Pirkkoliisa Ahponen · Päivi Harinen
Ville-Samuli Haverinen *Editors*

Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines

Methodological Nationalism, Transnational Reality and Cosmopolitan Dreams

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ISBN 978-3-319-21803-8 ISBN 978-3-319-21804-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015956535

Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
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Printed on acid-free paper

Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgements

Many colleagues have supported us in this cross-border travel, encouraging to continue to reach the finalising phase. We will thank collectively all the fellow travellers without naming everybody. The idea was initiated during the research project 'Changing civil society: Multiculturalism, young people and the Finnish civic culture'. We are grateful to the Academy of Finland for financing this project in 2008–2010. Some preliminary versions of the contributions were introduced and discussed in the final seminar of the project in October 2010. Warm thanks to the participants of the seminar for the fruitful comments. When we modified and reworked versions of the texts publishable, useful viewpoints of peer reviews have helped to improve the contents and the coherence of this collection. Our greatest debt of gratitude is addressed to the anonymous reviewers who read the whole manuscript carefully and gave us very valuable comments during the editing process of this collection.

The home base of the editors of this book is the University of Eastern Finland. Many thanks to the Department of Social Sciences for providing the facilities to our work as well as for giving preconditions to research work and everyday interaction. Contributors of this multidisciplinary and multicultural project work in many universities and institutions, and contacts have mainly been kept up via electronic media lines.

English is not the primary language of all the contributors, and therefore we needed to help in improving the linguistic quality of the contributions. Warmest thanks to Mr. Tatu Ahponen (MA) for his careful work in processing the versions more understandable.

The collaboration with our publisher Springer has been fluent and proficient. Special thanks are due to Senior Editorial Assistant Hendrikje Tuerlings for her patience and helpful guidance on proceeding with the editorial work.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Pirkkoliisa Ahponen

1.1 Construction

The ideal world of the global citizens is borderless and open to a variety of jointly shared global communication networks. It is a world, where people can acknowledge the value of opinions of the 'others' as well as they understand and accept the views of their fellow citizens. Likewise, in this world, the different appearances of strangers are tolerated and recognised on an equal basis with the familiar faces of our well-known partners. The common rights, freedoms and duties of the inhabitants of dreamed cosmopolitan communities are all equally respected. The ultimate goal of this dream is constructing a democratic society that encompasses the entire humankind.

In reality, however, our world is inhabited by unequally located dwellers of demarcated societies. As members of differentiated groups inside territorial communities, we are identified through social, political and cultural border-constructions. Our positions as citizens of different societies are structured hierarchically through territorial power strategies and agencies. In this process, the various inclusive and exclusive devices of governance are used for defining the boundaries between 'us' and 'them'; between friends and strangers. In the current conditions of political, economic and cultural globalisation, nation-based borders continue to exist and make the social life of transnational border-crossers problematic.

As politically active citizens, we struggle to build a better society. We make decisions on whether we want to compete as individuals for a chance to be among those who have the best opportunities to succeed. We may also aim to improve our structural possibilities of belonging to the group of well-off members of welfare societies. An alternative option is trying to help discriminated people to equalise their opportunities in the global struggle to achieve full civil rights as global citizens.

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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_1

The struggle for more equally shared social responsibilities presents a demanding challenge for the supporters of cosmopolitan democracy.

This collected volume discusses the different dimensions of various social and cultural belongings, using national, transnational and cosmopolitan frames. We intend to make visible the manifold possible ways to become community members and new citizens in the conditions of transnational migration and dislocation that are affecting the earlier fixed settlements. We also discuss the ways how receptive attitudes are demanded from the locals in order for them to accept the newcomers as fellow-citizens. Our observations particularly focus on the border-crossings of a new generation, as transnational connections are increasingly becoming the new reality of everyday life for young people. Increasing number of people have dual citizenships, even multinational citizenships. We ask how expatriate family members or people who are a part of a diaspora connect to their current localities. Related to the previous question, we also ponder the relevance of defining citizenship as being based on civil, social and political rights and duties in the national context (Marshall 1950/1992). In this, we refer to the discussions on whether cultural citizenship is a proper concept for analysing the hybrid situations of transnational border-crossers and the creative contributors of multiculturalism (e.g. Stevenson 2003; Modood 2007; Delanty 2009). In the course of this volume, we will argue for increasing the vitality of local communities and larger territories through participatory activities, utilizing the learning capacities and creative skills of the newcomers. This potential, however, can only be realised as a resource if community members, sitting in their 'nests', can open the doors of the society wide enough to allow venturing strangers to enter. Equal access to education and integration to society through work and family ties—all of these continue to be necessary presuppositions for full citizenship.

Human realities in concrete placements are experienced through culturally imagined situations. The ways of reasoning the construction and transformation of communities and their borders depend on the various frames in which the conditions of community membership are interpreted. A shift from methodological nationalism to methodological cosmopolitanism is seen as inevitable for understanding the demands of this new human order (see Cheah and Robbins 1998; Beck 2006; Fine 2007; Delanty 2009; Held 2010). We defend the visions of local cosmopolitans who recognise that their communities are formed by "collections of diasporas", as Bauman describes here the current lifestyle enclaves. Axford (2013, 98–99) prefers the term "methodological glocalism" as a way to see how cultural boundaries become permeable, nevertheless never disappearing completely, with the shift from solid to liquid modernity. Without learning to understand the influence of the less visible characteristics of ethnic and national border-formations, and the symbolic obstacles for overcoming them, we can never hope to become true global citizens.

People act politically to transform the society by jointly communicating and sharing their lived experiences across the borders (see e.g. Stevenson 2003; Delanty 2009). In this volume, we discuss how national and ethnic identifications and boundary constructions restrict our ways to use the contributions of the outsiders in a satisfactory way and influence the opportunities of the new members of society. We are conscious of the narrowness of our own view. Most of us view the changing

world through westernized eyes, though also realising that the threats of globally increasing inequalities and injustices demand a more broad-minded perspective. Unfair working conditions for the poorest people are not improved or educational opportunities enhanced without a struggle for cosmopolitan solidarity.

The idea of this volume was based on a research project, *Changing Civil Society – Multiculturalism*, *Young People and the Finnish Civic Culture*, which was financed by Academy of Finland in 2008–2010. All the authors have been in contact with the previous research group and the thematic has been jointly discussed during the research group's sessions. The aforementioned project aimed at contributing to research on transnational border crossings and multinational citizenship by collecting empirical data on young immigrants and multicultural youth work in Finland. This volume continues discussing this topic to show that the problems of border-crossings and cultural cosmopolitanism all have certain general characteristics and a global actuality. The volume's composition includes theoretical chapters on the conceptual belongings and dislocations of the citizens and empirical analyses on cases that represent the local realities of people living in border-crossing situations. Although examples are always situational, they show the general character of these problems in relation to the applied conceptual framework.

The cross-border situations discussed herein refer to several empirical cases in various countries. Our examples represent forced and voluntary immigration from Africa and Asia to Europe, the diaspora situations of exiled people, and educational preconditions for trans-border citizenship in Israel. We emphasise, however, the problems of young immigrants who come to live in a western welfare state and have to cross its nationally defined boundaries in their practices. We particularly focus on Finland as a rapidly globalising and modernising case study of a country that is encountering challenges in opening of its borders to immigrants. For a long time, Finland was a backwards-oriented, rural, poor, sparsely populated country. It remained enclosed within its national borders, with a population that was perceived to be ethnically homogenous, albeit with several different 'tribes'. Finnish emigration to US and Canada began at the end of the 1800s and, particularly during the 1960s and the 1970s, many people left their agricultural lives in the countryside to work in factories and services. This was also a period of emigration to Sweden. Finland experienced one of the most rapid industrialisation and urbanisation processes in Europe, and its technological development was astonishing. Official international contacts were long modest in nature, and Finland generally abstained from participating in transnational organisations until it was approved for membership in the European Union in 1995. Since the 1990s, however, the country has received more immigrants than sent emigrants abroad. At the same time, Finland has become a techno-structurally well-developed knowledge society. The Finnish case serves well in illustrating how a traditional, monoculturally oriented society has transformed to meet the demands of trans-border multicultural liberalism, even though reforming the society's conceptions of citizenship-related rights and responsibilities still presents challenges.

We find it relevant to particularly focus on the migrants representing the younger generation, due to their precarious situation. Due to their experiences as dual citizens

or minority-group representatives with a diaspora consciousness, they are considered to be agents of social transformation. They can potentially orientate to new kinds of civic interests and political forums in order to become full members of the society. Integration in a new home country and home-district is a precondition for this. If the society offers them enough open space for civil activities, the new members can use their learning capacities to contribute to the society as innovative translators and mediators between different cultures. Hopefully, next-generation border-crossers can fulfil the demands of cosmopolitanism better than the older ethno-nationally oriented local citizens.

Social communities become increasingly changeable when people move from their places of birth to settle down in new conditions. People from different backgrounds have to adjust the rules that form the basis of their habitual togetherness. Newcomers are expected to become familiar with the local habits and practices of their new domestic communities, but the members of the established communities also have to learn to accept, tolerate and respect the cultural rights, social practices and creative contributions of the newcomers. Mutual understanding is required from all partners, if they want to live together as equals.

1.2 Concepts

Theoretical and academic discussions in this volume are based on the concepts of methodological nationalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, as these concepts are related to the positions and situations of young immigrants who strive to fulfil the requirements of multinational citizenship. In this volume, multi-sided manifestations of belonging are discussed within the frames of social, political and cultural membership and citizen rights. Belonging means access to membership, but also maintaining, constructing and challenging the boundaries between inclusion and exclusion. Belonging also contains hierarchies within and across the boundaries, and the related political practices test the sustainability of boundaries. We see that our social identities and belongings are modified in multiple activities, including both practical doings and imagined intentions, which are influenced by intersectional narratives on the positions and locations of people (Shotter 1993, 120–121). The politics of belonging are a way to articulate how belonging becomes naturalised in the perceptions on the formations of collectives (Anthias 2009; Yuval-Davis 2011).

Citizenship is both an inherited or earned status and a process of dynamically constructed participatory practices (Turner 1993; Bellamy 2008). Therefore, it has formal, informal, instrumental and imagined characteristics. We analyse the diaspora situations and hybrid identities of people who are on the move inside their transitional realities. Travellers are identified as being dislocated after leaving their point of departure and before feeling at home in their destination. Conceptually, dislocation also means something else to us; it refers to the changing dynamics in the formation of community membership. When boundaries between the territorial dimensions

are intermingled and blurred, the intersectional divisions between 'us' and 'them' are also contested by the both-and dynamics of belonging.

Sociological understanding has mainly been based on the conventions of methodological nationalism. The underlying assumption is that 'social' and 'national' are co-extensive terms. When the nation-state is taken as the natural unit of reference, the state, nation and ethnicity begin to constitute the basic combination in the analysis of territorial membership in social research (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 301–334; Beck 2007, 679–705; see also Amelina et al. 2012). This volume contains case studies on how methodological nationalism has been applied in a Eurocentric context, particularly in Finland. Thus far, citizenship has been categorised as something that will advance democracy and welfare in the frames of the nation-state. Currently, many authors are discussing the influence of immigration, mobile societies and transnational connections on civil rights (see e.g. Hannerz 1996; Urry 2007; Vertovec 2009). The increasing transnational mobility of people has resulted to changes in the living conditions of community members and new mixtures of lifestyles for the residents of localities. Thus, new strategies are needed for ensuring the legal rights of newcomers, so that they can be integrated to their local settlements. The perspectives of immigrants or the mobile people themselves, however, are not too often taken into consideration when arguing for good communities. We are also including these views in our interpretations, in order to show how the changes are seen both by the locals and the newcomers.

In this volume, we continue the discussion on conventional sociological membership categories, but also challenge them. The nationalist ideology stubbornly permeates the social and cultural definitions and classifications of majorities and minorities in the construction of cultural identity. We try to come to grips with the problems of taken-for-granted categories of nationalism, which have resulted to an unequal recognition of political civil rights. We take seriously the idea held by Beck and Sznaider (2010) that the cosmopolitan condition cannot be understood without a radical epistemological departure from methodological dualisms such as national/international and us/them, which tend to separate different cultures, classes, races and religions on the basis of domestic localities. Like Delanty (2009, 15), we consider cosmopolitanism to be a field of tension between local and global interactions, mediated through entanglements of territorial and transnational cultural processes and the ways how they are marketed (see also Hannerz 1996, 107). In our view, complex ways of local everyday activities, intertwined with global processes, constitute a new space for civil activities and offer new possibilities for solving the problems of cosmopolitan practices of citizenship.

We insist on arguing that as long as citizenship categories, policies, and politics are based on membership inside the borders of nation-states, the criteria for the official acceptance of civil rights will continue following the logic of descent, even at a continental level. Membership in these family-like communities is evaluated according to the categories of birth, heritage and ethnic roots, inside territorial borders. Transnational civil status is officially permitted in the continuum of nationalist principles by closely following the legislative rules on dual/multiple citizenship (Vertovec 2009, 90–93). Individual freedoms are considered to be unequal proper-

ties, and even social responsibilities that are supposedly universal in principle are still restricted to cover only the people who are included as community members according to random but still collectively fixed criteria. All in all, social rights are granted to people by setting them to a fixed order according to inherited status positions (or status positions that resemble inherited positions). In this frame, solidarity to a projected myth of common destiny and loyalty to the cultural values of the nation-state are prerequisites for a sense of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202, 2011, 20–21). Citizens make both cognitive and emotional investments in guaranteeing national security, which is signalled in the acceptance of the importance of national inter-border defence, particularly by newcomers (see Harinen and Kivijärvi in this volume).

One problem, which we have considered to be worthy of discussion in this volume, is how the locally rooted identities of nation-state citizens transform into the cosmopolitan identities of global citizens. Political citizenship is a civic strategy to practise social activities to build a better democratic society. Now, increasing demands are made to extend democratic practices to cover the cosmopolitan values at a global level (Delanty 2009; Held 2010). Citizenship is, as Delanty (2009, 117) says, an essential aspect of democracy, allowing the public to participate in the operations of the civil society. Emphasising the citizenship's role both as a status and a practice, and including the formal and substantial roles of citizenship, we point out that social practices also test the politically defined legislative rights. Theoretical conceptions of citizenship, migration and minorities have to be viewed through concrete local cases and specific groups that represent the transforming realities of these categorised entities. This helps us understand how the earlier fixed membership categories have become liquid and how this has been caused by trans-border connections that influence cultural identities by making them hybrid constructions. Nowadays, transformative elements of membership replace earlier identities, which were based on group definitions inside specific localities. Togetherness, when produced in demonstrations, performances, or other kinds of momentarily acts, may be substantial but also instrumental or artificial. However, when these acts are consciously performed to increase global solidarity, we may speak of moral cosmopolitanism. A researcher's strategy to participate in these practices is supporting moral methodological cosmopolitanism.

Civic education is an important tool for developing self-consciousness and cultivating human values (Delanty 2009, 54–55), and thus advancing cosmopolitan democracy (Stevenson 2011) or emancipatory cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006, 44–45). We see education as a civilising vehicle for both the native citizens and the border-crossers, which can be used to add tolerance and recognition, which are needed for understanding different opinions, perspectives and views. Entering the labour market requires competences in marketing competitive skills. Young people have to be ready to improve their working capacities in the occupations and tasks that are currently in demand in our rapidly changing, 'liquid' conditions. Equality of opportunities is seen as an ideal principle of educational democracy, the other side of the coin being success in the competition of the management of qualifications to make the society productive. The application of these principles to the reali-

ties of the trans-border citizens poses an interesting, important question. We discuss herein the sorts of difficulties that are evident when trying to test educational qualifications of African migrants in the practices of working life in the European labour market.

Education is generally motivated by the potentiality of the people to use their learning capacities as instruments of cultivation. It prepares the *primus inter pares* to reside among the most skilful citizens. Its purposes are differentiating. The citizens are taught to manage the conventional rules of discipline. Folk education systems were developed to support the development of nation-states by civilising the entire populations inside their borders. The principle of equal opportunities now presents a big challenge for civic education in cosmopolitan frames (Jensen and Walker 2008). After all, transnational educational programmes are increasingly used to improve the chances of the most talented candidates to deal with competition in the innovative utilisation of professional skills. Creativity in the implementation of products of the global culture is a remarkable aspect of the economically oriented cultural globalisation in our knowledge society (see e.g. Thrift 2005; Nash 2010, 59–63).

Social membership relations are processed within actual social movements and cultural identities are transformed by new networks where people participate both physically and virtually. Civil rights have become a part of law inside the borders of states, but they are restricted to cover only those who are entitled to live inside a specific area. When civil rights (or human rights) cover larger unions than mere nation-states, such as the European Union or United Nations, citizenship starts resembling a matryoshka doll. Basically, the conventions concerning membership in these coalitions and the representations in global organisations have to be accepted through national democracy, i.e. parliamentary politics. However, partnerships in global networks influence the ways how the membership categories of transnational communities are structured and constructed. Increasing mobility, through both concrete and virtual means, tends to lead to changes in our models of social interaction. The local and global dimensions are both present in the arrangements of personal communication in ways that, as Hannerz (1996, 29) remarks, are increasingly making the interconnectedness of local and global processes opaque.

Transnationalism means that national borders start permeating the flows of people, commodities, monetary systems and various kinds of risks, as Ulrich Beck and other interpreters of reflexive modernisation have emphasised (see e.g. Beck 2009; Vertovec 2009). In our opinion, the remaining concepts of transnationalism are still connected to the border-markers of nationalism, even though the term refers to the erosion of these definers. Cosmopolitanism, however, aims to cover global human rights epistemologically, in order to overcome the nation-based classifications of "us" and "them". This is not a new concept: it was already rooted in the moral concerns of the civic virtues of Enlightenment philosophy. The practice of this potentiality is tested through the equalisation of educational opportunities, so as to develop the civil society as a political area for the civic activities of its citizens (See Delanty 2009; Held 2010).

Discussions on the shift from methodological nationalism to methodological cosmopolitanism also concern the use of social scientific methods as tools for

catching empirical practices. Methodological choices are meaningful in the epistemological application of concepts. Thus, it is important to note that methodologies always have practical consequences. In our volume, we utilise surveys, ethnographical observations and thematic interviews in collecting our data.

Categories that refer to methodological nationalism are constructed to guarantee the general reliability of opinions, attitudes and perceptions of majorities among study groups that are defined inside the borders of the nation-states. Statistical methods and survey logics serve categorised group formation well and make the prevailing trends reliable. This helps in keeping the identity categories coherent inside ethno-national membership formations. This way, it is possible to analyse how societies are structured and what kinds of structural classifications and typologies are favoured in terms of politics of identity. This logic fits the methodological application of conventional sociology well, as a part of a general wave of obstinacy to the principles of methodological nationalism.

How should we view the opaqueness of identity boundaries inside our changing societies? After all, observations on the dominant forms of cultural characteristics inside the prevailing systems tend to strengthen the structural categories. We can grasp some of the changes by interpreting emerging opinions, attitudes and perceptions—as well as recognizing how meaningful it is to see the cultural forms and practices that remain merely residual (see Williams 1981, 204–205). The cultural turn brought forward a discursive, constructive and reflexive methodological orientation in social sciences. It also changed the researchers' orientation. We began to see ourselves as inclusive participants in processes of study. Intensive interpretative analyses are needed for understanding how special individuals and minority groups are related to the changing social conditions. Their voices need to be heard in the interpretations of the processes where they participate. Two-sided research designs offer a reason to see how structural conditions influence the ways how people are settled and how their constructive activities become possible in certain structural contexts. Strategies of triangulation and mixed-method approaches help us analyse both the activities and the structures that influence the possibilities of full citizenship—across the borders, in this case (e.g. Creswell 2009). Thus, we consider the principles of pragmatism to be important for applying the research strategies for understanding how people make choices in situations where earlier fixed borders become permeable (Tashokkori and Teddlie 1998). Conventional research strategies face particular challenges in situations that demand a reciprocal understanding of different cultural contexts. If no common language and understanding exists between the researchers and the research subjects, it is difficult to understand and interpret the situation from a participatory perspective. Unobtrusive methods are helpful in analysing such sensitive situations (see Lee 2000).

The moral demands that the cosmopolitan citizens face are considerably more difficult than those faced by nation-state citizens. Requirements of individual freedom and social responsibilities are global ideals, but differently emphasised in the local applications of value-laden ideologies. Equalising different practices of people who are not personally familiar to each other is not an easy task. What cultural differences can be tolerated or respected in the name of the global democ-

racy and in equal measure with people's own values? Global citizens have to learn to recognise the human values of those who look different and identify themselves in cultural terms that differ from their native languages, traditional religions and domestic habits inside the borders of their own nations, as individuals and during the course of their everyday lives.

The ethical ideals of cosmopolitanism are only realised as something that is personally adopted and concretised in everyday behaviour. We can no longer apply the concept of culture as a synonym for 'fortress under siege', where the local inhabitants of the fortress are expected to manifest their loyalty daily in their own circles and give up their contacts with the outside world (Bauman 2012, 190). Cultural encounters may cause problems, but also offer us a chance to learn from each other. In our studies, we show that the creative learning capacities of people also function as cultural resources. Solving the problems of dissimilarities may motivate us to internalise various reliable moral principles, which function as guidelines for people who wish to live together as multicultural global inhabitants.

1.3 Contents

This volume is divided into three parts, comprising ten chapters in all. The focus is on highlighting the ways how membership in a local community is shifting away from national frameworks, as well as examining the dislocations brought about by transnational and cosmopolitan forms of belonging. Politics of belonging is connected to demands of methodological cosmopolitanism in pointing out the inadequacies of nationalism in understanding and accommodating the various forms of belonging that cannot be limited merely to the fixed boundaries of territories. Another side, problematised here as well, is how stubbornly the attitudes and prejudices, inherited from nationalist ideology, are rooted in the sociological conceptualisations of community membership and citizenship. Most of us have 'inherited' our ways to conceptualise the society from our western education, and we realise how challenging it is to see the world "with different eyes", respecting the basic human values.

Part I in this volume, "Belonging to Membership – Changing Frames of Citizenship", includes two chapters. The orientation here is both methodological and empirical. Dislocations of migrants are conceptualised and described in terms of the changing reality of transnational citizenship and cosmopolitan challenges. Diasporic situations of migrants and identity positions of dual/multiple citizens are mirrored with the conventions and 'locked' perceptions of methodological nationalism. In the opening Chap. 2 by Zygmunt Bauman, the focus is on the changing patterns of global migration. Cosmopolitan communities are constructed by the multicultural homes of interlocked diasporas, where membership is continuously renegotiated by perpetually mixing populations. In Bauman's opinion, this aspect demands a paradigmatic change in the studies on social and cultural belonging, identities, and citizenship. Instead of protecting the watertight borders of communities, today's

memberships are based on multiple belongings. Bauman contemplates how new migration casts a question mark upon the fixed bond between identity and citizenship, the cultural identities of the inhabitants of decentred communities becoming liquid processes of continuous renegotiation.

It has been commonly assumed that the 'sociability' of insects is, through birth, confined to their nests, which function as their places of belonging as family members and close relatives. Like wasps and bees, people are assumed to inherit their local membership by their birth in a specific nest, whose surroundings are protected by their nearest relatives. Bauman argues, however, for a process of socialisation through border-crossings, where community members resemble 'social insects' that manage to go on through the perpetual exchange of their populations. According to him, the socialisation of newcomers as members of a multicultural community requires that the natives can accept them as family members and fellow citizens. The principle of brotherhood means that the scope of this hospitability is widened from the inhabitants of a family nest to members of local communities and then to *les citoyens*, who must learn to renegotiate and reform their webs of global interdependencies and interactions. Bauman discusses the way how increasing border-crossings transform national populations into 'collections of diasporas' and hybrid constructions of multiple identity groups. According to him, our existence as 'human insects' depends on how well we are able to balance individual freedom and social security in our partly shared memberships in territorial locations that form continental and planetary combinations.

Dual/multiple citizenship is a concrete example of changing citizens' positions that require rethinking in the frames of transnationalism and cosmopolitan politics and policies. The first part of the volume ends with a chapter by Jussi Ronkainen, "Contents of Citizenship? Multiple Citizens' Orientations towards Nationality and Different Forms of Citizenship", where he points out the importance of reconstructing the current categories of citizenship, which are currently strongly and self-evidently defined in terms of methodological nationalism. Ronkainen argues for a new understanding of citizenship, an understanding that would refer to the identity, belonging and membership of the inhabitants of multicultural communities. To provide context on these changing views on citizenship, he analyses the differing views on the mental connections of dual citizens to their nationalities. In his analysis, he distinguishes formal and national definitions of citizenship from image-based and instrumental orientations. As related to dual citizenship, these issues mostly concern young people whose parents hold different citizenships or who have been born in immigrant families.

Ronkainen offers an analysis on how young dual citizens orientate to the preconditions of their own citizenships. Though his focus is on Finland, the supranational character of EU citizenship also influences the legal civil statuses of the young dual citizens, although the emotional connection to the habitat seems to be the most significant constructor of their cultural identity. In most European countries, the possibility of holding dual or multiple citizenships is quite recent. In Finland, it was realised when the country joined the European Union.

Ronkainen bases his analysis on a conducted survey and thematic interviews among the young dual citizens of Finland. These respondents held a variety of views

regarding their citizenship status. It seems, however, that in the past, cultural membership in a nation was self-evidently emphasised as the main factor in defining peoples' citizenship statuses and formal civil rights. Currently, when supranational form of citizenship is legalised in the continental frames, the aspect of image is increasingly important for transnational citizens' belonging. The rhetorical construction of global or cosmopolitan citizenship is even more image-influenced and may thus also have ideological and instrumental characters. The transitional situation of young people makes them feel like they are flying in-between nations, having no stable home anywhere. Cosmopolitan interpretation of citizenship also refers to the positions of elites among the global citizens. This kind of globalisation is strategically supported by supra-national authorities that grant multiple statuses of citizenship according to certain criteria to advance the competitive dynamic of our changing world.

The second part of the volume, "Studying Dislocations: From Methodological Nationalism to Methodological Cosmopolitanism" comprises four empirical case studies that bring out various contexts for the methodological shift from national frameworks to transnational and cosmopolitan understandings of how the migrants consider their belongings to their new destinations. Empirical analyses on this shift illuminate the difficulties of integration strategies and processes of dislocations, but they also demand us to find a new moral consciousness to survive as cosmopolitans without exclusive border construction.

This part is started by the Chap. 4. Päivi Harinen and Antti Kivijärvi address the 'national loyalty' of young migrants to their new homeland in the context of security policy and the ideology of methodological nationalism. They analyse the results of a survey (Finnish Youth Barometer) on attitudes towards the national defence system, as young male citizens are obliged participate or assist in military service or its civilian alternative. The respondents were categorised as national-majority youths and immigrant-background youths. In this chapter, the answers of the respondents representing immigrant families are considered as a specific group and their answers are compared with the answers of the majority youth.

The authors critically discuss the ways of seeing citizens' loyalty through certain background variables, such as gender, age, and church membership. As citizens, immigrants can be identified both in exclusive and inclusive terms. Sociological categorisations have usually leaned on interpreting citizens' positions through the lens of methodological nationalism. From an exclusionary perspective, the migrants represent 'them', and the defence of national boundaries is expected to be in the margins of their interests. Instead, inclusive citizenship contains memberships from local to global communities, and national loyalty does not need to be seen as being opposed to continental or even global citizenship, as shown by Harinen and Kivijärvi.

This chapter continues the discussion on instrumental or image-related aspects of citizenship, as it may be purposeful for people who have migrated to ensure their stay by expressing loyalty to their place of residence. Thus, they will certify their readiness to defend their new country of residence. The importance of national defence systems in guaranteeing the security of people in a globalising world is, however, a completely different question.

Harinen and Kivijärvi also discuss the way of studying this phenomenon by collecting survey data in the national frames, and how this way, which follows the conventions of methodological nationalism, may influence the character of the results. This strategy tends to emphasise conventional attitudes, so researchers need to be sceptical when interpreting the validity of survey factors in studies on changing perceptions. Anyway, the factors of age, gender and education are worth considering in the studies of young people's opinion-formation. The chapter opens a path for deeper observations on the direction that attitudes and perceptions are taking due to the increasing transnational border-crossings.

Sofia Laine, in her Chap. 5, argues that the ecological principles of embodied methodological cosmopolitanism oppose the competitive principles of neo-nationalism. Her analysis concerns locally and globally oriented 'micro-events'. She emphasises the moral aspect in participatory cosmopolitan practices and sees researchers as active subjects in embodied happenings. Laine frames her conclusions by referring to de Sousa Santos' concept of sociology of absences and Erving Goffman's view (1983) on interaction as the micro-politics of encounters. Her aim, then, is to develop a strategy for a researcher who not only observes social situations but also participates in social movements where civic activities are practised across the borders in cosmopolitan gatherings. Nevertheless, Laine is conscious of the fact that it is difficult to catch all the multilingual and multicultural political performances and situational encounters. Indeed, she points out that moral cosmopolitanism cannot be put into practice without seriously considering the principles of freedom and equality in evaluating the individuals as global actors. Like Beck (2010; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009) and other discussants of the 'new moral cosmopolitanism', she sees the role of the younger generation as being crucial in occupying more space for activities in movements that make globally connected meetings possible, so that globally competent moral values can be developed. Laine also points out that methodological cosmopolitanism becomes embodied through our expression of emotion and corporeal orientation, which serve as elements that connect the participants together. Various carnivalesque elements often serve the interests of social movements acting for solidarity and waging a peaceful civil struggle for expanding the frames of their civil rights.

Although the Kurds do not have a common nation-state, they have adopted a strong sense of national identity. They exemplify the politics of belonging well, as shown in the Chap. 6 by Mari Toivanen. She discusses the diaspora situation of young Kurdish migrants to Finland by describing their experienced and narrated difficulties on their road to citizenship. These people live in-between the locally rooted and globally integrated generations. Thus, they need to learn to negotiate and renegotiate their political, cultural and social commitments, ties and practices. For them, Kurdistan is only an imaginary diaspora homeland. Toivanen compares their dreams to their real situations as members of a discriminated minority in Iran, Iraq or Turkey. What sort of a citizenship can they hope to possess in these diaspora conditions, as immigrants in Finland? Their alternatives are formal integration into the Finnish society, which also grants them the political and social rights of citizens of European Union, or a chance to keep the cultural traditions of Kurds as a specific

group of a dreamed nation. The situation of young adults who have moved to Finland as refugees, with their parents, is a challenging one, both for their personal futures and the politics of belonging in general. Toivanen is inspired by Yuval-Davis' (2011) discussions of politics of belonging across boundaries that are approached from an intersectional perspective. The political activities of these young people can be addressed in a way that strengthens their diaspora identities to form an (imaginary) national membership or supports their integration to their localities as full citizens, or perhaps allows them to learn to identify themselves as transnational border crossers who feel cosmopolitan solidarity and understand our common human values deeply.

Discussion on the integration or the diaspora situation of transnational border-crossers is continued in the Chap. 7. Mulki Al-Sharmani and Cindy Horst write how people who have fled from Somalia to different countries and possess the discriminated status of refugees or asylum seekers remain excluded or marginal citizens. Through formal regulations, their access to a higher education and qualified labour market is often limited or completely prohibited. These positions make visible the hierarchical constitution of the various categories between unwanted and favoured citizenship. Even completing a higher academic degree does not necessarily improve the status of the residents who have been categorised as non-citizens, dislocated denizens, or minorities living in diaspora.

As destinations of Somali refugees, Kenya and Egypt, which have a very limited access to civil rights, differ from Western countries. The western examples given by Al-Sharmani and Horst, however, show that formal civil rights do not prevent people from being excluded from equal belonging. They may continue to be situated in the margin of the circle of real members, if they belong to the lowest level in the hierarchically ordered member categories. Segregation in the neighbourhoods and schools means that the migrant communities are separated from the domestic areas of the natives. This means that members of migrant communities remain mere hyphenated citizens, even though their ethnic cultures may be celebrated at enriching multicultural festivals. However, well-educated émigrés possessing a western passport tend to form transnational elites who try to use their citizenship statuses instrumentally to improve their social position across the transnational borders. Al-Sharmani and Horst also discuss the ways how transnational citizens respond to the demands posed by the decreasing marginalisation of migrants and increasing practices of belonging by negotiating their membership and inclusion.

The third part of this volume examines methodological possibilities for 'growing up' to become transnational citizens and increase cosmopolitan awareness through education and cultural learning. In the opening chapter of this final part, "Dilemmas of Cosmopolitan Education in the Context of Transnationalism", Devorah Kalekin-Fishman discusses the contradictory demands of basic education, which ought to teach individual values and the understanding of diversity. She introduces the principles of the state education system in Israel by remarking on its emphasis on discipline and governmentality, as pupils are prepared to serve their given goals inside the national framework. However, considering the current transnational

realities, the civic target of education should be learning how to cross borders and achieve mutuality by grasping how to respect the values of 'others'.

Kalekin-Fishman points out that advancing democracy in contemporary conditions requires arranging the teachers' education, teaching programs and learning processes for primary schools, so that they enable classrooms to become meeting places for children who come from different backgrounds and have different experiences, attitudes and models of behaviour. The principal task of these teachers, then, is to activate children to learn moral values, invent new ideas, increase their problem-solving capacities and enlarge and deepen their awareness of the need of a cosmopolitan morality in the surrounding world. Kalekin-Fishman, looking at individual development as a chain of temporal and spatial border-crossings performed during a lifetime, builds a cosmopolitan practice for education, where physical and mental encounters with the others serve as sites for learning how to cross borders. Kalekin-Fishman suggests using the problems, inconveniences and dissatisfactions experienced in these situations as material for constructing multicultural communities in classroom milieus.

The highest levels of education have always been based on international contacts and networks, although the degree programmes developed in the universities have often been balanced with nationalist interests and profit. Lately, the popularity of international study programmes has been increasing and, for today's universities, trans-border co-operation is a part of everyday life. Although the preferred key term in this context is 'internationalisation of universities', the practices are reasoned by arguments that are based on multiculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. In their Chap. 9, Anna Medvedeva and Pirkkoliisa Ahponen analyse the contents of multicultural, transnational and cosmopolitan strategies for considering the internationalisation programs in higher education. They also point out the mutual controversies often implicitly included in these concepts when they are adjusted to education. They believe that through conceptual analysis, we can see the interests that are emphasised in advertising the programmes as well as reasoning the results.

As discussed by Medvedeva and Ahponen, the internationalisation programmes can serve the competitive interests of a unique culture of nationalism as well as they serve the cosmopolitan ideals of cultural diversity. In practice, such programmes can be used for different purposes. They can integrate specially chosen students and teachers to the priorities of certain universities. The newcomers can contribute the utilisation of the cultural capital in the frames of nation-states, or the universities can use them to guarantee global productivity and success in the competition to obtain the best results. Increasing cultural creativity is demanded for supporting global innovations.

The competitive use of these programmes tends to increase the separation of the luckiest members of the rich part of world from luckless poor people who stay at the margin of the use of competencies. On the other hand, the internationalisation of the higher education can be used to create a more equal global democracy if the educational opportunities are improved to support talented people who have remained poorly educated due to structural reasons. This is an important question of cultural belonging.

Even though faith in education is often strong, its realisation as an equal resource is questionable. In the Chap. 10, Mathias Ebot focuses on the employment situation of highly educated African migrants who are trying to achieve success in the European conditions. For his study, he has interviewed Cameroonian migrants who have graduated in Finland and plan to have a professional position inside the Nordic labour market. Immigrants are testing how well the democratic principles of welfare and equal opportunities in education apply to border-crossers in Finland. English-language university education is far from being equally free for Finnish citizens, talented migrants and exchange students. The popularity of studying in Northern countries has increased among African candidates, and they also receive financial support to study effectively. However, after completing their degrees, they have faced difficulties in finding employment in their fields of profession.

As a country of emigration with scarce experience of immigration during the colonial period of Europe, Finland has only recently started receiving students and workers from Africa. Labour-based migration is a favoured 'mantra' in the Finnish political discussion. The official immigration policy is, however, mainly concentrated on refugee issues and the statutory treatment of asylum seekers. Ebot is interested in the relevant options for Sub-African people who represent the cosmopolitan generation. They have enough educational capital and cultural courage to stay voluntarily in Europe to receive full civil rights and a respectable civil status. Ebot's analysis shows, in an interesting way, how the status and practice of earned citizenship diverge when careful and realistic actions to apply the competences of the new citizens are not taken. The efforts of newcomers to reach the demands of their societal membership are not sufficient to guarantee a recognised cultural position in the society, when the ideas of cosmopolitan citizenship are not truly respected. Ebot emphasises the importance of overcoming of these applications of methodological nationalism, which indirectly restrict or prohibit the integration of immigrants at the labour market and keep them dislocated. These demands include proving that one can speak Finnish with a perfect native intonation. Negative attitudes towards appearance and names that differ from the perception of 'ordinary Finns' are expressed both openly and in hidden ways.

We are used to thinking that our everyday happenings are locally spaced 'here and now' experiences and that cosmopolitan images are free from fixed connections to place and time. In the final chapter of this volume, "From Locals to Cosmopolitans: Dislocated Territorial Dimensions of Cultural Citizenship", Pirkkoliisa Ahponen discovers that the presupposition of cosmopolitanism is that citizens learn to be both locals and cosmopolitans. She sees the conceptualisation of cultural citizenship as something that depends on an emphasis on territorial dimensions of member communities and their borders. Ahponen sees that, more than anything else, local communities are based on a feeling of familiarity and similarity. Family and home-like concepts are also adopted for the purpose of conceptualising native citizenship. Symbolic membership identifiers thus follow the territorial logic of social and cultural border-constructions in the realisation of global togetherness.

Virtual communication erases the borders between the familiar and foreign interactions, making worldwide contacts into everyday realities. Ahponen points out that

in order to become actual cosmopolitan citizens, we have to learn to apply the markers of global solidarity in our everyday practices. Cosmopolitanism is realised in civic practices only when it is interconnected with local happenings. Learning processes take place wherever the locals meet border-crossers, but also when they move to live in new settings as dislocated migrants. Civic education is an important aspect of becoming a cultural citizen who understands that recognizing the rights of strangers is a precondition for living together in the current world of social and cultural transformations.

Ahponen, saying that we identify ourselves subjectively through our belongings, refers to Yuval-Davis's (2006, 2011) concept of politics of belonging. Criteria for evaluating questions like "who am I" and "who are we" are adopted in encountered life-situations, through socialisation processes and with contacts ranging from the nearest face-to-face circles of interaction to the most distant communication networks. Ahponen exemplifies the strategy of border-crossings in the territorial dimensions of cultural citizenship by describing her own experiences of being born as a girl in an inward-oriented rural village and becoming a professor with worldwide contacts in the globalising milieu of academia. She insists that only by taking our grass-root activities seriously can we promote the new world order as local cosmopolitans, disseminating worldwide communication on civic virtues.

1.4 Continuation

We are aware that all our conceptualisations and interpretations form a part of a never-ending process. In this volume, the use of concepts like 'belonging', 'membership', 'methodological nationalism', 'transnationalism' and 'cosmopolitanism' is connected to the problems of changing demands of citizenship in the diaspora situations of migrating people. Usually, migrants or dual/multiple citizens form minorities among the national majorities. In mobile societies, localities and other territories will increasingly be inhabited by people who settle in them to participate in civic activities, changing the character of a certain place of living. Communities are renewed by the presence and participation of their active members and their openness to newcomers. The hybrid identities of immigrants as minorities amongst the natives are comparable with any representatives of 'exceptional' member groups. The new citizens influence the modification of symbols through which community members become identified in continually changing situations. These cases are not mere exceptions, which signals that group identities actually are liquid and hybrid constructions and could also be recognised as such.

In a knowledge society, education has an increasingly important role to play in giving people the keys to a positive future, not only as professionals and experts but also as civilised citizens and civic actors. Young migrants, in particular, especially when growing up in multinational families, have a remarkable role in offering their own input to the political development of the civil society as local cosmopolitans. Therefore, we believe that it is important to discuss education as a civic strategy for

creating a future world with low borders and a high level of togetherness and belonging. We also need more analyses on the real significance of 'cosmopolitan' education.

The cultural targets of cosmopolitanism are extremely idealistic; they cover universalism, individualism and the voluntary respect of rational authority. Global culture cannot be realised without learning to recognise the equal respectability of the cultural values of the 'others', meanings of those that do not share 'our' memberships and are thus left without full civil rights. Cosmopolitanism is, indeed, a matter of competence, entailing, according to the argumentation of Hannerz (1996, 103), openness toward divergent cultural experiences. Nevertheless, it seems to inspire a search for cultural contrasts rather than uniformity. Thus, for those who want to know what is actually happening in the world of multicultural differences, cosmopolitan togetherness offers a real dilemma.

The sense of being dislocated is the usual condition of border-crossers, as Bauman (2012, 196) contemplates, exemplifying this liminal situation through his own memories. Living in-between is an important signifier for the reality of people who are distant from their place of departure as well as their place of destination. Dislocations, whether forced or voluntary, are meaningful due to the fact that migrants may become more able to see the both sides of their existence more clearly, even though (or because) their identities are challenged. All of this contains the positive, satisfactory aspect of freedom unburdened by compulsory local engagements. Bauman (ibid.) believes that the experiences of dislocation can be pleasurable, even deeply satisfactory. These experiences may indicate possibilities for enabling ethically praiseworthy choices in situations that demand personal solutions for common, unavoidable dilemmas. Cosmopolitan citizens have the freedom of choosing their own side with a multidirectional perspective as their special privilege—without facing the attributed identifications of 'dislocation'.

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Part I
Belonging to Membership: Changing Frames of Citizenship

Chapter 2
Living in an Age of Migration and Diasporas

Zygmunt Bauman

2.1 The Sociability of Insects

A good starting point for this study is the astonishing discovery made a couple of years ago by a group of researchers from the Zoological Society of London, who went to Panama to investigate the social life of local wasps. This group was equipped with cutting-edge technology, which it used to track and monitor the movements of 422 wasps from 33 different nests for over 6000 h (Jones 2007). What the researchers found out has turned the centuries-old stereotypes concerning the habits of social insects, stereotypes these researchers shared with us, upside down. Indeed, ever since the concept of 'social insects' (a term that includes bees, termites, ants and wasps) was coined and popularised, a firm, rarely questioned belief was shared by the learned zoologists and the lay public: the 'sociability' of insects is confined to the nest where they belong—the place where they have been hatched and where they return for every day of their life, bringing the spoils of their foraging ventures and sharing them with the rest of the hive's natives. The possibility that some working bees or wasps would 'migrate', cross the boundaries between nests, abandon their hives of birth and join another hive of their choice, if ever contemplated, was seen as an incongruous idea. It was axiomatically assumed instead that the 'natives', the born and therefore 'legitimate' members of the nest, would promptly chase the maverick newcomers away and destroy them if they refused to go.

As with all axioms, or, more to the point, all convictions tacitly assumed to be parts of doxa or common sense, this belief was neither questioned nor tested. The thought of tracing the traffic between the nests or hives thus did not occur either to the ordinary folks or the learned experts. For the scholars, the assumption that socialising instincts are limited to their kith and kin or, in other words, their

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_2

community of birth and therefore belonging, 'stood to reason'. For the ordinary folks, 'it was obvious'. Admittedly, the technical means to answer the question of inter-nest migration (electronic tagging of individual wasps) were not available—but they were not sought either, since the question as such was not considered worthy of asking. Instead, a lot of research energy and funds was dedicated to the question of how the social insects spot a stranger in their midst so they can bar its access or chase it away: do they distinguish it by sight? By sound? By smell? By subtle nuances of conduct? The intriguing question was how the insects manage what we, humans, with all our smart and sophisticated technology, are only half successful in achieving. That is, how do they succeed in keeping the borders of 'community' watertight and protecting the separation of 'natives' from 'aliens'—'us' from 'them'? However, things that pass for 'reason' and the things that are considered obvious tend to change over time. The changes happen together with the human condition and the challenges that it posits. It tends to be praxeomorphic: it takes shape after the pattern of realities 'out there', perceived through the lenses, the prism, of human practices: what humans currently know how to do, are trained, groomed and inclined to do—and do. Scholarly agendas, like the popular perceptions of reality, are derivatives of these mundane human practices.

Problems encountered in daily human cohabitation decide the 'topical relevance' of issues and suggest hypotheses that the research projects subsequently seek to confirm or disprove. In most cases, if no effort is made to test the received popular wisdom, the situation is not caused as much by a lack of research tools as the fact that the common sense of these times does not suggest that such a test is needed and that there exists a need to search for research tools for conducting it. Something must have happened to the common human experience, which nowadays casts doubt on the received wisdom: the 'naturalness' and universality of the lifelong determination of 'belonging' by birth. Indeed, none of the nests they explored had the means of keeping its borders completely watertight and each had to accept the perpetual exchange of its population. On the other hand, each nest seems to have managed quite well under the circumstances: they absorb the newcomers without friction and suffer no malfunction due to the departure of some of their older residents. Furthermore, nothing they could see was remotely reminiscent of an 'insect centre' which would be able to regulate the traffic of the insects—or, for that matter, anything else amenable to regulating. Each nest had to cope with its life-tasks more or less on its own, though the high rate of 'personnel turnover' probably assured that the know-how gained by any one nest could and did travel freely and contribute to the survival success of all the other nests. Moreover, it initially did not seem that the London researchers had found much evidence of inter-nest wars. They also found that the inter-nest flow of 'cadres' appeared to compensate for the locally produced excesses and deficits of the nest populations. Finally, they realised that the coordination and indirect cooperation among social insects in Panama have been, it seems, sustained without either coercion or propaganda; without commanding officers and headquarters in sight; indeed, without a centre.

Contrary to everything that has been known (or, rather, has been believed to be known) for centuries, the London team found in Panama an impressive majority, 56 %, of 'working wasps' that changed their nests during their lifetimes. The wasps did not just migrate to other nests as temporary, unwelcome, discriminated and marginalised visitors, sometimes actively persecuted but always suspected and resented, but as full and 'rightful' (one is almost tempted to say 'ID-card-carrying') members of their adoptive 'community', collecting food and feeding and grooming the native brood just as the 'native' workers did. The inevitable conclusion was that the nests they researched were, as a rule, 'mixed-population nests', where native-born and immigrant wasps lived and worked cheek to cheek and shoulder to shoulder—becoming, at least for the human outsiders, indistinguishable from each other, except with the help of electronic tags.

More than anything else, the news brought from Panama reveals the astonishing reversal of perspective: the selfsame beliefs that, not so long ago, were imagined to reflect the 'state of nature' have now been retrospectively revealed to have been mere projections upon the insects of the scholars' own, all-too-human, preoccupations and practices (though those practices are now dwindling and receding into the past). Once the somewhat younger generation of scholars brought to the forest of Panama their own (and our own) experience of the emergent life-practices, acquired and absorbed from the now-cosmopolitan London, that 'multicultured' home of interlocked diasporas, they have duly 'discovered' that the fluidity of membership and perpetual mixing of populations are also the norm among social insects: a norm apparently implemented in 'natural' ways, with no help of royal commissions, hastily introduced bills of law, high courts and asylum-seekers' camps. In this case, and so many others, the praxeomorphic nature of human perception prompted them to discover 'out there, in the world' what they have learned to do and are doing 'here, at home' and what we all carry in our heads or in our subconscious thought patterns as an image of 'how things truly are'.

How could that be? Thus asked the Londoners baffled by what they found, hardly believing at first the facts that were so different from what their teachers told them to expect. When they sought a convincing explanation of the bizarre ways and means of the Panamanian wasps, they found it, as could be expected, in the warehouse of tested and familiar notions. Wishing to accommodate these unfamiliar events in their familiar worldview, they decided that the newcomers that were allowed to settle "could not be truly aliens"—there was no doubt that they were strangers, but not as strange as the other, genuine strangers: "they joined the nests of closely related wasps—cousins, maybe." Such an explanation put anxiety to rest: after all, the right of 'close relatives' to visit their family's home and settle there has always been a birthright. But how do we know that the alien wasps were 'close relatives' of the natives? Well, they must have been, must they not? After all, if they were not, the insiders would have forced them to leave or killed them on the spot—QED.

