest evolved along with the emerging *haute cuisine*, especially in southern China, under Ming and Qing. It was originally harvested from grottoes in the karst mountains of Guangdong, Hainan, and Yunnan, but Chinese traders began to range more widely through maritime Southeast Asia in search of the coveted sea swallows' nests. Favored sites included the Cham Islands off Hoi An, the Gulf of Siam, the Nicobar Islands, and Borneo (Nguyen and Tran 1993). Makassar, in southwest Sulawesi, also emerged in the late 17th century as a collection point for bird's nest from, especially, Banda in the Malukus, entering the annual junk trade to Xiamen (Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 102). Even so, it should be understood that the natural distribution of the sea swallows embraces most of the archipelago and the western Pacific.

Chinese traders were obliged to enter into agreements with local rulers, as the dangerous and laborious harvesting of the bird's nest was contracted out to locals. Over time, the business became more controlled and commercialized. As far as I can identify, the taste never caught on with cultures outside China; this traded item is emblematic of the East-Southeast Asian trade zone.

The Marine and Forest Products Trade

Harvests of the Seas

Then, as now, the seas were harvested for their marine products. Most fish was consumed locally, but salted fish and other marine products entered regional trade networks. Even today, the Western District on Hong Kong Island offers a bewildering array of dried marine products, from shark fins to *trepang* to other gourmet items of Cantonese cuisine. *Pasar ikan* (fish markets) abounded across Southeast Asia, both maritime and mainland. Water villages across the Malay world and even on the China coast speak of a symbiotic relationship between locals and the sea. Ayutthaya, as observed firsthand by Kaempfer (1987), was also partly maritime, just as Angkor and Cham harvested the marine resources of the Tonle Sap. As Tagliacozzo (2004) has noted, politics, commerce, and the trade in sea produce combined in powerful ways. Just as the collection of bounty from the marine goods trade supplied a rationale for British expansion

in the Malacca Straits (Penang from 1785, Singapore in 1819), it also led Britain into competition with the Sulu sultanate, which used the shallow waters of North Borneo as a vast collecting zone for sea produce shipped to China. From western Japan to the Lesser Sunda Islands (Lembata), entire villages engaged in whaling, an activity that would eventually lure Europeans and Americans, as recorded in Melville's classic, *Moby Dick*. Even the scattered atolls of the South China Sea, known to Vietnamese and Chinese fishermen since antiquity as a source of turtle eggs, tortoise-shell, coral (Ptak 1991; 1999), and other marine products, would become in the 20th century a major site of international contention.

The Forest Trade in Aromatics

Long before European traders sought spices in the archipelago, Chinese traders were attracted by the natural riches of the sprawling tropical zone to the south. Essentially this was a trade in natural forest products long antedating the deliberate cultivation of cash crops under European auspices. The forest product trade frequently brought coastal-dwelling peoples into contact with highlanders or inland peoples, as in Sumatra, Borneo, Timor, Yunnan, and the highland zones of Indochina and Burma. Some of these forest products then entered long-distance trading circuits with the Indian Ocean region to the Mediterranean in one direction, and China and Japan in another.

Among the coveted medicinals sought by Chinese traders was the aromatic Borneo camphor, in Malay *kapur barus* and in Chinese *longnaoxiang* (*lung-nao-hsiang*). Used in funeral rites or as a cosmetic, it was later used as medicine. Made of translucent crystals secreted in the trunks of the *Dryobalanops aromatica* tree, it has a wide distribution in equatorial Southeast Asia. Mention of this aromatic accumulates in Tang dynasty records; Arab and long-distance trade touching Southeast Asia expanded from this time. Java and especially Brunei were identified as superior sources of camphor by Zhao Rugua (Chao Ju-kua) in his description of Chinese-Arab trade in the 12th and 13th centuries. Through the Ming period, camphor entered the tribute trade from, variously, Annam, Siam, Melaka, Johor, Pahang, Sulu, Champa, and Brunei (Han 1985: 1–29). Camphor was also collected on Taiwan beginning with the Dutch regime.

An aromatic spice with a wide distribution in tropical Asia, cardamom is used for flavoring and as a medicinal. Historically sourced from the Malabar coast of India, cardamom entered Arab trade networks. Although traded by the Portuguese, it was the British who first established cardamom plantations in India. Cardamom entered the junk trade from Cambodia and Vietnam. The Cardamom Mountains of Cambodia and the Bolovens Plateau of Laos were traditional sources.

The mountain zones of Laos and Cambodia were, historically, important sources of such forest products as insect sticklac and gum benzoin. Sticklac is the resinous secretion of a tiny insect. In Laos, the lac is harvested from tree branches in the wild. From antiquity, lac was used as a dye for cotton, silk, and leather. Gum benzoin, sourced from Laos, Siam, Cambodia, and Vietnam, is a resin obtained from the styrax tree and, as an aromatic, was traditionally used in India, China, and Japan in the production of incense. Although this was essentially an intra-Asian trade, the Dutch East India Company sought to tap this trade at the source.

Besides sappanwood, as mentioned, calambac, eaglewood, and aloeswood all entered the cargo manifests of the junk trade to Japan. Resin from calambac and eaglewood was highly prized for the production of perfume. The price it commanded in the marketplaces of coastal central Vietnam confirms its status as a luxury item (Li 1998: 82). But just as these forest products opened a rare niche for the highland peoples to engage commerce with the outside world, so a range of other naturally occurring products, such as pepper, gambier, cloves, nutmeg, and sugarcane, would emerge under European auspices as cash crops, many developed under plantation systems.

The sandalwood trade, connecting the island of Timor with China from Yuan or early Ming times (Ptak 1987), is an example of a trade that did not involve any particular production process or innovation beyond the manufacture of incense or crafting the fragrant wood. The sustainability of the sandalwood supply can be viewed as a problem of resource management. Boomgard (2006: 173–74) writes of three models of sandalwood management in reaction to world market demand, namely, the Javanese, Sumba, and Timor models. Prior to 1500, Java was an export center for sandalwood, but by the time European traders entered Asian waters, supplies from Java had dwindled from overharvesting. In contrast, traditional rulers on Sumba (known to the first Europeans

as “sandalwood island”) resisted VOC attempts to harvest the sandalwood, owing to taboos associated with disturbing ancestral spirits in the forests. But Sumba could afford to keep up this “abstinence model,” at least up until the late 19th century, because it possessed other resources in demand, such as horses and slaves. By contrast, Timor represented a “durable supply model,” whereby, in the absence of other significant resources, traditional rulers were obliged to husband their resources over a long time. Boomgard mentions some other possible cases of resource management by local rulers, such as sago on northern Sulawesi, sappanwood on Sumbawa, and cassia trees in northern Sumatra.

Animals

Animal furs and skins were a constant item in cargoes dispatched to Japan from Siam, Vietnam, and, especially, Taiwan. At the outset of the 17th century, huge herds of sika deer (*Cervus nippon*) roamed the forests of Taiwan. They were not the only deer species but were most coveted for their hides. Deer-hunting was the traditional province of the aboriginal peoples, who hunted by spear, bow and arrow, and other traditional methods. The aboriginals exchanged venison and deerskins for salt, iron, and other commodities with Chinese traders, who then entered the coastal zones and the junk trade with Japan. Specifically, deerskins were in high demand in Japan for decorating sword handles and in making ceremonial armor. The Japanese red seal trade involved the import of various natural tanning agents for the treatment of the deerskins.

With the establishment of the VOC regime on Taiwan, the Dutch encouraged the aboriginal people to hunt the deer. They were unsuccessful, however, in imposing a monopoly over the export of deerskins. They also failed to prevent direct participation by Japanese in the trade. Beginning in 1636, Chinese hunters entered aboriginal domains and usurped the trade. Such was the lucrative nature of the trade that smugglers subverted Dutch attempts to impose a poll tax. In 1637, new hunting methods, namely the pit trap, allowed 100,000 deerskins to be exported in one year, eventually leading to the imposition of hunting seasons and restrictions (Campbell 1903: 175–76; Andrade 2005: 301–6). Certain native species became extinct on Taiwan, just as herds of deer in Vietnam and Siam were decimated by the trade.

Live wild animals were also traded. Just as the Zheng He voyages had returned to China with exotic animals from the Indian Ocean region, so all the European ships carried animals for food and as trade items, thereby kicking off a hemispheric exchange in non-native species that saw the introduction of dogs, goats, and other domestic animals into Asian lands. The Europeans also entered the trade in Asian animals; the Portuguese were interested in the elephant trade in Sri Lanka, as were the Dutch, who often included these animals in tribute missions, for instance to the Shogun court in Japan. All manner of rare and exotic birds entered this trade, just as Chinese traders had since antiquity sought animal parts like rhino horns as medicinals or edibles.

Industrial Products

Sulfur

A chemical entering East-Southeast Asian trading circuits was sulfur, a key ingredient in the production of gunpowder, first invented in China. The Japanese archipelago, including the Ryukyu islands with their abundance of active volcanoes, was long understood from Song times on as a source of the yellow chemical, as gunpowder weapons began to be used on the battlefield. According to Yamauchi (2006: 92–93), the Song launched at least one sailing fleet to Hakata in northern Kyushu Island in 1084, with a view to procuring sulfur in preparation for war. The major source of Japanese sulfur was then Iwo Jima, an island lying some 80 kilometers south of Kagoshima.

The island of Solor in the eastern archipelago, fortified by the Dominicans in the early 17th century, was also well known as a source of sulfur. Tomé Pires wrote in the early 16th century that “The island of Solor ... has a great deal of sulfur, and it is better known for this product than for any other ... There is so much of this sulfur that they take it as merchandise from Melaka to Cochin China ...” This was undoubtedly a Portuguese trade, but it would not be surprising if China was also a market; Vietnam and Ming China together were the major hemispheric consumers of sulfur, for the manufacture of gunpowder (Sun 2003: 27).

The Ming court favored sulfur among tribute items sent from Ryukyu; sulfur from the islands also entered the Fujian trading networks. Io

Torishima, an active volcano, was one location where the Ryukyu kings procured the sulfur; it is plausibly the sulfur mountain depicted on Ming-era maps. Ayutthaya also imported sulfur from Ryukyu, as the kingdom mastered gunpowder production and weaponry.

Taiwan was treated by the Qing as a valuable source of sulfur, especially after the winter of 1696, when the imperial gunpowder store in Fuzhou exploded. Taiwan was just 13 years under Qing domination when the literatus Yu Yonghe was commissioned to travel to the Taipei area to acquire the mineral. His account is recorded in *Bi hai ji you* (The Small Sea Travel Record), sometimes referred to as the Sulfur Extraction Diaries. Traveling through aboriginal country, he recorded that native peoples had long traded sulfur and used it in the production of primitive fireworks. The Spanish learned of this activity and likewise procured sulfur from the aborigines, identifying Beitou as the major source of sulfur. With the ouster of the Spanish, the Dutch also muscled in on the sulfur trade (Keliher 2003: 6).

Iron and Steel

A major Chinese trade item in demand in Southeast Asia was wrought and cast iron, usually loaded as ballast and wrapped in rattan. This is attested by the plain and tripod cast-iron pans in the 9th-century Belitung Wreck; wrought-iron bars and cast-iron pans in the 10th-century Intan Wreck; wrought iron blades and cast iron pans in the 12th-century Pulau Buaya Wreck; cast-iron cauldrons in the 13th-century Breaker Shoal Wreck; wrought-iron bars and cast-iron pans in the 13th-century Java Sea Wreck; and iron in the Binh Thuan Wreck of 1602, among others. The Java Sea ship, bound for metal-scarce Java, carried 200 tons of iron, while the Binh Thuan Wreck carried an almost identical cargo 300 years later, attesting to the importance of iron over a long time (Flecker 2005: 152–53).

While the smelting of iron would develop independently in Southeast Asia at a number of places, Chinese knowledge of metallurgy was for the entire premodern period superior and several hundred years in advance of Europe. As far back as 500 BCE, China had harnessed fossil fuels as an energy source. Citing Needham (1970: 107–12), Abu-Lughod (1989:

322) explains that, from the 8th century, coal was mined in northern China and used for the smelting of high-quality iron and even steel.

Both Vietnam and Japan were beneficiaries of Chinese metallurgy techniques. But Japan went further in the production and export of *katana*, or swords, not only to the China coast but also, as attested by Nieuhoff (1704: 219) to distant Patani. According to de Roever (1998: 50), in 1619 alone, the VOC manufactured 45,000 of these weapons in their forges on Solor Island, recently captured from the Portuguese, using iron imported from their trading post on Hirado in Japan, in turn exported to warring parties on Timor. From their first contacts, the Portuguese also imported Japanese *katana* entering their trade networks from Timor to Africa.

Conclusion

This study of the rise of money economies and the circulation of commodities, some luxury, some everyday, across and within cultures, as elaborated by Pomerantz (2001: chap. 3), has helped us to reach certain conclusions. From the outset, the European traders were more concerned with the traded items than the productive bases in the Asian heartlands. Even so, a quiet revolution was occurring in the major textile, ceramic, and metallurgical centers across Asia. In the major production centers, the participation of women in the silk and textile industry, for example, may have been significant. But whether this activity was capitalist, proto-capitalist, or just industrious relates to technological innovation. In any case, it became apparent, even as the Europeans established bridgeheads in the region, that large swathes of tropical forest and seas remained gathering zones for exotic produce entering distant markets and accruing profits to foreign middlemen, while adding little to local innovation, production processes, or even standards of living, at least as measured against the larger urban zones of Asia and Europe.

A definite correlation can be tracked between the commodification of commerce and the use and circulation of money. Eventually, only the bigger European companies could afford the financial risk of very long-distance trade, but self-funded Asian merchants were always active in the intra-Asian trade. While the role of Indians in the classical textile trade with Southeast Asia is less well documented, the range of Asian

merchants involved in the textile trade with Japan was surprisingly wide. Undoubtedly, micro-studies of, say, the textile trade in Vietnam or Java would confirm the presence of merchant networks alongside mere bazaars. The counterpart role of the Chinese (including Fujianese and Guangdong traders) in a range of trading activities over long periods is also amply demonstrated, as Chinese merchant diasporas became deeply embedded and even multigenerational in certain Southeast Asian locations. Religion, ethnicity, caste, and gender, may well have been governing factors in the operation of merchant networks in the Southeast Asian port polities, but we would require many more case studies to establish the patterns.

Markovits (2007: 122) has commented, “We should escape the kind of thinking that posits a teleological evolution of commerce in Asia under European dominance that leads to rationality defined in Weberian universalist forms.” To the contrary, the Europeans often bought into the indigenous trade, and traditional trading and consumption patterns — often illogical to outsiders — proved to be stubborn survivors. Modern communications (the steamship), the advent of the modern company system, and the creation of false needs eventually imposed universalist values, but not in our time frame and, indeed, not even today, outside the major commercial centers and lines of communication, if we consider large and remote swathes of the archipelago and highlands of Southeast Asia.

6

The Iberian Maritime Networks

If we are to accept that the Southeast Asian periphery was incorporated into the global order by the 16th century, then we should look to the mechanisms of penetration. Obviously, the creation of European outposts in East-Southeast Asia was crucial to the capture of such preciously traded commodities as spices and silk at the source, along with control over the long-distance, interoceanic trade in bullion. In their times, especially during the long 17th century, Melaka, Macau, and Nagasaki under the Portuguese, Manila under the Spanish, and, at a later date, Batavia and Taiwan under the Dutch performed this role perfectly. So did a second echelon of European outposts such as the fortified islands of Ambon, Banda, Solor, and Lifau on Timor. Such outposts were hierarchical links in globe-girding commercial networks connecting with India, Africa, Europe, and the Americas in one direction, and with Mexico in the other. A distinctive feature was the commercial networks and trading posts established by the Iberians, examined in this chapter, and the trading and colonizing impulses of the European chartered companies.

Iberian “expansion” was also European imperialism, albeit lacking the mature capitalist character of the later European companies. More so than the Indian, Islamic, and Chinese transfers, the Iberian irruption into the Asia-Pacific caused profound changes. The East-Southeast Asian world region in the making would enter global networks of production and exchange on terms set by outsiders. How did producers of tropical goods turn into consumers of European imports, progressively entering global markets? How did the European agents operate — through outright plunder and military bluster, through some benighted “civilizing mission,” or through some legitimating economic doctrine such as “free

trade,” or mercantilism? Did the external actors deaden local industries and commerce or did they fire up or dynamize the ancient trade circuits?

Portuguese Trading Networks

In the pre-1500 period, the Southeast Asia and China Sea zone is regarded as occupying an intermediate zone between Europe and China. The trade in porcelain, silks, and spices was firmly in the hands of Chinese, Arab, and Gujarati merchants, yet its scope and volume expanded dramatically with the irruption of Portuguese long-distance trade into the Malacca Straits area in 1511, and the rise in demand for these commodities in Europe. Tomé Pires estimated in 1510 that 2.4 million cruzados of trade passed through Melaka, with 2,000 ships in harbor at any one time. Often described as an “emporium,” Melaka was of course closely connected with such other harbor cities as Ayutthaya, Banten, Demak, Brunei, Makassar, Patani, and Aceh. Given the enormous profits generated by the East-West trade, the “spiceries” of the archipelago assumed critical importance, especially by 1513–70, after Portugal seized the supplies of pepper, mace, nutmeg, and sandalwood at the source (Souza 1986; Dixon 1991).

Famously, it was the Portuguese monarch Prince Henry the Navigator (1394–1460) who, motivated by religious as much as commercial zeal, devised the formula to outflank the Muslim nations from around the coast of Africa. Knowledge of the compass, the lateen sail, and navigational lore gained from the Muslims was crucial in this first wave of European expansion. Portuguese began to settle in the Atlantic Ocean islands of Madeira and the Azores between 1420 and 1430. Between the 1440s and 1460s, the Cape Verde archipelago was discovered off the coast of Guinea in West Africa. The Congo region was reached by 1483 and, in 1487–88, Bartolomeu Dias had rounded the Cape of Good Hope. With the voyages of Vasco da Gama to Calicut in India in 1497–99, and Pedro Alvares Cabral to Brazil in 1500, the Portuguese had established regular links between Europe and the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

The irruption of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean following the voyages of Vasco da Gama massively disrupted — but did not destroy — well-entrenched Islamic trade networks. In a short time, Portuguese naval supremacy was matched by a crescent of fortresses in Mombasa,

Mozambique Island, Hormuz, Diu, Goa, Ceylon, Aceh, Melaka, the Malukus, Solor Island, and Timor, to name just a few. Arriving in Melaka in 1509, the Portuguese advanced to the China coast in 1513, and to Kyushu in the 1550s, having reached Tanegashima Island further south in 1543.

In entering the China seas — at Macau (1557), Hirado (1560s), and Nagasaki (1571) — the Portuguese traded on sufferance, paying rent at Macau and lavish gifts and bribes in Japan. In East Asia, the Portuguese insinuated themselves into pre-existing trading networks. For example, the first Portuguese arriving at Tanegashima were, famously, part of a Chinese junk venture. Over a long period, Macau-based Portuguese would form partnerships with Chinese merchants. In a word, Portuguese trade routes linked Hirado and Nagasaki directly with Macau-Guangzhou and such ports of call as Melaka, Goa, Mozambique Island off the Swahili coast of East Africa, points on the west coast of Africa, Brazil, and, of course, Portugal.

Needless to say, this was a seasonal trade, governed by monsoon trade winds. It is also important to understand that the Portuguese purchased rather than traded spices. Whereas the Muslim traders bartered mostly Indian textiles against spices, the Portuguese brought in bullion, some of which was generated from the Iberian-American-African triangular trade. Notwithstanding shipwrecks, piracy, and the vast distances involved, the profits generated justified the enterprise. Even so, the Portuguese participation in this trade also hastened its demise. While vastly accelerating the trade in spices, the Portuguese presence in the archipelago provided a focus for rising opposition in the form of powerful indigenous states such as Aceh, Mataram, and Ternate in the Spice Islands. By 1574, the Portuguese were expelled from Ternate, leaving them down but not out in the archipelago (Souza 1986; Dixon 1991).

Technical Empowerment

The Iberian expansion into new worlds was an organized enterprise. State sponsorship became the hallmark of European trading and colonial endeavor, but the venture could not have succeeded without the acquisition and mastery of key maritime and navigational technologies, especially the nautical astrolabe, cross-staff, and quadrant. These were

inventions that determined latitude through the observation of the sun during the day and stars at night. Stellar navigation had appeared in Europe in the 15th century and was necessary for sailing beyond sight of coastlines.

This offered Portuguese cartographers an advance over portolan charts, typically representing coastal features in line with dead reckoning, as employed in coastal navigation. With its origins in Mediterranean navigation, portolan charts incorporated magnetic compass bearings. The new Portuguese sailing charts that evolved in tandem with Atlantic explorations combined the traditional grid of magnetic courses with the introduction of scales of latitude, described by Barreto (n.d.: 5) as “the great technical innovation made by the Portuguese in sixteenth century cartography.” Other innovations followed, such as indicating horizontally how coastlines appeared and recording depths.

As D. João de Castro wrote with confidence in his *Da Geografia de Dialogo* of 1535, “This, the true and perfect geography, consists primarily of demarcating lands by the correlation of each with the sky, giving its proper length and width. In this manner it is possible to place on a brief chart and painting the entire world, and any part, province, kingdom, or district of it with much accuracy” (Barreto n.d.: 3). In presaging the demarcation of the globe under European auspices, he was foretelling future disputes — even a “clash of civilizations” — over boundaries and demarcations outside of Cartesian comprehension.

Geographic Empowerment

Iberian nautical cartography reflected a tremendous shift in what was known about the oceans and coasts of the world. Previous knowledge had been based on a Greek or Ptolemaic view, extended with the tantalizing but often mythologized reports of Venetian travelers to Oriental lands. In contrast, Portuguese nautical cartography provided extensive information on the Indian Ocean and the China seas, becoming increasingly accurate over the 16th and 17th centuries, especially as information from Portuguese pilots and ruttiers (sets of instructions for setting one’s course at sea) accumulated. By 1502, the anonymous planisphere attributed to Cantino had decisively modified the Ptolemaic view of the Eastern world to include, unambiguously, India, the Malay Peninsula, the

Gulf of Tonkin, Hainan Island, the coast of China, and the archipelago. Of course, such an advance was possible only through exposure to Arab, Malay, Javanese, and Chinese knowledge. In fact, three of the most prominent Portuguese cartographers of the age were the Luso-Indians Fernão Vaz Dourado and Lazaro Luis and the Luso-Malay Manuel Godinho de Erédia. Another was Francisco Rodrigues, cartographer aboard the first Portuguese vessel to visit the spice islands and author of *Livro de Geographia Oriental* (c. 1513). From his base in Melaka, Rodrigues evidently procured a cartographic representation of Timor from a Javanese pilot. He was the first European to write a ruttier for navigating the China seas, the first to record the name China, and the first to mention the name of Macau.

To illustrate the advances that were made: in the planisphere attributed to Jorge Reinel (c. 1519), the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and the south coast of China are roughly drawn; in the planisphere attributed to Diogo Ribeiro (c. 1527), the Champa coast of Vietnam, Java, and the Malukus appear; the planisphere of 1529 names China, previously known as Cathay or Upper India, along with Java and Sumatra; in an anonymous Portuguese planisphere of 1545, noted also for the introduction of lines of latitude and longitude, Timor appears; an anonymous Portuguese planisphere of 1550 shows the Luchu (Ryukyu) islands and Japan. Starting with Lazaro Luis (c. 1563) and Fernão Vaz Dourado (c. 1556), Honshu and Kyushu are represented together as a turtle-shaped island, becoming a misshapen standard on European maps down through the 17th century. Borneo, the Philippines, the Gulf of Siam, and Vietnam are well delineated by Bartolomeu Lasso in his atlas of 1590. Portuguese cartography would be superseded, but in the 16th century, it was pioneering (Barreto n.d.).

Portuguese Diplomacy

The first sustained European encounter with the Hindu-Buddhistic world predated expansion into Southeast Asia. The Portuguese had made contact with Vijayanagara (1336–1565), the last remaining center of Hindu power on the Deccan to resist the Mughal expansion; they had also become involved with intrigues at the court of Kotte (Jayawardhanapura) in Sri Lanka, commencing pacifically in c. 1506, but resorting to military

conquest when they sought to command the trade in cinnamon, gems, and elephants (da Silva 1991). But as the Portuguese made contact with the Buddhist kingdoms of Pegu and Ayutthaya from their new base in Melaka, they also sought to enter into trade and diplomatic relations with Sunda Kelapa, the last center of Hindu-Buddhistic power on Java, as an ally against the rising threat of Islam on the north Java coast. Such civilizational encounters and clashes would be replicated across maritime Southeast Asia in this era, setting cultural-religious patterns that largely endure today.

Sunda Kelapa, the ancient trading port on the north coast of Java, was, at the time of first Portuguese contact, under the control of the last Hindu-Buddhistic kingdom of Sunda, known as Pajajaran, with its capital at Batutulis near present-day Bogor. Known as a prime source of pepper, Sunda Kelapa attracted ships from all over the region, including from Ryukyu (in 1513 and 1518). The first Portuguese to visit Sunda Kelapa, also known as Jayakarta (Jacatra), arrived in 1513, two years after the conquest of Melaka. They were accompanied by Tomé Pires, author of the *Suma Oriental*, who wrote the most important description of the kingdom before its capture by a coalition of north Java Muslim states in 1525–27. Although the Portuguese never occupied any part of Java, they negotiated a treaty with Pajajaran in 1522.

Pires' account mentions the growing tension in the Hindu court over the rising threat posed by the Islamic states of Cirebon and Demak. The kingdom held sway over a large swathe of the north Java coast as far east as Madura. Pires depicted the kings of Sunda Kelapa as "chivalrous seafaring warriors," frequently sailing their *lancharas* (ships of up to 150 tons) to Melaka, and possibly as far west as the Maldives. While Banten was a key port under the control of Pajajaran, Sunda Kelapa was a "magnificent" port, well governed with judges, justices, and clerks. Pires noted copious supplies of pepper, coarse cloth, and, crucial for the daily life of Melaka, rice, vegetables, and livestock. Hindu Javanese traders arriving in Melaka purchased Indian cloths for which they paid in Chinese cash or gold. Insofar as the kingdom of Sunda disallowed Muslims or sought to control them strictly, Pires' description is a rare cameo of an outward-looking, trade-oriented Hindu court prior to conversion to Islam.

Such was the threat from Islam that the Hindu ruler of Pajajaran, Prabu Suruwisesa (Ratu Samião/Samian) or Sang Hyang (meaning

“divine”), signed an agreement with Henrique Lemé, captain of a Portuguese ship sent by Jorge de Albuquerque, Captain of Melaka, to allow the Portuguese to construct a fortress. Signed on August 21, 1522 in two versions (one still extant in Portuguese archives) and witnessed by three “mandarin” emissaries of the king, including the *shahbandar*, the Luso-Sundanese Treaty was sealed with an exchange of gifts, including a thousand sacks of pepper presented to the Portuguese side. The Portuguese placed a *padrão* or stone pillar (one of three in all) on the chosen site at Ciliwang River, which was then on the beach at Kelapa. Rediscovered in 1918 in the now inland Kota quarter of south Jakarta, already a Chinese precinct by the 16th century, the *padrão*, currently displayed in the Indonesian National Museum, was crowned with an armillary sphere, inscribed with a cross of the Order of Christ and embossed with grammalogue inscriptions to the “Lord of Portugal” and “Espera do Mundo,” hope of the world.

Notwithstanding the treaty, Portuguese Melaka failed to defend Pajajaran. Indeed, according to Heuken (2002: 80), the Luso-Sundanese Treaty may actually have emboldened the Muslim coalition to press their attack. Banten fell to the sultan of Demak’s forces, led by Fatahillah, in 1524–25; Kelapa fell a year later. As depicted in the *Cerita Ceribon* (1720) and in modern Indonesian retellings, three Portuguese ships dispatched to defend Sunda Kelapa were rendered unseaworthy by a storm, arriving days after the fall: the infidel invaders fell easy prey to the new Islamic defenders.

In the early 17th century, Portuguese diplomacy began to focus on Java and Sulawesi, especially as a counter to the growing Dutch presence and influence (Souza 2007). By 1624, news of Mataram’s military actions against the Dutch on Java had reached the Estado da India, and orders were given to dispatch gifts, including horses, expressly with a view to striking an alliance with the sultan of Mataram. Intercepted and captured by the Dutch at sea, the mission came to naught. But such overtures continued over the following two decades, and included the dispatch of an envoy, Jorge da Cunha Costa. Although it came to nothing, Mataram apparently offered up Dutch-controlled Batavia to the Portuguese in return for an alliance and military support.

Goa under the Portuguese: Seat of the *Estado da India*

Goa, taken over by Portuguese governor Afonso de Albuquerque in 1520 from the south Indian kingdom of Deccan, survived as a Portuguese colony along with the obscure outposts of Damão and Diu down into modern times. Until they were driven out by the Dutch with the siege of Cochin and Cranganor (1661), the Portuguese occupied outposts along the Indian coast from Gujarat to Malabar, a term for the entire coastal strip from Goa to Camorin. Muslim-controlled Calicut, which remained outside Portuguese hands, came to be eclipsed as the leading Malabar trading city by Cochin, which was partly controlled by the Portuguese and partly by Muslims. Rich in such products as pepper, ginger, cinnamon, rice, sugar, and timber, the Malabar coast was especially exploited by the Portuguese over its rich trade in pepper (Krishna 1924: 21–22; Bouchon 1991: 45).

Formally, the Portuguese viceroy at Goa embraced five administrative jurisdictions, namely Mozambique, Muscat, Ormuz, Sri Lanka, and Melaka, and, later, Macau and Timor. The *Estado da India*, as it was dubbed by the Portuguese, represented an essentially India-centered, sea-borne trading empire connecting Goa with Southeast Asia and even China and Japan. The frailties of the system became all too apparent when the Dutch applied a chokehold on the Malacca Straits, but the fiction of Portuguese control continued through to the 19th century, with regular sailings from Goa bringing incoming governors to Timor and Macau. Once established in India, the British adopted a similar approach to Southeast Asia. Calcutta and Madras, in particular, became British rear-bases for official and private British trade and early empire-building in Southeast Asia, as in the acquisition of Penang and Singapore.

In 16th- and 17th-century writings on eastern trade, Goa under the Portuguese was noted either for the splendor of its emporium or the bad times that had befallen it. The same was true of Melaka and Macau, to which Goa's fate was hinged. Lach (1965, 1:1:482) remarks that the best description of the island city and surroundings before 1600 — known to tourists today as Old Goa — is that of the Dutchman, John Huighen van Linschoten, writing in 1583:

The City of Goa is the metropolis or chief city of all the Oriental Indies, where the Portugals have their traffic, where also the Viceroy, the Arch-bishop, the King's Council and Chanceries have their residence, and from thence are all places in the Oriental India governed and ruled.

There is likewise the Staple for all Indian commodities, while all sorts of merchants do resort, coming thither both to buy and sell, and out of Arabia, [...,...] Cambaia, Bengala, Pegu, Siam, Melaka, Java, Moluccas, China, etc. (Purchas, 1905: 223)

With its churches and stone relics, Old Goa today is but a memorial to a baroque past; in 1759, the Portuguese viceroy moved the administrative capital of Portuguese India to Panjim, where it stayed until the Indian invasion of 1961. While the archives of the grandiloquently named Estado da India remain largely intact in Panjim, the former colonial capital of Goa, with its pastel-colored Portuguese architecture, has obviously lost out in the quest to gain UNESCO protection. More likely, it never entered the race.

Portuguese Melaka: Crossroads of the Malay World

From its origins in the 1400s, the Melaka sultanate enjoyed an enviable prosperity. As a transshipment center located in a zone of calm between the two monsoonal systems, Melaka had attracted regular trade voyages from India in the west and from the Ryukyus in the east. From the time of its conquest by the redoubtable Afonso d'Albuquerque in August 1511, the Portuguese set about implanting their customary structures, including the formidable A Famosa fortress, built along medieval Portuguese lines. Defensive walls called *tranqueira* were also constructed. Answering to the Estado da India in Goa, the Melaka fortress was governed by a captain, a factor or harbormaster, and other officials. Ecclesiastical officials moving between India and China or Japan also made Melaka their base.

As Luis Thomaz has written, the main breach in continuity between the old order and the new was that a Portuguese ruling class installed itself in place of the traditional Malay rulers. Both served as “a kind of trading aristocracy, something between a conventional nobility and a true bourgeoisie.” Whether as noblemen, officials, soldiers, or sailors,

most Portuguese in Melaka belonged to the official class. Nevertheless, a minority of independent merchants existed in competition with the royal or official trade. Practically no Portuguese women traveled to Asia; mixed marriages and creolized societies emerged. Melaka was no exception. A class of *casados* or locally married Portuguese, including retired soldiers, controlled the *dusuns* or orchards abandoned by the Malay nobility. The *casados* also controlled the Misericordia, a charitable institution typically implanted in Portuguese territories. The number of *casados* rose to 300 by the early 17th century (Thomaz 1991: 70).

As the key Portuguese stronghold in the archipelago, Melaka is fairly well documented. The physical description of the town is well known from the *Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas*, authored in the early 1580s, as well as from Manuel Godinho de Erédia's "Plantas de praças das conquistas de Portugal" (1610) and his *Declaração de Malaca* c. 1611 (1882). But the first European enumeration of Melaka's extraordinary multi-ethnic trading communities was by Tomé Pires in 1515 (1944, 2:268):

Moors from Cairo, Mecca, Aden, Abyssinians, men of Kilwa, Malindi, Ormuz, Rumes, Turks, Turkomans, Christian Armenians, Gujaratees, men of Chail, Dabhol, Goa, of the kingdom of Deccan, Malabars and Klings, merchants from Orissa, Ceylon, Bengal, Arakan, Pegu, Siamese, men of Kedah, Malays, men of Pahang, Patani, Cambodia, Champa, Cochin China, Chinese, Lequeos, men of Brunei, Luoos, men of Tanjompura, Laves, Banka, Linga... Moluccas, Banda, Bima, Timor, Madura, Java, Sunda, Palembang, Jambi, Tonkal, Indragiri, Kapatta, Menang Kabau, Siak, Arqua, Aru, Bata, country of the Tomjano, Pase, Pedir, Maldives.

As Thomaz (1991: 71–72) notes, the largest foreign community in Portuguese Melaka were Javanese from the *pesisir* coast. They were joined by Muslim traders from Luzon. The Gujarati merchants who had flourished under the sultanate lost rank under the Portuguese, owing to their links with such adversaries as the Turks. On the other hand, the Keling or Tamil Hindu merchants gained in stature with official Portuguese patronage. The historically embedded Chinese community continued to grow from clandestine immigration, and retained their function as middlemen. Other communities included Bengalis, Peguans or Burmese, and Middle Eastern and Indian Jews.

Portuguese-controlled Melaka comprised three districts or quarters along the Melaka River. The first was Upeh, on the right bank, in which resided the Keling. The second, across the river and connected by a wooden bridge, was the Portuguese camp, housing both official and private citizens and offering shelter to allies during times of siege. By 16th-century standards, this settlement was impressively walled and bulwarked. The third quarter, Hilir, was located to the south and attracted mostly Malay and Javanese fishermen. Outside the town was Bukit Cina, now an enormous Chinese graveyard, site of an historic well, and, undoubtedly, a Chinese quarter in its time (Thomaz 1991: 74–77). The Portuguese maintained the *shahbandar* system, with a separate ruler for the Tamil Hindu community and a Muslim from Luzon as head of the Islamic community. As Thomaz points out, Melaka was surrounded by jungle, not fertile fields as were Angkor or Pagan. It depended upon the sea for its food imports. The nucleus of urban development was the mouth of a river, not a bay.

The recent discovery in Portuguese archives of a memoir dating from 1519 and written by an influential local merchant is of special interest. Composed in Persian by an unnamed person of Middle Eastern origin, perhaps Jewish or Armenian, the memoir ranges over the period 1511–19. This coincides with the governorship of Albuquerque. We learn that Albuquerque declared a three-year exemption of taxes to all Asian merchants in a bid to entice them to stay at Melaka. He gave priority to re-establishing maritime links with Java, especially as a source of vital provisions. He issued Portuguese money to replace that of the sultanate. He also sought to keep up diplomatic relations with Sultan Mahmud Shah, who had re-established himself on Bintan Island, south of Singapore. But after the departure of Albuquerque in January 1512, the writer records a political and economic “dis-coordination” by the Melaka captains, and even conflict within the Portuguese ranks. Under Jorge de Brito (1515–17), Melaka’s economy sagged, with only a dozen ships visiting the port annually compared to a hundred under the sultanate (Dos Santos Alves and Nasiri-Moghaddam 2008).

Conquered by the Dutch in 1646, Melaka passed out of Portuguese control. The Dutch imposed their own social and religious institutions without disrupting the fabric of local society. The British occupation of Melaka in 1824, in turn, facilitated the physical destruction of A Famosa.

Remarkably, a creolized Catholic Malay community lingers on in Melaka, though the European Catholic heritage of the now sleepy town is but a memorial; on the other hand, the old sultanate has been celebrated in Malaysian national discourse and boasts a dedicated museum. One element of continuity, however, is offered by the Chinese population of the town, which is not so much a legacy of the Portuguese past but part of a *baba* or creolized community that came to terms with the majority Malay Muslim population.

Portuguese Macau: City-state under Chinese Sufferance

Although Portuguese navigators had reached the coast of China within years of their conquest of Melaka in 1511, the tiny peninsula of Macau, off the coast of southern Guangdong, was permanently settled only in 1557, following a period of seasonal trade conducted either on the peninsula or nearby islands. The defeat of a strategically located, long-time Ming tributary and the Portuguese advance across the South China Sea began to put pressure on the Tribute Trade System. As recorded in the *Ming Shilu* (October 25, 1530), “During the Zheng-de reign [1506–21], the *Fo-lang-ji* [Portuguese] using an alias came mixed together (with other legitimate Southeast Asian tributaries) to offer tribute. They then spread their pernicious influence to the provincial seat.” As recorded, they were driven away by coastal defenses, yet a few years later local authorities “on the pretext of lack of funds and a lack of goods proposed re-opening to them” (Wade 2006). Eventually, with their trading base conceded at Macau, the Portuguese offered “ground rent” in silver to the local Guangdong authorities. The arrangements worked out between Portuguese traders and local authorities, dubbed the “Macau formula” by Fok Kai Cheong (1978), never translated into direct endorsement from the Ming court; the Lusitanian traders were left in an anomalous position, compared to other participants in the Ming pattern of trade and diplomacy.

While the legal basis of the Portuguese settlement on Macau Peninsula remained obscure into modern times, it was a privilege denied to other foreign nations, though there was a precedent on coastal China with the Muslim and Indian communities who had traded at Quanzhou in earlier centuries. With the possible exception of Russian commercial, diplomatic,

and religious embassies first arriving in Beijing in 1656–58, the Ming authorities jealously kept foreigners at a distance. Not for want of trying by guile or bluster, the Dutch and English were effectively shut out of direct trade with China until the advent of the Guangzhou Trade System. Although the Portuguese paid “ground rent” for the right to settle and trade from Macau, it should be noted that they were never recognized as vassals of the Ming. No Portuguese was ever received by the Son of Heaven, and no tribute was sent by the Portuguese to Beijing. They thus remained outside the system of tributary relationships (Fok 1978; 1991).

It is not just a cliché that, over the centuries, Macau served as China’s window on the world and Europe’s window on China. While no great school of Sinology emerged in Portugal, missionaries and others seeking to enter China studied the Chinese language and culture in Macau. Also, it was the Portuguese who introduced Chinese porcelain to Europe from their base in Macau. Undoubtedly, the first Chinese teas also entered Europe from there. In the reverse direction, a range of “European” cultural products entered China under Portuguese auspices, from New World food imports to the introduction of smallpox inoculation in the 19th century.

A Chinese-majority city ruled by a Portuguese merchant elite, Macau emerged as a hybrid, Catholicized society, out of unions between Portuguese males and Malay, Chinese, Indian, and sometimes Japanese females. Even today, a Eurasian or Macanese element in society reveals this bequest of history. Macau is also striking for European social institutions it implanted on Chinese soil, such as the Senate, undoubtedly the first such representative body to operate in China; the Misericórdia, the still-existing charitable institution; and the Catholic Church, alongside traditional Chinese institutions that flourished under the *pax lusitania*.

Following its settlement, Macau quickly emerged as the key gateway for Portuguese trade to Guangzhou. As described by Charles Boxer in his *Great Ship from Amacon* (1963), with access to Nagasaki secured in 1587, Macau became connected with the lucrative silk-for-silver trade with Japan, at least until access was blocked with the beginning of the *sakoku* (closed country) period. Japanese silver was used to pay the annual “ground rent” demanded by local Chinese authorities. A complementary voyage routed merchandise from Ayutthaya to Japan

via Melaka and Macau. By the 1620s, the Portuguese were increasingly reliant on both local Chinese and Japanese credit.

Notwithstanding Portuguese assertions of independence in Macau, the historical trend was toward increasing Chinese intervention in local affairs, for instance, the establishment in 1688 of a Chinese customs house inside Macau and, in 1776, the establishment just across the frontier of a local mandarin claiming legal rights over both Chinese and foreigners inside Macau. By 1800, the Chinese insisted on appointing a magistrate inside the walled city. Chinese interference not only constrained the authority of the Senate, but sapped away at the city's finances through an elaborate system of institutionalized bribes. By the mid-19th century, such conflicts of interest would lead to major misunderstandings, civil strife, and even assassinations and military reprisals.

Although the Portuguese had to face down Dutch naval actions in the China seas, the profits from the Japan trade reaped fortunes for the merchant stakeholders and the Portuguese Crown alike, as the city-state enjoyed a kind of golden age of prosperity. Fanciful etchings of 17th-century Macau in European publications evoked a grandly transplanted European city boasting merchant houses, imposing churches, and fortified positions. With the loss of the Japan trade, Macau shifted its trade routes to Ayutthaya, Vietnam, Batavia, Makassar, India, and, especially, Timor (Boxer 1963; Souza 1986; Wills 1998; Gunn 1999; de Seabra 2005).

Because of its longevity and relative stability under Portuguese rule, Macau is better documented than many other locations, in both Chinese and European languages. Besides official documentation, Macau was host to a range of Catholic missionary groups of various nationalities, usually sojourning long enough to master Chinese before advancing into China proper. Some gained special favor at the Ming and Qing courts; the Jesuits and Dominicans sought through their mastery of the Chinese classics to sway the Chinese elites. The Jesuit missionary, Mateo Ricci, arriving in Macau in 1582 and spending 28 years in China, was one example. Macau was frequently attested in the writings of such visitors, including Protestant missionaries, who started to arrive in the early 19th century. With the opening of the Guangzhou Trade System, Macau became the abode of many nationalities, including a number of European artists who bequeathed a stunning visual record.

Not all who visited Macau wrote with such sympathy. In fact, later British and American visitors never failed to write negatively about Portuguese officialdom, moral laxity, or corruption, though they all sought in Macau to make profits from opium, tea, or, in the mid-19th century, coolies. Given the near half-millennium-long Portuguese association with China, the reversion of Macau to Chinese sovereignty in December 1999 was an historic moment. In 2005, a number of sites in the historic center of Macau gained world heritage inscription, but not the whole historic city, most of which has been lost to “urban renewal” over the past 25 years.

Nagasaki and the Portuguese: Missionaries and Traders

Even prior to the formal establishment of Macau as a Portuguese enclave, Portuguese traders and missionaries, St. Francis Xavier among them, had been conducting trade at various ports on Kyushu Island in Japan, with the connivance of various local *daimyo*, or feudal lords. Hirado, a small island north of Nagasaki, was one trading port to which the Portuguese brought their Chinese wares. But when alliances with the Matura *daimyo* were disrupted, Jesuit missionaries, who were involved in business transactions, looked for other suitable sites. With the permission of the *daimyo* of Omura, whose domain extended to the little-populated harbor of Nagasaki, the Portuguese initiated an annual trade in silk against silver that would continue until the final exclusion acts brought down by the Tokugawa in 1637.

Just as the missionaries ushered in what historian Charles Boxer (1951b) termed Japan’s “Christian century,” so the Japan trade ushered in a golden era in terms of Macau’s prosperity. But this was also a win-win trade — for Guangzhou silk merchants, Portuguese captains, Jesuits, local Japanese merchants, and moneylenders alike. Insofar as Nagasaki was virtually controlled by Jesuits, the missionaries were also involved in the silk business as interpreters and brokers, though this was deemed scandalous by their ecclesiastical superiors.

Notoriously, the seasonal Portuguese traders in Nagasaki were bound by the so-called *pancada* or price-fixing system (*ito wappu* in Japanese), in which silk was purchased by Japanese merchants as a group. The *pancada* system depressed prices to the advantage of the merchant guild,

made up of a restricted circle of dealers from Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto. Originally applied to the Portuguese in 1604, it was later extended to the Chinese and Dutch. Only in 1631–32, after prevaricating on the repayment of loans, did the Portuguese gain some remissions to sell the silk outside this monopolistic system. Another feature of the trade was its system of finance. Under the *respondência* system, the Portuguese were obliged to borrow heavily on the purchase of silver from both Manila and Nagasaki. Surviving *respondência* documents and bills of lading reveal the degree to which the traders from Macau came to be indebted to Hakata-based moneylenders, sometimes incurring interest rates of up to 30 percent (Gunn 1999: 56–58). Boxer (1963: 65–74) believes that the final expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan was actually postponed owing to the debt question. At the time of the break, the Portuguese still owed 700,000 taels of silver to their creditors in Kyushu.

The Portuguese, it should be emphasized, never established a permanent presence in Nagasaki. As with the Dutch who would succeed them as residents of the newly constructed prison island of Deshima, the Portuguese were obliged to offer gifts and bribes to local officials as well as to the Christian *daimyo* with whom they did business. Like the Dutch, they were obliged to perform an annual journey to the Shogun court. Obviously this was a troubled trade for the Portuguese, who experienced not only increasing restrictions imposed by a wary Shogunate, but also wearing naval attacks by the Dutch, who were desperate to break the Portuguese commercial monopoly. In 1637–38, the Dutch even collaborated with the Shogunate in an expedition to crush revolting Christian rebels, an event known as the “Shimabara rebellion,” which finally ended the Christian era in Japan — and the Portuguese trade (Gunn 1999, chap.5) (Plate 10).

Undoubtedly, the Nagasaki trade with Macau contributed to Japan’s commercialization and industriousness. As described in Chapter 9, the trade fired up the extraction of silver through new processes, as Chinese demand for silver pushed the Shogunate to exploit the resource to the limit. The imported silk fed the esthetic demands of the swelling urban elites. Merchant circles and distribution networks were all called into play. The banking and credit system from Nagasaki to Hakata, Osaka, and beyond was very sophisticated. The seasonal nature of the trade probably constricted Nagasaki’s own prosperity, at least as compared

to the more populous centers in Japan. Yet the harbor town expanded its neighborhoods, accommodating a newly arrived Chinese merchant population.

Little survives of the historical Portuguese presence in Nagasaki today, aside from the excavated site of Santo Domingos, one of a dozen Jesuit-built churches; a stone well at Todas Os Santos, site of a Jesuit seminary though now a Zen Buddhist temple; and a few lexical borrowings entering the modern Japanese language. Nevertheless, French Catholic missionaries arriving in the early years of the Meiji era (1868–1912) were surprised to be greeted by members of an underground Catholic church that had survived centuries of persecution.

Portuguese Tribulations in the Spice Islands

The mini-archipelago of the Malukus is dominated by the twin islands of Ternate and Tidore, rugged volcanic cones ringed by dangerous coral reefs; these in turn lie some five kilometers west of the better-endowed Halmahera Island, with the historically important island of Ambon to the south. Nature's supreme gift, as recounted by Hanna (1990: 1–16), was — though no longer — the clove tree, grown on the lower slopes of the volcanoes. Clove trees grew on other islands but the best were on Ternate, Tidore, and three small adjacent islands. The late-medieval Italian traveler Ludovico di Varthema reported on these cloves; on the basis of this, Albuquerque dispatched Antonio d'Abreu in late 1511. He arrived at Banda Island, the prime source of nutmeg and mace, the following year. For their part, the Bandanese were happy to do business. Francisco Serrão remained on the island, while the respective rulers of Ternate (Sultan Bolief) and Tidore (Sultan Almazon) prevailed on the Portuguese to enter formal trade relations. Serrão set himself up in Ternate and initiated a brisk trade in spices with Melaka, using Asian craft. Ternate's gain ended in doom, as the Portuguese created trouble.

On November 6, 1521, Tidore was visited by the the sole surviving ship of the Magellan circumnavigational voyage. The captain of this ship, Del Cano, and the Tidore sultan entered into a partnership. Under António de Brito, the Portuguese fortified their presence on Ternate. An expedition of seven ships and 500–600 men, with cannons, muskets,

artillery, timber for construction, artisans, and craftsmen, arrived in May 1522; fresh forces followed in 1525. Facing down intrigues and a five-year siege under Sultan Baab, the Portuguese were obliged to capitulate; on July 15, 1575, they made an ignominious exit from an island they had more or less dominated since 1512. The sultan allowed the spice trade to Melaka to continue, however, as witnessed by Englishman Francis Drake in 1579. Advisedly, Hanna (1990: 1–16) terms this the “golden age” of the Ternatean monarchy.

The problem for the Portuguese was not only civilizational but also anthropological. First, the work of Jesuit missionaries in Ambon, St. Francis Xavier included, reached its peak in the mid-16th century with the conversion of 30 villages, more or less equal to the number of Muslim villages. But Christian villages in Ternate came under constant attack by Muslim raiders in the first half of the 16th century, as animosity between the Portuguese and the sultan of Ternate flared. From the work in the 1930s of Dutch anthropologist F.A.E. van Wouden, we know that Ternate and Tidore were subject to a strict dualism insofar as both depended upon each other, with Tidore as the wife-giver and Ternate as the wife-receiver (Andaya 1993).

As Leirissa (2006: 53–63) explains, the continuous raids, wars, and Christianization during the Portuguese presence in the 16th century were part of a struggle by the people of Ambon to preserve their “dichotomic symbiosis.” The people of Hito in the west of the island, at first receptive to the Portuguese, subsequently began to see them as a threat to their identity as *Ulilimas* or as Ambonese Muslims in the wider world of the archipelago. By contrast, the Ambonese Christian *Ulisiwas* dominant in the eastern Malukus may have seen the Portuguese presence as an opportunity to confirm their identity as part of a wider Christian world.

The Solor-Flores-Timor Zone

Well established in the Malukus by 1522, at least until driven out by a resurgent Ternate, Portugal was as yet unable to establish a permanent presence on Timor, known as the prime source of sandalwood. Instead, in 1556, some Dominicans chose first to settle the small adjacent island of Solor. Like Timor, Solor was known to the Portuguese from the time

of their arrival in Melaka or even before. Fortified by the Dominicans to protect local Christian villages against Muslim raiders from Sulawesi, Solor emerged as the main entrepôt for Portuguese trading activities in the eastern archipelago, providing a haven from the malarial coasts of Timor and a good anchorage where ships could wait out the changing winds. We have a better picture of the early years of Portuguese activity in Solor than on Timor even a hundred years later.

While Dominican texts are not in agreement as to the founding date of the Solor fort, according to Leitão (1948: 72), planning for its construction was obviously a priority, as the isolated settlement came under threat from marauding Muslim warriors. In 1566, a stone and lime construction was in place. The link with Goa was strengthened in 1575 with the arrival of an armed ship along with a captain and twenty soldiers. In 1595, the *Estado da India* assumed the right to appoint the captain, a matter fiercely contested by the Dominicans, who saw their privileges reduced.

By any measure, Solor is remarkable for the number of times it changed hands. In 1598, the fort of Laboiana, named after the principal settlement on the northern side of the island, was partly burnt in an abortive rebellion mounted by native forces against the captain, although it was soon rebuilt and restored. It was well located close to the sea, on high ground with deep valleys on either side. In 1602, Muslim Buginese attacked the fort with a force of 37 ships and 3,000 men. Only the chance arrival of a Portuguese fleet lifted the siege (Villiers 1995).

The Solor fort, along with that of Tidore and Macau, represented the easternmost trading post of the Portuguese in a system of fortified cities and islands stretching from Sofala on the African coast, along the Coromandel coast of India, to Melaka. Having won out against Muslim rivals in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese were badly exposed in the eastern archipelago to European rivals, in what appeared to be a zero-sum game in the scramble for riches over souls. Arriving off Solor on January 17, 1613, a Dutch fleet under Apollonius Schotte captured the fort, allowing its Portuguese commander to return to Melaka. Renamed Fort Hendricus, the contest over Solor seesawed, with Dutch abandonment in 1615, reoccupation in 1618, and an unsuccessful Portuguese attack in 1621. To the dismay of the Dutch, however, in February 1629 the new captain of Solor, the mixed-race Jan de Hornay, deserted to the

Portuguese, causing the Dutch to again abandon the fort. This turn of events facilitated a temporary Dominican re-occupation, achieved in April 1630, until the island was once again abandoned and, in February 1646, reclaimed by the Dutch. The Portuguese then directed their attentions to Larantuca on Flores Island (1636) and, temporarily, Kupang in western Timor (1646). The Portuguese, or at least the mixed-race *Larantuqueiros*, a part-Portuguese-part indigenous group with their origins on Larantuca in eastern Flores, would subsequently reclaim Solor for Portugal. Nevertheless, its strategic importance in the sandalwood trade was diminished, just as Portugal looked to establish a permanent presence on the much larger island of Timor.

While Lifau, in Oecusse on the northwest corner of Timor, gradually emerged as a favorite port of call by the 1650s for the Portuguese, especially sandalwood traders from Macau, they still had no permanent settlement on the island. As was the practice in Macau prior to 1557, the Portuguese traders arriving on the north coast of Timor would build temporary dwellings in which to live for some weeks or months, while waiting to conclude business or for the change of season. Dating from Song times, Lifau was located in the arc of an ancient Chinese and possibly Muslim-Arab trading zone, but, under the Portuguese, it became seasonally connected with the Macau and Goa trade.

While the foundation of Dili in October 1769 — some 200 years after the pioneering actions by Dominicans in the Solor-Flores zone, and 100 years subsequent to the fortification of Lifau — is not well documented, we know that, once established in the new capital, the Portuguese looked to fortifying their defenses, not only against an external enemy, but also against the Timorese. But defenses would have mattered little without diplomatic success in winning strategic allies from among chiefs or little kings known as *liurai*. Attempts to implant a colonial administration in a period prior even to the establishment of the first British settlement in Australia (1788) would have been doomed without the creation of a customs regime along with other governmental institutions. Meanwhile, the island's trade had, lamentably, slipped into the hands of the Dutch, the Chinese, and the *Larantuqueiros* (Gunn 1999 chap. 5).

Portuguese “Shadow Empires” in the Bay of Bengal

We should not neglect what Georges Winius (1991: 273–87) has creatively titled the “shadow empires,” created by Portuguese outside the strict control of Lisbon or the *Estado da Índia*. The phrase describes Portuguese activities in the Bay of Bengal area during the 16th and 17th centuries. The crescent of Portuguese settlements around the Bay of Bengal were not “regular,” conquered by Portugal, or even subject to Portuguese rule. The Portuguese in these places occasionally appointed a *capitão* or captain (as at Hugli, present-day Calcutta), but in general they, runaways and fugitives included, were subject to Mughal power. Indeed, some of the fugitives entered Mughal service as mercenaries. Typically marrying local women, these *casados* were followed by missionaries, as a Catholic presence developed at various sites. By the 1580s, the “shadow empire” had spread, encompassing São Tomé (at Meliapor, today a suburb of Chennai), Pulicat, Nagapatnam (Nagapattinam), Hugli (Hooghly), Chittagong, Arakan, and Pegu. Notably, Syriam (opposite Rangoon) was settled in 1602 by Portuguese adventurers who had assisted the king of Arakan in military campaigns (Campos 1919).

The trade networks linking these communities generally exported Indian cotton goods to fill demand in Arakan, Pegu, and a host of other maritime locations girding the islands and harbors on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, including Junk Ceylon (modern Phuket). Melaka, more than Goa, was well connected with this network. By the mid-1630s, the “shadow empire” had become vastly reduced, in part owing to the activities of the VOC and the English, who established Fort St. George at Madras (Chennai) in 1640, and in part to difficulties with native rulers. Even so, through assimilation with local cultures, a Catholic Portuguese identity long remained in these outposts. As Winius (1991: 273–87) acknowledges, independent Portuguese merchant-adventurers also operated in the “shadows” on the coast of China and even in Brazil and the Caribbean. He might also have mentioned the necklace of creolized Catholic communities that emerged across the East Indies in present-day Malaysia and Indonesia.

Spanish Manila

Half a century after the Magellan fleet reached Cebu in 1519, the Spanish under Miguel López de Legazpi formally proclaimed the establishment of the city of Manila on June 3, 1571. The attack on Manila and the surrender of the Muslim chiefs of Tondo had been prepared the year before by Spanish naval actions. Manila already hosted a community of some 150 Chinese; prior Portuguese trade contact was also established. In choosing Manila as the capital of their future colony, the Spanish were well advised as to the center of gravity of archipelagic trade and contacts with Fujian and Japan. On June 24, Legazpi named two *alcades* (judges), an *aguacilmayor* (police chief), and 12 *regidores* (city councilors), as a prelude to building the city and its defenses (Ch'en 1968: 32).

As Sir Thomas Cavendish reported at the time of his visit in July 1586:

Manila is inhabited by Spaniards, who live there to the number of 6 or 7 hundred persons. It is an unwall'd town, and of no great strength, though it has vast riches in gold, and several good commodities. It has a confident yearly correspondence with Acapulco, in Nueva Espana, besides 20 or 30 ships for China and the trade of the Sanguelos, which is very profitable. (Harris 1745)

In fact, attacks on Manila in 1574 by the Chinese pirate-merchant and would-be colonizer Limahong (Lim Feng), with 62 war junks, hastened the need for fortifications. Manila had been destroyed by fire and earthquake several years prior to Cavendish's unwanted visit. Following more attacks by Chinese and the Dutch, the city was fortified and rebuilt with stone, imparting a more permanent character to the center of Spanish political, military, and ecclesiastical power in the region (Wills 1998: 353–63; Ogawa 2010). In time, churches and military institutions were rebuilt as the city repopulated, reflecting the new prosperity brought by the galleon trade. Designed by Jesuit architects and built by Chinese stonemasons and Filipino labor, the Intramuros quarter, sited between the Pasig River and the sea, emerged according to classical Spanish urban plans, with the central plaza surrounded by the cathedral and government structures, as can be witnessed even today. After the British occupation of 1762–74, the walled city of Intramuros emerged as the nerve

center of the city and colony. Various communities of non-Catholic people expanded their presence outside the walls (Zaragosa 1990: 7, 31). The galleon trade also encouraged the immigration of Chinese to Manila.

As Watson Andaya (1999: 74) remarks, the creation of Manila as a political center in the polyethnic, polycentered islands of the “Philippines” had no local precedents. Aside from Islamic institutions such as the Sulu sultanate and its outriders, the vast majority of Filipinos answered to no higher political authority than the *barangay* or community. Besides injecting an element of Holy War into the archipelago, the Spanish introduced in Manila and replicated in the provinces the totally alien idea of a centralized state. It is easy to understand how, in a situation where the Spanish dominated the government and military, where Chinese came to dominate commerce, and where missionary-friars controlled ordinary people’s lives, the Indios or Filipinos would be marginalized, in the words of Corpuz (1976: 29), useful only to the Spanish as a “source of revenue.”

While Manila stood out as the foremost center of Spanish power in the Philippines, it was not their only fortified presence in the East. Besides forts at Cebu and Zamboanga in the south, the Malukus were also defended for a number of years. In the endeavor to protect their trade lines to China, the Spanish in 1641 also constructed La Santissimo Trinidado at Tamsui on the northern tip of Taiwan. The Dutch siege of the fortress the following year and its subsequent capture also marked the first Spanish defeat in the western Pacific (Campbell 1903; Mateo 2009). Without great success, the Spanish sought to emulate the Portuguese by trading directly with Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese feared the example of the Spanish conquest of the Philippines and even sought to cooperate with the Dutch in an invasion of Manila.

The Manila Bullion Trade Network

The arrival of the Iberian nations in the East-Southeast Asia fired up the Bullion Trade Network, comparable in scope only to the Atlantic trade in New World bullion beginning with the Spanish conquest of Mexico. As mentioned, the establishment in 1571 of Nagasaki as the terminal port of the Macau-Japan trade, added a powerful new axis through which Japanese bullion would reach China, simply the most populous, technologically advanced, and socially differentiated national economy

on earth. As Adam Smith wrote in *Wealth of Nations* (1776) under the rubric “Digression concerning the Variations in the Value of Silver during the course of the Four Last Centuries,” the rise of correlated world markets and an international division of labor can be linked by the silver thread of the global bullion trade.

Between 1565 and 1815, notwithstanding risks and losses at sea, the Pacific or Manila galleon, linking the Americas with China via the Philippines, was one of the most profitable enterprises in European colonial history (Flynn and Giráldez 1994: 71–89). While the “hemorrhage” of American silver to the Orient and the general mechanism of the Manila galleon trade from Acapulco had been well known since the time of Smith, the modern literature has been the subject of some controversy (Garcia de los Arcos 1998: 10), especially as to volumes and impacts.

On the supply side, silver sourced from Mexico and the Potosi mines in Peru entered the annual galleon, departing Acapulco with the *brisas* (winds) between October and the end of April. Not only did the silver cover costs for merchandise contracted by merchant groups but, crucially, underwrote the *situado*, or subsidy, sent by the Mexican authorities to pay for Spanish administrative costs in the Philippines. The return journey, sailing with the *vendal* winds, brought silks, porcelain, and kilnware from south China, Vietnam, and Siam, along with other exotics (even cotton goods from India).

As such, the Manila galleon trade constituted a new and complementary route through which Europe sent precious metals to Asia even though the Portuguese, Dutch, and English continued to import New World bullion there via the western route. Such leakage was looked upon with apprehension by the merchants of Seville, as the silks of China undersold those of Spain in Mexico and Peru — the larger the export of silver to the East, the smaller it was to Spain. Accordingly, various official measures were taken to limit the trade, notably a ban on direct trade with China (1593), restrictions on commerce between Mexico and Peru (1587; 1636), and a prohibition on silk imports (1710). These measures were much evaded and, in any case, revoked in 1734 (Bourne 1903: 566).

Not surprisingly, the Portuguese sought to divert the Manila galleon trade from Acapulco to Macau and they succeeded in 1587. Over a long time, despite a serious contretemps between the Iberian nations, the Portuguese maintained their monopoly on access to silk at the source

and, at least until expelled from Japan in 1637, gained privileged access to Japanese silver. On the other hand, over an even longer time (250 years), the Spanish preserved their monopoly over New World silver.

Conclusion

As far as the Portuguese were concerned, settler colonialism was not an object of their maritime incursions into Asian waters. Unlike in the New World of the Americas, in Asia the Portuguese frequently faced superior civilizations and political centers. They did, however, engage in a zero-sum battle with Muslim adversaries in entering the Indian Ocean trade. Naval battles in Diu and over the Melaka sultanate were crucial in this context. Even so, the Portuguese could play the diplomatic card, as in sealing a treaty with the Hindu king of Pajajaran on Java, engaging Islamic Aceh, or in siding with the Brunei sultanate against their Spanish rivals, and in acting as supplicants rather than as adversaries in relations with China, Japan, Ayutthaya, the Trinh and Nguyen, among other oriental courts. Wherever the Portuguese put down roots, as in Goa and Macau (and Nagasaki on a seasonal basis), these enclaves emerged as sites of intense civilizational transactions. Elsewhere, I have termed this encounter the “Eurasian Exchange” (Gunn 2003).

Portuguese navigators, aided by local knowledge, virtually pioneered the hemispheric trade routes later followed by the Dutch and English. The Portuguese were also the first in Europe to understand the “segmentation” of the Asian trade, as in the silk for silver trade between Macau and Nagasaki, the sandalwood trade between Timor and Macau, or the Bay of Bengal trade in Indian textiles against spices and forest products. They were also the first in Europe to tap Chinese ceramics at the source. Not all Portuguese trade was official; there was also considerable private commerce. Portuguese adventurers also played their part as mercenaries and as transmitters of military knowledge across the region.

Following the model pioneered in Mexico, the Spanish conquered and remade the Philippines in their image. By engaging the Chinese in the Manila-Acapulco trade, the Spanish would also draw the Philippines into a new world region in the making. But relative to the commercial, military, and technological impacts of the later-arriving northern European powers, the Iberians did not greatly alter local production or

consumption patterns. Rather, they substituted themselves for, or complemented, local merchant elites. Crucially, the Iberian powers went far in the creation of a regionwide fiduciary system based on silver; the Spanish real would emerge by the 19th century as the currency of convenience across the region. In the absence of major technological changes, outside perhaps of mining technology as adopted in Tokugawa Japan, the major Spanish legacy in the Philippines, apart from the structures of a centralized state, might be in the realm of civilization and civilizational contest, as still exercises Muslim-Christian relations in that nation.

7

Hegemonic Sequence: Enter the Dutch and English Trading Companies

No sooner had the two Iberian powers established their positions as cultural and trade brokers par excellence within the Asian Tributary System than European rivals appeared over the horizon, namely in the form of Holland and England. Basing their commercial strength on long-distance trade and exploitation of the Atlantic trade in slaves, sugar, and bullion, these two northern European powers emerged as the core of what Wallerstein termed the “European world-economy” (1974: 107). This chapter traces the “hegemonic shift” occasioned by the rise of the northern European companies that would succeed — and eclipse — the Iberians in the Asian trade. The shift was also characterized by monopoly control over prized trade items at the source, control over territory, and the establishment of European-style bureaucracies, as with the British domination of the Indian subcontinent and the deepening involvement of the Dutch on Java. Once the Portuguese monopoly on trade with China had been broken, the opium-for-tea trade at Guangzhou further raised the stakes for the European companies and private traders alike.

The European companies — Dutch, English, French and Danish — were vastly better capitalized than the Iberian merchants. They have been viewed as highly structured bureaucratic organizations and exemplars of the first multinational corporations. Such understandings provoke a range of questions: How rational were their operations in a Weberian sense? And how did such rationality bode for the survival of indigenous merchant networks, local bazaars, and traders?

Rise of the European Trading Companies

A number of European countries, along with the United States, sponsored trading companies to engage the lucrative but costly business of engaging the China trade at Guangzhou from the late 17th century. The Dutch and English were the first northern Europeans to enter the classic spice trade at the source, followed by the French and Danish, though with far less success. The English and Dutch, joined by the French in Indochina, would, famously, parlay their trading interests into territorial empires. Naval supremacy played its part in such expansion, but so did the building of alliances. The Europeans were ingenious in plying local princelings and aristocrats, sultans, nawabs, and potentates, with presents, useful (cannons) and otherwise (luxury goods and European baubles). The successes invariably resulted in letters and treaties.

In the case of Holland, commercial rivalry went hand in hand with the national revolt of the Low Countries against the Iberian powers, climaxing with the birth of the Dutch Republic in 1581. A year earlier, Portugal had been annexed by the Spanish Crown, and the Lisbon market for spices had come under the control of the court of Madrid (Morse 1926: 3). As a major distributor of spices in Europe, Protestant Holland (and England) sought to bypass the ban on their trading in Lisbon by dealing directly with the source of supply. Having broken away from Spanish domination, the newly minted Dutch Republic declared war on Spanish shipping and colonial outposts, mounting serial attacks on the Portuguese, in the Spice Islands in 1601; Goa in 1603 and 1610; Mozambique Island in 1607 and 1608; Melaka in 1616 and 1629; and against the Spanish in the Philippines in 1610, and Macau in 1622 and 1626. All these attacks failed. But the Portuguese suffered irreversible losses to the Dutch fleets, namely in the Spice Islands, 1605; Melaka, 1641; Colombo, 1641; Cochin (Kochi), 1662; alongside losses to the Omanis, back in control of the Swahili coast of East Africa by 1730. Much to their disappointment, the Portuguese were expelled from Japan in 1639. Meanwhile, the English picked off Portuguese strongholds around the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Portuguese-Dutch rivalry in West Africa reached a crescendo in the 1640s and 1650s, with Portugal ultimately retaining control over Angola. Similarly, in Brazil, the Dutch successfully sapped away at Portuguese control in the northeast until that

colony became independent in 1822 (Russell-Wood 1998: 25–26). The shortlived Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense (1621–23) brought together the combined firepower of British and Dutch fleets in the China seas against Portuguese and Spanish vessels (Van Dyke 2006).

Within six years of their first trading voyage to Java in 1596, the Dutch unified their various trading companies into the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or VOC). By this point, the Dutch had gained virtual monopoly over the spice trade in Ambon in the Malukus. Until it was disbanded, nearly bankrupt, in 1798, the VOC served as a state within a state. It was virtually the first multinational company, running not only commerce but affairs of state, waging war, and holding the right of life and death over its employees (Plate 15).

