NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN IMPERIAL JAPAN

Autonomy, Asian brotherhood, or world citizenship?

edited by Dick Stegewerns

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Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan

Owing to the increasing scope of unification, there exists a strong desire to get to grips with the unsettling impact of globalization on the one hand and the resurgence of nationalism on the other. The Japanese case in its historical perspective constitutes an example in many ways for the rapid and extensive transformations we are undergoing in so many parts of the world.

Throughout the history of modern Japan there has been a continuous struggle to create an integrated conception of how a politically and/or culturally autonomous Japan might relate to a pluralistic and interactive world. *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan* scrutinizes nationalist and internationalist rhetoric by means of comparatively constant factors such as personal views of humanity, civilisation, progress, the nation, and the outside world, and thus attempts to develop new approaches towards the question of the relationship between Japanese nationalism and internationalism.

This book brings together a team of scholars who analyse how different generations of opinion leaders in the Japanese pre-war modern era tried to solve what they perceived as the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism.

Dick Stegewerns is Assistant Professor in Modern Japanese History at Osaka Sangyo University.

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This book is dedicated to Bart and Koen, who, with
their conspicuous blond hair and fluent Kyoto dialect,
are happily still unaware of any dilemma of nationalism
and internationalism in their world.

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Contributors

Thomas W.Burkman is Research Professor and Director of Asian Studies at the State University of New York at Buffalo. His research in modern Japanese diplomatic history has focused on Japan's relationship to international order between the world wars. He is the author of numerous articles and chapters on Japan and the League of Nations and the international career of Nitobe Inazo. He also edited three volumes of research papers and oral history on the Allied occupation of Japan. His bibliographical chapter on Japan in the First World War will appear in *A Handbook on World War I* (edited by Dennis Showalter and Robin Higham, Greenwood Press, 2003).

Kevin M.Doak is the Nippon Foundation Endowed Chair in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Georgetown University, USA. His recent publications include *Overcoming Postmodernism: Overcoming Modernity and Japan* (edited, with Y. Takada, Eikoh Institute of Culture and Education, 2002), *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia* (edited with Kai-wing Chow and Poshek Fu, University of Michigan Press, 2001) and 'Building National Identity through Ethnicity: Ethnology in Wartime Japan and After' (*Journal of Japanese Studies* 27(1), winter 2001). He is currently completing a book on ethnicity, populism and nationalism in modern Japan.

Kobayashi Hiroharu is assistant professor in modern Japanese history at Kyoto Prefectural University. His current research deals with the topic of the transformation of international society into worldwide society from the viewpoint of international law. He is the author of *Kokusai chitsujo no keisei to kindai Nihon* (Modern Japan and the formation of international order; Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2002), 'Niju-seiki no kokusai shakai to sono henyo' (The twentieth century and international society; in *Rekishi Hyoron,* no. 610, February 2001), 'Intaanashonarizumu to teikoku Nihon—1920-nendai shoto no kokusai ishiki' (Imperial Japan and internationalism—international consciousness at the beginning of the 1920s; in *Teikoku to kokumin-kokka,* edited by Rekishi to Hoho Henshu-iinkai, Aoki Shoten, 2000).

Seiji M.Lippit is assistant professor in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of

Topographies of Japanese Modernism (Columbia University Press, 2002) and the editor of *The Essential Akutagawa* (Marsilio Publishers, 1999).

Oikawa Eijiro is assistant professor in modern Japanese history at Tokyo Gakugei University. He obtained his PhD from Kyoto University for his dissertation on *'Kindai Nihon no shakai undo to sengo shakai chitsujo no genryu'* (The social movement in modern Japan and the roots of the post-war social order). His current research deals with the relation between the livelihood cooperative association *(seikyo)* movement and the issues of gender and Korean residents in post-war Japan.

Kurt W.Radtke obtained his PhD from the Australian National University in Chinese literature, and is professor in Japanese and Chinese studies at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo. One of his major research interests is Chinese and Japanese security strategies in the age of globalisation. His books include *Chinese Poetry of the Yuan Dynasty* (ANU Press, 1984) and *China's Relations with Japan, 1945–83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi* (Manchester University Press, 1990.)

Annette Schad-Seifert is assistant professor of Japanese Studies at the University of Leipzig. Her main fields of research are the history of social and political ideas in modern Japan, and contemporary cultural and gender studies of Japan. She is author of *Sozialwissenschaftliches Denken in der japanischen Aufklärung—Positionen zur 'modernen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft' bei Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Social scientific thought in the Japanese enlightenment—Fukuzawa Yukichi's discourse on modern civil society; Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1999) and co-editor of *Cultural Studies and Japan* (Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2001).

Dick Stegewerns is assistant professor in modern Japanese history and comparative culture at Osaka Sangyo University. His recent publications include *The End of World War One as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History* (contribution to *Turning Points in Japanese History,* edited by Bert Edström; RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 'The Japanese Civilisation Critics and the National Identity of their Asian Neighbours' (contribution to *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia,* edited by Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb; RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) and *Adjusting to the New World: The Taisho Generation of Opinion Leaders and the Outside World, 1918–1932* (forthcoming).

Alistair Swale is a senior lecturer in Japanese history and culture at Waikato University in Hamilton, New Zealand. He has recently published *The Political Thought of Mori Arinori* through the Japan Library (2000) and has contributed to several collaborative publications, including 'The Paradox of Progressive Conservative Leadership in Early Meiji Japan: A Study of the Role of Spencer's Evolutionary Thought in Fusing Progressivism with Conservative Objectives' (contribution to *Leaders and Leadership in Japan,* edited by Ian Neary, Curzon Press**,** 1996) and 'America: The First Stage in the Quest for "Enlightenment"' (contribution to *The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A*

New Assessment, edited by Ian Nish, Japan Library, 1998, a collection of essays commemorating the Iwakura Mission). He is currently working on a comparative history of perceptions of capitalism in Britain and Japan since the early nineteenth century.

Preface

When I first proposed to take upon myself the task of editing a volume on nationalism and internationalism in modern Japan, being new to this kind of job I entertained the optimistic hope that the whole thing could be completed within a year. Things soon proved to be not that easy. Having two Japanese articles translated for this volume cost a lot more time than expected. But finding myself all of a sudden in a succession of teaching positions, which not only varied in content but also forced me once again to relocate to Japan, was definitely most fatal to the original time schedule.

Luckily the time period covered in this volume is not so recent as to prove our findings outdated. Moreover, the relevance of the topic dealt with in this volume has not decreased a bit in the light of the developments since the beginning of this decade, in which Japan only seems more and more confronted with the necessity of (re)considering its position *vis-à-vis* (East) Asia, 'the West' and the world at large. How to harmonise demands in the wake of the terrorist attacks to 'show the flag' in support of a United States that publicly refutes the Kyoto Protocol? How to amicably co-host a soccer world championship with a former colony that demands that Japan revise its interpretation of its own (mainly pre-war and wartime) history? How to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the normalisation of diplomatic relations with China, a country that has developed into a formidable rival in many sectors of Japanese industry and is most commonly described in the popular media as the major threat to Japan? How to deal with the international maverick North Korea, 'an outlaw state' which violates Japan's territorial waters and has abducted Japanese citizens, but which nevertheless seems to solicit Japanese help in order to rejoin the world and East Asia? How to match ambitions to establish 'an autonomous Japanese way of contributing to the world' with the reality of a dwindling development aid budget? How to combine national emblems and a national history to be proud of, recently forced into the classroom, with the traditional load of English-language education and the emphasis on international exchange since the 1980s, aimed at turning the younger Japanese generations into world citizens? This is not the place for predictions and evaluations, so let me confine myself here to expressing the hope that the various insights gained from the case studies in this volume addressing Japan's struggle

with the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism (including regionalism) in the past will prove helpful in analysing Japan's conduct today.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) for kindly providing us with a platform to present the initial results of this project; Alistair Swale and Seiji Lippit for their painstaking efforts in translating the two Japanese chapters; Ingeborg Hansen for helping out with the index; and Rachel Saunders of RoutledgeCurzon for her patient and friendly support in getting this book together.

Kyoto, 4 September 2002
Dick Stegewerns

Note on Japanese, Chinese and Korean names and publications

Japanese, Korean and Chinese names have been rendered with the surname or family name preceding the personal name, in accordance with normal East Asian practice. The romanisation of Japanese words and names follows the Hepburn system. With a few exceptions, such as the 'established' transcriptions of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese words and names have been romanised according to the *pinyin* system. The place of publication of Japanese books of which the place of publication is not specified in the notes and bibliographies is Tokyo.

Part I

Theoretical introduction

1
The dilemma of nationalism and internationalism in modern Japan
National interest, Asian brotherhood, international cooperation or world citizenship?

Dick Stegewerns

Introduction

Due to the increasing scale of integration in our times, there is a strong desire to get to grips with the unsettling impact of globalisation on the one hand and the resurgence of nationalism and ethnicity on the other. The Japanese case in its historical perspective constitutes in many ways a precursor to the rapid and extensive transformation we are undergoing today in so many parts of the world. Ever since the Meiji Restoration many Japanese have continuously expressed a strong desire for their country to become a fully fledged and 'civilised' member of world society. In doing so they soon found themselves faced by the problem of how to position Japan *vis-à-vis* such entities as 'Asia', 'the West' and 'the world'. Sharon Nolte has designated the tension between nationalism and internationalism that emanated in the process as 'a problem of intense concern' and 'one of the central themes of modern Japanese thought'.[1] And, indeed, when one takes a sweeping look at the history of modern Japan one cannot but notice how successive generations of intellectuals have been continuously struggling to create an integrated conception of how a politically and/or culturally autonomous Japan might relate to a pluralistic and interactive world.

This project brings together a group of scholars who analyse how representatives of the different generations of opinion leaders in the Japanese pre-war modern era tried to solve what they perceived as the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism or, just as often, the dilemma of particularism and universalism. In their contributions the various authors have tried to mediate what Naoki Sakai has called the complementary character of particularism and universalism:

> [They] do not form an antinomy, but mutually reinforce each other. As a matter of fact, particularism has never been a truly disturbing enemy of universalism or vice versa…. Contrary to what has been advertised by both sides, universalism and particularism reinforce and supplement each other; they are never in real conflict; they need each other and have to seek to

> form a symmetrical, mutually supporting relationship by every means in order to avoid dialogical encounter which would necessarily jeopardize their reputedly secure and harmonized monologic worlds. Universalism and particularism endorse each other's defect in order to conceal their own; they are intimately tied to each other in their accomplice. In this respect, a particularism such as nationalism can never be a serious critique of universalism, for it is an accomplice thereof.[2]

Whether Naoki Sakai would agree with identifying internationalism as universalism is a separate issue, but in line with his argument one can at least find that nationalist demands are often justified by means of claims to universality, and internationalism is not infrequently advocated in nationalistic terms. The aim of this project is to scrutinise the nationalist and internationalist rhetoric by means of relatively constant factors such as personal views on humanity, civilisation, progress, the nation and the outside world, and thus to develop new approaches towards the question of the relationship between Japanese nationalism and internationalism.

The complementary character of nationalism and internationalism

In general nationalism and internationalism have been, and still are, mostly treated as opposite forces, the latter benign and the former undesirable. Nationalism is most often described (in the case of another country's nationalism) as narrow-minded and aggressive and thus as the root of the wars, border conflicts and internal ethnic-cleansing campaigns with which the modern world has been rife. At best nationalism is characterised as a historical trend that civilised man should have left behind by now in favour of the blessings of internationalism. Accordingly, in present-day Japan we can find such eulogistic series of biographies as *Those Japanese Who Gave Their Everything for [International Peace]* and *The 36 Japanese who Faced Korea,*[3] but one will have a hard time finding nationalist equivalents.[4] Analogously, in both Japanese and Western history writing on pre-war Japanese history there has been a strong tendency to make a distinction between the peaceful internationalist 1920s and the violent nationalist 1930s, conveniently demarcated by the turning point of the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and a similar distinction between internationalist good guys and nationalist bad guys (I am afraid that there has been an even stronger tendency to overlook women as individual historical actors).

Nevertheless, in the academic debate on nationalism and internationalism there has been a conspicuous new trend since the mid-1990s to do away with this 'schism of the isms' and instead focus on their compatibility. In stark resemblance to Sakai's abovementioned quotation, such diverse commentators as Yael Tamir, Micheline Ishay, Saeki Keishi, Kang Sang-jung and Matsumoto Kenichi have stressed the complementary character of nationalism and internationalism.[5] In

contrast to the majority of their fellow 'nationalism critics', often invigorated by the violent outbursts of nationalism following the crumbling of the communist dome over the Balkan and the Soviet Union, they instead break a lance for nationalism, although in the somewhat circumscribed form of civic, liberal or communitarian nationalism. Their message is as simple as it is insightful: the hallowed concepts of liberalism, democracy and internationalism cannot (yet) do without the state and the nation. They, and other defenders of the state, of course do not deny that undue emphasis on the nation-state has resulted into the various nationalist excesses that the 19th and 20th centuries have witnessed, but they also stress the crucial role nationalism has played in the establishment of parliamentary democracy and the eradication of colonialism. In short, they are reluctant to throw the healthy nationalist baby away with the contaminated nationalist bathwater. Moreover, as the term 'internationalism' implies, internationalism has to be an 'intra-nation' thing, and thus internationalism will make no headway whatsoever as long as one denies the present unit of international relations, the nation-state and the nationalism by which it is supported. In short, the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism is not an either/or question but a matter of finding the right ratio between these two 'isms' in order to bring about their inevitable co-existence.

