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The Transformation of Peace

Oliver P. Richmond



The Transformation of Peace

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

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"Peace" ~ freedom from war, disturbance,
or dissension (entered the English Language
in XIIth Century): quiet, stillness,
concord (XIIIth Century); peacemaker (XV Century)[*]

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* *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Etymology*, Oxford: OUP, 1996.

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Abstract

This study examines the implicit conceptualisation and apparent transformation of the discourse of peace both as an ideal, unachievable or achievable form, or as a subjective concept. It does so from its early beginnings in the context of the literature on political theory and philosophy, to the literatures on conflict, war and power, and its association with democratisation, development, free-market reform, human rights, and civil society. This is compared and contrasted with the development of the methods of making peace, public discourses on peace, and international and civil society organisations focusing on disarmament and later on humanitarian issues. This culminates in the policy discourses associated with the institutionalisation of such practices and discourses in the context of the role of the UN and peacebuilding. In particular this study focuses on the intellectual and policy evolution that has led to the development of a contemporary discourse of a 'liberal peace', implicit in most contemporary peacemaking activities and humanitarian intervention, and which is increasingly the precursor of intervention for governance purposes based upon a peacebuilding consensus. This study concludes by examining the different graduations of the liberal peace. It points to the danger of assuming that the concept of peace always signifies an ideal form, and therefore of condoning what may well be a slide of the debates about peace into debates about war in which the liberal peace is seen to be virtuous, but in reality is highly interventionary and perhaps also virtual. Indeed, this book argues that it may well be that the liberal peace is becoming a form of war, and furthermore, that this is far from being a new phenomena.

Preface

Oliver Richmond is a man to watch. He is a specialist in peace and conflict studies with an interest in various forms of intervention. He has undertaken field research in diverse conflict areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, and the Balkans. But he has always had a theoretical bent and he is master of the conceptual literature. His great strength, as this volume testifies, is his ability to fuse empirical and conceptual work to make informed, thoughtful, and thought-provoking arguments.

This is a mature work that reflects, in both its conception and its execution, a mastery and ease with the literature. It is a work of argument, scholarship, and well-founded empirical work. Richmond starts with the philosophical and theoretical literature and then considers the corpus of the conflict oeuvre before getting to the matter at hand – the evolution of the liberal peace in all its several guises. Richmond has something important and original to say and he does not pull any punches.

In the last decade of the twentieth century some 56 civil wars came to an end. So what do we mean by the 'peace' that came into being at their end? Were the settlements that replaced war merely truces, ready to flare up again when the constraining power of a third party, or of a victor, is taken away? Do they in fact resolve the conflict, as the Franco-German conflict has been resolved? Is there now a new set of relationships agreed by all the parties in the full knowledge of all and acceptable to them according to their own interpretation of their interests and values, without any significant form of constraint – structural or manifest?

Gradually, Oliver Richmond envelops the reader in his argument. He asks us whether we are advocating a form of governance which, however benevolent, may 'engender unintended consequences.' He wonders if we are guilty of a form of 'orientalism' towards the parties to a conflict since, in our heart of hearts, we think we know better than they do. As Richmond remarks most pertinently, 'One must take note of who describes peace, and how, as well as who constructs it, and why.' We must indeed!

The approach which Richmond asks us to embrace is that from the bottom-up and he warns us against 'contested attempts to import

liberal democracy models *via* military intervention, and political, social, and economic institution-building and reconstruction.' He is concerned that the liberal peace may become only a bulwark against 'the worst excesses of the state of nature, or anarchy and hegemony implicit on the victor's peace.' This is fused with Enlightenment ideas and secular attempts to create an 'institutional peace, at the structural, international, domestic, and civil society level.' This is all well and good, but it does not go far enough. For example, outsiders do not ask the disputants what type of peace they might envisage. To do so would be to the benefit of all.

What this study gives us is an impressive and very useful mapping exercise on the liberal peace. It sets out with admirable clarity, the conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory tendencies in the liberal peace framework. Sub-groups are identified but most intriguing is the analysis of when each approach is likely to come to the fore. In short, this study enables us better to realise what we are doing (whether we like it or not). In particular, it points to relatively easy entrances, but sometimes very painful exits for international actors intent on building the liberal peace. And what is left behind? Too often it is weak states, acute political, economic, and social problems, often within a chaperoned state entity such as Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor.

There is much to be learned from this work and not least in contesting Oliver Richmond's analysis. But that would be to write a book and not a preface. This bids fair to be a landmark volume.

AJR Groom
University of Kent.

Introduction

> 'Peace may or may not be a 'modern invention' but it is certainly a far more complex affair than war.'[1]
>
> '…The savage wars of peace…'[2]
>
> 'War is peace.'[3]

Introduction

Peace, and its conditions, is commonly assumed to be well understood by all who make up what is often referred to the international community. An elaborate intellectual and policy framework has been constructed in order to preserve and protect that peace. Peace is often used as a concept to refer to what Plato would have described as an 'ideal form',[4] or to depict a condition in which there is an absence of overt violence particularly between or within states. War and peace have generally been studied together, but as separate concepts. It is well known that the first Chair in International Relations, founded at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, was intended to help elucidate the causes of war *and* the prerequisites for the attainment of peace. Indicative of the mainstream understanding of peace is the firm differentiation between peace and war. Oppenheim's classic study of international law, dating from the nineteenth century, divided international law into two main bodies associated separately with peace and with war.[5] This classic distinction has generally been maintained as a pivotal difference in the state of international relations representing significantly different discourses and conditions. The contemporary concept of the 'liberal peace',[6] a product of a long evolution in the concepts of peace and the methods used in its construction, also aspires to this distinction.

We all often profess to abhor war. Most policymakers, academics and officials have now accepted the problematisation of war that has taken place over the last few years, and have some understanding of orthodox debates about war, and about 'new wars'.[7] Between 1989 and 2000, approximately fifty-six civil wars came to an end.[8] Some thirty were still ongoing in 2003, which was significantly lower than the fifty or more raging in the mid 1990s.[9] Yet, what kind of peace has replaced, or will replace, these wars is a question rarely directly asked, though there has increasingly been a debate about how peacemaking, humanitarian intervention, peacebuilding and peace processes may or may not address the underlying root causes of conflict.[10]

Peace is rarely conceptualised, even by those who often allude to it. Not only has it rarely been addressed in detail as a concept, the theorisation of peace is normally hidden away in debates about responding to war and conflict. This is so even in the states, institutions, organisations, and agencies, whose officials and representatives often present peace as an ideal form worth striving to achieve, and which dominate the many discourses of IR in policy and in intellectual terms.[11] Making peace in the international system has mainly been conceptualised as Western activity derived from war, from grand peace conferences, and more recently, the sophisticated contemporary institutionalisation of key norms associated with the liberal peace.[12] Where theorists do attempt to engage with peace as a concept, they often focus upon units such as states and empire as its main building blocks, thus broadly discounting the role and agency of individuals and societies in its construction and sustainability.[13]

For many individuals and actors within the international community, peace is reasonably well described by its Christian interpreters: 'Peace is the tranquillity of order' according to Saint Augustine.[14] According to the Catholic Church, it is the result of justice, economic equality, and charity:

> Peace is not merely the absence of war; nor can it be reduced solely to the maintenance of a balance of power between enemies; nor is it brought about by dictatorship Instead, it is rightly and appropriately called an enterprise of justice. Peace results from that order structured into human society by its divine Founder, and actualised by men as they thirst after ever greater justice. The common good of humanity finds its ultimate meaning in the eternal law. But since the concrete demands of this common good are constantly changing as time goes on, peace is never attained once and for all, but must be built up

> ceaselessly. Moreover, since the human will is unsteady and wounded by sin, the achievement of peace requires a constant mastering of passions and the vigilance of lawful authority.[15]

This does not exclude lawful self-defence, meaning just war, once all peace efforts have failed.[16]

Some commentators argue that peace requires the identification of a 'great illusion' – that profits cannot be gained from war. Others think that it is an unobtainable ideal, while others think that the 'conditions of peace' can be discovered and established. Many would perhaps agree with the assertion that '… the logic of strategy pervades the upkeep of peace as much as the making of war…' and perhaps would also not notice that much of the academic and policy literatures and discourses focused on war rather than peace.[17] Indeed, according to this view, war has the virtue that it prevents its own continuation by exhausting participants and resources, thus being the 'origin of peace'[18] War has a 'natural course', and the practices of the 'international community' relating to peace often block this course[19] In this mode of thought, there can be identified much that is familiar about war, often obscuring any serious discussion of the concept of peace.

Though there are many different terms for war in the English language, peace remains a sole denominator, though it is subject to multiple interpretations.[20] Though peace research, conflict studies, and IR are converging, only peace research really entails a specific conception of peace as being either negative or positive in character as a focus for its research and normative agendas (though the bulk of peace research tends to highlight structural aspects of conflict, rather then peace, to be the key area of concern). Conflict studies imply a range of understandings, from merely an absence of overt violence to an emancipatory version of peace. This convergence implies a direct link between thinking about peace, governance, and the establishment of the 'liberal peace',[21] which may well be liberal but is also contested.

This indicates that there is rather more to the debates about peace. These debates have occurred, but they have been hidden away behind other denominations. The orthodox assumption underlying the intellectual engagement with the problem of peace is that first the eradication or management of war must be achieved before the institutions of peace can operate, at a global, regional, state, and local level. Consequently, peace has, in Western political thought in particular, been enshrined in a notion of a utopian international community and has largely not been a primary priority in international thought. Where

the concept of peace is engaged with, militarisation or force has normally been a key mechanism for its attainment and its subjective characterisation has been imbued with a hegemonic understanding of universal norms.

Much of the debate about war is also indicative of our assumptions about peace and what it 'should' be. This has several dimensions. It has the pragmatic strand of removing overt violence. It also has an ethical strand of what should be. There is also an ideological strand associated with the political structures of peace. Furthermore, there has been a clear evolution of approaches to creating peace, which has culminated in the debates about 'resolving' war and conflict – in other words finding self-sustaining solutions, perhaps even while violence is taking place. These strands of thinking about peace can also be found in one of the rare attempts to conceptualise peace by Anatol Rapoport, who outlined 'peace through strength'; 'balance of power'; 'collective security'; 'peace through law'; 'personal or religious pacifism'; and 'revolutionary pacifism'.[22] Famously, Hedley Bull saw peace as the absence of war among states in the context of an international society,[23] subordinated to the self-preservation of the state system and individual states.

Increasingly, debates about war and peace and the way they are expressed have begun to mirror Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.[24] This has occurred in a functional manner in that the notion of the spread of democracy as a standard form of conflict-avoiding polity has been universalised as a strategy for ending war by the liberal hegemony of the world's most powerful states and their organisations, institutions and agencies. This in essence is a form of global governance, if not government, and while it may be perceived as benevolent, it may also engender unintended consequences.

One of the problems that soon becomes apparent in any discussion of peace is the concept's tendency to slip into either a universal and/or idealistic form, or to collapse under the weight of its own ontological subjectivity and ceases to become useful at all. For this reason, this study does not offer an historical narrative of peace, but instead attempts to construct a genealogy that illustrates its contested nature in the context of its key discourses. This study does not offer any insights into the implications of the various world religions on peace, nor of the debates outside of the west, instead focusing on the academic and policy discourses on the concept derived from within what is known as the liberal international community. By way of defence for these omissions it is clear that these serious limitations

cannot be excused in any other way other than to argue that the main goal of this study is to point to the deficiencies and oddities of the Western, secular discourses and practices associated with peace, and while noting that non-secular and non-Western discourses of peace are clearly important, they would have to be the topic of several other volumes of study to do them justice.

Despite these problems with the concept of peace, it is generally assumed by most theorists, most policymakers, and practitioners, that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus created. Indeed, the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is generally thought that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. This book sets out to evaluate this implicit claim, to refute this broad argument, and to establish a set of insights about what it would mean for IR if peace was conceptualised as thoroughly as war, for example. It is particularly important to examine the concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and ideological framework. Said investigated a similar point in his seminal text 'Orientalism' in which he argued that Western conceptions of the other (in this case specifically of the East) underlined the Western habit of absolutism in the creation of negative perceptions of the other.[25] The implication was that imperialism had had effectively unforeseen continuities in what was supposed to be a post-imperial world. In the following discussion of peace, there is also a similar point to be made, both in intellectual terms and also in terms of the practices deployed to create 'peace'. Indeed, in deploying Said's humanism for a study of peace, similar insights arise relating to the dangers of assuming that peace is a Platonic ideal form. Yet this ideal form has been subject to the kind of 'print capitalism' outlined by Benedict Anderson in the context of nationalism.[26]

One area of consensus appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and referred to in way that nearly always disguises the fact that that it is actually essentially contested. This is often an act of hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom, as a desire to do or achieve something positive in the eyes of its agents. Indeed, it may well be that many assertions about peace are actually a form of 'orientalism' in that they depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, either through their acts or through the peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. This entails an enlightened and rational actor being able to define what peace should be for others, and

how it can be achieved. This implies that actors involved in conflict are somehow inferior, deluded, or obsessed by violence, identity claims, power, territory or resources. In its extreme forms, this mode of thought provides interveners with legitimacy for their actions as long as they are directed towards the creation of a peace that is related to the interests of those caught up in violence. Conflict is not seen as a structural indicator, but as a dysfunctional form of behaviour that can be modified if the correct political, economic, social, and development approaches are adopted.

Conceptualising peace

The discourses and concepts of peace lack a research agenda that might clarify the contestation of the concept of peace. Instead, where there should be research agendas there are silences and assumptions. Contemporary approaches to creating peace, from first generation conflict management approaches to third generation peacebuilding approaches, rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may actually create, or question the conceptualisation inherent in their deployment.[27] Conflict zones are represented as *terra incognita* upon which one can superimpose such activities without fear that the outcome, even if successful, may not actually resemble the vague ideal form of peace which is so often generally assumed to be their aim.

Foucault's notion of a discourse helps to illuminate this darkness, because it indicates how multiple debates do exist though rarely openly acknowledged.[28] This is not a framework for analysis but it does provide a capacity to see theory as intertwined with practice, of equal significance, and inherently more decisive than a more traditional positivist theoretical/empirical divide would suggest.[29] It allows a basic foundation for the multiple and competing versions of peace to be both identified and analysed. In other words, using a discourse framework enables this study to examine competing concepts and discourses of peace, as opposed to accepting as unproblematic the orthodoxy that involves starting with a conception of peace as an ideal form and then exporting it though the forms of intervention inherent peacebuilding approaches into conflict environments. Rather than constructing peace in this fashion, it is first necessary to deconstruct it. Peace does not exist outside of thought, interest and resultant policymaking, but is actually a result of them. Imagining peace, and elucidating the resultant discourses through theory and in our dealings in conflict zones, has become a powerful, perhaps even radical, process of reform and

change. Western political thought and policy has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal frameworks, by which conflict in the world is judged. But there is not necessarily a clear agreement about why this has happened, and with what result. In the context of this latter question Gramsci's concept of hegemony is useful, though perhaps more so in its post-Gramscian context of plural 'hegemonies' than in its classical sense of the hegemonies of a single state in a confederation over others.[30] In this context, peace can be seen as a result of multiple hegemonies in IR colluding over the discourses, of, and creation of, peace. Consequently, 'peace' has no inherent meaning,[31] but must be qualified as a specific type among many. One must take note of who describes peace, and how, as well as who constructs it, and why.

Key contributions to this debate

Debates about peace tend to be unsophisticated, often revolving around a simplistic – realist – idealist axis – either there can be no peace, that peace is merely the absence of open violence but not of threat, or a utopian version of peace, perhaps to be arrived at by pacificism.[32] To date there have only been a few notable contemporary monographs published in IR, that have specifically focused on 'peace' rather than on the more common focus on war or order in which peace lurks in the background normally as a liberal assumption or an ideal form.

One of the key early studies on this topic in the twentieth century was A.C.F. Beales' *The History of Peace: A Short Account of the Organised Movements for International Peace* (1931). This was an important volume because it foreshadowed the manner in which peace had been written and thought about since. According to Beales, any study of peace becomes a history of international relations[33] and thus follows what is now a familiar course of examining the philosophical roots of peace, the evolution of 'schemes' for world peace, the emergence of peace societies and movements from the nineteenth century, and finally the Concert of Europe and WWI and after. Even at this time, Beales was aware of the negative connotations to be found in the study of peace, including 'cranks', pacificism and 'peace propaganda'.[34] He concluded that 'international man' (a precursor of 'cosmopolitianism') and world peace depended upon enlightened self-interest and interdependence, perhaps configured into a 'world federation' in which checks and balances controlled the tendencies that disrupted world peace.[35] This is

a very familiar path. Quincy Wright's, *The Study of War* (1942) focused on the problem of war but also made an important contribution on the question of peace from an internationalist perspective. He argued that peace lay in equilibrium, and that efforts were commonly made to objectify peace according to religion, law, arbitration, or disarmament, or international organisation. He also argued that '…the positive idea of peace [was often regarded as] dangerous, and warned against isolationism, neutrality and pacifism as a negative version of peace.[36]

An ambitious reading of peace was provided in David Mitrany's *Working Peace System*, which became a seminal text in the discussion of how peace might be achieved by focusing on the creation of functional institutions to develop an assurance of peace between states as well as '…social equality through the working of international services.'[37] This strand of thought has become important in the creation of an underlying discourse of 'peace through prosperity'. This was a forerunner of the popular binary framework of a negative/positive peace,[38] but it mainly focused on the methods for achieving this 'peace system' rather than the resultant peace. Galtung's notable argument that a positive peace existed when structural violence was removed, and until that point a negative peace would probably prevail has provided both the basis for peace research as an area of study, and has also been heavily criticised for bringing in too many 'variables' into the equation of making peace.[39] E.H. Carr's *Twenty Years Crisis*, which criticised 'utopian' approaches to peace and security, has for many years provided a powerful counterweight to such arguments.[40] *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* by F.H. Hinsley, published in 1963, examined early contributions to this debate from within political theory and political philosophy. Raymond Aron's *War and Peace*, published in 1966, presented a conceptualisation of three types of peace, ranging from equilibrium, hegemony, and empire, and provided a critique of what he described as the 'peace by terror' which dominated the Cold War environment he was writing in.[41] *Thinking about Peace and War* by Martin Ceadal, published more recently in 1987, offered a typology of thinking about war and peace associated with militarism, crusading, defencism, pacificism, and pacifism. Indeed, Ceadal illustrated how these approaches emphasised the close relationship between war and peace: militarism is associated with both war and a victor's peace; crusading with the expansion of a specific version of peace through war; defencism maintains that aggression can be met with force; pacificism, that war can be abolished but accepts the need for military force to defend against aggression; and pacifism, that war is always unacceptable.[42] Of

course there have been many other texts from the fields of IR theory, conflict management and resolution, and peace research, as well as an enormous literature on 'democratic peace theory' but they tend also to focus on the problems that impede the attainment of peace rather than on developing a sustained conception of how peace might be understood. Most of the key texts on peace assume a certain form of peace is universal and that war is an abnormal condition that interrupts the attempt to attain peace.

There have been several publications since the end of the Cold War that have made a further contribution to what is essentially am embroyonic debate. Ian Clark's study, *The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace* (2001), problematised the contemporary notion of peace, but tended to focus on its systemic qualities and implications, and mainly as a by-product of war. According to Clark, the liberal peace is multilateral, increasingly propagated by Western practices of humanitarian intervention, by globalisation, is both regulative and distribution, and is associated with the use of force, human rights regulation and democratisation. This is a result of the 'liberal moment' after the end of the Cold War.[43] Similarly, Ikenberry's *After Victory* (2001) examined the implications of post-war orders and 'peace settlements' for states and institutions. Indeed, Ikenberry makes a now well-known argument that understanding order benefits from an examination of the peace settlements that emerge directly after the end of a war.[44] Michael Howard's book, *The Invention of Peace and the Re-Invention of War* (2002) also presented a critique of the contemporary notion of peace in a similar vein, indicating that peace is a liberal invention rather than an indigenous quality. Michael Mandelbaum's book, *The Ideas that Conquered the World* (2002) was another notable contribution, though critical of a tendency towards a blind faith in the liberal universal project, generally supportive of its ultimate goals. As a counterweight to the liberal triumphalism inherent in Mandelbaum's study, perhaps one of the most insightful and critical contributions to this genre was Williams' study, *Failed Imagination: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century* (1998). This study documents how even the 'lofty ideals' of peace in the twentieth century rapidly became distorted under the weight of self-interest, limited resources, and a lack of will. All of these texts follow a similar path, opened up by Beales' earlier contribution, in which peace is a liberal ideal made possible by correct forms of governance and institutionalisation, and are a product of the practices and discourses of the post-Enlightenment development of the international community.

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen's study entitled *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace* is one of the most concerted recent attempts to directly open up the construction of peace as a research agenda.[45] He follows a familiar pattern as in the studies above in that he examines the major peace settlements after the wars of the twentieth century, as well as the roles of international organisation, and also discussed the implications of IR theory. Where he makes his most important contribution, however, is his introduction of an epistemological and ontological dimension to this debate. This is lacking in much of what has gone before, and opens up the possibility that peace is experienced and thought about in multiple and fluctuating ways, and therefore should not be subject to a totalising conceptualisation.

Of the more radical recent contributions, Mark Duffield has perhaps taken one of the most significant and critical steps. He has developed a sustained critique of the liberal conceptualisation of peace, specifically in the context of governance and the so-called new wars in his study *Global Governance and the New Wars*.[46] Duffield argues that liberal systems of global governance have emerged in response to the nature of contemporary conflict. More specifically, a radical development discourse has been developed as a response to conflict utilising multiple actors in the construction of the liberal peace:

> The aim of liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities.[47]

The contemporary mantras of human rights, democratisation, and human security, forming the cornerstones of the liberal peace, can also easily be subjected to this type of interpretation.

Despite the efforts outlined above, peace as a concept and political framework remains to be extensively catalogued, conceptualised, and theorised, especially within the context of the evolution of debates in IR. Perhaps this omission is telling in a discipline that has spent decades now rectifying 'oversights' relating to gender, the environment, development, poverty, normativity and so forth. Many of these attempts to conceptualise peace, directly or indirectly, infer that peace itself is more often a hegemonic and violent undertaking rather than an idealised and stylised order, which should be aspired to but which might never reflect the reality of international relations.

There was a huge body of literature technically outside of IR touching on the issue of peace published during and after the two World

Wars of the twentieth century. This literature was published by a broad range of academics, commentators, economists, politicians and policy-makers in official and non-official guises. Some of the best known include Angell's, *The Great Illusion* (which was published before WWI and attacked what he argued was a flawed and populist link between war and economic gain), Nicolson's *Peacemaking 1919* (which provided an insider's wry account of the events at Versailles in 1919), and Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (which heavily criticised the financial arrangements which were to underpin the new peace after Versailles, and which were to be blamed for its collapse). Added to the many volumes such as these published during these years was the work of informal committees such as Chatham House's, Dulles 'Commission to Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace', and the Council for Foreign Affairs. The British International Committee, derived from a small group of scholars known now as the English School, provided an umbrella for debate about international order and made an important contribution to these debates.[48]

Such debates and the discourses and practices they described have been instrumental in what has become perhaps the most sophisticated debate about peace in contemporary times, and which has now entered seemingly irrevocably into the consciousness of policymakers, and academics. The various formulations of liberal-internationalist and liberal-institutionalist debates about governance, which have emerged at different points of the realist-idealist axis, describe an evolution of agreed regimes moderating the relationship of states in an international society.[49] These debates, which eventually culminated in at the notion of the liberal peace, assume that while the nature of war may be contested, the nature of peace is not. These assumptions that the conceptualisation of peace is uncomplicated and uncontested are rarely challenged. For example, one could argue, controversially perhaps, that war and peace may have a great deal in common than might generally be thought. Indeed, war and peace are, in non-idealist formulations, almost indistinguishable and in recent history, this has become more, rather than less, apparent. There has always been a close relationship between the two concepts of peace and war, and more specifically between peace and intervention. This can be traced back throughout history, but specifically relevant to contemporary IR are two main waves of intervention by European states. The first was in the name of Christianity during the Crusades during the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, and during the conquest of the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The second wave can be found in nineteenth and

twentieth century imperialism, which was, of course, conducted in the name of European civilisation.[50] This tension continues to be reflected in contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention. One only has to examine the ideological formulations of the twentieth century to see how violent peace and its attainment might be. War has always been used to establish or expand a specific version or conceptualisation of peace, a peace that is just in the eyes of defenders or aggressors, as the 1990 Gulf War over Kuwait's sovereignty or the Crusades over the possession of the Holy Land might illustrate. Defining and constructing peace has therefore always been a self-interested endeavour, even for idealists. Violence deployed to attain a specific version of peace may or may not be relatively less than the violence that would occur if an intervention did not take place (as with the argument commonly made over the use of atomic weapons against Japan at the end of World War II).

When Kofi Annan became Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) in 1997, he argued that what was needed for the UN was to change its focus from one of *reacting* to conflict as its approach to maintaining peace and security as laid out in the organisations Charter, to one of preventing conflict.[51] This drew on seminal liberal documents such as Agenda for Peace, which laid out the need for 'preventive diplomacy'[52] among many other strategies, and also the *Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence*.[53] The more recent *High Level Panel Report* is a consequence of such intentions, as is the report on the *Responsibility to Protect*.[54] Such approaches to conflict imply that there is a prior understanding of what constitutes peace that needs to be defended as well as constructed where it is not present. Thus, conflict prevention is, ironically, a much more aggressive approach to the preservation and creation of that pre-existing peace. The implicit conceptualisation in these terms of peace is that any event, structure, or dynamic that occurs in the international system that does not conform to this prior notion can therefore be addressed by a reaction of the UN or other liberal organisations and states.

One logical step further, into the genre of conflict prevention, indicates that an anticipated threat to peace both requires and justifies a liberal organisation or state response. The identification of threats, such as terrorism, human rights abuses, threats to human security and to the ethnic, therefore becomes key to the elucidation and creation of a specific version of peace. But what actually is being threatened? Certainly, the liberal peace, generally defined, has become the foil by

which threats are identified, but this is also irrevocably linked to the territorially sovereign state as an umbrella for political community. Thus, as Annan argues, what is now possible are two-fold responses, to crises which threaten a normatively valued liberal peace, and to structures which engender conflict over the resources of sovereign states. This requirement for more coherent and efficient responses to conflict even before it threatens the liberal peace and the sovereignty of states also requires a coherent conceptualisation of peace, if it is to be achieved. Problematic too at a conceptual level is that the norms of personal sovereignty inherent in the notion that individuals have a right to a protection of basic human needs (or human security as more fashionable terminology might have it)[55] may also abrade the positivist frameworks integral to the Westphalian sovereign state.

It is even more apparent today that war is a tool of a shifting conceptualisation of peace, inextricably linked to its creation and expansion, and used to achieve a version of peace acceptable to the hegemonic few, or to the many, as was well illustrated by the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and US and UK involvement in Iraq in 2003–4. Concepts of peace may also be used as a tool of war, used to justify, legitimate, and motivate a recourse to war, as is apparent in the contemporary war against terrorism, and as was seen in the US military action in Afghanistan in 2001–2. The consolidation of a specific version of peace might also be said to have been a motivating factor in the use of atomic weapons that ended the war in the Pacific in 1945. As the recent Cold War and post-Cold War environments have illustrated, versions of peace and types of war coexist at the different levels of the international system. They have a close and intricate relationship in which both provide agency for the ending or establishment of certain structures. Types of war may provide the impetus for types of peace: versions of peace may provide the impetus for violence. The most significant question that arises from this argument is whether the factors that distinguish war from peace need to be preserved and accentuated, or whether peace and war can plausibly exist as a hybrid of each other. US presidents Jefferson, Franklin and Roosevelt were all aware that the attainment of peace normally involved a willingness to contemplate a recourse to war.[56] There seems to have been a shift from efforts to establish and preserve clear distinctions between peace and war that characterise the Westphalian period of the international state system in particular, to an acceptance that the two can also essentially be ambiguous hybrids. This would seem to be characteristic of the medieval Crusades, or of humanitarian war, and of the war against

terrorism that have marked the post-Cold War world. There are enormous implications, if this is the case, for the practice and study of IR. Might the hybridisation of peace and war herald a new 'state of nature' or a long-term struggle against kakistocracy and violence that has as its end the eradication of most, if not all, forms of violence and leading to peace as an ideal form or a subjective ontology?

Within the various discourses and practices related to the ending of conflict there is a clear impulse towards the resolution of war rather than merely its containment. This implies a long term and sustainable end to a conflict. There appears to be a developing consensus amongst academics, policymakers, liberal states, institutional, and NGO actors alike, that if this is to be achieved, certain forms of governance need to be instituted in conflict zones through interventions at multiple levels of analysis and in multidimensional issue areas. War and conflict, as it has been constructed by liberal states, now provides the international community, where interest dictates, with the opportunity to achieve exactly this. Indeed, this is not a particularly new phenomena as the Westphalian notion of non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign states implies.

It must also be noted that the widely used term 'international community' also indicates a key assumption of the contemporary debates on peace and war, implying that there exists a body of actors with sufficient consensus and will to be able to bring about peace in conflict zones – according to how this community conceptualises peace, of course.[57] One of the recurring refrains of this study is how difficult it is to sustain a clear differentiation between war and peace both as states of being, and of methods of political change. The impulse to dabble in the humanitarian, to resolve war, now legitimates long-standing and deep interventions in conflict zones, as can be seen in Bosnia and Kosovo since the interventions of the 1990s. Indeed, the hybrid notion of the liberal peace is now implicit within cosmopolitan and constructivist accounts of IR, which essentially functions on the basis of universalism and the subsequent legitimation of intervention in the social and political lives and structures of others.

These issues are addressed in following chapters in the context of intellectual and policy debates about war, peace, order, conflict management, resolution[58] and peacebuilding,[59] and their more recent application to conflicts, 'new wars' and humanitarian crises. This requires a focus both on what the identification of violence and resolution of war means for the creation or installation of peace, and on the broader intellectual and policy implications of such associated notions

of peace. There has been an increasing convergence of such debates as is illustrated to some degree in the evolution of peace interventions from Cambodia in the early 1990s to the more recent peace operation in East Timor.[60] Furthermore, this evolution has occurred in the context of the privatisation or subcontracting of many these tasks to the humanitarian community. Indeed this community often takes on roles that would not otherwise be fulfilled.[61] This is also linked to debates about the normative basis of humanitarian intervention,[62] an alliance of development with other facets of peace interventions, human rights, and rights or needs based approaches to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Surrounding these developments there continues to lurk the question of consent, and problem of the effectiveness of these multidimensional interventions in the context of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.[63] The desire to enhance such approaches' effectiveness, partly as a result of the globalisation of a particular, liberal version of peace associated with certain forms of governance, and a desire for its reaffirmation, has led to both a resolution approach to peace, as well as its subcontracting and privatisation. This is the terrain in which peace processes have increasingly come to be seen as opportunities to establish new forms of governance. Around this construction of the liberal peace, there has formed an epistemic community focused upon the activities that are required to construct the forms and institutions of governance now viewed as a sustainable basis for the ending of conflict.[64] Here, power and knowledge in terms of resources and expertise have been quietly amassed in the hands of this community in order to export the liberal peace.

Defining peace

As with many conceptual debates a tyranny of multiple terminologies about the notion of peace abound, most of them assuming peace to be an ideal form, possibly achievable, but nevertheless to be aspired to, to be universal, and so apparent as not to require serious debate. However, not only is it important to understand the roots and conditions of conflict and peace, but it is also important to start with an understanding of the essentially political, and therefore subjective, nature of the act and project of defining conflict and peace. As with the definition of terrorism for example, there is the problem of what peace is, and why, who creates and promotes it, and who peace is for. This also requires an identification of what constitutes conflict, violence and war, which then raises the question of who defines what

constitutes conflict? At what level of conflict does the intervention of states, international organisations, or NGOs occur? When are conditions sufficiently conflictual to spark multiple interventions, and what are such interventions aiming to achieve? The following chart indicates two possible ways of exploring the conceptualisation of peace, revolving around the subjective/objective distinction that has become an integral part of ontological debates in IR, conflict, and social theory.

Objective questions suggesting universal answers.	*Subjective questions suggesting negotiated and multiple answers.*
1. What is conflict?	1. What are the multiple roots of conflict, and who defines them, and for what objective?
2. What are the roots of conflict?	2. What are the discourses or concepts of peace?
3. What is the nature of peace?	3. Who defines peace?
4. How attainable is peace?	4. What are the inherent political, socail, and economic interests in the construction of peace?
5. How can peace be installed or constructed?	5. Who is the peace for?
6. How efficient are the methods used to achieve peace?	6. At what point in conflict, and on what basis should the intervention of states, international organisations, or NGOs occur?
7. When does conflict necessitate external intervention to create peace?	7. What type of justice, political, social, and economic system might peace be equated with in a particular case?
8. How can one create a peace equating with justice, democracy, human rights, and marketisation?	

Figure I.1 Some questions about peace

As the above questions show, the simplicity of the objective list of questions about peace raises some serious problems, as does the complexity of the subjective list of questions. However, the age-old myth that peace exists as an existential condition, neither temporal nor spatial, needs little thought before it is discredited. Peace always has a time and a place, as well as representatives and protagonists in diplomatic, military, or civilian guise, and exists in multiple forms in overlapping spaces of influence. It should never be assumed to be monolithic and universal in that the ontology and methodology of peace vary according to cultural, social, economic, and political conditions. Nor should it be seen as necessarily totalising if it does become universal, though one should always be wary of this possibility. Yet, almost inevitably thinking on peace has also followed the Platonic notion of an 'ideal form', which is partly why the concept is so often imbued with such mystical legitimacy.

In the light of the above, this study seeks to illuminate and explore the main concepts of peace and their usages through an examination

of relevant literatures and policy discourses. Furthermore, it seeks to chart the ontological, epistemological, and normative aspects of these debates. This leads to an examination of the nature of the now dominant concept of peace – the liberal peace – which has rarely received any sustained investigation. Perhaps what is more important is the attempt to open up a research agenda on the various forms of peace, to negate its constant use as an ideal form, to give room for the voices of dissent about its dominant models to be heard, and to investigate the potential for alternative or co-existing forms. While the latter is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that such spaces need to be opened up for future research. Finally, this study offers an assessment of the contemporary policy and academic discourses of peace, and their implications, because to even uncover assumptions is to become sensitised to them. This may produce more opportunities for the negotiation and renegotiation of sustainable forms of peace.

Outline of the book

Part I of the book examines the development of the debates and practices of explicit and implicit debates on peace from a theoretical and philosophical perspective. Chapters I and II examine the antecedents of contemporary debates and practices relating to the main strands of thinking on peace, and outlines the key areas covered in this study that illustrate how and why peace is an essentially contested concept, both in theory and practice. They indicate what the key competing debates in theory and practice are about peace and examines how these discourses have developed, both in the discipline of IR and beyond. Chapter III investigates the contribution of debates in peace and conflict studies to the explicit and implicit conceptualisations of peace. It shows how this contribution fits into the strands of thinking on peace that emerged from the previous two chapters. It illustrates how and why the development of the main approaches to ending conflict may create and recreate a particular international order associated with the dominant conceptualisation of peace.

Part II of the book turns to an examination of the liberal peace and its components in the context of a variety of post-Cold War peace operations and associated peacebuilding projects. Chapter IV examines the development of bottom-up approaches to the construction of the liberal peace, and human security as an ideology to

empower peace *via* grassroots. In this guise peace may become a form of 'biopower' as described by Michel Foucault, which involves interveners in conflicts taking on the role of 'administering life'. This requires the importation of expert knowledge into conflict zones, both on the many tasks associated with humanitarianism and security, and to establish 'governmentality' in which control is taken over most political, social, economic, and identity functions of groups involved in conflict and in the construction of peace. Both the community and the self are governed in order to allow external actors to create peace.[65] These practices and discourses have rapidly become a normalised part of our understanding of the liberal peace.[66] Chapter V examines how key top-down responses to conflict are also conditioned by these processes. This is the dominant approach to the construction of peace, through UN peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and more recently initiated by more or less unilateral uses of force. But what does this form of peace entail? It is assumed that UN peace operations contribute to the construction of a liberal international order made up of democratic states. This is conceptualised through a problem-solving model that initially aimed to stabilise existing order, and more recently has endeavoured to enhance it within a liberal international society. In practice this has proven to be highly ambitious, often resulting in a 'virtual peace' based upon contested attempts to import liberal democratic models *via* military intervention, and political, social, and economic institution building and reconstruction.

Part III of the study examines the different concepts of peace in common usage, their ontology and methodology, and the implications of such usages. Chapter VI lays out nine main concepts of peace ranging from the spatial and temporal approaches, to peace as an opposition to threats, a victor's peace, and inside-out peace or and outside-in peace, a peace dependent upon a specific political, social, economic, cultural or identity logic or framework, the latest hybrid permutation – a liberal peace – which is constructed through a peacebuilding consensus on the nature of governance required for a self-sustaining peace, a virtual peace, and finally a reflexive version of peace associated with different emancipatory discourses. These conceptualisations sketch out an important research agenda.

The conclusion examines the problem of the different conceptualisations of peace, specifically the virtual qualities of the liberal peace, problems with the peacebuilding consensus, and the notion of peace-

as-governance. It argues that there are different graduations of the liberal peace, reflecting a 'virtuous' hybrid of the age-old victor's peace, the Enlightenment work on constitutional peace, and the twentieth century attempt at an institutional peace at the structural and civil society level. In addition, the notion of a civil peace has made an important contribution. This is, however, qualified by the fact that often policymakers and electorates are satisfied by a virtual peace if they believe it is virtuous despite the fact that the actors peace has been visited upon may not agree themselves. This seems to undermine many assumptions common to the study of war, violence, conflict, and subsequent responses, derived from the separation of peace and war as distinct conditions and conceptualisations. The focus on war, force and power, reinforced by rationalism and legal positivism, may actually revive or justify the use of force or violence, and obstruct all but a nascent debate on the concepts of peace. This is a radical position, but one which requires serious and sustained contemplation by drawing on a broad and interdisciplinary literature, and on a wide range of issues in order to examine the claim that liberal peace entails a viable project incorporating the simultaneous pursuit of sovereignty, self-determination, democracy, development, and human rights within a global cartography in which territorial states vie for limited resources.[67] This is the emancipatory claim of the new peace – the liberal peace. This is perhaps not very new in its philosophical and normative dimensions, but the processes, mechanisms, and institutions that have grown up around it are without precedent though they clearly lack a developed capacity for reflexivity, conditioned as they are by reactivity. Cox's famous insight into IR theory might just as easily be applied to peace: if theory can be problem-solving or emancipatory, and is always laden with agendas related to actors' interests and objectives,[68] then so can peace. It may well be that the orthodox theoretical and policy literature's assumption of an apparent conceptual journey from negative to positive versions of peace ultimately arriving at a liberal conceptualisation of peace, has been marked by much back-sliding. The main contemporary versions of a liberal and therefore virtuous peace may still be characterised by hegemony and victors, be still bounded, conditional, temporal, spatial, and therefore virtual.

Part I
Approaches to Peace

1
Towards the Liberal Peace

> 'They make a desert and call it peace'[1]
>
> 'For every state war is incessant and lifelong against every other state… For what most men call 'peace', this is really only a name – in truth, all states by their very nature are always engaged in an informal war against all other states'[2]
>
> 'the nature of War consisteth not in actual fighting: but in the known predisposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.
>
> All other time is Peace.'[3]

Introduction

This chapter outlines the evolution of the traditional debates on peace in disciplines commonly drawn upon in this context, until World War II. It indicates what the key competing debates in theory and practice are about peace and how these discourses have developed, both in the discipline of IR and beyond. This chapter follows the traditional course of the development of these debates in the context of related literatures on political theory and philosophy, on international history and institution building, in order to set the scene for the following examination of the liberal peace.

Debates about peace span both classical literatures and the literatures of the contemporary world. Generally, they have followed a similar pattern, from the realism of Thucydides, Augustine, Hobbes and Schmitt in which one version of peace is to be found in a balance of strategic thought and practices between groups (and possibly in an unobtainable utopian form), the idealist, liberal, and liberal interventionist projects to construct international regimes, laws, and norms to

limit war and engineer peace, the Marxist orthodoxy relating to economic exploitation and revolutionary change, the contemporary realists and pragmatists like Waltz and Kissinger and the limited nature of peace, to the postmodernism of Foucault and his disciples indicating to ambiguousness of conditions of peace and war. They have spanned the extremes of war as natural, as pragmatic, or as evil, to peace as idealist and utopian, as engineered, to be attained through pacifism or pacificism, or as an attainable, though limited outcome.

What underpins much of the thinking and conceptualisation on and about peace is the Platonic 'ideal form'. In Plato's Republic, Socrates argued that truth is found in an ideal form, associated with 'goodness' rather than in perceptions. In other words, there is an objective reality of peace.[4] It is this type of thinking which the concept, or use of the word, peace is often imbued with, meaning that whatever is explicitly meant by its use in any particular concept holds extraordinary legitimacy. As this chapter shows, this notion of peace as an objective ideal form, regardless of whether it is being used as a victor's hegemonic peace, or an institutional, constitutional, or civil peace, forms the basis for most uses of the concept. Indeed, the most ambitious peace project of them all – the liberal peace – aspires to become an ideal form. However, there are divisions about whether this ideal form is practical or is ultimately unobtainable. As later chapters show, the liberal peace claims to be an ideal form while also accepting its own disguised subjectivity.

There has been much theorising of the international system or international society (in terms of realism versus liberalism), and of war, just-war, new wars and so forth, but very little on the question of pacificism.[5] There has been still less has there been on the question and concepts related to peace. Yet, as this chapter illustrates, the implicit conceptualisation of peace that has occurred in political philosophy, political and IR theory, betrays key assumptions about the constitution of peace, and most recently this has transformed into a debate about the liberal peace.

Antecedents of the liberal peace

A close reading of *Leviathan* or *The City of God* indicates important nuances, which have become more apparent in the context of the development of contemporary understandings and uses of peace.[6] In both texts it becomes apparent that though peace and war as alluded to as significantly different conditions, there are very small and often

indistinct margins between either concept. It could be argued that most importantly one's definition of one's current state as being in peace or war depends very much on one's subjective definition and the way in which society or socio-political grouping defines their status. In an Augustinian sense, for example, war was seen as part of the fallen condition of man but could also be legitimately fought against the enemies of Christendom. War within Christendom was sinful, and so should be limited in terms of its conduct.[7] The 'city of god' would therefore be a Christian empire of peace, but bounded by its own extent and reach. In other words, there is a great deal of ambiguity that can be explored here, even in the earliest literatures. Of course, there are less ambiguous arguments to be found in the early literature, such as in the growing belief that injustice and deprivation are important stimuli for war. *Leviathan*, is of course, one of the most influential early texts on war and therefore peace in the international system. Hobbes' argument revolved around the combating of the state of nature by constructing and reinforcing hegemony for a sovereign actor.[8] By implication, peace here rested upon the interests and capacities of the Leviathan rather than on civil consensus and legitimacy. Another famous pronouncement on war and peace can be found in Hegel's work. He argued that war maintained the ethical health of the nation and '…prevents a corruption of nations which a perpetual peace would produce.'[9] Yet, Hegel was also able to argue that generally individuals were concerned with the well-being of others. The version of peace that emerges from these texts is bounded, juxtaposed to more and less ideal situations, spatial, and temporally limited. It is often a victor's peace, albeit inspired by 'higher' ideals and norms. A peace based upon war is a familiar refrain.[10]

Kant provides us with perhaps the most comprehensive representation of the developing understanding of the liberal peace and how it should be constituted in the modern European states-system. This has been described as part of a cosmopolitan ethic dating back to Diogenes the Cynic, and the Stoics.[11] This found its contemporary character initially in the thought of Kant and the 'Peace Project' associated with the Enlightenment.[12] The *Project for Perpetual Peace* of the Abbe de St-Pierre (1713),[13] the start of a formal Enlightenment genre of peace projects, spurred Kant (as well as Rousseau, Bentham, Penn, and others) to develop these ideas further. Saint-Pierre's peace plan was essentially a European treaty for a federation of states, in which law would be founded upon justice, equality, and reciprocity. Saint-Pierre called for the Christian (and also Muslim) sovereigns of Europe to form

a permanent union for peace and security. This organisation would not intervene in the affairs of member states but would have intelligence and self-defence capacities and may even send in troops to preserve peace.[14] Penn also argued for a similar approach, including a form of European parliament, in order to achieve 'peace with justice'.[15] In 'An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe', Penn felt it necessary to argue for the desirability of peace before outlining its qualities, and the mechanisms it would require in the context of Europe! He argued that a parliamentary form of peace would not undermine the sovereignty of princes, nor would the absence of war lead to unemployment of to a lack of profit. Peace would prevent bloodshed, save the reputation of Christianity 'in the sight of infidels', save money, preserve cities and towns, allow movement, and create friendship.[16] Even in this early text, peace is being envisaged as link to a particular mode of governance.

In turn Kant continued these themes. Kant intended to develop an account of the social and moral world that would incorporate an understanding of the types of relations required between different polities if a moral life were to be possible.[17] This is exactly what Kant tried to achieve in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,* and continues to be a project that preoccupies most, if not all, actors engaged in the project of the 'international' and those engaged in the European integration project. Kant based his understanding of peace upon his belief that a 'categorical imperative' exists as an innate moral law. This allowed for its universalisation, and dictated that human beings should be treated as ends rather than means. This entailed the creation of just laws that would be reflected in a republican political order. As Brown points out, Kant insisted that the rule of law be extended to international relations if it were to be domestically effective.[18] This is particularly important in Kant's view because war is seen to be the direct consequence of the absence of an international rule of law. This contradicts Hobbes' assertion that international anarchy can be brought under control though domestic politics.[19] Kant was also clear that world government would not be a suitable method through which to attain peace, but rather that a system of states would suffice. Kant feared that a world government representing an attempt to attain a universal peace would be as unpleasant as a Hobbesian world as it might culminate in worse despotism.[20] Thus, *Perpetual Peace* sets out the conditions by which peace can be attained between states, some of which were later to be clearly reflected in the UN Charter. Kant specifies that states should be republican (i.e. adopt a form of democracy as a basis for government),

that international order should rest on a federation of free states that would be able to abolish war amongst themselves, and that non-citizens should be afforded 'universal hospitality'. Furthermore, international trade was seen to be beneficial in the creation of international cooperation and the ending of war. These arguments also gave rise to what has now become know as the 'democratic peace' thesis, for which a huge literature has constructed an argument that legitimates the use of democratisation as a tool to build the liberal peace. Yet Kant failed to resolve a problem that is particularly relevant in the context of the current liberal peace – how can perpetual peace be achieved without destroying human freedom?[21] What kind of peace could be restrictive of human freedom without disguising domination or being hegemonic in some manner?

John Stuart Mill argued that peace lay both in the protection of individual freedoms, and the existence of effective government.[22] In other words, there was still to be a Leviathan, but it would be constructed through consensual processes that would result in its legitimacy. The problem with the reliance of Kant, and of utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (who argued peace could be constructed partly through disarmament),[23] on states acting to maximise the interests of their own peoples is that the reverse may occur.[24] As we can see from the development of strands rooted in the French Revolution, in the romanticism associated with living in a political community seen in the work of Herder,[25] the problem was that the line between distinctive political entities contributing to international peace or following a nationalist interest was finely drawn. Hence the emergence of nationalism, partly based upon what John Stuart Mill identified as an understanding of the right of people to determine their own government.[26] This line of thought, once associated with the protection of specific territory, soon became a prescription for war between groups laying claim to the same territory, rather than peace. What was worse was that as the principle of self-determination gained popular appeal, especially during the dissolution of the European empires and with the end of the Cold War, the concepts of both nationalism and ethnonationalism associated with it became not the foundations of order but of war. However, such peace plans established their own genre, planning peace in Europe and beyond, which was essentially based upon Christian ethics and a balance between cosmopolitan and communitarian thought.

A further important strand of this construction of a more sophisticated notion of peace, and ultimately an embryonic concept of the liberal peace was the Grotian discourse on natural law. Grotius believed

that the foundation of natural law is in the right of self-preservation and the right to own property. These rights are extended to states that protect themselves in the context of norms and rules as opposed to the Hobbesian version of a state of nature.[27] Thus, natural law is based upon the morality of coexistence and non-intervention, and states have a right of self-defence to preserve their own security. This framework added the weight of legal discourse to the emergence of a concept of liberal peace, which by now also had political, legal, economic, and normative foundations. As Howard has pointed out, a legitimised order may produce domestic peace, which incidentally creates a framework in which war may also be legitimised.[28] This gives rise to 'just war' thinking, which Grotius endeavoured to secularise, moving it away from the doctrine of just war developed in the context of the Catholic church. Another important contributor in this area, Vattel, was concerned about what would happen if both parties to a war had just aims according to their own perception, especially as there did not exist a higher power to adjudicate?[29] (These continue to be troubling questions in the context of the contemporary liberal peace).

Another important facet of this debate can be found in the development of a human rights discourse, derived especially from the work of Western thinkers such as Locke and Mill. This essentially Western tradition put forward the view that individuals have an innate set of rights within the liberal tradition.[30] Implicitly, human rights and peace are equated in much of the literature: one cannot exist without the other.[31] Of course, this may not be completely coherent as an account of peace if peace is a subjective ontology. Thus, it may indeed be possible to have human rights or peace, and not both, depending upon who defines the extant peace and for which group of inhabitants of a specific polity. But the evolution of what have become known as human rights instruments is predicated upon a firm relationship between peace and justice.[32] This line of thought can be seen as a natural evolution of the universalism apparent in enlightenment thought.[33] This was derived from Aristotelian ethics depicting a natural law. This did not develop into an international human rights discourse until after WWII, when this developing regime became directly related to the understanding of peace – with its connection to the notion of national self-determination, which was, at least for a short time after WWI, seen as a key contributor to the pacification of populations, particularly colonial populations. There are two key antecedents to this rights discourse, one based upon a universal natural law tradition and another based upon a particularistic, contractual, legal account.[34]

Brown argues, concurring with Ignatieff's position on liberalism and its linkages with humanitarian intervention, that the fiction of universal rights is not harmfully misleading, though he acknowledges that if particularistic rights discourses are presented as universal then this problem is far more significant.[35] The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* was constructed in such as way as to represent a universal consensus, though it ultimately reflected the rights enshrined in Western constitutions.[36] Shue has conceptualised the development of these rights in terms of 'basic rights' that include security rights and subsistence rights.[37] Basic rights denote 'everyone's minimum reasonable demand upon the rest of humanity'. This is clearly reflected in the language of the *Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*.[38] A key question here is whether such rights are indeed intrinsic to the individual or require delegation to, or the guardianship, of states or international institutions as duties. Similarly, rights of individuals can also be seen as duties.[39] As Spivak has also pointed out there is a problem in the human rights debate related to a lack of recognition in instances where human rights are being denied that it is often outsiders who take on the role of defining, providing and monitoring human rights in response. This means that often agency *vis-à-vis* human rights does not rest with the individual, and perhaps even cannot do so.[40] This is even despite the fact that they were originally constructed as individual rights guarantees stemming from personal sovereignty but provided by institutional actors, rather than the other way around.

Hegel's account of the dimensions of ethical life in his *Philosophy of Right,*[41] including the family, civil society, and the state, is important in constructing this framework for understanding peace. For Hegel, the state was a vital component of this attempt to promote an ethical life and must retain its sovereignty and its capacity for war.[42] Indeed, for Hegel war might also provide a context in which individuals might demonstrate their capacity for an ethical life. In fact, peace for Hegel would produce a 'corruption of nations'. Once again, the limits of the value of war and of the capacity of the state to demonstrate its distinctiveness create fine margins between peace and war, and between the individual and the state. These are the parameters through which the liberal peace has come to be conceptualised and enacted.

These different accounts of peace adhered to the dictum that there was an objective peace to be attained, an ideal form, which was quite possibly an unlikely form at least during earthly existence. It was often characterised as a Christian enterprise, even if it was presented as secular, to be constructed mainly through inter-state relations and

treaties, and through an understanding of the normative frameworks in which governance was constructed and in which individuals would find the 'good life'. Thus, peace was understood as a simple binary, regulated to an elite level official discourse by state and government, or dependent upon a victor, and geographically and temporally bounded. This was the era of attempts to construct a constitutional peace in which norms of domestic governance and international relations between mainly European states would be governed by mutual consent in the absence of a higher power, and by a firm set of secular laws, regimes and principles.[43] This constitutional peace project continued to be underpinned by the concept of the victor's peace, reaffirming militarism's association with any discussion of peace.[44]

Peace in the nineteenth century

The development of imperialism in the nineteenth century is a key part of this debate, in particular in the development of the liberal peace. The British empire's exploration (perhaps an early intimation of the 'English School' approach to IR) of new sea routes during the Elizabethan era led to a rapid realisation of the potential for trade, and ultimately to a realisation of the financial and military benefits of territorial acquisition and control. When in 1570, Robert Dudley and Christopher Hatton commissioned John Dee to write his *Brytannica Republicae Synopsis*,[45] England had no empire, while Spain and Portugal both had possessions in the New World. The resultant flow-chart put forward in this document famously became the basis for imperial and trade expansionism. John Dee and Richard Haklut had both played a role in bringing this to the attention of Elizabeth I and so laid the foundations for the 'modern' permutation of imperialism. What is more, the profits and precedents from these early adventures in the new world laid the basis for trading companies with imperial links, such as the East India Company – and ultimately for this phase of imperial development.[46] Unlike in Imperial Rome, this version soon came to engender racial and religious overtones, though it was mainly based upon imperial competition for resources. Dee promoted the concept of an Empire, arguing that England had prior claims on the New World and need to assert itself through maritime supremacy. Maritime exploration became the engine of territorial acquisition and the expansion of international trade. This expansion of trade provoked more violence than peace, perhaps contradicting the Kantian notion that trade fostered peaceful relations. Maritime exploration led to new

routes east and west and laid the foundation for developments in the understanding of both peace and war. Implicit in this development was the relationship between war and peace in the colonies and dependencies. Peace was often defined as being very different by occupier and local inhabitants, and thus there was a blurring between the two concepts. The development of imperial policing, and of course outright war, came to be predicated upon the proliferation or protection of the imperial order. Furthermore, the unravelling of the colonial system on liberal normative grounds after the end of WWII illustrated the same tendencies in which force was often applied to conserve the colonial system against the clear wishes of inhabitants (though not all, it must be said).