From the outset, the English East India Company, founded by royal charter in 1600, was given exclusive trading rights between England and Asia. Prior to the establishment of Madras and Calcutta as seats of empire, the initial focus of the Company was the spice trade in the Malukus. The fleet of the first voyage (1600), under James Lancaster, visited Aceh and Banten and obtained trading privileges in both places. Banten on Java was chosen as the optimal base from which to conduct this trade. The fleet of the second voyage (1604) again visited Sumatra, in addition to Banda and Ambon, where they failed to gain trading rights. The third voyage (1606), under Hawkins, made the first English contact with India (at Surat), with return voyages to Banten and the Malukus. Surat and Mocha were the focus of the fourth fleet (1608). A fifth fleet (1606) returned to Banten and reached Banda. The sixth to tenth voyages sailed under instructions to procure Indian cloths (from Surat and modern Khambat) to exchange in Banten against pepper and spices.

From Banten, formally established as a Company trading post in 1603, English ships made forays to Hirado off southwest Kyushu Island in Japan and Siam (where trading privileges had been secured during the eighth voyage under Captain John Saris). By 1617, Banten was over-seeing “factories” or trading posts in Sumatra, Borneo, Banda, Japan, and the west coast of India. In 1617, the Company gained possession of the islands of Run and Rosengyn in the Malukus (until expelled by the Dutch in 1620), and established a trading post at Makassar (until its capture by the Dutch in 1667).

But following the “Amboina massacre” of 1623 and failure in the Japan trade, the presidency was removed from Banten to Dutch-controlled Batavia. With the capture of Banten by the Dutch in 1682, the English removed to Bencoolen (Bengkulu) on the west coast of Sumatra, where, in 1687, they constructed Fort York. More generally, the British focus shifted to the Coromandel coast or eastern seaboard of India, just as the Company became an agent of the state in consolidating British power over Mughal India. In 1684, Fort St. George (Madras) was raised to the rank of presidency, controlling Company activities around the Bay of Bengal; Bombay replaced Surat as center of the Company’s activities in west India and the Persian Gulf. Even so, Banten remained a way station for British shipping, now focused upon the China trade.

By founding the French East India Company (*La Compagnie française des Indes orientales*) in 1664, the French Crown sought to compete with the English and Dutch companies. This was planned by Jean Baptiste Calvert and chartered by King Louis XIV (r. 1638–1718) with the Indian Ocean zone in mind. The first director-general of the *Compagnie* was François Caron, a veteran of the VOC who had spent 20 years in Hirado. Under *Compagnie* auspices, the islands of Bourbon (Reunion) and *Île-de-France* (Mauritius) were established as plantation colonies. The French also intervened in Siam in 1685–88, both in the form of missionary enterprise at the court but also in a failed attempt to fortify an area near present-day Bangkok and at Mergui in the Bay of Bengal (Le Blanc 2007).

As the Mughal empire was entering its decline, the French and English sought to expand their alliances with local rulers in south India. With the French defeat in the Battle of Plessey (1757) by Robert Clive, Bengal came under British domination. Nevertheless, the French retained their enclaves at Pondicherry, south of Madras, and Chandernagore, on the banks of the Hugli River in Bengal, into modern times. French agents engaged in a kind of economic espionage in maritime Southeast Asia (as by the plant-hunter and empire-builder Pierre Poivre); the actions of missionaries and, in their wake, admirals induced France into launching gunboat diplomacy against the Nguyen kings in Vietnam, leading to the piecemeal annexation of the vast Indochina peninsula.

The only other European company to engage Southeast Asia directly was the Danish East India Company (*Dansk Østindisk Kompagni*),

founded in 1616. The *Kompagni*, dissolved in 1650, would be given an initial 12-year monopoly on Danish-Asian trade. From Tranquebar (Tharangambadi) on the eastern seaboard of India, the Danes pioneered a trading route to Tenasserim (Mergui), tapping into deliveries of pepper; from 1621, they entered the trade with Makassar in cloves, as well as opening up new trade routes to Banten and Sunda. From 1754, a settlement was established in the Nicobar Islands, although soon abandoned (Subramanyam 1989; Rasmussen 1996).

The preceding narrative of steady European expansion should also be read against the complex background of intra-European rivalry and wars, especially the Napoleonic Wars. Notably, the Netherlands were overrun by French forces in 1795, and turned into the client Batavian Republic, incorporated four years later into the French empire. Only with the defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig in 1810 did the Netherlands regain its autonomy. The French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula also weakened Spain and Portugal's hold over their colonies, especially in the Americas. On the other hand, the Napoleonic interlude saw the British occupying the French Indian Ocean possessions of Reunion and Mauritius, along with the five French trading posts in India, Pondicherry included. Dutch outposts also fell to British occupation, most notably Java under the temporary administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811–15) following the Anglo-Dutch Java war of 1810–11, but also Melaka, west Timor, and the Maluku. Only *Deshima* in Nagasaki continued to fly the Dutch flag.

The Dutch East India Company Operation

By the 1620s, firmly established in their new capital of Batavia on Java, the Dutch succeeded where the Portuguese had failed, in implanting administrative structures and neutralizing indigenous sources of power throughout the eastern archipelago. They also waged a war of attrition against the Portuguese, capturing Portuguese caravels, launching attacks on Macau (albeit unsuccessfully), and sapping the Melaka trade. By 1641, with the fall of Melaka to the Dutch, the Portuguese were obliged to confine their archipelagic trade to Makassar (in alliance with Muslim rivals of the Dutch) and to Timor, where Portugal's creolized allies check-

mated Dutch ambitions to acquire a monopoly over the durable and useful trade in sandalwood to China.

In part, the Dutch chokehold on the Malacca Straits led not to a weakening of Portuguese trade, but to an intensification of its Macau-based activities. By the mid-17th century, Macau replaced Melaka as the key center of Portuguese private trade, just as Macau-based traders (both Portuguese and Chinese) began to fan out to such destinations as Vietnam, Borneo, Manila, Timor, and even across the Bay of Bengal. The 16th- and 17th-century “age of commerce” enjoyed by the maritime Southeast Asian polities saw a corollary rise in commerce in the South China Sea, not only on European ships, as with the Macau-Japan trade, but in newer ventures along the China coast to Vietnam and other destinations via the junk trade and private Portuguese ventures, sometimes with Asian partners (Manguin 1972; Gunn 1996).

By the late 1630s, as Fujita (2000) has written, the Dutch had reformed medieval trade networks by connecting two separate maritime zones, the East China Sea and the Indian Ocean, through the two-way shipment of Chinese and Japanese bullion and Bengali silk. O.W. Wolters (1967) termed this a “single ocean” trade. It may be objected that the Portuguese traders and even the Arabs before them had accomplished the same prior to the advent of the VOC, but it is also true that, as a rising bourgeois proto-capitalist economy, the Dutch shipped cargoes in volumes and varieties that exceeded those of their Iberian and Asian rivals in the 17th century. After the Portuguese, no single Asian power commanded the intra-Asian trade to the same degree as the European traders.

VOC trade routes and trading ports were constantly changing according to political circumstance and commercial intelligence. Dutch trading routes underwent shifts, not only owing to the capture or loss of important trading posts, but because the rise of direct trade with Holland allowed certain centers to bypass Batavia’s chokehold over shipping. So-called coffee ships, sailing from Mocha in Yemen to the VOC fortified trading post of Galle in southwest Sri Lanka, were one example; after 1720, a direct route was opened between Holland and Guangzhou (Van Dyke 2006) and, from 1734, to Bengal.

Through plunder and capture, the Dutch gradually usurped Portuguese commercial and political control across the long Eurasian maritime crescent. From 1609, the VOC had settled and fortified Pulicat on the

eastern seaboard of India, north of present-day Chennai (Madras). With the capture of Melaka and the ouster of the Iberians from the Malukus, the Dutch cemented commercial hegemony across their proclaimed “official trade zone.” In 1646, the VOC gained exclusive trading privileges at Deshima in Japan, at Portugal’s expense. In 1663, the Dutch seized Cochin on the Malabar coast of India and, as with the Portuguese before them, intrigued with local authorities. Surat in Gujarat would also emerge as a site of major Dutch commerce with the Mughal empire. The Dutch established a trading post on the Hugli River along with a string of trading posts up the Ganges, connecting with interior India. In 1634–80, the VOC establishing a trading post at Syriam in Lower Burma. In the South China Sea zone, only Portuguese Macau held out against Dutch aggression, resisting three major attempts at invasion in the early 17th century, confirming, with China’s approval, the city-state’s privileged gateway role to the Guangzhou and China trade (Gunn 1996).

Having tapped Japanese silver at its source, the Dutch procured Bengal silks, among other items, for the return voyage (Das Gupta 2000: 67). Huang Anh Tuan (2007) has described in great detail the Dutch silver-for-silk trade in the period 1637–1700 with Tonkin, the major silk production and export region in East Asia. Persia was another important center where the Dutch traded (Barendse 2002). From their Southeast Asian base in Batavia, the Dutch levered their way into Hirado and Nagasaki in Japan, Tainan on Taiwan, various ports in Burma, Cambodia, Siam, and Trinh- and Nguyen-controlled Vietnam. But, denied direct access to the China market and driven out of Taiwan in 1661, the Dutch also sought to co-opt the China junk trade to their advantage. The Dutch never achieved true monopoly over the shipment of ceramics, either Chinese or Japanese. There were always competitors at various ends of the ceramics networks — Muslim, Indian, Chinese, Portuguese, and English. The intra-Asian trade, as perfected by the VOC, was an exchange of Asian commodities against other Asian products.

Batavia Under the Dutch

Founded in 1619 as the seat of the governor-general, Batavia served as the virtual capital of VOC operations in Asia (including the Cape) as well as the major rendezvous point for Asian shipping. The restored Kasteel

Batavia (now Museum Bahari), with warehouses dating from 1652, in the historic Pasar Ikan/Sunda Kelapa precinct of modern Jakarta, is an emblem of Batavia's role as the VOC's premium port. Altogether, the VOC employed some 200,000 staff in its various trading posts; in 1770, however, there were only some 40 with the rank of senior merchant or higher. As Gaastra (n.d.; 2003) has clarified, elite-track officials typically amassed fortunes from both official and unofficial income, amounting to millions of guilders a year. Many lived in luxury, surrounded by concubines and slaves. Some married into royal families. Recruitment into the VOC was a closed circle, favoring relatives.

Batavia was the major destination for Japanese exports, whether entering the European or the intra-Asian trade. The governor-general had supreme control over the company's trade in Asia. Orders from directors at home would ordinarily be transmitted to Batavia and then passed down to Deshima and elsewhere. The VOC operated at various levels: each post was headed by a governor (Ceylon, Cape Town), a *directeur* (Bengal, Surat, Persia), or an *Opperhoft*, or head of establishment (Deshima, Kupang on Timor). Despite the rise of direct shipping from Sri Lanka, Bengal, and Guangzhou, Batavia remained central to VOC shipping operations (Gaastra 2003).

Batavia was the first major port of call for the home voyage via the southern Indian Ocean route, which included Cape Town. Dutch ships transiting the Malacca Straits also serviced demand in India and beyond for ceramics, copper, camphor, lacquerware, various textiles, spices, and tea. Batavia came close to being a regional core, squeezing trade and tribute from a wide sweep of the East Asian hemisphere, and lancing, as it were, the traditional tribute trade carried out by both the Ming and Qing and even by their Portuguese surrogates. Its architecture and street plan mirrored this role, as did the colonial social hierarchies it supported.

Dutch Control over the Spiceries

Ambon

Ambon in the Malukus, a major source of coveted cloves, was conquered by the Portuguese in 1519 and subsequently fortified. In September 1600, Dutch admiral Steven van de Haghen successfully ousted the Portuguese

and concluded the first treaty between the VOC and the island's inhabitants. The conquest of Ambon gave the VOC its first territorial possession in the archipelago, preceding the foundation of Batavia. Another treaty was concluded by the admiral in February 1605, with Christian and Muslim villages. But the Dutch were unable to enforce the terms of the treaty, namely the maintenance of a fortress and the right of monopoly over local trade in spices.

Dutch historian Vlekke (1965: 115) observed that the right of monopoly was not written into subsequent treaties. In any case, these first contracts were of great importance, since "they laid the basis for the future political development of the whole archipelago." A treaty struck between Admiral Pierre Willem Verhoeven and the "orangkaya and lords" of the islands on August 10, 1609 was equally categorical, offering protection from the Portuguese and other enemies in return for an obligation on the part of all inhabitants to deliver up all their fruits (spices) to the Dutch Fort Nassau on the island of Neira (Verhoeven 1646: 213).

Ambon was described by Verhoeven on March 19, 1627: "The fort was located close to the shore enabling ships to berth almost alongside." It was constructed of stones in turn surrounded by a ditch and fortified with four battalions. At some distance stood a "good" arsenal in its own tiled building. Additionally, there was a large building housing a governor, commissioner and other offices. Underneath these buildings were located magasins or store lodges containing various foodstuffs such as rice, meat, lard, oil, vinegar, and also cloves, only a small amount of which was harvested on the island, the bulk being brought over from two nearby islands, Ourion and Larique. The monsoon harvest, as observed, amounted to 70 bars of cloves with 250–300 bars expected the following season. While cloves occurred naturally on the islands, some five years earlier quantities had been planted, yielding fruit in four or five months. The fort boasted a boutique where "anybody, inhabitants of the island, foreigners, bourgeois or domestics of the Company can go and buy what they need." There were 3,060 people then living on the island, of whom 1,230 were "black subjects" living near the fort. Altogether, 1,620 people on the island were deemed capable of bearing arms (Verhoeven 1646: 27).

In 1619, following an Anglo-Dutch agreement, the English East India Company was sanctioned to set up trading posts in the Malukus,

provided it shared the costs of the Dutch garrisons. Finding little profit in this arrangement, in January 1623, the English decided to withdraw from the island, but not before they had suffered what is called the “Amboina massacre.” This is a reference to the execution by the Dutch of the chief English merchant at Ambon, along with ten of his countrymen and a number of Japanese, allegedly part of an English conspiracy to kill the Dutch. Entering the English consciousness, even its literature (John Dryden), this act of perceived Dutch perfidy would not be quickly forgotten by the English.

Banda

Lying southeast of Ambon, the island of Banda, as described by Roggewain, was ruled by a Dutch governor from his seat at Neira. Customarily an eminent merchant, he had several other neighboring small islands under his jurisdiction. The government council was modeled along that of Ambon. The island was so well fortified that it was deemed “impregnable,” always guarded by a large squadron of small vessels. The garrison was described as “numerous but in much worse condition than any other in the Company’s service which arises from want of victuals, the island being of a barren, sandy soil, producing very little food of any sort ... the reason that the soldiers eat cats, dogs, and any other animal that comes to hand.” The natives, as described by the Dutch, were a “cruelly perfidious and intractable people,” which “the Company was forced to root out for their own security” in creating a Dutch colony. But, “being composed entirely of a rascally good-for-nothing people,” in “a very short time, they are carried off by the dry-gripes, or twisting of the guts which is the endemic distemper of this country.” Roggewain also described “a sort of free burgesse, who are called Perkiniers,” charged with the curing of nutmegs, which they supplied to the company in whatever quantities they thought proper and for which they received “a very moderate gratification, and yet live much at their ease.” But crisis aside, “the important commerce in nutmegs, which grow there in such prodigious quantities [enables] the Dutch to supply all the market of Europe” (Harris 1745: 291).

In December 1616, the English Company set up on the tiny island of Pulau Run, in the Banda group. Though gaining access to Run’s

nutmeg plantations, the beleaguered English group came under almost immediate Dutch surveillance and attack. In 1621, the Dutch overran the English defenses, thus effectively canceling the short-lived Anglo-Dutch agreement of 1619. But if the English prisoners were subject to various cruelties, the Bandanese were the victims of what today might be described as genocide. Undoubtedly, the debacle in Run and the treachery of the Dutch at Ambon drove the English Company out of the clove and nutmeg trade at the source, but it also saw a renewed focus by the English on the pepper trade at Banten from their new headquarters at Batavia, and later on the west coast of Sumatra (Keay 1991: 47–48, 246).

Makassar from 1669

Working from VOC archives, Knapp and Sutherland (2004) draw a portrait of a mostly thriving Makassan marketplace, under decisive Dutch control from 1669. Harbormaster registers reveal that, following a difficult transition period, Makassar thrived on exports, not only to local markets including Batavia, but also to China in the trade in sea cucumber or *trepang*, collected by Makassan and Buginese seafarers over a wide maritime zone that included even northern Australia.

The VOC was ruthless in driving out European competitors, delimiting the agency of local entrepreneurs, and tightening its monopoly over the spice trade. Under the Treaty of Bongaya (1669), Portuguese, English, and other European traders were expelled and forbidden to trade at Makassar. The VOC was granted a monopoly over imports of Indian cloth and Chinese wares. All subjects of Makassar were obliged to obtain VOC sailing passes, including even the smallest vessels. Owing to ongoing wars in Bima on Sumbawa, voyages to the Lesser Sunda Islands were initially forbidden. More damaging for Makassan interests was the prohibition on voyages to China and, especially, the Maluku and the Philippines. The Dutch did not seek to eliminate the interisland trade entirely, especially where they profited and where it did not impinge on their monopoly over the spice trade (Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 20).

A range of products was traded in Makassar — including agar agar, bird's nest, wax, and rattan — but the trade in *trepang*, a prized item in southern Chinese cuisine, is illustrative of Makassar's commercial revival. The *trepang* trade from Southeast Asia to China was still in its infancy in

the early 1700s. In the 1720s, only an average 3.5 cargoes arrived annually at Makassar; almost all outbound cargoes were Batavia-bound, with Chinese vessels taking a bare one-third of the volume. By the 1760s, the total number of cargoes arriving at Makassar had risen to 83, though fluctuating over the decades. Through the century, the Chinese grip on the trade became stronger, at the expense of the VOC and indigenous agents. By the 1780s, Chinese vessels were taking over 90 percent of the cargoes. With junks sailing direct from Xiamen in the 1770s, Batavia's share of the market began to decline; by the 1780s, Xiamen's share rose to 85 percent. Xiamen junks supplied the Makassan marketplace with ceramics, textiles, and possibly iron, also entering regional trade networks from Banda to Sumbawa. Makassar not only imported a range of cottons from India and China but also locally made cloth (Knapp and Sutherland 2004: 100–105).

The Makassans, including Buginese and other ethnic groups, were capable of considerable agency outside of Dutch control. In 1611, having recently converted to Islam, Makassar conquered its Buginese rivals. Ranging wide over the archipelago in an almost explosive burst of activity, Buginese seafarers carved out colonies around the Sulawesi littoral, on Lombok, Sumbawa (Bima), Flores, and Ceram; they entered into dynastic intrigues (Johor); and expanded their trade diaspora across an even greater crescent, reaching the Malacca Straits and the coast of Kalimantan (Andaya 1995). In 1640, the sultan of Tolo dispatched a fleet of 100 *prahu layar* and 15,000 men to sack the Portuguese settlement of Larantuka in eastern Flores. The Dutch may not have disapproved, but the Makassan fleet also advanced on Timor, mounting a short-lived attempt at Islamic conversion on the largely animist island (Gunn 1999: 75–76). As described by Lieberman (2009: 869), this was the largest tributary domain in the history of the eastern archipelago. Alongside the Arabs and Sumatran Minangkabau, the Buginese comprised the most significant non-Chinese, diasporic trading community of the archipelago. Some time in the early 1700s, the Makassans also initiated annual *trepang* voyages to northern Australia, as Chinese demand began to increase (Plate 19).

Unquestionably, Makassar under VOC control entered a new phase in its commercial history, as instanced by the *trepang* trade linking up the northern coast of Australia with markets in distant China. Our view of a

flourishing Makassar comes not only because the documentation on this port is better than on many others, but because of the port's locational aspects, the agency of its various ethnic groups, a dynamic indigenous industry (including in textiles), and consumption-driven demand. Such a view of post-contact Makassar appears to challenge Reid's "age of commerce" argument, that, following the trade-based prosperity of the 16th and 17th centuries, early modern Southeast Asian maritime kingdoms faded away or were caught in a pincer between European and Chinese commercial rivals (Knapp and Sutherland 2004).

Melaka Under the Dutch (1641–1824)

Melaka had been demographically transformed under the long Portuguese rule. Especially notable was the emergence of a Catholic, Portuguese-speaking Eurasian community. After a series of naval skirmishes and sieges, Dutch sea power eventually prevailed in wresting control of the port city, in 1641. Except for the Napoleonic interlude of 1794–1818 when the British took control, the VOC administered Melaka until 1824, when the British again usurped the Dutch.

Melaka had already lost much of its importance when captured from the Portuguese in 1641. Nevertheless, as the surviving VOC Stadthuys building in the modern city testifies, Melaka under the Dutch experienced a revival, especially as a depot where cargoes were sorted between those for Indian markets and those for Europe. Mid-18th-century Melaka, according to a contemporary British source, "still supports its reputation, and its commerce is very considerable" (Beawes 1772: 787). Melaka was also seamlessly connected into the VOC trading network, serving as an important transshipment point for cargoes arriving from Japan, Taiwan, and China, alongside the traditional archipelagic trade.

As the Malaysian scholar Nordin Hussin (2007: 197–98) notes, from 1641 until 1824, Melaka hosted 32 Dutch governors, alongside their respective entourages of company officials and senior merchants. In their administration of the town, the Dutch upheld the ward system as the most important unit in VOC colonial administration. The Dutch initially created four wards, each headed by a superintendent. These were Tengkeri (from the Portuguese *tranqueira*) in the north, Bandar Hilir to the south, and Bungaraya and Bukit Cina on the eastern side of

the historic Portuguese fort. The fort itself, though serving as residence for VOC officials and privileged Burghers (Dutch Eurasians), remained outside the ward system. By the 1770s, the number of wards had risen to seven, including Herenstraat and Jonkerstraat, with their Burgher, European, and rich Asian populations, as well as wards for Malays and Moors.

Nordin (2007) has also noted Dutch suspicion toward the Catholic community, on the basis of both their loyalty and their religion. Unlike the Baba Chinese and the Muslim Jawi Pekan communities, who were highly indigenized, the Catholic Eurasians remained apart. At the top of the political and social hierarchy stood the Dutch official caste. The British author Beawes (1772: 787) records the presence of 200–300 Dutch families in Melaka. Generally, as with the Portuguese before them, the Dutch looked to the Chinese as indispensable partners in trade. Attitudes toward the Indian community were less positive, though their role in regional trade was acknowledged. Certain Indian merchants commanded fleets of ships trading between India and China. Malays tended to traditional occupations and their niche in agriculture was also indispensable for the survival of the colony. Certain Jawi Pekan, or indigenized Muslim Indians who identified with the Malay community, were highly educated, while others gained esteem in colonial society as successful traders. One of the more celebrated was Munshi Abdullah, known as the father of Malay literature. Under Portuguese rule, the Muslim community of Melaka included Javanese, Bugis, Minangkabau, and many other ethnic and crossover groups. As Nordin (2007: 289) comments, while cultural separateness was maintained in Melaka under the Dutch, as the Dutch Reformed Church sought to hold sway over the Christian communities, cultural barriers were continuously being challenged, with intermarriages and other relationships.

The period between 1780 and 1830 was one of urban growth in Melaka; its population reached between 11,500 to 14,500 people. By the 19th century, wealthy Chinese tended to displace the Burgher households; new waves of Chinese immigration eroded the distinction between Baba Chinese and newcomer. With the end of VOC rule, Melaka had become a typically Asian town. Eventually, with the foundation of Penang in 1786 by English East India Company merchants, Melaka began to lose out to its new rival at the northern end of the Straits. And after its British

founding in 1819, Singapore would also siphon off trade and traders from the ancient port (Nordin 2007).

VOC at the Cosmopolitan Court of Ayutthaya

European maps and images of Ayutthaya — generally taking an aerial view of the kingdom from the south — reveal a walled city forming a natural island out of an oxbow of the Chao Phraya River. An artificial canal on the eastern side provided a natural defense. The 1686 map of French missionary Jean de Courtaulin shows that Ayutthaya hosted both Portuguese and French churches outside its walls, attending to a congregation of some 2,000 Catholics. Muslim (Moorish), Malay, Pegu (Mons), Chinese, Japanese, French, Portuguese, and Dutch quarters are all indicated, alongside ethnic villages. Canals intersected by streets define discrete quarters, including the royal palace, pagodas, and a naval arsenal. Tributaries and waterways supported rich agricultural production. Courtaulin's map was one of the first to acknowledge the large number of temples to the north and east of the city. The court was fixed in its notions of kingship, steeply hierarchical and feudal in relation with subjects, unforgiving to traditional enemies — yet remarkably open to the world.

The first European traders to make direct contact with Ayutthaya were the Portuguese, arriving soon after the conquest of Melaka in 1511. Within five years, they had gained trading privileges. The Dutch gained similar privileges in 1592 from King Naresuan (r. 1590–1605), who had reconsolidated the kingdom in the wake of the Burmese invasion and wars of the 1590s. But it was Ekathotsarot (r. 1605–10) and his successor, Songtham (r. 1610–28), who first invited foreign traders to establish a presence in Ayutthaya, opening up a new chapter in that country's history (Theeravit 1988: 21). All trade in Siam was mediated by the all-important *phrakhlang* or first minister. As in other Asian courts, the practice of plying the court with expensive or exotic gifts obtained.

Ayutthaya's favorable geographic location, connected by the Chao Phraya River to the transoceanic trade via the Gulf of Siam, was an important factor in its growth. Royal monopolies over trade were well established; the court had tribute trading relations from Ming China on. Resident Chinese merchants at the court served the long-distance trade in

locally constructed Chinese junks (some actually flying Portuguese flags). For instance, the Chinese crews manning royal junks on the trading route to Nagasaki lodged in a special quarter of the local Chinatown. Japanese also lodged in a special quarter, from the late 16th to the mid-17th century.

But it was the VOC that, from 1608 to 1767, retained a virtually uninterrupted presence. Naresuan had perceived as threatening the Portuguese maritime power and chokehold over even overland trade to Tenasserim. The first two Dutch diplomats to Siam, Cornelius Specx and Lambert Jacobsz, offered to facilitate a visit by Naresuan's envoys to the United Provinces, an offer that was eventually taken up by Ekathotsarot. To appease the Portuguese, the king also dispatched a mission to Goa. Eventually, the ambassadors from Siam joined a VOC ship under the command of Admiral Matelief, arriving in the Hague in 1609. But, uncomfortable with the dominant VOC trading position at Ayutthaya, the court renewed its trading concessions for Portugal in 1636.

Even so, the VOC was alone among the European companies in continuing at Ayutthaya, apparently owing to their neutral stance in the 1668 conflict. From King Phetracha (r. 1688–1703), the VOC gained valuable trading privileges in tin at Ligor. King Thai Sa (r. 1709–33) ratified existing treaties, though by his reign it was clear that the VOC could no longer maintain its monopoly privileges — or its profits — in the face of competition from private Chinese traders.

In 1750, the Burmese attacked Ayutthaya and plundered the VOC trading post; leaving Bang, the Dutch factor, dead in the chaos. In August 1766, Bangkok fell to the attackers. This time, the VOC director abandoned the post, leaving a local in charge. The following February, Siam's capital was again attacked and razed to the ground. The VOC later resisted a call by King Taksin, the Teochiu Chinese founder of Thonburi, to reopen a post in Bangkok. By 1788, the VOC was dissolved (Brozius 2009).

The Dutch and English in Japan

Although the Portuguese pioneered the silk-for-silver trade at Nagasaki from 1570, in 1646 the Dutch were confined to the newly constructed artificial island of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor, following their obligatory

relocation from Hirado. The English merchants had maintained a trading post on Hirado from 1515 before leaving in 1623. With the Portuguese expelled from Nagasaki, the Dutch, alone among the Europeans, were permitted to conduct trade in Japan down to 1853, when Commodore Perry's famous black ships forced the Bakufu government to open its doors to foreign trade. As traders on sufferance, and hostage to a system of local payoffs and bribes, the Dutch were obliged to perform an onerous and costly annual journey to the Shogun court in Edo. The Nagasaki Trade System is better documented than many others, owing to the longevity of Dutch trade and to the talents of certain outstanding individuals in VOC employ, namely Caron, Thunberg, Kaempfer, and Siebold, who devoted large parts of their lives to the study of Japan (Plutschow 1983; Gunn 1999; Blussé 2008) (Plate 14).

What trade did the Dutch undertake at Nagasaki? From the *dagregisters*, or VOC diaries, Dutch imports into Japan were comprised of both bulk and piece goods. Trade in bulk tended to be dominated by sugar (powder and candy), produced in Java and Taiwan, along with sappanwood, deerskins, pepper, nutmeg, cloves, sandalwood, and other tropical products from VOC trading posts in India, Siam, Vietnam, and the East Indies. The piece goods trade was dominated by such traditional imports as silk from China, Vietnam, and India, but also included some European cloths, responding to new tastes in Japan. The Dutch introduced to Japan a range of European manufactures such as glass, clocks, and other devices. Space restricts a discussion of the technology transfer to Japan, known as *rangaku*, or Dutch learning. The Dutch at Nagasaki successfully tapped Japan's silver and copper exports, feeding into a lucrative trade with Southeast Asia. Lacquerwork and ceramics were important complementary cargoes. The VOC at Nagasaki worked in competition, and sometimes in collaboration, with Chinese merchant communities engaged in the junk trade.

The Dutch and English Interactions with Trinh Vietnam

European merchants and missionaries first began to arrive in Vietnam at the time of the Trinh-Nguyen wars that beset, respectively, the north and center-south of the country. The Portuguese had been in the region for

one century and had developed a close relationship with the Nguyen in trade and military technology. In the 1630s, the VOC began to establish a trade relationship with Trinh Vietnam (Tonkin), which would see them taking sides against the Portuguese and the Nguyen. In the 1640s, the Dutch allowed some of their ships to be used in naval operations against the Nguyen.

Although the Dutch had preceded the English in establishing a trading base in Thang Long (Hanoi), the English followed up in 1671 with the ship *Zeni*, dispatched via Banten. Ready to withdraw owing to an uncertain reception, the English were commanded to stay by the king. As Morse (1926) summarizes, a trading post was duly established, but “struggled along for twenty-five years under a system of gifts, perquisites and exactions; unable to pay in cash; unable even to buy in cash ... but receiving much of their export ladings in the shape of ‘gifts’ from the King and prince.”

The Dutch were treated no better. Trinh Vietnam was then the only source of supply for Chinese silks and was thus the prime source of silks for the English market, notwithstanding the difficulties. In 1697, the English abandoned their base. Three years later, the Dutch also withdrew. The roving English sea captain Alexander Hamilton (1930: 114) asserts that a private English trade was kept up with the Trinh capital until 1722, when the trade was ruined forever by an “act of violence,” namely, the abduction of a Vietnamese woman on an English ship.

Samuel Baron was the Vietnam-born son of VOC employee Hendrik Baron. Following a five-year sojourn and education in England, the younger Baron arrived back in his homeland in the 1670s, involving himself with English Company affairs. By this juncture, the English and Dutch were at war. William Gyfford, to whom Baron dedicated his writings, was then in charge of the English factory at Hanoi. Nevertheless, during his four years of tenure, commerce in the Trinh capital waned, owing to Dutch hostility, the avarice of local officials, and lack of a market for English produce. Baron’s account, published in the Churchill collection some 60 years after being written, offers, in the words of Draw and Taylor (2006: 22), an informed account of Vietnamese history, education, Trinh family politics, provincial and central government, the legal system, public ceremonies, and everyday life — all the more valuable in view of the notoriously weak Vietnamese sources for this period.

Zeelandia on Taiwan (1624–61)

Dutch trade with Japan became more structured when, in 1624, the VOC settled on Taiwan, at least until their ouster in 1661. Having failed to open direct trading relations with China, the VOC base on Taiwan made relations with Fujian traders much easier. After 1634, it was common practice to commission kraak porcelain to fit European tastes.

Through 1573–1620, the island dubbed Formosa by the Portuguese and Spanish entered Ming writings as Taiwan, while the Dutch called their settlement Tayouan (modern Tainan) — where, until the Dutch arrival, Japanese and Chinese ships had rendezvoused in trade. The first Dutch voyage to reach the Pescadores (Penghu) was that of Admiral Wybrand van Warwick, who sailed from Patani in June 1604. A Dutch fleet under Cornelis Matelief returned in 1607. The Dutch purpose was to blockade the Chinese junk trade from Manila, an act which brought them into violent collisions with the mandarins of Xiamen.

The choice of Anping, on the low-lying western coast of the island, as Dutch headquarters came only in the wake of an ineffectual attempt to settle on the Pescadores. The Dutch claimed that Taiwan had been granted to the VOC by the emperor of China in lieu of their settlement and rough fortification on the Pescadores. But even Java-based governor-general Jan Pieterszoon Coen was obliged to acknowledge that Japanese settlers had preceded them years before. According to Campbell (1903: 8), the Dutch action was more like a conquest than a concession.

Tayouan is described as a sandbank one mile long off the southwest coast, producing only wild pineapples and some native vegetation. In a short time, the Dutch settlement, fortified as Zeelandia, attracted 10,000 Chinese and aborigines. The numbers rose as refugees, traders in rice and sugar, and other elements arrived to take advantage of Dutch security and trade. Within five years, according to the statistics of the third Dutch governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nuyts, the VOC had dispatched five cargoes of silk to Japan and two to Java, totaling over one million florins. Balanced against expenditure, “This gives for each of the Indies not less than 100 percent profit” (Campbell 1903: 51).

According to Volker (1971: 34–64), the invoices of ships trading from Taiwan to Batavia reveals that they held 100,000 to 250,000 pieces of ceramics per shipment. In a short time, the Taiwan factory was servicing

Hirado, Siam, and Batavia in the familiar intra-Asian trade. The trading profile from Taiwan began to change, however, as Chinese settlers entered this expanding frontier. Notably, sugar, produced on Chinese-run plantations, and deerskins began to enter the trade with Japan.

The Dutch were concerned to eliminate trade rivals. Dutch attacks on Fort Santiago in Tamsui started in 1641; they climaxed with a siege starting in August the following year. Magnanimously, in their first victory over the Spanish in the Pacific region, the Dutch spared the lives of the defenders, but looted up to one million silver dollars from the fort. Dutch Calvinist ministers moved in where Catholic missionaries had operated. The Dutch also faced considerable shipping losses at the hands of Chinese “pirates.” Pieter Nuyts wrote to the VOC agent in Hirado in June 1628, “No vessel can show itself on the coast of China, or Iquan [the pirate-chief] has it in his power” (Campbell 1903: 38–39).

Japanese claims were harder to parry, especially as Japan continued to ignore Dutch claims to overlordship. In 1626, Japan complained to the Dutch embassy in Edo. In the “Nuyts affair” of 1628, 470 Japanese, arriving in a heavily armed fleet of junks (six fieldpieces mounted on deck, with nine below as ballast) led by a Captain Jaffioen, stormed the Dutch fortress and held Nuyts and others hostage in exchange for an indemnity for lost trade advantages. The issue was further complicated by the trading claims of the Japanese merchants, Suetsugu Heizo and Hamada Yahei. Nuyts was put in prison in Hirado, where he languished for four years. To settle this affair, which also saw trade suspended at Hirado, the Dutch were obliged to send a special envoy to Edo in 1634–36, namely Hendrik Hagenaar (Renneville 1702–06: 309–429; Campbell 1903: 39; Murdoch 1903, 2: 639).

Eventually, in 1661, the Dutch fort fell to the pro-Ming forces of Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) after a nine-month siege that denied to the Dutch use of the island as a conduit linking the China and Japan trade (Campbell 1903: 457; Chiu Hsin-hui 2007). Until conquered by the Qing in 1683, the Zheng family dominated the coastal sea routes, sending junk fleets to both Nagasaki and Manila.

In 1670, Koxinga’s son Zheng Jing (Cheng Ching) invited the English Company at Banten to open trading relations. The directors in London embraced the proposal. The English set up in the former town hall of Fort Zeelandia, selling pepper and a small quantity of English broadcloth,

along with gunpowder, lead, iron, and muskets in support of the Zheng war effort. The Zheng held Xiamen between 1674 and 1680, so the English entered into trade with a mainland port (though not with the imperial administration) for the first time, taking out porcelain and the new commodity of tea. Even after the Qing conquest and takeover of Taiwan, the English Company was granted renewed access to Xiamen in 1684–85, then firmly in Qing hands. With the Qing relaxation on controls of overseas trade, English ships now sailed direct from India to such ports as Guangzhou, Zhoushan (Chusan), and Xiamen. The Hanoi post became redundant and was closed in 1697 (Morse 1926: 46; Farrington 2002: 80–97).

VOC in the Bay of Bengal

The Dutch did not neglect to secure trading posts on the Coromandel coast of India, especially with a view to capturing a share of the textile trade across the Bay of Bengal, with the Burmese market seen as the prize. The main center of VOC activities on the Coromandel coast was Pulicat, founded in 1609. Other 17th-century VOC settlements along the Coromandel coast included Bimlipatam (Bheemunipatnam), Jagannathapuram, Masulipatnam (Machilipatnam), and Nagapatnam. As Wil O. Dijk (2006: 203) has highlighted, it was the opportunity provided by access to Indian textile trade at the source that provided the impetus to engage in the Bay of Bengal trade. Following the establishment of Pulicat, the Dutch entered into major competition with Asian merchants for markets, setting up four trading posts in coastal Burma, at a time when the political-religious capital was transferred from Pegu to Ava in Upper Burma. The VOC conveyed Indian textiles and yarn from the Coromandel and Bengal factories to Burma, exchanged against local commodities. From 1650, the VOC began procuring copper coins entering Burma at the Yunnan border. Subsequently, Chinese coins sourced via Burma were introduced as legal tender in Batavia and even Sri Lanka, suggesting an even larger East Asian copper currency domain than conventionally acknowledged. During 1620–60, Pulicat emerged as the major Dutch center in eastern Asia for the production and distribution of gunpowder, not only for VOC needs, but also entering the Bay of Bengal trade wherever it was in demand (Dijk 2006: 44).

Progressively, to 1795, all Dutch possessions on the two coasts of India fell into the hands of the English East India Company. Earlier, in 1761, following the Battle of Plessey (1757), which virtually kicked off English domination of the subcontinent, the French outpost of Pondicherry had also been occupied by the English. VOC control on Sri Lanka was also racked by revolt (1761–65). Eventually, under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814, Cochin was ceded to the English in return for tin-rich Bangka Island off the east coast of Sumatra. Although Pulicat was repeatedly contested, the English finally took over formal occupation from the Dutch in 1825.

The English East India Company Focus on China

As Keay (1991: 52–53) has explained, aside from such motives as expected profits from the spice trade, one reason for the establishment of the English Company was the need to find markets for England's staple export of woolen cloth. Even though the Company was determinately import-oriented, national expectations about woolen exports obliged the directors to seek early diversification. In a 1606 report drafted by Captain John Saris from Banten, the islands of Japan were singled out as the only possible market for English broadcloth, especially as prospects for sales were bleak in tropical latitudes.

In fact, Saris cannot have read the letter penned by marooned Englishman Will Adams of January 12, 1613 from Hirado to his friend Augustin Spalding of the English Company, in which he stated, "I fear that there will be no profit which is principal for the commodities of our country are here too cheap, that is cloth." Matters would be otherwise, he continued, "if the English merchants could access the Chinese trade, then shall our country make such great profit here, and your worshipful Indian Company of London shall not have to send money out of England for in Japan there is gold and silver in abundance, for with the traffic here they shall have their need" (East India Company 1896: 209–10).

Amazingly, the adventurous English in Hirado entered the junk trade with Southeast Asia on their own terms. This they did by buying or renting Chinese junks, which they (Will Adams among them) sailed to such locations as Siam, Cambodia, Nguyen-controlled Quang Nam, and, in a final voyage of 1619, Trinh Vietnam. Other high-risk voyages were aborted in

the Ryukyus. No question vexed the English in Hirado as much as the need to tap into the China trade. According to Peter Auber (1834: 392), Company secretary and historian, in August 1613 the Company and its factors sought to take advantage of Hirado's favorable location to enter this trade, especially by engaging the services of the China captain and leading Chinese merchants in Nagasaki. Efforts continued, in vain, right up until the factory was withdrawn from Hirado.

Following setbacks in the Spice Islands and failure in Japan and on Taiwan, the Company virtually withdrew to India, just as the nature of trade with China began to change. While the collection of pepper, spices, and tin continued in the islands, the English began to enter the opium-against-tea trade with China. Banten re-emerged as a supply station for the China trade, as foreign shipping began to trade directly at Guangzhou. From their base in Madras, British naval expeditions began a long search for strategic bases to protect their shipping lines to China against rivals, "pirates," and local rulers, who still dominated the strategic straits and waterways. The cession of Penang to the British by the sultan of Kedah in 1794 was the first stage. As alluded to, the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15) saw the English Company occupying Dutch possessions in the archipelago, Melaka included. Over Dutch protest, Singapore was occupied by the British in 1819. Eventually, English and Dutch spheres of influence in the archipelago were settled under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, which also involved certain exchanges of territory on the Malabar coast. The Malay world would never be the same again, especially as the Malay and Borneo states would also be drawn into the British imperium.

The European Companies and the Guangzhou (Canton) Trade

Only companies with deep financial resources could compete on and survive the risks entailed in extending long-distance shipping lines from Europe to China. In a short time, the Danish, Swedish, Flemish, Germans, and Americans joined the Dutch and English companies in the Asian trade. From around 1685–1700, Guangzhou (Canton) became the focus of this trade.

From early Ming times, Guangzhou had already become the main external trade counter on the coast of China, alongside ports in Fujian

and Zhejiang. In choosing Macau at the southwestern extreme of the Pearl River delta, the Portuguese were obviously aware of the importance of Guangzhou. In the early days of the new commerce, initial negotiations with the Guangzhou authorities were conducted in Macau roads, but the authorities soon came to realize that the trade was easier to control from the Chinese city, leading to the lease of Macau Peninsula to the Portuguese Crown as the single sanctioned trading base for foreigners on the coast of China (Chang 1934; Fok 1978; Gunn 1996).

As Van Dyke (2005) explains, from small beginnings, the Guangzhou trade grew steadily each decade. From 1699 to 1714, the French and English companies sent one or two ships each year. Armenian and Muslim traders and other private (English) traders were already active. From 1717, the first Ostend General India Company (of Austria) arrived in Guangzhou. The VOC arrived in 1729, the first royal chartered Danish Asiatic Company ship in 1731 and, in 1732, the first Swedish East India Company ship arrived in Whampoa. From an early period, American brigs joined this trade as private traders. Portuguese (and Manila-based Spanish merchants) were, of course, still visiting Guangzhou each year to procure their cargoes. Characteristically, Danish ships anchored at Dane's Island, French ships at French Island, and none but the official class were permitted to lodge in Guangzhou. During the off season, all foreigners were obliged to sojourn in Macau.

Typically, European ships on the China trade were the largest vessels, they carried the richest cargoes, and plied the longest voyages. For the European companies, the main aim was to buy tea, which had become a fashion, even a habit, in Europe. Even so, within Europe, England was the principal market, along with the British North American colonies, at least until the Boston Tea Party of 1735. Profits from the tea trade with China — the sole source of fermented tea leaves, at least until the British established tea plantations in India and Sri Lanka — were obviously substantial. As an example, between 1730 and 1833, the Danish Asiatic Company sent 130 ships to China, of which five were lost. On average, the voyage out took 216 days and the return, 192 days. Tea was not the only commodity carried on these ships; much of the 700-ton capacity was taken up by much coveted Chinese porcelain.

Profits from the opium trade were lucrative. All the companies indulged in the opium trade with other Asian countries but not with

China, as the risks of losing the tea trade were too great for the European companies to bear. Rather, it was the private traders arriving from Bengal who profited from the illicit trade in opium with China. Opium sales brought quick returns paid in silver, necessary for the purchase of tea. Some senior officials in Macau (and Bengal) were directly involved in the opium trade. By the 1770s, opium was a regular imported commodity at Macau. The English Company forbade its ships to carry the drug, but encouraged private traders to purchase it from the Company in India and smuggle it into China (Van Dyke 2005: 125). From 1773, the English Company was granted permission to operate a grand house in Macau, to which the merchants were obliged to retire during the off season, thus adding a new dimension to Macau society, pending the foundation of the British colony of Hong Kong in 1841.

By the 1830s, the East India companies ceased their operations in Guangzhou, and private traders emerged as the dominant voice. By this stage, the advent of the steamship had overwhelmed the traditional barriers confronting would-be traders on the Pearl River; in the face of the new technology, the Guangzhou Trade System administratively collapsed. As stated in the introduction, with the prosecution of the “opium wars,” the age of “unequal treaties” was about to dawn. The British colony of Hong Kong assumed a critical new commercial importance on the Guangdong coast, and at the expense of Macau and even Guangzhou.

Conclusion

As the Dutch and English followed the Portuguese and Spanish tradition of establishing fortified outposts and trading stations, they sought to eliminate their European rivals while ingratiating themselves to their Asian hosts, at least where they were outnumbered or outgunned, as in the powerful bureaucratic empires of China and Japan, and also in Vietnam and Siam. Such places as Melaka, Hirado, Nagasaki, Batavia, Galle, and Zeelandia served as key nodes in a trade network linking Southeast Asia not only with India, China, and Japan but with the world. Many of these outposts would emerge as embryonic colonies; in the case of Batavia (for the Dutch), and Madras, Penang, and Singapore (for the British), these colonies became seats of empire, more or less conforming to Weber’s rational-legal type of organization. Yet in others — Goa,

Macau, and Nagasaki — the European presence remained as enclaves in powerful Asian bureaucratic states where, in Weberian terms, traditional or charismatic forms of government remained stubbornly embedded.

During the era of the “first globalization,” these European outposts, with their mixed Asian-European elements, became the sites of intense cultural exchange. While, typically, Christian missionaries accompanied the European traders, they also served as knowledge brokers, as in transmitting the achievements of European science and technology and, in the reverse direction, revealing Asia to Europe through their copious writings and publications. Such revelations included not only knowledge of Eastern religions and forms of government, but also hitherto unknown foodstuffs, botanical species, and other exotica. And as the Americas were brought into the new global trading regime, so Europe introduced to Asia the fruits of the Columbian exchange, ranging from new dietary supplements to drugs, with the most enduring being, undoubtedly, tobacco. While some outposts supported discrete ethnic enclaves, almost all were touched by the new creolized languages and populations that emerged from the mingling of peoples and ideas.

8

Nihon-Machi: Japanese Diasporic Communities of Southeast Asia

One of the more exotic of the Asian diasporic communities of 17th-century Southeast Asia was that of the Japanese who formed *Nihon-machi* (日本町), or Japantowns, in a number of court cities, Asian trading ports, and European fortified cities. In large part, these communities developed as a consequence of Japanese participation in the *Shuinsen*, or “red seal” trade, under which official passports were issued to select merchant groups, especially those based in such western Japanese ports as Nagasaki and Hakata. These should not be confused with the mixed Japanese-Chinese merchant-pirate groups that ranged the coasts of Korea and China, dating back to the 14th century. But owing to *kaikin*, or restrictions relating to Japanese participation in maritime trade brought down between 1633–36 by the Tokugawa Iemitsu (r. 1623–51 CE), those Japanese abroad were not allowed to return and non-Japanese forbidden to enter. More generally, this policy of seclusion is associated with the term *sakoku* (closed country). Until the exiled Japanese disappeared through assimilation into the host communities, this colorful, albeit tragic, episode witnessed almost uniquely the establishment of small, sometimes beleaguered communities of Japanese in such far-flung cities and ports as Macau, Manila, Batavia, Ayutthaya, Phnom Penh, and Hoi An in Vietnam. It was in some of these ports that much of Japan’s bullion-for-silk trade was conducted. The formation of *Nihon-machi* in Southeast Asian ports was an episode lasting but one or two generations, but there had been a broader engagement of Japan with East-Southeast Asia over a longer time frame, especially the early Japanese (and Ryukyu kingdom) trade in prestige goods.

The independent kingdom of Ryukyu served as a powerful conduit for the Southeast Asian trade with Northeast Asia. Both Japan and Choson

Korea piggybacked on the Ryukyu connection. Japan had had a historical tributary relationship with China, but broke from this tradition following its invasion of Korea in 1592 and again in 1598. According to François Gipouloux (2009: 118), Japan then began to view itself as an alternative or “counter-hegemonic” pole to China, seeking, variously, to bring Ryukyu and Korea within its orbit. This chapter seeks to answer a subset of questions, namely, what political and commercial impacts did the Japanese traders and adventurers have on local Southeast Asian societies? How enduring was Japan’s trading legacy in Southeast Asia? And, what impacts did the overseas connection have on Japan’s own internal economy and politics?

Early Japanese Trade in Prestige Goods

Historically, Japan participated in China’s tributary trade system. Reaching back to Sui times (mission to Loyang of 607 CE), the missions — cultural as well as trade-oriented — continued infrequently under the Tang (12 recorded missions between 630 and 837), until interrupted at the end of the 9th century. According to Sansom (1977: 88–89), the missions, involving large retinues, were conducted according to Chinese protocol “on an imposing scale.”

Just as China remained a fount of learning and inspiration for Japanese pilgrims and emissaries, so intermittent private exchange continued, largely through Chinese shipowners. Relations with Japan reached a nadir with the ill-fated Mongol invasion of November 1274 under Khubilai Khan; the trade system was resumed on an official basis only during the Muromachi (1392–1573), when in 1401 the Ashikaga Shogunate sent a mission. Under the Ming, special licenses were issued to Japanese tribute ships (known as *kango*), as retained by the Myochioin temple in Kyoto. As Sansom (1977: 357) observes, a special feature of relations with China during this period was the link between trade and religion, especially as the dispatch and receipt of cargoes were in the hands of Zen priests.

Maritime links between Kyushu Island and the Korean Peninsula and China were obviously intense in certain periods, especially during the long era when Chinese institutions and Buddhism filtered through Korea and were grafted on Japanese soil. Writing of the trade in prestige

goods, Batten (2002: 192–93) argues that Japan was already part of a pan-Asian trade network by the Nara period (710–84 CE). The Nara imported bronze mirrors from China and iron ingots from Korea; a range of Middle Eastern or Southeast Asian commodities arrived during the Heian (794–1185), by the terrestrial and maritime silk roads. In July 2009, archaeologists working at the ancient Nara capital of Heijo unearthed ceramic shards of Islamic provenance linked with late 8th-century Abbasid Iraq (*Asahi Shimbun* 2009). From the 9th century, Chinese ceramics started to arrive in Japan, dramatically increasing in volume in the 12th century down into the 16th century. In the reverse direction, Japan exported copper, sulfur, fans, lacquerware, and much-in-demand *katana*, or swords — 37,000 in 1483 alone (Sansom 1971: 357).

As Batten (2002: 189–90) explains, following the Heian period, commercial relations with China came to supplement, then supplant, official trade. By the early 9th century, if not earlier, Korean and Chinese vessels began to frequent the waters of Kyushu. Initially, these foreign merchants were required to lodge at the Korokan, an official inn on the west side of Hakata Bay (present-day Fukuoka), where a Chinese merchant community developed. Excavations at Korokan confirm not only a substantial stone edifice but Chinese ceramics from this period. Hakata is seen as a gateway for the entrance into Japan of a range of Chinese and Korean cultural imports, from Zen Buddhism to tea. Chinese coins also begin to appear in the late Heian period. Notwithstanding restrictions on foreign trade imposed around 900, trade tended to increase, especially private unsupervised trade. Batten links this activity with a rising demand in Japan for foreign prestige goods no longer available through diplomatic channels. Major consumers of such goods were local elites and their central counterparts in Kyoto, Buddhist temple fraternities among them.

During the subsequent Kamakura (1192–1333) and Muromachi (1336–1573) periods, foreign trade expanded. The evidence comes from various archaeological sites revealing coins and ceramics. Foreign vessels sought out new destinations, including the Japan Sea coast on Honshu and, from the late 12th century, the Inland Sea. As Gipouloux (2009) has highlighted, the port of Sakai in Osaka Bay emerged in the later half of the 14th century as a veritable “little Venice.” Relatively autonomous, being ruled by merchant guilds, Sakai linked Nara with the external world; it was a role played by a number of other *minato-machi*, or port cities,

notably Hakata. Notwithstanding further attempts by the Kamakura to regulate the Hakata-Inland Sea trade, foreign vessels were to be found at a great variety of coastal destinations across Japan by the 16th century.

Batten (2002) adduces two reasons for the general growth in maritime activity: first, the expansion of domestic commercial markets, linked with the loosening of central control; second, by the Muromachi period, Japanese vessels were entering foreign commerce, especially to Korea. By the Sengoku, or warring states, period from the mid-15th to early 17th centuries, Japanese vessels were venturing further, including to Southeast Asia, though this is an underresearched area. There was always a fine line between private and official trade, but the trend by the 16th century was toward official trade. This became absolute with the *kaikin* proclamations under the Tokugawa.

After 1496, the number of Japanese traders attached to tribute missions was reduced, owing to breaches of protocol, as rival clans vied for the right to conduct the mission to the port of Ningbo, across the East China Sea. Very little trade was conducted with China under the tribute system after 1523, especially as the trade part of the system broke down altogether in ensuing decades. Fatally, through his insistence on equality with or even superiority over the Ming court, Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1535–98), ruptured tributary relations with China, following the invasion of Korea in 1592. In this invasion, forces loyal to Hideyoshi advanced as far north as Pyongyang. China's attempts to help Korea, unparalleled in East Asian history, can be viewed as an obligation to the Yi dynasty (1392–1910) as much self-protection against a potent enemy. As Swope (2002: 757) explains, the failure of peace talks, in which the Japanese ruler attempted to break the system apart, represented "the first serious challenge to China's preeminent position in the East Asian world." Notably, Hideyoshi's claim to equality with the Ming implied an (East Asian) international system based on a balance of power among equals, as opposed to the Chinese world order, which placed peripheral states in nominal dependence. After Hideyoshi's death, the succeeding Tokugawa rulers (1603–1868) restored relations with Korea in the early 17th century, conquered the kingdom of Ryukyu, and focused their diplomatic relations on those two states.

In Schottenhammer's view (2008), although both China and Japan wished to continue with trade for different reasons (China needed

Japanese silver and copper, while Japan had a great thirst for Chinese medicines, learning, and practical devices), the former master-vassal relationship that had existed under the Ming was being reversed. Simply, the new Tokugawa rulers, beginning with Ieyasu (r. 1603–05), sought to create their own trade regulations, displaying their independence and authority vis-à-vis China. Japanese authorities were now issuing their own *shinpai*, or trade licenses, for foreign ships, as they sought to monopolize the China trade under stricter regulation. By the early 17th century, the Chinese residents in Japan, notably at Nagasaki, were increasingly under control.

The Red Seal Trade

The so-called *wako* or Japanese pirate ships pioneered Japanese contacts with the countries of the China Sea littoral. The arrival of the Portuguese off the coast of China coincided with intense activity by the *wako*. Indeed, the Portuguese ability to defeat or domesticate the marauders earned them the gratitude of local Chinese authorities. Reaching their zenith under the Ashikaga Shogunate (1336–1573), the *wako*, also known as *Bahan-sen*, carried out their part-piratical, part-legitimate trade without official Japanese regulation. This began to change after the unification of the empire by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (r. 1585–98). Thereafter, Japan's foreign trade was conducted under the government-regulated *go-shui-in* (literally, official passport with vermilion seal ship) system, also loosely known as the red seal trade. Such passports were actively solicited, as they guaranteed the identity of and protection to their holders, while distinguishing them from the *wako* (Bernard 1939: 56). Still, as observed by English traders at Hirado in the 1620s, violent *wako* activity around the coast of Taiwan and the east China seaboard disrupted Chinese maritime activities at that time.

Established by Hideyoshi around 1592, the red seal trade system continued until 1636. In 1624 alone, 179 red seal voyages were authorized: to Siam, 35 ships; Vietnam, 26; Brunei, 2; the Philippines, 30; Cambodia, 23; and Melaka, 1 (Hino 1941: 35–36). From 1604 to 1635, 356 vessels traded in Southeast Asian ports (Kato 1976: 48), including Macau. Not all this commercial activity originated from Nagasaki. Mogi, near Nagasaki, was for example also a prominent red seal port. But, in the

later period, there is reason to believe that the major focus of activity of the red seal ships was on the silk trade with Vietnam.

We know less about the types of ships involved, but as Boxer (1931: 6) asserts, the red seal ships were partly rigged on the European plan and were compelled to carry Portuguese pilots. Certainly this was the case in a “junk of Japan” encountered by Dutch commander Oliver van Noort off Borneo in January 1601: the boat was captained by Emanuel Powis, “a Portugall dwelling at Languasacke (Nagasaki) in Japan, the Pilot a Chinese, the company Japanders.” Van Noort offers this rare description of a “Japan ship” of 50 tons that he captured a month earlier off Manila: “The form was strange, the forepart like a chimney, the sayles of Reed or Matt twisted, three anchors of Wood, the cables of straw” (Purchas 1905, 2: 203).

With the foundation of Nagasaki, several powerful merchant groups emerged, not only participating in the officialized red seal trade, but also in some ways cooperating with the Portuguese, Dutch, and English in this trade. One such merchant, Araki Sotaro (b. 1588), captained his own ship to Nguyen-controlled Vietnam. Period *unga*, or woodblock prints, reveal that he flew the VOC flag upside down, literally flagging his possession of trading certificates issued by the Dutch (then based at Hirado). Another Nagasaki-based merchant, Suetsugu Kozen, was a local magistrate in Nagasaki and scion of a wealthy Hakata merchant family with a tradition of red seal trading activities. His trading activities spanned Luzon, Siam, Taiwan, and north and south-central Vietnam. Some 16 merchant families in Nagasaki invested in his trading activities through to 1634 (Tran and Nguyen 1977).

Japanese mariners frequently found employment on foreign, particularly Dutch and English, vessels that touched Nagasaki and Hirado, sailing to numerous Southeast Asian ports. Others found employment in the service of the Dutch in Makassar, Ambon, in the siege of Macau, or against the Dutch in Taiwan (Satow 1885: 140–41). Still others found work as mercenaries in the employ of the Portuguese in the Melaka garrison in 1614–15, in a Portuguese expedition to Solor in 1619, and in the Malukus from 1606 to 1615. In the 1590s, 20 Japanese mercenaries joined a force of Spanish wreaking havoc in the kingdom of Lovék in Cambodia (Cabaton 1914: 116). In 1616, Japanese captives were used as hostages when Joris van Spielbergen traded them for other prisoners

at Manila. One Japanese, possibly the first to visit the Americas, joined the crew of the *Buena Esperanza* on its voyage to Mexico, arriving direct from Macau on October 18, 1587. Two Japanese, “who could both read and write their language,” Cristobal, 20, and Cosme, 17, were among hostages taken by English seafarer Thomas Cavendish in the wake of his attack and spectacular plunder of the Manila galleon *Santa Ana*, off the coast of California in 1587 (Purchas 1905, 2: 172). Japanese castaways, marooned sailors, and fishermen also entered — fatally as it sometimes turned out — Portuguese Macau diplomacy in seeking to re-enter the Japan trade. While the castaway Japanese were welcomed back, the Portuguese were not.

Japan, Choson Korea, and the Southeast Asia Connection

Notwithstanding its image as a “hermit kingdom,” Korea was connected with the Southeast Asian trade. In 1391, as recorded by the official history of the Goryeo (Koryo) kingdom (918–1392 CE), a ship arrived in Korea via Japan from a place that can be identified as Siam. Choson (1392–1910) chronicles also record the arrival in 1394 of a ship from Siam bringing sappan- and aloeswood. Although vested with Siamese royal titles, these voyages were private trading ventures mounted by Chinese captains. In 1395 and 1408, Korea was visited by a Java-based Chinese envoy (Ch’oe 1983: 71–72).

Several attempts in 1394–96 by the Choson court to send an envoy to Siam fell prey to *wako* attacks. As Cho Hung-Guk (2006) concludes, these contacts were “sporadic accidents”; owing to the risk of piracy, they were interrupted, and not resumed in the premodern period. Nevertheless, early Choson tapped the Southeast Asian trade via the Ryukyu kingdom, to which it was linked by tribute missions. The Ryukyu capital even hosted a small Korean enclave that traded with Siam and Java (Kim 2005: 77).

A tradition of naval ship construction reached back to early recorded history. During the 8th and 9th centuries of the Silla period (57 BCE–935 CE), Korea entered its greatest era of maritime trade. Korean ships dominated trade in Northeast Asia, sailing south down the China coast to Yangzhou at the junction of the Yangtze and the Grand Canal. Although Silla ships seldom ventured further south, Korean silver gained a

reputation among Arab traders on the coast of China (Seth 2007: 65). By the late 1300s, Korean vessels armed with cannons successfully defended themselves against fleets of marauding *wako*, as the Choson improved on ship design. Even so, Korean war fleets operated defensively, a major exception being the dispatch in 1419 of fleets to Tsushima Island (Taema-do in Korean, and part of present-day Nagasaki prefecture of Japan), with a view to suppressing *wako* activity.

Besides the odd voyage from Siam and Java, Ryukyuans, Fujianese, and Japanese all entered maritime trade with Korea. While Korea never entered into direct official trade with Southeast Asia, some Korean ships ranged beyond Japan as far as Manila under the Spanish; individual Korean merchants also made their way to Southeast Asian countries (Cho Hungguk 1995; 2002). The Southeast Asian area came to be depicted on Choson world maps, such as the late 17th-century *Chonhado* (All under Heaven) map (Suárez, 1999: 50), in turn based on late 16th-century representations (Robinson 2007).

Choson Korea, Japan, China, and the Ryukyu kingdom all participated in a loose system of castaway repatriation. Notwithstanding the indeterminate character of maritime borderlands, certain protocols obtained in the repatriation process. Koreans arriving in Japan were tested for possible Christian contamination at Nagasaki, before being repatriated via Tsushima amid much protocol aboard Korean ships. Lee (2006) cites over 1,000 cases of repatriation from 1599 to 1888. It is unclear if the Shogunate went out of its way to rescue wayward Japanese, given the *kaikin* prohibitions. It is more likely that Japanese castaways (and runaways) joined local societies or entered the floating population of *wako*, swashbucklers, and others along the China seaboard, in such places as Siam and Cambodia, especially as they were forbidden from returning home.

Ryukyu in the Southeast Asian Trade

As a Sinicized kingdom blending indigenous traditions with Chinese borrowings, Ryukyu (known in modern times as Okinawa) remained isolated from the great traditions of East Asia. Even so, excavations from fortified settlements and other sites — of Chinese trade ceramics dating from the Song and Yuan periods and originating from Quanzhou in the

Minnan region — reveal an early connection with China. According to Pearson et al. (2001: 195), such ceramic imports were used by ordinary people alongside locally produced earthenware. Archaeological excavations in Ryukyu have also uncovered caches of Chinese coins, from the Tang dynasty and peaking with the Northern Song, before dropping off after the 13th century. Such commercial activity was probably linked with Ryukyu's famous natural resources. With the development of gunpowder in China, a new demand developed for sulfur from the islands.

Commencing around 1373 and continuing until the arrival of the Portuguese (the last Ryukyuan voyage was in 1570), the kings of Ryukyu forged close trading links with a number of Southeast Asian trading ports. An important feature of the Ryukyu trade was its royal monopoly status. The Ryukyu connection with Ming China fit into the classic pattern of tribute trade, both ceremonially and commercially, involving the delivery of certain goods at Chinese ports at certain times, by specific ships and in prescribed quantities (Pearson 1969: 117; Hamashita 2003b) (Plate 6).

From 1389, Ryukyu commenced sending tribute goods to Korea, namely sappanwood and pepper, imported from Siam, along with sulfur and horses. But not all of this tribute trade was direct. Much of it, having been imported from Ryukyu by merchant circles of Hakata and Sakai, was carried on the Korean-bound ships of Japanese *daimyo*, powerful Kyushu clan chiefs, merchants, and others. Until 1590, when Ryukyu tribute entered Korea via Beijing, Japanese ships often carried Ryukyuan envoys, knowing that they would get better treatment in the disposal of their private trade goods (Kobata and Matsuda 1969: 1–7).

China financed and otherwise assisted the Ryukyu kings in their oceangoing trade. From his reading of the *Ming Shilu*, Wade (2007a: 9–11) reveals that the first envoys sent by the Ming arrived in Ryukyu in 1372. The first mention of Ryukyu in the *Ming Shilu* refers to three polities: Sanzan, Chizan, and Sanhoku (to offer their Japanese equivalents). Each was controlled by a king, in contention; they also sought to exploit the connection with the Ming to their advantage. Prior to the emergence of a unified state in Ryukyu in 1428, the three rival polities all sent multiple missions to the Ming capital of Nanjing. The rise of Chizan (Zhongzan) as the pre-eminent polity in the early 15th century is confirmed by the falling away of Sanhoku and Sanzan, sending their final missions to the Ming capital in 1416 and 1429, respectively. Given the

frequency and nature of reciprocal missions, Ryukyu emerges from this picture as a “privileged” polity within the Ming Tribute Trade System.

The major sources on the Ryukyu trade are the 444-year-long *Rekidai Hoan* (Precious Documents of Successive Generations) and the Chinese-language tributary trade documents (1414–1867) compiled for the rulers of Ryukyu kingdoms. According to Kobata and Matsuda (1969: 1–7), who have translated sections of the *Rekidai Hoan* into English, a total of 458 documents pertain to voyages from 1425–1509. These include voyages to Luzon, Siam, Java (Sunda), Melaka, Palembang, Samudra-Pasai on Sumatra, Patani, Annam (Nguyen Vietnam), China, and Korea. Spices (including pepper), sappanwood, sugar, and silks were all part of this trade. The Ryukyu trade brought to Southeast Asia Japanese gold dust, silver, and swords, along with a range of Chinese trade items from porcelain to minted coins. With the exception of Java-bound vessels, the ships were typically captained by native Ryukyuan, even though the ships, the crews, and their navigators were Chinese. These were large vessels. A ship that sailed to Sunda Kelapa (future Jakarta) in 1513 carried a crew of 226 (Plate 7).

The most important of the Southeast Asian destinations was Siam, with which trade started earlier and lasted longer. Kobata and Matsuda (1969: 1–7) date the origins of contacts between Ryukyu and Siam to the late 1380s. Initially, communication between the two kingdoms was carried out by Chinese intermediaries residing in Siam but, with the decline of Chinese influence during the first half of the 15th century, Ryukyuan merchants took the initiative. The *Rekidai Hoan* reveals that, with the exception of the Siamese ship in 1479, it was Ryukyuan ships that traveled to Siam, not vice versa. While satin-silk, woven gold satin, and porcelain were the usual trade items, the Ryukyus, alone among the Southeast Asian destinations, exported sulfur to Siam.

Ryukyu traded from 1463 with a number of kings and sovereigns in Melaka. The last Ryukyuan contact with Melaka was in September 1511, on the eve of the sultanate’s conquest by the Portuguese. This change in circumstance led to an increase in Ryukyuan trade with Patani. Ryukyuan contacts with the Majapahit kingdom on Java commenced in 1430, with six extant records covering 1430–42. Two additional records relate to voyages to Sunda Kelapa, dated 1513 and 1518. An attempt to enter into trade with Nguyen Vietnam in 1509 did not

succeed. Ryukyu traded with Palembang on Sumatra, then a vassal of Majapahit. Correspondence between Ryukyu and Palembang referred to a prime minister rather than a monarch. According to Wade (2007a: 19), the term suggests that Old Palembang was then a Chinese colony controlled by a “pacification superintendent.” Kobata and Matsuda (1969: 1–7) confirm that it was communities of Chinese residents and exiles in Java and Sumatra that drove the trade with Ryukyu.

With the arrival of Portuguese traders, the rise of piracy, and competition from illegal Chinese traders taking advantage of Ming decline, the golden age of Ryukyu trade with Southeast Asia came to an abrupt halt, though it was reoriented toward servicing the growing China-Japan trade. No less crucial to the demise of the official trade, as Wade affirms (2007a: 25), was the Ming practice, begun in 1567, of issuing licenses to Chinese traders for dealing directly with foreign ports. The decline of *wako* activity along the China coast was also a precondition to the rejuvenation of the Chinese trade.

Hamashita (2003b) describes two distinctive features of the Ryukyu “trade network” within the overall tribute trade networks. First, trade with Siam and other Southeast Asian polities was vigorous between the early 15th and mid-16th centuries. Second, as trade with Southeast Asian polities declined, so Ryukyu trade with Korea and Japan increased. How well did the Ryukyu kingdom survive commercially? As Hamashita explains, even after the termination of the official trade in 1570, Ryukyu managed to obtain spices and sappanwood from Southeast Asia, via the burgeoning private Chinese trade that filled in for the old official trade. In 1666, for example, King Sho Shitsu (r. 1648–68) requested to exclude the traditional tribute gift of pepper from the list, presumably to satisfy local demand and trade needs with Korea and Japan. As Ryukyu joined with the Chinese merchants or made direct purchases, a new element energizing the China coast trade with Southeast Asia was the trade in Siamese rice.