2.2 Becoming Brothers and Sisters in Collections of Diasporas

The London researchers clearly forgot or failed to mention that it took a century or more of hard work, sometimes sword-brandishing and at other times brainwashing, to convince the Prussians, the Bavarians, the Badenians, the Wurtenbergians, or the Saxons (just as it takes now to convince the 'Ossis' and 'Wessis' in Germany or the Calabrians and Lombardians in Italy) that they were all close relatives of each other, cousins, even brothers or sisters, descendants of the same ancient German stock animated by the same German spirit, and that they thus should behave as close relatives do: be hospitable to each other and cooperate in protecting and increasing their common shared welfare. Or that on the way to the modern centralised nation-state and the identification of nationhood with citizenship, the revolutionary France had to include the slogan of *fraternité* in its call addressed to all sorts of 'locals' who had now been appointed as *les citoyens*—to people who had heretofore seldom looked (let alone moved) beyond the frontiers of Languedoc, Poitou, Limousin, Burgundy, Brittany, Guyenne or Franche-Comté. Fraternité, brotherhood: all Frenchmen are brothers, so please behave as brothers do, love each other, help each other, make the whole of France your common home, and the land of France your shared homeland! Or that since the time of the French Revolution, all the movements bent on proselytising, recruiting, expanding and integrating the populations of heretofore separate and mutually suspicious kingdoms and princedoms have had the habit of addressing their current and prospective converts as 'brothers and sisters'.

But to cut a long story short: the difference between the 'cognitive maps' that the older generations carry in their heads and those that have been acquired/adopted by the youngest generation reflects the passage from the 'nation-building' stage in the history of modern states to the 'multicultural' phase in their history; more generally, from 'solid' modernity, bent on entrenching and fortifying the principle of territorial, exclusive and indivisible sovereignty and surrounding the sovereign territories with impermeable borders, to 'liquid' modernity, with its fuzzy and eminently permeable borderlines, the unstoppable (even if bewailed, resented and resisted) devaluation of spatial distances and defensive capacities of the territories, and an intense human traffic across any and all frontiers. As for the daily practice of the humans, the same ongoing process exists: from the assimilatory pressures and expectations of impending uniformity to the prospects of living permanently with variety and difference.

Nowadays, human traffic goes both ways and frontiers are crossed from both sides. Britain, for instance, is currently a country of immigration (even if the successive Home Secretaries go out of their way to be seen as trying hard to erect new barriers and stem the influx of foreigners); but also, according to the latest calculations, almost 1.5 million born Britons are currently settled in Australia, almost one million in Spain, several hundred thousand in Nigeria, even a dozen in North Korea. The same applies to France, Germany, Poland, Ireland, Italy, Spain; one way or another, it applies to any bordered-off territory of the planet apart from

a few remaining totalitarian enclaves that still deploy anachronistic, Panopticon-style techniques that are more designed to hold the inmates (state subjects) inside their walls (state borders) than keep the aliens outside.

Population of almost every country is nowadays a collection of diasporas. Population of almost every sizeable city is nowadays an aggregate of ethnic, religious and lifestyle enclaves, where the line dividing the 'insiders' from the 'outsiders' is a hotly contested issue, while the right to draw that line, to keep it intact and make it unassailable, is the prime stake in the skirmishes for influence and battles for recognition that follow. Most of the states have by now passed their nation-building stage and left it behind them and thus are no longer interested in 'assimilating' the incoming strangers (that is, forcing them to shake off and forfeit their separate identities and 'dissolve' in the uniform mass of the 'natives'); and so the settings of contemporary lives and the yarn which weaves the life experiences together are likely to remain protean, variegated and kaleidoscopic for a long time to come. For all that matters and all we know, they may keep on changing forever. Cities, particularly mega-cities like London, serve as dustbins where the problems produced by globalisation are dumped. They are also laboratories where we experiment with the art of living with those problems (though not the art of resolving them), test our experiments, and (hopefully) develop our perspectives. Most seminal impacts of globalisation (above all, the divorce of power from politics and the shifting of functions once undertaken by political authorities sideways, to the markets, and downward, to the individual politics of life) have by now been thoroughly investigated and described in great detail. I will therefore confine myself to just one aspect of the globalisation process, too seldom considered in connection with the paradigmatic change in the study and theory of culture: namely, the changing patterns of global migration.

Diasporas are scattered, diffused, extended over many nominally sovereign territories; they ignore territorial claims in lieu of local demands and obligations; they are locked in the double (or multiple) bind of 'dual (or multiple) nationality' and dual (or multiple) loyalty. Present-day migration differs from the two previous phases as it moves both ways (virtually all countries, including Britain, are nowadays both 'immigrant' and 'emigrant'), and privileges no routes (routes are no longer determined by the imperial/colonial links of the past). It also differs in how it explodes the old TRG syndrome and replaces it with a new syndrome, the EAH syndrome (an extraterritorial—'anchors' displacing the 'roots' as primary tools of identification—hunting strategy).

The new migration casts a question mark upon the bond between identity and citizenship, individual and place, neighbourhood and belonging. Jonathan Rutherford, an acute and insightful observer of the fast-changing frames of human togetherness, notes (2007, 59–60) that the residents of his street in London form a neighbourhood of different communities. Some of those residents have networks that only extend to the next street, others have networks that stretch in connection with the paradigmatic change in the study and theory of culture: namely, the changing patterns of global migration.

Whether we admit it or not, and whether we relish it or fear it, we, the humans scattered among more than 200 'sovereign units' known under the name of the 'states', have also managed to live without a centre, like those Panama wasps, for some time now—even if the absence of a clear, all-powerful, unquestionably authoritative and uncontested global centre is a constant temptation for the mighty and the arrogant to fill that void or at least try to fill it.

'Centrality' of the 'centre' has been decomposed. The link between previously intimately connected and coordinated spheres of authority has been broken, perhaps irreparably. Local condensations of economic, military, intellectual, or artistic powers and influences are no longer coinciding, if they ever were. Maps of the world, where the colours of political entities mark their relative share and importance in, respectively, global industry, trade, investment, military power, scientific achievements, or artistic creation, will not overlap. And to make such maps serviceable for any length of time, the paints we use need to be applied sparingly and be easy to wash off, since the current rank of any country in the pecking order of influence and impact is by no means assured to last.

And so, in our desperate effort to grasp the dynamics of planetary affairs, the old and hard-dying habit of organising our mental images of global power-balances with the help of conceptual tools like centre and periphery, hierarchy, superiority and inferiority look, more than ever, like a handicap rather than, as previously, an asset; a blindfold rather than a searchlight. The tools developed and applied in the research of the Panama wasps may well prove much more suitable for this task.

2.3 Renegotiations on Freedom and Security

I suggest that 'identities' exist today solely in the process of continuous renegotiation. 'Identity formation', or more correctly 're-formation', turns into a lifelong task, never complete; at no point of our lives are our identities 'final'. The outstanding task of readjustment always remains, as neither the conditions or the sets of opportunities of our lives and the nature of threats to our ways of life ever stop changing. That in-built 'non-finality', the incurable inconclusiveness of the task of self-identification, causes a lot of tension and anxiety. There is no easy remedy for that anxiety.

One of the reasons for our difficulties of finding that remedy is that our process of identification navigates between two equally central human values: freedom and security. These values, equally indispensable for decent human life, are difficult to reconcile, and the perfect balance between them still remains to be found. Freedom, after all, tends to come as a package deal with insecurity, while security tends to be packed together with constraints on freedom. And as we resent both our insecurity and lack of freedom, we would be hardly satisfied with any feasible combination of freedom and security. Hence, instead of a 'linear progress' towards more freedom and more security, we have observed a pendulum-like movement, which will probably continue in the coming years: first overwhelmingly and staunchly towards one of the two values, then away from it and towards the other.

Currently, it seems, in many places on the planet, perhaps most of them, the resentment of insecurity prevails over the fear of lack of freedom (though no one can say how long this tendency will last). In Britain, for instance, a vast majority of people declare that they are willing to give up quite a few civil liberties in order (they hope) to reduce the threats to their security. Most are ready, in the name of more personal safety, to accept identity cards, so far stubbornly rejected in postwar Britain in the name of individual freedom and privacy; and most want the state authorities, again for the sake of security, to have the right to tap private telephone calls and open private mail. And it is in the realm of security, and under the banner of 'more security', that the link between the political authorities of the day and the individuals, their subjects, is forged and mutual understanding and coordinated actions are sought.

The dismembering and the disabling of the orthodox supra-individuals, these tightly structured and powerfully structuring centres, seem to run parallel with the emergent centrality of the orphaned self. In the void left behind by the retreat or the fade of the political authorities, it is now the self that strives to fulfil, or is forced to assume, the function of the centre of the Lebenswelt (the privatised/individualised/subjectivised rendition of the universe). It is the 'Self' that recasts the rest of the world as its periphery while assigning, defining and attributing differentiated relevance to its parts according to its own needs, desires, ambitions and apprehensions. The task of holding the society together (whatever the notion of 'society' may mean under the modern liquid conditions) is being 'subsidiarised', 'contracted out', or simply falling off to the realm of individual life-politics. It is increasingly left to the enterprise of the 'networking' and 'networked' selves and their connecting/disconnecting initiatives and operations.

All this does not mean that the 'normal', everyday conduct of the individuals has become random, unpatterned and uncoordinated. It just means that the non-randomness, regularity and coordination of individually undertaken actions can also be, and, as a rule, is, attained by other means than the solid-modern expedients and stratagems of enforcement, policing and chain of command—those preferred and deployed by the 'totalities' of the past, bidding to be 'greater than the sum of its parts' and bent on forcing/training/drilling its 'human units' into repetitive, routine, disciplined, normatively regulated conduct.

Everywhere, inter-human bonds, whether inherited or tied up in the course of current interaction, lose their past institutional protections and are increasingly viewed as irritating and unbearable constraints imposed upon individual freedom of choice and self-assertion. Liberated from their institutional frame (now censured and resented as a 'cage' or 'prison'), bonds become tenuous and frail, easily breakable and, more often than not, short-lived.

In a remarkable synthesis of the most common life-experiences of our individualised society, Francois de Singly (2003, 108–109) lists dilemmas that tend to cast each of the individual practitioners of the art of life in a state of acute and incurable uncertainty and perpetual hesitation. Life pursuits can only oscillate between mutually incompatible, even starkly opposite targets, like, for instance, joining and opting out, imitation and invention, routine and spontaneity—all those oppositions being

mere derivatives or exemplifications of the meta-opposition, the supreme opposition in which individual life is inscribed and from which it cannot free itself: the opposition between security and freedom—both ardently and equally coveted, but both also excruciatingly difficult to reconcile and virtually impossible to attain in an equal measure at the same time.

The product of self-creation, the process operated by the art of life, is supposed to be the 'identity' of the creator. Given the oppositions that self-creation is struggling in vain to reconcile, and the interplay between the constantly changing world and the similarly unstable self-definitions of the individuals trying hard to catch up with their changing life conditions, however, identity cannot be internally consistent, nor can it at any point exude an air of finality that leaves no room (and no urge) for further improvement. Identity is perpetually in statu nascendi. Each of the forms it assumes more or less suffers from an acute inner contradiction, each to greater or lesser extent failing to satisfy any yearning for reform, each lacking in self-confidence that could be offered solely by comfortingly long expectations of life.

As Claude Dubar (1991, 113) suggests, "identity is nothing else but a result simultaneously stable and provisional, individual and collective, subjective and objective, biographical and structured, of diverse processes of socialization which at the same time construct the individuals and define the institutions". We may observe that 'socialisation' itself, contrary to the belief that was universally held not long ago and still frequently expressed, is not a one-directional process, but a complex and unstable product of the ongoing interplay between yearning for the individual freedom of self-creation and the equally strong desire for security that only the stamp of social approval, countersigned by a community (or communities) of reference, can offer. The tension between these two things seldom subsides for long and hardly ever vanishes altogether. And Francois de Singly rightly suggests (2003, 108) that the theories on present-day identities and the metaphors of *roots* and *uprooting* (or, allow me to add, the related trope of 'disembedding') all imply the one-off nature of an individual's emancipation from the tutelage of their community of birth, as well as the finality and irrevocability of the act, should be abandoned and replaced by tropes of anchors dropping and drawing up.

2.4 Aspects of Belonging

Indeed, unlike in the case of 'uprooting' and 'disembedding', there is nothing irrevocable, let alone ultimate, in drawing up the anchor. Roots that have been torn out of the soil where they grew are likely to desiccate and die so that their (very unlikely) reviving will be verging on miraculous, but anchors are drawn up in hope that they may be safely dropped again elsewhere and dropped with similar ease at many different and distant ports of call. Besides, the roots design and determine in advance the shape that plants growing out of them will assume, whilst excluding the possibility of any other shape; but an anchor is only an auxiliary facility of a mobile vessel that does not define the ship's qualities and resources. The time-stretches

separating the anchor drop from the anchor being drawn up again are mere episodes in the ship's trajectory. The choice of haven where the anchor will be dropped next is most probably determined by the kind of load that the ship currently carries; a haven that is good for one kind of cargo may be entirely inappropriate for another.

All in all, the metaphor of anchors captures what the metaphor of 'uprooting' misses or is silent about: the intertwining of continuity and discontinuity in the history of all or at least a growing number of contemporary identities. Just like ships anchoring successively or intermittently in their various ports of call, so the selves in the 'communities of reference' where they seek admission during their lifelong search of recognition and confirmation have their credentials checked and approved at every successive stop; each 'community of reference' sets its own requirements for the papers to be submitted. More often than not, the ship's record and/or the captain's log are among the documents on which approval depends, and with every next stop, the past (constantly swelled by the records of preceding stops) is re-examined and revalued.

Perhaps the most important modification is the way the monopolistic ambitions of the 'entity of belonging' have faded. As signalled before, the referents of 'belonging', unlike the orthodox 'integrative communities', have no tools to monitor the strength of a 'member's' dedication: neither are they interested in demanding and promoting that member's unswerving loyalty and undivided allegiance. And they are not jealous in the manner of monotheistic deities. In its contemporary liquid-modern rendition, 'belonging' to one entity may be shared and practised simultaneously with belonging to other entities in almost any combination, without necessarily provoking condemnation and repressive measures from any of them. Accordingly, attachments tend to lose much of their past intensity. Much of their vehemence and vigour, just like the partisan pugnacity of those 'attached', is, as a rule, tempered by their parallel allegiances. Hardly any 'belonging' engages 'the whole self'. Each person is, at any moment of her or his life, being involved in 'multiple belongings', so to say. Being loyal only in part of one's self, or loyal à la carte (to the selected parts of the list of 'belonging' requirements), is no longer viewed necessarily as tantamount to disloyalty, let alone betrayal. Hence, the phenomenon of (cultural) 'hybridity' (that is, combining traits derived from different and separate species) has been now recast as a virtue and a sign of distinction, rather as (as it was viewed until quite recently) a vice and a symptom of either cultural inferiority or condemnable déracinement and déclassement. In the emergent scales of cultural superiority and social prestige, hybrids tend to occupy the top ranks and the manifestation of one's own 'hybridity' becomes the prime vehicle of upward socio-cultural mobility. On the other hand, being condemned in perpetuity to one, and only one, self-enclosed and invariable set of values and behavioural patterns is increasingly viewed as a sign of socio-cultural inferiority or deprivation. The old-style jealous and monopoly-seeking 'integrative communities' have been relegated and are now to be found mostly, perhaps even exclusively, at the lower rungs of the sociocultural ladder. Can public space once more be made a place of lasting engagement rather than casual and fleeting encounters? A space of dialogue, discussion, confrontation and agreement?

Yes and no. If what is meant by 'public space' is the public sphere wrapped around and serviced by the representative institutions of the nation-state, as it was through most of modern history, the answer is, probably, no. That particular variety of the public stage has been stripped of most of the assets that enabled it to sustain the past dramas. Those public stages, originally constructed for nation-and-state-related political purposes, remain stubbornly local—whereas contemporary drama is humanity-wide, and thus obstreperously and emphatically global. The answer "yes", to be credible, requires a new, global public space: genuinely planetary (as distinct from 'international') politics and a suitable planetary stage. It also requires a truly planetary responsibility: acknowledgement of the fact that all of us sharing this planet depend on each other for our present and our future, that nothing we do or fail to do is inconsequential for the fate of anybody else, and that none of us can any longer seek and find private shelter from storms that originate in any part of the globe.

The logic of planetary responsibility is aimed, at least in principle, at confronting the globally generated problems point-blank, at their own level. It stems from the assumption that lasting and truly effective solutions to the planet-wide problems can only be discovered and operated by renegotiating and reforming the web of global interdependencies and interactions. Instead of setting the goal only at limiting local damage and deriving local benefits from the capricious and haphazard drifts of global economic forces, this process would rather pursue a new kind of a global setting, where the itineraries of economic initiatives anywhere on the planet will no longer be whimsical and guided by momentary gains alone, with no attention paid to the side-effects and 'collateral casualties' and no importance attached to the social dimensions of their cost-and-effect balances. In short, that logic is aimed, to quote Habermas (2001, 109), at the development of "politics that can catch up with global markets". We can feel, guess, and offer our suspicions concerning what needs to be done. But we cannot know the eventual shape and form of these actions. We can be pretty sure, however, that the shape will not be familiar. It will be different from everything we are used to. This a long task, perhaps very long.

2.5 But for the Time Being…

"Europe needs immigrants." That is what Massimo D'Alema, currently the President of the European Foundation for Progressive Studies, states bluntly in the 10th May *Le Monde*, in direct dispute with the "two most active European pyromaniacs", Berlusconi and Sarkozy. The calculations that support his postulate could hardly be simpler: there currently are 333 million Europeans, but with the present, still falling average birth rate, the number will shrink to 242 million in the next 40 years. At least 30 million newcomers will be needed to fill that gap, otherwise the European economy will collapse together with our cherished standards of living. "Immigrants are an asset, not a danger," D'Alema concludes. So is the process of cultural *metissage* ('hybridisation'), which the influx of newcomers is bound to trigger; the

mixing of the cultural inspirations that is a source of enrichment and an engine of creativity—for European civilisation as much as for any other. All the same, there is only a thin line separating enrichment from loss of cultural identity and preventing the cohabitation between autochthons and allochthons from eroding cultural heritages. Therefore, it needs to be based on respecting the principles underlying the European 'social contract'. The point is, *both* sides need to do this!

How can one secure such respect, though, if the recognition of social and civil rights of the 'new Europeans' is so stingily and haltingly offered and proceeds at such a sluggish pace? The immigrants, for instance, currently contribute 11 % to the Italian GNP. Nevertheless, they have no right to vote in the Italian elections. In addition, no one can be truly certain how large the number of newcomers with no papers or counterfeit documents, actively contributing to the national product and thus national well-being, will be. "How can the European Union", asks D'Alema all but rhetorically, "permit such a situation, where the political, economic and social rights are denied to a substantive part of the population, without undermining our democratic principles?" And with civil duties coming, again in principle, as a package deal with civil rights, can one seriously expect the newcomers to embrace, respect, support and defend the "principles underlying the European social contract"? Our politicians muster electoral support by blaming the immigrants for their genuine or putative reluctance to 'integrate' with the autochthon standards—while doing all they can and promising to do yet more, to put those standards beyond the allochthons' reach. On their way, they discredit or erode the very standards that they claim to be protecting against a foreign invasion.

The big question, one likely to determine the future of Europe more than any other quandary, is which of the two contending 'facts of the matter' will eventually, yet without too much of a delay, come on top: the life-saving role played by immigrants in a rapidly ageing Europe, which few, if any, politicians have so far dared to embroider on their banners, or the power-abetted and power-assisted rise of xenophobic sentiments, eagerly recycled into electoral capital?

After their dazzling victory in the provincial election in Baden-Wurtemberg, leaving the social democrats trailing and, for the first time in the history of Bundesrepublik, putting one of their own, Winfried Kretchmann, at the head of a provincial government, the German Greens, and notably Daniel Cohn-Bendit, began to ponder the possibility of the German Chancellery turning green as soon as in 2013. But who will make history in their name? Cohn-Bendit has little doubt: Cem Ozdemir. Ozdemir, their present-day sharp-minded and clear-headed, dynamic, widely admired and revered co-leader was re-elected a few months ago by 88 % of those voting. Until his 18th birthday, Ozdemir held a Turkish passport; then he, a young man already deeply engaged in German and European politics, selected German citizenship due to the harassment that the Turkish nationals were bound to be exposed to whenever trying to enter United Kingdom or hop over the border to neighbouring France.

One wonders: who, in Europe's present, are the advance messengers of Europe's future? Europe's most active pair of pyromaniacs, or Daniel Cohn-Bendit?

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Chapter 3
Contents of Citizenship? Multiple Citizens' Orientations Towards Nationality and Different Forms of Citizenship

Jussi Ronkainen

3.1 Introduction

In terms of transnationalism, state territory, and representations of dislocation, dual citizenship is a relatively new, highly interesting point of reference. Dual or multiple citizenship (in this chapter, these words are used synonymously) refers to a formal or full membership in several nation-states. Until the last few decades, the field of international relations is treated like an unwanted guest. It was argued that multiple citizenship creates problems for national policymaking and security, regarding military service, voting, taxation and diplomatic protection (Martin and Hailbronner 2003, 4). For many people, a fundamental reason for objecting to dual citizenship was the shared conception of a nation-state's need to require undivided loyalty from its citizens.

Currently, globalisation, increased international migration and the end of Cold War have shifted the political and sociocultural foundations of citizenship. Attitudes towards multiple citizenship have also changed. In the last few decades, dual citizenship has become an important focus of research and a generally approved part of discussions concerning integration, immigration and citizenship policies. Nevertheless, multiple citizenship has been studied mostly as a political and juridical status and examined through comparative policy analysis (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; Hansen and Weil 2002; Martin and Hailbronner 2003; Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007a; Nyers 2010; Bloemraad 2004; Howard 2005; Sejersen 2008). Much less attention has been paid to the ways how dual citizens actually relate and orientate to their status and what they define as the most important parts of that status (cf. Conway et al. 2008; Pitkänen and Kalekin-Fishman 2007; Ronkainen

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_3

2011; Harinen 2001; see also Gustafsson 2005). These questions also reflect their identification with citizenship and its practice. After all, the hypothetically associated possibilities and status problems of citizenship only receive their meanings and contents when citizenship is studied as a practice.

One central element of citizenship is the emotional relationship between the people and the state. It has been noted that individuals consider citizenship to be a defining factor of who they are (Westin 2003, 172–173). Thus, citizenship works as an important definer and constructor of identity. Traditional nation-state ideology was based on the assumption that a citizen's state of citizenship has his or her undivided identification and loyalty. Multiple citizenship questions this assumption of a simple relationship between citizenship and identity, but still, the issue has been under-researched in the academic world, even as the peoples' lifestyles and identities have become increasingly reflective and individual (Giddens 1991; Beck 1992). Identities are now attached to multiple flexible communities and networks, and this also leads to relative changes in meanings and attitudes regarding national identity and national citizenship (Gustafsson 2005).

Contemporary young people, in particular, have been called a global generation (Bauman 2008; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009) whose multicultural knowledge and life-attitudes break the traditional national, cultural and mental borders of identification in their lives. The growing trends of 'globalisation of one's own life', multi-positionality (Beck 1999), and individual and collective identity formation, where identities are connected to several places and nation-states (Gustafsson 2002, 33), are implicitly attached to young multiple citizens. Positive attitudes and competences have also connected them to political and sociocultural transnationalism and cultural pluralism due to their alleged multicultural, multilingual and multinational backgrounds and legal statuses, which, in many cases, enable them to engage in multinational political participation and free movement in more than just one state territory (e.g. Schuck 2002, 75). But how is this multifaceted reality reflected in how these dual citizens view dual citizenship at a time when the contents of citizenship are changing, stretching and yielding, but nevertheless are still primarily connected to national connotations?

This chapter examines how dual citizens position themselves regarding this general picture and what affiliations, contents and meanings, or orientations, they attach to their national state-citizenships and to the concepts of EU citizenship, world citizenship, and cosmopolitan citizenship. In this chapter, the methodological concept of *meaning* refers to how the dual citizens perceive the things they consider to be important, meaningful and central for multiple citizenship. The scrutiny is performed through an extensive analysis of a structured open-ended survey carried out in 2002 ($n = 335$) and interviews ($n = 48$) carried out in 2005 among dual citizens living in Finland. At that time, dual citizens living in Finland were mostly young, so this analysis focuses on them, but some older-generation informants are also included. This data has been analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The meanings are constructed from the data using phenomenologically sought common 'denominators'. The quantitative analysis has been used to describe the general features of the target-group (multiple citizens living in Finland) and pointing out the frequencies of their orientations.

3.2 Contemporary Discussions on (Multiple) Citizenship

A basic question in the context of this volume concerns the important and actual notion of methodological nationalism, and, accordingly, the criticism to the orientation of traditional sociology. What, then, does methodological nationalism have to do with citizenship? Methodological nationalism is the basis of citizenship in the frames of the state. This becomes apparent in several different ways when the research is addressed to the contextualisation of social phenomena in order to understand the main issues of our society. First of all, methodological nationalism is shown as something that ignores every point of view that does not promote a national context. Methodological nationalism is evident when nation-states are seen as a 'natural' environment for the studied processes and things, and research is narrowed down geographically to only concern the internal issues of a certain nation (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; see also Martikainen 2009).

But when the nation-state has been taken as the self-evident 'basic category of truth' and the unquestioned foundation of sociological research, the concept of society has been more or less narrowed down and made synonymous with the nation-state. Citizenship has thus remained as a taken-for-granted membership of a nation-state/society (Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 15; Beck 1999). The traditional understanding of the concept of citizenship in social sciences—particularly in sociology—has been one of the ground-stones of the promotion of methodological nationalism and incapable of unveiling the multiple phenomena that do not fit to this national order.

This could be a wise contextualisation for certain research projects, but we should nevertheless take into account the fact that a globally interconnected world affects also the national level. Thus, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009), among others, have called for the field of cosmopolitan sociology to take the global multiplicity of social life seriously and substitute or at least challenge the emphasis on methodological nationalism through methodological cosmopolitanism. This view highlights two points: the tasks of researchers as scientific observers who work in a global frame of reference and as active subjects who see themselves in a global frame of reference.

The focal point of all this is the way how multiple global processes have made citizenship something that can no longer be defined as mere nation-state membership. In contemporary debates, citizenship has been seen as being multilevel (e.g. Yuval-Davis 2007) or nested (Faist and Kivisto 2007b), reaching from local to global and connected to multiform, overlapping identities and loyalties (Lister 2003, 57). Formal citizenship can be like a nested matryoshka doll: a person can be a Welsh national, a citizen of Great Britain, an EU citizen and a Commonwealth member. In addition, he/she can be a multiple citizen of other nation-states. Rainer Bauböck (2010) has suggested that the concept of 'citizenship constellations' reveals the study of these kinds of structures, where people are simultaneously linked to several political entities (as nationals, dual nationals, expatriates, denizens, EU citizens, 'global citizens' etc. of multiple nation-states, sub-states, EU etc.).

But in what ways are they able to belong to many different nations, in terms of ethnicity and culture?

Citizenship, as concept, originates from the ties of formal membership between the citizen and the state and is connected to the substantial rights and duties attached to this status. This is also the definition used by this chapter. On one hand, formal citizenship status does not prevent a de facto exclusion from actual citizenship access that is based on, for example, age, ethnicity, class, gender or religion. On the other hand, people who do not possess formal citizenship but have a permanent residence permit (denizens) in a certain state often have substantial rights and can act like citizens without being citizens per se (Hammar 1990; Castles 1994).

In some ongoing discourses, it has been argued that in our global society, citizenship and nation should be separate and citizenship should refer only to a political community without any requirement of a common cultural identity (Castles and Davidson 2000, 25). Post-national citizenship refers to conditions where citizenship and citizenship participation are also placed and (partly) directed in institutions and structures beyond the national level (EU, International Law, INGOs, etc.). In this view, citizenship is increasingly connected to and vested in 'personhood' (cf. international human rights) rather than nation-state membership (Bloemraad 2004, 396). De-national citizenship, on the other hand, shows internal changes at a national level and in how people increasingly identify with cultural and local groups instead of nations and national identity (Sassen 2002). Whereas EU citizenship is a clear supranational juridical status, discourses of world citizenship, global citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship mostly stay at a rhetorical and ideological level. The idea of global citizenship goes back to the stoical, Durkheimian and Kantian idea of citizenship as a moral framework of humanity, where we all have obligations towards each other, including the 'aliens'.

It is beneficial to study the changes in citizenship and its new forms in the context of transnationality/transnationalism (e.g. Vertovec 2009). Whereas the concepts of internationality and multinationality can be traced back primarily to relationships between the nation-states or their agents, transnationality refers to co-operation between individuals and other entities regardless of nation-state boundaries, transcending national borders. Internationalism mostly refers to global co-operation between nation-states, whereas transnationalism refers to actions where the nation-states and their governments do not have an important or significant role or where they have no role at all. Transnationality generally refers to the socio-cultural, political and economic ties upheld by individuals, networks and organisations (Portes et al. 1999). It has also been particularly attached to new migration, where immigrants do not just integrate to a new home country but also maintain and renew their ties to their countries of origin (Grillo 2001, 7–9). Political transnationalism refers to political actions, rights and civic participation. Socio-cultural transnationalism refers to actions to maintain cultural, religious and social communality or transmit ethnic and cultural awareness (Forsander 2001, 50). Discussions around multiple citizens' affiliations and identifications have revolved around the concepts of post-nationalism and transnationalism, but have also lacked empirical studies. Thus, little information exists concerning people claiming a dual citizenship or the implica-

tions of those claims, let alone how the claims orientate to the various different contents of citizenship (cf. Bloemraad 2004; Conway et al. 2008).

3.3 Finland as a Context for Multiple Citizenship

Dual citizenship is a position that very much depends on differing state legislations, agreements and such, which also creates differences. This chapter particularly focuses on multiple citizenship in Finland. During the twentieth century, Finland used to be a country of emigration[1] and also a country that did not permit dual citizenship. This negative stance on dual citizenship especially concerned older migrants. Thus, dual citizenship in Finland used to mainly be a youth issue. Special clauses mostly permitted it for young people whose parents have different citizenships (see similar cases in Hansen and Weil 2002), as well as some people with refugee backgrounds. Thus, the majority of dual citizens living in Finland were children of (returning) expatriates, usually living in bi-national families with the other citizenship being from one of the major Finnish emigration destinations (Sweden, US, Canada or Australia and also Germany and Great Britain). A notable factor concerning Finland's foreign and domestic politics was its geopolitical position between the East and the West, especially its location near Soviet Union/Russia. Foreign political pressure was one partial reason for Finnish immigration policies being so cautious and strict. Since then, general global changes, the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU membership in 1995 and other international agreements have changed Finland rapidly, making it a growing country of immigration. This has also caused challenges for Finnish citizenship policy (e.g. Harinen et al. 2006; Ronkainen et al. 2007, 2008; Ronkainen 2011).

The increasing acceptance of dual citizenship also pushed Finland to allow multiple citizenship openly in its new Nationality Act, which came into force in 2003. More specifically, Finland followed the example of Sweden (which has permitted DC since 2001) and wanted to guarantee its membership in the European Convention on Nationality (1997) without any clauses or reservations. Due to these general changes, Finland could also fulfil the long-term wishes of over one million expatriate Finns who wished to acquire multiple citizenship (Ronkainen et al. 2007, 2008). Currently, reportedly nearly 69,500 multiple citizens live in Finland. Most of them have Finnish and Russian citizenships (nearly 19,500).[2] In statistics, they are

[1] Finland has about 5.3 million inhabitants. The number of foreigners in 2012 was 195,500 (3.6 %) and has grown over sevenfold from the early 1990s. Foreign-born residents (including naturalised citizens) in Finland form 4.9 % of the population (267,000). On the other hand, clearly over a million people living abroad are considered Finnish expatriates. The largest groups of foreigners in Finland come from Estonia (39,800) and Russia (30,200). Over half of the latter group are considered to be returning migrants with Finnish roots (so-called Ingrian Finns) (Finnish Immigration Service 2013).

[2] Russia allows their citizens to gain other citizenships, but if someone wants to become a Russian citizen, she/he has to renounce their previous citizenship.

reported as Finnish citizens, which partly explains why Russian citizens are not the largest foreign group despite being the largest linguistic minority, even though most migrants come from Russia. Russian citizens leave about 2,000 citizenship applications per year and the total amount of multiple citizens grows by thousands annually. Other big multiple citizenship combinations are Finland-Sweden (6,000), Finland-US (3,500), Finland-Estonia (2,900), Finland-Iran (2,800) and Finland-Vietnam (2,600) (Finnish Immigration Service 2013). Thus, the socio-economic and demographic character and the societal meaning of dual citizenship in Finland are constantly changing.

3.4 The Methodology and Data of This Scrutiny

The examination presented in this chapter is based on two different sets of empirical data. Survey data was gathered in 2002, at a time when multiple citizenship was officially mainly not permitted. The interviews were collected in 2005, at a time when multiple citizenship was openly permitted. Another important point to remember is that, due to changes to the Nationality Act, the survey respondents were all young people but the group of interviewees includes people of all ages. As full citizenship is connected to age and learning and internalising citizenship takes time and changes in different phases of life, older people have somewhat different perspectives and often wider chances to perceive citizenship discourses than younger ones. Considerable differences may also exist between young people. As a clear majority of the people surveyed for this analysis are young, this chapter forms a picture of different orientations to citizenship particularly from their perspective. Youth can be seen as a phase of life or a question of generations. It is a stage where people grow into citizenship and move into the sphere of its rights and duties. In terms of generations, 'youth' have been defined as a group that has been freed from traditional and national ways to create ties and identifications, including the ability to create new ways of constructing societal belongings (Ziehe 1991). On the other hand, young people are often excluded from possibilities of influence as citizens, although the central aspect in citizenship, continuity, particularly involves them. Young people are often connected to the idea of quasi-citizenship, as they are somewhat excluded from full de facto citizenship (e.g. Bynner et al. 1997).

The survey questionnaire was sent to dual citizens between the ages of 16–26. The data that was received ($n = 335$) represents the general situation of dual citizenship at that time quite well.[3] The number of Russian multiple citizens started to grow only after changes were made to the Finnish Nationality Act of 2003. As informants need some knowledge regarding their citizenship, the minimum age was set at 16.[4] The respondents had 51 different dual citizenship combinations and 5

[3] $N = 2{,}900$, a systematic sampling, response rate 50.2 %; female 182, male 153.

[4] After turning 16, people in Finland can also define themselves if they wish to participate in these kinds of surveys. The limit age of majority and full citizenship is 18.

different triple citizenships from all the continents. The most common compositions were Finland-Germany (51), Finland-Sweden (49), Finland-US (27), Finland-Great Britain (26) and Finland-Vietnam (20). Usually, these young dual citizens were children of bi-national families, with two basic exceptions: (1) Many of the Finnish-Swedish dual citizens are children of Finnish parents who moved to Sweden in the late 1960s and 1970s to seek work and a better living standard due to rapid structural changes in the Finnish society, which caused unemployment particularly in the countryside (300,000 migrants). Some of them moved back quite soon, and so their children are dual citizens due to 'being born in Sweden', without any other ties to Sweden. (2) Finland-Vietnam dual citizens, then, are mostly children of Vietnamese refugees who came to Finland in the 1970s and thus also come from 'mononational' families. These facts have to be kept in mind when reflecting the results.

Almost all survey respondents spoke Finnish well and returned their answers in Finnish (nine returned questionnaires translated into Swedish[5] and three returned English versions). All in all, 30 % of the respondents had lived almost their entire lives in Finland and 40 % had lived in the country since their childhood while 10 % had moved to Finland from another country as teenagers. The remaining 20 % consists of people who have lived mainly in another country, in many countries (as 'suitcase children') or who have lived steadily in both of their states of citizenship. Most of them spoke Finnish as their mother tongue, though many reported that they had two 'home languages' and also spoke other languages. The variety of citizenships, languages and religions inside their families tells of their multicultural roots and everyday conditions. Most dual citizens with Western backgrounds were relatively well-educated, as were their parents.

The interviewees were mostly selected from survey respondents who had clearly transnational life-histories. Some interviewees were also Finnish-Russian dual citizens, who are becoming the biggest group of dual citizens in Finland. The interviewees ($n=48$, 31 women and 17 men) came from different parts of Finland. Their age distribution ranged from 18 to 72. They had 29 different citizenship combinations and 3 of them were triple citizens. Their most common other citizenships (besides Finnish) were from US and Russia (5) and Germany and Turkey (4). Some interviewees (7) had lived their whole life in Finland, some (8) had been born in Finland but had also lived in other countries, 16 had migrated to Finland as children with their parent(s) and 10 had moved to Finland as adults for reasons of employment, family or military service. In addition, there were refugees (3) and returning migrants (4), two of whom belonged to the so-called category of Ingrian Finns. Fourteen interviewees had received dual citizenship at birth, 21 on application and 13 recently through naturalisation after Nationality Act (2003) had made it possible. Most of the interviewees spoke Finnish as their mother tongue or had at least an adequate knowledge of the language, and thus only some of the interviews were carried out in English.

[5] Swedish is also a national language in Finland, and Swedish-speaking Finns (about 300,000) are a traditional, well-established linguistic minority.

The main theme of these interviews was examining how dual citizens define the meaning and importance of multiple citizenship. The informants were asked about their general interest towards dual citizenship, the possible benefits and disadvantages of their status, their interests in political participation, their identification and membership in states and nations (also at local, EU and global levels) and their experiences concerning social integration and multiple citizenship during the course of their education. The analysis of this chapter is mostly based on the survey's open-ended questions, where the respondents were asked about the importance of having a citizenship and their use of their citizenships in different occasions. Both the data of the interview and the open-ended survey questions were analysed using multi-sided content analysis and, in case of the open-ended questions, thematic categorisations.

Before going into the different orientations that dual citizens affiliate to their formal state citizenships, we have to address a few general points. These open up and contextualise the different contents of citizenship and put their views on formal state citizenship in proportion. Most important points concern the generational differences in understanding the relationship between citizenship and nationality and respondents' views on EU citizenship, global citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship.

3.5 Differences and Conglomerations between Citizenship and Nationality

Citizenship and nationality are conceptually intertwined in many ways. From a traditional nation-state perspective, people are often required to combine nationality and citizenship in their lives: a good state citizen internalises the nationality of the respective nation (national identity). A study by Päivi Harinen (2000; cf. Modood 2007, 148–149) shows that young people question citizenship as state membership but do not question nationality. A similar notion is shown by the data of this chapter, where differences between these concepts have often been fluid and flexible. Citizenship was primarily understood as formal state membership, but its content was also evaluated critically. The required core idea of a citizen being a critical actor in civil society and a source for processes of change can be connected to this: an active citizen should critically evaluate their own membership and its other end, the state.

Thus, when citizenship was considered to be the same as nationality, meaning honouring and upholding one's own family's cultural legacy and roots, it was not questioned. However, when citizenship was equated to nationality as membership in a national collective and community, reactions towards the concept became more critical. This is mostly related to the connection between citizenship and nationalism: not pride in one's own cultural roots, but membership in an exclusive, fundamental and unquestioned communality that has been connected to historical terrors, persecutions and massacres. Educated dual citizens wanted to renounce all this,

although often their roots and identity also had a strong national dimension that resulted from belonging to a nation and being a part of it. The contents of citizenship were connected to a national belonging, but the interviewees did not want to emphasise the personal significance of citizenship when understood this way, as it was thought to refer to a nationalistic discourse that was felt to be opposed to pluralism, solidarity and equality. This was usually, but not exclusively, done by young people:

> I wasn't prepared to give up my Australian citizenship […] as soon as I heard that [both Finland and Australia changed their laws to approve dual citizenship], I put in my application and just waited. […] The prime issue was just to get Finnish citizenship, because I wanted also a sense of belonging, not that I didn't have any, but it's really a matter of making it official.
>
> I've been at home twice in fifteen years. […] I will always be an Australian and I'm not sure if I will ever be a Finn. I'm a Finn on paper. I identify with culture […] and I suppose, a way of life, which I quite enjoy. I wouldn't be here if I had problems with the, I'm not that masochistic.

Later:

> I'm a practical person and I don't put a lot of weight on nationalities and citizenships, I don't even give a damn, you know. I think that that leads to problems in the world. […] The more I travel the less time I have for all this nationalistic rubbish. (Australia-Finland, male, 44, interview)

Older informants and dual citizens who had migrated as adults usually had relatively conventional ideas about national identity and identified themselves more often with their country of origin. They felt that it was their only real identity and emotionally the most important one, whereas citizenship gained through naturalisation had a narrower meaning that was connected to work and the political sphere. Long life-histories in certain countries and socialisation processes emphasising national affiliations had created a permanent affiliation to one's 'own country', which formed the foundation of their attitudes towards the new *other* country and its societal structure, culture and social order.

Younger dual citizens questioned the conventional idea of citizenship symbolising national identity and its necessity more often than the older age groups (such as their parents). This kind of attitude was usually related to their transnational life histories that already began during their early childhoods, but could also be a result of a feeling of living in a postnational world, where local and global factors were felt to be more meaningful than the national ones. Different borders (interactional, cultural, lingual and national) appeared lower for young multiple citizens than their parents:

> I know that my Finnish friends have this kind of lovely that we are Finns and Finland yeah, but as I haven't lived here that long and don't have that strong ties, I don't always understand it, but I look at it quite positively, that I'm this kind of global person. (Finland-Nigeria, female, 29, interview)
>
> Whatever you do, you can never, never forget […] let's say root, you can never, never forget your root […] where you are born and bred, you can never, never forget. […] I am thinking myself as a Finn, but with a difference [laughs]. Officially I am a Finnish citizen, everything, even my papers with the Finnish nationality, […] everything is Finnish, Finnish,

> Finnish, even my children, so I take both, I have allegiance for both countries […] but we can never say we can forget Nigeria entirely. […] We have saying that two houses is better than one, you see I cannot despise Nigeria, I cannot despise Finland. I have respect for the two countries equally, I can go out for the defence of any of the two countries […] [son] has been on military service for Finland. […] My children they gain more, they have more than me […] because they cannot say that they discriminate against people from Nigeria, they cannot say, they discriminate against people in Finland, they have friends in both ways, they create multinational society that you understand one another, you live happily […] so children are getting benefit more than myself. (Nigeria-Finland, male, 72, interview)

Looking at the previous citation, we can recognise the idea, moulded by nationalism, that loyalty is a zero-sum game. The older informants discussed their views on identity and belonging from this perspective. Threat, loyalty, defending, honouring and contempt—all of these are emotional terms that the cited interviewee uses to tie himself to a state membership but also to rationalise and explain their exceptional relation to the other state. Young dual citizens, on the other hand, did not use this sort of rhetoric. This partly encapsulates the differences produced by different age-groups in defining the meanings of citizenships.

Although many interviewees wanted to detach citizenship from nationality, the terms were, again, coincided with other contexts. Citizenship symbolises a tie to one's own roots, and the smallest common denominator for national citizenship is one's own family. 'Generational citizenship' sheds light to the differing ways how ('national') cultural heritage is transmitted from generation to generation and what identity negotiations this creates among the families and multinational young people.

> My both parents have migrated from their own countries […] they have this kind of romantic affiliations to somewhere, although they haven't attached to it like, 'Oh! My country!', so they are not exactly like this, but they do have kind of weird nostalgia that they transmit to children […] [identity] is really kind of question that you have to deal and go through at some stage. (Finland-Greece-Sweden, 25, interview)

Parents want to transmit their cultural heritage to their children, who face their identity struggles as multiple citizens and multicultural people and create their own history of collective belonging (Bhabha 1994). Acculturation in different phases (Portes 1997) can be seen in how the children teach their parents to live in a new society, which also puts extra pressure on their generational roles inside these multicultural families. Despite ethnicity and culture, national belonging and experiences of citizenship also renew and change from one generation to another, especially in case of bi-cultural families and families with a migratory background. Contents of citizenship are transmitted through cultural habits, with the families' traditions being the most important upholders. Thus, talk about meaning of citizenship, in many cases, turns to reflections on culture. Culture is connected to state citizenship when its practice is related to the national context or longs for it.

> Is it somehow important that your children have both citizenships?
>
> Yes, very important to me, it's a mental issue. […] It was very important to me in the beginning and I was quite concerned about that they had citizenship, primarily because of if we'd choose to go there, they could've gone in the country without any problems and I hope that as they grow older, they will both individually spend a year in Australia, so they get to understand my home culture. (Australia-Finland, male, 44, interview)

In some cases, the parents' worries about upholding citizenship traditions and transmissions have highly concrete and ritualistic forms—if you do not get your citizenship at birth, you can get it as a birthday present:

> To another one of our sons we bought [Finnish citizenship] as a present, as a birthday present, when it became possible, paid the expensive price […] he would have never gotten it himself. (Finland-Canada, female, 67, interview)

3.6 Breaking the National Level: The Meaning of EU Citizenship and Global Citizenship

The development of EU citizenship has diminished the benefits received by the citizens of several EU member states, in comparison to people with only one citizenship. However, multiple citizenship also seems to make the European citizenship more important for multiple citizens from outside the EU.

The interviewed dual citizens tended to support an open EU with free movement and extensive rights for EU citizens. Only those who do not travel actively or use their other rights refrained from showing any interest or even having clear opinions on EU citizenship. Europe, as a concept, does not have the same sort of an emotional dimension as nations do, as it has not succeeded in creating a sense of collective memory or participation (cf. Anttila 2007, 118; Moscovici and Doise 1992, 74). As EU is considered to be remote and the possibilities to influence it are seen as weak, common participation is also not seen as being expedient. Lack of participation then hinders group identity. The interviews did show that 'Europeanism' existed as a concept, which was apparent in references to a certain geographical area, common history, the contents of EU citizenship, or expressed wishes for enduring peace and tolerance. As with national citizenship and identification, the idea of 'Europeanism' was mostly created by expressing a difference with something and having a common contrast. The idea and the meaning of being an European or a national of some certain state becomes concrete, when Europe is detached from its usual context (Westin 2003, 197–198) and when common cultural features and political models become apparent:

> Well, to a certain extent, you identify, when there has been this US against Europe arrangement, you identify yourself like European, and especially when you come from two different EU-countries you understand […]. (Finland-Germany, male, 26, interview)

Whereas EU citizenship is a clear juridical status and a supranational form of citizenship, world/global citizenship and cosmopolitanism have mainly been rhetorical constructs without any concrete references. The interviewed dual citizens often understood cosmopolitanism and world citizenship very differently, even though the words have similar etymological backgrounds [cosmos and polis] (cf. Werbner 2000, 11–12; Gordon 2004). For the informants of this analysis, cosmopolitanism was connected to elitism, urbanism and solely economical and material values, whereas global/world citizenship was understood to be more connected

to the standpoints of morality, culture and ethics, such as openness towards other cultures, one's own transnational and multicultural roots, and participation in international (non-governmental) organisations regarding, for example, environmental or human rights issues. Mere openness towards other cultures or global-level thinking was not considered to be enough to make anyone a 'real' global citizen: for the interviewees, global citizenship required dynamic global mobility. Arguments were also raised against global citizenship, as it was seen as something that renews selective and exclusive class-thinking. For the interviewees, world citizenship is also bordered, as everyone does not have the economic or physical possibility or 'cosmopolitan competence' to act globally.

> I would like to say that I am not a world citizen, because I think that there is something pompous connected to being fortunate, that there is something I'm well-off, I can be a world citizen […] maybe also that, that there is this trend, a kind of must to be a world citizen […] world citizen-compulsion. (Finland-Greece-Sweden, female, 25, interview)

Questions about world/global and cosmopolitan citizenship caused vastly different reactions among the interviewees: the mere idea amused some, while others were confused about the whole subject. For some, it was a focal dimension of personal identification. Overall, dual citizens with transnational networks and language skills felt closer to the idea of world/global citizenship more often than those whose ties do not stretch much outside their current home-states. Experiences of world-citizenship intimacy were connected to experiences of being in-between nations and without a national home-state or home place. As global citizens, they often wanted to detach themselves from materialistic and instrumental cosmopolitanism that, from their point of view, is only possible for some privileged, wealthy people.