By the end of the nineteenth century, European imperialism came to be characterised less by the exploitation of a territory's resources and inhabitants and more by a humanist[47] and liberal benevolence in which colonial rule was thought to benefit local inhabitants – a sort of 'thin domination'.[48] Of course, this was often disguised by little more than a thin veneer of benevolence. The Mandate System, adopted after WWI at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, was constructed as unravelling this relationship and devolving power to local inhabitants according to the class of the mandate held in trust. Mandates would not gain independence until they had reached the point where self-governance could be undertaken competently.[49] By the end of WWII, of course, the norm of self-determination had taken on a life of its own, making imperialism and colonialism seem anachronistic and unjust. This meant that the norm of non-intervention now was to be applied to all states, new or old. From this norm of universalism at the international level, sprang the UN Charter in 1945 and the assertion of universal human rights in 1948, which soon became controversial components of the liberal peace.

A further addition to these dynamics lay in the creation of social and advocacy movements, which began to occur on a large scale during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The peace movements with which we are so familiar today have largely been a product of the Western secular experience.[50] Of course, many resistance movements have also described themselves as peace movements, whether they were resisting the nuclear bomb or colonial rule. Two distinct pathways can be observed here. Early and contemporary peace movements may have had or have a religious orientation. The second and most recent pathway is the secular emergence of liberal-internationalism, associated with cosmopolitan movements, disarmament, and democratisation

coordinated by international organisations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Other campaigns of significance can also be pointed to as a product of the Western secular experience. These include campaigns against conscription, ideological and feminist movements against war, the campaign for nuclear disarmament, and environmental movements.[51] It is also important to note the significance of the philosophy behind the French Revolution, which sought to devolve power to the population away from the lineage of royalty and liberate an entire nation. The Napoleonic wars also contributed to the sense of the nation. Furthermore, the American War of Independence contributed a philosophical strand on personal freedom and the role of government, embodied in America's resultant constitutional framework, to the debate on how peace could be attained.

The Congress of Vienna of 1815 involved the statesmen of the day in the construction of a framework which would guarantee a peace which would stand in contrast to the Napoleonic wars that had gone before. Metternich, Castlereagh and Talleyrand laid down a balance of power that constituted a new peace, and which depended upon their capacity to intervene, or refrain from intervening, in the affairs of other states.[52] This agenda for possible rampant interventionism allowed for the recognition that peace lay as much in cooperation as in isolation and division. Furthermore, underlying this process was an understanding that the pre-war ideals of peace, prevalent amongst the victorious policymakers would be continued, rather than constructed anew.[53] At the same time it was also indicative of a rejection at the highest level of policymaking of the idea that war was an inevitability in international relations. The Concert of Europe was intended to make this a reality. However, as Howard has argued, the conservatives and liberals of this era saw peace and war in different ways. The conservatives believed peace lay in the preservation of the existing order, perhaps through the use of war, while the liberals believed that peace would come about from a transformation brought about by economic and social progress, which war would interfere with. In Howard's thinking, nationalists formed a third grouping who believed that nations had a right to self-determination through the use of force if necessary.[54] The Vienna settlement operated as hoped for forty years or more despite French attempts to revise it and its own situation. But the forces of nationalism developed, resulting in the new order of nation states of 1871 in which war and peace became synonymous with territorial and industrialised nationalism, and its reinforcement. As Ikenberry has argued, the Congress of Vienna was primarily an instrument of British 'order creation' as an instrument of 'peace'.[55]

The form of peace that emerged in Europe over the next forty or so years was somewhat disfigured by the constant imperial and colonial conflicts fought in North America, Asia, and Africa in search of an empire to glorify nationalism, to preserve the wealth of the old conservative order, and as a civilising mission for liberals.[56] While there was peace in Europe, the self-nominated civilised nations of the period inflicted much violence in the name of one of these three versions of peace in the non-European world, which unfortunately carried with them motivations for war. Nationalism and liberal versions of self-determination as its logical extension became the motivation for some to use violence in order to receive the same rights and privileges as pre-existing, often imperial states. Industrialisation had made the scale of war greater and begun the democratisation of the means of violence. Peace became a future possibility only if nationalism and self-determination could be actualised.

At the same time the coalescence of an international community, which was intended to prevent the use of violence and the use of war as an extension of politics to protect the states-system also gathered pace. It is important to note that the era of European imperialism was crucial for both the use of force by states in pursuit of prestige and economic interest, and at the same time, the *mission civilisatrice* which went with it, involving missionaries, and campaigns against slavery, such as those conducted in the Congo against King Leopold's ruthless exploitation of the territory. These campaigns were often largely run from within civil society rather than by states.[57] There were also state run campaigns on behalf of civil society: from 1816 to the 1860s Britain deployed a naval squadron against slave trading on the west coast of Africa. This reversal in the British approach to slavery meant a reinterpretation of international law to allow vessels to be boarded and searched. This attack on sovereignty meant that for the first time, perhaps, a humanitarian principle took precedence.[58] This did not, of course, mean a rejection of imperialism as a significant contribution to a peaceful world order at this time and seemed to represent an uneasy collusion between humanitarianism and domination.[59]

A further contribution to the construction of a specifically liberal peace lies in Henri Dunant's work leading to the Geneva Convention of 1864, which delineated what was lawful in war in order to bind states to certain standards of behaviour during conflict. This led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was founded to care for war victims. Out of this gradually emerged what is known as international humanitarian law, of which

the ICRC is the guardian. The ICRC is the oldest humanitarian organisation, and is charged with the clear mandate through international treaty of being the custodian of the laws of war. In this role it has had to act in a neutral manner, which has also given rise to problems in the fulfilment of this mandate. Famously it remained neutral and withheld information about the Holocaust during WWII.[60] What is significant here, is the way in which international humanitarian law gradually became inculcated within the state's understanding of war and its conduct.[61] By implication, this reinforced an altered discourse of peace, in which individuals also became its agents, and which a civil peace would be a component of a broader, liberal peace. The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 led to the establishment of the International Court of Justice, though as Howard has pointed out, they became more concerned with making war more humane than its eradication.[62] Despite the instigation of a non-governmental sector that would become crucial in dealing with conflict during the latter part of the twentieth century, the believed plausibility of world peace in, and of that era, was being replaced with a conception of a martial order of nationalistic states:

> War was perceived, by misinterpreters of Charles Darwin, as a necessary part of the natural order of things… peace led only to decadence, defeat and, ultimately, the disappearance of the peoples sufficiently misguided to pursue it. Hegel was mutating into Hitler; Mazzini into Mussolini.[63]

Yet, during this period a more sophisticated version of peace began to emerge in the popular imagination. For example, in 1910 a Universal Peace Congress examined the need for international law, self-determination, and an end to colonialism. This was followed in 1913 by another congress, focusing on disarmament, to mark the opening of the Peace Palace in The Hague.[64]

What is implicit in much of the literature on or from this period, and policymaking *vis-à-vis* peace, is that the key task is often seen as the 'restoration' of peace, rather than its creation.[65] This conservative theme continues well into the twentieth century when debates about peacekeeping often revolved around ambiguous mandates involving wording indicating a 'restoration' of peace, security, and order. Implicit in this is the notion of a return to some pre-conflict ideal, in essence a balance of power favourable to a specific party. Clearly, this dominant approach implicitly meant (and means) that the roots of a conflict

were ignored, that disputants were reluctant to address them, or simply were not aware of them so inculcated were they in a specific discourse which ultimately focused upon peace as the absence of war, despite the emergence of agencies, international humanitarian law, NGOs, and advocacy movements, which had their sights trained upon something more sophisticated. A return to a pre-conflict peace in this context would seem in many cases to be a recipe for the continuation of conflict. Furthermore, the sense that peace could actually be constructed rather than merely preserved, and usefully be created in the interests of its sponsors was beginning to emerge – a version of what would be familiar in the twentieth century as the institutional peace, accompanied by the peace projects being projected by growing numbers of non-state actors. At the same time, in the growing non-governmental movements of the period, there was also a realisation that the individual and civil society had to be included in this project. The foundations of the contemporary liberal peace were already present and underpinning the evolution charted above was a tendency to cling to peace as Platonic 'ideal form', despite the obvious diplomatic tendencies of the day and the competing understandings of order associated with imperialism and nationalism. The liberal peace was still in an embryonic form.

Peace in the twentieth century: the Treaty of Versailles

These many strands in part were responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914 being greeted not with incredulity that 'civilisation' could still countenance such deviations from non-violent progression, but with enthusiasm in many quarters. As the war continued and its associated costs mounted, it became clear that war could become an end in itself without any perceptible means of bringing it to an end – other than surrender or genocide – when so many of its perpetrators believed strongly in the validity of their objectives. This war showed for the first time that large scale industrialised war could not be won decisively without incurring such costs as to make victory less meaningful than ever before. Even a victor's peace proved unattainable. Yet, the Versailles settlement and the associated League system was the basis for one of the most concerted debates on peace, its nature, and how it could be constructed. This revolved around discussions of,

> ...the lost peace, the limits of liberal internationalism, and the possibility of international order based upon democracy,

> self-determination, and rule of law. No peace settlement has been more frequently invoked in public and scholarly argument about the sources of peace and the lessons of history.[66]

Thinking about a post-war peace began very early on in the war. According to William's study on this subject the new world order's 'imagining' began in a number of liberal groups including policymakers and intellectuals which formed in order to think about the nature of that order throughout the war. Some were pacifists, while others focused upon international organisation and an end to the practices of the old diplomacy as a preventative for war.[67] For the first time the interpretation and construction of the nature of the post-war peace was relatively democratised, relying on consensus more than ever before. Of course, this was still tempered by the relative resources of key states and the continued relative marginalisation of non-state actors. Eventually, and mainly because of the US entrance into the war in 1917, the Allied cause transmuted away from the many different intentions of actors in the alliance, into a general liberal agreement that the end of the war might provide an opportunity by which democracy could be extended and a new international order created.[68] This was essentially a negation of German Wilhelmine militarism, and nationalism, as order producing mechanisms constituting a viable form of peace. The effect of this war was the exhaustion of the old order, and the introduction of a new vision of peace into international order by the United States in particular. While the previous version of peace was unstable and dominated by European powers which understood the concept in multiple ways, the version of peace now aspired to was idealistic in its liberal aspirations, it was rapidly contested for being vague, lacking any guarantees from its main perpetrator, the US, and was fatally flawed because it did not represent a consensus amongst the states it was ultimately imposed upon, or paid lip-service to it.

The importance of US President Wilson's Fourteen Points at Versailles in 1919 was crucial to the emergence of a contemporary notion of peace, though self-determination and its association with nationalism soon became clearly counter-productive in the attempt to redefine peace. The pathway that emerged at the end of the First World War toward the liberal peace and away from the nationalist, imperialist, and conservative notions prevalent until this point, can mainly be attributed to the role and interests of the US, and the values that it inculcated through its approach to systemic reform. It was still a victor's peace, but one that accentuated democratisation within a state framework, and

regulated inter-state relations. Tribal nationalism and the 'old world' conservative order had been repulsed and the US had emerged as a global force. Wilson was opposed to European imperialism and its contradiction with the values inherent in the American constitution, as well as the legacy of imperial relationships with North America (though such impulses continued to overlook the treatment of indigenous communities). Wilson argued that France and Britain had different views of 'peace' when compared to the American view, and proposed to '…force them to our way of thinking'.[69] The peace that Wilson had in mind – an '…ultimate peace of the world…' was reminiscent of Kant's perpetual peace through republican state democracy.[70] This was to rest on a '…community of power…' and represented an …'organised common peace'.[71] It was to be a 'peace without victory, a peace among equals'.[72] The later point is telling: it indicates that the focus was on states that had visible organisation characteristics that conformed to the democratic model, submerging intrastate factions and actors, or individuals within the state. This was underlined when Wilson spoke to the US Congress early in April 1917, during the course of which he famously stated that the '…world must be made safe for democracy.'[73] This was a philanthropic task in his eyes on the part of the US as an example to, and an exception from, the vagaries of European politics and colonialism. It was ultimately to be based upon the self-determination of peoples into coherent, monolithic states, with a fixed territory, fixed population, and requisite military, economic, and representative capacities making up the new version of peace. Unfortunately, the conduct of the representatives at Versailles in 1919 seemed to betray this ethos.[74] Wilson's Fourteen Points outlined what he saw as a mechanism for a sustainable peace to the US Congress on January 8th, 1918. They included the following: there should be no secret agreements between countries; diplomacy and negotiation should be public; there should be free trade, and freedom of the seas; and there should be a general disarmament. Finally, he called for the foundation of the League of Nations to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.[75] Added to these points, and among others, was the principle Wilson outlined before Congress on 11th February, 1918, that territorial adjustments should be of benefit to the populations concerned – in other words, self-determination. These principles were elucidated as representative of consensuality with America's allies, but in actual fact they represented a 'unilateral American pronouncement rather than a declaration of allied policy'.[76] Wilson's notion of a peace without victory was a clear departure from the norm of a peace *after* victory, which really

signified a 'victor's peace'. Yet, as it transpired, Versailles was regarded as the latter rather than the former, this being its fatal flaw. Again, Wilson's thinking was clearly based upon the Platonic ideal form as an achievable conceptualisation of peace, it being unimaginable that any states, groups, or individuals might continue to consider war as a viable project to attain their interests. Clearly, these principles contradicted many of the traditional interests of European powers, as events at Versailles, during the next twenty years, and during the Cold War indicated. Indeed, this tension between a universal understanding of liberal peace as an ideal form, and more parochial understandings of a limited, perhaps geographically bounded, peace, continues to be played out today in many of the world's conflict zones.

Interestingly enough, President Wilson drew on a group of academics code-named 'The Inquiry' in order to formulate plans for the post-war order. This group did not distinguish itself in its preparations to provide Wilson with advice.[77] Indeed, it has been convincingly argued that the make-up and approach of the Inquiry group, and of the way in which Wilson used one of its key members, Lippmann's work almost verbatim, indicates a level of amateurishness in this attempt to create world peace. Yet, Wilson was merely creating a continuity with early strands of thinking of peace, and despite the failure of the Versailles settlement, many of the key concepts of the current international order continue to be derived from this approach.[78] The planning of the post-war international order betrayed a simple binary conceptualisation of peace, a liberal understanding of peace as a universal ontology, and very rudimentary international architecture for its attainment, and one that seemed not to see a contradiction between peace and the use of force to attain it.

Crucially, for all of those engaged in the planning of the international order, and indeed those reflecting upon it, Wilsonianism lacked coherence on some fundament points – which have marked and marred the international system since then. The most obvious, yet least developed is the notion of self-determination. A contemporary commentary pointed out that Wilson's understanding of this concept seemed ambiguous at best, but more likely to be vague and unimplementable.[79] The use of the term 'people' in the singular, and the problems caused by a tendency to confuse self-determination with self-government were particularly problematic:[80] 'The true principle is the desire of the people concerned.'[81] This view is confirmed by the statements of many of the attendees at the Paris Peace Conference, and not least by Wilson's own comments.[82] Much of the brow-beating over

decolonisation, and many of the claims for self-determination since, appealing to Wilsonianism, have of course been political acts aims at maximising self-interest through an appeal to what was also presented as a supposedly benevolent and universal principle. This point in itself gives much credence to Clark's recent and critical claims for a regulative and distributive, but highly conditional understanding of, contemporary liberal peace as hegemonic.[83] At this early point, the dominant understanding of peace propagated by its international architects, was moving towards governance as an end itself that might also over-ride its means.

Even at this early point, there were competing versions of peace emerging in the post-war order.[84] Wilson's Kantian notion of a peace founded on self-determination and liberal democracy competed with another universalist or totalising notion of peace based upon the notion of a historical dialectic of progress and a classless society, as well as with imperialism and nationalism. Indeed, as with the later experience of decolonisation, self- determination often produced illiberal and non-democratic states – or even statelessness, refugees rather than citizens. Furthermore, militant nationalism was not yet dead as was soon to become clear. Indeed, self-determination and democracy were for a short period to allow militant nationalism to be propagated freely in Russia, Italy and Germany until it became a threat to the revolutionary orders that emerged. The major obstacle to Wilson's peace was that no state was prepared to take responsibility to provide guarantees, financial, military, and political, of the new peace. The US Congress did not want to be responsible at this level: Britain, France, and Germany still harboured their antipathies to each other; some statesmen and politicians still sought to justify imperialism and colonialism; Soviet Russia was concerned with its own revolution; militant nationalism was on the rise in Japan and elsewhere; and the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires had left spoils to be fought over. The peace that had been created was deeply flawed, and was made even more fragile by the financial crises of the late 1920s that created major socio-economic problems at a time when radical ideologies such as fascism and Marxist-Leninism were making themselves felt. Neither could there could be a fascist peace. War was the basis of the new order, as it had been in the past.[85] Thus, peace continued to be derived from military victory.

This was exactly the fear underlying Keynes' thinking in his important critique of the Versailles settlement, specifically in the context of the War Guilt Clause (Article 231) and reparations to be paid by

Germany.[86] He believed strongly that the way in which the Allies had established agreements while applying blame and financial responsibility to Germany and her allies meant that there would not be a stable peace resulting from the Treaty – German democracy would be 'annihilated' in the very process of trying to construct it.[87] Keynes' dislike of the settlement was also extended to the League of Nations, supposed to guarantee the future peace, but which instead would struggle to maintain the *status quo*. This he saw mainly stemming from the defects of Article V and Article X of the treaty, the former which prescribes unanimity and the latter which maintained the sovereignty and independence of individual states.[88] This was a telling criticism, ironically clearly reflected in the contemporary United Nations system, which has inherited similar defects. While Keynes railed at the settlement, many of the prescient insights in his study of its economic impact were soon commonly accepted, and later became institutionalised in the UN system, in Marshal Aid and the Truman Doctrine of the early post-war years. Yet, then, as is clearly illustrated in contemporary accounts, much of the negotiation of the Versailles settlement oscillated between the high moral vision of liberal peace offered by Wilson, and the low, bitter rivalry of resources, guilt, reparations, and territory, of which the victorious powers were also deeply culpable. Peace in these terms was little more than subjugation, domination, and disempowerment. Certainly, it was particularist.[89] As Nicolson infamously pointed out on the first pages of his account of the Versailles negotiations at which he was present, diplomacy was 'protean' and the 'new diplomacy' supposedly trumpeted in 1919 was subject to significant continuities with the old, which had been responsible for the war in the first place.[90] Nicolson records that creating the new and supposedly 'eternal' peace was a 'beastly' process engendering little confidence in what was established after World War I.[91]

Perhaps most famously in the context of theorising about the international system, E.H. Carr, who was a British delegate at the conference, presented the argument that 'utopianism' ignored the realities of practices and events in international politics.[92] In particular, he believed that the League of Nations put a dangerous over-emphasis on a notion of the international as being a society of states, rather than an environment in which states pursued their own political and economic interests with relatively little regard for the well-being of each other. Carr did not accept the logic of the argument that economic co-operation between states would lead to interdependence and a disincentive for conflict. Clearly, he was not alone in his criticisms of the

conference. Many saw the new peace as temporary, unjust, and the basis of a future war, and many of the concepts associated with Wilson's vision of a new world order, such as self-determination, along with the League of Nations, were essentially untested.[93] Subsequently, in view of the plethora of problems with the conduct and objectives of the conference, it was, and perhaps should have been, unsurprising that this new world order unravelled so quickly. Furthermore, as Williams has shown, war and peace were thought about at the highest levels in terms of a simple racial binary which was repeated often in official documents and treaties, as well as in general pubic discourse – that of 'warlike' and 'peaceloving' peoples.[94] Warlike peoples were thought to be susceptible to militarism and peaceloving people were susceptible to pacifism. Both ends of the spectrum were seen to be problematic. Militarism led to arms races and large-scale war whereas pacifism created the problem of free-riders and trust, because of which pacifists might be unable to respond to the threat of war or extinction.

There were more sophisticated reflections on the problem of war and peace. One notable response to the problem of war was Quincy Wright's, *The Study of War*, which though published in 1942, charted an internationalist project that began in 1926. This study sought to produce a multidimensional understanding of war and therefore to open up a debate on how it could be realistically abolished, predicated upon the acceptance that war was not an inevitable dimension of history and that peace represented an equilibrium of many different forces.[95] Margaret Mead also famously argued that war was a social invention.[96] The implication of these trains of thought was that peace could also be socially constructed, but this strand of thought was not comprehensively incorporated into approaches to constructing peace until after the war, and more specifically with the advent of thinking about peacebuilding approaches still later.

At the same time as the attempts to rethink and reformulate the international system from above to create an institutional peace, another wave of non-governmental organisations was being founded from below, often with a profoundly different conception of peace as their foundational assumption. As with the development of non-state actors in the nineteenth century, these were generally organisations founded to respond to problems we would now describe as relating to human security economic deprivation, human rights violations, and so on. For example, Save the Children was founded in 1919 to help feed children in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (because funds could be raised for innocent victims of the war who could not be tarred with

the brush of aggressor). Once again, this was part of the emerging belief that without a vibrant civil society, institutional and structural changes would not occur, hindering what was becoming a quest for the liberal peace – the new ideal form of peace. Yet, as events before, during, and after Versailles illustrated, the victor's peace remained influential.

Thinking about peace during and after World War II

The next attempt to create an institutionalised and international peace saw some of the lessons of the previous epoch learned and forgotten. As Williams has argued, the new peace that was to follow the Second World War was principally developed according to a North American consensus, and its retreat from isolationism – which could be interpreted as a realisation that a territorially limited, geographical version of peace could no longer be viable. Cordell Hull's Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934 was constructed to open up international trade as a counter to economic nationalism.[97] This was reflected in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 signed by Churchill and Roosevelt, which laid out the internationalist case for free trade, self-determination and decolonisation. These were to be the principal tenets of attempts at constituting the next version of peace: material and political freedom and well-being without domination. This peace was to be a hybrid of the main strands of thinking about peace outlined in the previous chapter: it was aimed at a certain geographical coverage, seen as a temporally evolving framework in this geographic context; it was a victor's peace; it was to be constructed through top-down and bottom up methods, bringing together states, IOs, and civil societies. Most importantly, it was to be an institutionalised liberal peace, if not in 1945 then within the foreseeable future, underpinned by the might, persuasiveness, and example, of the victors of the war. It also established a model for an illiberal peace as a staging post to the liberal peace, as was the case with both Germany and Japan after the end of the war.

This 'peace' that emerged after WWII was based upon a fragmented framework including the UN Charter, the emerging Cold War bipolarity between the US and the USSR, and the creation of new security, political, and economic arrangements between the US and the Western industrial countries and Japan. The former was a complex militarised settlement, and the latter was a complex institutionalised settlement.[98] Within the US there emerged several different versions of what shape the post-war order should take: these included themes such as global

governance, free trade, a North Atlantic association, a debate upon US viability as a geopolitical power, unity in Europe, and a Western alliance against the Soviet Union.[99] All of these approaches constituted different concepts of peace. All were associated with influential figures on the world stage. As with the Versailles Treaty, the new peace was developed by a mixture of public and private thinking on the matter.[100] This time, non-official input was much more developed, most notably in the context of Dulles 'Commission to Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace', and the Council for Foreign Affairs and in the work of Chatham House.[101] The new peace after 1945 was to be securely based upon both security guarantees and upon a degree of economic redistribution derived from Marshall Aid and the Truman Doctrine, but in the context of a global body that could establish the degree of consensus amongst states for a particular course of action. The 'idealist' peace engendered in Wilsonianism was now to become firmly institutionalised in organisations and institutions that would constantly work to provide military security, legal guarantees political consensus, humanitarian resources, and development and financial investment.

The UN system, and its genesis in the discussions between Churchill and Roosevelt during World War II, are also key to the emergence of humanitarian intervention. This, of course, was not a wholly new phenomenon. A humanitarian explanation had been given for European intervention during the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, and others. During the nineteenth century '…the morality play of humanitarian intervention in which a victimised population must be rescued from warlordism and tyranny was already well elaborated.'[102] Humanitarian intervention (and later preventative war) re-emerged as a response to the nature of the peace that had been outlined in the context of the UN, its Charter, and the parallel discourses that emerged in its different bodies. The defence and construction of the liberal peace as a sum of Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, ICC, international agency and international financial institutional evolution became a legitimate and legitimating objective in this context. The UN was to prevent war, the World Bank was to aid in international development, and the IMF and GATT were responsible for international financial and trade matters. There was, however, little co-ordination between these bodies at this early stage.[103] Once the multiple layers of the creation of a liberal peace in conflict zones became too much for the UN system alone to achieve as was evident in the 1990s and beyond, key components of that system took over. This

reflected the debated need for a 'good peace' between and after both world wars.[104] This was to be a peace not rooted in the threat of force, or bitter negotiations, or complex government, but a 'natural peace'.[105] This essentially gave rise to a debate about the installation of multiple layers of governance. The institutions of this peace emerged from Allied discussions about how peace could be both comprehensively constructed and guaranteed and were formalised at the conferences of Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and San Francisco in 1945 where the UN frameworks were discussed and agreed. What came out of these meetings was the UN Charter, which claimed universality in its understanding of peace and security and how if could be achieved. As Williams has pointed out, this document has gone largely unchallenged (at least openly) since then and is binding for all of its members.[106] Yet, it is also vague and repetitive in its characterisation of the specific nature of peace.

These activities were to be coordinated by and around a set of institutions emanating from the United Nations. The UN clearly elucidated its conception of peace, driven by the permanent five members of the Security Council in the preamble to its Charter. In the context of the UN system, peace came to engender the rejection of interstate war, the provision of humanitarian resources, development, financial regulation and adjustment, and human rights. Though the Security Council was envisaged as the primary security organisation, the specialised agencies, funds, and programmes suggested a much broader view of 'peace' than the Security Council framework implied. This meant that the World Health Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the UN International Children's Emergency Fund among others, were established as functional organisations involved in this broader project, though their contribution to a conceptually broader understanding of the new peace was disguised by their specialised agendas. The broader picture, however, tells a more interesting story. The General Assembly controlled these multiple tasks through ECOSOC giving the UN a leading role in promoting economic and social cooperation. Relationships between ECOSOC and institutions such as the IMF, UNESCO, IBRD, and the International Trade Organisation also quickly emerged.

It was from this network that made up the UN system that the notion of 'governance' began to emerge as a concrete, objective methodology to produce and institutionalise the liberal peace.[107] This has been conceptualised as a process by which a rule-dominated,

ordered society is generated in a multi-centric system.[108] This depends upon there being a multilateral consensus on rules requiring 'no further injunction', signifying an 'entrenched multilateralism'.[109] Of course, whether this entrenched multilaterism is universal is a matter of some debate. However, by the 1990s, 40% of UNDP's resources were aimed at governance activities.[110] Similar trends could also be seen in the context of the World Bank, USAID, DFID, and other international institutions and agencies. This approach can also be seen in the evolution of governance in Europe after WWII. Europe was, at least according to Roosevelt's intentions, pacified using a system of political, economic, and security frameworks, which would be overseen by the US.[111]

The 'organisation of peace' which dominated allied thinking during and after both world wars, was seen in terms of constructing international and regional organisations that could create consensus through which liberal political, economic and social reforms could be agreed and carried out. This order, was of course, to be led by the leading liberal states, of the time.[112] This was, of course, mirrored by German and Russian attempts to construct their own international orders, though more through force rather than consent, as well as the older European imperial system, which was now in the process of being dismantled or collapsing. Perhaps the most notable statement on peace during this period was Roosevelt's acceptance that the US rejection of Wilson's peace in 1920 had been mistaken, and that there was now no turning back from the construction of a liberal international order of democratic states adhering to open markets and international cooperation.[113]

In this, of course, there would be no place for formal imperialism or colonialism. Thus, the formal process of decolonisation developed as an effort to provide self-determining territorial units with the liberal institutions of governance, and the formal qualities of sovereignty and statehood as derived from the Western experience. This project, running through the UN system, was heavily contested by the USSR and after decolonisation continued to be contested by the superpowers, the UN, and international financial institutions, which engaged in the start of what soon became a vital relationship of dependency and conditionality with the fragile newly, decolonised states.

These renegotiations of peace meant that states should have sole authority over their territories, though there should also be integration into the norms of international society, and into international organisations and institutions:

> What emerged was a Western post-war order organised around liberal democratic policies and institutions. It was hegemonic in the sense that it was centred around the United States and reflected American-styled political mechanisms and organising principles. It was a liberal order in that it was legitimate and marked by reciprocal interactions.[114]

This marked out the parameters of the new peace: liberal and hegemonic, and perhaps most importantly during this period at least, in opposition to the threats of imperialism, nationalism, socialism, and fascism. These qualities would be absolutely decisive more specifically after the end of the Cold War in defining both the peace that existed in some parts of the world, the peace that would be projected through liberal and institutional forms of intervention, and the peace that was imagined in the conscience of the liberal 'international community' (which some more cynical commentators on humanitarian intervention deny existed at all). Another aspect of the new peace, however, was decidedly different in character. Where the emergence of a society of states seemed to signify a form of liberal peace, the 'containment order'[115] which emerged as part of the 1947 Truman Doctrine indicated that there were large parts of the world which would be subject to a more traditional and limited geospatial concept of peace, and would effectively be isolated from the liberal peace both through Western policy and through local compliance with the regime of the USSR.

The International Military Tribunal, set up by the Allies to try Nazi war criminals at Nuremburg, provided the beginnings of another important strand of the shifting debate on peace. The tribunal had three main jurisdictions, one of which was 'crimes against peace'. Crimes against humanity and war crimes are the most recognised of its jurisdictions, however. The Allies defined a crime against peace as one that involved planning, preparing or initiating an aggressive war.[116] Furthermore, these were to be viewed as crimes even if they were not in violation of domestic law in the country where they were perpetrated. This led to a new wave of legal development with respect to crimes against humanity, which as might be expected was the focus given the main emphasis of those reflecting on war in the international system, rather than crimes against peace.

The thinking of David Mitrany and his work on a 'Working Peace System' represented an important intellectual conceptualisation of these multiple debates, specifically in its attempts to establish a consensus on functional institutions which could contribute to a broader

and sustainable peace in the international system. This sustainability is what is implicit in Mitrany's conception of peace, though nowhere in his writings does there appear to be an actual definition of peace. Even in the context of the Working Peace System, while the nature of that system and the manner in which it needs to be constructed to enable it to work are defined, there is little specific discussion of the concept of peace.[117] Mitrany argued that the development of international administration, such as embodied early on in the International Postal Union, and the Hague Conference constituted the system required for a sustained peace.[118] In addition, he was clear that any peace needed to be a 'working' peace and not 'protected', by which it seems he meant that peace should be self-sustaining.[119] It was clear that his argument was also that any peace after WWII should also be universal in nature.[120] After WWII, Mitrany began to use what is now more familiar terminology – a positive peace.[121] This peace was to be based upon integration rather than division. This was exactly what the UN should become engaged in building in his view, and by necessity this incorporated the requirements not just of political actors, but also of social and economic agencies.

In December of 1949 the UN General Assembly gave what was perhaps one of the first indications of the dissent that was emerging between General Assembly members and the Security Council, which was to a large degree also a major concern of the Secretariat. The General Assembly passed a resolution on the *Essentials of Peace,* which presaged its later and more radical *Uniting for Peace* resolution of 1950.[122] The former resolution made the case in Article 1 that the UN Charter was actually a peace agreement in the eyes of its members and outlined the principles regarded as necessary for an 'enduring peace'. Article 2 reiterates the call to refrain from the threat or use of force, and rest of the document follows the *pro forma* of the UN Charter. What is interesting is the recognition in Article 6 of the qualities of peace that are required if we are to think not just in terms of peace, but of the 'human person', with a direct reference to the fundamental rights contained in the Declaration of Human Rights. This combination of principles led directly to the famous *Uniting for Peace* General Assembly resolution, which constituted an attempt to bypass the infamous veto problem that often crippled the UN Security Council. This, of course, provided the Security Council members with an incentive to avoid deadlock, but in this they were singularly unsuccessful and the Uniting for Peace resolution was used several times to establish peacekeeping operations where the Security Council could not agree on a

course of action in a specific crisis situation. This resolution also established a 'Peace Observation Committee' comprising of 14 member states which could gather data on any conflict it felt was necessary. Effectively, this move constituted a democratisation of the concept of peace, whereby the General Assembly attempted to bypass the Security Council's weaknesses when it came to dealing with failing states, war, and other security issues, by mandating itself to work on issues relating to peace for states and individuals. This was an important move mainly insofar as it established an international concern for a broader understanding of and reaction to the problems of conflict.

Consequently, in the light of the realisation of the role of the individual in both peace and conflict, it should come as no surprise that during this period non-state actors also began to gain more of a role in responding to conflict, specifically in the context of human rights and humanitarian assistance. One of the notable organisations whose experience illustrated the problems that such activities faced was the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which began it life rescuing Jews from Europe during WWII. It was later to be involved with retrieving Hungarian refugees after the failure of the 1956 rebellion and Cuban refugees after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959.[123] Other such organisations followed suit, including the Catholic Relief Service, World Vision, and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM). OXFAM's first main campaign focused on relieving the city of Athens from a British Navy blockade in 1941–2, which led to an estimated minimum of 100,000 deaths from starvation in the city.[124] Such developments were derived from a view that humanitarianism had to be included in any construction of peace, and many of these organisations soon also added the mantras of development to their repertoire,[125] further broadening the development of the conception of peace.

Clearly, there had been a change in thinking about peace during this period. There was a move away from the framework that had emerged from 1815 to 1919, in which major states constructed a top-down, and geospatially bounded peace that was focused upon retaining their privileges. This was disguised by the gradual adoption of the many peace projects of the Enlightenment into a constitutional and institutional form. This also came to include a public and private issues and actors. After 1945 peace was being constructed *via* what Vedby has called a positive epistemology, in which not only were threats to be countered or privilege protected, but the root causes of conflict had to be addressed while utilising and developing the capacity of the interna-

tional community to do so.[126] This also implied a break with the previous ontological position that peace was an ideal form, but rather that it could be achieved in a bounded, and limited cosmopolitan form, if the correct methods and formulations could be discovered, developed, and applied. Plato's ideal form now seemed to be achievable in the context of peace if the correct methodological formula was found. What is also clear is that increasingly, academics and policymakers were turning to the reconstruction of government and governance – in both domestic and international forms – as the method by which an ontologically stable peace could be created. This was mainly represented at this stage an institutional notion of peace, which also owed a great deal to the constitutional peace projects of the previous era. Despite many efforts to the contrary this also continued to be a victor's peace, also often associated with militarism.

Conclusion

It is clear that the poles of these debates revolve around several crucial factors:

i) the group defined as requiring security, be it empire, kingdom, or state, or community or individual;
ii) the ideology that the group aspires to, be it conservative, liberal, imperial, nationalist, religious or identity based;
iii) the referents of securitisation (the enemy and its threat);
iv) the [possibly unobtainable] concept of an ideal form of peace;
v) the use of war as a tool, either through a policy of pragmatism or through necessity to construct a victor's peace;
vi) a very clear distinction between peace and war , based upon an objective view;
vii) the existence of a specific time and a space for peace.

These key factors in early literatures run through all subsequent literatures, either as positivist assumptions, or in a few cases as critical weaknesses in positivist debates. This type of thinking progressed over the centuries into the notion that war should be waged by a legitimate authority as a last resort and in response to an act of unjustified aggression and the post-war international system was organised along these lines. This was soon constructed within the framework of the protection of a secular order of territorial states. The implications for the conceptualisation of peace were that territorial states and their

international arrangements were responsible and preserved a patchwork of interests between states: peace became the balance of power guaranteed through international treaties and alliances, as was endorsed by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Sovereignty was the guarantee and arbiter of peace, envisaged as a balance of power between juxtaposed territorial units, which mounted a possible threat against others. War was the process through which the balance of power mechanism corrected itself. Peace was more or less what existed in between such corrections.

As the Enlightenment progressed, the Hobbesian view that war was part of the natural fabric of international life was displaced by the view that peace should be so, rather than an ideal to be aspired to – and that this should be thought about in the context of nations.[127] Of course, the counter-Enlightenment unleashed the opposing view that peace should be derived, as Burke or Herder might say, from the uniqueness of the nation and tribe rather than from universalism. Of course, construing this sentiment in the context of nationalism might also be a cause for war. What emerged was a continuation of an understanding of war as the natural order of international relations, but which could be modified by the agency of enlightened actors with liberal views and objectives for the relationships of both states and peoples. Locke, for example, argued in opposition to Hobbes that a law-based government would produce consensus, legitimacy, and therefore a domestic peace.[128]

It is possible to chart four broad strands or discourses of peace. Firstly, it is obvious that the victor's peace continued to hold legitimacy although it was also dressed up in various disguises. Secondly, the constitutional peace projects of the early Enlightenment period were a genuine attempt to move beyond this thinking, but in practice, though they became very influential in popular consciousness, policy and intellectual terms, the victor's peace continued to underpin the new attempts at a constitutional peace. This was also the case later in the twentieth century with the third strand of thinking about peace – an institutionalised peace. This new attempt contained undertones of 'pacificism', which Ceadal describes as an agenda revolving around the abolition of aggressive war.[129] These latter versions of peace placed governance, law, civil society, democracy, and trade, enshrined in domestic constitutional documentation, and in international treaties at the heart of the new peace. With the development of a fourth strand or discourse on peace, a civil society and NGO discourse on the 'civil peace', many of the elements of the

contemporary liberal peace were now present. What is also clear about all four approaches to peace is that they all depend upon external actors' intervention. They place third parties in an almost omniscient position in relation to the peace they construct. These versions of peace became associated in various complex ways with conservative, liberal, imperial, and nationalist thinking and as the following chapter illustrates, there exists significant continuities with the contemporary debates and discourses on peace.

2
Towards Peace-as-Governance

> '… and make war that we may live in peace.'[1]
>
> 'Peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, and justice.'[2]

Introduction

After WWI, during the Cold War and after, the victor's institutionalised peace and its contestation became the major dynamic of the implicit conceptualisation of peace. This was competed over by the main superpowers within regional politics, but also as a model for the type of polity that either side favoured, from the democratic, free market model to the centrally planned and social welfare model. All of these different discourses inherent in thinking about peace – the victor's peace, and the constitutional and institutionalised models – were further contested (often to the detriment of civil society discourses on peace) by post-colonial states and developing countries according to their differing agendas. However, during this period, and certainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberal peace became increasingly part of the construction and conditionality of different forms of economic, social, and political intervention or assistance, and was characterised by conditional relationships between interveners, their donors, and recipients. By the 1990s, the liberal peace model was fully-fledged, though perhaps not fully enunciated, as this chapter illustrates.

Thinking about peace during and after the Cold War

Until the end of the Cold War the habit of Western political thought, discourse, and practice was to attempt to draw a distinction between

war and peace, both in thought, practice and policy, despite obvious empirical difficulties with doing so.[3] During the Cold War, as since, the clarity of this binary distinction broke down in many parts of the world, though as a discourse it continued. The debate on peace still endeavoured to create an ideal form, but there was a growing acceptance that this attempt might not be possible. Thus, peace during the Cold War was still represented as liberal, at least in the West, but was also heavily militarised and geographically bounded. Furthermore, the attempt to theorise and construct something approximating the liberal peace, was taken up by many working within, or influenced by, North American branches of political realism (though Mearsheimer and others saw little possibility for the liberal peace because of the absence of a sovereign power to oversee the activities of states in an anarchic international system). Thus, in these terms, the advent of dynamite or nuclear weapons could be said to cause peace because the terrible consequences of their use.[4] The democratic peace continued to be an important part of the liberal repertoire, though ardent realists such as Mearsheimer continued to argue that liberal and liberal institutionalist arguments were fatally flawed.[5]

The thorny issue of a final conclusion on the nature of political, social and economic systems specifically constituting this peace was held in abeyance until the end of the Cold War by superpower competition. The popular conception of peace which came to be associated with these developments moved further away from the inter-state framework of a balance of power that continued to lurk in the framework of the UN Charter (in Article 2, paragraph 7, to mention one of several, which prevents the UN from impinging upon a states sovereignty), and of course, in the context of the Security Council. In dealing with issues of hard security, the UN may have been deficient. Even in issues of soft security, it has often been faulted (though what is less talked about is the humanitarian impact the UN has had on people's lives around the world, both positive and negative). Underlying this inter-state framework, and until 1989, was the balance of fear produced by weapons of mass destruction, which – perhaps for the first time ever – created the starkest choice of all. War could no longer be seen as an instrument of politics unless ways could be found to limit its escalation (and, of course, ways were found in numerous 'proxy wars' and between actors which had access only to conventional weapons). This meant that the alternatives, in the form of different versions of peace, needed to be seriously considered and that a balance of power/fear could not be considered 'peace'. Thus, the 'Cold War'

was described as such to indicate a realisation of basic conceptual, philosophical, and perhaps ontological differences between its two main exponents and their assorted supporters. They could only agree to a balance of power if the alternative was complete annihilation.

For those who drove the different agendas for thinking about peace, there was now an urgency as never before. Yet, many of these agendas and research programmes were deemed marginal by officials and state representatives who were wholly caught up in preventing a so-called Armageddon. But, in this conflict between different representations of peace and war in the international system, the seeds of the new liberal peace were developing, envisaged as multilaterally guaranteed, democratic, and incorporating mechanisms to ameliorate conflict, oppression, under-development, and human rights according to the standards universally established by liberal states, organisations, and institutions. The irony of this was that many of the institutions and organisations entrusted with this task were far from transparent or democratic themselves, and that the manner in which this whole process culminated in the intention to propagate the frameworks of the liberal peace was likewise an expression of the hegemony of dominant international states and actors.

The traditional schism between a limited peace and an ideal peace continued during the Cold War. This was apparent between those who accepted the nuclear balance of terror between two juxtaposed ideological superpowers was the best that could be achieved, and therefore was in fact a hot 'peace', and those who saw nuclear deterrence as a threat to an ideal form of peace still waiting to be achieved in the future. This 'future peace' therefore came to be dependent upon a peace movement that challenged deterrence theorists, strategists, and practitioners rather than acquiescing to them. This development was also initially associated with those who rejected the capitalist economic system in the West, and US dominance. This alliance, one manifestation of which was the Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament (CND), was based upon a rejection of the military-industrial sectors, which it was argued promoted injustice and instability, and on the familiar theme of disarmament as a route to peace.[6] The Korean and Vietnam Wars served to underline the inadequacies of the notion of the *status quo* as a form of peace amongst these quarters, while the Cuban Missile Crisis added a sense that a continuation of these types of discourses could actually lead to a nuclear exchange.

The Helsinki Accords and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were among the first indicators that not all state representatives believed that a new

and more ambitious form of peace was implausible. These stipulated free trade, communication and co-operation between East and West producing a basis for what was seen as a more Kantian version of peace.[7] This may have been so in the context of East-West relations, but in the former colonies wars were still fought over territory, resources and power and the democratic, constitutional, peace that Britain, for example, tried to leave behind in its African colonies proved little more than a chimera. Pacifism, the opposition to all violence, was an influence on responses to these developments and movements, but more often, pacificism, the opposition to aggression but not necessarily to the use of 'just' force, formed a more significant influence on the development of thinking about peace.[8] Pacificism values peace over war, but also highlights the relationship between the two, and therefore that peace can be moulded or constructed by the just use of force, as defined by specific constituencies.

One of the key issues of this period lay in the debate about sovereignty. Essentially, this revolved around the right of certain actors, in this case states, to define national and international agendas. The subtext here was and is that states are both the necessary actors both in conflict and in making peace. Yet this denies the obvious point that during the Cold War, peace and war were often heavily dependent upon non-state actors, and would become more so as time went on. This included not just the role of states, but of communities, tribes, ethnic groups, and private organisations and their different roles in peace and war. This was particularly the case outside of the West, though there were many non-state actors within the liberal world – ethnic groups, indigenous communities, and so forth – which had challenged their host states. In the developing world in particular, this mismatch between state cartographies and that of the basic units of traditional societies has been very important in both the emergence of conflict and the construction of peace. As Schwab has argued, the kinship system, clans, tribes and local communities are as important in the developing world as are individuals in the West.[9] This has far reaching implications for the monolithic understanding of the liberal frameworks required for the achievement of peace, given that the developing world constitutes a large majority where groups control land in trust rather than private ownership, and traditional authority is decidedly undemocratic and revolves around chiefs and councils. Political rights in such cases are secondary to the community.[10]

With the end of the Cold War, the triumphalism of the liberal-democratic, neoliberal and cosmopolitan version of peace perhaps

most famously elucidated by Francis Fukuyama,[11] for which the scene was set by the fall of the Soviet Union and its many satellites and dependencies, was short-lived. Briefly, it had seemed that the liberal peace was to provide the foundation for developing strands of international thought. Notably, Held's study on *Democracy and the Global Order,* Kaldor's study on *New and Old Wars*, Ian Clark's study, *The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace*, and Duffield's study, *Global Governance and the New Wars* all took the liberal peace as a key starting point for trying to understand the new order and the creation of peace in the international system in the post-Cold War environment. These three texts all examined, albeit in different ways, the manner in which the new peace was being constructed and extended, and whether this was a viable project. For Held, democracy, while underpinning political development was also under attack from counteractive social, economic, and transnational forces, but the path to a cosmopolitan, liberal peace, was apparent.[12] For Kaldor, ethnic identity conflicts, transnational crime, and human rights abuses, founded upon a globalised criminal political economy pitted particularism against cosmopolitanism, and thus threatened the liberal peace, which provided a worthy, cosmopolitan, goal. For Clark, the new peace was restrictive and regulative, but also plausible even if it was often based upon the use of force.[13] For Duffield, and in one of the most sustained critiques of the liberal peace in the context of governance and the so-called new wars, liberal systems of global governance and a radical development discourse emerged as a hybridised response to conflict, utilising multiple actors in the construction of a more insidious version of the liberal peace.[14] For Ikenberry, liberal theories provide at least part of the picture in endeavouring to understand the politics of order construction after major wars, particularly in the context of the use of institutions.[15] Not only are institutions used to construct a liberal peace, but that dominant states use them to reassure other states and actors that they themselves can also be restrained.[16] In this evolving debate, governance became the key and its reform, construction, and restraint integral to this new version of peace. The new liberal peace's first exemplar was probably the first Gulf War in which a UN mandate under Chapter VII was deployed against Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Multiple identity conflicts, religious conflicts, and regional conflicts would still arise and the international communities response to say conflict in the Balkans was, at least initially, one of containment rather than constructive engagement. Yet, intractable conflicts such as in the Middle East,

between India and Pakistan, in Northern Ireland, and between North and South Korea inched, if at all, to some sort of accommodation rather than were revolutionised by the new liberal peace. In the Great Lakes region of Africa, genocide, state collapse and civil war continued, as in Sudan. Somalia collapsed despite determined efforts on the part of the US and some UN allies. In the Balkans, Yugoslavia collapsed defying any notion of the West as a bastion of the liberal peace. In the Caucuses, Central Asia, in the former Soviet Republics, in Chechnya, secessionist, irredentist, and guerrilla wars continued apace. As Huntingdon famously argued, the clash of civilisations was the new threat to the liberal peace, the assumption being that the 'West' was subject to the liberal peace internally but was threatened by alien civilisations which defied this version of peace as contrary to their own.[17]

This new peace soon appeared to look more like what Bull called neo-medievalism, defying the liberal rhetoric that accompanied the gradual formulation and institutionalism of the liberal peace.[18] It was based upon a conception of conditionality and governance, developed in the context of international organisations. Thus, transitional governance, the disbursement of funds through the IMF or the World Bank, and many other forms of intervention are normatively and practically assessed according to the capacity of recipients to build the liberal norms of governance, security, and development into their reform process. This liberal rhetoric strengthened after the end of the Cold War, through international organisations such as the UN, institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, agencies such as UNDP and UNHCR, and many thousands of different types of NGOs, which for various complex reasons, adopted aspects of the liberal agenda. The World Bank, for example, now espouses a framework for conflict analysis in its Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, which acknowledges six key areas in which conflict needs to be addressed. These include social and ethnic relations, governance and political institutions, human rights and security, economic structure and performance, environment and natural resources, as well as other 'external factors'.[19] The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit works on development in conflict zones and the Post-Conflict Fund works on physical and social reconstruction initiatives. This is according to the mantra of what has been described as political and economic liberalisation, which clearly conforms to the liberal peace model.[20] The World Bank has in many areas where it is engaged, managed to bypass its own restrictions in its involvement in consolidating certain types of political arrangements

inherent in the liberal peace *vis-à-vis* development, by equating development with a broad range of governance activities inside conflict zones. At the same time, it is also very careful to defer to officially constituted host governments as the final responsibility for any particular policy.[21] (By the 1990s of course, the experience of conditionality had been mostly negative, as even the most conservative of commentators would admit).[22]

This Enlightenment derived process, drawing on the liberal internationalism of the immediate post-WWI world, the functionalist agendas of post-WWII, and on an uneasy mix of self-determination, liberal democracy, neoliberal economic reform, human rights, a balancing of state and human security, international legal regimes such as international human rights and humanitarian law, has increasingly become an accepted part of the liberal projection on how globalised world politics operates. It is also clear, however, that without states, this projection of peace may be extremely difficult as states still provide the basic building blocks upon which all these actors and activities are based. Though states make war possible, many other actors are also involved (the democratisation of the means of violence has undermined this Weberian argument), but specific states do make the liberal peace possible.[23] This is not unproblematic given that states and the officials that run their defence, military, and foreign policies are conditioned to assume war rather than peace is the most plausible outcome in international relations. They are also conditioned to perceive dangers in peace that may undermine the *status quo*, rather than see peace as a danger in itself. The problem with states, of course, is that they themselves need to be stable and secure before they can indulge in a liberal international agenda. Peace is actually an artificial, intricate and volatile state.[24]

The emerging liberal peace acknowledges this problem, that peace may not be a natural condition, organic to society given certain conditions, and it may indeed rest upon all manner of preconditions, social, economic, political and cultural. This essentially leads into a repetition of the domestic analogy: the conditions of international peace can only arise through institutional and organisational arrangements that reflect the arrangements made inside states which have achieved a domestic peace. This is represented in the integration of the constitutional peace agenda of the early peace plans investigated in the previous chapter with the institutionalist project, which emerges in the twentieth century. This is, of course, very problematic because many contemporary liberal states, which view themselves, or are viewed as

part of the liberal international peace, are not themselves necessarily fully peaceful domestically. For example, it should be sufficient to point to the secessionist or irredentist conflicts that marred the political landscapes of Britain, Ireland, Spain, France, Turkey, Morocco, Cyprus, in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, and so forth. Furthermore, there are still indigenous and traditional interstate conflicts across the world. In addition to this merging of the constitutional and institutional argument, the civil peace framework is also significant. The core of this argument about peace is that it should include a bottom-up process in which states become pacified and then contribute to an international peace, replacing or complimenting a top-down process in which international organisations and institutions, dominant liberal states, and private actors pacify conflict zones and then install the institutions of peace from the top-down. During the twentieth century these strands seem to have emerged as the dominant and most plausible approaches to creating this version of peace. Peace results from either a top down process performed upon conflicts by outside coalitions of actors, or it emerges from intra and inter-societal consensus and is then reflected in developments at the state and international level.

This type of thinking is reflected in the English School debates about an international society. Though Carr's seminal critique of the inter-war period was an attack on universalism,[25] his experiences at Versailles had led him to belief that peaceful change was the key problem that needed addressing in IR.[26] Elements within the English School were always aware of the possibility of fact that the norms of international society were actually rather limited.[27] Bull, for example, was able to be critical of both realism and of universalism.[28] Thus, the notion of international society as a framework for peace between states follows a narrow path between a limited notion of peace as a balance of power between states, and a far more sophisticated version in which peace is a product of stable social relations between states and within their societies. In the international environments from which the various figures associated with the development of the English School were drawing empirical data, it is all too easy to see international society as playing a role as a fanciful alternative to the crude realities of superpower relations. Yet, many of the components of peace which they debated and identified, have become an accepted part of the post-Cold War liberal peace. These include the principles of democracy and of national self-determination, which have become 'settled norms' though of course, their application,

implementation, and degree may still be open to question.[29] Sovereignty, another key component which has changed its meaning from the nineteenth century interpretation of conveying the right to make war, is a settled norm in the liberal peace framework[30] which represents both the institutional ordering system that provides the framework for the international system itself, and the constitutional ordering system to ensue the stability of state. The right of war is only relevant under specific conditions of defence. Ironically, the twentieth century was marked by a strong norm against humanitarian intervention because of the thick version of the sovereignty that was aspired to, and one that had not been present earlier. By the end of the century this had begun to break down in select instances such as in Kosovo in 1999 or Sierra Leone in 2001. Indeed, as a consequence of the war in Iraq in 2003 it looked like the normative and positivist framework surrounding the use of force in relation to sovereignty was beginning to shift despite much opposition.

The debate about 'just war' – a phrasal formulation that has been generally accepted without criticism despite its antithetical nature – provides a further strand from which an understanding of peace can be identified. This debate has found its most convincing explanation in Michael Walzer's Legalist Paradigm.[31] In this framework Walzer lays out a construction of war that may be used to create or maintain a just peace. This is mainly aimed at the protection of the norms of sovereignty and self-determination.[32] The Legalist Paradigm revolves around the existence of an international society of independent states based upon an international law that protects the territorial integrity, sovereignty and self-determination rights of its members. Any use of force that poses a threat to this is therefore, illegal. Aggression justifies wars of self-defence and a war of law enforcement. This builds upon the notions of international society found in the UN Charter, the London Charter of 1945, which established the Nuremburg Tribunal, and the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928.[33] It reflects an international system in which security and peace revolve around states and their inhabitants and the moral discourses therein. Difficulties clearly emerge for this paradigm once applied to phenomena of war and conflict which fall beyond its inherent predication upon state-centricity, challenges existing states, their boundaries, and their supposed Weberian control of the means of violence.[34] However, Walzer is clear that his concern lies more with political communities rather than states, perhaps reflecting this contemporary shift in the various phenomena of violence. This approach to maintaining order makes the classic move associated with

both realist and liberal thought of empowering states with the protection of political communities despite the fact that it is often states and their nationalist elites that are in conflict with local or transnational political communities. Walzer's later amendments to the Legalist Paradigm moves some way to recognising these problems.[35] In these he outlines a doctrine of pre-emptive war that allows states to respond to threatened attacks, in which boundaries may contain more than one political community, in which secessionism or irredentism may require intervention or even a counter-intervention, and in which the violation of human rights may possibly justify intervention.