The Togukawa Shogunate sought to bring Ryukyu within its orbit, albeit at arm’s length so as not to prejudice the Ryukyu king’s valuable role within the Tributary Trade System under the Qing. In effect, the Shimizu clan of Satsuma accomplished this task on behalf of the *bakufu*, when, in 1609, the Ryukyu capital (Shuri Castle) was attacked and King

Sho Tai (r. 1848–79) was transported to the seat of the Shogun, not as an equal but as a confirmed tributary (Sadler 1937: 246).

Even though Ryukyu continued to send tribute envoys to Edo, the kingdom was abolished in 1879 and seamlessly incorporated into the expanding Japanese frontier. Shuri Castle, greatly damaged by the American invasion in 1945, remains as testimony to the greatness of the Ryukyu civilization. Reversion to Japanese sovereignty in 1972 sealed Okinawa's political fate. It is not hard to imagine the sometimes conflictual, sometimes dialogic visions of Ryukyuan history and identity that take place today, but notions of alterity undoubtedly touched rulers and subjects alike under the kingdom. As Smits (1999: 8–11) has written, the self-styled Confucian kings of early 18th century called up a range of external “others,” not only including the Shimizu clan and *Nihon/Nippon*, but also the broader East-Southeast Asian world.

The Swashbuckling Japanese of Ayutthaya

With time, the Ryukyu trade with Siam came to be challenged by the development of direct tribute-trading links between Japan and Siam. For example, the *daimyo* of Hirado tried to tap into this trade at a time when the Ryukyu trade began to taper off. This is known from the letter that Matsura Shigenobu sent to the King of Siam in 1557, intriguingly suggesting a Southeast Asian trade connection with Hirado, even prior to the arrival in this port of the first Portuguese ships (Matsura 1993: 8).

The development of relations between Siam and Japan must be viewed in the context of these countries' internal affairs. Just as the advent of the Tokugawa Shogunate ushered in a new era of unity, stability, and prosperity in Japan, so in Siam, King Naresuan (r. 1590–1605) reconsolidated the Ayutthayan kingdom in the wake of war with Burma. But, as mentioned in Chapter 6, it was Ekathotsarot (r. 1605–10) and his successor, Songtham (r. 1610–28), who first invited foreign traders to Ayutthaya. It is believed that some 800 Japanese settlers sojourned in Ayutthaya in the early 17th century (Theeravit 1988: 21).

Some of these Japanese wielded considerable influence in Siamese politics. For example, Yamada Nagamasu rose during the early years of Songtham's reign to become head of the Japanese soldiers serving as the king's guard (Cabaton 1913: 79; Iwamoto 2007). Kiya Kyuzaemon

of Nagasaki was rewarded with a special administrative position for his advice in overcoming the Burmese menace. Another Nagasaki merchant, Tsuda Matazaemon, was rewarded by the king with the hand of a daughter, for services rendered against the Burmese. Thai scholar Khien Theeravit (1988: 20) contends that stories of Japanese threats against King Songtham are erroneous, in any case not confirmed in official correspondence. The death of Songtham in 1628, however, opened a new and controversial role for Yamada Nagamasu when he took sides in a dynastic struggle, ending with his death.

In 1604, at the request of the *daimyo* of Arima in Hizen, Ieyasu issued three passports to a Japanese merchant in Siam for junks trading there. The *daimyo* of Satsuma also obtained one. The pioneering English Japanologist Satow believed it credible that the equipment of junks in Japan for the voyage to Siam was first initiated by the Portuguese and later imitated by the English factory in Hirado. Intriguingly, even European merchants were incorporated into the red seal ship system. Notable beneficiaries of the coveted vermilion pass were the Christian Padre Thomas (1609), the Portuguese or Spanish Manoel (1613), Will Adams (Anjin) (1614), and the Portuguese or Spanish Jacob (1615). Richard Cocks dispatched the junk *Sea Adventure* to Siam on more than one occasion in 1615–16. The pass for Adams was probably obtained for one of these voyages (Satow 1855: 140–41). In a letter written in 1613, Adams makes oblique reference to “the ship that comes from Patan,” or Patani, bringing raw silk, damask, taffetas, velvet, satin, and other Chinese commodities, including dyes (East India Company 1896: 210).

The contours of the trade from Nagasaki to Siam are captured by a series of letters written by Shogun Ieyasu to King Ekathotsarot of Siam, commencing with a letter dated October 22, 1606 requesting muskets and fragrant wood, and ending in 1629 (Theeravit 1988). Although a non-official Siamese party arrived by junk in Nagasaki in 1612 and held audience with the Shogun, the first officially sanctioned royal Siamese junk to visit Japan arrived only in 1616 (Satow 1885: 149). Three more Siamese embassies ensued in 1623, 1626, and 1629, to inform the Shogun of the succession of a new king, albeit already executed by the time the ambassadors held their audience. Theeravit (1988: 24) writes that, until the rift, both sides exchanged not only gifts but friendly sentiments, though mutually ignorant of each other’s countries.

According to Wood, it was on the advice of Yamada that friendly relations were opened between the king of Siam and Shogun Ieyasu, especially as the latter was eager to obtain firearms, ammunition, and gunpowder. Besides Yamada's loyalist bodyguard, Japanese freelancers provoked trouble in the kingdom. The desire on the part of Japan to place trade on an even keel is carried in the diplomatic tone of a letter from the Shogun, dated September 1623 and telling King Songtham, "Merchants are fond of gain and given up to greed, and abominable fellows of this kind ought not to escape punishment," a reference to Japanese freelancers who had thrown in their lot with the king of Cambodia in his campaign to invade Siam (Wood 1933: 159–69).

In 1630, coming under suspicion of treachery during the reign of King Prasat Thong (r. 1629–56), the Japanese colony in Ayutthaya was either massacred or driven out of the country. As Theeravit (1988: 35) explains, this event left the Japanese trade in the hands of either the Dutch or the Chinese, who managed the king's maritime and mercantile affairs. While the Siamese were to change their minds about the Japanese colony, an attempt to restore relations with Japan in 1635 failed. The envoys were not received by governors at Nagasaki, a rebuff plausibly linked with the seclusion edicts, but also, the Dutch reckoned, out of Japanese offense at Prasat Thong's usurpation of the throne. From the writings of Van Vliet, head Dutch merchant at Ayutthaya from 1631, it is clear that the Dutch saw much to celebrate in this breakdown, so much so that they might actually have contributed to the rift for their own commercial gain.

Writing of the aftermath of the so-called revolution of 1688 in Ayutthaya, in which King Narai (1656–88) was replaced by rulers seen as less solicitous toward foreigners, Dhiravat na Pombejra (1993: 261–63) observes that the new order in Siam was by no means opposed to foreign trade. He argues that the upturn in the China-Siam-Japan triangular trade during the late 17th and early 18th centuries led the Chinese and the Dutch at Ayutthaya to compete with the Siamese crown over exports to Japan of such items as sappanwood, tin, and deerskins. In 1697, for example, King Phetracha (r. 1688–1703) sent two junks to Japan and bought 10,000 animal skins from the VOC to form part of the cargo. In 1699, the king and Prince Sorasak, who would succeed his father as king in 1703, sent one junk each to Japan. Siamese junks returning from Japan often stopped over at a Chinese port, selling Japanese copper and

other goods before taking on a new cargo for Ayutthaya. Japanese and VOC sources in general tally on the scope of Siamese crown shipping to Nagasaki in the 1689–1703 period.

The Japanese of Manila: Good Reception, Uncertain Fate

The Japanese settlement at Manila may be understood in the context of the colonial foundations of the city and the triangular Manila-Macau-Japan trade linking with Acapulco. Equally, the expulsion edicts brought down by the Tokugawa Shogunate forced a wave of Japanese to seek permanent exile in the Philippines.

As described by Antonio de Morga — Spanish official, captain of the fleet, and historian — writing in 1609, the Japanese of Manila were well established:

Some Japanese and Portuguese merchantmen also come every year from the port of Nangasaque in Japan, at the end of October with the north winds, and at the end of March. They enter and anchor at Manila in the same way. The bulk of their cargo is excellent wheat-flour for the provisioning of Manila, and highly prized salt meats. They also bring some fine woven silk goods of mixed colors; beautiful and finely-decorated screens done in oil and gilt; all kinds of cutlery; many suits of armor, spears, catans, and other weapons, all finely wrought; writing cases, boxes and small cases of wood, japanned and curiously marked; other pretty gewgaws; excellent fresh pears; barrels and casks of good salt tunny; cages of sweet-voiced larks, called fimbaros; and other trifles. (Blair and Robertson 1907: 183–89).

Morga's description of these probable Japanese exiles from Nagasaki, some 500 strong, is also evocative:

They are a spirited race, of good disposition and brave. They wear their own costume, namely kimonos of colored silks and cotton, reaching halfway down the leg and open in front; wide short drawers, close fitting half-boots of leather, and shoes like sandals with the soles of well-woven straw. They go bareheaded and shave the top of the head as far back as the crown. Their back-hair is long and fastened upon the skull in a graceful knot. They carry their cattans large and small in the belt. They have scant beards and are a race of noble bearing and behavior. They employ many ceremonies

and courtesies and attach much importance to honor and social standing. They are resolute in any necessity or danger. (Blair and Robertson 1907: 183–89).

While, initially, members of the community could freely return to Japan, with time their exile became permanent. Relations with Japan began to deteriorate from 1590 under the governorship of Gomez Pedro Dasmarino. On the one hand, the Spanish began to impose restrictions upon the Japanese. On the other, certain individuals, such as Harada Quimon, pressed Hideyoshi on the idea of launching an expedition on Manila. Eventually, this led to an exchange of envoys and messages between Hideyoshi and the Spanish. But on December 14, 1600, Antonio de Morga destroyed two Dutch vessels off Corregidor, signaling conflict between the two European powers in the East (Pires 1994: 16).

With the death of Hideyoshi (1598), the danger of attack abated. But given that a large number of Japanese came to reside in Manila, we can conclude that the trading vessels from Nagasaki continued their visits and that many Japanese remained behind. Indeed, an uprising in Manila by the Chinese in 1603 was put down only with the assistance of the Japanese, then numbering some 800. In 1606, a Japanese rebellion broke out at a time when the governor was absent, leaving the Spanish dangerously exposed. A Japanese rebellion the following year was, however, crushed, and their quarter was razed to the ground (Pakse-Smith 1914).

In 1614, some 300 Japanese Christians arrived in Manila from Nagasaki, including Don Justo Takayama (Takayama Ukon), the celebrated Christian *daimyo* who had occupied a castle in Osaka until 1585. Although settled outside city walls, these and other Japanese Christians were well received in Manila. By 1622, a misericordia and school were established in Manila to cater to the needs of Christian Japanese and Chinese. However, in 1624, the Japanese authorities forbade commerce with Manila. In that year, a Spanish ambassador arriving in Satsuma, bearing rich presents for the court, was brutally handled. Yet, despite mutual suspicions and commercial rivalries, especially over Taiwan, Japanese continued to trade between Nagasaki and Manila. Pakse-Smith (1914) writes of the arrival in Manila of two vessels, one dispatched by the Nagasaki *bugyo* and one from Satsuma, whose missions may have been more military than commercial. But the arrival in Manila in 1631 of two trading vessels from Nagasaki carried an ill omen. In them came a

batch of deported lepers. In 1632 and again in 1635, other ships arrived in the Philippines, bringing women and children and even rich Japanese converts, all fleeing persecution. All, including the lepers, were well received.

The Japanese formed a *nihon-machi* in Manila. As described by Zaide (1980), the first, Dilao, was located on the south bank of the Pasig River, adjacent to the northeastern portion of the city walls, between the Chinese *parián* and Laguio. Dilao, or Dilaw (yellow) took its name from a shrub used for extracting yellow dye that grew luxuriantly in this quarter. Like the Chinese *parián*, Dilao was within firing range of the Spanish guns mounted on the city walls. It is marked on the 1671 map of Manila by Fray Ignascio Muñoz. A second *nihon-machi* arose in the San Miguel quarter, founded following the 1614 exile of Takayama Ukon and followers. This was located on the south bank of the Pasig adjacent to Dilao. But, unlike Dilao, which was a commercial town, San Miguel was a purely residential town for Christians. Both communities hosted churches. No trace of Dilao is registered after 1656, while San Miguel disappeared in a fire of 1768.

Cambodia: “Bandits Who Dare Not Return to Their Country”

By the early decades of the 17th century, the Japanese community constituted a privileged group in the kingdom, evidently as the result of taking the king’s side in a dynastic revolt. According to Kersten (2003: xiv), these were mostly exiled Christians who played a pivotal role in facilitating Cambodian commerce with Japan, as well as with the Portuguese and Dutch. According to a Khmer-language account, around 1605 the actions of piratical Japanese junks around the coast of Cambodia forced the Cambodian king to lodge complaints with the Shogun in Edo. It is also known that, between 1625–36, a Nagasaki interpreter by the name of Shimano Kenryo was sent on a pilgrimage to Angkor by the third Tokugawa shogun, Iemitsu (r. 1623–51) (Peri 1923; Bernard 1940).

As described by visiting VOC ambassador Henry Hagenaar in 1637, the Japanese community in Phnom Penh numbered 70 to 80 families living alongside Portuguese, Malay, and other merchants, although each community remained discrete. Likening them to “bandits who dare not

return to their country,” he was of course referring to the Tokugawa seclusion laws, forbidding inter alia Japanese abroad from returning to Japan. Otherwise, the community were viewed as in the good graces of the king, especially because the Japanese had fought valiantly in his defense against a challenge mounted by one of his relatives. Even so, the Japanese enjoyed no special favor in trade and were even obliged to send their merchandise to Quinam (Quang Nam) in south-central Vietnam, where it was transshipped to Japan via the Chinese junk trade (Hagenaar 1725: 467–68). By the 1660s, Cambodia, like Vietnam, would be directly linked with Japan (Nagasaki), but only by the Chinese junk trade.

In 2004, Japan’s National Research Institute for Cultural Properties commenced in situ archaeological research in Cambodia, in an attempt to locate the physical location of the Japanese settlement. In early 2008, the site was identified as Ponhea Lueu commune, situated 25 kilometers north of Phnom Penh, in present-day Kandal province. Excavation revealed ceramic shards and kiln sites. The lead researcher of the project, Sugiyama Hiroshi, reckoned that 100 Japanese resided in the village, most of them engaged in religious affairs and trading activities, although their martial skills were doubtless always in demand (*Japan Times*, February 16, 2008).

The Nagasaki Trade with Vietnam

By the late 16th century, Chinese and Japanese merchants, barred from direct trading with each other under Ming edicts, began to frequent such Vietnamese ports as Nguyen-controlled Fai-fo (Hoi An), along with Ke-cho (Hanoi), and Pho Hien under the Trinh domination, trading Chinese raw silk and silk piece-goods for Japanese silver. But when the Tokugawa exclusion edicts left the Japanese communities adrift, the Dutch and Nagasaki-based Chinese merchants began to move in on the lucrative silk-for-silver-turned-copper trade with Vietnam (Li 1998: 71; Iioka 2006). The political divisions besetting Vietnam complicated the political and commercial relations of all the foreign merchant communities in key trading ports along the Vietnamese coast.

Writing of his visit in 1627 to Hoi An, pioneering Italian-born Jesuit missionary Alexander de Rhodes commented, “there is great commercial activity by the Japanese who stay there and make their trade there.”

He saw Japanese alongside Chinese and Portuguese traders in the Cham kingdom, which he visited in 1641 (Rhodes 1854: 108). As Manguin (1972: 5) observes, calambac (aloeswood or eaglewood), collected from mountain forests under control of Champa, was then in great demand in Japan, where it was used in the production of incense. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the Trinh and the Nguyen in 1627, some 42 Japanese red seal passports were issued between 1604 and 1616 for trade from Japan to Nguyen-controlled Vietnam.

The other major center to which foreign merchants gravitated was Pho Hien (modern Hung Yen), located some 50 kilometers southeast of Thang Long (Hanoi) on the east bank of the Red River. Between 1604 and 1616, 11 red seal passports were issued for Vietnam under Trinh control, rising to a total of 35 by 1634, suggesting the importance of the port in Japan's silk-for-silver trade. Visiting Jesuits from Macau also traded with northern Vietnam, in the form of an annual ship from 1626 until 1660. In this trade, silver was the principal item imported, while Vietnamese (Tonkin) raw silk and silk piece-goods were the principal items exported, along with Chinese silks for the Japan market. The Portuguese also exported silk from Vietnam to Nagasaki. Notably, the voyage of 1637 carried large quantities and varieties of silk to Japan. The English at Hirado tapped this trade directly with the voyage of Will Adams. By the late 1630s, the VOC had muscled in on this trade, while the Tokugawa edicts left Japanese merchants in Vietnam adrift (Manguin 1972: 242; Souza 1986: 112; Li 1998: 60–65). Over a matter of decades the Chinese and Japanese communities had expanded to form discrete colonies in these ports.

Officialized Japanese trade with the Vietnamese states exemplifies the way in which Japan's Southeast Asian trade fell into a presumed tributary trade pattern. This is carried in a letter (c. 1600) to the "Prince of Annam" written by Fujiwara Seika, acclaimed neo-Confucianist scholar at the court of Tokugawa Ieyasu and commissioner of foreign trade and ambassador extraordinary. Written on behalf of a Kyoto merchant, Fujiwara's letter sought the establishment of relations on the basis of "good faith," especially as the crew of an earlier trading voyage had misbehaved, or at least not deported themselves to the civilized standards of Confucianized societies. More pointedly, and in line with Fujiwara's

own Confucian standards, he sought to subordinate pure profit-making to equality and mutual benefit (Tsunoda 1958: 340).

While the Portuguese were the dominant European power in central Vietnam, the Dutch were dominant in the north, especially after 1637, when the Trinh invited them to open an entrepôt at Pho Hien, attracting Japanese, Chinese, and Siamese merchants. But with the spread of civil war between the north and the center, the Dutch were drawn into supporting the Trinh against the Nguyen (Woodside 1971: 262).

In their complex and intricate dealings with the Trinh court, the Dutch party were assisted by a Japanese woman called Ura-san. Earlier, at Hue (or perhaps Hoi An), the Dutch had also received assistance from a Japanese interpreter called Guando. Ura-san, in the words of the Dutch, “had taken upon herself the task of defending us with the king against the slanders of the Portuguese.” Serving as general interpreter for the Dutch party at the Trinh court, Ura-san not only interpreted during their audience with the king, but also steered them through the complexities of court ritual. The Dutch were obliged to conduct their trade negotiations through Japanese brokers in the employ of the court, and forbidden to deal directly with local silk producers, a privilege reserved for the Japanese (Dixon 1883).

By 1642, the Jesuits and the Dutch increasingly supplied much coveted copper *caixa* (coins with a characteristic square hole) to the Trinh. First introduced by Japanese merchants, the *caixa* became the favored means of exchange in the countryside, while gold and silver bullion remained the coveted exchange item in the port cities. Minted by the Portuguese in Macau using imported Japanese copper, the *caixa* trade returned handsome profits for Macau until the practice was ended in 1688.

An embryonic Japanese community took root in Trinh Vietnam, at Hoi An and other coastal trading centers, in part connected with the Nagasaki silk trade, but also made permanent with the promulgation of the exclusion laws.

The Japanese of Macau: Mixed Receptions

After a near century of trade and Christian missionary activity connecting Macau and Japan, it is not surprising that a small Japanese community developed in Macau (and Goa) that included Christians, traders, and

slaves. Famously, four Japanese Christian converts and envoy-pilgrims to Rome sojourned in Macau on their long voyage to and from Europe, departing in 1582. It is also believed that Japanese masons made contributions to the construction and design of the facade of Macau's iconic St. Paul's Church.

But the presence in Macau of unruly Japanese sailors, especially during the governorship of Andre Pessoa (1607–09), compromised Portuguese relations with the Tokugawa. On August 24, 1609, in the wake of havoc caused by the crew of the junk owned by Nagasaki merchant Arima Harunoba, the Shogunate issued the following edict: "Since it is an undoubted fact that the going of Japanese in ships to Macau is prejudicial to that place, this practice will be strictly prohibited for the future. If any Japanese should go there, they may be dealt with according to local laws" (Boxer 1963: 322).

Macau continued to be a destination for Japanese Christians and the products of mixed marriages, at least until the exclusion acts prohibiting Japanese from trading or sojourning overseas. By Qing times, Japanese in Macau were congregated in two precincts, Patio de S. Paulo and Patio de Espinho, in addition to a community in Gongbei, near the Macau-China border gate. Teixeira (1979) identified 25 Japanese Christians who were buried in St. Paul's Church between 1648 and 1688. But, from time to time, Japanese trading and fishing boats were blown by storms to coastal areas of China. Invariably, local Chinese authorities forwarded these crews to Macau. On numerous occasions, as in 1685, 1795, 1798, 1813, and 1832 via the intermediary of the Swedish missionary Charles Gutzlaff, the Portuguese sought to repatriate these unfortunates and, fruitlessly, to ingratiate themselves with the Japanese authorities (Zhang 1996: 94).

Japanese Mercenaries on Ambon

The infamous massacre of the English on Ambon by the VOC, universally known as the "Amboina massacre," not only triggered off recriminations between the two European nations but was commemorated in numerous English texts over the years. One example is Beaumont's *The Emblem of Ingratitude: a true relation of the unjust, cruel, and barbarous proceedings against the English at Amboyna in the East Indies*, by

the Netherlands governor and council there (1672). While the fate of the English and the perfidy of the Dutch was at the core of such works, they also offer rare testimony on the lives and times of the Japanese mercenaries also put to the sword.

According to Clulow (2007: 19), some 300 Japanese mercenaries were shipped by the VOC from Hirado to Southeast Asian destinations. After a contingent of 68 men was sent in 1613 on the junk *Fortuije*, the Hirado trading post dispatched at least three other shiploads of mercenaries, all signed on with three-year contracts. A contingent of 100 dispatched on the vessel *China* was lost at sea with all on board. The Jakarta-based Dutch governor Jan Pieterszoon Coen ardently advocated recruiting Japanese mercenaries from Hirado. Japanese figured in most major VOC campaigns between 1613 and 1623, notably in the Tidore expedition of 1613, in the siege of Jakarta in 1619, and in the final conquest of the Banda islands in 1621, in which 87 mercenaries participated with great merit. Although Coen lobbied for more mercenaries, the Tokugawa ban on the export of people in 1621 put an end to the business.

On Ambon, the English Company were always overshadowed by the Dutch. To reinforce their garrison, the Dutch in Ambon resorted to the employment of Japanese mercenaries. Matters came to a head when the English and Japanese together were implicated in a plot to murder the Dutch and take control. The Dutch executed the alleged English conspirators, along with at least nine of the 11 Japanese mercenaries. The VOC were often at odds with their Japanese recruits over a range of issues, including attempted mutiny, as apparently the case on *Fortuije*. As Clulow (2007: 25) interprets from the list of those executed, the mercenaries were mostly young, not combat veterans. The youngest, Hizen-born Zanchoo was aged 22; the oldest, Thome Corea from Nagasaki (evidently a Christian), was 50. All hailed from various points in Kyushu, mostly Nagasaki and Hirado, as well as Hizen, Chicugo, and Karatsu. It is possible that Sousimo from Hirado, 26, and Sacouba, 40, were spared. The Japanese “captain,” Kusnoky Itsiemon, who played some role in the *Fortuije* mutiny, was also spared.

The Japanese of Batavia (Jakarta)

The colony that has captured popular imagination in Japan today is that of the Japanese stranded in Batavia by the *sakoku* proclamations. As early as April 1609, Dutch admiral Verhoeven deployed Japanese mercenaries in Banda (Hanna 1991: 25). Even so, the first Japanese to make the voyage to Java were those shipped out from Hirado on Dutch vessels. Dutch documents dated February 1613 reveal that Hendrik Brouwer sent 68 Japanese to Batavia in that year, among them carpenters, smiths, and plasterers, useful to the Dutch at a time when the foundations of Batavia were being laid upon the old native town of Jakarta. In 1615, a further 59 Japanese from Hirado were contracted for work in Jakarta. In 1620, the year before the Shogun forbade trafficking in Japanese subjects, 71 Japanese served as soldiers in Jakarta. In his expedition against Banda in 1621, Governor Coen brought along 80–100 Japanese mercenaries (Hanna 1991: 49). Until the formal expulsion of the Japanese wives and offspring of Dutch and English liaisons to Batavia in 1639, the colony mostly expanded by natural increase. In October 1639, the Dutch ship *Breda* brought the remaining families and children of mixed parentage. The only dispensation made was for Caron, who gained special permission to retain his Japanese wife and five children until his departure in February 1641 (Murakami 1939: 28). Those shipped to Batavia from Hirado via Taiwan in 1641 were well treated by the authorities (Caron 1935: lxxvii). As marriage between Japanese and foreigners was prohibited, the question of legitimizing these liaisons with the Dutch authorities arose.

Although the exiles were forbidden to correspond with relatives in Japan, they were able to use their influence with Caron. Through Caron, the Council of Indies, and the governor of Nagasaki, the exiles corresponded and exchanged presents with relatives in Japan. According to Murakami (1939), only four of these letters are extant, all written between 1663 and 1671. With some ingenuity, certain of the exiled women in Java managed to disguise their correspondence to relatives in Japan in patchwork fabrics, styled “Jagatera-bumi” (Letters from Jakarta). These were written on 20 centimeter square Java chintz, or *sarasa* as it is known in Japanese (from the Portuguese). One example is the *waka* poem of Geronima (Jagatera) Oharu, the Hirado-born daughter of an Italian sailor and Japanese mother, apparently adopted by an

official of *Chicugo-machi* in Nagasaki. As a 15-year-old, she was part of a mixed race group expelled to Batavia in 1639. Notwithstanding her Christian background, she is celebrated today in Shokufuji, a Buddhist temple in Nagasaki, and remembered in a popular song, “Nagasaki Monogatari,” as a tragic woman.

Not all the exiles were in hard circumstances in Batavia. The genteel or, at least, petit bourgeois character of many exiles is confirmed by the research of Murakami in the 1930s. From his scrutiny of Dutch church marriage records and wills for 1619–55 (70 entries), Murakami was able to identify such persons as Anthony Japon, sergeant of the *marjdikers*, or mixed-race soldiers, slave-trader, and moneylender; Michiel Boesaimon, Christian merchant and moneylender; Michael Itchiemaon, captain of the Japanese residents; and many others. He was also able to identify Michael T’sobe, as Michael Dias, a moneylender of probable mixed Portuguese parentage. T’sobe’s gravestone was “discovered” in 1889. The inscription in Old Dutch gave his birthday as August 15, 1605 and date of death as April 19, 1663. Born in Nagasaki, like many of the exiles, he was described as a “respectable Japanese Christian” (King 1889: 97–101; Murakami 1939).

Others gained even higher social status in Dutch colonial society (Blussé 1986). As may be viewed in an oil painting displayed in the Rijksmuseum of Amsterdam, one such was Cornelia van Neijienroode, a girl of mixed race born from the liaison between the head of the Dutch trading post in Hirado from 1623 to 1632 and the daughter of a wealthy Hirado merchant. Married to a Dutch burgher, she took her place in Dutch colonial society. In 1667, a five-tiered pagoda was built for the repose of the souls of her parents on the grounds of Zuiunji temple in Hirado (Matsura 1993: 28). Among the exiles in Java were the six offspring of François Caron and Eguchi Juzayemo, daughter of a Hirado townsman. Connections must have counted for much, as two of the sons later studied at Leiden, one returning as missionary-scholar to Ambon (Caron 1935: lxvi).

Conclusion

The political impact of the Japanese at the Ayutthayan court was undoubtedly singular. But, though the question remains underresearched,

armed bands of Japanese roving the China seas in the 16th and 17th centuries — whether as *wako*, as mercenaries of the Portuguese or Dutch, as followers of charismatic leaders such as Yamada Nagamasu, as aggrieved (or drunk) sailors, or as part of officialized punitive missions (the Nuyts case on Taiwan) — had an overall impact on highly diverse historical events that cannot be dismissed. One common thread that links the Japanese abroad was their legendary martial skills, though this image is belied by a range of other engagements, especially where settled communities formed.

Some Japanese in the diaspora played the role of cultural brokers par excellence, for the Portuguese, Dutch, and English in their dealings with local societies. Such was the role of the Japanese-Malay interpreter whom John Saris brought from Banten when setting up the English factory in Hirado in 1613; of Ura-san for the Dutch in their dealings with the Trinh Court; of exiled Japanese Christians in Macau; of Yamada in Siam. Additionally, the Japanese Christian exiles in Batavia and Manila played intermediary roles between, respectively, the Spanish and Dutch authorities in their dealings with Japan, at least until the exclusion edicts led to the disappearance of these communities.

Compared to the Chinese diaspora, the Japanese “trade diaspora” was far smaller and it was not replenished by waves of newcomers as with the Chinese. Its impact was far more limited. History has not been kind to physical legacies of the Japanese presence in Southeast Asia. There are Japanese Christian tombstones in Jakarta from the 1880s; the baroque facade of St. Paul’s Church in Macau, believed to have been executed by Japanese Christians; and the “Japanese bridge” at Hoi An. Testimony from the *Jagatera bumi* is even thinner, though highly evocative. Archaeological research, as in the recovery of the remains of the *nihon-machi* in Cambodia (2004–08), fits a renewed Japanese interest in this episodic history.

The impacts of the red seal trade on Japanese society must have been considerable, especially in western Japan. Not only did it engage prominent local merchants such as Arima, but the trade obviously fed into an expanding local, market-based economy. Certain proto-industrial commodities such as dyestuffs were obviously put to good use in the local textile industry, while prestige goods, including silks procured in Vietnam, reached clients in the larger urban centers, not excluding the

nobility. We reserve for another chapter the role played by Japanese copper exports in lubricating the Southeast Asian trade, but the trade was obviously backed by an increasingly sophisticated banking or credit system, connecting with powerful merchant groups in Hakata, Osaka, and beyond.

Japanese would of course return to Southeast Asia, but only following the Meiji reformation. In the decades leading up to the Pacific War, large Japanese communities emerged in the British colony of Singapore and as agriculturalists in Tawau in British North Borneo, as well as in Davao in the Philippines, then under American control. While the community in Singapore would include a range of professional and commercial people, Southeast Asia also became a destination for *karayuki-san*, or prostitutes, mostly emigrants from the poverty-stricken coastal islands of the Goto archipelago, part of present-day Nagasaki prefecture. But here we speak of colonial borders — a far cry from the open seas upon which the *wako*, red seal ships, and Japanese Christians sailed.

9

The Intra-Asian Bullion Trade Economy Networks

Having set down the functional aspects of the Iberian and Dutch trading systems across the East-Southeast Asian region, especially with respect to their political and ideological components, we now examine the means and terms of exchange driving this trade. It was Adam Smith (1776: 207) who signaled the global character of the bullion trade. “The silver of the new continent,” he wrote, “seems in this manner to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce between the two extremities of the old one is carried on, and it is by means of it, in great measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected with one another.” Smith’s understanding has been echoed by modern economic historians. Flynn and Giráldez (1994: 71) note that, beginning in the 1570s, silver initiated “significant and continuous trade at the global level.” This also applies to the production of Japanese silver, which at its peak amounted to around one-third of the world supply. Others, such as Gunder Frank (1998: 177), have stressed the superiority of East Asia in the bullion trade, both “*more* industrious and more productive to begin with” than the Europeans. Southeast Asia especially prospered on the transshipment of bullion and goods between regions. Although prey to interruptions on the supply side, the East Asian bullion trade from c. 1500 oiled the wheels of commerce almost everywhere across the broader region.

The East Asian regional focus allows us to test certain assumptions regarding the use and trade of metal-based currencies over long distances, between dynamically interacting and competing tributary systems. This is what I term a Bullion Trade Economy Network, spanning not only East and Southeast Asia but also linking hemispheres in a correlated global trade. While, for most of the 16th century, gold was imported into Japan to meet surging demand, silver was Japan’s principal export

for most of the 17th century, though gold, along with copper, would join silver as a major export item later in the century. Not generally construed as bullion, Japanese copper nevertheless entered regional and even global trading networks in bulk, both as a traded commodity and as a coveted source of coinage, especially in Nguyen Vietnam. As with ceramic production, Japan's mining industry can be seen as a proxy of early modern proto-industrial development. Japan's participation in the bullion trade also fed into a 17th-century regional economic boom — albeit one that ended with the exhaustion of mines, the debasement of coinage to prevent a drain on precious metals, and a serious fiscal imbalance.

This chapter seeks to investigate why gold failed to become an enduring East Asian standard. What were the broader regional implications of China's bi-metallic policy, especially in relation to new regional demand for both silver and copper? How and why silver did emerge in the 17th and 18th centuries as the new standard currency in Asia, matching its importance in Europe and the Americas? What were the impacts of the drain in coinage on the early 18th-century Japanese economy and what remedial measures were taken to stem the outflow? Finally, how did imported metal flows lubricate domestic Southeast Asian exchange and commerce, and what were the more enduring impacts of the regional and global trade in bullion, copper included?

Gold and Silver Mines in Japan

As Adam Smith understood and as Kobata (1965) acknowledges, study of the historical effect of precious metal production in the New World is crucial to understanding the development of capitalism in Europe. It is worth looking into parallel developments at mining sites in Japan and impacts across the broader East Asian region. Whereas the annual average amount of silver production from Potosi in Peru and mines in Mexico averaged from about 30,000–394,000 kilograms per annum in the 1541–1640 period, the level of production in Japan — from the Ikuno silver mines in Hyogo, the Iwami Ginzan mines in Shimane, and the Sado Island mines — reached, in Kobata's rough estimate, 200,000 kilograms annually at the beginning of the 17th century. Until exports of silver fell off after the 1630s, the volume of Japanese silver exports entering the East-Southeast Asia bullion trade actually exceeded that sourced


by the Manila galleon (Kobata 1965: 48). However, this estimate must be read against the best estimates for Spanish bullion exports entering this trade (Flynn and Giráldez 1996: 55–56).

Under the Tokugawa *bakufu* system, Kobata (1965) explains, gold and silver mining not only became a state monopoly, replacing the ad hoc system of the warring *daimyo*, it also became an important financial foundation. Domestically, gold and silver coinage replaced the older system of copper coins. The sudden increase in production of gold and silver was closely connected with new developments in foreign trade with Ming China, as demand for silver increased, especially with the advent of the China-sanctioned Portuguese trade in Chinese silk to Japan.

Developed from 1526, the Iwami Ginzan (“silver mountain”) mines in southern Honshu Island produced around half of Japan’s silver output during the 16th and 17th centuries. Domestically, silver from Iwami Ginzan entered the reserves of warring *daimyo* but also supplied vital resources to Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, seeking to unite the Shogunate system. In the first half of the 16th century, the Iwami Ginzan mines pioneered the Japanese use of the Korean method of smelting. Known to Portuguese and/or Jesuit visitors and appearing on early European maps of Japan, in 1571 Iwami Ginzan also adopted the Iberian amalgam method of mining, later extended to mines on Sado Island and Ikuno (present-day Hyogo prefecture in south-central Honshu), allowing even greater production. Here, thousands of convicts and others worked and died in primitive conditions. (See Map 9.1)

Nagasaki-Macau and the Silk-for-Silver Trade

The silver trade connecting Nagasaki with Portuguese Macau and China was in large part animated by Japan’s seemingly insatiable demand for high-quality silks. This was understood by Ralph Fitch (1921: 41), visiting Melaka in 1588, who recorded, “When the Portugals go from Macau to Japan, they carry much white silk, golde, muske and porcelanes, and they bring from thence nothing but silver.” The silk and textile trade has been surveyed from the supply side; in this chapter, we examine the means of exchange, especially as represented by silver, the new East Asian standard for settling large-volume transactions. Yet there was little



Map 9.1 Japanese Silver Mines and Trade Ports, c.16th–18th centuries

consensus on the amount of silver produced and exported from Japan (See Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 Portuguese and Japanese Red Seal Trade Silver Exports in Millions of Taels (1546–1637)

Year	Silver Exports (millions of taels)	Source
1546–70	12.4–15.5	Souza
1580–97	7.5–8.9	Souza
1546–1638	36.6–41.5	Souza
1615–1625	11.0	Iwao
1636	2.3	Kaempfer
1637	2.1	Kaempfer
Annual Average	1.3	Caron

Kobata (1965: 256) notes that in 1635, three ships exported 1,500 cases of silver; in 1636, four ships exported 2,350 cases; in 1637, six ships exported 2,600 cases; and in 1638, 1,250 cases were exported (each case contained 10 *kam*, i.e. 1,000 taels). As George Souza (1986: 56–57) argues, any estimate of the value of Portuguese exports of silver bullion must establish, first, the frequency of Portuguese arrivals and departures from Japan, and second, the annual estimated and observed values of their commercial transactions. Ideally, the variable rate should be factored in of the *respondência*, the practice of lending money on the cargo, which worked as a virtual insurance system.

From his research, Souza (1986: 58) determined that, from 1546 to 1579, the Portuguese exported between 12.4 and 15.5 million taels of silver from Japan (65 voyages each carrying an average annual value of 400,000 to 500,000 taels). From 1580 to 1597, average exports fluctuated at 300–600,000 taels per annum, or around 7.5 to 8.9 million taels over those 17 years. According to Souza, data for the last 41 years of Portuguese exports of silver bullion from Japan are more precise, estimated at 16.7 million taels. Altogether, for the period 1546–1638, Portuguese traders imported between 36.6 to 41.1 million taels of silver.

Even so, this figure does not account for bullion exported by the red seal ships, reaching, in the estimate of Iwao (1976: 150), one million taels a year over the 1615–25 period. But the ratio of red seal ship activity relative to that of the Portuguese varied with the gradual implementation of the Tokugawa policy of limiting direct Japanese involvement in foreign

trade, leading to a ban in 1635–36. As with the Manila galleon trade, the figures do not account for shipwreck, pillage, and other leakage. In the final years, the Portuguese vastly expanded their trade activity, plausibly owing to a liquidity crisis in the flows of New World silver to Manila, a tightening of credit in Japan, and financial losses incurred as a result of Dutch attacks on their shipping (Souza 1986: 58). While the Nagasaki trade in bullion was undoubtedly lucrative for the Portuguese, meaningful accounting remains problematic, especially as trade secrets were closely guarded and profits entered the area of commercial intelligence of the times. Nevertheless, as discussed below with reference to the English East India Company trade, it is a question that has engaged both contemporary and modern economic historians.

Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans in the Japanese Bullion Trade

Following the final expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1641, Dutch and especially Chinese bullion exports increased steeply. Silver exports also continued steadily until 1668–72, when the Japanese issued an ordinance against the export of this metal. Meanwhile, Korea opened up as a market for Japanese silver. But whereas the Chinese sought to smuggle silver, the Dutch turned their attention to *koban*, the elliptically shaped Japanese gold coins.

The VOC Trade in Gold

According to Kobata (1965: 195, 255), with a new balance in the relative values of gold and silver in East Asia by 1640, and the loss of the relative advantage of gold over silver in Japan, a window of opportunity opened for the resumption of Japanese gold exports (as had earlier attracted the Portuguese). The Dutch took advantage of this opening to launch into the export of gold. The Dutch had been interested in the gold trade to Japan from an early date. For example, VOC records for September 1617 reveal that the senior Dutch merchant at Ayutthaya, Maerten Houtman, reported a 35 to 40 percent profit on gold traded to Japan. Some ten years prior, the English agent in Siam had reported an exchange ratio of gold to silver at one to three. According to Bucknill (1931: 19), from June 1690, *koban* and smaller rectangular *itzi bu* coins, counterstamped

with a rampant Dutch lion symbol, took their place in Batavia alongside other European currencies.

Raffles, founder of Singapore and the author of a study on Dutch trade with Japan (1929), states that, in 1640, the Dutch commissioned and executed “to the best” orders for 10 to 12 million florins. This translated into an amount between 100 and 150 chests of gold in *koban*, *tibangs* and *zebos*. Citing VOC official Gustaaf Willem von Imhoff, at its peak the trade reached 200 chests of gold coin and 100–150 chests of silver. This amounted to a trade worth between half a million to one million sterling per annum. In 1641, according to Crawford (1820: 323), the Dutch exported 80 tons of gold, or 700,000 pounds, but only 14 chests of silver, or 4,666 pounds. The gold, in turn, was sold in India, raising a profit of 28 percent, while the silver realized a profit of only 4 percent. Thereafter, silver exports dropped away. Crawford believes the increased difficulty of working mines in Japan or official prohibitions drastically affected supply.

Another reason for renewed Dutch interest in Japanese gold was the loss of their establishment on Taiwan in 1662. Until then, the major supplier of gold to the Dutch had been China. Glamann (1953: 46) indicates that, at the close of the 1660s, abundant supplies of gold were discovered in Japan. As VOC diary entries reveal, the Dutch were particularly interested to learn of the discovery of various new gold mines around Japan, including the discovery in 1733 of a small gold mine in the precincts of Nagasaki Bay, which eventually yielded only a few nuggets (Van der Velde and Bachofner 1992: 22).

According to Raffles (1929: 22), after being coined, gold continued to be a very profitable trade item, purchased for 6 taels 8 maces or 6 taels 7 maces. Mas or mace coins (from the Malay for gold), were also in wide circulation, as at Aceh or Makassar. Records for 1669–71 reveal that gold was purchased during those years for as low as 5 taels 6 maces and 5 taels 8 maces, “for the great men of the country or merchants.” For two of these years, more than 100,000 *kobans* were obtained, rendering a profit of one million florins. As Glamann (1953: 45) explains, most of this gold was carried by way of Melaka to the Coromandel coast of India. This is noteworthy because, as Frank (1998: 142, 177) emphasizes, demand for the precious metal made India (alongside China) a global

gold destination. Even so, India never rivaled China as the premium global silver “sink,” as it was obliged to re-export some silver eastward.

The VOC Silver Trade

There were two types of Japanese silver exports, as Raffles clarified: fine and coarse, or bar, silver, also known as light and heavy money, respectively. Before 1635, bar silver was fixed at the rate of 62.5 stivers per tael, adjusted to 57 stivers per tael after that year. As this rate was considered overvalued by the Dutch for the Indian market, they shifted their attention to gold (Raffles 1929: 221). Even so, Glamann (1953: 49) observes, from 1666, the VOC calculated the tael at 70 stivers *ligt* coin (as opposed to *swaar* money at 25 percent higher value used in the Netherlands). Needless to say, such differentials in currency values, along with the VOC’s simple bookkeeping practices, which ignored freight costs, make it difficult to establish net returns on trade with any precision.

Japanese records, notably the *Empo Nagasaki-ki*, offer a useful context, not only for total Dutch exports of silver from Japan, but for the even more substantial Chinese exports. Whereas, during 1648–55, Dutch and Chinese silver exports were in close equilibrium, during 1656–72, the ratio of Chinese exports to Dutch had doubled. Moreover, during 1672–84, Chinese silver exports entered the record, but none were recorded for the Dutch. No records on Chinese exports are available for 1672–84 (in any case, a period when smuggling was rife). Thus, for the 71-year period 1648–1718, total Chinese silver exports were 259,374 *kan* (500 *monme*) versus, for the Dutch, 104,079 *kan* (727 *monme*), where 1 *kan* equals 1,000 *monme*, or 100 taels (Matsutake 1988: 45).

Kobata (1965: 256) notes that the Dutch continued to export large volumes of silver, at least until 1668 (1672?), when its export was prohibited. By 1685, however, silver lost its primary place to copper. It is difficult, however, to sustain Kobata’s view that the Dutch heavily exported silver in the 18th century. Notably, the Dutch Deshima diaries for 1700–40 scarcely even mention silver outside of Chinese concerns. As discussed below, the Dutch continued to export silver in the form of *kobans* until they came to be so debased as to be a poor means of external exchange.

Writing in the first decades of the 18th century, the Dutch West India Company official Roggewain (Harris 1745: 305) reckoned that the entire Deshima trade, gold and non-gold, produced an annual revenue of 5 million guilders, or half a million sterling, “exclusive of the great advantages that result from the distribution of the effects from Japan, over all the Indies, which perhaps result to us much more.”

The Korean Silver Trade

The Japanese trade in silver with Korea exceeded even that of the VOC trade in certain periods. This was especially the case following the Dutch ouster from Taiwan in 1662, when, bereft of imports of fine white raw Chinese silk, Japan began to focus on Korea as an alternative source of imports. While the Choson court began dispatching envoys to Japan in the 1380s, from the mid-15th century, Korea began concentrating its diplomatic and trading activities on the island of Tsushima, in the straits between southwestern Korea and Kyushu, and where trade was mediated by the So clan. In line with an agreement of 1609, this trade took three forms: tributary (*shinjo*): official, in which the Korean government bought copper and tin along with exotics like sappanwood; and private or market trade (Tashiro 1976: 85).

According to Chung Sungil (2004), the Tsushima clan (as compared to the VOC, who were closely monitored by the central government) was effectively able to circumvent restrictions by falsifying reports sent to the *bakufu*. After 1695, however, the buoyant trade situation declined; this had little to do with official ceilings set by the Shogunate, but rather occurred in tandem with the devaluation of Japan’s silver money in the 1690s. Nevertheless, Korea actively courted the trade through its “tribute” missions to Edo, as with the return mission witnessed by the Dutch in February 1712. Not only did Japanese silver help the Choson court to keep up its tribute payments to China, but the trade in silver linked Japan with continental Asia in the trade in ginseng and furs (Van der Velde and Bachhofner 1992: 143).

Japan and the Global Copper Trade

From the last quarter of the 17th century, as surveyed by Glamann (1953), silver and gold were superseded by a third metal for coinage — copper. In fact, Adam Smith (1776: 167) had much earlier noted that “the copper of Japan makes an article of commerce in Europe.” He was making the point that the market for metals was not confined to the neighborhoods of the mines but extended over the whole world. Moreover, he observed that the price of copper in Japan influenced the price of copper in Europe, just as the price of silver in Peru affected the price of silver in China (Shimada 2006).

As Swedish economic historians analyzed in the 1930s, the Dutch trade in copper at Nagasaki entered the European market in such capacity that it equaled or even, in certain decades, exceeded volumes produced by Sweden, the dominant European producer of the 17th century. Notably, Albert Olsen directly linked the slump in Swedish copper production with VOC imports of Japanese copper via Amsterdam. While silver coin upheld its dominance as the monetary standard in Europe, in 1624 Gustavus Aldolphus (r. 1611–32) of Sweden instituted a Swedish monetary standard of copper alongside silver (Glamann 1953: 42).

Prior to the Tokugawa period, Japan was an importer of copper coins from China, then the most common currency for ordinary market transactions (Maruyama 1993: 123). Portuguese interest in copper as a trade item went back to the 16th century, when merchants in Antwerp purchased it for the East Asia trade (Glamann 1953: 42). Japanese copper formed an important trade item only in the last years of the Macau-Japan trade and was chiefly used by Bocarro in his famous gun foundry in Macau. Boxer (1931: 6) clarifies that, because the cannon industry was so important for Macau, regaining access to Japanese copper was one of the chief objects of the ill-fated Portuguese embassy to Japan of 1647. Doubtless, the copper produced by Japanese foundries was put to good domestic use, in cannonry, the manufacture of bells, and in the casting of giant Buddhist statues. But while the Portuguese imported copper from Japan, by the 1630s they exported sizable quantities of copper to Trinh Vietnam. It was only in 1645, however, with the lifting of the *bakufu*'s 1638 embargo on copper exports, that copper exports from Nagasaki

began to expand dramatically, under the auspices of the Chinese and the VOC (Souza 1986: 54).

Japanese Copper Mines

According to Japanese economic historian Shimada Ryuto (2006: 46–56), Japan was host to 243 working copper mines as of 1703, producing some 5,300 tons on average per annum. Even so, the main mining regions were limited to northeastern Honshu (Mutsu, Dewa), with another cluster on Shikoku (Beshi). Many of these mines began as gold or silver mines but turned to copper when the gold and silver were exhausted. The best documented mine is that of Beshi, run from 1691 by the Sumitomo family with permission from the central authorities. Although smelted locally, the base copper was refined into pure copper at Sumitomo-controlled refineries in Osaka. There, it was shaped into bar copper, as exported by the VOC from Nagasaki; other types of copper ingot were produced for domestic consumption.

Needless to say, the Dutch came into fierce competition with the Chinese in the procurement and export of Japanese copper. This competition was complicated by the existence in Osaka of a shadowy organization of copper merchants called the Doza, the character of which was not fully understood by the Dutch. Under the control of the Sumitomo family, which also operated large refineries, the Doza was responsible for delivering copper to the Nagasaki Kaisho, or *bakufu* trading office. It would appear that the copper ingots or bars were freighted by barge to Nagasaki by the coastal route, an operation that required much security, owing to the differential between the price of export copper and that sold domestically. Established in 1701, the Doza had its monopoly revoked in 1712 by the Shogun, who exhorted local *daimyo* to search for new copper mines. Reconstituted between 1738–46, the monopoly was discontinued until 1766–1868. As witnessed by the Dutch in May 1705, the Osaka refinery was capable of high output (Van der Velde and Bachofner 1992: 563; Shimada 2006: 51, 165).

From the early 1700s, some 70 percent of the copper output was earmarked for export, dropping to 54 percent in the 1770s, as the domestic share rose accordingly. Notwithstanding certain innovations in drainage and mining techniques and the trend toward labor-intensive activities,

the national output of copper fell by approximately 50 percent in the course of the 18th century (Shimada 2006).

The VOC Copper Trade

At a time when gold offered by far the greatest profits for the Dutch, demand for copper in Europe and India was lagging. By the 17th century, as Shimada (2006: 17–19) has documented, the Dutch entered the trade in copper from Japan in a big way, as supplies appeared abundant. Copper came to dominate what has been described as the 17th-century VOC intra-Asian triangular trade, whereby copper shipped from Nagasaki on VOC ships either went to Europe via Batavia, or was diverted from Dutch-controlled Melaka for markets in Ayutthaya and Trinh Vietnam or South Asia; the trade triangle was closed as VOC ships returned to Nagasaki with a mix of tradable cargoes. By the 18th century, Batavia had replaced Melaka as the major transshipment base.

According to Kaempfer, the Dutch paid 12.55 taels or 18.5 Spanish dollars per *picul*, which the Singapore-based Crawfurd deemed much cheaper than copper sourced from Britain. In one period, the Dutch exported 700–1200 tons a year, much of it disposed of in India at a profit of 90 to 95 percent. Crawfurd believed that the Dutch received Japanese copper at a price far below its intrinsic value, as a “favor” and as a tax on the traders who supplied it (Crawfurd 1820: 323).

The Intra-Asian Copper Trade

In 1644, Raffles (1929: 222) noted that the Dutch supplied Banten with 4,000 *piculs* of copper; Surat with 2,000; and the Coromandel coast of India with 1,000. In 1655, the price of copper in Japan rose from 36 to 42 florins per hundredweight. In that year, the Dutch placed an order for 20,000 *piculs*, realizing a great profit. Raffles further explains that Japanese copper consisted of both sheet and bar copper, the former purchased at 200 taels per *picul*, 20 percent cheaper than European copper.

From his scrutiny of Dutch export figures for Japanese copper for the period 1646–1734, Glamann (1953: 51) confirms that the largest part of Japanese copper circulated in the intra-Asian trade, with a smaller part arriving in Europe. He also observed that, while in the 18th century

nearly all copper exports from Japan were routed through Batavia, in the previous century up to 1666, the bulk was taken to Taiwan and Melaka before distribution to markets in India and elsewhere. For the years 1701–24, Bengal took 27.03 percent; Coromandel, 24.57 percent; Surat, 23.99 percent; Sri Lanka, 11.59 percent; the Malabar coast, 8.37 percent; Mocha, 3.46 percent; and Persia, 0.99 percent. Figures for the 17th century are lacking but, Glamann reasons, the quota for the Coromandel coast was probably larger, and that of Bengal smaller.

European Markets for Japanese Copper

European researchers have shown that, for the period 1672–75, Japanese copper imports to Europe amounted to half the simultaneous copper and brass exports from Sweden, Europe's traditional supplier. As Glamann (1953: 61) observed, the period coincided with wars in northern Europe. Yet, by the 18th century, Japanese copper bars were of subordinate importance in the European trade of the VOC. Besides the practice of using Japanese copper as ships' ballast, the major determinant governing the trade was undoubtedly price differentials between the Japanese and Dutch markets, in particular the differential between Swedish and Norwegian bar copper and that from Japan. In any case, these overall trade figures suggest the great diversity of markets for Japanese copper in the 17th and 18th centuries, confirming our thesis of an Asian Bullion Trade Economy Network, not as an isolated hemisphere but corresponding to an emerging global marketplace, governed by a global sense of relative values.

But as Dutch demand for copper led to price increases, so by mid-1660, a growing domestic demand in Japan for copper-based coinage led to steep price rises. Even so, copper production in Japan was sufficient to meet the considerable VOC and, particularly, Chinese demand for copper. As Glamann (1953: 72) explains, Chinese merchants mostly shipped their copper to China, although some was carried to Batavia and to farther regions of Asia. In 1656, some 17–18,000 *piculs* of copper were carried by Chinese merchants to Batavia (and Banten), sold to private traders, and then carried to Coromandel, Surat, and Persia on VOC ships. By the 1670s, Chinese copper purchases nearly equaled those of the Dutch. In 1679, the VOC exported 23,500 *piculs* of copper bars

versus 18,477 by the Chinese, which, in turn, entered the hands of British and Danish traders in Siam and later shipped to India. Unable to control this leakage, in 1684 the VOC gave permission to Chinese merchants in Batavia and Banten to trade with Japan. At the close of the 1680s, the Chinese were exporting between 34,000 and 57,000 *piculs*, rising to 90,000 *piculs* in 1691, versus Dutch exports for the same year of 16,500 *piculs*.

From 1673 to 1684, the English gained a trading post on Taiwan. The success of this venture depended on intercepting the Chinese junk trade with Nagasaki. Such was the competition between the two northern European powers that Dutch merchants at Deshima were instructed by Batavia to purchase all the copper at Nagasaki to prevent it falling into the hands of the Chinese and, indirectly, the English (Pakse-Smith 1930).

The Special Role of Yunnan in the Imperial Chinese Monetary System

By the end of the Ming period, Yunnan province had produced 2.5 million kilograms of silver, or 75 percent of China's total output, equal to the amount entering China via the New World trade (Bin Yang 2008, chap. 6). But the Qing had gone over to a bi-metallic monetary policy, in which silver and copper coins coexisted. Silver was reserved for larger purchases, and copper for everyday use. While the Qing state did not regulate silver mining, it closely regulated copper mining along with the minting and circulation of copper coins. To feed the enormous demand for copper coins in daily use, the Qing sought both to import Japanese coins and to procure supplies of copper from domestic sources, Yunnan especially.

By the 17th century, the Qing had virtually achieved the economic incorporation of Yunnan by replacing cowries with copper-based currency. But as Japan began to control its copper exports to China, so the Qing began to further exploit copper mines in the Yunnan periphery. Yunnan was the only major copper source for the Qing imperial minting project in the 18th century; in this century, the Qing mined and shipped 5,000 tonnes of copper annually from the mountains of Yunnan to Beijing via the Yangtze River and Grand Canal. Burma, which had no other major source of bullion, also tapped Yunnan copper and silver,

ensuring a constant flow of precious metals into the lowlands (Bin Yang 2008). The entry of Yunnan copper into Burma further stimulated trade and commerce with the VOC and other commercial agents in the Bay of Bengal (Dijk 2006: 185). In the late 18th century, in order to meet regional demand for bullion, tens of thousands of Chinese miners from Yunnan moved into northern Burma and northern Vietnam to open mines (Lieberman 2003: 30, 146).

As Bin Yang (2008, chap. 6) emphasizes, “the copper industry in Yunnan was not only integral to the Qing monetary system and thus its economy but also left a deep legacy in local society.” Employing thousands of (sometimes unruly) people, the mining industry created major ecological impacts, including the decimation of the forests. But the copper boom in Yunnan was doomed with collapse and exhaustion. New World and Japanese silver would enter China as silver became the new global monetary standard, and as the supply side came to be monopolized by the Europeans.

Declining Japanese Copper Reserves and Responses

By the end of the 17th century, it became clear that known copper reserves in Japan were running down. In fact, the Dutch learned in 1701 that a huge copper mine near Kyoto was being held in reserve, to be exploited only in the event of an emergency. That year, Osaka merchants pooled resources to search for new copper mountains. Over the years, the Dutch heard of new copper mine discoveries in Shikoku, Satsuma, and elsewhere. In 1703, the Dutch unsuccessfully petitioned for the right to export more copper *piculs*, or small coins with a hole in the center, much in demand in Java (Van der Velde and Bachofner 1992: 133, 191).

Extracts from the VOC Deshima diaries offer a brief summation of major developments relating to Japanese copper exports. In July 1711, no copper was delivered to Nagasaki. Some newly introduced technical innovations in smelting, however, led to a reduction in spoilage. In May 1721, for the first time, the Dutch received copper bars instead of ingots. By at least 1730, copper refining was underway in Nagasaki, though not without problems: in 1734 a crucible burst, killing two operators. In April 1732, the Dutch understood that existing mines were being worked at increasingly deeper levels. In December 1736, they were informed that

the extra wages paid to miners working deeper underground would be passed on to the Company. The quality of the copper delivered was of concern to the Dutch. In October 1715, for example, they complained on this score and were promised redress by the Nagasaki *bugyo*, or magistrate (Van der Velde and Bachofner 1992: 133, 191, 394, 466).

According to Glamann (1953: 79), fear of the English, who in 1715 gained a trading opportunity in Guangzhou, was not the least reason for the tenacious Dutch hold on Deshima. Indeed, when in 1731, the English Company began to carry English copper into the East Asian market, the Dutch trade in Japanese copper was ruined forever. Still, large quantities of pure Japanese copper entered the official mint at Surabaya on Java during the British interregnum and struck as doits, or low denomination currency, for circulation in the East Indies (Bucknill 1931: 186).

Restrictions and Debasements

The question of bullion supply is important to the discussion of trade at Nagasaki. Crawford (1820: 322) agrees with Kaempfer that the fabulously rich gold seams of Sado Island were being rapidly depleted in his time. Imperial exactions on mining, along with local taxes, also raised the prices of gold and silver in Japan. In 1700, the Japanese government made an important alteration in the value of their gold standard coin, debasing the *koban* to the value of 37 percent. Such debasements fit with an overall policy adopted by the Tokugawa from the 1660s to restrict the outflow of silver coins in payment of trade.

As Raffles observed, the Dutch loss of Taiwan in 1662 led to the first shocks to their credibility in Japan; as a consequence, they began to suffer various prejudices and obstructions. In 1671, the *koban* was fixed by the Japanese at 68 maces; the hitherto free and unrestricted trade of the Dutch was subjected to arbitrary valuations of the imported cargoes, which were limited in volume. According to Imhoff's report, cited by Raffles, beginning in 1685, "our trade was limited to 300,000 taels, of which two-thirds were to consist of piece goods and weighable articles, and one third of silks." He continues, "This was confirmed in 1689, and we were allowed to export only 25,000 piculs of copper, whereupon our exports of that article formerly had been regulated according to our requisition." In 1689, a further tax was imposed on cargoes. In 1696, a new

kind of *koban* appeared, one-third less valuable than the old, yet received by the Dutch at the same rate. As senior merchant A. Douglas wrote in the diary entry for September 1701:

Regarding our request of September 4, we are informed that trade will be the same as last year; piece-goods and bulk goods up to 200,000 taels and silk up to 100,000 taels, both to be sold at an auction. The *koban* is valued at 68 maas and we are permitted to exchange goods with the city for copper up to 80,000 taels (Van der Velde and Bachofner 1992: 19).

The Dutch returned a loss at Coromandel when trading this item. Yet another debasement of the *koban* was recorded in 1710, reducing its weight by half; again the Dutch were obliged to receive it at the old rate (Raffles 1929). VOC diary entries describe the new *koban* (equal to 68 maces) as 60 percent copper covered with quicksilver. But regulations on the export of gold coins were restricted not only to the Dutch and Chinese, but also to the Satsuma clan of southern Kyushu. In 1686, the Dutch observed that the Satsumas' trade with Ryukyu and with Quelpaert (Cheju Island or Jeju-do) in Korea was limited to, respectively, 7,000 and 15,000 *kobans* a year (Vermeulen 1986–90, vol. 1).

Further restrictions followed. As the Deshima captain Van Hoorn wrote on October 1715, the following new orders were received: first, only two ships were allowed to trade annually; second, trade was limited to 300,000 taels; third, the exchange rate for *kobans* was set at the rate of 6.8 taels; fourth, the annual copper quota was set at 15,000 chests; fifth, provisions, porcelain, and camphor were set at 12,000 taels; and sixth, the minimum deposit of *kobans* was set at 140,000. Remaining *kobans* could be taken to Batavia (Vermeulen 1986–90, vol. 4). Vigorous Dutch complaints in 1720 led to a restoration of the previous rate. In 1730, yet another kind of *koban* was introduced, but, within the year, trade began to decline. Raffles observed a number of factors behind the decline, notably, a cap of 10,000 chests imposed upon copper exports, reaching back to 1721.

Raffles's Explanation

Although many advances had been made in shipping safety over the years, losses increased, apparently due to the habit of overloading by

private merchants. By 1743, the Deshima trading post was actually making a loss. The Dutch were effectively limited to one ship a year, with only half the cargo sanctioned. They gave serious thought to abandonment. Looking back, Raffles concluded that for more than a century the Dutch trade had been limited to two yearly ships from Batavia, the cargoes of which scarcely ever exceeded 300,000 dollars, limited only to trade in copper and a small quantity of camphor (1929: 34). Raffles dismissed this trade as “trifling.” Moreover, especially in consideration of economic fundamentals in Japan, the debasement policy was more of a political gesture, occasioned by suspicion of the Dutch. However, Raffles conceded that the Japanese had good reason to check an outflow of bullion.

Modern scholars, however, are less confident that the VOC suffered overall losses in Japan, especially if methods of accounting are re-examined. According to Camfferman and Cooke (2004), three main accounting issues should be considered when interpreting the records: transfer pricing, currency translation, and overhead allocation. While all these issues have been recognized in the literature, given the “complexity of the accounting issues involved,” they have not generally been considered together. These authors conclude that, if the accounting figures are adjusted accordingly, they support the view that keeping the Deshima trading base open was a correct decision from a commercial point of view.

Citing Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, Raffles observed that the discovery of mines in America had the effect of reducing the value of gold and silver in 17th-century Europe by one-third; about 6 million sterling was imported annually to Spain and Portugal. He queried, “shouldn’t the drain on bullion in Japan produce the opposite effect, especially as Japan is one country and not a continental system?” Here, Raffles implies, unlike the Spanish, the Japanese were better positioned to control or set limits on both production and exports. Raffles concluded that, given massive Dutch cupidity, it was not surprising that Japan revalued its bullion.

In other words, in contrast to the wholesale looting of Inca gold by the Europeans, Japan’s participation in the bullion trade was more in tune with economic laws of supply and demand. By the end of the 1660s, minting of gold monies had been unified, and, by the beginning of the 17th century, the Tokugawa achieved its monopoly of seigniorage,

or direct control of major gold mines, and, several decades later, silver mines as well (Maruyama 1993: 123).

The Early 18th-Century Crisis in Japan

By the early 18th century, Tokugawa finances were seriously disordered, with the currency debased and the economy beset by a chaotic budgeting and accounting system. Under Ogiwara Shigehide, who rose from chief magistrate of the Sado Island mines to superintendent of the *bakufu* finance department, the Tokugawa government resorted to debasing the currency, thus increasing the amount of currency in circulation. As Raffles was aware, debasement occurred in four stages, causing great confusion in the country, and also to the Dutch. According to one analyst, while the effects of debasement were not altogether negative, and while it subsequently turned out there was no alternative but to debase, Ogiwara along with mint officials profited illegally from the debasements and paid for it with his position (Van der Velde and Bachofner 1992: 545).

It was left to Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725), chief architect of government policy under Shogun Ienobu (r. 1709–12) and his successor Ietsugu (r. 1713–16) to address the question. At the heart of Hakuseki's reforms during his term in office (1709–15) — the so-called Shotoku Edicts of 1715 curtailing trade at Nagasaki — was the need to stop the drain on gold and silver caused by what he considered a one-sided trade. Far from embracing mercantilist principles, Hakuseki sought to tighten the trading monopoly and impose even stricter controls over smuggling. In fact, he mounted a two-pronged strategy, namely, curtailing silver exports and importing silver (Shimada 2006: 73).

A Confucian man of parts, Hakuseki's writings on the subject take a broad historical perspective. Hakuseki's report represents an economic history of the Nagasaki trade in miniature. But, in seeking to establish the volume of gold, silver, and copper exported from Nagasaki, he found the record for 1601–1647 missing from the port commissioner's office. From 1648 to 1708, however, the record revealed 2,397,600 *ryo* (half an ounce) of gold and 374,229 *kan* (8.25 pounds) of silver flowed out of the country from Nagasaki (the figures do not include exports from, for example, Tsushima to Korea, or to Ryukyu via the Satsuma domain in southern Kyushu). Comparing these figures with the amount of gold

and silver coined in Japan down to 1707, he reckoned (although modern historians have challenged these figures) that one-fourth of the gold and three-fourths of the silver had been lost. He predicted, not without reason, that at these rates gold reserves would be depleted in another hundred years, and silver even sooner. In the case of copper, the supply failed to meet the needs of foreign trade or domestic expenditure. He continued, "Thus treasures of permanent value which our country produces are being diverted in exchange for curios of momentary value which come from afar." Sound bookkeeping, a national inventory of bullion production, and strict limits upon bullion exports were imperative if Japan was to prosper as well as preserve its national wealth (Tsunoda 1958: 461–70).

Japanese Bullionism

The decline in copper production in Japan, combined with exhaustion of gold and silver resources, led to the emergence of what Shimada (2006: 61–63) has described as a "bullionist" turn in the Japanese economy. Far from being a net exporter of precious metals, as was its reputation from the 16th to the 18th centuries, Japan now pursued an active policy of importing precious metals. Was this not a case of Japan coming into line with the new East Asia standard, as explained in Chapter 5, whereby global trade with the two "sinks" of China and India was now conducted in silver?

We may also regard this "bullionist" turn in premodern Japanese history as symptomatic of a general crisis in early 18th-century Japan. Shimada (2006: 168) views these events against the background of declining resources, notwithstanding increasingly labor-intensive mining operations. Undoubtedly, as some economists have insisted, 18th-century Japan met the definition of an "industrious revolution," but with no fundamental shift in sources of power as in the mining industry of Sweden and, more dramatically, England, this fell far short of any industrial breakthrough. Japan did accomplish certain import-substitution activities, as in sugar cultivation, dye substitutes for sappanwood, and in establishing a domestic silk and cotton industry, but the real results would not be felt until the next century (Shimada 2006: 60–61).

Impacts of the Bullion Trade on the Southeast Asian Polities

In Chapter 5, we recorded a mixed bag of currencies and units of exchange in circulation across Southeast Asia, mostly prior to the advent of the integrated silver trade (c. 1500s onward). But we did not discuss the degree of monetization achieved in the “premodern” Southeast Asian polities, especially under the copper and silver standards. Following Frank’s (1998: 177) general assertions, the circuits of the bullion trade translated into enhanced commodification and commercialization wherever it flowed in Chinese and Southeast Asian marketplaces. But what were the specific impacts of the bullion trade on individual Southeast Asian polities, including the impact of debasements that obviously flowed through to local economies?

Shimada (2006) has sought to explain how the decline in Japanese copper production and restrictions on exports impacted upon East Asian economies. Faced with a shortage of copper for small-cash minting, local economies across East Asia resorted to hoarding, as they faced down a shortage of investment. Unless they took appropriate measures, local economies risked recession. Countries responded to the crisis in different ways. Persia and China sought to develop new copper mines, island Southeast Asia introduced lead- or tin-based coinage, while Korea resorted to barter arrangements. Northern Burma was well integrated into the Yunnan-oriented bullion trade networks. Even so, according to Lieberman (2003: 172), precolonial Burma was an imperfectly monetized economy lacking credit institutions. However, imported metals encouraged commodity production for domestic as well as long-distance trade. By the 19th century, silver was the new standard in Burma. Likewise, late Ayutthaya maintained a favorable balance with Europe and China up to 1730, through introducing foreign coins, including Chinese cash, and by facilitating the local minting of silver baht. Lieberman (2003: 293) sees the Ayutthaya case as one where, in comparison with the pre-1500 era, “maritime economic influences were particularly potent.”

In contrast to Burma, and notwithstanding local mining enterprise, Trinh Vietnam still relied on maritime links for its bullion requirements, with Japanese silver and copper figuring prominently as a component of the VOC triangular trade. As Lieberman (2003: 405, 415, 417, 421) has noted, by the 18th century, monetization had become so pervasive

that Trinh Vietnam, like Siam, began to pay for some labor services and accepted tax payments in cash. At a time when China was also sucking bullion out of Vietnam, competition for bullion intensified across the South China Sea. Interruptions in the flow of bullion and a shortage of coinage, as mentioned above, had domestic consequences, leading to rebellions in Trinh Vietnam in the 1730s and 1740s, as commercial life suffered. The Trinh responded to rising bullion prices by debasing coins, promoting silver alongside copper coinage, tolerating counterfeits, and allowing a huge expansion of Chinese-run mines along its northern border.