Nevertheless, many of the interviewed dual citizens seemed match the definition of being a cosmopolitan citizen (Vertovec and Cohen 2002, 8–14), able to adjust to multiple loyalties quite well. Besides national networks, they possessed regional/local, transnational and global networks. They were open to cultural diversity and wanted to encounter the 'other'. They possessed personal skills and competencies that enabled them to learn to get to know other cultures, cope with them and internalise them. For them, multiple citizenship competence, meaning language skills, education and upbringing, experience of several states and cultures and the personal experience of feeling and being treated as 'different', could strengthen the possibilities of *cosmopolitan patriotism* (ibid.). Ideally, this brought together their loyalty to their own citizenships, openness towards multiculturalism and awareness of a global moral community and its obligations and commitments:

> [Dual citizenship] is really important, although that kind of belonging into two countries culturally and by identity is sometimes a bit hard. […] There is precisely maybe just that, that bicultural identity has helped in seeing things, that for sure there rights, human rights, that are in principal same for everyone and then there are certain kind of responsibilities, that go over state borders and you try take care of the environment, because it is not just our Finnish issue and because problems do not stay inside borders and you have to show solidarity also to other people than the ones near you, I think, that when you have many countries that have affected your identity, that may have awakened to think about these issues, that both the possibilities and threats are so transnational nowadays, that you can't, that you are in the world, that can no one bypass anymore. (Finland-Great Britain, female, 36, interview)

3.7 Back to the State: Multiple Citizens' Orientations to State Citizenships

The central interest of this scrutiny was examining the different meanings that dual citizens put on their citizenships. This made the importance of their states of residence salient. For them, the citizenship of their state of residence mostly had a current, collective, active and practical meaning. This is why the other citizenship(s) more often had more mental and personal meanings and had only a passive importance in connection with one's life-historical past or future.

For the respondents, residence-state citizenship had an active significance when connected with the rights and duties of citizenship (even though in a welfare society, the rights are usually tied to residence permits). For some of the interviewed dual citizens, residence state citizenship also had an easily emphasised collective meaning, caused by living inside the state and being a part of the reference nation. Citizenship of another state, however, generally (though not always) had more passive meanings in relation to their rights and duties. Some interviewees with permanent ties to their other state, for example, actively used their national expatriate voting rights whenever possible. The other citizenship had more of a mental importance, however, and gained its significance in relation to the past (one's own ethnic and cultural roots) or the future and the plans of migrating at some later date.

Life-history, education, family upbringing, knowledge of culture, and particularly language skills are used to construct the individual conceptions of national/social identification in social interaction and also mould the contextual meanings seen in dual citizenship. The practical value seen in the other citizenship, and the travelling, living, studying and employment possibilities it offers, also increased the overall value of multiple citizenship, as well as the mental attachment to it.

This data shows different orientations towards the importance of multiple state citizenships. I call these *national citizenship*, *formal citizenship* and *imago citizenship*. These orientations can also be linked to the respondents, categorising them as different types of dual citizens (see Table 3.1). It has to be born in mind that these categorisations reflect only the data that has been in use and generalisations based on it should be cautious.

The above-described orientations differ between the state of residence and the other country. People who expressed a *national citizenship* orientation saw the core meaning and the main importance of citizenship in their state of residence (Finland, in this case) as representing national identification, home country, collective roots and pride in national belongings. Citizenship and nationality were considered to be synonymous. Because citizenship was based on the residence state, it also had a secondary practical importance in relation to rights and duties.

> [Important of the Finnish citizenship is that] I feel myself a Finn so it's obvious that my national identity means a lot. (Finland-Japan, male, 22, questionnaire)

A majority of survey responses could be considered to have this orientation. It was mainly carried by young people who have lived in Finland since their birth or

Table 3.1 Multiple citizens' orientations towards their citizenship

Orientation	Important to possess citizenship of the residence state (Finland)	Important to have the other citizenship
National citizenship	Symbolises collective national belonging and national identity, 'home-country'	Symbolises personal roots and family roots
	Citizenship synonymous with nationality	Underlines ethnicity and represents cultural background
	Practical meaning comes in form of rights and duties	Emotional meaning
Formal citizenship	Citizens' rights	Same as with the citizenship of the other country but as a future possibility
	Equal position in society	
	Security	
Imago citizenship		Positive distinction from other residence state inhabitants
		A symbol of individuality and uniqueness

early childhood and have gone to school only in Finland and spoke Finnish as their only mother-tongue. For some of them, the other citizenship did not have any practical or emotional meaning, as they believed that they would also continue living in Finland in the future. Many of the dual citizens of Finland and Sweden seemed to have this affiliation. Thus, as 'national dual citizens', they differed to a considerable degree from the interviewed 'transnational dual citizens' who were introduced in the preceding chapters. 'National dual citizens' had no migratory backgrounds or active transcultural memories, transnational networks or meanings related to these concepts.

When defining the other country's citizenship, *national citizenship* orientation encompassed an emphasised meaning that symbolised roots and personal identity. Holding some other citizenship only had a personal emotional meaning, as the other nation was not an apparent reference group and as practical rights are mainly connected to a person's residence. Nevertheless, citizenship underlined ethnicity and represented cultural background. In the data of this analysis, Finland-Vietnam dual citizens with refugee backgrounds particularly shared this orientation. Recently migrated adults often also had this orientation. In general, people who are treated culturally and ethnically as the most distant from majority Finns emphasised an urge to connect the core meaning of their other citizenship to their personal roots and ethnic identity.

> Roots, relatives and childhood memories [are important in the other citizenship]. (Finland-Japan, male, 20, questionnaire)

In the *formal citizenship* orientation, the main importance of residence state citizenship was in how it enabled citizen's rights, equal societal position and feelings of security. In cases of citizenship in another country, same issues were highlighted—but only as future possibilities. People who had an extensively national

orientation towards their other citizenship also had a formal orientation towards the citizenship of their residence state. The instrumental or pragmatic values of the other country's citizenship were considered to be important.

> [Important in Finnish citizenship is that] I can live without restrictions in Finland; I have good studying and work possibilities, good relations to other countries, respect from others. (Finland-US, female, 20, questionnaire)
>
> [Important in other citizenship is that] in the future it is easy either to visit or move there. (Finland-US, female, 18, questionnaire)

Imago citizenship orientation means that the main importance of dual citizenship was being able to build a distinctive image and reputation among the fellow citizens by possessing another citizenship in addition to the residence state's citizenship. For these people, the possession of another citizenship was a sign of positive individuality and uniqueness. *Imago citizenship* orientation was not related to the residence state citizenship and is only possible for the multiple citizens. Affiliating the importance of citizenship in this way was a particular concern for young people who are just beginning to construct their social identity. An important factor of *imago citizenship* orientation was that the other citizenship was associated and amalgamated to a membership in a society that was felt to possess a worthy, eminent and exclusive reputation and value. In a Finnish context, this particularly means the citizenships of Western European and North American states. As seen in the preceding citation, the possession of a citizenship attaches an individual to the connotations of his or her national character and makes him/her personally responsible for the state's past, present and future. Thus, people often cannot fully renounce the national connotations of their citizenship and merely term it an insignificant 'piece of paper', even when they would like to do so. The meaning of *imago citizenship* was mostly personal and individual, but it emphasises individual value rather than emotional importance:

> [Other citizenship] makes me a bit different than 'ordinary Finns'. (Finland-Greece, female, 16, questionnaire)

In addition to the previously-mentioned orientations, the data of this analysis shows an orientation for *instrumental citizenship* (see also Harinen 2001, 36). Instrumental citizenship is only possible for multiple citizens, as it requires several citizenships to 'play with' or choose from. Instrumental citizenship is connected to arguments that multiple citizenship increases inequality, as dual citizens have more rights than singular citizens and can go 'welfare shopping' (Joppke 2001, 52). In its most aggravated form, this has meant maximising all the rights of citizenship and avoiding all the duties. This was, however, generally not the case among the informants. Citizenships were nevertheless used instrumentally or pragmatically to facilitate strategic flexibility (Conway et al. 2008, 375, 393) in transnational life course options and choices, but only rarely this was the most important meaning of dual citizenship. Instrumental citizens generally had transnational life-histories and were aware of the rights attached to their status and how to use them. They believed that it was important that their citizenship combination had a practical value in enabling or facilitating travel, studies, employment, housing and so on.

3.8 Hierarchies of Multiple Citizenship

Multiple citizenship establishes clear hierarchy for its holders—some of them are highly esteemed members of their societies and some others may feel dislocated in their country of residence or both of their countries. Finland-US multiple citizens, for example, have many practical transnational benefits (free movement and life in both EU and US without a Green Card) that also increases the emotional importance put into their status. Finland-Russia dual citizens might still face discrimination and suspicion, however, solely due to their citizenship status—even though it might also offer instrumental benefits. Discriminatory and prejudiced attitudes derive from the Cold War era and the resentment caused by two wars that Finland and Soviet Union fought during the Second World War period.[6] Thus holding Russian citizenship may increase feelings of being not welcome and strengthen dislocation from 'Finnishness'. By raising question of: 'Are you a Finn or Russian?', may increase feelings of dislocation in both countries.

Dual citizens whose both citizenships are Nordic citizenships did not see any advantages to their status, as their Finnish citizenship, due to many bilateral agreements, already granted them freedom of movement. In case of two citizenships of EU states, the opinions varied. Due to the Schengen Agreement, some informants did not see any benefits in dual citizenship:

> As Finland and Germany are both EU-countries it is practically the same whether you have dual citizenship or not. (Finland-Germany, male, 23, questionnaire)

Nevertheless, different EU states have certain unofficial practices that only benefit their own citizens. For example, a Finnish citizen who also has a German citizenship has, in practice, some benefits in housing, studying and employment when compared to those who only have a Finnish EU passport. A British or German passport held in addition to the Finnish passport, for example, can guarantee access to wider European labour and educational markets. For people whose other state does not belong to the European Union, a Finnish citizenship can also have special instrumental benefits. In the data of this analysis, the instrumentality of dual citizenship was linked to the act of balancing a sense of belonging and practical rationality:

> I hold Finnish passport, but introduce myself as Vietnamese—I feel to be more Vietnamese than Finn. (Finland-Vietnam, male, 23, questionnaire)

The two-way labour-market hierarchy of dual citizenship is emphasised in the global economy. Transnational relations, language skills and a good knowledge of cultures can benefit economic activity and employment (Forsander 2001, 51). Multinational corporations seek educated cosmopolitans that possess knowledge of

[6] In case of Finnish-Russian dual citizens, we should remember the different backgrounds of the respondents. Ingrian Finns are considered to be Finnish returnees and their 'Finnishness' puts them into a different position than migrants from the other parts of Russia (or Russians from Estonia).

many cultures and perhaps also have several suitable citizenships that lower the juridical, political and psychological borders that prevent the transnational mobility of the people. A dual citizen that fits into this mould has trust in his/her possibilities to succeed:

> When you get a bit older you have this feeling that sometime in the future when you get good education maybe you could go back, at least to look how work life there would feel. And if one could give own input that the society would develop. Also that when you see the country and enormous economy growth you see it as country of possibilities. In a way that you could do something for the country but also take own part from it. (Finland-India, male, 21, interview)
>
> [Dual citizenship] promotes cultural activities between countries, for example trade and economy, it makes lot easier if you send from Finland a Vietnamese that has had education here, I have a friend that went to practical training there now, it's nice for us too to work in that environment, and it's much more beneficial for the firms to send Vietnamese than some Finnish fellow, that does not know language and culture that well. It improves the standard of living and develops friendship relations between countries. (Finland-Vietnam, male, 24, interview)

Working in international corporations located in Finland does not require Finnish-language skills, either. Then again, a dual citizen that does not enter negotiations in international markets but tries to cope and find a more routine job in the national Finnish labour market easily finds her/himself in situations where dual citizenship creates doubts. Merely having a 'weird foreign name' can become a threat and an obstacle for employment.

This two-way hierarchy also leads to two-way distinctions that dual citizenship (partly) creates. Having a dual citizenship can create a positive distinction by opening up several new life-political opportunities. The mere formal status of dual citizenship often creates an illusion that the dual citizen possesses international competence, language skills, and so on, even when this is not the case. Dual citizenship can also be used to attain positive attention, interest and personal uniqueness, as could be seen in our discussions of the imago citizenship orientation. However, dual citizens can also be considered untrustworthy and eccentric, which may worsen their employment possibilities. Negative distinction can derive from biased attitudes and historical stereotypes that are linked to their other citizenships (Russians in Finland, Germans and World War II). Other people's negative or positive reactions can also relate to ethnicity and cultural habits instead of citizenship, but for a dual citizen, these aspects can be inseparable from their citizenship status. Studies carried out in Finland have shown that people who are treated ethnically, culturally and religiously the most distantly have to face the most suspicious and prejudiced attitudes from others during work-life and everyday interactions. As an example, employers and officials in Finland have been shown to view people coming from Middle-East, Africa or Russia the most negatively and people from other Nordic countries, Western Europe or North America the most positively (Pitkänen and Kouki 2002; also Jaakkola 2005). This shows that ethnicity and culture are still integral parts of citizenship as a lived reality, despite its new, transnational forms and contents.

3.9 Summary: Varying Contents of Multiple Citizenship

Multiple citizenship has become a concrete form of trans-societal membership, but empirical studies covering the subject have been neglected. This chapter examined the multiple citizens' orientations towards the contents of their citizenship. The results can be summarised as follows. First and foremost, multiple citizens understood citizenship as (a) critically evaluated formal state-membership, but also as (b) something positive representing their personal and familiar cultural roots and/or underlining their own ethnicities or (c) a status that symbolises national belonging and national identity. Youth with transnational life-histories and networks (transnational dual citizens) particularly wanted to renounce the emphasis on a national collective meaning in citizenship, as they connected it with vilified nationalism. Thus, they reflected and affirmed well the discourses of a global generation (Bauman 2008; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009) and transnational or post-national citizenship (cf. Bloemraad 2004; Conway 2008). Older dual citizens, however, saw emphasised meanings in the citizenship of their country of origin. They felt that it was their only true citizenship and coincided the meaning with national affiliations. For them, the citizenship of their current residence state had a more practical and instrumental meaning, which was connected to the spheres of politics and employment.

Nevertheless, dual citizens who only had life-histories in their country of current residence (national dual citizens) did not see much value in their multiple citizenship status and saw nationality and national belonging as the core meanings of their citizenships. Similar distinction was also apparent in their views on EU citizenship, global citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship. Dual citizens with transnational life-histories and ties of family and friendship saw EU citizenship and global citizenship in the most positive light. Then again, people who had all meaningful ties extensively inside one country did not even have clear opinions on EU citizenship or had no ideas about global or cosmopolitan citizenship. It is important to underline that the informants of this analysis often understood world/global citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship very differently. Cosmopolitan citizenship had a rather negative tone connected to elitism and materialistic values, whereas world/global citizenship was considered to be connected to ethics, cultural openness and human rights. For some 'transnational dual citizens', world citizenship was the most important form of collective identification. It is worth noting that different life-histories also put multiple citizens into different national or trans/post-national categories and multiple citizenship should not be reflected merely as an ongoing transnational status. Also, although European citizenship or global citizenship may not replace national citizenship, they have become concrete parts of the sphere of citizenship.

Multiple citizens had different orientations concerning the importance of their state citizenships: *national citizenship*, *formal citizenship*, *imago citizenship* and *instrumental citizenship*. In all of these, the state of residence had a salient meaning. Multiple citizenship can also form a two-way distinction in many other arenas. Holding a 'right' combination of citizenships can become an implicitly recognised

asset. Then again, inside the national sphere, with a combination of citizenships that creates 'wrong' collective stereotypes, multiple citizenship can even become a burden for its holder. In these specific cases, citizenship status can become a factor increasing dislocation from citizenship in practice. Nevertheless, multiple citizenship in the light of this data seems to be mostly a positive, unproblematic and rather privileged status. Citizenship still has both official and unofficial importance in defining how individuals are located to a certain national or political community. Multiple citizenship increases the leeway of choosing your national, binational or transnational identity and this way creates spaces for positive dislocations from taken-for-granted national assumptions and affiliations. In terms of dislocation, multiple citizens seem to be safe from discriminatory treatment in general (as they are also partly 'us'), but their citizenship combinations still define the social locations of their everyday lives quite strongly.

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Part II
Studying Dislocations: From Methodological Nationalism to Methodological Cosmopolitanism

Chapter 4
Which Side? Young Multicultural Generation Facing Nationalistic Research Frameworks

Päivi Harinen and Antti Kivijärvi

4.1 Introduction

In public debates concerning the nation-state, implicit references to immigration and emigration are often connected with the problem of identity location, but also with problems of security and loyalty. After all, nation-state citizenship, as an ideological principle, has turned individuals into parts of a collective state system. It has generally been thought that confirming one's loyalty to a nation-state requires a strong sense of belonging, where individuals are made to subordinate their personal welfare to the principles of common welfare (see Ronkainen 2009). This sense of belonging has, in turn, been created through the production of social constructions, such as 'a common origin' and 'a place of our own'. One nationality, connecting citizens at the level of belonging, has been the most important political goal and achievement of the nation-state (e.g. Bauman 1992).

However, these nation-state citizens, in Finland as well as elsewhere, have increasingly begun to represent various different nationalities. This has meant that questions of national loyalty have lost their self-evident nature and become visible and worthy of consideration in a wholly new way. In practice, the new active nature of these questions of loyalty is seen in various considerations relating to the compulsory military service of the immigrants and their willingness to defend the country where they live, their need to choose a side (and the demands that they make this choice) and their readiness to sacrifice their personal interests for the collective when the idea of a 'common origin' is not enough to explain those sacrifices (e.g. Harinen and Ronkainen 2003). An implicit assumption of these questions seems to

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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_4

be that increasing immigrant populations cause a new loyalty risk: how can people who are not, by their nature, 'us', be expected to defend 'us and our area' from threats to our community, whether from the outside or the inside?

In this chapter, we scrutinise empirically how immigrant-background youth living in Finland see Finland's national foreign policy and security policy. Starting points of this study include the current debate on national loyalty (e.g. Ronkainen 2009) and the ongoing debate on methodological nationalism. The concept of methodological nationalism has been created as a critique of the reproduction of the global national order and how this self-evidently functions as political and sociological guide, even though in practice peoples' lives do not fit these frames any more—and it is questionable if they have ever done so (Chernilo 2006). Among other things, this critique of methodological nationalism is augmented by the fact that the younger generations living in a global reality have made cosmopolitanism, which surpasses state borders and national boundaries, something that inevitably increases (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009; Nowicka and Rovisco 2009).

Recognising methodological nationalism, learning to get away from it and interpreting the experiences of the younger generation would require the researchers to seek new concepts and methodologies of research that are not bound to the nation-state categories (see e.g. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller 2009). The principle of methodological nationalism still guides socio-political research, however. Among other things, this is shown by how the informants of immigration and multiculturalism studies are regularly asked questions like "what country do you identify with" or "are you planning to move to Finland permanently?" (See Harinen and Ronkainen 2010).

The above-mentioned trap of methodological nationalism is also visible in the way the quantitative data of this study was collected (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009). The chapter is based on the Finnish Youth Barometer, where respondents are categorised into Finnish majority youth ($n = 1897$) and immigrant-background youth ($n = 203$).[1] The focus of the survey was measuring the attitudes and views of the youth towards Finnish defence and foreign policies. First of all, this division of respondents illustrates the methodologically nationalistic research setting: the

[1] In this chapter, we use the term 'majority youth' to refer to youth whose native tongue is Finnish or Swedish and who have at least one parent born inside the borders of the Finnish state. We use the term 'youth of immigrant background' for the second group of informants. They were chosen for the Youth Barometer primarily on a linguistic basis—their native language had to be something other than Finnish or Swedish. Furthermore, the group was chosen for this chapter so that at least one of the young person's parents was born outside of the borders of Finland. The language-based samples have been criticised for being too narrow, as they often only include people who have recently moved to the country and leave outside a great deal of young descendants of immigrants (see Martikainen 2007; Martikainen and Haikkola 2010). Partly due to this, the sample of immigrant-background youth also includes (regardless of the native language) youth who have themselves been born and who have one parent born outside Finland, and those whose both parents have been born outside of Finland. As is evident at this stage, the artificial border between these two groups of respondents is a great way to demonstrate how problematic concepts like 'majority' and 'person with an immigrant background' are when describing a manifold reality where national borders are increasingly porous.

interest is on measuring the differences between the majority and immigrant populations. Secondly, many of the questions take the Finnish nation-state as a self-evident point of reference, with the commitment of youth to the national institutions being the primary concern. Thus, the main aim of our chapter is scrutinising the extent of our young respondents in stretching and challenging the image of citizenship, limited by methodological nationalism, offered to them in this questionnaire—as might be hypothetically expected based on many of the current thinkers.

4.2 Target Groups and Analysis

In our analysis, we pay particular attention to questions and propositions that might be expected to measure ties to the Finnish state and its military defence. We will also look at how the youth view UN and EU as guarantors of international stability. UN and EU were the only supranational institutions mentioned in the questionnaire. Other transnational institutions and organisations, like NGOs that diverge from the national order, were not mentioned.

National defence is not merely a question of a self-chosen loyalty relationship or distancing oneself from it. According to the Finnish Constitution (731/1999, 127§): "Every Finnish citizen is obligated to participate or assist in national defence, as provided by an Act." In practice, this means that every healthy adult young male is required (and every healthy adult young female permitted) to go through military service or a civilian alternative and, when needed, participate in armed, operative national defence during wartime. This, then, also includes immigrants who have obtained a Finnish citizenship—unless they have double citizenship, with another country's laws offering possibilities for surpassing the draft (Ronkainen 2009).

Finnish youth are not generally considered to be very interested in foreign policy or domestic policy. School curricula have received criticism for this, among other things (e.g. Brunell and Törmäkangas 2003). The results of the previous studies hint that immigrant-background youth are more interested in political questions than majority youth and are also readier to act according to their political views. In particular, the questions of human rights have inspired youth who have experience in living in some other societal order than the Finnish one (Harinen and Ronkainen 2003; Harinen et al. 2009). It is not known yet, though, how the immigrant-background youth who live in Finland see UN and EU in the frame of national and international security.

Study institutes are often national institutions meant to offer information for national decisions and policymaking (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 306; cf. Levamo et al. 2010). The Youth Barometer is a crystallised example of this sort of a regular national information-gathering system. The Barometer's material is gathered using the principles of a nation-based classification system and according to those principles, even though the critiques of methodological nationalism are aimed against settings like that. The methodological nationalism of the questionnaire leads us to analyse the data by comparing the answers of the immigrant-background respondents with the answers of the majority youth respondents. According to the

principles of the critique of methodological nationalism and the so-called 'new left' (see e.g. Könönen 2011) analysis of society, we have also included gender, age, living area, education and membership in the Evangelical-Lutheran church as background variables for grouping the respondents. We start with the view that possible group-based differences in frequencies cannot be explained entirely (or at all) by immigrant background, cultural differences or 'country of origin'—it has been asserted that differences and inequalities originate from social and hierarchical processes that are far more complicated (e.g. Anthias 2001).

We have analysed these materials by calculating the distributions (frequency, percentages) and significances of inter-group differences (chi square tests of independence, *p marginal value = 0.005*). We have calculated the significances with cross-tabulation, with the material roughened by dividing the respondents to three attitude categories: those who agree, those who disagree, and those who are uncertain or unsure. After this, we used SPSS Statistics to find out how these three categories of respondents are divided into cross-tabulation 'cells' in relation to different background variables. The value of *p* tells us the chances that we have made a mistaken assumption in saying, for instance, that there is a clear gender difference in relation to some attitude-measuring proposition in some part of the material. The smaller the value of *p* is, the more likely it is that background variable differences in the material are systematic and convincing. In reporting the results, we've rounded the percentages in the proper text to the nearest integer.

The background information of the Table 4.1 tells us about the demographic nature of the target group and their status as youth living in Finland. There are no large differences in the sex ratios of the immigrant-background youth and the

Table 4.1 Description and comparison of the target groups

	Immigrant-background youth (*n = 203*) (%)	Majority youth (*n = 1897*) (%)
Women	48	49
Men	52	51
15–19-year-olds	24	34
20–24-year-olds	35	32
25–29-year-olds	41	34
Youth who live in the countryside	7	28
Youth who live in a city	93	72
Youth who live in Southern or Western Finland	90	75
Youth who live in Eastern or Northern Finland	10	25
Youth who have completed secondary education or are currently taking it	56	67
Youth who have completed tertiary education or are currently taking it	37	30
No schooling beyond primary education	7	3
Youth who belong to the Evangelical-Lutheran church	61	90

majority-population youth. The immigrant-background informants are, on average, slightly older than those representing the majority population, and they are also relatively more highly educated than the majority youth. As the frequencies clearly challenge the view of immigrant youth as a group with a relatively low educational status in Finland (for instance Kuusela et al. 2008), this result is probably best explained by the differing ages of the respondent groups. The greatest background information differences are probably related to the place and the area of the respondents: many of the immigrant-background respondents live in the capital region or the large cities of Southern and Western Finland. There is, unsurprisingly, also a difference in whether the respondents belong to the Evangelical-Lutheran church. Immigration is obviously diversifying the religious landscape of the Finnish society (see also Harinen and Ronkainen 2003; Martikainen et al. 2008).

4.3 Loyal Citizens

In international discussion, current youth have often been considered a global or cosmopolitan generation (Bauman 2008; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009). This leads to the traditional cultural and national-ideological borders becoming full of holes and tears. In particular, young people whose personal histories have included lives in many countries or who are in the middle of many cultural meaning-worlds have often been considered as people who will question many of the values and life-choices of the older generation, including those that might be interpreted as patriotic (e.g. Harinen 2000; Ronkainen 2004; Harinen and Ronkainen 2010).

In our data, the young respondents were posed with claims strongly connected to the idea of a Finnish nation-state. They were asked, among other things, to offer their opinion on Finland's national defence system and compulsory military service and to evaluate their own willingness to participate in civil duties that are related to these institutions. The questionnaire also included questions on how the youth view the Finnish state as a (foreign) policy actor and what they consider to be valuable and worth defending in Finland and Finnishness. Behind these questions and assumptions, we can see an attempt to measure and concretely evaluate the loyalty of the youth towards the Finnish nation-state (e.g. Ronkainen 2009). The answers of youth with immigrant background, in particular, are interesting. In what amount are minority youth, who do not easily fit in the great national story of a common Finnish origin and roots (see Alasuutari and Ruuska 1998), willing to commit to this narrative and reproduce it, both at the value level and the level of concrete life choices?

The theory of a global generation, recognised in discussions about multiculturalism, and its liberal attitudes do not receive particular support in this data. Quite the reverse: the views on national and general conscription offer remarkably few challenges to the current system and practice. Even though there is an ongoing critical conversation about the needs of a compulsory military service, as many as 72 % of all the youth who answered the survey support general compulsory military service in principle. There are no statistically significant differences between the majority

youth and the immigrant-background youth. Both the majority youth and the immigrant-background youth are quite sceptical about voluntary military service and the prospect of not having a national army at all. Clearly over half of the majority youth (64 %) as well as immigrant-background youth (57 %) agree that Finland needs a strong, independent defence system, and the differences between groups of respondents are not statistically significant here, either. The results are in line with the result that only one youth in every 10 agrees with the following view: "The changing world has made general compulsory military service unnecessary." Bit over a half of both the majority-population group and the immigrant-background group disagree with this statement.

Furthermore, according to data, the youth still retain a strong personal will to participate in national defence, going against our hypothesis. The respondents were posed with claims measuring extreme loyalty, as they were asked about their readiness to participate in military action, violence (either as a perpetrator or as a victim) and even about the possibility of having to sacrifice their own lives for Finland. Posed with these claims, they proved rather loyal to the Finnish state. For instance, over 60 % of the majority youth respondents agreed to some degree or entirely with the line "If Finland is attacked, I'm ready to give up my life for Finland". Notably, 54 % of those with an immigrant background also expressed their willingness to sacrifice themselves in a similar way. This difference between these groups of respondents is not statistically significant, either. We should note, however, that the above claims may not be relevant to all youth, particularly the immigrant-background youth. We arrive at this conclusion due to the fact that in statements measuring readiness to sacrifice one's own life for the Finnish state, the immigrant-background youth had chosen the option "uncertain/unsure" somewhat more often than the majority youth.[2]

There also were no statistically significant differences in the views of the majority youth and the immigrant-background youth in their views about the Finnish state as a global political actor or as a part of a global world order. The two groups of respondents were, unlike we expected, rather in agreement with the following provocative statement: "Finland should mostly concentrate on looking after Finland and Finns." Only less than 10 % of the respondents, both in the immigrant-background sample as well as the majority-youth sample, disagreed with the statement completely. If we assume that most of the immigrant-background youth have social ties and a life-history outside of Finland, this result seems surprising. Both groups of respondents were also quite negative about the statement that the Finnish defence force should participate in the control of crises and security threats all over the

[2] Fifteen percent of the immigrant-background youth had chosen the option "uncertain/unsure" for the statement "if Finland is attacked, Finns should defend themselves with arms in all situations even if the situation looked uncertain", with the same percentage being 10 for other respondents. Eighteen percent of the immigrant-background youth and 11 % of the other youth could not or would not give their opinions on the statement "if Finland is attacked, I am ready to personally participate in defence of the country in my personal wartime role". The percentages were 17 and 14 for the statement "if Finland is attacked, I'm ready to give my own life for Finland".

world, which is partly in line with the view that the Finnish state should look mainly after those living in Finland.

There were no great differences between the two groups of respondents when their views on the statement "a stronger role for cross-border actors, such as UN and EU, in foreign policy and crisis management" were compared. Both the immigrant-background youth and the majority youth were quite positive about this, going against the nation-state-centric line of the previously analysed answers. Their views on the role of EU differ, though, as the immigrant-background youth see it somewhat more important than the others ($p = 0.000$). This result might be considered surprising based on the theories of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009), as most of the immigrant-background youth participating in the study have ties to the world outside of the EU states and North America, and it is they who should be the most critical towards Europe that is closed off from the 'outsiders'.[3] On the other hand, this result is logically connected to the idea that, for many immigrants, EU citizenship is an added value to the Finnish citizenship (Ronkainen et al. 2007).

When looking at the previously mentioned results as a whole, the only possible conclusion is that the data reflects firm identification to the national categories and values rather than a strong challenge to them. Identification with the Finnish state and defence forces is, at times, surprisingly strong. When the respondents were asked to locate themselves on the scale patriotism–non-patriotism (measured on a scale from 1 to 5), over 60 % of both immigrant-background youth and majority youth placed themselves on the patriotic end of the scale (1 or 2). Of course, this raises a question—what state do the immigrant-background youth feel patriotic towards? They were not directly asked this question.

The strong positive attitude towards national defence of the immigrant-background youth is interesting when looking at where they locate their national identity. Eighty-two percent of them define themselves (at least to some degree) as Finns, 80 % as Europeans, 80 % as global citizens, 68 % as immigrants and 64 % as foreigners. The questions of identity make borders lose their meaning, and a young respondent can position him- or herself quite well in many different, even contradictory, identity categories.

To some degree, these national categories break down in how the immigrant-background youth often answered "uncertain/unsure" (or otherwise did not take a clear stand). For instance, when the youth were given the open question "what they consider worthy and worth defending in Finland", as many as 77 % of the immigrant-background youth did not answer the question directly or answered that they could not say. The share was 54 % in the group of majority-population youth. This may

[3] Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009, 33) divide the new "global generation" to two groups: on one hand, the youth from the poor areas, who, thanks to increased media images and the possibilities offered to them by the freedom of movement, are attempting to break into the European or American zone of prosperity ("Generation More") and, on the other hand, Western youth who are trying to get used to the new life of uncertainty and globalisation ("Generation Less"). The first generation fraction should, thus, be critical about the European Union, as it permits internal movement within the EU and the free movement of EU citizens to every other place of the world but attempts to stop the movement of those coming from elsewhere to its own area (Fortress Europe).

indicate language problems, but it is also possible that many youth (both those of an immigrant background as well as those of native population) do not consider these questions to be particularly relevant in a globalising world.

4.4 Differences and Similarities

In this chapter, we aim to dodge the trap of methodological nationalism by refusing to merely divide the group of respondents (roughly and, by necessity, artificially) to 'us' and 'them'—the majority population and the immigrant-background population. The wider analysis of the material was made using cross-tabulation of the statements that had to do with Finnishness, patriotism, national defence and international security policy, with background variables that are used to divide people into groups (gender, age, education, living area, membership in the Evangelical-Lutheran church). As we wanted to see whether this sort of analysis reveals differences (or similarities) on the majority-immigrant axis, we first looked at both sub-data separately and then side by side.

Like previously, we measured the statistical significance of the differences between groups through a chi square independence test. We now offer the results of these tests by concentrating on the analysis, which fulfil the conditions of the chi square test (*p*: *border value* = *0.005*). The background variables of gender, age and, to some degree, Evangelical-Lutheran church membership proved to be the ones with the most explanatory power. However, educational background or the living area of the respondents was not able to explain the attitudes and views of the youth as a background variable.

Gender as a Dividing and Uniting Factor In the nation-state debate, the duties of citizens regarding national defence are strongly gendered (e.g. Yuval-Davis 1997). Participation in national defence is also considered to be a question of gender equality these days, and women increasingly participate in international crisis management (Jukarainen and Terävä 2010), the Finnish society has traditionally considered the physical use of force and armed operative military actions to be the province of men. When comparing the answers of the native-population men and women, it seems that questions of national defence are still gendered in the world of youth.

The principle-measuring claim "if Finland is attacked, Finns should engage in armed defence" divides the majority-youth respondents to different attitude groups based on their gender. The attitude of the majority-youth respondents is shared relatively by more male than female respondents, who are often unsure of their views ($p = 0.000$). It is worth noting that the differences between the genders are not noticeable with the immigrant-background respondents. In the sample of majority youth, the male respondents expressed more readiness to personally participate in possible wartime duties than female respondents ($p = 0.000$), and again the difference between the genders disappears when looking at the immigrant-youth sample. The claim that concerns the extreme sacrifice for one's own nation—"the readiness to

die for Finland"—shows something that repeats what is shown above: the majority-youth men are readier to die for their country than females ($p = 0.000$). In the immigrant-youth sample, this claim does not divide the genders in a statistically significant way.

At some places, comparing the genders in the immigrant-background sample turns the setting upside down: the immigrant-background women are steadier supporters of national defence than the men. Thus, the sub-data concerning the immigrants shows a clearer support for strong Finnish defence among female than male respondents ($p = 0.005$). This difference between the genders disappears, however, when we look at the other claims concerning the same field in the sample of immigrant-background youth.

The answers to the questions of international security policy also show the gendered nature of attitudes, particularly with the majority-youth respondents. Most young majority-population women are strong proponents of a national defence system, but they also consider the transnational actors to be important in the advancement of world peace. "Making the roles of UN and EU stronger in international security policy and crisis management gets" clearly more support among female respondents than male respondents (*UN*: $p = 0.000$, *EU*: $p = 0.000$). On the other hand, for this question, the group of uncertain respondents includes clearly more women than men—the attitudes of majority males are more black-and-white in the questions of security policy than those of females. There are no such gender differences in the immigrant-population sample.

Age as a Grouping Variable In addition to gender, age ended up being one of the background variables showing the most differences between respondents. The respondents were divided to three age-groups for this analysis: 15–19-, 20–24- and 25–29-year-olds. In our age-group analyses, we noted the same thing as with gender: a systematic examination of both samples shows that age separates the respondents of majority youth more than those of an immigrant background. It is worth noting that the age-group of 20–24-year-olds of majority youth, in particular, seems to be quite traditional and even patriotic in their answers. For instance, the claim "Finland needs a strong, independent defence system" gets clearly the strongest support among the respondents of 20–24 years ($p = 0.000$). Answers to the claim "if Finland is attacked, Finns should engage in armed defence" are similar and similarly age-grouped ($p = 0.000$). As age increases, this no-compromise attitude seems to weaken, however.

The 20–24-year-old majority youth respondents are more willing than the other age-groups to participate in military defence if necessary ($p = 0.000$). The same age-group included relatively the largest amount of people ready to sacrifice their own lives for Finland ($p = 0.000$). The youngest group of respondents was the most negative about the idea. Among the immigrant-background respondents, the questions of military readiness did not show any age-group differences.

Multinational security institutions and their importance were considered positive among both the oldest and the youngest majority-youth respondents (*UN*: $p = 0.000$, *EU*: $p = 0.000$). The 20–24-year-olds have a more negative view, which is logical,

considering their patriotic attitudes.[4] The immigrant-background sample also shows an age-group difference in the question of the importance of EU: "EU's security policy importance" is particularly stressed by the immigrant-background respondents who are over 25 years old ($p = 0.000$). Similar age-related tendency is notable in the answers of the immigrant-background respondents when evaluating the importance of the UN. An age-group comparison for the claim "Finland needs a strong and independent defence system" shows that the youngest group of immigrant-background respondents agrees with the claim the most ($p = 0.004$). It seems that in the immigrant-background sample, the oldest age-group breaks from the nation-state ideology the most strongly.

When all these age-group comparisons are placed side by side, we notice the same phenomenon as with gender comparisons: with many claims, there are no differences between the samples, and with other claims, the age-group differences turn up being opposite when comparing the majority youth to immigrant-background youth. A bold interpretation of the previous gender and age-group analyses might be that the immigrant-background men, in particular, are part of a new 'global and cosmopolitan generation' with their views that challenge the nation-state order—at least their attitudes are clearly different from those of the majority-population 20–24-year-old males.

The Significance of Church Membership The information presented by the previous table tells us that 90 % of the majority youth participating in the barometer interviews and over 60 % of the immigrant background youth are members of the Evangelical-Lutheran church. Membership or non-membership in the Church proved to be the background variable showing more differences within the majority respondents than in the group of immigrant-background respondents. Our analysis shows that the trinity of home, faith and the fatherland still exists as a force that weaves together attitudes and values.

Questions where church membership explains the differences in attitudes between the majority-population respondents include those that have to do with categorising oneself as being patriotic or unpatriotic, the necessity of an independent defence system, the readiness to participate personally in military action, "the necessity of military defence and the superiority of general compulsory military service when compared to other defence systems". Majority respondents belonging to the Evangelical-Lutheran church systematically consider themselves more patriotic than those who do not belong to the church. When they are asked about their own "readiness to participate in wartime functions and how well general compulsory military service fits Finland as a defence system", the result is the same: both receive more support from those belonging to the church ($p = 0.005$, $p = 0.000$).

The claim "Finland, if attacked, should defend itself with arms in all situations" also gets different levels of agreement depending on whether the respondent belongs

[4] In the age-group analysis, the group of 20–24-year-old majority-youth respondents was not completely consistent: the claim "The changing world has made compulsory military service unnecessary" surprisingly got the most support in this middle group ($p = 0.000$).

to the Evangelical-Lutheran church or not. Both the majority-youth respondents ($p=0.001$) as well as the immigrant-background respondents ($p=0.004$) who belong to the church are systematically more likely to support the claim than those who do not. As a background variable, church membership is also significant when the immigrant-background youth were asked about their "readiness to sacrifice their own lives for Finland". The respondents who do not belong to the church take a more negative and uncertain view of this extreme sacrifice than those who do ($p=0.002$).

4.5 Towards New Research Settings

In constructing our argument, we were guided by the hypothetical idea of nation-state ideology weakening at the personal experience level of young people. Our hypothesis was strengthened by youth studies on multiculturalism and the general societal debate about the strengthening of cosmopolitan life attitudes (Nowicka and Rovisco 2009) and the weakening of national defence institutions. Nation-states, however, still have a strong political and practical role in the lives of people and their general security (Agamben 2000; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 325; Hutchins-Viroux 2010). Perhaps for this reason, attachment to the nation-states is strong and their prominent role in global politics is self-evident among most of the youth living in Finland, even though the national backgrounds of the Finnish youth are becoming increasingly varied.

Looking at our empirical data, we can say that with many attitude claims, the differences between the majority youth and the immigrant-background youth are smaller than differences inside those groups, such as with gender or age. It also seems that internal variation in the majority youth group is more general than in the group of immigrant-background youth. Gender is the background variable that shows the clearest differences between the respondents. It is somewhat surprising, however, how the gender differences become statistically significant among the majority youth respondents. Even though it is often emphasised that gender is not as meaningful a source of variation among the Finnish population as in many other regions, the data of this study lead to other types of questions. Young men of a majority-ethnicity background seem to be traditionally nationalistic compared to the women and especially the young men of immigrant background.

Thus, the methodologically nationalistic comparison between majority and immigrant-background youth does not provide many statistically significant differences. Immigration, cultural background and 'country of origin' are often merely one, relatively meaningless variable among the others. It is not realistic to expect that an extremely multitudinous group of people, varying in their age, gender, socio-economical, religious, cultural and ethnic backgrounds, could be analysed as one. Thus, both with research and with public debates, there is a need to be careful when societal phenomena and people's attitudes are explained through immigration or national cultures.

The attitudes of immigrants are often compared to the 'national average' (as has been done here) without noting the dimensions of age, gender or socio-economic status (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; see also Anthias 2001). When these factors are considered, the statuses, the readiness and the attitudes of immigrants are put into a new light and turn the views from cultural differences to economic power structures and material circumstances (Rumbaut and Cornelius 1995; cf. Könönen 2011). In this chapter, we have not yet reached the full meaning of these factors, but these results might be considered as one step towards further studies and more sophisticated analysis, probably leading to studies that challenge methodological nationalism.

Finally, immigration is often portrayed as a national loyalty risk, but our analysis can calm down those who feel the most concerned: most immigrant-background youth define the country they live in as worthy of commitment and defence. Our results may cause feelings of disappointment for those who share the critique of methodological nationalism; a concern about the resilient nature of patriotism and nationalism. What happens in the future if the young generation defines itself by the same national values as their predecessors? Will the world of attitudes, coloured by the nation-state ideology, change due to citizens living their transnational youth?

However, the methodological argument of our paper is that we need to be careful about above interpretations: the similarity of the opinions of immigrant-background youth and other respondents does not necessarily tell the whole truth or reveal the many dimensions of their world of experiences. Firstly, national and cosmopolitan stances do not necessarily exclude each other. Secondly, critiques of methodological nationalism include an inherent claim that research that takes nation-state discourses, loyalty and history as given things cannot explore cosmopolitan or transnational realities (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 304). This risk is particularly a part of structured questionnaire-based studies. Repeating similar questions, tied to a nationalist ideology, might offer the researchers the same answers time after time, particularly in data-gathering situations where the questions get quick responses without further thinking. The room for expressing cosmopolitan attitudes might be diminished in methodologically nationalistic research settings.

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Chapter 5
Embodied and Moral Methodological Cosmopolitanism in Opposition to the Rise of Neo-nationalism: A Micro-analytical Perspective

Sofia Laine

5.1 Introduction

22 July 2011 dramatically changed the theme of youth political participation in transnational political meetings and gatherings. What happened on that date on the island of Utøya, Norway, was an attempt to paralyse a certain subgroup of a political generation. The mass murderer had a political mission—intercepting the growth of a multicultural society. Few days after the Utøya massacre, International Peace Bureau (2011) offered its condolences to Norway and urged a greater commitment to peace-work. In their letter, they state:

> We share their sorrow at these truly appalling atrocities, committed against so many young people—future leaders of the Labour Party—and even the government itself. While we struggle to understand the mindset which could justify and coldly plan such attacks, we fervently hope that Norwegian society and its democratic representatives will find ways to reinforce the country's well-known commitment to openness and tolerance, rather than the reverse. The post-atrocity policy debates will undoubtedly reveal a wide range of opinions on issues from immigration to policing and surveillance of extremist groups. It will be a testing period for all those who wish to maintain Norway's traditional openness, both to the outside world and in terms of domestic practices, especially the close links between politicians and people. In this sense there is an important connection between democracy and peace-making. […] The response cannot be a society with more security controls, armaments and police power. Instead, we need to find new ways to foster a global culture of peace and non-violence. True security can only be built on justice, co-operation and compassion for fellow humans, across all borders and religious/ethnic/political divides.

Since 2006, I have travelled to many different continents, i.e. South America, Africa and Europe, in order to understand how young people participate politically in transnational political meetings. I have gathered data from the World Social Forums (Mali 2006, Nairobi 2007 and Belém 2009), the European Social Forum

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_5

(Malmö 2008), the Global Young Greens Founding Conference (Nairobi 2007) and the EU Presidency Youth Event (Hyvinkää 2006). In these events, I have focused on the roles of the young people, their experiences and their ways of participating in these events (see Laine and Gretschel 2009; Laine 2009, 2011). In this chapter, I aim to discuss more generally what I believe could be an embodied and moral methodological cosmopolitanism, as well as how its development and use in research settings is important for challenging the rise of neo-nationalism. My perspective is micro-analytical, i.e. while I focus on the face-to-face interaction by using several different methods, I also aim to understand more generally how the 'transnational interaction order' becomes true: Where are conflicts grounded in the everyday actions in political events and what do these contestatory performative acts demonstrate in a wider context. In this light, I see the tragedy of Utøya as an extreme cosmopolitan micro-political conflict between those striving for global cooperation and understanding and those who highlight the differences among different groups of people, especially nationalities.

In his manifesto, the mass murderer clearly emphasises his militant far-right ideology, including his support, to a varying degree, of cultural conservatism, ultranationalism, Islamophobia, Zionism, anti-feminism, right-wing populism, Serbian paramilitarism and white nationalism. The manifesto calls for the violent annihilation of "Eurabia" and multiculturalism to preserve European Christendom[1] (See also Robbins 2011). The above list may be seen as a very extreme version of neo-nationalism and is used here as an example, because the murderer's values led him to attack an international political meeting for young people in order to paralyse the political activity of the next generation whose values were quite opposite to his.

In the next section, I will explain what is this 'all' that may count as cosmopolitanism and why moral cosmopolitanism is under study in this chapter. Then, I will turn to research methodologies and take a look at methodological cosmopolitanism and methodological nationalism as research practices. After that, I focus on concepts that I call embodied and moral methodological cosmopolitanism and argue for their importance. The moral methodological cosmopolitanism is discussed in the light of the sociology of absences, developed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2009). In the section on embodied methodological cosmopolitanism, I argue why embodied methods are crucial for understanding cosmopolitan micro-politics, i.e. practical cosmopolitanism. Here, I follow in the footsteps of Erving Goffman (1983) and use the interactions between the cosmopolitan youth and the police as an example of embodied micro-analysis.

[1] All this is described in Wikipedia—The Free Encyclopedia.

5.2 What Kind of Cosmopolitanism Opposes Nationalism?

The cosmopolitan ideals have been put forward since antiquity. Back then already, the motivating idea in acting like a 'citizen of the world' was helping human beings—and sometimes the best way to do that is to serve as a teacher or a political advisor in some foreign place. At the same time, some travel to learn. In other words, a cosmopolitan considers moving away in order to serve (the world). Onora O'Neill writes (2002, xii):

> […] the countless institutional changes that we group under the label 'globalisation' may have altered the very context of political action, and created the space for something that we could well call 'global citizenship'. If this is the case, the moral cosmopolitanism that has been articulated and praised since antiquity may perhaps from now on be increasingly realised through forms of institutional cosmopolitanism, in which actions whose effects go beyond borders will be judged in a new and more demand light.

Not all cosmopolitanism is moral cosmopolitanism that tries to build universal human rights and world peace among the citizens of the world. Nor do all the cosmopolitans search for global forms of democracy and governance. Another kind of cosmopolitanism is promoted by the capitalist globalisation of 'free' trade in terms of freedom of global movement for goods and individuals (cf. Massey 1999). Here, the cosmopolitans are those who have the interest and the necessary resources to travel abroad, to benefit the most from the different locations of the world. And the other way around, not all those who see moral cosmopolitanism as important have the resources to travel across the planet—or the willingness to do it, for environmental or ethical reasons.