This readjustment shadowed a general dissatisfaction with the norm of non-intervention in liberal quarters, and particularly where the identification of the shape of the liberal peace was strongly affirmed. The contours of the debate indicated a tension between the main discourses of the liberal peace, and particularly between its state-centric aspects associated with its institutional and constitutional versions, and the civil discourse of peace. The state-centric norm of non-intervention soon betrayed its flaws and contradictions with the norm of universal human rights and this has given rise to numerous non-state or multilateral fora in which this tension has at least been partially addressed (while at the same time also being emphasised). The ICRC provides an excellent example of this tension. The ICRC is mandated to 'protect the lives and dignities of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance', by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which provided the organisation with legal standing under international law. The ICRC has very carefully, and often controversially, preserved certain key conditions under which it operates in the field. The organisation observes strict neutrality, impartiality and independence, in return for the privileges (mainly of access) and immunities granted to it by host states. Of course, the implication of this is that the organisation has and will be torn between its status, its objectives of a liberal peace within a state's civil society, and the interests of states also operating in conflict zones. The norm of non-intervention effectively allowed human rights abuses, humanitarian disasters, ethnic cleansing and genocide, phenomena that undermined the assertion of a liberal international order. Such difficulties emerged in multiple contexts – in the Middle East after the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, in India and Pakistan during Partition in 1948, in the attempted secession of Katanga in the Congo in 1960, during the war between East and West Pakistan in 1971 and the subsequent intervention, in the attempted secession of Biafra during the Nigerian

Civil War 1967–1970 (and numerous other cases). Indeed, it was the case of Biafra that brought to international attention the issue of intervention on humanitarian grounds. The very controversial role of humanitarian organisations such as ICRC and Oxfam were aimed at preventing genocide if Biafra was defeated. When in 1968, the Nigerian federal government forbade assistance to the rebels, the ICRC withdrew but Oxfam and others continued. This, it has been argued, led to the continuation of the war and furthermore, upon the defeat of Biafra genocide did not actually take place. Humanitarianism was given an early political lesson. Henceforth, non-intervention became a much-disputed norm in unofficial humanitarian intervention with some NGOs deciding to work only within the context of state consent. Famously, a splinter organisation from ICRC led by Bernard Kouchner broke with these norms, and rejected the historical status and guardianship of the ICRC of humanitarianism, and articulated a separate and non-state 'right of humanitarian intervention'. Whether this was a legal right or norm was ambiguous, but the intent was clear. Humanitarianism and peace were too important to be left solely within the domain of state activity, and the civil discourses of peace and the coalescence of actors around them challenged the dominant state-centric discourse of peace. Despite these developments, humanitarian intervention as a right was not exercised in the cases of the West Bengal crisis of 1971, the Vietnamese overthrow of Pol Pot in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979,[36] but the 1990s heralded the return of an occasional practice of humanitarian intervention,[37] heralded by UN Security Council Resolution 688 and humanitarian action on behalf of the Kurds in northern Iraq during and after the first Gulf War. While the tension between state and non-state discourses on peace was not resolved, any divergence tended to be ignored in the context of the general adherence to the broader debate on constituting the liberal peace.

The most recent of these debates has been about humanitarian intervention in response to the so-called 'new wars' of the 1990s, as a basis upon which the liberal peace can be installed.[38] There is a long tradition that humanitarian intervention may do more harm than good and also that responsibilities to others transcends state boundaries. Given the injunction to 'do no harm', which is measured against the liberal peace, this tension requires consideration[39] especially if we accept that the failure to respond to human suffering may also constitute harm, as aspects of the liberal peace argument intimate.[40] Consequently, this debate has increasingly highlighted the fragility of

the norm of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of states. The norm of non-intervention has generally been regarded as a fundamental part of the Westphalian system,[41] which may only be ignored if gross violations of human rights are taking place (here the example of the ending of the slave trade is often given). Finnemore argues that this development hinges on changing notions of what it means to be 'human', a term that has only relatively recently been deployed universally for all of humanity.[42] Clearly, however, within the category of humanity there still exist ethnocentric and racial categories that play a role in debates about war and intervention. Despite this, the debate about humanitarian intervention posits that liberal states have a duty to help those whose humanity is threatened, and therefore provides the agents of the liberal peace with a normative right of intervention in the institutional, constitutional and civil society mechanisms which may impede the liberal peace and cause humanitarian disaster. Through this argument, the liberal peace, identified and negotiated, provides legitimacy for multiple forms of intervention condition for its installation.

These issues have formed the main interest of such debates, mainly focused upon the legal rights associated with humanitarian intervention and their normative implications *within* a liberal discourse of peace, and pragmatic issues such as organisation and efficacy. They have generally not discussed the implications for the liberal peace, however. In one of the best of the many recent contributions on humanitarian intervention Ramsbotham and Woodhouse provide a framework spanning initiation, process and mechanisms, objectives and actual outcome to determine whether an intervention is humanitarian in character.[43] This refers to the debate on humanitarian intervention within a philosophical and practical framework, which demands a reflection upon basic normative and pragmatic assumptions about such forms of intervention associated with the liberal peace. Nye, for example, has argued that humanitarian intervention should respect the following requirements: that it is perceived as just; means and ends are proportional; success is likely; and that the humanitarian cause coincides with other national interests.[44] This conception of humanitarian intervention implies that humanitarian crises, which do not affect the national interest of a state in the world, may go unattended. Furthermore, this framework is very much dependent upon 'national' capacity and a 'national' definition of what constitutes a humanitarian problem and how this links into specific national interests. Its implications for the construction of peace therefore suggests it

is often selectively based upon interest, defined in 'thick' or 'thin' liberal terms. Reflecting this, Bellamy has argued that that within the contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention there are three key questions relating to what constitutes a humanitarian emergency, if there is there a right of intervention, and how states and militaries should conduct themselves in the process?[45] Along with Wheeler, he argues that there are essentially two main responses stemming from the pluralist and solidarist approaches. The former generally assumes that the problems created by intervention are conceptually too difficult for such a project to be undertaken unless national interests are at stake, while the latter argues that a cosmopolitan international society has concurred on these questions and therefore can construct a conceptually sound response with both international and local consensus to carry it out.[46] Increasingly, the solidarist view has become dominant, and as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty demonstrated in its report of 2001, the right to intervene is increasing set against the 'responsibility to protect'.[47] In other words, this is not a legal debate about what is acceptable in the Westphalian international system which needs to balance security with intervention, but what is acceptable in a liberal international system in which humanitarian norms take precedence over the type of security associated with the norm of non-intervention. It could also be argued that the modern states-system is a quasi-imperial formation[48] resting on territorial sovereignty and non-intervention. The period of decolonisation exported these norms and regimes around the world, emphasising their legalistic and universal nature. These norms are themselves often sources of competition and conflict and have been substantially modified recently with new regimes based upon the limitation of violence, the rights of groups, peoples, and individuals, perhaps most famously brought to the fore by the discourses and practices of humanitarian intervention. Thus, humanitarian intervention and its associated normative frameworks could be seen as a hegemonic project, based upon the more coercive and less consensual exportation of the liberal peace.

An example of this tension can be found in the work of Rawls, who has argued, based upon his early work in *Theory of Justice*,[49] that there exists 'liberal peoples' who have a common moral nature, sympathies, and who are governed by a reasonably just constitutional democracy.[50] This he combines with the notion of the democratic peace and the expansion of the number of democracies based upon this.[51] Rawls argues that this can also be extended to non-liberal people provided

that they meet certain criteria.[52] These criteria are problematic, however, as it looks as if Rawls is using liberal frameworks to create a liberal relationship between liberal and non-liberal peoples. In practice, this has occurred (say between Jordan and liberal states), but as the Iraq war in 2003–4 showed this can often be very unsatisfactory.

The democratic peace thesis has come to underpin attempts by the liberal international community to reconstruct the failed or failing states that emerged after the end of the Cold War. This thesis represents an intellectual acceptance of US policy in promoting democracy during the twentieth century, starting with the elucidation of the relevant principles at Versailles, then the installation of democracy and nation-building in post-war Japan and Germany,[53] the US experience in Vietnam, and then a string of interventions from Panama to Grenada, Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia.[54] The UN, and international institutions, organisations, agencies, and NGOs, have all adopted the assumptions inherent in democratic peace theory partly because of their own conditional relationships with the US and other major sponsors of humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding. There is a generally held view that the democratic peace thesis comes very close to a 'law' in terms of the workings of IR. Elshtain reflects a commonly accepted view in her argument that states are central to the creation of suitable democratic conditions in which civil society can flourish.[55] Rawls agrees that people living in democracies have '…nothing to go to war about…' this being patently not the case![56] Indeed, it has become generally acceptable to use the concepts of the democratic peace and the liberal peace interchangeably.[57] The democratic peace argument may therefore be empirically doubtful as a universal rule, and much debate has focused upon the difficulty of deciding exactly what constitutes a democracy, as well as what kind of economic conditions are best suited to democratisation. There is a consensus that democracy is a somewhat contested concept, and that its relationship with developing or post-conflict economies is problematic. Yet it remains one of liberal IR theory's core assumptions.[58] The democratic peace argument is inherently tied to forms of political liberalism. There are three main categories of liberalism in this debate, including conservative-liberalism, left-liberalism, and radical-liberalism. These variants respond to the democratic peace proposition in different ways, and in particularly to the orthodoxy that democracies do not go to war with other democratic states.[59] Essentially what transpires from this argument is that the democratic peace proposition only addresses itself to a limited number of the issues that hinders the creation of general

peace in the international system. For example, are democracies more likely to intervene in a non-democratic state to end genocide? The events in Rwanda in 1994 initially saw democracies refuse to intervene and it was left to African non-democracies to respond if they saw fit. Liberal state intervention, when it finally came, ended up effectively being of more benefit to the perpetrators of genocide that to the victims, at least in the early phases of the intervention. If this is the case, then, taking the moral high-ground due to internal politics may not be sufficient justification for the claim that democracy may lead to a form of world peace. Furthermore, as Lewis has illustrated *vis-à-vis* terrorism in the context of those who feel wronged in someway by democratic states, democracy means that all are culpable for decision-making outcomes.[60]

Snyder has made one of the most concerted critiques of democratisation in action, and its implications for the development of stable polities. Democratisation is not necessarily a process that begins with the holding of free and fair elections, especially in instances where post-colonial patronage, political alignment, and factionalism means that politics during democratisation accentuates ethnic divisions.[61] Thus, democratisation may occur later on during a process of stabilisation. This represents a step back from the assumption that democratisation is a foundational part of the liberal peace and opens up the possibility of other, preliminary, and possibly illiberal, formulations. The assumption that democracy is a route to 'peacefulness' can also be countered on the basis that democracy has a colonial dark-side in which democratic and liberal states were often the worst offenders against indigenous inhabitants of their colonies in terms of committing acts of ethnic cleansing.[62] Indeed, Michael Mann goes as far as to argue that genocide became an extreme consequence of 'We the people…'.[63] Perhaps, as Zakaria has argued, the main task facing the proponents of the democratic/liberal peace is to '…make democracy safe for the world.'[64] Perhaps, what is most important from the point of view of the construction of the liberal peace is that it tends to ignore the fact that there are differing levels of democratisation and the illiberal transitional period into a well-established market democracy is a period in which the institutions of state and civil society are extremely fragile.

There were many continuities with the situations that emerged in states which collapsed once Cold War structures were removed with the situation on the ground during decolonisation, and the response of the international community in many cases was to assume that the

'democratic peace thesis' was sufficient basis upon which state reconstruction could be legitimately grounded. This, of course, raised the question of whether this was sufficient to legitimate forcible installations of liberal democracy. Despite these concerns, democratisation has become a cornerstone of the emerging consensus on the liberal peace as has been illustrated in much of the relevant UN documentation since *Agenda for Peace*. Kofi Annan has argued that democratic governance, along with human rights, is essential in restoring 'domestic peace'.[65] Furthermore, he has linked this to what he calls 'democratic international peace', which reflects a policy consensus on the democratic peace argument.[66] The UN organisation continues to be the organisation around which much of the conceptualisation of the liberal peace as an ideal form is focused. UN General Assembly resolutions have recently laid out the character of this particular conceptualisation of peace, in which the construction of the liberal peace revolves around education, consensus, non-violence, sustainable economic and social development, human rights, social equality, democratic participation, pluralism, and access to knowledge and free communication.[67] This characterisation stems from long-standing UNESCO project dating back to 1989.[68]

Such assumptions represent the apogee of liberal international thought in which liberal and democratic norms, derived from Kant, form the building blocks of national and international peace.[69] These debates have led to a '"conflict-centred" appreciation of the creation of liberal peace through war.'[70] The implications of this are clear: either we must accept that peace is a form of hegemony, sometime imported through forcible intervention, or built through social, political and economic intervention and engineering, or we accept that this is a corruption of an ideal of peace. Either way, it must be accepted that we are perhaps consciously, but probably unconsciously replicating the classic realist-idealist dichotomies about war and international relations. Indeed, Buchanan goes as far as to argue that Kant himself was certainly not a theorist of the democratic peace.[71] This is part of what he sees to be the process of forcible 'civilisation' of illiberal actors and states enacted by those who profess to follow the liberal tradition.[72] This brings together the processes of liberalism, the 'civilising mission', and imperialism – something that seems to have been replicated in the discourses on peace and war within international relations.[73] This also ties in with one of the main ways in which Western societies now choose to conceive of peace, in terms of civil society and the civil peace discourse.[74] This line of thought is derived from a Kantian faith

in the expectation that civil society would want to be at peace, and democratic peace theory, a key component of the liberal peace, is directly derived from this line of thought.[75]

As Chapter 1 and this chapter have endeavoured to show, perhaps the most common analyses of peace and war have come about through the debate about the nature of the international system directly after a major war, or in terms of the contemporary shape of the international system.[76] Clark's study of the shape of the post-Cold War order, and Ikenberry's study about the shape of the international order after the peace settlements of 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945 concur in that they both agree that to understand order one must look at the way in which major systemic wars are ended, and what then follows. This implies that peace is constructed mainly as an outcome of war, of course, this being one of the most common approaches, linked to the long-standing concept of the victor's peace, with its binary, geospatial, temporal, and now liberal peace implications. This argument that peace is somehow contingent upon war is a common trope of hard and soft debates about security in the realms of Realpolitik. Peace either occurs after a major war and is constructed upon its ruins or is constructed directly through war or the use of force. Either way, a common occurrence after a major war is the institutionalisation of the new peace by the remaining dominant actors (usually states) in the international system.[77] This is to 'lock in' the new order, and to establish restraints on state power including on allies, competitors and one's own state. Thus, in the context of post-WWII, the US occupied and reconstructed Germany and Japan, established the Bretton Woods Institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the US–Japan security treaty.[78] This conforms to the contemporary argument implicit in liberal and constructivist accounts of IR, that institutions are key guarantors of the normative compliance necessary for the liberal peace to survive.[79]

This approach to the establishment of a sustainable peace is reflected in what Cooper has called, a 'post-modern' peace.[80] This argument about peace is explicitly linear, and of course, does not use the term 'post-modern' in a way that many academics would recognise. What this seems to refer to is a peace that has gone beyond what was previously known by past configurations, but one which is solidly rooted in the Western liberal development of the international system (rather than as a rejection of that system, which might be more recognisable to most understandings of post-modernism). Thus, Cooper argues that previously order meant empire, which roughly translates into a more

contemporary understanding of peace based upon the extension of hegemony through liberal inducements and coercion.[81] This looks very similar to Hardt and Negri's notion of imperial sovereignty; more specifically, the increasing 'non-place' of empire, progressively blurring distinctions between inside and outside, and supported by a notion of 'omni-crisis'.[82] Cooper sees the world as divided into the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern, in which a new imperialism is quite plausible and may be equated with the modern peace effectively.[83] Hardt and Negri imply that imperial sovereignty, which Cooper might describe as the post-modern peace (in which transnationalism and supranationalism have taken hold of some regions as in the case of the EU)[84] is effectively rooted in hegemony and domination. However, Cooper would disagree because its components are liberal and therefore universal, in his terms. The hybrid notion of the liberal peace is now implicit within both cosmopolitan and constructivist accounts of IR, which essentially function on the basis of universalism and the subsequent legitimation of intervention in the social and political lives and structures of others.

This view of the liberal peace seems to concur with Spinoza's notion of peace, cited at the beginning of this chapter: 'Peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, and justice.' In other words, within the liberal peace exists war and violence, despite its best intentions.

Peace as governance

This brings the contemporary argument about the construction of a liberal peace to a key moment engendered in the contemporary 'governance' discourse of peace, which has become more prominent along with debates upon intervention.[85] The liberal peace had come to be understood as a Platonic ideal form achieved through specific forms of intervention and governance, despite its many inadequacies. This derived from the earliest attempts of political theorists in the Western tradition that focused upon the form of government required to create a durable peace. Recent theory and practice in IR and peace and conflict theory concur, at least for the most part (more radical strands of thought associated with post-structuralism provides a much more complicated picture). Dealing with conflict now depends upon the reform of governance directed by an alliance of actors which become custodians of the liberal peace and enforce this relationship through the use of conditionality between the

different actors involved and recipients of the liberal peace. There is now a consensus about what form this should take along the lines suggested by Kant, Locke, and Mill. The liberal peace discourse has effectively become a Leviathan which all must assume and accept unquestioningly as a counter to the Hobbesian state of nature. The contemporary argument about the nature of peace is now focused mainly on the effective methods to be deployed to achieve the liberal peace.

Falk has done much to elucidate the different historical and contemporary trends that have now been drawn together in various ways to contribute to contemporary debates about peace and war. In *On Humane Governance* he outlines the trends of thought that have led to the construction of the liberal peace, and the emergence of the synthesis of peace with governance. This is as a result of the attempt to reconstruct the international system to allow and encourage social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, human rights, and demilitarisation.[86] This has resulted in the strong association of the liberal peace project with the reconstruction of approaches to governance, within states and in the international system, and involving economic, political, and social intervention.

This project incorporates a normative attempt to achieve a number of key goals as follows. Taming war revolved around regulating its use in a Grotian fashion, from the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (which attempted to regulate the tactics and weaponry used in warfare, to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and avoid cruelty) to the Geneva conventions of 1864 and 1949 and the emergence of international humanitarian law.[87] These conventions outlined the responsibilities inherent in waging war, including protecting victims and prisoners. These conditions were expanded in the Geneva Protocols of 1977, which focused on regulating weapons of mass destruction.[88] These attempts have been seen as both progressive and as hypocritical. Furthermore, while the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dealt with states and war, the Additional Protocols of 1977 recognised the roles of actors that are not states.[89] This means that there has been some development beyond the traditional Westphalian view that states make, and respond to war: it is recognised in these protocols that groups, which are well defined, have a capacity to engage in both war and in the construction of peace.[90] Indeed, the legal notion of 'insurgents' has always implied that non-state actors engaged in conflict have a form of international and domestic status despite not being representatives of states.

Abolishing war forms a more idealistic strand of this endeavour, as exemplified through the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928, which abolished war as a form of politics, only allowing its use in the context of aggression and self-defence (it is still technically in force).[91] This was reproduced in the UN Charter, Article 2 (4), which prohibits the use of force in accordance with the terms of Article 51 (i.e. only in self-defence).

Holding individuals accountable for activities during war forms the next strand of the attempt to moderate and regulate its use, as can be seen through the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals after WWII. This led to the authoritative formulation of the Nuremberg Principles by the International Law Commission at the UN in 1950.[92] This has been extended by the war crimes tribunals established in the 1990s to examine cases relating to Bosnia and Rwanda, and a growing number of other cases.

Collective security forms another strand of attempts to moderate peace and war by replacing geopolitics with international regimes resting on global consensus. The most notable embodiment of collective security exists in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the degree of consensus required to enable the UN to use force has rarely been attainable – only in special circumstances, such as over Korea in 1950, Kuwait in 1990, and Somalia in 1992. Over Kosovo and Iraq in 1998 and 2003 respectively, a lack of consensus resulted in the bypassing of the Security Council and Chapter VII authorisations of the use of force. An alternative to this approach (one which could even be described as complementary to collective security thinking) can be found in debates on the rule of law. The use of judicial procedures to provide frameworks in which disputes can be settled mirrors the legal system that exists within the state framework, with the significant difference that there does not as yet exist a coherent and efficient global enforcement capacity that is universally agreed and responsive. The establishment of the World Court at The Hague in 1920 was the first step towards producing such a capacity, which of course, has been followed up in the guise of the International Court of Justice (see also International Criminal Courts and International Courts of Human Rights). Many states have been reluctant to recognise the legitimacy of such procedures as outweighing their own judicial frameworks or political interests. However, these regimes rest upon a general agreement that humanity carries innate rights, which states and governments are duty bound to respect.[93] This, of course, raises the question of the universality of these rights which rests upon their being ontologically natural rights rather than social.

Other themes Falk identifies include non-violent revolutionary politics, such as the strategies of resistance associated with Gandhi and Martin Luther King, the 'realisation' of the implications of human rights and resistance to genocidal practices as exemplified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the role and demands of the natural environment, and cosmopolitan democracy.[94] These multiple themes are part of what Falk terms 'humane governance', forming a broad view of the liberal peace in rather more emancipatory terms than other versions under consideration in this study.

Gilpin has argued that governance change occurs as part of a system ordering process in which alterations occur in the distribution of power, prestige, and 'rules and rights embodied in the system'.[95] This often reflects hegemony on the part of a 'lead state'. In an intricate manner, thinking, discourse and policy about peace, and strategies used for ending conflict by multiple actors in multiple issue areas, converge upon the attempt to reconstruct governance at the local, regional and international level by those integral to the hegemonic mantras of liberal peace creation. Thus, if we take Ikenberry's three versions of international order which revolve around the balance of power, hegemony, and constitutionalism,[96] all three converge in this version of peace. The balance of power framework elucidated by Waltz provides the hard security and a negative governing of peace through the use of and balancing of threat and force.[97] Hegemonic order presents a softer additional framework of peace created and sustained through hegemonic governance, or coercive domination in Ikenberry's terms,[98] in which dominant actors define and sustain order.[99] Constitutional orders revolve around political orders based upon agreed rights and limitations broadly institutionalised throughout the international system, though perhaps limited to actors which are most closely associated with such constitutional order.[100] This is roughly similar to the disjuncture between realist and liberal thinking about peace, such that it is. Realism sees peace as existing in a basic level of order, whereas liberal approaches see a complex process which constructs a much more ambitious universal form of peace. The liberal peace that has replaced the Cold War is an institutionalised peace,[101] in which governance and regimes set by dominant actors such as the US and the UN, the World Bank, and so forth, are established to bring a sustainable end to conflict. The debate on multilateralism is also important here,[102] as it is generally accepted that it may enhance the legitimacy of these forms of governance and the processes by which they are inserted in the conflict zones.

Notwithstanding multilateralism, which depends upon universality and non-exclusivity, such approaches have serious shortcomings from the perspective of post-structural debates and their implications for this association of the liberal peace with certain modes of governance. As Foucalt has argued, we '…live in an era of 'governmentality'.[103] Societies and international relations are ordered by sovereign governments and where conflict exists, governmentality in a liberal vein is what is required from this perspective. This is controlled by states and their institutions operating in a traditional top-down manner. Thus, states and liberal governance provide the international system with a continuity that is viewed by its dominant actors as sustainable. Given the emergence of a non-governmental, private and public strand of peace (the civil peace), it would also be accurate to say that non-state, non-official forms of governance have also become important at the civil society level in constructing the liberal peace. This debate, associated with human security, is essentially a form of biopower[104] in actors are empowered and enabled to intervene in the most private aspects of human life as their contribution to the development of the liberal peace. Consequently, the evolution of thinking about peace and the evolution of strategies for making peace have now converged upon strategies to install or reform liberal governance in recognisable state entities. Governance has become a key part of the vocabulary of IR.[105] This governance is super-territorial, multi-layered, incorporating official and private actors from the local to the global, institutionalised in the alphabet soup of agencies, organisations, and institutions,[106] but such actors also rely on dominant states and their institutions for its direction. It is represented as neutral, objective, benevolent for the most part, and yet at the same time, is often also accused of effectively maintaining insidious practices of intervention upon host and recipient communities.[107] In this vein, it has been argued that global governance aims to increase power over life, rather than death as in geostrategic debates in IR, in its attempts to equate good governance with equitable development and neoliberal economic policy.[108] It presents a collusion between socio-economic development and political reform, and results in a relationship of conditionality between its agents and recipients, as is mirrored in such relationships which include the World Bank, the UN and its agencies, and NGOs. This is effectively conceived as an example of social, cultural, political, and economic under-development, which the liberal peace attempts to reform and replace with a conditional relationship based upon hegemonic intervention at worst, or through the installation of new modes of liberal governance, negotiated between hosts and interveners at best.

Globalisation and threats to the liberal peace

The much-contested phenomena of globalisation has had a major impact on the development of approaches to the construction of peace. Globalisation has raised public and political pressure and awareness in the West to respond to conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and inequalities on their periphery and beyond, and reconstruct a liberal peace. Yet, at the same time aspects of globalisation have also underlined the problematic aspects of the one-size fits-all liberal peace model that are perpetuated through conflict endings, while also providing capacities which may allow terrorism, or provoke particularism and ethnic conflict. This also has an impact on how those caught up in conflict react to intervention and peacebuilding approaches. These concepts and practices tend to be based on developing Western liberal norms pertaining to an uneasy collusion between so-called human and state security. This tension drove the increasingly interventionary practices observable in response to conflicts in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and others, and also caused a backlash against inaction in the case of Rwanda. This globalisation of a specific ontology and a 'positive epistemology' of peace in many contemporary responses to conflict is constituted by conflicting forces that require more intervention into its different aspects, ultimately requiring the importation into conflict zones of alternative forms of governance. The globalisation of responses to conflict has thus produced pressures for more comprehensive approaches to intervention. This can be seen in the apparent 'peacebuilding consensus', which appears to have tested the will and consensus of the international community in ways which merit further examination. The globalisation of responses to conflict in order to construct a new peace is conditioned by the norms that infuse dominant states and major international institutions such as the World Bank and organisations such as the UN, as well as NGOs and other actors. This globalisation of peacebuilding as a liberal and democratic ideology,[109] promoted by a liberal conception of international order, has created a great burden for the UN system in particular. The irony is that though it is driven by Western perceptions of humanitarianism, the dominant Western state – the US – was until after the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, unwilling to support the UN and foot the bill for, or take part in, the projection of such a normative order, focusing instead on its own strategies for economic globalisation and concurrent political liberalisation. Where necessary, as was seen in Somalia, in the later responses to the conflict in Bosnia, in Kosovo, Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003, US foreign policy has

tend to veer towards the use of force and the renegotiation of the norm of intervention to incorporate 'preventive war', with or without the UN.[110]

It is important to consider what impact globalisation had on the understanding of far-flung conflicts and types of provisions made for their management and settlement. What impact has the increasing international awareness of inequality, the hegemony of the West, and the resources that the international system provides disputants, had on the emergence and conduct of, and responses to, conflict? Globalisation has been presented as both a solution to conflict through promoting liberalisation, democratisation, development, human rights and free trade – as the concept of the liberal peace entails – and as an agent of hegemony, of the domination of the Western economy, norms, and actors over others. Clearly, globalisation has highlighted the broad range of conflict and complex emergencies across the world, yet has also moved the goalposts of the application of peacebuilding tools, thereby increasing the complexity and expectations of peacebuilding and the increasing the amount of resources needed. Paradoxically, the dynamics associated with globalisation have also highlighted the limited and essentially Western nature of the liberal practices deployed to deal with conflict. This essentially reflects the Wilsonian Triad,[111] and possible colonial interpretations of this.[112] Given that much contemporary conflict has been characterised as intrastate, ethnic, or identity based – as international-social conflict,[113] it is clear that the roles of globalisation and fragmentation have become vital in how we understand both conflict and attempts to end it. McGrew argues that an emergent global society is based on the Enlightenment belief in the similarity of humanity, and the importance of interdependence, and is leading to a shared vision of world order.[114] However, there are major disagreements about the nature of globalisation, ranging from the view that it as a product of interdependence, new technology, free markets, and a form of voluntary association leading to the 'good life' for all participants, to the argument that it is the result of the economic and political dominance and proselytising of the hegemonic West (and in particular the US and its particular form of capitalism and its strategic interests).

There is general agreement that globalisation is causing change in the order of sovereign states, though the level of their dissolution is contested, ranging from the argument that the Westphalian system is breaking down, to the belief that it is in the process of a modification which will keep the system more or less intact. This seems to point to

either the eventuality of global governance of some sort, or a retreat to protectionism and possible cultural, political and economic, isolation in an attempt to both preserve difference and to protect against it. Waters has argued that globalisation is 'a consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet *via* settlement, colonization and cultural mimesis'.[115] Yet this mimesis might be leading to the resurgence of ethnonationalism. This is highlighted in the debate about the response of cosmopolitan and local cultures in promoting or reacting to globalisation, leading to both a deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of identities.[116]

The key perspectives in the globalisation debate have been summarised as follows. Globalisation can be seen as internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, or deterritorialisation, of which only the latter presents something new.[117] All of these interpretations provide alternative perspectives of peace and ways in which it can be attained. The internationalisation model would see peace as zero-sum and gained through alliances with other states. The liberalisation model would see peace as dependent upon the adoption of Western liberal structures and procedures. The universalisation model would extend this to a debate about how liberal models could be applied to (or imposed on) all. Finally, the deterritorialisation model implied that peace would no longer be chained to a rigid order of territorial sovereignty, but that this would come about because of the influence of markets and global civil society, perhaps without the acquiescence of states. However, while Scholte sees the possibility of post-sovereign governance,[118] its character is still inherently statecentric (therefore dominated by Western states, meaning also that peace, intervention, order, and conflict tend to be defined by those states).

Scholte argues that globalisation has highlighted broader understandings of security and, in particular, human security:

> …[I]n some respects globalisation has promoted increased human security, for example, with disincentives to war, improved means of humanitarian relief, new job opportunities, and greater pluralism. However, in other ways globalisation has perpetuated or even deepened warfare, environmental degradation, poverty, unemployment, exploitation of workers, and social disintegration.[119]

This is illustrated by the polarised debates about the links between globalisation and security, and also by the possibility that globalisation raises normative questions about security well beyond the traditional

limits of the state (though it also tends to highlight global social hierarchies). This also raises debates about whether globalisation enhances or undermines popular participation and consent procedures. Axeworthy has argued that globalisation has made security indivisible and human suffering an irrevocable universal concern.[120] This has dictated a normative and practical role to governments, world markets, communicational facilities, civil society, IGOs and NGOs in facilitating better conditions for those caught up in violence or disasters. Axeworthy has pointed out that coalition building now occurs to address such issues between like minded state and non-state actors, creating a 'new diplomacy'.[121] We can also point to the Washington Consensus as an aspect of this development,[122] which, as with debates about globalisation has been linked to both neoliberalism and 'market fundamentalism'.[123] This is important in the context of the globalisation of responses to conflict because of the conditionality associated with the work of the World Bank and IMF in conflict zones. This conditionality is mirrored by the broader activities of states, organisations, institutions and NGOs when they construct interventions, gather funding for those interventions, and develop relationships with actors involved in conflict through the various political, economic, developmental, and social reform projects peacebuilding entails.

Kaldor has proposed that the 'new wars' that have marked the post-Cold War era have to be understood in the context of globalisation.[124] She argues that the increase of global interconnectedness in all of its many dimensions is a contradictory process involving homogenisation, integration, fragmentation, diversification and localisation. Also important in her view are the increasingly global presences in these new wars, of international reporters, mercenaries, advisors, diaspora volunteers, and many international agencies – members of a 'global class' who bring their norms and values into the conflict environment – which often results in the counter-emphasis of the norms of those involved directly in the conflict but who are excluded from global processes.[125] Furthermore these conflicts occur in the context of the global decline of sovereignty and the disintegration of the state where its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence is increasingly contested. This contestation has occurred through transnational and private processes, from above and below, illustrating the core of contemporary conflict – particularistic values and identities versus cosmopolitanism, the latter as a result of choice and integration or hegemony, assimilation, and coercion, militarily, culturally, economically and politically. Conflicts might now be characterised as between those who favour globalisation and its

many processes, and those who do not, or perhaps more accurately, those who are excluded and those who are included. Much of the literature eulogising globalisation seems to imply that it is, or at least leads to, peace. Similarly, the creation of peace is often seen as an opportunity to become 'globalised' and to reap its many benefits. Similar implications can be drawn from supportive analyses of imperialism and colonialism from the pre-war and interwar periods.[126]

Clark has perhaps provided the most comprehensive analysis of the role of globalisation *vis-à-vis* the creation of a liberal local, regional, and systemic peace in his account of what he calls the division of the 'spoils of peace' after the end of the Cold War. Globalisation is a key agent and structure though which a liberal peace has been constructed'.[127] Clarke's view is that the West's agency with respect to globalisation is limited but that there is a convergence between globalisation and a Western liberal agenda. Crucially, globalisation has become embedded in the post-Cold War settlement – which has become the model for the creation of 'peace' (though we should not confuse peace with peacemaking).[128] This is not such a radical departure as one might assume in that globalisation infers continuities with previous international dynamics (such as imperialism) and contains both regulative and distributive dynamics.[129]

The debates around cosmopolitanism are also important in developing and understanding of the relationship between globalisation and peace. According to Held the objective of cosmopolitanism is to build an '…ethically sound and politically robust conception of the proper basis of political community, and of the relations among communities.'[130] This rests on four principles, which seem to be as follows: individuals are the core moral unit of IR; individuals have equal worth; that collective decision making should reflect the involvement of those affected; and that political decision making should be decentralised, but also reflect broader universal democratic principles.[131] Held argues that the key principles of '…egalitarian individualism, reciprocal recognition, consent, and inclusiveness and subsidiarity…' have been elucidated clearly in instruments such as the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, in the Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals in 1945–48, the Torture Convention of 1984, and of course the statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998.[132] Despite this recognition of such principles, Held argues that this has '…not… generated a new deep-rooted structure of cosmopolitan regulation and accountability.'[133] What is required therefore is a framework of cosmopolitan multilateralism in which a reformed UN

General Assembly, regional parliaments and governance structures, transparency in functional intergovernmental organisations, a broad use of regional or global referenda, and a 'cosmopolitan law enforcement and coercive capability' would be created or employed.[134] This radical agenda seems to exist already in at least a nascent form, though this does not mean that its ambitions are unproblematic. The connections between globalisation, cosmopolitanism, and an understanding of contemporary peace, and a peace to be achieved in the future, need much more examination.

Both Scholte and Clark concur that equating globalisation with peace is simplistic[135] and globalisation cannot be assumed to be a 'pacifying process'.[136] Conversely, simplistic assumptions that globalisation exports conflict, domination, and hegemony must also be treated with caution. But there are elements of all of these possibilities, given that globalisation includes certain dynamics such as the democratic peace framework,[137] and that globalisation and democratisation are often seen as parallel processes.[138] Yet globalisation underlines the limitations of democracy, particularly in zones of conflict, and with the lack of democracy within international institutions. Giddens argues that a global cosmopolitanism is the result of this process, though emerging in a somewhat chaotic form.[139] Also included in this must also be the export of human rights, neoliberal economics, development and so on. This parallels Clark's notion of peacemaking as a process of becoming[140] in which the central question is, what exactly does globalisation distribute in fulfilling its role as part of the distributive, post-Cold War settlement?[141] This heralds the return of Wilsonism in which globalisation exports a peace that facilitates the reform of states so that they can contribute to the construction of workable international organisation.[142]

This sets the parameters of the debate about peace in contemporary international relations, in which globalisation becomes its key implicit propagator. Yet agents of intervention in conflict zones, involved in developmental, economic, social, and political reform have a great deal of agency in constructing this cosmopolitan international order of democratic polities – and ultimately, liberalism may not be comprehensively and universally agreed or aspired to by all actors in conflict zones. Consequently, in some circumstances it is also apparent that globalisation may replicate conflict. This is the inherent irony of this view that globalisation and peace are in someway interconnected. The historical continuity of contemporary peace with other 'liberal' projects, such as colonialism, imperialism,

and self-determination/independence, as well as with the liberal-institutionalist project can also be glimpsed in the debates on globalisation. Globalisation may also export structures and frameworks that are hegemonic; it may export conflicting ideologies that cause 'glocalisation';[143] it may export information and access to mechanisms that can cause violence and instability. Indeed, as part of the liberal project, globalisation assumes that its export will be welcomed with open arms in a trusting way by recipients, rather than used rationally for self-interested, pre-globalisation objectives.

Essentially, what arises from this hegemonic discourse of peace is a universalist, and often totalising, understanding of pathways to peace.[144] This has been slightly modified to create a consensus that works on the logic that democratisation, free market reform, human rights protection and development, will ultimately create peace in post-conflict societies. This consensus means that economic inequality and development and environmental sustainability, and that inconsistencies in the conflicts addressed in these terms have become globally apparent.[145] This is implicit in the 'peacebuilding consensus', which is examined further in the next chapter. This consensus has been constructed principally by the liberal, though differing, approaches of the UN, the US, and its allies, both on strategic and on ethical grounds. For some actors, such as the UN agencies, many international NGOs, or the UN Secretariat, some states such as Canada, the UK, or Scandinavian states, this consensus is a response to an ethical imperative to help others. For other states, such as the US (and also perhaps the UK) this is also a strategic imperative, which allows the spread of liberal value systems into previously anarchic zones.[146]

Consequently, it seems that the proposition that globalisation represents the dynamics of a relative deterritorialisation, universalisation, and liberalisation, as well as internationalisation has important implications for peacebuilding and approaches to ending conflict. Structural forces related to capitalism and rationalism have fed into institutional approaches to ending conflict, meaning that they ultimately aim to produce liberal democratic solutions. Yet, tensions continue to arise as approaches to dealing with conflict are rooted in territorially sovereign frameworks that reproduce discourses of majoritarianism and exclusive national identities. Globalisation has raised anew the question of what peace really is, and how it can be attained equitably, and state and institutional weaknesses in this respect have been further highlighted as a rethinking of the notions of space, identities, and justice have emerged. We could agree with Ignatieff when he argues that the noble

fiction of liberal universality needs to be taught to all to the extent that they believe and act upon it. [147] Even Mandelbaum argues that the 'liberal internationalism' of the post-Cold War era was not universal but hegemonic though also the 'world's orthodoxy'.[148]

The liberal peace and globalisation also share a tendency to accentuate relative threats, measured against both. Since the end of the Cold War, the main threats to the liberal peace have emerged in the following areas: in statelessness (as in Somalia); in the lack of development, free markets, and democracy; in ethnic and other forms of identity conflict; and in political violence and terrorism. Such threats relate to historical uses of violence against dominant hegemonic actors, and ideologies, and impinge upon key issues relating to territorial sovereignty, ideology, self-determination, political and economic power. Such issues and threats have provided conceptual and pragmatic reasons for the construction of the liberal peace, which also appears to be in parallel to the main dynamics of globalisation. The post-Cold War period has seen conflict of a transnational nature and more recently terrorism (or perhaps more specifically new wars and new terrorism) highlighted as key problems needing to be addressed to protect the liberal peace, accentuating its crusading nature.[149] The 'new wars' and 'new terrorism' debates have tended to deconstruct the traditional division between state and non-state actors and issue areas, as well as broadening the concept of security away from its traditional state-centric framework to include transnational networks, non-state actors and objectives. Thus, the divisions between war, peace, low intensity and high intensity conflict, and terrorism, between friend and enemy, soldier, criminal, and civilian have become relatively indistinct, though the concept of the national state still underpins these 'new' frameworks and often is assumed to operate as if these distinctions were still clear. Network now fight network in a struggle to upset or reconstitute the liberal peace. The multiple versions of liberal peace are often a target of these activities. Yet, the identification of conflict or terrorism also provides a legitimate basis for the construction of the liberal peace.

Increasingly, debates about war and conflict have also recognised the role of the 'other', responded to the increasing ambiguity of war and violence, and to the normative changes that have taken place. In Kaldor's new wars, transnational organisations such as NGOs, criminal organisation, media organisations vie for space with government agencies, international organisations, regional organisations, and other officials, while the conflict plays itself out in the many spaces between

the official use of force and violent non-state actors which have usurped the legitimate use of violence, defy borders and norms of majoritarian governance.[150] According to Ignatieff, responses to this type of new war have become virtual – lives of peacemakers and interveners cannot be risked, but the universal norms of neo-liberal governance must be imposed.[151] Der Derien has argued this is essentially virtuous war, with all of the problematic universalist connotations this raises, though its high tech nature raises doubts about its reciprocity.[152] Coker has argued that the West is trying to humanise war,[153] with similar implications.

Similarly, the literature on ethnic conflict is generally set against the foil of the liberal peace. The ethnic and identity conflict literature has been commonly predicated upon the assumption that these phenomena are effectively related to sovereignty and the way in which liberal statehood is constructed as the key component of the liberal peace. Thus, the subtext of much of this literature is that ethnic conflict is both a threat to the liberal peace, but also legitimates intervention to construct the liberal peace. Indeed, the recognition that states within the liberal peace are susceptible to being hijacked by ethnic entrepreneurs and transformed into ethnocracies is, while still representing a form of statehood and sovereignty, unacceptable to those working to theorise and build the liberal peace. Furthermore, the rise of ethnic-nationalism in which an identity group launches claim for Westphalian statehood in modernist guise, is a direct affront to the notion inherent in the liberal peace, that civil society is a conduit to its creation rather than a hotbed of latent primordial hatred. As Gertz pointed out, it is often the case that primordial hatred discourses are deeply embedded in conflict societies, and that any notion of civil politics engendering democracy, development, pluralism, and human rights, is little more than a superficial overlay.[154] While this may be true, it is certainly likely that the sentiments of social division are powerful enough to corrupt attempts to create the liberal peace whereby nationalists use its institutions to create continuities in pre- and post-reform power structures – as seems to have happened as a consequence of the electoral process in the post-war Balkans, for example.

Ethnic claims for sovereignty, often expressed through separatist violence, arise to prevent insecurity through irredentist or secessionist movements inspired by grassroots movements, internal ethnic entrepreneurs, or by outside actors. Of course this may create quite the reverse effect. The prevalence of ethnic conflict has led to a specific

form of thinking about peace as a response, and despite the fact that as Gurr has shown, ethnic conflict may be on the decline,[155] this notion of peace continues to exert considerable influence in academic and policy circles. It revolves around forms of separation into distinct autonomous political groups as a response to ethnic conflict, while at the same time accepting the need for a future accommodation. This is a compromise on secessionism, but continues to see the ethnic world as being ordered in a binary fashion – until, that is, ethnic groups in conflict learn the liberal ways of peace.

Conclusion

During the second half of the twentieth century the different strands of the liberal peace discourse have become clearer, even if they have not generally been explicitly discussed. The hybridisation of the different discourses of peace and their associated actors have led to a contemporary understanding as the liberal peace as constituted by different forms of governance and within the forces of globalisation. This has come to be constituted in a peacebuilding consensus.

Clearly, the methodology and ontology of the liberal peace, and the technical frameworks it engenders and the many types of actors involved in its construction, aspire to stability and cooperation, for states, state and non-state actors, communities, and economies.[156] Yet the objective of simultaneous liberal regimes prescribing state sovereignty, individual human rights, self-determination, and democracy with a free market and globalised system can be inherent contradictory. The sovereign state may not be compatible with self-determination or human rights, and democratisation may not be compatible with economic liberalisation in multiple ways. The liberal peace implies a mutual acceptance and negotiation through a system of rewards and costs – in other words, through conditionality. All of this takes place in the context of global governance – or key liberal state direction of political, economic, and developmental processes.[157] This depends upon self-nominated actors determining what peace is for others, and in doing so replicating their own stereotypes, opinions, attitudes and behaviour, along with the liberal peace, as a universal example of sustainability. As Duffield has argued, the '[l]iberal peace is geared towards a logic of exclusion and selective incorporation.'[158] It is constructed mainly by donor governments, NGOs, international organisations and international financial institutions, multilateral agencies, the

military and corporations.[159] This is, as Chandler has pointed out, a new international security framework, most recent propagated in the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty's report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* and echoed in the UN's recent *High Level Panel Report*.[160] These reports propagate the right to use interventionist means to promote the liberal peace *contra* Realist state-centrism and the consensuality of the right of non-intervention in domestic affairs where the norms of the liberal peace are not instilled in a state's domestic and international discourses[161] and practices. Yet such interventions and norms are easily appropriated by actors in charge dealing with conflict to suit their own interests.[162] What is also interesting about this new discourse of peace is its qualification as liberal. Somewhat ironically, this implies that at an ontological and epistemological level, there is now widespread, if only implicit, acceptance that peace is a subjective concept and there are different and competing formulations of peace in circulation. If there is a liberal peace, does this also mean that there might also be an illiberal peace? The liberal peace represents the assertions and assumptions of those states and organisations which are its main backers, funders, and organisers, and have imagined this as a possible future. Yet another critical problem which contemporary discourses about constructing peace through peacebuilding, humanitarian intervention, and preventive war disguise are the power relations, partisanship, and strategic interests that also exist. There is an elusive collusion and conditionality between these different actors, and their interests, that are required to carry out such interventions. All of these debates depend upon an enabling omniscient view, structure, or philosophy of the political environment and its innate qualities, in which sovereign man is able to distinguish between war, peace, threat, security and insecurity.

This chapter has charted the evolution of conceptualisations of peace from a victor's peace to a liberal peace based upon the hegemonic reform of institutions, constitutions, governance, and civil society, propagated through globalisation and in opposition to the threats of conflict, ethnicity, and terrorism, and in which at least to certain extent all individuals, rather than merely elites are represented. The culmination of these debates in a 'peacebuilding consensus' about how the liberal peace can be constructed, through peace and conflict theory, and in policy terms is outlined in the following chapter.

3
Towards the Peacebuilding Consensus

'Without Contraries there is no progression.'[1]

Introduction

This chapter investigates the development of theory about conflict and peacemaking in the discipline of IR, through three generations of debates on approaches to ending conflict. These debates have culminated in a 'peacebuilding consensus', indicating a general consensus upon the objectives of intervention and approaches to ending conflict that are deployed therein. There is a concurrence on the main root causes of violence, how they should be addressed, and who should do so. This does not mean that this consensus is not regularly contested, conceptually or in practice, of course. In addition, there is rarely any direct acknowledgment that a specific notion of peace is envisaged as an outcome of the application of the peacebuilding consensus, despite the fact that the various literatures in this areas can clearly be linked with the different strands of peace developed in the previous two chapters, including a victor's peace, a constitutional peace, a civil society peace, and an institutional peace. Through a closer examination of this literature, it becomes apparent that such approaches commonly deploy conceptualisations of peace based upon clear binary oppositions in terms of threat, ideological, geospatial, temporal, inside-out and outside-in, top-down and bottom-up formulations. All claim to be emancipatory in some way, and particularly in contemporary debates on peacebuilding, they are implicitly associated with the liberal peace.[2] However, much of the contemporary focus is increasingly on the efficacy of wide ranging attempts to export/import order into conflict zones, in which conflict is viewed as a problem to be solved and provides and opportunity to export the liberal peace.

Debates within peace and conflict studies tend to focus on the nature of the conflict, and upon the specific strategies that can be used to prevent or respond to it. While such approaches do of course carry implicit implications for the nature of the post-conflict situation that interveners aspire to, this tends not to be extensively conceptualised. For example, conflict management approaches (or 'first generation' approaches) focus on the strategies that can be used to create a negative peace, which is viewed to be a compromise between continued conflict and an ideal peace. This is viewed to be a form of order in which overt violence is rarely, if ever, present, even if it rests upon military or other forms of enforcement. Conflict resolution approaches focus on a peace that fulfils basic human needs contributing to a world society, which is much closer to a debate about creating an ideal peace (this is commonly described as a 'positive peace'). Similarly, peace research approaches focus on the structures of the international system of conflict societies that impede a peace based upon social and economic versions of justice. In these terms, peace is explicitly conceptualised as social justice, economic viability and sustainability and democratic political representation within states and civil society, which in turn will reflect a broader transnational and international peace. These 'second generation' approaches have gained much legitimacy in both academic and policy discourses because they offer an ideal form of peace and argue this can become a reality. Peace operations and peacebuilding approaches bring together the previous strategies and attempt to develop a more multidimensional approach involving multiple actors at all of the main levels of analysis. These 'third generation approaches' effectively lead to the construction of the liberal peace through a complex epistemic process in which specialist knowledge, expertise, capacities, norms, actors, regimes, and institutions converge in particular forms of conditional and regulative governance, each strand legitimated independently by its adherence to different aspects of a peacebuilding consensus on how the liberal peace can be built.[3] What is interesting, however, about this academic debate and its practices, is that while their methods have been heavily conceptualised, their objectives have received rather less attention. The same goes for their intellectual and practical roots.

These approaches to ending conflict are now used to create a version of the liberal peace, framed by the Wilsonian triad.[4] In practice, and sometimes despite the best intentions, this is often an extremely limited and illiberal version of peace (dependent upon outside actors), as a cursory look at conditions in at least some of the world's conflict

zones where such strategies have been applied indicates. Peace is often constructed even in conflict theory as a remote ideal form, as a utopian condition, or as a universal condition, which might be attained given the right methods. In practice, peace often lies in the writ of the victors in a conflict, a 'Cold War', or a negative peace, though efforts to bring peace are commonly presented in academic and policy discourse as aiming at a liberal peace and therefore beyond question and reproach as an end in itself. Most of the debates in this literature focus on the methods of peacemaking and on the technicalities and strategies employed to respond to conflict, rather than on the perhaps equally important question of what type of peace is being envisaged. The implication of this can be seen running throughout the evolution of conflict theory as this chapter illustrates.

Reflecting on peace through conflict theory

Contributions to the debates on the nature of peace from conflict theory can generally be associated with four main theoretical and practical strands. In earlier work I have argued that these can be termed four generations of theory and practice and I follow this usage in this chapter. The first generation is derived from conflict management approaches that attempt to produce order without open violence by preserving the state and its relations. The second generation focuses on removing violence and injustice mainly for individuals. The third generation focuses on large scale, multidimensional approaches to creating peace. The fourth generation, as yet barely expressed in theory or practice, seeks ways of dealing with conflict that would not result in its replication in various forms.[5]

These generations roughly equate with key strands of thinking about conflict. The main strand, most commonly equated with political realism sees conflict as biological (the inherency argument), which can be seen in first generation thinking. The second generation approach reflects the broad second strand of thinking about conflict as being psychological, as socio-biological, or as a product of political, economic and social structures.[6] All of these strands are reflected in third generation approaches to conflict. This raises the question of whether peace may have biological, psychological, social, or structural pre-requisites. Does conflict arise out of clashes of interests, power and resources constructed through human biology? An alternative view is rather more positive about the potential of humans for co-existence and peace. Conflict arises out of a repression

of certain human needs, and therefore is more a social phenomena,[7] reflecting a peace resting on a social contract.

There is a connection between these two approaches, however. The inherency argument sees conflict as inherent to human nature. Developing this essentialist line of thought are theoretical strands of liberalism, which endeavour to establish social, economic and political frameworks that contain and manage conflict *via* functional institutions and regimes. Liberalism itself can be broken down into different strands, ranging along an axis of pluralist or crusading liberalism that can be broken down into 'conservative', 'left', 'radical' liberalism, and the democratic peace.[8] All of these different strands indicate an approach based upon creating a universal peace (or some would say, totalism). Underpinning such understandings of conflict is what appears to be a Burtonian position, and any disagreement seems to be more based upon the question of what justifies intervention and whether the liberal peace is actually an end in itself. The Burtonian human needs argument sees conflict as socio-biological, derived from a suppression of a basic hierarchy of human needs requiring social engineering to remove conditions that create violence. This position has much in common with structuralist arguments, perhaps best embodied in the work of Galtung, which sees conflict as being derived from violence inherent to political, economic and geopolitical structures, and as such requires incremental structural change to remove oppression. Similarly, Gurr's relative deprivation theory identifies a sense of injustice as a source of social unrest, and the frustration-aggression approach sees frustration as a necessary or sufficient condition for aggression. Both approaches develop a more psychological understanding of conflict.[9] All of these approaches offer tools that may be used to uncover the roots of conflict and to develop methods for redressing it. They also have important implications for the nature of peace and order, and the way it is politically, economically and socially constituted. Miall *et al*. have argued that contemporary conflict can be characterised as international-social conflict, reflecting third generation approaches, and the peacebuilding consensus, which represent a liberal peace.[10] Fourth generation approaches to conflict, on the other hand, imply a peace that reflects the interests and needs of all actors, discovered and enacted within a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice. These ambitions are reflected in second and third generation approaches, but fourth generation approaches can be distinguished by their prioritisation of such thinking in the

broader context of peacebuilding. The following sections look at the emergence of the peacebuilding consensus and implications for the conceptualisation of peace through this framework.

Peace and conflict management

Conflict management approaches provide the first step in this evolution. Such first generation approaches provide a limited state-centric discourse that necessarily and for the reason of parsimony, excludes non-state actors and ignores non-state centric issues. Ultimately, this is an attempt to impose simplicity upon what is a very complex phenomenon. This type of discourse is based on traditional realist thought, which identifies the main dynamics of the international system as relating to states and their interests and relative capability in a hard security framework. A softer version of this security debate includes the role of the UN and other international organisations, derived from the incorporation of liberal-institutional thought on international cooperation as a way of modifying the inherent realism of the international system. Conflict management approaches provide an imaginary of an international system, and of relationships between disputants which are balanced, controlled, or modified by the insertion and presence of neutral third party, or a third party operating on the basis of its interests, acting upon the basic interest of reducing violence to a level of acceptability that allows the third party to continue to play a relatively marginal role in the conflict. This represents a triadic system that modifies the classic friend-enemy distinction in favour of an externally managed balance between disputants. This provides third parties with a significant resource, be they states, individuals, institutions, or organisations, and requires them to calculate their own relative interests in relation to the broader liberal goals of reducing and managing conflict.

The research agenda of first generation conflict management approaches focuses on neutrality or the partiality of the interveners (and whether or not this is viable), trust, the timing of the intervention, the form the intervention takes, in the context of various stages of a conflict,[11] and often in the context of hurting stalemates and ripe moments.[12] Zartman argues that disputants will only settle their conflicts when their current situation is too painful and if there are already proposals and mediators available.[13] These forms of intervention, ranging from peacekeeping to mediation, are dependent upon the disputants' resources, conditions, and structural position, and

may be most effective if there exists a mutually hurting stalemate between disputants in which they cannot afford to continue their conflict any longer. Of course, such analytical frameworks are both Machiavellian in that it means that settlements are opportunistic and always second best to a victor's peace, rather than based upon a philosophical framework of justice and accommodation. They are also Hobbesian in that they project a worldview of inevitable violence while disputants retain any effective fighting capacity.