The 1921 debate on nationalism and internationalism

However, although there seems to be an ongoing need to make us aware of the fact that nationalism and internationalism are not antinomian but instead are very well able to function as mutually reinforcing entities, it is interesting to see that this message was entirely superfluous for the Japanese opinion leaders of the 1920s. This is evident from a series of articles addressing the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism published in the leading general magazine *Chuo Koron* in February 1921.[6] Under the title of 'Jikoku honishugi tai kokusai kyodoshugi hihan' (A critique of nationalism versus internationalism[7]), it featured contributions by prominent representatives of three different generations of Japanese opinion leaders. Although I am not perfectly certain whether this is the first instance in Japanese history of a debate on the various merits and demerits of nationalism and internationalism, I would not be greatly surprised if this indeed is the case. When during the 18th century European intellectuals such as Montesquieu and Kant felt themselves perfectly at ease to support simultaneously the new concept of national identity and the older concept of cosmopolitan identity, Japan was still predominantly living in a domain-based world of its own and did not take part in the ensuing debate. As Japan genuinely opened itself to 'the outside world' in the early Meiji period, it finally took notice and gratefully incorporated the provisional conclusions of the debate, which were overwhelmingly in favour of the absolute nation-state. It was only at the end of the 1910s when the state lost its absolute sovereignty—to national society on the one hand and international society on the other—that the Japanese intelligentsia

could do away with the state-centred thinking that had dominated their intellectual outlook, and thus were for the first time able seriously to consider the possibility of harmony between nationalism and internationalism. In hindsight we may tend to take the establishment of the League of Nations in January 1920 for granted as just another established historical fact, but one should not forget that many contemporary Japanese opinion leaders were completely taken by surprise by this revolution in the field of international relations. No matter how feeble and incomplete its central organ of conflict control, a new age of multilateral treaties had begun, and at the time of the abovementioned critique quite a few of the participants were already keenly aware that an invitation to what was to be the Washington Conference later that year was on its way. If others were somewhat less adept at predicting the immediate future, all participants at least very clearly shared an awareness that with the end of the Great War the world had entered a new historical stage and Japan also should incorporate the new historical trends in its internal and external policies—and indeed it was this awareness that formed the basis of what might very well be regarded as the first Japanese (public) debate on nationalism and internationalism.

What is most striking is that the majority of the participants in this 'critique of nationalism versus internationalism' try to remove the oppositional aspect out of the subject that they were given and instead stress the possibility of coexistence of the two 'isms'. This is first of all clear from such titles as 'The Application of Internationalism on the Basis of Nationalism' (Miyake), 'The Union of National Life and International Life' (Hayashi) and 'Nationalism and Internationalism are not Contradictory' (Nagai). However, apart from this general agreement quite different solutions are being proposed as to how best to combine nationalism and internationalism. It is at this point that we can discern a difference between three generations, and within the generation that is numerically best represented in this critique, some subdivisions.

Miyake Setsurei (1860–1945) is the only spokesman of the older generation in the *Chuo Koron* debate. With his Seikyosha companions no longer active and his Minyusha rival Tokutomi Soho evidently not very welcome in the more progressive general magazines of the day, he on his own had to represent what once was 'the new generation in Meiji Japan'.[8] With his relativist and down-to-earth approach—the latter best expressed in the adage 'One had better not look at the stars when walking but keep one's eyes to the ground'—Miyake proved himself to be quite flexible when addressing the new dilemma of nationalism and internationalism. He seemed to have no problems in gnawing at the vestiges of the state when he mentioned that the latter was anything but an immutable and permanent entity and that it, just like the preceding feudal system, was constantly subject to change and might very well be ultimately discarded. However, he did not forget to add that, whereas the state may not be fully solid, the League of Nations was as yet in a far more premature and feeble stage. Miyake remarked astutely that with the United States, Germany and Russia not participating one could hardly expect it to be a terribly effective peacekeeping organ. Still, from his

evolutionary view of history he considered the mere fact that a new trend of internationalism had come into being of considerable significance and, accordingly, if it was only for lack of a better alternative, advocated the nurturing of the existing League of Nations. He concluded that the present age dictated that man adopt both nationalism and internationalism, but in doing so, he stressed, for the moment one had better make sure one stood firmly on the most solid of the two. Following in the footsteps of both the many countries that decided to participate and the United States, which in the end decided not to participate in the League—all of which had come to their various decisions by means of a pragmatic consideration of opportunistic reasons of national interest—Miyake reassured soothingly that there was nothing wrong in supporting internationalism on the basis of nationalism.[9]

After this relatively nationalist support of internationalism by a representative of the Meiji generation we come to what one may term 'the Taisho generation of opinion leaders', or the Taisho 'civilisation critics' *(bunmei hihyoka)* as they called themselves. Although no longer in their heyday, in 1921 this generation was still the most prominent in the media and, not surprisingly, they supplied more than half of the participants in this debate. The first, the philosopher Kihira Tadayoshi (1874–1949), was the least known of the four and might have been called upon merely because he formed a counterweight to the optimism of many of the others. He clearly was most critical of international cooperativism and its symbol the League of Nations, as can be gathered from the title of his contribution: The Former [nationalism] is a Fact, the Latter [internationalism] a Mere Utopia'. The direct reason was that he was completely enamoured of the state, much more than a 'Meiji man' like Miyake. He defined the state as, respectively, the direct and inevitable product of our needs as *jinkakusha* (men of character), the only medium that guarantees the freedom of the individual, the most concrete expression of society, and the unit of culture and the ethnic nation. He would not allow any criticism of nationalism and patriotism, since this would come down to negation of the self and thus an act that the self-conscious modern man could not condone. In this connection internationalism was also characterised as something very suspicious. In sharp contrast to many adherents to the evolutional view of culture and civilisation, Kihira expressed such 'modern' notions as the idea that culture would halt its development when the blood of the ethnic nation mingled with that of other nations and lost its purity. From this point of view, internationalist efforts to unify humanity ignored differences in blood and would merely lead to a world of compromise and idleness. Having said that much, one can only remain somewhat astounded that even Kihira concluded by saying that he could, nonetheless, cope with a league of nations that served the needs of the various countries and stimulated the development of their various specific cultures.[10]

Next in line is Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875–1969), one of the most famous 'liberal intellectuals' of the pre-war period. Since his prose is utterly uninspiring, I find it something of a wonder that this man was so well liked, but judging by the

articles that I did read I also tend to consider him more of a socialist than a liberal.[11] Here Hasegawa yet again proves himself to be a true socialist of his day by focusing solely on the management of national society. In his 'Anatomy of Nationalism', he first defines the state as essentially nothing but the incarnation of man's instinct to rob, kill, possess and subjugate, after which he concludes that nationalism is only for the strong and that Japan stands to gain nothing by it. Having thus debunked the state and nationalism as immoral, he does not go into the topics of international cooperation and internationalism, and, accordingly, provides the longest but least enlightening contribution to this debate.[12]

The last two representatives of the Taisho generation of opinion leaders, Hayashi Kiroku (1872–1950) and Yoshino Sakuzo (1878–1933), although furthest apart of the four mentioned here in terms of age, take a rather similar pro-internationalist stand. To start with Yoshino's 'Internationalism is the Undercurrent of Contemporary Thought', in this article—in consonance with my discussion of this 'isolated' figurehead of the Taisho generation in Chapter 6—he also shows himself perfectly capable of coming up with an analysis of the international situation that is out of line with the vast majority of his contemporaries. This is, as is often the case, most evident in his lenient and idealist evaluation of the leader of the new world order, the United States. Yoshino argues that America's decision not to join the League but to hold on to its absolute national sovereignty is based on the desire to fulfil the fundamental spirit of the (yet imperfect) League of Nations. It is merely trying to repair the deficiencies of the League from the outside. Therefore, he maintains, America's recent so-called 'isolationist nationalism' is not contradictory to, but complementary with the spirit of internationalism.[13] Hayashi, the foremost diplomatic historian of his age, was somewhat more realistic in his assessment of nationalism when he called attention to the fact that nationalism was not dead but, on the contrary, had seen a major surge through both the formation of many new states and the nationalist emotions instigated by the war.[14] Yet in the end the two drew exactly the same conclusions *vis-à-vis* the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism. In their view the establishment of the League of Nations marked the advent of a new era in international relations, in which the state was no longer absolute but under the jurisdiction of a supra-national constitution. Yoshino remarked confi dently that even the demise of the existing League of Nations would not imply the end of this internationalism. The civilised world would no longer pardon one country ignoring the grand principle of international coexistence and the concept of universal justice. In this new era the narrow-minded self-centred nationalism of yore would become an act of suicide. But Yoshino and Hayashi agreed that there was still room for 'sound nationalism' and that this would be fully compatible with internationalism. In the words of Hayashi:

> At first sight nationalism and internationalism seem contradictory, but that is merely because of the yet undeveloped state of international life. The

> evolution of the latter will make for a situation…where there will be increasingly less difference between acting on behalf of one's own state and on behalf of international cooperation.[15]

When one looks at the contributions of the two representatives of the early Showa generation, social scientist Sugimori Kojiro (1881–1968) and politician Nagai Ryutaro (1881–1944), one tends to rush to the conclusion that 'the younger, the more internationalist'. Echoing the other contributors, both see no reason whatsoever why (ethnic) nationalism and internationalism could not coexist, but they are even more radical. Where Yoshino had only vaguely hinted at the possible future demise of the state, saying that he was willing to put up with the form of the nation-state for the time being while simultaneously voicing the hope that internationalism would see more concrete form in a substantially improved League of Nations that would become the foremost unit of international life, Sugimori and Nagai were quite outspoken on the subject. Sugimori, in his 'A Small Progress for the Forces of Culturalism Against the Forces of Militarism', stressed the fact that the ultimate criterion of social, national and international life was the development of the individual, and that the rise of internationalism—promoting world peace, free trade and equal opportunities for all individuals—was nothing but a natural trend dictated by individualism. Although he was not willing to discard the state and the ethnic nation immediately, asserting that these had not yet come to their full bloom on behalf of the individual, he did emphasise that their fate was already decided upon and that the world would inevitably develop to a higher stage of individualism, namely cosmopolitanism.[16] Nagai's temporary support for the state was, by contrast, based on the criterion of the development of the ethnic nation *(minzoku):*

> The raison d'être of the modern state continues until the ethnic nation has completely established its particular civilisation. When the various ethnic nations by means of their states have established their new civilisations…these will eventually form the content of world civilisation and in the process total human coexistence will come about.[17]

Identical to Sugimori's 'individual' route, we are led towards cosmopolitanism and en route the nation-state is discarded.

Having come this far, we might consider dividing the contributors to this debate on nationalism and internationalism into the following categories: aloof socialists (here merely represented by a member of the Taisho generation, but definitely of a wider generational diversity), cynic realists (predominantly nationalist, represented by the Meiji and Taisho generations), moderate idealists (internationalists, represented by the Taisho generations) and radical utopianists (cosmopolitanists, represented by the early Showa generation). The last characterisation may seem rather sudden and harsh, but in my opinion it makes more sense in the debate on nationalism and internationalism to make a

distinction between those who recognise the existence of the nation-state and those who do not, rather than between ‘nationalists’ and ‘internationalists’. Very enlightening in this regard is Raymond Williams in his very helpful book *Keywords:*

> The complexity [of the term ‘nationalism’] has been increased by the usually separable distinction between nationalism (selfish pursuit of a nation’s interests as against others) and internationalism (co-operation between nations). But internationalism, which refers to relations between nation-states, is not the opposite of nationalism in the context of a subordinate group seeking its own distinct identity; it is only the opposite of selfish and competitive policies between existing political nations.[18]

In short, internationalism is not opposed to nationalism in all its manifestations. It is opposed to ‘selfish pursuit of a nation’s interests as against others’, but it cannot reject the nation-state insofar as it refers to ‘relations between nation-states’. It is on these two points that one has to be extremely cautious not to categorise the early Showa cosmopolitanists, such as Sugimori and Nagai, as internationalists. Sugimori was in a world of his own, completely isolated from national and international reality, when he depicted a healthy social Darwinist sort of musical chairs ending in cosmopolitan amalgamation with his proposition that the various nation-states should be made to compete for the sympathy of the individual, who should be able freely to choose the country and nationality of his or her liking.[19] Nagai had no problem measuring up to Sugimori considering the following remark:

> Just as a field alive with all sorts of flowers shows the great harmony of natural beauty, …the common goal of humanity is to stimulate the various ethnic nations that make up humanity to establish their specific civilisation, compete, adjust *(renma)* and harmonise, thus bringing about a true world civilisation. However, in order to let the various ethnic nations establish a new civilisation based upon their specific natures, the various ethnic nations must first establish their right of existence *(seizonkeri)*…. The Japanese ethnic nation has to contribute to world civilisation by guaranteeing the existence and freedom of all races and ethnic nations, and must offer them the equal opportunity to establish their specific civilisations. Japan should not side with the world imperialism of the advanced nations of Europe and America but with world liberationism *(sekaiteki kaihoshugi)*.[20]

One would think it impossible to remain completely silent here as to what implications this ‘world liberationism’ should have for Japan’s colonialist and imperialist trophies, but Nagai did just this. Not surprisingly, the duo’s simultaneous support and rejection of the nation-state, ultimately destined to be sublimated while first having to develop further, was nothing more than the

advocacy of a 'transitory' regionalist stage towards cosmopolitanism in which the other (East) Asian ethnic nations were expected to be absorbed into the superior Japanese nation. It will need no further explanation that the early Showa generation, by negating the ethnic-national right of self-determination of the other Asian nations, can be taken to be fully responsible for calling down all conceivable kinds of misfortune upon the world (at least its East Asian part) and for Japan's ever continuing isolation in the (East) Asian region. Besides, perhaps somewhat more controversially, one might also say that the socialist forces in Japan acted as an accomplice of sorts by primarily concentrating on internal issues and, accordingly, not truly contributing to the essential debate on nationalism and internationalism.

This implies that the new internationalist current after the First World War had to be supported by the two remaining groups of cynic realists and moderate idealists. In my research on several main members of the Taisho generation of opinion leaders[21] (and in the abovementioned chapter on Yoshino) I come to the conclusion that the new stock of ideas was indeed safe in their hands. The following remark by Hayashi seems to point in the same direction:

> One cannot demand of the state, the present unit of national and international life, to do away with itself.... We have to strive for forms of sound nationalism that serve the interests of one's own country in harmony with the principle of international coexistence.[22]

This rejection of utopianistic cosmopolitanism and the call for sound, internationalist nationalism even seem to be identical to the liberal, communitarian nationalism that Yael Tamir and others prescribe for our present age. In this connection it is extremely sad that the early Showa generation declined to inherit the complementary set of realistic nationalism and moderately idealistic internationalism presented to them by their fore-bears, and instead pushed towards over-the-edge forms of nationalism, cosmopolitanism and total-war thinking.