Nguyen Vietnam's export economy, based upon silk and exotic products, handsomely attracted foreign bullion. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the Japanese silk trade with Nguyen Vietnam was also a trade in minted copper coins, or *caixa*. Coins were used either as currency or melted down for the construction of cannons. Generally, a currency deficiency stimulated trade with Japan. In 1688, Nguyen Phuc Tran (r. 1687–91), who ruled Dang Truong (southern Vietnam), dispatched four letters to the Shogun and Nagasaki officials requesting in vain that coins be struck on his behalf in Japan. By 1725, the Nguyen simply had to cast its own coins as, by 1710, Japan had started to impose limitations on copper exports. Between 1695 and 1750, the price of Japanese copper in Vietnam had doubled. By the mid-18th century, the Nguyen had started to mint zinc coins, deemed inferior and thus contributing to a general economic downturn (Li 1998: 90–97).

Such trade-oriented polities were obviously far more integrated into Bullion Trade Networks relative to the vast interior zones of Laos and Cambodia where premonetized economies defied even French colonial efforts to collect tax in cash (silver) as opposed to kind through to the early 1900s (Gunn 1990). As Lieberman (2003: 30, 53) acknowledges, almost everywhere on the mainland, subsistence agriculture coexisted with growing commodity production for the marketplace; the major beneficiaries of the maritime trade were the coastal and lowland zones (Ayutthaya included), at the expense of interior zones.

The Philippine archipelago is geographically integrated with the South China Sea zone but the countryside benefited only marginally from the international commerce generated by the Manila galleon trade. Over a long period, the Manila galleon had operated as a state monopoly

controlled by Crown officials, and also as a system in which individual merchants could participate. While individuals amassed fortunes from this trade, the local population was not engaged except as sailors or ship-builders. Because the profits from the galleon trade were so great, local Spanish agents in the Philippines neglected to exploit such staples of the East-Southeast Asian trade as spices or commercial crops, as the Dutch and British later did in their respective colonial spheres (Zaragoza 1990: 25). A dichotomy existed between Manila as a key hub in the Bullion Trade Economy Networks and the internal economy, where traditional modes of production prevailed (Kathirithamby-Wells 1992: 607). This is not to imply that all internal commerce was deadened, but, through the Spanish period, the broader economy remained premonetized.

According to Reid (1988: 118–19), another impact of the “massive influx” of, especially, Japanese (but also Chinese and European) copper into the Southeast Asian marketplace in the 17th century was that most of the small and local mines became redundant. Even so, the bronze-working industry continued to flourish, as in the royal capitals of Southeast Asia where a range of items such as gongs, cannons, and colossal statues of Buddha were constructed. But there were other impacts, especially relating to interruptions in the Japanese supply.

Conclusion

From antiquity, the core East Asian states had a shared heritage of minting coinage. Despite the vagaries of dynastic change and internal struggles, the broad contours of the regional monetary system remained remarkably consistent. The reliance upon copper coinage, with its Chinese origins, as the standard was notable. So was the attempt by centralized states to impose this standard. All the concerned East Asian states were involved in mining, along with the regulation of copper mines and trade in copper. All shared the technology of forging copper coinage; the circular forged copper coins with a square hole for ready stringing became a familiar standard for everyday purchases. Even so, supply and demand for regional copper depended on many factors, namely market factors, trade prohibitions, domestic demand, and the exhaustion and discovery of new copper mines, whether in China or Japan.

While gold was a significant traded item over long periods, involving production sites across the broader East-Southeast Asian region, it never became a single standard in the region, though, as part of the Asian Bullion Trade Networks, gold was used to settle large transactions (as in the silk-for-bullion trade conducted at Nagasaki). Undoubtedly, gold was highly regarded in the Indianized world as well as in Japan, both for its rarity as well as its esthetic qualities, as applied in craft and religious iconography. While many societies across Southeast Asia esteemed gold for its intrinsic value, outside of Yunnan and its borderlands, the mining of gold, along with that of silver and copper, never became a highly organized activity within our time frame. Though the first arriving Europeans pursued rumors of gold, from the Golden Peninsula to the Philippines and far-flung Timor, they did little to exploit the resources, opting rather to tap into the major Asian source countries, China and Japan.

The switch by China to a bi-metallic policy (copper and silver) was obviously epochal in world-historical terms, especially as demand connected late Ming China to the prime New World sources of silver and, while supplies lasted, with Japan. While demand for copper across East-Southeast Asia continued through our period via the triangular trade, it was clear that the new emerging global standard of exchange was silver. Silver, gold, and copper mining was undoubtedly an index of early proto-industrial activity, as was the application of metallurgy in the minting process, as conducted under strict state controls in the commercial centers of China, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam.

Vietnam, especially, became highly dependent on Japanese copper-based coinage. Likewise, Java under Dutch control was brought into the East Asian currency regime around 1685, becoming increasingly reliant on debased Japanese silver *koban*. Just possibly, the free flow of Japanese silver and copper into VOC trading networks deadened local mining industries, especially in the archipelago. No less important, as Shimada (2006) has revealed, importers such as Vietnam became so dependent upon Japanese imports that they were also highly vulnerable to supply-side problems.

As the case of late Tokugawa Japan reveals, monetary policy required state intervention in the face of debasements and declining resources. But Japan was also singular in the way that it engaged the world system, through strict control of foreign transactions at a small number of sites,

of which Nagasaki was the most important. By contrast, China under the Qing appeared to lose control over the terms of trade, especially as the Guangzhou Trading System facilitated the hemorrhaging of silver from China, traded against opium and other Western imports.

Overall, our analysis of the mining industry, bullion flows, and shifting currency standards reveals a high degree of correlation across, not just the major mining, refining, and minting economies (China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam), but practically all the major export- or trade-oriented Southeast Asian polities. The notion of competing currency values was clearly understood by all the major players, both indigenous and external. We can boldly assert that the entire East Asian region participated in exchange relationships mediated by bullion (including a copper standard), through established protocols relating to exchange rates and values in a way that confirms a truly unifying regional monetary system — notwithstanding considerable local variation — prior to the age when European banks and credit organizations would issue their own silver or gold-backed currencies.

This is not to suggest a generalized monetization typical of present-day advanced capitalist economies; but deepening monetization across mainland and island Southeast Asia went hand in hand with commercialization wherever trade was conducted. We suspect that, notwithstanding occasional liquidity crises, devaluations, and interruptions to supply, the monetization of trade and commerce via the bullion trade steadily increased across the 1500–1800 period, postponing the retreat of the Southeast Asian economies from the nascent world economy, and cushioning the livelihood of millions from the globalizing forces unleashed by Western imperialism.

10

East-Southeast Asia in the Global Ceramic Trade Networks

Nothing better exemplifies the linking of the East and Southeast Asian states and polities into a coherent regional complex of producers and consumers than the ceramic trade networks. The production and quality of earthenware, including ceramics, is often viewed as an index of civilization — and the esthetic and technical quality of Chinese ceramics was held as equal to none. High-fired glazed ceramics and porcelains were produced by sophisticated processes hitherto unknown in Europe. Jingdezhen was the world's largest porcelain production site during 1350–1750. The production, marketing, and transport to local, regional, and long-distance markets engaged tens of thousands of workers in numerous large-scale production sites — this called for a high degree of proto-industrial activity and organization, even if it fell short of a capitalist revolution. Alongside production sites in China, such other production centers as Champa, Dai Viet (Vietnam), Siam, Burma, and Hizen-Arita on Kyushu Island followed suit, finding regional and long-distance markets according to market niche. Unlike textiles and many other traded goods, durable ceramics remain as examinable objects and can serve as veritable time capsules of long lost or poorly recorded exchange networks. The expanding field of marine archaeology helps us understand the nature of these exchanges, from provenance to geochemistry. The analysis of specialized ceramic production sites can be a highly sensitive “proxy of political, social as well as economic change” (Grave et al. 2005: 165).

A number of studies in English have focused on the traded ceramics (Impey 2002); particular regions (Guy 1986); the VOC trade in ceramics (Volker 1971); kiln technology (Ho 1990); and the correlation of complex production cycles among Japan, China, and Vietnam (Ho 1994).

This chapter seeks to highlight the global trade in East-Southeast Asian ceramics — the identification and examination of the primary, secondary, and tertiary destinations of highly prized commodities turned *objets d'art* and, even, objects of sacred veneration. We seek to throw light on the production and exchange dynamics of East-Southeast Asian ceramic production and consumption, especially with regard to our broader aim of identifying proto-capitalist industrial activity. We also test the theory that the European invasion caused a crisis in production cycles during the 17th century.

Chinese Ceramics Production

The Southern Song (1127–1279) actively promoted the export of Chinese ceramics to address the drain on silver stemming from the flow of high-value imports from the long-distance India trade. Some 400 kilometers inland, but connected to the coast via the Yangtze River and other waterways, Jingdezhen in present-day Jiangxi province was for centuries the major global ceramic production and export center. Dating from the 6th century CE, its status as a production center was consolidated under the Song. By Ming (1368–1644) times, production of high-quality porcelain at Jingdezhen surged; it became the procurement center for the royal household, and also met the needs of the thriving export market. Owing to local disorder, production stopped in 1506–21 and again in 1567–72, when the government orders failed. Jingdezhen was also temporarily closed in 1650–80 during the Ming-Qing transition. Under the Qing (1644–1911), Jingdezhen furnaces were revived as “imperial kilns,” under the close attention of the emperor and high officials (Watson and Ho 2007; *Encyclopedia Britannica Online* 2009). It was also the principal source of export porcelain for the Dutch.

Driving European interest in Chinese ceramics were the published accounts of such European visitors to China as the Dominican Gaspar da Cruz in 1569 and the Spanish Juan de Mendoza in 1586. Undoubtedly, the most sensational text of this kind was the quite detailed account of the porcelain production process — then practically unknown in Europe — in the “Jesuit letters” sent by François Xavier d’Entrecolles from Jingdezhen in 1712 and 1722. This entered various texts, including the influential work on China by Jean-Baptiste du Halde, published in

1735 (Gerritsen 2009: 123). Europe had already sought independently to master the process of manufacturing porcelain: the credit goes to the chemist Johann Friedrich Böttger, employed by Augustus the Strong, elector of Saxony (r. 1694–1733) and king of Poland (r. 1697–1706). In 1710, Augustus founded the Meissen porcelain factory, which soon began to produce imitations of Chinese and Japanese porcelain (Hobson 1908, chap. 13).

Writing at the end of the Kangxi reign (r. 1661–1722), d'Entrecolles observed that, while other centers of production existed in China, “[Jingdezhen] alone has the honor of supplying all parts of the world; even the Japanese come to China for it” (Gullard 1908: 274). To British diplomat George Staunton, part of Lord Macartney’s embassy to China in 1793–94, the spectacle of several hundred factories belching flames into the night sky was awesome. As he learned, the furnaces employed some one million male workers. The production of a single teacup involved the labor of 50 different hands, from the quarry to the furnace. The painting alone was divided among half a dozen persons. The most beautiful specimens attracted premium prices at imperial command (Staunton 1798: viii) (Plate 9).

Involving a series of complex industrial and craft processes, transport logistics, and “outsourcing,” ceramic production in China was obviously an important index of industriousness, if not of the “sprouts of capitalism.” Having access to kaolin and other resources, Jingdezhen was strategically connected to the Grand Canal. Other production sites emerged, such as the maritime trade-oriented south Fujian (Minnan) region, together with long-distance trade under the Song. In contrast to the imperial chokehold over the kilns of Jingdezhen, the Fujian ceramic industry has been seen by some analysts as integral with the urbanization, commercialization, and success of this outward-looking coastal zone (Clark 1991: 166–67; So 2000; Ho 2001: 237).

Acknowledging the archaeological data collected by Chinese researchers from the 1950s on, notably the Fujian Cultural Relics Team, Ho Chuimei (2001) has sought to identify the growth and geographic distribution of ceramic production sites in the Minnan region during the Song and Yuan periods. In these periods, celadon production was concentrated in coastal areas of Fujian, Tong’an, Nan’an, and Quanzhou, as well as other centers further north. Certain wares were crafted expressly for the

Southeast Asia market, notably *kendi*, or spouted pouring vessels, made at Dehua, Anxi, and Cixao. During this period, some 100,000 people, or 10 percent of the Minnan population, were engaged in the ceramics industry.

In the Ming-Qing period, as internal markets expanded, production increased dramatically in the inland mountainous areas, closer to sources of clay at Anxi, Dehua (known for high-value wares), and nearby Jinjiang. The local kilns at Dongmen, close to Quanzhou, stopped production (Pearson et al. 2001: 192–93). Ho (2001) has tracked a shift from coastal sites to inland areas, positing the collapse of the Song at the hands of the Mongols as a likely reason. There could also have been economic factors for the shift, such as rising taxes, transport logistics, kaolin clay availability, or even competition with other industries for such resources as wood. The shift to the interior was marked by a change in ceramic glazes, vessel types, and firing technology.

The Marine Archaeological Evidence

Some of the most exciting research in the field of the historical ceramic trade stems from advances in marine archeological research. Needless to say, mounting expeditions is fraught with financial and legal risk; the stakes are high for those who venture the capital as well as for prize claimants, both individual as well as national (Ruppé and Barstad 2002). Researchers like Roxana M. Brown (2005) have led the way in interpreting the often conflicting evidence.

Chinese ceramics entered the ancient silk roads as traded items. As Abu-Lughod (1989: 327) points out, Chinese ceramic shards are found strewn along the coastal zones of the Indian Ocean. The same is true of Southeast Asian waters and terrestrial sites. But the first long-distance traded ceramics arriving in Southeast Asia were undoubtedly produced in south India, in the “Indian transfer” of the 1st to 5th centuries CE. The tradition was carried forward by Muslim traders reaching the coast of China.

The influence of West Asian techniques on Chinese pottery may have been significant, as with the importation from Abbasid Persia of cobalt oxide, vital for the production of blue and white porcelain. While the original source of cobalt was Persia, that arriving by sea was known as

Sumali (Su Bo Ni Qing) or Sumatra Blue, used for creating a rich dark blue pigment. Also known as Su Ma Li Qing (Samara Blue), it was first conveyed to Ming China by envoys from Sumatra (Srivijaya) in 1426, 1430, 1433 and 1434, or by the returning fleets of the Zheng He missions (Hobson 1923). Recent research on the cobalt-blue pigment used in Jingdezhen official porcelain around the end of the Xuande reign of Ming (1426–35 CE) has confirmed the sourcing of cobalt ores of different types from different places (Du and Su 2005).

An important link was the recovery in the late 1990s of the Belitung Wreck, a dhow-type ship laden with Changsa ceramics dating from the Southern Tang (937–75 CE), known for their distinctive brown and straw-colored glazes (Flecker 2000; 2001). A wreck excavated off Cirebon on the north Java coast in 2004–05 yielded a wealth of Yue ceramics (olive- or brownish-green celadon) with strongly Buddhist motifs. It included a range of glass and other objects with Arabic and/or Islamic inscriptions, possibly of Syrian or Persian provenance, as well as two gold-plated daggers with Sunni Arab inscriptions. With its mixed Chinese and Arab cargo, the provenance of the ship is open to interpretation, though it may well have transited Srivijayan ports. This was not a Chinese vessel and possibly neither Arab nor Indian; rather, its lashed lug-and-dowel construction strongly suggests Austronesian origins (Tan Y. 2007).

The maritime trade was dominated by foreign shipping, at least until after the 8th century, when the first large oceangoing Chinese vessels began to appear. The Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) saw the construction of large naval vessels, explicitly for entering Southeast Asian waters, as in the invasion fleets sent to Japan in 1281, Dai Viet and Champa in 1283–88, and Java in 1292.

Significantly, there is no maritime archaeological evidence for Chinese vessels from the 8th to the 12th centuries. Even so, the discovery in 1987 and excavation in 2007 of the “Nanhai No. 1” or “South China Sea No. 1” wreck off the coast of Yangjiang, 240 kilometers southwest of Guangzhou, offers new data for contextualizing the long-distance Chinese maritime trade. Dating from the early Southern Song (1127–1279), the wreck contained some 80,000 porcelain items, believed to have been manufactured in folk kilns in Fujian and Zhejiang. The Nanhai vessel also carried ceramics plausibly crafted for the Middle Eastern market

(*South China Morning Post* 2007). By contrast, the Quanzhou Wreck, discovered in 1973 at the estuary of Quanzhou Bay, dated to c. 1275, was carrying a cargo of pepper and aromatic wood, evidence that it was returning from a Southeast Asian destination (Guy 2001: 295).

The early role of Korea (and Japan) in the East Asian trade networks deserves attention. In this regard, the Sinan Wreck, discovered off the southwest coast of Korea in 1976, offers rare evidence of the scale and organization of the China, Korea, and Japan trade, not only in ceramics but also in Chinese coins. Probably on its way back to Hakata in northern Kyushu from China when it sank in 1223, the Korean-built ship carried over 120,000 pieces of high-quality ceramics. Hakata hosted a Chinese merchant community at this time. According to Stargardt (2001: 366), the main entrepreneur responsible for the cargo was the Higashiyama Temple in Kyoto.

The earliest identified wrecks of Chinese junks in Southeast Asian waters are the Turiang Wreck from around 1400, found in the Straits of Singapore; the early 15th-century Bakau Wreck, found on the western edge of the Karimata Strait (broadly separating the islands of Borneo and Sumatra); and the Binh Tuan Wreck, c. 1608, in southern Vietnam, containing a cargo of Zhangzhou porcelain and cast iron. The Zhangzhou porcelain was definitely intended for Southeast Asian markets.

Excavations conducted at the 13th-century Majapahit capital of Trowulan in east Java have added to our knowledge of the ceramic trade. The oldest Chinese ceramics identified here are from the 9th century, predating the foundation of the kingdom. They include Yue ware ceramics (olive green), originating from Zhejiang, usually attributed to the Wu Yue kingdom (907–78 CE) and typically associated with the long-distance trade to the Persian Gulf (Dupoizat and Harkantingsih 2004).

The marine archaeological evidence of European ships engaged in the export of Asian ceramics provides another lens on the subject. For example, the Spanish ships *San Diego* (1600), wrecked off Luzon, and *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción* (1639), sunk off Saipan, offer mixed south China and Thai assemblages, including “heirloomed” or chronological outliers (Grave et al. 2005: 181). When Portuguese ships enter the picture, we begin to see Jingdezhen porcelain expressly crafted for the European market. The “Fort San Sebastian Wreck,” recovered in 2001 off Mozambique Island, is notable. Identified as the Portuguese carrack

Espadarte, which sank in 1558 on the return journey from India, the wreck yielded quantities of Ming dynasty blue-and-white porcelain from the Jiajing period (1522–66). Surprisingly, the Dutch ship *Mauritius*, wrecked off West Africa (1609), and the Portuguese ship *São Gonçalo*, wrecked off the Cape of Good Hope (1630), reveal Siamese and Burmese martaban (jar) assemblages (Grave et al. 2005: 181).

The next recorded wreck in Southeast Asian waters, the Vung Tau Wreck, is a *lorcha*, a hybrid Portuguese-Chinese vessel that sank in c. 1690, off Con Dao Island in southern Vietnam, carrying blue-and-white Jingdezhen porcelain for transshipment to Batavia and Europe (Flecker 2005: 145).

From the beginning of the 17th century until the mid-19th century, the only recorded wrecks in Southeast Asian waters with cargoes of ceramics (several European vessels aside) are Chinese vessels, representing a resurgence in the Chinese junk trade. A common item found on these wrecks is iron, wrought or cast, in a variety of pans and cauldrons, usually with the ceramics were stacked on top. The ceramics found in these wrecks were largely for utilitarian use as opposed to luxury consumption. However, Flecker (2005: 156) points to ceramics used in funerary practice or buried with the dead, as found in the Breaker Shoal Wreck southwest of Palawan Island, in the present-day Philippines. Destined for Borneo or Sulawesi, it is unclear who used this type of ceramic.

According to Brown (2005: 78–79), the shipwrecks reveal a substantial shortage of Chinese ceramics in the early Ming dynasty. This “Ming Gap,” as it was dubbed by Tom Harrisson (1958), dates from 1380 to 1487. From the evidence, China maintained a near monopoly in trade ceramics from at least the 9th to the early 14th centuries. But, from about 1368 to 1424–30, the cargoes yield only 30 to 40 percent Chinese ceramics, plunging to 5 percent in the mid-15th century. A bubble appears in the Hongzhi period (1488–1505), but a moderate shortage remains until the Ming ban on overseas travel is lifted in 1527. Shortages in the 16th century were not as severe as in the preceding century — not enough to lure Burmese and Vietnamese producers back into the market. But, between 1510 and 1580, Siamese kilns competed with Chinese, until China regained its monopoly.

As Brown (2005: 80) explains, the Siamese and Vietnamese ceramics in shipwreck artifacts represent a loss for China but a “golden age”

for Southeast Asian exporters. Even so, following the period of Chinese monopoly, there is a century-long gap in the marine archaeological evidence before the first mixed cargoes appear. But once they do, the Chinese monopoly is broken for two centuries. The plunge in Chinese exports emerges precisely after the last of Zheng He's voyages (1405–24, 1433). The “Ming Gap” exposes a dearth of blue-and-white porcelain corresponding to a 135-year period from 1368–1487. This, Brown (2005: 87) believes, can be attributed to closure of the Jingdezhen kilns by Yuan military activity. Among the Southeast Asian exports, Siamese ceramics dominate for 200 years, especially celadon, although northern and central Vietnam were also significant exporters.

The Siamese and Burmese Ceramics Trade

Archaeological research at Ban Chiang in northeastern Thailand, from the 1960s and 1970s to today, has offered special insights, not only into the prehistorical origins of Siamese ceramics (Labbe 2002), but also into the regional linkages, influences, and cultural practices associated with these productions (Guerin and van Oenen 2005). Our understanding of Siamese kilnware is also advanced by recent research derived from marine archaeology.

Flecker (2005: 18) confirms that, as a direct result of the scarcity of Chinese ceramics in the Southeast Asian market, Siamese ceramic exporters moved in. The northern kilns of Sukhothai and Sawankhalok, already producing glazed stoneware by the 10th–11th centuries CE, raised their production levels as kiln technology evolved and organization became more centralized. Building on a Mon tradition of stoneware production, Sawankhalok produced celadons with their characteristic green glaze. The major production site of Sisatchanalai, some 50 kilometers north of Sukhothai, mass-produced large martaban jars, Buddhist statuary, and other items, many for export. Products from these kilns reveal strong Chinese influence, though it is not clear if indigenous or Chinese potters were involved. Hein (1990) makes a claim for indigenous technology or at least a lack of foreign technology from the 10th century onward.

As Ayutthaya moved into the production of export-ware, the pace of ship construction increased to service the trade. Ships were of Chinese tradition (notably incorporating bulkheads and an axial rudder) and

used teak in the construction; in the Southeast Asian tradition, they also employed dowel-edge joining. These shipwrecks offer a great many examples of Siamese ceramics, but are also the best preserved, owing to their worm-resistant teak construction. In fact, the abundance of Siamese wrecks is matched only by the dearth of Chinese wrecks from the 14th to the 16th centuries. The Turiang Wreck is a case in point, revealing an assemblage of Sukhothai and Vietnamese black underglaze ware but no blue-and-white porcelain (Sjostrand and Barnes 2001). By the end of the 15th century, the Siamese kilns had virtually ceased production for export, as Chinese blue-and-white returned to the international market (Wade 2003: 30).

The Burmese trade in martaban jars was significant. From the 11th century, Mon people around the Gulf of Martaban in Lower Burma influenced the production of pottery in Pagan, as ports around the Gulf serviced the porcelain trade linking India and China, as well as the export of Sawankhalok and other Siamese wares. As Patricia Gutman (2001) has demonstrated, Arab, Chinese, and European sources track the Burmese martaban trade from the 14th century until its decline in the 18th. Under the Toungoo dynasty (1486–1752), the mainland production sites were transferred from the Siamese kingdoms to Burma. As Grave et al. (2005: 172) have hypothesized, martaban production and export from Burma in the late 16th and early 17th centuries can be directly linked to Dutch agency. Given that conditions for marine archaeology in Burmese waters are not yet optimal, future discoveries may await us.

The Vietnamese and Cham Ceramics Trade

Northern Vietnam emerged as a major ceramic production site during the period of Chinese domination (111 BCE–938 CE) over the Dai Viet state. The major production centers were along the Red River, from Thang Long (Hanoi) to Hai Duong province, with sites extending into the Haiphong delta and reaching the historical island port of Van Don, north of Ha Long Bay. Guy (2005: 110) describes Chu Dao, the major center of high-fired ceramics in Hai Duong province, as a veritable Vietnamese “Jingdezhen.” Firmly under Ly (1009–1225) state-backed enterprise, the Chu Dao kilns were designed especially to compete with Chinese wares in the Southeast Asian marketplace.

By the 8th century, as Bulbeck (2004: 319) observes, northern Vietnam had emerged as the largest ceramic production site in Southeast Asia, exporting large stoneware jars of a style indistinguishable from those of southern China. The brief reoccupation of Vietnam in the early 15th century by the late Yuan led to a tradition of Yuan-style motifs, including blue-and-white wares, Buddhist statuary, and other vessels. Vietnam also supplied blue-and-white tiles such as those found in Java at Trowulan and other Majapahit sites. According to Dupoizat (2003), these were clearly inspired by Middle Eastern, especially Persian, wares. Vietnamese wall tiles, produced on commission, were used to decorate newly constructed mosques on the north coast of Java, as at Demak and Kudus, and figure in buildings in Cirebon and Jepara.

As a maritime-oriented kingdom, Champa mastered ceramic production and entered the export industry. According to Guy (2005: 118), the Cham kilns, capable of producing high-fired glazed ceramics in commercial quantities, were located at various sites near Quy Nhon, in present-day Binh Dinh province of Vietnam. Cham wares are attested in Japanese sites, as well as in the Philippines and Java. The emergence of ceramics production under Cham control should be viewed in the context of rivalry between the rising Dai Viet state and the Cham kingdoms for access to the international maritime trade, at least until Dai Viet invaded and absorbed Vijaya in 1471. With the rise of the Ly dynasty in the 11th century and the restoration of the capital to Thang Long, Vietnamese kings sought to mesh their economy with the external trade. The contest with the Cham saw an expansion of shipbuilding. Even so, Cham ships continued to operate in Southeast Asian waters after the capture of Vijaya. Both Melaka and Ryukyu upheld trade relations with Champa. According to Guy, the Cham ceramics export industry declined owing to competition from China, when the Ming lifted bans on overseas trade after 1571. But the Ly sought to integrate the Southeast Asian trade as a tributary trade, bringing in, besides Champa, Laos, Siam, Java, and Melaka.

Overall, as Guy (2005: 107) has demonstrated, a valuable “barometer” of Dai Viet participation in international trade is the volume of glazed ceramics exported in the 15th and early 16th centuries. The Hoi An Wreck, discovered in the mid-1990s near the historic port city, contained some 15,000 intact pieces along with 100,000 incomplete. It

offers, in the words of Guy, “the most complete profile of Vietnamese export ceramics of this period to date.” Generally, Guy (2005: 115) notes, what the Vietnamese lacked in technical skill they made up for in decorative skill, as in richly colored polychrome wares “unlike anything seen in the Chinese tradition.” The largest group of ceramics found in the Hoi An Wreck were underglazed blue decorative wares, some matching Chinese blue-and-white in quality; other items, as preserved in the National Museum of Vietnamese History, include striking wine ewers, *kendi*, dishes, and urns in underglaze blue with striking dragon and *kylin* (*kirin*) patterns.

The Hoi An ship itself was in the Chinese style, but the teak timbers and storage jars from kilns in Singburi suggest construction in Southeast Asia, most likely at Ayutthaya. Guy hypothesizes that, as a Siamese royal junk, the Hoi An vessel was returning either to Ayutthaya or possibly Java, having laden its cargo at a government-designated port such as Van Don Island. Vietnamese ceramics have been attested at a range of sites in maritime Southeast Asia (Aoyagi 1993; Guy 1997), including the southern Philippines (Nguyen-Long 1999), and Japan (Hasebe 1993; Honda and Shimazu 1993). Vietnamese wares were also targeted at Middle Eastern countries, as attested at archaeological sites in the Red Sea, notably at Fustat, the first capital of Egypt under Arab rule, and the Arabian/Persian Gulf/Hormuz region. Individual pieces appear in the Iranian and Ottoman imperial household collections, including a famed bottle in the Topkapi Museum in Istanbul, dated 1430 and produced in Chu Dao.

As Guy concludes, the volume of cargo discovered in the Hoi An Wreck reveals the highly organized nature of the ceramic production center of the Red River. It points to a well organized system of production, marketing, and distribution that obviously involved strong capitalization with a massive investment of people and resources. The commissioning agents obviously knew their market.

The European Ceramics Trade

Items of Chinese porcelain entered European collections from an early age. The Doge of Venice (1461) was a collector, as Venice was connected up with the ancient silk roads to China. Another was the Duke

of Normandy (1363). But the very first export porcelain made exclusively for European clients in China was commissioned in 1541 by Pero da Faria, a Melaka-based Portuguese merchant. Examples remain in the Topkapi Museum, the museum of the Duca di Martina in Napoli, and the museum of the Rainha Dona Leonor in Beja, Portugal (Kiel 1942; Jin and Wu 2007). Specially commissioned “Jesuit-ware” characteristically featured an armillary sphere, the emblem of King Manuel I (r. 1495–1521), the Portuguese coat of arms, and the Jesuit insignia in cobalt blue. Dating from the Zhengde reign (1506–21), examples can be found today in the porcelain room of Marques de Abrantes Palace (Pinto de Matos 1994) (Plate 8).

Early evidence of Portuguese interest in Chinese ceramics comes from the 1554 São Bento Wreck off the east coast of South Africa (Auret and Maggs 1982). Taken together with the 1558 wreck of the *Espadarte* off Mozambique, it is clear that the Portuguese entered the porcelain trade even prior to gaining a permanent trading base in China. With the establishment of Macau in 1557, the Portuguese were better positioned to tap into the Chinese porcelain trade, especially as Guangzhou was then the main center in south China for maritime trade and export. During this period, Japan was still a market for Chinese porcelain, whether by the Chinese junk trade or by the Portuguese Black Ships (Boxer 1963: 180).

As Lisbon took over the historical role of Venice as the European emporium for Chinese products, so the first Chinese porcelain to arrive in Portugal stimulated an aristocratic interest in Oriental *objets d'art* that would later be associated with the fashion for chinoiserie. Portugal pioneered the commissioning of Chinese porcelain. Portuguese potters with a long tradition in the production of faience, or glazed earthenware, were the first in Europe to reproduce Chinese porcelain. The earliest known Portuguese copy dates from 1623, though the process had undoubtedly commenced in the last quarter of the previous century. In early 17th-century Lisbon, some 17 traders specialized in importing Chinese porcelain (Monteiro 1994). Dutch merchants also sensed demand for Oriental ceramics among the wealthy classes in Holland. Porcelain manufacturing was then unknown in northern Europe; the imports were strikingly esthetic as well as functional substitutes for local products. In a much cited event, an auction in Holland of Chinese ceramics captured from two

Portuguese ships in 1602 and 1604 helped popularize blue-and-white porcelain (Volker 1971: 54).

After this, porcelain regularly formed part of the VOC's shipments. Typically, it was sold at auction in the various VOC city chambers, notably, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Delft (Volker 1971: 54). At first, the Dutch procured Chinese kraak ware, thin-body porcelain painted in underglaze cobalt-blue with landscapes, plant, or animal designs, but, with a base secured on Taiwan from 1624, the porcelain trade became more structured. Until ousted from the island in 1662, the Dutch made indirect contact with mainland Chinese traders and, after 1634, commissioned porcelain to Western tastes. Wares of this period are known as Transitional porcelains, owing to the turbulence associated with the transition from Ming to Qing (Jorg 2006: 347). According to Volker (1971: 59), between 1604 and 1637, three million pieces of porcelain reached Europe, mostly of Chinese provenance. The temporary closure of Jingdezhen from 1650–80 offered a special niche for Japanese potters and exports.

The Zheng Family Ceramics Trade

The ouster of the Dutch from Taiwan in January 1662 by the Ming loyalist Zheng dynasty contributed to major changes in production and export cycles, especially as the Zheng competed with the Dutch in the porcelain export trade. As Ho (1994: 42–44; 47) affirms, the Zheng merchant networks continued to tap the production site at Jingdezhen despite Qing interference. Additionally, the Zheng were also able to access low-quality ceramics such as those produced at the Dehua-Anxi kilns, some 30 kilometers from Xiamen in Fujian. As Japan was entering the ceramic production market in a big way, so the Zheng sought to exploit this new production center through importing high-end teapots and other items destined for the luxury market. In fact, the Zheng actually preceded the VOC in the lucrative marketing Japanese wares in 1658. In so doing, Ho declares, the Zheng were able to transform a family enterprise into one matching the VOC in terms of financial resources, military power, and commercial strategies. Crucially, the Zheng maintained command over intraregional shipping and privileged access to the ceramic production

sites. By siding with the English East India Company, the Zhengs met with fierce competition from the Dutch and the Qing into the 1680s.

The new political circumstances created by the rise of the Zheng commercial empire impacted on ceramic production sites. As Ho (1994: 45) has explained, during 1662–82, coinciding with shifts in the Zhengs' fortunes, the focus of the Chinese ceramic trade shifted backwards and forwards between Guangzhou-Macau and Fujian. Only in 1676 and 1680, when the Zhengs re-established themselves in Xiamen, were they able to resume sending Fujianese cargoes to Southeast Asia. By contrast, the kilns of Yaoping, the third-largest center for ceramic production in China after Jingdezhen and Fujian, produced blue-and-white wares that competed with Fujian wares. Another vector in the 16th- and 17th-century trade in ceramics was the export of Zhangzhou or Swatow ware, found in archaeological sites in the Philippines (Tan R. 2007). (See Map 10.1)

The Guangzhou Ceramic Export Trade

By the end of the century, the rise of Guangzhou as an open port of access in tandem with the Guangzhou Trade System led to further changes in ceramic production and export patterns. An increasing number of international traders entered the market at Guangzhou — Portuguese, Macau-based Chinese, English, independent Dutch burghers, Siamese traders, and the Cantonese themselves. Southeast Asian ports from Banten to Melaka also re-emerged as major markets in this mixed junk and European trade. The Dutch were now obliged to act as intermediaries rather than tapping the ceramics at their source. By this stage, the Zheng monopoly was long gone (Ho 1994: 46).

The Guangzhou Trade System facilitated the direct export of Chinese porcelain to Europe and, eventually, America, just as it facilitated the trade in tea, sourced exclusively from China to meet surging demand in Europe. Ceramics were stored at the lowest level in ships' holds, providing not only ballast but also protection for more vulnerable cargoes such as tea. But the tea trade also spawned a new genre of ceramics, from teapots to teacups. From the second half of the 17th century, stoneware, including teapots from Yixing (120 kilometers north of Shanghai), began to figure in VOC exports for the first time. These included "red teapots" with floral patterns, including items earlier shipped from Macau



Map 10.1 Ceramic Production Sites and Junk Trade Ports, c.16th–19th centuries

by Portuguese exporters. The popularity of Yixing teapots in Europe was such that they were imitated. The first to be produced in the Netherlands were by Lambertus Cleffius in 1672, followed by potters in England and Saxony. Yixing teapots strongly influenced European ceramic art and even the common shape of the European teapot (Lo 1990).

Japanese Ceramic Trade Networks

Japan's participation in the 17th-century ceramics trade took many dimensions: as importer of pottery techniques, innovator, or exporter. Japan entered the global export porcelain trade via the maritime silk, or rather porcelain, roads, in the wake of European expansion. China came to be challenged by Japan as the premier historical manufacturer and exporter of ceramics in the mid-17th century (Ho 1994). The history of the Japanese ceramics industry is beyond the scope of this chapter; suffice to say that, going back to the 4th century CE, Chinese, Korean, and even Vietnamese influences all came into play with respect to both techniques and designs (Hasebe 1993: 52).

In large part, global demand for ceramics had been met by Jingdezhen. Nevertheless, its temporary closure during 1650–80 in the context of the Ming-Qing transition offered a new opportunity for ceramic producers on Kyushu — especially at the major production site of Arita (present-day Saga Prefecture), then in the domain of Hizen — to service the needs of Dutch importers. While authorities on Japanese export porcelain claim a relatively short florescence for the Kyushu-based industry, from 1652 to 1680, Dutch records reveal the trade continued well into the early 18th century, certainly beyond 1757 (Volker 1971: 66; Vialle 2007: 145).

The eventual decline of the Arita export porcelain industry was connected with the refurbishment of Jingdezhen and the Dutch return to China as principal source of export porcelain. Another factor in the decline of Arita-Hizen was the ability of Delft and Meissen to imitate Oriental ceramics at lower cost. Such was the cachet of Arita ware, dubbed Imari-ware in Dutch records after the port from which local ceramics were initially shipped, that Chinese imitations entered the global market.

Domestically, the Tokugawa, including local *daimyo*, were avid collectors and connoisseurs of a range of ceramic styles, imported and local.

Meanwhile, the domestic pottery industry, Arita included, played its part in the proto-industrialization of Japan. Demand for stylish ceramics coincided with rising consumer demand on the part of townsmen across the country. As Uchiyama (2008: 11) has highlighted, traveling Imari-ware merchants serviced urban demand during the late Tokugawa period. To give some indication of the scale of the production and marketing of Imari-ware, Edo in 1835 took 60,000 traditional straw bales of ceramics (or 18.74 percent of national consumption); the consumption of nearby Seki-Hasshu was similar; while Osaka took 36,000 or 11.25 percent, with total production for the domestic market at 320,100 “bales.”

The Dutch Ceramics Trade at Nagasaki

Commercial relations between Holland and Japan were officially initiated in 1609; the first VOC trading post was established on Hirado Island in present-day Nagasaki prefecture in September of that year, through the good offices of Matsura *daimyo*. The Hirado period was formative for the Dutch, witnessing the importation of a range of commodities from Southeast Asia, traded against Japanese commodities. According to Kato Eichii (1976), ceramics did not figure among Dutch exports during this phase. This is confirmed by Volker (1971: 122–25), who nevertheless records that the Dutch observed a fairly intense trade of Chinese porcelain into Japan, especially from Taiwan by Chinese vessels. From their new base in Deshima in Nagasaki, the Dutch kept in close correspondence with Matsura *daimyo* and, undoubtedly, tracked the rise of a pottery industry in Hirado.

With the loss of Jingdezhen, the Dutch looked to the Arita kilns as an alternative source of kraak porcelain. At the end of the 1650s, kilns in Arita started to produce underglaze blue Chinese-style goods for the Dutch, the design the Dutch were most familiar with. Close imitations were soon followed by pieces in a more authentic Japanese style, or in a mix of the two.

At a later stage, kilns in Arita-Hizen produced and exported a kind of export porcelain with an overglaze enameled decoration. This was dubbed Kakiemon after the name of a specialized workshop. Known for its distinctive bright colors and striking patterns, Kakiemon was an immediate success in Europe. Typically, Kakiemon-ware was painted with

symmetrical designs of blossoming plum trees, dragons, and phoenixes on a milky-white background. Generally decorated with an underglaze of blue, red, and gold with touches of green, replete with landscape gardens and animals, Kakiemon came close to Western baroque taste (Jorg 1982: 2006: 348). It should be noted that, until local substitutes were found, Arita imported certain pigments from China. A range of products was commissioned: simple plates, medical jars, butter dishes, more artistic armillary designs for European royal families, and coffee paraphernalia for the new vogue of coffee-drinking in Europe. Kakiemon-ware would be emulated by a range of porcelain makers across Europe.

Silver and then copper traditionally dominated Dutch exports from Nagasaki by volume. By the 17th century, however, ceramics, along with camphor and lacquerware, joined the list of Japanese exports. Lacquerware and porcelain are frequently mentioned together in the Dutch reports. We learn from VOC Deshima diaries that the Arita porcelain-makers visited the Dutch in Deshima rather than the other way around. The Dutch could be fickle as about the price and quality of the porcelain delivered: in November 1690, an order was rejected owing to the low quality of the samples (Vermeulen 1986–90).

Primary VOC Trading Networks

Having been commissioned and manufactured in Arita according to Dutch specifications, the prized porcelain was shipped from Imari port to Nagasaki. As specially commissioned products, Japanese export ceramics entered VOC shipping at Taiwan, Melaka, or Batavia, prior to reshipment through an intraregional trade network. Batavia was the first major port of call for the home voyage via the southern Indian Ocean route; following its foundation in 1652, Cape Town also entered the network, with certain shipments filling local orders for company officials. Outside official trade, VOC employees at Nagasaki indulged in a lucrative and illegal *kamban* or private trade, especially in valuable ceramics (Chaiklin 2003; Vialle 2007).

According to Volker (1971: 34–64), amounts of 100,000 to 250,000 pieces per shipment are found on invoices of ships trading from Taiwan (to Batavia). As the Taiwan junks supplied Nagasaki with a steady stream of Chinese porcelain, so the loss of the VOC base on Taiwan and the

turmoil surrounding the Ming-Qing transition offered a new lease of life for Arita-Hizen porcelain-makers as the Dutch stepped up procurement in Deshima to meet the deficit.

European Demand and the Rise of Delft

Europe first began to produce porcelain under the patronage of Augustus the Strong of Saxony. Alongside Chinese ceramics, copies of Japanese porcelain were reproduced and decorated in the Kakiemon style at the Meissen factory in Dresden. In 1723, hundreds of copies from Japanese prototypes of sake bottles, teapots, vases, and bowls were produced for the royal collection. Augustus sought not only to demonstrate the technical and artistic prowess of his artisans, but also to sell these high-demand products to European courts. By 1745, confident in their technical virtuosity, Meissen craftsmen practically abandoned Oriental motifs in favor of European designs (Pietsch 2007: 3–11).

Holland had a long tradition of producing faience, or tin-glazed pottery, but from the early 17th century and on for 100 years, the greatest influence on Dutch pottery would be Chinese motifs. Beginning in the 1570s with painted pottery in Haarlem, by the 1620s, potters in the city of Delft saw a market for well-made, cheaper imitations of Chinese porcelain. The new and fashionable Japanese pieces found a ready market in bourgeois households, and were quickly followed by Delft imitations. The result was the famed Delftware. From 1639, the faience manufactory of Lambertus Cleffius in Delft was part of the trend in imitating Oriental ceramics. Blue Delft, the product of long experimentation by local potters to make thin earthenware, became an icon of the bourgeois revolution in Holland. Elsewhere, these colored wares appealed to a wide public; grand Imari vases and garnitures, large dishes and a multitude of smaller objects still adorn palaces and country houses all over Europe (Jorg 1982).

The same could be said of France, where porcelain production was unknown until the last decade of the 17th century, and the ownership of porcelain was restricted to royalty or the aristocracy. Works produced in Chantilly, from 1730 the private factory of Louis Henri, Duke of Bourbon, were strongly influenced by Japanese porcelain. Kakiemon, the first Arita porcelain imported into Europe in the early 17th century, was

according to Gullard (1908: 375) “imitated at every manufactory far and wide, at Dresden and other German works, at St. Cloud: where every specimen seems to copy the early Japanese ware; and at Chelsea, Bow and Worcester.”

Toward the end of the 1662–82 period, the VOC was forced to limit exports of blue-and-white Arita-ware, owing to the popularity of Delftware (Plutschow 1983: 63). Where European chinoiserie took over, appreciation of the Oriental product faded.

Cycles of Japan-Dutch Ceramic Trade Networks

The phases or cycles in Japanese export ceramics may be observed in line with contemporary international developments, especially, the events surrounding the Ming-Qing transition. The following is guided by Ho Chuimei’s (1994) reading of Volker (1971), but with some added reflections on the decline of Arita-Hizen export ware with the rise of Qing competition after 1683.

- Phase I (1602–44): This period marks the beginning of VOC involvement in the ceramics trade with China, the beginning of large-scale exports to Holland, and the creation of a Europe-wide demand for Oriental porcelain. During this period, Japan was still a net importer of Chinese ceramics; the VOC briefly experimented with exporting Dutch earthenware to Japan. The period ends with the Ming-Qing transition.
- Phase II (1645–61): During this period, Japan reduced its imports of Chinese ceramics by one-fifth, while emerging as a major exporter in its own right. The Dutch were ousted from Taiwan in 1661, forcing the VOC to turn elsewhere for their ceramic supplies. By the end of phase II, Delftware had begun to be exported to Asia.

A cargo of coarse Japanese porcelain shipped to Xiamen is sometimes mentioned as the starting point for the Japanese ceramics export trade. Nevertheless, according to Volker (1971: 125), the first commissioned Japanese porcelain was shipped to Batavia in 1653 on the *Witte Valck*, which sailed for Batavia via Trinh Vietnam with 2,200 porcelain gal-lipots (or drug jars) “for the apothecary’s shop at Batavia.” Other sources suggest that the same vessel shipped “coarse porcelain” to Vietnam in

1750 (Sakuraba and Viallé 2009: 216). The order was repeated the following year, and again for the “surgeon’s shop in Batavia” in 1654, 1657, and 1658; and in 1656, for the same purpose in Taiwan. One of these blue-and-white “drug jars,” held in the Ashmolean Museum, is attributed to the Shimoshirakawa kiln of Arita-Hizen (Ashmolean Museum, “Japanese Export Ware”).

As Volker clarifies, these separate shipments hardly indicated a large-scale export industry. Nor does he set great store on the shipment of a single case of Japanese porcelain to Bengal. However, an express order from Batavia in 1659 commanded Deshima to contract 56,700 pieces for export to Mocha, if possible “the next north monsoon via Formosa for Melaka and from there to Mocha ...” or by default to Batavia. As Volker interprets, “the first order for abroad shows a marked predilection in Arabia for blue and white.” Besides Mocha — then center of the lucrative coffee trade and where a 500 percent profit could be earned — cases were packed for Surat, Coromandel, and Bengal. Montanus, cited in Volker, reveals that demand had increased in China for Japanese export porcelain.

The years 1659–1660 marked the first shipments of Japanese porcelain to Holland. Notably, the consignment included teacups. Discussions were conducted on design, crucially for an Islamic market, where human and animal images were discouraged. In 1661, four ships sailed from Deshima for Melaka and beyond, with 57,730 pieces of porcelain. A VOC-chartered junk sailed to Siam.

- Phase III (1662–82): During these years, with the consolidation of the Qing and the end of the Zheng regime on Taiwan, the majority of shipments and pieces were sent to Batavia and/or Siam, Quy Nhon (Nguyen Vietnam), or northern Vietnam under the Trinh, for Southeast Asian consumption. After 1664, Sri Lanka dropped off the list. Some 21 ships carried ceramics to Holland. Even so, cargoes were small relative to the Southeast Asian trade.
- Phase IV (1683–1720): From 1683, with the political stability and prosperity ushered in by Emperor Kangxi (r. 1661–1722), porcelain exports were resumed. In 1662, the famed Jingdezhen kilns underwent major reorganization under imperial auspices coinciding with the Ming-Qing transition.

Orders for Japanese porcelain still came in strongly, averaging around 50,000–80,000 pieces a year (1670; 1671; 1677; 1679), diminishing in the early 1700s, and steadying to around 10,000 items a year in the following decade. But, by 1712 onward, no porcelain at all was shipped in certain years (Sakuraba and Viallé 2009: 228–30). By c. 1732, the system of commissioning from Arita had evidently broken down. This is confirmed by a Dutch record for November 1732, which mentions that, in buying porcelain for the apothecary in Batavia, “it is much cheaper to buy it at a stall rather than order it.” Perhaps, the Dutch memory had faded; as the concerned Dutch official at Deshima, B. Coop a Groen, wrote in 1736, the best porcelain was still made in the domain of Hizen and, accordingly, he would solicit samples. In 1740, company officials ordered mundane butter jars and pickle pots (Van der Velde and Bachhofer 1992). In 1754, Batavia ordered dishes and plates from three visiting porcelain-makers, but not without protracted negotiations. Even so, it would appear that demand for high-quality Imari-ware had faded fast, just as considerations of quality and price often led to a breakdown in negotiations with visiting porcelain-makers. According to Yamawaki Teijiro, who has analyzed documents from the Arita side, the last shipment of porcelain from Nagasaki was in 1757 (Sakuraba and Viallé 2009: 237).

- Phase V (1729–): The advent of the Guangzhou Trade System in the late 17th century attracted all the European trading companies, including the VOC from 1729. Tea was the prime commodity, but silks and porcelain were also in high demand. The VOC commissioned Chinese junks to haul porcelain and other cargoes direct to Batavia (Van Dyke 2005: 148). To give some perspective on the volume and value of the China trade, the VOC ship *Geldermalsen*, sailing from Nanjing to Batavia in 1751 and foundering off Bintan Island adjacent the Singapore Straits, was found to be carrying 200,000 pieces of porcelain (along with 147 gold bars) when recovered in 1985.

Secondary Destinations: The Intra-regional Trade

Not all trade items stayed in the major Asian ports but were transhipped to other regional ports, by VOC ships or native craft, as part of

an intraregional ceramics trade network. From this second tier of destinations, which Volker (1971) calls the interinsular trade, quantities of ceramics, including Arita-Hizen trade items, were taken to the hinterlands, becoming burial objects, sacred items, or heirlooms. The intraregional trade — lasting into very recent times in Indonesia — was serviced by a great variety of local ships, including European-Asian hybrid vessels. Small and swift, these vessels could range across the archipelago as well as connect with the estuaries and rivers that penetrate island Southeast Asia.

Most of our information about these items has been revealed by excavations, galvanized by a renewed Japanese interest in maritime history. The list of sites continues to grow but includes Dëshima and other locations in Nagasaki, Intramuros in Manila, Pasar Ikan in Jakarta, the former Japanese settlement of Oudong in Cambodia, Ayutthaya, Old City Vientiane, Monte Fort in Macau, Melaka, Hoi An, the former Dutch settlement at Tainan on Taiwan, and Old Singapore (Temasek). Altogether, Nogami (2009: 349) offers 31 archaeological sites revealing a broad distribution of Hizen ceramics across East-Southeast Asia. The largest assembly of Hizen-ware fragments discovered in Southeast Asia has been uncovered at Banten, suggesting an intense, albeit indirect, traffic from Japan to the Javanese sultanate. Notably, in 1993–97, joint Indonesian-Japanese researchers collected large numbers of Hizen-ware shards from excavation sites in Banten Lama/Old Banten as well as from the royal palace at nearby Tirtayasa (Sakai 2000–01).

Summing up, in the final 23-year phase, only 190,000 pieces of Japanese ceramics arrived in Holland, not high compared to the quantity of Chinese porcelain. The reasons for this decline, whether profitability, quality, or looming war with England, should not detain us here. Still, 570,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain were exported by the VOC during the final period to Asian markets outside of the Indonesian archipelago (Volker 1971: 172, 192). From his reading of Arita documents, Yamawaki offers a grand total of 1,233,418 items of Japanese export porcelain (Sakuraba and Viallé 2009: 237), possibly suggesting a considerable overflow of production entering the Chinese junk trade.

The Chinese Junk Trade in Ceramics

The Chinese junk trade should be considered as integral to the intra-Asian trade though, with the exception of Macau-based Chinese traders, it seldom extended across the Bay of Bengal to India. With the delivery of a cargo of Japanese porcelain to Xiamen in 1654, Japan finally became an exporter of porcelain, ending a long-standing Chinese monopoly (Ho 1994). As Volker (1971: 128) speculates, this porcelain was actually intended for re-export to Southeast Asian markets and not for China *per se* (Plate 11).

As explained, the entry of Japan into this trade was initiated by Chinese merchants under the Zheng family from their base on Taiwan, then much encouraged by the VOC, owing to a decline in exports from China. Examination of the *tosen*, or junk, trade radiating out of Nagasaki suggests that it was various kinds. Besides the usual independent Fujianese junk networks, the VOC commissioned junks to service the Batavia trade, especially among the Fujianese in Nagasaki, Manila, and Batavia. Trade with Manila, of course, stood outside direct Dutch concerns. Nogami (2006), who has researched the Hizen-ware discovered in Intramuros in Manila, believes that it could only have arrived in the Spanish-controlled city via the Chinese junk trade. It is unclear whether Japanese ceramics arriving in Banten Lama were shipped via VOC channels or the junk trade.

As a rough estimate, according to Volker (1971: 154), Chinese trade with Japan was twice that of the Dutch; it might be inferred that the Chinese shipped twice as much ceramics as the Dutch, even though their preference was for coarse alongside fine porcelain. However, a law of 1668 forbade Chinese junks to unload their cargoes of porcelain in Nagasaki; arriving junks were ordered home without being able to unload. VOC records of 1686 mention several occasions when porcelain was fished up from Nagasaki harbor, suggesting an illicit trade in this item by Chinese, notwithstanding the draconian punishments handed down for smuggling (Vermeulen 1986).

Toward the end of Phase IV (1683–1720), the VOC moved back to Chinese wares, leaving the trade in Japanese porcelain to private Dutch merchants. Soon, however, the VOC abandoned its Chinese porcelain trade as well, because Chinese junks came to Batavia in great numbers,

offering an enormous variety of porcelain on the market. This made it possible for both private merchants to buy and compete; within a few years, this private trade became very extensive. In 1694, faced with a decline in profits, VOC directors decided to stop all imports into the Netherlands, leaving supply completely to others (Jorg 1982). As Cynthia Viallé (2007: 141) has written in a detailed study of the private trade, “they spoil the market,” even though, from 1603, the VOC had issued ordinances prohibiting private imports (though they were allowed by the Japanese authorities from 1685). In a later period, the Chinese junk traders sold Japanese porcelain at Guangzhou to English and other European merchants such as the Danes and Swedes.

Conclusion

The ceramics trade, with its major production centers in Burma, Siam, Vietnam, Champa, China, and Japan, not only contributed to the making of a broader East-Southeast Asian trade complex linked by intricate networks of suppliers, producers, and consumers, but stood as an index of early industrial activity. In other words, the intraregional trade in ceramics welded the region together like no other commodity. It predated the bullion trade — and postdated it, too. It involved technology transfers (China and Korea to Japan, Vietnam, and possibly Siam) and both internal and external outsourcing (Ming China’s imports of Middle Eastern and Sumatran cobalt, Japan’s import of pigments). It was the lifeblood of the intraregional junk trade, connecting with a host of unrelated commodity chains. It catered for the luxury trade as well as to mass demand, as with the millions of earthenware jars, plates, and *chawan* entering this trade.

The ceramic trade networks reaching the various segments of the regional trading system — the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Java Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the coasts of India — helped to fire up commerce and markets almost everywhere.

It was an ancient trade, entering the silk roads from antiquity, with Middle Eastern wares traded eastward and Chinese wares traded west. But, with the entry of Westerners into Asian waters, the ceramics trade went global, as new markets for Asian ceramics opened in Europe and the Americas. While Europe itself would imitate Chinese and especially

Japanese porcelain, European competition would not dislodge Jingdezhen as the global ceramics production center. Although Jingdezhen declined during the middle Ming period, leaving China peripheral in the export side of the global-regional ceramics industry, economic shifts occurred in the transition period, before the European market became a major factor in driving the external trade. In other words, ruptures in the age-old Asian ceramics production system stemmed more from internal rather than external events, as with the epochal Ming-Qing transition and the rise of the Zheng family networks off the coast of China. Eventually, though, under the Guangzhou Trade System, the Chinese ceramics export industry underwent a resurgence, involving the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of workers and artists, not to mention transport workers and shippers. There is no evidence to suggest that China's cautious response to European demand for ceramics led to its eventual peripheralization, as other factors were obviously involved.

Similarly, the rise of a porcelain industry in Japan was entirely the fruit of local agency, creativity, and enterprise, building on a long history of ceramics production. Japanese manufacturers quickly responded to elastic regional and global demand, created by the turmoil surrounding the Ming-Qing transition. Although the ceramics industry in Japan was the clearest example of an industry fired up by Dutch agency, Japan's own internal market was burgeoning, in line with rapid urban population growth and general prosperity under the Pax Tokugawa (Nakai and McClain 1991). The Arita-Hizen-based pottery industry was but a small part of Japan's industrious revolution.

On the Southeast Asian side, Champa-ware production had clearly peaked prior to the early modern period, just as the collapse of Siamese production centers in the mid-16th century occurred outside considerable European interest. Vietnam-ware as an export product was closely tailored to Asian needs and not greatly exploited by the Europeans. The martaban trade from Burma evidently gained a lease on life under the VOC, but did not survive the transfer of the capital from Pagan to Ava. While the Europeans came to command the long-distance trade in Asian ceramics, outside the Bay of Bengal, they never completely supplanted the intraregional junk trade connecting coastal China, Japan, and Southeast Asia, which was founded on detailed commercial intelligence and serviced by intricate supply networks.

Although bullion served a dual role as traded item and currency, porcelain in particular acquired a special esthetic value, differentiated across civilizations and cultures. Notably, the European craze for things Japanese followed from a broader European interest in chinoiserie. VOC interest in Japanese ceramics was not entirely esthetic as profit was always the bottom line, but the fashion of chinoiserie and genuine European admiration for the wafer-thin, colorful glazed Arita porcelain, alongside more familiar Chinese ceramics, stimulated demand and drove the industry on the supply side. But our study has emphasized that Europe was only one of a number of primary destinations for Arita-Hizen ware; the bulk was shipped to Java or the two coasts of India or Persia, where it stayed, or where it entered secondary networks.

11

Knowledge Transfers: A Regional Technology Complex?

It was Europe, especially Northern Europe, that first experienced an industrial revolution. Enlightenment advances in science and technology, developing upon Renaissance knowledge, gave Europe the edge, leading, seemingly inexorably, to a half-millennium advance over the rest of the world. While the gap between the “West and the rest” began to close with the rise of industrial Japan and, in our time, a Greater China industrial complex, the question of why Asia stagnated has much to do with Asia’s subsumption within European-dominated bullion trade networks. Yet, why did it appear to the first European visitors that Asia lagged in certain technological achievements, though it was obviously ahead in other fields? What kind of technological civilization did the first European visitors confront in East-Southeast Asia? To what degree was “indigenous” knowledge in East-Southeast Asia the product of civilizational exchanges, new and old? In this chapter, we examine levels of skill in craft (besides handicraft), manufacture, science and technology across a select number of polities, with a view to establishing where major East-East transfers and advances occurred alongside rejections and stagnations. East-East transfer implies knowledge exchanges from across the vast Eurasian zone, raising questions as to the primary origins of this or that trait, and allowing for separate or simultaneous developments from around the globe. The 1000–1800 time frame was a period when Occidental knowledge made its impact in East-Southeast Asia, but tracing the embrace of universal science in Asia is not the primary intent of this chapter.

Pacey (1990: 7, 31), in his global study of technological exchange across civilizations, offers South India and Southeast Asia as part of a “regional technology complex,” sharing certain features relating to

irrigated rice culture and tree crops, employing only limited water-raising devices and — Sri Lanka and Angkor aside — small-scale irrigation techniques. Drawing on Francesca Bray (1985), Pacey allows that South China falls into the same pattern; but not North China, with its large-scale engineering works in canal construction and flood control, and extensive use of water wheels and other mechanical devices. Such a “regional technology complex” is defined by high degrees of “technological dialogue” or “inventive exchange.” Pacey’s schema of largely contemporaneous “Asian technology complexes” (1990: 31–32) might be contrasted with Gupta’s “commonwealth of agricultural, metallurgical and maritime knowledge” (2006: 115). Technology-knowledge complexes were layered across time, as new technologies came to be borrowed or adapted, consonant with regional and global impacts.

Ptolemaic, Arab, Indian, and Chinese Knowledge Exchanges

Elsewhere (Gunn 2003), I have sought to demonstrate that globalization was a two-way street and did not necessarily imply only Westernization. From the Arab transfer, Europe gained mathematics, astronomy, and such crucial navigational devices as the compass and the astrolabe. This was also a Ptolemaic transfer: Egyptian astronomers had in the second half of the first millennium BCE perfected spherical cosmology, itself drawing on earlier Babylonian understandings. Ptolemaic geometry, an understanding that the heavens circulated around a stationary, spherical earth, was not only standard in Europe until the age of Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton, but was part of the Hellenistic science that traveled with the Roman empire to India, in turn becoming part of a Sanskrit tradition before its transmission to the world of Islam, China and Southeast Asia included. The expansion of Islam not only continued the transmission of Hellenistic mathematics and astronomy, but fed into late medieval European understandings and, eventually, modern physical science, as mathematical astronomy followed the trade routes east to India, central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia (Plofker 2007: 14). Famously, before being trumped by Jesuit displays of astronomical knowledge in 1673, the Ming court in Beijing hosted a Mongol observatory, built in 1274, the result of learning gathered from contacts with the Islamic world.

In this chapter, I seek to tease out these exchanges and transfers, especially as they touched Southeast Asian societies, in particular the Chinese, Indian, and Islamic civilizational worlds. Just as it would be a mistake to claim particular “ownership” of many scientific and technical processes, so it is often difficult to ascribe indigenous origins to technologies found across the vast Afro-Eurasian landmass. This we have seen with the example of mathematics and astronomy.

While the notion that Indian or Chinese civilization had merely been transplanted in a Southeast Asian context found strong support among the first Orientalist scholars to examine monumental remains, the “diffusionism” approach has also come to be critiqued by later anthropologists, not to mention proponents of autonomous history. The Indian and Chinese legacy cannot be dismissed out of hand, but the scholarly trend in modern anthropology is to account for local “genius” or adaptivity across a range of societies or, especially, “part societies” in anthropological contexts (Keyes 1977: 3–4). Even today, we (cultural relativists) are full of admiration for many local Southeast Asian craft or “industrial” traditions — weaving, pottery, metalwork, the production of musical instruments, the creation of designs. Many local practices, as in hunting and fishing, have proven remarkably resilient (although headhunting met with strong colonial and missionary disapproval). Other practices, such as house- and boatbuilding, are not only ecologically optimal but also highly esthetic. And where earlier generations saw only profit in felling tropical forests, the modern world has an eye on potential medicines known to local peoples and found only in zones of great biodiversity such as Sumatra, Borneo, and New Guinea, as well as Yunnan. Wary of outsiders and often following animist traditions, members of such part-societies typically guarded local knowledge as sacred, or entrusted only by elders to initiates. Typically, the skills and practices were transmitted orally and stood outside of other trends, especially in less accessible zones.

By contrast, in civilizations hosting complex bureaucracies and literate traditions, such as China, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, and India, some sense of teleological progress is discernible in the development and adaptation of a range of abstract ideas and practical technologies. However, it is more difficult to read back on technological innovation in Southeast Asia, especially in the absence of significant texts. As Lieberman (2003:

437) acknowledges, the study of indigenous technological innovation in Southeast Asia is not well developed, indeed not even written on.

The Indian Transfer

The Indian civilizational transfer to Southeast Asia involved not only forms of sacred kingship, leading to the foundation of what we have described as *negara* states or charter kingdoms based upon Saivite and Buddhist concepts, but also philosophy, popular religious practices, music, drama, and the plastic arts, ranging from sculpture to architectural form. The Indian transfer also reached China and, in turn, Korea and Japan. Many techniques and practices considered indigenous in Southeast Asia do in fact have Indian origins.

Mookerji (1912: 181) celebrates three great ancient Indian discoveries in applied chemistry, which helped her capture the world markets of that time. First, the preparation of fast dyes for textile fabrics by the treatment of natural dyes with alum and other chemicals. Second, the extraction of the principle of indigo from the indigo plant by a process “in anticipation of modern chemical methods.” Third, the tempering of steel — “a process to which the medieval world owed its Damascus swords.”

In India, the production of cotton textiles goes back to 2000 BCE. It was not simply cotton textiles that were introduced into Southeast Asia but also Indian textile techniques such as batik, *ikat*, tie and dye, and other practices. Cotton is obviously of great antiquity in Southeast Asia. Chinese records suggest that cotton was introduced to south China from Vietnam in the 7th century CE. From the 13th century, Chinese traders imported cotton from Vietnam, Java, and Luzon; Burma, Cambodia, the west coast of Sumatra, and Bali were all cotton-producing areas (Reid 1988: 92; 2009).

The batik process continued to evolve on Java especially, as with the likely introduction in the 16th century of the *canting*, or small metal tracer used to apply wax to cloth. The modern batik industry in Java reached its current level of refinement only in the 19th century. Chinese sources from Ming times testify that batik spread to Siam, Vietnam, and elsewhere, with each evolving variant techniques and motifs. While *ikat* is a Malay term, the craft is believed to have originated in Indian regions such as Orissa and Gujarat. *Ikat* is generalized across much of

Southeast Asia. In Laos, *ikat* patterning shares features with that of many cultures in the archipelago, but it may also have northern origins, such as Dongsonian culture from Vietnam. As Buddhism reached the Tai and Lao kingdoms in the first millennium CE, so the weaver's repertoire began to include Buddhist themes and symbols such as the *naga*. The Lao court also copied designs from imported Indian and Persian brocades (Naenna 1990: 3, 10).

The magical function and power of textiles is still evident and on display today. It holds not only in court centers, as with the yellow cloth favored in Buddhist courts and even at the sultanate of Brunei, but also at the popular level, as with the black-and-white checked patterns decorating Hindu iconography in Bali today (Tanaka 1995: 13), or with the wrapping of bodhi trees, spirit houses, and *chedi* or stupas, in yellow cloth, as practiced in modern Thailand, Burma, and Laos (Naenna 1990: 44).

Commenting on the reception of Indian sciences in Southeast Asia, Coedès (1966: 226–28) found they were juxtaposed with older ways pre-dating the Indian transfer. In Khmer epigraphy, for example, the Indian decimal system and the use of nine digits together with zero occur when dates are employed but, in counting objects and in measurements, an indigenous system is used. But the figures used in the Indian decimal system hark back to an even earlier Indian script. The astronomy used in ancient Indochina was purely Indian, except for some data relating to the Cambodian meridian. All the Indianized countries adopted the Indian calendar; it is still in popular if not official use in Bali. While Sanskrit and Pali remain a source of enrichment to local vocabularies and helped to spread local ideas, Sanskrit never displaced local vernaculars, although it helped to record them.

One obvious legacy of the Indian transfer was the construction of major monuments and hydraulic works, many of which have become synonymous with the Southeast Asian charter kingdoms. Impressive as they are, little is known about the transfer of architectural, engineering and hydraulic skills during that age. With the end of the golden age of temple-building, very little of this legacy appeared to have been handed down or advanced upon. There is no convincing answer as to this apparent stasis; obviously, temple-building could hardly have outlived the practice of slave or forced labor. An alternative thesis, however, allows for a

high degree of voluntary participation in the management and organization of minor, albeit complex, hydraulic works, as with the *subak* system, which still prevails on Bali (Lansing 1991: 10–11).

Reflecting upon the Indian transfer to Cambodia, Chandler (1992: 13) observes that, even down until the 19th century, Cambodians demonstrated many Indian traits, such as in wearing turbans along with skirts, rather than trousers as in Vietnam. Musical instruments, jewelry, and manuscripts were all in Indian style. But an Indian-style caste system was not imported. Nor, after the 14th century, did Cambodia look back to India for new ideas. Cambodia also did not rebel against India, as Vietnam did against China. Importantly, Cambodian cattle-raising techniques were introduced from India in an early age, and are virtually unknown elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Indian technological transfer is also associated with a number of agricultural imports and practices. Sugar cultivation and processing is one such transfer, though further developed in China. Sailing techniques may also have been contributed from India.

Islamic Transfers

While early Islam may have been suffused with Hellenistic thought and the concept of reason, no particular evidence suggests that a priority on revelation was diminished in exegetical texts arriving in Southeast Asia. As far as can be established, there was no Islamic equivalent to the Sinic tradition, which exported practical texts on everything from bridge-building to medicine and hydraulic technology. Although Islam is a religion of the book, the arrival of the Holy Quran in Southeast Asia did not stimulate a print revolution. The tradition of hand-copying manuscripts persisted in the Malay world into modern times; Quranic knowledge was — and is — received both orally and aurally, as with the Sufist dictum of “knowledge by heart” (Sweeney 1987; Gunn 1997). Nevertheless, technology transfer did occur from the Middle East to the Islamic periphery. Aceh was one of the first points of reception (Riddell 2001: 139).

Diffusion of Chinese Technologies in East-Southeast Asia

Not only was science and technology in China historically far ahead of Europe but, as Joseph Needham (1971) convincingly demonstrated, China also excelled in a range of technologies that, for over a thousand years, remained largely inaccessible to Europe. As Abu-Lughod (1989: 331) argues, virtually all the institutions required to facilitate state and private capitalism were in place in China in Song and Yuan times — production and distribution, paper money and credit, and control of foreign sea trade. But China's economic collapse came under the Ming. Abu-Lughod (1989: 344–7) posits that the Ming's difficulties had in large part been caused by the collapse of the old world system around it, especially the loss of the Central Asian hinterland and the ultimate failure of Zheng He's voyages to accomplish tangible economic results. Europe did not stand still; Renaissance advances in science, harnessed to the riches derived from new discoveries, opened up the "great divergence" between the West and the rest (Pomerantz 2001).