First generation approaches aim at the construction of a form of peace derived from a formal process of diplomatic communication between sovereign representatives and the military and diplomatic tools they control to maintain order. This is a problem-solving process invoking sovereign man, in which peace, or a limited approximation of peace, is attained either through the rational application of scientific knowledge. The use of negotiation, mediation, and peacekeeping, to create an acceptable *status quo* is generally acknowledged not to be in the pursuit of peace as an ideal form, but a much more limited version.[14] The construction of peace during the Cold War world was limited by the bipolar balance of power, and the need for cohesion and unity in each camp. This was often used to justify the use of a limited concept of peace, rather than as an ideal form. But even such uses suggested a powerful awareness of a monolithic ideal form of peace, which could be achieved if it was not for the obstacles the Cold War had created. The objective has been to preserve the *status quo* in the international system by preserving the integrity of states. Thus, first generation approaches' primary aim is normally either to find a new constitutional arrangement in torn states, to find a solution between warring states, and far less often to establish a new regional state system consisting of fragments of one or more failed states. All of this assumes that the attainment of a semblance of peace will contribute to a self-sustaining international order.

This can be seen in the evolution of the key methods of conflict management, and more specifically in the evolution of peacekeeping. Traditional UN peacekeeping, as it evolved from Dag Hammarskjold's *Summary Study,*[15] was supposed to separate and police disputants from *host states*. This provided an idealistic blueprint for peacekeeping, which did not reflect the conditions on the ground in many conflicts, especially in Africa where often states simply did not exist.[16] If the *Summary Study* had been written after the UN experience in the Congo in the early 1960s it might have been a very different document.[17] More specifically, the designation of states as 'hosts' of peacekeeping

forces, and the requirement of 'freedom of movement' indicated the problems that were to emerge later on. Partly because of this, a 'no blame' principle emerged in which the UN tried to avoid jeopardising its relations with parties in a dispute where a peacekeeping force was present, or where a UN sponsored diplomatic process was in existence. This meant that the UN's role would not be jeopardised in terms of its continuation or in terms of the security of personnel. What these principles effectively caused was the watering down of the UN's capacity to implement its commitment to a more ambitious version of peace alluded to in its own Charter. This was very apparent in the context of the UN's earlier peacekeeping engagements in Africa.[18] Later forms of peacekeeping were to provide the conditions of stability in which diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation could then be used to avoid any reliance on quasi-military forces which could become essential to the *status quo* (as rapidly became the case in the Middle East with UNEF1 and with UNFICYP in Cyprus). However, it rapidly became clear that peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation were power-based and hegemonic activities despite their claims about consent, impartiality and neutrality. There were clear continuities with the evolution of international organisations during the nineteenth century,[19] and an overlap between the evolution of organisations to manage war and the evolution of institutions to manage civilian cooperation, spanning agreements such as the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the conventions of Geneva in 1864, and at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, with the Union Internationale des Telecommunications in 1865, the Union Postale Universalle in 1874, and the World Meteorological Organisation of 1873.[20] There were also colonial antecedents which, despite Dag Hammarskjold's attempts to prevent great powers being involved in peacekeeping, meant that external intervention was required to remedy failed post-colonial constitutions. Though this could not be described in any sense as colonialism, it did mean that subject states became dependent upon peacekeeping and associated forms of intervention. It was a short step towards such failed states being dependent upon external aid and financial resources, in order to meet economic and social needs. From the path was clear towards the emergence of governance and conditionality in which interveners made their assistance contingent upon certain modes of behaviour from recipients. These were inherently conservative approaches to peace, which assumed that peace would be extremely limited and fragile, created through diplomacy, mediation and negotiation as long as it was conducted impartially, neutrally, with the consent of the participants, or alternatively

through coercion or force in the favour of the intervener. These discourses on peace are strongly influenced by the notion of the victor's peace. Yet peacekeeping as it evolved *via* the work of Dag Hammarskjold and Lester Pearson[21] was also an attempt to disrupt the victor's peace project in conflict zones, to mitigate open violence, and to allow disputants to find a way out of a conflict it perhaps no longer felt was in its interests. It was also an important strategy by which international actors, through the UN, were able to intercede to contribute or shape the post-conflict environment. In this sense, it could be said to be a process by which a coalition of international actors gained access to a conflict to construct a new peace that they perceived to be legitimate. During the Cold War, conflicting versions of a legitimate peace, as in the case of ONUC in the Congo in which both the West and the USSR disagreed on the objectives of the mission because of their conflicting ideologies, betrayed a disunity on what shape peace should take (in this case between the US and USSR over democratisation). With the end of the Cold War, a general consensus on the liberal peace rapidly emerged.

The way in which peacekeeping was initially conceptualised implied that there was prior peace on the ground, which could be 'restored'. In fact, an examination of early peacekeeping operations clearly showed that often there was not a local peace that could be revived, unless one looked back before the advent of colonial powers or regional conflicts, and that such interventions were more likely to be in the interest of regional or global states that wanted to de-escalate a particular conflict. What this meant in fact, was that the drafters of UN Security Council mandates were reflecting upon their own domestic experiences and ideological positions on peace, and this is what they were actually referring to. Similarly, familiar language referring to a 'return to normal conditions' and 'law and order' reflected the interveners' experiences and aspirations, and perhaps more so than those of local actors. Effectively, it reflected an agreement amongst the coalition of states and actors backing the operation (normally in the UN Security Council) that there should at least be a limited form of peace, and this agreement outweighed the disagreement of local actors on their nature of the peace that was required to end their conflict. In this imbalanced relationship, the moral high ground associated with liberal peace and international consensus on intervention was attained. This also had Orientalist and perhaps even racist implications, though, in the sense that the recipients of this agreement, often newly decolonised territories, were required to submit to intervention in the name of a limited

version of the liberal peace. The extent of these attitudes were mitigated somewhat, of course, by the notions of consent, legitimacy, and non-intervention, as well as by the ruling against the use of the great powers in peacekeeping, incorporated into the doctrines of peacekeeping from a very early stage.

Yet, peacekeeping's antecedents could be observed during the nineteenth century as part of the balance of power system operated by the great powers[22] and peacekeeping, as it came into being with UNEF in 1956, had a clear imperial provenance.[23] Cold War UN peacekeeping was supposed to prevent overt violence, global and regional escalation of localised conflicts, and to provide the conditions of stability in which peacemaking could occur. Such approaches often led to controversial situations based on a post-conflict *status quo*. UN peacekeeping in the Cyprus case amply illustrates this, and it has often been accused of consolidating an ethnic division and state of Cold War between the main disputants.[24] Indeed, in the case of Cyprus more recent events in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots have peacefully exchanged unregulated visits into each others' zones since the UN patrolled demarcation line was opened up in 2003, belies the nationalist, separatist, and legalistic rhetoric of the island's nationalist leaders over the last thirty years, and the generally accepted idea that the two sides could not mix until a solution had been mediated at the official level. This became a rhetoric upon which the UN based its mission in Cyprus after the war of 1974.[25] This seems to indicate that UNFICYP has indeed indirectly endorsed and institutionalised an elite-led Cold War on the island. In this case, peace was understood to be a reduction of violence and a settlement process that ultimately failed to prevent ethnic division. Implicitly, peace was being conceptualised in this case as a mono-ethnic and particularistic balance of power between the two Cypriot Communities and their motherlands, even despite the attempts to mediate a federal solution.

In the case of UNFICYP in Cyprus and also with ONUC in the Congo, peace was constructed around an attempt to support a failing government and constitutional structures, to 'restore law and order' and effect a 'return to normal conditions'.[26] This language obscured a reality on the ground that was far removed from the liberal conception of a pre-existing peace that could be restored and did little to lessen local fears of imperial continuities, particularly in the case of ONUC.[27] It must also be noted that the growing post-colonial majority in the General Assembly were extremely sensitive to the implications of any action that might contain links with the colonial era. Macqueen argues

that ONUC actually escalated the Congo conflict for a variety of unforeseen reasons, in an environment in which there was no peace to keep.[28] Other UN interventions, for example in Egypt, Syria, and Kashmir did not aim to have a major impact on importing a liberal peace though it could clearly be argued that by aiding in the prevention of wider conflagrations, they did facilitate a less violent *status quo* on the ground. There is general concurrence on this notion of peacekeeping as a form of refrigeration of a conflict.[29] These peacekeeping practices revolved around the protection and replication of the Westphalian international system. Early peacekeeping strategies focused on preventing open violence and monitoring ceasefires and *status quos*, and demilitarisation and policing – as much of the Cold War literature on peacekeeping illustrates. They were also to provide conditions for diplomatic settlement processes to occur. This limited view of peacekeeping was clearly quite unsatisfactory when one considered the 'peace' that was being created in conflict zones was beneficial mainly to the international community, as one could see when examining the sites of peacekeeping of this sort, from Cyprus to Congo. While it might have reduced pressure upon the international system, civil societies and communities were forced to endure the *status quo* it often created. Clearly, limited goals meant a level of success was more easily claimed on the part of the interveners and perhaps it was for these reasons that after a flurry of peacekeeping activities in the 1960s, the UN then turned to 'détente management'. Peacekeeping was effectively abandoned until the late 1980s when it started to become much more explicitly engaged in the liberal-democratisation project of the liberal international community.[30] The obvious flaws of peacekeeping and its inability to provide sustainable solutions merely led to institutionalised and long-term engagement in conflict zones, as could be seen in Cyprus, on the Golan Heights, or in Kashmir, among many others. This was indicative of the problems of conflict management in general and the extremely limited and often violent form of peace it offered.

Such antecedents, requirements, and practices, in the context of peacekeeping mean it is unsurprising that these approaches have contributed to very limited concept of peace, particularly in cases revolving around claims for representation, statehood related to disputed historical possession of territory, identity, and culture. The construction of this version of peace is subjective and derived from the experience of those who frame and ultimately try to construct it. The agents of this limited notion of peace work on the basis of the prob-

lematic assumption that a fully-fledged version of the liberal peace cannot be achieved in such conflicts, and so disputants must settle with a version that is actually illiberal. This is both practical, *and* somewhat Orientalist, as can also be seen in the debate on success in such approaches to ending conflict. This ranged from the production of a negotiating culture, in which official negotiations between disputants become a communicational and diplomatic norm, even if they do to achieve a settlement, a ceasefire in which overt violence ended, or often an externally guaranteed settlement of a short or long-term nature. Such formulations constructed an initial peace based upon the balancing of interests, issues, and resources, perhaps dependent upon external guarantors. Certainly this was the case in terms of a longer term success, which was consequently generally dependent on external guarantees. Thus, this conceptualisation of peace was necessarily based upon the dominance of one disputant over another, or of a third party over them both. Peace is therefore constructed as a negative peace, based upon a perceptual and relative balance. This is perhaps closer to a victor's peace. Furthermore, the role of third parties was in this sense either conceptualised as a victor, where an external actor took control of the settlement process, or as neutral actor, working within towards an implicitly liberal peace. The notion of neutrality, impartiality, and consent in these terms were constructed to disguise the fact that third parties were self-interested, would ideally prefer a peace defined by its own interests, but either lacked the capability or incentive to do so. Thus, a negative peace represented a condition somewhere between a victor's peace for one of the disputants and a suitable peace as envisaged interested external actors.

The revival of the use of peacekeeping to construct a more ambitious peace has followed a similar form after the end of the Cold War. It reflected the experience, ideology, and interests of the interveners, and as peacekeeping evolved into a multifunctional form, this became more pronounced and bore more resemblance to the liberal peace, in a more ambitious form. Thus, increasingly, the constitutional and institutional strands of the conceptualisation of peace became part of the peacekeeper's mandate at least in its wider form. In the context of new expectations for the peace they were to keep (or create) a rapid evolution into what has been called 'multifunctional peacekeeping' occurred where the demands on the role of the UN and its supporting actors multiplied and diversified, partly because of the victory of the liberal peace in the context of the Cold War. The peacekeeping operations that followed in Namibia, in

Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador seemed to offer the hope that the liberal peace engendered in UN intervention would go beyond patrolling ceasefires and would instead contribute to the democratisation of failing and failed states. In this way peacekeeping was now seen to provide the basis for the institutionalisation of a new peace based on democratisation, human rights, development, and economic reform, managed in an institutionalised setting by the UN. The academic and policy literatures surrounding these developments repeated the same patterns as with earlier forms of peacekeeping. The types of outcome they imagined arising out of this new breed of peacekeeping ultimately reflected the liberal peace, again replicating the dominant experience of those involved in framing such operations in policy and academic literature. Effectively, peacekeeping, and the complexity of tasks now associated with it became part of a nascent form of global governance where conflict zones provide interveners with the opportunity to construct a liberal peace. This seen by some to be slightly ominous, especially in the context of the fact that the end of the Cold War meant that the US and other major states could become much more involved in and manage peacekeeping operations themselves.[31] It also provided the opportunity for Canada, some Scandinavian states, developing countries such as Bangladesh, and Japan as donors and agents, to become involved in the construction of a version of the liberal peace in which the civil and institutional versions of peace could be emphasised, as opposed to the more conservative emphasis on the constitutional peace. Both Britain and the US also became involved in this project, perhaps envisaged as complimentary to the more conservative version of the liberal peace they were also engaged in constructing.

Inherent in this debate are a number of contradictions about the nature of peace. Firstly, peace is generally seen to be the result of a top-down, elite-led, official process, and in temporal terms is seen to be represented merely by a contemporary removal or lack of overt violence. It is conceptualised as an objective form, based upon a specific ontology, known only by those who have an omniscient view of the international system. Yet, this lack of overt violence may well disguise structural violence, rather than remove it, and certainly depends upon the use or threat of force by third parties. Alternatively, it may be based upon the military exhaustion of disputes, or the victory of one over another. Inherent in this view is a certain fatalism, though there is also the sense that a future peace may be more normatively acceptable.

Peace and conflict resolution

The next stage in this debate is fundamentally different in that rather than being partly a product of, and agent of, the victor's peace, conflict resolution is derived from, and projects, a civil society oriented discourse of in which public and private actors, operating at the level of the group or individual are empowered to construct what is often described as a positive peace. This second generation debate within peace and conflict theory perceives violence to be structural as well as direct.[32] Conflict resolution approaches are often represented as being able to aid in the development of civil awareness and the reduction of zero-sum views. This discourse associated with ending conflict also has ambitions to reconfigure our understanding of the role and relations of state and non-state actors within a world society rather than merely revolving around the pursuit of power by states.[33] Yet, a closer look at this framework indicates close similarities with aspects of the liberal peace framework. Conflict resolution approaches highlight human needs and thus human security over state security, structural violence, and the need for new forms of communication to be developed in order for human security in a latent international society, to be realised. This approach to conflict has been crucial, not just in the contribution of new perspectives to peace, but also in providing a conceptual and methodological framework for new types of actors (NGOs, for example) and civil society to become involved in the complex transnational communicational and other transactions that mark the shaping of the liberal peace.

This alternative and second generation approach to understanding and ending conflict posits that conflict is rooted in the misallocation of universal human needs for identity, political participation, and security, which are non-negotiable.[34] This represents a key critique of first generation conflict management approaches because they revolve around denying rather than providing for such needs.[35] These needs are presented as an ontological drive common to all,[36] assuming universality. Azar has argued that the repression and deprivation of human needs is the root of protracted conflicts,[37] along with structural factors, such as underdevelopment, effectively equating forms of development with peace. What this theorisation of conflict therefore requires is a specific approach that empowers the individual in the search for a form of peace. This is provided by conflict resolution workshops and the facilitation of third parties, which claim to allow individuals and groups to discuss their conflict and the peace they desire away from the rigours of officialdom.

This discourse envisages a peace based upon the needs of different actors within world society,[38] and presents a conceptualisation of peace based upon values and transnational networks shared by states, civil societies, and by international organisations. Peace in this case built from the bottom-up, by civil society and *via* a concurrent agreement between state and non-state actors on universal human needs, the provision of which brings a form of peace associated with world society. It is the role of state and international organisations to distribute these human needs fairly, and it is the role of the individual and civil society to provide indications of where such needs are required. This debate forms an important component of the liberal peace, which requires that human needs are provided by states and their organisations to civil society actors, but also concurs that civil society actors themselves have agency. Indeed, an important aspect of the liberal peace is the argument that conflict cannot really be 'resolved' unless the concerns of civil society are met, and furthermore, that there cannot be a liberal peace unless there is a vibrant civil society. Implicit in this discourse on peace is the cosmopolitan belief that a universal version of peace is possible through a scientific perfecting of the strategies to be deployed. Effectively, however, the peace represented by the debates surrounding conflict resolution is normative in character, because of its focus on the needs of individuals. Conflict resolution thinking represents a normative response to an assumed need for social justice to be incorporated into the new peace. Conflict resolution offers a plausible alternative to the elitist diplomacy of conflict management approaches by focusing upon civil society actors and their transnational connections as if they are divorced from the power of the state and norms of the international system. Similarly, peace research approaches seem to offer a critique of the structural violence inherent in the international system, which is unlikely to result in a viable peace.

The understanding of peace that has emerged from these approaches is still very limited and works only by focusing on one specific dimension of the conflict environment. Civil society, the state, or the reform of international structures seemed unlikely in the context of the Cold War, to bring anything more than a negative peace, geographically bounded, temporally projected as leading to a better ideal future, and based upon the threat or use of force. What is most important about the apparent tension between conflict resolution and conflict management debates is actually that the notion of a resolution of conflict presents a far more attractive policy and intellectual discourse about the sort of peace that would be the result of third party intervention in a

democratic polity. This positive peace, as Galtung has described it, carries such discursive and normative power that what soon became apparent was the requirement for more sophisticated methods to achieve it than either first or second generation approaches provide.

It is easy to see why conflict resolution has also contributed to a number of emerging research programmes, such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As Miall has pointed out, there is a clear convergence between the agendas of peace research and conflict resolution with the peacebuilding project. This has occurred specifically in the context of conflict prevention, now a major part of the repertoire of international and regional organisations such as the UN and the OSCE.[39] The EU is particularly advanced in its institutional approach in these areas, though this is in terms of conceptualisation rather than practice at present.[40] It is well known that conflict resolution approaches developed out of a need to find a process that could facilitate the 'resolution', rather than management, of intractable conflicts. They developed in particular with a view to the redressal of non-state and identity conflict. They focused upon a bottom-up, grassroots analysis, rather than the state-centricity of management approaches, and attempted to understand the role of the individual in order to move beyond traditional diplomatic or quasi-military forms of settlement. Consequently, the conflict resolution literature assumes a much richer notion of peace in a world society where human needs are met. Despite these ambitions, it is clear that the Westphalian system of conflict management is still preponderant, and frames, stimulates and delineates most discussions about conflict.[41] Though more emphasis is placed upon the non-state level and on the agency of non-state actors and inter-subjective factors, there is little acknowledgement of cultural or other social and particularist differences between individuals or societies. Despite such weaknesses, what this indicates is that conflict resolution approaches highlight the depth and breadth of conflict more accurately than conflict management approaches, and also therefore offer the potential to establish methods through which a broader form of peace can be constructed. The conceptualisation of peace, inherent in this sort of thinking underlines the need to address the individual, and also to understand the agency of the individual in the reconstruction of peace. This type of thinking highlights the fact that conflict is both multidimensional and multi-level, and any attempt to construct peace needs to reflect this depth and breadth.

Conflict resolution approaches are often represented as a methodology through which citizens are able to deal with a conflict in a

non-zero-sum manner, but without any intention of influencing the zero-sum debates that may continue at the official level. This is a limited, inherently conservative, and contained view of the process that fails to acknowledge the connection between civil society and constitutional or institutional versions of peace. A better representation of conflict resolution would be to acknowledge that it provides a far more radical perspective on conflict and peace in which neither can occur without accepting the agency of the individual and civil society in both. In terms of the development of a specific conceptualisation of peace, within such debates there is an implicit acceptance of the norms and regimes associated with pluralism and democracy, human rights and social welfare. What second generation approaches offer the debates on peace therefore, are a set of alternative perspectives and strategies through which the civil aspect of the liberal peace can be constructed. From this insight, it is only a short step to establish an intellectual and policy framework that incorporates both first and second generation approaches in the quest to establish the liberal peace in conflict zones. The theoretical and methodological impact of conflict resolution approaches has become a significant part of the liberal toolkit against conflict despite the fact that some of its claims – the identification of human needs, the scientific rather than normative aspects of conflict and its resolution, its impact upon but separation from first generation approaches, its complementary possibilities for official mediation, its claim to neutral facilitation and so on – are problematic. Yet, they have also helped develop the rigid Westphalian notions of diplomatic forms of communication, and implicitly added a normative aspect and association of the individual and civil society with 'positive peace'. In turn, this positive peace contributes to the debate on the liberal peace, which has been conceptualised as a 'cosmopolitan turn' in conflict resolution.[42] These second generation approaches offer insights in the causes of conflict methods that lend themselves to the work of non-state actors and NGOs in particular in their contribution to the creation of human, rather than state, security. Peace is therefore constructed by the identification and allocation of human needs, which, perhaps most importantly, requires listening to the voices of non-state and unofficial actors. This purports to offer a peace, close to an ideal form, in which human needs are fulfilled, and there exists a transnational 'cobweb model' of transactions that form a world society.[43] This is one of the few explicit theorisations on the type of peace that the application of a specific approach to dealing with conflict, in this

case conflict resolution forms of facilitation or workshops, would produce.

Much of the logic and legitimacy underpinning this type of thinking and theorising assumes that such approaches do not tend to support the most powerful party,[44] but rather that they empower marginalised actors and bring to light the hidden factors which give rise to violence. This is an important contribution. But it is also probable that conflict resolution approaches deny the reality that conflict is an inevitable part of the human condition,[45] but more importantly the implicit relations of domination between official actors who are caught up in a zero-sum struggle for control of disputed sovereignty, territory or other resources, and non-state actors who wish to renegotiate human needs in civil society. Conflict resolution approaches may be strongly influenced or outweighed by dominant official discourses and structures.[46] Furthermore, because it is assumed that human needs are universal, and that effectively, a zero-sum peace settlement (i.e. the *resolution* of conflict) leads to a liberal peace which is not in need of cultural negotiation, second generation approaches fall short of examining key assumptions related to the nature of peace. They assume that contact with the 'other' leads to a deconstruction, rather than reification of conflict, and that funders and organisers are not self-interested but are neutral and benevolent. They also assume that it has some impact upon official dialogues rather than the reverse (which is probably more likely given the dominance of states), and that the kind of human security discourse which takes place in conflict resolution workshops illustrates how the roots of conflict can be addressed through cooperative means, rather than making participants more aware of the structural violence or injustice they may be undergoing. Despite this, conflict resolution debates owe much to a conceptualisation of peace derived from the empowerment of civil society and the individual, and the imaginary of peace it presents for the future as an ideal form in which needs are correctly allocated for all, is constructed from the bottom-up, is not limited in geospatial terms, and is not greatly corrupted by hegemonic strands of the victor's peace. It is clear that conflict resolution and peace research approaches to conflict imply that the form of peace aspired to is a descendant of the civil society strand of the debates on peace. As the next section shows, the legitimacy of such debates is very important for the even more ambitious peace project engendered in third generation debates on peacebuilding.

Conceptualising peace through peacebuilding

In order to achieve what was implicit in the conflict resolution agenda, including its implied legitimacy and sustainability within civil society as well as at the levels of the state and world society, more sophisticated methods are required. This is why a hybrid methodological framework for the construction of peace has emerged – a third generation approach – initially focusing on the parallel role of conflict management and resolution roles, and which rapidly expanded to include the multiple interventions of a variety of international agencies, organisations and non-state actors. The construction of the liberal peace rapidly became more plausible with the end of the Cold War, and in this context the multidimensional approaches of conflict transformation and peacebuilding began to develop. The main objectives of the peacebuilding project include a self-enforcing ceasefire and peace, democracy, justice and equity.[47] Yet these seemingly innocuous ambitions soon saw peacebuilding lead into the terrain of nation-building and transitional administration.

These approaches seem to have emerged along two main paths, though both subscribing to the same liberal ethos. The first has developed in the context of international organisations, institutions, and major donor states – the institutional strand of thinking on peace. This approach has focused on constructing both institutions of a regional peace and on the construction of the domestic institutions for a local, constitutional peace. It represents the hybridisation of institutional and constitutional thinking of peace. The second has evolved from the grassroots peace movements into local and international NGOs and other non-state actors that rely on external sources of funding to develop local responses to conflict. This represents a contemporary version of the civil peace, added to the institutional and constitutional hybrid peace. These approaches and strands rest partly on what could be called a victor's peace – in which dominant actors and the institutions and organisations that underpin the post-war and post-Cold War order project the form of peace inherent in the peacebuilding project, and represent a consensus on the validity of project. As these strands developed, the ontology of peace moved further into the realm of what had formerly been thought to be an unobtainable ideal form – from the Westphalian to claims of representing the post-Westphalian. Its epistemology became one which focused self-sustainability rather than on external forms of guarantee. Through the construction of the liberal peace by the multiple interventions at multiple levels inherent in peacebuilding approaches, peace came to be seen as something

technically plausible, which could be manufactured as a permanent entity through which conflict would be transformed. This debate has developed along parallel paths, both intellectual and policy oriented, within the liberal international community, and within an epistemic community increasingly providing the necessary expertise.

This necessitates conflict transformation at the actor, issue, rule and structural levels, in order to bring about internal or external changes, including the recognition of new parties to the conflict, the emphasis of issues upon which commonality exists, the redefinition of the relationship of disputants according to mutual norms, and at the level of the structural relationship between the actors.[48] This implies multiple third party interventions aimed at redefining the discourses, practices, and structures of the conflict environment. This presents a discourse of cooperation in which disputants find new modes of non-conflictual interaction with each other and with interveners, but what this effectively requires are multiple third parties engaged in the construction of conditional relationships with disputants which provide them with the necessary resources for cooperation but at the same time exert forms of leverage over their own relationships with disputants in order to modify their behaviour. This tension is also replicated in the gap between the interveners' understanding of peace and their recipients' expectations and interests. There is little consideration in the peacebuilding literature of this problem, though there is an implicit recognition that the peacebuilding project is about the exportation of a particular version of peace into conflict environments. This is a laudable task, but is also problematic. It represents a hybrid of the constitutional, institutional, and civil society conceptualisations of peace, which is constructed as a universal concept dependant upon the exportation of scientific and rational applications of specific mechanisms and frameworks. In this sense, it can also be said to be representing aspects of the victor's peace, because there is an implicit assumption that one specific conceptualisation of peace – the liberal peace – should be privileged.

Different aspects of these strands of thinking about peace are emphasised by different intellectual and policy conceptualisations of peacebuilding. For example, John Paul Lederach, who is widely regarded as having made one of the most important theoretical contributions to the peacebuilding debate, is particularly sensitive to the consent of local actors, particularly civil society actors, to the construction of a specific version of peace.[49] This reflects thinking on civil society contributions to peace as well as the constitutional strand of thought that

requires specific liberal-democratic free market frameworks to be present in constitutional structures to regulate and empower civil society. The addition of a further institutional strand in which international actors provide parallel frameworks for restriction, regulation, and definition, is also common to the peacebuilding enterprise. While there has been broad acceptance of the need to establish an infrastructure for a peace constituency from within a community, rather than transferred from outside, this comprehensive approach to peacebuilding also integrates top-level leaders and elites, with community leaders, and grassroots actors, with little consideration of the relative resources and that each level of activity may be able to mobilise to support its own position. Lederach proposes three levels of peacebuilding, including an elite 'top-down' approach which involves intermediaries or mediators backed by a supporting government or IO and whose goal is to achieve a negotiated settlement. The second level includes problem solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace commissions. The third level includes grassroots bottom up approaches.[50] Lederach suggests that there is a need to understand systemic issues, the progression of conflict, and the sustainability of its transformation, which requires a multidimensional approach to peacebuilding including international, regional, state, grassroots, local and NGO actors.[51] These multiple actors should therefore be engaged in political, social, economic, and developmental tasks if peacebuilding is to be a multidimensional response to conflict.

The implication of this is that peacebuilding, as a regime or framework for building the liberal peace, is highly interventionary at the different levels of analysis invoked by such models. Guidance in, or control of, almost every aspect of state and society is provided by external actors, which construct liberal regimes through a mixture of consensual and punitive strategies. All of these approaches effectively combine an outside-in construction of peace whereby outside actors import the specialised knowledge, procedures, and structures, with an inside-out approach, whereby disputants attempt to re-negotiate this process according to their own interests, culture, and frameworks. How far the outside 'dominates' the 'inside' or the top level dominates the grassroots level therefore becomes an important question, relating to that of agency and structure. This development of thinking and policy-making regarding conflict arose in the post-Cold War environment as a result of the liberal-state intention to utilise the political, economic and social frameworks which had formerly enabled them to reached a state of liberal order. This development can be identified well before

the end of the Cold War, both in academic literatures and in evolving policy trends within international organisations or institutions like the OSCE, the UN, the EU, and the World Bank, and through the formulation of liberal state policy and the evolution of non-state practices. After Operation Desert Storm, there was a general liberal state consensus that the international community could and should intervene more broadly in conflict. However, this merely exacerbated the tension between 'doing nothing' and 'doing something', which has given rise to increased interventionary activities and claims of hypocrisy in conflicts where nothing has been done.

Two key developments arose out of these trends. The first was the development of multidimensional peace operations (which incorporated traditional peacekeeping with humanitarian components, democratisation, and the other elements incorporated within the liberal peace) while the second lay in quasi-enforcement operations. Debates on peacebuilding expanded to incorporate both sets of debates. Both approaches revolved around the key issue of consent. The shift from classic peacekeeping operations to multi-functional operations entailed the consensual implementation of complex multidimensional peace agreements. This touched upon the problem of how multiple approaches engendered in the peacebuilding project were coordinated. These third generation approaches to responding to conflict have given rise to more inclusive responses, but also raise questions about the nature of the universal peace that they imply. In order to avoid the problem faced by first generation conflict management approaches of operating *in perpetuity*, third generation approaches now operate on the basis that there is a clear conception of what type of peace should be the outcome. This notion legitimises multiple forms of intervention into a conflict zone, even at the expense of tradition Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has important implications that can be observed in the way in which the UN has shifted from traditional interpositionary peacekeeping to the integrated and multidimensional operations that epitomise its more recent practices. UN peace operations often provide the framework through their Security Council mandates and their coordinating presence in conflict zones for peacebuilding, and it has been through the UN framework that it has become possible to link peacebuilding interventions with the construction of the liberal peace. *Agenda for Peace* provided an early conceptualisation how a sustainable peace could be constructed, how, and what form that peace would take.[52] *Agenda* revived Hammerskjold's notion of preventative diplomacy, and brought together peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, as well as

peace-enforcement operations in order to enable the UN to become engaged in constructing the liberal peace. This meant an involvement with a broad range of issues and a spectrum of actors from governments to NGOs, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public.[53] More recent UN documentation has attempted to grapple with some of the difficulties thrown up by this attempt to present the construction of the liberal peace as a universal and legitimate end, focusing on the problems that arise where consent may be lacking from recipients. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has argued for a combination of 'coercive inducement' and 'induced' consent.[54] This has seen the development of a 'global peacebuilding enterprise' in which consent may or may not be required.[55]

This comprehensive endeavour is reflected in the work of many academics and practitioners using or developing peacebuilding approaches, much of which is focused on developing universal and comprehensive blue-print approaches to the construction of the liberal peace. This approach is exemplified in the peacebuilding project's attempt to develop a framework for coordinated and 'multifaceted action' both to prevent,[56] and to resolve conflict. An influential attempt to create a universal blue-print for peacebuilding can be found in Chopra's 'peace maintenance' approach,[57] which involves a mechanism whereby the UN, regional organisations, member states, and local actors, could take control or monitor the instruments of administration, the judicial system, police, and armed forces in conflict zones.[58] The *Carnegie Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997) outlines some of the thinking behind these theoretical developments and the UN policy documentation spanning the *Agendas* and the *Brahimi Report*.[59] It describes an approach to conflict aimed at the construction of 'capable states with representative governance, based upon the rule of law, widely available economic opportunity, social safety nets, protection of fundamental human rights, and robust civil societies.'[60] This is based upon an international set of regimes that should be able to provide a supportive environment for such states. Barriers to the spread of conflict are envisaged in the interim, and during the transition from violence to the sort of peace envisaged above, outside actors take on many of the governance roles required in a transitional administration that would address the roots of the conflict. This means that there are effectively both operational and structural preventative measures in place. The Carnegie Report embraces the full spectrum of peacebuilding activities and liberal governance norms engendered in this approach, within a cosmopolitan framework of states in an international society. This is a recognisably liberal peace, which

depends upon humanitarian guises for intervention at multiple levels and by multiple actors to develop the institutions, frameworks and norms necessary for democratisation, marketisation, development, human rights and the rule of law, in an interdependent, transnational and globalised context. It may depend upon the use of force as well as persuasion, and upon the hegemony of the discourse of conditionality in the context of the trustees of such approaches and their relations with local actors and communities.

A very important aspect of this development lies in debates on democratisation, which constitutes an important part of the liberal peace. Literatures on democratisation and on peacebuilding came into their own in the 1990s, and have increasingly been linked together in practice during this period.[61] Yet, there is also strong evidence to show that democratisation has not been overly successful in the many cases where it has been tried, through UN operations, or in other forms of intervention. Out of 18 UN attempts at democratisation since the end of the Cold War, 13 had suffered some form of authoritarian regime by 2002.[62] This has similar implications for peacebuilding, involving constitutional, institutional and civil society peace processes. The relevant literatures tend to focus upon the common liberal ethos of the different strands of peacebuilding and fail to notice that there may be tension between them, though both peacebuilding and democratisation theorists have moved away from simplistic assumptions that the holding of elections should be the main focus and is where success can be defined.[63] This reflects the fact that peacebuilding approaches tend to weigh in favour of elite level politics despite claims and efforts to the contrary. This is further reflected in the liberal peace project.

The role of international financial institutions (IFIs) is also increasingly influential in this respect. Through their increasing involvement in peacebuilding, and through the general trend of establishing their unit research and policy units to examine their role in the construction of the liberal peace, they have become involved in democratisation, as well as the more traditional areas of development. There has also been an acknowledgement of the need to reduce poverty and create social welfare and responsibility in order to complement their contribution to peacebuilding.[64] Yet, this can also be construed as little more than '…poor relief and riot control':[65]

> The IFIs have not changed their macro-economic conditionalities or provided additional and adequate means to sustain basic social services, employment and local productive capacity. Furthermore, a

> commercialisation of aid policy and humanitarian assistance is also highly conditioned by the ideals of liberal peace, to stimulate outcomes congenial to a particular view of political economy.[66]

Also increasingly recognised as being important in this context is relationship between peacebuilding and justice, and in particular, the problems of establishing post-conflict justice. This is a controversial debate revolving around the argument that justice needs to be incorporated into any self-sustaining peace, or that justice may have to be secondary in the short to medium term to the creation of such a peace because too many individuals and organisations in conflict environments whose consent are needed for peace may be implicated. However, it is generally agreed that the relationship between justice and peacebuilding is an important post-conflict component of the process of legitimising the new liberal peace, where a peacebuilding consensus has been deployed, even if only with partial success. These efforts have recently focused on the creation of *ad hoc* tribunals, and the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as local tribunals in East Timor and Sierra Leone operating with the assistance of the UN Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have also been a very visible part of this development. In the context of this specific debate about peace, this raises the question of whether the liberal peace project in conflict zones can be facilitated by justice or by reconciliation, where the former demands identification and punishment and the later the healing of old conflicts? Experience in Latin America and South Africa seems to show that TRCs may not be able to aid reconciliation if they uncover the activities of war criminals. Yet, letting such people go free in the interests of reconciliation is inconsistent with both treaty and customary law, which dictates the prosecution of suspected war criminals.[67] In El Salvador, for example, the TRC established by the Mexico Agreement of 1991 was ignored in the general amnesty passed by the government. More recently, the Commission working in this area in East Timor has focused on its governmental advisory role, and especially on community facilitation. *Ad hoc* tribunals have similar shortcomings. The tribunals established to deal with war crimes in former Yugoslavia, and the *genocidiares* in Rwanda, have used Chapter VII of the UN Charter to promote international humanitarian law but depend upon national cooperation in order to arrest perpetrators only until the point where the UN Security Council decides peace and security has been installed. Though they override national courts they also

depend heavily on local cooperation. Though they illustrate the desire of the international community to hold only certain members of a community responsible for war crimes, they have limited jurisdiction and no enforcement capacity. Yet, such institutions and the discourses they affirm are integral to the peacebuilding consensus and to the liberal peace.

The International Court of Justice also plays an interesting, if controversial role in the legitimisation of efforts to create a liberal peace. The ICJ is similarly dependent upon state cooperation, international political will, and the Security Council. According to Article 36 of the UN Charter, states should refer their legal disputes to the court for resolution and the court can also give advisory opinions on legal questions from international organisations and agencies.[68] It has become involved in the question of peace and security and issues relating to boundaries, sovereignty, the use of force and intervention, hostage-taking, asylum, and diplomatic relations. In its decisions, however, the court often seems divided and unable to reach a clear consensus on these issues. For example, in its 'Advisory Opinion' of 8 July 1996 regarding the 'Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict', it responded to a query by the Director General of the World Health Organisation (WHO) about whether a state's use of nuclear weapons would breach that states obligations to WHO,[69] and General Assembly Resolutions arguing that the threat or use of nuclear weapons could never be justified.[70] The ICJ argued in response to the UN General Assembly query that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law for armed conflict, and to international humanitarian law. However, the ICJ was unable to respond to the WHO request because it argued that WHO's role was to deal with the effects of such weapons use rather than its legality. WHO should not, the Court advised, encroach beyond its role in the provision of public health.[71] This is indicative of the problems that the UN system faces in taking a decisive stand on issues that emanate from its implicitly liberal, governmental and bureaucratised, universal notion of peace. Furthermore, the caseload of the court has generally been light because states do not want to see it impinging upon their sovereignty and national interests through adjudication.

Both *ad hoc* courts and the ICC appear distant and slow moving to those who want to see justice take its course. Perhaps one of the most interesting developments has been the emergence of hybrid courts, specifically in East Timor.[72] The trials in East Timor have been conducted in the Dili District Court with international support, illustrating

how atrocities committed in war are both a local and international issue. Clearly, such developments illustrate the tension between peace with or without justice, reconciliation, the local and the global, underlining the dilemmas for planning for a comprehensive local peace, acceptable at the global level, and installed in conflict zones. But perhaps most significant is their use in order to legitimate the liberal peace that is installed in conflict zones by the internationals present.

These various literatures associated with peacebuilding have effectively concurred on their objective. The coalitions of state and non-state actors and agencies have reached a 'peacebuilding consensus' on the nature of the peace to be created – the liberal peace. This reflects an amalgam of constitutional, institutional, and civil society pathways to peace. Peace is conceptualised as an achievable ideal form, the result of top-down and bottom-up actions, resting on liberal social, political, and economic regimes, structures and norms. It can be exported by the agents of the peacebuilding consensus (including IOs, ROs, agencies, IFIs, NGOs and donors) and there is a modicum of concurrence about the fact that it is also open to negotiation with its recipients. In this sense, peace has moved away from the notion that it is an ideal form, achievable far into the future or simply utopian. Through the peacebuilding consensus it has come to be seen as achievable if the correct steps are taken. Yet rarely in these literatures is there any explicit reference to the liberal peace. Its theorisation remains assumed or absent. But there is a great deal of debate on the various methods that can be applied to construct it, in an ever deepening and ever more complex manner. The evolution and hybridisation of the different strands of thinking about peace and the different methods inherent in the three generations of literature on peace and conflict studies outlined here, have reached the irrevocable conclusion that the devil in dealing with conflict lies in method and effectiveness, rather than in objectives. What lies hidden in these assumptions, however, is that elements of the victor's peace remain, and that the actors involved in peacebuilding are not just engaged in constructing the liberal peace through institutional, constitutional and civil society formulations, but they are also involved in minor or major ways in renegotiating the nature of this peace. This renegotiation occurs between major international actors, funders, and liberal states interests, capacities, and objectives, as well as with local recipients of these activities in conflict zones. Peacebuilding, therefore, is not just about implanting the fruits of a broad consensus on peace on the ground in conflict zones; it is also about negotiating and renegotiating the peacebuilding consensus and the different forms

of conditionality upon which it rests, or which are used to create the liberal peace, between its sponsors, its different agents, and its recipients. Indeed, what transpires from this line of thought is that third generation approaches to dealing with conflict result in a debate about governance within, between, and beyond the different polities that make up an international society. Peacebuilding approaches imply that peace emanates from liberal forms of governance.

A peacebuilding consensus?

It is through the conceptualisations associated with peacebuilding that the developing peacebuilding consensus clearly emerges. In order to achieve both the peacebuilding consensus and the liberal peace, intervention in governance by external actors, working on the basis of a conditional relationship with both the agents of intervention (such as liberal states, IOs, IFIs, NGOs, and agencies) with local actors is key. Governance is seen to be the route by which public and private individuals and formal institutions and regimes are '…empowered to enforce compliance…' or have reached an agreement on informal arrangements perceived to be in the interest of all.[73] This type of thinking is exemplified in the general agreement that such coordinated activities and intervention implies that there is a common, perhaps even universal, basis for the construction of peace agreed by the vast majority of the world's actors, states, organisations, governments, administrations, and communities. In general terms, this seems to be the case, but in terms of specific details case-by-case, the consensus on method and on the liberal peace inferred by such work seems extremely limited: the peace it creates on the ground in conflict zones is sometimes virtual and accentuates the gap between international custodians' aims, capacities and interests, and those of local actors. In the peacebuilding operations around the world there are two particular and very common complaints: that there is a lack of coordination and too much duplication amongst the agents of intervention; and that the peacebuilding process is mainly owned by these agents who seem themselves as custodians of the new peace, rather than by its recipients. There is a huge cultural gap between the interveners and their recipients. This is partly because such highly interventionary and complex processes entailed by peacebuilding approaches require many resources, and specialised knowledge, which as has been repeated by the international agents of peacebuilding from Somalia to East Timor, is simply not present in local populations immediately.[74] Furthermore,

the different actors involved often jealously guard their control of their area of operation, or access and resources. This raises the question of why finding the requisite resources for such operations is so difficult, why the peacebuilding consensus often disguises a dissensus, and why local consent may fluctuate or not be present. This raises the problematic debate of the universal versus the relative normative basis for such action and the possibility that, as peacebuilding becomes more and more involved in governance, that such developments could be viewed as neo-colonial. It also accentuates the fact that all intervention, top-down and institutional, or bottom-up and civil society oriented, both represents the interests of the agents of intervention, and is a process of negotiation over those interests with recipients and local actors.

The peacebuilding consensus presupposes the fact that there is a universally agreed normative and cultural basis for the liberal peace, and that interventionary practices derived from this will be properly supported by all actors with the requisite resources. In contrast, while approaches to ending conflict have become more interventionary in many cases, they generally still operate on the basis of consent and a contested set of assumptions associated with the liberal peace on its universality. There has been little creative discourse about such problems by policymakers, let alone within peace and conflict theory debates. The policy documentation on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, prevention, development, and democratisation released by the last two Secretaries General since the 1990s (and culminating in the recent High Level Panel Report) has worked within the confines of the developing liberal peace, seeking its consolidation from a methodological point of view. It has been read as calling merely for adjustments to the international system, rather than a reformulated debate about the nature of the peace that is emerging or is envisaged in such discourses and practices, or the gap between the former and the later. The UN as a universal system, and the whole panoply of peacebuilding actors, are faced with developing a heavily contested universal framework for making peace and for intervention, or becoming operationally, if not normatively, bankrupt.

This raises the question of whether the peacebuilding consensus can achieve a negotiated and consensual peace in its liberal vein, which represents local and particularist dynamics as well as a cosmopolitan intent. Yet this is clearly what is required if peace and conflict theory, and their associated practices are to create a legitimate and consensual peace in conflict zones. Constraints against change arise from the 'sovereign' discourse and practice of making peace, derived from its con-

ceptualisation through constitutionalism and institutionalism, which also sits somewhat uncomfortable with its civil and victor's peace strands. The peacebuilding project is in some ways inherently contradictory in its vision of an ideal form of peace represented by the liberal peace and installed locally and globally by different actors at different levels of analysis working in official and unofficial guises from the top-down and the bottom-up. The conditionality of this endeavour, in relationships between funders, agents, and recipients, and the limited feedback in these relationships are also problematic. The peacebuilding consensus effectively depends upon specific qualifying moves and relationships of conditionality between peacemakers and disputants.

This process of normalisation of conflict zones by international actors means that peace processes and agreements, which are either the objective or basis for the use of such approaches in conflict or post-conflict zones, tend to incorporate what are now familiar features. As in the context of the 1991 Peace Accords in Angola, the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, and the 1995 Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement, human rights, the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples are normally included. Comprehensive peace agreements provide an increasingly detailed and deterministic framework for peace, and often have similar formats and wordings.[75] This is apparent in a close examination of the Paris Agreements in 1991 for Cambodia, and numerous peace plans for Cyprus since 1986, culminating in the 2004 'Annan Plan'. The foundations for these and similar agreements can be seen in the Treaty of Versailles and US President Wilson's 14 Points, and the nascent representation of liberal democracy and self-determination for viable states as a method of re-ordering conflict zones. Peace accords since 1945 have always included clauses on independence, autonomy or power-sharing, and a fair distribution of resources,[76] and self-determination struggles most often end on these terms.[77]

Peacebuilding approaches have become more concerned with creating access to the very fabric of political communities, as both Boutros Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan's work on reforming the UN peacekeeping framework beyond the limitations of the Westphalian framework and towards long-term settlement processes which may produce a self-sustaining and just peace, has illustrated. This has been operationalised into a peacebuilding consensus involving coordinated and multidimensional peacebuilding regimes. This peacebuilding consensus provides a regime of truth about peace, propagated through the tools and approaches used for ending conflict by the plethora of actors

and institutions involved, including the UN, international agencies, international financial institutions, the international courts, and a vast number of NGOs. These actors operate in various independent and co-ordinated roles, depending upon their independent mandates and cultural evolution, in order to construct this regime of truth. The effects of their interventions are made permanent in the regimes of governance they establish through peace treaties covering international relations and constitutions, through the democratisation, human rights, and development frameworks they establish, and the structures of marketisation and international trade introduced, and the establishment of the rule of law. Perhaps what is most important is that this consensus exists mainly among the internationals involved in intervening conflict, representing their view of peace, and local opportunities to negotiate peace in this context are very limited. Even this elite level consensus actually masks a dissensus between the different actors involved in peacebuilding, and a struggle over the limited resources available for peacebuilding.

The thinking that has emerged in prominent intellectual and policy circles has tended to concur that if the liberal peace is to be achieved within civil society this requires deep intervention into the social, economic and governmental institutions of that region in question. Such forms of intervention could be construed as a corruption of the concept of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but for the fact that many of the organisations involved are non-state actors, or international institutions that have gained internal political consent. Clearly, behind these NGO, agency, or institutionally fronted interventions lies the financial and ideological presence of liberal states. Providing an umbrella for these technical mechanisms are the neo-liberal and liberal political structures of the post-Cold War international system. These structures have evolved to ensure that new, modified, or restored states adopt forms of popular representation that include minority and human rights protection, and they enter the globalised neo-liberal economy. This is a product of a regulative post-Cold War peace[78] in which ending conflict can be used to shape unreformed and unregulated territories through a hegemonic or constitutional multilateral approach.[79] This re-opens the key question of *consent*. Traditionally, consent was provided by states but increasingly, consent is seem as being provided by non-state actors. This is a key point, and it has radical implications because it means that consent has to be assessed and harnessed by very different methods to the traditional state-centric approaches (i.e. through leadership). If a community calls for humani-

tarian intervention and aid, are they consenting to intervention overriding the voice of their host state leaders? What about if a liberal actor identifies a community in need according to its own understanding of need? Does this mean that the community's consent is automatic and therefore need not be sought? In the case of genocide or ethnic cleansing, for example, can we assume that consent is automatically present, even if as in the case of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, or in Kosovo in 1999, official state actors did not call for, or want, assistance (and indeed saw it as contrary to their own objectives)? The notion of an 'international community' is an important indicator in the debate on peace from the point of view of liberal states, IOs, IFIs, agencies, and NGOs. It indicates an assumption that these actors have reached a consensus on conditions that should exist across the worlds, see conflict and disaster zones are aberrant, and have the mandate and resources to intervene to normalise these conditions. This means that they carry sufficient consensus on how to bring about peace in conflict zones, according to how peace is conceptualised. Of course, the failure of this community has led some to argue that this means that there is actually no such community at all.[80] Despite such claims, it cannot be denied that these 'internationals' are present, interconnected, have roughly parallel mandates, and see their role as in someway ameliorating conflict and contributing to the construction of a peace of sorts. This is as far as the peacebuilding consensus has developed.

Defining peace through conflict theory

The conflict management, resolution, and peacebuilding literatures rests on a set of assumptions about the creation of peace. The Realist tradition and the notion of a victor's peace has heavily influenced much of the debate in conflict studies, which has tended to focus on territorial and legalistic constructions both of peace and war, in which a hegemonic 'order' would be an acceptable compromise. The advantage of such a conceptualisation is that it allows simple binaries to be deployed in order to describe one's condition, either of peace or of war. The disadvantage, many would argue, lies in the limited view of peace that can be attained as a result. For Hobbes, for example, peace was an extremely rare reprieve from war or a predisposition to war:

> the nature of War consisteth not in actual fighting: but in the known predisposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is Peace.[81]

Despite the apparent simplicity of this approach, phenomena such as Cold Wars, low intensity conflict, civil war, guerrilla war, internal war, revolution, and terrorism, must be identified as deviations from the norm of either a condition of peace or a condition of war through this framework. Because these phenomena were seen as deviations they were regarded as temporary and distinct rather than a normal part of certain types of conflict. Solutions to these forms of conflict therefore could be simply developed *via* the reconstitution of existing states through consent-based or coercive diplomatic, or military, methods leading to a negotiation of territory and constitutional arrangements. Sometimes this extended to the creation of new states, as occurred in the case of Pakistan in 1947, Israel in 1948, Cyprus in 1960, and Bangladesh in 1971. Other cases, such as the split between Czech and Slovakia spring to mind. Almost all of the cases of state modification or creation involved complex power-sharing constitutional arrangements along the liberal democratic model, modified in deference to ethnic, linguistic, or religious identity. In other words, this logic was unable to satisfy or represent all of the different actors or agendas present in a conflict and therefore any peace settlement would result in 'order' rather than an ideal peace. This model was very much in the vein of the problem-solving approach to IR.[82] The privileging of the structures of the Westphalian system, notably territory and boundaries, and later majoritarianism, made these resources the focus of intense and often violent competition. The neo-realist version of peace implies that it must be equated with order brought about through the threat of force and balance of power. This is slightly modified in terms of structural realists who accept that international cooperation may create economic regimes which moderate the military power. Derived from this are interdependence theorists who argue that suggest that peace will come about as a result of growing economic interdependence. These problems are heavily reflected in conflict theory and in particular, first generation approaches to ending conflict, which are themselves derived from the victor's strand of thinking about peace.

Such problems also play a significant role in the liberal, neo-liberal, and functionalist schools of thought that intergovernmental organisations and institutions can be used to establish international regimes, norms, and mechanisms that can ameliorate the worst effects of this system. These norms and regimes claim universality. The idealist school of thought, also associated with pluralism and world society/human needs thinking, argues that an ideal form of universal peace is

possible, and in more sophisticated versions, there are a set of human needs which must be fulfilled if peace is to be attained. There is a clear link here with a Kantian discourse on perpetual peace in which war is permanently abandoned through the categorical imperative, and by treating one another as ends rather than means, establishing civil associations, republics and peaceful federations. The result of these actions would be the outlawing of war. Peace is conceptualised here as an end result of such processes after a long transitional period. Peace would, in these terms, represent the permanent and legal renunciation of war in a Grotian sense, in which peace would be derived from law and morality and individual rights would be observed. As this form of peace could be predetermined, a just war could be legitimate if it was fought in the interests of this type of peace. These strands of thought are present in both second and third generation approaches to ending conflict, and have much in common with the constitutional, institutional, and liberal concepts of peace. They were also strongly associated with the civil society discourse in which non-official and non-state actors began to search for their own types of agency and roles in the construction of peace. Post-structuralists, structuralists and Marxists see the liberal peace in itself as being a possible source of hegemony and oppression engendered in the role of the state, nascent forms of empire, and international financial institutions, on other grounds. Peace research presents a version of peace that requires a sustainable peace through a transformation of political community. In all of these approaches, peace is also inferred to be a dependent upon a radical transformation of the international system.

Several meanings of peace emerge in the context of the debates about 'positive' and 'negative' peace stemming from peace research. Peace can be seen as the absence of war, as justice and development, as respect and tolerance between people, in terms of environmental balance, as a spiritual quality, and 'wholeness.[83] Indeed, as Miall has pointed out, peace studies is concerned with the movement away from war to peace along a continuum ranging from,

> …destructive wars, through to lesser armed conflicts, to crises and potential conflicts, to 'unstable peace', to zones of peace where violent conflict is highly unlikely, to enduring peaceful relationships that survive for centuries through to a peaceful world which has learned to permanently end war. Peace studies is legitimately concerned with movements from war towards peace at any point on this continuum.[84]

This notion of a linear axis of peace and war is a classic move made to graduate, but also to maintain, a distinction between these two concepts in the conflict studies literature and to ward of any ambiguity between them. This continuum is also represented by Galtung's notion of positive and negative peace in which 'structural violence' distinguishes between the two. In the context of peace studies, this means that its fundamental preoccupation with preventing conflict and building a positive peace provide key markers in this exploration of peace and its conceptualisation. Conflict prevention involves addressing the roots of conflict in political, economic, cultural, and social structures, attitudes and beliefs that institutionalise and legitimise violence. Peace studies indicates that if a positive peace is to be built, what is required is the identification and transformation of hegemonic relationships that hinge upon the oppression or suppression of peoples. Here it concurs to some degree at least with the agendas of conflict resolution and critical and post-structuralists approaches to ending conflict. Though it might be argued that there is little basis for agreement in the various schools of thought, apart from a somewhat vague position that '…peace is the absence of war, and is to be balanced against other values such as order, freedom, security and justice…'[85] it is clear that aspects of all of these versions of peace are present in the contemporary liberal conceptualisation of peace:

> …the dominant conception in the West is of a liberal peace in which citizens enjoy negative freedoms from coercion, want, and fear, and positive freedoms to associate, organise, and hold and express their beliefs. Democratisation and human rights underpin the liberal peace, international institutions are expected to settle disputes peacefully and liberal states use methods other than force to settle their disputes with each other. As in the Augustinian and Grotian tradition, just wars still have to be fought by legitimate collective authority against aggressors and dictators who pose a threat to international peace and security.[86]

This genealogy of the liberal peace indicates its antecedents lie in somewhat contradictory frameworks: secular nationalism and its monopoly of the means of violence; in non-secular understanding of common morality; and in an implicitly cosmopolitan understanding of an international society with shared legal norms and regimes. One of the most significant contributions which underpins much contemporary reflection on mainstream approaches to peace can be found in

the debates surrounding the 'democratic peace'. The argument that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other allows for the construction, both conceptually and in practice, of the concept of the 'zone of peace'.[87] The expansion of this liberal version of peace may '…produce a periphery of turbulence around a liberal core.'[88]

Taking a more radical stance, structuralists, post-structuralists, and peace researchers concentrate on the violence produced by economic systems, cultural and political structures, and on issues of justice derived therein. This gives rise to an understanding of conflict in the international system provoked by exploitative economic practices, by avaricious actors greedy for economic and territorial resources. The attainment of peace from this perspective seems far more difficult as it requires an understanding of hidden structures and practices of domination, which state-centric and human needs approaches may not grasp. As Foucault has argued, '..[p]eace would then be a form of war, and the state the means of waging it.'[89] From this perspective, it is possible to argue that mainstream discourses and practices associated with ending conflict are actually expressions of an attempt to stamp a hegemonic character on the new peace to be established in conflict zones; yet this is not generally perceived to be problematic because this peace is liberal and therefore universal, and any problems that may emerge are mainly related to its implementation or the technical process used to introduce it and establish it.