Definitions of nationalisms and internationalisms

In the above I have tried to show that it is better to avoid strictly dividing the various time periods of and the various individuals and groups of actors in modern Japanese history between the two categories of nationalism and internationalism. I have done so mainly by means of stressing the inclusive and mutually sustaining nature of the two 'isms'. However, there is an equally important reason for avoiding this deceptively dichotomous view of history, which, for brevity's sake, I partially ignored in my discussion of the 1921 'critique of nationalism versus internationalism' but which we must try to deal with in the rest of the book. As Aira Kemiläinen has pointed out, the differences of the various meanings and interpretations of the term 'nation' in the various (European) languages are

anything but minor and have to be kept carefully apart.[23] The Japanese language, to which the various meanings and interpretations of the term 'nation' and its derivative 'nationalism' were introduced from the West, presents no exception to this rule. One might say that it has fared better than the English language, by making a distinction between, for instance, *kokuminshugi, kokusuishugi, minzokushugi* and *kokkashugi*. Nonetheless, one also has to admit that not all Japanese continuously observed the distinction between these terms—especially at times when one or more of the terms had been recently introduced to the language—and, moreover, one must also concede that most of the Western research on modern Japan has not been terribly helpful either, bringing all of these terms, as it does, once again down to that one English term 'nationalism'. Since I am not primarily a scholar of nationalism, nor a native speaker of the English language, I will refrain from offering any definitive translations, but I will present some provisional translations for the three most common nationalist 'isms' that pop up every once in a while in these pages.

In my view *kokuminshugi* (derived from *kokumin,* the political nation) is the nationalism in which the claims of the nation (in the sense of 'the people') are favoured over the claims of the state, and the term can best be translated as *popular nationalism*.[24] Others have opted for *civic nationalism* or *liberal nationalism,* but I find these to be, respectively, too small or too wide a translation for *kokuminshugi*. Its counterpart is *kokkashugi* (derived from *kokka,* the state), a concept of nationalism (?) where the claims of the state are favoured over the claims of the people and for which I propose the translation of 'statism'.[25] However, there is a considerable problem in the fact that *kokkashugi* is also the 'nationalism' used in conjunction with or in opposition to 'internationalism', in which case it often lacks most of its statist connotations. The Japanese language regrettably has no neutral term for 'nationalism', in the sense of a term that does not favour either the state, the nation or the ethnic nation. The editors of the *Chuo Koron* tried to solve this problem by proposing the very neutral *jikoku honi shugi* ('one's own country as standard-ism') in relation to 'internationalism', but almost none of the contributors to the debate cared to use it and the term has not made it into the Japanese language.[26] Therefore, in this case, in which *kokka* (the state) is used rather in the sense of *kuni* (country), one had better translate *kokkashugi* as plain 'nationalism'. The last main variety of 'nationalism' is *minzokushugi* (derived from *minzoku,* the ethnic nation), which originated somewhat later than the other two terms and whose use only became widespread after the advocacy of 'the (ethnic) national right to self-determination' (in Japanese, *minzoku jiketsushugi*) after the First World War.[27] In Western research on modern Japan this term has just as often been thrown on the heap of 'nationalism' as it has been mistakenly translated as 'racism', but, echoing Kevin Doak's publications on the subject, I would like to stress the necessity of staying as close as possible to the meaning of the original Japanese and to insist upon the term 'ethnic nationalism' as its only proper translation.[28]

Having thus configured the various ‘nationalisms’ to some extent, I should also issue an identical warning not to mix up the various ‘internationalisms’. In the *Chuo Koron* debate one stumbles over such terms as *kokusaishugi, kokusai kyodoshugi, kokusai kyochoshugi, kokusai renmeishugi, sekaishugi* and *kosumoporitanizumu*. The differences between the first four ‘internationalisms’ are not all that pronounced, although in my findings *kokusaishugi* is the one most used in an abstract sense, while the other three have a more concrete frame of reference. Thus *kokusai kyochoshugi, kokusai kyodoshugi* and *kokusai renmeishugi* often have the connotation of international cooperation with the Western powers (most likely within the framework of the League of Nations and/or the Washington Treaties), while some advocates of *kokusaishugi* may also have had an eye on ‘lesser gods’ such as China. However, just as I have stressed in the foregoing, in contrast to the often minor differences between these four ‘internationalisms’ one has to be keenly aware of the potentially strong anti-internationalist contents of *sekaishugi* and *kosumoporitanizumu* and, accordingly, to be sure to render them not as ‘internationalism’ but as ‘cosmopolitanism’ when appropriate.

Notes

1 Sharon H.Nolte, *Liberalism in Modern Japan—Ishibashi Tanzan and His Teachers, 1905–1960,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987, pp. ix, 148.

2 Naoki Sakai, ‘Modernity and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism’, in *Postmodernism and Japan,* edited by Masao Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989; pp. 98, 105 (original in *Gendai Shiso,* December 1987).

3 *[Kokusai heiwa] ni tsukushita Nihonjin* is part of the *Mezase! 21-seiki no kokusaijin* (Aim to become a 21st-century internationalist!) series, edited by Hatakeyama Tetsuaki, Kumon Shuppan, 2002. The second volume in this series is on ‘Those Japanese Who Gave Their Everything for the World Environment’. *Kankoku-Chosen to mukiatta 36-nin no Nihonjin* (edited by Tateno Akira, Akashi Shoten, 2002) is slightly different in the sense that some of the persons included in this volume are portrayed in a critical way. This edifying genre probably finds its origin in Chinese moral tales of exemplary loyal and pious heroes. A fore-runner in the case of Japanese ‘internationalist’ heroes can, somewhat arbitrarily, be traced to the three-volume ‘bible’ of the quite nationalist Kokuryukai, the *To-A senkaku shishi kiden,* originally published from 1933 until 1936.

4 The closest one will get is the *Sengo kyokasho kara kesareta hitobito* series by the revisionist group around Nishio Kanji and Fujioka Nobukatsu, although this group also portrays itself as liberalist rather than nationalist.

5 Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993; Micheline R.Ishay, *Internationalism and its Betrayal (Contradictions of Modernity, Volume 2),* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995; Saeki Keishi, *[Amerikanizumu] no shuen—Shibikku riberarizumu seishin no saihakken e,* TBS Buritanika, 1993, and *Gendai Nihon no ideorogii—Guroobarizumu to kokka ishiki,*

Kodansha, 1998; Ishida Takeshi and Kang Sang-jung, *Maruyama Masao to shimin shakai,* Seori Shobo, 1997; Matsumoto Kenichi, *[Hi no maru Kimi ga yo] no hanashi,* PHP Kenkyujo, 1999.

6 'Jikoku honishugi tai kokusai kyodoshugi hihan'. *Chuo Koron,* February 1921, pp. 39–72.

7 The literal translations of *jikoku honishugi* and *kokusai kyodoshugi* are 'one's own country as standard-ism' and 'international cooperativism'. The first term is extremely rare and was probably chosen as the most vague and neutral option, which could encompass all of the more common forms of nationalism that the various contributors used, such as *'kokkashugi'* (depending on the context either statism or nationalism), *'kokuminshugi'* (popular nationalism), and *'minzoku (jiketsu) shugi'* (ethnic nationalism). The latter term is fairly usual, although it has a few variants such as *'kokusaishugi'* (internationalism), *'kokusai renmeishugi'* (international leaguism) and *'sekaishugi'* (cosmopolitanism). I will go into the more and less subtle differences between these 'nationalisms' and 'internationalisms' at the end of this chapter.

8 For Miyake, the Seikyosha, and the Minyusha, see Kenneth B.Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan—Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885–1895,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1969.

9 'Jikoku honishugi ni tatte kokusai renmeishugi no katsuyo', pp. 55–9.

10 'Ippo wa jijitsu, ippo wa kuso', pp. 51–5.

11 For treatments of Hasegawa as a true liberal, see Andrew E.Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988; and Mary L.Hanneman, 'Dissent from Within—Hasegawa Nyozekan, Liberal Critic of Fascism', *Monumenta Nipponica,* 52.1, spring 1997, pp. 35–58. In contrast Sakai Tetsuya characterises him as 'representative of Taisho socialism'. *Shiso,* no. 945 (2003): p. 134.

12 'Jikoku honishugi no kaibo', pp. 39–47.

13 'Gendai shicho no teiryu wa kokusai kyodoshugi', pp. 64–9.

14 'Kokka seikatsu to kokusai seikatsu no itchi', pp. 69–72.

15 *Ibid.,* p. 7l.

16 'Buryokushugi to tatakau bunkashugi no tate no sunshin', pp. 47–51.

17 'Kokkashugi to kokusaishugi wa mujun sezu', pp. 59–64.

18 Raymond Williams, *Keywords—A Vocabulary of Culture and Society,* revised edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985 (first edition 1976), p. 214.

19 'Buryokushugi to tatakau bunkashugi no tate no sunshin', p. 50.

20 'Kokkashugi to kokusaishugi wa mujun sezu', pp. 62–3, 64.

21 Dick Stegewerns, *Adjusting to the New World—The Taisho Generation of Opinion Leaders and the Outside World, 1918–1932,* forthcoming.

22 'Kokka seikatsu to kokusai seikatsu no itchi', pp. 71–2.

23 Aira Kemiläinen, *Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification,* Kustantajat Publishers, Jyväskylä, 1964.

24 Here, of course, I encounter the problem that the term 'popular' has two meanings, but let it be clear that in this instance it has the meaning of 'based on the people', as in 'popular government' and 'popular vote'.

25 Rebecca E.Karl, who in her writings on Chinese nationalism severely criticises various theorists on Chinese nationalism and nationalism in general for conflating statism and nationalism into one isomorphic 'nationalism', proposes 'nation-statism'

as a translation for the Chinese equivalent of 'kokkashugi', but I cannot help feeling that 'the state' and 'statism' are not the same things as 'the nation-state' and 'nation-statism'. If they were, it seems that there would not have been any need to qualify 'the state' and 'statism' with the prefix 'nation' *(kokumin)*. Rebecca E.Karl, *Staging the World-Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,* Duke University Press, Durham 2002, pp. 17–26.

26 Nowadays, especially scholars try to avoid this troublesome problem by adopting the katakana *'Nashonarizumu',* which, however, once again brings with it the problem that, as in the English original, it can cover so much.

27 Just as Louis Menand makes mention of the fact that the term 'ethnicity' in early 20th-century America was indiscriminately used in alternation with 'race' and 'ethnicity', in the case of Japanese writings up to the 1910s one also has to be very flexible when translating, since the meaning of the terms *minzoku* and *minzokushugi* had not yet crystallised and many Japanese publicists used them on the basis of their own 'unique' interpretation. Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club—A Story of Ideas in America,* Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 2001, p. 392.

28 I am aware that in recent academic debate on nationalism the term 'ethno(-) nationalism' is more popular than 'ethnic nationalism', but I cannot see why all of a sudden we should have ethno-nationalism while we lack corresponding terms like cultura-nationalism, econo-nationalism, libera-nationalism and so on.

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2
Liberal nationalism in imperial Japan
The dilemma of nationalism and internationalism

Kevin M.Doak

Introduction

The perspective I adopt below assumes that the relationship of nationalism to internationalism is indeed a complicated one. Rather than seeing internationalism as the polar opposite of nationalism, I emphasise how nationalism and internationalism have been intricately intertwined throughout the time period we are concerned with, both in Japan and elsewhere. To argue that nationalism is not the opposite of internationalism or that it should not be conceived as a force independent of internationalism requires that the question be pursued with attention to the broader context beyond the national framing of a 'Japanese' internationalism. Therefore I will draw from theoretical texts that may seem at first to take the discussion beyond Japan, but I do so only in order to frame a more general perspective on the question. This is especially important in a discussion on nationalism, since studies on nationalism run a risk of merely reinforcing the nationalistic tendency to think in the very categories of exceptionalism that nationalism tends to espouse.

To avoid reading nationalism through nationalist categories, it may be useful to incorporate an element of internationalism in thinking about Japanese nationalism, although 'internationalism' itself is no certain prophylactic against nationalist attitudes or sentiments. Regardless of whether nationalism is best understood as an effect of boundary consciousness (Self and Other) or whether one believes that internationalism undermines nationalist particularities in the name of an Other, some attention to how the problem of nationalism and internationalism is conceived outside the Japanese discourse is essential in order to establish a position from which one can adopt a critical perspective on the problem. To incorporate these 'other' texts into a critical perspective does not necessarily render the Japanese discourse parochial or derivative: as we will see, the distinction between a Japanese discourse and a non-Japanese discourse on even such culturally loaded issues as national identity or internationalism is difficult to sustain in the modern era. It is not so much a matter of whether one asserts a difference between Japan and the broader international world as a question of the very terms through which such assertions of distinctiveness are made, since the latter reveal the relative

strength of liberalism one finds in modern Japan. For, in the end, the contemporaneous aspect of this dilemma of nationalism and internationalism reveals a global space where national identity remains locked in a relational mode with other kinds of identities, attitudes and sentiments. To fully appreciate the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism for modern Japan means that we must fold writings on nationalism and internationalism from outside the 'Japanese discourse' back inside—to uncover the international linkages in the evolution of the modern discourse on nationalism and internationalism within the Japanese discourse. Not to do so risks merely repeating a specific position within the broader problematic of nationalism and internationalism, a position that underestimates the shared temporality of the problem and overestimates the particular space of the nation.