China was of course receptive to foreign borrowings and exchanges arriving through the maritime and terrestrial silkroads, from new rice varieties to religious lore, Islamic knowledge, New World crop imports, and military technologies. However, it is seldom acknowledged that pre-modern China was itself a powerful disseminator of technology across East and Southeast Asia.

The following account is brief; obviously, the civilizational transfers to Vietnam, Korea, and Japan — of Confucian literature, philosophy, governance, geomancy, cartography, medicine, ceramics, metallurgy, town-planning, and so on — form a vast subject. The acquisition of Chinese learning in these Confucianized societies was conducted over millennia, just as mastery over Chinese characters by indigenous elites became the means of acquiring and applying that knowledge, even in the absence of direct contacts outside of tribute trade missions.

Rice Culture

The single most important contribution of China to human society may well be the technique of transplanting rice seedlings to irrigated land. Evidenced from 7000 BCE in the lower Yangtze Valley and from 5500

BCE in the central mainland (Thailand), over a long period “domesticated” rice culture spread south through the wetter zones of monsoon Asia, mostly replacing taro-based cultivation such as survives on New Guinea, parts of Borneo, and Timor.

Not all rice types were adapted to wet-field agriculture; as a variety of “native” rice types exist today, especially outside areas of commercial agriculture, in many upland zones and outliers such as Timor. A well-known exception to the southerly dispersion of rice culture out of China is the “Champa transfer” of early maturing and drought-resistant rice varieties from Champa to the Fujian area toward the end of the 10th or early 11th century CE. In 1202, the Song authorities decreed the transfer of a Champa rice variety to the lower Yangtze Valley, then suffering a drought (Pacey 1991: 5; So 2000: 28–29), as agriculture expanded to meet the demands of a rapidly rising population. Today, the problem for many Southeast Asian societies suffering loss of biodiversity is the protection of “heirloom” varieties of rice and other plants.

One cannot imagine Angkor, Ayutthaya, Pagan, and the Hindu-Buddhistic civilizations of central and east Java without irrigated rice cultivation. One of the earliest known writings in the Balinese language, dating from the 8th century CE, refers to irrigation tunnel-builders. Some terraces in Bali have been under continuous cultivation for over a millennium. In Bali, irrigation is dependent on the seasonal flow of rivers, as opposed to tanks or storage dams. Accordingly, amazingly complex systems involving tunnels, canals, and aqueducts developed in the regions where rice cultivation is oldest. As Lansing (1991: 38) notes, water management through *subaks*, or water-user groups, is not only a social activity in Hindu Bali, but ritually integrated with a system of water-temples. At some unknown date, farmers in Java and Bali developed their mechanical device for lifting water — a pivoted bamboo tube which, when filled with water, tilts its load into a canal (Pacey 1990: 29).

Perhaps the most monumental example of engineering enterprise in broader East-Southeast Asia are the mountain rice terraces. Some, like those of the central cordillera of Luzon Island, represent 2,000 years of continual use. Mountain terracing of ricefields has a wide dispersion, from China to Korea and Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, including Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Bali. The Hani minority of southwest Yunnan and the Zhuang of Guilin, among other ethnic groups in China,

support mountain rice terraces of some antiquity. Located at a higher altitude than other sites, and occupying steeper slopes, the Banaue terraces of Luzon represent, in the UNESCO description, a “mastery of engineering,” including soil and stone embankments, pest control, zoning and planning, soil conservation, and sustainable agriculture. Fed by water flows above the Ifugao mountains, the irrigation system is supported by Ifugao ritual and belief system as well as traditional organization and engineering prowess (UNESCO World Heritage Center 1995).

The foregoing certainly raises questions as to the emergence of a regional cultural-technological complex. Was this ancient technology an “Austronesian” transfer, presumably out of China? Or were these spectacular hydraulic projects products of indigenous genius and local adaptivity? So little is known about this transfer that it calls into question many of the assumptions about broader cultural and technological civilizational borrowings.

Print Culture

China long had the edge over Europe in the manufacture of paper and the art of printing. It is believed that China perfected papermaking early in the first millennium CE. Woodblock printing emerged around 700 CE, and movable type by the mid-11th century, though it did not eclipse block printing. By this time, the Arabs had acquired the technology; the first paper mills emerged in Spain in the 12th century (Abu-Lughod 1989: 323). Vietnam, Japan, and Korea all adapted the Chinese art of papermaking, with Korea advancing the production of metal movable type to new levels.

The knowledge transfer took on a physical character; it involved the export of books, many with illustrations, as printing improved under the Qing, through the refinement of movable type copper and the use of multicolor engraving techniques. From the late 16th century, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam imported a range of Chinese books. The import of many thousands of Chinese texts, on philosophy, optics, medicine, and European learning, continued at Nagasaki down to the beginning of the Meiji era. In Vietnam, the Nguyen emperors actively solicited Chinese moral and legal texts, seeking to confirm their Confucian orthodoxy. Pigafetta, scribe of the Magellan voyage, saw imported Chinese paper

used during his sojourn in Brunei in 1515, confirming the cheapness and availability of this product even outside the Sinic world. From an early period, Vietnam adopted Chinese printing techniques. The first books published by the Church in Manila were printed by Chinese in xylophone form (Gunn 2003: 92–93), like texts produced by Chinese immigrant communities on the Malay Peninsula and Java.

As Glass (2008, 20) has written, East and Central Asian Buddhist printing prowess, as in the development of monastery seals by the 8th century CE, was not matched in South and Southeast Asia, where printing was barely known, at least until the European arrival in the 16th century.

Material Culture

The Chinese contribution to architecture in Southeast Asia ranges from brick construction to the ubiquitous Chinese temples that dot the landscape wherever Chinese communities set down roots. In building their capital in Hue, Vietnamese emperors emulated classical Chinese models. From the early 1600s, Chinese temples, like those from Fujian, Guangdong, and Nanjing, appeared in trade-oriented Nagasaki alongside intricate Chinese-style stone bridges. The *pesisir* coast of Java hosts numerous Chinese temples and structures dating from an early period of contact.

Archaeological research from Thailand, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s led to claims that bronze-working at the village level began in Southeast Asia before India or China (Keyes 1977: 16). Higham (2002a: 7; 353), however, believes that knowledge of copper- and bronze-casting is part of a process of diffusion that began in the Middle East in *pharaonic* times, crossing the steppes to Gansu and the Yellow River Valley of China, before spreading into Southeast Asia. Higham (2002: 177) also contends that direct Chinese contact with Dong Son people was the most likely means by which knowledge of iron-casting reached Bac Bo. Dong Son was contemporaneous with the imperial Chinese expansion under the Han (202 BCE–220 CE). In any case, the great bronze drums that are the hallmark of the Southeast Asian Bronze Age were manufactured only in a small area around Dong Son in northern Vietnam before being traded out. Progressively, Dai Viet

mastered other metallurgical processes, including silver-smelting and, by the Trinh and Nguyen dynasties, the casting of cannons.

While Vietnam could well have benefited from the full gamut of Chinese metallurgical processes from the 11th century, the evidence for a Chinese transfer to the rest of Southeast Asia has been called into question. Bronson (1985) offers the case of the Tai states, where metallurgy developed more in line with South Asia and the Middle East. Unlike in China, where a two-stage process in the smelting of iron prevailed, in Southeast Asia, a direct process was the only one known. Iron appeared in Southeast Asia a thousand years after locally made bronze and copper. The archaeological evidence from Southeast Asia (except perhaps for Vietnam) is that of wrought iron produced in small backyard “bloomery” furnaces with low output. There is no evidence of slag typical of the larger scale Chinese furnace process (later adopted in Korea and Japan), which produced cast iron out of molten metal.

A transition in technology did occur in Siam in the 17th and 18th centuries, not owing to European influence, but as a result of the technology accompanying Chinese immigrants to the Bangkok area. While the direct method of iron smelting survived in insular Southeast Asia, the Thai accomplished their own small “industrial revolution” in metallurgy by almost completely abandoning the old method. As Bronson (1985: 221) speculates, Thai kings may have actively encouraged this switch, especially as cannons cast in iron were more desirable than the more traditional and expensive bronze item.

The evidence from marine archaeology suggests that China made major contributions to Southeast Asian shipbuilding, leading to the emergence, from Song times, of the hybrid-style vessels common in the Java Sea area. Such *jong* fleets, as witnessed by the first Portuguese visitors, disappeared by the second half of the 16th century, as new influences took over. Early Indian and Arab influences, such as lateen sails, cannot be ignored; undoubtedly, a kind of hybridization of hull and sail types occurred according to proximity to trade routes, among other factors. Specific Chinese features included watertight bulkheads, the compartmentalization of cargoes, and the use of nails, unknown in Indian and Southeast Asian shipping. Chinese vessels would become known in Southeast Asia, just as new hybrid Chinese-Portuguese vessels, generically termed *lorcha* in Portuguese, plied the China coast. Japanese and

Korean shipbuilding developed in some isolation, though connected with a Chinese tradition. The Chinese commercial tradition also bequeathed to Southeast Asia weights and measures, such as the *picul* (about 60 kilograms), the *kati* (one-hundredth of a *picul*), and weighing instruments, such as the *daching* (a Malay word) (Reid 2000: 76).

As mentioned in Chapter 10, Chinese porcelain-making was perfected in Vietnam, Korea, and Japan long before its emulation and mastery in Europe. The center of world porcelain production from 1350 to 1750 was Jingdezhen in northeastern China. Jingdezhen closely guarded its technology from prying Europeans. Ceramics production and the proliferation of production sites in the context of overseas trade activity and burgeoning internal markets have been noted as one indicator of proto-capitalist development. By any measure, the historical ceramics industry in China signals a precociousness in a range of applied scientific techniques.

While mulberry trees and silkworms were indigenous to parts of Southeast Asia, the Chinese developed to a far higher degree the art of grafting trees and the breeding of worms. While silk can be traced back to the 11th century CE in Burma and was attested in Cambodia in the 13th century, in Reid's (1988: 93) estimation, only in Vietnam did techniques of silk production and dyeing match those of China and Japan; Vietnam's raw silks were highly esteemed in Tokugawa Japan. Silk production did not easily translate into "factory" production. As Abu-Lughod (1989: 330) comments, unlike the textile and wool industries in some other societies, silk production was so labor-oriented and resistant to labor-saving that little technical innovation resulted. In this case, it was not lack of inventiveness per se but the nature of the product.

The Fujian Transfer?

The first Chinese to establish fixed multigenerational communities in Southeast Asia were the Fujianese arriving in Manila under the Spanish from the late 16th century. They introduced a range of practical technologies, in large part indigenized into local societies. Chinese craftsmen arriving across Southeast Asia took up their vocations as, variously, boat-builders, smiths, masons, market gardeners, animal breeders, artists, and others.

According to Mazumdar (1998), from 3 BCE basic sugar-making techniques were diffused from India to China. But China's sugar-making techniques changed continuously over time, through indigenous invention and the selective appropriation of foreign technologies. The technology used for crushing and refining sugar in China kept pace with changes occurring in the Americas and "may even have initiated some of them." But whereas three-roller systems evolved in the Americas, the vertically aligned Chinese two-roller system obviously evolved separately. The two-roller cane-crusher design became standard in Ming China, and Chinese immigrants arriving in the sugar-producing zones of Southeast Asia introduced it as the new standard equipment.

In Java under VOC control, Chinese technology transfer in the newly established sugar industry was undoubtedly "revolutionary" in terms of productivity. Sugarcane juice, for example, was extracted by a press using cow or buffalo power to turn a cog wheel, a device housing a 4.5 meter shaft through which the sugarcane was inserted and pressed twice to extract the maximum amount of juice. Dutchman Andre van Braum (1796: 44), who accompanied the VOC embassy to the Chinese court in 1794–95, was able to inspect a sugar mill in south China, observing that the method and apparatus were identical to that used in Java, and concluding that it was the Chinese who had introduced the milling method to Java.

The Dutch also observed a plow and winnowing machine of Chinese type in Java c. 1600. One hundred years later, both the Swedish and the Dutch experimented with Chinese iron share plows and threshing machines deemed superior to their European counterparts, especially in their use of metal parts (Pacey 1990: 134). Over a long period, the Chinese had developed an array of special agricultural tools, including sickles, hoes, and plows, and winnowing machines and mills for husking and polishing the grain. Increasingly, from the 17th century onward, Chinese immigrants began to introduce their methods into Java and, we suspect, the Philippines and other areas, offering a vast improvement on hand-pounding, while increasing productivity.

Besides peaches, longans, star anise, and varieties of citrus, the Chinese introduced a range of vegetable crops to Southeast Asia, including the soybean. All soybean products in Java bear Chinese, actually Hokkien, names: *tauge* (beansprouts), *tabu* (tofu), *tauco* (fermented

soybean). This is reflected in other Southeast Asian languages as well, as with Tagalog *tahuri* (curd or tofu), *tokwa* (pressed curd), *taho* (porridge), and *taoxi* (fermented soy). In inventing tempeh, or fermented soybean, in its many varieties, the Javanese went further. Tempeh is attested in the *Serat Centini*, a gossipy chronicle of popular life composed c. 1815 in Surakarta, though its origins undoubtedly predate this source. The Chinese improved on fishpond farming in Java as well as the collection of mussels and shellfish. Overall, we can surmise, Chinese from Fujian and elsewhere had major impacts on Southeast Asian diets, culinary habits, food preservation (salting, drying, and fermenting), and everyday cooking techniques, no matter how indigenized such practices may now appear.

Military Technology Transfers

The Chinese Gunpowder Revolution

While gunpowder is known to date back to the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the question of how the Chinese applied it to the development of weaponry, as opposed to fireworks displays, is more obscure. But they certainly did use gunpowder as a propellant for mortars and as bombs. The Mongols used such weapons in wars against the Song and even in the invasion of Japan in 1281. Although the Mongols did not employ these weapons in their land invasions (1206–60), the Arabs acquired knowledge of gunpowder and weaponry within this time frame.

An Arab innovation with Byzantine origins was the use of “Greek fire,” or incendiary weapons made from oil seeping from the ground. Arab traders in the Malacca Straits area evidently introduced the technique; it was quickly exploited in Sumatra, owing to the prevalence of local oil seeps. By 917 CE, the Chinese had learned of the technique. Pacey (1990: 7) offers this as an example of “technological dialogue” or “inventive exchange” between different regions of Asia.

Gunpowder was first written of in Europe by Roger Bacon in 1216. It would appear that in the 13th and 14th centuries CE, the Mongols, Arabs, Mughals, Ottomans, and late medieval Europeans had all advanced on knowledge of gunpowder to produce an array of weaponry. Even so, as

Lorge (2008: 24) demonstrates, “gunpowder and the gun were invented in China.”

Cannonry evidently arrived relatively late on mainland Southeast Asia. Zhou Daguang, the visiting Yuan dynasty envoy to Angkor in 1296–97, reported that “The Cambodians have neither bows nor arrows, balistas nor cannon, neither armor plate nor helmets ... they have neither tactics nor strategy” (Briggs 1951: 249). As Sun Laichen (2003) reveals, Ming China was responsible for the dissemination of gunpowder technology all over northern mainland Southeast Asia, including southern Yunnan, northeast India, northern Burma, and Vietnam. Although Chinese firearms had been reaching Dai Viet since 1390, it was the Ming invasion of Vietnam (1406–27) that was most consequential in terms of military technology transfer, as Ming mastery over the technology eased their military conquest. As Sun demonstrates, contrary to assertions made in the *Ming shilu*, China did not acquire gunpowder technology from Vietnam, but it did gain certain innovations such as the wooden wad used to enhance the effectiveness of “magic fire lance arrows” and possibly a new ignition device suitable in Vietnam’s moist environment. Captured Vietnamese munitions specialists were pressed into service by the Ming (Sun 2003: 14–15).

Vietnamese armies used handguns and artillery in overwhelming their Cham counterparts. In 1390 the Cham king, Che Bong Nga, was killed by handgun, an event deemed a turning point in the struggle between the Dai Viet and their Cham adversaries. The Cham did not adopt the new technology. Bamboo spears and massed formations had pushed Dai Viet to the brink, but the Cham legions and warships were no match for rockets and gunpowder-propelled missiles (Sun 2003: 4–5).

Although the Vietnamese had known gunpowder technology and employed firearms since 1390, their weapons were generally inferior in quality and quantity to the array of weapons wielded by the Ming. For example, a typical mid-16th century Ming battalion wielded “thunderbolt shells,” “wine cup muzzle general cannon,” “continuous bullet cannon,” hand guns, grenades and bullets or some 29.4 tonnes of weaponry (Sun 2003: 6). However, the Ming troops gradually lost their edge, as the Vietnamese under Le Loi captured more and more Ming weapons, culminating in the siege of the key Ming positions in 1426–27 (Sun 2003:

11). The scale of these battles, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties, appears to bear out the deadly use of firepower.

In 1466, as Lieberman (2003: 393) relates, Dai Viet armies were organized along Ming lines. By capturing or copying Ming armaments during the occupation, and by smuggling copper from Yunnan, the Dai Viet began to produce improved cannons and handguns. By 1515, the Dai Viet supported countless musketeers and possessed many small bombards along the Chinese model. The practice of importing copper from Yunnan continued into the 17th century, though on a diminished scale (Sun 2003: 18).

Gunpowder technology spread westward from Dai Viet to the Phuan region of northern Laos. According to Sun (2003: 18–19), Muong Phuan, annexed in 1479 as Tranh-Ninh, was not only acculturated as a Vietnamese province but received Vietnamese military technology, permitting the Phuan to manufacture their own firearms, including handguns and rockets. In 1443, when the northern Thai state of Chiang Mai invaded Nan, it was a Vietnamese military specialist who facilitated the siege of this kingdom. More generally, the Dai Viet began to press upon the various Tai peoples in the Sip Song Chau Tai region, just as Ai-Lao (Laos) emerged as a tributary.

Writing on weapon technology transfers to Burma, Lieberman (2003: 146, 152) notes that, from as early as 1397, various renegade elements in Yunnan introduced primitive handguns, cannons, and rockets across the border into Shan-dominated areas of Burma. The Shan, who replicated these weapons, strengthened themselves against the courts of Ava and Ming. In turn, from the 16th century, the Shans served as middlemen in transferring Chinese military technology to the Avan court. From the early 1400s, both Muslim and Chinese cannons had been used in coastal zones of Burma.

While China pioneered the casting of light cannon by the late 14th century, it nevertheless lagged behind Europe in the metallurgical skills necessary for forging larger cannon. This gap would be filled by new knowledge acquired from the Portuguese in Macau as well as from Jesuit experts at the Ming and Qing courts. Portuguese military specialists lent their services to the Ming in the Imjin War, fought in Korea and surrounding waters against the invasion mounted by Hideyoshi in 1592.

Almost all the mainland Southeast Asian kingdoms sought the advice of Portuguese or European missionaries on military matters.

According to Lieberman (2003: 152), cannons and handguns were employed inside Vietnam against domestic enemies. By the time of the Tay Son rebellion (1771–1802), European-style firearms began to supplant Chinese models. Certain polities benefited from a windfall of captured or salvaged European weapons from shipwrecks, as observed by Christoforo Borri (1633: 52) in Nguyen Vietnam in the first decades of the 17th century. The Nguyen not only took possession of new weapons, crucial in maintaining their autonomy from the northern Trinh, they also became expert in their management and use, such “that they surpass our Europeans.” Sun Laichen (2003: 25–26) is undoubtedly correct in noting that European military technology did not arrive in Vietnam in a vacuum in the 17th century, but built on an earlier Sino-Vietnamese layer.

Mastery of military equipment and methods undoubtedly confirmed trends toward state consolidation on the mainland. Even so, the VOC trade in cannons and matchlocks in the archipelago — if we are to believe early 19th-century Portuguese accounts — may have led to political fragmentation, as with the rise of the independent, mixed-race Larantuqueiros, who stood off both the Portuguese and Dutch on Timor in the mid-18th century and with the emergence of the Buginese/Makassan trading empires and diasporas, reaching westward from Sulawesi to the Borneo coast and the southern Malacca Straits zone, and southward to Sumbawa and even northern Australia.

The Ottoman Military Transfer

Casale (2006: 192–93) relates that, following discussions with an Aceh embassy that arrived in Istanbul in 1562, seeking artillery and war supplies along with Ottoman gunners and cannon founders, the two sides negotiated a formal tributary relationship between the local ruler and the Ottoman sultan. In 1567, a fleet sailed to Aceh to assist with defenses, but upon arrival exchanged artillery, munitions, gunners, and men-of-arms in return for a cargo of pepper and other spices. In the mid-1580s, the bishop of Melaka observed that Aceh owned over 100 pieces of large bronze artillery, many more pieces of iron, arquebuses, cannons, and gunpowder. As Casale rightly concludes, “in effect, the Ottomans

were exporters of technology, an imminently more important medium of exchange than hard currency.” He notes that, in the 16th century, artillery was the “technologically advanced and labor-intensive product par excellence.” The export of this technology not only offset the drain on precious metals from the Ottoman home market to the Indian Ocean, but helped to produce desirable political outcomes for the Ottoman’s closest trading partners and tributaries.

But with the arrival of the Portuguese in India in the early 16th century, Mughal India also acquired new metallurgical skills alongside advances in cannonry acquired from Ottoman advisers. Obviously, the dispersion of this technology was uneven, especially given the costs involved in forging large cannon. But, under the Mughals, the matchlock became ubiquitous, allowing for the massing of lightly armed forces. While such technology assisted in the centralization of states and empires, the increasing ability of rebels and even bandits to acquire matchlocks posed new challenges to central authority (Khan 2004). From the late 16th century, armed piracy emerged in a range of peripheries — the coast of China, around the Bay of Bengal, and along the coasts of Borneo — just as light cannon came to be used on junks and other craft.

East-Southeast Asian Military/Science/Technology Balances

What were the military technology balances across East-Southeast Asia and how did imported technology alter what we would term the “balance of power” between states?

Undoubtedly, the acquisition of cannons and other weapons was a major factor in the consolidation of state power. As Lieberman (2003) affirms, the acquisition of foreign-style weapons and the formation of professional armies helped the Toungoo kingdom to consolidate power in the mid-16th century. It also aided Demak, Makassar, Aceh, and Ayutthaya to become strong and centralized powers in the early 17th century (Reid 2000). The acquisition of foreign weapons helped the Nguyen consolidate power over central Vietnam (Mantienne 2003). Portuguese mercenaries, renegades, and advisers were often crucial in transferring military skills, including the construction of fortifications. The Vietnamese were avid importers of Portuguese military technology dating from the first missionary contacts. Notably, in Nguyen Vietnam, Emperor Gia Long (r.

1802–20) gained valuable assistance from the Breton missionary Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau in the construction of Vauban-style citadels and fortifications and other imported European military techniques.

The Melaka sultanate was another Islamic kingdom that imported cannons, from India. It also hosted a cannon foundry. But, even though Albuquerque reported thousands of cannons in Melaka, they were not sufficient to defend the city against rapid-firing Portuguese ship platforms (Reid 2000: 8). In Brunei, Pigafetta also witnessed mass cannons in the sultan's palace, although we know less about how this weaponry was used.

Reid (2000) is correct in noting that the huge cannons forged in such places as Aceh and Makassar were more often than not for display or for magical purposes. Emperor Gia Long also forged enormous cannons from copper items seized from the Tay Son rebels. Begun in January 1803 and completed one year later, the nine cannons were each consecrated after a season and the five elements, for purely ornamental-cosmological purposes as protectors of the palace at Hue. Several, weighing up to 10,000 kilograms, are on display in the Vietnam Military History Museum in Hanoi.

Whereas guns were familiar in northern mainland Southeast Asia more than a century before contact with Westerners, maritime Southeast Asia did not deploy guns as often or with such effect. Lorge (2008: 88–91) explains this lag as owing to the limited contact of maritime Southeast Asia with Ming armies as well as limited access to the necessary resources. By the 18th century, Southeast Asians began to abandon quite advanced systems of gun-casting in favor of both superior imported weapons and gunpowder. As a result, Southeast Asia lagged not only the West in gunmaking but also the rest of Asia. But the abandonment of gun and gunpowder manufacture in Southeast Asia was not of a piece but was rather a pragmatic decision arrived at by many centers over decades.

An Emerging Southeast Asia Material Culture-Technology Complex?

In one of the few synthetic studies of material culture in premodern Southeast Asia, Anthony Reid (1988: 62–199) notes that certain elements became essentialized in house design. Houses were usually constructed

of wood, resting on poles and with a steep roof, though in the case of religious edifices, Southeast Asians built stupendous monuments in brick and stone. Reid (1988: 112) observes a trend toward constructing with brick in the 16th century, as Europeans and especially Chinese helped to generalize this material. The Chinese often served as builders, as with the Patani mosque. Even so, ceramic tiles had already found a niche in the homes of rich merchants, as in Hoi An, or in religious edifices, Islamic, Christian, and Buddhist, across the region.

For good reason, Reid (1988: 112–14) dubs metalwork “the key to power,” in both war and industry. As he observes, specialized metalworking villages developed under royal patronage in all the major states. Reid suggests that, although the technology of mining, prospecting, refining, and smelting of ores in Southeast Asia was lower than in China or Europe, it was local and indigenous (though he does not research the possibility of even earlier transfers). Reid argues that the technology of smelting ore by roasting with charcoal appears to have been so widespread in the region that only cheaper Chinese imports that arrived in Song times eventually drove it out. An exception was among upland people. Various mining sites — the Sarawak River, Kamirata Island (off south Kalimantan), and Sumatra — produced exportable ore, in high demand for kris-making on Java and other needs. Intriguingly, the “most distinctively Southeast Asian feature of the operation” was the so-called Malay bellows, or bamboo cylinders used to focus a stream of air. Found across the region in various forms, their presence in Madagascar suggests a lineage going back thousands of years. Nor does Reid (1988: 116) neglect Malay and Tai skill in tin-mining. Fitting our theory of a truly integrated East-Southeast Asian world region, small-scale copper mining flourished on Sumatra, west Java, on the Vietnam border with China, and in southern Laos; it folded in the face of Japanese copper exports, peaking in the 17th century.

Writing of Aceh, the French sea-captain Beaulieu observed, “Some of them are very good mechanics, especially for the building of galleys, and they make all sorts of iron works as well as anywhere else though they do not work with the same facility and dexterity as the Europeans. They work very well in copper and wood and some of them are skilled in casting and artillery.” He was equally enthused about craftwork. The prince of Aceh, he remarked, “was very curious in all lapidary and

goldsmith wares, for he had above 300 goldsmiths that wrought daily for him ..." (Harris 1745: 745). Possibly, this was more a boast about wealth than craft, but in all the major court centers of Southeast Asia, from Angkor to the sultanates and as still today in Hanoi (ancient Thang Long), extensive craft quarters were linked with specialist production villages.

Indigenous mining for tin and other metals had long antecedents in both mainland and island Southeast Asia, but it was the arrival of immigrant Chinese to Bangka and Borneo in the early 1700s that would revolutionize traditional methods of alluvial mining. The Chinese immigrants not only introduced new hand tools and mining techniques but also new methods of water control, involving the construction of canals and dikes, further facilitating alluvial extraction. Chinese miners in Selangor on the Malay Peninsula introduced *chin-chia*, or chain-pumps connected to water-wheels, activated by flowing water. Water-races were constructed to link with waterwheels at lower elevations. Hakka miners in the Sambas River area of west Borneo, who began arriving in the 1740s at the invitation of local Malay sultans, formed partnerships or *kongsi*, administrative entities often locked in deadly rivalry over the spoils of the gold mines: "They constructed sluices, reservoirs, and canals, giving the landscape a distinctly Chinese appearance" (Chew 1990: 26–27).

Such large-scale projects could not have been undertaken without centralized management and forms of social control. On the Malay Peninsula, such control was supplied by Chinese secret societies. Because of the long-term nature of the investments, forms of credit were involved. Such pioneer engineering operations in the Southeast Asian frontier derived not only from higher Chinese technical knowledge, but also from the Chinese way of human organization, involving the accumulation of capital and credit, something we associate today with the business firm (Chun 1988: 11). Salt-making was another industry developed by the Chinese, notably in the Sichuan Basin, but we should not ignore local ingenuity across Southeast Asia, as with the Ban Bo salt pits in Laos, where bamboo piston devices were used to pump the saline water (Archambault 1973: 1).

Conclusion

We doubt whether it is possible to generalize about levels of technology across so many cultures, states, and civilizations, here are some general conclusions.

The Chinese technology transfer to Southeast Asia is obviously an understudied area, yet it is significant even outside of Vietnam, where one might assume it was bundled with the civilizational transfer. There is much we don't know about prehistorical transfers; the debate as to indigenous origins versus the diffusion of imported technologies continues. But there is some consensus that, dating back to the early Iron Age, mainland Southeast Asia owed much to China for basic metallurgical processes and high-fired ceramic production techniques. The Dong Son Age has become emblematic of this emergent culture. We have singled out the transfer to many Southeast Asian societies of Chinese methods of transplanting rice seedlings and hydraulic control, as a defining feature of a "technological complex," as described by Pacey (1990: 7, 31). It is also true, as confirmed by the discussion of mountain rice terraces, that the "Austronesian" pattern of adaptive irrigation, also dating back to the Dong Son Age, became far more prevalent over dispersed areas of Southeast Asia-Yunnan than the later South Indian-Sri Lankan model of tanks and canals. The East-Southeast Asian "technological complex" never borrowed or produced mechanical devices, as in North China, nor was there any large-scale canal construction of flood control exercises as with the North China model.

An enduring or even foundational element of the East-Southeast Asia "technology complex" is the India-inspired exchange, reaching back in history to Alexandria and the spread of Hellenistic ideas eastward. Long before the "Chinese century," Persian, Indian, and other merchants in search of Asian spices and riches plied the Asian seas. Pilgrims, priests, and others carried Hindu and Buddhist precepts far beyond their homelands in India and Sri Lanka. Important elements of the Indian transfer, continuing into the 14th century, were firmly implanted in both maritime and mainland Southeast Asia — monumental architecture, urban planning, the organization of agriculture, hydraulic projects, the plastic arts, including *ikat* and other textile techniques, and a general Sanskritization of culture.

The arrival of Islam heralded the evolution of a new “technological complex,” especially in the archipelago, but also touching the mainland China. The first European visitors to the eastern archipelago, such as Pigafetta, were struck more by the energy of his would-be Muslim antagonists than with their overall naval-military supremacy, but all visitors to maritime Southeast Asia were struck by its sheer variety of sailing craft revealing various influences, whether indigenous, Chinese, Indian, or Arabic. Visitors to the western archipelago, such as Beaulieu, were more upbeat about the naval prowess, metalwork, and craft of Aceh, in part the result of what we have termed the Ottoman transfer. As indicated, the Ottoman transfer, which may also have been part of a Mughal Indian transfer, involved important innovations in cannonry and its use. Although much remains for study, it is generally understood that Arabs, Gujaratis, and other Muslim traders arriving in island Southeast Asia brought new understandings of celestial astronomy, navigation, map-making, literacy, numeracy, and other commercial skills, alongside signature mosque architecture.

The Chinese civilizational transfer to Vietnam was considerable over a thousand years, not excluding military and weapons transfers dating back from the 13th century, if not earlier. But we should not confuse this transfer with the practices and techniques brought to Southeast Asia from the maritime provinces of China by junk-borne sojourners. Fujianese maritime networks were the key to technology transfers in this age. Likewise, the maritime provinces of China were the first to absorb new introductions arriving via the maritime routes. In fact, through the Fujian networks, much synergy developed between the maritime provinces of China and such locations as Manila, the Java coast, the Malacca Straits zone, Bangkok, and the Vietnam coast. Such two-way transfers confirms Pacey’s (1990: 7) sense of “technological dialogue” or “inventive exchange” between different regions of Asia, just as it exemplifies a regional “technological complex” in flux in this “early modern” period.

Few who have perused Needham’s (1971) *magnus opus* would doubt China’s achievements in science and technology by Song times, if not earlier. Du Halde (1735) entertained strong doubts that 17th-century China was abreast of Europe in science and technology (though that may be disputed). He did not see signs that China had grasped the Enlightenment accomplishment of scientific skepticism. Undoubtedly,

neo-Confucianism under the Qing applied the brakes, just as the age of European imperialism approached. Rather than search for the “sprouts of capitalism” in China, we have argued that the late Ming and early Qing bequeathed to Southeast Asia a range of practical technologies that were revolutionary in impact upon local economies and societies.

The first European visitors to Japan were impressed with the standard of its crafts and general ingenuity. They were well positioned to comment on mining and metallurgy, viewed as superior to that encountered in Southeast Asia. West-East technology transfer is not the major theme of this chapter, but Japan (Nagasaki) was one of the first points of technological exchange between West and East, from Portuguese firearms to newer metallurgical processes, from Dutch medicine to the full gamut of European learning (Goodman 1967). Because the Japanese were such adept learners in military skills and other sciences, we cannot speak of a stagnant Japan in the 17th and 18th centuries. Japan’s ability to avoid direct European colonization, along with a shift toward import substitution, obviously facilitated the emergence of a largely autonomous “technological complex,” albeit layered upon or embedded within historical technology ensembles that owed to significant borrowing from East Asian models.

Conclusion

With China at its core, East-Southeast Asia today stands with India as the new century's global economic powerhouse. The world region that emerged out of the "first globalization" has obviously made its mark on the present-day globalized world. Such economic triumph, however, has not come without costs — rising income disparities, regional growth imbalances, major ecological damage, and the exhaustion of natural resources. The region is still subject to hiccups in the global economy; the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 struck at the most vulnerable of the globally linked economies, Thailand and Indonesia. Nor were the more globalized parts of the region spared the full impacts of the Wall Street crash of 2008–09. Pieterse (2006: 412–13) cautions against a kind of glib "retroactive Sinocentrism or Indiacentrism" that pumps up or reads back a glorious past interrupted only by imperialism. Still, he concedes, there is a "global confluence" at work in the rise of China and India, as historiography catches up with facts of life unsettling to "the self-indulgent West-centric view of globalization."

A Greater East Asian Region

To what extent has this book confirmed the historical existence of a supra-East-Southeast Asian region or community? Although it is difficult to speak of a single united community — then or now — we are comfortable with the notion of multiple and shifting communities, frequently layered and oftentimes embedded within larger communities. Some of these communities were structured, as with royal or state-sponsored trade or tribute missions, or radically restructured as a result of dynastic changes, wars, or invasions. Although not well documented outside of

Chinese annals, many royal centers were in close correspondence with the central kingdom especially on trade matters; port cities acted as hubs connecting large and small polities alike. Outside the better documented official trade, many regional interactions were of a spontaneous or private nature, mounted by merchant-adventurers or even diasporic communities. Frequently, such communities were not even coterminous with state or polity.

Taken together as an historical ensemble — some parts Indianized, Islamicized, Sinicized, strictly indigenous, or coming under European merchant and missionary influence — a coherent East Asian community existed, in which many people, ethnicities, and creeds participated. Out of this community emerged myriad hybrid associations that render many essentialist notions of state and race questionable. Such communities included almost all the major Asian civilizational templates (Indian, Islamic, and Sinic). Yet other communities with a broad East Asian regional dispersion — Philip Curtin’s “trade diasporas” — emerged out of activities associated with the Tribute Trade, the Bullion Trade, and the trade of the European companies.

No Rome-like empire united the various shores of the Southeast Asian archipelago; nevertheless, commercial transactions mediated by the exchange of currencies against commodities in demand — the Bullion Trade Networks — welded the trading ports and agrarian cities together in a commercial network, across vast spaces and centuries. In this view, the Yellow, East China, and South China seas, the Gulf of Siam, the Java Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the all-important Malacca Straits — all unified rather than divided. Alongside silver, Japanese and Chinese copper cash-coins came the closest to serving as a common East Asian currency, with a great deal of convertibility across not only China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, but also in maritime Southeast Asia, as in Brunei and on Java, alongside the major trade destinations serviced by the Dutch East India Company.

Modifying Pacey’s (1990: 7, 31, 61) sense of a fixed and timebound regional “technology complex,” a layered series of technological complexes evolved and coexisted over long periods, in line with major civilizational influences and regional and global impacts. Even today, despite the homogenizing impact of globalization, the evidence for such premodern technological complexes survives, especially, but not exclusively, in

anthropological settings or as revealed through archaeological findings. Though uneven in reception, knowledge-technology transfers — certain some deeply embedded — greatly contributed to the making of a distinctive East Asian world region.

India imposed a major civilizational footprint upon the Southeast Asian world-region — the “Sanskrit cosmopolis,” as described by Pollack (2006: 123). In earlier times, southern India, Sri Lanka, and such maritime trade-oriented polities as Srivijaya on Sumatra, Pajajaran on Java, and Brunei on Borneo, along with the kingdoms of Angkor, the Tai kingdoms, Pegu, Pagan, and Champa on the mainland — all grafted Indian forms of religion, statecraft, writing systems, plastic arts, and monuments upon indigenous cultures. These were not isolated polities, but were connected in ways that are little researched. Certainly, all were involved in the transfer or reception of prestige goods, manpower, and ideas. The Indianized polities were also connected with China via the tributary trade. We learn of these kingdoms from Chinese chronicle accounts, just as the first Portuguese visitors recorded their impressions and even, in certain cases, entered into diplomatic relations with these Oriental courts.

The expansion of Islam across Eurasia from the 7th century CE onward had both political and commercial ramifications. Not only did Muslim trading networks re-energize the ancient silkroads, but powerful new Islamic polities emerged along these roads, even if the larger, agrarian-based polities of mainland Southeast Asia still remained Indianized to an impressive degree. No caliphate emerged in Southeast Asia along Middle Eastern models, though the spread of Islam within our time frame embraced an expanding community of believers, whether as majorities in the nations known today as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam or as important minorities in the Philippines and in the mainland states, China included. Even today, Muslim peoples in China and Southeast Asia sometimes place religion over state, though, notionally at least, no such contradiction is held in the Southeast Asian sultanates, where the ruler also serves as the head of religion.

Decline of the Tribute Trade System

China’s Tribute Trade System operated as both a symbolic and a functional system, notwithstanding the waxing and waning of dynasties and

the fluctuating fortunes of lesser tributaries. Often, tribute missions to China were called off, either because of dynastic change as in the Ming-Qing transition, or because of radical changes in the fortunes of ruling dynasties in Southeast Asia. Japan opted out of the China-centered Tribute Trading System, while Vietnam extended a version of its own. The eclipse of the sultanate of Melaka in 1511 by Portugal jolted the Ming, although, once lodged in Macau, Portugal entered China as a rent-paying tributary in a new guise.

It has to be explained why the Tribute Trade System, which had been perfected under the Ming, also fell away under the same dynasty. As Joseph Needham demonstrated of early Ming expeditions to Java, Melaka, India, and coastal Africa, the “Portuguese century” of Dias, da Gama, and Albuquerque was equally a “Chinese century,” in terms of shipbuilding, maritime exploration, and trade diplomacy. In its heyday, about 1420, the Ming navy probably outclassed not only any other Asian naval force but that of any European state or combination of states. But where the heirs of Henry the Navigator continued to make important nautical innovations, Chinese marine technology, impressive as it was, made no such revolutionary breakthrough after the 15th century. For a complex of reasons — part economic (drain on silver), technological (new inland water communication in China), and political — the Ming navy fell to pieces. By 1474, only 140 warships remained; shipyards fell into disrepair. By 1500, it became a capital offense in China to build a seagoing junk of more than two masts. By 1551, even trade in multi-masted ships was proscribed (Needham 1971: 508, 526–27).

The Ming and Qing codes ranked and modified, according to circumstance, the tributaries across Southeast, Northwest, Central, and Northeast Asia. Such tributary states as Korea, Vietnam, Siam, Champa, Java, Melaka, Brunei, and Angkor regularly sent missions to China bearing obligatory gifts, cementing diplomatic relations, facilitating trade with the Central Kingdom, and confirming the Son of Heaven’s imperium and majesty. Cultural borrowing, trade ties, and diasporic communities supplied the Sinicizing cultural element.

The Ming-centered tributary system took another blow in the wake of the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592. By dropping out of China’s age-old tributary orbit, Japan sought to establish itself as a tributary center, as demonstrated by the series of missions mounted by Korean

envoys to the Shogun court in Edo (with the Portuguese and Dutch in their train). Even so, informal trade continued with China via Nagasaki (and with Korea via Tsushima Island), albeit on a restricted basis (Swope 2002: 757).

Attacked by Ming armies in 1406, in turn repulsed in 1426–27, Vietnam obviously presents a special case. By restoring tributary relations with China as a cultural defense and by reaffirming Confucianism, Vietnam was able to create its own tributary system on the Chinese model, in relationship to Tai and other tribal minorities. Until their fatal demise, the Cham sought to play off both the Ming and the Vietnamese against each other as tribute-collecting overlords. Under the Nguyen, regular tribute missions took on a political character outside of trade considerations, as the court of Hue skillfully treated its neighbors (Laos and Cambodia) as tributary states.

As Stuart-Fox (2003: 115–20) explains, even in terminal decline, the Qing resolutely clung to the facade of the tributary system. Setting aside the Russians, who, because of geography, upheld a special relationship with China, all other European missions to Beijing under the Qing, namely the Portuguese (1670, 1678, 1727, 1753), the Dutch (1656, 1663, 1667, 1686), and eventually the British, fell under the strict protocol of the tribute system. Wang (2004: 352) confirms that the European interventions eventually rendered the Tribute Trade System obsolete. By the end of the 18th century, only Vietnam, Siam, and some of the Shan and Lao states still presented tribute regularly. The Lord Macartney affair of 1793, whereby the British envoy to the Qing court famously refused to kowtow, merely pointed up how irrelevant the protocol had become to the burgeoning maritime trade. The “hollow shell” of the system persisted for another 50 years, as confirmed by the Amherst mission of 1816, but the need for a new form of diplomacy was already apparent. By then, China confronted the most powerful navy on earth, namely that wielded by Britain, the nation that prosecuted the Opium Wars and, to its great profit, established the Treaty Port System.

East-Southeast Asia in the World Economy: Retreat or Subordination?

The scope, flow, and intensity of East-Southeast Asian trade and the nature of the “early modern” Asian world economy was dramatically altered by a convergence of events — the transition in Ming China from a fiduciary-based currency system to one based on silver; the near-contemporary insinuation of the Portuguese into China-coast trading networks, leading to permanent settlement in Macau in 1557; and the rise of the Nagasaki-centered Bullion Trade System, under which the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch and Chinese, traded Chinese silk against Japanese silver and copper. The engine driving the bullion trade was the gathering of silkworms and the production and export of silks. Yet another event shaping the early modern East Asian world economy was the establishment of the Spanish Philippines in 1564 and the initiation of the Pacific galleon trade, linking Manila with, variously, China, Acapulco, and the New World in the silver-for-silk-and-ceramics trade.

Indian textiles remained in constant demand across East-Southeast Asia, both for luxury and everyday use. The participation of the Europeans in the ancient ceramics trade fired up both Chinese and Japanese production sites, but also left such excellent early producers as the Thai and the Vietnamese on the sidelines. Finally, the 300-year-old Bullion Trade System was wound down by the rise of the Guangzhou Trade System, a system that involved not only the Guangzhou-based junk trade, drawing in most of Southeast Asia, but also the European tea-for-opium trade, reversing the historical flow of bullion into China. By this time, the Tribute Trading System was honored only by remote and scattered princelings on the periphery of the Qing empire.

My argument has been, in line with van Leur, to stress continuity as opposed to a hypothesized retreat from the world economy (Reid 1993). But more than van Leur would have allowed, I concede the eventual subordination of local Southeast Asian economies to European capital. In Reid’s view (1999: 160), by 1700 it was already clear that the Southeast Asian states were not following the path of Europe. Compared to the century before, he states, cosmopolitan craft specialization, private concentration of capital, and curiosity about the scientific world were less rather than more important, suggesting a disengagement from technology

and its accompanying mindset. As a result, Southeast Asian states lacked the bureaucratic method, the national coherence, and, above all, the technology to face up to the Western onslaught of the following century.

A range of cultural factors mitigated against the rise of a merchant-banker class in Southeast Asia, such as emerged in China and Japan with respect to financing junk voyages and arranging collateral, as well as facilitating the complex proto-industrial activities associated with mining, metallurgy, and ceramics production and their marketing. The early curiosity evinced for Western science and technology by East-Southeast Asian monarchs did not translate into an Asian Renaissance. Even the arrival of Islam did not offer substantive practical technologies that might have led to a scientific breakthrough, just as Islam itself offered no Renaissance in learning, at least after its historical “golden age.” If anything, the gap widened between an exceptional Europe and a laggard Asia, but this was also because European control of the vital maritime trade deadened local industry, including the Indian textile industry.

Even so, regional East-Southeast Asian trade networks proved remarkably resilient through to 1800. The Japanese trade in silver was a magnet for the Chinese junk trade, alongside the more formalized VOC trade. The sugar economies of Java and Taiwan (while it lasted) boomed through the 1700s, fed by rising Japanese urban demand. Similarly, the regional trade in Japanese copper, especially to Vietnam, lubricated local commerce, as in the local silk industry. The Europeans fired up the Chinese and Japanese ceramic industries in ways that benefited Asian producers and entrepreneurs alike. The multiplier effects of this industriousness upon local patterns of labor and consumption cannot be underestimated, not excluding the sexual division of labor, with Southeast Asian women especially entering the textile industries.

But the 17th-century Southeast Asian “crisis,” as outlined by Reid (1993), was mitigated by proximity to China. Arguably, Chinese diasporic communities and their trading networks rescued Southeast Asia from a complete retreat from the early modern world economy. From Vietnam to Bangkok, the *pesisir* coast of Java, and Makassar, Chinese captains and *shahbandars* oversaw the busy, two-way junk trade between Fujianese and Southeast Asian ports. Alongside Arab, Indian, and indigenous agents, Chinese put up the capital and credit, while lubricating the interinsular trade. As suppliers of both prestige (high-end ceramics)

and everyday goods (utilitarian ceramic products and ironware), as well as a mix of proto-industrial products, including chemicals, Chinese operated virtual, regionwide department stores. Even during the “Ming gap,” Ryukyuan traders entered the Southeast Asian market, alongside Thai and Vietnamese, albeit in Chinese vessels. With the resumption of the junk trade, the Chinese market for pepper, sandalwood, *trepang*, and other natural and cultivated products offered substitute markets for those of distant India and Europe. In many ways, Chinese — especially the settler communities — served as more functional partners with princes and other Southeast Asian elites over a far longer period than the European companies, who often sought to gain by force what they could not obtain by guile. The Dutch loss of Taiwan was actually a boon to the Southeast Asian junk trade, just as the Portuguese in Macau survived only through entering into relations with Chinese business partners in the Makassar and Timor trade, alongside alternative destinations in southern Vietnam and on the two coasts of India.

It may be that, during 1740–80, Southeast Asia began sinking into peripheral status, but that was the fate of all world peripheries of that period, under the weight of metropolitan monopoly capital. Although it avoided the fate of Mughal India, large parts of Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia’s general connectedness to China via the all-important junk trade offered only a temporary crutch for the East Asia region, until China itself became supine under the weight of the Opium Wars and Unequal Treaties.

To take textile production as an index of local agency and industriousness in Southeast Asia through to 1800, the continuity in traditional forms of silk and cotton manufacture from Vietnam to Thailand, Java, and south Sulawesi is surprising, notwithstanding the influx of Indian cottons and the subsequent arrival of Dutch and English substitutes. Batik manufacture on Java, with its cultural traditions, actually revived at this juncture. One adaptation was the use of plain white imported Indian and, later, Dutch textiles as the base material. The industry further evolved under Chinese auspices, with a shift from the court centers of Java to north coast ports. “Innovation and change” came to be a successful survival strategy for many other “traditional” Southeast Asian industries under assault from new global forces and agents. Subordination did not necessarily spell collapse for these industries in this age.

Reading Back Regionalism Today

No regional identity emerges from “national” narratives in Southeast Asian historical texts and chronicle accounts. Seldom do these offer cognizance of a wider world, at least outside of religious (Hindu/Buddhist/ Islamic) world views. Even the tradition that produced the Tunis-born historian and polymath Ibn Khalud (1328–1406) did not apparently inspire emulators in Southeast Asia, though, unquestionably, a sense of Darul Islam touched all believers. By contrast, the Ming annals are exceptional as historical records, at least in the way of logging tributary missions and in naming rulers and realms. Spanning 444 years, the *Rekidai Hoan*, or Chinese-language Ryukyu diplomatic correspondence, also echoes this broader world of interconnected port cities and realms. At least in the Chinese world view, a coherent Nanyang was both known and imagined. Certain shared understandings of the expanded region also reached the Tokugawa and Choson courts, as reflected in new, hybrid indigenous-Western-inspired maps (Suárez 1999: 50; Gunn 2003: 130–35).

Today, archaeology, anthropology, linguistics, epigraphy, and cartography are all in the service of the modern East-Southeast Asian state, to impose order where often none exists; to strengthen boundaries even where they have been artificially imposed; to celebrate nation and race (Thailand, Malaysia); to impose as much as celebrate “unity in diversity” (Indonesia); as nation-building strategies (Philippines, East Timor); to create a sense of belonging (Singapore); to demarcate difference (Cambodia); to prevail over historical and other enemies (Burma, Laos, and Vietnam); or combinations of all of the above. Powerful national historical discourses and narratives have emerged, along with powerful state bureaucracies, state-controlled media systems, and educational curricula, wherever one-party or one-party dominant systems prevail (most of colonial and post-colonial East-Southeast Asia, most of the time). Proudly, such interpretations are announced in national museums, textbooks, parades, and dioramas, celebrated on national days and in the anointment of heroes and heroines.

Needless to say, history writing in North and South Korea has taken divergent paths. Communist North Vietnam and its former adversary in the Republic of South Vietnam also drew selectively from their respective historical corpora. But, as suggested by present-day conflicting

Sino-Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea, the former Confucianized states of East Asia have to degrees sought to assert control over history. This applies not only to China and the Koreas but also to Japan, especially through its ministry of education. The textbook wars between, respectively, Japan and Korea and Japan and China are illustrative (as indeed was the mass protest by Okinawans launched in 2007 against Tokyo's revision of war history). But Japan and China also disagree over imperial history, as do Korea and China, in ways that raise questions about the "ownership" of history in an age of international scholarship and information revolution.

Divergent Paths to Modernity

The striking feature of Southeast Asia was the ability of the region to absorb, adapt, hybridize, and improvise new knowledge and practical technologies. Reaching back to the Dong Son Age, this process was one of the active creation of regional technology ensembles, layered with the civilizational imprints of the Hindu, Muslim, and Sinic worlds. Nor can we ignore the impact of Europe on the East-Southeast Asian world region in terms of technology exchanges.

Again taking the example of batik-making on Java, the wax technique as applied to an ancient art continued to be developed and refined, just as the development of the copper *cap*, or stamp technique, rescued the industry from European competition. As Sekimoto (2003: 115) points out, we should not view the early batik industry on Java "as the antithesis to modern capitalism." Examples of indigenous creativity may be multiplied, just as newer techniques of Chinese, Islamic and European provenance became part of the 18th- and 19th-century repertoires of local craftsmen and artisans, within and without the workshops of Southeast Asian courts. Nevertheless, highly divergent paths to modernity were taken across the region.

Notwithstanding the weight of neo-Confucian doctrine, late Tokugawa Japan was exceptional in developing a mindset for scientific experimentation, just as national coherence and bureaucratic strength kept interlopers at bay. But the Japanese model had few emulators. Meanwhile, Europe did not stand still in terms of scientific and technological developments. This might sound like European exceptionalism, but Enlightenment

skepticism, feeding into a scientific revolution, did enable Europe, now wedded to the Americas, to emerge as the global core.

Willy-nilly, modernity arrived in Southeast Asia but only under the auspices of colonial capitalism — the British annexation of India, including Burma, along with Malaya and the north Borneo territories, including the sultanate of Brunei; piecemeal Dutch administrative consolidation over the East Indies; French control over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and the American eclipse of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. The Thai state retained its political independence but looked to Meiji Japan (1868–1912) and Europe as a model for a modernizing monarchy. As European colonialism implanted its military-bureaucratic machinery in the Southeast Asian colonies, it turned to the scientific exploitation of resources, to the building of infrastructure, and the basic education of a collaborating cadre of local administrators. As triumphant colonial-capitalism promoted a teleological view of progress, so the universalism of science merged with or trumped local technologies. Undoubtedly, the advent of steam power was an early harbinger of this development.

Once the object of cartographic imperialism, postcolonial successor states in Southeast Asia inherited fixed boundaries and maritime claims. But as the new nation-states took their place as equals in a community of nations, so in a range of cases (Aceh, Patani, Papua, and the Iban/Dayak, Karen, Hmong, and Moro peoples), ethnic and religious fault lines leave legitimacy assertions highly contested. In other words, the post-charter polities that emerged on mainland Southeast Asia offered but symbolic recognition to non-state peoples or ethnic minorities (Scott 2009). The “little cultures” of the archipelago, from Borneo to Papua, have fared even less well in the transition to modern and mostly contrived centralized bureaucratic cultures.

With time, a second tier of East Asian port cities emerged as products of colonial capitalism and/or as key nodes in imperial commercial networks. Gipouloux (2009: 173–203) offers the examples of Surabaya, Haiphong, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin (Tientsin), Hankou, Yokohama, Kobe, Pusan, and Inchon, with some thriving today as truly global cities. Taking a variety of political trajectories — Leninist (China, Vietnam, and Laos); military-led (Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma); multi-party democratic (Philippines); neo-traditionalist (Malaysia); and even absolute monarchical (Brunei Darussalam) — all the postcolonial

states of the region have embraced modernity, scientism, developmentalism, consumerism, and, to degrees, growth-without-limits doctrines. As an untoward consequence, the ecological devastation of Southeast Asia's tropical rainforests and marine and natural resources appears to be irreversible; even human habitat appears threatened across large swathes of the region, alongside rising incomes, showcase development, the amassing of sovereign wealth funds, and the emergence of middle classes and the super-rich.

As a world region, East-Southeast Asia is more coherent today, at least on paper, as suggested by the invention of such regional groupings as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, since 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three (including China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea), especially in discussions on shared economic and financial issues, including even the (premodern) notion of a common regional currency. In the interim, both China and Japan have promoted alternative visions of an East Asian Community. Invoking the importance of the Malacca Straits at a forum in Singapore in November 2009, former Japanese prime minister Hatoyama Yukio talked (hopefully) of a "sea of 'yu-ai' (fraternity)," noting that "most regional commerce depends on sea-routes" (*Japan Times Online* 2009). With Abu-Lughod (1989: 293), we feel wistful at the virtual disappearance of the former "world cities" of Melaka, Palembang, Aceh, Champa, Hoi An, Quanzhou, and the many "pepper coasts," silk-for-silver marts, and ceramic production sites that once connected the Sinbad routes of another age, but it is important in this narrative to know and see where we have been.

References

Printed Works

- Abu-Lughod, Janet L. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Abu Talib Ahmad and Tan Liok Lee, eds. *New Terrains in Southeast Asian History*. Ohio University Press Monograph Series No. 107. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003.
- Adams, Ronald Lynn. “The Megalithic Tradition of West Sumba, Indonesia: An Ethnoanthropological Investigation of Megalith Construction.” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Archaeology, Simon Fraser University, 2007.
- Andaya, Barbara Watson. “Political Development in Southeast Asia between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.” In Tarling, *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, 402–59 (1992 ed.) and 58–115 (1999 ed.).
- . “Review Article: Southeast Asia, Historical Periodization and Area Studies.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 45, no. 2 (2002): 268–87.
- . “Oceans Unbounded: Transversing Asia across “Area Studies.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 65, no. 4 (2006a): 669–90.
- . *The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006b.
- Andaya, Leonard Y. *The Kingdom of Johor, 1641–1728*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- . *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of Southwest Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
- . *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993.
- . “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas.” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 68, no. 1 (1995): 119–138.
- . “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness.” *Archipel* 61 (2001): 29–98.
- Anderson, Benedict. *The Specter of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. London: Verso, 1998.

- Anderson, James A. *The Rebel Den of Nung Tri Cao: Loyalty and Identity along the Sino-Vietnamese Frontier*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007.
- Anderson, John. *English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., 1890.
- Andrade, Tonio. "Pirates, Pelts, and Promises: The Sino-Dutch Colony of Seventeenth-Century Taiwan and the Aboriginal Village of Favorolang." *Journal of Asian Studies* 2 (May 2005): 295–321.
- . *How Taiwan became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Antony, Robert J., ed. *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010.
- . "Introduction: The Shadowy World of the Greater China Seas." In Antony, *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers*, 1–14.
- . "Piracy and the Shadow Economy in the South China Sea, 1789–1810." In Antony, *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers*, 99–114.
- Aoyagi Oji. "Vietnamese Ceramics discovered on Southeast Asian Islands." In National Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hoi An, *Ancient Town of Hoi An*, 72–76.
- Archambault, Charles. *Structures Religieuses Lao: Rites et Mythe*. Vientiane: Vithagna, 1973.
- Ardika I. and Peter Bellwood. "Sembiran: The Beginnings of Indian Contact with Bali." *Antiquity* 65 (1991): 221–32.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century*. London: Verso, 2007.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden, eds. *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 year perspectives*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, Po-keung Hui, Ho-fung Hung, and Mark Selden. "Historical Capitalism, East and West." In Arrighi, *Resurgence of East Asia*, 259–333.
- Asahi Shimbun*. "8th Century Islamic Vase Found," July 6, 2009.
- Asao Naohiro. "The Sixteenth Century Unification." In Hall, *Cambridge History of Japan*, 40–79.
- Ashmolean Museum. "Japanese Export Ware." Description of jar. Museum accession no. EA2002.22. <http://potweb.ashmolean.org/jep/EA2002.22.html>.
- Asian Research Institute of Underwater Archaeology. Official web site. http://www.ariua.org/english/about_en/ (accessed May 20, 2009).
- Auber, Peter. *China, an Outline of its Government, Laws, and Policy and of the Foreign Embassies To and Intercourse with that Empire*. London: Parbury, Allen, and Co., 1834.
- Aung-Thwin, Michael. *Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.
- Auret, C. and T. Maggs. "The Great Ship São Bento: Remains from a Mid-Sixteenth Century Portuguese Wreck on the Pondoland Coast." *Annals of the Natal Museum* 25 (1982): 1–220.

- Aymonier, Étienne-François. *Le Cambodge. Les provinces siamoises*. Paris: E. Leroux, 1900–1904.
- Backus, Charles. *The Nan-chao Kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern Frontier*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Baker, Christopher. "Ayutthaya Rising: From Land or Sea?" *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no.1 (2003): 41–62.
- Barendse, Rene J. "Traders and Port-Cities in the Western Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." *Revista de Cultura* 13–14 (January–June, 1991):105–28.
- . *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
- Barnes, Ruth, ed. *Textiles in Indian Ocean Societies*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Barreto, Luis Filipe. *Cartography of the East-West Encounter*. Macau: Macau Territorial Commission for the Commemoration of the Portuguese Discoveries/Fundação Oriente, n.d.
- Barrkman, Joanna. "Indian Patola and Trade Cloth Influences on the Textiles of the Atoin Meto People of West Timor." *Archipel* 77 (2009): 155–82.
- Batten, Bruce L. *To the Ends of Japan's Premodern Frontiers, Boundaries and Interactions*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.
- [Beaulieu, Augustine de]. "The Expedition of Commodore Beaulieu to the East Indies." In Harris, *Navigantium Atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca*. Vol. 1.
- Beaumont, John. *The Emblem of Ingratitude: a true relation of the unjust, cruel, and barbarous proceedings against the English at Amboyna in the East Indies, by the Netherlands governor and council there....* London: William Hope, 1672.
- Beawes, Wyndham. *Lex Mercatoria Rediviva, or the Merchant's Directory: Being a Compleat Guide to all Men in Business....* London: John Moore, 1772.
- Bellwood, Peter. *Man's Conquest of the Pacific: The Prehistory of Southeast Asia and Oceania*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- . "The Origin and Dispersal of Agricultural Communities in Southeast Asia." In Glover and Bellwood, *Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History*, 21–40.
- Berlie, Jean. *Sinicisation*. Paris: Guy Trédaniel Editions, 1998.
- Bernal, Rafael. "The Chinese Colony in Manila, 1570–1770." In *The Chinese in the Philippines 1570–1770*, Vol.1, edited by Alfonso Felix, Jr., 40–66. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1966.
- Bernard, Henri. "Angkor, la Capitale religieuse du Cambodge, et sa découverte par les japonais aux XVI–XVII siècles." *Monumenta Nipponica* 3, no. 2 (1940): 637–42.
- Bernard, P.H. "Expansion dans les mers du Sud." In "Infiltrations Occidentales au Japon avant la Réouverture du dix-neuvième siècle." *Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonais*, nos.1–4 (1939): 48–63.
- Bin Yang. "Horses, Silver and Cowries: Yunnan in Global Perspective." *Journal of World History* 15, no. 3 (2004): 281–322.

- . *Between Winds and Clouds: The Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE)*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Blench, Roger. "Reconstructing the Southeast Asian Past: Archaeology, Language, Genetics and Material Culture." Prepared for the conference "Dynamics of Human Diversity in Southeast Asia." Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient, Siem Reap, Cambodia, January 7–10, 2009. <http://nickenfield.org/files/blench_200_pg_ms.pdf> (accessed 17 March 2009).
- Blussé, Leonard. *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*. Dordrecht: Foris, 1986.
- . "Chinese Century: The Eighteenth Century in the China Sea Region." *Archipel* 58, no. 3 (1999): 109–29.
- . *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Blussé, Leonard, and Chen Menghong. *The Archives of the Kong Koan of Batavia*. Sinica Leidensia Series, Vol. 59. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- Blussé, Leonard, and Femme Gaastra, eds. *On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998.
- Blussé, Leonard, and Wu Fengbin. *The Chinese Community of Batavia at the End of the Eighteenth Century*. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 2001.
- Blussé, Leonard, and Zhuang Guotu. "Fuchienese Commercial Expansion into the Nanyang as Mirrored in the Tung Hzi Yang K'ao." *Revista de Cultura* 13–14 (January–June 1991): 140–49.
- Blust, Robert. "The Austronesian Homeland: A Linguistic Perspective." *Asian Perspectives* 20 (1985): 48–67.
- . "Subgrouping, Circularity, and Extinction: Some Issues in Austronesian Comparative Linguistics." In *Selected Papers from the 8th International Conference on Austronesian Linguistics*, edited by Elizabeth Zeitoun and Paul Jen Kuei Li, 31–94. Symposium Series of the Institute of Linguistics no. 1. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999.
- Boomgaard, Peter. *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC/Clio Press, 2006.
- Borao, José Eugenio Mateo. *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626–1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavour*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009.
- . "The Fortress of Quelang (Jilong, Taiwan): Past, Present and Future." *Revista de Cultura (International Edition)* 27 (2008): 60–77.
- Borri, Christoforo. *CochinChina: Containing many admirable Rarities and Singularities of that Country...* London: Robert Raworth for Richard Clutterbuck, 1633.
- Borschberg, Peter. "The Seizure of the Sta. Catarina Revisited: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (1602–ca. 1616)." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33 (2002): 31–62.

- . “The Euro-Asian Trade and Medicinal Usage of Radix Chinae in the Early Modern Period (ca. 1535–1800).” *Review of Culture* 20 (2006): 103–15.
- Bose, Sugata. *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Commerce*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Bouchon, Geneviève. “Calicut at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century.” *Review of Culture* 13–14 (January–June 1991): 39–47.
- Bougas, Wayne A. “Patani in the Beginning of the XVIIth Century.” *Archipel* 39 (1990): 113–38.
- . “Surau Aur: Patani’s Oldest Mosque?” *Archipel* 43 (1992): 89–112.
- Bourne, E.G.. “Historical Introduction.” In *The Philippine Islands 1493–1803*, Vol. 1., edited by E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1903.
- Boxer, Charles Ralph. “Notes on Early European Military Influences in Japan 1543–1853.” *Transactions of the Asiatic Society*. 8 (1931): 67–93.
- . *Jan Compagnie in Japan, 1600–1817*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1936.
- . *Macau na Epoca da Restauração* [Macao three hundred years ago]. Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1942.
- . *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549–1650*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951b.
- . *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555–1640*, Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos, 1963.
- . *Francisco Vieira de Figureido: A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South-East Asia, 1624–1667*. The Hague, 1967.
- . “A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540–1600.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10, no. 3 (1969): 415–26.
- Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. London: Fontana/Collins, 1975.
- Bray, Francesca. *The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- . *Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Breazeale, Kennon. “The Lao-Tai Son Alliance, 1792 and 1793.” In *Breaking New Ground in Lao History: Essays on the Seventh to Twentieth Centuries*, edited by Mayouri Ngaosrivathn and Kennon Breazeale, 261–80. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002.
- Briggs, Lawrence Palmer. “Dvaravati, the Most Ancient Kingdom of Siam.” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 65, no. 2 (1945): 98–107.
- . *The Ancient Khmer Kingdom*. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 41. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1951.

- Bronson, Bennet. "Notes on the History of Iron in Thailand." *Journal of Siam Society* 73, parts 1 and 2 (1985): 205–25.
- . "Export Porcelain in European Perspective: The Asian Ceramic Trade in the 17th Century." In Ho, *Ancient Ceramic Kiln Technology in Asia*, 126–50.
- Brown, D.E. *Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate*. Monograph of the Brunei Museum Journal, no. 2. Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei Museum, 1970.
- Brown, Roxana M. *The Ceramics of Southeast Asia, Their Dating and Identification*. 2nd ed. Chicago: Art Media Resources, 2000.
- . "Ming Ban-Ming Gap: Southeast Asian Shipwreck Evidence for Shortages of Chinese Trade Ceramics." In Cheng, *Chinese Export Ceramics and Maritime Trade*, 78–104.
- . *The Ming Gap and Shipwreck Ceramics in Southeast Asia: Towards a Chronology of Thai Trade Ware*. Bangkok: River Books, 2009.
- Brozius, John R. "Siamese King Sent Diplomats to 'King' Maurits at The Hague: VOC Manned Country's Only Foreign Trading Post." <http://www.godutch.com/newspaper.index.php?id=264> (accessed 1 October 2009).
- Brummett, Patricia. "Visions of the Mediterranean: A Clarification." *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 17, no. 1 (2007): 9–55.
- Buckley, Brendan M. et al. "Climate as a Contributing Factor in the Demise of Angkor, Cambodia." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107, no. 15 (2010): 6748–52. <http://www.pnas.org/content/107/15/6748>
- Bucknill, John. *The Coins of Dutch East Indies*. London: Spink and Sons, 1931.
- Bulbeck, David. "Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 874–79.
- . "Pepper." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 1055–56.
- Bui Van Vuong. *Bronze Casting in Viet Nam*. Hanoi: The Gioi, 2008.
- Buschman, Rainer F. *Oceans in World History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.
- Cabaton, Antoine. "L'Espagne en Indochine: à la fin du XVI Siècle." *Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies* (1913): 73–116.
- . *Brève et Veridique Relations des Evénements du Cambodge par Gabriel Quiroga de San Antonio (1604)*. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1914.
- Caetano, Maria Paula. Introduction. Manuel de Abreu Mousinho, Breve discurso em que se conta a conquista do Reino do Pegú na India Oriental. Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1990.
- Camfferman, K. and T.E. Cooke. "The Profits of the Dutch East India Company's Japan Trade." *Abacus* 40, no. 1 (2004): 49–75.
- Cañizares-Esguerra, Jorge and Erik R. Seeman, eds. *The Atlantic in Global History, 1500–2000*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007.
- Campbell, W.M. *Formosa under the Dutch*. London: Kegan Hall, Trench, and Trubner, 1903.
- Campos, J.J.A. *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*. Calcutta and London: Butterworth & Co., 1919.

- Caron, François, and Joost Schouten. *A True description of the mighty kingdoms of Japan and Siam. Written originally in Dutch by Francis Caron and Joost Schouten and translated into English by Captain Roger Manley*. London: R. Boulter, 1671. Reprinted from the English edition of 1663 and edited with an introduction by C.R. Boxer. London: Argonaut Press, 1935.
- Casale, Giancarlo. "The Ottoman Administration of the Spice Trade in the Sixteenth Century: Red Sea and Persian Gulf." *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 49, no. 2 (2006): 170–98.
- [Cavendish, Sir Thomas]. "Voyage Around the World." In Harris, *Navigantium Atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca*, Vol. 1.
- Chaffee, John. "Diasporic Identities in the Historical Development of the Maritime Muslim Communities of Song-Yuan China." *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient* 49, no. 4 (2006): 395–420.
- Chagneau, Jean-Baptiste. "*Le Memoire sur la Cochinchine*." 1820. In *Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hué* 2, Avril-Juin, 1923.
- Chaiklin, Martha. *Cultural Commerce and Dutch Commercial Cultures: The Influence of European Material Culture on Japan, 1700–1850*. Leiden: Leiden Research School, 2003.
- Chambert-Loir, Henri, and Hasan Muarif Ambary, eds. *Panggung Sejarah: Persembahan kepada Prof. Dr. Denys Lombard*. Jakarta: Ecole Française de l'Extrême Orient/Pusat Penelitian Nasional Yayasan Ober Indonesia, 1999.
- Chandler, David. *History of Cambodia*. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007.
- . *Facing the Cambodian Past*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1996. Reprinted 1998.
- Chang T'ien-Tse. *Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644: A Synthesis of Portuguese and Chinese Sources*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1934.
- Charnvit Kasetsiri. *The Rise of Ayudhya: A History of Siam in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- . "Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya) Ayudhya, Ayuthia (1351–1767), Kingdom of." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 192–94.
- Chau Ju-Kua. *Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-Fan-Chi*. Translated and annotated by Friedrich Hirth, and W.W. Rockhill. St. Petersburg: Printing Office of the Imperial Office of the Academy for Science, 1911. Reprinted 1966.
- Chaudhuri, Kirti. *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660–1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- . *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Cheeseman, Patricia. *Lao Textiles: Ancient Symbols, Living Art*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1988.