Villiina Hellsten (2005, 54) has emphasised the significance of viewing the practical cosmopolitan resources of the informants. She calls these resources a *psychological cosmopolitan readiness*, defined as knowledge of foreign languages (especially English), higher education, the possibility to travel abroad (for the purpose of leisure or work), having international friends, and acting internationally in organisations. Handling new technology (Internet, chat and other forms of e-communication and electronical information) is also a cosmopolitan skill. Transnational political meetings, for example, are spaces where institutional cosmopolitanism appears. Also, it is important to note how the participants have different amounts of cosmopolitan resources and how these resources have an effect on how the person participates in these events and how likely it is that he/she will follow the process in the future, e.g. is he/she able to follow the process globally or not.

In recent research, cosmopolitan practices have been viewed from the perspective of networks, consumption, technologies, communication, capital, flows and mobility of the people from travel and tourism to the migrant studies (incl. exiles and refugees). Focusing on cosmopolitan practices, Magdalena Nowicka and Maria Rovisco (2009) find two analytical levels:

1. Cosmopolitanism as a practice that is apparent in things that people do and say to positively engage with the "otherness of the other" and the oneness of the world;

2. Cosmopolitanism as a moral ideal that emphasises both tolerance towards difference and the possibility of a more just world order.

Ulrich Beck (2010, 287) encourages researchers to discover, map and understand the *cosmopolitan condition*: what is the cosmopolitanism of the twenty-first century—and how to reach methodological cosmopolitanism. As Beck (ibid.) asks: "what are alternative, non-national units of research? What are post-national concepts of the social and the political?" The post-national concepts of the social and the political, sought by Beck (ibid., 286), are, in my study, equal to freedom in terms of Hannah Arendt (2005, 129):

> Freedom of movement […] is rather the substance and the meaning of all things political. In this sense, politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense.

In other words, in this chapter, moral cosmopolitanism is understood as an attitude in favour of freedom and equality among human beings (Guibernau 2008, 149). In addition to attitudes and values, this research is located in situations where concrete moral cosmopolitan actions take place. Guibernau (ibid., 151) continues:

> A cosmopolitan culture should exclude the values, principles and social practices present in some national and other types of culture, which deny the equal worth and dignity of all human beings. It should reject all aspects of particular cultures tolerating, defending and promoting discrimination and inequality on grounds of gender, age, health, race, religious faith, social status and other mechanisms utilized to exclude people and curtail their freedom.

From this definition of cosmopolitan culture, it is easy to understand how neo-nationalism and its values create an opposite culture. Next, I will discuss methodological cosmopolitanism and ask questions about how to apply the aforementioned issues to concrete research practices.

5.3 Methodological Cosmopolitanism Opposing Methodological Nationalism

During my research project, I have asked what would be a suitable methodology for studying active young global citizens and their actions in different global locations. While looking for answers, I have studied 'new cosmopolitanism', which Ulrich Beck (2010, 286) sees as a thing that unites at least three interconnected commitments:

1. Shared critique of methodological nationalism;
2. Shared diagnosis that the twenty-first century is an age of cosmopolitanism; and
3. Shared assumption that, for this reason, we need methodological cosmopolitanism.

To open the first commitment more, as Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2002) have stated, methodological nationalism affects research in three ways. First, the research ignores the points of view other than those promoting national context. Second, nation-state is seen as the 'neutral' environment for processes and things.

Third, research is narrowed down geographically to concern only the internal issues of a certain nation (Wimmer and Glick Shiller 2002).

I would say that every research project can be placed on a line where, at one end, there is something like 'pure methodological nationalism' and at the other end, 'pure methodological cosmopolitanism'. In practice, all research settings are somewhere in-between. Furthermore, the traditional research settings that focus on issues that happen inside national borders may be moral and ethical in other ways, even if *moral cosmopolitanism* is overlooked. In my research setting, methodological nationalism is contested by focusing on transnational political meetings where the actors come from around the world.[2] The focus is on the cosmopolitan sphere where the participants handle global themes. The national context is diminished at the same time as the local (i.e. location of the event) and the global (i.e. the participants and the issues of the event) contexts get more attention.

Even if the researcher is assumed to follow moral cosmopolitanism, the locations and the research topics may vary from their cosmopolitan orientation. Therefore, methodological cosmopolitanism can take place wherever a cosmopolitan sphere appears, or whatever cosmopolitan themes, "things" (Marcus 1995), groups or individuals are studied. Cosmopolitan or transnational spheres cross the limits of nation-states and connect the local and the transnational—even the global—in many different ways. In these locations, people aim to form a cross-border collective, to search for transnational dialogue, networking, even for chances to act. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009, 26) see two levels in methodological cosmopolitanism:

> first, the level of social scientific observer, who *researches* generations in a global frame of reference (observer perspective); second, the level of the active subjects, the members of the global generations, who *see themselves* in a global frame of reference (actor's perspective). (Ibid., 26)

For example, a researcher who tries to understand people's political participation in transnational meetings needs to follow them to different political spheres—i.e., *global spaces of experiences and expectations* as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009) describe it—that flare up and disappear in different global locations. At a more general level, methodological cosmopolitanism may be used in multi-sited global ethnographical research and it can also be applied to research where the focus is on localised transnational practices of politics (see e.g. Luhtakallio 2010) or our everyday lives and their social relations (see e.g. Hautaniemi 2004; Peltola 2010). Actually, in this cosmopolitan age (cf. Beck 2010), the researcher easily finds global connections and cosmopolitanism everywhere. Therefore, it is not only the research location and/or the topic but also the attitude and method that necessitate the turn to cosmopolitanism, especially in the case of *moral cosmopolitanism* where the researcher aims to 'serve the world' with his/her research.

[2] Even though most of the participants always come from the event country or its surroundings, all the events had participants from Europe, North and South America, Africa and Asia. For example, the division of the Global Young Greens participants was as follows: Africa 89 (50 Kenyans), Americas 5, Asia Pacific 31 and Europe 26 (Global Young Greens 2007).

Table 5.1 Research and researcher's positions and questions towards cosmopolitanism in practice

		Research	
		Cosmopolitanism as a practice, apparent in things that people do	Cosmopolitanism as a moral ideal
Researcher	As a social scientific observer, who *researches* in a global frame of reference (observer perspective)	"How cosmopolitan are the ways how people act?"	"How cosmopolitan are their values and missions?"
	As an active subject, a member of the global generation, who *sees him/herself* in a global frame of reference (actor's perspective)	The same question as above, and in addition: "how cosmopolitan are these research practices?"	The same question as above, and in addition: "how cosmopolitan are the values and missions of this research?"

What I have concluded in Table 5.1 are different research and researcher positions and questions considering different kinds of cosmopolitan orientations. In other words, the research results may look different depending on whether the researcher posits himself/herself as a social scientific observer or as an active subject, i.e. a member of the global generation (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009, 26). The results may also be different according to the practical dimensions of the informants' cosmopolitanism that the research focuses on, i.e. how they *act* their cosmopolitanism or how cosmopolitan their values are. In other words, the researcher may study structures and institutions (e.g. what kind of nationalism or cosmopolitanism do they support), actors and their actions (e.g. how nationalists/cosmopolitans act and whether their actions tied to their values and worldviews) or methodologies (i.e. ways of conducting research on cosmopolitanism/nationalism). This chapter discusses the latter focus—more specifically, methodological cosmopolitanism.

The researcher who tries to reach 'methodological cosmopolitanism' needs to actively seek new ways of conducting research to be sensitive towards the rapidly changing moral cosmopolitan culture. This calls for openness and awareness towards diversity, difference and hybridity, and also demands the researcher to consider the ethical and moral consequences of his/her research multidimensionally at each phase of his/her research. As Nowicka and Rovisco (2009, 2) describes:

> It is important to stress that cosmopolitanism—understood as a moral ideal—and cosmopolitanism—as enacted in the outlooks and practices of ordinary individuals and groups—are dimensions of cosmopolitanism which, although analytically distinct, are intrinsically related at the level of empirical reality. In this sense, and in some particular contexts more than others, concrete individuals embrace and mobilize—with different degrees of reflexivity—certain cosmopolitan values and ideals which allow them to develop a cosmopolitan imagination and a moral standpoint.

I have considered it important to develop the moral cosmopolitan research practices in social sciences—teaching ourselves (i.e. researchers) to ask new kinds of questions from our informants. Here the *asking* needs to be understood as widely

as possible to include careful *listening* (see Back 2007), with several different—likewise embodied—techniques, to grasp new kinds of answers. In the following subchapter, I will first ask the question of how to adapt something I call 'moral methodological cosmopolitanism'. After that, I will focus on embodied techniques and argue how these techniques may be helpful as methodological cosmopolitan research practices.

5.4 Moral Methodological Cosmopolitanism: From the Sociology of Absence towards the Sociology of Ecologies

Returning to Table 5.1, what I call here a 'moral methodological cosmopolitanism' is relevant to the values and missions of the researcher as well as his/her research practices. To make methodological cosmopolitanism moral, it is also necessary to be aware of colonial history and how *westernisation* still continues today. Its history has been described by Quijano (2007) in the following way:

> The repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over the resources, patterns, and instruments of formalized and objectivised expression, intellectual or visual. It was followed by the imposition of the rulers' own patterns of expression, and of their beliefs and images with reference to the supernatural. These beliefs and images served not only to impede the cultural production of the dominated, but also as a very efficient means of social and cultural control, when the immediate repression ceased to be constant and systematic. […] Cultural Europeanisation was transformed into an aspiration. It was a way of participating and later to reach the same material benefits and the same power as the Europeans: viz, to conquer nature—in short for 'development'. European culture became a universal cultural model. (Quijano 2007, 169)

Quijano's description leads one to ask what counts as relevant knowledge in today's world. It also questions the way we identify the relations between "western-based scientific knowledge and other knowledges derived from other practices, rationalities or cultural universes" as Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2009, 193) says, continuing: "Ultimately, these are differences about what it means to be a human being." Santos suggests a new perspective that he calls *ecologies* (ibid., 196) that he develops from *the sociology of absence*. With the term *sociology of absence*, Santos refers to attempts to expand the present in order to make visible the experiences that have been made invisible by modernity/coloniality and Eurocentric views. As Ramón Grosfoguel (2011) says: "Invisibilised absence is produced socially, both by relations of power and by hegemonic social sciences, and yet it produces 'available experiences'."

Santos (2009, 196) focuses on the sociology of absences in the following way:

> To be made present, these absences need to be constructed as alternatives to hegemonic experience, to have their credibility discussed and argued for and their relations taken as object of political dispute. The sociology of absences therefore creates the conditions to enlarge the field of credible experiences. The enlargement of the world occurs not only

> because the field of credible experiences is widened but also because the possibilities of social experimentation in the future are increased.

Santos' (2009, 196) aim is to replace the monoculture of thoughts and knowledge with *ecologies* to emphasise the importance of developing more sensitively any rational monoculture that might follow and attach itself not only to methodological nationalism but to methodological cosmopolitanism, as well. Next, I will go through all five ecologies that Santos builds and consider how this kind of epistemology could be useful in moral methodological cosmopolitanism.

First, *the ecology of knowledge* confronts the logic of monoculture of scientific knowledge with the identification of other knowledge. The sociology of absence points to the forms of ignorance or lack of culture. In the ecology of knowledge, the "central idea is that there is no ignorance or knowledge in general", as Santos (2009, 196) writes, continuing: "All ignorance is ignorant of certain knowledge, and all knowledge is the overcoming of a particular ignorance." Therefore, moral methodological cosmopolitanism as a research practice would benefit from being sensitive to a wide variety of knowledge, as well as from the researcher being sensitive to both the hints of his/her own ignorance and that of the informants.

For example, some young people participate in various transnational political agoras as expert citizens who lack cosmopolitan resources. Should there be no common language, it might be a challenge for the researcher to reach these young people and their knowledge. Still, it is important for the researcher to be aware of the difficulties in reaching certain groups of participants and to consider how this lack affects the overall picture of the young people's participation he/she gives in the research report.

Santos also describes *the ecology of temporalities* that challenges the monoculture of linear time. He explains *the ecology of recognition* that stands for "a new articulation between the principles of equality and difference, thus allowing for the possibility of equal differences" (Santos 2009, 195–197). In this chapter, I want to focus more on the fourth ecology that is *the ecology of trans-scale* confronting the logic of global scale, as Santos (ibid., 197) explains:

> The de-globalisation of the local and its eventual counter-hegemonic re-globalisation broadens the diversity of social practices by offering alternatives to localised globalisms.

In the sociology of absence, this refers to the monoculture of the universal and the global, and non-existence is produced under the form of the particular and the local (ibid., 196). Here, moral methodological cosmopolitanism could benefit from micro-political analysis of the local settings and we should think more about what local actions tell at a general level, which is also a macro level. For example, I have studied the micro-moments of disruption and disorder inside transnational political meetings. In light of this study, it seems that these moments—when something unexpected captures the core of a political gathering—are in fact crucial elements of deeper democracy (Laine 2009).

Fifth, *the ecology of productivity* consists of the recuperation and valorisation of the alternative systems. The sociology of absence points to a monoculture of criteria

for capitalist productivity and efficiency, where non-existence is produced in the form of non-productiveness: sterility, lack of skills and laziness (Santos 2009, 196). Here, moral methodological cosmopolitanism could, for example, focus on new types of solidarity economy or the wide variety of creativity, as creativity is often also equivalent with productivity.

'Time banking', for example, is one type of globally used solidarity economy. It is a pattern of reciprocal service exchange that uses units of time as a currency. This unit of currency is valued at an hour's worth of a person's labour. Reciprocal volunteering, community participation and active citizenship are encouraged, particularly for the socially excluded persons who normally volunteer the least (Seyfang 2004).

In conclusion, I state that in order to oppose the rise of neo-nationalism, the above-mentioned five ecologies are important guiding principles for *moral methodological cosmopolitanism*. These guidelines may help methodological cosmopolitanism stay away from the problematic categories and enable the researcher to dive into the diversity and richness of global humanity. From there, they can look for an understanding of what a global community could be.

5.5 Embodied Methodological Cosmopolitanism: Interaction between the Cosmopolitan Youth and the Police as an Example of Analysis

Returning once more to Table 5.1, what I call here an 'embodied methodological cosmopolitanism' has to do with the embodied practices of the researcher. When looking for methodological possibilities to study structure/agency relationship in the cosmopolitan sphere, embodied understanding may prove useful. Chris Shilling (1999, 543) has criticised the way these theoretical conceptions of this structure/agency relationship often share a relatively disembodied view of the agent "which overemphasizes cognition and marginalizes the significance of the emotional dimensions of interaction".

Ervin Goffman (1983) has studied systematically and in depth the *interaction order*, i.e. face-to-face relations and bodily co-presence. His studies will get a new significance when interaction happens in the transnational spheres. In these spheres, where people speak several different languages and where there often is no single language that everyone can fluently use, corporality, presence and the pre-discursive forms (particularly vision, embodiment and emotions) will increase in significance. Therefore, here exists one opportunity of methodological cosmopolitanism for analysing the interaction order: how informants locate and move their bodies. In this kind of a performative thinking, one needs to focus, besides the data, on one's personal experience from the field (Gergen and Jones 2008, 14). 'Performative' also refers to the researcher's different bodily techniques and his styles of understanding and gaining knowledge of the global social movements. As Lis Engel (2008, 8) describes:

> This means that we, as embodied qualitative researchers, must attune ourselves to the event as openly and fluidly as possible, and then express the felt meaning in relation to human practices and possibilities through embodied scenic description, inviting a critical dialogue and embodied understanding in relation to human practices, possibilities and existential meaning.

Next, I will show some examples of embodied methodological cosmopolitanism by using some micro-political episodes from my fieldwork as examples where cosmopolitan actors face national actors. Here, the police is used as an example of the latter category. With the term 'micro-politics', I refer to William E. Connolly's (2002, 2006), and Macdonald (2002) writings, where he relates the term to the arts of the self and the techniques of the self. As David Campbell (2008, 296) encapsulates, micro-politics.

> involves those practices that work on us or are drawn on by us to establish us, individually or collectively. They are techniques through which existing identities can be stabilized, new ideas permitted, or new formations enabled. They can locate in a multitude of cultural and social sites […] though they always work at numerous 'in-between' points, nodes, and lines of the network state. Micropolitics flows from the paradoxical relationship of identity/difference and is vital to a deep, multidimensional pluralism.

Micro-politics indicate the significance of the transversal rather than the transnational, highlighting how the global is simultaneously local and the local is also necessarily global (Campbell 2008, 297). For this reason, when focusing on the micro-political side, there is always a link to the macro-political side. *Doing* micro-politics points to the importance of 'techniques of the self'. Connolly describes this in an interview (Macdonald 2002, 169): "Such tactics mix image, movement, posture, concept and argument to a new effect, simulating the process by which the habit in question became embodied the first time around." *Studingy* micro-politics calls attention to a methodological mixture of image and movement analysis, participatory observation and interviews, i.e. different techniques and equipment which we can use to capture the micro-world (see also Scheff 1990, 28).

In embodied methodological cosmopolitanism, where micro-politics occurs in certain spaces at certain times (Goffman 1983, 3), the focus is naturally on the cosmopolitan actors and their actions (e.g. the micro-politics may be performed by global social movements or at a transnational event). Here, the example comes from the WSF Nairobi in 2007, where the police stood at the entrance gates of the venue site at all times. In an interview after the event, a 27-years-old male informant recalls:

> It was a safeguarding event very strongly.
>
> Did it increase fears? (Sofia Laine)
>
> Yes, definitely. The more I was scared, the more those guys had guns, at least in my case it works like that. Goddammit I got panicked when the first guard at the gates had helmet on and an assault rifle on his hand, it made me think if I even have courage to go there. It [safeguarding] works totally in an opposite way, but for sure there are things going on.

For the researcher, in order to work with something like 'embodied methodological cosmopolitanism', it is highly important to do ethnography and be embodied in the studied moments. For example, I, too, remember how the appearance of the

Nairobi police was strongly present: How I, too, paid attention to the rifles they had, and how it was in the news every day that the Nairobi police had shot someone (often called 'robbers' in the articles) on the street. In this case, the different research techniques needs to include at least participatory observation and interviews.

The involvement of the participants in the interaction order is often critical, and therefore different emotions, mood, cognition, bodily orientation, and muscular effort are intrinsically involved (Goffman 1983, 3). Like in the quotation above, ease and uneasiness, unselfconsciousness and wariness are central (ibid.). Even when I focus, with my example, on the interaction between the young actors of the transnational political events and the police, the emotions and bodily orientations may vary greatly. This becomes evident with the next example: a case from ESF Malmö.

The case occurred during a demonstration which formed a part of the programme of ESF Malmö. Starting from a multiethnic suburb, Rosengård, the demonstrators paraded more than 3 h across the city singing, dancing, shouting political messages and carrying banderols. The ambience of the police, many of who were women, was also friendly and helpful. The atmosphere changed in the city centre. 'Dialog polis' disappeared and riot police appeared. First, they stood alone in the corners, but as the demonstration crowd proceeded closer to the centre (and nearer to the banks and commercial houses), the columns of police officers in a full riot gear became longer. I did not feel safe. I felt the police was there only to affirm the money and the market, not to protect the people but to harm us.

Right then, where the demonstration was getting short of laugh and the atmosphere was getting very serious and dark, the *Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army* (CIRCA) appeared. Wearing clown costume mixed with army clothes (see Fig. 5.1), the clowns started to imitate the police: clowns stood in the lines between the police, marched to the end of the police queues and tried to look as serious as the police officers did.

Fig. 5.1 CIRCA in ESF Malmö (Leo 2008)

What worked in the times of renaissance still continues to work. Clowns brought about a carnivalesque atmosphere by turning the controlling mechanisms upside-down: the lowest (the clown) and the highest (the policeman) exchanged places. Clowns adapted sarcasm to the moment. Suddenly the whole world seemed absurd. The visuality, intensity and the shape of actions are highly important elements in the "interaction order" that "allows others to glean our immediate intent and purpose, and all this whether or not we are engaged in talk with them at the time", as Goffman (1983, 3) describes.

Even though CIRCA is a global social movement that has its own web page[3] and videos of their action across the globe in the YouTube, I argue that it is not enough for a researcher to study their actions virtually. As Goffman (1983, 3) states, the necessity of face-to-face interaction is rooted in certain universal preconditions of social life. When looking at social movements or global solidarity at a more general level, it becomes even more important that the people feel that they can pass each other closely and safely. Furthermore, to build a global culture, the people need to feel safe with each other.

What is interesting here is that the function of the police is ensuring safety. The police officer is a personification of the state, designated to put in practice the enforced law, protect property and reduce civil disorder in civilian matters (see e.g. Police Foundation 1996). In ancient Greece, the term *πολισσόος* (*polissoos*) referred to a person who was guarding a city or cities. In terms of Goffman (1983, 6) the police, acting as a personification of the state, "provides stand-by arrangements for stepping in when local mechanisms of social control fail to keep breakdowns of interaction order within certain limits".

As a third example from my research, in the EU Presidency Youth Event (Hyvinkää 2006), the police carefully planned beforehand how they could ensure the maximum safety of the participants. As I worked as an EU meeting coordinator at that time, I gave the police a precise timetable and explained where the guests would be located. For example, a few days before the conference started, I drove with the police down the walking path the guests were using to get back to the hotel after the opening ceremony. This is interlinked with the social ritualisations that are, in Goffman's words (1983, 3),

> the standardization of bodily and vocal behaviour through socialization, affording such behaviour—such gestures, if you will—a specialized communicative function in the steam of behaviour.

To return to what happened in Utøya, it is not a coincidence that the mass murderer wore a police uniform. He wanted to support the state (i.e. keep the nation clean), and additionally the police uniform gave him an opportunity to carry arms. He saw the meeting as a hazard and a threat to his country, and claimed to be the final authority in taking control of the nation's future. In this police costume, he

[3] Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA). http://www.clownarmy.org/about/about.html.

embodied the nation-state and faced the global community in the bodies of the young actors of the camp that he wanted to eliminate.

In conclusion, Goffman's microanalysis gives many useful tools for studies motivated by embodied methodological cosmopolitanism. The micro-political situations, where the police (i.e. personification of the state) and the cosmopolitan actors (i.e. personifications of the global community) interact, may provide rich data for analysing and understanding the conflict between nationalism and cosmopolitanism at a more general level. It is important to underline here, once more, the need for the researcher's own embodied understanding of the primary data (see also Juris 2008, 329).

5.6 Conclusions

> The liberation of intercultural relations from the prison of coloniality also implies the freedom of all peoples to choose, individually or collectively, such relations: a freedom to choose between various cultural orientations, and above all, the freedom to produce, criticize, change, and exchange culture and society. This liberation is a part of the process of social liberation from all power organized as inequality, discrimination, exploitation, and as domination. (Quijano 2007, 178)

Quijano supports the perspective of 'new anthropology', where the focus is on similarities and common humanity. Opposition to this world-view is promoted by different kinds of terrorism. In this chapter, I have discussed how methodological cosmopolitanism can be developed to serve moral cosmopolitanism and, from that position, oppose rising neo-nationalism. In addition, I have called for something I have named 'embodied methodological cosmopolitanism' to grasp the global in the micro-world and micro-events in a certain place at a certain time. As the nation-building projects needed methodological nationalism during that period, now the global age needs methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009): research that would shed light on the international connections of local phenomena across national borders, in a multi-disciplinar, multi-methodological, polyphonic and multi-locational way. In a research setting driven by methodological cosmopolitanism, the data needs to be diverse to support globally diverse knowledge and orientations. At the same time, the different kinds of data need to be equally respected and treated.

A researcher who shares a 'moral cosmopolitan identity' engages him/herself in an active struggle against all the ideologies, value systems and social practices impeding the fulfilment of human freedom and equality (cf. Guibernau 2008, 152). The combination of moral and embodied methodological cosmopolitanism is challenging but also very useful. The 'moral' component spurs one to look for diversities equally and understand their true richness. The 'embodied' component also stimulates the researcher to look for similarities and things in common with the orders of interaction.

In future studies, the epistemology of methodological cosmopolitanism is hopefully investigated further. For example, the different possibilities offered by this kind of knowledge, its origins and its limits—all these would constitute important methodological research topics. At its best, this kind of methodological analysis will 'liberate' the research from its problematic nationalistic past and give fruitful guidelines for a diverse field of methodological cosmopolitan studies of the future, aiding us in our search for a better understanding of global culture, peace and non-violence.

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Chapter 6
Political Transnationalism as a Matter of Belonging: Young Kurds in Finland

Mari Toivanen

6.1 Introduction

The turn of the millennium has witnessed an exponential increase in studies that apply a transnationalist framework. These studies have been prompted by criticisms of the allegedly rigid nation-state-centric conceptualisations of migratory movements, which have been labelled *methodological nationalism* (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Transnational theories, which mainly discuss cross-border contacts of non-state actors in two or more countries (Glick Schiller 1999), have mainly focused on the migrants' social, cultural and economic cross-border connections. More recently, researchers have become interested in the *political* dimensions of these transnational contacts (Faist 2004a). Studies on *political transnationalism* have focused on the migrants' political ties and practices regarding their country of emigration, including extra-territorial voting, long-distance lobbying, remittances to political parties and participation in demonstrations (see Faist 2004b; Bauböck 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).

However, it has been long debated whether the younger generations of migrant-background people engage in transnational activities at all (Portes 2001, 189; Rumbaut 2002). The degree of their involvement in transnational politics is also a point of speculation (see Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Political transnational ties are not necessarily merely a first-generation phenomenon, either, as the migrants' children may also express interest in the politics of their homelands. For example, several studies show that if there is a political disturbance 'back home', the symbolic ties of young diaspora Kurds may be resurrected and mobilised (Baser 2015; Mügge 2010; van Bruinessen 2000; Curtis 2005). Bahar Baser's (2015) study on second-generation political transnationalism among Turkish and Kurdish

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_6

communities in Sweden and Germany accurately depicts the way the second generation participates in homeland politics via transnational political activism. Furthermore, it sheds light to the generational continuity of such activism. Nevertheless, significant differences arguably exist, not only between (as well as within) the Kurdish communities and other migrant communities, but also qualitative differences between the transnational political activities of Kurdish generations and their attachments towards their 'homeland'.[1]

One approach to this generational dimension has been making quantitative comparisons between the political transnational activities of the first-generation migrants and their children. It has been argued that young migrant-background people operate within a transnational space and that their empirical field is narrowed down by differentiating between various degrees of transnationality (see Itzigsohn et al. 1999). This approach, however, pays insufficient attention to the greater predisposition towards political activism among diaspora communities (see Sheffer 2006) like the Kurds. The field of diaspora studies, on the other hand, deals with the migrants' political transnational ties as a manifestation of their belonging to a perceived 'homeland'.[2] The concept of 'diaspora' is mainly employed when studying first-generation refugee-origin groups like Palestinians, Kurds or Somalis (see Lindholm Schultz 2003; Wahlbeck 1999; Kleist 2008). It seems questionable, though, to conceptualise the political transnationalism of the younger generations who have grown up in their societies of settlement as simply diasporic, at least in comparison to their parents. To them, transnational political involvement may carry a variety of different significances. Political transnational ties also need to be considered as something that is produced in relation to both the migrants' societies of departure and settlement, particularly in case of younger generations who are, to some extent, familiar with both contexts. In the end, the central issue in all this is the importance of foreign-born young adults being involved in homeland politics, which leads to questions that concern their various modes of belonging and the implications of their memberships in multiple political institutions.

In this chapter, I approach the younger Kurdish generation's transnational political ties and practices as a matter of 'belonging'. What meanings do transnational political activities have for the younger diaspora-origin Kurdish generation in Finland, in terms of belonging? On the other hand, how do the regulatory powers of the states and the memberships of transnational actors in various polities affect their transnational political ties and feelings of belonging? I argue that the transnational political setting provides these young Kurds a platform for constructing and enacting various modes of belonging and non-belonging. These belongings are nevertheless rooted in and shaped by the localities where they are embedded. Regarding this, I will also focus on how the overlapping memberships of the various polities (or lack of them) shape political transnational activities and the different ways of negotiating belongings.

[1] One example of differing political views between the generations is J Street, a liberal advocacy group, which aims to encourage the American leadership to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict peacefully. The group attracts many young Jews (post-Holocaust generation) whose political views differ from their parents' views (Harwood 2009).

[2] Sheffer (2003) discusses the concept of diaspora politics in more length.

I start by presenting some background information on Kurds in Finland before moving to discuss the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this study. I will then showcase the political transnational activities young Kurds take part in via the empirical material. Finally the implications their overlapping memberships in different polities bear for such activism will be explored.

6.2 Kurds as an Organised Diaspora Group in Finland

In the aftermath of political turmoil in the Middle-East, Kurdish families started arriving to Finland in the 1990s. The armed conflict between the Kurds and the Islamic state in Iran led to refugee flows towards Western and Northern Europe, and Kurds from Iraq also fled the Ba'athist regime's oppression and a civil war between Kurdish parties. Kurdish migration flows from Turkey were motivated by political oppression and resettlement of Kurdish villages (Hassanpour and Mojab 2005, 217–220). Although a majority of Kurds living in Finland are Kurds from the Iraqi side, several Iranian Kurdish families spent years in Iraqi or Turkish refugee camps before arriving to Finland (Wahlbeck 2005, 1005). As a result, many of the Iranian Kurdish families' children were born in refugee camps.[3] Notably, the Iranian Kurdish refugees often had participated in Kurdish resistance movements while living in Iran. When the situation became intolerable in the Iraqi and Turkish camps, they were forced to flee to Europe. As a matter of fact, most Kurds in Finland have arrived as a result of Iraqi refugee resettlement, decided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (ibid.).

At the end of 2014, Kurdish-speakers formed the sixth largest foreign-language group in Finland, with a total number of 10,731 persons, mostly living in the Metropolitan Helsinki area (Statistics Finland 2014). However, the number of those identifying themselves as Kurdish is estimated to be larger what these mother-tongue-based statistics would suggest (Wahlbeck 2005, 1005). As for the generational aspect, it is worth noting that young 20–30 year olds constitute over one-third of all Kurdish-language speakers, a significant number even in comparison to other foreign-language groups[4] (Statistics Finland 2014). It has been argued that the Kurdish community in Finland is highly politicised regarding the politics of their homeland, which has resulted to them founding numerous diaspora associations (Wahlbeck 2005, 1007). We should also point out, however, that the political and social environment in Finland has been favorable to the establishment of migrants' associations and that immigration authorities and administration have emphasised the role of those associations as an important tool of integration (see Pyykkönen 2007, 197).

[3] Several interviewees have been reported to been born in a specific refugee camp located at the Iraqi-Jordanian border.

[4] All the respondents, with the exception of one, belong to this generation and age-cohort.

Today, the main Iranian Kurdish parties that operate in Finland are PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), Komalah and the KDPI (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran). PJAK functions in close connection to PKK (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* or the Kurdistan Workers' Party), which is mainly based in Turkey, and based on the data we have, they seem to cooperate in organising demonstrations and celebrations, circulating petitions and so forth. While the parties share a relatively similar agenda in promoting greater liberties for the area of Kurdistan, PKK seems to function as an umbrella organisation that appeals to numerous Kurds' political aspirations, as suggested by one respondent: "PKK is more practical, instead of just speaking. People like that" (Gavan[5]). The rapid mass mobilisation of Kurds across Europe in the aftermath of the capture of leading PKK figure Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 serves as a case in point (Rogers 1999).

PKK was founded in Turkey in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist party, but during the 2000s it has become a complex system of parties and institutions (Akkaya and Jongerden 2011) that usually ends up in the international headlines for its conflicts with the Turkish state. It is listed as a foreign terrorist organisation by the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union 2009), although the European Union Court overturned this decision in 2008 (BBC 2008). US also added PJAK to its terrorist listing in 2009 (US Department of Treasury 2009). It is considered to be an affiliated branch of PKK operating in Iran, whereas PKK mostly functions in Turkey (Gunter 2008). Another movement, KDPI, states on its website that it fights for Kurdish national rights, including self-government, language rights and political freedom, in Iran.[6] The party split into two factions in 2006, and this also seems to be reflected within its diaspora sections.

It should be noted that numerous interviewees follow Finnish politics and discussed the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2011, which were ongoing during the data collection process, in length. More recently, there have been several Kurdish-origin candidates in municipal and national elections. In this chapter, I chose to concentrate on the respondents' political activism within Kurdish political parties in Finland. Young Kurds' political participation in Finnish politics and the construction of their belonging in the local setting would be a topic for another study.

6.3 Political Transnationalism as a Matter of Belonging

How can young individuals' political cross-border contacts be conceptualised without being caught between the Scylla of methodological nationalism and Charybdis of methodological transnationalism? In other words, which theoretical tools disregard the 'container model of society' approach of methodological nationalism, yet simultaneously avoid exaggerating the individuals' transnational agency at the expense of local opportunity structures and constraints? In order to tackle

[5] Interviewees' names have been anonymised.

[6] Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. http://www.pdki.org.

this dilemma, young Kurds' political transnational activism is approached as a matter of belonging.

The concept of belongings can be criticised for its reductionist tendencies of dichotomising identity construction into belonging or non-belonging. In order to transcend these binary and mutually exclusive categorisations of belonging, this phenomenon has been approached from the perspective of intersectionality (Yuval-Davis 2006), as a matter of positionalities (Anthias 2002), or by fine-tuning different analytical levels (see Christensen 2009; Yuval-Davis 2006). Some have also argued that the issue of non-belonging is equally central, as it can function as a symbolic mark of distinction for different groups (Christensen 2009). In this study, belonging is understood as a constantly shifting process, in which the individuals construct their sense of belonging differently shaped by the socio-political contexts, whether transnational or local, in which they are located.

This study employs Nira-Yuval Davis's analytical framework to study the various modes of *belonging* by looking both at the individual-level constructions of belonging and the way how they are intertwined with collective projects of belonging. Drawing from an intersectional frame, Yuval-Davis (2011, 10) suggests differentiating *belonging* from *politics of belonging*, the former referring to an emotional attachment and feelings of 'home' and the latter comprising:

> […] specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are themselves being constructed in these projects […] in very specific boundaries.

Their involvement in (transnational) political practices stems from a sense of emotional attachment to collectivities and groupings, which can also be indexed to politicised identity narratives within these collectivities. From here emerges the question of maintaining, constructing and challenging the boundaries of one's community, which has consequently been named *politics of belonging*. Belonging is constructed in terms of boundaries and also hierarchies that exist within and across these boundaries (Anthias 2009). Thus, a key component of constructing a sense of belonging is rooted in the mechanisms of exclusion, inclusion, access and participation (ibid.), both in transnational and local contexts.

In this sense, we also need to address locality, or more specifically multi-locality. Transnational political activities take place in reference to several locations, most commonly the societies of settlement and departure, and in relation to the opportunity structures and constraints of these locations. Furthermore, the constructions of belonging and 'home' are also multi-local or multi-territorial (see Hannerz 1996) in the sense that they affectively reference two or more localities. However, it is also important to pay attention to the locality types that receive these emotional attachments and how the territorial status of these localities affects the politicisation of belonging and the related political transnational involvement.

This observation is particularly relevant in the case of diaspora groups and even more so in the case of (continuously) stateless diasporas, like the Kurds (see Sheffer 2003). The continuous state of statelessness of a certain ethno-national group, coupled with politicised collective narratives of belonging that are rooted to a diaspora consciousness, can result in specific transnational political activities. Contextual

factors, such as the boundaries of the nation-states and the related entitlements, also serve as relevant features in shaping the political activities and the political identities of transnational actors. For instance, besides both of them being originated in the Kurdish diaspora, the Iranian Kurds and the Iraqi Kurds may reference the region of Kurdistan affectively as a 'homeland'. Yet, they function within (or work towards building) different political systems[7] that dictate their conditions and motivations for political involvement to a certain degree.

6.4 Methodology, Data Collection and Ethical Issues

This study draws conclusions from data that consists of 11 open-ended thematic[8] interviews conducted with politically active young Kurds in Finland and ethnographic observation in the gatherings and demonstrations of political associations. I have made these observations during political demonstrations in Helsinki, which had been organised to protest the executions of political party members in Iran who had opposed the annual celebration for founding the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and supported releasing Abdullah Öcalan from prison. I also participated in political association meetings in Turku.

Most interviewees had migrated to Finland as part of the Kurdish diaspora movements of the 1990s (see Wahlbeck 2005), whereas a smaller number had arrived to Finland in the 2000s as asylum-seekers. Two interviewees were originally from Turkish Kurdistan and the rest had background in Iranian Kurdistan. All respondents but one had arrived to Finland during their childhood or teens.[9] At the time of the interviews, the youngest interviewee was 19 years old and the oldest was 28. The median age of interviewees was 22.[10] These interviews were conducted with young adults who belonged to Iranian or Turkish Kurdish parties in Finland (The Democratic Youth Union of Iranian Kurdistan, PJAK and PKK) and identified themselves as Kurdish.

I used chain-referral sampling (snowball sampling method) to get in touch with research participants. In practice, this meant contacting various Kurdish political parties, visiting their meetings, and being put in contact with politically active Kurds through key persons. As a result, the sample consisted of young Kurds with hetero-

[7] Most notably the semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, whose status within the Republic of Iraq considerably differs from that of Iranian region of Kurdistan and its status within the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[8] The interview themes included their level of political activism, the current situation in Kurdistan, transnational contacts, citizenship and sense of belonging/home. The interview themes were structured loosely to allow the interviewees to reflect on issues that they considered to be significant for them.

[9] The age at arrival varied between 5 and 18 years (apart from one, who arrived at the age of 21), and the median age at arrival was 13.

[10] Yet it needs to be acknowledged that the informants' age can arguably be a relevant factor in determining their political engagement and how it shifts over time.

geneous backgrounds in terms of political affiliation, religious affiliation, duration of stay in Finland, legal status, educational background and so forth. Three out of 11 interviewees, for instance, did not have a Finnish citizenship, and only a few were religiously affiliated. The duration of their stay in Finland varied between 6 and 15 years, the median duration of stay being 10 years. Based on data I have gathered from political meetings and demonstrations, it seems that young Kurdish males are more numerous in these activities. Most interviewees, with the exception of the two female interviewees, were male.

Methodologically, ethnography is considered to be particularly suited for studying the transnational social fields where the individuals are embedded after their migratory experience and exploring how they maintain their identities and interact across these boundaries (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). One of the limitations of this study is that although it takes a stance against methodological nationalism, it remains methodologically local. Nonetheless, I have used the distinction between transnational *ways of belonging* and transnational *ways of being* as a methodological code for analysing the empirical data. According to this method, an individual may be embedded within a transnational field even if he or she does not express a sense of belonging towards a particular group:

> Ways of being refers to the actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in rather than to the identities associated with their actions. […] Individuals can be embedded in a social field but not identify with any label or cultural politics associated with that field. […] Ways of belonging combine action and an awareness of the kind of identity that action signifies. (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 11)

In this case, this would imply that engagement in the activities of political parties does not automatically suggest enactment of an identity with a conscious connection to a collectivity. Evidently, the distinction is not clear-cut and the two facets are not mutually exclusive, but it does provide a methodological frame for analysing the data. I analysed my empirical data with a theme analysis that concentrates on extracting identifiable themes and patterns from the data (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2009).

As for the sensitive nature of the politically active Kurds' situation in Iran, some interviewees wished to remain anonymous for political reasons, so I chose not to use their actual names. In order to avoid any eventual retribution by Iranian authorities against informants whose asylum applications were still pending, I also chose not to give a detailed description of my channels of information or provide a detailed account of the parties' activities. I took part in meetings organised by these political associations and also participated in three demonstrations organised in Helsinki, which provided additional data that included notes gathered from observing the participants, video footage and photographic material. This part of the data clarified the role of the young Kurds in demonstrations and the distribution of the information that followed them. The bus trips back and forth to Helsinki[11] also allowed them to

[11] The trips to demonstrations departed from Turku, where the researcher was invited by key persons in the community.

reflect on the demonstrations, thus providing me with further insights to the meanings that political activities carried for them.

My observation notes also include reflections on researcher positionality, which is central for any ethnographically orientated research. As a Finnish woman who is not affiliated to any political party, my presence in the male-dominated demonstrations and interest towards Kurdish issues raised (friendly) curiosity among research participants. In several instances, while observing political demonstrations, I needed to reflect upon my own participation and ultimately decided not to take part in shouting slogans or making speeches, even though at one point I was requested to deliver a speech in Finnish.

As for the terminology, I use 'Kurdistan' to refer to the geo-cultural region that extends to cover parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. In this chapter, I have used the terms 'Iranian Kurds' and 'Iraqi Kurds' for clarity, although it is probably necessary to point out that the interviewees also referred to 'Eastern Kurds', 'Southern Kurds' and 'Northern Kurds', using the geographical frame of Kurdistan instead of the state frontiers of Iran and Iraq. We will discuss what this means later on.

6.5 Politics and Boundaries

The transnationalist approaches have problematised the rapport between the regulatory powers of the states and the people who belong to multiple settings. Transnational actors are considered to be embedded in "multiple legal and political institutions that determine access and action and organise and legitimate gender, race and class status" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 15). The authors point out that "people living in transnational social fields experience multiple loci and layers of power, and are shaped by them, but can also act upon them" (ibid.). Thomas Faist (2004a, 14) further argues that studying political transnationalisation requires making a distinction between *politics*, which comprises decision-making processes that include the surrounding behaviour and activities, and *polity* as an order of political systems. On the other hand, political scientist Rainer Bauböck (2002, 5) deals with political transnationalism as simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities instead of limiting the scope of study to just one polity. He distinguishes four types of relations between polities (2002, 4–5):

> State and polity may coincide (international), several political communities can be nested within a larger state (multinational), several states can be nested within a larger political community (supranational) or such communities can overlap between separate states (transnational).

This distinction is central, as this study deals with political transnationalism among young Kurds who belong to an ethnonational minority with a diaspora background. The activities of the young Kurds take place within and towards Finland, the European Union, Iran and, to some extent, the de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Polities are approached as contexts providing opportunities and constraints for political activism (see Smith and Guarnizo 1998), which are regulated through

status (i.e. single citizenship, dual citizenship, denizenship) or entitlements (i.e. right to vote, right of association), or shaped by communication, transportation and networks established in/between European societies and Kurdistan.

Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, 4) defines political transnationalism as something that consists of "various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees, as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country". In this study, the political activities of young Kurds include formulating channels of influence and petitions that circulate among the international Kurdish associations, organising political meetings in Finland and abroad, sending remittances, visiting political actors in Iraqi Kurdistan, participating in public demonstrations and lobbying Finnish decision-makers and political parties. More recently, the political situation in Iran has resulted to a tighter surveillance of rebelling groups, such as the politically active Kurds in outlawed parties, which has resulted to imprisonment, torture and executions (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2012). The activities of Kurdish diaspora associations in Finland, who organise demonstrations to protest the executions of Kurdish activists and on behalf of Kurds who are on death row in Iran, also reflect this.

Not only are these activities forged in relation to the local and transnational settings, but also in relation to manifestations of belonging to a perceived homeland, real or imagined. Overlapping with legal (or assigned) membership statuses, the boundaries of these polities become sites for determining one's own political identity (Bauböck 2002, 14–15). How, then, are the young Kurds' transnational (political) ties shaped by the different layers of power set by polities in terms of (perceived) membership categories?

6.6 Affiliation to Multiple Settings and Membership Categories: Empirical Openings

Membership in a nation-state and its political order seems to automatically be connected to the question of an individual's legal membership, *citizenship*. The field of citizenship studies has established itself as a de facto field in the 1990s (Isin and Turner 2002), and theoretical efforts to conceptualise transnational political agency have resulted to a multitude of avenues, including *diasporic citizenship* (Laguerre 1998), *multiple* or *transnational citizenship* (Bauböck 1994) or *transborder citizenship* (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Khayati 2008). Polities can, however, also base on different political premises and manifest varying levels of democratic practices and institutions, which directly affect our ways of understanding national/legal membership.

The collected data indicates that several young Kurds are excluded from access to even the most basic citizenship rights, such as the right to a safe return in their land of departure/birth or the right to a country (partially explaining their interest towards Iraqi Kurdistan). This issue is particularly problematic for informants whose families have (assumed) political background in outlawed Kurdish parties. On the other hand, respondents who were born in Iraqi refugee camps, albeit of

Iranian Kurdish parents, face similar mechanisms of exclusion, including denial of Iranian citizenship.

> I would have wanted to visit my grandparents in Iran, but unfortunately I cannot…I cannot accept oppression of people, I have to talk about it, express my opinions. The Iranian government does not accept it. […] To get the Iranian citizenship, one needs to have relatives, documents, they would fine you if you haven't gone to the army, and ask many questions why you fled. At that point, the Finnish citizenship does not mean a thing. (Gavan)

It seems that regardless of EU member state citizenship, feelings of exclusion and denied access can function in favour of belonging becoming politicised. This argumentation shifts the attention from the legal, de facto membership that citizenship represents towards de jure citizenship and its implications in various political orders. Citizenship status and its implications seemed to be the central issue in contrasting the memberships of political orders of Iran and Finland, particularly in terms of political activities and varying democratic institutions.

However, other constraints become more significant when looking at national polities within supranational ones, i.e. Finland's membership in the European Union. The respondents suggested that the particular situation of Iran and its diplomatic relations to the European Union (and United States) had resulted to an atmosphere of diplomatic tiptoeing. They believed that this has led to a lack of criticism against violations of human rights, notably in the case of executions of Kurdish political activists carried out by the Iranian state. The key persons also suggested that the sensitive nature of the current EU-Iranian diplomatic relations would influence micro-level political activities, such as demonstrations not being permitted in proximity of the Iranian embassy in Helsinki. Active party-members reported that Kurdish secessionist claims mean that some politically active Kurdish individuals are allegedly considered with suspicion by Finnish authorities.[12] Related to this, some expressed suspicions regarding the Finnish Security Police (SUPO), whose actions were considered to be guided by the diplomatic relations between European Union, Turkey and Iran.

On the other hand, the respondents justified in length the legitimacy of the political agendas of Kurdish parties and voiced criticism over them being listed as 'terrorist' organisations by the European Union and the United States. Several accounts contested the way of branding Kurdish parties, most notably PKK and PJAK, as 'terrorist organisations':

> Does this [PKK] sound like a terrorist organization? (Sirwan)
>
> 'Terrorist' is just a political label [for PKK], so that the US can develop the diplomatic relations with Turkey. (Gavan)

Michel Foucault argues that knowledge is produced by competing discourses that are linked to contestations over power (Foucault 1980). The respondents' accounts echo competing discourses, which seem to give them their positions and also a way to position themselves. One such membership category discourse was

[12] For instance, Wahlbeck (1999, 154–155) mentions that refugees from Kurdistan who do not intend to pursue their political endeavours in Finland seem to be favoured in the selection process.

'terrorist', which was highly contested.[13] Views on the implications of one's legal status, as a result of participation in black-listed Kurdish political parties like PKK and PJAK, also varied. Some thought that a membership in these parties would seem suspicious when applying for Finnish citizenship, although others suggested that it would improve the chances of a Kurd being granted asylum in Finland.

The contestations over what constituted a 'terrorist' were narrated particularly in relation to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The label 'terrorist' and the related antiterrorism law (Law on the Fight against Terrorism) are employed against journalists who speak or write about the Kurds (see Freedom House 2012). The executions of Iranian Kurdish activists in 2010, on the other hand, were based on being convicted of *moharebeh* (enmity against God) for terrorist attacks and involvement in the PJAK party (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2012). Thus, young Kurds related their political transnational activities to how they or the Kurdish communities were positioned within particular polities, but also to the perceived relationships between the various polities (Iran-Finland, Finland-EU, EU-Turkey, etc.).