The very fact that the tensions between nationalism and internationalism exist not only within a shared global space, but also within a specific shared time brings us to what might be called 'the modernity of nationalism and internationalism'. By this 'modernity' I mean that a historically adequate perspective on the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism requires consideration of how nationalism and internationalism have been understood outside the chronological boundaries of a specific, historical 'Japanese' discourse. The modernity of the events and ideas that shaped the debates on nationalism and internationalism in Japan reminds us that the meaning of this discourse on nationalism and internationalism, shaped by global events and discourses during the years 1868–1945, can be and in fact is being reshaped by the changing significance of nationalism, internationalism and liberalism today. Seen in this light, it becomes evident that the dilemma we face is not simply the apparent one between the values of nationalism and internationalism. Underlying this dilemma is a deeper one: the epistemological dilemma posed by the historical gap between the ways in which nationalism and internationalism were understood during this period, how they are being reconceived today, and the inevitable uncertainty that attends any assertion of a distinction between our present understanding and the understanding that prevailed at some past point in time.

Still, it would be foolish to project into this presumed dilemma between nationalism and internationalism certain assumptions about the ultimate triumph of internationalism over nationalism or of the betrayal of interna-tionalism by a resurgent nationalism today. If historians can learn anything from the past, it should be a renewed appreciation of the contingency of human experience and a sense of modesty in the face of the future. But all good history carries at least an implicit argument about the future. Historians have their own dilemma in their use of the past: neither to erase that aspect of history that is useful in the present, nor to allow concerns over the utility of history to overwhelm the particularities of a specific historical discourse.

Towards a theoretical approach to nationalism, internationalism and liberalism

Nationalism and internationalism are not contradictory value systems. Each represents values and goals that often overlap with and interdetermine each other, and in fact they are so intertwined that it may be impossible to completely disentangle them. It is customary to think of internationalism and nationalism as opposites, with internationalism upholding the principles of universal human rights and global justice while nationalism retreats to the particularity of national culture and the prerogatives of its own people over other nations and even the larger international community. This understanding of nationalism and internationalism may seem like 'common sense', but it was not always thus, and in fact it has a history.

The juxtaposition of nationalism with internationalism as opposite value systems was encouraged during the post-war years, shaped by a specific interpretation of the war experience and spurred on in large part by the efforts of Carlton Hayes, professor at Columbia University and US ambassador to Spain during the Second World War.[1] Writing in the aftermath of the Great War, Hayes offered a narrative of modernisation that would eventually move humanity along the universal path of liberty that Immanuel Kant had envisioned in cosmopolitanism. Hayes sought to revise Kant's cosmopolitanism by offering the image of internationalism, a 'desirable antidote to the poison of nationalism' that all people would eventually reach. 'To go from nationalism to internationalism', he noted, 'is merely to take a well-marked turn on the very highway on which the modern world is travelling.'[2] This faith in historical development provided a metanarrative of global progress in which the entire world would move away from nationalism towards a more tolerant, democratic international world. Defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan in the Second World War and the implementation of the post-war international order dominated by the United States and its allies only further legitimated Hayes's view of the ultimate historical triumph of internationalism over nationalism.

Hayes's metanarrative of the struggle between nationalism and internationalism was propagated in the post-war historical profession by his students at Columbia University, many of whom later became important scholars of nationalism. More recently, Ernst B.Haas has offered a newer version of this metanarrative of history's universal march past nationalism to liberalism and liberty. Haas develops a rational behaviourist model that allows for national differences in learning curves and styles, but which asserts that collective learning will lead all peoples eventually to recognise that the nation can no longer serve as a rational mechanism for achieving wants and needs in an increasingly international age.[3] Haas's approach to nationalism is useful insofar as he recognises that liberalism and nationalism are often mutually reinforcing, but his understanding of internationalism retains this belief in its ultimate incompatibility with nationalism, although not with liberalism.

If those who espouse the values of internationalism often see nationalism as their enemy, scholars of nationalism frequently return the favour by evidencing a lack of interest in internationalism. Leading theorists of nationalism today—Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie, Anthony Smith, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Julia Kristeva and Liah Greenfeld—may disagree over whether nationalism can be liberal, yet they often seem to agree that nationalism can be understood as a force distinct from internationalism.[4] For some among those who draw a sharp distinction between nationalism and internationalism, internationalism often remains a sign of history's victory over the dark side of humanity, or what Micheline Ishay more critically describes as 'an ill-conceived alternative to nationalism, a liberal or socialist version of global solidarity uninformed by nationalism'.[5] Until we overcome this recent binary opposition of internationalism and nationalism we will not understand the significance of either one. Nor will we grasp the dilemma that nationalism and internationalism represented to Japanese as they began to struggle with modernity in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

As a first step, we would do well to follow Ishay in recognising that internationalism is not some clearly defined thing that can easily be opposed to another clearly defined thing called nationalism. Rather, Ishay proposes that we think of internationalism not as a policy or set of principles but as a process:

> [A] process sui generis rather than a static concept, shaped by progressive thinkers and historical events…. Unlike the realist paradigm in international relations, which conceives the global arena as a system of relationships between monolithic states, internationalism has to be understood in broader terms, as philosophical guidelines describing social relations between and within states. Internationalism assumes a dynamic between the global and the domestic social arrangement. It is thus the historical record of progressive events and thoughts clustered around philosophical, political, and global perspectives.[6]

Ishay's approach is helpful for a number of reasons. First, she challenges modernisation theory and its positing of a progressive development from nationalism to internationalism by demonstrating how modern European history may also be read as a move from the internationalism of the Enlightenment to the nationalism of the 19th century, represented by such intellectuals as Burke, Fichte and de Maistre.[7] Her point is not to replace one universal teleology with another, but to reassert the tensions and complications that confront all metanarratives and universal developmental theories when located in specific historical contexts.

Ishay not only discards the artificial dichotomy between nationalism and internationalism, but redirects our attention to ideas and values, the role of intellectuals as well as that of structures and events, in shaping the varied historical meanings of nationalism and internationalism. Underlying her turn toward values and the role of intellectuals is a sense that liberalism cannot be explained solely on

the basis of value-free procedures and institutional structures.[8] By inviting us to think of internationalism as more than organised modes of foreign relations and inter-state diplomacy, Ishay moves the discussion of internationalism towards a consideration of the values and ideas employed when a given people is constituted as a nation. Thus she reminds us that those rational-choice models and civil-society theories that emphasise voluntary organisations or populist agency have not successfully explained the illiberal and undemocratic results of Weimar Germany or imperial Japan. Formal considerations, including how large the franchise is, how widely accepted the institutions of civil society are, how free the citizens are from state interference in their lives, need to be coupled with more substantive concerns: what kind of values are upheld in a given social and political order? In short, Ishay's suggestion that internationalism be conceived as the philosophical guidelines describing social relations between and within states helps to connect the relationship of internationalism and nationalism to the possibilities of liberalism.

Only when we have grasped the interdetermined relationship of nationalism and internationalism can we also begin to understand why it is that for many internationalist liberals the national question must be solved before liberal politics can become a reality.[9] The implications of nationalism and internationalism for liberal values emerge in Ishay's conclusion, a compelling analysis of the tensions between liberalism and romanticism, internationalism and nationalism as found in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. Her analysis of Hegel is especially relevant here, given the influence of Germanic constitutional thought in shaping the modern Japanese state and the parallels between Hegel's solution and that of many liberals in imperial Japan.

Ishay uncovers in Hegel an attempt to reconcile the tensions between particularism (nationalism) and universalism (internationalism) in the monarchical state. Following Grotius and Vico, Hegel believed the monarch was a necessary means of unifying a nation, by mediating the privacy of civil society and the public nature of the *Volksstaat*. Hegel's concept of patriotism did not reflect blind obedience to an external force, but was a means of reconciling his support for both the state and individual freedom. Rather than arguing that Hegel's support for the state was incompatible with liberalism, Ishay emphasises that 'his view of the state was developed in harmony with his view of bourgeois civil society'.[10] Betrayal of internationalism is found not in Hegel's support for the state, but in his concept of the *Volksstaat,* a concept of German national identity that tips the balance in favour of the particular over the universal. From this nation-state position, Hegel descends into a kind of political theology that deferred judgments on the actions of the *Volksstaat* to history, for in his opinion the only higher judge was the Universal Absolute Spirit (God), which was, by definition, not knowable to humans.[11] Here, the limits of liberalism follow the surrender of internationalism, as morality and justice lose their mooring in any conception of humanity larger than the *Volk*.

As compelling as Ishay's analysis is, it is important to recognise that she offers neither a theory of internationalism nor a theory of liberalism. Consistent with liberalism's belief in the contingent nature of politics and its suspicion of grand theories as too reductive to represent all of human potential, Ishay helps us avoid metanarratives and grand theories that, in the case of Japanese liberalism, have often reduced it to mere functions of some determinant notion of 'capital' or 'the emperor system'. We cannot conclude from her history of modern Europe that nationalism is theoretically irreconcilable with internationalism. What Ishay provides is merely one historical account of how internationalism and nationalism have interacted in a specific place and time (post-Enlightenment Europe), and an invitation to explore the ways in which internationalism, nationalism and liberalism have interacted elsewhere. While modernity itself may ensure that the European debates Ishay traces may resonate elsewhere, there is no reason to believe that the result of these struggles over nationalism and internationalism will always come to the same conclusion as Hegel. To answer that question we must leave theory and turn to history.

Before moving to the history of nationalism and internationalism in Japan, let me briefly review some of the key points in my reconsideration of nationalism, internationalism and liberalism. First, it is important to recognise that democracy is deeply linked to nationalism. Modern democratic government is inconceivable without a national framework, and nationalism can be as essential in enfranchising equal citizens as it can be in oppressing those deemed non-nationals.[12] To remember that democracy and nationalism are often intertwined is not to become an apologist for all kinds of nationalism; nor is it to cheapen democracy. The key problem is to determine what kinds of nationalist values support democracy and what kinds of nationalist values undermine democracy. In short, a liberal view of nationalism—a vision of national community composed of equal citizens determined by open laws rather than by ethnic or 'blood' criteria—requires that we not homogenise nationalism as a phenomenon but disaggregate the various kinds of nationalism that compete with each other, even within a single national community. As Yael Tamir has noted, it is not as a result of any single nationalist ideology that nations are formed; rather, it is through participating in the debate over what constitutes national culture that we become members of a cultural (national) community.[13]

In a similar way, it is important to look beyond liberalism as a value-free process and to identify ideas and values that serve to enhance liberal democracy. This does not mean that procedural issues are irrelevant to liberal democracy. The values of liberal democracy and those of liberal nationalism converge around a respect for legal procedures that are applied to all citizens equally, regardless of race, ethnicity or gender. A delicate balance between values and procedures must be struck. To draw from Tamir again, 'liberal nationalism is predicated on the idea that all nations should enjoy equal rights, and in fact derives its universal structure from the theory of individual rights found at its core'.[14] Moreover, liberal nationalism requires the existence of a state, and upholds the principle of

cooperation between states (and between the state and international organisations), finding in them a means of evaluating social norms that do not violate human rights, even while protecting the special rights of citizens. Needless to say, these values are rarely, if ever, matched perfectly with reality. But it would be foolish to dismiss the historical existence and future possibilities of liberal nationalism simply because reality does not always match theory. To do so would be, in many cases, to lend support to the illiberal forces that have been struggling against liberal nationalism, if not to dismiss the power of ideas to transform current social realities. Whether fully realised or not, liberal nationalist values remain important as signposts to encourage nations to move forward towards a future that is determined by neither metatheory nor primordial tradition but by the aspirations and acts of a citizenry that believes its best days are ahead.

The origins of nationalism and internationalism in modern Japan, 1868–1900

To appreciate the role of liberal nationalism in modern Japan it is important, first, to recognise that Japan's encounter with modernity was simultaneously an encounter with a historically specific form of internationalism. While Japan had maintained relations with its East Asian neighbours throughout the Tokugawa era, it was only with the unequal treaties imposed on Japan in the years following Commodore Perry's arrival in 1853 that a global international order made its influence felt in Japan. That international order stemmed from the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, which gave formal, legal expression to an internationalism premised on the integrity of states and their right to determine their own internal affairs. This international order of states was regulated by a body of international law, which in turn rested on certain cultural and religious assumptions about what being civilised meant. As Western nations expanded into Asia and Africa in the 19th century, concepts of civilisation converged with the use of law to regulate diplomatic and trading relations with people of different cultural and religious traditions. As Japanese were discovering, to be 'civilised' meant, at a minimum, the formation of a centralised state regulated by open and uniform laws that could be accountable to the international world. As the *bakuhan* system collapsed, former revolutionaries found themselves confronted by the task of constructing a new social authority located in a modern legal state, the required political unit of the modern international order.

After the new Meiji government announced on 13 February 1868 that it would honour the unequal treaties Western powers had signed with its prede cessor it won formal recognition from England and other foreign powers. This moment marked the inclusion in international society of a modern Japanese state that recognised international law and the existing international order.[15] Yet this was a 'state' more in name than in fact. The new Meiji government may have secured international recognition with this acceptance of law, but establishing authority and legitimacy at home was a much more difficult matter, and remained

so for much of the rest of the century.[16] Indeed, the entire period from the establishment of the Meiji government in early 1868 to the completion of a bureaucratic infrastructure for the new state in 1900 may be seen as a period of simultaneous, yet distinct, processes of state formation *(kokka keisei)* and nation formation *(kokumin keisei),* with the former more successful than the latter.[17] To appreciate the prospects for liberal nationalism and internationalism in modern Japan requires not only an awareness of the international context of Japan's state building efforts, but also an understanding of the development of state building and nation building, and especially of the relationship between the new emerging state and the nationalist values that were developing among the Japanese people.