There is an important literature emerging, constituting a fourth generation of approaches to ending conflict, that focuses on the question of how one can move beyond the installation of a hegemonic peace in conflict zones, instead replacing it with one which reflects the agency and needs of individuals and groups within conflict zones, and the construction of peace settlements which are sensitised to the local as well as the state, regional, and global. This reflexive version of peace associated with different emancipatory discourses[90] is far from new. Indeed it coloured the work of many work in the field and associated sub disciplines, but without explicit explanation. This may partly have been, as Jabri has explained, because of the problems of providing a value-oriented discussion of such a powerful normative concept or because anything other than a narrow version of peace lacks parsimony and therefore policy relevance (such as Galtung's negative/positive framework).[91] The problem here is that peace is a politicised concept, and the current liberal peace framework operates by claiming universality. If every peace is envisaged as permanent and every war the last, then clearly there are enormous stakes to be had in claiming

a part of the new or current peace. Thus, for example, reframing peace as communicative action based upon Habermasian dialogic relations underlines the negotiation and mediation which are played out in any discussion of peace between actors, interests, norms, and values, past, present and future as well as the role of individuals in claiming agency in their emancipation.[92] This type of process, of learning and of feedback, does not seem apparent in most theorisations and practices that contribute to peacebuilding and the peacebuilding consensus. This development of a fourth generation in conflict theory seems to be a counter-discourse to the mainstream dogma of peace. However, it is also problematic because the sort of universalism inherent even in an emancipatory discourse such as in critical theory, which privileges liberal positions, may tend toward the notion that one actor in a relationship has better knowledge or more expertise in a particular area and therefore must act to emancipate the other. In one sense, this is exactly the conundrum faced by the liberal peace and its associated peacebuilding consensus. At least the liberal version of peace has the integrity of a specific adjective to qualify its status as an ideal form, however.

Conclusion

As this chapter has argued, conflict theory has tended to assume that the liberal peace unquestionably forms the basis for theorising the ending of conflict, and more recent debates on peacebuilding and UN peace operations have moved into the terrain of the reforms or construction of liberal modes of governance of economies, polities, and development. The three generations of intellectual and policy discourses and practices discussed in this chapter, spanning conflict management, conflict resolution and peace studies, seem initially to be the most obvious places to look for a theoretical and conceptual debate on the nature of peace. However, much of the work within these subdisciplines actually focuses more on conflict and war and the sources or catalysts for violence. Certainly, their primary concerns relate to the development of effective methods to limit violence or create a sustainable peace. This is seen to be the route to the creation of the liberal peace, though again this is rarely made explicit. Though the peacebuilding project is a key and a necessary approach to dealing with conflict, the fact that there is almost no debate upon peace, its nature, and achievement, other than in the indirect way that would emerge from any discussion about the ending of conflict, is extremely prob-

lematic. This holds true even within the realm of peace studies, though it is also here that we find the most concerted efforts to conceptualise peace and to open up an area of debate that would effectively lead to this.[93] What this means is that the peace that is ultimately being installed by these three generations of approaches to ending conflict is not clearly consensual or negotiated between disputants and interveners, but is more a product of multiple intervener objectives with perhaps only a marginal renegotiation with its local recipients. This is not clear-cut, however. As this chapter has shown, each of these generations of thinking about approaches to ending conflict reflect, aspects of the victor's peace, the constitutional, institutional, and civil conceptualisations of peace. Peacebuilding approaches effectively draw on all four of these approaches in the context of the peacebuilding consensus, the development of liberal governance, and the ultimate construction of the liberal peace.

Yet, much of the discussion of peacebuilding omits the analysis of one key foundational dynamic: what exactly is the liberal peace that is being constructed by the peacebuilding process? There have been various indirect attempts to describe and explain its character, but little in the way of the production and development of a body of thought about the contemporary nature of peace, and its antecedents. The definition that seems to be implicit in the peacebuilding literature is as follows. The liberal peace is defined as that contained within the methodological and objective-oriented peacebuilding consensus where like-minded liberal states, international, regional and local actors coexist in a western-oriented international society in which states are democratic, human rights are observed at an acceptable level, markets are open and transparent, and multilateralism is the norm except in extreme circumstances. This view of the liberal peace provides the model for that being produced in conflict zones through peacebuilding. It is both an end state and a methodology for its own creation, as can be seen in the peacebuilding consensus. Problems only arise when differences between actors that comprise the liberal peace emerge over methods and objectives. This may seem an insignificant point, but herein lies a requirement for an understanding of the dynamics of the development of the international system and international society, inclusive of all of its international, regional, state and local actors, as well as an understanding of the pressures upon, and dynamics of the interventionary mechanisms that are used to establish peace. Knowing what 'peace' is, as both a process and goal, encompasses epistemic communities involved in peacebuilding and the methods they apply.

All aspects of liberalism – which is part of the wider picture of state-reconstruction – are founded upon a specific theory of peace, conflict prevention and transformation.[94] First generation approaches within the Westphalian system tend to replicate the flaws of that system, particularly if the conflict under scrutiny in some way undermines the fragile conceptual unity of the states-system. Second generation conflict resolution and transformation approaches tend to be constrained by the prevalence of official discourses and by a tendency towards social engineering. Third generation approaches have ultimately continued to be 'normalising' activities involving the epistemic and methodological transfer of knowledge from peaceable communities in conflict zones, and within the framework of the peacebuilding consensus about the transformation of governance into a liberal peace format to ensure the new peace's commensurability with the agents and custodians of peacebuilding, and therefore its sustainability. This problem is encapsulated by the increasing concern in policy circles engaged in peacebuilding with the issues of efficacy and legitimacy.[95] The latter denotes a requirement that there is local and international consensus and support, while the former essentially requires that each peace process has a clear objective, which is pre-determined and legitimate. In other words, there must be agreement on what peace is before an intervention occurs, and the process must arrive at this peace as efficiently as possible. Off course, this also raises the question of whether a peace brought about though inefficient, illegal, or unjust methods may also become viable or legitimate.

The irony of the study of peace in the context of these generations of approaches to ending conflict, which culminate in peacebuilding, can be seen clearly in the experience of peace research. Even peace studies tend to conceptualise peace

> … as a continuum from war to absence of war or to peace conceived as the presence or absence of 'positive peace', in the sense of justice and development, and by whether they engage mainly with the actor level, the relational level or the system level.[96]

The study of peace is usually overlooked in the face of the need to understand violence. When one does begin to study the conceptualisation of peace through the various research programmes and theoretical approaches available, it becomes very apparent that all is not as it seems. Utilising a genealogical view of the development of approaches to ending conflict indicates that the outcome – the order – they

produce, may only contribute to the hegemony of dominant actors. In other words the processes used to construct contemporary peace could be argued to mainly serve the interests of dominant actors in international politics rather than to achieve a version of peace based upon a much broader consensus, including those who are its recipients. Defining and then negotiating peace cannot be examined without some kind of parallel examination of the reproduction of specific orders, which peace processes effectively revolve around. What is clear about the current theorisation of the practices and discourses of conflict and approaches to end conflict is that there is an impetus towards a broad and institutionalised peacebuilding consensus from within the liberal international community, and that this is aimed at constructing a conditional and liberal peace. The methods inherent in this peacebuilding consensus are heavily theorised and are developing rapidly. However, the liberal peace and all that it entails has tended to escape any sustained examination, but rather is made up of a series of norms, concepts, and regimes, which have emerged as a resulted different strands of thought, theory, policies and strategies used in different issue areas. The reality of both the peacebuilding consensus and the liberal peace is that they mask dissensus and are heavily contested both in discourse and in practice.

Part II
Constructing the Liberal Peace

4
Constructing the Liberal Peace from Below

'…to correct vices and maintain justice…'[1]

Introduction

How is the liberal peace imagined and created in contemporary policy and academic approaches to the ending of conflict from the perspective of non-state actors and civil society? What is their role in constructing peace from inside the conflict environment, through what is often referred to as a bottom-up peacebuilding process? Such processes are often in close association with donor states, international organisations like the UN, agencies like UNDP or UNHCR, or the World Bank. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Trade Organisation, among many others, encourages relationships with civil society.[2] What are the implications for the nature of the civil peace that non-state actors attempt to construct from the group upwards? The discourses and practices associated with such 'human security' oriented approaches involve both a normative commitment to a just and sustainable settlement to conflict, the reframing of security debates, and the involvement of external non-state actors with access to conflict zones, or indigenous non-state actors. This is connected with the role and status that civil society now has in constructing the liberal peace. Non-state actors, agencies, and civil society focused intervention, are very important in the wider legitimisation of the liberal peace through the constitution of the civil peace, and also by contributing to the construction of a constitutional peace in a broader institutional context. At the same time, states and international institutions and organisations are provided with legitimate access to the norms, regimes, and institutions of civil

society non-state actors and the human security discourses they deploy. Partly because of this the liberal peace has become an end that appears to legitimate the means used, giving rise to some significant contradictions in contemporary non-state practices design to construct a liberal peace from below. Such processes can be directly linked to the civil society discourse of peace, of course, but they also contribute to the constitutional and institutional discourses of peace in that their role is conditional upon their contribution to democratisation, to free market reform, to legal reforms, and to the anchoring of the new liberal peace within an international institutional context of global governance. This conditionality also suggests a link with the victor's peace in that dominant actors (states and their associated agencies or institutions) in the state system define the agendas of bottom-up peacebuilding approaches inherent in the liberal peace. Different actors contribute to the liberal peace model by installing forms of peace-as-governance associated with the regulation, control, and protection of individuals and civil society. This chapter investigates the nature of the peace that is envisaged in bottom-up peacebuilding interventions in conflict zones and assesses how this process contributes and also attempts to influence the liberal peace project.

Peace through human security

Human security (HS), and its associated concepts and frameworks, is mainly associated with the work of non-state actors, quasi-state agencies, and especially NGOs. Such actors are engaged in constructing a version of the liberal peace at the grassroots level, though obviously agencies and international institutions have a role that impinges upon both the grassroots and the state level. HS emerged during the 1990s in response to what Hedley Bull might have described as a 'new medievalism'.[3] The human security debate[4] has been notable mainly because of its acceptance in key policy circles (such as within the UN organisation, and by major donor states such as Japan or Canada), and in what has been identified as 'global civil society' – that interconnected space which links civil society, NGOs, international agencies and international organisations, donors, and international financial institutions.[5] This debate calls for the subjects of security to be redefined from the 'state' to the 'individual' – in other words from managing inter-state relations to building peace by introducing social, political and economic reforms. 'Freedom from want, freedom from fear' is its most

common expression in policy circles mainly related to the UN, agencies and NGOs. Mahbub ul Haq is credited with shaping this as a concept in the 1994 UN Development Report. Its initial acceptance was mainly because liberal state and international organisation objectives shifted from *status quo* management to the multidimensional approaches to peacebuilding in which strategies are applied which aim to transform conflict '..into peaceful non-violent process of social and political change…'.[6] These developments can be observed in the context of UN Agenda's for the reform of international approaches to peace published throughout the 1990s (including the Agendas for Peace, Democratisation and Development) and beyond, in which it is clear that the notion of peace envisaged depends to a large part of non-governmental actors and agencies because they tend to have unparalleled access to conflict zones, far beyond those actors which form part of the official political, economic and developmental discourse.[7]

Perhaps the development of the concept of human security encapsulates this evolution best. Yet, the attempt to construct a more inclusive terrain for the notoriously narrow and simplistic debates that have disfigured the discussion of security appears to have fallen into the same trap that classical debates on security were subject to. Classical debates, as illustrated by multiple versions of realism often culminate in the protection of the concept and framework of the Westphalian state, rather than the populations they house. The concept of human security broadens the agents and structures identified as being causes of insecurity and responsible for its eradication so far that it becomes very difficult to prioritise crucial areas that may be most effective in ameliorating insecurity. Thus, the concept has been likened to 'carrying a band aid' to deal with humanitarian crises caused by war.[8] Yet, at the same time HS recognises the complexity of security issues, and the breadth of issues and actors who are affected by them. Since their emergence, HS oriented approaches and actors offer a vision of the liberal peace in which social welfare and justice can be incorporated into parallel constitutional and institutional projects for peace. This effectively legitimates all of the different strands and discourses of the liberal peace project, and increasingly has outweighed the interventionary aspects of this project associated with the victor's peace.

While it is likely that actors and strategies at this level effectively replicate state practice, this criticism also tends to overlook the agency of such actors that has also emerged at this level which enables them to act relatively independently in some instances of institutional and

state control. Yet, there is a broad concurrence between human security-oriented agents and their actions, and that of states and their organisations within the liberal peace context. While this concept and these types of actors seem to provide a challenge to the traditional conceptions of the international system, most humanitarian actors, NGOs and associated non-state actors, must, for their very existence, work within the confines of the dominant institutions and regimes of the states-system. This tempers the challenge that they create somewhat and reduces their role in the negotiation and re-negotiation of the peacebuilding consensus as subservient to that of states. However, most commentators agree that non-state actors and agencies are a vital and key part of peacebuilding, and indeed that global governance is not possible without their cooperation.[9] They have become integral to the overall project of the liberal peace because the many different actors involved in, and many approaches to, peacebuilding have been used to provide avenues of legitimate intervention for the broader state-led liberal peace project. These ever-deeper forms of intervention involve structural intervention whereby social, political, economic, and cultural, frameworks are altered or introduced to contribute to the creation of the liberal peace.

Non-state actors are vital in their contribution to the liberal peace from the bottom-up, as well as offering a contribution to the liberal peace from actors inside the conflict zone. This effectively provides both a private and a local aspect to the negotiation of the peacebuilding consensus and the installation of the liberal peace. Non-state actors have been involved in constructing a peace that is more representative of the 'local' in many ways. Non-state actors were directly involved with the International Labour Organisation since its founding in 1919, and though they were excluded from the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, their very exclusion was also an acknowledgement of their existence. The League of Nations also provided non-state actors with informal consultative status. All of this serves to show that there was a realisation that peace could only be constructed if civil society could be accessed, influenced, and involved. Furthermore, though the UN Declaration of Human Rights dates back to 1948, Human rights continued to be subordinate to sovereignty until the 1970s, when NGOs and other non-state actors became key players in advocating change and development in this respect. Amnesty International, the first such organisation founded in 1961, was a key actor in this development, which as Ignatieff has explained '…was a harbinger of the huge international human rights movement that was to develop…'.[10] One early

success was the retrieval of Soviet Jewry in the 1970s, from which Human Rights Watch emerged, as well as a new dynamism of the human rights movement.[11] Such developments were encapsulated in the agreement over the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.[12] From these strands developed a powerful body of non-state actors, and a development of a language of rights and norms that has undermined the absolutism of Westphalian sovereignty and reinforced the agency of the individual. This has been an extremely important addition to the peacebuilding consensus, and so to the liberal peace project. It has also been in this context that the dynamics of humanitarian intervention by states and by non-state actors has developed. States may intervene for humanitarian reasons on the basis of the legitimacy of these norms, despite the fact that the act of intervention is itself illegal, as was the case in Kosovo in 1999 or in the case of India and East Pakistan in 1971. Non-state actor intervention, and more specifically that of NGOs generally, is perceived unquestionably as legitimate because of their normative and practical roles and precisely because they are perceived not be representative of the interests of a specific state.

One of the side effects of the deployment of this concept in practical terms, particularly in the context of UN organs and the humanitarian community has been that the provision of basic needs of populations in conflict zones has been privatised. By the end of the 1990s most countries dispersed 25% of their overseas aid through NGOs: the EU Commission Humanitarian Aid Office was using NGOs to disperse at least 60% of its budget.[13] This dispersal has effectively created a market situation where NGOs have to compete for funds, and therefore must respect the conditionalities imposed upon them by donors intent on constructing the liberal peace. These processes have been characterised by their complex and multi-level, multidimensional nature, and represent a securitisation of development, economy, human rights, as well as politics.[14] This development, guided by the human security framework, has had a major impact on the practice and efficacy of intervention. In this, the UN and its relationship with NGOs has become crucial, because of its recognition of the multiple political, social, economic and humanitarian dynamics of 'peace' *via* the concept of human security. *Agenda for Peace* enabled the UN to become engaged in social justice and political issues, which was as close as this documentation came to a broad conceptualisation of peace. The *Agendas* for 'Democratisation' and for 'Development' moved the debate further into the terrain of the liberal peace, though at no point in any of this documentation is there an acknowledgement of the multiple conceptualisations of peace, and that

the liberal peace might be but one of those – the liberal peace is represented implicitly as an ideal form and ontologically stable.[15] Human security provides a framework to guide non-state and state actors in its achievement.

Various other documentation also support this hypothesis, including Oxfam's *Poverty Report* and the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on *The Responsibility to Protect,* which projected a similar concern with broad security issues and with the development of methods to address the broader roots of conflict through multiple forms of intervention.[16] The former grappled with the inverse relationship between peace and poverty while the latter examined the responsibility that the 'international community' had to intervene in conflicts and crises regardless of the norms of sovereignty. Both documents see international intervention in civil society as a vital response to human security problems, in coordination with international institutions and organisations. Such documentation also indicates a tension in the humanitarian discourse in which two opposing arguments are made as if they were unproblematic: firstly that outsiders should and can do more to intervene in conflict, development, and human rights problems within civil society; but secondly that recipients should do more to help themselves.[17] The implication of this is that both interveners and insiders effectively need to agree on what constitutes the peace to be installed, and how this is to be carried out. Human security effectively provides a response to these questions: the peace to be created protects the individual, and a mixture of international, local, official and unofficial actors can take part in its provision. The Brahimi report retained similar contradictions.[18]

As already noted, what was characteristic of these developments was the emergence of democratisation as a key objective in which civil society could be stabilised in a sustainable manner and human security could be guaranteed.[19] Kofi Annan saw this as an attempt to construct democratic governance at the local level, particularly in conflict zones, and to '…explore democratic principles at the global level.'[20] What this indicated was that any form of intervention in a conflict, whether state, IO, agency or NGO, had become implicitly contingent upon their contribution to democratisation processes. Similarly, this is also associated with arguments about the need for development, which is itself linked to the entry of the conflict zone into the globalised international economy. As can be seen from El Salvador to Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia, democratisation provides an umbrella for these liberal constructions that are seen as integral to the

creation of long-term sustainable conditions of peace. From Bosnia, to Kosovo and East Timor, transitional administrations have taken a firm grip of this democratisation and neo-liberal development process,[21] and aid and its provision, often through NGOs and agencies had now become linked to governance.[22] The agendas established in order to create human security mean that NGOs and non-state actors have become intricately entwined with official actors and transitional administrations through conditionalities relating to the construction of the liberal peace by donors *vis-à-vis* NGOs and their target populations. Indeed, Duffield argues in the context of the Dinka in the transition zone in Sudan that this relationship has acted as a form of cultural suppression, as it has attempted to reorder the communities into Western socio-economic groups.[23]

The role of non-state actors and agencies in a human security framework is susceptible to this accusation.[24] Human security as a concept works as a form of 'biopower', which domesticates and normalises mainly non-Western societies and communities caught up in humanitarian crises, bringing their political structures and socio-economic interactions into a liberal peace and governance framework. It is in this bottom-up guise that peace may become a form of biopower, which involves interveners in conflict taking on the role of 'administering life'. This requires the importation of expert knowledge into conflict zones, both for the many tasks associated with humanitarianism and security, and to establish 'governmentality' in which control is taken over most political, social, economic, and identity functions of groups involved in conflict and in the construction of peace at the level of civil society. This governmentality actually depends upon the maintenance of a space between the local and the state/ international, in order to maintain its authority, even though this may undermine local consent. Both the community and the self are governed in a manner in which external actors expect will create peace.[25] These practices and discourses have rapidly become a normalised part of our understanding of the liberal peace.[26] Essentially, from this bottom-up level of analysis, the liberal peace can be said to be a hegemonic peace, broadly consensual from the perspective of the coalition of external actors involved in it. But, its consensuality also depends on the incentivisation of, or conditionality of, such forms of intervention. What this indicates is that the privatisation of peace and the increasing subcontracting of peace activities to private actors also masks a tendency for bottom-up peacebuilding to represent international rather than local consensus, and to swamp the voices of local actors involved in such civil society strands

of the construction of the liberal peace. In its defence, it must be said that the version of the liberal peace propagated at this level is more concerned with social welfare and justice than the more conservative version propagated directly by states. Non-state actors and agencies working along the lines indicated by HS effectively serve as a filter for the liberal peace, renegotiating its priorities, between its propagators and its recipients.

Conceptualising peace through non-state actors

Non-state actors and NGOs have been instrumental in broadening our understanding of peace and security and their existence is also indicative of the liberal peace project. In 1914, there were 1083 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and no firm conception of universal human rights affirmed by the international community, such that it was. Now the estimated number of NGOs stands at between 37,000 and 50,000.[27] Though contested, there are now firm conceptions of human rights as well as emerging humanitarian norms, and a discourse of human security, which provides a basis for non-state actor intervention. Many NGOs were formed in the 1990s as a response to the broad requirements of this synthesis of peacebuilding, humanitarianism, human rights monitoring and advocacy. Most NGOs operate on specific issues or bridge several aspects of these areas. The most familiar NGOs working on human rights include the International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, and it is in the realms of human rights that NGOs have made what is perhaps their most important contribution. Yet, the definition of NGOs, our understanding of their roles, and the contexts of globalisation, global governance, and of global civil society, in which NGOs exist and operate are heavily contested.[28] The general thrust of these arguments indicate, however, that NGOs operate in, and contribute to, the construction and facilitation of global governance and globalisation in transnational networks to advocate liberal reform.[29] This assertion is, of course, rather problematic given the fact that all of these concepts are contested and there is little agreement in the relevant literatures even on the nature of NGOs.

Scholars have offered various NGO typologies of which perhaps the clearest is the Weiss and Gordenker typology. This includes orthodox NGOs, which are private citizens' organizations, active on social issues, are non-profit making, and have a transnational range. QUANGOs are 'quasi-nongovernmental organisations' such as the ICRC. These have

relative autonomy, but which generally decreases as reliance on government funding increases. QUANGOs include government contractors, providing expert services (for example, the International Rescue Committee). DONGOs are donor-created NGOs for particular purposes, such as development and humanitarian emergencies.[30] NGO functions include documentation, lobbying, dissemination and political activism in analysing effects on human rights.[31] Most NGOs work in global, regional, and local networks of seemingly ever-increasing density and pro-activeness. Independently, or as part of a networked concert of NGOs, they channel information, advocacy, and other resources to nodal points of identifiable need. This might involve lobbying political or economic institutions, advocating changes in, and reform of, or monitoring, norms and practices within institutions like the World Bank or in conflict or crisis zones, or transferring humanitarian resources into conflict zones. In particular, there is an emerging consensus that NGO efforts need to be owned by the local civil society to be effective. NGOs do not just work with a narrow, legalistic conception of human rights, but have the capacity to operate in the context of a broad range of economic, social and cultural rights, as was made clear at the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.[32] Many NGOs have tended to be issue-oriented but increasingly, connections are being made between NGOs operating on different issues, and also between operational and advocacy NGOs.[33]

Their antecedents began to emerge in the nineteenth century in association with the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the ending of the slave trade, voting rights for women, international law and disarmament discourses, and many other activities organised by non-state actors aimed at political, social, and economic reform. This formed an important strand of the evolving debate on the nature of peace and how it could be achieved in the context of the civil peace. Such actors soon began to proliferate: the International Rescue Committee (IRC) began its life rescuing Jews from Europe during WWII, and was later to be involved with retrieving Hungarian refugees after the failure of the 1956 rebellion and Cuban refugees after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959.[34] Other such organisations followed, including the Catholic Relief Service, World Vision, and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM). NGOs played an important role in highlighting the need for human rights to be included in the UN Charter at San Francisco in 1945, and have consistently worked to develop the UN Human Rights System. NGOs provided useful input into the drafting of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. They have also been key actors in the creation of different UN treaties and conventions spanning issues from the elimination of discrimination against women (1979) to the rights of children (1989). They have also played important roles in many other human rights related UN working groups, as well in the creation of the position of the UN High Commission for Human Rights. In the UN system their roles have fallen into three main guises: setting standards, monitoring, and implementation.[35] NGOs have also been able to introduce human rights mechanisms into other international organisations such as the World Bank and its Inspection Panel, which was introduced in 1993 to examine the impact of the organisation's policies on human rights. International NGOs have been important in bringing to light abuses by states and advocating change in their practices, and local NGOs are often crucial in re-establishing human rights in conflict and crisis zones.

In the realm of human rights, observation, monitoring, and enforcement (which in the Westphalian international system is generally left to host states) NGOs have the ability, capacity, access, and resources, to work with, or even to bypass host states, and take on board such tasks themselves. Sometime this is in a role which directly addresses human rights abuses, or provides monitoring, or it is as a 'norm entrepreneur' in which NGOs are instrumental in bringing about the social, political and economic changes necessary to enhance human rights. Many of these organisations have also added the contemporary mantras of peacebulding, democratisation, and development to their repertoire of human rights and humanitarian assistance,[36] incorporating human security into policy and intellectual debates. Furthermore, a connection has now developed between human rights, humanitarianism, and associated forms of intervention, military and non-military. This has partly been because of experiences in multiple contexts – from the Middle East after and since the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, in the attempted secession of Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970, and in the first Gulf War. This has raised the question of whether NGOs operate on a 'rights' or a 'needs' basis[37] distinguishing between victim and aggressor or simply providing assistance where it is required regardless of this distinction. Despite the controversy over this question, the role of NGOs has continually strengthened since the first Gulf War when UN Security Council resolution 688 of 5th April 1991 allowed NGO intervention to take precedence over state sovereignty (in this case, of Iraq) to deal with human rights issues, among others.

The question of intervention on the part of non-state actors, and whether or not they intervene on a rights or needs basis, is important to identifying the type of peace they construct. The fact that they bypass state sovereignty reinforces a civil notion of peace. The fact that they do this in an intimate conditional relationship with sponsors and recipients indicates that they are involved in a broader programme of social, political, economic, humanitarian, and developmental engineering. This indicates that the civil peace is contested to a large degree by state actors and organisations that gain access to civil society through NGOs, who aid in the normalisation of civil societies which have deviated from the expected norm. The debate over whether they intervene on a rights basis revolves around a set of norms and rights from within the liberal peace. In this sense, the question over intervention on a needs basis would see victims and aggressors being equally weighted, rather than evaluated according to their respective positions relative to the installation of the liberal peace. This represents the differing positions taken by humanitarian pragmatists and humanitarian idealists in which regulation of such activity to preserve an overarching normative framework is contrasted with the liberalisation of NGOs to provide assistance to those that need it regardless of their position as victim of aggressor, or their location within the overall normative framework of the international system. Furthermore, what is often overlooked in both views is that making a decision on the basis of pragmatic or idealistic humanitarian is itself a hegemonic act made by third parties about 'others'. This opposition can be observed in the position of the ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF).[38] Such actors are far from non-political actors (or even apolitical actors). They have increasingly adopted a liberal discourse of peace in order to justify the strategic choices they make in the field as to which actors they work with and for. The debate on needs-based involvement versus rights-based intervention means is that these actors have to make strategic choices in two directions: as to who they help and why; and whether, in order to curry favour and amass resources, they accept the dominant, and perhaps even hegemonic liberal peace discourse engendered in the peacebuilding consensus and in their role as part of a governance framework intended to institutionalise a sustainable liberal peace from the outside.

NGOs have been particularly valuable *vis-à-vis* human rights because they are not necessarily bound by the norm of non-intervention, are not sovereign actors, and operate in a private, non-official capacity (of course, given their financial relationships with donor states and

international organisations, one might qualify this status as 'pseudo-private'). In the realm of human rights they have the capacity to monitor abuses and to publicise them, to advocate action to be taken, to take action themselves to build compliance with international law and norms, and build the necessary institutions to combat further abuses. They have been instrumental in the construction of international human rights law and regimes, humanitarian law, advocating further development, and overseeing compliance. Without the presence of NGOs representing these capacities, it is unlikely that human rights regimes would be as prominent within the liberal peace, or as developed as they now are, nor would be such a key part of the reconstruction of the liberal peace in failed states and conflict zones. However, humanitarian NGOs are themselves divided about their role, its limits, and whether they should accept constraints, and in particular accept constraints associated with more traditional forms of sovereignty. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) defies many of these restrictions, and focuses upon the need to assist against human rights violations, respecting neither sovereignty nor political neutrality. The ICRC opposed this in the context of the Biafran crisis, which effectively spurred the creation of MSF and these principles in 1971. The differentiation between rights and needs-based humanitarian assistance has become a key issue dividing NGOs in the field: MSF works on the basis that all victims have a *right* to humanitarian assistance. Of course, this still requires the identification of victims. For example during the Rwandan genocide the blurring of victim and aggressor did not solely depend upon identifying Hutu and Tutsi in the refugee camps, but also understanding the politics behind the Hutu power exploitation of Hutus fleeing from the Rwandan Patriotic Front and their exploitation of these camps for their own political purpose. Thus, the differentiation between the political and the humanitarian is not always easy. Similarly, for those that argue that peace lies in the exhaustion of the means of war NGOs may provide resources which delays that exhaustion.[39]

Conflict resolution NGOs also provide some interesting conundrums in their role in early warning, conflict resolution and prevention, constructing the institutions necessary for democratisation and the rule of law to become integral to an emerging peace. International Alert (IA) in particular has worked on the premise that the denial of human rights leads to conflict and therefore works on heightening awareness of such problems in conflict zones. The Carter Center also operates on issues related to democratisation, economic liberalisation and coopera-

tion, development, human rights, and conflict resolution drawing on the status of former US President Carter in order to operate in the margins between officialdom and grassroots in conflict zones.[40]

In both humanitarian and conflict resolution guise, NGOs have become important in the canon of the liberal peace, and owing to their unique access, legitimacy, and flexibility, have become a vital tool for states and international organisations and institutions in the construction of that peace. They can respond quickly, are not bureaucratically crippled, cannot coerce and therefore are widely respected. Most importantly, the combination of these assets mean that they can fulfil roles and tasks which states and their liberal organisations simply cannot achieve. However, they also have certain limits that are only now beginning to be identified and reflected upon. They also require security, they cannot control what happens to the resources they bring into the conflict zone, and they may confer a level of legitimacy onto actors who are not adverse to the use of violence. There is a level of conditionality that is also introduced into the relationship between NGOs and their funders, especially when it comes to the economic, social, and political dimensions of the peace that they are helping construct in conflict zones. Obviously there is a significant tension between attempts to introduce conditionality into relationships between internationals, agencies, or NGOs and disputants, especially as this may undermine or impede attempts to act in a humanitarian manner.[41] Furthermore, there is also a problem with the sheer numbers of NGOs operating in conflict zones in terms of the division of labour and overlap of roles and responsibilities. Perhaps most controversially there is the issue of accountability: should NGOs be held accountable and what kind of frameworks can be constructed to ensure this. Would this undermine their independence and flexibility in identifying problems and responding to them? For this later problem there have been initiatives (such as SPHERE) that are intended to improve their effectiveness and accountability.[42] Despite such problems, it is important to recognise that NGOs are now a recognised part of the UN system and hold consultative status within ECOSOC, and therefore the peacebuilding consensus and contribution to the liberal peace that they represent are an integral part of the humanitarian discourse. Under Article 71 of the UN Charter ECOSOC is empowered to consult with NGOs on issues within its remit, as well as on issues relating to refugees, the environment, and development. This is particularly important in the context of debates about human security and the emergence of a contested 'global civil society'.[43]

In this sense, advocacy movements, epistemic communities, non-states actors, NGOs, and agencies are what Wallace and Josselin have described as 'norm entrepreneurs' which privilege democracy, human rights, and forms of development in their micro level interventions as well as in their discourse in the realm of international relations.[44] Clearly, it has been disillusionment with the role of states in constructing peace in conflict zones that has led to an increased role for non-state actors, organisations, and agencies. This evolution has been based upon the need for expertise in the field in the different aspects of human oriented security, enabled by the development of transnationalism and the recognition of non-state actors as key agents in this area.[45] Gradually, they have become important not just in providing technological expertise, but also in a normative sense, in fulfilling a role in the construction of the liberal peace. The relationship between positive and negative aspects of such forms of intervention is intricate: not producing harm through humanitarian assistance might mean not providing aid where it might impinge upon human rights or create further incentives for conflict.[46] Despite such troubling choices to be made on the part of those intervening in the name of humanitarianism (and there are many who fervently oppose such decisions),[47] understanding the role of NGOs opens up the possibility of a private, civil society account of peacebuilding, and of its fraught relationship with agencies, international organisation, institution and state-backed work. Such an understanding also sheds light upon what disputants and societies in conflict want from both their wars, and the coming peace they are assumed to be committed to. Advocacy movements, epistemic communities, non-states actors, NGOs, and humanitarian actors act as liberal peace norm entrepreneurs, privileging democracy, human rights, and forms of development in their micro level interventions as well as in their discourse in the realm of international relations.[48] Their links with international and regional organisations and agencies, and their focus on human security issues derive from normative macro-frameworks of political community. Such actors may express partisan interests, but human security as either a right or a need appears to be their main over-riding justification. However, they are constrained by the same tension that exists between the goals of international organisations, IFIs, and agencies, particularly with respect to the elevation of groups rights and justice at the local level. This is the normative, practical, and conceptual location of many contemporary conflicts and represents a fault line between self-determination, territorial sovereignty and the normative and practical implications of

different levels of international and domestic legal frameworks in the context of the often conflicting objectives of states, majorities, groups, and international society. This is a problem that has become particularly acute in the context of the liberal rhetoric of the post-Cold War environment. The ambiguities engendered in this tension can be found in the fact that the systemic peacemaking process that the international system has been subject to after cycles of major wars, has in fact been less about a utopian version of peace, but more about hegemony projected as an ideal form of peace, with at least a minimum level of consent.

This means that non-state actors are conceptualised as contributing to peace in different ways. They are generally seen to be contributing to an inside, grassroots peace, based upon local community consent and legitimacy in the context of a global civil society. This conceptulisation lies at the more idealist and utopian end of the peace spectrum and is reflected in the work of OXFAM, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and other groups concerned with issues like development and human rights, through which NGOs enable the diffusion of ethical norms associated with the liberal peace. At the other end of this spectrum, non-state actors are seen as thinly veiled fronts for powerful state interest in they act as front for the insertion of realist state interests in a disguised form.[49] This is particularly so where they have very close relationships with donor states, agencies and IFIs, who generally subcontract work to NGOs precisely because of their access and legitimacy in civil society, and also because humanitarian, social, educational, conflict resolution, and developmental tasks play a significant role on the reconstruction of the state. What both approaches agree upon is that such actors provide a way of bypassing sovereignty and gaining internal access into societies, economies, and polities, with a high degree of legitimacy and flexibility. Both approaches also agree that this occurs in the context of the proselytisation of the liberal peace. Where they disagree is whether this peace is universal and this can be legitimately installed through this process in the local environment, or whether local particularism needs to be built into any peace process. Furthermore, it is also possible that non-state actors might merely replicate the insensitivities of the actors who run them.

Constructing the civil peace

Part of this evolution can be found in the growth of institutions, organisations, regimes, norms, and law pertaining to the rights of

groups and individuals as ends in themselves. This has not been an unproblematic development for humanitarian actors in their endeavour to engage in the construction of the civil peace through humanitarian principles and means. As an important contributor to the liberal peace, such activities still find themselves having to seek consent, grapple with the asymmetries caused by non-state actors' status, and the problems caused by the liberal peace's binary framework that establishes a differentiation between victims and aggressors. For example, in the case of UNRWA, though it has fulfilled an important role in aiding Palestinian refugees around the Middle East, there is also a strong argument that it has perpetuated their refugee status and made it difficult for them to create new lives.[50] Despite this experience which has spanned much of the second half of the twentieth century, at the end of the Cold War the role of non-state actors in humanitarianism, peacebuilding and in the broader project of the construction of the liberal peace, came into their own. Humanitarian law provides the legal context in which NGOs operate. This was first brought into prominence with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provided protection for war victims, and then through the Nuremberg Principles which sought to protect victims from genocide and racial killings. At the end of the Cold War, a series of UN General Assembly resolutions called for humanitarian assistance to victims of emergencies and natural disasters, for access for accredited agencies, the establishment of relief corridors, and the establishment of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs to coordinate humanitarian intervention (though bound to the rules of sovereignty).[51] Furthermore, during the Kurdish crisis in Northern Iraq, UN Security Council resolution 688 of 5th April 1991 facilitated humanitarian intervention involving a number of NGOs.[52] The status of international NGOs has continued to develop in the context of the UN General Assembly and in the Security Council (often through the use of Rule 39) since the ICRC became an observer in 1990.[53] So important are international NGOs to the construction of the liberal peace, that some argue that they may now have become a third category of subject in international law, along with states and international organisations.[54] In the context of the emerging peacebuilding consensus, NGOs provided the main bridge between the local and the global, public and private. Their role in humanitarian intervention also became a major contribution to the construction of a civil peace. In the context of peacebuilding processes, they also contributed to the constitutional and institutional aspects of the construction of the liberal peace.

Despite the link between the civil peace project and the role of non-state actors, many commentators describe the evolution of humanitarianism through a focus on the obstacles to state innovation in this area, often suggesting that humanitarianism is a secondary motivation to state interest.[55] This dynamic can even be seen in the context of one of the key foundational examples of contemporary humanitarianism – the Biafra crisis of 1968. For Biafra, humanitarian intervention in 1968 meant defying the state sovereignty of Nigeria and risking revelations that the crisis was more political that humanitarian. Humanitarian aid NGOs mobilised despite international disapproval at the state level.[56] This was repeated increasingly during the 1970s, highlighting the disengagement of the international community and its officials with humanitarian issues created by crises such as in Biafra (though the extent of the crisis is still disputed), Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Cambodia.[57] Filling this gap is precisely the function of the civil peace, and actors working within this framework. Similar dynamics were at play in Somalia and in Bosnia during the 1990s, illustrating how the developing liberal humanitarian discourse about the creation of the liberal peace could produce paradoxical methods and ends for the liberal peace project. Grand schemes of rehabilitation and reconstruction of failed or failing states in the international system can easily fall victim to actors who see such normative projects as a threat to their own project (for example, the plethora of nationalist and tribal leaders in both Somalia and Bosnia). In Bosnia, Security Council Resolution 771 of 13 August 1992, called for humanitarian organisations to have unimpeded access, but humanitarian assistance was rapidly politicised and might even have prolonged the conflict. In Somalia, the mandate of the force included the role of helping to create conditions for the strengthening of civil society and humanitarian relief operations.[58] The Secretary General's Special Representative, Ahmed Sahnoun, attempted to bring in NGOs to facilitate this in order to involve local groups in the peace process. However as the mission was essentially a military enforcement mission, which due to Chinese objection did not have a human rights component, this marginalised local human rights groups.[59] NGOs were also drawn into the protection rackets that sprang up around the relief efforts. In Haiti, the joint UN-OAS International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) also suffered from the fact that there was no clear mandate guiding its relationship with local human rights NGOs though.[60] In Rwanda, links between the UN Human Rights Field Operation (HRFOR) and local human rights

NGOs were also somewhat tenuous, and in Liberia, links between the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIL) and NGOs were often blocked by the institutionalised violence that occurred against human rights NGOs.[61] Thus, this coalition between non-state actors and the construction of a civil peace, and the role of international organisations – part of the peacebuilding consensus – is a flimsy humanitarian mechanism used to install the liberal peace.

Regional organisations also added their weight to the peacebuilding consensus, as they were required to do in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the OAS in Latin America, and the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) among others, have illustrated this in their ongoing attempts to construct separate frameworks to deal with different regional conflict issues. Along with the European Union (EU), all such organisations have become involved in the peacebuilding consensus, and adhere to the liberal peace as a legitimate and viable objective in their humanitarian, political, social, economic, developmental, and peacebuilding roles.

The expectation has been that where IOs, IFIs, ROs, agencies and NGOs have cooperated for humanitarian reasons, human security concerns have tended to transcend the interests of actors engaged in the conflict, making the creation of the liberal peace more plausible at the civil level. Such a coalition of actors would therefore be able to engage in the construction of a liberal, multidimensional, and multilevel peace, spanning the civil to constitutional, to institutional levels. Yet it may also be the case that the ideology of human security, and the relationship of dependency between disputants and interveners in constructing the liberal peace means that these are also part of the relationship of dependency being formed around humanitarianism and the peacebuilding consensus. The question is whether they are dependent upon the liberal states and their institutions in creating this conditional relationship *vis-à-vis* disputants and the liberal peace, or whether they are agents themselves in this relationship? Given the nature of the conditionality surrounding the construction of the liberal peace, and non-state actor dependency upon donors, this is far from clear. What is very clear however, is that non-state actor legitimacy *vis-à-vis* their access within civil societies is very useful in the construction of the liberal peace, which depends on social engineering, as much as international stability or state institutions. It might be argued that the civil peace strand of the liberal

peace conceptualisation both legitimises deep intervention at the civil level, and requires interventionary practices in order to expand the liberal peace. Non-state actors, NGOs, and international agencies and institutions have played an important role in this evolution. As key actors in humanitarianism, in the peacebuilding consensus, and in the construction of the liberal peace, non-state actors contribute to the construction of peace-as-governance in conflict zones. For example, human security motivated approaches to peacebuilding have become embedded into a governance approach to ending conflict in Kosovo since 1999, through the UN Interim Administration (UNMIK) and its four pillars, the presence of UNDP and NGOs. These actors cooperated over the establishment of the necessary liberal institutions of a democratic state, involving broad institution building to reconstruct the political, social, and economic infrastructure of the state. This is succinctly stated in the mandate and role of UNMIK.[62] However, there is a contradiction between the discourses and practices of human security in such a governance context. Humanitarian assistance is not apolitical of course, but it provides states with a tool with which to become deeply engaged in conflicts, and also to avoid foreign policy engagement[63] through the work of the many agencies and NGOs involved in conflict zones. In this sense the main agents of the liberal peace have both options open to them, and therefore can use more traditional interest-based criteria to evaluate why they may want to become more directly involved. This is perhaps why it is more accurate to argue that the work of these actors has become part of foreign policy in the general sense of constructing a liberal peace.

It has already been noted that in the very earliest development of humanitarianism and the emergence of non-state actors in the case of slavery in the nineteenth century, many of those states such as Britain, and non-state actors and individuals involved in lobbying against slavery, also were imperialists and believed in its moral value as a system of constructing peace within empires. This tension between humanitarianism and imperialism still exists in the modern context. As Rieff argues,

> …contemporary advocates of state humanitarianism share something of the same faith that a combination of high moral intent, military force, the imposition of good government, and benign tutelage (for Kipling's 'lesser breeds beyond the law' read today's 'failed states') could be a force for the betterment of humanity.[64]

Despite the intentions behind the notion of human security, and the many non-state actors and agencies which promote it, the assumption that the liberal peace has resulted in a peacebuilding consensus at the civil peace level is problematic. Despite the fact that the civil peace and the relevant actors' roles therein is often represented as a highly legitimate aim for the humanitarian community, this is also heavily contested. The liberal order is understood to be peaceful internally and progressive in its external impact on other states, as well as characterised by democracy, free trade, and human rights, and public consent for human security activity by NGOs, agencies, states and IFIs, and IOs is broadly present in most states. This differentiates the peacebuilding consensus from past imperial orders,[65] but even at the level of civil society, the liberal peace often rests on coercion and conditionality in order to install liberal norms and regimes in regions where they are being resisted.[66] Implicit in this understanding of the liberal peace, as Laffey illustrates, is the return of the 'language of empire' divided between accounts of US imperialism and accounts of a more general liberal empire.[67] This has important implications both in terms of the universalism that is often claimed for humanitarianism and the many agents of human security, and for the role of the many non-state actors that claim legitimacy for their interventions on this basis.

These developments have highlighted a tension between transnationalism and inter-governmentalism. The UN system has been forced to assign more of the increasingly complex duties associated with constructing the liberal peace to outside and non-state actors, because it and its member states cannot fulfil such duties alone. This contracting out of such services to NGOs and specialised agencies means that transnational agendas are replacing intergovernmental agendas.[68] In other words, the civil peace is gradually being reconstructed and is shifting away from an emphasis on the security of the state as an umbrella for that of the person, to an independent discourse of security for the person in which specific states acting as donors within the liberal transnational framework are influential. But this discourse is based upon an agreement on how such security can be provided in a manner that legitimates and empowers liberal states and their organisations to intervene under what they claim to be a peacebuilding consensus to construct the liberal peace in conflict zones. Given that the liberal peace encompasses a civil peace, non-state actors working towards the humanitarian and human security agendas are vital to this process given the access and legitimacy they have in conflict zones as agents of humanitarian goods. They are effectively the

only actors in a good position to negotiate the importation of new norms and institutions in conflict zones with civil societies, whilst also remaining loyal to the conditionality of the liberal peace in both its regulative and restrictive forms.

Conclusion

Clearly, the discourse of humanitarianism and human security has become an important indicator of the agency of international organisation, agencies, and non-state actors in their contribution to the civil peace. This contribution also is very important with regard to the development of the constitutional and institutional aspects of the liberal peace project. Furthermore, such actors, with access, reach, and legitimacy, are crucial in the evolving peacebuilding consensus. This has allowed intervention upon a humanitarian basis to claim its own legitimacy, regardless of the norm of non-intervention, and furthermore has create an apparent normative requirement for such action in the event of conflicts and crisis on the part of the international community, as part of its commitment to the liberal peace. NGOs and other non-state actors, as well as international agencies, often go so far as to call for the use of force to clear the way, or provide security, for their own actions and interventions in conflict zones. In their conditional relationship with recipients, donors, international organisations and international financial institutions, non-state actors have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of intervention in civil society in order to develop a civil peace and contribute the broader liberal peace project through the institutionalisation of bottom-up forms of governance, engendered in the liberal peace project. Indeed, it is through this conditionality that dominant actors of the international system pass on the norms and regimes associated with the liberal peace, and through which they receive any feedback at all from recipients and local actors. This process also has the inadvertent advantage of allowing states access to civil society, and providing non-state actors with the capacity to survive and become influential at the civil and global levels. The version of the liberal peace that emerges through this non-state actor level of the peacebuilding consensus tends to be more concerned with aspects of social justice, development, and identity, but also facilitates and legitimates intervention at this level through non-state actors who are influenced by their relationship with donors. Many such actors retain their agency by negotiating continuously with donors but even so the liberal peace regulates their behaviour.

This leads to one irreconcilable conclusion. The liberal peace has given rise to a situation where non-state actors may concur with its crusading aspect, perhaps even legitimating the use of force for the end of reproducing the liberal order. This crusading aspect can be legitimised by the establishment of a civil society, and a stable system of governance.[69] If the state cannot secure these aspects of the liberal peace, outside actors effectively take over.[70] Often human right violations or a lack of human security provides the basis for both state and non-state forms of intervention, whereby the governance of the state and existence of civil society comes to depend upon outside actors.[71] This provides external actors with both an ethical *obligation* to intervene far beyond the state and into civil society, if they are to live up to human rights and humanitarian rhetoric, and also an *opportunity* to intervene at the level of both state and civil society. Clearly, the ideology of human security and the nature of the role of non-state actors in conflict zones in reproducing these types of dependencies mean that they are complicit in the reproduction of the liberal peace as the dominant form of conflict settlement. Because of this relationship of conditionality, this means that the civil peace generally reflects the dominant concerns of states and donors (governance, capacity building, and ownership, are often mentioned in this context) and therefore is actually very close to the constitutional and institutional discourses of peace. Some actors happily accept this concurrence as inevitable in the context of the peacebuilding consensus, while others, perhaps more focused on issues of social justice, may resist it. In the context of capacity building *via* the peacebuilding consensus, the problem may well be not that only a limited capacity is being built but that institutional and local capacity is also being destroyed in target conflict environments.[72] The following chapter extends this analysis to the installation of the liberal peace by institutional actors and organisations.

5
Constructing the Liberal Peace from Above

'Peace is the tranquillity of order'[1]

Introduction

This chapter examines the elite level, outside – in processes that have developed in order to construct the liberal peace in conflict zones *via* the various internationals that represent states or a multilateral state consensus. This represents the dominant dimension of the peacebuilding consensus, and a counterpart to grassroots forms of peacebuilding. This form of peacebuilding effectively represents the continuation of the constitutional and institutional strands of thinking and policymaking about peace. It also betrays a significant relationship with the victor's peace, and with the militarised versions of peace that stem from this type of conceptualisation. These approaches resemble a hybrid of imperial and colonial style relations with colonies, in which governance, political and economic reform, peacebuilding processes, and peacekeeping within conflict zones are combined. Nation building has gradually taken over the original peacebuilding agendas outlining in the UN documentation of the early 1990s.[2] In addition, as the previous chapter has shown, new actors, and new debates on security and peace have also become part of this hybrid approach, effectively uniting them with grassroots approaches to peacebuilding and with the civil strand of thinking about peace. These developments can be traced in debates about 'nation-building', transitional administration, peacebuilding, and peace operations. While there has been much recent and useful debate upon these developments, far less has been said about the conceptualisation of peace inherent in their application, nor the implications of their methods, ontology, and epistemology.

This chapter examines the forms of peace that are being created as a contribution to the remaking of the global order by elite level and top-down peacebuilding processes, and examines their implications for the conceptualisation of the liberal peace.

Conceptualising peace from above

What does the 'peace' that is being installed in conflict zones around the world through UN peace operations, transitional administrations, humanitarian interventions, conditional relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and former disputants, and more recently initiated by more or less unilateral uses of force, entail? How does the peacebuilding consensus and peace-as-governance affect global and local order? These questions are rarely asked because it is assumed that UN peace operations, or the role of international financial institutions, for example, contribute to the construction of the liberal peace.[3] This is conceptualised through a problem-solving model that initially aims to stabilise the existing order, and then endeavours to restructure it according to the liberal peace framework.[4] In practice this has proven to be highly ambitious, often resulting in a 'virtual peace' based upon contested attempts to import liberal democratic models *via* military intervention, and political, social, and economic institution building and reconstruction.[5] What this represents in the eyes of some is a form of limited and voluntary empire, embodied in the assistance programmes of the World Bank or the IMF, or the various forms of 'trusteeship', with their light or heavy 'footprints' which have been set up in the Balkans, for example.[6] Its purpose according to this often strongly contested argument is to provide the communities in conflict zones with a 'breathing space' in which international assistance can facilitate the construction of a new liberal peace and remove the sources of nationalism and ethnonationalism, as well as other forms political, social, and economic discrimination by installing a democratic process, a rule of law, a free market, development, nurturing security for the state and for civil society, and stimulating a more active civil society. This breathing space effectively means an illiberal peacebuilding interval where governance is controlled by external actors until they deem it to be sustainably constituted, whereupon governance is returned to local institutions and populations. Its voluntary nature provides it with legitimacy,[7] in which one of the most important norms of the modern era – self-determination – is deferred.[8] Of course, this is true, but only if one accepts that the overall outcome embodied in this construction of

the liberal peace by the dominant members of the international community (namely, Western states) is generally accepted on the ground. In Cyprus in April 2004, the Greek Cypriot community effectively rejected the liberal peace upon the grounds that it did not provide enough concessions to them in their old territorial dispute with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, this after decades of peacekeeping and UN involvement in mediation, and after an EU harmonisation process.[9] Throughout the Balkans, the liberal peace has so far generally failed to supplant ethnic nationalism.

This returns the discussion of peace to the question of consent: the early optimism surrounding the liberal peace, that to know its character would legitimate its imposition by outside actors, seems to have proven false in many cases. This means that the construction of the liberal peace through the creation of new modes of social, economic, and political governance in conflict zones associated with the liberal peace is very dependent upon high levels of local and international consent and consensus, as well as support. It is here that the historic role and experience of the UN in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, holding elections, providing humanitarian support, and effectively taking over governance, is crucial.

As a result of the elevation of a universal liberal discourse of peace, the notion of disputant and international consent has been diluted amongst the elite agents of the top-down peacebuilding consensus, where the legitimacy of the end of the creation of the liberal peace has outweighed the problems associated with a lack of consensus during intervention. This has occurred with somewhat unpredictable consequences, as can been seen in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In all three cases, the ineluctability of this notion of a liberal peace came to be characterised as a threat to the parties to the conflict, notably the warlords and in particular General Aideed in Somalia, and the regular and irregular forces in both Bosnia and in Kosovo. In contrast, the EU, OSCE, NATO, and the UN Security Council and General Assembly, all agreed on the general liberal schema of a peace that should follow a ceasefire in these cases, though individual states disagreed strongly on the courses that should be taken to bring this about. It can be inferred from this that even amongst its strongest proponents, there is doubt, if not about the universal qualities of a liberal peace, then as to whether this vision of peace is sufficient as an end to justify the means (to deploy the Kantian language which is often used to critique such a position). The irony of this situation lies in the fact that the use of force can now be contemplated to create a reluctant,

virtual peace amongst such actors. This type of linkage has come to be associated with a humanitarian imperative in which the violence suffered by civilians has provided a strong incentive for a discourse to emerge about the installation of the liberal peace in response – as developed in the cases of Somalia, and then Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo during the 1990s – by the UN, along with many other international and non-governmental actors.