The empirical evidence indicates that young Kurdish adults who risk being sent back to Iran are strategically less visible in the Kurdish political parties operating in Finland, as this could result in retribution by the Iranian officials in case of their asylum applications being rejected. This demonstrates well that polity and nation-state, in an analytical sense, ought not to be considered as perfectly overlapping entities, as the implications of a membership within a political system extend well beyond the borders of nation states. On the other hand, in case of ethnonational diaspora groups, complex political configurations problematize the assumption that the group members' identifications are constructed in relation to a nation-state, or, as I will argue next, even a perceived homeland.

I have discussed the political transnationalism of young Kurds in relation to the implications of their memberships in multiple legal and political institutions where they are embedded. I have argued that their membership statuses in different political systems affect the nature of their political transnational activities and ties. In the following paragraphs, I look at how these practices and ties infuse the young Kurds' constructions of belonging.

6.7 Ways of Being, Ways of Belonging

> At least for me I don't feel where I come from […] because I don't actually know where I come from. It's a sensitive topic to me, like if somebody asks where do you come from, then I think for a while, where do I come from, I don't have my own country, even if I am Kurdish, but it's hard for me to say 'from somewhere', because nobody will accept it. In Finland I'm a foreigner, and nobody accepts me, if I say that I am foreigner, Kurdish, then you are discriminated against. In Turkey, you are just a Kurd, a terrorist, and then I stop to think like where do I really come from. (Runak)

[13] This echoes the competing discourses 'terrorist/freedom fighters' in the Palestinian case (see Hall 2006, 167).

Political diaspora associations offer a space for the expressions of belonging and attachment to be articulated and enacted. It would nevertheless be misleading to interpret transnational political involvement as only manifesting either belonging or non-belonging. How do these activities relate to different ways of being and belonging, then?

Wahlbeck (2005, 1006–1007) has described the activities of Kurdish political associations in Finland as mainly being centred on cultural and social activities. The findings of this study indicate that numerous young Kurds seem to take part in activities organised by political associations and their youth sections.[14] Political parties cooperate in organising cultural events, although separate celebrations organised in various different Finnish cities are quite common. Parties organise their own memorial events commemorating deceased political figures, for instance. The most notable joint effort is the organisation of *Newroz*, a Kurdish New Year's party that is celebrated every March. Political messages start off this annual celebration, but the rest of the evening includes dancing, singing, eating, discussing and, for the younger generations, possibilities for courting. Young Kurds participate in these events to a varying degree.

Saksela-Bergholm's study (2009, 141) features a typology of migrant associations in Finland, dividing the associations to four categories based on their collective activities: societal, ethno-cultural, integrative (category containing both societal and ethno-cultural activities) and transnational.[15] According to party members' accounts, Kurdish diaspora parties in Finland can be distinguished in terms on whether most of their activities target the local Kurdish community in Finland or focus on the situation of the Kurds living in Kurdistan region. Some party activities are specifically aimed at local young Kurds, while other parties were more directly involved in homeland politics through lobbying, traveling, petitioning and demonstrating. In this sense, the political parties also seem to function as a platform for cultural activities with local agendas. In fact, some respondents de-emphasised the political facet of their party's activities for Kurdistan while emphasising the cultural activities targeting the younger generations in Finland with sporting events, celebrations and trips.

Young Kurds' transnational involvement rarely seemed to be limited to a set of political activities, and therefore it might be more suitable to talk of *politico-cultural transnationalism*. Participation in the 'Kurdish cause' had educational, sportive and cultural aspects, like translating news into Kurdish dialects, maintaining Kurdish-language blogs, making Kurdish cultural characteristics more known (through dance, cultural exhibitions and food) and raising awareness through sporting events. The active translators and bloggers considered the distribution of information in Kurdish (regardless of its content) to be a political act in itself, due to the politicised position of the Kurdish language in the Middle-Eastern region. They also consid-

[14] This is based on observation notes in various political and cultural meetings, both in Turku and Helsinki. No official party membership figures exist.

[15] Miikka Pyykkönen has also suggested a typology of his own in his study on immigrant associations in Tampere and Jyväskylä (2007, 78–79).

ered the Kurdish language to be at the core of what they perceived to constitute 'Kurdishness' (see Toivanen 2013), and they saw a battle for its language status taking place in the cyberspace, with censorship and hackers trying to hinder Kurdish language sites or Internet pages that were related to Kurdish issues.[16]

Besides these politicised forms of belonging, participation in diaspora associations' activities had the theme of cultural continuation in diaspora. The respondents' participation in political parties' activities was motivated by their concern about the possibility of the future generations forgetting their roots and Kurdish origins, but also by their personal wish to learn more about 'Kurdishness'. This suggests that cultural identifications are not necessarily constructed in direct relation to their perceived 'homeland' and that a sense of 'Kurdishness' can also be constructed in terms of local and diaspora communities. The boundaries of Kurdish collectivities are thus maintained, constructed but also challenged in this context of intergenerational negotiations and dynamic interplay between the concepts of cultural continuity and diaspora adaptation.

On the other hand, the respondents emphasised that young Kurds needed to acquire the means to succeed in the Finnish society while learning about 'Kurdishness'. This resonates with Pyykkönen's findings (2007, 82) that indicate that migrant associations aim to foster a strong identity within their ethnic community but also function as vehicles for the integration of their members into the Finnish society. In some instances, these activities were similar to youth social work in general, including drug awareness campaigns and discussions with young people who spent their time on the streets[17]. Transnational networks also included ties with other diaspora communities in the Nordic region. Local community activities included, for instance, inviting Kurdish lecturers and key political figures from other Nordic countries to hold lectures on the future prospects of the younger Kurdish generations. Similarly, in many cases, young Kurds interacted with other Kurds in the Nordic region instead of those living in the region of Kurdistan.

Thus, political parties provide a platform for action regarding certain endeavours, although they were also intertwined with other venues of being active and constructing a sense of 'Kurdishness'. For instance, the sense of obligation to contribute towards the 'homeland' and work in favour of the Kurdish cause was a reoccurring theme in several accounts. This would imply a transnational *way of belonging*, with a conscious connection to the Kurdish community and 'homeland':

> I feel Kurdish, and I have the kind of feeling that forces me to participate in my own culture, that I should not forget that I was born as Kurdish and live the rest of my life as Kurdish. (Bijar)

[16] For example, the website http://www.kurdistan.fi had been closed for several months (November 2012) reportedly due to cyber-attacks from hackers, who identified themselves as "Turkish kemalists" and "The liberation front of Syrian Arabs".

[17] The young Kurds who 'hang around' in the public spaces were called *hansalapset* (hansa-children) by some respondents, referring to the shopping centre Hansa located at the city centre of Turku.

> For example, if the young people go back to Kurdistan later,[18] they would have some degree from Finland, so they can teach others. They wouldn't go with empty hands, and then someone would ask you what have you been doing in Europe all this time, just been eating and sleeping? (Gavan)

It was reported that the activities organised by political associations provided some young Kurds merely an opportunity to meet friends and have fun (*way of being*). This matched the interviewees' observations that the members of the younger generation were generally politically less active, although their political affiliations and membership in Kurdish parties mostly followed their parents' footsteps and motivations. Taking part in activities targeting the local community can also be interpreted as young Kurds fostering different forms of agency in their local setting and possibly having a conscious connection to their locality, i.e. having local ways of belonging and being instead of transnational ways of belonging and being. Yes, transnational dimension was present in the form of referencing a distant homeland as a place of origin during cultural events. This was even the case when the activities themselves could be characterised as more or less local, rather than transnational.

Nevertheless, with the younger generations coming to age, the political associations of Kurdish diaspora in Finland have adjusted their activities to take the needs of the local communities better into their consideration, thus providing a wider selection of cultural activities targeting the young Kurds. The political associations seem to provide a platform for the younger generations to learn about 'Kurdishness' and the Kurdish language.[19] A sense of belonging to a collectivity is therefore enacted and manifested in various ways (in relation to the homeland, but not only so) and distinguishing between the *transnational ways of being and belonging* becomes rather tricky.

6.8 Politics of Belonging

> The most important thing for me, and why we are in parties, is that we are for the independence[20] of Kurdistan, for the liberty of Kurdish people, welfare. That is why we are in parties, it is a common principle, and only next comes the political programs. (Gavan)

Political parties of the diaspora are most commonly characterised as having a "long-distance nationalist" orientation (Glick Schiller 2005, 570–571), with a conscious projection to homeland politics (Sheffer 2003). In case of the Kurds, the continuous 'state of statelessness' and the potentially explosive situation in Iranian and Turkish Kurdistan seemed to provide an incentive for political endeavours. Several interviewees reasoned their participation through feelings of injustice and

[18] Several interviewees expressed their wish to work in the Kurdistan area but not necessarily move there definitely.

[19] Miikka Pyykkönen's study (2007, 82) shows that the maintenance of an ethnic language is central to the immigrant associations in Finland.

[20] On the other hand, some interviewees preferred a federalist or other semi-autonomous system to total independence.

oppression experienced by the Kurdish people, which they argued to be central in understanding the formation of the Kurdish political identities (see Eliassi 2010, 105–106). The Kurds' greater predisposition to take part in political organisations, even after a longer stay in their society of settlement, was explained by the long-term suffering that the Kurdish people had faced, including references to the ongoing oppression of Kurdish political activists by Iranian authorities and the measures by the Turkish state targeting the Kurds:

> When there are so many countries in the world, what do the Kurds have? We have no official language, no country, nothing. The only thing we have is the people, nothing else. And wherever we are, we are refugees. (Zedan)

Historical references were frequent in the interviewees' narrations, including references to the Anfal Campaigns and Halabja gas bombings by Ba'athist regime in 1988 (Human Rights Watch 1993). Historical events became more tangible when they were related to concrete transnational political actions. For example, a group of young Kurds organised a biking trip to the Finnish Parliament with the purpose of rendering a petition to the Finnish state for officially declaring Halabja gas bombings a genocide. Parallel event took place in Iraqi Kurdistan, with a memorial visit to the gas bombing sites. The historical events, even though not personally experienced, were used to anchor one's personal narration of belonging to the collective narrations of 'Kurdishness'. Drawing from a victim-based discourse of collective suffering, young Kurds employed the discourses of human rights to justify their political motivations and identities (see Emanuelsson 2005). Simultaneously, the collective narratives offered by the political parties of the diaspora seemed to be based on past experiences of injustice and oppression and simultaneously being constructed in relation to current events in the Middle-East region. The political situation in Iranian Kurdistan after 2009, for example, with increasing measures taken against Kurdish political activists (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2012), had prompted some Kurdish individuals to become more active in politics.

The continuous state of statelessness was considered to be a historical injustice resulting from the actions of the neighbouring states, but also a result of political manoeuvring by the United States. The choice of terms to refer to their 'homeland' as Southern, Eastern and Northern Kurdistan, instead of Northern Iraq, North-Western Iran and Eastern Turkey, reflected these contestations over the current political *état d'être* of Kurdistan.

> Many people say that, ah ok, you are Kurdish, and they ask, so are you an Iraqi Kurd or Iranian Kurd. I don't answer anything to that question. I just say that think if Finland was divided in two parts, with Russia and Sweden, and you were asked from which side do you come from, the Russian or the Swedish side. You would say that you are Finnish, and so I answer too that we are Kurdish. […] That I come from Eastern Kurdistan. (Mevan)

As a matter of fact, it has been suggested that one of the major building blocks of Kurdish identity are the common experiences of oppression in the Middle-East region and the ongoing Kurdish struggle for recognition (Wahlbeck 2005, 1009). Ethnic identification and political affiliation become intertwined, particularly in case of ethnonational groups like the Kurds (Sheffer 2006). The identity category of 'Kurdishness'

seemed to be charged with political undertones, to the extent that among the respondents, the cultural identity of 'Kurdishness' was equated with a political identity. However, this was highly contextual, as Hussen's account demonstrates:

> It is hard to make a distinction between politics and the Kurdish culture. Being Kurdish means being political. (Karzan)
>
> If somebody in Iran says that he is Kurdish, it means that he is political. In Finland, you can be Kurdish without being political. (Hussen)

Collective belongings were constructed and reproduced during political events in form of symbols and cultural practices. Examples of these include the use of Kurdish flags and party flags, portraits of martyrs (notably Farzad Kamangar and Hossein Khezri) and those on the death row (see International Federation for Human Rights 2010), speeches and slogans in Kurdish (but also in Finnish) and serving typical Kurdish tea to the participants. In other words, the political parties' activities provide *terrains of belonging* (see Fortier 1999, 42) that were used to construct and reproduce the feelings of collective belonging.

Diaspora associations offer an organisational setting for civic participation and a platform to construct and enact feelings of membership in a collectivity. In this study, some activities had the direct aim of influencing homeland politics (diaspora politics), whereas others were more locally rooted to the Nordic context and the part of the Kurdish diaspora that is present here. Nevertheless, even the more locally orientated political parties have a transnational dimension in the sense that they offer collective narratives of 'Kurdishness' as a part of their political projects of belonging. Thus, we can conclude that the diaspora associations in this study provide a platform to foster feelings of belonging towards the (imagined) homeland and the Kurdish collectivity. Naturally, these collective narrations and projects of belonging become intertwined with more personal narrations of belonging, and it is rather difficult to distinguish political projects of belonging to a collectivity (politics of belonging) from the emotional attachments of individuals and their understandings of 'home' (belonging).

All in all, empirical evidence demonstrates that transnational political activities provide an important way for the Kurds to enact a sense of belonging and self-identify as 'Kurdish'. This was even true for the interviewees who had not visited the area of Kurdistan after their departure as children. Instead, they were actively engaging in transnational dialogue with other party-members online, staying updated through Kurdish media, participating in demonstrations, and drawing a sense of 'Kurdishness' from political involvement of the sort.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter aims to explore how emotional attachments and various modes of belonging are constructed through transnational political activities by presenting a case study of foreign-born young Kurds in Finland. Looking at how these young Kurds are embedded in multiple polities and (assigned) membership categories, and

how this interrelates with their belongings, was an attempt to move the locus beyond the state-centric categories of methodological nationalism. Furthermore, applying Nira Yuval-Davis's analytical frames of *belonging* and *politics of belonging* lets us grasp the young Kurds' individual-level constructions of belonging and their ways of intertwining with the meso-level projects of collective belonging.

The empirical distinction between *ways of being and belonging* (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) provided the means to code the empirical material. In the transnational *ways of belonging*, two tendencies emerged. Firstly, transnational actions included an awareness of self-identification happening through those actions (*ways of belonging*)—one's sense of 'Kurdishness' seemed to lean on the idea of a common, often imagined, 'homeland' of Kurdistan. Secondly, the young Kurds also constructed a sense of belonging and 'Kurdishness' by belonging to their local Kurdish community and local activities. Furthermore, locality was significant in the sense of a Nordic context, as transnational political ties with Kurdish parties in Sweden were rather frequent. It can additionally be argued that there are contextual specificities in the construction of belonging which can be grasped when looking at transnational political activism with an analytical distinction between the nation-states' political systems and polities. Memberships in different polities shape, and to a certain degree, set the conditions for such transnational political activism.

Three main themes emerged from the data: diasporic consciousness, cultural preservation/continuation and boundaries. These can be further divided into subthemes. *Diasporic consciousness* entails a sense of obligation to contribute to the Kurdish cause and a motivation to work against human rights violations either through direct political participation (petitioning, demonstrating, lobbying) or indirect involvement (maintaining Kurdish blogs, raising awareness of the Kurdish cause, producing material in various Kurdish dialects). Both activities were mostly justified through a sense of historical injustice against the Kurdish people.

The second theme of this data was the aspect of *cultural preservation/continuation*. In this case, involvement in political associations was in many cases considered a venue to learn more about one's own roots in order to foster a sense of 'Kurdishness'. An orientation that might be called 'think transnationally, act locally' was also emphasised. This included raising awareness on Kurdish culture among the generation that had grown up in Finland, with the aim of offering a possible source of identification through locally and transnationally organised cultural activities. These politico-cultural activities mostly took place either locally or transnationally in the Nordic region, often with a conscious connection to one's origins in Kurdistan. In contrast, for some interviewees, these activities merely provided an opportunity to socialise with other young people (*ways of being*).

The third theme was *boundaries*, which comprised the issues of entitlements and statuses, which were considered to shape the means for political activism. In terms of nation-state-centred conceptualisations, it can be argued that focus on membership in overlapping polities instead of citizenship status sheds light on the implications of other societal constraints and power-structures. Similarly, contestations over the meanings attached to certain discourses ('terrorist', 'homelandless', 'Kurdish') revealed the power-dimensions of the languages, which arguably

influence the options for creating identity categories. For contextual relevance, the affiliations in overlapping polities and dominant discourses formulated the spaces where belonging was negotiated.

Furthermore, cultural identities are not merely constructed in terms of an imaginary homeland, but a sense of identity can be fostered from a multitude of sources and, to a greater extent, in relation to local and other diaspora communities instead of the people 'back home' or an imaginary homeland. This moves us further away from the line of argumentation that nation-states automatically provide the individuals with their primary source of identification. Consequently, ethnicity and generation are no longer employed as explanatory starting points, nor is 'transnationality' of the younger generation of migrant parentage measured on a scale. In case of foreign-born youth operating in transnational space, it seems more fruitful to look at the intersections of social locations and the context-specificity of identifications in order to grasp the differences within the 'ethnically' labelled groups instead of those between them. Hence, the question of "where do you belong?" turns into a question of "how do you belong?".

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Chapter 7
Marginal Actors? Diaspora Somalis Negotiate Their Citizenship

Mulki Al-Sharmani and Cindy Horst

7.1 Introduction

The notion of citizenship, in its legal sense, assumes a full and equitable membership of all those who have been recognised as citizens of a self-governing polity. In his seminal work on citizenship, T.H. Marshall (1950) argues that citizenship as a form of membership is based on the equality of rights. According to Marshall, there are three interconnected citizenship rights that are necessary for equal membership: civic (e.g. individual freedom), political (e.g. political participation), and social rights (e.g. education, health services, employment, welfare provisions). The implication of Marshall's model is that being a citizen entitles one to these rights and ensures that one can claim a full membership in the society. Thus, Marshall's model, which has been widely adopted in literature on citizenship, assumes that citizenship exists and can be claimed outside the space of the hierarchies and inequities that exist between the different sectors of the society.

This model of citizenship has been questioned by the literature on immigrant and diaspora communities (see e.g. Brubaker 1989; Soysal 1994; Ong 1996; Balibar 2004; Bauböck et al. 2006; Modood et al. 2006).[1] The main critique has been that such a uniform and unproblematic notion of citizenship fails to take into account the differentiation of the daily experiences of citizenship (in terms of access to rights and claims to membership) along the axes of ethnicity, race, and class. In other

[1] Feminist literature on citizenship has also contributed to the critiques of the assumed notions of uniform status and rights that are associated with citizenship (see e.g. Orloff 1993; Walby 1994; Lister 2006).

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_7

words, those who argue that citizenship has created equality in liberal democracies for all residents focus mainly on the formal rights and duties involved (see also Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 370). However, citizenship consists of different dimensions that do not always have straightforward links between them and thereby translate into uneven experiences for the different sectors of the society. Membership is not only defined in terms of formal rights and duties but also in terms of a sense of belonging to a polity.

In different polities, the ability of persons to be or become citizen is determined by the relation between individual and state in terms of *ius sanguinis*, *ius soli* and *ius domicili*: ethnic descent, territorial birth and residence (Grillo 2001). In many states, formal membership, with pre-determined rights and obligations, can be obtained through birth or residence. Yet, a mutual sense of belonging between the individual and the state is mostly related to descent and membership in the same socio-cultural system. This aspect of citizenship then affects the way the membership of a state, including the related rights and duties, is experienced by the individual. It is this aspect of citizenship, the sense of belonging based on shared descent, culture, and history, which leads to inequality (Castles 2005b). In fact, Abu-Laban (2000) suggests an approach to citizenship that starts by recognising that citizenship produces inequality. She argues that citizenship may be seen as maintaining global inequity through inheritance, as citizenship is neither easily chosen nor acquired. In a world where global resources are distributed in a radically uneven way, a person's birth citizenship is a powerful determinant of their life-chances (Abu-Laban 2000, 516). This chapter wishes to build on this conceptual approach that problematises citizenship and disaggregates its various dimensions with the aim of shedding light on the assumed relations between different aspects of citizenship and their complex operations in the daily lives of naturalised migrants and non-national residents.

We will focus on diaspora Somalis in neighbouring, regional and Western countries to discuss two aspects of citizenship. We will first analyse how citizenship creates inequalities and the ways it is appropriated and transformed by the very same groups that suffer from these inequalities. Our main argument is that because citizenship is not merely a quasi-legal contract between an individual and a state but relates just as much to (discourses on) national belonging, the rights of individual citizens differ. Those with lesser rights, such as the Somalis discussed in this chapter, do not necessarily accept this situation but rather deal with it by creating new forms of citizenship. They opt for a transnational way of living and belonging so that they can access more rights, overcome exclusion and claim more empowering identities. Finally, we conclude that the diaspora experiences of the Somalis that this chapter focuses on exemplify the reality of a growing number of migrant communities. These experiences highlight the contradictions inherent in the notion of a nation-based citizenship as a model for an equitable and full membership in a society. They also show how such new migrant communities are unsettling and changing the traditional ways of making a claim to a societal membership.

The data used in this chapter has been collected by both authors during fieldwork in Kenya, Egypt, Canada, United States, the Netherlands and Norway, for well over

a decade now. Besides using our own data from interviews, life histories and participant observation, we have also incorporated the work of others who are studying similar themes among the Somali communities elsewhere. The chapter will first discuss the cases of Kenya and Egypt, where Somalis have no access to citizenship or only a very limited access. The Somalis living in those countries are largely refugees, with very limited rights in terms of employment, education, family reunification and free movement, for example. Another group of Somalis living in Egypt are what we will term 'émigrés': they reside in Egypt but have a Western citizenship. This situation creates inequality between these different groups of people, as this chapter will illustrate.

Second, we will discuss the Somali diaspora in Europe and North America. Those with European, American or Canadian citizenship have access to far more rights, yet they still, in many ways, feel excluded and marginalised, as they cannot enjoy the benefits of those rights and do not feel that they are equal citizens. Thus, they develop a very pragmatic sense of citizenship, where some rights, such as freedom of movement, are guaranteed through their, say, Canadian citizenship, but others are guaranteed through their transnational networks with relatives and friends worldwide, by their high mobility, or by their ability to choose their residence separately from their citizenship. Their sense of belonging thus encompasses a mix of legal citizenship, residence and transnational involvements. We end with a discussion on whether we should consider this reality to have implications for our general understanding of citizenship.

7.2 Kenya and Egypt: Access to Citizenship?

The conflict in Somalia has been continuing for over 15 years and, especially with the currently deteriorating political developments in the region, is not likely to come to a halt soon. Out of a total population between seven and nine million, an estimated one million people have been forced to flee their country of origin. In international law, the main concern for refugees across the world has been defined as their inability to enact their rights of citizenship. When an individual flees across a border and is accepted as a refugee, the nation-state the refugee flees from is seen as being unable or unwilling to provide protection from persecution. This situation can only be durably resolved by a re-installment of the worth of citizenship; either the same country, through return, another regional country, through integration, or by resettlement to a third, western, country. Those who have sought refuge in the neighbouring countries or the general region during the period of 15 years when Somalia could not protect its citizens and, in fact, ceased to exist as a state, have often found themselves without durable solutions. Whereas return is not an option for the most, local integration is not accepted by these host countries. The refugees have no access to citizenship or only a very limited access, but they also have extremely limited opportunities to gain an independent livelihood and continue their lives in exile while waiting for solutions.

7.3 Somali Refugees in Kenya: A Protracted Refugee Situation

Being one of the neighbouring countries to Somalia, Kenya has been the host to large groups of Somali refugees since the late 1980s. The majority of these refugees originate from the South of Somalia, up to the Mogadishu area. They largely have a similar clan background as the Kenyan Somalis who inhabit a large part of Kenya's Northeastern Province. Kenya is currently estimated to host about 200,000 refugees, most of whom stay in the three camps around Dadaab in the Northeast (approximately 135,000). Considerable numbers reside in Kakuma camp in the North, and many Somalis, often illegally, reside in towns. Eastleigh, one of Nairobi's suburbs, is home to a large numbers of Somali refugees, and refugees can also be found in local district towns. However, as these towns are originally inhabited by Kenyan Somalis and the refugees are supposed to remain in the camps, it is impossible to establish the exact numbers.

Kenya is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter 1951 Convention) and its 1967 New York Protocol, as well as the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter 1969 OAU Convention). It has not put any of these obligations into its national law, however. Despite the longstanding presence of refugees in the country, Kenya still has no refugee legislation. A draft Refugee Bill has been in existence for many years now but has never reached the Parliament. Refugees in Kenya are provided temporary asylum on the basis of their group determination, and their prima facie status offers very little protection and is not a durable solution. They are expected to remain in the Dadaab or Kakuma camps, where they have no access to employment and their access to education is limited. The camps are situated in insecure, remote and ecologically and politically marginal areas. Having only limited regional livelihood opportunities, they also receive little international protection (Horst 2006b).

It is highly unlikely that the Government of Kenya will provide Kenyan citizenship to any Somali refugees now or in the future. Many Somali refugees have found a way out of this situation by utilising the fact that there are ethnic Somalis in Kenya. Quite a number of refugees have managed to obtain Kenyan ID cards that give them some rights, such as the right to travel within the country. Still, these rights are dependent on their ability to speak Swahili and the authenticity of the obtained ID card. Obtaining a Kenyan passport, for example, required to travel outside the country, is more difficult and costly, but not impossible. If this fraud is not discovered, such a passport basically gives its holder the rights guaranteed by citizenship. Yet, as Castles (2005a, 691) accurately observes, "while all passports are equal, some are more equal than others". In other words, Kenyan citizenship does not guarantee many rights, especially at an international level.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that Somalis in Kenya are looking for alternatives. Not having any form of citizenship nor enjoying any citizenship rights, they have been in limbo for over 15 years now. In order to not put their lives on hold by

simply waiting for change, either in Somalia or Kenya, a considerable number has investigated the option of moving on. Secondary movement from Kenya sometimes leads to other African countries or towards the Middle East, but efforts are mainly directed at getting access to Europe or North America. In Kenya, a new word has been developed to describe this dream of resettlement in the West: *buufis*. This word refers to a longing or desire "blown into" someone's mind (Horst 2006a), an obsession with something, in this case resettlement. Many are said to 'suffer from' the *buufis* disease, investing a great deal of time and resources in the opportunity to leave. Whereas the resettlement of some refugees has improved the conditions of others in the camps, through remittances and more opportunities to leave, only a small minority will eventually manage to do so. The large majority of Somalis in Kenya are truly stuck in a "protracted refugee situation" (Crisp 2003).

7.4 Somali Refugees in Cairo: Membership of What State?

The onset of the civil war in Somalia in 1991 resulted in a large number of Somalis coming to Cairo. According to recent UNHCR statistics, there are currently 3809 Somali refugees in Egypt (UNHCR 2005). This number includes the recognised refugees as well as asylum seekers. For the first half-decade after the onset of the war, Somali arrivals mostly had an urban background, college degrees and held professional or administrative jobs in their original homeland or the Gulf countries. They fled the country via Kenya or the Gulf region without spending more than a few days or weeks in the transit areas (Al-Sharmani 1998). Since 1999, the profile of the Somali refugee population in Egypt has changed. Many of the current refugees have a different socioeconomic background and have experienced different patterns of flight. These refugees are a heterogeneous mix of urban and rural Somalis. Their work experience in their original homeland and their previous host societies has mostly consisted of manual labour, vocational jobs and petty sales. The new groups of refugees have much less education than the previous groups. The diasporic trajectories of the current refugees are also distinct: A considerable number of them have lived countries other than Middle East and Africa, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Kenya, before relocating to Cairo in the late 1990s or afterwards.

Egypt has had a long history of receiving refugees from different ethnic backgrounds. At the moment, the largest refugee groups are the Palestinians, Sudanese and Somalis. Egypt is a State Party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 1969 OAU Convention.[2] In addition, the Egyptian Constitution gives political refugees a right of asylum.[3] Yet, the situation of refugees in Egypt is

[2] Egypt ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol on 22 May 1981, and the 1969 OAU Convention on 12 June 1981.

[3] Article 53 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 11 September 1971 as amended by the referendum of 22 May 1980.

ambiguous and mostly vulnerable. On one hand, Egypt's commitment to these international conventions translates into fairly generous admission rights for refugees, renewable temporary residence permits and the right of non-refoulement. On the other hand, the government does not provide refugees with a legal framework and institutional support for sustaining themselves and securing an adequate life. This is because Egypt has placed reservations on four articles in the 1951 Geneva Convention: Articles 12 (1) (Personal Status), 20 (Rationing), 22 (1) Public Education, 23 (Public Relief), and 24 (Labour Legislation and Social Security). These reservations lead to an inability of the refugees to access basic functions that are essential for their lives in Egypt, such as legal opportunities for labour and government-funded educational and health services. In addition, because of the lack of adequate capacities and institutional resources, the Egyptian government has delegated all the tasks related to refugee status determination, except for those related to Palestinians, to the UNHCR Cairo office.[4] Furthermore, Egypt lacks a comprehensive national legislation regulating all the refugee affairs. The vulnerability of the refugees is also perpetuated by their ineligibility for Egyptian citizenship, regardless of their length of residence.

Although Egypt is a highly cosmopolitan country that is home to heterogeneous communities of Egyptians and non-Egyptians, the Egyptian citizenship laws are restrictive. Citizenship is based on descent (*jus sanguinis*) and, until recently, could only be acquired through an Egyptian male parent or spouse.[5] At the level of state policies, long-term non-national residents are not considered to be societal members and their integration is not encouraged. For example, the non-national residents are subjected to restrictive laws regarding residence and employment, regardless of their length of residence or their possession of local businesses and real estate. Furthermore, the construction of Egyptian national identity in public discourses has often been formulated in opposition to outsiders such as Arabs from other countries and, more recently, non-Arab migrant groups. In recent years, Egyptian identity has also been articulated by distinguishing it from African refugee populations. Various African groups are accused of prostitution, selling drugs, and stealing jobs from Egyptian youth; and local newspapers and magazines such as *Al Ahram* and *Roza el Yusif* have repeatedly published texts that presented the African refugees as an economic and moral threat to the Egyptian society.

Thus, the daily reality for almost all Somali refugees in Egypt is one where they lack employment, have no access to adequate educational and health services and feel trapped in a country where they can never aspire for equitable membership rights that are associated with citizenship status. This, to a great extent, explains why most refugees in Egypt seek resettlement in the West through various means, such as UNHCR-sponsored resettlement programmes, clandestine travel to the

[4] Because of political considerations pertaining to the Middle Eastern conflict, the Egyptian government handles all the affairs of the Palestinian refugees.

[5] In 2004, after decades of lobbying by women's organisations, this law was modified and the children of Egyptian women and non-Egyptian fathers are now eligible for citizenship. Yet, the benefits of the new law are diminished by its inclusion of financial and bureaucratic restrictions.

West and arranging marriages with Somalis in the West. Not only do they hope to be able to rebuild their lives in Australia, North America or Europe, but they also aspire to eventually gain citizenship in these countries.

In addition to the refugees, there is another smaller group of Somalis who relocated to Cairo from western countries. Although there is no official number of this latter group of Somali émigrés, the co-author's count, based on tallying individual families throughout a period of 5 years, indicates that the number varies between 150 and 300 families. The émigrés who relocate to Cairo are mostly mothers and their small children. The husbands and/or the older children and relatives stay behind in the West but continue to be involved in the support of their family. Many of these families moved to the West in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The majority of the Somali émigrés are from an urban background. Their educational level is higher than that of the refugees. Most have college degrees or post-high-school diplomas. The relocation of these Somalis to Cairo is motivated by multiple factors, linked to an effort to resist marginalisation in their countries of citizenship and negotiate a more equitable long-term membership as well as maximise the resources of their families and make a claim to an empowering identity. We will elaborate on these points in the following sections.

7.5 Europe and North America: The Realisation of Unequal Citizenship Rights

Stephen Castles (2005a, b) has analytically expanded the idea of inequality in citizenship, studies by arguing that there is a "hierarchy of citizenship". In this hierarchy, Somalis find themselves in the lowest category, which includes the "non-citizens" (Castles 2005b, 42). People in this category live in failed states with no protection from rival armed fractions and find themselves badly off internationally in a world of nation-states. Thus, it is not surprising that Somalis who have a chance to attempt to obtain new citizenship do so, preferably in the nation-states with a top ranking in Castles' hierarchy (US, Europe, Canada and Australia). In this case, naturalisation does not necessarily signal a shift in allegiance from one national culture and identity to another, even though a number of states expect such a loyalty shift. It may be more fruitful to see naturalisation as taking place in a world where rights can be claimed, demands articulated and interests organised at multiple levels.

Despite the fact that they hold a citizenship status in powerful western states, there are Somalis who opt for a transnational life where some family members move to Egypt while others stay in the West. Living in Europe and North America, they learn that there is a hierarchy of citizenship not only at the international but also at national level. Daily experiences of unequal membership and marginalisation in their countries of citizenship teach them this. In interviews conducted in Cairo, Somali émigrés often expressed frustration about the fact that in the West, despite their relatively high degree of education, they find themselves trapped in dead-end

jobs. A 41 year old mother of two children who holds undergraduate and graduate degrees from a reputable university in Ottawa, for example, recounts:

> My friend and I found out that the local government was holding this open meeting so that people can come and hand in their resumes to apply for government jobs. We went. We waited in a line for jobs for MA holders. When my turn came to hand in my application, the lady taking the papers asked me, 'Do you know these jobs are for MA holders?' I said, 'Yes, and I have an MA degree.' This shows you what they think of us. It does not matter if we are citizens or educated. They don't see us like that. We did not get the job.

According to informants in Egypt and Canada (see also Al-Sharmani 1998, 2004), discrimination against immigrant groups is prevalent in the Canadian society in many different ways. Émigrés point out that Canadian employers require job applicants with employment experience in Canadian workplaces. This reduces the new immigrants' opportunities for finding jobs and forces many of them to stay on welfare.

The sense of being kept out of a professional life is shared by educated émigrés from other Western countries. An engineer who was interviewed in Cairo had relocated his family and children from Sweden. He was bitter about the fact that in Stockholm, he could not find a job in his field and had to support his family by working at a Somali money transfer office (*xawilaad*). At times, finding appropriate jobs is complicated by the difficulty of getting African and Asian certificates accredited. Immigrants with Western certificates also face various restrictions, however. In the Netherlands, Somalis with relatively higher education felt so patronised and limited in their ability to develop themselves that it effectively destroyed their own initiative to engage in education or find suitable employment (Reek and Hussein 2003). The consequences, especially in terms of their social and financial status, motivated many of them to move out of the country.

Another form of marginalisation that Somalis in different contexts often complain of is posed by the limited educational possibilities that are available for their children in the lower-class, often racially segregated neighbourhoods where they live. Consequently, some of their children drop out of school. Those who stay in school sometimes spend too much time in remedial classes, which the parents often find a waste of time and a way for the school to get funded by the local government at the expense of their children's educational needs. Additionally, some of the émigrés who moved from the Netherlands complained that their teenage children were pressured by their Dutch school teachers and academic advisors to enrol in programmes that geared them towards low-level vocational jobs rather than college education and professional careers. In fact, recent studies show that the abovementioned reasons motivated Somali migrants in the Netherlands to relocate to UK and elsewhere (Brons and Schaap 2002; Reek and Hussein 2003).

Besides facing various severe restrictions in their attempts to build livelihoods and lives, another issue that illustrates the Somalis' understanding of unequal citizenship is the public discourse on migrants and integration, particularly in Europe. Research in the Netherlands indicated that the reduced Dutch tolerance towards migrants was an important contributing factor for their considerations of migrating

to the UK (Brons and Schaap 2002). Somalis felt they were greatly restricted in their expressions of religion and culture and did not feel they could be Muslim unconditionally outside of the private sphere. In many European countries, they are personally affected by the debates on a wide variety of issues related to integration, some of which are directed at the Somali population, as well. In the Netherlands, the Dutch-Somali politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali's confrontational approach to Islam and Islamic practices (Ghorashi 2003) was felt strongly by the Somalis. In various Scandinavian countries, the fast-growing Somali population is often stereotyped as the "worst migrant community" in terms of integration (see e.g. Fangen 2006; Kleist 2007).

The experiences of émigrés from North America, we argue, also show that the inherent contradictions in state discourses and policies of multiculturalism inadvertently contribute to their marginalisation and accordingly fail to facilitate their integration. For example, some of the émigrés from Canada recounted the contradictory effects of multicultural policies in their lives. They explained that, on one hand, the local government of their country of citizenship supported the migrants' efforts to maintain their cultures by funding their cultural festivals and the heritage classes where the migrant children learn their mother tongues. On the other hand, migrants' visible cultural differences (e.g. dress, accent and other markers of cultural identities) were often experienced as liabilities that hindered their employment and advancement in the society.

In short, citizenship in Western countries is often limiting and marginalising for many Somalis due to their lack of fundamental rights guaranteed by citizenship, such as adequate employment and education that enables their economic and social empowerment. In addition, their sense of exclusion and stigmatisation are often exacerbated by public discourses that present Muslim migrant groups as problematic and uncomfortably 'different'. In many European countries, citizenship in no way guarantees a migrant's inclusion in society. The strongly felt pressure to assimilate, masked as integration policy, is combined with very limited options for doing so and a discourse that teaches Somalis and other migrants that they will never truly belong. There exists something that Ghorashi (2003, 166) calls a "dual discourse on citizenship": one for the "real citizens" and the other for the "unwanted citizens", immigrants. The first category is assumed to consist of responsible, active citizens who have internalised the norms and values of the state of their belonging. The second category consists of those who are not aware of their duties and have to be forced to accept their responsibilities. In North America, and United States in particular, there may be a far more rapid and thorough transition process taking place, where the next generation may define themselves as hyphenated Americans; Somali-Americans, in this case. Yet, this process largely guarantees a fast integration to an inferior class position only (see Portes 1999). Thus, it becomes clear that the struggle for equality entailed by all this is both a struggle for equal rights and a struggle for inclusion. Often, negotiations of interest are turned into negotiations of identity (Kastoryano 2005, 693) and vice versa.

7.6 Somali Responses: Transnationally Experienced Citizenship

According to Ehrkamp and Leitner (2003), research on immigrants and citizenship has largely neglected the ways how immigrants themselves lay claims to citizenship and enact it. Furthermore, as Benhabib (2004) argues, citizenship does not only concern the passive criteria of membership in a national community with rights or duties conferred by the state. Rather, citizenship also needs to be considered as a social practice that individuals engage in beyond the state, through institutions of civil society and civic actions on a local, national and transnational level. As such, it is important to analyse how Somalis themselves engage with citizenship, both in terms of enacting it transnationally and replacing its importance through other types of memberships.

7.7 Somali Émigrés in Cairo: Transnational Citizenship Practices

An increasing number of Somali families that consist of citizens of Western countries have moved to Egypt since the late 1990s. These Somali émigrés, located in Cairo, are a typical example of new diaspora communities that are opting to use their Western citizenship as a form of political and social capital. They utilise their Western citizenship to pursue a transnational life, where they and their families can increase their material and non-material resources, build better lives for their children and make claims to positive and empowering identities (Kadende-Kaiser 1998; Manuh 1998).

While the lack of citizenship status in the Egyptian context has serious ramifications in the daily lives of Somali refugees, the possession of a Western citizenship enables the émigrés to lead a transnational life in which they enjoy more social and economic rights and equitable membership—albeit in fragmented forms and in different nation-states. Relocation to Cairo has ensured many benefits for Somali émigrés, precisely due to their Western citizenship status. The émigrés obtain 1-year renewable tourist or educational visas because they hold European, North American, or Australian passports. Their passports protect them from harassment by police officers that sometimes raid neighbourhoods where migrants are concentrated. Moreover, these émigrés can afford to enrol their children in private schools with money remitted by family members who have stayed behind in the West. Furthermore, female émigrés engage in transnational trading activities during their frequent trips to Gulf countries and Western countries. Their mobility is made possible by their possession of Western passports and their transnational economic activities help increase their family incomes and resources.

In addition, relocating to Cairo offers the émigrés opportunities for more positive self-identifications and a higher social status. Giving financial support to the

refugees and helping with the creation of a united active community becomes important for the émigrés and lets them feel that they are valued individuals and members of a community, rather than marginalised second-class citizens. Also, life in Cairo offers the émigrés a combination of an enlightened Islamic culture and a cosmopolitan urban life. The émigrés avail themselves of the city's Islamic culture by taking religious tutorials from Azhar-trained Somali and Egyptian teachers, attending sermons in mosques and following the televised lectures of famous Egyptian religious scholars such as Amr Khaled.

Both the refugees and the émigrés share a notion of citizenship that has multiple benefits for families and communities. Western citizenship enables Somalis and their different family members to maximise their resources through a transnational way of living. First and foremost, being a holder of a Western passport enables mobility between different nation-states. This is highly important for diaspora Somalis, who are part of an intricate transnational family network. As Western citizens, the émigrés do not need to fear deportation from Egypt or elsewhere. They can visit family members in different nation-states, especially at times of crises. They can also apply for a sponsorship for their relatives in order to be reunited.

One should not reduce the diaspora Somalis' perceptions and their new uses of a citizenship to a mere strategic and instrumental view of citizenship. A crucial factor determining the Somalis' pursuit and use of citizenship as a capital is the reality of their marginalised lives in particular nation-states. Using citizenship as a form of transnational capital, in other words, constitutes a way for these Somalis to negotiate a better membership in different nation-states. Émigrés in Cairo point out repeatedly that their relocation to Egypt will enable their children to have better education and then go back to their countries of citizenship in order to go to college and be equipped to have a successful middle class life. In addition, several of the émigrés point out that while their lives as mothers on welfare in Western countries made them feel marginalised, their relocation to Egypt has enabled them to generate income through transnational trading activities.[6] Moreover, these women add that they feel empowered through their newly acquired economic resources as well as their status as respected and well-educated Somali émigrés who donate to educational and social refugee projects.

The possession (or lack) of a Western citizenship divides the refugees and émigrés into two groups with uneven resources and power. Émigrés provide financial assistance to community development projects as well as some employment opportunities to the refugees. In addition, for some refugees, marrying into an émigré family becomes a means of securing resettlement in the West. Yet, the uneven power and different diaspora trajectories of the two groups also create tensions between them. Émigrés often point out that refugees have idealistic and distorted notions of life in the West, while refugees complain that émigrés fail to appreciate the vulnerabilities of a refugee's life in Cairo. Another source of contention between the two groups emerges from the differences in their interpretations and use of religious

[6] For detailed analysis of the economic activities of female émigrés and refugees, see Al-Sharmani (2006).

knowledge in their daily lives. According to the refugees, the émigrés have erroneous interpretations of religious knowledge and thus adopt rigid practices such as face veils for women, long beards for men and the segregation of male and female guests in Somali weddings. On the other hand, the émigrés claim that the refugees have limited religious knowledge due to their low education level.

The flexible notion of citizenship espoused by the refugees is intertwined with an assertion of a Somali identity. This latter identity becomes important in Egypt, as the Somali refugees have to depend on their own community for survival and have to compete with other refugee populations (such as the Sudanese) for the limited resources of UNHCR and other refugee organisations. Making claims to a collective Somali identity is also part of an effort to overcome the divisions that exist among the refugees, predominantly shaped by clan affiliations but also by different collectivities that have been formed by shared diaspora experiences in previous nation-states (e.g. Somalis who moved from Libya versus those from Saudi Arabia). Thus, the transnational benefits of Western citizenship enable émigrés to make claims to positive layers of identities, namely: generous and committed Somalis who help their communities, successful citizens of Western countries who manage to escape the challenges of poor communities in the inner cities or run-down government-housing neighbourhoods, and family members with more power and say in their family affairs.

7.8 Somali Appropriations of Western Citizenship?

Since the collapse of the Somali state, Somalis have become, in a sense, "outside the national order of things" (Malkki 1995). In fact, one of the main objectives for diaspora Somalis striving to obtain Western citizenship is regaining state membership as well as the accompanying rights, like mobility. There is a great discrepancy between this rather pragmatic approach to citizenship that the Somalis have and the focus of the European states on national identity and belonging. The establishment of the European Union and the associated attempts to create a European identity not only require the inclusion of all those who 'belong' but also the exclusion of those who do not. This process leads to increasing debates on not only European but also national identity. Whereas citizenship is crucial in providing a legal status to migrants and a key to economic and social rights, this focus on belonging leads to great differences in what citizenship means in practice. As such, EU citizenship may provide certain basic rights but does not sufficiently guarantee economic and socio-cultural mobility, nor does it necessarily allow the migrant and his/her family to deal with various types of insecurity. Many Somalis opt instead for a sort of 'transnational citizenship', focusing on belonging to a wider Somali diaspora which may provide different forms of capital with multifaceted benefits.

One way how this transnational citizenship expresses itself is through secondary movement within Europe. Somalis may be resident in one country but hold citizenship in another country. In fact, once a stable type of citizenship, such as EU

citizenship, has been obtained, Somalis are free to move to a place of residence that they prefer more, and often do so. For example, relatively large numbers have moved from the Netherlands and Denmark to the UK (Brons and Schaap 2002; Bang Nielsen 2004). Another expression of transnational citizenship is the highly mobile life of many places, which also happens mostly after citizenship or at least a secure residency in one place has been obtained. This may be combined with families splitting up and their members having either same or different citizenships. Most Somalis in Europe and North America have close family members living elsewhere and a large majority sends remittances to those who are in Somalia and the region. Although these remittances involve great responsibilities and may entail burdens to their local livelihoods, they also enable the Somalis to share the risks transnationally and establish status in the Somali society.

Do transnational citizenship practices then illustrate a high level of power and choice, or agency, or do they point to the opposite direction? In our view, a satisfactory answer should incorporate a bit of the both views. Levitt's (2001) words illustrate this well: "heightened globalization *enables* some, but *pushes* other migrants, into maintaining strong transnational ties." Somalis resist various types of marginalisation through transnational strategies. They do not have the same level of power and choice as others when using their citizenship to gain certain rights and they also face socio-economic marginalisation, negative stereotyping and other types of insecurities. The fact that they develop a new, transnational, understanding of citizenship may be seen as a response to this marginalisation. It may also be understood as an attempt to deal with transnational obligations—even to a point of what Al-Ali (2001) terms "forced transnationalism". At the same time, they choose their transnational strategies consciously to regain a sense of belonging, increase their rights and to add to their social status, as well as due to a genuine desire to contribute to one's family, community or country of origin.

7.9 In Conclusion: Implications for Notions of Citizenship?

Building on the notion of unequal citizenship, we have argued that citizenship in a Western country plays an important role in the lives of the diaspora Somalis. Refugees view it as capital that enables them to sustain their transnational families and communities. That is, diaspora Somalis see and seek citizenship as a form of political and social capital that enables those that own it to have mobility, negotiate more equitable forms of membership in multiple nation-states and contribute financially to collective efforts in creating a community of Somalis. Because some have this capital and others do not, it divides diaspora Somalis into different class groups.

The new ways how diaspora Somalis use their citizenships reveal its limits as a state discourse that equates citizenship with the full membership of a nation-state. The transnational lives that Somali individuals, families and communities have in different countries are strongly inspired by a wish to deal with marginalisation. As Portes (1999, 465) argues, "when, by reason of its racial features and culture, a

foreign group is uniformly rejected and confined to a permanently inferior status, there is every incentive to reaffirm its collective worth and seek economic security through non-conventional means". Through their appropriations and new experiences of citizenship, Somalis are redefining the meaning of membership both in terms of experienced rights and obligations as well as in terms of inclusion and belonging to a nation.

There is likely to be a clash between approaches towards citizenship in various states and the Somali perceptions and strategies related to citizenship. Citizenship may be experienced unequally as a result of belonging or not belonging to the idea of a nation. Also, flexible, transnational notions of citizenship and the approach of seeing citizenship as a form of capital may not augur well with the way citizenship is considered to be strongly linked to a national belonging. The rhetoric used in countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, where immigrants are challenged to show commitment and responsibility towards their countries of residence, makes this clear.