The first decade after the Meiji Restoration was a period of political instability and crisis. During the 1870s the new government sought to ensure its survival—and the survival of an independent Japanese nation—through attempts at encouraging 'civilisation and enlightenment' *(bunmei kaika)* coupled with social and administrative reforms designed to create both the infrastructure of a centralised state and a unified, equal citizenry. The establishment of prefectures *(haihan chiken)* in 1871 began to address the need for a centralised state, while a new universal military draft beginning in 1873 helped to reform the old social order by challenging the elite status of the samurai. Revolts and uprisings against the new authorities exploded across the land, culminating in the Satsuma Rebellion, which brought Japan to the brink of civil war until it was quashed in September 1877 by the new imperial troops. Ironically, the actions of the imperial troops in suppressing uprisings only reinforced the sense that the new government might not serve the interests of the Japanese people any better than the old *bakuhan* system had. Not yet fully incorporated as nationals *(kokumin)* of the new state, exsamurai and newly ordained commoners still retained Edo-period concepts of the people as receptive 'objects' *(kyakubun)* of the political order.[18] This failure to fully incorporate the people as a nation frustrated the ability of the Meiji elite to construct a legitimate nation-state. But it also weakened the people's ability to identify with the Meiji government's priority on treaty revision and with internationalism in general. To the degree that 'civilisation and enlightenment' seemed merely cynical code words for appeasing the Western powers, internationalism was a hard sell among the Japanese people and merely increased their alienation from the emerging centralised state. The result was that nation building remained weak even as the state grew stronger—a situation that did not bode well for the values of either internationalism or liberalism in the new modern Japan.

This was the situation that confronted Fukuzawa Yukichi in the 1870s. Fukuzawa was a progressive liberal who celebrated the personal liberation of the new Meiji society that he understood was a prerequisite for a citizenry composed of social equals. Annette Schad-Seifert is quite right to remind us that Fukuzawa was both an individualist and a nationalist, a liberal who understood the importance of constructing a nation that was critical of, but enfranchised within, the modern state. Although Fukuzawa has long been recognised as the paramount

liberal of Meiji Japan,[19] the commitment to nationalism that accompanied his liberalism has been less appreciated.[20] Yet his nationalism was so strong that Makihara Norio has described Fukuzawa's 1873 *Gakumon no susume* (An encouragement of learning) as 'the first real work of nationalism *(kokuminshugi)* in Japan'.[21] In Fukuzawa's nexus of progressivism, wariness of the state and commitment to both individualism *and* nationalism lies the key to understanding Meiji liberal nationalism. Fukuzawa captured the fundamental challenge for liberals of his time when he announced in his study of civilisation that 'in Japan there is a government but no nation *(kokumin)*'.[22] This lack of a sense of community in the new, emerging legal state, this completely contingent sense of nation, is a sharp commentary on the problem of internationalism and liberal nationalism as it took shape in the early Meiji period. But the issue remained long-lived. As Schad-Seifert notes, Fukuzawa's nationalism and the nationalism of the post-war liberal Mamyama Masao were very similar: both sought to encourage a new sense of the nation *(kokumin)* that rested on citizenship within the liberal state rather than the populist kind of organic nationalism that turned to indigenous forms of ethnic and cultural identity *(minzoku)*. Fukuzawa knew that without a common sense of civic national identity among the Japanese people citizenship, liberal nationalism and internationalism faced a dim future in modern Japan.

Fukuzawa's fears seem borne out by the events of the decade which followed. The decade of the 1880s was a time of political extremism and reactionary response that exacerbated the tensions between nation and state in modern Japan, even as both nation building and state building made considerable progress. To appreciate this shift and its implications for civil society in Japan, we must recall that this was the period when the Freedom and People's Rights Movement *(Jiyu Minken Undo)* was at its height. Since the 1960s, historians of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement have tended to portray the movement as democratic because of its violent opposition to the Meiji state.[23] This perspective reflected in part a broad, global shift during the 1960s and 1970s that increasingly rejected the state as an agent of democracy and which therefore should be confronted 'by all means necessary'. But the new perspective on the Freedom and People's Rights movement was also informed by post-war Japanese reflections on the wartime state as an authoritarian and oppressive, if not outright fascist, institution. Certainly, the Freedom and People's Rights Movement raised the call for the natural rights of the people against the political state. But closer attention to the movement in the context of its own time reveals that it was not necessarily supportive of democratic values, let alone liberal nationalism or internationalism. The limitations of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement as a vehicle for liberalism became apparent when even Fukuzawa, himself no slavish follower of the state, became alienated by the extremism of those claiming to pursue 'the people's rights'. In an 1881 letter to Okuma Shigenobu, he wrote:

> [T]he *minkenron* (advocacy of people's rights) seems to be more and more favouring direct action. If it goes in that direction, the antagonism between

> the government and the people will become increasingly embittered, and in the end I fear it will mean unfortunate bloodshed.[24]

From a Marxist or populist perspective, Fukuzawa's condemnation of the Freedom and People's Rights movement might suggest he was really a conservative, not at all a liberal or 'progressive' (which in Japanese political discourse is often equated with Marxism).

But Fukuzawa was not only worried about this movement's effect on the frail sense of liberal national identity in Japan. He was also aware of the dangers posed to liberal nationalism by the emerging trend of conservative populism. He wrote at a time of growing opposition to the new, constitutional Meiji state by disgruntled conservatives like Tani Kanjo and Torio Koyata, whose conservative nationalism stemmed from their disillusionment with internationalism following the former minister Inoue Kaoru's concessions to the Western powers in negotiations over treaty revision. To these conservative nationalists, Inoue's brand of 'internationalism' sacrificed nation building to the interests of foreign powers.[25] Fukuzawa understood quite well the need for critical distance from (but not outright rejection of) the constitutional state, but he also kept a wary eye on extra-legal populist movements that were agitating against the state.[26] Unlike these conservatives who would reinvent the nation along traditional cultural lines and away from the internationalism of the Meiji state, Fukuzawa never abandoned his belief that internationalism and civilisation could still be instrumental in promoting liberal nationalism at home, a liberal nationalism which by definition would resist both extremes: the conservative nationalism of Tani and the authoritarianism of statism *(kokkashugi)*.

By the time the decade had drawn to a close Japan had taken shape as a modern constitutional state. But, ironically, the newly formed state found it increasingly difficult to control the rhetoric of nationalism, which often took on a life of its own, separate not only from identification with the state but also from the goals of liberal nationalism. If it is true, as Yamamuro Shinichi has argued, that internationalism in the project of building the Meiji state first promised a civic form of the nation only to abandon nation building by 1889 in favour of rendering the Japanese people as mere 'subjects' of the emperor,[27] it is also true that the imperial state's abandon ment of the nation meant that nationalism was now available to others who were quite critical of the state. Many of those in the Seikyosha (Society for Political Education), like Shiga Shigetaka and Miyake Setsurei, who played leading roles in propagating nationalism during the 1890s, had been members of Tani's 'new conservative party' and were no doubt inspired by Tani's own brand of conservative, anti-state nationalism.[28] Writing in their journal *Nihonjin* (The Japanese, established in 1887) and the newspaper *Nihon* (Japan, established in 1889), they and associates like Kuga Katsunan condemned Meiji political leaders like Foreign Minister Inoue for failing at nation building while they simultaneously preached their own form of cultural nationalism *(kokusuishugi)* as 'resistance against the policy of Europeanization and the

humiliating revision of the treaties'.[29] Moreover, on the basis of mainly French influence they began to discover and employ a different kind of nationalism that identified the nation, not as a political or civic nation *(kokumin)* framed by the constitutional state, but as an ethnic nation *(minzoku)* that was supposedly more traditional and more populist than 'the European-inspired' concept of Imperial subject *(shinmin)*.[30] Needless to say, Miyake and his group were not always precise in their distinctions between *kokumin* and *minzoku,* the two new concepts of the nation. It was, after all, only during the 1890s, and especially in their journals, that this new concept of the nation as an ethnic or 'racial' nation *(minzoku)* first gained widespread circulation. This triangular competition within Japanese nationalism between the state, civic (liberal) nationalism and ethnic nationalism was the result, unintended to be sure, of various efforts since the Meiji Restoration to build a modern nation-state in Japan. It also provides the foundation for subsequent debates over nationalism, liberalism and internationalism during the 20th century.

Internationalism, liberalism and nationalism(s) in Greater Taisho, 1900–30

Alistair Swale's chapter on Tokutomi Soho (Chapter 4) may be read as offering support for the tendency of recent historians of modern Japan to accept the turn of the 19th century as an important moment in Japanese liberalism and democratic theory. Recently, historians have once again suggested that the period from roughly 1900 to 1930 can be seen as a coherent block of time, a 'Greater Taisho', that illuminates fundamental developments in politics and society in modern Japan.[31] This is especially true for the issues relating to nationalism, liberalism and internationalism. Swale's chapter demonstrates the continuities from the national building projects of the 1890s into the Greater Taisho period. But he also emphasises the changes that take place around the turn of the century. Swale recognises the change in Tokutomi's nationalism that many historians have noted, but he provocatively suggests that Tokutomi did not turn away from liberal nationalism until the First World War. In short, in spite of the Meiji state's turn towards imperialism and the embrace of conservative nationalism by many of its opponents, Tokutomi provides stark evidence that liberal nationalism was not yet dead in the early 20th century. Instead, liberal nationalism, like conservative nationalism, was quite capable of adapting itself to Japan's increasing move towards formal empire. For a considerable time, Tokutomi sought to retain the populist nationalism of the Seikyosha, but not their conservatism. His call for a nationalism rooted in a sense of social equality, or 'commonerism' *(heiminshugi),* in no way required him to abandon his belief in historical progress.

Well grounded in the liberal nationalism of the late 19th century and retaining the connection between liberal nationalism and an international consciousness, Tokutomi was still resisting what Julia Thomas has described elsewhere as a new shift towards 'naturalizing nationhood' around ethnicity during the Greater

Taisho era.[32] Indeed, through the subtle shifts in his thought that Alistair Swale's chapter analyses, Tokutomi reveals striking similarities with another representative of Meiji liberal nationalism, Nitobe Inazo. Like Tokutomi, Nitobe first approached the problems of liberalism and nationalism during the late 19th-century period of state building, when the need for a modern state was driven more by considerations of international power than by concerns for nativist culture. Clearly, the state remained at the core of both Nitobe's liberal nationalism and his internationalism, as Thomas Burkman demonstrates in his description of both Nitobe's hopes for the League of Nations and his subsequent disappointment with it (Chapter 5). Indeed, it is ironic that Nitobe served as Japan's representative to the League Secretariat, since he showed little understanding that the new principle of liberal nationalism had been revolutionised by the First World War, shifting national legitimacy from the dynastic states of the pre-war period to the nationalism invoked by claims of 'ethnic national self-determination' in the post-war period.[33] Nitobe, however, appeared more concerned with racial issues, especially the treatment of Japanese immigrants in the United States, than he was with the ethnic self-determination of nations like Korea. Nitobe held fast to his 19th-century understanding of state, nation and liberal values, an understanding which was deeply implicated in the social Darwinism and racial hierarchies of Meiji progressivism that Thomas has contrasted with the Taisho sense of naturalised nationhood.[34] This outlook did not make it easy for Nitobe to understand the new global vision that shifted from racial hierarchy and political states to particularistic ethnic groups as self-determined nations. It is not hard to see how Nitobe's Meiji liberalism led to a disillusionment with the League of Nations and its profession of universalistic values, which no longer meant what they seemed to mean during the Meiji period, when universalism meant the equality with the West that revision of the unequal treaties promised to bring. As Burkman notes, Nitobe 'found that the universalist vision among internationalists had begun to fade' by 1927 and was deeply sceptical about the turn to the nation as the framework for addressing key political issues of the day. Towards the end of his life Nitobe revealed a strong sense of frustration that the meaning of liberalism and internationalism had shifted in ways that were increasingly difficult to understand.

Yet, in his turn towards regionalism in the Institute for Pacific Relations, Nitobe was part of a broader response within Japan that began to realign nationalism and regionalism and to withdraw from the delicate balance of internationalism and nationalism that had informed the liberal tradition since Meiji. Nitobe was one of the most public participants in the Japanese state's response to the new political world after the Great War, and his role was well suited to the Japanese state that had nominated him for it. While Nitobe adhered to an understanding of nation as the state (hence his proclamation that China was not 'a nation'), younger Japanese intellectuals with a greater sense of distance from the Japanese state were more open to the new internationalism of the post-war era, which realigned liberalism with the rights of the ethnic nation *(minzoku).*

Early 20th-century liberals like Yoshino Sakuzo and Yanaihara Tadao showed more intellectual flexibility in coming to terms with this new concept of ethnic national identity.[35] If their shared interest in the people as the foundation of the nation led these younger liberal intellectuals to consider the concept of the ethnic nation as a potential source of liberal democracy, their responses to the challenges of ethnic nationalism to the state diverged from that of Nitobe and to a lesser degree from that of Tokutomi. This divergence is most apparent in the period around the First World War, when Tokutomi made it clear that his populism needed to be firmly grounded within the state *(kokkateki heiminshugi)*. In order to avoid having to give 'common rights' to the colonised, this state populism of course had to be contained within the domestic boundaries *(naichi)* of Japanese imperialism. Ethnic nationalism was usually rejected, being a principle that was most likely eventually to undermine the Japanese Empire.

Yet Tokutomi was more eclectic and domestically oriented than Nitobe, and he was more willing to draw from the new populist nationalism of the post-war era a celebration of the masses as the foundation of the Japanese nation, even as he was less concerned with whether the masses were represented as commoners *(heimin),* a political nation *(kokumin)* or an ethnic nation *(minzoku)*. In fact, one finds Tokutomi's thought evolving in a direction that overlapped with Yoshino's in its willingness to reconsider the ethnic nation. This overlap in their approaches to the national problem is evident in the introductions both men wrote to the volume *Kyokuto no minzoku* (Ethnic nations of the Far East), published in 1916 by Tokutomi's Minyusha. In his introduction, Tokutomi argued that if readers of the volume wished 'to understand the changes in international relations hereafter [the Great War], they must understand the current situations of the various ethnic nations distributed among the states'.[36] Yoshino followed with his own introduction as the editor of the volume, and he too praised this attempt to understand Chinese history as a narrative of struggles among the five ethnic groups of Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uigur and Tibetan.[37] Yoshino also understood the potential of ethnic nationalism as a force that might undermine Japanese imperialism, but he was more creative in his response to it.