- Ch'en Ching-Ho. *The Chinese Community in the Sixteenth Century Philippines*. East Asia Cultural Studies Series, no.12. Tokyo: The Center for East Asia Cultural Studies, 1968.
- Cheng, Pei-Kai, ed. *Proceedings of the International Conference: Chinese Export Ceramics and Maritime Trade, 12th–15th Centuries*. Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Books, 2005.
- Chin Kong, James. "Merchants and Other Sojourners: The Hokkiens Overseas, 1570–1780." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1998.
- . "The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries." In Cooke and Li, *Water Frontier*, 53–70.
- . "Envoys, Brokers and Pirates: Chinese Maritime Merchants Revisited." In Makino, Fujita, and Matsumoto, *Dynamic Rimlands and Open Heartlands*, 133–52.
- . "Merchants, Smugglers, and Pirates: Multinational Clandestine Trade on the South China Coast, 1520–50." In Antony, *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers*, 43–57.
- Chiu Hsin-hui. *The Colonial 'Civilizing Process' in Dutch Formosa, 1624–1662*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Cho Hung-guk. "Early Contacts between Korea and Thailand." *Korea Journal* 35, no. 1 (1995): 106–18.
- . "The Trade between China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia in the 14th Century through the 17th Century Period." *International Area Review* 3, no. 2 (2002): 67–107.
- . "Siamese-Korean Relations in the Late Fourteenth Century." *Journal of the Siam Society* 94 (2006): 9–25.
- Ch'oe Sang-su. "Korean-Indonesian Relations: Visit of a Java Envoy in the 15th Century." *Korea Journal* 23, no. 4 (1983): 71–72.
- Choi Byung Wook. *Southern Vietnam under the Reign of Minh Mạng (1820–1841): Central Policies and Local Response*. Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Series, Issue 20. Cornell, NY: SEAP Publications, 2004.
- Christian, David. *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- Christie, Jan Wissemann. "Negara, Mandala and Despotism: Images of Early Java." In Marr and Milner, *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, 65–93.
- . "Trade and State Formation in the Malay Peninsula, 300 B.C.–A.D. 700." In Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers, *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity*, 39–60.
- Chun, Allen. *Towards a Political Economy of the Sojourning Experience: The Chinese in 19th Century Malaya*. Working Paper no. 93, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1988.

- Chung Sungil. "The Volume of Early Modern Korea-Japan Trade: A Comparison with the Japan-Holland Trade." *Acta Koreana* 7, no. 1 (2004): 69–85.
- Clark, Hugh R. *Community, Trade, and Networks, Southern Fujian Province from the Third to Thirteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- . "Maritime Diasporas in Asia Before Da Gama: An Introductory Commentary." *Journal of the Social and Economic History of Asia* 49, no. 4 (2006): 385–93.
- Clearly, Mark. "Historical Geography of Insular Southeast Asia/Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 591–96.
- Clulow, Adam. "Unjust, Cruel and Barbarous Proceedings: Japanese Mercenaries and the Amboyna Incident of 1629." *Itinerario* 1 (2007): 15–34.
- Coedès, Georges. "Le Royaume de Çrivijaya." *Bulletin de Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient* 18, no. 6 (1918): 1–36.
- . *Indianized States of Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968. Originally published as *Les Etats hindouisés d'Indochine et de l'Indonésie*. Paris, 1944.
- . *The Making of Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. Originally published as *Les Peuple de la Péninsule Indochinoise*. Paris: Dunod, 1962.
- . *Angkor: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Condominas, Georges. *L'Espace Social à Propos de l'Asie du Sud-est*. Paris: Flammarion, 1980.
- Colani, Madeleine. *Mégalithes du Haut-Laos (Hua Phan, Tran Ninh)*. Paris: EFEO, 1935.
- Cooke, Nola and Tana Li, eds. *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
- Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. *Introduction to Indian Art*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1969.
- Cooper, Michael. "The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade." *Monumenta Nipponica* 27, no. 4 (1972): 423–33.
- Corpuz, Onofre D. *The Philippines*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
- Cortese, Armando. *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*. London: Hakluyt, 1944.
- Crawford, John. *History of the Indian Archipelago*. Vol. 3. Edinburgh, 1820.
- Cummings, William. *Making Blood White: Historical Transformations in Early Modern Makassar*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.
- Curley, Melissa G., and Hong Liu. *China and Southeast Asia: Changing Socio-Cultural Interactions*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002.
- Curtin, Philip D. *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

- Cushman, Jennifer. *Fields from the Sea: The Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program (SEAP), 1993.
- Dampier, William. *A New Voyage Round the World*. London, 1697. Reprinted by the Argonaut Press, 1927.
- Das Gupta, Ashin. *The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant 1500–1900: Collected Essays of Ashin Das Gupta*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Davidson, J.A. “Brunei Coinage.” *Brunei Museum Journal* 4, no. 1 (1977): 48–81.
- Dewar, Robert E. “Of Nets and Trees: Untangling Reticulate and Dendritic in Madagascar’s Prehistory.” *World Archaeology* 26, no. 3 (1995): 301–8.
- Dhida, Saraya. *Sri Dvaravati: The Initial Phase of Siam’s History*. Bangkok: Muang Boran, 1999.
- Dhiravat na Pombejra. “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was there a shift to isolation?” In *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, edited by Anthony Reid, 250–72. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Diamond, Jared M. “Taiwan’s Gift to the World.” *Nature* 403 (17 February 2000): 709–10.
- Dijk, Wil O. *Seventeenth-Century Burma and the Dutch East India Company 1634–1689*. Singapore: NIAS Press/Singapore University Press, 2006.
- Dixon, Chris J. *South East Asia in the World-Economy: A Regional Geography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Dixon, J.M. “Voyage of the Dutch Ship ‘Grol’ from Hirado to Tongking.” *Transactions of Asiatic Society of Japan* 11, part 1 (1883): 180–215.
- Dos Santos Alves, Jorge M. and Pierre-Yves Manguin. *O Roteiro das Causas do Achem de D. João Ribeiro Gaio: Um olhar português sobre o Norte de Samatra en finais do século XVI*. Lisbon: Comissão Nacional Para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1997.
- Dos Santos Alves, Jorge M. and Nader Nasiri-Moghaddam. “Une lettre en persan de 1519 sur la situation à Malacca.” *Archipel* 75 (2008): 145–66.
- Draw, Olga, and K.W. Taylor. *Views of Seventeenth-Century Vietnam: Cristofori Borri on Cochinchina and Samuel Baron on Tonkin*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2006.
- Du Feng and Su Bao Ru. “Further Studies of the Sources of the Imported Cobalt-blue Pigment Used on Jingdezhen Porcelain from Late 13 to early 15 centuries.” *Science in China Series E: Technological Sciences* 51, no. 3 (2005): 249–59.
- Dupoizat, Marie-France. “Majapahit et la couleur: le cas des carreaux de revêtement mural.” *Archipel* 66 (2003): 47–61.
- Dupoizat, Marie-France, and Naniek Harkantiningih. “Les plus anciennes céramiques chinoises du site de Trowulan.” *Archipel* 67 (2004): 11–15.

- Dutton, George. *The Tay So'n Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth Century Vietnam*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006.
- East India Company. *Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, Vol.1, 1602–1613. London: Sampson Low, Maiston & Co., 1896.
- EFEQ-Vientiane. Official website. <http://laos.efeo.fr/spip.php?rubrique5&lang=en>
- Elvin, Mark. *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Emerson, Donald K. "Southeast Asia: What's in a Name?" *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 15, no. 1 (1984): 1–21.
- Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "Jingdezhen." <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/112982/Jingdezhen>.
- Eredia, Manuel Godhino de. *Malaca, l'Inde méridionale et le Cathay: Facsimilé du manuscrit autographe de la Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique*. Edited by L. Janssen. Brussels, 1881–82).
- Farrington, Anthony. *Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia 1600–1834*. London: British Library, 2002.
- Felix, Alfonso, Jr., ed. *The Chinese in the Philippines 1570–1770*. Vol. 1. Manila: Solidaridad, 1966.
- Fell, R.T. *Early Maps of Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Flecker, Michael. "A 9th century Arab or Indian Shipwreck in Indonesian Waters." *International Journal of Nautical Archaeology* 29, no. 2 (2000): 119–227.
- . "A 9th century AD Arab or Indian Shipwreck in Indonesia: First Evidence of Direct Trade with China." *World Archaeology* 32, no. 3 (2001): 335–54.
- . "The Advent of Chinese Sea-Going Shipping: A Look at the Shipwreck Evidence." In Cheng, *Chinese Export Ceramics and Maritime Trade*, 143–58.
- Flynn, Dennis O., and A. Giráldez. "Silk for Silver: Manila-Macao Trade in the 17th Century." *Philippine Studies* 44, no. 1 (1996): 52–68.
- . "China and the Manila Galleons." In Latham and Kawakatsu, *Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy*, 71–90.
- . "Born Again: Globalization's Sixteenth Century Origins: Asian/Global versus European Dynamics." *Pacific Economic Review* 13, no. 3 (2008): 359–87.
- Fok Cheong Kai. "The Macau Formula: A Study of Chinese Management of Westerners from the Mid-Sixteenth Century to the Opium War Period." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1978.
- . "The Ming Debate on How to Accommodate the Portuguese and the Emergence of the Macao Formula: The Portuguese Settlement and Early Chinese Reactions." *Revista de Cultura* 13–14 (1991): 324–83.
- Foster, William, ed. *Early Travels in India: 1583–1619*. London: Oxford University Press, 1921.

- Fox, James. "Current Developments in Comparative Austronesian Studies." Paper prepared for the symposium "Austronesia Pascasarjana Linguistik dan Kajian Budaya," Universitas Udayana, Bali, August 19–20, 2004. <http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/43158/1/Comparative_Austronesian_Studies.PDF>
- Frank, André Gunder. "World System History." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New England Historical Association, Bentley College, Waltham, MA, April 23, 1994.
- . *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Franko, Wolfgang, et al. *Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Indonesia*. Vol. 3. Singapore: South Seas Society, 1997.
- Fryke, Christopher, and Christopher Schweitzer. *A Relation of Two Several Voyages Made into the East Indies*. 1700. Reprinted with an introduction by C. Ernest Fayle). New Delhi and Madras: Asia Educational Services, 1997.
- Fujita Kayoko. "A World of Difference: The VOC and Japan's Economic Policy." *IISA Newsletter* no. 22 (June 2000): 9.
- Gaastra, Femme S. "Opening lecture: Corruption and the VOC," Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Universiteit Leiden, n.d., pp.10–17.
- . *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline*, Zutphen: Walberg Pers, 2003.
- . "Batavia as an Administrative Centre." http://www.tanap.net/content/voc/organization/organization_batavia.htm
- Galvão, Antonio. *A Treatise on the Moluccas (c. 1544)*. Edited and translated by Hubertus F. Jacobs. Rome, 1971.
- García de los Arcos, María Fernanda. "Philippine Historical Studies in Mexico." *Asian Research Trends* 1 (1998): 1–23.
- Geertz, Clifford. *Negara: The Theater State in 19th Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Gerritsen, Anne. "Fragments of the Global Past: Ceramics Manufacture in Song-Yuan-Ming Jingdezhen." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 52 (2009): 117–52.
- Gervaise, Nicolas. *Déscription Historique du Royaume de Maçassar*. Paris: Hilaire Foucault, 1688.
- Gibson, Thomas. *And the Sun Pursued the Moon: Symbolic Knowledge and Traditional Authority among the Makassans*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003.
- Giddens, Anthony. *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping our Lives*. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Giersch, C. Patterson. *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Gilbert, Erik, and Jonathan T. Reynolds. *Trading Tastes: Commodity and Cultural Exchanges to 1750*. New York: Prentice Hall, 2005.

- . *Africa in World History*. 2nd ed. New York: Prentice Hall, 2007.
- Gipouloux, François. *La Méditerranée asiatique: Villes portuaires et réseaux marchands en Chine, au Japon et en Asie du Sud-Est, XVIe–XXIe siècle*. Paris: CNRM, 2009.
- Glamann, Kristoff. “The Dutch East India Company’s Trade in Japanese Copper, 1645–1736.” *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 6 (1953): 40–79.
- Glass, Andrew. “Early Adopters: Debunking Stereotypes of Buddhist Attitudes Towards Technology.” *IIAS Newsletter* 49 (Autumn 2008): 20–21.
- Glover, Ian. *Early Trade Between India and Southeast Asia: A Link in the Development of a World Trading System*. Kingston-upon-Hull: University of Hull Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989.
- Glover, Ian, and Peter Bellwood, eds. *Southeast Asia: From Pre-history to History*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
- Grave, Peter, Michael Macceroni, and Leanne Lisle. “The Transition to the Early Modern Economy in East and Southeast Asia, 1400–1750 AD: Production and Exchange of Stoneware Jars.” In Cheng, *Chinese Export Ceramics and Maritime Trade*, 163–86.
- Greater Angkor Project (GAP). Official web site. <http://acl.arts.usyd.edu.au/angkor/gap/>. June 24, 2005. Updated by Martin King, March 31, 2010.
- Green, Gillian. “Indic Impetus? Innovations in Textile Usage in Angkorian Period Cambodia.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 43, no. 3 (2000): 277–313.
- . “Angkor Vogue: Sculpted Evidence of Imported Luxury Textiles in the Courts of Kings and Temples.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50 (2007): 424–51.
- Groslier, Bernard Philippe. *Angkor et Cambodge au XVI siècle d’après les sources portugaises et espagnols*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958.
- Guerin, Nicol, and Dick van Oenen. *Thai Ceramic Art: The Three Religions*. Singapore: Suntree, 2005.
- Guillot, Claude. *The Sultanate of Banten*. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990.
- . “Les Portugais et Banten, 1511–1682.” *Revista de Cultura* 13–14 (1991): 80–95.
- Guillot, Claude, and Ludvik Kalus. *Les monuments funéraires et l’histoire de Sultanate de Pasai à Sumatra (XIIIe–XVIe siècle)*. Paris: Cahiers d’Archipel 77, 2008.
- Gullard, W.G. *Chinese Porcelain*. Vol. 2. 4th ed. London: Chapman and Hull, 1908.
- Gunn, Geoffrey C. *Rebellion in Laos: Peasant and Politics in a Colonial Backwater*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.
- . *Encountering Macau: A Chinese City-state on the Periphery of China, 1557–1999*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
- . *Language, Power and Ideology in Brunei Darussalam*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997.

- . *Nagasaki in the Asian Bullion Trade Network*. Monograph no. 32, Research Center of Southeast Asia, Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University, 1999.
- . *Timor Loro Sai: 500 years*. Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999.
- . *First Globalization: The Eurasian Exchange 1500–1800*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
- . “Luang Prabang.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia; A Historical Encyclopedia*, 795–97.
- . “The 17th century Japan-Eurasian Porcelain Trade Networks.” *Journal of the Kakiemon-Style Ceramic Art Research Center* (Kyushu Sangyo University) 3 (March 2007): 153–71.
- Gupta, Sunil. “Early Indian Ocean in the Context of Indian Relationships with Southeast Asia.” In Pande, *India’s Interaction with Southeast Asia*, 111–42.
- Gutman, Pamela. “The Martaban Trade: An Examination of the Literature from the Seventh Century until the Eighteenth Century.” *Asian Perspectives* 40, no. 1 (2001): 108–18.
- Guy, John. *Oriental Trade Ceramics in Southeast Asia: Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- . “Sarasa and Patola: Indian Textiles in Indonesia.” *Orientations* 20, no. 1 (1989): 48–60.
- . *Woven Cargoes: Indian Textiles in the East*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1996.
- . “Vietnamese Ceramics in International Contexts.” In *Vietnamese Ceramics: A Separate Tradition*, edited by John Stevenson, John Guy, Louise Allison Cort, 46–62. Chicago: Media Resources with Avery Press, 1997.
- . “Tamil Medieval Guilds and the Guangzhou Trade.” In Schottenhammer, *The Emporium of the World*, 283–308.
- . “The Hoi An (Cu Lao Cham) Shipwreck Cargo and Asian Ceramic Trade.” In Cheng, *Chinese Export Ceramics and Maritime Trade*, 105–25.
- [Hagenaar, Heinrik]. “Voyage de Henry Hagenaar aux Indes Orientales.” In Renneville, *Recueil des Voyages qui ont servi à L’établissement et au Progrez de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, Book 9.
- Halde, Jean-Baptiste. *The General History of China containing a geographical, historical, chronological and physical description of the Empire of China, the Chinese Tartary, Corea and Tibet....* 4 vols. The Hague, 1735. London: John Watts, 1736 and 1741.
- Hall, John Whitney, et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Japan*. Vol. 4, *Early Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Hall, Kenneth R. *Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.
- . “Multi-dimensional Networking: Fifteenth-century Indian Ocean Maritime Diaspora in Southeast Asian Perspective.” *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient* 49, no. 4 (2006): 454–81.

- Hamashita, Takeshi. "The Tribute Trade System and Modern Asia." *Toyo Bunka, Memoirs of the Research Department of Tokyo University* 46 (1988): 7–24.
- . "Tribute and Emigration: Japan and the Chinese Administration of Foreign Affairs." *Senri Ethnological Studies* 25 (1989): 69–86.
- . "The Tribute Trade System and Modern Asia." In Latham and Kawakatsu, *Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy*, 91–107.
- . "The Future of Northeast Asia—Southeast Asia." In *Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East*, edited by Stephen Kotkin and David Wolf, 312–22. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
- . "Competing Political Spaces and Recreating Cultural Boundaries in Modern East Asia: Regional Dynamism and the Maritime Identity of Asia." In Curley and Liu, *China and Southeast Asia: Changing Socio-Cultural Interactions*, 27–37.
- . "Tribute and Treaties: Maritime Asia and Treaty Port Networks in the Era of Negotiation, 1800–1900." In Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden, *The Resurgence of East Asia*, 2003a: 17–50.
- . "Hamashita Takeshi on Ryukyu Networks in Maritime Asia: An Introduction to the Rekidai Hoan." *Kyoto Review*, March 2003b. http://kyoto-review.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article_230.html
- Hamilton, Alexander. *A New Account of the East Indies*. Vol. 2. 1727. London: Argonaut Press, 1930.
- Han Wai Toon. "Notes on Bornean Camphor Imported into China." *Brunei Museum Journal* 6, no. 1 (1985): 1–31.
- Hanna, Willard A. *Indonesia Banda: Colonialism and its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands*. Banda Naira, Maluku: Yayasan Warisan dan Budaya Banda Naira, 1991.
- Hanna, Willard A., and Des Alwi. *Turbulent Times Past in Ternate and Tidore*. Banda Naira, Maluku: Yayasan Warisan dan Budaya Banda Naira, 1990.
- Hardy, Andrew, Mauro Cucarzi, and Patrizia Zolese, eds. *Champa and the Archaeology of My So'n (Vietnam)*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008.
- Harris, John. comp. *Navigantium Atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca or a Complete Collection of Voyages and Travels consisting of above six hundred of the most Authentic Writers*. 2 vols. London, 1705. 2nd ed., 1744–1748.
- Harrison, Barbara. *Later Ceramics in Southeast Asia: Sixteenth to Twentieth Centuries*. Oxford in Asia Series in Ceramics. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- . "The Ceramic Trade across the South China Sea, c. AD. 1350–1650." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 76, no. 1 (2003): 99–114.
- Harrison, Tom. "The Great Cave of Niah: A Preliminary Report on Borneo Prehistory." *Man* 57 (1957): 161–66.

- . “The ‘Ming Gap’ and Kota Batu, Brunei (with an Appeal for Help).” *Sarawak Museum Journal*, n.s., 8, no. 11 (1958): 273–77.
- . *Prehistoric Wood from Brunei, Borneo (Especially as Excavated at Kota Batu)*. Monograph of the Brunei Museum Journal, no. 2. Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei Museum, 1974.
- Hasebe, Gakuji. “Historical Relations between Japan and Vietnam in the Area of Trade Ceramics.” In The National Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hoi An, *Ancient Town of Hoi An*, 51–54.
- Hein, Donald. “Savankhalok Export Kilns: Evolution and Development.” In Ho, *Ancient Ceramic Kiln Technology in Asia*, 205–28.
- Heng Thiam Soon, Derek. “Temasik as an International and Regional Trading Port in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: A Reconstruction Based on Recent Archaeological Data.” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 72, no. 1 (1999): 113–24.
- . “Export Commodity and Regional Currency: The Role of Chinese Copper Coins in the Melaka Straits, Tenth to Fourteenth Centuries.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 37, no. 2 (2006): 179–203.
- Heuken, Adolf, SJ. *The Earliest Portuguese Sources for the History of Jakarta: Including All Other Historical Documents from the 5th to the 16th Centuries*. Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002.
- Higham, Charles. *The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- . *Early Cultures of Mainland Southeast Asia*. Bangkok: River Books, 2002a.
- . *The Civilization of Angkor*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002b.
- Hino, Iwao and S. Durai Raja Singam. *Stray Notes on Nippon-Malaysian Historical Connections*. Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur Museum, 1941.
- Ho Chuimei. *Ancient Ceramic Kiln Technology in Asia*. Hong Kong: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1990.
- . “The Ceramic Trade in Asia, 1602–82.” In Latham and Kawakatsu, *Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy*, 35–70.
- . “The Ceramic Boom in Minnan During Song and Yuan Times.” In Schottenhammer, *The Emporium of the World*, 237–82.
- Hobson, John M. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Hobson, R.L. *Porcelain, Oriental, Continental and British: A Book of Handy Reference for Collectors*. London: Archibald Constable, 1908. Reprinted by Barman Press, 2008.
- . *The Wares of the Ming Dynasty*. London: Ben Brothers, 1923. Reprinted Tokyo: Tuttle, 1963.

- Honda, Hiromu, and Noriko Shimazu. *Vietnamese and Chinese Ceramics: Used in the Japanese Tea Ceremony*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Horridge, Adrian. *Sailing Craft of Indonesia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Horton, A.V.M. "Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries)." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 270–71.
- Hourani, George. *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Medieval Times*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951. Revised and expanded by John Carswell, 1996.
- Huàng Anh Tuấn. *'Silk for Silver': Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637–1700*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Hull, Geoffrey. "The Basic Lexical Affinities of Timor's Austronesian Languages: A Preliminary Investigation." *Studies in Languages and Cultures of East Timor* 1 (1988): 97–198.
- Hurles, M.E., B.C. Sykes, M.A. Jobling, and O. Forster. "The Dual Origin of the Malagasy in Island Southeast Asia and East Africa: Evidence from Maternal and Paternal Lineages." *American Journal of Human Genetics* 76 (2005): 894–901.
- Igawa Kenji. "At the Crossroads: Limahon and Wakō in Sixteenth Century Philippines." In Antony, *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers*, 73–84.
- Iik Arifin Mansurnoor. "Islamic Reform in Brunei 1912–1915: Introductory Remarks." In *Essays in Modern Brunei History*, edited by Tan Pek Leng, Geoffrey C. Gunn, B.A. Husseinmiya, Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, 53–99. Bandar Seri Begawan: Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 1992.
- . "Revivalism and Radicalism in Southeast Asian Islam: A Pattern or an Anomaly?" *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2009): 222–62.
- Ikeda Satoshi. "The History of the Capitalist World-System vs. the History of East-Southeast Asia." *Review* 19, no. 1 (1996): 49–77.
- Impey, Oliver. *The Early Porcelain Kilns of Japan: Arita in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- . *Japanese Export Porcelain: Catalogue of the Collection of the Ashmolean Museum*. Amsterdam: Hotei, 2002.
- Iioka, Naoko. "Introducing We Zhiyan (Gi Shien): Networks of a Seventeenth Century Merchant and their Implications." In Makino, Fujita, and Matsumoto, *Dynamic Rimlands and Open Heartlands*, 115–32.
- Ishii Yoneo. "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam." *Journal of the Siam Society* 59, no. 2 (1971): 161–74.
- . "Thai-Japanese Relations in the Pre-Modern Period: A Bibliographical Essay with Special Reference to Japanese Sources." In, *Thai Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective*, edited by Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds, 1–16. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1988.

- , ed. *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tōsen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674–1723*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998.
- Iwamoto, Yoshiteru. “Yamada Nagamasu and His Relations with Japan.” *Journal of Siam Society* 95 (2007): 73–84.
- Iwao Seichi. “Japanese Emigrants in Batavia during the 17th century.” *Acta Asiatica* 18 (1970): 1–25.
- . “The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period of the Seclusion Policy Particularly in Raw Silk Trade by the Dutch Factory at Hirado.” *Acta Asiatica* 30 (1976): 34–84.
- . *Nanyo Nihon-machi no kenkyu* [A study of Japanese settlements]. 2 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993 and 1996.
- Jacq-Hergoualc’h, Michel. *The Malay Peninsula: Crossroads of the Maritime Silk Road (100 BC–1300AD)*. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- Jacobs, Els M. *The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century*. Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2008.
- Jacobs, Hubert, SJ, ed. *The Jesuit Makassar Documents (1615–1682)*. Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, Vol. 134. Rome: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1988.
- James, Helen. “Mon” and “Pegu.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 1044–45.
- Japan Times Online*. “Hatoyama outlines East Asia bloc.” November 16, 2009. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091116a2.html>
- Jin Guo Ping and Wu Zhiliang. “Liampó nas Relações Sino-Portuguesas entre 1524 e 1541 e a Escudela de Pêro de Faria.” *Revista de Cultura* (International Edition) 24, (2007): 7–19
- Johns, A.H. “Sufism as a Factor in Indonesian Literature and History.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 2, no. 2 (1961): 10–23.
- Jorg, Christiaan. *Porcelain and the Dutch Chinese Trade*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
- . *Interaction in Ceramics Oriental and Delftware*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Urban Council, 1984.
- . “East Meets West: Chinese Export Art for Europe.” In *Treasures from Imperial China: The Forbidden City and the Royal Danish Court*. Exhibition catalogue, Royal Silver Vault, Christiansborg Palace, 346–53. Copenhagen, 2006.
- Kaempfer, Engelbert. *The History of Japan*. Vol. 1. London, 1727.
- . *A Description of the Kingdom of Siam*. Translated by John Scheuchzer with an introduction by H.K. Kuløy. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1987.
- Kalus, Ludvik and Claude Guillot. “Réinterprétation des plus anciennes stèles funéraires islamiques nousantariennes II. La Stèle de Levan (Java) datée de 457/1082 et les stèles associées.” *Archipel* 67 (2004): 17–36.
- Kathirithamby-Wells, J. “The Age of Transition: The Mid-eighteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries.” In Tarling, *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, I: 572–612.

- Kathirithamby-Wells, J., and J. Villiers, eds. *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990.
- Kato Eichii. "The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period of the Seclusion Policy, Particularly on the Raw Silk Trade by the Dutch Factory at Hirado, 1626–1640." *Acta Asiatica* 30 (1976): 30–84.
- Kearney, Milo. *The Indian Ocean in World History*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Keay, John. *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company*. London: HarperCollins, 1991.
- Keliher, Macabe. *A History of 17th Century Taiwan, or Yu Yonghe's Tales of Taiwan*. Taipei: SMC Publishing, 2003.
- Kern, Hendrik. "Inscriptie van Kota Kapur (eiland Bangka: 608 Çaka)." *Bidragten van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Landen Volkenkunde* 67 (1913): 393–400.
- Kersten, Carool, trans. and ed. *Strange Events in the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos (1635–1644)*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2003.
- . "Cambodia's Muslim King: Khmer and Dutch Sources on the Conversion of Reameathipadei, 1642–1658." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2006): 1–22.
- Keyes, Charles. *The Golden Peninsula: Culture and Adaptation in Mainland Southeast Asia*. New York: Macmillan, 1977. Reprinted Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1995.
- Khan, Iqtidar Alam. *Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Khoo, Dionysius. "Dionysius Khoo, a native of China." In Harris, *Navigantium Atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca*, Vol. 3, 960–70.
- Kiel, Luis. *Porcelanas Chinesas de Século XVI com Inscrições em Português*. Lisbon, 1942.
- Kim Chun-gil. *The History of Korea*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005.
- King, A.F. "A Gravestone in Batavia to the Memory of a Japanese Christian of the Seventeenth Century." *Asiatic Society of Japan Transactions* 17 (1889): 97–101.
- King, Victor. "Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 492–98.
- Kleinen, John, and Manon Osseweijer, eds. *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
- Knaap, Gerrit, and Heather Sutherland. *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- Kobata, Atsushi. "The Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Japan." *The Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 17, no. 2 (1965): 245–66.
- Kobata, Atsushi, and Matsuda Mitsugu. *Ryukyuan Relations with Korea and South Sea Countries: An Annotated Translation of Documents in the Rekidai Hoan*. Kyoto, 1969.

- Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. "Dialogue of Two Pasts: 'Historical Facts' in Traditional Thai and Malay Historiography." In Abu and Tan, *New Terrains in Southeast Asian History*, 199–218.
- Kratoska, Paul, Henk Schulte Nordholdt, and Remco Raben, eds. *Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*. Ohio University Southeast Asia Monograph Series No. 111. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005.
- Kratz, Ernst Ulrich. "Yang tersurat dan yang tersirit: Historicity and Historical Truth." *Archipel* 60 (2000): 25–44.
- Krishna, Bal. *Commercial Relations between India and England (1601 to 1757)*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1924.
- Kuløy, H.K. "Introduction to the 1987 Edition." In Kaempfer, *A Description of the Kingdom of Siam*, viii–x.
- Kulke, Hermann. *The Devaraja Cult*. Data Paper no. 108. Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1978.
- . "The Early and the Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History." In Marr and Milner, *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, 1–22.
- Kulke, Hermann, K. Kesavapany, and Vijay Sakhujia, eds. *Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Labbe, Armand J. *Prehistoric Thai Ceramics, Ban Chiang in Regional Cultural Perspective*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2002.
- Lach, Donald F. *Asia in the Making of Europe*. Vol. 1, Books 1 and 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Laffan, M.F. "Iskandar Muda, Sultan (Mahkota Alam) r.1607–1636." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 667–68.
- Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. Tree Ring Research Laboratory home page. <http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/tree-ring-laboratory>
- Lansing, J. Stephen. *Priests and Programmers: Technologies of Power in the Engineered Landscape of Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Lape, Peter V. "Chronology of Fortified Settlements in East Timor." *Journal of Island & Coastal Archaeology* 1 (2006): 285–97.
- Lape, Peter V., and Chao Chin-Yung. "Fortification as a Human Response to the Holocene Climate Change in East Timor." *Archaeology in Oceania* 43 (2008): 11–21.
- Lape, Peter V., and Sue O'Connor. "Rock Art: A Potential Source of Information about Past Maritime Technology in the South-East Asia-Pacific Region." *The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology* 36, no. 2 (2007): 238–53.
- Latham, A.J.H., and Heita Kawakatsu, eds. *Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy, 1640–1715*. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Le Blanc, Marcel. *The History of Siam in 1688*. Translated by Michael Smithies. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2007.

- Lee, Hoon. "The Repatriation of Korean Castaways in Choson Korean Japan-Relations, 1599–1888." *Korean Studies* 30 (2006): 67–90.
- Lee, James. "The Legacy of Immigration in Southwest China, 1250–1850." *Annales de démographie historique* (1982): 279–304.
- Leirissa, Richard Z. "St. Francis and the Jesuits in Ambon (1546–1580)." *Review of Culture* 19 (2006): 53–63.
- Leitão, Humberto. *Os Portugueses em Solor e Timor, de 1515 a 1702*. Lisbon: LCGG, 1948.
- Lemos, Jorge de. *Historia dos Cercos que Achens, & Iaos Puserão a Malaca*. First published 1585. Reprinted with introduction and notes by João C. Reis. Lisbon: Coleção Cultura Portuguesa do Mar, 1991.
- Leur, J.C. van. "On Early Asian Trade." Translated by J.S. Holmes and A. van Merle. In van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, 1–144. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955.
- Lewis, Martin and Karen E. Wigen. *The Myth of Continents*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Li Minghuan. "From Sons of the Yellow Emperor to Children of Indonesian Soil: Studying Peranakan Chinese Based on the Batavian Kong Koan Archives." *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 34, no. 3 (2003): 215–30.
- Li Tana. *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1998.
- . "The Water Frontier: An Introduction." In Cooke and Li, *Water Frontier*, 1–20.
- . "The Late-Eighteenth and Early-Nineteenth-Century Mekong Delta in the Regional Trade System." In Cooke and Li, *Water Frontier*, 71–84.
- . "The Eighteenth Century Mekong Delta and the World of Water Frontier." In *Viet Nam: Borderless History*, edited by Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony J.S. Reid, 147–64. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.
- Lieberman, Victor. *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, 1580–1760*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- . "Wallerstein's System and the International Context of Early Modern South-east Asian History." *Journal of Asian History* 24, no. 1 (1990): 70–90.
- . "An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia? Problems of Regional Coherence—A Review Article." *Journal of Asian Studies* 54, no. 3 (1995): 796–807.
- , ed. *Beyond Binary Histories: Re-imagining Eurasia, to c.1830*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- . *Strange Parallels*. Vol.1, *Integration on the Mainland: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- . *Strange Parallels*. Vol.2, *Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, Southeast Asia, and the Islands: Southeast Asia in Global Context c. 800–1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- [Linschoten, John Huighen van]. "John Huighen van Linschoten, His Voyage to Goa and Observation of the East Indies (Abbreviated)." 1583. In Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus*, Vol. 10.
- Lo, K.S. "Historical Relations between Yixing and Macau." In *O Cha Pavilhao do Jardim Lou Lim Ieok*, Macau, 7 April 1990.
- Lockard, Craig. *Southeast Asia in World History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Lodewycksz, Willem. "D'eerste Boeck: Histoire van Indien vaer inne verhaelt is de avontueren die de Hollandtsche schepen bejeghent zijn." 1558. In *De eerste schipvaart der Nederlanders naar Oost-Indië onder Cornelis de Houtman 1595–1597*, edited by G.P. Rouffaer and J.W. Ijzerman. 3 vols. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1915–29.
- Logan, William. *Malabar*. 2 vols. 1887. New Delhi: Asian Education Services, 1989.
- Lombard, Denys, and C. Salmon-Lombard. *Les Chinois de Jakarta, temples et vie collective*. Paris: Maison de Homme, 1960.
- . *Le Sultanat Atjéh au temps Iskander Muda (1607–1636)*. Paris: Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient, 1967.
- . *Le carrefour javanais, Essais d'histoire globale*. 3 vols. Paris: Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient, 1990.
- , ed. *Mémoires d'un voyage aux Indes Orientales 1619–1622 Augustin de Beaulieu: Un marchand normand à Sumatra*. Paris: Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient, 1996.
- . "Comment on Sakurai's Paper." In *Proceedings of the International Symposium Southeast Asia: Global Studies for the 21st Century*, 125–27. Kyoto: Kyoto University Center of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997.
- Lombard-Jourdain, Anne and Claudine Salmon. "Les Chinois de Kupang (Timor) aux alentours de 1800." *Archipel* 56, no. 1 (1998): 393–428.
- Lorge, Peter A. *The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Book*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Loubère, Simon de la. *Du Royaume de Siam*. 2 vols. Paris: Coignard, 1691. Reprinted in Singapore, 1986.
- Lunet de Lajonquière, Etienne E. *Inventaire descriptif des monuments du Cambodge*, Paris: E. Leroux, 1902.
- [Ma Huan]. *Ying-yai Sheng-lan* [The overall survey of the ocean's shores]. 1433. Translated and annotated by J.V.G. Mills. London: Hakluyt, 1979. Reprinted by Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997.
- McCune, George, M. "The Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan during the Tokugawa Period." *The Eastern Quarterly* 5, no. 3 (1946): 308–25.
- McNeil, J.R., and William H. McNeil. *The Human Web: A Bird's Eye View of World History*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003.
- McPherson, Kenneth. *The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea*. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

- Majul, Cesar Adib. "Chinese Relationship with the Sultanate of Sulu." In Felix, *The Chinese in the Philippines 1570–1770*, 143–59.
- . *Muslims in the Philippines*. Manila: St. Mary's Publishing, 1973.
- Majumdar, R.C. *Champa History & Culture of an Indian Colonial Kingdom in the Far East, 2nd–13th Century AD*. Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1985.
- Makino, N., K. Fujita, and M. Matsumoto, eds. *Dynamic Rimlands and Open Heartlands: Maritime Asia as a Site of Interactions*. Osaka: Osaka University Press.
- "The Malays of Siam." Public Record Office (PRO), London, Colonial Office (CO) series. CO717, vol.156, 1949.
- Malinee Dilochwanich. "A Study of Samkok: The First Thai Translation of a Chinese Novel." *Journal of Siam Society* 73, nos. 1–2 (1985): 77–109.
- Manguin, Pierre-Yves. *Les Portugais sur les Côtes du Viet Nam et du Campa*. Paris: Ecole Française de Extrême Orient, 1972.
- . "Palembang and Srivijaya: An Early Malay-Harbour City Rediscovered." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 66, no. 1 (1993): 23–46.
- . "Demografi dan Tata Perkataan di Aceh pada abad 16: Data baru menurut sebuah buku pedoman Portugis Tahun 1584." In Chambert-Loir and Ambary, *Panggung Sejarah: Persembahan kepada Prof. Dr. Denys Lombard*, 226–44.
- . "Shipbuilding." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 2004a: 1194–95.
- . "Śrīvijaya (Śriwijaya)." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 2004b: 1245–48.
- . "'Welcome to Bumi Sriwijaya' or the Building of a Provincial Identity in Contemporary Indonesia." Working Paper Series 102, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2008.
- Manning, Patrick. *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- . *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Mantienne, Frédéric. "The Transfer of Western Military Technology to Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Case of the Nguyen." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34 (2003): 519–34.
- Marini, Giovanni Filippo. *A New and Interesting Description of the Lao Kingdom (1642–1648)*. 1663. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996.
- Maritime Asia. Official web site. <http://maritimeasia.ws/>
- Maritime Lanka. "The Ceramic Finds from the *Avondster*." <http://cf.hum.uva.nl/galle/avondster/ceramics.html>
- Markovits, Claude. "Structure and Agency in the World of Asian Commerce During the Era of European Colonial Domination (c. 1750–1950)." *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient* 50, nos. 2–3 (2007): 106–25.

- Marr, David G., and A.C. Milner, eds. *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*. Canberra and Singapore: Australian National University/ISEAS, 1986.
- Maruyama, Makoto. "Hansatsu: Local Currencies in Pre-industrial Japan." In *From Political Economy to Anthropology*, edited by Colin A.M. Duncan and David W. Tandy, 122–32. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993.
- Maspero, Georges. *Royaume de Champa*. Paris: Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient, 1928. Reprinted 1988.
- Maspero, Georges, and Walter, E.J.T. *The Champa Kingdom: The History of an Extinct Vietnamese Culture*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2002.
- Mateo, José Eugenio Borao. *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626–1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavour*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009.
- Matheson, Virginia. *A Short History of Malaysia: Linking East and West*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003.
- Matsura, Akira. *Hirado: Historical Notes and Chronology*. Hirado: Matsura Historical Museum, 1990. Matsutake, Hideo. *Boken Shinshaku 'nagegane' no shiteki: kai ho teki kenkyu: Macau, Zerandia, Kochin, Siam nado yono kan ro kai un boeki kinyu*. Nagasaki Daigaku Tonanasia kenkyu-jo, no. 25, Nagasaki, 1988.
- Matussin Omar. *Archaeological Excavations in Protohistoric Brunei*. Bandar Seri Begawan: Muzium Brunei, 1981.
- Maura, Rinaldi. *Kraak Porcelain. A Moment in the History of Trade*. London: Bamboo Publishing, 1989.
- Mayoury Ngaosrivathana and Kennon Breazeale, eds. *Breaking New Ground in Laos History: Essays on the Seventh to Twentieth Centuries*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002.
- Mazumdar, Sucheta. *Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology and the World Market*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Mazzeo, Donatella, and Chiara Silvi Antonini. *Monuments of Civilization: Ancient Cambodia*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.
- Melink-Roelofs, M.A.P. *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
- Miksic, John. "Mataram, A Javanese Empire." In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 865–66.
- Mills, J.V. *Eredia's Description of Malacca, Meridional India and Cathay*. 1930. Reprinted by the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1997.
- Monteiro, João Pedro. "Oriental Influences in 17th century Portuguese Ceramics." In Pinto de Matos and Monteiro, *A Influencia Oriental na Ceramica Portuguesa*.
- Mookerji, Radhakumud. *A History of the Sea-borne Trade and Maritime Activity of the Indians from the Earliest Times*. Bombay: Longmans Green & Co., 1912.

- Morga, Antonio de. *History of the Philippine Islands: From their Discovery by Magellan in 1521 to the Beginning of the XVII Century*. 1609. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1907.
- Morse, Hosea Ballou, *Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*. 5 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926. Reprinted by Ch'eng-wen Publishing Company, 1966.
- Mousinho, Manuel de Abreu. *Breve Discurso em que se conta a Conquista do Reino do Pegu na Índia Oriental...no ano 1600*. Introduction by Maria Paula Caetano. Lisbon: Publicações Europa-America, 1990.
- Murakami, N. *Diary of Richard Cocks: Cape Merchant in the English Factory in Japan 1615–1622*. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Sankosha, 1899.
- . *The English Factory at Hirado, 1613–1624*. Tokyo: Miyasaki, c.1920.
- . “The Japanese at Batavia in the XVIIIth Century.” *Monumenta Nipponica* 2, no. 2 (1939): 24–41.
- Murdoch, James. *A History of Japan: During the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse*. London: Kegan Paul, 1903. Reprinted 1910 and 1925.
- Naenna, Patricia. *Costume and Culture: Vanishing Textiles of Some of the Tai Groups in Lao P.D.R.* Chiang Mai: Studio Naenna, 1990.
- Nagamatsu Manoru. “History and Archeology of Nagasaki.” In *Unearthed Cities: Edo, Nagasaki, Amsterdam, London, New York, 195–200*. Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Edo-Tokyo Museum, 1997.
- Nakai Nobuhiko and James L. McClain. “Commercial Change and Urban Growth in Early Modern Japan.” In Hall, *The Cambridge History of Japan*. Vol.4, *Early Modern Japan*, 519–95.
- Narayana Moorthy Murugiah. *KaalaChakra: Exhibition Companion*. Singapore: Lee Kong Chian Reference Library, National Library Board, 2008.
- National Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hoi An. *Ancient Town of Hoi An*. Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993.
- Needham, Joseph. *Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West: Lectures and Addresses on the History of Science and Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- . *Science and Civilization in China*. Vol. 4: 3, “Civil Engineering and Nautics.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- . *The Shorter Science and Civilization in China: An Abridgement of Joseph Needham's Original Text*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Ng Chin-Keong. *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1685–1735*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983.
- Ngo Van Doanh. *Champa Ancient Towers: Reality & Legend*. Hanoi: The Gioi, 2006.
- Nguyen Chi Trung and Tran Anh. “Collecting Sea-Swallows Nests in Thanh Chau.” In National Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hoi An, *Ancient Town of Hoi An*, 190–93.

- Nguyen Dinh Dao, "The Birth and the Historic Evolution of Hoi An." In National Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hoi An, *Ancient Town of Hoi An*, 117–27.
- Nguyen-Long, Kerry. "Vietnamese Ceramic Trade to the Philippines in the Seventeenth Century." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 30 (1999): 1–21.
- Nguyen Vinh Phuc, et al. *Hanoi: Streets of the Old Quarter and Around Hoan Kiem Lake*. Hanoi: The Gioi, 2006.
- Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony J.S. Reid, eds. *Viet Nam: Borderless Histories*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.
- Nicholl, Robert. *European Sources for the History of the Sultanate of Brunei in the Sixteenth Century*. Bandar Seri Begawan: Muzium Brunei, 1975.
- . "Brunei and Camphor." *Brunei Museum Journal* 4, no. 3 (1979): 52–74.
- . "A Note on the Verlade Map." *Brunei Museum Journal* 6, no. 2 (1986): 72–76.
- . "Some Problems of Brunei Chronology." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (1989): 175–95.
- Nieuhoff, John. "Voyages and Travels into Brazil and the East Indies (1703)." In *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, Vol. 2, edited by John Churchill. London, 1704.
- . *L'Ambassade de la Compagnie orientale vers l'empereur de la Chine*. Leiden: J. de Meurs, 1665.
- . *An Embassy from the East India Company to the United Provinces*. London, 1699.
- Nishikawa Joken. *Zoho Kai tsusho ko* [Commerce and trading between China and uncivilized countries: the enlarged edition]. 1708. Nihon Keizai taiten, Vol. 4. Tokyo: Shishi Shuppansha, 1928.
- Nogami Takenori. "On Hizen Porcelain and the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade." *Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association Bulletin* 26 (2006): 124–30.
- . "Worldwide Exportation of Arita Ware." [In Japanese.] *Journal of the Kakiemon-Style Ceramic Art Center* 5 (2009): 339–54.
- Nordin Hussin. *Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007.
- . "Pendagang Bugis dan Kuasa Europa di Selat Melaka, 1500–1800." *Sari (ATMA)* 25 (2008): 199–211.
- O'Connor, Sue, Mathew Spriggs, and Peter Veth. "Excavation at Lene Hara Cave Establishes Occupation in East Timor at least 30,000–35,000 Years Ago." *Antiquity* 76 (2002): 45–50.
- O'Connor, Sue, and Peter Veth. "Early Holocene Shell Fish Hooks from Lene Hara Cave, East Timor Establish Complex Fishing Technology Was in Use in Island Southeast Asia Five Thousand Years before Austronesian Settlement." *Antiquity* 79 (2005): 249–56.
- Oliveira, Nuno Vasco. "Subsistence Archaeobotany: Food Production and the Agricultural Transition in East Timor." Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 2008.

- Ong Tai-Hae. *The Chinaman Abroad or a Desultory Account of the Malayan Archipelago, particularly of Java*. Shanghai: Mission Press, 1849.
- Ooi Keat Gin, ed. *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor*. 3 vols. Santa Barbara, CA, and Oxford: ABC/CLIO, 2004.
- Orta, Garcia da. *Colloquies on the Simples & Drugs of India*. Translated by C. Markham. London: Henry Southern & Co., 1913. Reprinted in Lisbon, 1985.
- Osumi, Tamezo. *Printed Cottons of Asia: The Romance of Trade Textiles*. Rutland, VT: Tuttle, 1963.
- Pacey, Arnold. *Technology in World Civilization: A Thousand Year History*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990.
- Pakse-Smith, M.T. "The Japanese Trade and Residence in the Philippines: Before and During the Spanish Occupation." *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* 22, no. 2 (1914): 685–710.
- . *Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days 1603–1868*. Kobe: Thomson and Co., 1930.
- Pande, G.C. ed. *India's Interaction with Southeast Asia: History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*. Vol. 1: 3. Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilization, 2006.
- Parmentier, Henri. *Inventaire descriptif des monuments Cams de l'Annam*. Paris: Leroux, 1909–18.
- Pearson, Michael. *The Indian Ocean*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
- . *The World of the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800, studies in economic, social and cultural history*, Ashgate, Burlington, 2005.
- Pearson, Richard J. *Archaeology of the Ryukyu Islands*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969.
- Pearson, Richard J., Li Min, and Li Guo. "Port City and Hinterlands, Archaeological Perspectives on Quanzhou and its Overseas Trade." In Schottenhammer, *Emporium of the World*, 177–236.
- Péris, N. "Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l'Indochine au XVI et XVII siècles." *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française de l'Extrême Orient* 23 (1923): 1–104.
- Perret, Daniel. "Kota Raja Dalam Kesusasteraan Melayu Lama." In Chambert-Loir and Ambary, *Panggung Sejarah: Persembahan kepada Prof. Dr. Denys Lombard*, 248–59.
- Persoon, Gerard. "Agarwood: The Life of a Wounded Tree." *IIAS Newsletter* 45 (Autumn 2007): 24–25.
- Pham Quoc Quan and Nguyen Dinh Chien. *Gom Hoa Nau Viet Na: Vietnamese Brown Patterned Ceramics*. Hanoi: National Museum of Vietnamese History, 2005.
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. "Oriental Globalization." *Theory, Culture and Society* 23, nos. 2–3 (2006): 411–13.
- Pietsch, Ulrich. "Kakiemon Porcelain as Models for Meissen and Other European Porcelain Manufactories." In *The Universal Nature of Kakiemon*,

- International Symposium*, 2–14. Fukuoka: Kakiemon-style Ceramic Art Research Center, 2007.
- [Pigafetta, Antonio]. *The Voyage of Magellan, The Journal of Antonio Pigafetta*. Facsimile of *Le voyage et navigation fait par les espignolz es isles Mollucques*. Paris 1525. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969.
- Pinto de Matos, Maria Antónia, and João Pedro Monteiro. *A Influência Oriental na Cerâmica Portuguesa do Século XVII* [Oriental influence on 17th century Portuguese ceramics]. Lisbon: Museu Nacional do Azulejo, 1994.
- Pires, Benjamin Vieira. *A Viagem de Comércio Macau-Manila nos Séculos XVI a XIX*. Macau: Museu Maritima de Macau, 1994.
- Pires, Tomé. *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*. 1515. Translated by A. Cortesão. London: Hakluyt Society, 1944.
- Plofker, Kim. “Empires and Exact Sciences in Pre-modern Eurasia.” *IIAS Newsletter* 43 (Spring 2007): 14.
- Plutschow, Herbert E. *Historical Nagasaki*. Tokyo: Japan Times, 1983.
- Polo, Marco. *The most noble and famous travels of Marcus Paulus, one of the nobilitie of the state of Venice into the east partes of the world....* London: Ralph Newbery, 1579.
- Pollack, Sheldon. *The Language of Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture and Power in Premodern India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
- Pomerantz, Kenneth. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Pomerantz, Kenneth, and Steven Topik. *The World That Trade Created; Society, Culture and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. 2nd ed., 2006.
- Prakash, Om. *The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- . “European and Asian Merchants in Asian Maritime Trade, 1500–1800: Some Issues of Methodology and Evidence.” *Review of Culture*, nos. 13–14 (1991): 131–39.
- . *Precious Metals and Commerce: The Dutch East India Company in the Indian Ocean Trade*. Norfolk: Variorum, 1994.
- Ptak, Roderich. “The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to Macau and China during the Ming Dynasty.” *Review of Culture*, no. 1 (1987): 36–45.
- . “China and the Trade in Tortoise-Shell (Sung to Ming Periods).” In *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400–1750*, edited by Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, 195–229. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1991.
- . “China and the Trade in Cloves, Circa 960–1435.” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113, no. 1 (1993): 1–13.

- . “Sino-Japanese Maritime Trade, circa 1550: Merchants, Ports and Networks.” In *O Século Cristão do Japão, Actas do Colóquio Internacional Comemorativo dos 500 Anos de Amizade Portugal-Japão (1543–1993)*, edited by Roberto Carneiro and A. Teodoro de Matos, 281–311. Lisbon, 1994.
- . *China and the Asian Seas*. London: Variorum, 1998.
- . *China’s Seaboard Trade within South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)*. London: Variorum, 1999.
- . “Quanzhou: At the North Edge of a Southeast Asian ‘Mediterranean.’” In Schottenhammer, *Emporium of the World*, 395–428.
- . “The Ryukyu Network in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries.” *Review of Culture* 6 (2003): 7–33.
- . *China, the Portuguese and the Nanyang*. London: Variorum, 2004.
- . Review of Li Qingxin, *Mingdai haiwai...*[The Overseas Trade System of the Ming Dynasty, Beijing, 2004]. *Archipel* 76 (2008): 309–13.
- Purchas, Samuel. *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrims*. Vol. 9. 1625. Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1905.
- Quiason, Serafin D. “The Sampan Trade, 1570–1770.” In Felix, *The Chinese in the Philippines 1570–1770*: 160–74.
- Raffles, Thomas Stamford. *Report on Japan to the Secret Committee of the English East India Company*. Preface by M. Paske-Smith. Kobe: J.L. Thompson and Company, 1929.
- Raignal, Guillaume-Thomas Abbé. *Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies*. Vol. 1. Translated from French by J. Justamond. Dublin, 1776 (1780).
- Raman, K.V. “Indian Influence on the Place Names of Southeast Asia.” In Pande, *India’s Interaction with Southeast Asia*, 57–70.
- Rantoandro, Gabriel. “Kiyai Ngabehi Kaytsu di Banten: Syahbandar dan Perantara.” In Chambert-Loir and Ambarly, *Panggung Sejarah: Persembahan kepada Prof. Dr. Denys Lombard*, 262–84.
- Rasmussen, Peter Ravn. “Tranquebar: The Danish East India Company, 1616–1666: A Brief Essay in Narrative Form.” 23 September 1996. Revised version of term paper. University of Copenhagen, spring 1996. <<http://www.scholiast.org/history/tra-narr.html>>
- Reid, Anthony. “Sixteenth Century Turkish Influences in Western Indonesia.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10, no. 3 (1969): 395–414.
- . *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680*. Vol. 1, *The Lands below the Winds*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988.
- . *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680*. Vol. 2, *Expansion and Crisis*. London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.
- . “Political ‘Tradition’ in Indonesia: The One and the Many.” *Asian Studies Review* 22, no. 1 (1998): 23–38.

- . “Economic and Social Change, c. 1400–1800.” In Tarling, *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*. Vol. 1: 2, 116–63.
- . *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
- . *An Indonesian Frontier, Acehnese & Other Histories of Sumatra*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2005.
- , ed. *The Chinese Diaspora in the Pacific*. London: Ashgate, 2008.
- . “Southeast Asian Consumption of Indian and British Cotton Cloth, 1600–1850.” In Riello and Roy, *How India Clothed the World*. 29–52.
- . “Violence at Sea: Unpacking ‘Piracy’ in the Claims of States over Asian Seas.” In Antony, *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers*, 15–26.
- Renaudot, Eusebius. *Ancient Accounts of India and China by Two Mohammedan Travels*. London: Sam Harding, 1733.
- Renneville, R.A. de Constantin. *Recueil des Voyages Qui Ont Servi à l’Etablissement et aux Progrès de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales*. 5 vols. Rouen: Cailloué, 1725.
- Reynolds, Craig J. *Seditious Histories: Contesting Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006.
- Rhodes, Alexandre de. *Histoire du royaume de Tunquin*. Lyons: Devenet, 1651.
- . *Voyages et Missions du Pere Alexandre de Rhodes de la Compagnie de Jesus en la Chine et autres Royaumes de l’Orient*. Paris: Julien, Lanier &c., 1854.
- Ricklefs, Merle C. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. London: Macmillan, 1981. 4th ed., 2008.
- . *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamicization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries*. Norwalk, CT: Signature Books/EastBridge Books, 2006.
- Riddell, Peter. *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World*. Singapore: Horizon Books, 2001.
- Riello, Giorgio, and Tirthanker Roy. *How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asia, 1500–1850*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Roberts, Luke. “What Are East Asian Cash Coins?” Faculty home page. September 26, 2001. Updated October 24, 2003. <http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/roberts/coins/index.html>.
- Robinson, Kenneth R. “Choson Korea in the Ryukoku Kangnido: Dating the Oldest Extant Korean Map of the World (15th Century).” *Imago Mundi: The International Journal for the History of Cartography* 59, no. 2 (2007): 177–92.
- Roever, Arend de. “The Partition of Timor: An Historical Background,” in Maria Johanna Schouten. ed. *A Ásia do Sudeste: História, Cultura e Desenvolvimento*. Lisbon: Vega, 1998:45–55.
- [Roggewain, Jacob]. “An Account of Commodore Roggewain’s Expedition, with three ships for the Discovery of southern lands, under the direction

- of the Dutch West India Company from an original manuscript.” In Harris, *Navigantium Atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca*, 1: 281–305.
- Rohayah Md. Lani, et al., eds. *Aksara: The Passage of Malay Scripts: Select Bibliography*. Singapore: National Library Board, 2006.
- Rolett, B.V., Tianlong J., Gongwu L. “Early Seafaring in the Taiwan Strait and the Search for Austronesian Origins.” *Journal of East Asian Archeology* 4 (2002): 307–19.
- Ruppé, Carol V., and Jan Barstad, eds. *International Handbook of Underwater Archaeology*. New York: Kluwer, 2002.
- Russell-Wood, A.J.R. *The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808: A World on the Move*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992. Reprinted 1998.
- Sadan, Mandy. “Mons.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 907–8.
- Sadler, A.L. *The Making of Modern Japan: The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1937.
- Sagart, Laurence, Roger Blench, and Alicia Sanchez-Mazaz. *The Peopling of East Asia: Putting Together Archaeology, Linguistics and Genetics*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Sakai Takashi. “Junana-juhaseiki no Asia toji boeki—Banten do no boeki wo chosin ni.” [Asian ceramic trade in the 17th and 18th centuries—The trade at Banten.] [In Japanese, with an English summary.] *Toyo Toji* (Oriental Ceramics) 30 (2000–2001): 81–104.
- Sakamaki Shunzo. “Ryukyu and Southeast Asia.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 23, no. 3 (1964): 383–89.
- Sakuraba Miki and Cynthia Viallé, eds. *Japanese Porcelain in the Trade Records of the Dutch East India Company*. Fukuoka: The Kakiemon-style Ceramic Art Research Center, Kyushu Sangyo University, 2009.
- Sakurai Yumio. “Eighteenth Century Chinese Pioneers on the Water Frontier of Indochina.” In Cooke and Li, *Water Frontier*, 35–53.
- Salmon, Claudine. “Récontes études épigraphiques chinois en Asie du Sud-est.” *Archipel* 8 (1974): 213–23.
- . “Les sucriers chinois de Kelapadua, Banten, XVIIes. Textes et vestiges.” *Archipel* 39 (1990): 139–58.
- . *Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Indonesia*. Vol. 2, *Java*. In collaboration with W. Franke and A. Siu. Singapore: South Seas Society, 1997.
- . “Srivijaya, la Chine et les marchands Chinois (Xe-XIes). Quelques réflexions sur la société de l’empire sumatranais.” *Archipel* 63 (2002): 52–78.
- . “Réfugiés Ming dans les Mers du sud vus à travers diverses inscriptions (ca.1650–ca1730).” *Bulletin de l’Ecole Française de Extrême-Orient* 82 (2003–2004): 177–237.
- . “Women’s Social Status as Reflected in Chinese Epigraphs from Insulinde (16th–20th Centuries).” *Archipel* 72 (2006): 157–94.
- . “Cultural Links between Insulinde Chinese and Fujian as Reflected in Two Late 17th Century Epigraphs.” *Archipel* 75 (2007): 167–94.

- . “Le goût chinois pour les nids de salanganes et ses répercussions économiques en Indonésie (XV/XVI–XXI).” *Archipel* 76 (2008): 251–90.
- Sansom, G.B. *Japan: A Short Cultural History*. 1931. Revised edition. Tokyo: Tuttle, 1977.
- Sarasin Viraphol. *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Sarkar, H.B. *Trade and Commercial Activities of Southern India in the Malayo-Indonesian World, up to AD 1511*. Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1986.
- Satow, Ernest M. “Notes on the Intercourse between Japan and Siam in the Seventeenth Century.” *Transactions of the Asiatic Society* (London) 3 (1885): 139–89.
- Sayavongkhamdy, Thongsas, and Peter Bellwood. “Recent Archaeological Research in Laos.” *Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association Bulletin* 19 (2000): 101–10.
- Scale, Giovanni. *Delle fortificationi. Nuovamente ristampate con aggiunte d'diverse piante e fortezze, Gioseppe de Rossi*. Rome, 1596. Reprinted 1603, 1627.
- Schottenhammer, Angela, “The Role of Metals and the Impact of the Introduction of Huizi Paper Notes in Quanzhou on the Development of Maritime Trade in the Song Period.” In Schottenhammer, *The Emporium of the World*, 95–167.
- Schottenhammer, Angela, ed. *The Emporium of the World: Maritime Quanzhou, 1000–1400*. Sinica Leidensia. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
- . “Japan-The Tiny Dwarf? Sino-Japanese Relations from the Kangxi to the Early Qianlong Reigns.” Working Paper Series 106, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2008.
- Schutte, Joseph Franz. *Monumenta Historica Japoniae I*. Rome, 1975.
- Scott, James C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Seabra, Leonor de. *The Embassy of Pero Vaz de Siquiera to Siam (1684–1686)*. Macau: University of Macau, 2005.
- Sekimoto, Teruo. “Batik as a Commodity and a Cultural Object.” In *Globalization in Southeast Asia: Local, National and Transnational Perspectives*, edited by Shinji Yamashita and Jeremy Seymour Eades, 126–44. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003.
- Selden, Mark, and Takeshi Hamashita, eds. *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 year perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
- . “East Asia Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16th to 21st Centuries.” *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* Vol. 9-4-09, February 25, 2009. <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/3061>.
- Sen, S.P. “The Role of Indian Textiles in Southeast Asian Trade in the Sixteenth Century.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 3, no. 2 (1962): 92–110.

- Sen Tansen. *Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Travel: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600–1400*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003.
- . “The Formation of Chinese Maritime Networks to Southern Asia 1200–1450.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 49, no. 4 (2006): 421–53.
- Seth, Michael J. A. *Concise History of Korea: From the Neolithic Period through the Nineteenth Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Shimada, Ryuto. *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company During the Eighteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Silva, Chandra Richard da. “Political and Diplomatic Relations of the Portuguese with the Kingdom of Kotte during the First Half of the Sixteenth Century.” *Revista de Cultura* 13/14 (1991): 220–32.
- Sjostrand, Sten, and Claire Barnes. “The Turiang: A Fourteenth-century Chinese Shipwreck Upsetting Southeast Asian Ceramic History.” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 74, no. 1 (2001): 71–109.
- Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. 1776. New York: Modern Library, 1937.
- Smith, George Vinal. *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand*. De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University, 1977.
- Smithies, Michael. *Yogyakarta: Cultural Heart of Indonesia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Smits, Gregory. *Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.
- So, Alvin. *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformations and World System Theory*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- So, Billy K.L. *Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946–1368*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Southworth, William A. “Champa.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 2004a, 1: 321–32.
- . “Dvarawati.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 2004b, 1: 442–43.
- Souto, Luis, Leonor Gusmão, Antonio Amorim, Francisco Corte-Real and Duarte N. Vieira. “Y-STR Haplotype Diversity in Distinct Linguistic Groups From East Timor.” *American Journal of Human Biology* 18 (2006): 691–701.
- Souza, George Bryan. *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Reprinted 2004.
- . “Country Trade and Chinese Alum: Raw Material Supply and Demand in Asia’s Textile Production in the 17th and 18th Centuries.” *Review of Culture* 11 (2004): 136–53.
- . “Gifts and Gift-giving in Portuguese-Indonesia Diplomatic Relations.” *Review of Culture* 24 (2007): 20–32.

- . “Opium and the Company: Maritime Trade and Imperial Finances on Java, 1684–1796.” *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009a): 113–33.
- . “Commerce and Consumption: Merchants and Opium at Batavia over the 18th Century.” Lecture at the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Macau SAR Government, March 19, 2009b.
- Speelman, Cornelis. *Journal of kort verhael van't begin voortgangh en einde des oorloghs tusschen den konigh en verdere regeeringe van Maccassar en de Nederlandtsche geoctroyeede Oost-Indische Compagnie in der Jaron 1666/1667/1668 en 1669 voorgeuellen...* Amsterdam: Marcus Doornick, 1669.
- Stargardt, Janice. “‘Behind the Shadows’: Archaeological Data on Two-way Sea-trade between Satingpra, South Thailand, 10th–14th Century.” In Schottenhammer, *Emporium of the World*, 309–93.
- Staunton, George Thomas. *A Complete View of the Chinese Empire: Account of Earl McCartney's Embassy*. London, 1798.
- Steensgaard, Niels. *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, IL, 1975.
- Steinberg, David Joel, ed. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*. Revised ed. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
- Stuart-Fox, Martin. *A History of Laos*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- . *The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang: Rise and Decline*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998.
- . *A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003.
- Suárez, Thomas. *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia*. Hong Kong: Periplus, 1999.
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. “Notes on the Sixteenth Century Bengal Trade.” *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 24, no. 3 (1987): 265–89.
- . “Commerce and Conflict: Two Views of Portuguese Melaka in the 1620s.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19, no. 1 (1988): 62–79.
- . “The Corromandel Trade of the Dutch East India Company, 1618–1649.” *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 38, no. 1 (1989): 41–56.
- . *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History*. London: Longman, 1993.
- . “On World Historians in the Sixteenth Century.” *Representations* 91 (2005): 26–57.
- Sugihara Kaoru, ed. *Japan and China and the Growth of the Asian-International Economy, 1850–1949*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Sun Laichen. “Chinese Military Technology and Dai Viet: c.1390–1487.” Working Paper Series no. 11, Asia Research Institute, Singapore, September 2003. <http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/pub/wps.htm>

- . “Chinese Gunpowder Technology and Dai Viet, ca.1390–1497.” In Nhung Tran and Reid, *Viet Nam: Borderless History*, 72–130.
- . “Chinese-style Gunpowder Weapons in Dai Viet (Vietnam): The Archaeological Evidence.” *Revista de Cultura* (International Edition) 27 (2008): 42–49.
- Sunait Chutintaranond. “‘Mandala,’ ‘Segmentary State,’ and Politics of Centralization in Medieval Ayudhya.” *Journal of Siam Society* 78, no. 1 (1990): 89–100.
- Sunait Chutintaranond and Christopher John Baker, eds. *Recalling Local Pasts: Autonomous History in Southeast Asia*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002.
- Suryadinata, Leo. “Zheng He, Semarang and the Islamization of Java: Between History and Legend.” In Suryadinata, *Admiral Zheng He and Southeast Asia*, 72–93.
- , ed. *Admiral Zheng He and Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
- Sutherland, Heather. “Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2003): 1–20.
- Sweeney, Amin. *A Full Hearing: Orality and Literacy in the Malay World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Swope, Kenneth M. “Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592–159.” *International History Review* 24, no. 4 (2002): 757–82.
- Tagliacozzo, Eric. “Hydrography, Technology, Coercion: Mapping the Sea in Southeast Asian Imperialism, 1880–1900.” *Archipel* 65 (2003): 89–107.
- . “A Necklace of Fins: Marine Goods Trading in Maritime Southeast Asia, 1780–1860.” *International Journal of Asian Studies* 1 (2004): 23–48.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Tan, Rita C. *Zhangzhou Ware Found in the Philippines: “Swatow” Export Ceramics from Fujian 16th–17th Century*. Philippines: ArtPostAsia, 2007.
- Tan, Yvonne. “Cirebon Cargo of Yue Ceramics Vessels.” *Asian Art Newsletter*, May 2007. http://www.seaceramics.org.sg/articlesciberon_cargo.html (accessed October 13, 2007).
- Tanaka, Yuko. “A Comparative Study of Textile Production and Trading from the Beginning of the 16th Century to the End of the 19th Century.” *Hosei University Bulletin*, February 1995. <http://www.lian.com/TANAKA/english-papers/context.html> (accessed May 15, 2007).
- Tarling, Nicholas. *Sulu and Sabah: A Study of British Policy towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978.