But the Somali case does not stand on its own, and a proliferation of transnational membership seems to take place, challenging the meaning and content of citizenship and participation. Increasing numbers of residents in contemporary nation-states are non-nationals or hold multiple citizenships. In some cases, they assimilate and remain transnational at the same time. As Levitt (2001, 203) argues, increasingly large numbers of migrants and non-migrants now understand their roles as a parent, a moral compass, a breadwinner or a political claims-maker as the one they will carry out across borders over time. At present, only a few states seem to be able to deal with this fact. A focus on national belonging that is too strong and one-sided may complicate the efforts to find new ways to deal with present-day realities for marginalised citizens and non-citizen residents.

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Part III
Complex Preconditions of Cosmopolitan Citizenship: Toward Learning Society

Chapter 8
Dilemmas of Cosmopolitan Education in the Context of Transnationalism

Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

8.1 Introduction

The current on-going changes in the social processes of globalisation have upset what was, for so long, taken as normative—the allocation of political and economic activity to bounded state territories with integrated societies. Today, there is a proliferation of interests across boundaries, and transnationality is evident in dual or multiple political loyalties, in the formation of diasporas, in economic dealings, in political interventions and in hybridising cultures. Comprehensive descriptions of this new cosmopolitanism hypothesise that people are also undergoing a "globalization from within", a broadening consciousness of interdependence (Beck and Sznaider 2006, 9, 12). It is said that these shifts herald 'openness', 'acceptance of the other' and awareness that there are far more similarities than differences among people across the globe. Since this assumption lacks empirical confirmation, cosmopolitanism is best seen as a world-view and a quasi-political programme. Realising the goals of such a programme requires an extensive redirection of education, but to date, the literature on this topic has done little more than outline a benign target. This chapter argues that in order to undertake a programme of cosmopolitan education, we must engage with the challenges of state-sponsored education, with the actualities of teaching and learning and with teachers' tools for dealing with the tensions between national goals and the patent transnational reality in schools. The skills that teachers acquire in professional education can be applied to achieve goals that go beyond the nationalistic objectives of state education, at least if they take advantage of the insights that humans are constantly exposed to during the formation and the re-formation of community. Awareness that spatial and temporal

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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_8

border crossings are inevitable is the key to sensitising consciousness to the perception and acceptance of the cosmopolitan values.

> Transnationalism has been cited as a necessary component of cosmopolitanism—a contemporary school of thought which encourages reassessments of cross-border responsibility, illustrating the educational challenges of promoting transnational social justice, global citizenship, and human dignity across familiar social boundaries and divisions. (CICE 2009)

Although there are papers on education that recognise the prevalence of transnationalism and see it as a basis for realising the moral agenda of cosmopolitanism, remarkably few of them delineate any criteria for discovering what kind of a programme would, in fact, foster the openness and sympathetic awareness of the 'others' that is the core cosmopolitan goal. Even fewer relate to the realities of school as a place where a project of cosmopolitanism can be integrated.

The chapter is divided to six sections. First, I will sketch the meanings attributed to transnationalism and cosmopolitanism and indicate their connections. Then I will point out the weaknesses in the literature supporting 'cosmopolitan education'. Next, I will examine the structures of schooling in order to indicate the complexities and dilemmas that present obstacles to the acceptance of education for cosmopolitanism. The situation in the Israeli state system of education is described as an illustration of the pertinence of this argument. Finally, I suggest an approach to practices that can lead to a programme for cosmopolitan education. I conclude that although cosmopolitanism is described as a form of consciousness, the starting point for cosmopolitanism in education should be framed in appreciating the prevalence and the power of border-crossings in the life-trajectories of the people involved.

8.2 Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism

In a globalising world, where the flows of goods and ideas are accompanied by flows of people, transnationalism is a social reality; it is an existential position observed among diaspora groups, minorities, migrants, their kin and neighbours (Castells 1996; Vertovec 1999; Vertovec and Cohen 2003, 9). Referring to "social formations" that "span borders" (Vertovec 1999, 3), transnationalism implies an awareness of multi-localities, fostering a "transnational imaginary", a type of collective identification that can potentially replace national imagery (Vertovec 1999, 4ff.; also Anthias 2002). Groups with a "transnational imaginary" form politically engaged diasporas and social movements that proclaim their pertinence to multi-local sites (Vertovec 1999, 9ff.). As a tool, moreover, transnationalism is often deliberately promoted by religious establishments, which package cultural elements for diffusion across borders to ensure transnational consumption (Vertovec 1999, 6–7). In the economy, it is evinced in the flow of capital via trans-national corporations in the macro-context and, in the meso-context, with circles of dispersed kinship groups (Vertovec 1999, 7ff.; also Portes 1997; Robertson and Scholte 2007;

Sassen 1991). In fixed networks, transnationalism is signalled by "the force and form of electronic mediation between the spatial and virtual neighbourhoods that underscores the constantly widening disjuncture between territory, subjectivity and collective social movement" (Vertovec 1999, 13).

We can assume that the intertwining threads of transnational themes (Vertovec 1999, 2006) will ultimately have the effect of shaping a human condition of "cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space, […] call[ing] attention to the horizontal and vertical economic, social, and cultural practices that span space, the power hierarchies and citizenship regimes where they are embedded and the ways these practices are enabled and regulated by the changing relationship between states and capitalism" (Ong 1999, 4). This blueprint of transnationality serves as a foundation for arguments for cosmopolitanism in the social sciences (Hollinger 1995, 86). On this platform of cosmopolitanism, transnationalism is recognised as a configuration of opportunities for transforming lived experiences.[1]

Explanations of the 'new cosmopolitanism' do not, however, take transnationalism as their point of departure, nor are they satisfied with the indicators we have cited above. In theoretical terms, Beck (2009, xii) describes "cosmopolitanism" as a logical step in the evolution of the term "globalization" in the social sciences from "denial" to "conceptual refinement and empirical research" to "cosmopolitanization" and ultimately to the recognition of an "epistemological shift". He bases his analysis on the definition of the phase "cosmopolitanization" as "the erosion of clear borders separating markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and the life-worlds of common people [which] […] implies the involuntary confrontation with the alien other all over the globe". On this basis, Beck (2009, xii) calls for re-conceptualising the social sciences by eliminating "methodological nationalism" (Beck and Sznaider 2006, 1) and by revising the moral underpinnings of daily experiences (Hollinger 2003). However, even if we agree that borders are "more permeable to the flow of information, capital, and risk" (Beck 2009, xi) and that societies are not necessarily contained within state territories, there is still little theoretical or empirical evidence that such flows lead to deep-rooted changes in how people understand themselves and the nature of what constitutes knowledge (Delanty 2011).

Both transnationalism and cosmopolitanism specify the meanings and effects of globalisation. Cosmopolitanism, like transnationalism, has geographical, political, and economic dimensions that refer to 'spanned borders' and cultural, financial and political relations across the state boundaries. But while the concept of transnationalism necessarily remains associated with the overweening importance of nation-states in the human experience, Beck and Sznaider (2006) read cosmopolitanism as a new social condition which calls for a radical epistemological departure from traditional concerns with the dualistic axes distinguishing "national from international" and "we from them" on the dimensions of race, culture, religion or class. In short, cosmopolitanism is heralded as a scientific and a political project yet to be

[1] For a historical overview of the development of cosmopolitanism as an idea and as a principle see Vertovec (2006).

accomplished, with unavoidable moral implications (see also Vertovec and Cohen 2003, 9).[2]

Emphasising the moral aspects of cosmopolitanism, many researchers identify it as a realisation of the Enlightenment philosophy of life which, thanks to globalisation, has finally become viable (Archibugi 2005; Hollinger 1995). Because cosmopolitanism is also taken as an attitude, a state of mind and a set of competencies at a personal level, the cosmopolitan turn relates not only to the organisation of global affairs, but also to the fate of individuals (Beck 2009; Hannerz 1990). The encounter of cosmopolitanism's moral basis and the reading of cosmopolitanism as a frame of mind and a set of capacities highlights the need for an alliance between cosmopolitanism and education.

8.3 Cosmopolitanism in Education

In literature relating to education, cosmopolitanism is read as the view that people growing up in a globalising world should be equipped with competencies that enable them to take advantage of new political and economic opportunity structures, but should also be able to appreciate the 'others' and be receptive to their worlds.

Partisans of cosmopolitanism see education as a means to correct the ethical failings of contemporary society (Nussbaum 1997, 2000), a means to ensure that humanity will be imbued with a more viable ethic to overcome blind competitiveness in a world full of global challenges (Papastephanou 2005, 548). Presumably specifying some of the content of such an education, Hansen (2007) describes it as "(1) an expression of values, (2) a moral compass, and (3) an abiding engine of ideas about teaching, curriculum, [and] learning". In his view, through a cosmopolitan education, students acquire respect for the unknown and hence an ability to accept new people and new ideas. Dedication to cosmopolitan education as an expression of the 'good life' can, however, lead to contradictory conclusions. Grasping cosmopolitan education as an education for democratic values (Held 2003); Ben-Porath 2007) insists that it is not, after all, at odds with patriotism, insofar as in times of trouble, members of a nation must collaborate and care for one another (see also Osler and Starkey 2003, 243, 252). Casey (2007) actually describes cosmopolitanism in terms of national values; he recommends furthering cosmopolitanism by liberalising the admissions policies of US universities! Somewhat vaguely, Gunesch (2004, 268) emphasises that the core of education for cosmopolitanism should be derived from a clear image of the type of individual to be educated but that the state is palpably important in shaping that image. In a similar vein, Torres (2007, 156) argues that to further cosmopolitanism, students have to be guided to understand themselves better while being educated to democracy. Still,

[2] To date, literature on cosmopolitanism has not related to the problems of women in a world that is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan. In the framework of this paper, I will not be able to extend my discussions to these issues.

by 'redeeming' Freire's concept of "*conscientização*" as self-reflection oriented to one's history and traditions, Torres effectively binds cosmopolitanism to nationhood.

In some of the literature, cosmopolitanism is cited as a technical component of teaching and learning. Emdin (2008, 773–774), for example, outlines "3 C's" for harnessing youthful energy to the study of science in school: cosmopolitanism, co-generative dialogue and co-teaching. However, while he provides at least initial instructions for 'doing' co-generative dialogue and co-teaching, in regard to cosmopolitanism he is content to encourage teachers to subscribe "to a cosmopolitan outlook" as a tool for convincing students of various backgrounds to learn science.

In sum, the literature describes education for cosmopolitanism as a mission for achieving mutuality through learning to respect 'others'. It also insists that students acquire democratic values, along with an understanding of what it means to be global citizens. Researchers imply that if the requisite norms and values 'are taught' and the textbooks describe and explain them, students will learn the messages and 'have' to seek for the values. Suggestions for strategies, however, are sadly lacking. Most writings on cosmopolitanism in education evade the complexities of (a) education as a state programme; (b) predicaments in learning; (c) complexities of the teacher's role—dilemmas and resources; and (d) commonalities of human experience that can serve as keys to accomplishing cosmopolitanism. These themes provide broad grounds for proposing a programme of potentially effective action for cosmopolitanism.

In the following section, I will first sketch theoretical underpinnings of education, illustrating my interpretation with some details concerning the state education system in Israel (Kalekin-Fishman 2004). Then I will go on to propose foundations for a cosmopolitan education.

8.4 Obstacles to Effecting Cosmopolitanism in Education

Consensus in Education All told, the literature stemming from cosmopolitanism ignores the fact that education forms an important part of governmentality (a means to achieve unity of apperceptions of reality) and not a site where decisions on goals can be imposed as 'neutral' curriculum directives (Foucault 1980). The introduction of different shifts in education thus requires a sophisticated and flexible interpretation of how power governs schooling and how social actors deal with its processes and structures. Although relations can be structured in different ways, the encounters between teachers, learners, and study materials in contemporary schools are always highly political.[3]

[3] In a newspaper article published in the 1860s, Marx (1978) condemned a new UK law obliging children to attend primary school, expressing his fear that compulsory schooling would not only homogenise personalities but would also be a way of regulating long-term social and political life, preserving the political and the economic status quo. One hundred and fifty years later,

In practice, the organisation of a state education system is always a site of struggle. From without, in a concerted assault on national sovereignty, a growing number of regional, international, and global organisations attempt to impose agendas on their member-states. Preceding them and resisting encroachment, the state education systems defend and sustain a shared image that enhances the political state as a national home. Furthermore, within states, groups with diverse interests struggle over what conceptions of the state's uniqueness are to be reproduced and disseminated in order to preserve the nation. They strive to shape education so as to institute a specific mode of governmentality (see above). Thus, there are constant clashes on how to formulate goals, allocate students to different types of organisations and apply criteria for shaping careers in schools both for the students and for those in charge of carrying out the tasks defined as education. The prevailing decisions impose the presumed consensus in the modes of school organisation, the language of instruction and the subject matter, as well as the disciplines identified as required knowledge. The consensus is implicitly configured in the allocations of time and space, in hierarchic structures and in bureaucratic strictures. Overall, a historical narrative interweaves the history of a 'nation' with the history of national education. Because the consensus related to schooling is always a temporary outcome of ongoing international and intra-national struggles, no configuration is fixed and no outcome can be foretold in full (Fischmann and Haas 2012). Therefore, agitation for different kinds of education is an integral part of political campaigns.

As the support team of the 'winners' in any given clash, teachers are sent into schools as messengers of the 'people', a mystic entity which is somehow embodied in the powers that be and the diffused curriculum. They are educated to accept the forms of education that they will participate in as eternal expressions of the national essence. Furthermore, they are equipped with professional tools that are described as scientifically proven instruments for furthering learning and fostering excellence in the existing frameworks by conveying what is defined as knowledge.

The Teaching-Learning Complex Discussions of cosmopolitan education also fall short, as they fail to consider the full complexity of learning processes. Learning, which is never a linear outcome of teaching, is not a singular process. Researchers have shown the importance of cognitive skills for organising what is taught hierarchically as knowledge (memory of specifics), understanding, application, analysis, synthesis, each of which is subject to evaluation (Bloom 1956). Further development of learning capacities depends on the acquisition of meta-cognitive skills such as "planning, organising, monitoring, and doing self-assessments of one's competencies" (Hartley 2007, 46). The constructivist turn in education, moreover, has shown that learning is related to how the students assess its contextual requirements.

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education—at least primary education for all—is perceived as an unalloyed good. The availability of education has become a central factor in indexing the progress of states towards ensuring a decent standard of living for their populations and developing reasonably comfortable Western-style life conditions. It has been shown, much as Marx feared, that schools everywhere affect (and, presumably, upgrade) the children's consensual ways of thinking, ways of understanding their environments and their modes of action (Scribner and Cole 1981).

Examining the outcomes of lecture-based learning in comparison to student-activating lessons, for example, Struyven et al. (2006) found that activated students make concerted efforts to plumb the meanings of the texts and the ideas presented to them, while the students who were required to attend lectures do not exert themselves beyond acquiring the obvious details laid before them. They may even take a 'strategic' approach, not centred on what is to be learned but on how the lecturer is likely to test them. Still another aspect of how learning gets done is the factor of grouping. Many studies show that sharing learning experiences has a positive effect on the outcomes (Lazonder 2005; Stanton-Salazar and Spina 2005). Beyond the cognitive skills and the degrees of activation, elements of affects such as motivation and intention or whether there has been a history of failure or a history of success also shape current learning (Struyven et al. 2006, 14). Moreover, through varieties of experience, beyond infancy, all learners have a tacit understanding of how they learn and what behaviours and consequences show that learning has been 'done'.

As it is clear that students do not learn exclusively from what is presented as 'the material of the lesson', it has also proved fruitful to study the distinctions that escape the above-noted categorisations. There is purchase in analysing formal and informal learning, examining the relative salience of what is learned (core knowledge and peripheral knowledge, explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge), and discovering what students have learnt about practices and the degree to which students have learnt to be (i.e. to perform as) participants in a community of practice. Moreover, it has been shown that people endowed with different types of intelligence and different sensibilities learn in different ways and acquire different kinds of knowledge (cf. Eisner 1994; Gardner 2006; Sternberg and Grigorenko 2002).

The complexities of learning and, hence, the complexity of deciding what types of learning are possible and how those types of learning can be fostered in teaching-learning events are challenges that teachers face daily. General orientations of the students to the classroom situation may be decisive in regard to whether the teacher will be involved in a supply-push or a demand-pull mode of teaching, i.e., a proactive or reactive approach to what is considered learning (Brown 2006). Given a variety of choices in texts and tasks, the teacher is responsible for helping students develop appropriate cognitive and meta-cognitive skills. But beyond the specific goals of assuring knowledge acquisition, there are questions of classroom arrangements, lesson pacing, student placement, event monitoring, and the oversight of long-term learning processes. All these create a climate which may or may not promote learning for different students.

Hence, the teachers' responsibilities for adapting their work to the learners are highly complicated. Every teacher is also confronted by challenges to her person in the teaching-learning situation. These challenges derive from the temporal tension of the teacher-learner encounters across generations and the limitations of space. In schools, individual teachers are enclosed in relatively rigid classroom spaces with clusters of students. They are constrained to experience the students' temporal evolution, their life trajectories, together with their own, as an unavoidable source of pressure (Massey 2005).

Although I surmise that these foundations of state schooling are quite general, I will here illustrate the complexity of the situation, ignored by the philosophers of cosmopolitan education, by citing cases in point from Israel's state system of education.

8.5 State Education in Israel

Contests in Education From the founding of the state in 1948, education in Israel has been contested vigorously. For a time, all the pre-state school networks were maintained, apart from the government schools of the UK, the mandatory/colonial power. For schools where Hebrew was the language of instruction, there were four distinct systems, each an arm of a political party. These were the centrist General Zionist system, the left-wing Socialist Workers' system, the Religious Zionist system and the right-wing system of ultra-orthodox anti-Zionist schools. Education for Arabic speakers was generally conducted under the aegis of religious bodies, apart from some integration to the mandatory government's system.

The early years of the state were characterised by Jewish mass immigration, which more than doubled the number of children eligible for schooling, and the rival systems engaged in zealous, often fanatical competition. Passed in 1953, the Law for Compulsory State Education ostensibly instituted a system of state schools to counter this fragmentation. By law, the state was supposed to replace the political parties and take responsibility for free compulsory primary education (kindergarten to eighth grade) for all the children in the country. However, in an effort to avoid disputes, the law defined "state education" ab initio as a doubly bifurcated system with separate apparatuses for the religious state sub-system (Hebrew-speaking) and the non-religious state sub-system (the latter divided again according to the language of instruction—Hebrew or Arabic). Furthermore, the law recognised ultra-orthodox Jewish schools as private schools eligible for state support, although no governmental supervision was imposed. In the state secular system, the Socialist Workers' system was assimilated to the system of the General Zionists and effectively eliminated from the educational map.[4] The new law formulated general goals for education which expressed the interests of all the parties, even though they no longer controlled curricula or staffing. Thus, the formal overall aims of education included the goal of learning the scriptures (a principle of the religious Zionists), the goal of fostering a positive orientation to science while developing craftsmanship (General Zionists) and the goal of training for agricultural expertise (Socialist Workers). As noted previously, in the schools for students whose mother tongue was Arabic, the state conceded that Arabic should be the language of instruction, but then underlined the over-arching goal of education as the development of a Zionist consciousness, i.e., unquestioned dedication to Israel as a Jewish state (Lamm

[4] The party had a majority in the government and so could be cajoled into accepting the decision by its 'own' ministers.

1973). Furthermore, the state asserted its right to control education by deciding on staffs for all the schools, apart from the private religious schools. The presumed centralised control of the state system essentially reinforced segregation among the different sectors of the population.

It was, of course, patently impossible to build educational programmes to achieve all the contradictory objectives and arguments of the different pre-state streams, which continued to present obstacles to the operations of the Ministry of Education on the floor of the Knesset. Moreover, the right of the Arab citizens, a large national minority, to control their own educational system was consistently ignored. The organising principle of using education to develop a Zionist (Jewish national) consciousness meant that minority interests were patently overridden. True, a significant achievement of the 1953 law was the institution of compulsory state education for children whose mother tongue is Arabic. Until then, less than 10 % of male children (and far fewer of the girls) had had any formal schooling. In the narrative of the system, however, goals that related to Arabic as a mother tongue, Arabic culture, or Muslim, Druze and Christian religious values, were not officially accepted until more than 40 years later, in the mid-1990s. Only then, with the pressure of the Arab Committee for Education (a NGO set up by the heads of local councils in Arab areas in Israel), together with the Arab Members of Parliament and activist members of the Jewish lay public, did the Ministry of Education revise the formulation of the goals of education to include recognition of the cultural rights of the Arab minority, 'loosening' but not removing the demand for identification with the Zionist project (see Kalekin-Fishman 2004).

The Student Career State intervention in determining what constitutes knowledge and moulding the student career presents obstacles to cosmopolitan education. In public education, students are inducted to a framework where their curriculums are fixed, their positioning in classes organised and their daily agendas arranged throughout the 10 months of the school year. A determining experience is the students' encounter with their teacher, the single overwhelming authority in the kindergarten. In the early grades of primary school, one teacher is responsible for each class, as well, with only occasional variation by part-time teachers of sports or music. The consistent presence of the class teacher teaches the children what patterns of behaviour are acceptable in public, often by contrasting them with the patterns of behaviour they practise at home. Through the time-table, children are also taught that the fields of knowledge are organised hierarchically. The 'extra' teachers deal with music, art, sometimes sports, which are less important as areas of knowledge and, at best, provide peeks to what is meant in schools by 'fun'. In secondary schools, the hierarchy is nuanced because the teachers are responsible for specific subject areas. The staff members may be experts in relatively esoteric disciplinary domains which are held in high public esteem (teachers of physics or chemistry, for example).

The signs of what constitutes the national character are a constant presence. Marking the annual cycle, religious holidays are adapted (in the state secular system) to express powerful national symbolism. Among the fixed elements of the educational universe, the school calendar expresses the state's distinction between

the sacred and the profane. Rituals are connected to designated places within state territory by action and discourse: Memorial Day is observed in military cemeteries; (Jewish) religious agricultural feasts are connected with the plants and odours of the fields of the motherland, and national holidays are exhaustively celebrated in places that endear the territory and emphasise the association of the state with nationhood. Each highlighted date is also associated with appropriate songs, slogans and sounds (Kalekin-Fishman 2010). The structures and symbols that legitimise the ideology of the state have an impact on the consciousness of each student, establishing a set of understandings that is reinforced annually. These understandings are the criteria for examining the significance of different sorts of knowledge and the indicators of personal and collective morality. Willy-nilly, the teachers who convey knowledge and sanction the patterns of the profane also conduct the sacred activities to establish the incontrovertible truth of the existence of a nation (Kalekin-Fishman 2004).

Even though 90 % of the students in today's schools were born in Israel, there exist lingering memories and practices from the diverse countries of origin of their parents and grandparents as well as from their networks of connections fostered in the family. Due to the state policy of encouraging and supporting Jewish immigration, schools are all populated by trans-nationals whose networked belongings are ignored. Thus, of the more than seven million Israelis, about 76 % are Jews from over 100 different countries, but all are defined as belonging to the same nationality. Among the members of the Arab minority, 20 % of the population, there are connections with family in the 'near afar' of the occupied territories and with international religious establishments. Unacknowledged divided allegiances explode in open hostility, with tides of violence surging among peers and, at times, their parents, on the basis of their different origins (Arieli 1995; Elbaz-Luwisch 2005; see Wilf and Wilf 2008). Clearly, the effects of transnationality are not necessarily benign.

Educating Teachers Further obstacles to cosmopolitanism in the Israeli system (or systems of education) arise from the framework of the teachers' professional education, embodied in performances, positions, rules and discourses. In specialist professional schools and professionally-oriented university departments, candidates for teaching acquire grounded pointers on how to get along with the students in schools, along with repertoires of skills for imparting 'pieces of knowledge' of various kinds. Since teaching is purported to be weighted by attendant consensual values (values taken for granted in textbooks and acted out in the organisation of schools), the lessons learned are assumed to be unambiguous.

While the teacher is encouraged to see herself as an autonomous professional, she is also taught to limit her interventions to what is needed to preserve community and state solidarity. Internalisation of the framework for the *nationalising* programme of the state is facilitated by referencing the easily assimilated slogans abstracted from canonical texts such as the Bible, the orthodox Jewish Prayer Book or the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Slogans such as 'all Jews are responsible for one another', one is obliged to 'bend one's will to the will of God', the unques-

tioned national mission of 'ingathering the exiles'—all of these are among these self-evident values that the teachers are expected to internalise and disseminate. Defined as central state values, the slogans also serve to legitimate the state's practices of assigning rights and duties differentially in response to claims made by citizens representing various sectors.

Furthermore, the hierarchy that is embedded in government ministries, including the Ministry of Education, is replicated in each school from the headmaster 'down' and adapted to the taken-for-granted classroom hierarchies. Thus, the relations of hierarchy are taught—and learned—as the structure of a framework that makes learning possible. Preparation for the vocation of teaching also underlines the explicit messages of the system. Practice teaching is designed to test the skills of the teachers in consensual classrooms. Forms of teacher education and the conditions of the teachers' employment are coordinated with the way that schooling is framed and 'normal' teachers act.

Moreover, presumably on the basis of psychological theories, student candidates for teaching are warned that in order to safeguard the well-being of students, schools have to provide a concerted vision of *apolitical* neutrality in regard to the issues of state. Having undergone vocational preparation, teachers have to be able to set aside the doubts and the confusion that their university studies provoke. Subject matter that has been institutionalised in the curriculum is presented as the neutral, unambiguous core of every relevant discipline. As professionals, teachers are encouraged to entertain only changes that can be justified on pedagogical grounds. Thus, they are recruited to support the status quo and receive credentials as agents—not in the philosophical sense of autonomous actors, but in the insurance sense of being representatives of organisational goals. In their conceptualisations (metaknowledge), their repertoires of patterns of behaviour and their intentions (habitus), teachers are deputised to represent the officially sanctioned ideology, the state's vision of a 'good life' that legitimates its perpetuation as a material and a symbolic institution (for detailed explications of the above-described situations, cf. Kalekin-Fishman 2004; Elboim-Dror 1986; Lamm 1973).

8.6 Can Cosmopolitanism Be Integrated into Education?

Although the particularities of the Israeli condition cannot be generalised, research shows that the dominance of nationalistic trends in state-supported education is not unique. There are, however, pressures that challenge the exclusivity of a nationalist orientation, even though teachers who have gone through the system are deliberately prepared for the ideological context. As persons, teachers are products of a school system that awaits their professional services, socialised to the hegemonic narrative of the nation-state. But this is not the whole story. Concomitantly with their preparation for teaching, or even before they enter upon professional training, students planning to become teachers are exposed to academic courses of study, where they face knowledge as it is practised in the real world. This exposure tears

apart the veils that are so carefully woven throughout their primary and secondary schooling. In tertiary education, the students-who-will-be-teachers learn to appreciate all the differences of opinion that attend the formation of what is called 'knowledge'. They are introduced to the heart of scientific inquiry: the uncertainties, doubts, questions and arguments that can never be permanently resolved (Weber 1958). These disclosures open a window to scepticism and perplexity. The national worldview is implicitly questioned.

Furthermore, as noted, no state is immune to the influence of decisions taken in supra-state organisations, such as the various sub-groups of the United Nations, the conventions of regional groups such as the European Union, or international non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and Médecins sans Frontières (Ku 2002, 542).

Most important, diverse types of population movements across the globe have made trans-nationality increasingly prevalent in schools. Transnational communities have been formed throughout Europe, Asia, and Latin America (Basch et al. 1994; Castles 1998; Kastoryano 1998; Portes 1997). Mobility among experts, students, industrial workers, domestic workers, even when originally intended to be temporary, has given rise to groups with families who have settled into the receiving countries (Raijman 2008/2009). Ties with communities that span borders are reinforced by the media. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, children of temporary residents of all types are admitted to school systems and bring transnational affiliations, loyalties, communal identifications and the rhythms of their everyday lives into the classrooms. Immigrant children are equipped with the slogans, times, spaces and practices of 'there', all the while attempting to fathom the meanings of the slogans, times, spaces and practices that are taken for granted 'here'. Thus, students of all ages bring sets of thinking, tools and practices that are likely to diverge from local norms to the schooling situation. Although professional education grooms the teachers to stem the tide,[5] they have to deal with what is likely to be a confusing array of family trajectories, meaning 'time so far' and pointing ahead in different ways in the classroom space. They are challenged daily to adapt their educational materials and behaviours to a diversified, diversifying groups of students. Relationships that develop among the students may have different kinds of consequences for the class as a whole and for its subgroups. Cultural meetings may lead differentially to "cultural homogenization, cultural polarization, hybridization, and unity in diversity" (Delanty 2011, 649).

Still, while attempting to deal with growing multiplicity and its occasionally bewildering consequences, teachers are hindered by an internalised ideology that buttresses the interests of the state. The rigorous structures of national education

[5] As a part of a recent reform in Israel, teachers are obliged to spend more time in schools and attend to individual needs of students. As 'autonomous professionals', they are instructed to compile a 'vision' for operating their school. They do this with a view for adopting the consensual values and the official ideology to what they see as the essence of schooling. Experience shows that the presence of students with different backgrounds in class is taken as a problem that has to be overcome by pressure for homogeneity (Ministry official: personal communication).

systems attempt to overlay the existential reality of trans-nationality and also clash with cosmopolitanism as a political and moral project. To integrate cosmopolitan projects into education, teachers must develop a practical orientation to the unfolding meanings of globalisation and their relevance to the dense cultural interchanges in classrooms. One challenge is finding loopholes in the edifice of state education that can be used for interpolating cosmopolitan values. Another is discovering what in professional socialisation enables the teachers to identify with cosmopolitan goals and engage their students in the openness and awareness that signal a cosmopolitan morality. This is not an enterprise that will last a month or a year but an orientation that must infiltrate education slowly. It is important to find 'hooks' onto which a programme of cosmopolitanism can be hung without turning into a threat-to-be-resisted by the educational establishment and its participants. Indeed, such hooks can be found, on one hand, in a re-interpretation of the basic idea of community and, on the other hand, in the psychological vision of good teaching. Through words and deeds, state education systems foster solidarity that is referenced to the nation at large but also applies to creating a climate of community in the school as a whole and in each class. At the same time, the principles that frame good teaching demand that teachers pay attention to the needs of children individually and in groups. These openings can help educators realise that there are key experiences that may be highlighted to further cosmopolitanism legitimately. These can be clustered under the heading 'border crossings'.

Border Crossings: A Key Tool According to Balibar (2006), the nature of borders determines the position of individuals or groups as foreigners (strangers, neighbours, 'one of us', or enemies). Given that individual development can be seen as a chain of border crossings, it can help us to get a handle on a crucial issue in the school careers of the teachers and students. This is palpably true in relation to spatial borders. The people who have life-stories where the conditions of transnationalism unfold have learnt what it means to be on the different sides of mapped borders. But the people of every classroom have had to realise the potentialities of the self by successively crossing borders in households, communities, villages, towns, "the street, the business, the craft, the profession" (Appiah 1998; Bhabha 1994, 195), in regions as well as in states. By playing out our positions at the borders of each of these domains, a lifelong challenge, we can attain a perception of a panoply of 'others' and a deep-rooted grasp of what there is to know as an 'other' and how to overcome being a stranger. Furthermore, every student, like every teacher, has the experience of crossing temporal/developmental borders. Crossing them acceptably entails being seen as, and being, 'others' when *meeting* perceived 'others' at various blockades and embankments. Because they are taken for granted as a part of ordinary experience, temporal borders are not given the notice they deserve, but the succession of temporal-developmental crossings combines into a powerful mechanism for cultivating a morality appropriate to 'globalisation from within'.

To recapitulate, a practical programme for cosmopolitan education can only be formulated if the realities of schooling as a political enterprise, teaching as a professional responsibility and the processes of teaching and learning are all consid-

ered. To further a cosmopolitan programme, it is necessary to build on a reinterpretation of life experience as a sequence of temporal and spatial border crossings, the archetypical experience of being and encountering others. Conceptually, the link is in understanding that when crossing borders, people move to new kinds of cultural interchange, from membership in one type of community to inclusion in another (Delanty 2011; Etzioni 1993, 2008; Elshtain 2010).

8.7 Building a Programme for Cosmopolitan Education

Given the key function of these temporal border crossings in fostering cosmopolitan understandings, the usual organisation of schooling into classes of fairly homogeneous ages can serve as a foundation. By conceptualising the school class as a community, teachers can help their groups of students see the many border crossings they carry out in space, those that they have carried out over time and will have to carry out in the future. Moreover, they can learn how an outcome of every crossing is a not only a re-positioning of the self but also a restructuring of the group and the community. Teachers can use the repertoire of skills they have acquired in their academic and professional education to guide the children through the relevant activities that highlight the uncertainties that attend each crossing, their encounters with the 'others' and the sensations of being 'others' while crossing and, often, after it has been completed. Such learning can engage the pupils' interests with varied learning styles (Brown and Adler 2008). Collaboration in groups, which has been shown to be useful for learning, perhaps because it fosters community solidarity, can be extended to projects involving entire schools (Lazonder 2005; Papastephanou 2005).

Any teaching programme that highlights the centrality of community fits in with consensual professional goals and the advanced cosmopolitan values. Moreover, the classroom community-in-the-making can be a site for activities that emulate civil society in all of its permutations (for a useful survey of definitions of civil society, see Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Ku 2002; Rudolph 2004). Let us see what one approach might entail.

Community and Civil Society The framework for researching "Global Civil Society", developed at Johns Hopkins University (Salamon et al. 2003) and explored comparatively in 40 countries, provides an associational scaffolding for classifying the kinds of interests that may arise in class and school communities. They define civil society as: "a broad array of organizations that are […] outside the institutional structures of government; that are not primarily commercial […]; that are self-governing; and that people are free to join or support voluntarily." According to them, civil society comes into being as groups that form to deal with issues of culture and recreation, education, health, social services, environment and housing. Such groups include social movements, religious congregations, business and professional organisations and unions. Although this list was generated as a

summary of adult activities, each of the terms hints at issues related to households, families, social inequality, power, justice, law, history, memory and politics.[6] These are core social concerns that are likely to be raised by different groups of children in a classroom. When the teachers provide opportunities for actively engaging with the arising issues, students can learn how to participate in civil society on the basis of their own experiences.

Thus, in practice, the point of departure for introducing cosmopolitanism into education is helping children relate to the problems/inconveniences/dissatisfactions that affect them as a group and the class as a community. These may have to do with the daily agenda (culture, recreation, environment), the celebration of holidays (religious practices), inequality (justice) and so on. In the early years of schooling, students will raise questions that are palpable in their immediate surroundings. As they mature, the students may develop sensitivity to wider issues. The original definition of class as an acting collective will expand to encompass the community in a broader social construct. Students will be observing different types of community actions while reflecting on themselves and it will be possible to call their attention to the environmental, economic and even political context.

This approach provides the necessary connections with the goals the state has set for education and the teachers' professional commitment. Emphasis on group concerns accords with the goals of solidarity. Furthermore, to reach decisions on community action (however community is defined in any given year of study), a teacher's guidance will be needed, fostering significant intellectual capacities: observation, definition, clarification, translation into action, implementation, drawing conclusions about what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. These keys to cognition are justified professionally and indicate what kinds of learning can be attractive to different students—a task that every teacher can legitimately undertake. Such foci also evolve as a contribution to professional development. According to Dillon (2008, 258), these pedagogical indicators can lead to breaks with disciplinary norms, broadening the teachers' perceptions about the nature of knowledge, thus advancing the programme of new cosmopolitanism (Beck and Sznaider 2006).

8.8 Concluding Remarks

In a globalising world, cross-border relationships are inevitable. They include elements of feeling such as multi-local belonging, 'trans-national imaginary', and connections with 'neighbours' who are physically at a distance and with transfers of cultural elements. Such relationships also include contacts through the flow of capital and coordinated political engagement; interconnectedness encompassing "horizontal and vertical economic, social, and cultural practices that span space"

[6] These are core terms for social issues which Beck and Sznaider consider to be in need of revision in the social sciences.

(Ong 1999, 4). The complex relationships evolve into transnationality, with implications going beyond the limitations of nationhood. All this is essential for making the transition from narrow conceptions of nationalism to perceiving the nation as part of the globe, and hence, understanding the need for promoting a cosmopolitan consciousness.

To this end, education is an integral component of the 'new cosmopolitanism', defined by Beck (2009) as a project that embraces ethical principles as well as social theory and changes in the epistemological basis of methodology. Aspirations, however, are inadequate to bring about the kind of practice that is implied. Only by taking into account the practicalities of school structures and their political implications, as well as the teaching-learning nexus and the sources of teachers' professionalism, can cosmopolitanism be brought into education.

Because state schooling is an apparatus for imparting knowledge in ways appropriate to the national imagination, careers for both students and teachers are framed by regulations that ensure the maintenance of whatever compromise among conflicting interests is accepted as serving collective and individual needs at any given time. Yet, classroom populations are not necessarily attuned to the state's consensual mode. Groups put together for the purpose of learning are increasingly transnational, made up of students whose backgrounds are highly diverse. And this diversity is often the root of the most basic problems that the teachers have: pedagogical dilemmas on how to induce effective learning.

For the teachers, the adoption of a programme of cosmopolitan education may actually help in solving the problems they confront when facing a class where transnationalism is 'rampant'. This can be accomplished by adapting and conveying the realisation that during their life trajectories, students and teachers all cross temporal and spatial borders. At each crossing, temporal as well as spatial, people emerge from one communal configuration to find themselves in a new one which can operate as a civil society maintained by the active voluntary participation of its members. With this awareness, teachers can activate classes of children as communities whose members are guided to turn their attention successively to problems that they can help unravel as a group or as a 'group of groups'. Despite the relative single-mindedness of the teacher's education, the broad infrastructure of teaching allows the teachers to find ways of furthering a project of civil society by encouraging voluntary participation. Working through the activation steps as the participants of a social nexus, the students have opportunities to acquire competencies that support an interactive transnational reality while becoming imbued with a global ethic. From the teaching-learning nexus literature we can see that in this type of undertaking, the teachers are enabled to use the very professional resources which are known to advance in-depth learning. Working in the classroom as a community or as subgroups, settling on problems that concern the community as it is understood by students at different stages of their development and using varied keys to cognition as pedagogical indicators—all of these lay the groundwork for openness that can lead to solutions for the moral dilemmas of community and aid in furthering a mindset that is in accordance with the cosmopolitanisation of the world.

The inexorable advance of globalisation and the need for a cosmopolitan consciousness is a wave that the schools can ride with the help of tools invented for tangential purposes. The milieu where teachers are called upon to exercise their profession is rife with contradictions. The life-trajectories of students and teachers are similar in providing successions of temporal and spatial border crossings. Growing awareness of these stepping stones makes it possible for teachers to apply their professionalism to further selected national goals but also advance critical thinking, problem-solving, innovative thinking and a sense on how to collaborate in a globalised world.

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Chapter 9
The Internationalisation of Higher Education: Multicultural, Transnational and Cosmopolitan Perspectives Approached

Anna Medvedeva and Pirkkoliisa Ahponen

9.1 Introduction

Current transnational reality also challenges the institutions of higher education and their practices, which are capable of answering the highly varying academic needs of their diversifying students, including the 'dislocated' ones. The development of knowledge economy and the multicultural challenges of our society also affect the operations of the universities. Due to the changing global demands, institutions of higher education are launching international projects, increasingly planned to follow the international academic standards. They also try to make their performances visible in regard to the globally comparable evaluation criteria. The key functions of higher education in teaching and research are best realised nowadays in answering to new international tasks.

To enhance their global visibility, academic institutions have to rethink their profiles. Specialisation priorities are demanded from every university. A significant number of institutional activities should concentrate on improving the quality of higher education and having a specific status in the fields that fit their chosen profile. In this way, a specific university distinguishes itself in the international interest circle or even the global context. Multiple factors determine the university's responsibilities; these include the conditions given to them by the state, the available financial and organisational resources and traditions and the prevailing practices. The new call for internationalisation coincides with specific situations and higher education targets in a variety of ways. The internationalisation of universities is in the interests of the state, as it fulfils modern policy priorities and explores the limits of

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_9

economic opportunities in higher education. A latent conflict of loyalties also exists, however; by becoming more international, the university also becomes less and less aligned with the nation-state.

According to Stier (2003), academic research concerns the competitive and economic dimensions of university internationalisation, while a clear understanding of its academic purposes is often missing. The current discussion is focused on university assessment indicators and comparisons of the international achievements of universities. This orientation does not fully assess the development of internationalisation. Critical revisions of internationalisation approaches include pinpointing the myths and misleading assumptions on the targets and searching for academic values as such and revising usable terminology (Egron-Polak et al. 2012). These projects search for new ways to frame ideas and concepts that would best explain our multiple understandings of internationalisation and the variety of its implementation.

This chapter uses the concepts of multiculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism to look at development of internationalisation in higher education analytically. The presented analysis reveals the key controversies emerging as a result of the university's attempts to redefine its relationship with the nation state. The values of university internationalisation are also reassessed through these concepts.

The term 'multiculturalism' originally referred to the group rights of ethnic minorities. Kymlicka (1995) has distinguished the rights of the minorities that have inhabited a country for a long time from the demands of new migrant groups coming into the country on presumably voluntary grounds. According to him, the newcomers are more prone to assimilation. Later on, no differences between the older and newer migrant groups existed. Multiculturalism meant the right to settle, retain a specific culture and demand cultural recognition from the society (Modood 2007, 2–5). Finally, multicultural philosophers emphasised the importance of the majority's cultural awareness of an ethnically diverse society (Appiah 1994). Multiculturalism became a marker of a liberal society and cultural awareness was considered to be a valuable learning capacity.

In the field of education, multiculturalism initially signified the rights of various ethnic minorities to pursue learning. Their access to higher education was enhanced through affirmative action, which prioritised the admission of minority candidates with necessary qualifications. This aspect of educational opportunities becoming more equal caused much debate regarding the university's public obligations, which include providing best possible education to a society's members regardless of their ethnic origin, as well as ensuring social advancement and promoting social justice (Malamud 1997). The other aspects of discussion regarding minority rights were related to drop-out rates, academic achievements and college adaptation (Eimers and Pike 1997). Later on, it began to be seen that cultural reflections on multiculturalism and the inclusion of diversity topics in the curriculum are important for reforming higher education to meet the modern demands of the universities. Finally,

the slogan "celebrate diversity" affirmed cultural awareness as an educational value (Hoffmann 1996). Thus, this policy started with the rights of the minority students and developed to envelop understanding of the majority students' benefits.

Transnationalism is the new mode of migrants' integration in two or more societies through the establishment of social ties across national borders; this is the result of increased mobility and developed means of communication. Besides social ties, transnationalism is marked by fluid identity-constructions and complex relationships with national affiliations. These changes have been noted by Glick Schiller (1997, 164) while comparing modern migration to the earlier waves of migration. Portes et al. (1999, 218) do not adhere to the idea that transnationalism distinguishes the new waves of migration from the previous ones; they claim that qualities like the longitudinal character of relationships between two societies and the intensiveness of this relationship with their society of origin should define transnationalism. These terminological delimitations, introduced by Portes et al. (ibid., 228–229), decrease the number of individuals covered by this phenomenon. Importantly, these authors stress the significance of transnational impact in terms of stronger economic, cultural and political ties between the societies. Finally, the term 'transnationalism' is increasingly used to describe virtually-enhanced communications and networking (see e.g. Vertovec 2009).

In the higher education, transnationalism is often used to describe the expansion of educational institutions from their original localities to new countries, and the degrees of independence that these newly established institutions have can vary. Branch campuses of British or American universities in Eastern countries are examples of such transnational institutions (Naidoo 2009). The core difference with the originally developed theoretical concept of transnationalism is that transnational educational projects are organised through administrative efforts, with a clear business rationale. This model might be called transnationalism from above, which is similar to the general activities of global corporations and governments (Kivisto 2001, 561). Thus, although the theory of transnationalism was introduced to define unprompted social relationships between individuals across borders and networks emerging from below, this understanding of transnationalism in higher education only embraced the idea of intensive ties across the borders (Portes et al. 1999, 219).

Cosmopolitanism puts an emphasis on individuals' globally oriented mindsets and their interest in the global world is valued higher than their national belongings. As a theoretical perspective, cosmopolitanism has been developed for a long time, but only recently has it received more attention. Critical sociology is looking for new ways to deal with contemporary diversities (Beck 2006). In the field of higher education, this means a broad, non-national orientation towards global affairs; the key idea is the permeable orientation on the affairs of life and the education of global citizens (Hansen 2010). The idea of cosmopolitan education does not contradict the idea of internationalisation, but it is clearly more focused on human civilisation as an ideal value for all academic pursuits.

9.2 Concepts of Cultural Diversity in the Context of Higher Education

Multiculturalism The value of multiculturalism in education often aligns with the needs of a multicultural society. Educational practice fosters new approaches to diversity. University internationalisation is also seen as a response to the challenges of multicultural life conditions (Parker 2011).

In terms of multiculturalism, student diversity has a positive impact on the outcomes of higher education. An example of how diversity can be a core value of education was eloquently justified in the materials of a Michigan trial, where academic experts defended, in the courtroom, the right of a university to employ affirmative action. According to Gurin et al. (2004), this meant giving minority students with relevant qualifications the primary right to enter a university. The key argument was that all students benefitted from studying in a multicultural environment that fosters cultural awareness, communicative experiences and an ability to work in diverse teams. These capacities were seen as things that justified the university's right to foster student diversity.

The meaning of affirmative action is bound to the state; university as a public institution has obligations to the members of society. Admission strategies of this kind could not be reasoned for international applicants, as they are not subject to the university's obligations. However, these diversity-value arguments are logically expandable to the international level, as one of the major expected benefits is an increased level of internationalisation.

In the framework of international higher education, multiculturalism is connected to global citizenship discourses, with the key principles being knowledge, recognition of the others and respect for diverse cultures (Parker 2011). The concept of diversity is also expanded beyond ethnic minorities to all sorts of different cultural and social groups and, internationally, people coming across borders from countries with diverse lifestyles. However, in practice, these revenues and strategic benefits are derived from international status to stimulate the university to gather more international students. Institutions of higher education constantly market themselves to international audiences and therefore will have to address the potentially attracting factors of academic competition. Furthermore, universities typically have certain stable patterns for international students; these are determined by the university's status, geographic location and other attractive factors. An important issue is, then, how to deal with the diversity of the campus to maximise educational benefits, at least assuming that the international students are not only involved in the process for financial reasons. The core of this activity is multicultural curriculum review.

Appiah (1994) claims that it is important for diverse cultural groups to learn all about each other's histories, form a joint history and defend its relevance to all of them in order to manage their lives together in our societies. Appiah exemplifies this statement by describing how the stories of the Indian population, African-Americans, Mexicans, Chinese and multiple other minority groups have been collected together

as parts of the American history. Another example might be the history of Europe. Expanded from the continental level, these projects can enhance global awareness. Though student diversity is fruitful for educational purposes, these initiatives should not be limited to mere curriculum review. Fostering interactive experiences and forming cross-border networks with diverse people can maximize cultural impact, as stated by Gurin et al. (2004). While these issues are widely discussed by multiculturally oriented scholars, they are not pursued consistently enough as parts of the university's practice (Otten 2003).

Sometimes, the starting point of the internationalisation of study programs and other activities is the already-existing diversity of university students. The need to internationalise teaching could be felt differently, but universities with diverse student populations are more prone to developing everyday multicultural practices (Parker 2011). English-speaking universities in cities with large migrant populations had to respond to the multicultural calls before internationalisation was formed and adopted as a general strategy of academic education.