As Dick Stegewerns' chapter reveals (Chapter 6), Yoshino was not only an idealist, but also a pragmatic liberal who evaluated ideas not so much on their intrinsic merit as on their usefulness in realising a liberal social order. Yoshino also had a clear understanding of the limits of the Meiji state as a democratic body, and his disillusionment with the state led him to look for other sources of cultural and social identity than the state. When appled to international affairs in the post-war era, this devaluation of the state led Yoshino to accept non-Japanese cultural and ethnic national identities in the empire: it was not necessary to erase Korean ethnic national identity to defend Japanese national interests in the region. But, as Stegewerns points out, Yoshino's confrontation with the right to ethnic national self-determination brought out in sharp relief tensions between nationalism and internationalism that could not be ignored.

Yoshino's response was a characteristic one for liberals throughout the world in the inter-war period: the distinction between ethnic national identity *(minzoku)* and the state *(kokka)* could be used to call for ethnic national states *(minzoku kokka),* but it could also provide an ethnic cultural identity that would satisfy the demands of cultural identity without necessarily leading immediately towards an independent ethnic national state. Implicit was a recognition that it was simply impossible for all self-professed ethnic groups to become independent nation-states, but this recognition came with a sense that the right to cultural, even ethnic, identity of various groups was unquestionable. In contrast to Tokutomi, who sought to recontextualise populist nationalism within the state, Yoshino's strategy was more accommodating of ethnic identity and, like that of many liberals today, it tried to weaken the connection between ethnic identity and the political state. Indeed, Yael Tamir argues that it 'is central to the theory of liberal nationalism… that national claims are not synonymous with demands for political sovereignty'.[38] In the end, for liberals of Yoshino's bent, economic prosperity took priority over the cultural and political ideologies of nationalism. And underwriting Yoshino's cautious acceptance of ethnic national identity was a pragmatism that is also characteristic of such contemporary advocates of liberal nationalism as Tamir, Isaiah Berlin and Jean Bethke Elshtain.[39]

Nationalism and internationalism in Early Showa, 1930–45

Historians of modern Japan have often portrayed the 1930s as a watershed in the move from liberalism and internationalism towards totalitarianism and nationalism. Whether that trend is seen as proof of the 'failure' of Japan's modernisation or as the inevitable working-out of capitalist moder nity, both interpretations employ a concept of the nation as equivalent to the state and a belief that the effect of this state-centred nationalism was to drive political consciousness within Japan further inward and away from the outward-orientation of Taisho internationalism. Thus historians like to point to Kiyosawa Kiyoshi as a Taisho liberal under siege, forced to confine his internationalist sentiments to his diary. Or they celebrate Nagai Kafu, whose private scribblings are seen as remnants of the earlier Taisho cosmopolitanism. These intellectuals are portrayed as resisting totalitarianism because they kept cultural identity alive and apart from the state.[40] Yet many of these 'liberals' were indebted to the Taisho discovery of ethnic identity as the font of national identity. What makes Ienaga's evaluation of them as victims of the dark forces of the day troubling is that their turn toward ethnic nationality came just as national socialism was increasingly taking over that ethnic nationalist discourse. Ethnic nationalists who opposed the state were often far more troubling in their failure to understand liberalism than were some defenders of the constitutional state.

The key to understanding the problem of liberal nationalism from the 1930s until the end of the war lies in the shifting relationship between the earlier Taisho

'liberal' ethnic nationalism and the growing strength of national socialism (especially from Nazi Germany) as the new context for ethnic nationalism in Japan. Oikawa Eijiro provides a succinct outline of how this earlier internationalism turned to national socialism during the 1930s. Underlying the tensions between the various factions of the Sakai Taishuto (Social Masses' Party) was the rift between nation and state that grew out of the populism of the Greater Taisho era. As Oikawa demonstrates, Takabatake Motoyuki played an important role in connecting populist concerns with the state during the 1930s, providing the Sakai Taishuto with a powerful means of addressing its own internal divisions: the split between right-wing social democrats, who were more inclined to negotiate with the state, and the national socialists, who felt the need for a more revolutionary politics.

It is important to add, however, the influence of a concept of the nation defined in ethnic terms *(minzoku)* that often informed the national socialists' agenda and their brand of 'fascism'. With the outbreak of war with China in 1937, leaders of the national socialist movement in Japan like Kamei Kanichiro argued that state and ethnic nationality (and class) ought to be reconciled around a concept of ethnic national capital *(minzoku shihon)* that would provide the foundation for an East Asian Community *(To-A kyodotai),* the pillar of Japanese imperialism in East Asia. While Kamei and the Sakai Taishuto might easily be mistaken for liberals due to their concern with the plight of the Japanese consumer, one should not forget that their source of nationalism was less in the liberal state or the constitutionally defined *kokumin* than in the *minzoku kokka,* or *Volksstaat.* Kamei was quite impressed during his stay in Nazi Germany in 1937–8, and his new vision of internationalism was Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy's agenda to 'build a new world order with ethnic nations rather than modern states as the struc tural units'.[41] Kamei's participation in both this project of national reorganisation and Konoe's 'New Order in East Asia' is one rather distressing result of the new kind of internationalism and nationalism that gained the upper hand in Japan during the late 1930s and early 1940s.

The rise of the national socialists within the Sakai Taishuto reveals striking parallels in the cultural and literary world, as Seiji Lippit's sensitive reading of Yokomitsu Riichi's novels reveals. During the 1920s Yokomitsu was regarded as a 'modernist', something like the cultural equivalent of a liberal. Like the liberals, this modernist Yokomitsu was no friend to Marxist literary movements, but neither was he fond of the conservative nationalists. His novel *Shanghai* (1928–31) utilised an international imagination to expose the unreliability of ideologies and national identities, the quick fixes of both the conservative nationalists and the anti-imperialist Marxists. But by 1930 Yokomitsu was moving towards a less liberal reading of internationalism, a turn inward to self and to culture as an expression of an ethnic national subjectivity.[42] Like Kamei Kanichiro, he was impressed by his visit to Nazi Germany, where he observed Hitler's celebration of the German *Volk* identity. His discovery of ethnic nationhood *(minzoku)* and its employment in *Ryoshu* (which he began writing in 1937, the same year the Sakai

Taishuto began shifting towards the national socialists) was, as Lippit points out, no simple return to some primordial authentic past. Like Kamei's *Volksstaat,* Yokomitsu's celebration of ethnic nationhood sought to provide a means of responding to the present and the future, a new identity for organising a new Japan and a new Asia. Here, Yokomitsu's shift toward the ethnic nation recalls Ishay's analysis of Hegel's limitations as a liberal thinker. Both Hegel and Yokomitsu arrived at a similar imagination of nationalism that was based on a conception of the nation as (ethnic) *Volk:* a radical form of subjectivity whose actions were not constrained by the judgments of the international community and were only answerable in the final analysis to the verdict of history.

By the middle of the 1930s the ethnic nationalism that Taisho liberals had mobilised against imperialism in the name of a more just international order was beginning to lose its liberal lustre. Together, Kamei and Yokomitsu suggest that this new use of ethnic nationhood was not the result of an insular withdrawal from the broader international world. It stemmed from a new apprehension of internationalism that took its lessons from Hitler's Germany more than from English liberal attitudes towards ethnic pluralism. Along with this national socialist celebration of ethnic nationhood came a renewed sense of a moral mission in international, especially East Asian, affairs. Moralists like Kimura Takeo, a member of the lower house of the Diet, argued that it was Japan's moral duty to intervene in national development in East Asia, and this duty was often articulated as the need to reconstruct East Asia as a realm of ethnic national harmony *(minzoku kyowa).*[43]

This kind of moralistic approach to national and international affairs frightened Ishibashi Tanzan, who, as Kurt Radtke's chapter points out (Chapter 8), remained committed to a pragmatic liberalism that avoided the excesses of ideology while maintaining both a commitment to the state and to an engagement with the international world. Ishibashi's liberalism is best expressed in his criticism both of the Marxist critique of capitalism and of the national socialist attempt to replace free-market economies with a concept of the nation as a moral economy. Given the significance of moralism in late 1930s Japanese discourse as the foundation for aggressive intervention in China, Ishibashi found himself in a dilemma: how to move Japanese society in the direction of liberalism without appealing to values and ideals that might simply encourage more of the kind of moralism that was so prevalent among the far right. In the end he settled on a pragmatism and rational economism that were clearly distinct from the national socialists' vision of a moral economy based on the ethnic nation *(Volk).* But the circumstances of his time left him without the ability to articulate the moral values essential to liberalism. Consequently his liberalism remained articulated only at the level of procedural questions, an understandable compromise given the tenor of the late 1930s. But, as Radtke concludes, the lessons of Ishibashi's liberalism are less those of defeat than a reminder of the many strategies liberalism may adopt in its defence of the value of humanity.

Ishibashi's liberalism did not prevail. Rather, the mainstream in the development of nationalism and internationalism during the 1930s and early 1940s is represented by Kobayashi Hiroharu's analysis of Royama Masamichi's theories on international politics. As Kobayashi notes, Royama's writings on international politics span the period from the heyday of liberalism during the Taisho period to the nationalism of the early Showa period. Royama was influenced by certain liberal attitudes, including a pragmatic rather than a cultural determinist approach to nationalism. Yet the solutions he arrived at diverged from liberalism, as they recapitulated the tendencies within broader segments of Japanese society towards a withdrawal from the international community in favour of reinvestment in the East Asian region. Certainly, as Kobayashi points out, regionalism itself is not inherently incompatible with liberalism or all forms of internationalism. But the values behind Royama's regionalism are revealing, and in the end his regionalism was modelled not on the American Monroe Doctrine, but on the new world order of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. These illiberal values were present within Royama's managerial approach, and they emerged in his call to redefine national identity along ethnic lines. In this, Royama made a key contribution to the reconception of the East Asian region as a single community composed of separate ethnic national groups organised under one Japanese state. Here, Royama's specific method of reconciling national and international concerns linked him to Kamei Kanichiro's approach to international politics. The fact that both men drew their inspiration from Nazi German theories must not be forgotten when considering the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism—or the prospects for liberal values—in wartime Japan.

The limits of liberal nationalism in imperial Japan

At the outset I suggested that a reconsideration of the ostensible opposition between nationalism and internationalism might lead to a re-evaluation of certain types of nationalist thought as examples of political liberalism. Following Ishay, I argued that if internationalism is at best a value-orientation rather than an objective description of actual political behaviour, then it might also be useful to think of nationalism as a value-orientation, rather than as a description of actual practices centred on the political state. Approaching both nationalism and internationalism as systems of values allows us to see them as competing fields. They are competing fields against each other, to be sure, but that is not the limit of this competition. Sometimes, as we have seen, nationalism and internationalism are mutually supportive. But nationalism and internationalism themselves are also fields where competing voices struggle with each other for the right to represent what 'the nation' or 'the international community' means. And serious political implications result from how these problems are articulated.

Following the turn in the early 20th century towards ethnic nationalism as a new ideology that would preserve cultural identity through a 'revolt against the West',[44] the concept and use of internationalism also began to shift from a global,

and mainly Euro-centric context, to a regional and East Asian one. For some, liberalism was a test of whether national values could be contained by economic relations. For others, the question was whether ethnic nationalism could be checked within the colonies and the homeland under the auspices of the multi-ethnic imperial Japanese state. In short, the dilemma many Japanese liberals faced was not only whether internationalist values could triumph over nationalist ones, but also whether an internation-alist form of nationalism could resist the rise of a new, potentially explosive form of ethnic nationalism. Legacies of Meiji-period nationalism included not only the emergence of the Meiji state but also a vision of a liberal nationalism, first articulated by Fukuzawa, Tokutomi and other Meiji intellectuals, that sought to synthesise the values of individualism, internationalism and national culture.

But, with the rise of the Japanese Empire in the 20th century, liberal nationalism in Japan faced a familiar dilemma. As Ernst Haas reminds us,

> [L]iberal nationalism legitimated the building of the British, French, and American colonial empires after 1870. The very origin of the word *empire* in modern political discourse is associated with populism and the national mission to diffuse it. Liberal nationalism inspired much of colonial administration and explains the responses of the first generation of anticolonial nationalists in Asia and Africa.[45]

By the 1920s Japanese liberals were aware of the dilemma posed by Western liberal nationalism to nationalists outside the West: how to become a nation without getting absorbed by the same logic that had already colonised so much of Asia and Africa. Some of these erstwhile liberals sought a solution by reconceiving national identity along the ethnic lines favoured by anti-colonial nationalists everywhere. This redefinition of nationalism from individualistic and political criteria towards collective and ethnic markers of identity did not solve the problem. Instead, it further weakened the position of liberalism in Japanese political discourse, thereby making the political situation in East Asia even worse.

One of the risks in the current trend among postcolonial studies towards highlighting imperialism as the key to understanding internationalism in early 20th century Japan is a tendency to use imperialism to discredit liberal nationalism and the values it espouses. But the history of Japanese ethnic nationalism and imperialism suggests differences between how this 'anti-colonial' ethnic nationalism was employed by Japanese imperialists and how it developed in other colonial contexts. In evaluating Japanese imperialism we must not forget that by the 1930s Hitler and the Nazis were also employing the rhetoric of liberating 'peoples' from foreign oppression, and it was their ethnic nationalism that was most well received among Japanese intellectuals who sought to resolve the dilemma of liberal nationalism and imperialism in East Asia. Abandoning liberal nationalism as 'Western', radical ethnic nationalist imperialists transferred ethnic liberation from particular national contexts to the liberation of East Asia from the West.[46]

Japanese imperialists could support their empire through liberal nationalism, but increasingly they did so through an ethnic nationalism that rejected liberal nationalism. While the institutional form of a trans-ethnic sense of *kokumin* remained in place throughout imperial Japan, more important is the fundamental shift that came from the alignment of ethnic nationalism and the values espoused, not by English or American liberal nationalists, but by Hitler and national socialists. Internationalism turned to regionalism, ethnic national self-determination became a key ingredient in the logic of a new East Asian regional order (under Japanese leadership) and ethnic nationalism was made compatible with imperialism. Japanese imperialism was deeply embedded in this dilemma between the values of liberal nationalism that supported imperialism elsewhere and the attraction of ethnic nationalism as a form of resistance to Western cultural imperialism.