The emergence of this discourse can be seen in a variety of examples. For example, the World Bank sees democratisation as a vital part of the installation of the liberal peace. Its Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, through its focus on social and ethnic relations, governance and political institutions, human rights and security, economic structure and performance, environment and natural resources,[10] and its association with other international agencies (such as USAID and DFID), conforms rigidly to the liberalisation model inherent in the construction of the liberal peace through external governance and reform of conflict zones. The Unit focuses on building political and social institutions that are inclusive, equitable, and accountable, on ethnic, social, and economic diversity, equitable development, and circumventing violence by dialogue. This is clearly a liberal peace agenda reflecting the problem-solving discourses inherent in conflict resolution and peacebuilding debates.[11]

The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) is even more explicit in its linkage between the strategies deployed for the redressal of conflict and the creation of peace.[12] A recent review of the British government's approach to peacebuilding showed that there was little coordination, and not enough focus on what was termed the capacity of conflict zones to 'absorb' peacebuilding aid.[13] Furthermore, it was recognised that humanitarian work provided access to conflict zones in order to stabilise them, but that this required a better understanding of the roots of the conflict, the local context, and the capacity and coordination of peacebuilders needed to be developed. It proposed that an agreed strategic planning mechanism and coordinating body is required, working on the basis of an agreed understanding of conflict. DFID is mainly focused on development issues in this context, whereas the British Foreign Office focuses on good governance and human rights.[14] Despite this difference, development is the main focus of intervention in a post-conflict phase. This document acknowledges that type of peace being built has not really been engaged with, though it is the professed goal of DFID and other British agencies and organisations.

From the elite, top-down level, and operating from the outside-in, institutions, organisations and international non-governmental organisation cooperate to a large extent on constructing the liberal peace, though of course there are the usual bureaucratic disagreements over how democratisation, development, economic reform, and civil society capacity building should be conducted, by whom, and with what resources. However, this aspect of the peacebuilding consensus represents a governance approach to the construction of a new peace, as can be seen in various different ways as these practices have evolved in the UN peace operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. The assumptions surrounding peace that now exist have been legitimated by a broad international (though far from universal) consensus implicit in UN consensus building. Despite the weakness of this consensus, and the lack of resources made available for its implementation, it has increasingly been seen by some states, agencies, and NGOs as legitimising the multilateral, and even unilateral, use of force if necessary. This tension between the use of force and the creation of peace, initially constructed by the same actor (as could be seen with the role of the UN in Somalia in the early 1990s) has now led to a separation of functions, where the use of force and peacebuilding are coordinated by separate actors. This has occurred in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan more recently, indicating the potential of the peacebuilding consensus, despite the furore this has created since the NATO intervention over Kosovo in 1999. Furthermore, the UN itself (more specifically the Secretariat, agencies, and institutions) has accepted that the 'ends' provided by the liberal, humanitarian, developmental, and democratic conception of peace are often more pressing than allowing the arguments for or against humanitarian intervention to impede the establishment of peace operations, humanitarian missions, advisory missions, democratisation processes, and political reform under its auspices. The reluctance to accept the US and UK attempts[15] to renegotiate the norm of non-intervention for reasons related to humanitarianism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the part of some Security Council members, the Secretariat, and members of the General Assembly on account of their stance against unilateralism in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kosovo, for example, has not diminished the resolve of the UN that it should be involved in post-conflict peacebuilding (and indeed prevention) in line with its Charter, and that this represents the only viable and sustainable form of peace in existence.[16] This can be seen in the implicit symbiosis now seen between peacekeeping and

peacebuilding, as laid out in a Department of Peacekeeping Operations Report of 1999, among others.[17]

Peacekeeping is now expected, at least on a flexible basis, to provide a basis for peacebuilding and the reconstruction of war-torn societies, including addressing refugee and internally displaced person issues, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, democratic development, economic and social development, and the establishment of the rule of law. The irony here is that peacekeeping was ever only understood to be an *ad hoc* replacement for collective security through the UN, which had failed because of the Cold War. This form of intervention is based upon a mixture of national interest formulations, political reform, and humanitarian requirements, which result in inconsistent intervention, by the international community[18] and a complex installation of peace. It is part of the liberal-institutionalist collusion with strategic thinking on constructing a peace which has been beneficial to liberal states post-WWI and WW2; with Wilsonism, partly with the experience gained from the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after 1945 (and Europe in general), democratic peace theory, humanitarianism and human security, and development and economic reform discourses. This consensus amongst academics and liberal state, IO, and NGO actors indicates that if a reversion to war is to be avoided, certain forms of governance need to be instituted in post-conflict zones through multiple interventions. 'Peace' in some cases now legitimates and rests upon long standing and deep interventions in conflict zones constructed through long-term peacebuilding approaches, often resting on defensive or offensive military intervention. The emergence of humanitarian intervention and the related peacebuilding consensus,[19] is illustrated to some degree in the evolutions of peace interventions from Cambodia in the early 1990s to Kosovo in the late 1990s[20] which resembles the 'Wilsonian Triad'.[21] This evolution has occurred in the context of the privatisation or subcontracting of many of these tasks to the humanitarian community,[22] which often takes on roles that would not otherwise be fulfilled.[23] The culmination of these debates is a liberal peace constituted by a specific form of external governance with local consent and co-operation, based upon a *quid pro quo* of a gradual devolvement of power to local institutions. Peace on the ground is simulated to be as it is in liberal states, though in practice it may be more like the situation that existed in former colonial dependencies.[24] Such operations have increasingly become governance interventions in which IOs and associated actors take various levels of responsibility for governance, as in evidence from Cambodia to East Timor. Peace from

above is therefore clearly derived from the institutional and constitutional strands of thinking about peace, and their related methods, regimes, and norms. What is more, this hybrid form of peace expressed through a peacebuilding consensus rests on the opportunities present at the end of the major conflicts of the modern period. This systemic approach to the construction of peace through intervention, control and regulation of governance, also provides a space for intervention in civil society processes, as outlined in the previous chapter.

UN peace operations and the liberal peace

The conceptualisation and practice of UN peace operations since the early 1990s[25] and the emergence of the practices associated with transitional administration or state-building, projects a conceptualisation of peace derived from the establishment of processes that culminate the replication of the liberal-democratic state. This encompassed the third generation approaches outlined in Chapter III in the context of the various approaches inherent in the discourse of peacebuilding. Given that peace is now 'known', what is now required are ways of building it. Consequently, much of the focus of official documentation and academic enquiry on the subject of UN peace operations, and peacebuilding more generally is of a methodological nature, focusing mainly on how the technical aspects of a peace process may be conducted more efficiently, effectively, and with least cost in terms of life or finance. There is also an increasing focus on local ownership, upon minimising the disruption that such an intervention itself causes, coordination, and upon the question of when sustainability has been achieved (opening the way for an exit of the internationals). Yet, given the crisis management nature of much of this sort of intervention, the nature of the peace to be produced is rarely questioned. This is despite the fact that there is a clear continuity with earlier peacekeeping approaches in the sense that the intention was a restoration of a perhaps fictitious peace requiring the creation rather than restoration of that same image of peace. Despite the attention to such matters, these interventions are still plagued by the question of consent, of who pays for them, and of the co-ordination of the many different actors engaged in them. This is generally a product of the political, social, and cultural legitimacy of the universal claims made by reproduction of the liberal peace on the ground, and amongst its recipients.

This type of discourse, in association with the expediencies required by policymakers and by the private decision-making processes of

human rights, developmental actors,[26] and NGOs in responding to conflict, has led to far more complicated multidimensional processes first theorised in the peacebuilding literatures, as outlined in Chapter III. This evolution into peacebuilding approaches, institutionalised in the work of the UN and international agencies, IFIs, NGOs, and the many actors engaged in conflict environments, has effectively both reopened the debate on the plausibility of outside forms of governance to mitigate and stabilise conflict, and neo-imperial critiques of the liberal bodies engaged in such activities. Indeed, the development and transformation of peace as a discourse has reached the point where force and intervention (in humanitarian forms) are legitimated by the requirements of the installation of liberal democratic institutions as the ultimate solutions to conflict guiding peace processes. It might be argued that the construction of the liberal peace both legitimises intervention and requires interventionary practices in order to expand this 'zone of peace'.[27] What seems to have emerged is that approaches to peacebuilding, humanitarian intervention, development issues, democratisation, human rights and conflict resolution have been used to provide avenues of legitimate intervention (sometimes forcible or by private actors) at different levels of analysis for the construction of the liberal peace. This is an important, though sometimes devious part of the increasing privatisation of peace and the subcontracting of peace activities to private actors, but still effectively controlled by dominant donor states and their organisations.

These developments are outlined clearly in recent UN documentation.[28] The key question is how far does this intellectual and policy development of an understanding of peace resemble what has occurred on the ground in conflicts where peace operations have taken place? *Agenda for Peace* was an attempt to improve the peace that was to be supplanted into conflict zones, based on the universal ideals supposedly encapsulated within the UN Charter. The construction of the liberal peace as a project now required early warning systems, preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, as well as peace-enforcement operations. Implicit in *Agenda* was a general commitment to the liberal peace, thus denoting responses to disarmament issues, refugees, the restoration of order, election monitoring, the protection of human rights, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions, and '…promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.'[29] This clearly required deep intervention into the social, political, and economic functions of a society if the liberal peace was to be installed. As a result, the issue of consent became a key

problem, dealt with by Kofi Annan through a combination of 'coercive inducement' and 'induced' consent. This seems to indicate that the establishment of the liberal peace through peace operations would be appropriate even where consent from disputants was absent.[30] This illustrates the core problem facing the discourses and practices associated with the liberal peace and inherent in the top-down peacebuilding consensus: it appears to emphasise means rather than ends, the later of which are not open to negotiation. Yet, as the practice inherent to UN peace operations has shown, both may in fact be equally difficult to achieve on the ground. The more recent Brahimi report retained the liberal peace as an institutional goal, as have other UN documents published recently.[31]

Democratisation is presented as a key process in the construction of the liberal peace from the top-down[32] at the local level in association with the exploration of '…democratic principles at the global level'.[33] The democratisation processes from El Salvador to Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia have been seen as integral to the creation of long-term sustainable conditions of peace. As in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, transitional administrations have taken a firmer grip of this democratisation. Of course, as Snyder has pointed out, this type of short-cut to the 'democratic peace' may well just lead to the creation of nationalist and ethnic 'pseudodemocracies' rather than what Snyder calls 'well-institutionalised' civic democracies.[34] As Annan argued, democratic elections will not necessarily prevent the re-emergence of violence, as happened in Angola after the holding of what were described as 'free and fair' elections in 1992.[35] The UN's experience in organising elections has seen mixed results, spanning efforts from El Salvador to Cambodia, to East Timor. What is more, democratically elected representatives may be internationally recognised but not actually be locally recognised, and *vice versa*.[36] Furthermore, there may be little connection between representatives and constituencies.

Despite such problems, the construction of the liberal peace continues to hinge upon the building of specific institutions in classic problem-solving mode. This is part of a globalisation of the liberal peace,[37] which requires a response to conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and inequalities. Both Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros Ghali have articulated a notion of a 'sustainable peace' in this context – essentially a liberal peace – in their various writings on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. 'New' threats to the peace, such as ethnic wars, state fragmentation, terrorism, human rights violations, or development issues, have emerged as a consequence of this discourse,

empowering and requiring organised, elite level, top-down international responses. The UN embodies the historical experience of this project, mainly derived from its peacekeeping and peacemaking functions as an international organisation in itself, but also an as 'actor'. This reflects what ultimately was the post-Cold War settlement,[38] requiring strategies involving traditional military and diplomatic tasks, and deep intervention into the social, economic and governmental institutions of that region in question. The sustainable resolution of conflict therefore implies deep and multi-dimensional forms of intervention, and a liberal and cosmopolitan faith on the part of the interveners on the infallibility of their approach. In other words, there must be an assumption of some broad universal norms that enable, legitimate, and provide objectives for such interventions. This has occurred, as Paris points out, through four key top-down and elite level mechanisms: the insertion of political and economic liberalism into peace settlements; providing expert advice during implementation; conditionality attached to economic assistance; and proxy governance.[39] These mechanisms contribute to the processes outlined in the triptych of the UN's *Agendas*, and the liberal peace project upon which interventions have become conditional.[40] Peace-as-governance in these terms focuses on the institutions of state as the basis for the construction of the liberal peace.

This has created practices in which states and organisations that profess to understand what peace is are able to intervene in conflict in order to educate others in their ways of peace, without necessarily renegotiating the peace frameworks that have arisen from the recipients' experience, culture, identity or geopolitical location. In effect, top-down approaches to the construction of the liberal peace indicate an assumption that there is little need to reflect upon itself and its assumptions – assumptions mainly created by the outcome of major 'world' conflicts and the conduct of Western diplomacy in order to address problems related to the preservation and advancement of contemporary order. The question of what peace might be expected to look like from the *inside* (from within the conflict environment) is given less credence than the way the agents of intervention desire to see it from the *outside,* and moderates searching for peace from within the conflict environment almost universally endeavour to expropriate Western models in their search for a solution. This resembles a quasi-imperial framework related to the dynamics of the post-colonial state-system and the flaws of quasi-imperial states.[41] Ignatieff describes this as 'Empire Lite' and argues that nation-building rests upon a temporary

imperial tutelage required to install peace.[42] The language deployed in these missions betrays its continuity with the indirect rule of the imperial project whilst trying to induce a growing capacity for self-governance within externally defines regimes and restrictions.[43] Where this type of selective intervention occurs, peace is assumed to be reconstituted by the establishment and importation of external governance frameworks, which it is then hoped will take root. This represents a 'thin-domination' akin to a form of imperial power.[44] This is a fascinating development, presaged by calls for a revival of the Trusteeship council,[45] for the establishment of a 'semi-imperialism', 'mandates' or 'benign colonialism', to assume the governance of conflict zones.[46] There has been an increasingly vocal debate about what looks on the surface to be a return of imperial or colonial practices in some policy, academic, and media circles with some arguing that we have little choice if the liberal peace is to be maintained and others resisting any return to practices associated with former imperial and colonial practices.[47] Many of those in favour make the important argument that given the fact that such semi-imperialism is conducted through the UN system, this means that it is both multilateral and consensual, and therefore has little to do with past practices. Others argue that the UN system and its choice of conflicts to become involved with is dominated by major Western state interests and therefore represents a clear continuity with such practices. Many believe that there is no real alternative to a '…quasi-permanent, quasi-colonial relationship between the "beneficiary" country and the international community'.[48]

The liberal peace, UN peace operations, and transitional administration

Contemporary peace operations have aimed at the reconstitution of liberal states. From Central America, Namibia and Cambodia to Somalia and Yugoslavia to Sierra Leone and East Timor, the official focus guiding peace operations was the creation and recreation of Westphalian states in order to provide a basis to democratise failing states, introduce human rights, free market reforms, development models, or to solve humanitarian problems. In former Yugoslavia and perhaps in Kosovo, and in East Timor, the focus was on creating new states, but ones that were ultimately based on ethnic majoritarianism. This tendency emphasises the fact that liberal states underpin the key organisations through which peace operations occur, and the end result is the replication of their liberal values. Thus, top-down

approaches to peacebuilding require an agreement on method, which can be found in a peacebuilding consensus aimed at the construction of peace-as-governance. Such activities, by virtue of their depth and breadth require co-ordination either by dominant states or by the UN. They also require a renegotiation of the norm of non-intervention, as has been clear in US and UK rhetoric since the Kosovo intervention[49] which culminated in an invasion of Iraq in 2003 over the feared presence of weapons of mass destruction.

The UN peace operations in Central America provided early examples of what was to develop more generally. These operations took their cue from previous US interventions in the region which had focused upon establishing a basis for democratic elections.[50] In Nicaragua from 1989, El Salvador from 1992, and Guatemala from 1996, solutions were reached which were then implemented by UN and joint peace operations. In Nicaragua, the UN's efforts led to the voluntary demobilisation of the resistance movement, and in 1990, a UN mission observed Nicaragua's elections. This was the first time the UN had observed elections in an independent country.[51] In El Salvador, mediation by the Secretary-General ended 12 years of fighting and a UN peacekeeping mission verified the implementation of the resultant agreements.[52] In Guatemala, UN-assisted negotiations ended a 35-year civil war, though the ensuing UN Verification Mission continues to work in the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreements.[53] In Haiti, an attempt to install the liberal peace has faltered, despite its emphasis on democratisation, human rights, consensus-building, and civil society.[54] Such operations have generally been regarded as successful in implementing the terms of the relevant peace settlements, and in starting the process of constructing a liberal peace. Yet, while democratisation may have been effective in the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador, economic liberalisation may have recreated some of the dire socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.[55] In Guatemala, it has been well documented that land reform has failed to occur as expected since the peace settlement in late 1996, despite progress in other aspects of the construction of the liberal peace. The major weakness of the peacebuilding experiment in these cases has been that democratisation can be undermined by a failure to address socio-economic issues, and effectively that marketisation may not complement democratisation, at least in early stages.[56]

The UN operation in Namibia from 1989–1990, which focused on democratisation, and the following creation of the UN's Electoral

Assistance Division, were early harbingers of the consolidation of the peacebuilding consensus and its objectives.[57] The Electoral Assistance Division was established in 1992 to guide states making a transition to democracy.[58] UNDP also followed suit in its attempts to promote good governance as well as the eradication of poverty.[59] The OSCE, the EU, and the World Bank as well as many other organisations (and national development agencies such as USAID or DFID) became increasingly involved in peacebuilding and followed similar paths, effectively creating conditional relationships with disputants in which economic and political liberalisation became the key condition of their assistance. In Angola, the comprehensive peace accord signed in 1991 between UNITA and the MPLA followed a pattern of democratisation and elections, respect for civil liberties, and the integration of the opposing armies, to be verified by UNAVEM, the UN verification mission.[60] The ICRC, UNHCR, and UNDP also engaged in the peacebuilding process. Yet, this attempt to construct liberal forms of governance and peace through a coalition of actors following the peacebuilding consensus, was not successful. Elections held the following year led to prolonged fighting over a contested result. The UN eventually withdrew in 1999 and a ceasefire between UNITA and the MPLA was not signed until 2002. This failure stemmed from an inability to disarm the warring factions, or to respond to civil society voices' warnings that elections might lead the disputants into conflict.

Perhaps the US and UN experience in Somalia provides the clearest indication of what was developing. The UN Secretary General was given the opportunity to apply the framework developed in *Agenda for Peace,* and the US continued the attempt to translate its nation-building experiences partially learnt through the occupation of Germany and Japan, and in Vietnam, into a success for the liberal peace thesis. Consequently, UN Security Council Resolution 814 was thus a formula for nation-building in Somalia.[61] Perhaps unsurprisingly both the US and the UN learnt that offering the means to create the liberal peace to disputants did not automatically mean it would be accepted, and further, that forcing it upon them could lead to a violent response.[62] The UN peace support operation in Haiti confirmed this problematic move into the terrain of nation-building.[63]

In the context of Rwanda, a similar picture emerges, even if indirectly. There is a strong argument that the Arusha Accords, signed in 1993, led to violence. They followed a familiar pattern in attempt to construct a liberal peace in Rwanda through the creation of a transitional government, the integration of Hutus and RPF forces, the return

of refugees and the holding of multi-party elections in 1995. This was to be supervised by a UN force.[64] This clearly fitted in well with international pressure from the UN, donors, and many states to end the conflict by reconstructing Rwanda's modes of governance in the guise outlined by the liberal peace project. The Hutu president, Habyarimana, was reluctant to sign or implement the accords but was forced to do so by international and donor pressure (especially from the World Bank).[65] This undermining of Hutu privileges probably contributed to their attempt to overturn the Arusha Accords and the genocide of 1994.[66] During and after this process, as is well documented, UNAMIR, the UN, a range of states and other actors found themselves powerless or unwilling to intervene, even despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, and relevant Security Council resolutions upon which a broader intervention could have been based.

Kissinger has pointed out that peacekeeping operations now often form the basis of permanent military commitments,[67] on occasion this being something to avoid and on others, to contemplate. Where the latter occurs, what the internationals are involved in can be compared to the role of the Ottoman and Austrian empires in the Balkans in the nineteenth century where a form of peace was overseen by establishing protectorates.[68] This became clear during the 1990s in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. In Cambodia during 1991–3 the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC) implemented the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements, which involved it assuming responsibility for foreign affairs, defence, security, finance, communications, and civilian affairs.[69] This was effectively a transitional government even though its powers were delegated from the Cambodian Supreme National Council in which sovereign powers had been vested as a result of the Paris Peace Agreements. As with Rwanda, the democratisation process exacerbated tension in the period running up to national elections in both 1993 and 1998 as different factions manoeuvred for more influence.[70] In Liberia, ECOWAS and the UN through, ECOMOG and UNOMIL, were involved in establishing a process whereby democratic elections could be held in May 1997. This seemed merely to exacerbate the then President Taylor's reliance on security forces rather than a plural, democratic discourse.[71] In the cases mentioned above, either the attempt to deploy direct transitional forms of external governance failed to lead to democratisation, or there was a large focus on assisting local actors with their functions rather than taking them over completely. Operating on another level of governance in an indirect guise, of course, was the conditionality that disci-

plined any state and actor involved in international transactions and relations adopting liberal modes of behaviour.

Bosnia

The most direct form of governance intervention in which the liberal peace is constructed through the installation of liberal, and what is expected to be sustainable, modes of governance is reflected by the activities of a concert of actors, including the UN and an 'alphabet soup' of international agencies, regional organisations, international financial institutions, and NGOs. Their tasks involve promoting civil and political rights, democratisation and election administration, drafting constitutions, establishing police forces and legal institutions, establishing civil society, political parties, and free market economies.[72] This was and is exemplified in post-Dayton Bosnia (replicated to a large degree in Kosovo), which was to be pacified explicitly through its transformation into a liberal democracy, through the involvement of NATO's Stabilisation Force, the UN Mission on Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), UNHCR, ICRC, UNDP, OSCE, Council of Europe, UN Commission on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, and the World Bank. These actors were and are partly coordinated by an international 'high representative', an intergovernmental Peace Implementation Council, and a Five Nation Contact Group.[73] They have comprehensively taken control of governance in an effort to establish a liberal peace, though perhaps not to the same extent as similar state-building missions in Kosovo, East Timor and Eastern Slavonia.[74] The office of High Representative (OHR) was strengthened by the so-called 'Bonn powers' established in December 1997, which had allowed him to issue binding decisions where agreement was not forthcoming, and to remove individuals from public office if they were undermining the implementation of the Dayton Accords.[75] This was an example of 'progressive international development' based upon economic and infrastructural redevelopment, human rights and humanitarian assistance, the return or resettlement of refugees and the displaced, the prosecution of war crimes, and the hold of election.[76] Yet, local actors' responses to the attempt to construct a liberal peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, betray marked continuities with the pre-Dayton situation.[77] What is more, the construction of the liberal peace has '…paid little attention to the social and human consequences of the liberal peace….'[78] and UN officials have made frequent reference to 'national pathologies' and the need for 'radical surgery'.[79] Consequently, peacebuilding, despite

being couched in the language of a liberal peace, has overlooked the social and human consequences of the process of constructing that peace.[80] It is obvious that Balkans are dependent upon external governance and outside visions of what peace should entail. This extends to the internationals having to bypass their own standards to ensure that elections would be held in 1996 in Bosnia even though this might lead to the consolidation of nationalist power.[81] In elections in 1997, efforts were made to promote moderate voices. Such strategies continue to be used as part of the attempt to construct a liberal peace, to the extent that the High Representative now regularly intervenes in the political process in order to remove actors who are thought not to contribute to the development of a moderate political discourse. Such direct conditionality between the construction of the liberal peace, and the status and situation of Bosnia *vis-à-vis* the OHR as well as the EU (bearing in mind Bosnia's accession aspirations), NATO, the OHR, and the World Bank, for example, have meant that peace in Bosnia is at best a bitter peace.[82] While Sarajevo may have managed a reasonable degree of multi-ethnicity, beyond the capital this is relatively rare. In Republica Serbska, the OHR is seen as victimising Serbs: in Sarajevo, it is seen as protecting the communities. Yet, economic stagnation, corruption, unemployment and anti-democratic practices (resulting in political apathy particularly amongst younger people), are rampant, and there has been no truth and reconciliation process. Indeed, it is very plausible that the very presence of OHR has created dependency amongst local politicians who do not see the need to take any responsibility for difficult decisions when the OHR can do so for them.[83]

These problems exist throughout the Balkans, despite the lengthy peacebuilding and governance intervention of the many internationals present. Indeed, the implementation of reforms is slow or non-existent throughout the region and the liberal peace looks more respectable from the outside than it does from the inside. Politics has often been radicalised by the presence of the internationals, and their attempts at constructing a conditional liberal peace.[84] Indeed many local actors in Bosnia argue that the very source of the liberal peace from the perspective of the internationals – the Dayton Agreement – is now the reason why progress is not being made on the ground. What is more, there is still a strong possibility, a decade after Dayton, that if the internationals withdraw, the three ethnic groups that make up the state will try to divide it into three parts, partly because democratisation has led to a certain tyranny of the majority, and privatisation has destroyed what

economic support there was. The post-war ethnic mix in the state is now less multi-ethnic than it was before the war.[85] It also seems that the peace the internationals want to construct is less ambitious in practice than the peace that many local actors aspire to. Across the Balkans, the failure to deal with pressing socio-economic issues have undermined trust in the role of both internationals and local governments.

Kosovo

Similar problems have been prominent in post-intervention Kosovo[86] as has been well documented.[87] After the eleven week NATO bombing campaign in 1999, when Kosovo became an governance vacuum after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav authorities, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 created the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) which was to be closely coordinated with the NATO force KFOR by a special representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), who would also be responsible for Kosovo's administration.[88] The resolution reflected the language of earlier peacekeeping operations denoting normal and peaceful conditions (though without mentioning the need to a 'return' to such conditions), maintaining law and order, and promoting human rights. The role of the SRSG was to oversee the replacement of Yugoslav authority and assume an interim role of governance. The role of the SRSG in Kosovo provides what is perhaps the clearest example of the way in which this consensus has been globalised, creating a coherence of macro-objectives (though not of strategies) in the post-war environment. Indeed, Habermas went as far as to see the emergence of a Kantian Pacific Union as result of such strategies.[89] In Kosovo, after much wavering over the rest of former Yugoslavia, NATO decided to use force to facilitate its humanitarian commitment to the Kosovo Albanian community despite disagreement in the UN Security Council. This set a new precedent in that the institution and coordination of a long-term peacebuilding process through UNMIK obscured the earlier disagreement on intervention.

Evidence from insiders during the earlier period of the mission indicate a slightly different story in which the UN and the OSCE competed over who would control peacebuilding in Kosovo. The UN, UNHCR, OSCE, and the EU struggled to coordinate themselves, and a 'mad scramble' for personnel ensued when the scale of the operation became clear.[90] Outside of this framework KFOR was to provide security while UNMIK's role was to perform basic civilian administrative functions, promote autonomous self-government and reach an agreement on the future status of the region, coordinate humanitarian aid

and reconstruction, maintain law, order, human rights, and assure the return of refugees. Add to these roles are a broad swathe of further responsibilities including in matters of education, health, banking and finance, post, and telecommunications. UNMIK organised elections in November 2001 and established economic agreements with Macedonia. UNMIK essentially governs Kosovo.

Yet, despite this broad array of tasks, most attention has been paid to the legitimacy of the use of force, obscuring the implications of the governance processes that were then established, which UNMIK has been responsible for promulgating, and which led to elections in late 2001.[91] There have been the usual complaints from the local communities that UNMIK did not consult with them sufficiently (over human rights promotion, for example), and ignored the local and increasingly vibrant NGO community.[92] Indeed, there is also a suspicion that local actors have become adept at exploiting international naivety about the explosiveness of the Balkans.[93] Similarly, instead of marginalising extremism, it seems that the agents of the liberal peace in Kosovo have marginalised moderate voices and perhaps even damaged their capacity.[94] This partly confirmed by the question of the final status of Kosovo, and the fact that the SSRG is intent on transferring all competencies barring sovereignty to the local government, as long as they meet the 'standards' set by UNMIK.[95] These standards were introduced by UNMIK and were to be met before further progress could be made on the issue of final status. They concern functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and reintegration, economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps.[96] This process created a self-fulfilling process whereby local actors were being made accountable for the withdrawal of the internationals and for the final status issue to be resolved despite the fact that they had no real power. Most of the internationals working in Kosovo admit that the mission there has mainly played a holding function, until such time as the diplomatic problems, particularly with China and Russia in the UN Security Council, can be resolved,[97] as well as major problems related to the economy, law and order, and ethnic relations. In the event of a resolution of these issues, independence or autonomy will probably occur in the context of a close relationship with, or accession to, the EU. Yet, many see the way that the final status issue is being handled as effectively infantilising Kosovo, and to some degree responsible for the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in March 2004.[98]

It is clear that international administration will have to continue for quite some time. Indeed, if local actors interests and objectives are to be taken into account in the final status agreement for Kosovo, it is likely that international administration will have, in at least some aspects, to become permanent.[99] This is particularly so given the difficulties with communication between local and international actors over the question of the final status of Kosovo, which has from the beginning meant that the internationals would not be able to develop a clear exit strategy to remove themselves from what is effectively a trusteeship position.[100] Essentially, the argument followed here is that if states cannot provide governance, outside actors may take on this task in order to protect vulnerable citizens.[101] This is all the more apparent in the light of the problems with the Kosovo Assembly election in 2004, in which most of the Serb community abstained, and the fact that many Kosovo Albanians now view the UN as an obstacle to independence (despite the fact that it is effectively building a separate state, and has created a political class in Kosovo for the first time).[102] What is more, a resolution of the final status problem is probably more dependent about geopolitical considerations than merely progress on UNMIK's standards for Kosovo.[103]

UNMIK provided the model on which the UN operation in East Timor was to be based. It is not surprising that in both cases there has been a strong undercurrent of local antipathy to the notion that governance has been removed from local control, even merely for a limited period of deferment. What is clear is that in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the liberal peace is being constructed by intervention at the civil level, constitutional reform, and institutional development and linkages. Similarly, in Serbia and Montenegro, internationals are focusing on governance issues *via* which the internationals exert conditionality based upon the Serbian government's cooperation with the ICTY.[104] What is more, such strategies are also based upon military intervention, thus representing a modified form of the victor's peace (stemming here from the will of internationals and the agreement represented by the peacebuilding consensus). The victor's peace, along with constitutional and institutional development has effectively been developed with a minimum of local consent, by external actors, intent on establishing new modes of governance in order to create a sustainable and recognisably liberal peace in their eyes.

East Timor

East Timor provides an important example of the role of the UN in transitional administrations whose end goal is not contested and in

which coercive measures (and so the victor's peace) have been avoided (if one excludes the issues of Indonesia occupation, its sympathisers, and the militias). Instead, into what had become a governance vacuum, at least to the eyes of those looking for the institutions of the liberal state and free-market economy, was installed a variant of the liberal peace.[105] The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was deployed in October 1999 to administer East Timor during its transition to independence, during which time it was a non-self governing territory.[106] This operation came about after the UN sponsored referendum on the future of East Timor had resulted in a violent withdrawal of pro-Indonesian militias. The assumptions lying behind this mission were a natural extension of the role of the UN in Cambodia and the Balkans, and the UN became a sovereign in its own right during its attempt to construct a sustainable polity. This, of course, raises the question of whether a national government can easily emanate from such a process (particularly from the use of peacekeeping), who regulates the role of the UN in such circumstances, and when and how local political actors are determined to be ready to take over governance themselves. Regardless, in East Timor the UN extended its experience of similar state-building activities as in other cases of transitional governance whereby it took a role in making and enforcing law and order, choosing local officials, adjudicating over property, regulating media, reforming the banking system, and running public services and schools. The UN mission was mandated to establish an effective administration, support capacity building for self-government, assist in the development of civil and social services, coordinate and deliver of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance, and establish the required conditions for sustainable development. It was explicitly mandated to '…take all measures…'. Consequently, along with peacekeepers and civilian police, UNTAET consisted of officials whose role was governance and administration. The activities of these branches of UNTAET were funded by $520 million pledged at a donors meeting held in Tokyo in late 1999 (though this sum soon proved inadequate). Independence was achieved by May 2002, security was relatively good, large numbers of refugees were returned, and the economic situation improved.

The Kosovo operation provided a reference point for this governance mission based upon,

> …the broader doctrinal evolution that incorporated experiences from Namibia to Eastern Slavonia… The administration for East

> Timor had only three pillars (as against five in Kosovo) – governance and public administration (GPA), humanitarian and rehabilitation, and the (military) peacekeeping.[107]

The governance pillar is representative of this coalescence of the different actors and roles engaged in UN peace operations as perhaps the most sophisticated process of constructing peace in the international system today. It faced three main challenges including the creation of a sustainable budget, staffing, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local population (or 'Timorisation').[108] There was a large influx of resources into East Timor through UNDP in the early period of the operation that focused mainly upon providing basic necessities dictated by human security requirements (which was one of the requirements of Japan as a major donor in this case). Later, UNDP shifted its focus to sustainability, particularly *vis-à-vis* democratisation and justice. Despite this, UNDP tends to retain ownership of its projects.[109] Along with UNDP and many other agencies, the World Bank is also involved in the peace operation in East Timor in developing a number of projects in the areas of community empowerment and local government, as well as in development planning.[110] Its involvement ranges from the training of ministers, micro-loans, anti-corruption programmes, and promoting an independent media.[111] Effectively it also became indirectly involved in the establishment of democratic institutions.[112] One of the main criticisms levelled at the institution has focused upon its elitist and enclosed bureaucracy, which represents interests associated with the liberal peace, and lack of accessibility for local actors.[113] However, World Bank officials argued that the organisation was accessible, was sensitive to local government, and had moreover learnt that donor co-ordination and the creation of a government from scratch could be achieved.[114] World Bank documentation also indicates an awareness of these problems, and an attempt to respond to them.[115]

NGOs in Dili tended to confirm criticism of the agencies and IFIs. They tended to focus on the sheer scale of the problem NGOs were attempting to ameliorate, and accused the agencies and IFIs of doing too little, generally too late, being wasteful, excessively bureaucratic, and erecting barriers to local participation through the latter. A common complaint from them has been that locals cannot contribute to the state building exercise meaningfully because of a lack of capacity and that internationals tend to ignore what local capacity there is.[116] What was more, there were also complaints that the UN had shown

little leadership in terms of coordination of the various agencies. There was also an awareness that there needed to be support for indigenous CR processes, particularly because there had been little effort to initiate peacebuilding to deal with social justice and welfare issues.[117] The operation in East Timor emphasises top-down peacebuilding and governance at the expense of bottom-up peacebuilding, social justice, and welfare, despite claims to the contrary. It represents a very conservative version of the liberal peace.

Yet, the UN had sovereign authority of a kind it had not experienced before during this operation. In Cambodia, the UN cooperated with the government in rebuilding the state and in Kosovo, the UN had governed but was not sovereign given the fact that the final status of Kosovo had not yet been determined. Perhaps the transitional arrangements in Namibia formed the closest comparison. Governance in East Timor was developed to the extent that the UN became the sovereign actor in the absence of easily identifiable liberal governance capacity. Indeed, the 'lack of local capacity' became a mantra that internationals deployed to legitimate their control of governance in East Timor. Local actors, who point instead to the many internationals' lack of local language skills, cultural understanding and empathy, and understanding of society, as well as inter-organisational competition and conflict, of course dispute this absence.[118] Despite the sovereignty enjoyed by the UN in East Timor devolution of power to a local government occurred at a much faster rate than in the Balkans. Even so there were bitter complaints about the emergence of social, political, and cultural disjunctures between the role of UNTAET and the emerging East Timorese administration.[119] As Suhrke has pointed out, '[I]n colonial terms, it was a model of direct rather than indirect rule.'[120] The UN operation in East Timor effectively exercised complete executive and legislative control over the territory until independence in May 2002, and the UN Secretary General's Report to the Security Council in 2001, outlined 235 core and related core functions essential to 'the stability and functioning of the government' provided by external actors and international assistance.[121]

Peace had become associated with governance of a mainly external nature, though the operation found most of its local legitimacy in the sense that it was merely transitional rather than a fully competent government.[122] Not only was it a precursor of independence, which was legitimate in the eyes of the local population, but it shaped the coming peace as a liberal peace, as it was explicitly tasked to do by the international community. It has been questioned whether the success that

UNTAET is adjudged to have achieved was more of a success for the international community than it was for the East Timorese themselves[123] in other words, a virtual peace. As a somewhat jaundiced Jarat Chopra has pointed out, the UN mission risked establishing another form of authoritarianism unless it was itself held to be accountable to the local population, and there was not a separation of powers.[124] Indeed, Chopra charts an abrasive relationship between the World Bank and the UN over who controlled sovereignty, in which UNTAET resisted Timorese participation to '…safeguard the UN's influence.'[125] It is little wonder that UNTAET was often seen as distant and disassociated from local communities, at least until the formation of the National Consultative Council, which was formed to provide a direct institutional link between UNTAET and the East Timorese population.[126] These experiences represent the culmination of the construction of the liberal peace in the 1990s, as well as becoming the blue print upon which future attempts to create peace will probably be based.

Given the significance of the experience of internationals, donors, and local actors in the specific context of East Timor, it should not be surprising that the East Timorese President, Xanana Gusmao was evidently extremely aware of the questions relating to the nature of the peace that were apparent in this case. In one of the most explicit documents in existence from the policy world on the nature of peace he argued that the experience of East Timor indicated that peace was a basic human right and this involved not just international and civil violence, but socio-economic deprivation, a lack of development, and an engagement with the experience of recipient communities on the part of internationals.[127] It is easy to understand why there was so much disappointment amongst locals when many internationals withdrew after independence, and because so many of the improvements were mainly limited to the capital. Even a superficial liberal peace created through such a far-reaching operation was seen to be better than what had gone before.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan the imposition of a liberal peace has been far less apparent. Instead there has been a focus on advisory functions, reconstruction, and reconciliation, through the work of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UNDP. This shift in approach to the liberal peace remains unexplained, despite the fact that it has huge implications for the future of peacebuilding in collapsed or failing

states around the world, and the role of the international community and its agencies therein. The case of Afghanistan seems to deviate from this evolution in the sense that while the liberal peace was still the goal, international engagement was far less heavy-handed. There seems to be three possible reasons for this. It may relate to differences in the local or regional political situation and the different interests of the Security Council members that negotiated the respective mandates for Kosovo and Afghanistan. Secondly, it is also possible that there has been a withdrawal from the liberal peace discourse. Thirdly, it is possible that there has been a realisation that this model, as applied in Kosovo for example, is unnecessarily interventionary and that influencing governance and humanitarian policy is better done through local political and administrative institutions and actors. Consequently, the construction of the liberal peace in Afghanistan has been far less direct than that in Kosovo or East Timor,[128] perhaps indicating a weakening of the peacebuilding consensus during this period. However, a version of the same consensus has still provided the foundations for peacebuilding since the fall of the Taliban and the UN has still effectively operated as a parallel administration in some contexts, despite the resistance of the Afghan government (and its own stated intentions). This because the UN mission coordinates the many agencies engaged in humanitarian support. UNAMA is the main provider of such capacity in the country. The UN operation has, however, been based not on international administration, but on promoting local Afghan capacity though this has clearly been overshadowed by the sheer weight and capacity of the internationals present. This has become known in the context of state building debates as the 'light footprint' approach.[129] The Bonn conference in 2001 set the target of consolidating the peace process in Afghanistan within three years, and in March 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1401 established the aptly named UN Mission. However, UNAMA was given the task of integrating 16 different UN agencies and their Afghan government counterparts and many national and international NGOs. The UN has been entrusted with the bulk of the funds for reconstruction set aside by the Tokyo conference rather than the interim government, meaning that the UN is effectively operating as a parallel administration.[130] The UN documentation on this assistance has been very careful to defer to the lead role of the local transitional administration, but even so the mandate of UNAMA includes national reconciliation, the tasks entrusted to the UN in the Bonn Agreement, human rights, the rule of law, gender issues, and the management of all UN humanitarian, relief,

recovery, and reconstruction activities.[131] Given the fragmented nature of politics in Afghanistan, perhaps the most that can be achieved in the medium term is to collude with regional fiefdoms in order to construct what Ignatieff describes as a 'rough and ready peace' rather than a fully fledged liberal peace, as has been the focus of efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.[132] This is also what may transpire in the context of the attempt to construct the liberal peace in Iraq after the intervention of 2003.[133] It is important to note the problems the UN has faced in maintaining the credibility of the 'light footprint' model. There has been a lack of authority over donors, NGOs, and international financial institutions on the part of the UN system meaning that the coordination process and system between all of these actors in the case of Afghanistan has been dysfunctional.[134] This is partly because the light footprint approach has confused strategic ends (for example, maintaining the consent of local actors for the reform process) with the operational processes in what has been described as 'aid-induced pacification'.[135]

An illiberal peace?

Both the light and heavy versions of this attempt to construct the liberal peace have been extremely fraught where they have been attempted, and have increasingly rested upon the capacity of the interveners to induce and coerce recipients into cooperating with their multiple programmes.[136] The obvious solution to this lack of capacity has been to focus upon key states as the main agents of peacebuilding. This has of course resulted in the replication of the liberal state and the liberal peace through peacebuilding. As Fukuyama makes clear, a strong state that is able to transfer its institutions is central to statebuilding is what he calls one of the most important projects for the international community.[137] Other commentators have been extremely critical of the assumptions explicit in such positions, argued that they are Western-centric, preoccupied with forms of national governance that confront traditional structures and socially legitimate elites and preventing the development of an 'indigenous paradigm'.[138] In this sense, the peacebuilding consensus replicates a peace-as-governance as little more than a superficial modification of existing social, political, and economic practices.[139]

These different versions of the peacebuilding consensus have been constructed through a globalised hybridisation of approaches to the creation of the liberal peace. During transitional periods at least, this

project rests on an illiberal peace. This involves peacekeepers, sometimes the use of force (as seen in Bosnia and Kosovo), officials working on democratisation, IFIs and development agencies, humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and a plethora of international and regional institutions and organisations working an *ad hoc* manner, though attempting to coordinate their activities where possible, while also protecting their own epistemic control of specific issue areas.[140] This complex network of actors comprise and contribute to this peacebuilding consensus, creating a perception that ever broadening attempts to intervene, reconstruct, liberalise and democratise failed states is a liberal imperative bounded only by strategic imperatives. Such ambitions are complicated by the UN's adherence to a 'no blame' principle, which partly accounts for the recent rise of unilateralism in attempts to construct the liberal peace.[141] This agenda for capacity building may of course simply result in so many internationals being present in a conflict zone that local capacity is actually marginalised, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and to a large extent in East Timor.[142]

The resultant use of international administration gives rise to six broad categories of intervention: (1) establishing order, security, and human rights; (2) humanitarian assistance; (3) resettling refugees and IDPs; (4) taking over basic civil administrative roles; (5) establishing local political institutions, holding elections, and building a civil society; (6) economic reconstruction.[143] This top-down construction of the liberal peace effectively requires deep intervention in the social, political, and economic processes and institutions in, and between, societies. The problem here is while there may be international consent in theory for such processes stemming from liberal states, NGOs, international agencies and organisations as well as international financial institutions, gaining consent on the ground is extremely difficult. This can be seen in the tendency for nationalists to regain power through elections, or for corruption to continue through development and marketisation, for local resistance to international transitional authority, and remaining marked continuities with former conflict management, and indeed colonial, practices.

The peacebuilding consensus depends on third parties imposing the choice of integration *via* very specific qualifying moves (the adoption of free markets, elections, human rights and so on), into the global arena on all disputants. Actors which fail to accept this become excluded economically and politically despite the fact that, or because, this may be their 'choice' and suffer from the weight of the political and economic asymmetries that international consensus

against them can so easily produce. The more difficult it is to get local actors to cooperate, the more governance functions are taken on by external actors. For example, in the case of Cyprus, where the UN had not been involved in a transitional administration, but had offered its own interpretation of governance in the recent 'Annan Plan' which was put to a dual referendum in both Cypriot communities in April 2004.[144] The failure of the Greek Cypriot side to endorse the plan after the Turkish Cypriot side accepted it by a large majority has raised the question for the European Commission of who shall take over the vacuum left by the absence of a federal Cypriot government, a space which it seems to be filling itself in the interests of reinforcing liberal governance over the island as opposed to nationalist politics. Even peacebuilding processes focusing on the establishment of norms of governance derived from the liberal peace may become typified by the rejection of international norms, of globalisation and interdependence by the disputant identified as intransigent and therefore deviating from the norms of the liberal peace. This can even occur in a post-conflict peacebuilding process as in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 2002 elections.[145]

The liberal peace requires governance during a preliminary illiberal peace, often justified on the grounds of human rights violations.[146] This provides external actors with both an ethical *obligation* to intervene if they are to live up to the human rights and humanitarian rhetoric of liberal states, but also an *opportunity* to intervene to establish liberal forms of governance. Some have argued that this may not be a perfect solution but '…less interventionist measures, in some cases, are worse alternatives…',[147] despite the fact that there is strong evidence that conflict zones are ill-suited to democratisation processes.[148] Yet, as outlined in the Brahimi report, establishing democracy is seen as the ultimate goal.[149] The installation of a liberal democracy resting on human rights, humanitarianism, an agreement on what constitutes development, and a globally integrated economy is the only governance formula the international community will invest in. When this installation undercuts the interests of vital groups in peace processes, consent is often lacking as can be seen in the contemporary situation in the 'international protectorates' of Bosnia and Kosovo.[150] This means that there is often external consent for this sort of intervention, but internal consent is clouded by the particularistic political, social and economic practices that may not survive such an intervention. The evolution of humanitarian intervention seems to underline exactly this conundrum.

This debate carries overtones of neo-colonialism[151] similar to the much criticised and now rejected notion of the 'Washington Consensus',[152] which has often been used as a synonym for neoliberalism and 'market fundamentalism'.[153] Indeed, it has much in common with the 'post-Washington' consensus[154] which offers a more flexible version of neo-liberalism. The peacebuilding consensus implies a broad and deep approach to intervention, impinging upon high politics as well as the full range of social, political, cultural, and economic issues that affect societies caught up in war.[155] This has become a cosmopolitan position (as envisaged by Kaldor, for example),[156] and requires a way around the classical approaches to non-intervention, and that the social, political, and economic roots of conflict are addressed. Some commentators have argued that this development of peace-as-governance indicates a return of international protectorates based upon the ideological formulations of the 1990s.[157] In this context, UN peace operations can be described as agents of an illiberal peace in which the recipients of intervention may loose the right to rule themselves. What is clear is that the role of the custodians of such a process are effectively taking a position of autocracy in which the role of the custodians is to end their own presence and transfer power as quickly and smoothly as possible. This requires a complex and often difficult relationship with local communities who 'own' the resultant polity. There has been some debate in the light of these developments about the revival of the UN Trusteeship System under Chapter XII of the Charter. This system was to administer colonial territories through the Security Council that had formerly been managed by the League of Nations Mandates System and under Article 76 its objectives were the promotion of political, economic, social development, and a progression towards self-government or independence.[158] The last trust territory (Palau) became independent in 1994. While this may be effectively what has already happened, formalising such arrangements would meet resistance by states sensitive about the norm of non-independence and the revival of any form of colonialism. Yet, as Groom has argued, the UN operations in both Cambodia and in Kosovo have led to situations analogous with Class A Mandates in the League System, whereby both territories are sovereign but are or are not fully independent, at least for a brief period.[159] The contemporary UN strategy in such cases is to try to help the inhabitants of former conflict zones into a situation where they can enact a process of self-determination again, where possible.[160]

It has been suggested that the first task of top-down approaches to peacebuilding and the construction of the liberal peace would be to

return the monopoly over the use of violence to the state (initially in the hands of external actors), and that peacebuilders must be prepared to remain *in situ* for lengthy periods of time, regardless of the problems of creating a culture of dependency or neo-colonialism.[161] The irony here is that to construct the liberal peace, peacebuilding actors must be prepare to act illiberally.[162] Calls for the creation of a centralised peacebuilding agency with a much more structured approach to the full range of peacebuilding powers, rather than the *ad hoc* approaches generally applied,[163] imply a centralised model of peace to be implanted by such an agency, with marginal differentiation according to specific locales, but focusing essentially on the same elements of the liberal peace. There has been some recent recognition of these problems, particularly in the context of the importation of liberal norms and mechanisms into conflict zones with little regard to local dynamics.[164] Clearly, interveners and the intervened upon are much more closely bound together than they may initially appear,[165] and the numerous peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War have been '…nothing less that an enormous experiment in social engineering, aimed at creating the domestic conditions for durable peace within countries just emerging from civil wars'.[166] A mark of how problematic this experiment has been in practice was the UN Secretary General's realisation that 'participatory governance' was required for there to be a sustainable peace.[167] Yet, this contrasts strongly with the close association between top-down peacebuilding approaches, the state, and governance, and the associations between civil society and bottom-up forms of governance which focus upon social actors.

Conclusion

Debates about peace in liberal states at both the official and unofficial level have concurred about what peace is, and how it should be constituted. From the Balkans to East Timor, interventions have been based upon a mix of idealism associated with 'saving people' through political, social and economic interventions, and the realist project of military occupation, which can exercise temporary authority by virtue of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.[168] This represents a hybrid of the civil, constitutional, institutional, and victor's strands of thinking about peace. The liberal peace encapsulates this hybrid, and the peacebuilding consensus represents the multi-level, but predominantly top-down and elite level consensus that the liberal peace is the proper response to conflict, and should be carried out by the relevant actors

working in specific issue areas in coordination with this overall objective. Yet, the liberal peace may well be a virtual peace when internal conditions in a conflict environment are compared with external perceptions or intents. Internationals often believe it is a 'virtuous' peace despite the fact that the actors peace has been visited upon may not agree themselves. This 'virtual' peace is acceptable even if it requires direct and indirect forms of governance to be taken over by outside actors like the UN or EU, agencies, and NGOs. UN peace operations provide a high degree of legitimacy for such endeavours, though when force is used this legitimacy declines. Even in this case the liberal international community often seems satisfied with a virtual peace that is superficially virtuous when viewed from the outside.

The peace that is constructed through the medium of UN peace operations such as in Bosnia or Kosovo certainly is a virtual peace when compared to the objectives stated in their mandates. Despite this, there is a clear progression in terms of humanitarian work and institution building when compared to the situation in Cyprus since 1964 where there has been a state of 'Cold War' bearing little resemblance to the intentions of the original mandate.[169] Such tasks have been left to the Cypriot disputants, enabling them to perpetuate the conflict through the institutions of state. If war and peace are often not easily distinguishable,[170] then the only way in which 'peace' can be attained is through the establishment of particular forms of governance in the interests of dominant actors or representing a consensus. Yet, the progress gained in the Balkans, for example, is at great cost, both in terms of legitimacy and resources and the liberal account of the peace that is being produced seems not to be reflected upon the ground.

Notwithstanding, governance has become the 'new vocabulary' of the top-down version of the liberal peace and the associated peacebuilding consensus, defined as a multi-level, 'multilayered' process incorporating aspects of civil society, state and global politics, operating with public as well as private instruments. Some have described this as a rehabilitation of imperial duty,[171] while others see it as a liberal imperative. Chesterman, for example, ridicules the claim that transitional authority belongs to local communities and depends on their views.[172] The unspoken bargain is that governance will be devolved to local inhabitants once a sustainable outcome can be expected. But this might never happen. Thus, the peacebuilding consensus might lead to permanent 'peace-as-governance' – a form of 'empire lite' as described above by Ignatieff or as 'UN protectorates' by Caplan, which risk administrative and donor dependency.[173]

Peace operations and the construction of the liberal peace play a key role in an epistemic community[174] engaged in the construction of the institutions the liberal peace. This epistemic community also shares normative beliefs and principles, causal beliefs, notions of validity and common policy objectives.[175] The liberal institution building that occurs *via* this sort of intervention locates power and knowledge in terms of resources and expertise, and amasses them in the hands of the UN system and other associated institutions and actors, which contribute to the creation of the liberal peace. They are engaged in the construction of the institutions of 'reality',[176] at least as they are imagined in the context of these actors.

Despite the risk of creating a form of administrative donor dependency, the peacebuilding consensus and top-down approaches to the construction of the liberal peace actually require dependency and conditionality in order to make sure the liberal peace settlement does become sustainable. This is based ultimately upon the will and resources of hyper-liberal actors, constructing states in which a virtual peace from the outside seems sufficient justification. Viewed from this inside, 'peace' in states such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and in Kosovo looks very flimsy, and is dependent upon the long-term engagement of the actors involved in the peacebuilding consensus. This implies that peace-as-governance rests upon long-term governance from the outside, and that the transfer of the ownership of peace in these conflict zones to local actors and institutions may be extremely difficult for reasons pertaining to both the custodians' interests, and perhaps because local actors and institutions 'readiness' for transfer will prove a moving target. Foucault and Orwell's aphorism that war is peace illustrates the dilemma of what Kipling called 'savage wars of peace', which ironically, seem to be a key component of the top-down liberal peace project.[177]

Part III

Reflecting on the Concepts of Peace

6
Conceptualising Peace

Introduction

A number of different strategies for conceptualising peace have emerged in the intellectual and policy discourses examined in the previous chapters of this study. There appears to have been an evolution in approaches to dealing with conflict and constructing peace, which has moved away from the notion that peace was geographically contained, or contained and constructed by race, identity, or power, and also away from the notion that universal peace was an unlikely achievement. What seems to have developed is an understanding of a certain version of peace – the liberal peace – as being universal and also as being attainable, if the correct methods are concertedly and consistently applied by a plethora of different actors working on the basis of an agreed peacebuilding consensus, and focusing on the regimes, structures, and institutions required at multiple levels of analysis and in multiple issue areas by liberal governance. This development is a hybrid form related to the main strands of thinking about peace outlined earlier in this study, including the victor's peace, constitutional, institutional, and civil approaches, and there exist both 'thick' and 'thin' versions. In the thin version, peace is a superficial overlay, dependent upon international will and consensus and local consent, whereas in the thick version the liberal peace can be imposed, perhaps through unilateral uses of force and little in the way of local consent. These two poles of the debate upon the liberal peace are often negotiated and balanced through a focus on local consent, upon the return of decision-making power to local actors at some defined point in the future, and through practices associated with 'capacity building' and conditionality. The following chapter outlines

the main characteristics of thought and practice associated with peace, and with the emergence of the liberal peace, as have been observed during the course of this study. It outlines the approaches generally used to conceptualise peace, and their implications, and also discusses the types of threats and security challenges that have been influential in their theorisation and practice. It also examines their ontological and epistemological implications and their potential for coexistence or abrasion with other versions of peace.