The current internationalisation goals are aligned with multicultural ideas; the ways of working with this diversity are expanded to integrating international students to the mainstream activities of the universities. Perhaps the biggest difference between the discourses on internationalisation and multiculturalism is the role of the nation-state. Under the framework of multiculturalism, minority students are seen as right-holders who are the university's responsibility, while the discourse of international education sees international students as economic or strategic opportunities. Thus, the value of diversity is not consistently pursued when their studies are being organised.

Transnationalism Transnational social space means circulating cultural ideas, symbols and materials across national borders. Universities participate in this circulation by expanding their affairs in the communicative networks of study and research. Interactive practices of utilising multiple cultural elements may result to intensified specialisation and produce innovative knowledge, thus improving the quality of higher education (see Knight 1997; Faist 2000, 13). Thus, beneath all this is the question of whether university networks can be considered to be transnational spaces.

The Bologna process, for instance, was created as a common space for enhancing the employability and mobility of the citizens of participating countries, which would then further increase the competitiveness of European higher education (The Bologna Declaration 1999). This does not necessarily mean that a university should aim to develop long-term relationships with some particular universities in other countries. The main point is long- or short-term interest towards all significant contributors and efforts to increase these ties. The Bologna process is a reaction to global stimuli, not a result of bottom-up development.

Two aspects distinguish university internationalisation from the original concept of transnational space. First, there's the role of state; university internationalisation processes are supported and managed by nation states. The second aspect is the competitiveness rationale of internationalisation; exchange studies, study programs,

research networks and co-operative administration are adjusted to fulfil the demands of competitiveness (Marginson and van der Wende 2007; Jensen and Walker 2008, 26–27).

Transnationalism is nevertheless useful as a metaphor and there are many similarities in ways to discuss the migrants' transnationalism and the internationalisation efforts of the universities. First, university internationalisation fits the development of a modern society well by increasing interactions across national borders. All universities are more or less affected by the forces of globalisation and have to adapt themselves to these new conditions. The anticipated outcomes are thus similar. Transnational migrants are integrated to their societies of residence and also contribute to the cultural lives of their new homes. They construct meaningful relationships with two or more countries. In case of university internationalisation, the desired result is a new quality of education and an improved competitive position for the university in the international arena; these developments result in international collaborations. Finally, it is also true that neither all the migrants nor all the universities are equally affected by transnationalism; to a degree, these characteristics have to be measured to fully understand this phenomenon.

It is therefore important to see what factors determine the development of transnational social spaces and generate varying levels of acculturation and varying migrant relationship strengths in these two states. The decrease of travel costs and development of communication technologies play their roles, as do cultural determinants inherited by the migrants from their country of departure and adopted from the country of their destination, generating different kinds of transnationalism (Kivisto 2001). Similarly, the internationalisation level is determined by a number of factors, like the impact of globalisation, competition in higher education and the emergence of knowledge economies. Further, internationalisation contains different degrees of development; in fact, various highly different phenomena could be called 'internationalisation' in different universities. To exemplify this, we have considered the characteristics provided by Kivisto (2001, 553–570) and tried to adapt them to the university internationalisation measurement standards offered by the other discussants of this subject.

The list below is results from analysing the available literature on internationalisation. These characteristics could help in accurately describing the type of internationalisation taking place at a particular university.

The geographic locations of the host university and its partners determine the potentiality of their relationships. The university's location is associated with factors like its economic conditions (regarding its country, city and size), travel costs, international student flows and the university's overall effect on globalisation (Marginson and van der Wende 2007).

The advancement of computer and communication technologies at the university and its potential partners promotes their overall development and possibilities to participate in international education as well as maintain ties with their foreign partners (Thune and Welle-Strand 2005).

Another indicator, analogous to the one introduced by Kivisto (2001), is the "salience of homeland political issues" or "poor economic conditions", contrasting

with their situation in the host country. The migration rationale is a powerful driver of the university's internationalisation; there is a clear trend of international student flows from the less-developed countries to more-developed ones (Dreher and Poutvaara 2005). Sometimes, international students are viewed as a source of quality migration, like in the cases of Canada and US. Migrated academics often have strong international ties with their countries of origin. Skilled migrants bring useful social capital to support the development of these ties (Lee and Kim 2010).

Sometimes, a countertrend also exists. Fulbright programs, for instance, allow academics, students and experts to spend a period of their research in a foreign university and then return home. Initiatives managed by administrative decisions in their home countries also exist, such as return programs for academics (Chang 1992). These governmental decisions show how influential political attempts are in maintaining national ties with institutions in another country and having internationalisation serve top-down transnationalism. Currently, Norway and Denmark, for example, are designing policies to stimulate these international students to return home. This trend of students and scholars returning to their home countries after studying abroad is no less important. This does not only concern academic migration but also the development of long-term reciprocal relationships, contributing to the development of universities as transnational spaces.

The development of international services and the improvement of international students' and scholars' rights are key factors of internationalisation. The whole debate on adaptation, assimilation, acculturation and integration of international students concerns this. To a large degree, these factors of well-being determine international student flows. This is analogous to Kivisto's (2001) factor of newcomer discrimination in their receiving countries, stipulating the development of transnational relationships.

The involvement of international students and scholars in academic life and their impact on the academia of the receiving country is valuable for developing internationalisation. The social ties of individuals within a university depend on long-term and short-term stays; this aspect, although important, is difficult to measure in a relevant way. Well-being measurements of students and academics are available (e.g. McLachlan and Justice 2009), but it is problematic to assess how these ties are connected to their formal university ties, what these ties actually contain and how far they reach. There are efforts to measure the graduates' impact in the US in economic terms (e.g. Chellaraj et al. 2005), but the relevance of these kinds of measurements is uncertain (cf. the discussion on the economic importance of arts; Myerscough 1988; also e.g. Selwood 2010).

Transnational placements define the lives of individuals who exist in nation state conditions. Similarly, university structures determine the modalities of internationalisation for students and scholars. Countless international projects exist: degree studies and exchange programs, research collaboration, international scholar exchanges, student recruitment. Combinations of these activities are unique for every university and university policies and infrastructures vary, although relative similarities in the applied models exist.

Internationalisation paths that are available for individuals offer fruitful areas for research. It is important to understand how educational opportunities depend on internationalisation frameworks that dominate the institutions of higher education. The opportunities include a broad range of initiatives, like attracting international students as a part of educational business and mutual exchange programs as a way to strengthen the networks and scholarships for students from developing countries as an act of global responsibility. Due to a combination of these developments, different kinds of transnationalism emerge and their comparability with the contents of the whole process of university internationalisation is often problematic.

The results of this university internationalisation process depend strongly on cultural impact, either anticipated or not, which comes with the development of transnational ties. Sometimes the outcomes of internationalisation are considered to be too vague (Otten 2003), at least when the focus is on internationalisation goals, which are more often merely declared rather than actually pursued. Though these factors of intercultural competence can be effectively measured (e.g. Deardorff 2006), their assessment is not systematically planned by the universities themselves. Abstract intercultural skills without concrete cultural references are not helpful enough for truly multicultural citizens. Adaption processes often result to a culture shock before the host university's rules are fully realised (see e.g. Zhou et al. 2008). The idea that an international environment can be beneficial for the students, both for building their own national identity and enriching the cultural horizons of the others, is pointed out in the discussions on the results of these processes.

Finally, university itself can play either an active or a passive role in the development of internationalisation (Scott 2006). The intensity of participation is determined by its number of institutional initiatives and amount of available resources. Thus, apart from the resources, universities differ on whether their organisations are oriented to receive or send out initiatives. Universities in the United States, for example, are willing to influence international activities of higher education, but are also less oriented to influencing universities from other countries (Marginson and van der Wende 2007).

Modern universities strive to become transnational spaces. Ideally, a transnational university can form a space for realising the internationalisation of academic values in the process of producing knowledge at a multicultural campus milieu (McBurnie and Pollock 2000; Egron-Polak et al. 2012). In practice, universities display a degree of transnational elements, so it is problematic to speak about transnationalism in fixed terms.

Cosmopolitanism Cosmopolitanism in higher education means a global perspective for learning and teaching human values. This means acquiring continuously increasing knowledge from open-minded world citizens (Hansen 2010). This is the normative meaning of cosmopolitanism. In contrast, scientific cosmopolitanism refers to a research framework for analysing the functioning of cosmopolitan ideals in the real world (Beck 2006).

Cosmopolitan ideals are a part of the modern university's discourses, referring to the conditions of openness, access to knowledge and mobility trends, as well as

marketisation, business orientation and increased competitiveness. Institutions of higher education are affected by the trend of internationalisation; some are advantaged by this trend and actively participate in it, others are passive recipients. There exists a need for new critical sociological theory, able to seize the complexity of this internationalisation development and assess the way how these cosmopolitan ideals function in modern conditions.

There exists a latent controversy between cosmopolitan ideals and the relationship of the university and the state. Historically, it is the responsibility of the state to organise and control the education of its citizens. Now, the content of studies is defined both by the state, which is interested in educating its native citizens, and the cosmopolitan principles, which feature a globally competent citizen as an ideal target of higher education.

In order to illustrate this latent conflict, we refer to the discussion in the US Senate about increasing the funding of schools that follow the international curriculum. Opposing these initiatives, a certain senator formulated a perspective for desired international education: "I would like to have American citizens who know how to function in a global economy, not global citizens" (see Parker 2011, 9). Under this vision, internationalisation is a way to gain strategic or financial advantages rather than seek a new quality of education.

Thus, higher education in international frames features an interesting twist; the cosmopolitan idea of education for a global perspective turns into education of citizens who are able to function across national borders. This approach ignores other perspectives of international education, such as the goals of international students themselves and the orientation towards their wellbeing. Due to latent controversies with state interests, cosmopolitanism is not addressed in policy documents. According to Parker (2011, 12), cosmopolitan discourse is usually found in academic circles. Cosmopolitan ideas are favoured in the reasoning of value statements and the internationalisation programme goals but they only have a marginal influence on the social practices of higher education. The rhetoric of advertisements relies on the field of international cosmopolitan education. Thus, the implementation of cosmopolitan practices is considerably weaker according to these assessments (Otten 2003).

Higher education in late-modern societies is a combination of national and international tendencies. Several examples can characterise this situation to be analysed in a cosmopolitan framework:

The terminology that distinguishes international and domestic students is analytically useful for strategic internationalisation, which aims to foster diversity on the campus. Thus, there is a difference of discourses discussing the domestic and international students. The state provides higher education to its citizens and is obliged to keep this opportunity accessible. Domestic students have the right to receive high-quality education, intercultural skills being one of the dimensions. "Internationalisation at home", as well as a study-period abroad, are required for maximizing the benefits of internationalisation for domestic students (Clifford 2011). International students' admission is often discussed in marketing terms; the possible benefits of their enrolment are their tuition fees, talents, and the creation of

an international campus. Since international students are valuable for the university, their well-being, progress and adaptation to campus life are widely discussed (Nieto and Booth 2010). The need to formalise the rights of the international students was voiced just recently by publication a declaration of international students' rights (European Association for International Education 2012). Membership in a university community is based on the status of the students, which explains the differences of these student categories—the state has different obligations towards them. In an education system guided by cosmopolitan perspectives, this distinction becomes less relevant.

Organisational issues of the university often display cosmopolitan controversies. Changes in university governance are perceived as necessary preconditions of internationalisation. A relevant example is the debate concerning the start of the academic year in Japan (Shimmi 2013). The shift of the start of the academic year's from March to September could bring advantages for students who go abroad for a semester without a gap in studies; it could ease the admission of international students and offer other possibilities for collaborating with international university partners. From a national perspective, studies beginning in March have a traditional meaning. The change would also cause continuity problems for secondary education and other national schedules. The majority of controversies have dealt with their objective *pro et contra* arguments. The cosmopolitan framework should be able to reason why the national traditions should not dominate anymore, which is a question for political debate.

The debate on university language policy also contains a cosmopolitan controversy. English is often chosen as the language of globalisation in terms of technological progress, and the university follows these processes. At the same time, national identity support and the stronger role of a national language are also within the functions of the university (Phillipson 2003; Tollefson and Tsui 2004). Some universities present themselves as bilingual universities (Koch Christensen 2002). Yet, some others switch most of their activities into English (Day 2012). Positions on this problem stem from a different understanding of the university's tasks; on one hand, concerns about national academic traditions exist, on the other hand, the cosmopolitan values of openness to learning from diversity and improving intercultural skills.

International studies at non-English speaking universities are often organised separately. Their primary aim is attracting international students. Advancement of their development and their challenges are also discussed separately. In order to have a cosmopolitan impact, these studies need to become an integral part of our universities. The international students' isolation at the campus minimizes the benefits of internationalisation (Knight 2011).

The issue of trust in academic credentials is a burning problem of higher education. The universities have traditionally trusted diplomas that the applicants have received in their home country or the neighbouring countries the most. Recognising overseas diplomas has often been a problem (Bergan et al. 2000). Bologna process standardised the educational credentials to some degree. A cosmopolitan approach will require specific practical solutions for acknowledging the standards of higher education systems at a global level.

From a critical cosmopolitan perspective, the practices of higher education contain numerous controversies that we need to solve to truly benefit from the results of this internationalisation process. In our current reality, "deformed cosmopolitanism" (Beck 2006) is transforming the field of education. It offers impulses for furthering the development of internationalisation at universities, and the incoming international students are leading the university system to reform itself.

International processes do not necessarily decrease the state's dominance of university development. The university's finances depend on state budgets, and the political and economic conditions of the state are decisive in determining the final shape of the universities' internationalisation projects. Due to the influence of globalisation, the relations between the state and university have become more complex, not least due to market influences. The state's requirements and priorities increasingly depend on external forces, such as calls for a knowledge economy and global education competition. University rankings influence the politics of higher education; internationalisation criteria are often based on global indicators. Internationalisation is, however, connected to the historical frames and modern conditions of the state where the university is situated. Thus, university internationalisation has adopted national characters, depending on the specific situations of certain universities and their relationship with the state. According to Beck and Sznaider (2006, 4), nowadays national tendencies grow stronger in conditions where the cosmopolitan approaches are known. Beck (2006, 6) also describes this as a situation where cosmopolitan and national empathy "permeate, enhance, transform and colour each other". In today's world, creative learning is best advanced by new cross-border contacts. Border formations have never disappeared entirely, however, and their power has to be understood to make them more permeable than earlier.

9.3 Conclusions

The implementation of international education varies, depending on the actual topics on the agenda, the available resources, the structural conditions and the driving forces of the entire education system (Parker 2011). The practically-oriented discourses of international education are full of declarative goals, and incomplete understanding of internationalisation results in controversies when it is implemented. The variety of ideological underpinnings, displayed through documents, institutional practices and the people's attitudes and activities, should also be recognised. A critical theoretical perspective helps in analysing the different sides of internationalisation development. Therefore, the internationalisation of higher education is interpreted here as a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon in the frames of multiculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Multiculturalism sheds light on diversity and our new ways of dealing with it in the changing society. Multiculturalism in higher education was introduced to develop new classroom work-practices and review our ways of working with diversity. Diverse student bodies are not sufficient in themselves for providing an equal

educational value for all students. We need to accommodate diversity in all educational processes as a precondition of multiculturalism in higher education.

Transnationalism was initially developed as a concept of academic literature to assess how migrants were integrated in their migrations between two or more countries. The transnationalism question also concerns a dislocated cultural identity in changing conditions across the borders. Transnationalism characterises well the construction of space for communication and interactions that universities are developing as a result of their internationalisation processes. Two major points are relevant for this analysis: the degree to which transnational characteristics are displayed in concrete cases and the role of the state in this development.

This chapter will contribute the volume by characterising the quality of university internationalisation through transnational contacts of students and teachers, principally in exchange programmes. No uniform understanding of a transnational space in higher education exists, and the measurement of certain indicators would only generally help in discriminating between the different phases of transnational processes. Thus, universities are transnational spaces in some aspects of their work; most of them only display these characteristics. University is not a transnational space as such due to the adoption of an internationalisation strategy. These assumptions only lead to an analysis of pluses and minuses of the university's internationalisation, and the conclusions can easily be misleading.

Doubts concerning transnational developments in modern universities focus on the role of the state and its rationales for pursuing internationalisation. Universities that are relatively free from the state dominate the university rankings. These competitive institutions serve as a model for world-class universities, which is also the ideal of internationalisation and internationally successful university performance (Salmi 2009). Thus, rankings can only be used as a very distant quality benchmark for higher education, and this factor points out the controversial role of the state in the development of internationalisation. We need new perspectives of university development, neither purely national nor readily international. Analysis on the applicability of transnationalism is useful for uncovering real processes that serve as vectors for the international development of universities.

The theory of *cosmopolitanism* allows us to look critically at the practices of international education. Due to the concurring loyalties of the university, as well as formalised state requirements and alternative understandings of internationalisation, its implementation contains a number of controversial issues. According to Beck and Sznaider (2006, 8–9), this illustrates deformed cosmopolitanism as a representation of real life well. The analysis of this picture should now be the focus of sociology. Beck and Grande (2007, 44) state that the "imperfect cosmopolitan realities" could be transformed to perfection by using the normative ideals of cosmopolitanism.

Applied to the university, this argument means that positive transformations can be based on the idea of reviving academic values becoming activated in the practices of internationalisation (Egron-Polak et al. 2012). This challenges the usual norms of internationalisation measurement. It means that the number of international students is not the only thing that matters. Their real integration in education

processes could lead to a more nuanced assessment of their practices. When the internationalisation of academic practices is not tied to state requirements or ranking indicators, it becomes possible to be guided by the cosmopolitan vision of the implementation of human values.

The meaning and the vision of the internationalisation of higher education based on academic rationales is still unclear. Theories tackling diversity and its apprehensive issues help in developing these visions further. Internationalisation practices are not always guided by visionary goals. The state, with its formal requirements and narrow rationales, often determines how cross-border programs are implemented. Instead of striving to realise cosmopolitan ideals, the modern discourses on international education are bound to international competitiveness (see Stromquist 2007). This is shown in how much attention media and academic attention pay to rankings. Cosmopolitan agendas receive less attention, as they have caused a latent controversy regarding national prevalences. There are concerns, also expressed by Knight (2006), that internationalisation based on economic and competitive rationales may not always lead to desired ideal results. The academic meaning of internationalisation can be reasoned as a result of a process of reviewing the philosophical foundations of higher education in a global context.

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Chapter 10
Is Education Still Enough? Skilled Sub-Saharan Africans Face the Nordic Labour Market

Mathias E. Ebot

10.1 Introduction

Today, the transnational mobility of students and skilled labour force is considered favourable and something to be advanced with policy-level programs and strategies. We often hear the political mantra 'labour-based immigration' in Finland, for example. However, when collecting experiences from African-background immigrants, we can easily recognise the representation of dislocation, as the Nordic labour market does not welcome all skilled immigrants.

This chapter examines the experiences of skilled Cameroonian immigrants in Finland, concentrating on background factors that encourage them to leave their countries for the distant North and their ways of experiencing the integration of skilled African immigrants to the Nordic welfare society or, to put this question in more exact terms, at labour market, which actively seeks highly skilled professionals. The composition is qualitative and the data have been collected in the capital region between May and June 2010 using 26 semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The study was conducted among Cameroonians who gained degrees/certificates in Finnish universities and entered Finland through direct post-graduate admissions. They have lived in Finland for at least 3 years. The basic questions are: what factors have influenced these Cameroonians to come to Finland, how do they view integration into the Finnish society and what are their future plans as skilled and educated immigrants in the Global North.

Viewed in a perfunctory way, the informants of this analysis represent the so-called cosmopolitan generation (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009), with educational and economic resources and cultural courage pushing them to choose to study in a foreign university. However, in spite of their apparently privileged positions, the

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_10

influence of methodological nationalism and its reductionist stance toward integration is also shown in their experiences. Based on the interviews of these Cameroonians, it may claimed that current Finnish welfare policies have been designed to meet the needs of immigrant refugees/resettling persons better than those of trained immigrant graduates, who often continue to lack any official support from the Nordic welfare institutions.

The chapter begins by briefly presenting the Cameroonian situation and the Finnish conditions in terms of migration and integration. Then, it explores how Cameroonian immigrant graduates who have lived permanently in the country and thus understand its practices to some degree have faced the Finnish labour market. Not only do they seem to be well-informed and used to addressing these research questions, but they also form the first generation of Anglophone Cameroonian immigrants in Finland, which surely affects their encounters and confrontations in their new society. They also differ from most other groups of Sub-Saharan Africans in Finland by not having a history of being refugees, unlike many others (e.g. Somalis and Sudanese).

10.2 From the South to the North

When did you start thinking of leaving Cameroon and why? (E[1])

Around the 90s when the new era of politics began. It had impact on youth in particular, opportunities were highly limited and avenues closed. The possibility to seek for a professional school that one could have a future ahead was actively bleak. (I.2)

A single chapter in one volume on dislocations of migrants is not enough to comprehensively cover the history of Sub-Saharan Africa or its war-triggered migration flows, but it can try to offer a way to frame the growing interest in the mobility of young Sub-Saharan Africans, who find themselves in difficult economic, political and environmental conditions in their homelands and seek better educational possibilities in the North. The growing centres of economic, social and educational dynamism in the Nordic region making it an increasingly attractive destination for skilled and educated Sub-Saharan Africans, when compared with traditional destinations like US, UK, Canada, France and Germany.

There exists a long history of Sub-Saharan African movement from Africa to rest of the world. According to Grillo and Mazzucato (2008), the movement encompasses diplomats and missionaries, merchants and students, slaves and servants, soldiers and seamen. It can be, in many ways, considered a process of unforeseen developments or unintended consequences. First, there was forced labour and abusive migration during the era of slavery. Then, colonial migration in terms of guest-worker policies and asylum-related migration in a case of natural disasters, i.e. flood, drought and earthquakes, or occasionally calamities like cultural or political

[1] The codes refer to the interviewer (E = Ebot) and interviewee (I) and his/her number.

unrest and wars.[2] The 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Hutus and Tutsis), for example, had a total number of victims (including moderate Hutus) varying from 500,000 to 1,000,000 or more (United Nations 1994). It led to a flight of mostly Hutu refugees/militias to the neighbouring countries, like Tanzania, Uganda and DRC.[3] Independent nations have observed internal strife and civil wars, like in the cases of Angola, Somalia, DRC, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Chad, with refugees fleeing all the way to Cameroon, which is a relatively calm and peaceful country despite a process of political liberalisation that includes continuous regime change efforts.

Cameroon has a long history as two territories inherited from the British and French colonial rulers, with different cultural legacies, languages and levels of economic development that have required merging (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003, 2): *Anglophone Cameroon* and *Francophone Cameroon*. After the First World War, the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate (1884–1916) was partitioned between the British and the French, first as 'mandates'[4] under the League of Nations and later as 'trust'[5] territories under the United Nations (Rudin 1938; Gardinier 1963; Le Vine 1964; Joseph 1977; quoted in Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003). This partition led to the British acquiring Southern Cameroon, which consists of two narrow non-contiguous regions in the western part of the country, stretching from the Atlantic coast all the way to Lake Chad and bordering Nigeria. The British territory comprised only one fifth of the total land area and the former German colony's population was much smaller than that of the French territory. Researchers generally agree that the roots of the so-called Anglophone problem in Cameroon can be traced back to this partitioning.

The two territories, based on British and French colonial rule with separate colonial state-formation processes and separate development of territorial differences in languages and cultural legacies, created the spatial and historical foundations for the construction of Anglophone and Francophone identities in Cameroon (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003). Peoples in the areas of Anglophone Cameroon, differing in socio-political organisation, culture and kinship structures, were brought together by the colonial rule. Anglophone Cameroon became Southern Cameroon. People in this area were experiencing a growing social and cultural marginalisation as a result of the unitary nation-state project of the Francophone political elite (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003). This was not only made possible by the contradictions between the political elites but also due to tensions within the Anglophone community itself.

In their study, Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) explain how these tensions were evident even when the Anglophone elite began to mobilise the regional population against their allegedly subordinated position and demand self-determination and

[2] The early 1990s saw increasing conflicts in the African continent, such as in the Great Lakes Region.

[3] Then known as Zaire, mostly to the Eastern parts (the Kivu and Goma regions), where their presence is said to be a sure-fire formula for continuing the disaster that has raged through the DRC, due to their unlimited access to weapons.

[4] Mandated Territories under the League of Nations.

[5] Trust Territories under the United Nations.

autonomy during the political liberalisation process of the early 1990s. The post-colonial state (the political elite of Francophone Cameroon) often had taken advantage of the existing contradictions within the Anglophone community to play off the south-western elite against its north-western counterpart in a persistent effort to bolster the unitary state and deconstruct the Anglophone identity. Notably, a large majority of Cameroonians who move to the North are Anglophone Cameroonians. They have left their country in order to study abroad, but also due to occasional bitter feelings of social misrecognition. It is still notable that their immigrant status is not the one of a 'refugee' and that national asylum policies and arrangements do not affect their situations. Their decisions to leave Cameroon have also been quite individual and personal (cf. Habti 2012).

> [I wanted to] run away from the heat. The system is so much so that it's becoming unbearable and unacceptable to the youths of Cameroon. Within the Anglophones, there's problems, competition, rivalry. (I.7)
>
> After high school, I was supposed to do medicine in CUSS.[6] I failed at the level of orals. Man! Everything was in French, not good environment. Not easy to get a job without political connection [corruption]. Two years in Yaoundé[7] was discouraging, I wanted to do medicine by all means and abroad was the only solution. (I.12)

10.3 The Finnish Context of Internationalisation

The informants of these interviews were mainly recruited from the Anglophone Cameroonian community in Finland. The Anglophones often have shared feelings of marginalisation and oppression by their Francophone counterparts. Interestingly, they now are seeking educational aggrandisement in Finland, a country without any previous colonial or post-colonial ties to Cameroon. Finland, on the other hand, is accepting these new African immigrants at the same time as it tries to become familiar with the wider phenomenon of immigration. Pirkko Pitkänen and Satu Kouki (2002) have shown how the context of Finnish immigration differs from other Western European countries by explaining that when these countries were attracting labour migrants to their factories and, later, service sectors during the 1950s–1970s, Finns were emigrating to Sweden and further away (i.e. United States and Australia). Consequently, until the 1980s, Finland was almost untouched by immigration that was taking place in many other Western industrial societies, thus being a latecomer to receiving immigrants (Valtonen 2001a, b). As immigration to Finland is a fairly recent phenomenon, the availability of longitudinal data regarding immigration is particularly limited (Salmenhaara 2008).

The project to create an image that Finland is an international and multicultural society has received a lot of policy-level attention, however. Educational institutions, such as universities, have also participated in this image-creation process. According

[6] Centre Universitaire des Sciences de la Santé Yaoundé 1 [University Center for Health Sciences Yaoundé 1].

[7] Cameroon's capital city.

to Hakala (1998, 56), all universities in Finland have always been state-run, which has created a cultural understanding that institutions of higher education are an important part of the nation's competition with all the other nations (Välimaa 2004). Previously, internationalisation has mostly taken the form of bilateral highest-level academic research collaboration, usually between academic professors (Clarke 2005). Later on, a broad political consensus that emerged by the end of the 1980s saw the process of internationalisation in universities as an essential strategy of development for the rapidly globalising Finland (Virtanen 2002, quoted in Clarke 2005). Today, the Finnish university network not only covers the entire country, but has also witnessed an increase in the number of foreign students arriving through European exchange programs, i.e. European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University of Students (ERASMUS) and Centre for International Mobility (CIMO). Uniquely, the Finnish internationalisation process has led to the establishment of complete graduate programs, taught in English, in almost all of its universities, with no tuition fees. This has led to a completely new phenomenon: increasing numbers of students from Sub-Saharan Africa are coming to Finnish universities. It also seems to lead to a growing need to investigate the challenges faced by these immigrant students, which should provide insight and understanding on how to support this group, especially after their graduation.

According to Centre for International Mobility (2012), the number of foreign degree students in Finnish polytechnics and universities respectively hovers around 7113 and 6984. These students represent more than 40 nationalities. Respectively 27 % and 10 % of them came from Africa. Sub-Saharan Africans form the largest groups of Africans living permanently in Finland (Finnish Immigration Service 2012). The table briefly illustrates the top 13 African countries according to how many of their citizens live permanently in Finland (see Table 10.1).

The table shows that while Cameroonians are not the largest group of Sub-Saharan Africans living permanently in Finland, their numbers have increased significantly

Table 10.1 Foreign citizens from African countries living permanently in Finland, 31 December 2011 (Finnish Immigration Service 2012)

Country	Number of citizens
Somalia	7393
Nigeria	1568
Democratic Republic of Congo	1397
Sudan	1123
Ghana	927
Morocco	888
Ethiopia	850
Kenya	832
Cameroon	613
Egypt	487
Angola	409
Tunisia	386
Algeria	363

in recent years, from 141 to 497 (Finnish Immigration Service, December 2005–2009), and that now their amount is well over 600.

According to Helsingin Sanomat (2010), the most popular newspaper in Finland, 7170 foreign students applied for the Finnish universities' autumn courses and programs, an increase of some 2000 applicants over the last year. The two largest groups, respectively, are the students coming from Nigeria and Cameroon, followed by China, Ghana, and India. This chapter discusses Cameroonian immigrants, because most of them entered Finland through direct post-graduate admissions into Finnish universities. Many of them remain in the North after graduation, get married or engaged in *mixed parenting* with a native Finn, and become *Anglophone Cameroonian fathers* in Finland. This mostly affects Cameroonian men who are married/live in civil unions with Finnish women, as more Cameroonian men than women live permanently in Finland. But is there a space for them in Finnish working life, in a society that values education and is based on meritocracy, where each person should have equal opportunities to show their capabilities and competences?

10.4 Integration: Easy for Highly Skilled People?

The main objective of this chapter is to describe the possibilities of highly educated Sub-Saharan African immigrants to integrate to their host nation in the context of a Nordic welfare state. In this case, the researcher also comes from Cameroon, as the variation in the immigrants' countries of origin, numbers, status, years of residence and even how the native Finns perceive them suggests that research on immigration/immigrants cannot only be conducted and understood from a Finnish perspective. Besides, discussions concerning immigrants in Finland have mostly referred to refugees/resettling persons and asylum seekers. Until now, research on Sub-Saharan African immigrants in Finland has mainly focused on people who have arrived as refugees and asylum seekers (i.e. from Somalia, DRC, Nigeria etc.), while other groups of immigrants from that part of Africa have not been studied by the social sciences as much. The interviewees of this study are first-generation Cameroonian immigrants in Finland, understood as a group with a common country of origin, without any assumptions of homogeneity within that group. The informants are a diverse group in terms of language (mother tongue), cultural heritage and cultural identity, political views and, to an extent, religion.

Most interviewees were young adults when they first arrived to Finland. All the respondents had obtained a Master's degree or an equivalent degree in a Finnish university, with a varying range of disciplines. All the respondents had been working full-time and studying simultaneously. The interviews were conducted using a protocol that included questions on the background information of the interviewees, such as education and employment in their countries of origin, their purpose for leaving Cameroon and deciding to come to Finland and their previous knowledge of Finland. They also included questions on their societal participation in the economic, social and cultural life-spheres of their host societies. Their family ties, duration of

their stay in Finland, education and training in Finland, employment history, language proficiency, opportunities and understanding of integration were also discussed. The relevant data on language skills, real opportunities, employment and perception of integration were also analysed for the purposes of this analysis.

More than 10 years (1999) have passed since the first Integration Act of Finland came into force with the following objectives: supporting the integration of immigrants into the labour market and society and designing individual integration plans for non-European nationals who have been unemployed for the first 3 years of their stay in Finland. Municipalities with foreign residents need to create integration programs as a starting point for individual integration plans (the new Integration Act of 2010). Most Finnish migration researchers have emphasised the importance of educational qualifications as a crucial factor for the immigrants' integration and, for example, their positions in the labour market (Söderling et al. 2003; Forsander 2002; Valtonen 1999).

Discussions around migration appear to be highly polarised. The Finnish Ministry of Labour (2010), for example, says that Finland would like to be an affluent society with job opportunities for everyone, where employment services have been reorganised to meet the challenges of the new labour market situation and the changing work-life. This reorganisation hints that immigration and immigrants cause positive internationalisation and cultural enrichment in addition to generating economic resources. On the other hand, immigrants are still seen as a national threat; many fear that Finnish culture is endangered and that unemployment and crime will increase as a result of immigration (Pitkänen and Kouki 1999; Alasuutari and Ruuska 1998, 199–214; Anttonen 1997; Söderling 1997, 1). Furthermore, analysis by Pitkänen and Kouki (2002) concerning the attitudes of the Finnish authorities indicates that there is much confusion about the increase in cultural diversity and negative attitudes towards the new arrivals (Egharevba 2009).

Finland is not the only country with this problem. African immigration to Europe has made the issue of European (Union) identity being threatened becoming more prominent, rendering integration criteria controversial. In a comparative study of the European Union as a whole and Portugal, United Kingdom, France and Germany in particular, Vala et al. (2006) found out that cultural, economic and security threats in Europe are considered to be significantly associated with immigration. A Commission of the European Communities (2003) report on immigration, integration and employment has emphasised that EU faces future challenges in participating in international competition over skilled workers and taking care of its own ageing population. How does a Nordic society trying to learn multicultural working life deal with these processes?

10.4.1 Opportunity Hoarding in Front of Closed Doors

How would you describe you future job opportunities in Finland? (E)

It's very bleak; in fact I don't have a future in Finland. Day after day it makes me sick—being a cleaner, Massa! There isn't any life in that. (I.1)

The interview data pointed to extensive, continuous opportunity-hoarding, mainly for no effect. The Cameroonians who were interviewed for this study reported that they have generally had the same low-skilled and low-paid jobs as in their early months in the host society, even after graduating from the university. Thus, graduation gave them no advantages, even though statistically it offers a good guarantee of employment for a majority of population in the labour market (Statistics Finland 2013).

Consequently, the informants also expressed non-satisfaction in the jobs they are working to support themselves and their families (cleaning, construction, dishwashing, early-morning newspaper delivery, restaurant work, etc.). They were not willing to blame themselves, as they have reported that they have used a broad range of relevant job-seeking channels and acquired a great familiarity with the nature of the employment market. Their self-initiated searches have included written applications and personal visits, a daily scrutiny of newspapers, Internet searches, following up leads by telephone and making spontaneous enquires at likely places. Interviews with Cameroonian immigrant graduates made it quite clear that doors to employment that corresponds to their educational qualifications and experience remain closed for them.

> Anyway, I can say what I studied I can't see any future in Finland, except I study Finnish very well. We were taught as managers, how to manage health care systems. With time if I'm working as a nurse, I can use it but now I don't see the possibility in Finland. Even if you speak Finnish it's still impossible to be in the managerial position. We were taught as office workers—very good field but difficult to start from your level. (I.8)
>
> Personally, I'm not satisfied with my job because it's not what I've studied. But I always keep a positive mind in so far as you can deliver, master the Finnish language, I'll have better opportunities with time—let's see, not only in Finland maybe also in UK and US. Future lies on your palms but from experience it's not necessarily the Finnish language. (I.12)

The repeated experiences of extensive opportunity-hoarding point to the existence of attitudinal and institutional factors of resistance along labour-market boundaries towards employees who are culturally 'too different'—even if they have the required working skills. Such factors of resistance are based on skin colour, appearance and language, and significantly, the respondents remain unable to obtain relevant employment in spite of their educational advancements (their systematically increasing stock of human capital), social capital and job-search activities. Some of them even considered themselves too well-educated for the needs of the labour market:

> There are some opportunities for unskilled labour but very slim avenues for skilled labour generally to foreigners and most especially for black people. I'll say the opportunities are within 'margins of error'. Hoping for the best while I keep studying but for my 6 years experience here it isn't positive. My expectation is to get the Ph.D. and if trends remain the same I'll move in search of better job market. (I.3)

Tilly's (1998) concept of *categorical inequality* is an appropriate conceptual frame for interpreting this societal hierarchy, where immigrant graduates may enjoy the status of welfare state citizenship but are still on unequal footing when accessing the labour market, even if they serve as a strong resource in maintaining welfare

structures. Exploitation and opportunity-hoarding, where immigrant graduates with Sub-Saharan African origins are systematically pushed to oppressed labour market positions, are strategies that cause and maintain durable inequality. Categorical inequality, as Tilly (1998) writes, can arise when paired but unequal categories that consist of asymmetrical relations across a socially recognised dividing line between interpersonal networks (such as the boundary of the labour market) recur in a wide variety of situations, with the usual effect being the unequal exclusion of each network from the resources controlled by the other network.

More than a decade ago, Kathleen Valtonen (2001a) concluded that apart from a few exceptions, highly educated immigrants continued to be unable to obtain work commensurate with their qualifications. They had not been able to use their education or experiences in the Finnish labour market. Today, the situation remains unchanged, and based on the data provided by this chapter, it seems evident that African graduates, after being trained in Finnish institutions of higher education, are moving to Canada, United States and Australia, which have attractive work programmes for skilled immigrants, mainly due to their labour market positions and experiences on receiving immigrants. From the society's point of view, this is naturally an unfavourable tendency, which can also cause individual problems, as moving from country to country can be difficult for people who are married and have children.

> With regard to career prospect within the fields of my study, I can't say it's optimistic. Also, we should understand that it is hard to get a job when the language is poor. Again, even those with good language are still cleaning. Because of this, I'm considering moving out of Finland when the time is right. (I.5)

The educated Cameroonians also argue that Finland focuses more on refugees and asylum seekers, including resettled persons, than immigrant graduates. This specifically refers to refugees/resettling persons who have been granted permission to live permanently in Finland, as opposed immigrants and students who have graduated from Finnish institutions after studies in special degree programmes in English. Refugees and resettling persons are often included in the labour market 'pre-employment arena', which offers a wide range of labour market orientation and training programmes, including Finnish-language instruction. Active labour market policies can encourage employment through financial support. Many immigrant graduates are not able or ready to risk their cleaning jobs in order to take part in such practically oriented programmes.

The Embarrassing Question of Language- ***(Puhutko Suomea?)*** The Finnish Intergration Act (2010) has not succeeded in removing nationality-based discrimination and categorical inequality from the life-spheres that are important for an individual's welfare. This can be seen from Perttu Salmenhaara's studies, for example (2003). He analysed the nature of recruitment discrimination using research data on language, skills and trust from Paananen (1999). Employers interviewed by Paananen (ibid.) based their trust on immigrant recruits mainly on their Finnish-language skills to such an extent that their recruitment practices turned out to be extremely ethnocentric and discriminatory. There seems to exist a shared assump-

tion that a person's ability to adapt to the Finnish working culture is legitimately indicated by his or her skills in the Finnish language. Thus, in their view, the recruitment processes have not been designed to accept the best recruits but primarily to exclude foreigners (see Forsander and Similä 2003).

Another common experience, shared by numerous study respondents, was being told that their Finnish was not good enough, merely basic and, at best, satisfactory. This led to a common experience of social rejection. Often, their own opinion was that their level of skills was sufficient for coping with Finnish working life and that poor language was used as an excuse for the real reason of their rejection—being non-natives.

> I would say it's [Finnish language] manageable but not good enough. (I.6)
>
> I think it's good enough to go about the basics in the society—like writing reports in Finnish. (I.15)

The interviewed Cameroonians recounted that telephone enquiries and spontaneous enquires were often apt to terminate, with the refusal being explained by there being no vacancies or with remarks or assumptions of poor Finnish-language skills, even though they are also well-aware that a majority of Finns understand and speak English. Their education has prepared them to work in institutions and organisations where educated professionals work together and can supposedly also communicate in languages other than Finnish. Still, the pressure to excuse their poor Finnish skills seems to dominate the interview data.

> How would you describe your Finnish language proficiency? (E)
>
> Basic, literally I understand a reasonable level of what is said and make simple sentences. But, because of my busy job schedule I couldn't take extensive language course. (I.5)
>
> Intermediate, Finnish language is very exciting and scientific language. My opinion is that people should start studying the language even before they can be admitted or granted the visa to come to Finland. (I.14)

Even though we might accept that language is, to an extent, an important aspect of integration and communication in any country, the data of this analysis consist of many notions held by the informants that were influenced by their memories on how they have not even had a chance to demonstrate their language proficiency or show their work records and qualifications. These bitter experiences are apt to constitute *blatant discrimination* (Zegers de Beijl 1997).

This practice and principle of nationalistic denial and ignorance reinforces a reductionist stance; the logic of methodological nationalism is evident when the language proficiency skills of the immigrants are measured or compared with the national standards. In this context, discrimination could be understood as a situation where the immigrant graduates are treated worse than majority-population members despite their education and work experience being equivalent to those of the majority-population candidates. This resistance to hiring immigrant-background graduates, which often has highly spurious reasons, defeats the purpose of free education and labour market training. Young graduates comply with labour market requirements by developing their human capital. Some of them may lack good

Finnish-language skills or be engaged in currently non-expanding labour-market sectors, but these cases would hardly account for the consistent employment blocks they encounter regarding jobs corresponding to their educational qualifications and training. Such conditions indicate a serious inequality of opportunity.

Informal Apartheid The interview data point to the interviewees' own perspectives and understandings of integration in the host society and thereby hints at social, marital, cultural, educational, economic and political integration. It also sheds light to their post-graduation experiences. It seems that Nordic immigration policy has forgotten those transnational newcomers who have chosen to enter the country voluntarily and would actually be useful for the economic well-being of the society.

Even though Finnish policies have paid a lot of formal attention to the increasing immigration and multiculturalism in the country in terms of articulated strategies and programmes (see Harinen et al. 2005), these tendencies have not reached the peoples' everyday levels of life. A certain kind of apartheid is seen in many of the choices made by the natives, even small ones:

> What do you understand or perceive as integration and do you feel integrated in the society? (E)
>
> I think Finland is trying to be open to diversity but it lacks the policy of integration because there is policy to integrate unskilled migrant not skilled migrant. If you're refugee, there's a fixed program for you than when you're a graduate. Most difficult for a black person than persons of other races—they find other races to be exotic. For example, it's almost impossible when the bus is full for a native Finn to sit beside a black person. They rather sit where somebody is having a dog. I think, they are suffering from apart gab. (I.20)

The economic depression of the current decade has quite obviously decreased labour market opportunities of almost all young adults, but this bad situation is even worse for those who are 'different'. Furthermore, graduating jobseekers nowadays need different transitional periods (e.g. unpaid internships) to get their feet on the labour market and create some social capital, but in the case of African immigrants, it seems that these markets also include multiple means of racial segregation.

> Official policy, quite interesting, supports financially when you're learning the language. Unofficial practice beyond helping to get support for language acquisition, many barriers are still in place. Structural deficiencies are still in place as private companies don't hire graduates from the university. After my graduation, I made several applications to do internship but was never called. It's systematic process in the sense that the state is making some visible commitment towards immigrant integration but there is a lack of political will. I hope the private sector will understand the contributions of immigrants in a significant way, i.e. how the African manpower is wasting. Helsinki Times magazine in my hand is saying nurses from Philippine were brought to work in Finland after receiving one year language training in Philippine. While African nurses that have graduated alongside Finns in Finnish institutions are working not in hospitals but in old people's home. (I.5)

The Nordic welfare society devotes a lot of its resources to education, is proud of its educational supply and trusts its ability to save people, both at the micro level of individual life-courses and the macro level of societal success. Furthermore, when it comes to migration, the educational systems receive immigrants eagerly—but

then something happens. It seems that the society educates immigrants at its own loss, as it does not want them as professional workers after graduation. Primarily only some low-paid and supplementary jobs, those not wanted by the natives, are available for the Africans.

> First, I give Finland credit for educational integration; you don't find this from many countries in the West. Second, integration is a two-way process, meaning the immigrants should be willing to step in—in ways that they can contribute like learning the language, creating networks, learning the lifestyles and cultures of the new society, looking for jobs and be ready to work, be ready to take part in municipal or parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the host society should acknowledge and recognize the efforts made by immigrants. This leads to something I've always thought about why will Finland train immigrants and when they graduate they can't find job in their fields of study. These immigrants move to other countries that need their expertise after they've gained free knowledge. Integration in Finland still has a long way to go but then they are making gradual progress. (I.22)
>
> There are two perspectives, social and economic integration. Social integration means creating a friendly environment where a migrant will not feel as a stranger in the Finnish community—meaning there should be the same clot, a common understanding, sharing cultural diversity, recognizing the difference in culture but being one as a people. Language too is of course very important. Economic integration… either we go by the quota system or we have a transparent policy of employment. Employing migrants has to be mandatory, not supplementary. Meaning the government has to be sure it gives employment to migrants so as to act as a role model to the Finnish community. Obviously, at this moment there is no mandatory or a clear-cut policy of employment for migrants in the entire Finnish community. (I.6)

Though almost no interviewees stated clearly if they felt integrated, one concrete opinion held by a majority of the interviewees is that it is difficult to find work and, at times, places for internship within their educational curricula. The Cameroonians often pointed to the visible aspect of their identity (i.e. being black) as their main reason of being marginalised. Some of them have entered mixed marriage/cohabitation with native Finns and see that as means to integration and labour opportunities.

> I see no future for me in Finland. Maybe, there can be some shared luck but apart from this there's no future. Hoping to make some money in Finland and maybe go to law school. But as a woman I could get married, in this circumstances Finland is no base. It is very difficult for people to study and work as the same time. In 2008, I was in Turku in human rights law, but couldn't find job so had to quit. (I.9)

10.5 In Conclusion: Methodological Nationalism as a Form of Discrimination

The situation of the Cameroonian informants described in this article can be likened to any Sub-Saharan African group deprived of equality by labour market insiders. While social and juridical citizenship makes them full citizens and state members with a right to welfare (housing, education, and health services), their labour market relations remain highly unsatisfactory. From an anthropological standpoint, Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo (2004, 124) has highlighted the fact that acculturation paths that lead to blocked opportunities should be discovered in time, since these processes do

not only have tragic consequences at an individual level over generations but are also harmful for the future of entire ethnic groups and social equality in general. She also points out that the receiving society is in charge of providing the first-generation immigrants with real social opportunities, as this would enable them to learn how to understand their new society, cope with it and guide their offspring within it (ibid., 125). Education and employment have been considered the most efficient mechanisms of integration; relevant employment may boost confidence, offer empowerment and bring status and a social niche.

The immigrants' own points of views and perspectives have not always been considered when planning for policies to support their coping or implementing those policies. The data collected for this analysis point to this grievance, as the interviewees also suggested various improvements that would help with their racial interactions and ways of coping with diversity, such as civic education of the native population and, as they think that the media and some politicians are not representing them properly, public debates and discussions where they can be heard. Another perspective was directed at standardised programmes for language instruction, labour market orientation and training, with a crucial commitment from the part of graduates. Meritocratic recognition of the relevance of educational diplomas and degrees, and relevant professional employment emerged as things that were valued by the majority of informants.

Discussions with the informants also point to questions of societal and political integration and participation of talented immigrants, and they want some significant structural changes from the part of the society. Political and societal participation constitute important spheres of integration, as they can be a way of influencing things from the bottom up. The immigrants' participation in daily Nordic politics is very low, and the interviews show no exceptions: skilled Cameroonians do not participate strongly in these spheres.

Most of the Cameroonians interviewed for this analysis work in unskilled jobs and have consistently encountered blocks in their search for jobs corresponding to their educational qualifications and experience.[8] As a result of this grievance, many immigrant graduates plan to move to countries where they can participate in organised employment programmes that are aimed at skilled immigrants—Canada and the United States, for example. Thus far, it seems that European countries only consider the education and skills of their own national members, or those coming from EU-member states, to be valuable. Even though educational institutions eagerly welcome foreign students, their offered certificates and diplomas are not sufficient if the job applicant's national identity does not meet the challenges

[8] The focus here is on Cameroonian immigrants with a Masters' degree, even though there are also many graduates with undergraduate degrees who are studying in undergraduate programs. This limitation is used due to a belief that those in the former category will be in a better position to acquire relevant employment. The limitation comes at a cost, however: those with undergraduate degrees, i.e. nursing, are more active in the labour market. Even those who have come to Finland on humanitarian grounds can be enrolled in polytechnics and perhaps manage their own companies now. Hence, this article cannot focus on this group's understandings and integration perceptions.

of methodological nationalism in the receiving country. In addition to cultural rejection, racial rejection, for example, can be observed in how immigrants from Western or Nordic countries are eagerly accepted whereas immigrants from distant cultures and with different looks, especially people with African backgrounds, face more prejudice than the others. Transnational possibilities to be integrated are restricted, not world-widely equal.