When we reflect on the legacy of this history for Japanese liberalism today, we need to keep in mind the resilience, not merely of cultures, but especially of political ideas. While liberal nationalism may not have been the main cause of aggression in wartime Japan, it was certainly compromised by Japanese imperialism. Yet, because of this history of imperialism, we should not assume that liberal nationalism no longer has a role to play, or that imperialism has rendered liberal nationalism dead. Indeed, one of the major questions facing theorists of nationalism today is whether and how nationalism and civil society might be revitalised as the foundation for liberal politics in a postcolonial and post-Marxist world. Similarly, in post-war Japan it would seem important to separate liberal nationalism from the whole question of imperialism. Certainly, Maruyama Masao thought this was a crucial task and devoted much of his career to the effort. To argue that Maruyama's silence about ethnic minorities fatally tainted his vision of a trans-ethnic liberal nationalism is no more compelling than to argue (as some have) that the record of ethnic and racial discrimination in the United States renders the liberal democracy in that country a complete sham. In fact, the 1993 revision of the Japanese citizenship law suggests that liberal nationalism in post-war Japan is more vigorous than ever, although other more illiberal kinds of nationalism—along with considerable indifference to both liberalism and nationalism—also remain quite strong in Japan today. This history of liberalism, nationalism and internationalism in pre-war modern Japan suggests that the challenges to liberal nationalism are deeply rooted and unlikely to disappear soon. The key question that remains to be answered is whether this modern tradition of liberal nationalism can be strengthened and reformed to support a greater sense of internationalism, respect for individual rights and cultural pluralities in contemporary Japan. But this is not a problem that Japan faces alone.

Notes

1 For examples of the legacy of Hayes in this regard and the approach many of his students took on nationalism and internationalism, see Edward Mead Earle, ed. *Nationalism and Internationalism: Essays Inscribed to Carlton J.H.Hayes*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1950.
2 C.J.H.Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*. Macmillan, New York, 1926, p. 271.
3 Ernst B.Haas. *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress, Volume One: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997. See, especially, pp. 322–52.
4 Micheline R.Ishay, *Internationalism and its Betrayal*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1995, pp. xv-xvi.
5 Ishay, p. xvi. Needless to say, this bias towards internationalism is not characteristic of all scholars of nationalism. Of those cited above, it is least true of Gellner, Greenfeld and Smith.
6 Ishay, p. xxi.
7 Ishay, pp. 102–12.
8 For a related argument on the (restricted) power of ideas and intellectuals in liberal democracies, especially for the illiberal implications of much of what passes for contemporary 'liberal' academics in America, see Jeffrey C.Goldfarb, *Civility & Subversion: The Intellectual in Democratic Society*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, especially pp. 56–77.
9 See John A.Hall, 'Introduction'. In Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 13; also Alfred Stepan, 'Modern Multinational Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron'. In Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation,* pp. 219–39. The centrality of the national concern for Japanese and Chinese Marxists is the topic of Germaine Hoston, *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994.
10 Ishay, p. 126.
11 Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (section 192, p. 297); cited in Ishay, pp. 128–9.
12 It is precisely in the severing of democracy from national frameworks (through Diaspora, multinational capitalism or even transnational regional blocks) that recent theorists find the twilight of modernity and the dawn of 'postmodern' world.
13 Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p. 51.
14 Yael Tamir, p. 9.
15 Yamamuro Shinichi, 'Meiji kokka no seido to rinen'. In *Iwanami koza Nihon tsushi 17: kindai 2*. Iwanami Shoten, 1994, pp. 113–48, at p. 117.
16 Bernard S.Silberman sees the domestic problem of authority and legitimacy continuing in Japan until around 1900. See Silberman, *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States and Great Britain*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pp. 159–222.
17 Yamamuro Shinichi, 'Kokumin kokka keisei-ki no genron to media'. In Matsumoto Sannosuke and Yamamuro Shinichi, eds., *Genron to Media, Nihon kindai shiso taikei,* vol. 11, Iwanami Shoten, 1990, pp. 477–540, at p. 481.
18 Makihara Norio, *Kyakubun to kokumin no aida*. Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1998.

19 Traditionally, one of the challenges to the idea of liberal nationalism in Meiji Japan rests on the well-known tension between Fukuzawa, as a representative liberal, and Kato Hiroyuki, as a representative authoritarian. However, such an opposition is too ideal and misses their overarching points in common. Neither were conservatives, as both Fukuzawa and Kato were impressed by progress and the West and they both believed that Japanese culture needed to be remade in light of Western culture. Moreover, they shared a concern that extreme populism and cultural conservatism would destroy Japanese independence. Their differences in fact reflected different kinds of Western liberalism, with Fukuzawa leaning towards English liberalism and Kato favouring German liberal state theories. While Kato may have misjudged the dangers of Fukuzawa's liberalism (as Fukuzawa may have misjudged the importance of a state for late 19th-century Japan), the following lines from Kato illustrate their differences, but also his openness to some kinds of liberalism: 'Fukuzawa's thinking is too liberal…. *Not that being liberal is unacceptable,* but when it is too liberal, a liberal argument will weaken state authority.' Kato Hiroyuki, cited in Motoyama Yukihiko, *Proliferating Talent: Essays on Politics, Thought, and Education in the Meiji Era,* translation edited by J.S.A.Elisonas and Richard Rubinger. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1997, p. 260. Emphasis added.

20 One pioneering work that grasped the liberal universalism and nationalism in Fukuzawa's thought is Albert M.Craig, 'Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism'. In Robert E.Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, pp. 99–148.

21 Makihara, *Kyakubun to kokumin no aida,* p. 11.

22 Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Bunmeiron no gairyaku*. Iwanami Shoten, 1931, p. 192.

23 Cf. Irokawa Daikichi, *Meiji no bunka*. Iwanami Shoten, 1970; Roger W.Bowen, *Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement*. University of California Press, Berkeley and London, 1980.

24 Letter of Fukuzawa to Okuma Shigenobu, dated 1 October 1881; cited by E.H. Norman, in *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State;* reprinted in John W.Dower, ed., *Origins of the Modern Japanese State,* Pantheon Books, New York, 1975, p. 288.

25 On Tani, Torio and the conservative critique of the Meiji government, see Motoyama Yukihiko, *Proliferating Talent,* especially pages 195–237.

26 Fukuzawa's liberalism is underscored by his critical acceptance of the constitutional state. His attitude toward the Meiji state is illuminated by Jean Bethke Elshtain, who reminds us that the state is essential for liberals:

> I am not so naive or foolish as to believe we can do without the state. The state, properly chastened, plays a vital role in a democratic society. Rather, I am worried about the *logic* of statism, which looks to the state as the only entity capable of 'solving a problem' or responding to a concern.
>
> (Elshtain, *Democracy on Trial*. Basic Books, New York, 1995, p. 18)

Fukuzawa was similarly worried about 'statism' *(kokkashugi)* and sought to counter it with a constitutional sense of citizenship invested in a national identity as *kokumin*.

27 Yamamuro Shinichi, 'Meiji kokka no seido to rinen', pp. 122–33.

28 The name 'shin hoshuto' (new conservative party) was coined by Tokutomi Soho, who was a critic of the group. See Motoyama, pp. 232–7.
29 Motoyama, p. 233.
30 On the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism as anti-government nationalism in Kuga Katsunan and Miyake Setsurei's writings, see Motoyama Yukihiko, *Meiji shiso no keisei*. Fukumura Shuppan, 1969, pp. 201–79. Evidence that supports translating *'minzokushugi'* as 'ethnic nationalism' includes Yoon Koncha, *Nihon kokumin ron*. Chikuma Shobo, 1997; and Yasuda Hiroshi, 'Kindai nihon ni okeru [minzoku] kannen no keisei: kokumin, shinmin, minzoku'. *Shiso to gendai,* no. 31 (September 1992), pp. 61–72.
31 The concept of a 'Greater Taisho' was first sketched out by Tetsuo Najita in his 'Introduction: A Synchronic Approach'. In Tetsuo Najita and J.Victor Koschmann, eds., *Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The Neglected Tradition*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, More recently, 'Greater Taisho' was then applied by a broad spectrum of historians writing in Sharon Minichiello, ed., *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900–1930*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1998.
32 Julia Thomas argues that 'in the early decades of the twentieth century…Japan sought to reinscribe the nation as natural' (p. 114). For the details on this 'naturalised nationhood' (which presumes a concept of the nation as distinct from the state), see Thomas, 'Naturalizing Nationhood: Ideology and Practice in Early Twentieth-Century Japan'. In Minichiello, ed., *Japan's Competing Modernities,* pp. 114–32.
33 On the international context of this shift in national legitimacy under the auspices of the League of Nations, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, 1983, p. 104. The conflict between this new principle of the right to ethnic national self-determination and the fact that most members of the League of Nations were in fact multi-ethnic states was discussed at length by many Japanese political commentators. See my 'Culture, Ethnicity and the State in Early Twentieth Century Japan'. In Minichiello, ed., *Japan's Competing Modernities,* pp. 181–205.
34 Thomas, 'Naturalizing the Nation', in Minichiello, ed., pp. 114–32.
35 Yanaihara was one of the most influential of these liberal advocates of ethnic nationalism, in spite of his close relationship with Nitobe. See my 'Colonial and Ethnic Nationalism in the Political Thought of Yanaihara Tadao'. *East Asian History,* no. 10 (December 1995), pp. 79–98.
36 Tokutomi Iichiro, 'Jobun'. In *Kyokuto no minzoku*. Minyusha, 1917, p. 2.
37 Yoshino Sakuzo, 'Reigon'. In *Kyokuto no minzoku,* p. 2.
38 Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism,* p. 57.
39 Tamir accepts national identity premised on ethnic markers of culture, but argues against ethnic national self-determination as the result of ideas of cultural identity in favour of a case-by-case determination (*Liberal Nationalism,* p. 75). Elshtain is more sceptical about ethnic nationality and liberal nationalism, and instead emphasises the importance of a re-legitimation of national space for citizenship which rests not on the ideas of intellectuals but on the practice of ordinary people. *Democracy on Trial,* pp. 109–11, 133–5. Both Tamir and Elshtain explicitly draw much of their understanding of liberalism and nationalism from Berlin.

40 Among those whom Ienaga Saburo, a well-known historian of this period, counts as dissenters (but who in fact were quite enthusiastic about *minzoku* as a cultural identity) were Ozaki Hotsumi, Uehara Senroku, Ishimoda Sho, Toma Seita, Takeuchi Yoshimi and Yanaihara Tadao. See Ienaga Saburo, *The Pacific War, 1931–1945*. Pantheon, New York, 1978, pp. 204–10. Ienaga's argument that these intellectuals resisted the illiberal turn during the 1930s rests on an assumption that oppressive nationalism meant statism, and that the suppression of ethnic nationalism was an attack on liberalism. This view, however, not only equates Marxism with liberalism, but also overlooks the illiberal turn in ethnic national discourse in the years after 1930.

41 Kamei Kanichiro, *Dai To-A minzoku no michi: kyoeiken no mokuhyo*. Seiki Shobo, 1941, pp. 261–2.

42 See my *Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity*. University of California Press, Berkeley and London, 1994, pp. 111–12; also 'Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth Century Japan'. *Journal of Japanese Studies,* vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 77–103.

43 On Kimura and the problem of moralism in 1930s Japan, see my 'Nationalism as Dialectics'. In James Heisig and John Maraldo, eds, *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1994. Also, Kimitada Miwa, 'Japanese Policies and Concepts for a Regional Order in Asia, 1938–1940'. In James W.White, Michio Umegaki and Thomas Havens, eds, *The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan Between East and West*. University Press of America, Lanham, 1990.

44 See Tetsuo Najita and H.D. Harootunian, 'Japanese Revolt Against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century'. In Peter Duus, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6: The Twentieth Century*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 711–74.

45 Ernst Haas, p. 49, n. 20.

46 Tetsuo Najita and H.D.Harootunian, 'Japanese Revolt Against the West'. The ethnologists in the Institute for Research on Ethnic Nationality wrote explicitly about how to use ethnic nationalism *(minzokushugi)* to redefine East Asia as an 'ethnic nation' opposed to the cultural imperialism of the West. See Nakao Katsumi, 'Minzoku kenkyujo no soshiki to katsudo: sensochu no nihon minzokugaku'. *Minzokugaku kenkyu,* vol. 62, no. 1 *(bessatsu,* June 1997), pp. 47–65. In English, see my 'Building National Identity Through Ethnicity: Ethnology in Wartime Japan and After'. *Journal of Japanese Studies,* vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 1–39.

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Part II

Case studies

The Meiji and Taisho generations

3
Constructing national identities
Asia, Japan and Europe in Fukuzawa Yukichi's theory of civilisation

Annette Schad-Seifert

Introduction

The construction of national identities is clearly a modern phenomenon. It started in Europe in the late 18th century and gained social and political importance on a global scale in the centuries which followed. According to Shmuel N.Eisenstadt, the construction of national identities has to be seen as an attempt to produce a collective identity on the basis of primordial symbols (historical, territorial, linguistic, ethnic) and political boundaries. Since there is no fixed cluster of primordial symbols and no natural identity such as language or ethnicity which guarantees the emergence of modern nation-states, national identity is usually manufactured and shaped by particular social groups *(Trägergruppen),* including, especially, the cultural 'intelligentsia' and political 'entrepreneurs'.[1] For Eisenstadt, it is important to note that the development of new collective identities was embedded in a more extensive cultural and civilisational context and that the various ways in which national identities were produced depended to a great extent on how the relationship between primordial-particularistic and the more general religious-universalistic elements were shaped and maintained. He argues that a tension between these two aspects is unavoidable and that this tension acquired an especially decisive form in the European case. In Europe the chasm between the transcendental and the mundane led, first, to the emergence of a hierarchical relationship between the higher ethical and the political order and, second, to the development of a way of overcoming this tension, namely a worldview of the type that Max Weber has called a religion of salvation *(Erlösungsreligion).* The pressure which grew out of the intellectual enterprise to make the mundane political order correspond to the appropriate transcendental vision created, in Eisenstadt's view, a missionary style of universalism that is a salient characteristic of all 'Axial civilisations'.[2] By Axial civilisations' (a concept introduced by Karl Jaspers) Eisenstadt means those civilisations that crystallised in the period extending from 500 BC to the first century of the Christian era or even to the rise of Islam, within which new types of ontological visions—conceptions of a basic tension between the transcendental and the mundane

orders—emerged and were institutionalised.[3] The core of Eisenstadt's s argument lies in main taining that the universalism of these civilisations helped them to succeed in creating institutional frameworks that dominated and marginalised those of the non-Axial civilisations.