The main concepts of peace

There seems to be nine main methods through which peace is imagined, theorised, and practised within the more general intellectual frameworks provided by the victor's peace, the civil institutional, and constitutional, peace as the following diagrams illustrate. All of these versions of peace encompass an imaginary of world politics and of the mechanisms, institutions, actors, and methods required to entrench them, through intervention in international, state, or private life, as patterns and frameworks of global, local, and regional interaction. These conceptualisations include spatial and temporal approaches to peace. Peace may be imagined in opposition to perceived threats. It may be a victor's peace. It may be understood and projected from either the inside of a political community or from its outside. It may have a specific logic, derived from a specific political framework (for example, democracy and constitutionalism), a specific international framework (balance of power or institutionalism and governance) or an economic framework (free trade and markets), or a social framework (a common or agreed identity or mix of identities, civil society and human rights). Such thinking gives rise to the hybrid permutation of peace – a liberal peace. This rests upon a complex web of actors working on the basis of a common peacebuilding consensus on the institutionalisation of peace-through-governance. Of course, all of these main modes of thinking about peace, which run through the relevant literature and practices, overlap and cannot be taken as closed categorisations. While it is possible to trace a linear evolution from more limited notions of peace that are contained, bounded, and often viewed as utopian, it would also be a simplification to assume that the liberal peace hybrid represents an advance upon what has gone before. Indeed, because it is a hybrid it is still subject to many of the same and untreated weaknesses of other previous conceptualisations. Furthermore, as contemporary practices in many parts of the world seem to

indicate, the liberal peace may only result in a 'virtual peace' in which the methods and objectives associated with it are mainly visible to those observing from the outside of the conflict zone in the liberal international community rather than those upon whom this peace is being visited. Indeed, these continuities can still be found in a three-fold distinction of peace in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as being conservative, liberal, or nationalist.[1] The liberal peace is predominantly conservative in that while it offers itself to improve the lot of those it is brought to as a universal form, it also preserves and accentuates the moral superiority and sophistication of those who are already subject to it. It is also tinged by the promotion of the national interest through international instutionalism.

A final important conceptualisation, though perhaps more difficult to elaborate upon here in any concrete form, lies in the reflexive version of peace associated with different emancipatory discourses, (Foucauldian, Habermasian, and Coxian among others) such as that outlined by Andrew Linklater, Vivienne Jabri, Richard Falk.[2] This focuses on the construction of a universal peace, but one that is negotiated and built on consensus, rather than on an assumption of consensus tinged with moral superiority. For example, a critical conceptualisation of peace as communicative action based upon Habermasian dialogic relations has emerged in some literatures. This represents an important (though some would argue, utopian or even revolutionary) attempt to describe the qualities of peace often referred to in much of the conflict resolution literature in which consensus, truth, justice, and individual agency are all present.

Peace as an internal/external binary definition

The following diagram indicates one of the main binaries present in many of the conceptualisations of peace, which if any serious contemplation of the concept is to be worthwhile, emphasises its subjective nature. This is the first basic conceptualisation of peace identified in this study.

This diagram illustrates the distinction between internal and external understandings of peace and conflict. It is important to note the inevitable disparity between local and international actors and the rather simplistic boundary – often a contested site – between the two sets of actors. These indicate the overwhelming weight of international discourses on peace, and the potential for perhaps violent disagreement between them. Of course, this does not mean that there is an absolute distinction between what local actors and international actors



Figure 6.1 Defining peace and conflict

perceive, as there are many connections between local and international in a globalised and transnational international society. What it does show, however, is the inter-subjectivity of peace and conflict as it is understood by the many different actors involved in identifying and responding to conflict, and those involved in constructing the liberal peace. It is not necessarily the case that different local actors will perceive there to be a conflict in accordance with the views of the international organisations, agencies, NGOs and states which normally respond to conflict under certain conditions in the international system. Similarly, an international response aimed at constructing a new peace in a conflict zone may also not be accepted by some local actors who see the new peace as possibly transgressing their interests – effectively as an act of war. There are many examples of this type of conflict, perhaps one of the most notable early examples lying in settler colonisation of North America or Australia, in which conflicting versions of peace led to what some may describe as acts of genocide being committed by settlers against indigenous communities. This type of interaction was repeated across sub-Saharan Africa and in South America during the waves of colonisation that occurred. A more contemporary set of examples can be found in the US/UN intervention in Somalia to bring about effective government and humanitarian aid, or in NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.

Peace as a hegemonic act of definition

The second main approach to conceptualising peace lies in the act of defining its nature by specific actors. A primary form of this type of conceptualisation of peace lies in the well-known framework of a victor's peace in which, as Sun Tzu has argued, the object of war is peace on the terms of the victor.[3] Many Realists would argue that peace is derived from a decisive military defeat on the battlefield, and rests

upon the role of the victor in establishing a framework for a peace in its own interests (and often in its own image) but perhaps with a modicum of negotiated legitimacy. In these terms, peace is often associated with militarism.[4]

Defining the nature of conflict and peace is the first step to identifying and responding to conflict with the installation of peace. This in itself is often a hegemonic discursive act in which those states, actors, agencies or NGOs with a particular area of interest (from the ending of slavery to the banning of land-mines) react to their own thresholds which denote the emergence of an issue they must respond to, and then put into operation what ever procedures they have evolved in coordination with others. This always occurs with an eye to a specific outcome, normally dependent upon their conditional relationship with allies, sponsors, or funders, and then renegotiated with those representing their targets for intervention. The construction of a new peace increasingly has depended upon a concurrence of multiple identifications by multiple actors operating in the different locations of the state, society, the international system and its institutions and organisations. This of course, raises the question of which actors dominate this identification process? Dominant liberal states are key, as is the UN secretariat in its advisory role to the UN Security Council. Members of the General Assembly are also important, as are international agencies and NGOs, as well as the media. What this means is that the particular biases of these mediums are present in the identification of what constitutes conflict and therefore in the subsequent imagining of peace and its construction. This process of defining what constitutes conflict is also influenced by what sort of peace conflict is measured against. All of these actors have an inherent conception of what peace should look like built into their standard operating procedures, constitutions, agendas, and remits for action and policy. This is now normally associated with some aspect of the liberal peace. Consequently, conflict is also defined in opposition to, and as a challenge to and for, this notion of the liberal peace. This is the main reason why the notion of governance has become so important as the objective of responses to conflict.

This is encapsulated in the following diagram representing the liberal peace as a more or less universal condition and in which conflict areas represent an abnormality, and in which actors identify and respond to threats emerging in their areas of interest, according to their internal and negotiated agendas.



Figure 6.2 The liberal peace and responses to conflict

Numerous understandings and conceptualisations of peace are in evidence in the different disciplinary and policy literatures and debates that have been examined, but most if not all conform to the logic of these two diagrams above. Many are used and applied in a confusing, ill-defined, and overlapping manner. These different definitions are derived from multiple sources, methodologies, and disciplines.

Peace as a bottom-up or top-down construction

Despite such confusion, what conceptualisations of peace also seem to hold in common are the dual conceptualisations that the inhabitants of conflict zones must either achieve peace through bottom-up activities, or that it can be achieved from above by outside actors and institutions imposing their knowledge of peace and how it can be achieved from above. This is encapsulated by the top-down and bottom-up terminology often applied in IR, conflict and peace studies, and in the work of the UN system. This is associated with a specific methodology of peace that ranges from states, NGOs, UN and agency or institutional engagement at this level. Earlier debates on peace present its creation as occurring from the outside-in and from the top-down, as is represented by international treaties and state-building. Alternatively, peace is to be achieved from the inside-out, and bottom-up, though civil society building representing the voices of local and indigenous communities. An important debate here rests on the legitimacy of both approaches, with there being a general wariness about external, top-down approaches without consent. It



Figure 6.3 Peace from above or below

has also come to be generally accepted that consent should be derived from both civil society and official discourses in a particular state or community. The contemporary peacebuilding consensus on peace-as-governance as being the pathway to the spread of the liberal peace rests on both assertions.

Temporal concepts of peace

A fourth common mode of conceptualisation revolves around the temporal qualities of peace, as existing in the present and in need of defending and reinforcing, or as existing in the future as an ideal form, perhaps achievable through the application of certain methods known only to actors with access to specific and highly specialised knowledge. This dictates that the construction of peace engenders a relationship of conditionality between custodians of peace processes and peacebuilding and recipients of intervention. Historically, peace is normally perceived as fatally flawed in some way that led to its complete breakdown (though there is also often an association with a past, and lost peace – a golden age). Peace is thus seen progressing along a linear chronological axis.



Figure 6.4 Temporal qualities of peace conceptualisation

The geography of peace

A fifth approach lies in a geographical understanding of peace, popularised through often repeated terminology indicating that there are zones of peace and zones of conflict. This type of thinking is repeated constantly throughout relevant intellectual and policy discourses. This represents a geographically bounded conceptualisation of peace. This spatial separation is vital to orthodox understandings of the distinction between war and peace, though it seems increasingly hard to sustain in this contemporary era of new wars, and the 'war on terror'. The implication of this conceptualisation is that the zones of peace and conflict are entirely separate and cordoned off from each other, perhaps even by closed boundaries. If peace is to spread into conflict zones external actors must gain access in order to mount a crusade in which the zones of conflict are normalised. This common spatial differentiation between peace and conflict is represented in any of the diagrams in this chapter. As pointed out early, this is little more than a simplistic stylistic device, but it does represent a dominant mode of thought in much intellectual and policy discourse about peace and conflict. More recently, there has been an elucidation that zones of conflict can be transformed into *illiberal* zones of peace, as a preliminary step to a fully-



Figure 6.5 Spatial qualities of peace

fledged liberal peace.[5] Note that if the spatial representations of this diagram were accurate, the zone of liberal peace would probably be little bigger than the zone of conflict, particularly if a definition of conflict as including non-state actors were to be applied. This cartography of the liberal peace would be further reduced by a considerable margin if a demographic cartography were to be applied to illustrate populations subject to the liberal peace relative to those that were not (especially given that the liberal peace includes development issues and human security).

Levels and agents of peace

A further contemporary conceptualisation of the nature of peace can be found in an examination of different aspects and actors in the international system, using a levels-of-analysis framework. Peace can be seen to reside in civil society, in the state, or at the regional and international level, or in a specific economic, political or social logic. Again different approaches to its construction tend to reduce or prioritise one particular level. This means either a focus upon the institutions, actors or issues is prevalent at this level. At the level of civil society, therefore, discourses related to identity, human rights, development, and democratic rights become visible. At the state level, these enabling domestic structures, or relations with other states or organisations, may be focused upon. At the international level, all of the above may be necessary, or it may be that the focus is upon one set of such issues and actors. Thus, there may be a discourse related to the sanctity of sovereignty, to the type of governance, or to the role of international organisations. The arguments for free trade, and in particular their association with the democratic peace are a popular discourse associated with peace in this context, as is the increasing prevalence of attention towards, and conceptualisation of, the role of civil society. All of these variants can be observed as the foci of the construction of peace during the development of the modern international system as the discourses and practices of the liberal peace develop.

A specific logic of peace

This version of peace is widely deployed, normally in the context of a long line of antecedents related to political, ideological, economic, and social debates about what type of system may or may not produce peace. Thus, peace is seen to have a specific logic that provides a formula for a specific type of peace as an outcome to conflict. These tend to be derived from specific socio-economic and political frameworks. The argument

about the democratic peace is well known, and from its Kantian foundations to the vast literature today, it has been argued to be an empirical law leading to a union of democratic states which both ensures the rights and security of their own inhabitants, and that of foreigners. Peace could also be associated with a system to provide social welfare as its priority. It could be associated with a specific economic framework, from the centrally planned economies of the Soviet Union, its satellites or allies, to the free trade, marketised, and globalised economies of the developed world. It may also rest upon a social framework, relating to a common or agreed identity or mix of identities, ethnicity, tribalism, a religious framework, civil society and human rights. It may also rest upon a specific international framework such as the balance of power enshrined in alliance and treaty systems, or consent and legitimacy enshrined in institutionalisation and governance.

The liberal peace and peace-as-governance

The dominant spatial and temporal understandings of peace outline above have been brought together in the contemporary peace-as-governance framework, in which the future ideal peace lies in the reform of comprehensive frameworks for social, economic, political and cultural regulation and governance by outside and inside actors working toward the same general framework encompassed by the liberal peace. This is the main contemporary conceptualisation of peace prevalent (though normally implicit rather than explicitly referred to) in contemporary academic literature and policy discourses. This framework represents a union of some or all of the previous concepts and of the thinking that underlines them, and can be charted through the evolution of institutional approaches to constructing peace from the Treaty of Westphalia, through to the UN system and beyond. Thus, it is restrictive, regulative, and conditional, while at the same time promising to provide the democratic, political, social, economic capacities and freedoms in the very near future in former conflict zones. It abstracts from the present temporal conditions in the liberal international community, and through internal and externally promoted conditional processes of reform and institution building, it offers 'zones of conflict' a future liberal peace. In this way, the liberal peace also has crusading qualities. It also represents a positive epistemology of peace – a belief that it *can* be achieved, through a peacebuilding consensus representing all the major actors involved in the projection of the liberal peace, as opposed to simply maintaining a *status quo* resting on structural violence.[6]



Figure 6.6 The liberal peace and the peacebuilding consensus

Though rarely considered, the liberal peace engenders a specific methodology and ontology. Its ontology suggests co-existence is possible if certain modes of governance are adopted. Its methodology requires its construction by many types of intervening actors including states, state and non-state actors.[7] This involves a constant negotiation of the liberal peace through a system of conditionality in the context of global governance and regimes led by key liberal states pertaining to political, economic, and developmental processes.[8] These states act as donor governments that deploy NGOs, international organisations and international financial institutions, multilateral agencies, the military and corporations.[9]

Political, social, and economic regimes associated with liberal and neo-liberal governance and its reform have become the new conditions of peace and a peacebuilding consensus has emerged around such regimes and their installation. This consensus is often generally assumed to be decisive and universal, though as previous chapters of this study have shown this is often far from the case. This institutional notion of peace is predicated upon a rationalist understanding of organisations and institutions existing beyond the state and operations on the basis of restricting their roles within certain multilaterally agreed frameworks, and empowering their capacities for reform on liberal terms through relationships of conditionality between states and such organisations and institutions. Reform of governance is seen as a response to the failures that give rise to conflict, and the

multiple processes by which governance may be reformed provide the methodology applied to achieve peace.

Governance, unlike peace, has been extensively theorised. Of course there are many contested definitions of governance, its methods and frameworks. Its basic qualities can be taken as follows: the regulation and coordination of issues and social, economic and political resources by multiple authorities, organisations, private and public actors, including both formal and informal arrangements. All of these actors focus on the application of multiple layers and frameworks of governance procedures to produce a particular policy outcome.[10] Clearly, while governance is a useful concept in this context, it has also been subject to a tyranny of definitions, propagated through the roles of regional and supranational institutions and organisations, as well as with the IMF and the World Bank, the UN Department of Political Affairs and UNDP.[11] The important point to note here is that all of these actors are involved in managing issues which are perceived to be common to all involved. There is a normative element to this understanding of governance in which issues are responded to with frameworks that represent the norms and values of the agents of governance. In this way, governance depends upon both objective understandings and inter-subjective understandings of both methods and goals.[12] What this also means is that governance cannot only be instigated by official actors working from the outside of a conflict zone requiring regulation and coordination, but that as well as being a top-down process, it must also been constructed as a bottom-up process. This is mainly why there has been so much recent emphasis on both the promotion and regulation of civil society in conflict zones. Similarly, there has been a rapid expansion of the role of non-state actors not constrained by the strictures of sovereignty when it comes to intervention. Otherwise those who are being governed may see these external frameworks of governance as little more than a soft form of imperialism, and the custodians of such processes will find that they are operating without local consent and legitimacy in conflict zones.

These main modes of understanding peace are encapsulated in Galtung's well-known negative/positive framework,[13] which replicates and endorses all of the binaries upon which the above distinctions rest upon. Although a useful typology, it tends to obscure the plethora of definitions that are in circulation because of its dependence upon a simple binary construction of peace. Galtung's positive/negative peace proposal actually indicates that peace can be conceptualised as a coercive order, as structural violence or terror, or as consensus and

harmony, as trade, democracy, or human rights. It can also be defined as a crusading and totalising universalism. These strands of the implicit debate need further, direct examination, but clearly emerging from these different strands of the debates on conceptualising peace-as-governance are several implied requirements: that peace is broadly representative of all actors at multiple levels, both public and private; that its identity is clearly understood in opposition to other states of being; that its boundaries are generally recognised; that it is legitimate and formalised in institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks; and that it is sustainable into the future, is defensible, and sufficient to initiate mobilisation in its defence; and that it provides social, economic and political resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it.

In many of these approaches to understanding and constructing peace, identity plays a key role. This can be in the classic terms of the racial or ethnic superiority of one group over an *other*, or in their agreement on equality and claims for resources or representation. It can be constructed *via* a system of mono- or multi-ethnic sovereign states. Identities can be understood as relating to the ethnic, to the state, to the region, or to a cosmopolitan or internationalist ideal. Furthermore, many of these approaches to thinking about peace also develop an understanding of identity as either fixed by population and geography, or as fluctuating and shifting according to the needs or wishes of individuals or groups. Thus, constructivist accounts of the liberal peace, an in particular its democratic structure, tend to emphasise a sense of collective identity amongst states subject to this peace.[14] In these terms, and as argued by Campbell and Walker, a collective identity implies an adversary:[15] thus the peace to be found *via* a collective identity exists only because there is an *other*, not subject to the same and identity, and crucially, therefore not subject to the same peace or alternatively subject to a state of war in the eyes of the identity collectivity. Identity and its transient and multiple natures underpin the debate about conceptualising peace, particularly in its liberal peace form. It is also, perhaps, important to note that identity issues replaced the Soviet Union and its political ideology as the main threat to the liberal peace after the end of the Cold War. It has now been partly displaced by development problems, environmental threats, and most recently by terrorism, as the foil for the liberal peace. Developmental problems and their association with economic deprivation have been used to legitimise the Washington and post-Washington consensus on the provisions of resources as a conditional process contingent upon the

recipients' acceptance of modes of governance, not necessary only in economic spheres, associated with the liberal peace. To some extent, environmental problems have served a similar purpose, though there is less consensus in the developed world that environmentalism is a concrete component of the liberal peace. Terrorism has certainly become an important aspect of this debate however, with preventive measures and actions becoming part of the conditionality package in all areas of life. Terrorism also, of course, plays a significant role in endorsing the value of the liberal peace, and in mobilising support for its spread, though as can be seen specifically in the recent cases of US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, this is far from decisive.

In the context of security, governance has normally been conceptualised, as by Keohane, by focusing on the maintenance of collective security, order and goals, through a set of institutions that regulate the behaviour and relationships of their members. This is achieved partly through asserting entry qualifications.[16] Conditionality in the relationship between agents of governance and actors in conflict zones then becomes a key part of the continuation of reform processes. This, of course, gives rise to the problem related to a gap between norms and capacities.[17] This is specifically problematic where norms, discourses, ideas, and practices are clearly far apart. It has been customary to assert when dealing with such inter-subjective issues in a world where actors are often described as having 'power', 'hegemony', and 'norms' with the capacity to inscribe these upon the workings of the international system or international society, that 'ideas matter', while also being constrained within the context of fluid international relations between important and influential actors in the system.[18] Peace has of course, always been a significant idea, dressed up in many different forms, of which governance is one of the most recent. What should be recognised is that in all of these various forms one of the key motivations for a specific method deployed to construct a specific form of peace depends on the type of threats identified by those actors exercising a hegemonic role in the international system. Such threats relate to multiple issues, from war, conflict, terrorism, underdevelopment, disease, geography, boundaries, identity, human rights, and so on.

Even in its most sophisticated forms, as outlined above, peace may still be contested. Even the liberal peace cannot aspire to be a Platonic ideal form. These moves have been made in terms of the evolution of the peace-as-governance framework in order to reduce such contestation, as has the relative lack of debate on such an evolution. At its most basic level, peace should be understood as an inter-subjective

concept in terms of how it is perceived by its multiple agents and the actions required to construct it. At an ontological level there are of course conflicting versions of the concept, spanning those of utopian thinkers to those who argue that what is, however imperfect, represents a practical peace.

Peace as emancipation: counter-discourses

The most sophisticated approach to understanding the many different versions of peace stems from the utilisation of a genealogical method of investigation, which allows for the exploration of peace as a previous, current or future state, as the end result of the application of a specific set of methods. It must also be acknowledged that peace in any of these forms is often used to legitimise the politicised and self-interested application of certain methods, tools, and frameworks that might give rise to a later state of peace. Furthermore, if we assert that peace is an inter-subjective concept then it is also open to ideological and functional manipulation – in other words peace can be used as a motivating and legitimising tool for associated strategies and objectives. Indeed, it may well be that dominant forms of peace represent the methods and objectives of hegemonic actors.

This type of thinking represents the final conceptual framework suggested by this study, which lies in the reflexive version of peace associated with different emancipatory discourses.[19] This is derived from different strands of thought. The cosmopolitan and communitarian debates have, for example, increasingly focused on cultural problems and ethics associated with particularism and universalism.[20] In critical and post-structural approaches to IR, there has also been an increasing focus on dialogic ethics as a method of dealing with culture while avoiding the extreme of cultural relativism.[21] For example, Jabri's version of this type of conceptualisation focuses on the type of peace that might be achieved through communicative action, based upon Habermasian dialogic relations. The point here is to achieve a recognition that any discourse about conflict and peace is constructed with reference to the aspirations and interests of those involved in specific dialogues about peace and conflict. To attain an emancipatory version of peace, dialogic relations should rest upon the openly stated needs and requirements of all actors through a conversation which emancipates and provides agency rather than masks subtle or open forms of domination. It is arguable, however, as to whether this type of thinking can overcome the burden created by its tendency to posit future outcomes for other actors, and to impose a totalising discourse of peace

associated in some way with the liberal claims of cosmopolitanism. This type of argument assumes that its participants are 'minimally liberal'.[22] What is perhaps even more dangerous is that the assumption is made that all agents actually want to be liberal if they are not currently so. However, this type of critique does attempt to move beyond the limitations of previous approaches, and provides an important critique of the liberal peace. In particular, it is important to note that it is with this type of analysis that peace can be seen as a product, to a certain degree at least, of human agency in negotiating co-existing but different forms of peace. The Kantian/Habermasian dictum that morals and norms must be universalisable,[23] whether plausible or not, provides an important guide for the construction of an emancipatory peace, but it also provides obvious problems for the liberal peace project which require further investigation.

What these alternative approaches to understanding peace underline is that some of the conceptualisations of peace tend to fall into mainstream, orthodox and conservative discourses, whereas others, such as that associated with Habermasian discourse ethics,[24] are effectively counter-discourses, which in critical fashion indicate that the notion of peace simply cannot be deployed without an adjective specifying what type of peace is being referred to, who defines it, and for what reasons. The liberal peace is a classic example of this requirement, and indicates that built into its implicit theorisation is an acknowledgement of its limitations. In effect such orthodox conceptualisations of peace as an ideal form, obtainable or unobtainable, represent a discursive game in which the use of the term often disguises or legitimates baser objectives.

Conclusion

From this attempt to conceptualise peace there emerges some key ontological and epistemological strands: the philosophical strand of thinking about peace seeks to provide a normative understanding of how peace would be probably in terms of a universal moral order; the positivist strand seeks to create a basic level order through scientific investigation of the interactions of units *vis-à-vis* a re-ordering of resources and structures; the post-positivist strand focuses on emancipation from hegemony, domination, and marginalisation through either a universal critical order, or through a reflection on an underlying ontological and epistemological understanding of being at, and knowing, a multiple or hybrid peace. These concepts of peace can be understood to be within human experience(s), or beyond it and proba-

bly out of reach. The dominant understanding of peace that has emerged represents a hybrid of the above in the context of the liberal peace, which engenders both an institutional, international, constitutional, political, economic, developmental, civil and social conceptions of 'sovereign man' constructed through a projected consensus on the nature of peace. Furthermore, peace can be constructed as a geographically bounded condition, as limited, or as crusading, and a normative undercurrent 'out there', as a rational or subjective process, the result of political constructs, economic frameworks, human rights, permutations of bounded or global identities, as institutional, as social, lying in civil society, or international society, derived from restrictive and regulative regimes propagated by hegemons, or through freedom from the latter.

The liberal peace and the emancipatory notion of peace are often equated, though as I have shown, there are significant differences. It is a characteristic of most discussions of, claims, about, and conceptualisations of, peace that its emancipatory qualities are claimed and emphasised (mainly because it is such a powerful normative concept). As Chapters I & II outlined, these notions have lengthy antecedents. The victor's peace has remained a key aspect of all conceptualisations, even possibly including the emancipatory discourses which still seem to depend on others being able to know, and install peace for those caught up in conflict. But the victor's peace increasingly became diluted and disguised by the long-line of peace projects in the post-Enlightenment period, which were mainly European in origin and euro-centric in nature, the emergence of a private discourse on peace with the growth of NGOs and civil society actors, and then in the twentieth century the formalisation of an institutional discourse on peace. This later discourse, again underpinned by the victor's peace, formed the basis for the hybrid form that was to become the liberal peace discussed in Chapter 3–5, in which multiple actors at multiple levels of analysis in rigid conditional relationships with each other began its universal construction according to a mixture of conservative, liberal, regulative, and distributive tendencies. This construction requires a specific ontology of peace, a methodology, mechanisms and tools deployed by epistemic communities which have the necessary expertise, by coalitions of organisations, states, institutions, involved in a conditional relationship between them and locations where the liberal peace is being constructed.

The ontological and epistemological undercurrents of this discourse have not yet received much attention, though indeed, it must be said



Figure 6.7 A genealogy of the liberal peace

they are implicit in IR theory, in conflict and peace studies, and in associated practices. What can therefore be asserted at this stage is that peace can be seen as a social contract[25] and also as a social construction. The latter in particularly can be seen in anthropological work: for example, according to Kelly's study of warless societies the Andamanese make both war and peace as social constructions[26] and as war evolves so too do mechanisms for its redressal.[27] In other words, the spatial, temporal, and conceptual binaries that mark much thinking on the concept of peace tend to be applied to disguise the fact that such discourses are subjective, self-interested, and essentially contested. Peace should never be deployed as a concept without some sort of qualification as to its assumed qualities.

The conceptualisations of peace derived from the main theoretical debates in IR can be seen in the following frameworks:

1. Idealism and Utopianism: future complete peace social, political and economic harmony (no examples). This type of peace is represented as desirable but effectively unobtainable. It is an ideal form.

2. Liberalism, neo-liberalism, imperialism, marxism: a general peace based upon significant levels of justice and consent, but probably marred by terrorism, secessionism, guerilla warfare perpetrated by marginalised actors; present, geographically limited peace due to other actors operating on the basis of factors outlined in (3). Peace in this framework can be constructed, however, by multiple forms of intervention (many examples) and is often represented as an ideal form.
3. Realism, fascism: no peace but perhaps a limited temporal and geographically bounded order (e.g. border conflict, territorial conflict, ethnic, linguistic, religious (and other identity forms conflict). This type of peace rests upon balance of power, domination, and perceptions of threat
4. Post-structuralism and critical theory: an emancipatory peace is possible if marginalised actors and discourses are recognised, and discourses and practices of domination are removed, or if there is radical reform, though whether there can be a universal or multiple peace is heavily contested. However, there is still a strong sense that peace as an ideal form could be achieved.

Type 1 indicates an ideal form. Type 2 indicates a situation where peace is dominant for the vast majority of the population. Type 3 indicates a situation where conflict is an everyday part of life – where war-time conditions and peace-time conditions interact in a manner familiar to those who reside in conflict zones. Apart from type 1, this interaction of the dynamics of peace and war occurs to varying degrees in all conditions. Type 4 indicates that the conditions of peace may not be fully recognised and that key assumptions associated with peace and order are perhaps more contested than generally thought. This typology illustrates a fundamental problem with the way we think about conflict and peace. Despite the general fascination with war and the categories of war, there has been little attempt to produce a categorisation of peace that does not automatically discredit itself by utilising the common linear depiction spanning war at one end of the axis to utopia at the other end of the axis. The most common approaches to thinking about peace automatically postpone this debate until after the end of conflict and war, meaning that because of the prevalence of conflict peace rarely receives much thought. This paradox has recently been addressed to some degree through the construction of a peacebuilding consensus about the liberal peace, though without any sustained theorisation of either. Clearly, much more rigour is required in the way the concept of peace is conceptualised, deployed and constructed, as this chapter has endeavoured to provide.

Conclusion

What is Peace? Virtual Peace, Virtuous Peace

'To remember Hiroshima is to commit oneself to peace.'[1]
'Pax Invictis'[2]
'Virtue runs amok.'[3]

Introduction

Encountering peace through conflict

What can the academic, diplomat, or peacebuilding official, agency or NGO employee, do when, on a UN helicopter taking off after a meeting in a rebel held village in Eastern Congo, a woman tries to put a sick child on board so it can receive desperately needed medical care in a faraway town? Or when a government official in East Timor asks for more resources so that children can receive a proper education with a prospect of a job afterwards? Or when a human rights advocate in Sri Lanka documents the abuses occurring at the hands of his own government and army?[4] In these instances the actual outcome was often the reverse of what one would expect if the liberal peace were to be fully pursued. The child was taken off the helicopter in Eastern Congo on the grounds that a precedent could not be set. The government official in East Timor acknowledged that there were other priorities in the political hierarchy. The Sri Lankan human rights advocate acknowledged that some abuses might not be easily stopped. These actors often recognise that pragmatism might not be the best course for a sustainable peace, and do try to respond to these apparent paradoxes.

What can the 'pragmatic' realist, the 'missionary' liberal, the 'uncertain' post-structuralist, or the dogged and determined humanitarian or official, do in these circumstances? How can the academic, however

conservative or however much an activist, when called on to help on political, social justice, or welfare, issues assist? How does an ontological assumption of a liberal universal peace, or a relativist assumption of a shifting and intersubjective peace assist or hinder? How can one reconcile the exploration of desperate issues engendered in conflict with responses and activism, with detached analysis, with the surety of objective knowledge or the uncertainty of subjectivity? Why study peace if not to reinforce one's belief in a particular approach to peace, or to critique a particular orthodoxy of peace? What motivates a researcher, diplomat, official, or civilian, to become involved in such murky issues in which surety can either protect or be undermined very easily? Such questions arise from the study of the concept of peace, albeit at an implicit level, especially as peacebuilding, aid, development, and human rights are subject to conditionality that is often influenced by the interests of state sponsors,[5] as well as demography, geography, donor cycles, and the one year cycles of UN mandates.

The victor's peace framework has also been subject to the *hamartia* of territorial and strategic over-extension, greed, and an inability to control unruly subjects. The civil peace discourse often struggles to be heard, even though it is often propagated by non-state actors motivated by human security and social justice, who blame the state for war, or liberal states for self-interest. The institutional peace discourse struggles to cope with many discordant voices and the enormity of its systemic project, which has drawn the UN system and IFIs and agencies into many wounds caused by conflict. It often fails to communicate with those involved at the civil level, or to receive their feedback on its overall project. The constitutional peace struggles with those who do not want to share power, and who do not want the certainty of domestic legal structures that might outlaw their activities. It fails to overcome the simple binaries it depends upon – the territorial inside/outside, and the identity of friend or enemy. How does one emancipate without dominating, without ignoring difference, without knowing the mind of the other? How do these different discourses interweave, play themselves out, and communicate with each other, without competing, dominating or negating each other? How can those who 'know' peace talk to those who do not? So arises the question of the nature of peace, and how it is to be achieved.

The role of the peace and conflict researcher means dealing with these issues, in the field and intellectually, and recognising the tension between theory and practice. Where peoples' lives are at stake there is little more that can be done than try, learn, and try again, aware, but

unaware, enlightened but still blind. The conflict researcher cannot reconcile the intellectual discussion of conflict and peace with often devastating experiences in the field other than through being true to the goal of emancipation, while also being aware that the emancipatory discourse of peace treads a fine line between emancipation and domination, assuming the mind of the other or facing an existential void in which there is no peace, or peace is merely a fantasy. To understand peace we must insert ourselves in the mind of the other. This we cannot do. To give peace, we must sometimes dominate. This we do. But, as the dilemmas outlined above show, what we do is never enough. It is a task for Sisyphus.

'In the field' (a phrase often deployed as an orientalist description of abnormality and inferiority) there are many actors and agents who assume the liberal peace without question: there are few who assume that there is an unproblematic peacebuilding consensus. Yet, there are also many 'distant' officials who need to learn humility; many career international workers who care for little more than their next posting while going about their sometimes dangerous jobs; many frustrated NGO personnel and activists who think the IOs, ROs, and IFIs are needlessly bureaucratic, shoddy and careless, but also have never really thought about the legitimacy they have attained by bypassing officialdom and its qualifying hurdles through their incorporation into the private sector. Rarely is there an explicit connection between action and the end goal of a specific type of peace.[6] There is an assumption of the liberal peace being generally prevalent, though little thought on what type of liberal peace is being created. The whole apparatus of peace is sometimes colonial and racist in that it implies the transference of enlightened knowledge to those who lack the capacity or morality to attain such knowledge themselves. Yet, the alternative is far less palatable. This is the most difficult dilemma inherent in the research of conflict and peace: we put ourselves in this same position. Often after only a few days in a country, or in archives or a library, we offer models, solutions, suggestions, about situations we have not lived through ourselves. If we are part of them, we rarely pause to consider our own motivations. By showing the subversiveness of the discourses of peace, is the critical researcher merely opening up further pathways for the peacebuilding consensus to manipulate, re-educate, and engineer? Or are we opening the way for more reflexive versions of peace. Is it better, for example, not to make the argument that internationals need to become more involved in cultural issues so that they cannot justify

and legitimate social engineering projects? The agents of the peacebuilding consensus are internally divided about this. Those running the top-down peacebuilding project tend to see NGOs and agencies as attempting to usurp their prerogatives or being open to manipulation, while those working on the bottom-up project tend to see their counterparts as obsessed with power and status, blind to suffering and social justice, and so forth. Fukuyama, for example, rails against the 'motley' collection of actors involved in state-building, and argues for a return to the strong, sovereign actor (in his terms, a nation-state).[7]

In Dili in East Timor and Bukavu in Eastern Congo (DRC), among many other conflict torn environments, the many internationals live and work behind barricades and fortresses. Since 9/11 it has become the norm for international premises to be fortified. The irony this indicates for their construction of the liberal peace is manifold. Clearly, they are afraid that this peace is not fully accepted by all. In Bukavu, the internationals live in beautiful colonial era bungalows around Lake Kivu, replacing and displacing and replacing the former colonial occupants themselves, while the general populace live in general poverty. Clearly, different contexts and environments are more suited to the liberal peace, the lucky few grateful for menial jobs serving the internationals in their homes and offices. In East Timor, human rights and liberal governance are readily accepted by most, as is the need for development and a market economy, but the inhabitants do not have the necessary physical resources, not have experienced such things before, and therefore face a lonely struggle to achieve them. In the Congo, many rebel groups want social justice and welfare, but feel themselves to be excluded by both the politics of the country and by the peacebuilding process.

The agencies, IOs, agencies, IFIs, and NGOs, involved are themselves merely the vanguard of the liberal peace, but they are under-resourced, staffed, subject to massive pressure from the expectations of the international community, and have enormous difficulty in communicating with local actors in a meaningful way, and in being able to respond to indigenous attempts to renegotiate the liberal peace, because they have to concur with their own mandate and write reports which chart their progress to its accountable finale. In many places the liberal peace is a often little more than a chimera, a superficial implant, transplanted into a soil without water, dependent upon foreign resources, and subject to uncertainty about the longevity of external commitment. Here there exists a virtual peace, masking deeper cultural, social, and

economic realities of violence. Peace is not war, even in these places, but it is an expression of relative domination or hegemony by outsiders involved at its most basic level. Internationals believe in their work, and in the liberal peace, but they too are touched by the weariness that comes with recognising the vastness of this task. It can entail structural violence. To reach an agreement between officials, or to win a war, is one thing, but to change a social, political, and economic landscape is another. This project is telling of the international community's desire to pass on what it has learned of the liberal peace; the minimal resources provided by them for this project is also telling. This is often peace on the cheap, a moral succour, flimsy and transient, dependent upon the capacity of its agents, and the will and interests of its donor. Those working in conflict and post-conflict zones know this; most importantly, those living and enduring in them are fully aware of it too. Simple comparisons between the financial costs of the peace being constructed in a post-conflict environment compared to the cost of war make this explicit.

The liberal peace is a discourse, framework and structure, with a specific ontology and methodology. Its projected reform of governance entails a communicative strategy on which depends its viability and legitimacy with its recipients. This, as was shown in chapters IV and V, operates both at a social and a state level. It cannot be achieved without significant resources. The allocation of those resources, the power to do so, and their control, is often the new site of power and domination in post-conflict societies. It must be asked how this can be so while at the same time remaining true to the emancipatory claims of the liberal peace. It must also be said that the NGO and agency personnel, those in the UN, and World Bank, diplomats and officials, show great commitment to the countries they are working in, often in difficult, uncomfortable, and dangerous conditions, and are to a large degree implicitly if not explicitly, aware of the problems of the liberal peace model. Many are committed to avoiding the creation of dependency, sensitive to the needs of local ownership, careful not to tread on the toes of local, district or central officials and governments, even where they may also feel that interests and politics are blocking their progress. They may be sensitive to such problems, while also recognising that their professional roles or the projects they are part of are in many ways inadequate. What little is done is better than none. They can adhere to the injunction "do no harm", increasingly written into the mandates of the UN, UNDP, and World Bank, for example, because they have an implicit if some-

what vague understanding that the liberal peace is what requires protecting from harm at the most basic level.

Understanding the different conceptualisations of peace, and the different graduations of the liberal peace, therefore offers an important contribution to the types of dilemmas and issues outlined above, and more generally in this study. These understandings offer a better awareness of what the objectives of multiple interventions engendered in the peacebuilding concensus construct, and what different decisions, actions, and thinking, imply about the achievement of these objectives. To know peace provides a clearer understanding of what must be done, and what must be avoided, if it is to be achieved. First, we must know peace.

Understanding contemporary thinking about peace

Through an examination, in the light of the above, of the implicit concepts of peace and their usages in the relevant, mainly Western literatures and policy discourses (the dominant forms of 'print capitalism' in the context of peace), this study has outlined how the evolution of the dominant and some would argue, hegemonic, conceptualisations of the liberal peace have progressed, and what this implies. This has also underlined the ontological, epistemological, and normative aspects of these debates in an attempt to open up the conceptualisations and imaginings of peace as a serious research agenda in order to undermine the constant assumption that peace is an ideal form, and to allow debate and dissent. The emergence of the liberal peace reflects Augustinian thinking on 'tranquillity of order'[8] and the project outlined by Quincy Wright, that peace is represented by a community in which law and order prevail, both internally and externally.[9] War is made in the 'minds of men' and therefore '…in the minds of men the defences of peace must be constructed'.[10] This is telling of the liberal peace project at its most minimalist: it merely constructs a defence against the worst excesses of the state of nature, or anarchy and hegemony implicit in its victor's peace component. The UN system is crucial in providing the liberal peace with legitimacy and a breadth beyond hegemonic state interest.

The liberal peace is a hybrid of the age-old victor's peace, the Enlightenment and often Christian based work on constitutional peace, and the twentieth century secular attempts (but also tinged with non-secular, mainly Western claims) to create an institutional peace at the structural, international, domestic, and civil society level. Similar

normative frameworks are also integral to the civil peace model, though this is more strongly focused upon social justice. The liberal peace is an ideal form and a Kantian moral imperative: it is also a discourse or a master signifier that may sometimes silence any thought or discussion of other alternatives. It is presented as an ideal form, though there are divisions about whether this ideal form is practical or unobtainable. The subjectivity of the debate on the liberal peace is generally disguised by the objectification and universalisation of peace in theoretical and policy usage. What is clear from this debate is the privileging of the Western experience of peacemaking, which of course has been on an enormous scale since the Treaty of Westphalia, but in particular during the twentieth century. The basic characteristics of both thought and practice on peace are rooted in the Enlightenment, and the notions of rationality and sovereignty, underpinned by various forms of liberalism and progressivism found therein. All four strands of thinking about peace, from the victor's to the civil peace, effectively nominate omniscient third parties to be placed in a position to transfer external notions of peace into conflict societies and environments. The liberal peace depends upon intervention, and a balance of consent and coercion. All of this is measured against and relative to the liberal peace. Of course, the victor's peace, the constitutional, institutional, and civil notions of peace, have been strongly influenced by pacificism in that they construct the use of force as either defensive or in the name of the liberal peace (hence its imperial and neo-colonial overtones).

These notions have lengthy antecedents and the victor's peace has remained a key aspect of all conceptualisations, even possibly including the emancipatory discourses, which still seem to depend on others being able to know, and install peace for those caught up in conflict. But, the victor's peace was increasingly becoming diluted and disguised by the long-line of peace projects in the post-Enlightenment period, which were mainly European in origin and euro-centric in nature, the emergence of a private discourse on peace with the growth of NGOs and civil society actors, and then in the twentieth century the formalisation of an institutional discourse on peace. This later discourse, again underpinned by the victor's peace, formed the basis for the hybrid form that was to become the liberal peace, in which multiple actors at multiple levels of analysis in rigid conditional relationships with each began its universal construction according to a mixture of conservative, liberal, regulative, and distributive tendencies. This construction requires a specific ontology of peace, a methodology, mechanisms and

tools deployed by epistemic communities which have the necessary expertise, by coalitions of organisations, states, institutions, involved in a conditional relationship between them and locations where the liberal peace is being constructed.

The liberal peace is created through the methodologies associated with the peacebuilding consensus, where like-minded liberal states coexist in a Western-oriented international society and states are characterised by democracy, human rights, free markets, development, a vibrant civil society, and multilateralism. Being part of this framework of liberal peace provides certain rights. Knowing peace empowers an epistemic community, legitimately able to transfer the liberal peace into conflict zones. This represents a continuum from war to absence of war or to peace. Despite the assured nature of the liberal peace from this perspective, the peacebuilding consensus is heavily contested both in discourse and in practice. Indeed, it has been argued that institutional and local capacity is actually being destroyed by intervention in conflict environments.[11] This is partly because those working from the top-down to construct the liberal peace tend to focus more on the state and its institutions. This is often resisted by those working on bottom-up versions of peacebuilding. Their conditional relationship with recipients, donors, international organisations and international financial institutions, means that many non-state actors have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of intervention in states and in civil society in order to develop a civil peace and to contribute the broader liberal peace project. This important capacity is of course of great benefit to the predominantly state-centric liberal peace project.

The liberal peace conceptualisation represents a hybrid of the main associated ontological and epistemological issues: it contains a philosophical strand that seeks to provide a normative understanding of how peace would be probably in terms of a universal moral order. It contains a positivist strand that seeks to create a basic level order through scientific investigation of the interactions of units *vis-à-vis* a re-ordering of resources and structures. It also claims to contain a post-positivist strand, focusing on emancipation from hegemony, domination, and marginalisation through either a universal critical order, or through a reflection on an underlying ontological and epistemological understanding of being at, and knowing, a multiple or hybrid peace. The liberal peace is often claimed to be emancipatory, and effectively to conform to critical notions of peace.

There can be no debate about peace, without an identification of its associated factors. The concept of peace acts as an umbrella, or

disguises an entire subset of political, economic, social, and structural frameworks, regimes, and norms. It may also include a specific population group, a geospatial and temporal understanding, a common ideology or set of norms, a clear opposition and threat (either real, imagined, or existential), an ideal form, methods to create peace (from peacemaking techniques to war), and a sense of the distinction between peace and war. Peace lends itself to being thought about and constructed in simple, positivist terms. What underpins the contemporary version of peace is the protection of a secular order of liberal-democratic, quasi-territorial states. This was not always the case, but has rather been the product of a long evolution. What the different phases of the discussion of peace share, however, is their dependence upon sovereign actors for its creation, longevity, and guarantee. The genealogy developed in this study indicates that historical, philosophical, and political thought, as well as policymaking within and between states, has followed the Enlightenment desire that peace should universally be achievable, through law-based government and a constitutional domestic peace, an institutional settlement at the international level, and a civil peace within and between societies. In order to achieve this, a victory was often required (and was attractive) as its basis in order to provide the necessary spaces for the negotiation of this peace at different levels. Thus, contemporary versions of peace are inextricably associated with the victor's peace, and the militarisation associated with it, even within liberal, defence-oriented or pacifist ideologies.

This means that victor's peace continues to hold legitimacy, though it is heavily disguised. It underpins the constitutional and institutional peace. These versions of peace combine governance, law, civil society, democracy, and trade, enshrined in domestic constitutional documentation, and in international treaties at the heart of the new peace, along with the emergence of a civil society and NGO discourse of peace (the 'civil peace'). What is rarely discussed in this context, is which of these strands of the peace are the most evident in any particular post-conflict environment. This mainly depends of where the observer is located, but it is undeniable that the form of peace perceived is dominated by its main sponsors, which in the context of the liberal peace, is without question the key states, donors, and executers of its components through the many agents of the peace building consensus. Of course, these dynamics are also subject to change, so it is likely that different aspects of the liberal peace may receive more attention at different periods in the post-conflict peacebuilding

process. Yet, the outcome normally reflects the work of the earliest political theorists in the Western tradition, and their focus upon the form of government required to create a durable peace. The reform of governance is directed by an alliance of actors, which become custodians of the liberal peace. Their control of this process rests upon a combination of inducement, consent, and co-operation, occasionally verging upon the coercive, or even the outright use of force. There is essentially a conditional relationship between different states and other actors involved in projecting the liberal peace, the agents they use to construct the peace, and the recipients of the liberal peace. There is little questioning of the validity of the liberal peace, or the way in which its various components fit together.[12] Thus, it is assumed that democratisation, development, and economic reform, are complimentary, along with human rights reform, and legal processes. There is also little questioning of the motivation of the projectors and agents of the liberal peace, other than amongst its recipients, who, whether official or non-official actors, tend to be suspicious of outsiders' objectives. Most of the critical focus therefore tends to be on the methods used to construct the liberal peace most effectively, efficiently, and as quickly as possible.

As a result, the different strands of thinking about peace, from political theory and philosophy, the early constitutional peace plans, the empowerment of civil society, and the institutional peace plans of the imperial and post-imperial periods have converged on a contemporary notion of peace-as-governance. Peace-as-governance is the most common form of peace applied through a methodological peacebuilding consensus in conflict zones where internationals become involved, in which a reordering occurs in the distribution of power, prestige, rules and rights. Peace-as-governance in state building terms focuses on the institutions of state as the basis for the construction of the liberal peace. For NGOs and agencies, it focuses on the governance of society. In terms of bottom-up peacebuilding, different actors contribute to the liberal peace model by installing forms of peace-as-governance associated with the regulation, control, and protection of individuals and civil society. The balance of power, hegemony, institutionalism and constitutionalism, and civil society converge in this version of peace in an era of governmentality, which is super-territorial, and multi-layered. It incorporates official and private actors from the local to the global, institutionalised in the alphabet soup of agencies, organisations, and institutions. But, it is also a form of the victor's peace, relying on dominant states, as well as relying on the states-system.

Peace and conflict theory reflects this evolution clearly, assuming that the liberal peace unquestionably forms the basis for theorising the ending of conflict. Debates on peacebuilding have moved into the terrain of the reform or construction of liberal modes of governance of economies, polities, and development, as a logical extension of the debates on conflict management, conflict resolution, peace studies, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding. This is rarely made explicit, however. These generations of thinking about approaches to ending conflict each reflects aspects of the victor's peace, the constitutional, institutional, and civil conceptualisations of peace. Peacebuilding approaches are effectively a hybrid, which reflects the liberal peace extremely closely. It gives rise to 'normalising' activities involving the methodological transfer of knowledge from peaceable communities into conflict zones. This is also reflected in the implicit development of concepts of peace in IR theory. A realist peace lies in the state-centric balance of power, dominated by a hegemon, which operates to moderate the worst excesses of the state of nature. Liberal debates in IR theory, and in particular those associated with internationalism and, institutionalism see peace as existing in liberal institutions and international regimes governing international cooperation. Cosmopolitan versions of peace provides a universal basis (as with constructivist accounts) for the extension of internationalist and institutionalist arguments about cooperation, responsibility, and rights. Structuralist versions of peace require the replacement of structural violence, hegemony and domination, with social justice. Critical versions of peace extend the cosmopolitan argument in order to develop its treatment of social justice and communication to provide a much broader emancipatory discourse of peace. In these terms, peace is found in a cosmopolitan transcendence of parochial understandings of global responsibility and assistance. In turn, post-structuralist approaches see peace as lying in the identification of structures of dominance and their complete replacement as a consequence of that identification.

What much of this seems to indicate is that rather than starting with the problems caused by conflict, war, underdevelopment, a research agenda is required which starts with the type of peace envisaged in a particular situation and at a particular level analysis, by particular actors whether they are intervening or are local actors. This requires extensive and ongoing consultation and research in order to develop these ideas so that they are ready to be negotiated, accepted, rejected, and constructed when and where becomes necessary. Perhaps this would make the projects of prevention and of peacebuilding far more

feasible When internationals engage in conflict zones, one of the first questions they might ask of disputants at the many different levels of the polity, might be what type of peace could be envisaged? Working towards such an explicit end goal would be of great benefit both to internationals and recipients of intervention. This would also have to occur in the explicit context of responses to the root causes of the conflict, meaning that peacebuilding occurs at two starting points. Rather than merely beginning from the identification of the root causes of the conflict, it would concurrently build peace from the perspective of the specific notion of peace deemed to be appropriate for the specific environment. This appropriateness would be negotiated from the perspective on the internationals, custodians, and other interventionary actors, and of course, local actors. Where one set of actors could not agree, the other would compensate, upon the explicit understanding that this would be merely an interim (and possibly illiberal) measure.

Of course, most internationals tend to equate challenges to the liberal peace with development and poverty and in practise most peacebuilding strategies, both top-down or bottom-up, tend to propagate development strategies in the first instance (though many US agencies and actors prefer to focus on democratisation). Like many of the afflictions of the developing world, such as poverty and its associated implications (which have been interpreted by Thomas Pogge in an important contribution to this debate),[13] the equation of development with the liberal peace may disguise the lack of capacity of the self-defined liberal and 'peaceful' states and actors of the 'international community' in their project to construct the liberal peace. This is also indicative of the fact that peace is a slippery concept, despite broad aspirations towards it. The general deficit or oversight in its explicit study and conceptualisation has in essence arisen because the effort required to gain a concurrence about a 'peace' acceptable to all has in the past seemed impossible and unlikely. This has given rise to a certain intellectual laziness, and a sleight of hand that has obscured the fact that this does not mean that there cannot and should not be any debate on these issues. Indeed, to paraphrase Pogge, this lack of engagement actually acts as an arbitrary discrimination process in which only certain actors, mainly in the developed, rich parts of the world, have the legitimate capacity to speak of peace and then only fleetingly and in a superficial mode. There are many qualifying moves which any actor or individual must make before attracting the gaze of the liberal peacemakers, not least the use of violence or suffering

humanitarian catastrophe, to establish the basis for an order which the hegemonic agents of the liberal recognise as an opportunity for its installation. Thus, a discourse of peace is a closely guarded privilege in the international community, as well as in civil society. If we agree with Pogge's position that the developed states actually participate, rather than prevent, the problem of starvation because of the nature of global interdependence and responsibility,[14] the same could be said of war and peace. This discrimination and silence must be addressed if an emancipatory peace, in liberal or other guise, is to be achieved.

Conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory graduations within the liberal peace framework

The liberal peace project can be broken down into several different graduations. There is first the *conservative* model of the liberal peace, mainly associated with top-down approaches to peacebuilding and development, tending towards the coercive and often seen as an alien expression of hegemony and domination, sometimes through the use of force, or through conditionality and dependency creation. This equates to a hegemonic and often unilateral, state-led peace, which diplomats are fond of describing as the 'art of the possible'.[15] Such charges are often levelled at the World Bank or the UN, but more often at recent US unilateral state-building efforts. It represents a fear of moving peacebuilding into a terrain where coercion and even force may used to apply it, and where it becomes an expression of external interest rather than external concern and responsibility. The militarisation of peace in this context, especially as has been seen in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq represents a *hyper-conservative model,* heavily informed by the victor's peace in preliminary stages of intervention.

The next discourse is provided within an *orthodox* model of the liberal peace in which actors are wary and sensitive of local ownership and culture, but still also determined to transfer their methodologies, objectives, and norms into the new governance framework, but dominated by consensual negotiation. This equates to a balanced and multilateral, but still state-led peace. This is generally found again within the international organisations and institutions, which become involved, as well as through international NGOs. It represents a bottom-up approach as well as a top-down approach, and focuses and contests needs-based and rights-based activities. However, top-down peacebuilding activity tends to dominate particularly through the conditional models and practices

of donor, organisations, and institutions, as does the interests of major states and donors. This model is exemplified by the UN family's practices of peacebuilding and governance reform, which started at the end of the Cold War and culminated in UN sovereignty for a time over East Timor. Both the conservative and orthodox models assume technical superiority over subjects, as well as the normative universality of the liberal peace.

A third discourse is provided by a more critical form of the liberal peace, the *emancipatory* model, which is concerned with a much closer relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership, and tends to be very critical of the coerciveness, conditionality and dependency that the conservative and orthodox models operate upon. This is mainly found within the bottom-up approach, and tends to veer towards needs-based activity and a stronger concern for social justice. This critical approach to the liberal peace still envisages its universalism, but accentuates its discursive and negotiated requirements. These different actors, mainly local and international NGOs in association with major agencies and some state donors, and associated types of the liberal peace, tend to become more or less prominent in different phases of the conflict and the peacebuilding process. This peace equates to the civil peace, and generally is not state-led, but shaped by private actors and social movements.