The situation of the Cameroonian immigrant graduates in Finland in the year 2012 seemed to parallel the situation in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, where labour immigration patterns evolved between the less-wealthy European nationalities (e.g. Italian, Turkish, Yugoslavian) and more affluent ones (e.g. German, French), and immigrants worked in low-skilled positions that were strongly concentrated in a few specific branches, earning low salaries and working long days (Pierson 1998; Sassen 1999).

According to Salmenhaara 2003 (quoted in Forsander and Similä 2003), the problems presented in this chapter are related both to the larger policy, the missing link between immigration and integration policy, and to small policies, which erode the objectives of the larger policy in practice. Besides, Söderling et al. (2006) depicts social capital as undoubtedly a positive resource but also draws our attention to its possible use in alienating certain groups. She used a study by Portes and Landolt (1996) to maintain that reciprocal trust and social relations between the members of an ethnic group can lead to ethnic groups offering jobs only to their own members and leaving the others out. This is certainly a pure, often non-recognised form of methodological nationalism.

Avoiding this ‘misuse’ of trust leads to an insistence on total disengagement from the mythical Africa of Western subconscious, which means jungle, fear, and strangeness, with whiteness equated with cleanness, sinlessness and innocence. As these mythical categories are deep and often are not explicitly recognised, this disengagement is a serious cultural challenge for education. But if we do not start these lessons until higher education, we inexorably seem to start too late.

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Chapter 11
From Locals to Cosmopolitans: Transferring the Territorial Dimensions of Cultural Citizenship

Pirkkoliisa Ahponen

11.1 Introduction

Our personal characteristics are embedded in various social situations, where we participate as specially recognised actors. Our everyday connections, group identifications and structural social categorisations from the part of the dominant society influence the formation of our social identities through the society's spatial, temporal and symbolic dimensions—a view that follows the phenomenological logic of Schutz (1932/1967). He introduced this approach as a response to Weber's concept of meaningful action. In this concept, space and time are immediately shared in face-to-face situations, where we experience togetherness as a personally meaningful thing. These "We-relationships" differ from "They-relationships", which are anonymous and based on abstractions on ideal types. We learn to identify ourselves through our belongings by applying subjective criteria, adopted in the processes of socialisation and modified through our contacts, from nearest face-to-face circles of interaction to most distant communication networks (see Yuval-Davis 2006, 2011). We are identified by others to the degree that they know us and recognise our actions. Identifications are both situational and contextual, the key distinction being, as Brubaker (2004, 41) defines, between relational and categorical modes of identification—in other words, between participation processes and status positions.

As members of communities, we have cultural rights and social responsibilities, which are structured, maintained and reformed by means of state governance and civil activities. Our participation ties us together in small- and large-scale social discourses through family membership, work arrangements, friendships, consumption habits and political associations. These social arrangements influence how we view civil rights and responsibilities, our daily travels from home to work, shopping,

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5_11

meetings, and our cultural leisure activities. Our daily activities are mostly local and happen in the concrete situations of the immediate circle of daily responsibilities and practices. We live in our homes, but also meet our companions in numerous other locations, where they are present personally or via telecommunication. Our social and cultural belongings, reaching from the nearest familiar circles to the global spheres, symbolically influence our ways of acting as members of local, regional, national and transnational communities. All of these dimensions are present in our attempts to become cultural citizens in the present world.

Boundaries of cultural belonging of local inhabitants demand readjustment in the current social conditions, where corporeal happenings intermix daily with virtual trans-border interactions. Cultural citizenship is supported by cosmopolitan ideals on learning being a resource for increasing democracy in the civil society. The aim is to make the rewards of socialisation be shared by circulating of skills in the global sphere (Delanty 2011; Stevenson 2011). People are, however, unequally situated in their local, regional and national domains, and their resources are not equally supported, either.

I start discussing the territorial dimensions of cultural citizenship by considering my own placement. I live in the Northern corner of Europe, near the Russian border. My roots are in the middle of Finland, in the countryside. In my youth, I moved to Helsinki, the capital of Finland. For most of my adult life, I have lived in a cross-border region named Karelia, in Joensuu, the easternmost town in Finland. The predecessor of the University of Eastern Finland (established in 2010), the University of Joensuu, was founded 1969. This resulted from a regional political decision to extend the network of universities to cover the whole country. At that time, equalisation of opportunities in higher education was an important topic for a Nordic welfare-state like Finland. This university became my professional home, but its location also taught me to see the importance of international contacts and global networks in the academic work. As a Finnish citizen, I recognize the influence of the status of membership in the European Union for my identity. National and continental history and culture have formed a significant part of my education and made me a defender of the European civilisation, cultural values and liberty, which are modified by the heritage of Enlightenment. I have deepened my involvement in cultural politics in crossing the territorial borders, mostly by travelling in Europe but also during some short visits to the other continents. Here, my aim is to see the meaningfulness of the territorial dimensions—from local to cosmopolitan perspectives—to better understand the principles of cultural democracy as related to cultural citizenship.

Definitions of cultural citizenship have influenced the ways of discussing the information economy in the context of cultural liberalism (Stevenson 2003, 4–5, 10–12; see also Rosaldo 1994). Ideal meaning of cultural citizenship in the promotion of universal rights and human civilisation is synonymous with cosmopolitanism. The Kantian roots, inherited from Enlightenment, and contemporary debates on cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy and cosmopolitics have recently come under much discussion (e.g. Archibugi 2003; Beck 2006; Fine 2007; Held 2010). Archibugi (2003, 11) reminds us that tolerance, legitimacy and effectiveness

of political activities are all emphasised as cosmopolitan principles for humanitarian intervention. Stevenson (2011, 19) argues that cultural citizenship is the "ability in a shared cosmopolitan context to participate in the polity while being respected and not reduced to an Other". Beck (2006, 29, 80) refers to the critical views on cosmopolitan culture being produced by postmodernism as a way of seeing sociality through transforming relations, streaming networks, blurring boundaries and liquid transactions. Beck addresses this critique of multiculturalism as an aspect of cosmopolitanism, and Bhambra (2011, 313–328) responds from a postcolonial perspective by criticizing Beck's inability to see the challenges of the multicultural world due to his Eurocentric orientation. We are not ready to speak of cosmopolitanism in universal terms before learning to see the situated emphases in our understanding on the world. This understanding has to contain the realisation of narratives on how national borders became constituted and what obstacles the outsiders have to cross when they wish to become citizens.

Although political liberalism recognises universalism, equality and tolerance as the basic values on which cultural citizenship is grounded, the political practices of liberalism represent selective universalism, exclusive solidarity and national particularisms—as we see when observing the current European situation (e.g. Joppke 2015, 669–674) and global inequalities. Controlled borders separate the integrated citizens from wanderers, nomads and outsiders, who neither hold a membership status nor enjoy equal rights after getting to a certain place.

These problems are actualised due to the consequences of globalisation processes. Debates concerning the rules for distinguishing accepted and favoured border-crossers from unpopular and rejected newcomers are increasing. The threat of neo-national atmosphere is spreading even in the most liberal countries in Europe. Global freedom of movements of border-crossers is restricted by the tightened border-control regimes, which are arranged by transnational authorities (Bauböck 2011, 343–376). Supporters of liberal economy favour free trade more than they favour the free flow of the people across the borders. An important issue in all of this is the claimed concomitance of neoliberalism with the rise of nationalism, or the adjustment of transnational federalist governance and competitive liberal marketplace. According to critical viewpoints, influential political powers try to balance cultural racism and ethnic nationalism with competitive sub-national governance and the exit options of transnational affairs to make these efforts consistent with the competitive demands of neoliberal capitalism (Harmes 2012, 59–86; Simonsen 2004, 357–362). Multiculturalism, postcolonial hybridity, and cultural politics of differences, favoured terms in minority issues since the 1970s, have now met increasing criticism. Thus, backlash effects against multiculturalism have become evident in many countries and regions after the turn of the new millennium (see e.g. Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; also e.g. Bhambra 2011, 313–328).

The focus of citizenship has long been on the equalisation of civil justice, political representation and protection of social welfare inside the borders of the European class society. This Marshallian (1950/1992) strategy to connect citizenship to civil virtues by means of the welfare-state governance has been challenged in the post-1990s discussions on cultural citizenship (e.g. Rosaldo 1994; Pakulski 1997;

Stevenson 2003, 2011). Pakulski (1997, 79) remarks that the social extension of the dimensions of citizenship is aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of the welfare state. The advancement of cultural democracy demands active citizens who emphasise individual freedom of choice, personal development and the process of finding a qualified way of life within their aspirations. The cultural turn has influenced the ways of seeing how individual rights and public responsibilities are related, which has also resulted to unanticipated, even paradoxical consequences.

As a status, citizenship is not only fixed to nationality and the ethnic origin of community members. Citizenship is embodied in the continuous processes of cultural transformations (Stevenson 2003, 12–18). When Stevenson (2011, 5) speaks for liberal socialism, he conceptualises culture as a human capacity for participating in the society meaningfully but critically. Yuval-Davis (2006, 199) sees belonging as a dynamic process of transitions, not a reified fixity. Current civic activities include many informal ways of arranging social relations, dealing with environmental issues, shaping proper views on consumer behaviour or manifesting one's own voice in the demonstrations of the peace movement or degrowth campaigns. Cosmopolitan citizens are fluidly connected together through virtual activities. Social media channels tempt us to participate in lively global interactions by chatting, commenting, or otherwise attending online discussions. Active citizens are required to have an opinion on everything, from the intimate spheres of life to macro-political issues like the inequalities of the labour market, the fairness of taxation, or moral considerations on transnational social care, human trafficking, sexual violence, and so on.

Stevenson (2011, 33–34) refers aptly to Williams's (1961/2001) ideas on civil education as the kernel of culture. Learning by doing enables, in particular, involvement in activities that demand us to understand political rights and responsibilities as personal and common practices. These practices enable our human capacities and allow us to develop the democratic society. This definition emphasises the active, participatory, capable and creative elements of citizenship. When aiming to increase our cultural capacities, we do not rest on inherited status positions but construct ourselves further in the various arenas of civil society by civic means. Therefore, civic education is emphasised as a tool for becoming a culturally competent citizen in a good society.

Although we live in a particular place and our physical existence has to adhere to the local conditions of mundane life, we can virtually reach distant events and imagine other realities without being bodily present. Imagination, spirituality and cultural rituals are all important in preserving the traditions of mankind and the process of symbolic construction of societies (Delanty 2009, 14, 183).

Nowadays, the channels of virtual communication influence our social identities through mobile networks and across spatial borders. Communication is easily detached from concrete life-situations and meetings with people, situated on physically distant dimensions, are enabled through technological means. As Nash (2010, 45) says, the quick development of information technology affects the social changes that takes place within the imaginary limits of its use. Globally circulated multicultural messages modify our ways of conceiving the reality. Connolly (1995)

has noted that the spatial construction of the dimensions of political communities change to correspond to the ethos of imaginary pluralisation. When cultural diversification penetrates the political domain, social groups identify themselves as "carriers of diverse forms of life" and arguments on multiculturalism are seen as being shaped by this liberal notion (Delanty 2009, 143–144; see also Bauman 2011).

Welsch (1999, 197, 205) argues that the keywords of transcultural social relations between the people are entanglement, intermixing and commonness. Because the exchange of outputs dominates the neoliberal interactions across borders, an attempt is made to avoid and balance the conflicts between cosmopolitan partners. According to Delanty (2011, 143) multicultural equality of people guarantees universal civil rights for community members. Bauman (2011, 46–49) emphasises the importance of seeing freedom of choice as a principle of multiculturalism, in connection with the consequences of increasing intra- and inter-social inequalities. These arguments have inspired me to further analyse the changes of territorial communities from containers of homogeneously understood local, regional and national cultures to heterogeneous constellations of transcultural permeations and mixtures.

Terms like communalism, racism, ethnicism, nationalism and even continentalism are, to refer to Jenkins (1997, 23, 43), all "allotropes" in the continuum of group identification. In this article, the local, regional, national and transnational dimensions of social and political locations of communities are discussed from the point of view of cultural citizenship. The intermingling of the local practices of community members with the transcultural processes of cosmopolitans challenges our earlier ways of seeing civil activities as spatially based. This essay intends to analyse how the interrelated spatial placements and displacements influence our social activities as community members when the preconditions of politics of belonging change to respond to the cosmopolitan situation of cultural citizenship in a learning society.

11.2 Locality as a Basic Dimension of Social Membership

We experience our situational existence concretely by touching things with hands and feet, in other words by laying, sitting and walking on the ground. According to the conventional understanding on territorially constructed social contacts, the nearest and most intimate relations take place in localities that allow us to meaningfully put our corporeal practices, domestic affairs and face-to-face meetings into order. We reason our local community memberships through symbols that refer to the circle of family, home and the domestic sphere. Communities do not only serve as the real, actual meeting places of the people, but also as imaginary representations of social relations. In localities that are near each other, people meet concretely on foot, while far-reaching contacts are mediated through transportation systems or virtual means. Symbolic communities also characterise the transformation of social contacts and express how local and global entities are increasingly becoming interrelated (see Humphrey 2012). Communication via channels of mediation modifies these mobile and flexible communities.

Consciously formed enclaves stick together to construct their cohesive cultural identity on the ground of value-categories that are common as their own rights. To become such a right, a recognised difference must be defended collectively by a categorised, sizeable group. The right to difference must become, as Bauman (2011, 90) says, a "stake in the joint implementation of demands". Community members belong together and share their collective togetherness, but they also construct boundaries against the outsiders (Yuval-Davis 2006, 205). Bauman (2011, 69) expresses this by saying that people long for a sense of community to give them "shelter from the rising tide of global turmoil". To keep the others separated from their personal domains, they safeguard their collective identifications with protective barriers.

Socio-cultural identifications begin from everyday situations and are modified through lived practices. The micro level of citizenship is tested in the matters of family and the domestic sphere, as workmates or by participating voluntarily in civic activities. I remember my childhood community in the 1950s as an inward oriented rural village, where everybody knew each other family and their affairs. The boundaries with the neighbour villages were clear in our minds and our local identity was strong. Foreigners were hardly seen in the everyday life and different-looking people were considered as something to be avoided. This small community was, however, a safe place to learn the first steps of civic activities and participate in voluntary cultural associations. This context also gave me a basic model to observe how the structures of domination and subordination operate in the social situations where we participate.

Although family, home and work are the most significant definers of local sociality in our everyday circles of life, families take multiple forms and family life may be organised in different ways, depending on the relations between the family members. The children do not always live with their parents and the parents do not always live together (cf. Appiah 2006, 47–49). Our ordinary lives take place at our homes, but housing settlements can be quite diverse. The home can be inherited from the earlier generations, built by the inhabitants themselves, or taken into possession as a ready-made building, either purchased or rented. The home territory is marked with personal signs that tell something about the special character of this place. The construction and furnishing of the home by the dwellers themselves is an ever-changing process.

Territorial borders, from localities to nation-states, are understood as formations that separate the familiar circles from the unfamiliar spheres and our own sites from foreign spaces. In the ideal home, the family relations are stable and the preservation of home traditions forms the basis of our cultural identity. The concept of citizenship is also made meaningful as something related to family membership in the domestic sphere. Principles of modern social order are justified in this continuum as being inherited from our family traditions. Likewise, the basic categories of cultural identities and the principal denominators of political citizenship are defined by reflecting on the notion of family relations in the domestic circle. The inherited origin of memberships in a local community is preconditioned as a frame of reference for the membership of the entire society. In this context, the principal criteria

for defending the civil rights are based on family heritage and, for territorial inhabitants, the place of birth. On this ground, citizenship is defined to mean membership status in a community that resembles a family, the home being the symbol of belonging in the areas of politics, work, welfare systems and cultural relations (Castles and Davidson 2000; Yuval-Davis 2011).

Today's local communities are not inward-oriented, like the small villages were a few decades ago. The changing society demanded industrial work, public services and more trade at the market—in other words, intensification of the skills required for making all life-spheres productive. Increased educational opportunities influenced our social mobility. Social transformations have mostly concerned the spheres of waged labour, commodity consumption and, increasingly, virtual sociality. The transforming ways of life challenged the conventional understandings of locality being a stable category or cultural identity being habitually fixed to the given determinants.

My personal course of life exemplifies this change. In my youth, I was eager to move from a country village to an urban centre to improve my opportunities to study and work. My generation preceded the post-war baby-boom in the end of 1940s and the great internal migration in the 1960s and 1970s in Finland. Since then, people have moved in great numbers to study, work, or raise a family, or just to migrate due to variety of opportunities. These processes have led to inter-locality boundaries increasingly being crossed and boundary-formations themselves becoming mobile. Old, ideologically constructed boundaries have blurred together, and new hybrid boundaries have been built. The situation has made ethnic identities and their boundaries more visible, but the status of ethnicities as community-definers is also more questionable than ever before.

11.3 Regions as Definers of Ethnically Based Cultural Citizenship

A region means an enlarged locality. According to anthropological and ethnographic traditions, regional communities are provincial territories, inhabited by people who have inherited the same origin by birth or by descent (Smith 1986; cf. Jackson Preece 2005, 136; Calhoun 2007, 60–63). The tribal descent of the inhabitants of these ethnic communities is defined by following the physical or cultural traits of their descent and their kinship categories, from generation to generation. In other words, the membership of ethnically defined regional communities is principally based on family roots, the local birthplace and the domestic region, these criteria being same as in the case of kinship communities. An ethnically defined region is, however, more a symbolic identifier than a pure category of consanguinity. Members of ethnic groups belong together and share their provincial identity, because they are believed and imagined to have a common descent and shared kinship bonds (Jenkins 1997, 9–10). Myths, memories, symbols and customs are all

necessary for preserving and vitalising the cultural heritage of ethnicities (Smith 1995, 22–23, 111; Calhoun 2007, 59–68). It is presumed that people who live in a restricted province share all the symbolic markers of ethno-cultural identity, such as common habits, unique language, certain lifestyles, religious rituals and everyday orders (see Day and Thompson 2004; Eriksen 2010; Fenton 2010).

Indeed, when I moved more than 40 years ago from the capital of Finland to the regional capital of North Karelia, I was astonished how influential the regional identity—Karelianism—was in my new home-region. It was also seen as the core of romantic Finnish nationalism. People looking different and behaving differently than the majority easily found themselves targets of discrimination.

I started my research work in the service of a regional university by carrying out studies that were rife with regionalist interests. Luckily, comparisons across borders were favoured in these affairs, and analyses on culturally identified regions led me to consider the questions on politics of culture, border-crossings in cultural citizenship and the changing contexts of member-identifications concerning 'us' and the 'Others'.

Unlike local communities, the region is not a concrete arena for social contacts. Distances between the regional borders reach so far that all inhabitants are not expected to know each other as persons. Different mediation channels are needed for contacts between the people. For instance, wheeled vehicles, nowadays usually equipped with motors, have been used to overcome the hindrances of daily meetings. Public information channels, like newspapers, TV and radio, as well as the technical mediation of virtual contacts, help us preserve the common regional identities. Likewise, the civil society is organised by means of voluntary associations, and state institutions extend their administrative regulations to regional arrangements, as well. These definers, controllers and organisers of regionalism convince the people to enter the domains of public power in order to practice their civic duties by democratic means, as regional citizens (Calhoun 2007, 80–84).

As far as the ethnic characters are trusted as symbolic markers of common provincial identities, the ethnicities of the inhabitants in these regions are left unquestioned. The symbolic cultural characters are then understood to be stable, unique and non-changeable. This kind of ethnicity is defined by following the rhetorical frame of the primordial model to see the ethnic differences of human nature as essentially group-specific properties (see Jenkins 1997, 44; Brubaker 2004, 83–85; Calhoun 2007, 62–63). Trust in the common ethnic traits is saved in strictly restricted areas that have visible (geographic) or invisible (cultural) borders. As long as different ethnic groups are presumed to be naturally distinguishable inside their territories, the group members are categorised according to their kinship roots and their inherited ethnic identity is principally seen as unitary inside provincial borders (Brubaker 2004; see also Jackson Preece 2005, 137–139). Stereotypes and schemas are meant to produce group sense for seeing the mankind through ethnically reasoned social categorisations (Brubaker 2004, 71–81).

Ethnic distinctiveness is now politicised in the current of cultural and political interpretations. Political orientations are also present in the inclusive self-determinations of imaginary identity groups, just like when the national majorities define different ethnic groups as minorities (Jenkins 1997, 18–19, 90; Brubaker

2004; Jackson Preece 2005, 136, 138; Nash 2010, 30–38, 159–160). A minority position, when used to support group activities with political targets, can be a resource or a burden to a member group. In any case, the position concerns the maintenance of boundaries between different identity groups. Ethnicity has been emphasised positively by minorities who claim specific cultural rights for properties that differ from the recognised properties of the majorities. But the political claims and activities of minorities have then transformed the nature of the concept of ethnicity from an essential, primordial property to a situational, instrumental construction (Jenkins 1997, 44–45; Brubaker 2004). When ethnic traditions are not seen as inherited, but rather created or invented, ethnic identity ends up becoming a disputed cultural basis for nationalism (Calhoun 2007, 62).

When ethnic characteristics are understood as socially constructed markers of borderlines between us and them, the nature of tribal group identities gets blurred and the substance of ethnicity is transferred to fluid, artificial and hybrid formations. New ethnicities are useful for purposes of multiculturalism, though disposable for the purposes of manipulation. Positive use of multicultural differences demands that the designers have the capacities to self-consciously select the aspects that can be used to form new cultural constellations (see Vertovec 2009, 7). These constellations can be utilised by marketing them as transnational affairs that are culturally covered by local and regional elements, such as the revitalisation of dialects, local cuisines and folk dances. The newly invented, cross-border Karelia is an example of this sort of revival (see e.g. Fingerroos and Häyrynen 2012). The success of this sort of cultural transmission depends on how well the meanings are translated to serve the current affairs by producing a sense of togetherness, which is symbolically labelled through local or regional elements. When discussing this aspect, Delanty (2009, 194–198) reminds us that culture is never translated neutrally and that when different cultures meet, dislocated identities may result. Either we produce new, equally hybrid compilations of languages, religions and habits or cultural elements, or the less powerful identity groups melt into the hegemonic culture through soft subordination. After all, the political solutions to the problems of border crossing have, until now, been based on the idea of national sovereignty, and since the peace treaties of Augsburg and Westphalia in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the principle of cuius regio eius religio has been followed. Territorial rulers decide how the hegemonic identities are recognised, and researchers also find different national cultures unitary and homogenous, viewing them through their own ethnic lenses (Glick Schiller 2012, 29).

11.4 National and Transnational Dimensions of Cultural Citizenship

The spiral of cultural identification of community members on the basis of commonly inherited ethnic characters contains a continuum from localism to regionalism and further to nationalism. In this continuum, ethnicity has a specific identifying role, which is related to the territorial dimensions of citizenship, depending on the

perspective adopted by the interpreter. Ethnicities can be both useful and harmful for the process of border-formation, where the spheres of communities are covered by ideological processes from localism via nationalism to transnationalism. Since Kohn's (1944/2005) analysis on the idea of nationalism, civic nationalism has generally been distinguished from ethnic nationalism. This distinction refers to the meaning of politics of culture in the formation of nation and the roles of citizens as conscious actors of the civilising process and inheritors of the membership status. Smith (1995, 100–101) points out that nations always represent a symbiosis of civic and ethnic elements. From a constructivist perspective, Brubaker (2004, 131–144) sees civic and ethnic nationalism as two different sides of national inclusion and social closure. In his cultural-political interpretation, both of these terms are considered to be normative and ambiguous for purposes categorizing citizenship.

The nation-state is, according to Hoffman (2004, 49), who follows Weber's argumentation, an institution that claims a legitimate monopoly to practise sovereign power inside a particular territory. It demands loyalty from its citizens, on the ground of a common heritage and imaginary belonging. Local cultural aspects, interpreted in ethnic terms, are useful for the purposes of making people's own experiences valid for the production of national identities (see Day and Thompson 2004, 196–197). Thus, localised civic activities, fulfilled in cultural associations, are important tools for togetherness in the micro scale. The more diverse group composition is, the more legal methods of governance are required to keep it in order. In the political spiral of hierarchically organised order, the national administration subordinates local and regional communities under the power of state. Governmental rationality involves the interrelations of local, regional, national and transnational units in a way that makes the domains of activities of responsible citizens increasingly organised so as to be able to respond to the demands of the entire structure of governance.

The status of my home university is not reasoned through traditional, regionalism-based arguments any more. The University of Eastern Finland participates in competitive networks, both nationally and transnationally, trying to be among those who have best results in research and education. Regional interests and the educational interest of inhabitants of Eastern Finland are, however, continuously considered to be relevant, and their needs for life-long education are strategically supported. The location is still meaningful, one of the university's priorities being research on borders and border-crossings, especially in relation with Russian studies.

In academic duties among institutions of higher education, national interests are valued, and national identity continues to be involved in the profile of the university. From a cultural-political point of view, construction of cultural symbols is significant in strengthening the legal status of the political power of a nation-state. Ideological character of nationalism means that putting one's trust on the artificial substance of national values demands symbolical guarantees, which are mediated as being involved in the education. Cultural properties, thought to be shared by inhabitants of nation-states, are needed to ascertain the idea of legality of a nation (Jenkins 1997, 142–143). This means that lower territorial dimensions are subordinated to serve the intentions of nationalism through governmental strategies. Imaginary

construction of nations (Anderson 1983) is a symbolical element in the politics of belonging (Day and Thompson 2004, 95; Yuval-Davis 2011), and cultural universalism is embedded in the local cultures through cultural translation (Delanty 2009, 194).

Governmental legitimacy presupposes that citizens represent their nations by means of a status, which is defined by means of jurisdiction (Bauböck 2011, 345–346). Such legally defined criteria allow the citizen to enjoy equal political, social and cultural rights in democratic conditions. These civil rights are defined by the authorities in the continuum of inherited origin (ius sanguinis), reclaimed property (ius soli) and legalised residence (ius domicili) (Castles and Davidson 2000, 85, 91–94), and they are presumed to be natural when inherited from birth and descent. To the degree that civil rights are earned or result from political campaigns, they are considered to be man-made, and thus artificial, instrumental and changeable.

Along with modernisation, the social preconditions of political citizenship have become flexible. The primordial ethnic basis of reasoning citizenship by principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli becomes ambivalent, uncertain and questionable, immigration and binational families being among the reasons. When people move across borders, the status of dual or multiple citizenship increasingly becomes accepted when the roots of family members are on a foreign ground (see e.g. Bauböck 2011, 347; Castles and Davidson 2000, 84–85; see also Ronkainen and Toivanen in this volume). The relevance of the ius domicili principle is considered more often than earlier when defining the access to full civil rights. Bauböck (2010, 847–859) argues that political authorities apply instrumental rules and normative principles flexibly in negotiations on the legality of the criteria for the access of citizenship.

Increasing migration across national borders challenges the conventional notions of the role of a stable locality as the basis of community membership. The occupation of a legal right of residence, temporal or permanent work contracts and actual participation in civic duties in local associations—all of these are significant markers of the changing positions of migrants as citizens. Currently we live in mobile, liquid society, where contracts with partners are ambivalent and changeable (Urry 2007; Bauman 2001). This society is characterised by our active search for sustainable connections and guarantees for our membership relations. Fixed local identities and status positions as citizens, inside strictly controlled national borders, are compensated by multiple loyalties with many partners and communities. Globalising space is shaped by networks, flows, and channels within supranational territorial blocs. These systems operate inclusively and exclusively by taking political control mechanisms into use for verifying the security of travellers and communicating partners at their borders or at the cross-cutting lines of the transportation of messages (Delanty 2009, 235–236). Flexible life in a mobile society demands continuous learning capacity, for instance, to use new technical systems and become certain enough on the reliability of these systems. The traditionally considered local, regional or national markers of identity are useful for many culturally laden instrumental purposes, although they also seemingly tend to become liquid or "watered-down", as Vertovec (2009, 93) describes. The validity of the means of identification control must thus continuously be ensured in a purposeful context. Imaginary and

metaphoric elements of these transformative communities are used to represent and narrate cultural values that are modified according to the wishes of cumulative cultural capital in the symbolic exchange of the peoples' properties.

Earlier 'tribal' minorities were considered to form problematic identity groups within specific territorial communities. The current nomads, dislocated migrants, try to survive in-between specific territories, in uncertain conditions, without a guarantee of a stable home. Exiles, migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers are "taken away from the territorial bases of their local cultures" (Hannerz 1996, 111). They hope to reach a situation that is less ambivalent than residence at gated camps, expecting to be integrated instead of having relative security in their diaspora situation. As discussed in other chapters in this volume (Al-Sharmani and Horst; Ebot), immigrants face problems due to national restrictions when trying to improve their citizen positions through education, especially if they come from countries outside of Fortress Europe. In the best case, in liberal conditions, capacities of newcomers can enrich the values of the receiving society with learning possibilities, educational capacities, and innovative skills, both in their new homelands and in interactions across the borders.

Vertovec (2009, 12) remarks, referring to Appadurai's (1995) discernment, that the adoption of the idea of transnationalism has changed our views on spaces. It is, as such, debatable whether the transnational public sphere is a new phenomenon of the global era or continuation of the Enlightenment vision of cross-border movement (see Fraser 2014, 19). Spatial boundaries are constructed from the overlapping elements of communities, from localities to nation-states and even to continental unions. Transnational communities are now changing from territories with strict borders to networks of communication and virtual constructions, which are characteristically temporal, changeable and transformative social entities. Transnational connections thus demand communicative skills in the exchange of useful products and usable contacts. Flexible civic capacities, however, allow us to understand human differences and similarities across the borders, adopt new cultural variants and lifestyles, and create settlements in the new circumstances.

Transnationalism is basically an ideology of migration across the borders of nation-states. The concept of nationalism is still embedded in transnationality, but it is a proper term for conceptually interpreting the current transformation of society, as it invokes both the processes of connection and belonging, as Glick Schiller (2012, 23) says. Beck and Sznaider (2010, 381–403) argue for a turn to methodological cosmopolitanism to grasp how the dualities of local communities and global networks may be dissolved to take the citizens' civic initiatives seriously (see also Nash 2010, 58–59; Amelina et al. 2012). Transnational citizenship opens up a problem sphere for focusing on different sorts of interchanges, transportation and mobility. Cross-border situations mediate our local experiences of cosmopolitan processes and activities and organisational processes from local and national frames to global networks.

11.5 Cosmopolitan Citizenship in the Global Sphere

The current global concerns cannot be separated from the domestic requirements of the local inhabitants. Political and social responsibilities of active citizens cannot merely be limited to the troubles inside the local, regional or national communities, but likewise, many global worries also affect responsible cosmopolitans. Political and economic macro-level affairs result in ever-increasing global interdependency, which also influences the characteristics of social interaction, making it thin, liquid and momentary. In this change, involvements in personal micro-level happenings are influenced by macro-level processes that only affect us fleetingly, and imagined and discursively mediated global realities intermix with the everyday experiences. Another issue, related to the previous one, concerns the changing meanings of thick and thin, when cosmopolitan processes are embedded in ethically crucial values. Delanty (2009, 89–94) refers to the need to develop a deeper moral consciousness for globally important ethical issues, while Stevenson (2011) speaks for a good society and sees education as a tool for competent cultural citizens who wish to adopt cosmopolitan awareness and responsibility. This means that humanity cannot be conceived only as an abstract ideal of togetherness, but personal reactions against violence and towards solidarity are also required in order for these attitudes to be practiced seriously at everyday life-arenas.

Consciously or unconsciously met global interdependencies form our everyday realities. When participating in fluidly changing social networks, we easily communicate across the borders through virtual means to negotiate on complex commitments. We form virtual network communities with our colleagues and friends across the world and often know the affairs of distant partners better than those of our next-door neighbours. Do these border-crossing processes transform our sociality to make us real cosmopolitans?

I realise the effects of these processes in my own life by observing the changing profile of my home university from the perspective of transnationality. In the 1970s, not many teachers and students came from abroad. Comparative research across borders increased in the 1980s, and luckily, I was involved in these international affairs at the European level. A certain doctoral student, who came from Africa as a political refugee, is still remembered at our university due to the curiosity of her appearance. During the 1990s, exchange students and visiting scholars started to become a part of the everyday university life. At the same time, Internet and e-mail were increasingly being used to meet colleagues virtually. Nowadays, internalisation is one of the strategic cornerstones of our university. Global mobility, numerous international exchange and degree study programmes as well as globally oriented research collaborations are all important for reaching the standards of the leading universities of the world and measuring the success of the university in global scientific competition. Does this development lead to the adaptation of cosmopolitan principle? Does it make higher education promote democracy and enable culturally competent citizens to see their interconnected-related responsibilities, from local to global spheres?

The recognition of cultural rights of 'others' is a complex issue in cosmopolitanism, which refers to universally shared citizenship in an inclusive context. Actual ideological, religious and other value-laden problems in defining universal human rights show that borderless human awareness, the ever-yearned mission for humankind (see e.g. Appiah 2006, xiv), is very difficult to create. Is it possible to develop a common loyalty among the global citizens in a sustainable and peaceful way? It is obvious that the real placements and displacements of the participants of transcultural dialogues influence our loyalties in the process of dealing with the equal rights of different multicultural minorities. Stevenson (2003, 62) emphasises, like Bhabha (1994), the conceptual distinction between cultural differences and cultural diversity. This distinction allows us to see minority cultures as negotiated, translated and enunciated processes, instead of seeing them as separate islands inside their pregiven contexts.

One crucial problem of cosmopolitan citizenship concerns comparing the recognition of global universal ethics with the responses of particular responsibilities to the nearest people, with whom we share close emotional ties due to kinship and intimate relations. In its purest form, universalism is an essential value and thus an "empty signifier of the presence of meaning as such". It can be an ideological zero-institution, which provides a neutral, all-encompassing space where "all members of society can recognize themselves", to refer to the discussions of Butler et al. (2000, 113–114) on universality, hegemony and contingency. Conflict processes, after all, cannot be resolved without the solidarity of communicating partners. Encountering affective boundaries offers loyalty and critical lessons to the participants of civic activities. The rules of solidarity are best learned in engagements that demand moral obligations, not only with the nearest people but also towards the strangers (Delanty 2009, 103–105).

The principal ideas of cosmopolitanism are often discussed by emphasising equal democratic values, inclusive human rights and responsibilities, the pursuit of individual and collective freedoms in political arrangements and respect of morally valued goods in diverse cultural choices (e.g. Held 2011, 164–169). The ultimate ideal is to transcend all boundaries that hinder the people from adopting democratic values at a global level, as Stevenson (2003, 5) states, regarding this imaginary situation. But cosmopolitanism is a fluid term, as proved by numerous authors in this field, including the contributors of "Cosmopolitics" (Cheah and Robbins 1998). Robbins (1998, 246–264) compares this term with abstractions of terms like universalism, internationalism, multiculturalism and hybridization. He sees the validity of cosmopolitanism in catching the "sensibility of our moment" (ibid., 260). Cosmopolitics is introduced as a strategy for the politics of culture, to learn how particulars are embedded in the expected universals and how our own location—situatedness and belonging—influences our ambitious aims to become global citizens. Cosmopolitan practices lead to the pursuit of translocal connections in displaced situations. Being a matter of variations and a plurality of contrasting cultures, cosmopolitanism demands both generalised and special competences from the cosmopolitan self, as Hannerz (1996, 103) sees it. Involvement with the 'Other' and various initially alien cultures is a particularly good measure of the cultural capacities of cosmopolitans as representatives of 'us' and familiar perceptions.

Abstract and thus liquid characteristics of cosmopolitan culture are methodologically supported by the constructive, discursive and reflexive terminologies that are applied in the diagnosis of the current social and political phenomena. As applied to social practices, universality means equivalencies between particularities that are always contingent and context-dependent. Here, cosmopolitanism is seen as a post-universal, critical and dialogic reality; a plurality of local and global combinations of human rights, and a transfer from either-or to both-and consciousness (Beck 2006; Fine 2007, 16–17; Delanty 2009, 67). When defining the contents of cosmopolitan life in our own daily practices, we must adapt our lived particularities to these contextual frames. We can even see the big global issues from the situational perspective of political participants and active citizens that express opinions and organise demonstrations. When the arenas of sociality are being transformed, the orders and borders of the life spheres become interconnected in new ways, and we may discover ourselves in situations that we have never experienced before (Bauman 2011, 89).

Cosmopolitanism is a proper concept for analysing changing sociality, as it covers flexible social relations, the actualisation of communication networks, effective civil activities and increasing demands of cross-border citizenship all around the world. As post-sociologists, however, we need to remember that our consciousness is embedded in sociology which was developed for understanding the changes of the western modernisation inside the national frames (Bhambra 2011, 323). It is not an easy context for arguing that cosmopolitan civic practices are equally meaningful for all global citizens, as their contents are plural and intentions often contradictory. Can cosmopolitan ideas be adopted by denizens who were obliged to move from their original homes and who live separated from their nearest friends and have to break off their family ties to survive temporarily and without full civil rights? Are metropolitan elites able to understand the discrimination problems of people in the peripheries (Robbins 1998, 249–252)? Unsolvable global conflicts, where violence spreads across borders due to a lack of mutual control system, demand new kinds of solutions. Rules for negotiating the harmful effects of moral controversies are ambivalent, and we still lack a global guidebook of ethics.

Cosmopolitanism is unanimously favoured as the celebration of our common universal human values and idealistic meanings of cultural differences. Particular cosmopolitanisms are exemplified by applying them to the concrete situations of specific minority groups. Vernacular and provincial cosmopolitanisms are introduced by the supporters of post-colonial theory. (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Delanty 2009, 60; Bhambra 2011, 322–326; see also Rovisco & Nowicka (eds.) 2011). Werbner (2011, 109) refers to vernacular cosmopolitanism in order to ask whether the local, parochial, rooted and demotic cultural elements can coexist with translocal, transnational, transcendent and universal dimensions. In diaspora situations, minorities tend to apply the strategy of hybridity, where they transfer vernacular cultural elements to cosmopolitan contexts by adjusting them anew (Kalra et al. 2005). This is one way to occupy space to advance the political demands of minorities. Specific groups that need to identify themselves as culturally valuable may also strategically claim more universal competency.

Our reality is constructed on a continuum of local and cosmopolitan activities. When the doors of my hometown were opened to immigrants, including asylum seekers from Africa, in relatively small numbers, some conflicts broke out, giving this town a bad reputation and a racist label for a long period. Effective youth work, civic education programs, cultural campaigns like "Worlds Meet" and "Welcome to Us" have successfully made the town more open towards newcomers and border-crossers.

Citizens become cultural cosmopolitans by learning to interpret social and political transformations in a globally meaningful context. Cosmopolitan terms give the researchers tools for identifying the mobile placements of migrants, the fragile positions of precarious workers, and the hybrid social identities of the border-crossers.

11.6 Conclusions: From Local Members to Cosmopolitan World-Citizens

Criteria for defining citizenship have conventionally been understood in the context of nationality, as being based on local community memberships. When interpreting the social and political conditions in terms of methodological nationalism, citizens are increasingly becoming dislocated, but their political identities overlap in transnational contacts (Vertovec 2009, 100). Current social and political border-crossing processes are not restricted to activities in geopolitical frames that demand official governance operations from the functionaries of the state. Border-crossings, when they contain socio-cultural transformations, make it necessary and even essential to reconstruct the categories of citizenship so that local and global dimensions are interrelated. Local cosmopolitans promote this new world order in their grass-root activities, disseminated via worldwide communication channels in a conscious operation to promote civic virtue.

When thinking about the role of civil society, citizens belong to the society as members of political communities in order to associate their benefits and rights with their participation and contribution (Bellamy 2008, 12–16). Discussing cultural citizenship, Stevenson (2003) points out how ways of thinking about culture have been implicated in the definitions of citizenship. Homogeneous and static cultural values are joined to claims to citizenship inside the locality-based nation-states. Another way of understanding the concept of culture, however, is seeing culture as being compiled from creatively invented, actively processed and constructively conceptualised ingredients, produced by active cultural creators. This means that instead of just one culture, there are many cultures, which are considered, as Stevenson (2003, 16) pronounces, to be "travelling, hybrid patterns" intermixed in the various border-crossing processes. Cultural knowledge is transferred in these processes from one locality to many others, and skills and products are shared to expanding networks of contacts and increasing communication.

When people practise civic activities with a concern on treating discriminated others seriously as equals, revitalising polluted environments or reacting to economic injustice, human rights become politicised as ordinary practices that require daily efforts from the ordinary people. Members of social communities, recognising themselves as local and cosmopolitan citizens, can thus jointly mobilise their political resources.

Delanty (2009, 128–129) emphasises the importance of learning capacity as a resource for becoming an active citizen, able to cultivate oneself. According to Delanty (ibid.), the learning component is also a "medium of social construction" to be collectively used for translation and coordination, so that collective learning "ultimately becomes realised in social institutions". This aspect is relevant for how we reason the role of cultural politics as a tool for citizens. Bauman (2011, 96–98) describes very aptly how cultural policy was invented for the government to use culture to promote learning, improve manners and refine artistic tastes. Culture has become a mission of enlightenment; something where the knowledge of ordinary people has been improved by calling them to action for creating a new man. Culture is now understood, as Delanty (2011, 640) defines it, as a process of self-constitution in the sense-making activities of those who possess a potential for learning.

But the joint capacities of cosmopolitan community members increase only if there is enough solidarity, skills to share and trust on confident commitments across the borders. One problem concerns the guarantees of trust for people who we do not known personally or who are not categorised as members of our familiar social circles. A demand is presented for feeling of togetherness to reach from concrete face-to-face meetings in local communities to imaginary families in the homeland and, further onwards, to all humans in global networks. Global relations may be based on moral commitments, on a sense of a common cultural understanding, or on shared ethical values. Mutual exchange, like a trade partnership, starts with a reciprocal share and aims to win opportunities through competition. Because such exchange interactions have instrumental intentions, their rationality requires the maintenance of continuous guarantees. The sense of continuous requirement of these equivalent guarantees can result from surface multiculturalism as much as it can result from the preservation of a traditional diaspora identity in the liquid conditions of transmodernity. To avoid this, our global solidarity must be tested through ethically sustainable practices.

It is still easier for us to deal with cosmopolitanism as an abstract, sublimated ideal, seen from above, than to understand from below how cosmopolitan aspects are encountered as something that is intermingled with the mundane civic practices of our daily lives. To become local cosmopolitans, we have to seriously consider the meaning of the slogan "Think globally, act locally". Real encounters with the others result in self-sensitive learning processes. Without caring for our closest relations and the environment that we touch by our hands and feet, we cannot credibly apply our ethical perspective of human issues to the global concerns.

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Afterwords

All the continuous ongoing debate on our transnational everyday lives and methodological nationalism, with its implications, such as representations of dislocation, has much to do with changes in politics and policies. Nation states, as frames for political independence, policy-making governing and organising, are increasingly more intensively obliged to pay attention to diversifying citizenship statuses, different culturally regulated needs and expectations and life-historical cumulated competencies of their inhabitants at the very moment in question. The motions of traditionally slow policy systems also need to become quicker as the intensity of transnational mobility does not seem to grow thinner but instead is encouraged and supported widely by, for example, discursive strategies and economical programs. Dislocation, a voluntary condition for certain people, is enhanced—but still we ask why is it most often defined negatively and with suspicion or at least draped in terms such as problem, challenge, and complexity. Is this because transnationalism is, indeed, challenging many of the basic ideas of the Western political order and political theory? Or does cosmopolitanism really influence in the world-wide practices of discrimination, equalising the belongings of cross-border travellers?

Global changes, especially those concerning individual people's mobility, fundamentally rock what is possibly the most classical and somehow sacred relationship between the individual and his/her state: citizenship. Citizenship can be seen as the basic concept of political theory, an abstract formula for concrete, culturally and regionally differing forms. Besides various ideas concerning the rights and duties of citizenship, it consists of an implicit and univocal reference to loyalty: in the exchange between freedom and safety, a citizen sacrifices some dimensions of his/her existence in order to defend his/her political whole, the state. This is easy only if the citizens commit themselves to that whole emotionally, and thus, the state has to turn into a nation-state. However, the statuses, living conditions and political aspirations of multiple citizens complicate this relationship in interesting ways. This is already seen in the numerous attributes of citizenship (cultural, multicultural, regional, local, primary, secondary, etc.), as well as the ways how dual/multiple citizenship is presented as a condition for competent cosmopolitanism in the new transnational reality.

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P. Ahponen et al. (eds.), *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21804-5

People's new transnational mobility does not only challenge national politics but also demands us to rethink our entire way of organising the various local institutions that affect our possibilities of life and our everyday encounters with people, like juridical and educational institutions, garrisons, labour organisations, municipal courts and civil-society associations. Issue-political and life-political actions, with their micro-level aspirations, often have global reach, as well as agents that do not demarcate their understanding of civil society or localism inside their own national borders. The spheres of people's actions are not inevitably tied to territorially limited interests, and their normative restrictions become obscure though not unnecessary. This also means changes in rethinking their legislations and national independence.

Methodological transnationalism is an 'ism' that is presented as one wide answer for understanding and living with the challenges and complications of this breakdown of traditional nation-state-based categories. It has been developed to express a comprehensive way of thinking that reaches from politics and policies via education and research to the everyday encounters of the ordinary people in the schoolyards, armies, at the labour market and so on. The strength of strict, nationalistic representations, which still intrude and disturb the people's relations and experiences in transnational reality, is worth noticing and raises a need to really strive to pass from methodological nationalism to methodological transnationalism and morally embedded methodological cosmopolitanism at every possible level of societal action.

In this world of turbulent transnational mobility, different forms of racism, discrimination and hierarchies of diversity still often set the tone for the people's everyday encounters, *die Lebenswelt* of individual people. Multiple statuses, rights and policies have not sufficed in changing the social and cultural orders at the level of ordinary life. In this new situation, we find an old and unfortunately familiar phenomenon: the most 'dislocated' ones, from the European point of view, year after year, are the people from Sub-Saharan Africa, whether they are refugees or highly educated immigrants. Their miserable labour market positions, for example, undercut the educational programs that praise internationalisation—higher education does not seem to save all transnational migrants from the unscrupulous reality of nationality-based discrimination. So this wider picture still allows us to discuss neo-colonialism, neo-racism, Euro-centrism and the tragedy of Africa.

We have still to ponder whether methodological transnationalism is a counter-ideology or a continuation of methodological nationalism. We can see it in the representations affecting the people's everyday encounters but also in social scientific research. Why is it so important for us to ask the immigrants or multiple citizens about their feelings of belonging and ethnic identity, about their loyalties, about their plans to stay in their 'host country' or move away and so on, over and over again? After all, these questions are not asked from 'native citizens'—and so the old categories are also actively maintained by the researchers, no matter how critical and open-minded they tend to be. If we continue to ask these same questions in sense of methodological nationalism, we will also continue to receive the same kinds of answers and sustain the categorical thinking of our nation-state-based

minds. However, possibly the most difficult current question is how to develop new questions within the prevailing, limited and deeply internalised space of discourses and conceptualisation. Can the young, cosmopolitan generation manage this—or has it already been captured inside the dogmas created by their predecessors?

Nevertheless, we would like to suggest that the current age of transnationalism can also be seen as an in-between phase of late modernity and as a continuation of nationalism, at least as long as the people's identities are tied within the distinctions of 'us' and 'them'. The contemporary reality already leans on global citizenship and cosmopolitanism to quite a degree, which, nevertheless, have thus far been made into strategies for successors. The selective mechanisms of societies continue maintaining the choosy nature of these strategies if the people's equality and parity are not accepted as the principal 'isms' of the global village. This, however, is only possible if we are continuously ready to come to know that change of thought is needed at all levels of the people's societal existence.