- , ed. *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 and 1999.
- Tashiro, Kazui. "Tsuchima han's Korean Trade, 1684–1710," *Acta Asiatica* 30 (1976): 85–105.
- Tavares, João de Vellez Guerreiro. *Jornada que Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho, Governador e Capitão General da cidade do Nome de Deos de Macao na China, Fez de Goa ate chegar a dita Cidade no anno de 1718*. Lisbon: Officina da Musica, 1732.
- Taylor, Keith Weller. *The Birth of Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- . "The Early Kingdoms." In Tarling, *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, 1: 2.
- Taylor, Philip. *Cham Muslims of the Mekong Delta: Place and Mobility in the Cosmopolitan Periphery*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2007.
- Teh-Gallo, Annabel. "Camel Seals and the Early Tin Coinage of Brunei." *Archipel* 70 (2005): 261–80.
- Teixiera, Manuel. "The Church of St. Paul in Macau." *Studia* 41–42 (1979): 51–111.
- Temple, Robert K.G. *The Genius of China: 3,000 Years of Science, Discovery, and Invention*. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1986. Reprinted 2007.
- Thuan Luc. "Japan Early Trade Coins and the Commercial Trade between Viet Nam and Japan in the 17th century, May 1999." <http://www.viettouch.com/numis/nagasaki.htm>.
- Theeravit, Khien. "Japanese-Thailand Relations, 1606–1629." In *Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective*, edited by Chaiwat Kamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds, 17–44. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1988.
- Thomaz, Luis Filipe F.R. *Early Portuguese Malacca*. Macau: Macau Territorial Commission for the Commemoration of the Portuguese Discoveries, n.d.
- . "Malacca: The Town and its Society During the First Century of Portuguese Rule." *Review of Culture* 13/14 (1991): 68–79.
- Thongchai Winichakul. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997.
- Thornton, John. *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Thurgood, Graham. *From Ancient Cham to Modern Dialects: Two Thousand Years of Language Contact and Change*. Oceanic Linguistics Special Publication no. 28, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.
- Tibbets, G.R. *A Study of Arabic Texts Containing Material of Southeast Asia*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979.
- . *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Portuguese*. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1971. Reprinted by RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

- . *A Study of Arabic Texts Containing Material of Southeast Asia*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979.
- Topik, Stephen, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr Frank, eds. *From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500–2000*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Tran Quoc Vuong and Nguyen Vinh Long. *Hanoi: From the Origins to the 19th century*. *Vietnamese Studies* no. 48. Hanoi, 1977.
- Tsunoda, Ryusaku, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene. *Sources of Japanese Tradition*. Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.
- Twitchett, Dennis C., and Frederick W. Mote, eds. *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 8, *The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644*, Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Uchiyama, Toshinori. “A Study on Domestic Circulation of the Imari-ware Porcelain in the Days of the Tokugawa Shogunate: As an Example of the Role of Porcelain Merchants in Tokuzen Region (the Northeast Region of Fukuoka Prefecture).” *Journal of the Kakiemon-Style Ceramic Art Research Center* (Kyushu Sangyo University) 4 (2008): 1–26. [In Japanese.]
- UNESCO World Heritage Centre. “Butuan Archaeological Sites.” May 16, 2006. <http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/2071/>
- . “Rice Terraces of the Philippine Cordilleras.” 1995. <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/722/>
- Valentijn, François. *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*. 3 vols. Amsterdam, 1724. Reprinted in The Hague, 1856–58.
- Van Braum, André Everard. *An authentic account of the Embassy of the Dutch East India Company to the court of the Emperor of China in the years 1794 and 1795*. London: Phillips, 1798.
- Van Dyke, Paul. *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005.
- . “Manila, Macao and Canton: The Ties that Bind.” *Review of Culture* 18 (2006): 125–34.
- Van der Kraan, Alfons. *Murder and Mayhem in Seventeenth Century Cambodia, Anthony van Dieman vs King Ramadhiphati I*. Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 2009.
- Velde, Paul van der, and Rudolph Bachofner. *The Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700–1740*. Scientific Publications of the Japan Netherlands Institute, no. 12. Tokyo, 1992.
- Verhoeven, P. “Voyage to the East-Indies, China and the Philippines (1607–1612).” In *Begin ende Voortgangh*, compiled by Isaac Commelin. Amsterdam: Johannes Janssonius, 1646.
- Vermeulen, A.C.J. *The Deshima Dagregisters: The Original Table of Contents*. Vol. 1, 1680–1690, Vol. 2, 1690–1700. Leiden: Leiden Centre of the History of European Expansion, 1986–1990.

- Viallé, Cynthia. "Company Trade and Private Trade in Japanese Porcelain in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century." *Journal of the Kakiemon-Style Ceramic Art Research Center* (Kyushu Sangyo University) 3 (2007): 141–52.
- . "An Introduction to the Organization of the VOC and its Archives." In Sakuraba and Viallé, *Japanese Porcelain in the Trade Records of the Dutch East India Company*, 12–16.
- Vickers, Michael. *Society, Economics and Politics in pre-Angkor Cambodia: the 7th–8th Centuries*. Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for UNESCO, the Toyo Bunko, 1998.
- . "Two Historical Records of the Kingdom of Vientiane." In *Contesting Visions of the Lao Past: Laos Historiographies at the Crossroads*, edited by C.E. Goscha and S. Ivarrson, 3–36. Copenhagen and Chiangmai: NIAS/Silkworm Books, 2005a.
- . "Champa Revised." Asia Research Institute Working Paper 37, National University of Singapore, March 2005b. http://ari.nus.edu.sg/publication_details.asp?pubtypeid=wp&pubid=304
- Villiers, John. *East of Malacca*. Bangkok: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1985.
- . "Ayutthaya as a City of Commerce in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries." *Review of Culture* 13–14 (1991): 59–67.
- Vink, Markus P.M. "Indian Ocean Studies and 'the New Thalassology.'" *Journal of Global History* 2 (2007): 41–62.
- Vlekke, Bernard H.M. *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia*. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1965.
- Vogel, Hans Ulrich. "Cowry Trade and its Role in the Economy of Yunnan: From the Ninth to the mid-Seventeenth Century." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 36 (1993): 211–52 and 309–53.
- Volker, T. *Porcelain and the Dutch East India Company as Recorded in the Dagb-Registers of Batavia Castle, those of Hirado and Deshima and other Contemporary Papers, 1602–1682*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954. Reprinted 1971.
- Voltaire. *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*. 1756.
- Von Glahn, Richard. *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- . "Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500–1800." In *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800*, edited by Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giraldez, and Richard von Glahn, 187–206. London: Ashgate, 2003.
- Wade, Geoff. "Po-Luo and Borneo—A Re-examination." *Brunei Museum Journal* 2 (1986): 13–35.
- . "Melaka in Ming Dynasty Texts." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 70, no. 1 (1997): 31–69.
- . "The Pre-Modern East Asia Maritime Realm: An Overview of European Language Sources." ARI Working Paper Series no. 16, Asia Research

- Institute, National University of Singapore, 2003. <http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps.htm>.
- . trans. *Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu*. Singapore: Asia Research Institute and the Singapore E-Press, National University of Singapore. <http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1877> (accessed 12 November, 2006a).
- . “Ming Chinese Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia.” In *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, edited by Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig, 73–104. London: Routledge, 2006b.
- . “Ryukyu in the Ming Reign Annals 1380s–1580s.” Working Paper Series no. 93, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, July 2007. <http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps.htm>.
- . ed. *Southeast Asia-China Interactions: Reprint of Articles from the Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*. Reprint 25. Kuala Lumpur, 2007a.
- . “Chinese Economic Activities in Java in the Late Eighteenth Century as Reflected in the Batavian Kong Koan Records.” *Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies* 1 (2007b): 116–37. http://csds.anu.edu.au/volume_1_2007/Wade.pdf
- . “Engaging the South: Ming China and Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 51 (2008): 578–638.
- . “An Earlier Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia: 400–1300 C.E.?” In Makino, Fujita, and Matsumoto *Dynamic Rimlands and Open Heartlands*, 27–81. Reprinted as “An Early Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia, 900–1300 CE.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 40, no. 2 (2009): 221–65.
- Wade, Geoff, and Sun Laichen, eds. *Southeast Asia in the 15th Century: The Ming Factor*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Modern World-System*. Vol.1, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World- Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
- . *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- . *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- . *The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy 1730–1840s*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1989.
- . *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Wang Gungwu. “The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea.” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society* 31, no. 2 (1958): 1–135.

- . “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay.” In *The Chinese World Order*, edited by John K. Fairbanks, 34–62. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968a.
- . “The First Three Rulers of Malacca.” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society* 41, no. 1 (1968b): 11–22.
- . “China and Southeast Asia, 1402–1424.” In *Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia, Essays in Memory of Victor Purcell*, edited by Jerome Ch’en and Nicholas Tarling, 375–401. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- . “Ming Foreign Relations: Southeast Asia.” In Twitchett and Mote, *Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 8, *The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2*, 301–32.
- . “Reflections on Networks and Structures in Asia.” In Curley and Liu, *China and Southeast Asia: Changing Socio-Cultural Interactions*, 13–26.
- . “Chinese Tribute System.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 350–52.
- Wang Ling-Chi and Wang Gungwu, eds. *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays*. 2 vols. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998.
- Warren, James. *The Sulu Zone: 1768–1898*. Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1981.
- Watari Yoshito. “In 8th century, State Knew How to Control Local Mints.” *Asahi Shimbun*, December 27, 2008.
- Watson, William, and Chuimei Ho. *The Arts of China after 1620*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press/Pelican History of Art, 2007.
- Wheatley, Paul. “Geographical Notes on Some Commodities Involved in Sung Maritime Trade.” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 32, no. 2 (1959): 1–139.
- Wheeler, Charles. “One Region, Two Histories: Cham Precedents in the History of the Hoi An Region.” In Nhung and Reid, *Viet Nam: Borderless Histories*, 163–93.
- Wicks, Robert S. “Monetary Developments on Java between the Ninth and Sixteenth Centuries: A Numismatic Perspective.” *Indonesia* 42 (1986): 42–77.
- . “Ancient Coinage in Southeast Asia.” In Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 144–45.
- Widodo, Johannes. “A Celebration of Diversity: Zheng He and the Origin of Pre-colonial Coastal Urban Pattern in Southeast Asia.” In Suryadinata, *Admiral Zheng He and Southeast Asia*, 94–123.
- Wills, John E., Jr. “Relations with Maritime Europeans, 1514–1662.” In Twitchett and Mote, *Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 8, *The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2*, 333–75.
- Winius, George D. “Portugal’s ‘Shadow Empire’ in the Bay of Bengal.” *Revista de Cultura* 13/14 (1991): 273–87.

- Wink, André. *Al-Hind, the Making of the Indo-Islamic World*. Vol. 1, *Early Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries*. Leiden: Brill, 1996 (2002).
- . *Al-Hind, the Making of the Indo-Islamic World*. Vol. 3, *Indo-Islamic Society, 14th–15th Centuries*. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Wolters, O.W. *Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Sri Vijaya*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.
- . *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- . *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. Revised edition, 1999.
- Wood, W.A.R. *A History of Siam*. Bangkok: The Siam Barnarkich Press, 1933.
- Woodside, Alexander. *Vietnam and the Chinese Model*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. 2nd ed., 1988.
- Wong, R. Bin. *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1997.
- . “Entre monde et nation: les régions braudeliennes en Asie.” *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 56, no. 1 (2001): 5–42.
- Wong Tze Ken, Danny. “Vietnam-Champa Relations and the Malay-Islam Regional Network in the 17th–19th Centuries.” *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, March 2004. <http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue5/index.html>.
- Yamauchi, Shinji. “The Japanese Archipelago and Maritime Asia from the 9th to the 13th Centuries.” In Makino, Fujita, and Matsumoto *Dynamic Rimlands and Open Heartlands*, 82–99.
- Yuan Bingling. “Chinese Women in Jakarta during the Colonial Period.” http://www.xiguan.net/yuanbingling/013.htm#_ftn1 (accessed May 2009).
- Yule, H., and A.C. Burnell. *Hobson-Jobson, a Glossary of Colloquial Anglo Indian Words and Phrases*. 1886. London: Linguasia, 1994.
- Zaide, Gregorio F. *Takayama Ukon, Japanese Christian Daimyo, Japanese Town in Manila during Spanish Times; and Japanese Population in the Philippines during Spanish Times*. Kanagawa: Seiken Bunko, 1980.
- Zaragoza, Ramon M. *Old Manila*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Zhang Wenqin. “Macao and Japan during the Qing Dynasty.” *Review of Culture*, 2nd series, 29 (1996): 85–110.

Further Reading

Unless specified, full bibliographical information on these works is provided in the bibliography.

Chapter 1: Southeast Asia Between India and China

Standard works on Southeast Asian prehistory, including the archipelago, include: Ian Glover and Peter Bellwood (eds.), *Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History* (2004), especially “The Origin and Dispersal of Agricultural Communities in Southeast Asia,” 21–40; Peter Bellwood, *First Farmers: The Origins of Agricultural Societies* (2005).

Works that deal specifically with the Austronesian dispersion include: Peter Bellwood, *Man’s Conquest of the Pacific: The Prehistory of Southeast Asia and Oceania* (1979); and James Fox, “Current Developments in Comparative Austronesian Studies” (2004).

Works on mainland archaeology include: Charles Higham, *The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia* (1989); and his *Early Cultures of Mainland Southeast Asia* (2002). On the hinge role of the Malay Peninsula, Michel Jacq-Hergoualc’h, *The Malay Peninsula: Crossroads of the Maritime Silk Road (100 BC–1300AD)* (2002). On Singapore, John Miksic and Cheryl-Ann Low Mei Gek (eds.), *Early Singapore, 1300s–1819: Evidence in Maps, Texts and Artifacts* (2004). On China, Laurence Sagart, Roger Blench, and Alicia Sanchez-Mazaz, *The Peopling of East Asia: Putting Together Archaeology, Linguistics and Genetics* (2005).

For recent research in the archipelago, see Peter Lape and Sue O’Connor, “Rock Art: A Potential Source of Information about Past Maritime Technology in the South-East Asia-Pacific Region,” (2007); on Timor, see Nuno Vasco Oliveira, “Subsistence Archaeobotany: Food Production and the Agricultural Transition in East Timor” (2008).

On Southeast Asian environmental history, see Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (2006); and Charles Keyes, *The Golden Peninsula: Culture and Adaptation in Mainland Southeast Asia* (1977; reprinted, 1995).

On Indianization, see Georges Coedès, *The Making of Southeast Asia* (1966); Tansen Sen, *Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Travel: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600–1400* (2003); Sheldon Pollack, *The Language of Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture and Power in Premodern India* (2006); Sunait Chutintaranond, “‘Mandala,’ ‘Segmentary State,’ and Politics of Centralization in Medieval Ayudhya” (1990).

On Arab trade and geographical knowledge, see George Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Medieval Times* (1951; revised and expanded 1996); G.R. Tibbets, *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Portuguese* (1971; reprinted 2002).

On the Chinese maritime networks, Wang Gungwu: “The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea” (1958); Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in *The Chinese World Order*, edited by John K. Fairbanks (1968); Wang Ling-Chi, Wang Gungwu (eds.), *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays* (2 vols.) (1998). Also, Angela Schottenhammer (ed.), *The Emporium of the World: Maritime Quanzhou, 1000–1400* (2001); Tansen Sen, “The Formation of Chinese Maritime Networks to Southern Asia 1200–1450,” (2006); Billy K.L. So, *Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946–1368* (2000); John E. Wills, Jr., “Relations with Maritime Europeans, 1514–1662,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 8, *The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2*, edited by Dennis O. Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (1998).

On Chinese epigraphic sources, see Wolfgang Franke et al., *Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Indonesia*, Vol. 3 (1997); Wolfgang Franke and Chen Tieh Fan, *Chinese Epigraphic Material in Malaysia*, 3 vols. (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1983–87); Chau Ju-Kua, *Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (1911; reprinted 1966).

Websites relating to recent archaeological research on, respectively, Laos and Cambodia:

EFEU Centre in Vientiane <<http://laos.efeo.fr/spip.php?rubrique5&lang=en>>;

Greater Angkor Project <<http://acl.arts.usyd.edu.au/angkor/gap/>>.

Chapter 2: Rise and Fall of the Southeast Asian “Charter” Kingdoms

Works on the charter kingdoms include Georges Coedès, *The Making of Southeast Asia* (1966); *Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (1968); Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830 Vol.1 Integration on the Mainland* (2003); O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Sri Vijaya* (1967); *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (1975); Jan Wisseman Christie, “Trade and State Formation in the Malay Peninsula, 300 B.C.–A.D. 700,” in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, edited by J. Kathirithamby-Wells and J. Villiers (1990).

Works on Burma: Victor Lieberman, *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, 1580–1760* (1984); Michael Aung-Thwin, *Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma* (1985); Helen James, “Mon,” and “Pegu” in *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor*, edited by Ooi Keat Gin, Vol. 2 (2004).

Works on Angkor: Georges Coedès, *Angkor: An Introduction* (1968); David Chandler, *History of Cambodia*, 4th ed. (2007); Charles Higham, *The Civilization of Angkor* (2002b); Michael Vickery, *Society, Economics and Politics in pre-Angkor Cambodia: the 7th–8th centuries* (1998).

Works on the Tai polities: Charnvit Kasetsiri, *The Rise of Ayudhya: A History of Siam in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (1976); Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Ayutthaya as the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was there a shift to isolation?” in *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, edited by Anthony Reid (1993); Bhawan Ruangsilp, *Dutch East India Company Merchants at the Court of Ayutthaya: Dutch Perceptions of the Thai Kingdom, c. 1604–1765* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

Works on Lan Xang/Laos: Martin Stuart-Fox, *A History of Laos* (1997); *The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang: Rise and Decline* (1998); Mayoury Ngaosrivathana and Kennon Breazeale (eds.), *Breaking New Ground in Lao History: Essays on the Seventh to Twentieth Centuries* (2002).

Works on Vietnamese history: Keith Weller Taylor, *The Birth of Vietnam* (1991); Alexander Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model* 2nd ed. (1988); George Dutton, *The Tay So'n Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth Century Vietnam* (2006); Graham Thurgood, *From Ancient Cham to Modern Dialects: Two Thousand Years of Language Contact and Change* (1999); Andrew Hardy, Mauro Cucarzi, and Patrizia Zolese (eds.), *Champa and the Archaeology of My So'n (Vietnam)* (2008); Ngo Van Doanh, *Champa Ancient Towers: Reality & Legend* (2006).

The major study on non-state people of the mainland is James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (2009).

Chapter 3: Islamic Courts and Maritime Trading Ports

Studies of Islamic trading centers in Southeast Asia include: Anthony Reid, *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (2000); Barbara Watson Andaya, "Political Development between the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, Vol. 1, Part 2, *From c.1500 to c.1800*, edited by Nicholas Tarling (1999).

Works on Islamicization across the Indian Ocean world include: André Wink, *Al-Hind, the Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, Vol. 1, *Early Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries* (2002); Peter Riddell, *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World* (2001); Thomas Gibson, *Islamic Narrative and Authority in Southeast Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Studies on Aceh include Anthony Reid, *An Indonesian Frontier, Acehnese & Other Histories of Sumatra* (2005, chaps. 3–5); on Banten, Claude Guillot, *The Sultanate of Banten* (1990); on Brunei, D.E. Brown, *Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate*, (1970); Graham Saunders, *A History of Brunei* (1994); Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Language, Power and Ideology in Brunei Darussalam* (1997); on Johor, Leonard Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor, 1641–1728* (1975); on Makassar, Leonard Y. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of Southwest Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century* (1981); Anthony Reid, *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (2000,

chaps. 6 and 7); Thomas Gibson, *And the Sun Pursued the Moon: Symbolic Knowledge and Traditional Authority among the Makassarese* (2003); William Cummings, *Making Blood White: Historical Transformations in Early Modern Makassar* (2002); on Mataram, M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 3rd ed. (1999); *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamicization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries* (2006); Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: a Study of the Later Mataram Period, Sixteenth to Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1968); on Melaka, C.C. Brown (trans.), “Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals,” *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Asiatic Society* 25, nos. 2 and 3 (1952); Wang Gungwu, “The First Three Rulers of Malacca” (1968); on Moro-land, Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (1973); on Patani, Wayne A. Bougas, “Patani in the Beginning of the XVIIth Century” (1990).

Chapter 4: The Tribute Trade System and Chinese Diasporas

The corpus of writings by Wang Gungwu on early Chinese trade, the tribute trade system, and the Indonesian-Malay world, are indispensable texts for a better understanding of Chinese diasporas. See Wang Gungwu, “The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea” (1958); “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in *The Chinese World Order* edited by John K. Fairbanks (1968); “China and Southeast Asia, 1402–1424,” in *Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia, Essays in Memory of Victor Purcell*, edited by Jerome Ch’en and Nicholas Tarling (1970); “Chinese Tribute System,” in *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor to East Timor*, Vol. 1, edited by Ooi Keat Gin (2004); and Wang Ling-Chi and Wang Gungwu (eds.), *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays*, 2 vols. (1998). See also Anthony Reid (ed.), *The Chinese Diaspora in the Pacific* (2008); Kenneth Hall, “Multi-dimensional Networking: Fifteenth-century Indian Ocean Maritime Diaspora in Southeast Asian Perspective” (2006).

On the Portuguese and Dutch perspective, see John E. Wills, Jr., *Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Embassies to K’angshih, 1666–1687* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

On relations between Ming China and Southeast Asia, see Geoff Wade, “Engaging the South: Ming China and Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century” (2008); Geoff Wade and Sun Laichen (eds.), *Southeast Asian in the 15th Century: The Ming Factor* (2008).

On Java, see Leonard Blussé and Wu Fengbin, *The Chinese Community of Batavia at the End of the Eighteenth Century* (2001); Leonard Blussé and Chen Menghong (eds.), *The Archives of the Kong Koan of Batavia* (2003); Li Minghuan, “From Sons of the Yellow Emperor to Children of Indonesian Soil: Studying Peranakan Chinese Based on the Batavian Kong Koan Archives” (2003).

On Taiwan, see Chiu Hsin-hui, *The Colonial ‘Civilizing Process’ in Dutch Formosa, 1624–1662* (2007).

On the Chinese presence in Nagasaki, see Herbert E. Plutschow, *Historical Nagasaki* (1983); Robert Leroy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (1980).

On Manila, Melaka, and Macau, see John E. Wills, Jr., “Relations with Maritime Europeans, 1514–1662,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 8, *The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2*, edited by Dennis O. Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (1998); Ch’en Ching-Ho, *The Chinese Community in the Sixteenth Century Philippines* (1968).

On Siam, see Jennifer Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: The Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (1993).

On Brunei, see Tan Peck Leng, “A History of Chinese Settlement in Brunei,” in *Essays in Modern Brunei History*, edited by Tan Peck Leng et al. (1982).

On the Mekong region, see Nola Cooke and Tana Li (eds.), *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*, (2005); Choi Byung Wook, *Southern Vietnam under the Reign of Minh Mạng (1820–1841): Central Policies and Local Response* (2004); on Nguyen Vietnam, see Li Tana, *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1998); on Chinese-Vietnamese-Tai acculturation patterns, see James A. Anderson, *The Rebel Den of Nung Tri Cao: Loyalty and Identity along the Sino-Vietnamese Frontier* (2007).

On piracy, see John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (eds.), *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*

(2010); Robert J. Antony (ed.), *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas* (2010).

Chapter 5: Commerce, Currencies, and Commodities

General texts on links between Europe and Asia in global trade include: Kenneth Pomerantz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2001); Kenneth Pomerantz and Steven Topik, *The World That Trade Created; Society, Culture and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present*, 2nd ed. (2006).

Works on currencies include: Bin Yang, “Horses, Silver and Cowries: Yunnan in Global Perspective” (2004); Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700* (1996); “Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500–1800,” in *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800*, edited by Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn (2003); Robert S. Wicks, *Money, Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia* (1992).

Works on traded commodities include: on silver, Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn, *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800* (2003); on the range of commodities entering Chinese trade, Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (eds.), *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400–1750* (1991); Roderich Ptak, “China and the Trade in Cloves, Circa 960–1435” (1993); *China and the Asian Seas* (1998); *China’s Seaboard Trade within South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)* (1999); on textiles, S.P. Sen, “The Role of Indian Textiles in Southeast Asian Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (1962); John Guy, “Sarasa and Patola: India Textiles in Indonesia” (1989); Ruth Barnes, *Textiles in Indian Ocean Societies* (2005); Giorgio Riello and Tirthanker Roy, *How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asia, 1500–1850* (2009); Alvin So, *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformations and World System Theory* (1986); Michael Cooper, “The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade” (1972).

For a rare study on alum, see George Bryan Souza, “Country Trade and Chinese Alum: Raw Material Supply and Demand in Asia’s Textile Production in the 17th and 18th Centuries” (2004); on opium, George

Bryan Souza, “Opium and the Company: Maritime Trade and Imperial Finances on Java, 1684–1796” (2009a).

On Portuguese activity in the African-Asian slave trade, see Rudy Bauss, “A Demographic Study of Portuguese India and Macau as well as Comments on Mozambique and Timor, 1730–1850,” *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 24, no 2 (1997): 199–216.

On the Chinese junk trade, see James Chin Kong, “Merchants and Other Sojourners: The Hokkiens Overseas, 1570–1780” (1998); “The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” in Cooke and Li (eds.), *Water Frontier* (2005), 53–70.

Chapter 6: The Iberian Maritime Networks

General texts on Iberian maritime networks include: George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (1986; reprinted 2004); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History* (1993).

On the broader galleon trade, see Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “China and the Manila Galleons,” in *Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy*, edited by A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu (1994); “Silk for Silver: Manila-Macao Trade in the 17th Century” (1996).

Studies on the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal include: George D. Winus, “Portugal’s ‘Shadow Empire’ in the Bay of Bengal” (1991); Rene J. Barendse, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century* (2002).

Studies of Macau include: Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Encountering Macau: A Chinese City-state on the Periphery of China, 1557–1999* (1996; 2003); Christina Miu Bing Cheng, *Macau: A Cultural Janus* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999); on Manila, Ramon M. Zaragoza, *Old Manila* (1990); on early Chinese-Iberian interactions, see John E. Wills, Jr., “Relations with Maritime Europeans, 1514–1662,” in Twitchett and Mote (eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 8, *The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2* (1998); on Melaka, Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz, *Early Portuguese Malacca* (n.d.); “Malacca: The Town and its Society during the First Century of Portuguese Rule,” (1991).

On the Nagasaki trade, see C.R. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549–1650* (1951); on the Spice Islands, Leonard Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period* (1993); Willard A. Hanna and Des Alwi, *Turbulent Times Past in Ternate and Tidore* (1990); Willard A. Hanna, *Indonesia Banda: Colonialism and its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands* (1991); on Timor, see C.R. Boxer, “Portuguese Timor: A Rough Island Story: 1515–1960,” *History Today* 10 (1960): 349–55; Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Timor Loro Sai: 500 years* (1999); on the Spanish encounter with Taiwan, see José Eugenio Borao Mateo, *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626–1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavour* (2009).

Chapter 7: Hegemonic Sequence: Enter the Dutch and English Trading Companies

General texts on the European trading companies and their Asian activities include: Els M. Jacobs, *The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the eighteenth century* (2008); M.A.P. Melink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and about 1630* (1962); Claude Markovits, “Structure and Agency in the World of Asian Commerce During the Era of European Colonial Domination (c. 1750–1950)” (2007).

On the East India Company, see Anthony Farrington, *Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia 1600–1834* (2002); John Keay, *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company* (1991). For a three-city view, read Leonard Blussé, *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans* (2008).

On India and Burma, see Om Prakash, *The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720* (1985); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “The Coromandel Trade of the Dutch East India Company, 1618–1649” (1989). On VOC activities in Burma and the Coromandel coast, see Wil O. Dijk, *Seventeenth-Century Burma and the Dutch East India Company 1634–1689* (2006).

On Penang and Melaka, see Nordin Hussin, *Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830* (2007); Radin Fernando, *Murder Most Foul: A Panorama of Social Life in Melaka from the 1780s to the 1820s* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian

Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2006); on Makassar, see Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (2004); on the Dutch at Nagasaki, see Paul van der Velde and Rudolph Bachofner, *The Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700–1740* (1992); Herbert E. Plutschow, *Historical Nagasaki* (1983); on Persia, see Rene J. Barendse, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century* (2002).

On Taiwan, see Chiu Hsin-hui, *The Colonial ‘Civilizing Process’ in Dutch Formosa, 1624–1662* (2007); Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century* (2008, chap. 3). On Vietnam, see Huàng Anh Tuân, ‘Silk for Silver’: *Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637–1700* (2007).

On Siam, see Kennon Breazeale (ed.), *From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia* (1999); George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand* (1977); David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Dirk Van der Cruyse, *Siam and the West 1500–1700*, translated by Michael Smithies (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002); and Bhawan Ruangsilp, *Dutch East India Company Merchants at the Court of Ayutthaya: Dutch Perceptions of the Thai Kingdom, c. 1604–1765* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

On Cambodia, see Alfons Van der Kraan, *Murder and Mayhem in Seventeenth Century Cambodia, Anthony van Dieman vs King Ramadhiphati I* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009). On Yemen, read C. G. Brouwer, *Dutch-Yemeni Encounters: Activities of the United East India Company VOC in South Arabian Waters since 1614* (Amsterdam: D’Fluyte Rarob, 1998).

On the Macau-Guangzhou trade system, see Chang T’ien-Tse, *Sino-Portuguese trade from 1514 to 1644: A Synthesis of Portuguese and Chinese Sources* (1934); Paul van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (2005).

Chapter 8: Nihon-Machi: Japanese Diasporic Communities of Southeast Asia

General English-language studies on this theme are lacking, but the major Japanese-language study of the Japanese settlements in Southeast Asia is

Iwao Seiichi, *Nanyo Nihon-machi no kenkyu* [A study of Japanese settlements] 2 vols. (1993, 1996).

For English-language studies on the history of Japan, see G.B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (1931, 1977); Bruce L. Batten, *To the Ends of Japan's Premodern Frontiers, Boundaries and Interactions* (2002).

On the Japanese at Ambon, see Adam Clulow, "Unjust, Cruel and Barbarous Proceedings: Japanese Mercenaries and the Amboyna Incident of 1629" (2007); at Batavia (Jakarta), Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (1986); Iwao Seiichi, "Japanese emigrants in Batavia during the 17th century" (1970); at Macau, see C.R. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549–1650* (1951); at Manila, Gregorio F. Zaide, *Takayama Ukon, Japanese Christian Daimyo, Japanese Town in Manila during Spanish Times; and Japanese Population in the Philippines during Spanish Times* (1980); in Siam, see Ishii Yoneo, "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam," *Journal of the Siam Society* 59, no. 2 (1971): 161–74; Khien Theeravit, "Japanese-Thailand Relations, 1606–1629," in *Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective*, edited by Chaiwat Kamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds (1988); in Vietnam and Indochina, see Li Tana, *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1998); N. Péri, "Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l'Indochine au XVI et XVII siècles" (1923).

On the Korean connection with Southeast Asia, see Cho Hung-guk, "Early Contacts between Korea and Thailand" (1995); "The Trade between China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia in the 14th Century through the 17th Century Period" (2002); Ch'oe Sang-su, "Korean-Indonesian Relations: Visit of a Java Envoy in the 15th Century" (1983).

Studies of Ryukyu include: Gregory Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics* (1999); Geoff Wade, "Ryukyu in the Ming Reign Annals 1380s–1580s" (2007); Ishii Yoneo (ed.), *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tosen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674–1728* (1998); Hamashita Takeshi, "Hamashita Takeshi on Ryukyu Networks in Maritime Asia: An Introduction to the Rekidai Hoan" (2003b); and his Japanese-language *Okinawa Nyūmon* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2000).

Chapter 9: The Intra-Asian Bullion Trade Economy Networks

Works on this topic include: Kobata Atsushi, “The Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan” (1965);

George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (1986; 2004).

On the Japanese copper trade, see Kristoff Glamann, “The Dutch East India Company’s Trade in Japanese Copper, 1645–1736” (1953); Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company During the Eighteenth Century* (2006).

On VOC profits at Nagasaki, see K. Camfferman, and T.E. Cooke, “The Profits of the Dutch East India Company’s Japan Trade” (2004); on the Korea trade, see Chung Sungil, “The Volume of Early Modern Korea-Japan Trade: A Comparison with the Japan-Holland Trade” (2004).

Chapter 10: East-Southeast Asia in the Global Ceramic Trade Networks

General texts relating to the maritime trade in ceramics include: Brian S. McElney, *Chinese Ceramics and the Maritime Trade pre-1700*, catalog of exhibition held at the Museum of East Asian Art, Bath, August 22–December 10, 2006/University Museum and Art Gallery (2007); Pei-kai Cheng et al. (eds.), *China Westward: Bibliography and Research Guide, Chinese Porcelain and East-West Maritime Trade, 12th to 15th c.* (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 2005); John Carswell, *Blue & White: Chinese Porcelain Around the World* (London: British Museum, 2000).

On Southeast Asian ceramics, see Roxana Brown, *The Ceramics of Southeast Asia: Their Dating and Identification* (1998); John Guy, *Oriental Trade Ceramics in Southeast Asia: Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries* (1986); Barbara Harrison, *Later Ceramics in Southeast Asia: Sixteenth to Twentieth centuries* (1996); “The Ceramic Trade across the South China Sea, c. AD. 1350–1650” (2003); John Stevenson, John Guy, and Louise Allison Cort, *Vietnamese Ceramics: A Separate Tradition* (Chicago: Art Media Resources with Avery Press, 1997).

On the Dutch trade in ceramics, see Christian Jorg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (1982); *Interaction in Ceramics Oriental and Delftware* (1984); John Ayers, Oliver Impey, and J.V.G. Mallet, *Porcelain*

for Palaces. *The Fashion for Japan in Europe, 1650–1750* (London: Oriental Ceramic Society, 1990); T. Volker, *The Japanese Porcelain Trade of the Dutch East India Company* (1959); Miki Sakuraba and Cynthia Viallé (comp.), *Japanese Porcelain in the Trade Records of the Dutch East India Company* (2009).

On marine archaeological evidence from shipwrecks, see Michael Flecker, “The Advent of Chinese Sea-Going Shipping: A Look at the Shipwreck Evidence,” in *Proceedings of the International Conference: Chinese Export Ceramics and Maritime Trade, 12th–15th Centuries*, edited by Cheng Pei-Kai (2005); Sten Sjostrand and Claire Barnes, “The Turiang: A Fourteenth-century Chinese Shipwreck Upsetting Southeast Asian Ceramic History” (2001); Roxana M. Brown, *The Ming Gap and Shipwreck Ceramics in Southeast Asia: Towards a Chronology of Thai Trade Ware* (2009). See also the website of the Asian Research Institute of Underwater Archaeology (bilingual Japanese-English) <www/ariau.org/english/about_en/>. For a list of specific wrecks relevant to Chinese ceramics, see John Carswell, *Blue & White: Chinese Porcelain Around the World*, chap. 8 (2000).

Chapter 11: Knowledge Transfers: A Regional Technology Complex?

On indigenous technologies in non-Western societies, see Joseph Needham, *The Shorter Science and Civilization in China, an Abridgment of Joseph Needham’s Original Text* (1986); Robert K.G. Temple and Joseph Needham, *The Genius of China: 3,000 Years of Science, Discovery, and Invention* (1986; reprinted 2007); Francesca Bray, *The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies* (1985); *Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China* (1997); Gregory K. Clancey, Hui Cheah-Loy, Alan Kam-Leung Chan, *Historical Perspectives on Asian Science, Technology and Medicine* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2002); Grant Goodman, *The Dutch Impact on Japan, (1640–1853)* (Leiden: Brill, 1967); Arnold Pacey, *Technology in World Civilization: A Thousand Year History* (1990).

Index

- Abbasid dynasty, 44, 80, 213, 266
Abdul Majid Hassan (Sultan), 92
Abdul Wakkil, 118
Abdullah Agung (Sultan), 117
Abdullah Munshi (Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munsyi), 198
aboriginals (*see* ethnicity; minorities), 154, 156, 203
Abu-Lughod, Janet, 11, 140, 266, 297, 302, 326
Abyssinia (“Abissins”), 83, 88
Acapulco, 180, 182, 22, 320
accounting, 254
acculturation, 113, 116, 126
Aceh (Sumatra), 45, 81, 83–6, 94, 97, 99, 100, 102, 134, 139, 143, 145, 150, 160–1, 183, 187, 243, 296, 307–11, 325–6
Adams, Will (Anjin), 206, 223, 229
adat, 87
A Famosa (*see* Melaka), 167, 169
Africa, 5–6, 9, 22, 29–30, 32, 37, 44, 80, 102, 104, 159, 160–1, 177, 186, 269, 293, 318
“age of commerce” (*see* Reid, Anthony), 1, 21, 23–4, 190, 197
agrarian-based kingdoms, 54
agriculture (agrarian), 23–4, 26–7, 34, 39, 64, 112, 115, 117, 122, 140, 198–9, 236, 258, 298, 303, 312
Agung (Sultan), 89
Ahmad bin Majid, 44
Ai-Lao (Laos), 306
Al-Andalusia, 43
Ala’u-dinn (King), 97
Alexandria, 312
Ali Mughayat Syah (Sultan), 84
Ali Saifuddin (Sultan), 93
aloeswood (*see* eaglewood), 153, 217, 229
alum, 138, 143–4, 294
A-Ma temple (*see* Macau), 117
Amangurat I, 90
Amazon basin, 22
Ambon (Amboina) (Ambonese), 99, 119, 147, 159, 175–6, 186–7, 187–8, 192–4, 216, 231–2, 234
America (American) (Americas) (*see also* New World; United States), 14, 75, 133, 152, 159, 161, 173, 182–3, 207–8, 217, 238, 254, 276, 287, 303, 322, 325
Amherst mission, 319
Amphioen Society, 149
Amsterdam, 234, 246, 274
Andaman Sea, 27
Andamans (Andamanese), 29
Andaya, Leonard, 84, 86, 101
Anderson, James, 128
An Giang province (*see* Vietnam), 27
Angkor (Wat) (*see also* Bayon; Cambodia), 1, 11, 38–9, 42–3,

- 52, 55–9, 62, 72–3, 76, 111, 115, 135, 141–2, 148, 151, 169, 227, 292, 298, 311, 317
- Anglo Dutch Agreement (1619), 193, 195
- Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense (1821–23), 187
- Anglo-Dutch Java war, 189
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1814) [Convention of London], 206
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824) [Treaty of London], 207
- Angola, 186
- Anhui, 130
- animal trade, 139, 154
- animism, 23, 36, 62, 74, 90, 196, 293
- Annam (*see* Vietnam), 152, 220, 229
- Annamite mountains (*see* Trung Son), 22
- anthropology (anthropologist), 16, 74, 98, 176, 293, 317, 323
- Antony, Robert J., 106–7
- Antwerp, 246
- Arab (Arabs), 11, 15, 17–8, 22–3, 33–4, 37, 43–4, 46, 52, 81–3, 86, 88, 92, 94, 140, 144–5, 152–3, 160, 163, 190, 196, 218, 271, 273, 292, 299, 304, 313, 321
- Arabia, 10, 283
- Arabian Gulf (*see* Persian Gulf), 273
- Arabian Peninsula, 43
- Arabic, 16, 22, 35, 80, 83, 99, 267
- Arai Hakuseki (*see* Hakuseki), 255
- Arakan, 22, 65–7, 143, 179
- Araki Sotaro, 216
- archaeology (archaeologists), 4, 6, 21, 23, 25–7, 29–31, 33–4, 41, 44, 46, 48, 53, 55, 75, 91, 213, 219, 228, 235, 263, 265–8, 270–3, 276, 285, 300–1, 317, 323
- archipelago, 29–30, 53, 196, 207, 285, 307, 313, 316
- architecture, 42, 57, 65, 76, 90, 121, 126, 167, 180, 192, 284, 295, 300, 321
- Arima Harunoba, 223, 235
- Arita (*see also* ceramics; porcelain), 278–80, 282, 284–5, 289
- Arita-Hizen, 278, 281, 283, 285, 288–9
- Armenians, 150, 169, 208
- armies, 63, 65, 68, 72, 101–2, 127
- armillary sphere, 274
- aromatics (*see* wood), 42–3, 52, 152–3, 268
- Arrighi, Giovanni, 13
- art (artists), 33, 172, 284, 288, 312
- Aru, 84
- Arung Pallaka, 99
- Asal Raja-raja Melayu*, 101
- Asao Nachiro, 137
- ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 326
- Ashikaga shogunate, 212, 215
- Ashmolean Museum, 283
- Asian Bullion Trade Economy, 249–50
- Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, 315
- assimilation, 114, 121, 124
- astrolabe, 161, 292
- astronomy, 80, 292–3, 295, 313
- Atlantic 6, 143, 160, 162, 181, 185
- Auber, Peter, 207
- Augustus the Strong, 265, 281
- Australia, 23, 29, 178, 195–6, 307
- Austria, 208
- Austroasiatic, 34–5, 74
- Austroloids, 29
- Austronesian, 11, 23, 30–35, 39, 48, 72–4, 100, 267, 312
- Ava (kingdom of), 14, 38, 65, 67, 78, 205, 288, 306
- Aymonier, Etienne, 58
- Ayutthaya (*see also* Siam), 14, 38, 43, 51–2, 58–9, 62–4, 66, 78, 122–6, 148, 151, 160, 164, 171–2, 183,

- 199–200, 211, 222, 224–5, 234,
242, 248, 257–8, 270, 273, 285,
298, 308
- Azores, 160
- Baab (Sultan), 176
- Baba (*see* peranakan), 103, 170
- Baba-Nyonya culture, 122, 198
- Babylon, 262
- Bacon, Roger, 304
- Baghdad, 9, 44, 80–1
- Bahan-sen, 215
- Bahnaric, 34
- baht, 257
- Bakafu, 201, 221, 239, 245, 246–7,
255
- Bakau Wreck, 268
- Balambangan Island, 95
- Baldi, Caspero, 66
- Bali (Balinese), 30, 36, 45, 79, 99,
119, 295–6, 298
- Banaue terraces, 299
- Ban Bo salt mines, 148, 310
- Ban Chiang, 27, 270
- Banda (Bandanese), 30, 99, 146–7,
159–60, 175, 187, 194–6, 232–3
- Banda Sea, 96
- Bandar Hilir, 86, 197
- bandits, rebels, 308
- bang* (congregations), 131
- Bang, Nicolaas (Dutch factor), 200
- Banggai, 99
- Bangka, 206, 311
- Bangkok (*see also* Siam; Thailand;
Thonburi), 38, 59, 61, 63, 78,
88–9, 99, 120, 125–6, 131, 188,
200, 301, 313, 321
- Chinese community 125–6, 301
- banks, 174, 261
- Banten, 28, 81–2, 87–9, 114, 116–8,
146, 164–5, 187–9, 195, 203–4,
206–7, 235, 248–50, 276, 285
- Banten Lama (*see* Old Banten), 285–6
- barangay*, 33, 181
- Barito Valley, 32
- Baron, Hendrik, 202
- Baron, Samuel, 202
- baroque, 280
- Barreto, Luis Filipe, 162
- Basilan, 95
- Bassac, 59
- Bassam, 65
- Batavia (*see* Jakarta), 64, 89–90,
118–20, 139, 144, 159, 165, 172,
188, 190–3, 195, 203–4, 209,
211, 233–5, 243, 249–50, 253–4,
269, 280, 282–4, 286
- Batavian Republic, 189
- batik, 42, 294, 322, 324
- Batten, Bruce L., 213–4
- Batu Maung, 117
- Bayinnaung (King), 66
- Bay of Bengal, 17, 22, 26–8, 35, 37,
41, 66, 179, 183, 205, 251, 286,
287, 288, 308, 316
- Bayon (*see* Angkor), 57, 73
- beads, 27–8, 35
- Beaulieu, Augustin de, 85, 310–1, 313
- Beaumont, John, 231
- Beawes, William, 141, 198
- Beijing, 9, 76, 104, 109, 114, 141,
170–1, 219, 250, 292, 319
- Beitou, 156
- Beja, 274
- Belitung Wreck, 156, 267
- Bellwood, Peter, 31, 33, 48
- Bencoolen (Benkulu), 188
- bendahara*, 87, 101
- Bengal (Bengali), 34, 88, 139, 142–4,
147, 150, 168, 187–8, 190–1,
192, 205, 208, 249, 283
- Bengawan (Solo) River, 29, 45
- benzoin, 153
- Berlie, Jean, 114
- Beshi (Honshu), 247
- betel, 69, 88, 120, 146

- Biangan, 118
 Bihar, 34
 Bima, 99, 195–6
 Bimlipatam (Bheemunipatnam), 205
 Bin Yang, 126, 134, 251
 Binh Dinh, 73 province, 43, 72, 272–3
 Binh Tuan Wreck, 268
 Bintan Island, 169, 284
 biodiversity (*see also* ecology; environment), 298
 bird's nests, 150, 195
 Blench, Roger, 29
 boats (*see also* ships), 21, 32–4
 Bocarro, Manuel Tavares, 246
 Boesaimon, Michiel, 234
 Bogaya Treaty, 99
 Bolkiah (Sultan), 93
 Bolovens Plateau, 153
 Bombay, 188
 Bone, 97, 99
 Boomgaard, Peter, 25, 153–4
 borderlands, 103, 122, 131, 218
 Borneo (*see* Kalimantan), 30, 32, 54, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 131, 134, 139, 150–2, 163, 187, 190, 216, 268, 293, 307–8, 310, 325
 Borneo, British North, 152, 236, 295, 325
 Borobudur, 1, 38–9, 42, 52
 Borri, Christofuro, 128, 307
 Borschberg, Peter, 100
 Bose, Sugata, 5
 Boston Tea Party, 208
 Böttger, Johann Friedrich, 265
 boundaries (*see also* borderlands), 325
 Bourbon, Duke of, 281
 Bow, 282
 Boxer, Charles, 171, 173–4, 216, 246
 Brahmanism (*see also* Hinduism), 23, 28, 41, 43, 57, 62–3, 65, 74, 145
 Braudel, Fernand, 5, 15
 Bray, Francesca, 292
 Brazil, 160–1, 179, 186
 Breaker Shoal Wreck, 156, 269
 Breda *ship*, 233
 Breton missionary, 309
 Briggs, Lawrence Palmer, 55–6
 Britain (British) (*see* England), 12, 30, 90, 101, 141, 151–2, 188, 197–8, 208–9, 248, 250, 259, 319
 British India (*see* India), 44, 143, 150, 153, 166, 185, 187, 325
 Bronson, Bennet, 301
 bronze, 11, 21–2, 25–30, 28, 34, 48, 259, 300–1
 Brouwer, Hendrik, 233
 Brown, Roxana M, 266, 269–70
 Brunei, 11, 40, 44, 79, 81, 83, 87, 91–4, 101–2, 111, 130, 135, 146, 152, 160, 183, 215, 295, 300, 309, 316–7, 325
 Brunei Bay, 92
 Brunei Darussalam, 317, 325
 Buckley, Brendan, 56
 Bucknill, John, 242
 Buddhism, 26, 28, 38, 41–3, 52, 53–5, 57, 60, 62–3, 65, 68, 71–2, 82, 95, 164, 175, 212–4, 246, 259, 267, 270, 272–3, 284, 295, 300, 312, 323
Buena Esperanza ship, 217
 buffalo, 30
 Bugis (Buginese) (*see* Makassar), 16, 34, 87, 96–7, 99–100, 177, 195–6, 198, 307
bugyo (Nagasaki governor/magistrate), 226, 233, 252
 Bukit Cina, 169, 197
 Bulbeck, David, 30, 272–3
 bullion (trade), 17–8, 138–40, 159, 161, 181–2, 185, 190, 211, 237, 252, 254, 256–9, 261, 289, 316
 Bullion Trade Economy Network, 237, 258, 316, 320
 Bungaraya, 197
 burial sites, 28

- Burma (Burmese; Burman), 11, 14, 23, 27, 29, 33–4, 36, 38–42, 44, 48, 52, 55–6, 60, 63–5, 67, 72, 77, 79, 108–9, 126, 134, 143, 148, 150, 152, 168, 191, 205, 250–1, 257, 263, 269–71, 287–8, 294–5, 298, 305–6, 317, 323, 325
- Burmanization, 78
- business, Chinese, 311, 322 firm, 311
- Buton, 99
- Butuan, 27, 34, 72
- Byzantine, 304
- Cabral, Pedro Alvaro, 160
- caixa (*see also* coins; copper), 138, 230, 258
- Cakkravati, 58
- calambac (*see also* aloeswood; eagle-wood), 153, 229
- Calcutta, 166, 179, 187
- calendar, 295
- Calicut, 79, 144, 160, 166
- California, 217
- caliphate, 81, 317
- Calvert, Jean Baptiste, 188
- Cambaia, 139, 167
- Cambay (Khambat), 187
- Cambodia, 1, 14, 23, 27, 38–9, 41–2, 55, 57–9, 61, 72–7, 82, 99, 109, 111, 118, 129, 142, 153, 191, 206, 215–6, 224, 227, 235, 258, 285, 294–6, 300, 305, 319, 323, 325
- Cambridge history, 68
- Camfferman, K., 254
- Camorin, 166
- Campbell, W.M., 203
- camphor, 139, 152, 192, 253–4, 280
- Candi Mendut, 42
- cannons (*see also* firearms; guns), 58, 65, 70, 77, 186, 218, 258–9, 301, 305–9, 313
- canting*, 294
- Can Tho, 129
- Cantino planisphere (*see* planisphere), 162
- Canton (Cantonese) (*see* Guangdong; Guangzhou), 115, 123, 125, 128–9, 150–1, 276
- cap*, 324
- Cape Datu, 93
- Cape of Good Hope, 146, 160, 191, 269
- Cape Town, 192, 280
- Cape Verde, 160
- capital (capitalism), 8, 71, 109, 133–4, 190, 263–5, 297, 302, 311, 314, 320, 322, 325
- cardamon, 153
- Cardamon Mountains, 153
- Caribbean, 179, 322
- Caron, François, 188, 201, 233–4
- cartography (*see also* maps), 58, 71, 80, 91, 161–3, 297, 323, 325
- casadas*, 168, 179
- Casale, Giancarlo, 307
- cash crops, 133, 150, 153
- cassia, 32, 145, 154
- castaways, 217–8
- caste, 157, 296
- Cathay, 163
- Catholic (*see also* church; Christianity), 61, 64, 71, 77, 97–8, 124, 171–5, 179, 181, 204
- cattle raising (*see also* buffaloes), 296
- cave sites, 28, 30
- Cavendish, Sir Thomas, 122, 180, 217
- Cebu, 99, 148, 180–1
- celadon, 270
- Central Asia printing, 300
- Central Kingdom (*see* China), 103, 109–10
- Ceram, 96, 99, 196
- ceramics, trade, 2, 16, 41–2, 44, 53, 94, 125, 139–40, 144, 183, 191–2, 196, 201, 203, 206,

- 213–4, 260–5, 263–89, 273–5,
278–9, 281–4, 287, 289, 310,
320, 322, 326
- Cerita Ceribon*, 165
- Ceylon (*see* Sri Lanka), 161, 192
- Chaigneau, Jean-Baptiste, 309
- chaomuang* (*see* muang), 58–9
- Chakkri, 61, 78, 125, 131
- Cham Islands, 150
- Champa (Cham), 10, 14, 34, 38–9,
41–4, 51–2, 55–7, 68–9, 71–6,
78, 82, 108–9, 112, 128, 140,
151–2, 163, 229, 263, 271–3,
278, 287–8, 305, 317, 319
- Cham negara (*see* negara), 76
- Champa rice, 112, 298
- Champassak, 59–61
- Chandinagore, 188
- Chandler, David P., 59, 296
- Changsa ceramics, 267
- Chantaburi, 129
- Chantilly, 281
- Chao Phraya River (*see* Menam), 14,
22, 27, 56–8, 62, 66, 124, 199
- Charnvit Kasetsiri, 58, 62
- charter kingdoms, 51, 58, 294
- chawan* (bowls), 287
- Che Bong Nga, 305
- chedi*, 295
- Cheju Island (Jeju-do), 253
- Chelsea, 282
- chemistry, chemicals, 155, 263, 294,
322
- Chenla, 40, 56, 59
- Chennai (*see* Madras), 179
- Chen Zuyi, 115–6
- Chettiars, and opium trade, 149
- Chiang Mai, 58, 63, 306
- Chiang Rai, 58
- Chiang Sen, 58
- Chicugo (Kyushu), 232
- Chicugo *machi* (Nagasaki), 234
- China (Chinese; “Chineseness”),
1–2, 6–7, 9–14, 16–18, 22–3,
25–7, 31, 33–46, 48, 52–3, 55–7,
59–60, 62–3, 65–6, 68, 70,
73, 76–7, 80, 82–3, 86–94, 97,
102–4, 106–98, 111–7, 118–26,
128–30, 133–42, 144–5, 149–54,
160–1, 163, 166–7, 169–72, 180,
190–1, 196–7, 199, 204, 207–9,
211–2, 218–21, 235, 238, 243–4,
250–1, 257–61, 264–77, 273–5,
277–8, 287–8, 292–3, 296–308,
310–12, 315, 317–22, 324, 326
- chin-chua* chain pump, 311
- “Chinese century,” 312, 318
- Chinese Council, 119
- China sea (*see* East China Sea; South
China Sea), 23, 28, 91, 106, 133,
162–3, 172, 235
zone, 160
- Chinese technology diffusion,
297–304
- Chin Kong, James, 112
- chinoiserie, 274, 282, 289
- chintz (*see also* cloth; textiles), 142–3
- Chittagong, 179
- Chizan (*see* Zhongzan), 219
- Cho Hung-Guk, 217
- Chola, 40–3
- Cholon, 130
- Chonhado world map, 218
- Choson (*see* Korea), 211, 217–8, 245,
323
- Christianity (Christians) (*see also*
Catholic; church), 7, 64, 78, 80,
97–8, 101, 123, 174, 176, 184,
210, 218, 230
- Christie, Jan Wiseman, 36
- Chu Dao, 271, 273
- chu nom*, 127
- Chung Sungil, 245
- Chuong Chau, 130

- churches (*see also* Catholic; Christians), 124, 167, 175, 300, 310
- Churchill, Awnsham and John, collection, 202
- Chuzei (Zhongzan), 219
- Ciliwang River, 165
- cinnamon, 30, 145, 164, 166
- circulation, 135, 152
- Cirebon, 89, 164, 267, 273, 278
- civilization, 7, 16, 159, 263, 289, 312–3, 316
- Cixao, 266
- class, 326
- Cleffius, Lambertus, 278, 281
- Clive, Robert, 188
- cloth (*see* textiles)
- cloves, 99, 146–7, 153, 175, 189, 192–3, 195, 201
- Clulow, Adam, 232
- cobalt, 139, 266–7, 274, 287
- Cochin (Kochi), 143, 166, 186, 191, 206
- Cochinchina, 128, 155
- Cocks, Richard, 223
- Coedès, Georges, 36, 40, 42, 53, 55, 295
- Coelho, António de Albuquerque, 101
- Coen, Jan Pieterszoon, 119, 203, 232–3
- coffee, 280
paraphernalia, 280
trade, 283
- coinage (*see* currency), 26, 86, 91, 133–5, 238–9, 242, 246, 258, 268
- Colani, Madelaine, 27–8
- Cold War, 5
- Colombo, 186
- colonial (colonialism), 45, 65, 71, 122, 126, 150, 258, 326
- Columbia University Tree-Ring Laboratory, 56
- Columbus (Columbian), 8, 80, 210
- commerce (commercial), 133, 138–57, 146, 151, 160, 174, 186, 197, 257, 258–9, 264–5, 288, 313, 316
- commodities, 110, 138, 157, 180, 191, 209, 257, 264
- commodity chains, 133, 138–57
- communism, 324
- compass, 160, 162, 292
- Con Dao Island, 269
- Condominas, Georges, 74
- Confucianism (*see also* neo-Confucianism), 2, 10, 69, 71, 78, 110, 114–5, 127, 131, 229–30, 255, 297, 299, 319, 324
- Congo, 160
- congregations (*bang*), 128–9, 131
- Constantinople (*see* Istanbul), 83
- consumption, 138–9, 141, 144, 149, 184, 197, 263, 287, 326
- Cooke, Nola, 4, 129
- Cooke, T.E., 254
- coolie trade, 173
- Coop a Groen, B., 284
- Copernicus, Nicolaus, 292
- copper, 2, 18, 26, 70, 86, 127, 134, 136, 138–9, 192, 205, 213, 215, 245, 247–9, 251–3, 257, 259, 299–301, 306, 310, 324
- copper mines, 247, 251, 310
- coral, 25, 152
- Corea, Thome (Japanese mercenary), 232
- Coromandel coast, 34, 142–3, 149, 177, 188, 205, 243, 248–9, 253, 283
- Corpuz, Onofre, D., 181
- Corregidor, 226
- corruption, 173, 202
- Costa, Jorge de Cunha, 165
- cotton, 37, 64, 86, 141–3, 182, 196, 256, 294, 322

- Council of Indies, 233
 Courtaulin, Jean de, 199
 cowrie shells (*see also* currency), 134, 250
 craft, 71, 123, 265, 291, 293, 310–1, 313–4, 320
 Cranganore, 166
 Crawfurd, John, 243, 248, 252
 credit, Chinese 172, 297, 311
 creole (creolization), 12, 103, 131, 168, 170, 179, 189, 210
 crisis, early 18th century Japan, 255–6
 cuisine (*see also* diet), 124, 195
 Cultivation System, 145, 147
 Cultural Revolution, 126
 Cummings, William, 98
 currency (*see* coinage), 88, 133, 238, 245, 252–5, 260–1, 297, 320
 Curtin, Philip, 114, 131, 140, 316
 Cushman, Jennifer, 125

daching, 302
 da Gama, Vasco, 8, 44, 144, 160, 318
Da Geografia de Dialogo, 162
dagregisters (diaries), 201, 244, 253
daimyo, 173–4, 219, 222–3, 226, 239, 247, 278
dakwa, 92
 Dalat, 56
 Dai (*see* Tai) minority, 126
 Dai Viet (*see* Vietnam), 43, 48, 51–2, 69, 72, 78, 104, 263, 271–3, 300–1, 305–6
 Dali, 38, 43
 kingdom, 38, 134
 Damão, 166
 Damascus, 81
 Damascus swords, 294
 Dampier, William, 74
 Danang, 28, 75
 Dane Island, 208
 Dang Ngoia, 69
 Dang Son, 68

 Dang Trong (*see* Vietnam), 69, 128, 258
 Danish Asiatic Company, 208
 Danish East India Company, 188–9
 Dar-ul-Islam, 80
 Dasmardino, Gomez Pedro (Governor), 226
datubandar (*see shahbandar*), 101
 Davao, 236
 Davidson, J.A., 135
 Dayak-Iban Chinese male liaisons, 115
 d'Abreu, António, 146, 175
 d'Entrecolles, Francois Xavier, 264–5
 de Albuquerque, Afonso, 63, 87, 166–7, 169, 175, 309, 318
 de Albuquerque, Jorge, 84, 165
 de Brito, António, 175
 de Brito, Jorge, 169
 Deccan, 163, 166
 de Castro, João, 162
Declaracam de Malaca, 168
 de Costa, Cristavão, 145
 de Cruz, Gaspar, 264
 deerskins, 154, 201, 224
 de Faria, Pedro, 274
 de Horney, Jan, 177
 de Horta, Garcia, 144–5
 Dehua-Anxi kilns, 266, 275
 de la Motte, Pierre Lambert, 64
 Del Cano, Juan Sebastian, 175
 Delhi, 82
 Deli, 84
 Delft, 275, 278, 281–2
 Demak, 43, 54, 89, 160, 164–5, 272–3, 308
 Denmark (Danish), 89, 97, 101, 185–7, 207, 250, 285, 287
 de Rhodes, Alexander, 98, 228–9
 de Sequiera, Diego Lopez, 87
 Deshima (*see* Nagasaki), 174, 191–2, 200, 244–5, 250–3, 279–80, 283–4

- devaluations (*see* currency), 245
 de Souza, Salvadore Ribeiro, 66
devaraja, 42
 developmentalism, 326
 de Veleso, Diego, 58, 61
 Dewa copper mines, 247
 Dhiravat na Pomberja, 224
 Dias, Bartolemeu, 160, 318
 diasporas, 17, 21, 108, 110, 112, 126,
 149, 157, 196, 211–36, 235, 316,
 321
 Dieng Plateau (*see* Java), 42
 diet (*see* cuisine), 210
 Dijk, Wil O., 67, 205
 Dilau, 227
 Dili (*see also* East Timor), foundation,
 178
 dinars, 138
 Dinh dynasty, 136
 diplomacy, 105, 163–8, 319
 Diponegoro wars, 90
 Diu, 79, 161, 166, 183
 Dmanisi, 29
 doits, 252
 Dominicans, 124, 155, 172, 176,
 177–8, 264
 Dongmen, 266
 Dongsonian culture, 26, 30, 34, 295
 Dong Son age (*see also* Dongsonian),
 21, 26, 46, 300, 312, 324
 Douglas, A., 253
 Doza, 247
 drain (*see also* gold and silver), 255
 Drake, Sir Francis, 88, 176
 Dravidian culture, 41
 Draw, Olga, 202
 Dresden, 281–2
 drugs (*see* medicinals), 210
 Dryden, John, 194
 Duarte, Fernandes, 63
 Dubois, Eugene, 29
 du Halde, Jean Baptiste, 264–5, 313
 Duong River, 70
 Dupoizat, Marie-France, 272–3
dusuns, 168
 Dutch (*see also* Holland;
 Netherlands), 16, 18, 45, 53, 58,
 61, 64, 67, 71, 82, 85, 88–90,
 98–102, 105, 107, 109, 113–4,
 116, 118–20, 135, 143–8, 154,
 156, 166, 171, 174, 177–8,
 181–2, 185–7, 190–5, 197–99,
 201, 204, 207, 209, 224, 226,
 230–2, 233–4, 237, 242, 248,
 259, 271, 274, 276, 288, 303,
 307, 314, 322
 Dutch East India Company (VOC)
 (*see also* Holland, Netherlands),
 64, 67, 88–90, 97, 99, 102, 119,
 142–4, 148–50, 153, 179, 185–8,
 189–92, 195, 197–202, 205, 225,
 232, 242–4, 249, 252, 257, 260,
 275–6, 279–80, 282–4, 286–7,
 303, 307, 316–7, 321,
 Dutch East Indies (*see* Indonesia), 325
 Dutch Reformed Church, 198
 Dutch West India Company official,
 245
 Dvarawati, 27, 41, 62
 dye (dyestuffs), 138, 143–4, 146, 223,
 227, 234, 256, 294, 302,
 eaglewood (*see also* aloeswood), 153,
 229
 earthenware (*see* ceramics), 263, 281
 East Asia, 203, 109, 213–4, 218, 222,
 237, 239, 242, 256, 259–61, 268,
 300, 308–9, 315–6, 320, 322,
 324–5
 East Asian Community, 326
 East China Sea, 15, 17, 109, 190, 214,
 287, 316
 East Indies (*see also* Holland;
 Netherlands), Dutch control, 325
 East Timor (*see also* Portugal), 30, 33,
 48, 323

- Easter Island, 31
- ecology (*see also* environment), 56, 293, 315, 326
- economy (economic) 127, 136–7, 149–50, 238, 242, 254, 259, 261, 263, 315
- edibles (*see also* cuisine; diet), 144–5, 150–1
- Edo, 148, 174, 201, 204, 222, 227, 245, 279, 319
- EFEO (Ecole Française d'extrême-orient), 27–8
- Eguchi Juzayemo, 234
- Egypt, 86, 292, 141, 300
- Ekathotsarat (King), 199–200, 222–3
- elephants (*see also* animals), 39, 65, 78, 142, 154, 164
- Empo Nagasaki-ki*, 244
- engineering, 285, 292, 295, 299, 311
- England (English) (*see* British), 12, 18, 64, 71, 85, 88–9, 97, 101–2, 139, 146–7, 150, 171, 179, 182, 185–6, 188, 191, 193–5, 201–2, 204, 207–9, 217, 223, 229, 242, 252, 256, 278, 322
- English East India Company (*see* England), 12, 150, 185, 187, 193, 195, 198, 204–9, 231, 242, 276
- Enlightenment, 7, 10, 291, 313, 324
- environment (*see also* ecology), 22, 25, 30, 251
- epigraphy, 52, 73, 323
- Eredia, Manuel Godinho de, 84, 163, 168
- Espadarte* (ship), 269, 274
- Estado da India (*see* Portugal), 166–7, 176, 179
- ethnicity (*see* minorities), 157, 168, 199, 210, 298, 316, 325
- Eurasia (Eurasians), 12, 21, 171, 317
- Eurasian Exchange*, 183
- Eurocentrism, 6–8, 10, 14, 109
- Europe (Europeans), 1, 6–7, 9–10, 12–5, 18, 37, 51–3, 57–9, 61–5, 69, 74, 77–80, 82, 85, 87, 90, 97–8, 100–2, 103, 106, 116, 118, 128, 130–1, 133, 138–9, 140–3, 145, 147, 152–4, 159–61, 163, 171–2, 177, 182–90, 194, 197, 208, 210, 223, 238–9, 246, 248–51, 257, 261, 264, 268, 271, 273–6, 278–82, 284, 287, 291–2, 300–1, 304, 306–7, 309, 314, 316, 318–20, 322, 324–5
- European trading companies (*see also*, English; Dutch; Danish; French; East India companies), 188–9
- European world economy, 185
- everyday goods, 321–2
- exchange rates, 261
- exclusion edicts (*see* expulsion; *kaikin*), 228, 230
- export trade, 275
- crops, 145
- restrictions, 257
- zones, 148
- expulsion edicts (*see* exclusion, *kaikin*), 225
- Fa Ngum (King), 60
- faience, 274, 281
- Faifo (*see* Hoi An), 228
- Fatahilih, 165
- fauna, 30
- female (*see* gender; women), 69–70, 120, 140, 171
- feudalism, 59, 71, 199
- Fez, 82
- fiduciary system (*see also* currency), 184
- Figuerido, Francisco Vieira, 97
- finance, resources, 275
- risk, 157
- firearms (*see also* cannons, guns, weapons), 64–5, 77, 98, 104, 156, 304–5, 307
- “first globalization,” 2, 210, 315

- fish (fishing), 23, 25, 32–3, 57, 120, 123, 148, 151, 169, 304
- Fitch, Ralph, 66, 139, 239
- Flecker, Michael, 269–70
- Flemish Guangzhou trade, 207
- flora, 30
- Flores, 96, 99, 176, 178–9, 196
- Flynn, Dennis O., 135, 139, 237
- Fok Kai Cheong, 105, 170
- food (*see also* cuisine; diet), 304
- forests (*see* rainforest), 138, 151–2, 293, 351
- Formosa (*see* Taiwan), 203, 283
- Fort Nassau, 193
- Fort Rotterdam, 99
- Fort St. Georges (*see* Madras), 188
- Fort San Sebastian Wreck, 268
- Fortuije* junk, 232 mutiny, 232
- Fort York (*see* Bencoolen), 188
- France (French), 26, 58, 70, 72, 74–5, 85, 95, 98, 113, 130, 147, 149, 175, 185–6, 188–9, 199, 258, 281, 310
- Frank, Andre Gunder, 237, 243, 257
- Franke, Wolfgang, 116
- free trade, 159
- French East India Company, 188, 208
- French Island, 208
- Fryke, Christopher, 89
- Fujian (Fujainese), 15, 31, 46, 105–7, 111–3, 115, 117, 119–20, 122–3, 125, 128–9, 130–1, 137, 142, 144, 149, 155, 157, 203, 207, 218, 265, 267, 276, 286, 298, 300, 302–4, 313, 321
- Fujian Cultural Relics Team, 265
- Fujita Kayoko, 190
- Fujiwara Seika, 229–30
- Fukuoka, 213
- Funan, 27, 40–1, 56, 147
- furnaces (*see* iron), 301
- furs, 245
- Fustat, 273
- Fuzhou, 46
- Gaastra, Femme S., 192
- Galle, 190, 209
- galleon trade (*see* Manila galleon trade), 122–3, 140, 181, 258
- gallipots (drug jar), 282
- gambier, 146, 153
- gamelan*, 90
- Ganges River, 191
- Gansu, 300
- Gao Viet civilization, 68
- garuda textile motif, 142
- Geertz, Clifford, 36
- Geldermalsen* ship, 284
- gems, 164
- gender (*see* women) 114–5, 157
- genetics, 35
- geography (geographical) 23, 46, 69, 162–3
- geology, 48
- geomancy, 297
- geomorphology, 23
- geopolitics, 110
- Georgia, 29
- Germany, 207, 282
- Gervais, Nicolas, 98
- Gia Long emperor, 75, 308–9
- Giang Binh, 107
- Gibson, Thomas 97, 100
- Giersch, C. Patterson, 3
- ginseng, 245
- Gipouloux, Francois, 15, 212–3, 325
- Giraldez, A., 135, 139, 237
- Glamann, Kristoff, 243–5, 248–9, 252
- Glass, Andrew, 300
- glazed ware, 28, 263, 266, 274, 289
- global (*see also* world) 8–10, 159, 182, 243, 246–51, 264, 278, 315, 322, 325
- globalization, 5, 12, 15, 292, 315–7
- Glover, Ian, 48