These main aspects of the liberal peace model tend often to be combined in the peacebuilding consensus and are expressed to different degrees in any one peacebuilding intervention, depending upon priorities associated with dominant state interests, donor interests, and the capacity of peacebuilding actors. The nominal unity of the peacebuilding consensus often breaks down exactly because of the internal competition, interests, and capacity of its different components. Clearly, conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory versions of the liberal peace may actually contradict and undermine each other, leading to disruption in the broader peacebuilding process.

During an emergency period the hyper-conservative or conservative version of the liberal peace may find their *raison d'etre* at the top-down level and operate partly as a succour to the liberal international community, but also to preserve and reinforce the sanctity of the liberal peace model within the states-system. In a post-conflict reconstruction phase, official actors may begin to shift to the orthodox version of the liberal peace, which focuses on the development of institutional relationships, institutions and constitutions that preserve or redefine the state but also provide for the interests and requirements of the general

population. Agencies and NGOs often operate in both phases upon the basis of the more critical emancipatory version of the liberal peace, mainly because they are much more dependent upon local and donor consent. Those actors, mainly agencies and NGOs, working within the critical model tend to be wary of the conservative approaches and their associated actors, while those working in the latter tend to be disdainful of consensual requirements and local ownership while 'results' are more pressing than sustainability in an emergency, or immediate post-conflict phase. Clearly, however, once sustainability becomes key in a post-emergency phase, and internationals begin to think about their exit strategies, even top-down actors begin to move towards more critical emancipatory models of the liberal peace. This latter discourse appears to be the most legitimate of all of these models, despite its breadth, and lack of parsimony. All of these strands of the liberal peace are often presented as emancipatory in policy discourses and practices.

This raises some important policy implications both in terms of the four versions of peace that emerge from a genealogical examination of the various literatures consulted in Chapters 1–3 and actors and cases examined in Chapters 4 and 5, and in terms of the different versions of the liberal peace outlined above. It is clear that there seems to be shifts between these different approaches, depending upon the conditions and thinking prevalent within the international community and within conflict zones. One could draw a broad teleological evolutionary line in which the victor's peace gave way to a constitutional peace, to which was then added an institutional and civil peace in European and Western thinking and policymaking. The next stage of this evolution – one which is currently emerging at least – seems to engender the projection of the resultant civil peace from beyond its current boundaries. This has, of course, occurred in the broader context of a belief in the superiority, infallibility, and universality of the liberal peace. Depending on the strength this position, the project of the liberal peace moves from the conservative coercive models, to the more consensual orthodox model, or to the emancipatory model, or contests a specific combination of all of the above.

Clearly, it is vital to identify the *graduations of the liberal peace* that are being constructed through different types of intellectual and policy analysis, and by different actors, in order to evaluate the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding approaches. This is represented by a configuration of the main four discourses of peaces, and the four graduations of the liberal peace outlined above. This leads to a better understanding of the (i) type of peace being created, (ii) impediments

This figure illustrates the working conceptualisations of peace developed, and the axis along which the nature of the liberal peace can be located.

Hyper-Conservative	Conservative	Orthodox	Emancipatory
Geography: limited area of strategic allies	Limited area of norm sharing aliies.	Still geographically bounded but aims at universal coverage.	Aims at universal coverage
Threat: Regular and irregular war and capacity for war; obstacles to necessary resources; terrorism.	Regular and irregular war and capacity for war; obstacles to trade and resources; terrorism.	War; structural violence; identity conflict; under-development; terrorism; obstacles to trade; barriers to norms and regimes.	War, structural violence; identity conflict; under-development; obstacles to trade; terrorism; free communication and representation; social justice.
Sustainability of Peace: Negligible	limited	high	complete?
Exit of Internationals: Unlikely	possible in long term?	Likely in medium to long term	likely in medium to long term

Hyper-Conservative	Conservative	Orthodox	Emancipatory
Method Use of Force **Actors** State officials and regular/ irregular military forces **Nature of Peace** Victor's peace defined solely by military superiority. **Ontology of Peace** Peace is not possible, very limiter, or is territorially bounded; peace is utopian	**Method** Force and Diplomacy, military intervantion leading leading to ceasefire, mediation or negotiation. **Actors** State officials and regular/ irregular military forces **Nature of Peace** Victor's peace, constitutional peace: constitutional peace settlement/ international peace treaty (but not an institutional peace). Quasi military measures such as peacekeeping deployed for long periods. **Ontology of Peace** Peace is a product of force and elite diplomacy; universal form of peace should be aspired to but is unreachable	**Method** Top-down peacebuilding; some bottom-up peacebuilding **Actors** State officials and regular/ irregular military forces; IO, RO, IFI, actor leading agency, and NGO personnel efforts. **Nature of Peace** Constitutional and institutional Peace; elements of victor's peace through hegemony rather than use of force. As with conservative model, but long term measures for sustainability also included: institutional, constitutional, and civil governance measures for political, economic, developments, and social issues imported through conditional relationship between agents of peacebuilding and recipients; settlement more important than justice. **Ontology of Peace** Peace rests on mainly constitutional and institutional measures; it is universal and can be achieved through epistemic transference of technical knowledge and frameworks.	**Method** Top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding **Actors** Combinations of state officials and regular/ irregular military forces; IO, RO, IFI, Agency, and NGO personnel but led by local actor. **Nature of Peace** Civil Peace; focus on social movements, social actors, and issues, social justice as a pathway to peace. Wary of external forms of domination being imported through external intervention. **Ontology of Peace** Peace rests on social justice and open and free communication between social actors, as well as state/ official actors; recognition of difference and otherness.

Figure 1 Graduations of the liberal peace model



Figure 2 Current examples of the liberal peace

to peace, and (iii) the sustainability of this peace. Conclusions drawn from this analysis and comparison carry important policy and intellectual implications and open the way for a greater intellectual and policy understanding of the agendas inherent in the different aspects of the liberal peace project. The figures above illustrate the axis along which the nature of the liberal peace can be located, and from which the implications for sustainability of the peace, its costs, and likely areas of resistance, can be drawn in a number of cases. It indicates the general tendency of peacebuilding interventions, though it should be acknowledged that interventions often show some crossover between these graduations.

What the cases of contemporary peacebuilding seem to illustrate is that entry into a conflict zone is often predicted on a conservative version of the liberal peace, with the aspiration of moving towards the orthodox. A significant number of examples can be provided for this movement, as Figure 2 illustrates, but a significant number also remains mired within the conservative graduation of the liberal peace. No cases can be located within the emancipatory graduation, and indeed, a serious deficiency with respect to social justice, socio-economic well-being, and development mars all such international efforts in the post-Cold War era. Clearly, the above diagrams illustrate the tendency for internationals to enter a conflict environment somewhere within the conservative graduation, and then aspire (both the internationals and local recipients included) to move along the axis to the orthodox peace, which is both sustainable and allows the internationals to withdraw. However, experience seems to show that where force is used in a hyper-conservative initial approach, moving along the axis towards the orthodox category tends not to occur. The best illustration

of this appears to be Bosnia and Kosovo, where the political entity (state or not) is weak, and socially and economically unsustainable despite the length of time the internationals have been involved.[16] Where entry is based upon a peace agreement with broad consensus, it often occurs within the conservative graduation but moves rapidly towards the orthodox, as many of the cases in Figure 2 indicate.

This raises the question of what the requirements are for the construction of a specific graduation of the liberal peace, which may then shift from the conservative to the orthodox version. Clearly, the liberal peace discourse focuses on constitutional democracy, human rights, development, and international relations with institutions, as well as a civil peace, these providing the general framework through which the liberal peace can be achieved. In practice, however, in many of the cases examined in this study, the processes have created very weak states, and institutions, and civil society is marred by joblessness, lack of development, nationalism, and the often tortuous slowness of the shift from the pre-intervention situation to even the most limited form of the liberal peace. In these conditions, a lack of confidence in the new polity, and in the economy are often key problems, as well as suspicion of the intentions of internationals, and of local actors. For instance, throughout the Balkans, there is suspicion of the intentions of internationals, of local politicians, as well as a lack of confidence in constitutions, the viability of the states being formed, and acute problems relating both to unemployment and ethnic chauvinism. This is despite the lengthy presence of the many internationals.

All of these versions of the liberal peace identify geographical zones that are to be safe from war, terrorism and political violence, underdevelopment, human rights abuses, and other forms of structural violence. The liberal peace ranges from the virtual and highly interventionary to the more consensual and concerned with social justice. All of these strands of the liberal peace have graduated approaches to consent and conditionality, but they all share an assumption of universality, which legitimates intervention, and of the superiority of the epistemic peacebuilding community over its recipients. The conservative approaches tend to be more conditional, though this can also be seen in the more critical liberal peace approaches in relations between grassroots actors and donors. In the conservative discourse, however, conditionality is imposed from the top-down by the external actors involved. In the more critical approaches, conditionality is subject to negotiation, thus acquiring a bottom-up aspect and being coloured more by social justice concerns. This conditionality is also two-way. Internationals are now

learning that where they set conditionalities so local actors also expect conditionalities to be observed. If a sustainable peace is to be constructed, there can be no exit until both locals and internationals have agreed that such a version of peace has actually been achieved. What is more, the emphasis of different aspects of the liberal peace – the victor's peace, constitutional, institutional, and civil – depends on which actors take the lead in intervention or coordination. The UN family tends to focus simultaneously on all aspects, despite the fact that they may not be complimentary, but the institutional peace provides its *raison d'etre* (though this is constrained by the imperative to foster and preserve state sovereignty as part of its charter). The US tends to focus on the victor's peace as well as the constitutional peace (though it must be noted that on all terms apart from per capita, the US is the biggest contributor to all of the different aspects of the construction of the liberal peace). NGOs and agencies tend to focus on the civil peace, as do major donors such as Britain, Japan, Canada, and Norway, who also emphasise the institutional peace and associated forms of multilateralism. The OSCE and EU have probably the most explicit view of their end goals, which are constituted in terms of the orthodox category of the liberal peace, though moving towards the emancipatory version.[17]

Those engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, through the UN, the agencies, or through NGOs, often argue that their understanding of peace is often actually something much more than the liberal peace. They seem more comfortable claiming to locate their activity as a counter-discourse of an emancipatory peace in a certain amount of tension with conservative versions of the liberal peace. There is often an unspoken narrative that these actors and individuals have preserved the aspiration of an emancipatory peace despite the hegemonic qualities of the liberal peace, resisting the self-interested politics of ideology, states, and those who operate or deploy them, who use peace, and even the liberal peace, for their own ends.

All of these different approaches often claim to be emancipatory. They all find their *raison d'etre* in the identification and response to specific threats identified to the liberal peace project. Furthermore, they exist side by side, and in tension which each other. The conservative notions of liberal peace and the critical notions act, both in theoretical, conceptual, and policy terms, as brakes upon each other and upon the worst excesses of hegemony, domination, and relativism. This raises the question of what is emancipation, who carries it out as its agents, who understands and transfers it, and who receives, and why, and what impact this has upon the recipients identity? Again these open questions underline the subjective ontology of peace.

The various cases examined in Chapter V can mainly be placed somewhere between the conservative and orthodox liberal peace components in terms of their preponderant approaches. Cambodia, Angola, and East Timor generally fit into the orthodox frameworks. Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq, would fit somewhere between the hyper-conservative and conservative frameworks (of course, this depends upon which phase of the peacekeeping/peacebuilding intervention was under review), perhaps slowly moving towards the orthodox model. These general positions can be broken down further by examining the different actors involved. The orthodox and emancipatory models would be more significant if one focused on agencies and NGOs and their peace projects. It must be acknowledged, however, that the preponderant framework relates to the reconstruction of the state, meaning that the conservative and orthodox discourses are the most commonly expressed through these peace operations. This then raises serious questions about the sustainability of the peace that is being created, and the limits of the liberal peace. There is a general tendency to respond to the seriousness of conflict or war by moving the intervention along the liberal peace axis towards the hyper-conservative framework, and then as peacebuilding consolidates, to push the focus back along the axis towards the orthodox framework.

The East Timorese President, Xanana Gusmao, argued that peace should be a basic human right spanning not just responses to civil violence, but socio-economic deprivation.[18] In the UN triptych of *Agendas*, democratisation and development are also seen to be a right and in the recent report on the *Responsibility to Protect* the broader international community is called upon to protect communities and individuals where their host states are unable.[19] This is a far more interventionist agenda for peace than ever before: the liberal peace works only by creating a basis for liberal states and organisations to intervene at political and social and economics where abnormalities in others political, social, and economic practices are seen to exist. Thus, creating the liberal peace is about disciplining those deemed to be responsible for such abnormal practices through conditionality and effective transnational governance regimes controlled by liberal states, organisations, NGOs, and donors and IFIs. Notwithstanding these notions of peace as a right, the shift in the liberal peace model has recently been towards the conservative rather than emancipatory model, as can be seen in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq between 2002–5. This remains unexplained, despite the fact that it has huge implications for the future of peacebuilding in collapsed or failing states around the

world, and the role of the international community and its agencies therein. If liberal peace is a right, then clearly this raises the question of which form of liberal peace? It is clear that while the conservative versions may have some legitimacy in an illiberal transitional phase, the orthodox graduation would probably provide a minimum long-term aspiration, providing both sustainability and the opportunities for internationals to withdraw.

Methodological, ontological, and epistemological implications

The ontological and epistemological undercurrents of these discourses have not yet received much attention. Yet, they are implicit in the various academic and policy literatures. In general, peace is commonly represented as a thick or thin form of social contract[20] (coinciding with the conservative/orthodox liberal peace graduations on the axis in Figure 1) and a social construction: the thick version occurs where there is a broad consensus represented at the civil, constitutional and international areas, as currently exists is a recognisable form in the West and amongst liberal states (referring to the orthodox version of the liberal peace). The thin form exists where these levels of consensus are deferred into the future, and where levels of physical violence and minimal, though structural violence, social welfare and justice are absent, and international recognition and agreement over status, boundaries, and constitutions may well be deferred (referring to the conservative and orthodox versions of the liberal peace). In this latter case, the thin liberal peace is often in the hands of an international epistemic community of peacebuilders, led by a military-civilian alliance in which the military are preponderant.

Despite the graduations in discourses of peace outlined above, the dominant view of peace has been one in which it exists as an ideal form, which recognises that its achievement is so difficult that this effectively justifies minimalist strategies for peace because the presence of threats and the concurrent need for a militarised peace. This view echoes Kissinger's argument that,

> Whenever peace – conceived as the avoidance of war – has been the primary objective of a power or a groups of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community.[21]

This view of peace seems positively antiquarian, yet it still forms the basis of much mainstream theorising in IR. But Kissinger is correct to point out that 'a generally accepted legitimacy' is a key to the stability that he describes.[22] Implicitly it must also form the basis of the peace he appears to believe is unobtainable, and in which forces and indeed conflict itself may be used to respond to conflict in its name. Kissinger seems to be arguing that peace is merely the avoidance of conflict at best. Yet, this is clearly not how it has come to be conceptualised, where those involved in the construction of the liberal peace are not averse to war as a tool of its construction but legitimate its use by claiming that the elements of the liberal peace, through governance and the peacebuilding consensus, are universally legitimate. So peace is now conceptualised as far more sophisticated than the avoidance of war, and has actually come to engender war itself. It is amazing that this evolution of thinking about peace has occurred both in discourses and practices since Kissinger presented this view as an absolute truth, but with little recognition of this shift from policymakers and theorists. We have moved from a narrow and simplistic view of peace in which it was absolute, ideal, and unobtainable, to a far more sophisticated epistemology and ontology of the concept. This has opened up the debates that Kissinger wanted to avoid, of course. The liberal peace is a hegemonic discourse and practice and it is created through a peacebuilding consensus, which creates multiple processes, levels, and institutions of governance by external actors. All of this is contested and racked by dissensus: yet the liberal peace construction project continues unabated.

States see peace as internal domestic stability amongst citizens, agencies, institutions, police, and army, government and bureaucracy. Amongst states, peace is a balance brought about by cooperation, isolation, and hegemony. International organisations and institutions see peace as a product of their mediating and norm-building role in which they act to build an international consensus. Regional organisations also see peace in this vein. NGOs see peace as stemming from a global civil society, and from the redressal of micro and even international social, political, economic, disarmament, developmental, and human rights issues. International financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank see peace as a specific form of economic governance, openness, control, and specific models of development. International agencies such as UNDP or UNHCR see peace as relating to their more specific activities within the UN system. All of these different versions of peace emanating from actors within the international system seem

to coincide in the context of the communitarian/cosmopolitan debate about thick and thin versions of international order, problematic as it might be. Indeed, these actors often operate as if peace was not at all problematic, that a universal peace could be created out of a consensus constructed in their area of cooperation and brought about by promoting the spread of a broader, and normally elite level consensus in their area of engagement to actors who had not yet been 'enlightened' as to these approaches. This peace is one that colonises. This is essentially the peacebuilding consensus, and is one that is constructed through a process of intervention in which carrots are provided for specific types of reform in a system of conditionality which constructs a version of peace-as-governance.

The evolution of thinking about peace shows that it is an ontologically unstable concept (indicative of ontological insecurity).[23] But the history of engagement with the construction of peace indicates that it has been generally thought of as an ontologically stable concept. Much of the discourse of the liberal peace is derived from the development of a governance approach, which since 1945 has focused on the reform and regulation of both domestic government, and global governance, in a regulative and restrictive fashion. Thus, the liberal peace project has endeavoured to produce a peace that is stable and consensual, but within this cosmopolitan framework of governance which is both a representation of the individual and also often the global. This complex position on peace needs to be clearly elucidated before we can begin to decide whether it has the potential to become ontologically stable and a positive epistemology. As Rasmussen has argued, peace is still policy, rather than fact.[24]

As Walker has previously argued, the construction of binaries has been one of the key approaches for mainstream theories of IR.[25] This has meant that for a variety of conceptual approaches to IR, including balance of power approaches, and discourses on security and sovereignty, that a common pattern has emerged which depends upon the identification of threats and of an 'other'. This is what Rasmussen has called a 'negative epistemology' of peace.[26] Similarly, Wilmer has argued in the context of former Yugoslavia that reconstruction and reconciliation the construction of 'otherness' plays a key role. This is most often played out in a discourse of moral superiority versus inferiority:

> Simultaneously, the 'international community' has been articulated by Western states/people as a normative space, in part by defining the 'international-community-as-self/subject' as distinct from 'backward, indigenous peoples-as-other-object'.[27]

There is an important point here that the peacebuilding consensus and peace-as-governance have been constructed as ways around the incessant problem of seeing peace as a negative epistemology revolving around short-term 'threat assessments'. Whether they have achieved this, or merely replaced it with a new imperial sovereignty (in the words of Hardt and Negri)[28] is a matter of some debate. Peace, however, has long been a policy goal as Cooper points out.[29]

Such approaches are indicative of a critical and post-modern construction of a counter debate to the general mainstream essentialisation of negative epistemological assumptions about peace that is to be found in protective securitisation discourses. Drawing on the work of critical theorists and post-structuralists, who themselves draw upon Foucault, Gramsci, Habermas and others, there has been a emancipatory project in IR *vis-à-vis* peace, which can be found in the work of an eclectic range of theorists from Cox to Walker, Linklater, Der Derian, and Waever, to name but a few. This challenge to the mainstream can be constructed in terms of the creation of a positive epistemology of peace, and one which attempts to avoid orientalism and totalism, while still aspiring to the plausibility, if not possibility of universalism. Part of the problem with this approach is its complexity. But this is also where its sophistication lies. The recognition of the sheer complexity both of conflict, and of the peace projects of internationals in relation to threats, disasters, and conflict, is necessary. This is especially so in the light of the strong evidence that the reductionist strategies of the internationals in the context of the peacebuilding consensus, are troubled across the world – and that the liberal peace is in practice often little more than a virtual peace. Indeed, this looks very similar to the notion of imperial sovereignty; more specifically, the increasing 'non-place' of empire, progressively blurring distinctions between inside and outside, and supported by a notion of 'omni-crisis'.[30] Cooper sees the world as divided into the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern, in which a new imperialism is quite plausible and may effectively be equated with the construction of the liberal peace.[31] Yet this is a common misconceptualisation – and technique – representing the liberal peace as a distinct break with past versions of peace, which this study has clearly shown is not the case, and which presents the liberal peace as a critical or post-modern emancipatory project, which is also dubious. The liberal peace has clear and unambiguous continuities with earlier versions and discourses.

The liberal peace is generally understood to be geographically limited, often to be achieved in or for the future, legitimates the use of

force for its ends, and is understood in opposition to threats. Both the acts of defining and constructing peace are therefore hegemonic acts dependent upon international institutionalisation, governance, and regimes, and the dominant threat discourses in the international system. This seems to be the main thrust of the act of defining or projecting peace. This reaffirms the claim that peace is ontologically unstable as a concept and should be recognised as such both by those inside the machinery of its construction and those seeking to understand and explain it. The different and dominant ontologies of peace illustrate that fact that peace is often based upon totalising, universal claims that are both self-referential and under-developed. Many assertions about peace are actually a form of orientalism in that they depend upon actors which know peace creating it for those that do not, either through their acts or more basically through the peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war as located in opposition to agents of peace.

As Howard has argued, peace and war are derived from perceptions. Most people conceptualise peace as a satisfaction with their lot in the context of what he argues are rather basic expectations.[32] However, there are also those who argue that peace must be attained rather than preserved, thus indicating rather more sophisticated demands for the nature of peace.[33] Thus peace, in Howard's words, becomes a visualisation of a social order in which war is controlled and ultimately abolished, specifically in the context of Western enlightenment and post-enlightenment thinking.[34] It is of little surprise that the political and social institutions of both war and peace always coexist. War and peace are both social and political inventions:[35] but war is generally seen as abnormal. Perhaps it might also be that the tendency to assume the virtuousness of the liberal peace is abnormal – a defective social institution. What also becomes clear is that peace needs to be juxtaposed with a non-peace situation in order to have any meaning. Either this is a situation of violence or war, or a threat. Thus peace can be juxtaposed against systemic war, or simply against the multiple security issues that war creates for states and individuals, or it can be juxtaposed against threats such as those seen in ethnic separatism or in the use of terrorism against the state. As Der Derian has pointed out much of US official rhetoric in recent times has linked the creation of peace with a revolution in military affairs, with technology and mobility.[36] Power is still inextricably linked with peace as well as war, the implication being that war may be necessary for peace. After the attacks on the US in September 2001, the restrictions introduced in liberal states to

combat the threat of symbolic forms of terrorism and to preserve the hegemony of the liberal state, began to undermine the very freedoms of the liberal peace. The task became one of how to preserve this peace while retaining security.[37] It is no surprise then that, as Gore Vidal argued in an essay entitled 'Black Tuesday', since the end of WWII the US has been involved in what he called a 'perpetual war for perpetual peace' on hundreds of fronts, all of them initiated by the US.[38] What this leaves open is what type of peace the 'RMA' helps construct? In this sense, peace merely becomes a discourse deployed to legitimate a response to perceived threats, war, conflict, and even humanitarian catastrophe.

As the sociologist William Graham Sumner has argued, a universal understanding of peace may be a fallacy:

> It is a fallacy to suppose that, by widening the peace group more and more, it can at last embrace all mankind. What happens is that, as it grows bigger, differences, discords, antagonisms, and war begin inside of it on account of the divergence of interests.[39]

In other words, as peace spreads it collapses. Peace becomes war. War becomes peace.

Virtual peace, virtuous peace

Clearly, the use of strategies and theories for understanding conflict, war and terrorism that do not move beyond the strategic analyses of state interest runs the risk of remaining 'virtual'. As represented in Figure 1, the tendency appears to be for interventions to enter a conflict environment somewhere within the conservative category, and to aspire to move towards the orthodox framework where the liberal peace becomes self-sustaining, more concrete, and the internationals can withdraw. Yet, the reality – apparent from the Balkans to East Timor – is that intervention focuses upon the creation of the hard shell of the state and rather less so on establishing a working society, complete with a viable economy.[40] This results in a virtual peace – one which looks like the virtuous orthodox liberal peace from the outside, but looks and feels like its more conservative version from the inside – especially from the point of view of those who are experiencing it.

Indeed, the possibility is that the 'virtuous' distinction between peace and war, which creates a situation of virtual peace, is explicitly advantageous for Western liberal states and their interventionary

policies. This allows the superficial distinction based upon domestic and international public law to obscure the fact that in reality, on the ground in many parts of the world, peace and war are synonymous in actuality – as Orwell and Foucault have already pointed out. Indeed, war to create the liberal peace – the victory of 'democratic theory' – underlines exactly this. But, is the democratic peace in post-conflict societies much more than a virtual construction by outsiders for the consumption of their own audiences? Of course, much has been achieved in conflict zones by the agents of the peacebuilding consensus, but these achievements are mainly measured by their own frameworks and standards. It is also clear that the internationals' representation of their achievements is often skewed in favour of what donors and the main actors in the international community want. The peace being constructed in the various contemporary conflict zones around the world looks very different from the perspectives of local communities, polities, economies, and officials. This is clear in the discourses about peace that are in evidence, and is emphasised by the fact that these discourses are so rarely acknowledged. In a rather Orientalist manner, Western political thought and policy have reproduced a science and methodology of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal frameworks, by which conflict in the world is judged and dealt with. Indeed, this is an expression of hegemony – a tempered victor's peace in which its agents and its recipients clamour to be heard to influence the outcome. The post-Gramscian notion of plural 'hegemonies'[41] encapsulates the liberal peace as a form of both multiple hegemonies and a single dominant discourse promoted by powerful states. Peace can be problem-solving or emancipatory, but in either case it is always laden with agendas related to actors, interests and objectives. In this sense, a virtual peace may be of a problem-solving character despite its 'virtuous' claims to be emancipatory. Such claims have to be made on behalf of someone or something and the voices of the marginalised are often swamped by such hegemonic voices.

Because the liberal peace is virtual and highly interventionary, it engenders a whole range of debates about hegemony, the moral equivalence of interveners and the recipients of intervention, the motivations of interveners and receptions in their relationship, neutrality, impartiality, and conditionality. Yet, as shown in this study, much of the work dealing with peace both directly or indirectly fails to present a working definition of the peace that is being imagined, nor engage with any of the epistemological, methodological, or onto-

logical issues it raises. Top-down approaches to the creation of peace have been based upon a mix of idealism associated with humanitarianism and through political, social and economic interventions, and the militarist strategies associated with the realist project. This has increasingly taken the form of military occupation. Again, this represents a hybrid of the civil, constitutional, institutional, and victor's strands of thinking about peace. It is in this context that it becomes clear that the liberal peace may well be a virtual peace, certainly in its more conservative forms, despite (or because of) the fact that it is based upon deep-rooted intervention in governance. This is, essentially, a form of rehabilitation of imperial duty and a liberal imperative. The top-down construction of the liberal peace dominates the epistemic community engaged in the construction of the institutions the liberal peace, which treads a narrow path between dependency, conditionality, and sustainability. Peace-as-governance is supposed to be a transitional phase but a final outcome may be remote. The liberal peace legitimates the use of force and external long-term governance, but peace without external governance may not be achieved.

Peace has thus been transformed from a possibly unobtainable utopia coloured by the ideology and norms of the perceiver to an objectified graduation of the liberal peace – an actually existing and obtainable peace propagated through an epistemic peacebuilding community, involving political, social, economic, and even cultural intervention through external governance. Examining a research agenda on the nature of peace rather than merely the nature of conflict and intermediate responses, provides a much clearer vision of the specific project of peace implied and engaged with by specific intellectual and policy approaches to international order, war, and conflict. It underlines the possibilities of this project – in this case of the liberal peace – and its key problems. The graduations of the liberal peace are implicit in the construction of peace in the contemporary era but dangers in this project have become apparent, not least the relationship and indeterminacy of forms of peace and war. For peace to be acceptably transformed, it first needs to be understood, negotiated, and mediated, in fora designed for multiple voices and free communication. This process is still little more than embryonic endorsing recent and critical claims about a regulative and distributive, but highly conditional understanding of, contemporary liberal peace as hegemonic.[42] This peace project needs to respond to the suspicion that '[L]iberalism destroys democracy…'[43] and that different forms and components of the liberal peace may effectively

be incoherent…'. Ironically, the liberal peace treads a fine line between a coercive peace based upon '…wars to determine once and for all what is good for all, wars with no outcome except an end to politics and the liberation of difference….'[44] and a peace based upon consensual, universal governance.

The IR project seems to have become wrapped up mainly in the discusion of war and the problems of international order construction, and threats to this project, rather than focusing more directly on peace. The conflict studies project has remained true to the discussion of the roots of violence and how to identify and placate them, and the peace studies project, apart from the notable democratic peace projects, has likewise mainly focused upon the roots of violence and their prevention. What this study has underlined is that there is a need for a research agenda on the different components of the liberal peace (as well as any possible alternatives), and how they interact with each other, as there is much evidence to show that this interaction may often be negative. There has been little research on the nature of the liberal peace project, how one gains consent for it, how it is legitimated, how actors learn in this context, how human rights, humanitarian assistance and aid, democratisation, development, free market reform and globalisation actually fit together, how they overlap, and where they may impede each other. If we claim we now 'know' what peace is, then this is inexcusable.

Notes

Introduction

1 Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace and War*, London: Profile Books, 2000, pp. 1–2. Here Howard is paraphrasing a famous quotation on the flyleaf of his book by Sir Henry Maine, *International Law*, London, 1888, p. 8. 'War appears to be as old as mankind but peace is a modern invention.' If one looks at the anthropological literature it appears that debates about peace are just as old as those about war. For example Kelly argues that where there is war, societies also have well developed strategies for peacemaking. See Raymond C. Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origin* of War, University of Michigan Press, 2000.
2 Rudyard Kipling, 'The White Man's Burden.' *McClure's Magazine*, Vol. 12, February 1899.
3 George Orwell, *1984*, London: Signet, 1969, p. 164. This was the party slogan.
4 'The Allegory of the Cave', *The Republic of Plato*, Translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941.
5 Lassa Oppenheim, *International Law*, Vol. 1 and 2, 1st ed., 1905/6.
6 For an overview of this concept, see in particular, Roland Paris, *At War's End*, Cambridge: CUP, 2004, pp. 40–51.
7 Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
8 M. Sollenburg and P. Wallensteen, Armed Conflict 1989–2000, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 4, No. 38, 2001, pp. 629–644.
9 See International Peace Research data, cited in the *UN High Level Panel Report*, A/59/565, December 2004, p. 17 and p. 33.
10 In one of the best recent examples of a study of peacemaking, most chapters focus on technical aspects of peace processes, with little investigation on the nature of the proposed peace. This is less a criticism of this study, than it is the artificial division of work on conflict and peacemaking and concepts of peace. See, for example, John Darby and Roger MacGinty, *Contemporary Peacemaking*, London: Palgrave, 2003, esp. pp. 3–5.
11 It must be pointed out here that this study essentially only deals with this rich westernised discourse which alludes to the nature of peace, if only indirectly.
12 See here the very important contribution made by Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen on the question of Western constructions of peace. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2003, esp. p. 13.
13 Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, London: Transaction, 2003 [1966], p. 151.
14 Saint Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 13, 1, London: Penguin Classics, 1991.

15 Pope Paul VI, The Fostering Of Peace And The Promotion Of A Community Of Nations, *Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modern World, Gaudium Et Spes*, Chapter V, 78, 7 December, 1965, para. 1–2. See also Isaiah 32:17.
16 *Gaudium et Spes, op. cit.*, 79, para. 4
17 Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1987, p. xi.
18 *Ibid.*, p. 57.
19 *Ibid.*, p. 59.
20 David Barash, *Approaches to Peace*, Oxford: OUP, 2000, p. 63.
21 Hugh Miall, What do peace studies contribute distinctively to the study of peace?, *Paper prepared for the 18th International Peace Research Association Conference*, Tampere, Finland, August 2000, p. 2.
22 See Anatol Rapoport, *Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992.
23 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977: Hedley Bull and A. Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
24 Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1917.
25 See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, London: Routledge, 1978, esp. Introduction.
26 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York, NY: Verso, 1983.
27 For an elaboration of these 'generations' see Oliver P. Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2002.
28 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon), 1980, p. 30*: Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge*, London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1972, p. 205.
29 Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics*, Cambridge: CUP, 2000, esp. introduction.
30 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Lawrence & Wishart, p. 56–59.
31 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
32 I do not deal with pacifism in this study because, ironically, though important in terms of some social movements, it generally has not been of significance in contemporary theoretical or policy debates in IR dealing with the relationship between war and peace, nor with the conceptualisation of peace.
33 A.C.F. Beales, *The History of Peace: A Short Account of the Organised Movements for International Peace*, London: Bell and Sons, 1931, p. v.
34 *Ibid.*, p. v.
35 *Ibid.*, p. 334.
36 See Quincy Wright, *The Study of War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, esp. p. xiv and p. 266.
37 David Mitrany, 'A Working Peace System' in *The Functional Theory of Politics*, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p. 132.
38 Johann Galtung, *Essays in Peace Research*, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975, p. 29.
39 For the latest version of his argument see, Johan Galtung, *Peace By Peaceful Means Peace And Conflict, Development And Civilization*, London, Sage, 1996, p. viii. See also Roland Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
40 E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, London: Macmillan, 1939, p. 10.

41 Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 151 and p. 173.
42 For more on these conceptualisations see, Martin Ceadal, *Thinking about Peace and War*, Oxford: OUP, 1987, pp. 4–5.
43 Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford: OUP, 2001: G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 216–241
44 G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. xiii.
45 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *op. cit.*
46 Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, London: Zed Books, 2001.
47 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
48 See in particular, Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, London: Palgrave, 1998.
49 See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London: Macmillan, 1977.
50 For more on this see Tzetvan Todorov, 'Right to Intervene or Duty to Assist', in Nicolas Owen (ed.), *Human Rights, Human Wrongs*, Oxford: OUP, 2002, p. 30.
51 For his elucidation of this approach see, Kofi Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, *S/2001/574*, 7th June 2001.
52 Boutros Boutros Ghali, *Agenda for Peace*, NY: UN, 1992.
53 *Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence*, December 1997, www.carnegie.org/sub/research/.
54 *High Level panel Report*, www.un.org./secureworl/, 2004: *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, 'The Responsibility to Protect', Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.
55 See among others UNDP *Development Report* 1994: Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2001, pp. 87–102; Vol. 7, No. 3 July–Sept. 2001; Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?, in *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 3 July–Sept. 2001.
56 David Barash, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
57 Some commentators, like David Rieff, deny that any such things actually exists on the basis that so little is done to resolve the issues blighting conflict and disaster zones by this supposed community. David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night*, London: Vintage, 2002, p. 10.
58 Here, conflict management (using techniques of mediation and negotiation with some reference to international law and norms in order to arrive at a solution based on a rearrangement of resources and mutual concessions, rather than justice) is differentiated with conflict resolution (in which a win-win situation is arrived at with also contributes a modicum of justice according to humanitarian norms). See K. Boulding, 'Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1978.
59 'Peacebuilding' denotes multilevel and multidimensional approaches. See also Kofi Annan, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on the work of the Organisation', *UN doc., A/53/1*, 27th August, 1998, para. 28: J. Lederach, *Building Peace-Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997.
60 However, it is important to note that there have not been any cases where the UN has expressly authorised the use of force for humanitarian purposes.

Neither is there a consensus on unilateral humanitarian action. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'The Political and Moral Limits of Western Military Intervention to Protect Civilians in Danger' in Colin MacInnes and Nicolas J. Wheeler (eds), *Dimensions of Western Military Intervention*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, p. 3.

61 Nicholas J. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

62 See Chris Brown, 'Selective Intervention: A Defence of Inconsistency', *Presentation at the University of St. Andrews*, 11 November 2002.

63 For more on these multidimensional approaches, which I have termed 'third generation' see Oliver P. Richmond, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapter V.

64 John Ruggie, 'Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, September 1972, p. 874–893.

65 Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 87–104.

66 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 1, London: Penguin, 1990 (1976).

67 For a critique, see Stanley Hoffman, *World Disorders*, Roma and Littlefield: Lanham, Md., 1998, p. 61.

68 Robert Cox, 'Postscript 1985', in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia UP, 1986, p. 242.

Chapter 1 Towards the Liberal Peace

1 Tacitus, 'The Life of Gnaeus Julius Agricola', *Agricola*, Oxford: OUP, 1999, Chapter 30.

2 Plato, *Laws* (1.626A). Cited by Victor Davis Hanson, *Why the West Has Won*, London: Faber and Faber, 2001, p. 440.

3 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford: OUP, 1998 [1651], p. 186.

4 'The Allegory of the Cave', *The Republic of Plato*, Translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941.

5 Chris Brown, *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity, 2002, p. 15.

6 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford: OUP, 1998 (1651): Augustine, *City of God*, London: Penguin, 1964.

7 Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace and the Re-Invention of War*, London: Profile, 2002, p. 9.

8 Thomas Hobbes, *op. cit.*

9 G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, London: Prometheus, 1996.

10 The notion of 'Jihad' provides another example.

11 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

13 Patrick Riley (ed.) 'On the Works of the Abbé de St Pierre,' in *Leibniz: Political Writings*, Cambridge; CUP, 1988, pp. 121–45.

14 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe*, 1714–1738. Rousseau also took up these themes. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*, trans C.E. Vaughan London: Constable and Company Limited, 1917.

15 William Penn, 'An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe', *The Peace of Europe*, London: Everyman, 1993 [1693], pp. 5–22.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 17–22. Two other benefits Penn envisaged would be that peace would prevent Ottoman expansion and allow princes to marry more freely!
17 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
18 *Ibid.*, p. 44.
19 Thomas Hobbes, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
20 Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 58.
21 Robert Kagan, *Ibid.*, p. 58.
22 John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, Oxford: OUP, 1998 (1859), esp. Chapter 1.
23 Bentham's 'A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace' was written in 1789. In it he argued that the reduction of military forces in Europe and the emancipation of colonies would help create a new peace. Jeremy Bentham, in 'The Principles of International Law', Essay IV, *The Collected Works*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1996.
24 See Jeremy Bentham, *op. cit.* Cited in Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
25 See *Ibid.*, p. 48.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 48, John Stuart Mill, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapter 1.
27 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 30
28 Michael Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
29 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 25: See also E. de Vattel, 'Just War: In a doubtful cause', *The Law of Nations*, Liberty, 1975, § 38.
30 David Barash, 'Human Rights' in David Barash, *Approaches to Peace*, OUP, 2000, p. 149–151.
31 *Ibid.*, p. 155.
32 Christine Bell, 'Human Rights and Minority Protection', in John Darby and Roger MacGinty, *Contemporary Peacemaking*, London: Palgrave, 2003, p. 161.
33 David Barash, 'Human Rights' in David Barash, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
34 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
35 *Ibid.*, p. 118. See also Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, London: Chatto and Windus, p. 71.
36 Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
37 Henry Shue, *Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy*, Princeton: PUP, 1980. See also Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
38 *Ibid.*, p. 123. 'International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', *General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI)*, 16 December 1966 (entered into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27).
39 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
40 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Righting Wrongs' in Nicolas Owen (ed.), *Human Rights, Human Wrongs*, Oxford: OUP, 2002, p. 226.
41 GWF Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945. Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
42 G.W.F. Hegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–40.
43 It is notable that the European Union today owes a great deal of its normative and constitutional structure to these Enlightenment peace projects.
44 Martin Ceadal, *Thinking About Peace and War*, Oxford: OUP, 1987, p. 4.
45 Summary of the Commonwealth of Britain. For more on this see W.H. Sherman, *John Dee: the politics of history in the English renaissance*, Amherst: Massachussetts UP, 1995.
46 Ian Cameron, *Lost Paradise*, London: Century, 1989, p. 109.

47 As Tuck argues, the early humanist impulse was that there was an entitlement to conquer with the intention of civilising the less civilised. Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Oxford: OUP, 1999, p. 45.
48 Martin Shaw, 'Post Imperial and Quasi Imperial', *Millennium*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2002, p. 330.
49 See Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
50 David P. Barash, *Approaches to Peace*, Oxford: OUP, 2000, p. 228.
51 For more detail on these movements, see Nigel Young, 'Peace Movements in History', in S. Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker (eds), *Towards a Just World Peace*, London: Butterworths, 1987.
52 Michael Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
53 Article V of the Treaty of Chaumont, 1 March, 1814. Cited in G. John Ikenberry, *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 104.
54 Michael Howard, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–5.
55 G. John Ikenberry, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
56 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
57 For a fascinating account of Edmund Morel's campaign against slave labour in the Congo see Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, London: Macmillan, 1999.
58 David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night*, London: Vintage, 2002, p. 58.
59 *Ibid.*, p. 59.
60 For an interesting discussion of this and other short-comings see David Rieff, *Ibid.*, p. 20.
61 See the *Geneva Conventions* of 1864, 1949, and the *Additional Protocols* of 1977, which form the basis of international humanitarian law.
62 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
63 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
64 For more on these developments, see Elise Boulding, *Cultures of Peace*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
65 See for example, statement by William Pitt in January 1805 about the 'restoration of peace' through a concert of powers. Cited in G. John Ikenberry, *op. cit.*, p. 99. For an interesting account see Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*, New York: Viking, 1961.
66 G. John Ikenberry, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
67 Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century*, Manchester: MUP, 1998, pp. 23–26.
68 Michael Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
69 Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel* House, Vol. 3, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928, p. 51, cited in David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, London: Pheonix Press, 1989, p. 253.
70 Arthur S. Link *et al.* (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. 41, January 24–April 6, 1917, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 525.
71 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate, 12 January 1917, in Arthur S. Link *et al.* (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. 40, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 536–7.
72 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate, 22 January 1917, in Arthur S. Link *et al.*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 40, p. 539.

73 Arthur S. Link, *op. cit.*, Vol. 42, p. 525.
74 For more on this from first hand see Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, London: Constable, 1945.
75 Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 3, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928, pp. 323–339.
76 Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980, p. 136.
77 David Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace*, London: Pheonix, 1989, pp. 260–261.
78 *Ibid.*, pp. 128–140. The group was made up of academics from a few major US academic institutions, depended upon secondary sources for information, and Walter Lippmann, for example, was relatively inexperienced and under thirty.
79 Gilbert Murray, 'Self-Determination of Nationalities', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 1:1 (January 1922), p. 6.
80 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
81 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
82 Margaret Macmillan, *The Peacemakers*, London: John Murray, 2003, pp. 9–14.
83 Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford: OUP, 2001, p. 248.
84 Michael Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
85 *Ibid.*, p. 68 and p. 71.
86 John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, London: Macmillan, 1920, esp. Chapters V–VII.
87 *Ibid.*, p. 201.
88 *Ibid.*, p. 243.
89 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2003, p. 65.
90 Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, Boston and New York: Houghton and Mifflin, 1933, pp. 3–4.
91 *Ibid.*, p. 371.
92 E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, London: Macmillan, 1939.
93 Andrew Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
94 *Ibid.*, p. 180.
95 See Quincy Wright, *The Study of War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, esp. p. xiv.
96 Margaret Mead, *Warfare is Only an Invention-Not a Biological Necessity* (1940) in Douglas Hunt (ed.), *The Dolphin Reader*, (2nd ed.), Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990, pp. 415–421.
97 Andrew Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
98 G. John Ikenberry, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
99 For a detailed outline of these different approaches see *Ibid.*, pp. 176–185.
100 Andrew Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
101 For more on this see *Ibid.*, pp. 127–33.
102 David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night*, London: Vintage, 2002, pp. 32–383.
103 For more on this see Paul Williams, 'Peace Operations and the International Financial Institutions' in Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, 'Peace Operations and Global Order', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, p. 103.

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105 *Ibid.*, p. 178.
106 *Ibid.*, p. 197.
107 Paul Taylor, 'Developing the Role of ECOSOC' in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *The UN at the Millennium*, London: Continuum, 2000, p. 122.
108 *Ibid.*, p. 122.
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113 Roosevelt to Morris L. Ernst, 8 March 1943, in F.D.R., *His Personal Letters, 1928–1945*, p. 1407, cited in *Ibid.*, p. 101.
114 *Ibid.*, p. 203.
115 G. John Ikenberry, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
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117 See for example, David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p. xi. Here Mitrany reflects upon the working peace system without defining what it was to achieve in terms of peace. However, it is clear that he has a somewhat broader notion of the concept than was generally accepted in the policy world at the time.
118 David Mitrany, 'The Progress of International Government (1932)', *op. cit.*, p. 90.
119 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
120 *Ibid.*, p. 174.
121 *Ibid.*, p. 180.
122 See text of *General Assembly Resolution 290*, 1 December 1949: *General Assembly Resolution* 377, 3 November 1950.
123 David Rieff, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
124 *Ibid.*, p. 80.
125 *Ibid.*, p. 81.
126 *Op. cit.*, p. 112.
127 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
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129 Martin Ceadal, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Chapter 2 Towards Peace-as-Governance

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'Correspondence: Back to the Future Part III', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1991, pp. 216–222.

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6 Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace and the Re-Invention of War*, London: Profile, 2002, pp. 80–1.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

8 For more on this see Martin Ceadal, *Thinking About Peace and War*, Oxford: OUP, 1987, p. 4–6.

9 Peter Schwab, *Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs*, London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 64.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

11 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Penguin, 1993.

12 David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Cambridge: Polity, 1995, p. ix.

13 Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford: OUP, 2001: G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 216–241.

14 Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books, 2001.

15 G. John Ikenberry, *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 13.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

17 This of course, was made famous by Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

18 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 245.

19 See World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, *Conflict Analysis Framework*, World bank, August 26, 2003, p. 2.

20 Roland Paris, *At War's End*, Cambridge: CUP, 2004, p. 5.

21 This was made very clear during a series of interviews I conducted with local and international members of the World Bank Team in East Timor, *Personal Interviews*, 10 and 11 November, Dili, East Timor, 2004.

22 Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and Order in the Twenty First Century*, London: Profile, 2004, p. 48.

23 Michael Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

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30 Chris Brown, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

31 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, New York: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 58–63, pp. 74–85.
32 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
33 *Ibid.*, p. 90.
34 Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', *The Vocation Lectures*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004 (1919).
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37 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
38 See in particular, Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, Cambridge: Polity, 1998.
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40 *Ibid.*, p. 263.
41 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
42 Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society*, Cornell UP, 1996: Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
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44 Joseph S. Nye, 'Redefining the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999.
45 Alex Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Intervention and the Three Traditions', *Global Society*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, p. 3.
46 *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
47 *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, 'The Responsibility to Protect', Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001, pp. 16–17.
48 See Martin Shaw, *op. cit.*
49 John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, Oxford: OUP, 1999 (1971).
50 Chris Brown, *op. cit.*, 174: John Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, Harvard UP, 2001, pp. 23–4.
51 See also Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, 1983, pp. 205–235.
52 John Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
53 Fukuyama makes the valid point that both Germany and Japan were strong states before WWII and retained many continuities with the pre-war system long afterwards. The main difference was democracy rather than authoritarianism was the basis of legitimacy in the new post-war orders. *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.
54 See Karin von Hippel for an excellent analysis of this. Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, CUP, 2000.
55 Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror*, New York: Basic Books, 2003, p. 161.
56 John Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999, p. 47.
57 Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom*, New York: Norton, 2003, p. 115. The democratic peace argument is only one component of the liberal peace, however.
58 For more on this see Bruce Buchan, 'Explaining War and Peace', *Alternatives*, Vol. 27, 2002, p. 408.
59 This important differentiation is made by John Macmillan in 'Whose Democracy, Which Peace*', Paper presented at ECPR*, Marburg 18–21

September 2003. Indeed, he claims that this may well have distorted our understanding of the liberal legacy. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

60 Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003, p. 123.

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63 *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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106 *Ibid.*, p. 288.
107 See for example, Preface to François Debrix and Cynthia Weber (eds), *Rituals of Mediation*, Minneapolis: Minnesota, 2003, p. xv.
108 Michael Dillon, 'Culture, Governance, and Global Biopolitics' in *Ibid.*, p. 135. Dillon argues that defining development in such a way allows the Bank to become involved in political issues, which is actually forbidden in its charter.
109 For more on this argument, see Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the "Mission Civilisatrice"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 642–5.
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111 Michael Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

112 For accounts of possible colonial interpretations of this, see Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'The Clash of Governmentalities: The Fall of the UN Republic and America's Reach for Imperium', *Exploring Imperium*, University of Sussex, 11 December 2002: Martin Shaw, 'Exploring *imperia*: Western-global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states' *Exploring Imperium*, University of Sussex, 11 December 2002, www.the-globalsite.ac.uk.
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120 Lloyd Axeworthy, 'Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First', *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 20.
121 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
122 John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics, 'What Should The Bank Think About The Washington Consensus?', Paper prepared as a background to the World Bank's *World Development Report 2000*, July 1999, www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsaug00/pdf/(6)Williamson.pdf, p. 1.
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125 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
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128 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
129 *Ibid.*, p. 139.
130 David Held, 'Cosmopolitanism: Globalisation Tamed?', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2003, p. 470.
131 *Ibid.*, pp. 470–1.
132 *Ibid.*, p. 474.
133 *Ibid.*, p. 474.
134 *Ibid.*, pp. 475–8.
135 Scholte, 2000, pp. 211
136 Clarke, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
137 Buzan and Little, 1999, p. 92, in Clarke, 140.
138 Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World*, London: Profile Books, 2002, p. 5.
139 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
140 *Op. cit.*, p. 140.
141 *Ibid.*, p. 148.
142 *Ibid.*, p. 160.
143 Stephen Gill, 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism', *Millennium*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1995, pp. 399–400.

144 Michael Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
145 Some radical questions arise from this debate. For example, does the Western discourse about peace obscure the fact that the West does not want to be drawn into a meaningful discussion about what peace may be as it is generally felt it is dangerous to compromise upon its self-interested interpretation of order? Has this led to the fact that there are few forums in which diverse definitions of peace can be negotiated beyond the norms and state-centric interests of officials – or is it caused by the fact that these institutions are weak?
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147 Michael Ignatieff, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
148 Micheal Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
149 See Martin Ceadal, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
150 Mary Kaldor, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
151 M. Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.
152 James Der Derien, *op. cit.*
153 Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare*, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 40.
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157 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
158 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
159 *Ibid.*, p. 52.
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161 *Ibid.*, p. 60.
162 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

Chapter 3 Towards the Peacebuilding Consensus

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4 Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World*, New York: Public Affairs, 2002, p. 6.
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Chapter 4 Constructing the Liberal Peace from Below

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Chapter 5 Constructing the Liberal Peace from Above

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Chapter 6 Conceptualising Peace

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22 Stephen Hopgood, 'Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society', *Millennium*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000, p. 10.
23 J. Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990, p. 64.
24 It is important to note the that notion of 'cosmopolitan conflict resolution' which has emerged partly as a response to the more critical work in peace and conflict studies such as this, has tried to modify the orthodox agenda of the field in order to respond to these criticisms. Effectively, however, cosmopolitan conflict resolution still fits fairly closely into the liberal peace agenda.
25 R.J. Rummel, *The Just Peace*, California: Sage, 1981, p. 11.
26 Raymond C. Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origins of War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 108.
27 *Ibid.*, p. 160.

Conclusion

1 Pope John Paul II, 25 February 1981. Part of an inscription at the Hiroshima Peace Park, Hiroshima, Japan. The irony of this is of course that a Western and mainly Christian state was responsible for the use of the nuclear weapons against Japan.
2 'Peace to the undefeated' or the victor's peace. Inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Solider in St. Mary's Cathedral, Sydney, Australia.
3 Attributed to G.K. Chesterton.
4 All of these scenarios were witnessed during the course of the fieldwork and consultations conducted for this study.
5 In an interview conducted at the British FCO, it was argued that Britain was one of the few states that did not tie aid to British foreign policy interests, though a morally just strategy was the aim of both. *Personal Interview*, Conflict Issues Team (Names withheld by request), FCO, London, 13 January, 2005.
6 In a series of interviews conducted in FCO and DFID in January 2005, several respondents argued that they had a clear idea what the end goal actually should be, but rather that the methods that should be used remained unclear.
7 Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and Order in the Twenty First Century*, London: Profile, 2004, p. 141.
8 Saint Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 13, 1, London: Penguin Classics, 1991.

9 See Quincy Wright, *The Study of War*, University of Chicago Press, 1964, esp. p. 174.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 257.
11 Francis Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
12 Some notable exceptions are Jarat Chopra, and Tanja Hohe, 'Participatory Intervention', *Global Governance*, Vol. 10, 2004; Roland Paris, *At War's End*, Cambridge: CUP, 2004; Michael S. Lund, 'What Kind of Peace is Being Built: Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions', *Paper presented on the 10th Anniversary of Agenda for Peace*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, January 2003.
13 Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, Cambridge: Polity, 2002, p. 99. Pogge argues that severe poverty could be prevented by the rich without much of an effect upon their own wealth.
14 *Ibid.*, p. 214.
15 This cliché was often quoted to me during interviews with officials during the fieldwork for this project.
16 This was the conclusion reached by many of my interviewees, official and non-official during fieldwork in the Balkans in January, 2005.
17 This point was made to me by Daniel Fearn, *Personal Interview*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 13 January, 2004.
18 President Xanana Gusmao, 'Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Timor Leste', *Seminar on the role of the UN in Timor Leste*, Dili, 26th November, 2004.
19 See David Chandler, '*The Responsibility to Protect*: *Imposing the Liberal Peace*, in Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, 'Peace Operations and Global Order', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004, p. 60.
20 R.J. Rummel, *The Just Peace*, California: Sage, 1981, p. 11. For anthropological evidence on this matter, see Raymond C. Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origins of War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 108.
21 Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957, p. 1.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
23 Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 35–69.
24 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2003, p. 174.
25 See R.B.J Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: CUP, 1992.
26 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
27 Franke Wilmer, 'The Social Reconstruction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia', in *Social Justice*, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 95.
28 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 183–204.
29 Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 111.
30 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–204.
31 Robert Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
32 Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War*, London: Profile, 2001, p. 5.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
34 *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.
35 Margaret Mead, *Warfare is Only an Invention – Not a Biological Necessity* (1940) in Douglas Hunt (ed.), *The Dolphin Reader*, (2nd ed.), Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990, pp. 415–421.
36 James Der Derian, Introduction to Paul Virilio, *Desert Screen*, London: Continuum, 2002, p. xiv
37 For more on symbolic terrorism see Oliver P. Richmond 'Realising Hegemony? New Wars, New Terrorism, and the Roots of Conflict', *Terrorism and Conflict Studies*. Vol. 26, No. 4, 2003.
38 Gore Vidal, 'Black Tuesday', in *The Last Empire*, London: Abacus, 2002, pp. 316–324.
39 See William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1911.
40 Indeed, much of my fieldwork illustrates that the focus is on the state, and that the economic and social lives of individuals comes a very poor second.
41 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Lawrence & Wishart, p. 56–59.
42 Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford: OUP, 2001, p. 248.
43 Tracy Strong, Foreword to Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. xxiii.
44 Carl Schmitt, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

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