- Goa, 63, 142, 144, 146–7, 161, 166–7, 176, 183, 200, 209
- gold, 27, 37, 40, 83–4, 123, 134, 137, 141, 164, 180, 206, 220, 238, 243, 252–4, 256, 260, 284, 311
- Golden Peninsula, 260
- Gongbei, 231
- Gong Guan (Kong Koan), 119
- Goryo (Koryo), 217
- go-shui-in* (see also red seal trade), 215
- Goto archipelago, 236
- Gowa-Tallo, 96–7, 99
- Grand Canal, 217, 250, 265
- Grave, Peter, 271
- Great Britain (see Britain; England)
- Greater China (see China), 291
- Great Ship from Amacon*, 171
- Greece (Greeks), 6, 9, 22, 162
- Green, Gillian, 142
- Gresik, 44, 54, 116–7
- Groslier, Bernard, 72
- Grotius, Hugo, 100
- ground rent, 171
- Guando (Japanese interpreter), 230
- Guangdong, 45, 115–6, 119, 128, 139, 141, 147–8, 151, 157, 170, 209, 300
- Guangxi, 14, 114
- Guangzhou (see Canton), 43, 45–6, 63, 72, 76, 80, 105, 107–8, 111, 121, 125, 130, 141, 144, 150, 171, 185–6, 190–2, 205, 207–9, 252, 267, 274, 276–8, 287
- Guangzhou Trading System, 12, 105, 171–2, 209, 261, 276, 284, 288, 319
- Guilin, 298
- Gullard, W.G., 282
- Guillot, Claude, 87
- Guinea, 160
- Guizhou, 114
- Gujarat (Gujaratis), 44, 81–2, 86, 88, 140, 142, 160, 166, 168, 191, 313
- Gulf of Martaban, 271
- Gulf of Siam, 4, 22, 62, 74, 129, 149, 151, 163, 167, 187, 199, 316
- Gulf of Tonkin, 106, 163
- guns (see also cannons; firearms), 57, 65, 67, 72, 85, 101, 305
- gunpowder, 67, 123, 155, 205, 224, 304–6, 309
- Gupta, Sunil, 34–5, 292
- Gustavus Aldolphus (King), 246
- Gutman, Patricia, 271
- Gutzlaff, Charles, 231
- Guy, John, 272–3, 278
- Gyfford, William, 202
- Haarlem, 281
- habitat (see environment), 326
- Hagenaar, Hendrik, 204, 227
- The Hague, 64, 200
- Hai Duong province, 271
- Hainan, 22–3, 45, 74, 125, 151, 163
- Haiphong, delta, 271
- as global city, 325
- Hakata, 44, 112, 155, 174, 211, 213–4, 216, 219, 236, 268
- Hakka miners, 311
- Hakluyt, Richard 7
- Hakuseki (Arai), 255–6
- Hall, Kenneth R., 114
- Halmahera, 33, 147, 175
- Ha Long Bay, 271
- Hamada Yahei, 204
- Hamashita Takeshi, 13, 19, 109, 221
- Hamenko Buwono I (Mangkubumi), 90
- Hamilton, Alexander, 202
- Han dynasty, 10, 21, 39, 300
- Han (see China; Chinese), 46, 109, 126–8, 131
- Hani minority, 298

- Hangzhou, 9, 42, 46
Hankow, as global city, 325
Hanna, Willard, A., 175–6
Han Li Bo (Hang Li Po), 87
Hangzhou, 120
Hanoi (*see* Thang Long), 61, 69–71, 75–6, 128, 148–9, 202, 205, 309, 311
Han Viet civilization, 68
Harada Quimon, 226
harbor cities (ports), 53, 106, 160
Harlem, 281
Harrison, Tom, 29, 91, 269
Hasanuddin (Sultan, Banten), 87
Hasham Abu Bakr, 94
Hassanuddin (Sultan, Gowa), 99
Ha Tien, 76, 129
Hatoyama Yukio (Japanese prime minister), 326
Hawkins, William (Captain), 187
Hayam Waruk, 54
headhunting, 293
hegemony, 185, 191, 212
Heian period, 213
Heijo-kyo (*see* Nara), 136, 213
Hein, Donald, 270
Hellenism, 292, 296, 310
Hendricus, Fort, 177
Henry the Navigator (Prince), 160, 318
Herenstraat (Melaka), 198
Heuken, A., 165
Hideyoshi (*also see* Toyotomi Hideyoshi), 214, 215, 226, 306
Higashiyama temple, 268
Higham, Charles, 23, 25–7, 48, 56, 300
highlanders (*see also* montagnards; uplanders), 78, 148, 153, 310
Hikayat Negeri Johor, 101
Hikayat Patani, 95
Hilir, 169
Henzavadi, 65
Hervásy Panduru, Lorenzo, 31
Hindu (Hinduism), 12, 28–9, 38, 42, 45, 51–5, 59, 62, 69, 72, 76, 78, 80, 82–3, 85–7, 89–91, 92, 102, 145, 163–4, 183, 284, 295, 298, 323
Hirado, 106–7, 113, 161, 187–8, 191, 201, 204, 206–7, 209, 215–6, 222–3, 229, 232–4, 279
history (historiography), 18–19, 25–30, 28, 92, 111, 133, 256, 285, 312, 315, 324
Hito, 176
Hizen domain (*see also* Arita; Arita-Hizen), 223, 278, 284–6
Hmong (*see* Miao), 23, 23, 325
Hoabinhian period (*see also* Holocene), 25, 27
hoarding, 257
Hobson-Jobson, 139
Ho Chuimei, 265–6, 275, 282
Hoi An (*see* Fai-fo), 61, 74, 128–9, 151, 211, 227, 230, 235, 272–3, 285, 310, 326
Hoi An Wreck, 272–3
Hokkien language, 119–20, 122, 125, 131
Holland (*see* Dutch; Netherlands), 13–4, 185–6, 274, 279, 281, 283, 285, 287
Holocene epoch, 23, 30
Holy War, 181
Hong Kong, 91, 106, 151, 209, 325
Hongzhi period, 269
Honshu Island, 163, 213, 237, 246
Hormuz (*see* Ormuz), 86, 161, 273
Horridge, Adrian, 32, 34
horse trade, 134, 153, 165, 219
Horton, A.V.M., 91
Houa Phan, 61
house (home), 25, 69, 111, 118, 141, 309–10
Houtman, Martaen, 242

- Huang Anh Tuan, 191
 Huasheng mosque (*see* Guangzhou), 45
 Hue, 61, 69, 71, 75–6, 78, 128, 230, 300, 309, 319
 Hugli (Hoogly) River, 179, 188, 191
hukum kamun, 87
 hunter-gatherers, 23, 25–7, 154
 Huong Giang (Perfume River), 75
 hydraulics, 23, 39, 55–6, 295–6, 299, 311–2
 Hyogo prefecture, 238–9
- Iberian (Iberians), 18, 58, 81, 105, 159–84, 183, 185, 237
 Iberian Peninsula, 189
 Ibn Batuta, 46, 81, 83
 Ibn Khalud, 323
 Ice Age, 23
 Iemitsu Shogun (*see* Tokugawa), 227
 Ienobu Shogun (*see* Tokugawa), 255
 Ietsugu Shogun (*see* Tokugawa), 255
 Ieyasu Shogun (*see* Tokugawa), 223–4, 229
- Ifugao mountains, 299
 Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, 81
 ikat, 42, 294–5, 312
 Ikuno silver mines, 238–9
 Imari port, 278–9, 284
 Imhoff report (*see* von Imhoff, Gustaaf Willem), 252
 Imjin War, 306
 immigration (*see* migration), 125, 127
 import substitution, 256
 Inca gold, 254
 incense, 153
 Inchon as global city, 325
 income disparities, 315
 India (Indians) (*see* British India), 2, 7, 9–11, 14, 16–8, 21, 26–30, 34–44, 52, 66, 72–3, 81, 83, 86, 88, 92, 97, 100–1, 133–4, 139, 141–4, 146–7, 153, 156–7, 159–60, 162, 164, 166–8, 172, 177, 182, 187, 191–2, 197, 205, 207–8, 243, 245, 248, 250, 257, 260, 264, 266, 269, 286–7, 289, 291–3, 294–6, 300–1, 305, 312, 315, 317, 321–2
 Indianization, 10–11, 27–8, 35–6, 40, 52, 55, 60
 Indian Ocean, 6, 17, 23, 31–2, 35, 37, 44, 63, 65, 78, 104, 133–4, 145, 147, 152, 154, 160, 162, 177, 183, 186, 188, 190, 192, 266, 280, 308
 indigo, 143, 294
 Indochina, 22, 40, 42, 66, 148, 152, 188, 295
 Indonesia, 34, 40, 55, 80–1, 103, 165, 179, 285, 315, 317, 323, 325
 Indonesian archipelago, 16, 22, 285
 Indonesian National Museum, 164
 Indo-Pacific beads, 35
 Indrapura, 73
 Indus Valley, 141
 industry, 122, 144, 155, 174, 235, 265, 256, 260, 279, 287–8, 291, 321–22
 information revolution, 324
 Inland Sea, 214
 insurance system, 241
 interpreters, 173
 intra-Asian regional trade, 153, 190–2, 204, 248, 284–5
 Intramuros (Manila), 180–1, 285–6
 Ito Torishima, 156
 Iraq, 213
 iron, 26, 28, 30, 34, 154, 156–7, 196, 213, 268–9, 294, 300–1, 307, 310, 322
 Iron Age, 21, 25–30, 48, 312
 Irrawaddy River, 14, 22, 66
 irrigation (*see* hydraulics), 23
 Iskander Muda (Sultan), 83–5
 Iskander Shah (Sultan), 85

- Islam (Islamic) (*see also* Moors; Moros; Muslims), 6–12, 37, 43–5, 52, 54, 74, 79–85, 87, 89–93, 97, 100–2, 117, 134, 144, 160, 164, 181, 196, 267, 283, 292, 296–7, 309, 317, 321, 323–4
- Istanbul (*see also* Constantinople), 273, 307
- Italy (Italian), 61, 71, 92, 128, 228, 233
- Itchiemaon, Michael, 234
- Itinerario*, 139
- itsi bu* coins, 242
- Iwami Ginzan mines, 238–9
- Iwao Seichi, 241
- Iwo Jima, 155
- Jacob (member of red seal ship), 223
- Jacobsz, Cornelius, 200
- Jacq-Hergovalc'h, Michel, 23
- Jacatra (*see also* Jakarta; Batavia; Sunda Kelapa), 89–90, 285
- Jaffioen (Captain), 204
- Jagannathapuram, 205
- Jagatera-bumi* (Jakarta letter), 233, 235
- Jainism, 26
- Jakarta (*see also* Jacatra, Batavia, Sunda Kelapa), 30, 116, 120, 165, 192, 232–3, 235
- Jambi, 53, 87, 99
- Jamul ul Kiria I (Sultan), 95
- Jannisseries, 83
- Japan (Japanese) 2, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 35, 44, 48, 54, 62, 70, 77, 103, 105–11, 112–3, 115–6, 122, 127–31, 135–40, 142–3, 147–8, 152–5, 157, 161, 166, 171–5, 180–1, 183, 186–8, 190–1, 193, 199–201, 209–10, 212, 216, 218–9, 221–2, 224, 230–1, 236, 238–9, 242, 249, 251, 254–7, 258–61, 268, 273–4, 278–9, 283–4, 287–9, 293, 297–8, 302, 310, 313–4, 316, 321, 324–5
- Japan Sea, 213
- Japara, 117
- Japon, Anthony (Japanese Christian exile), 234
- Jarai minority, 74, 76
- tribute, 76
- Java (Javanese), 1–2, 10–11, 16–7, 23, 25, 29–30, 32, 34, 36, 38–9, 41–4, 48, 51–4, 78–9, 82, 84, 86–90, 93, 96–7, 99, 108–9, 111–2, 114–21, 130–1, 134, 136, 140, 145, 147–50, 152–3, 157, 163–5, 167, 183, 186–9, 198, 201, 220–1, 238, 251–2, 267–8, 272–3, 289, 294, 298, 300–1, 303–4, 310, 313, 316–7, 321–2, 324
- Java Man, 29
- Java Sea, 15–6, 37, 100, 287, 301
- Jayakarta (*see also* Jacatra; Jakarta), 164
- Jayarvarman II, 39
- Jayarvarman VIII, 42, 57, 63
- Jayawardana, 54
- Jawi community, 93
- script, 92
- Jepara, 89, 273, 278
- Jesuits (*see also* Catholic; church; missionaries), 61, 97, 172–3, 176, 180, 228–30, 239, 264, 274, 292, 306
- Jewish, 169 at Melaka, 168–9
- Jiajing period, 269
- Jiangxi province, 264
- Jingdezhen, 263–5, 267–9, 270, 275–6, 278–9, 283, 288, 302
- Jinjiang, 266
- Jiugong (*see* Palembang Old Port), 28
- Johns, A.H., 81

- Johor, 81, 83–5, 87, 94, 99–102, 146, 152, 196
 Johor River, 100
 Jolo, 93–5
 Jonkerstraat (*see* Melaka), 198
 junk and junk trade, 62–3, 88, 104–5, 107–8, 113–4, 123–25, 129–30, 138, 144, 161, 190–1, 201, 203, 206, 223, 228, 273–4, 283, 285–8, 308, 318, 320–2
jurutulis, 92
 Junk Ceylon (*see* Phuket), 179
- Kabul, 43
 Kaempfer, Engelbert, 64, 151, 201, 248, 252
kafir, 80, 118
 Kagoshima, 155
kaikin (*see also* seclusion edicts), 211, 214, 218
 Kakiemon, 279, 281–2
 Kalimantan (*see also* Borneo), 89, 196, 310
 Kamakura period, 213–4
kamban trade, 280
 Kampar, 111
 Kampong China (*see* Melaka), 86
 Kanchanburi, 35
 Kandal, 228
 Kandy kingdom, 145
kango, 212
 Kangxi reign, 265
 kaolin, 265–6
 Kapitan Cina, 118–20, 131
 Karatsu (*see* Kyushu), 232
karayuki-san, 236
 Karen minority, 325
 Karimata, 268, 310
 Karma (Ma Ja Ka Ma), 91–2
 Kartasura, 90
 Kashgar, 43
 Kasteel Batavia, 191
kasuiri, 142
katana, 213, 220, 225
 Kato Eichi, 279
 Kautara, 72
 Kaytsu, Ngabehi, Kiyai, 118
 Keay, John, 206
 Ke-cho (Hanoi), 228
 Kedah, 26, 28, 100, 207
 Kediri, 38, 89
 Kelantan, 74, 81, 112
 Keling, 86, 168–9
 kendi, 266
 Kepler, Johannes, 292
 Kerala, 36, 145
 Keramien, 94
 Kern, Hendrik, 53
 Kersten, Carool, 57–8, 227
 Kertarajasa (King), 54
 Khambat (*see* Cambay), 187
 Khan River, 60
 Khmer (*see* Cambodia), 56, 58–9, 69, 74, 76, 227, 295
 Khorat Plateau, 25
 Khubilai Khan, 11, 212
 Kiangxi emperor, 283
 kilnware (*see also* ceramics; porcelain), 270
 Kinh, 78
 Kiya Kyuzaemon, 222–3
 Klang Valley, 28
 Knaap, Gerrit 195
 knowledge, 291–3
koban, 242, 244, 252–3, 260
 Kobata Atsushi, 220–1, 239, 241–2, 244
 Kobe as global city, 325
 Kompong Cham, 74
 Konbaung dynasty, 67
 kongsi, 311
 Korea (*see* Choson; Goryeo; Silla), 12, 16, 48, 109, 112, 127, 136, 139, 211–3, 217–8, 220–1, 239, 242, 245, 255, 257–8, 261, 268, 297, 299, 301–2, 306, 316, 318–9

- Korea, Republic of, 324, 326
 Korean Peninsula, 212
 Korean Silver Trade, 245
 Korokan, 213
 Koryo court, 136
 Kota Batu, 91–2
 Kota Kampur, 53
 Kota Tampan, 29
 Kotte (Jayawardhanapura), 163
 Koxinga (*see* Zheng Chenggong), 204
 Kra Isthmus, 28
 kraak porcelain, 279 Chinese, 275
kraton, 90
 Kratoska, Paul, 5
 Kratz, Ernst Ulrich, 82–3
kris making, 310
 Kuala Kupang, 91
 Kuantan, 111
 Kuching, 91
 Kudus, 89, 272, 278
 Kulke, Hermann, 36
 Kuløy, H.K., 64
 Kumeimura, 112
kupang, 134
 Kupang (west Timor), 178
 Kure, 135
 Kusnoky Itsiemon (Japanese mercenary), 232
 Kutai, 40, 99
kylin (*kirin*), 273
 Kyoto, 136, 174, 212–3, 229, 251, 268
 Kyushu, 2, 18, 44, 107–8, 112, 137, 161, 163, 173–4, 187, 212, 219, 232, 245, 253, 255, 263, 278

 Laboiana fort, 177
 labor, ceramics industry, 239, 247, 256, 258, 266, 288, 295, 308, 321
 Lach, Donald F, 167
 lacquerware, 71, 192, 201, 213, 280
 Lac-Viet civilization, 68
 Laffan, M.F., 85
 Laguio, 227
 Laguna, 112
laksamana, 87
 Lampung, 33, 87
 Lamreh inscription, 45
 Lamuri, 81, 83
 Lancaster, James, 187
lanchara, 164
 Lane Xang, 58, 60
 Langasuka, 95
 Lanna, 58
 Lansing, J. Stephen, 298
 Lao Pako, 27
 Laos (Lao), 14, 23, 27, 30, 36, 40, 42, 57, 59–61, 77, 109, 126, 134, 142–3, 150, 153, 258, 272–3, 295, 306, 319–10, 319, 323, 325–6
 Lape, 48
 Lapita ware, 31
 Larantuka, 178, 196
 Larantuqueiros, 178, 307
 La Sanctissimo fort, 181
 Lasso, Bartolomeu, 163
 lateen sail, 160, 301
 latitude, 162–3
 law, 87
 Le (Ly) dynasty, 68–9
 Le Loi period, 71, 305
 Le Hoan (commander), 68
 Le-Trinh dynasties, 61
 Lee Hoon, 218
 Legazpi, Miguel López de, 122, 180
 Leiden, 234
 Leipzig, Battle of, 189
 Leirissa, 176
 Leitão, Humberto 176
 Lembata, 152
 Lemé, Henrique, 165
 Lene Hara cave, 30
 Lenggong, 29
 Leninism, 326

- Leonor, Raihna Dona, 274
 lepers, 226–7
 Leren stele, 44
 Leria, Giovanni-Maria, 61
 Lesser Sunda Islands, 152, 195
 Lewis, Martin, 5
 Li Cong Uan, 68
 Lieberman, Victor, 12, 36, 51, 58,
 64–7, 69–70, 72–3, 77, 196,
 257–8, 293, 306–8
 Lifau, 178
 Ligor, 200
 Limahon (Lim Feng), 107, 180
 Lingga, 82
 Lingnan, 26
 linguistics (language), 31, 33–5, 73,
 323
 Linschoten, John Huighen van, 139,
 166–7
 liquidity crisis, 242, 261
 Lisbon (*see* Portugal), 179, 186, 274
 Li Tana, 4, 69–70, 128–9
 literacy, 65, 293, 313
liurai, 178
 livelihoods, 261, 304
Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas, 168
Livro de Geographia Oriental, 163
 localization, 113–5
 Lombard, Denys, 14–15, 39, 120
 Lombok, 23, 45, 97, 196
 Lomlen Island, 34
 London (*see* England), 204, 206
 Longgupo cave, 29
 longitude, 163
 Lopburi, 58, 62
lorcha, 269, 301
 Lorge, Peter A., 309
 Loubière, Simon de, 95
 Louis XIV (King), 188
 Louis Henri (Duke of Bourbon), 281
 Lovek, 57–8, 216
 Low Countries (*see* Holland;
 Netherlands), 186
 Loyang mission, 212
 Luang Prabang, 27, 38, 58, 60–2, 78
 Luchu (*see* Ryukyu), 163
 Luis, Lázaro, 163
 Lumut, 91
 Luso-Sundanese Treaty (*see* Portugal;
 Sunda), 165
 luxuries, 144, 153, 186, 269, 287, 320
 Luzon, 23, 25, 97, 148, 168–9, 216,
 220, 268, 294, 298–9
 Ly dynasty, 70, 271–3

 Ma River, 28
 Macanese, 171
 Macartney, Lord, 265, 319
 Macau, 16, 63, 88, 99–100, 105–6,
 117–8, 139–40, 144, 150, 161,
 153, 170–3, 177–8, 181–3, 186,
 189–91, 150, 159, 166, 170–3,
 191, 208–11, 217, 230–1, 235,
 239–40, 274, 276–8, 285–6, 306,
 318, 320, 322
 Macau Peninsula, 170, 208
 Mac Cuu (Mo Jiu), 129
 mace, 99, 145–7, 160, 175
 Madagascar, 30, 119, 310
 Madeira, 160
 Madras (*see* Chennai), 139, 150, 166,
 179, 188, 191, 207, 209
 Madrid (*see* Spain), 186
 Madura, 89, 164
 Magellan, Fernand, 8, 54, 102, 147,
 175, 180, 299
 Maghreb, 43
 Maguindanao, 94
 Mahabaratha, 40
 Mahayana Buddhism (*see also*
 Buddhism), 62–3, 65
 Mahmud II (Sultan), 101
 Mahmud Shah I (Sultan), 87, 100, 169
 Majapahit, 38, 43, 52, 54–5, 86, 89,
 91, 100, 117, 136, 220–1, 268,
 272–3

- Majul, Cesar Adib, 94
- Makassar (Makassarese/Makassans)
(*see* Ujung Pandang), 96–100,
102, 143, 147, 151, 160, 172,
187, 189, 195–7, 216, 243,
307–9, 321–2
- Malabar (Malabari), 82, 88, 104, 153,
166, 191, 207, 249–50
- Malacca Straits, 11, 15–6, 37, 42, 45,
83–5, 93, 99, 101–2, 106, 111,
115, 134, 152, 160, 166, 190,
192, 196, 198, 304, 307, 313,
317, 326
- Malagasy (*see* Madagascar), 32
- Malaya (Malay), 34, 40, 43, 45, 53,
66, 73–4, 79, 81–8, 92–3, 97–9,
101–2, 106, 119, 121–2, 131,
140, 150–1, 162, 167–8, 183,
198–9, 207, 310–1, 325
- Malay archipelago, 54
- Malay Peninsula, 22, 29, 32, 35, 40,
43, 53, 62–3, 74, 86, 96, 100,
107, 111–2, 129, 134–5, 145,
162–3, 300, 311
- Malayo-Polynesian, 31, 73
- Malaysia (Federation of), 28, 40, 103,
124, 134, 170, 179, 197, 317,
323, 325
- Maldives, 79, 134, 164
- Malik Al-Zahir (Sultan), 83
- Malikal Saleh (Sultan), 83
- Malinee Dilochwanich, 125
- Malleret, Louis, 40
- Malukus, 78, 93, 96–7, 161, 163, 167,
175–6, 181, 186–7, 189, 192–3
- Malwa, 150
- mandala, 36, 48, 142
- Mangkubi (Hamenko Buwono I), 90
- Manguin, Pierre, 52–3, 55, 229
- Manila, 10, 16, 61, 99, 107, 118,
122–4, 131, 139, 142, 148, 159,
180–1, 190, 204, 211, 216–8,
225–7, 235, 249, 285, 300,
302–3, 313
- Manila Bay, 94
- Manila galleon trade (*see also* galleon;
Manila), 140, 182, 239, 242,
258–9
- Manoel (member of red seal ship),
223
- Manuel I (King), 274
- manuscripts, 98–9, 296
- maps (*see* cartography) Western-
inspired, 323
- Markovits, Claude, 157
- Marini, Giovanni Fillipo, 74
- marjdiker*, 234
- markets (marketing), 115, 135, 320.
322, 326, 275, 278–9, 283
- marine (maritime), 33, 39, 53, 63,
65–6, 100, 139–40, 151–2, 213,
258, 266–8, 270–1, 274, 285,
297, 301, 318, 325–6
- Martaban, 27, 65–6, 139
- martaban jars, 270, 271, 288
- Marques de Abrante Palace, 274
- Martina, Duke of Naples, 274
- mas (mace) coins, 243
- Masnur Shah (Sultan), 86–7
- Maspero, Georges, 72–3
- Masulipatnam (Machilipatnam), 205
- Marx, Karl, 56
- Mataram, 79, 89–90, 102, 161, 165
- Matelief, Cornelis (Admiral), 200,
203
- material, culture, 300
- mathematics, 292–3
- Matoaya (Sultan), 98
- Matsuda Misugu, 220–1
- Matsura Shigenobu (daimyo), 173,
222, 279
- Mauritius, 188–9
- Mauritius* ship, 268
- Mazu, 117
- Mazumdar, Sucheta, 303

- Mecca, 9, 80, 93, 139
 medicine, medicinals, 144–5, 150,
 152, 215, 293, 295, 297, 299
 Medina, 81
 Mediterranean, 9, 14–6, 37, 40, 44,
 144, 146, 152, 162
 megaliths, 26–7, 30
 Meiji era, 175, 236, 299, 325
 Meissen, 281, 265, 278
 Mekong River, 14, 22, 27, 39, 55,
 57–8, 60–2, 126
 Mekong delta, 10, 26, 40, 69, 129,
 131
 Melaka, 11, 26, 44, 63, 66, 74, 79,
 81, 83–7, 92, 94, 97, 99, 101–2,
 109, 112–3, 116, 121–2, 131,
 135, 139, 143, 146–7, 152, 155,
 159–61, 163–5, 167–70, 172,
 176–7, 179, 183, 186, 189, 191,
 197–8, 209, 215–6, 220, 239,
 243, 249, 272–4, 276, 280, 283,
 285, 297, 307, 309, 318, 326
 Melaka River, 169–70
 Melapor, 179
 Melville, Herman, 152
 Menan River (*see* Chao Praya), 27
 Mendoza, Juan de, 264
menteri, 118
 mercantilism, 160, 255
 merchant communities, 22, 70, 108,
 125, 168, 185, 228
 mercenaries, 67, 179, 216, 232–3, 235
 Mergui, 63, 188–9
 Mesopotamia, 146
 Metal Age, 26, 30
 metals, metallurgy, 22, 27, 134, 136,
 138, 182, 293, 297, 301, 310,
 312–4, 321
 Mexico, 140, 142, 159, 180–3, 217,
 238
 Miao minority (*see* Hmong) 115
 Middle East, 37, 84–5, 140, 146,
 168–9, 213, 267, 272–3, 287,
 296, 300–1, 317
 migration (*see* immigration), 33–4,
 48, 124
 migration of Austroasiatic speakers,
 48
 military (*see* armies), 72, 79, 104,
 163–4
 military-science-technology balance,
 308–9
 military technology, 51, 72, 83, 104,
 297, 304–9
 Minangkabau, 53, 100, 196, 198
minato-machi, 213–4
 Mindanao Island, 27, 34, 72, 94, 99
 Mindoro, 94, 112
 Ming dynasty, 11, 16–9, 37, 52, 68–9,
 76, 86, 103–6, 109, 111–7, 127,
 129, 131, 136, 140, 151–3, 155,
 170–2, 192, 204, 207, 212,
 214, 219, 221, 228, 239, 260,
 264, 267, 269, 272–3, 275, 288,
 292, 297, 303, 305–6, 309, 313,
 318–20, 323
 Ming Gap, 269–70, 322
 Ming-Qing transition, 105, 107, 127,
 131, 137, 264, 275, 278, 280,
 282–3, 288, 318
Ming shilu (*see* Ming dynasty). 86, 93,
 111, 121, 170, 219, 305
 Ming and Tribute Trade System, 220
 Minh Huang, 129–31
 Minh Mang, 75–76
 mining (*see* copper; silver; metal),
 25–6, 238, 247, 256, 258–9, 261,
 310–1, 314, 321
 Minnan region (*see* Fujian), 219,
 265–6
 minorities (*see* ethnicity), 109, 128,
 131, 148, 150, 319
 minting, 261

- Misericordia, 168, 171, 226
 missionaries, 94, 99, 102, 128, 171–2,
 181, 188, 201, 204, 210, 230,
 293, 307, 309
Moby Dick, 152
 Mocha, 190, 249, 283
 modernity, 324–6
 Mogi (red seal port), 215
 Mojokerto, 54
 Mombasa, 79
 fortress, 160
 money (monetary) (*see* currency), 70,
 127, 135–8, 157, 241, 257–9,
 261
 monetization, 138, 257–8, 261
 Mongols (*see* Yuan), 11, 17, 41, 43–4,
 53, 65, 69, 72, 80–1, 108, 126–7,
 134, 212, 266, 292
 Mongoloids, 23
 Mons, 27, 34, 41, 58–9, 64–7, 199,
 270
 monsoon system, 23, 81
 montagnards (*see* highlanders;
 uplanders), 76, 78, 148, 310
 Montanus, Arnoldus 283
 Monte Fort (Macau), 285
 Morga, Antonio de, 225–6
 Mookerji, Radhakumud, 294
 Moors (*see also* Islam; Moros;
 Muslims), 198
 Morocco, 80, 82
 traveler, 46
 Moros (*see also* Moors; Muslims;
 Islam), 92–4, 325
 Morse, Hosea Ballou, 202
 mosque, 88, 90, 117–5, 273, 310, 313
 Mouhot, Henri, 62
 Mozambique, 274
 Mozambique Island, 161, 166, 186,
 268–9
muang (*see chaomuang*), 59
 Muda Mahmud, 101
 Mughal (Mughals) (*see* India), 12, 44,
 85, 143, 163, 179, 188, 191, 308,
 313, 322
 Muhammad, Prophet, 80, 94
 Muhammad Yamin, 55
 Munda, 34
 Muñoz, Ignascio, 227
 Muong Phuan, 306
 Muong Sua, 60
 Murakami, N., 233–4
 Muromachi period, 137, 212–4
 Muscat, 166
 Musi River, 53
 music, 284, 293, 296
 Muslim (*see also* Islam; Moor;
 Moros), 46, 54, 65, 78, 81–2, 92,
 104, 114, 118, 121, 138, 150,
 160–1, 165, 168, 180, 184, 191,
 198–9, 208, 266, 306, 317
 Mutsu, copper mines 247
 Myochioin temple, 212
 My Son, 73
 Naga, 295 textile motif, 142
 Nagapattnam (Nagapattinam), 41,
 143 179, 205
 Nagarakertagama, 54
 Nagasaki, 2, 113, 118–9, 147, 159,
 161, 171, 173–4, 181, 183, 189,
 191, 199–201, 204, 207, 209–11,
 215–6, 223–6, 228, 230, 233,
 236, 239–40, 242–3, 246, 248,
 250–2, 255, 260–1, 279–80,
 285–6, 299–300, 314, 319–20
 Nagasaki Kaisho, 247
Nagasaki Monogatari, 234
 Nakhom Phanom, 41
 Nakhon Sri Thammarat, 63
 Nan, 58, 306
 Nan'an, 265
 Nancowry, 35
 Nanhai (South Seas) trade, 103, 139

- Nanghai No 1 (South China Sea vessel No.1 wreck), 267
- Nanjing, 92, 104, 140–2, 219, 284, 300
- Nanyang, 103, 130, 323
- Nanzhou (Nan Chou), 38, 68, 126–7, 134
- Napoleon, 189
- Napoleonic interlude, 90, 189
- Napoleonic Wars, 189, 207
- Napoli, 274
- Nara, 44, 136, 213
- Narai (King), 224
- Naresuan (King), 199–200, 222
- National Museum of Vietnamese History, 273
- National Research Institute for Cultural Properties, 136, 228
- nations (national) nation-states, 79, 109, 113–4, 138, 256, 323–4
- navigation, 80, 160–2, 313
- navy (naval), 54, 115–6, 160, 186, 183, 207
- Needham, Joseph, 37, 297, 313, 318
- negara*, 73, 76, 294
- Negara Brunei Darussalam (*see* Brunei), 92
- negritos, 29
- Negros, 148
- Neira, 193–4
- neo-Confucianism (*see* Confucianism), 69, 110, 229, 314, 324
- Neolithic, 21, 25, 29–31, 46, 48
- Netherlands, 189, 244
- New Guinea (*see* Papua), 29, 32, 96, 134, 293, 298
- New World (*see* Americas), 14, 127, 139, 171, 181–3, 238, 242, 250, 260, 297, 320
- Newton, Isaac, 292
- Nghe-Tinh provinces, 61
- Nguyen dynasty (*see* Vietnam), 39, 61, 68–71, 74–6, 127–8, 138, 183, 188, 191, 202, 206, 216, 220–1, 228, 238, 258, 283, 299, 301, 307–8, 319
- Nguyen Hoang, 69–70
- Nguyen Phac Tran, 75, 258
- Nha Trang, 41, 72–3
- Nhi Phu (Ong Bong) pagoda, 130
- Niah caves, 29
- Nias, 30
- Nicholl, Robert, 92
- Nicobar (Nicobarese), 34–5, 151, 189
- Nicote, Philippe de Brito, 67
- Nieuhoff, John, 135
- Nihon, 222
- Nihon-machi* (Japan towns), 211–36
- Ningbo, 214
- Nippon, 222
- Nishikawa Joken, 139
- Nogami Takenori, 285–6
- Nordin Hassin, 197–8
- Normandy, 274 Duke of, 273–4
- Northeast Asia, 110–1, 211, 217
- North Korea, 323
- North Vietnam, 323
- Norway (Norwegian) bar copper, 249
- Notre Dame church, 44
- Nuestra Señora de la Concepción* ship, 268
- numeracy, 313
- Nusantara, 72
- nutmeg, 99, 146–7, 153, 160, 175, 194–5, 201
- Nuyts, Pieter, 203–4, 235
- obon*, 148
- Oc Eu, 10, 27, 40
- O'Connor, Sue, 48
- Oda Nobunaga, 137
- Ocusse, 178
- Ogiwara Shigehide, 255
- Oharu, Geronima (Jagatera), 232
- Okinawa (*see also* Ryukyu), 218, 222, 324

- Olsen, Albert, 246
 Oman (Omanis), 186
 Omura daimyo, 173
 Ong Bong (Nhi Phu) pagoda (Saigon), 130
 Ong Tai-Hao, 118, 120
 opium, 139, 141, 144, 149–50, 172, 185, 207–9
 Opium Wars, 12, 18, 130, 150, 209, 319, 322
 Opperhoft, 192
 oral culture, 98, 293
 tradition, 296
orangkaya, 85, 193
 Orchid Island, 31
 Oriental, 8–10, 15–6, 56, 310
 Orissa, 34, 86
 Ormuz (*see* Hormuz), 166
 Osaka, 174, 213, 226, 236, 247, 251, 279
 Ostend General India Company, 208
 Ottoman, 83, 85, 102, 144, 273, 307–8, 313
 Oudong, 57, 285
- Pacey, Arnold, 291–2, 304, 312–3, 316–7
 Pacific galleon trade (*see* Manila galleon trade), 182, 320
 Pacific Ocean, 17, 31, 35, 151, 181, 204, 322
 Pacific War, 236
 Pacification Mission for Palembang, 116, 221
 Pacinan, 118
padrão, 165
 Pagan, 11, 38, 42–3, 56, 65, 135, 169, 271, 288, 298, 317
 Pahang, 81, 84, 100, 107, 112, 116, 152
 Pajajaran, 43, 87, 164, 183, 317
 Pakse-Smith, M.T., 226
 Paku Buwono II, 90
- Palang-Wa, 34
 Palawan Island, 269
 Palembang, 28, 53–4, 98–9, 106, 111, 113, 115–6, 220–1, 326
 Paleolithic, 29
 Pali, 39, 295
 Pallava script, 40
pancada, 173
 Panduranga (*see* Pho Hai-Pham Rang-Phan Ri), 72
 Panjim, 167
 paper, Chinese, 299–300
 Papua (Papuan) (*see* New Guinea), 23, 29, 32, 325
 Paraneswara, 85
 Parian, 123, 227
 Parmentier, Henri, 71–2
 Parsis, 150
 Pasai, 81, 83, 95, 134, 220
 Pasar Ikan (*see* Jakarta; Sunda Kelapa), 192, 285
 Pasig River, 123, 180, 227
 Pasir, 84, 99
 Patani, 81, 95–6, 107, 116, 160, 203, 220, 325
 Patio de Espinha (Macau), 231
 Patio de S.Paulo (Macau), 231
 Patna, 150
 patriarchy, 114–5, 122, 131
 Pattingalong (Sultan), 98–9
 Pearl River, 105–7, 208–9
 Pearson, Richard, J, 219
 peasant, labor, 140
 Pedir, 84
 Pegu (Peguans), 27, 65–7, 78, 88, 139, 164, 167–8, 179, 199, 205, 317
 Pekalongan, 120
 Peking Man, 29
 Penang, 117, 152, 166, 198–9, 207, 209
 Penghu Islands (*see* Pescadores), 31
 Pengkalan Bujang, 43
pengulu, 87

- pepper, 41, 83–5, 87–8, 90, 139,
144–6, 153, 160, 164–6, 189,
195, 201, 204, 219–20, 268, 307,
322, 326
- Perak, 29, 81, 84
- Perak Man, 29
- peranakan* (see Baba), 103, 116–7,
119, 131
- Perkiners, 194
- Perlak, 83
- Perlis, 81
- Perry, Mathew (Commodore), 201
- Persia (Persians), 44–6, 82, 86, 140,
142, 169, 191–2, 249, 257, 267,
272–3, 289, 295, 312, 319
- Persian Gulf (see Arabian Gulf), 37,
43, 86, 102, 104, 186, 188, 268,
273
- Peru, 182, 238, 246
- Pescadores (Penghu), 202
- pesisir* coast, 45, 54, 79, 86, 89, 112,
116–7, 131, 168, 300, 321
- Pessoa, Andre (Governor), 231
- Phan Rang (Panduranga), 72–4
- Phan Ri, 74
- Phayao, 58
- Phetracha (King), 200
- Philippines, 22–3, 25, 27, 30, 33, 38,
72, 78–9, 92–3, 96, 102, 111–2,
122, 134, 142, 148, 163, 181–3,
186, 195, 215, 225–7, 236,
258–60, 269, 272–3, 299, 303,
317, 319, 323, 325
- philosophy, 284, 297, 299
- Phnom Penh, 57–8, 61, 211, 227–8
- Pho Hai-Pham Rang-Phan Ri (see
Panduranga), 72–4
- Pho Hien (Hung Yen), 128–30, 230
- Phra Bang, 60
- phrakhlang*, 199
- Phra Narai (King), 63
- Phuan, 62, 306
- Phuket (see Junk Ceylon), 179
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 9
- Pigafetta, Antonio, 54, 92, 299–300,
309, 313
- pigment imports, 287
- pilgrimage (pilgrims), 93, 312
- piracy (pirates), 15, 94, 102, 105–7,
113, 116, 180, 204–5, 207,
215–17, 221
- Pires, Tomé, 139, 147, 155, 160, 164,
168
- Plain of Jars, 27
- planisphere (see also cartography;
maps), 162–3
- plantations, 147, 153, 188
- Plessey, Battle of, 188, 206
- plow, 303
- Pollack, Sheldon, 39–40, 317
- Poivre, Pierre, 147, 188
- Poland, King of (see Augustus the
Strong), 265
- Polo, Marco, 45, 81
- Pomerantz, Kenneth, 134
- Pondicherry, 188–9, 206
- Ponhea Lueu commune, 228
- Po-ni (see Brunei), 91, 111
- Pope, 98
- population (see demography), 22–3,
26, 43, 55, 61, 84, 119, 125, 210,
298
- porcelain (see ceramics, stoneware),
37, 88, 91, 139, 160, 171, 182,
205, 208, 253, 263–4, 266, 268,
274–5, 278, 284, 286, 302
- Porte (see Constantinople), 83
- portolan charts (see cartography;
navigation), 162
- ports, 109–10, 114, 128–9, 139,
173–4, 197, 213, 215, 325
- Portugal (Portuguese), 2, 13, 16, 30,
34, 39, 44, 58, 61, 63, 65–7,
70, 82, 84–5, 87–8, 96–8, 100,
102, 105, 107, 109, 113, 116,
122, 142–8, 150, 153–5, 160–8,

- 170–3, 176–9, 181, 185–6,
189–92, 197–9, 200, 208–9, 216,
221, 230–1, 237, 241–2, 246,
254, 268, 274–5, 276–8, 301,
306–9, 314, 317–9
- Portuguese century, 318
- Po Saut, 74
- Potosi mines, 182, 238
- pottery (*see* ceramics, porcelain, stone-
ware), 30–1, 91, 122, 293
- Powis, Emanuel, 216
- Prabu Suruwisesa, 164
- prahu layar* (*see also* boats), 101, 196
- Prambangan, 42
- Prasat Thong, 224
- precious metals, 256
- prehistory (*see* history), Southeast
Asia, 35
- prestige goods trade (*see* luxuries),
211–3, 235, 317, 321
- print, 296, 299–300
- production, 133, 138, 184, 287, 297,
300
- profits, 133, 160–1, 193, 203, 206,
208–9, 230, 242, 248, 255, 259
- progress, teleological, 293
- Prome, 65
- Protestant (*see* Christians; missionar-
ies), 186
- Ptak, Roderich, 105, 146
- Ptolemy, 18, 22, 162, 292–4
- Pulau Buaya Wreck, 156
- Pulicat, 179, 190, 205
- Purchas, Samuel, 7
- Pusan (Busan) as global city, 325
- Pusat Penyelidikan Arkeologi, 29
- Pyongyang, 214
- Pyu culture, 65
- Qing, 2–3, 12, 18, 91, 103, 106–7,
110, 112, 127, 129–31, 134, 136,
150–1, 155, 172, 192, 204–5,
221, 231, 250, 261, 264, 275,
282–3, 306, 313, 318–20
- quadrant, 161
- Quang Nai, 148
- Quang Nam, 128, 148, 206, 228
- Quanzhou, 41, 43, 46, 105, 121, 130,
138, 170, 218–9, 265–6, 268,
326
- Quanzhou Wreck, 268
- Quaran Holy, 80, 92–3, 296
- Quelpart (*see* Cheju Island), 253
- Quillon, 88
- Quinam (*see* Quang Nam), 228
- Quy Nhon, 273, 278, 283
- Raffles, Stanford Thomas, 90, 189,
242, 244, 248, 252–5
- Raignal, Guillaume Thomas, 150
- rainforest (*see* forests), 157, 326
- Rama (King), 125
- Ramathibodhi (King), 63
- Ramayana, 40
- Ramthamkaeng (King), 65
- Ramusio, *Giovanni Battista*, 7
- rangaku*, 2002
- Rangoon, 65–6, 179
- rattan, 195
- Razadarit (King), 65
- Red (Song Khoi) River, 22, 25, 38, 48,
69–71, 229, 271, 273
- Red Sea, 37, 62, 83, 144, 146, 273
- Red Seal Trade (*see* Japan), 110, 143,
154, 211, 215–7, 223, 229, 236,
241
- Reid, Anthony, 37, 48, 96, 106,
116–7, 121, 146, 197, 259, 302,
304, 309–10, 320–1
- Reimel, Jorge, 163
- Rekidai Hoan*, 220, 323
- Relandus, Hadrianus, 31
- religion, 147, 157, 160, 210, 260, 297,
310, 316, 323, 325
- Renaissance, 2, 98, 291, 297, 321

- respondência*, 174, 241
 Reunion (Bourbon), 188–9
 Reynolds, Craig, 37
 Rhade minority, 74
 Riau, 82, 87, 101, 146
 Ribeiro, Diogo, 163
 Ricci, Matteo, 172
 rice, 23, 25, 30, 34, 56–8, 62, 64–5, 86, 97, 111–2, 149, 154, 166, 203, 221, 292, 297–9, 303, 312
 Ricklefs, Merle, 54, 81, 89
 Riddell, Peter, 84
 Rijksmuseum, 234
 risk capital, 266
 river-mouth states (*see* states), 28
 Rodrigues, Francisco, 16, 163
 Roggewain, Jacob (Captain), 194, 245
 Rome, 6, 15, 32, 37, 40, 141, 231, 292, 316
 Ronquillo, Diego (Governor), 123
 Rosengyn Island, 187
 Rotterdam, 275
 Ruiz de Herman, Gonzales Blas, 58, 61
 Run Island (Pulau), 187, 194–5
 Russia, 67, 109, 170–1, 319
 ruttiers (*see* navigation), 162–3
 Ryukyu (Ryukuans), 2, 18, 22, 105, 110, 112–3, 136, 142, 155, 163, 207, 211–2, 214, 217–222, 253, 255, 272–3, 323

 Sacouba (Japanese mercenary), 232
 Sado Island mines, 238–9, 252, 255
 Saga prefecture, 278
 Saigon, 76, 130
 Sailendra, 38, 52
 St. Cloud, 282
 St. Paul's church (*see* Macau), 231, 235
 Saipan, 268
 Saivism, Saivism as Indian transfer, 284

 Sakai, 213, 219
sakdina, 59
sakoku (*see* seclusion edicts), 171, 211, 233
 Sakurai Yumio, 129
 Salagam caste, 145
 Salazar, Domingo de (Bishop), 123
 Salmon, Claudine, 116, 120, 151
 salt, 25, 28, 120, 148–9, 311
 Salween River, 22
 Samarakand, 43
 Samarinda, 99
 Sam Bao Gong temple, 117
 Sambas River, 311
 Sam Senthai (King), 60
 Samião (Ratu)/Samian (Sang Hyang), 164–5
 Samudra-Pasai, 83, 134, 220
 sandalwood, 25, 54, 139, 144, 153–4, 160, 176, 178, 184, 189–90, 201, 322
 Sande, Francisco, de, 94
 Sández (Fray), 123
 San Diego, 268
 Sanfoqi (*see* Srivijaya), 52–3
 Sangiran cave, 29
 Sangley (*see* China; Philippines), 122–3, 180
 Sanhoku, 219
 San Miguel, 227
 Sanskrit, 10, 28, 39–40, 59, 92, 292, 295, 312, 317
 Sansom, G.B., 212
Santa Ana (ship), 217
Santa Caterina (ship), 100
 Santiago fortress (Taiwan), 204
 Santo Domingos church (Nagasaki), 175
 Sanzan, 219
 São Bento Wreck, 274
São Gonçalo ship, 269
 São Tomé, 179

- sappanwood, 143, 153–4, 201, 217, 219–21, 224, 245, 256
- sarasa*, 142–3, 233
- Sarawak, 29
- Sarawak River, 91, 310
- Saris, John (Captain), 187, 206, 235
- Satow, Ernest M., 223
- Satsuma, 221, 223, 226, 251–3, 255
- Sawankhalok, 270–1
- Saxony, 278, 281
- Scott, James, 4
- Schotte, Apollonius, 177
- Schottenhammer, Angela, 214
- science (*see also* technology), 10, 23, 210, 291–2, 295, 302, 313, 320, 324–5, 326
- sculpture, as Indian transfer, 284
- Sea Adventure* (red seal junk), 223
- sea, 23, 30, 107, 111, 113, 146, 151–2
- sea cucumber (*see* trepang), 151
- sea swallows (*see* bird's nests), 151
- seclusion edicts (*see kaikin*), 224
- seignorage, 254
- Sejarah Melayu*, 43
- Seki Hasshu, 279
- Sekimoto Teruo, 324
- Selangor, 81, 311
- Selden, Mark, 13
- Semarang, 90, 117, 120
- Sembiran, 30
- Senate (*see* Macau), 63, 171
- Sengoku, 137, 214
- Serat Centini*, 304
- Serat Surya Raja*, 90
- Serrão, Francisco, 175
- Sethathirat (King), 60
- Seville, 182
- “shadow empire,” 179
- Shaf-ite, 81
- shahbandar*, 85–7, 118, 121–2, 165, 169, 321
- Shan, 65–6, 124, 306, 319
- Shang dynasty, 75
- Shanghai, 276, 325
- sharif*, 94
- shibo* license system, 105
- Shikoku Island, copper mines, 247, 251
- Shilifoshi (*see* Srivijaya), 52
- Shimabara rebellion, 174
- Shimada Ryuto, 135, 138, 247–8, 256–7, 260
- Shimane prefecture, 238
- Shimano Kenryo, 227
- Shimizu clan, 221
- Shimoshirakawa kiln, 283
- shinjo* tributary trade, 245
- shiinsen* (*see* red seal trade), 211
- shinpai* trade licenses, 215
- ships, 74, 124, 130, 139, 157, 164, 216–8, 270–1, 274, 285, 293, 301–2, 310, 313
- shipwrecks, 46, 161, 242, 269, 271, 307
- Shogun (Shogunate) (*see* Japan), 130, 137, 155, 174, 201, 218, 2123, 231, 235, 245, 247, 255, 319
- Shokufuji temple (Nagasaki), 234
- Sho Shitsu (King), 221
- Sho Tai (King), 222
- Shotoku edicts of 1715, 255
- Shuri kings, 136 castle, 221–2
- Siam (*see* Thailand), 13, 27, 42, 55, 57–9, 62–4, 66, 76–7, 86, 91, 109, 118, 125, 129, 142–3, 152–4, 182, 188, 191, 199–200, 204, 206, 209, 215–6, 218, 220–5, 242, 250, 258, 263, 269–73, 276, 283, 287–8, 301, 319
- Siang state, 97
- Sichuan Basin, 311
- sika deer, 154
- silk, 2, 21, 37, 71, 86, 88, 105, 122–3, 140–1, 159–60, 173, 182, 213, 220, 223, 228, 239, 256, 260,

- 266, 273, 284, 287, 302, 317,
320, 322, 326
- Silla period, 217
- silver, 2–3, 14, 27, 37, 42, 105, 122–3,
134, 137, 139, 141, 170–1, 174,
182, 206, 215, 228, 238–9, 241,
252, 254–6, 259, 316, 318
- silver mining, 134, 137, 238–9, 254–5
- Sinan Wreck, 268
- Sinbad routes, 326
- Singapore (*see* Temasik), 101, 146,
152, 166, 198–9, 207, 209, 236,
285, 323, 325
- Singapore Island, 16, 87, 101, 169
- Singapore Straits, 87, 100, 102, 284,
268
- Singasari, 38
- Singburi, 273
- Sinhala (*see also* Ceylon; Sri Lanka),
42
- Sinhavaram (King), 75
- Sino (Sinicization), 21, 52, 113–5,
127–8, 171, 103, 125–6, 200,
296, 315–6, 318, 324
- Sip Song Chau Tai region, 306
- Sipsongpanna (*see* Xishuangbanna),
58
- Sirlao, 65
- Sisatchanali, 270
- situado*, 182
- Siva (Shaivism), 36, 40–1, 54–5
- Skinner, William, 125
- slaves, 59, 78, 115, 119–20, 153, 185,
231
- smallpox, 171
- Smith, Adam, 2, 182, 237, 245, 254
- Smithies, Michael, 90
- Smits, Gregory, 222
- smuggling (smugglers), 106, 113, 244,
255, 286
- So, Alvin, 140
- So clan (*see* Tsushima), 245
- Sofala, 177
- Solo, Susuhan of, 90
- Solor, 155, 159, 161, 176–8, 216
- Song dynasty 9–12, 17, 42–3, 46, 63,
68, 91, 103, 108, 111–2, 114,
117, 130, 136, 139–40, 146–7,
155, 178, 218–9, 264–7, 297–8,
301, 313
- Songtham (King), 199, 222–4
- Sorasak (Prince), 224
- Souligna Vongsa (King), 59
- Sousimo (Japanese mercenary), 232
- South Africa, 274
- South America, 322
- South Asia, 143, 248, 300–1
- South China Sea (*see* China Sea), 11,
14, 17, 22, 27, 72, 82, 96, 109,
152, 170, 190–1, 258, 287, 316,
324
- South India model, 312
- Southeast Asia, 79, 102–4, 105–7,
112, 109, 110–1, 113, 115,
117, 121–2, 124, 126, 130,
133–5, 141–3, 145–7, 149–51,
159–60, 164, 188–90, 197,
209, 211–2, 214–5, 217, 219,
221, 229, 237–8, 257–61, 266,
268–73, 276, 283, 285–6, 293–6,
297–305, 308–10, 311–2, 316–8,
320–5
- South Korea, 323
- South Vietnam, 323
- Southworth, William A., 73
- Souza, George, 143–4, 149–50, 241
- Spain (Spanish), 16, 33, 43, 58, 61,
78, 80, 82, 88, 91–2, 97, 113,
123, 145, 156, 181, 183–4, 186,
189, 208–9, 216, 225–6, 239,
254, 259, 264, 268, 299, 302
- soy products, 303
- Spalding, Augustin, 206
- Specx, Cornelius, 200
- Speelman, Cornelis, 99

- spice (spiceries), 52, 83, 97–9, 102, 144–5, 159, 160–1, 163, 175, 186, 192–3, 195, 206–7, 220–1, 259, 307, 312
- Sri Lanka (*see* Ceylon), 41–4, 56, 60, 65, 81, 104, 119, 145, 154, 163, 190, 205–6, 208, 249, 283, 292, 312, 317
- Srivijaya, 10, 36, 38–9, 41–4, 51–3, 55, 62, 67, 83, 85, 91, 108, 111, 166, 267, 317
- Stadthuys (Melaka), 197
- Stargardt, Janice, 268
- state, 64, 70, 113, 307–8, 313, 316, 318, 323–4
- Staunton, George, 265
- sticklac, 153
- stoneware (*see* ceramics, porcelain), 91, 270–1, 273
- striver, 244
- Stuart-Fox, Martin, 104, 113, 319
- Suárez, Thomas, 44
- Subak* system, 296, 298
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 7
- Suetsugo Heizo, 204
- Suetsugu Kozen, 216
- Sufism (*see* Islam; Muslims), 45, 81, 93, 296
- sugar 118–20, 147–8, 153, 166, 185, 201, 203–4, 220, 256, 296, 303
- sugar production zones, 303
- Sugiyama Hiroshi, 228
- Sui dynasty, 52, 212
- Sukadana, 99
- Sukhothai, 38, 43, 58, 63, 65, 270–1
- Sulawesi, 31–2, 35, 79, 93, 96–7, 100, 109, 118, 151, 154, 176, 196, 269, 298, 307, 322
- Sulawesi Sea, 15
- Suleiman bin Abdullah al-Basr, 81
- sulfur, 155, 213, 219
- Sulfur Extraction Diaries*, 156
- sultanates, 79, 82, 85–7, 92, 101, 121, 167, 169, 309, 311, 317, 318
- Sulu, 3, 34–5, 79, 81, 93–5, 99, 102, 106, 109, 152, 181
- Sulu Sea, 34, 93
- Sumali (Su Bo Ni Qing) (Sumatra Blue), 267
- Su Ma Li Qing (Sumara Blue), 267
- Suma Oriental*, 139
- Sumatra, 10, 16, 23, 30, 32–3, 36, 40–1, 45, 52–4, 81, 83–5, 87, 89, 95–6, 100, 111–2, 115–6, 118, 134–5, 139, 145, 152, 154, 163, 165, 187–8, 196, 206, 221, 268, 287, 293–4, 298, 304, 310, 317
- Sumba Island, 23, 30, 153–4
- Sumbawa Island, 96–7, 99, 154, 195–6, 307
- Sumitomo, 247
- Sun Laichen, 305–7
- Sunda, 54, 79, 96, 101, 111, 164–5, 189, 220
- Sunda Kelapa, 16, 87, 89, 118, 164–5, 192, 220
- Sunda Straits, 28, 87–8
- Sunni, 80–1 Arab, 267
- Suphanburi, 62
- Surabaya, 45, 89, 116, 252, 325
- Surakarta, 304
- Surat, 144, 188, 191–2, 248–9, 283
- Suryadinata, Leo, 117
- Suryavarman I, 62
- Suryavarman II, 56
- Surinyavongsa (King), 61
- Sutherland, Heather, 195
- Suvannabhumi, 27
- Suzhou, 45, 120
- swaar money, 244
- Swahili coast, 104, 161, 186
- Swatow ware, 276
- Sweden (Swedish), 207, 231, 246, 249, 256, 287, 303
- Swedish East India Company, 208

- Swope, Kenneth M., 214
swords (*see katana*), 220
syair, 92
Syriam, 66–7, 139, 179, 191
Syria (Syrian), 46, 267
- Tabinshweihti (King), 66
Tagalog, 304
Tagliacozzo, Eric, 151–2
taho (porridge), 304
tabu (tofu), 303
taburi (curd or tofu), 304
tauxi, (fermented sauce), 304
Tai (Dai), 3, 12, 14, 22, 27, 36, 55,
58–9, 62, 66, 78, 104, 114, 128,
295, 301, 306, 319–10, 317
Tai-Kadai languages, 31
Tai-Lao kingdoms, 38–9
Tai-Vietnamese, 34
Tainan, 191, 203, 285
Taipei, 156
Taiwan (Taiwanese), 11, 22, 31, 103,
107, 112, 115, 131, 144, 146,
148, 152, 154, 159, 181, 191,
203–5, 207, 215–6, 226, 233,
235–6, 243, 245, 249–50, 252,
274–5, 279–83, 285–6, 321–2
Taiwan Straits, 31, 105
Takayama Ukon (Don Justo
Takayama), 226–7
Taksin (Phra Chao; King), 59–60, 63,
125, 129, 200
Talo, royal house, 99
Tambiah, Stanley, J., 36
Tambuka, 99
Tamil (Tamils), 41, 46, 169
Tamsui, 204
Tanegashima Island, 161
Tang dynasty, 10, 39, 42–3, 52, 68,
72, 91, 108, 126–7, 152, 212,
219, 267
Tang Viet civilization, 68, 127
tange (beansprouts), 303
- Tansui, 181
tariqa, 93
taro-based culture, 298
tarsila, 94
Taruma site, 30
tauco (fermented soybean), 303
Tausug, 94
Tavares, João, 100
Tawau, 236
Taylor, Keith W., 68, 202
Tayouan (*see Tainan*), 203
Tay Son, 61–2, 69, 71, 75, 307, 309
taxes, 139, 169, 252, 258, 266
tea, 150, 171, 173, 192, 205, 208,
213, 276–8, 283–5, 320
technology (*see also science*) 18, 51,
83, 123, 138, 161, 181–2, 184,
201, 210, 226, 237, 247, 263,
287, 291–4, 287, 299, 301–2,
304, 310, 312–4, 316, 320–1,
324
technology complex in Southeast Asia,
309
Teixeira, Manuel, 231
Temasik, 28, 285
temenggong, 87
tempeh, 304
temples, 130, 295, 298, 300, 310
Tenasserim, 63, 189, 200
Tengkerá, 197
Teochiu, 124–6, 129, 200
Ternate, 93, 147, 161, 175–6
monarchy, 176
sultanate, 147
textiles, 21, 41, 44, 88, 122, 125,
138–9, 140–3, 161, 192, 196–7,
205, 263, 294–5, 302, 312,
320–2, 235,
Thailand (Thai) (*see Siam*), 23, 25,
27, 35, 39, 55, 59, 119, 124, 126,
142, 149, 270, 295, 298, 300–1,
306, 315, 320, 322–3, 325
Thai Sa (King), 200

- Thang Long (*see* Hanoi), 69–72, 202, 229, 271, 273, 278, 311
- Thaton, 27
- The Emblem of Ingratitude*, 231
- Theeravit, Khien, 223–4
- Theravada Buddhism (*see* Buddhism), 38, 41, 59–60, 62–3, 65, 78
- Thomas (Padre) (member of red seal ship), 223
- Thomaz, Luiz Filipe, F.R., 121, 167–8
- Thonburi (*see* Bangkok), 125–6, 131, 200
- Thongchai Winichakul, 4
- Thunberg, Carl Peter, 201
- Thurgood, Graham, 73
- Tianjin (Tientsin), 125, 325
- Tibet, 103, 126, 131, 134
- Tibeto-Burmese, 65
- Tidore, 93, 147, 175–7, 232
- Timor (Timorese), 29, 36–7, 54, 99, 119, 131, 134, 152–3, 159, 161, 163, 166, 172, 177–8, 183, 189–90, 196, 260, 298, 307, 322
- tin, 28, 125, 135, 224, 245, 257, 311
- Tirtagasa royal palace, 284
- tobacco, 210
- Todos Os Santos church (Nagasaki), 175
- Tokugawa (*see* Shogunate), 2, 17–8, 51, 67, 70, 110, 137, 173, 184, 211, 214–5, 221–2, 225, 227–9, 232, 239, 241, 246, 252, 254–5, 260–1, 278–9, 288, 323–4
- Tokyo, 324
- Tolo, sultan, 196
- Tondo, 180
- Tong'an, 265
- Tongo, 65
- Tonkin, 191, 202, 229
- Tonle Sap (Great Lake), 39, 56–7, 151
- Topkapi Museum, 273–4
- tortoise shell, 152
- tosen*, 286
- Totok (*see also* Baba; peranakan), 116
- Toungoo kingdom, 38, 66–7, 77, 271, 308
- Toyotomi Hideyoshi (*see* Hideyoshi), 239
- trade, 71, 87, 105–6, 108–10, 114, 131, 135, 140, 159–61, 174, 190, 199, 208, 257, 259, 264–6, 267–9, 276, 285–7, 316
- Trailokanat (King), 59
- Tran dynasty, 112
- Tranh-Ninh, 305
- Trankera mosque, 121
- tranquiera* (*see* Tengkera), 121, 167, 197
- Tranquebar (Tharangambadi), 189
- Transitional porcelain (*see* porcelain), 275
- transport logistics, 265–6
- Trat, 129
- Treaty of Bongaya (1669), 195
- Treaty of Gianti (1755), 90
- treaty port system (*see* ports), 12, 319
- Trengganu, 74, 81
- tre pang* (*see* sea cucumbers), 150–1, 195–6, 322
- tribute, 11–3, 21, 27, 51, 54, 62, 76, 91, 104, 124, 135, 137, 139, 141, 192, 196, 237, 323
- Tribute Trade System (*also see* trade), 103–111, 116, 130, 170, 221, 316–9
- Trinado fort, 181
- Trinh dynasty (Vietnam), 39, 61, 68–70, 75, 183, 191, 201–2, 206, 228–31, 248, 257–8, 282–3, 301, 307
- tropical, 157, 201, 326
- Trowulan, 38, 54, 268, 272
- Trung Son mountains, 61, 77
- T'sobe (Dias), Michael, 234
- Tsuda Matazaemon, 223

- Tsushima (Taema-do) Island, 106, 217–8, 245, 255, 319
- Tuban, 54, 89
- Tunipalangga (King), 97
- Tunis, 323
- Turiang Wreck, 268, 271
- Turkey (Turkish), 37, 44, 82–3, 88, 90, 168
- Tutuala, 30, 33
- typhoon, 15 regime, 27
- Uchiyama Toshinori, 279
- Ujung Pandang (*see* Makassar), 96
- Ulilimas, 176
- Ulisiwa, 176
- ummah*, 80
- unequal treaties, 130, 209, 322
- unga*, 216
- United Provinces (*see* Holland; Netherlands), 200
- United States (*see* America), 70, 95, 186, 222, 236, 325
- Upeh, 86, 169
- uplanders (*see* montagnards; highlanders), 310
- Ura-san (Japanese women in Vietnam), 230, 235
- urbanization, 71, 265, 297, 312
- UNESCO (*United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*), 60, 75, 167, 299
- U Thong (founder of Ayutthaya), 63
- U Thong (walled city, Thailand), 41
- Van Braum, André, 303
- Van Dan (Van Hai), 128
- Van Don Island, 273, 271
- van Dyke, Paul, 150, 208
- van der Haghen, Steven (Admiral), 192–3
- van Hoorn (VOC captain at Deshima), 253
- van Leur, J.C., 40, 46, 82, 133, 320
- van Neijlenroode, Cornelia, 234
- van Noort, Oliver, 216
- van Spielbergen, Joris, 216–7
- van Warwick, Wybrand (Admiral), 203
- van Wouden, F.A.E., 176
- van Wuysthuff, Gerrit, 61
- von Imhoff, Gustaaf Willem, 243
- Imhoff report, 252
- Varthema, Ludivico di, 175
- Vat Phu, 59
- Vauban-style citadels, 309
- Vaz Dourado, Fernão, 66, 84, 163
- Venice (Venetian), 7, 44, 66, 146, 162, 213, 273–4
- Verhoeven, Pierre Willem (Admiral), 193, 233
- Versailles, 64
- Viallé, Cynthia, 287
- Vickery, Michael, 57, 72–3
- Vientiane, 27, 38, 59–61, 76, 148, 285
- Vietnam (Vietnamese), 2, 4, 10, 14, 16, 18, 21, 23, 25–7, 34, 37–41, 42, 55, 57, 60–2, 68–72, 74–5, 77–8, 103–4, 107–11, 112, 115, 118, 126–31, 135–6, 138, 140, 143–5, 148–50, 152–5, 157, 163, 172, 182, 188, 190, 202, 209, 216–7, 228–30, 235, 251, 258, 260–1, 268–73, 278, 281–2, 287–8 293–7, 299–301, 305, 308–10, 312–3, 316, 318, 319–23, 325–6
- Vietnam Military History Museum, 309
- Vietnam National Museum, 75
- Vijaya, 72–3, 272–3
- Vijayanegara, 163
- Vishnu, 36, 90 Vishnite, 54, 56
- Vlekke, Bernard, H.M., 193
- VOC (*see* Dutch East India Company)
- volcanoes, 155

- Volker, T., 203, 275, 279–80, 282–3, 285–6
- Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet, 7
- von Glahn, Richard, 136–7
- von Siebold, Philip Franz, 201
- Vung Tau Wreck, 269
- Wada Kaichin coin, 136
- Wade, Geoff, 37, 48, 86, 104, 116–7, 219, 221
- Wahabbi, 93
- waka* poem, 233
- wako*, 105–6, 215, 217–8, 221, 235–6
- Wall Street crash of 2008–09, 315
- Wallace, Alfred Russel, 23 3 7
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, 7, 13, 109, 185
- Wang-Hamashita debate, 107–11
- Wang Gung Wu, 103, 107–11, 318
- warfare, 58
- Warren, James, 3, 94
- water, 18–19, 129, 151, 292, 311
- Watson Andaya, Barbara, 33, 36, 114, 181
- wax, 195 for batik industry, 294
- weapons (*also see* cannons; firearms; guns)
- weaving, 293
- Weber, Max, 157, 185, 209
- Wealth of Nations*, 182, 254
- West Asia, ceramic technique, 266
- Western (*see* Europe), 64, 71, 77, 82, 111, 106, 109, 126, 139, 261, 275, 287, 321
- Westernization, 292
- West and the rest, 291, 297
- Westphalia, 13
- whaling, 152
- Whampoa, 208
- Wheeler, Charles, 74
- Wicks, Robert S., 135
- Wigan, Karen E., 5
- Windstedt, Sir Richard, 101
- Wink, André, 23, 28, 81
- Winnius, George, 179
- Wittfogel, Karl, 36
- Wolters, O.W., 35–6, 180
- wood (*see* aromatics), 90, 266
- Wood, W.A.R. 224
- woolen cloth (*see also* cloth; textiles), 206, 302
- women (*see also* female; gender), 88, 111, 114–5, 119, 141, 168, 202, 227, 230, 233–4, 321
- Woodside, Alexander, 75–6, 120
- world (*see also* global) economy, 5–6, 8, 13, 82, 109–10, 133, 141, 143, 145, 156–7, 159, 173, 185, 260–1, 321, 326
- Worcester, 282
- Wu Yue kingdom, 268
- Xavier, Francis, 176
- Xiamen, 106–7, 151, 196, 203, 205, 275–6, 282, 286
- Xiang Khoang, 27
- Xishuangbanna (*see* Sipsongpanna), 126
- Xuande reign, 267
- Yamada Nagamitsu, 222–4, 235
- Yamaguchi, 136, 155
- Yamawaki Teijiro, 284–5
- Yani minority, 31
- Yangjiang, 267
- Yangtze River, 31, 139, 141, 217, 250, 264, 297–98
- Yangzhou, 217
- Yao minority, 23
- Yaoping, 276
- Yaowarat, 124
- Yayoi sites, 35
- Yellow River valley, 300
- Yellow Sea, 15, 316
- Yeman, 190
- Yi dynasty, 214

- Yijing (I-Tsing), 41
 Yixing, 276–8
 Yogyakarta, 90
 Yokohama as global city, 325
 Yongle emperor, 104, 115–6
yu-ai sea, 326
 Yuan dynasty (*see* Mongol), 42–3, 46, 57, 63, 68, 93, 108, 111, 114–6, 136, 153, 218, 265, 267, 270, 272–3, 297, 305
 Yuan Bingling, 118–20
 Yue ceramics, 267–8
 Yuegang, 105–6, 112–3
 Yunnan, 14, 22, 38–9, 68, 103, 111, 117, 126–7, 131, 134, 151, 250–1, 257, 260, 293, 298, 305–6
Yunnan Shiliao Congkan, 126
 Yu Yonghe, 155
- Zaide, Gregorio, F., 227
 Zaiton (*see* Quanzhou), 46
 Zamboanga, 94, 181
 Zanchoo (Japanese mercenary), 232
 Zealandia fort, 203–4, 209
 Zen Buddhism (*see* Buddhism), 175, 212
Zeni ship, 202
 Zhang Xue (Chang Hsieh), 113
 Zhangzhou, 105, 130, 276
 porcelain, 268
 Zhao Rugua (Chau Ju-kua), 111
 Zhejiang, 106–7, 140–1, 208, 267–8
 Zheng dynasty, 107, 204–5, 275–6, 286, 288
 Zheng Chenggong (*see* Koxinga), 204
 Zheng-de reign, 170, 274
 Zheng He (Admiral), 11, 87, 104, 108–9, 111–2, 115–7, 121, 154, 270, 297
 Zheng Jing (Cheng Ching), 204
 Zhongzan (*see* Chizan), 219
 Zhou (Chou) dynasty, 75, 135
 Zhou Daguan (Chou Ta-Kuan), 57, 111, 141, 305
 Zhao Rugua, 152
 Zhoushan (Chusan), 204
 Zhuang minority, 298