I refer to Eisenstadt's major analytical approach because it also applies to nationalism, which spread globally together with the expansion of modern civilisation. In this context, it is important to stress that the relationship of tension is what characterises the construction of national identities in Axial civilisations in general. Eisenstadt also wrote extensively about Japanese civilisation and the different ways in which the expansion of modern nationalism has influenced the emergence of national identity there.[4] The distinctiveness of Japan, according to Eisenstadt, lies in the fact that it is the only non-Axial civilisation that preserved a history of its own without becoming marginalised by the Axial civilisations of Asia, with which it was in continuous contact, namely China and Korea (Confucianism and Buddhism).[5] For Eisenstadt, the peculiar aspects of the Japanese historical experience lie in Japan's ability to internalise the foreign influences. Furthermore, he claims that the Japanese case of constructing a national identity shows relatively low features of tension between primordial-particularistic and religious-universal elements because 'the Japanese state has always been more or less congruent with the Japanese collective identity, the Japanese nation or simply with the ethnic community'.[6]

Eisenstadt refers to the Heian period of Japanese history (794–1160), when the formation of an idea of a 'divine country' *(shinkoku)* was closely related to the development of a sacred ritual known as *Shinto*. He maintains, however, that the strong concern for the sacred and unique character of the Japanese nation cannot be compared with the missionary-style universalism found in monotheistic religions and in the corresponding civilisations. Therefore Japanese identity should best be characterised by the term 'sacred particularism',[7] a feature which is resistant to the influence of more universalistic ideologies and which is also characteristic of the middle of the 19th century, when the Japanese referred to European models in order to organise themselves into a modern state.

It is important to note that Eisenstadt treats the terms 'collective community', 'nation' and 'ethnic community' as interchangeable. He also supposes an almost natural continuity of the Japanese nation which maintained itself against the threats of Chinese Buddhism, Confucianism and Western ideological universalism. Eisenstadt does not ignore the fact that the necessity of manufacturing a Japanese nation with a particular, unique and identifiable history, religion, language and ethnicity was in part the result of and not the precondition for cultural contacts with the Chinese Civilisation; nor is he unaware that the Japanese nation acquired a cohesive and 'modern' form due to its experiences with Western expansion in the middle of the 19th century.

It seems questionable, however, that the construction of national identity in the Japanese case is really characterised by less tension than it is else-where. In Japan the idea of a modern nation was the result of political processes and cultural

change. Therefore it is reasonable to view intellectual notions of 'Japan' not as proof of an already existing 'natural nation', but as expressions of a process by which the identity of a society was both described and produced. Tessa Morris-Suzuki has argued convincingly that the formation of 'Japan' as a modern nation within its contemporary boundaries caused a thorough modification of the ties between the Japanese state and other regional communities or the frontier societies of the Ainu and the Ryukyu Archipelago. A tremendous shift in perspective took place during the 19th century when, due to the influence of European and North American ideas of historical progress, these frontier societies were no longer seen in spatial terms such as 'foreign' or 'exotic', but were reinterpreted in temporal ones as being 'backward' in comparison to the Japanese people.[8] This reconceptualisation of difference was complicated by the fact that Japan itself, according to the Western-inspired version of civilisation, was seen as occupying an 'intermediate' or 'half-civilised' level in universal world history.

When examining how ideas of 'Japan', 'Japanese society' and the 'Japanese nation' were created in modern pre-war Japan it is therefore worthwhile to sketch at least very briefly the formation of the 'discourses' in which Europe began to describe and represent itself in the same period. As a consequence of their expansion in the 16th and the 17th century, the countries of Western Europe began to define themselves as an advanced segment of humankind, progressing toward an ever-increasing level of well-being—a self-perception which in the so-called Age of Enlightenment of the 18th century was expressed by the term 'civilisation'.[9]

The use of the term 'civilisation' in the European philosophy of the Enlightenment alternated continuously between a national and particularistic dimension—according to which the actual conditions in Europe represented 'civilisation' per se—and a collective as well as future-oriented dimension that referred to universal processes affecting all of humankind.[10] Due to its double meaning, the concept of civilisation remained ambiguous. On the one hand, it served to promote a hierarchical difference between the 'West' and the 'non-West' and helped to establish power relations in an age of colonisation and domination. On the other hand, the differences between cultures were not conceived as fundamental ones, because 'civilisation' implied the notion of a world or universal history, in which non-European cultures were regarded as representing historical stages of development which Europe had already surpassed. Accordingly, in the history of civilisation the Asian nations were described as being stationary, non-progressive and even barbarian. Nevertheless, the non-European cultures were put into the same historical framework as Europe itself, or, to phrase it somewhat differently, Europe conceived the variety of cultures in terms of temporal differences. The concept of 'civilisation' as a universal phenomenon was connected to the recognition that humankind as a single species originated from the same genus. This connection had a substantial impact on the emergence of concepts such as universal human rights and equal rights.

Morris-Suzuki has pointed out that the code of inclusion inherent in the term 'civilisation' nonetheless coincided with an image of a world divided into radically different 'ethnic groups' *(Völker)* and was integrally connected to structures which sought to exclude individuals or groups on the grounds of their racial or ethnic origin.[11]

In order to achieve a better understanding of the problem that might be called the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism, I shall examine both European and Japanese discourses on civilisation, nationhood and society more closely. This will show how the Western idea of civilisation created new structures of inclusion and exclusion during the transformation of Japan into a modern nation-state after the Meiji Restoration. I suggest that the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism be understood in terms of a tension between the two conflicting codes of the inclusion of Japan into universal history and the exclusion of China from it as efforts were undertaken to 'civilise' Japan.

The idea of Western civilisation in Meiji Japan

In the period following the Meiji Restoration the status system was abolished and Western notions of nationalism and citizenship were introduced. People were encouraged to consider themselves to be Japanese nationals. Still, the image of a nation was by no means easy to instil. Moreover, the various definitions of the nation that were advocated by political leaders and intellectuals were not always in accordance with one another. On the one hand, imagery of the family (*kazoku* or *ie*) was used to indicate that equal citizens could have unequal rights and duties, just as different family members are not all treated alike. On the other hand, the popularisation of Western theories of civilisation did in fact put the discourse about the nation into a more international perspective.

In order to create a sense of national superiority, intellectuals could draw on European ideas of a human group linked by common ethnicity, history and language. Since, however, this meant viewing Japan as one of the many peoples of Asia, it also tended to highlight the tension between the particularist concept of the nation and the universalist concept of civilisation.

Fukuzawa Yukichi's notion of a civilised nation-state

One of the most influential propagandists of the idea of Western civilisation was the Meiji intellectual and reformer Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), who is known both as an advocate of Japan's entry into international society and as a thinker with strong national concerns. Fukuzawa was a lower samurai and scholar of Western learning, who, by the 1860s, was active in publicly presenting images of the West along with widely accessible information about the societal, political, technological and cultural conditions in Western countries. After the Meiji Restoration Fukuzawa continued his career as an advocate of *bunmei kaika* (civilisation and cultural improvement). In this capacity, he popularised the notion

of civilisation not only by disseminating Western ideas but also by offering critical arguments about how the spiritual renewal of the Japanese people could be achieved. Fukuzawa often maintained that the material and technological conditions of Western civilisation are easy to borrow but that the spiritual state of the people is more difficult to change. His main concern was how the non-material aspects of modern civilisation could be adapted to Japan.

The historical situation in which Fukuzawa articulated his ideas was characterised by a pressing need for political reform. This explains why he strongly opposed the feudalism of the Tokugawa era, which he regarded as being deficient in ethical, metaphysical and scientific terms. The desire to establish a new national approach to ethics and science was the motive force behind Fukuzawa's orientation towards the European philosophy of the Enlightenment. By drawing on Enlightenment philosophy, he attempted to overcome the traditional teachings of Chinese Confucianism, which in his view had a detrimental influence not only on Japanese science but on social ethics as well.

In the following pages I shall focus on Fukuzawa's ideas of civilisation as they are articulated in his *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* (An outline of a theory of civilisation, 1875). It is important to emphasise, however, that in nearly all of his writings he saw himself faced with the task of creating a new class of Japanese citizens that would constitute a civilised nation-state.

The new concept of bunmei *and the Japanese cultural heritage*

As has been pointed out by Morris-Suzuki, the idea of civilisation, which Fukuzawa translated with the Japanese word *'bunmei',* contrasted with the older Chinese notion of the concept. The pre-Meiji view of the world was modelled after the relationship between the civilised centre *(ka)* and its 'barbarian' periphery (i).[12] The logic of difference implied in this world order was a territorial one. The closer the position to the centre, the more civilised one would be regarded. An important shift in the vision of world order was expressed in the term *'bunmei',* by which Fukuzawa indicated a dynamic process of spiritual improvement of humankind in the course of history:

> A theory of civilization concerns the development of the human spirit. Its import does not lie in discussing the spiritual development of the individual, but the spiritual development of the people of the nation as a whole *(tenka shujin)*. Therefore a theory of civilization may perhaps be termed a theory of the development of the common mind of the people.[13]

The process of national inclusion which is addressed in Fukuzawa's argument clearly implies the notion of joining the trajectory of universal history. But it must be noted that Fukuzawa's attempt to link Japan to the group of progressive Western nations was plagued by a fundamental dilemma.

On the subject of comparison between different levels of civilisation, Fukuzawa initially notes a difference between the culture of the West and that of Asia. Accordingly, he provides a critical analysis of the traditional features of Japanese society and concludes that the mentality of the Japanese people still prohibits them from reaching a fully civilised state. He blames the overwhelming influence of Confucianism for having had a detrimental impact on the mentality of the common people. His criticism of the status system of traditional feudal society *(monbatsu seido)* is directed not only against the ruling class but also against the Confucian spirit that was part of the everyday mentality of all members of society. What we must note in this criticism is that Fukuzawa posits a formative principle 'imbedded in the spirit of the Japanese people as a whole', which he called the 'imbalance of power' *(kenryoku no hencho)*.[14] As a result of this imbalance in human relations, all members of society are equally and without exception affected by a mentality called *'wakudeki'* (ignorance, narrow-mindedness), or, as Fukuzawa also put it, 'to adhere to old customs blindly'.[15]

> Though in human relations sentiments of suspicion and jealousy run deep, when it comes to discussing the nature of things men lack the courage to raise doubts and ask questions. Men are adept at imitative craftsmanship, but there is a dearth of original production. They know how to cultivate the old, but not how to improve it. There are accepted rules governing human intercourse, and slaves of custom as they are, they never alter those rules. This is called the semi-developed stage. It is not yet civilization in the full sense.[16]

Fukuzawa defines the Japanese traditional pattern of thought by assigning it to a certain stage of world history, here called the semi-developed stage *(hankai)*. The civilised stage is characterised by the capacity for self-improvement—that is, in an open-ended process of self-transcendence, where 'today's wisdom overflows to create the plans of tomorrow'. In contrast, peoples at the primitive level of humankind still 'cower before the forces of nature and are dependent upon arbitrary human favour or accidental blessings'.[17]

In accordance with European theories of civilisation, Fukuzawa deploys a temporal periodisation such as the three 'stages through which mankind must pass' in order to justify differences among human groups living in different spaces. He views the peoples living in Africa, Asia and Europe as embodiments of these stages:

> When we are talking about civilization in the world today, the nations of Europe and the United States of America are the most highly civilized, while the Asian countries such as Turkey, China and Japan, may be called semi-developed countries, and Africa and Australia are to be counted as still primitive lands.[18]

Fukuzawa's concept of nationalism seems to acknowledge Japan's backwardness; nevertheless, this kind of self-diagnosis should not be interpreted as a static concept, but rather as a dynamic one, for only by realising the shortcomings of the shared Asian cultural heritage, symbolised by *wakudeki,* would the Japanese be able to overcome them.[19] Fukuzawa's construction of a particular Japanese cultural identity does not presuppose any superior character of the Japanese nation, as is often the case with 'nationalism', but instead takes the position of objectifying the cultural heritage as an obstacle that must be overcome from within.

He construes a cultural heritage by presuming the existence of a specific formative principle which is active within the mind of each member of society. Still, this cultural pattern of value and behaviour is generally characterised by Asian backwardness and despotism. As a national identity consists of several functions, there must be another dimension which can serve positively as a unifying code of national inclusion. In Fukuzawa's argument this unifying principle is citizenship *(jinmin),* a concept which we have to consider in more detail.

Fukuzawa's concern for national unification

Encouragement of public discussion

The prominent post-war intellectual historian Maruyama Masao, in the first of his three-volume interpretation of Fukuzawa's *Bunmeiron no gairyaku,* has suggested that Fukuzawa's criticism is also an expression of a historical period of instability and crisis. The crisis was caused by radical changes in society due not only to the abolition of the feudal status system but also to the sudden impact of Western culture after two centuries of isolation. Maruyama argues that systems of belief and the whole way of thinking had been shaken severely, and that the loss of traditional certainties and the sudden confrontation with new ideas had created a spiritual vacuum in the minds of the people. What he regards as striking is that Fukuzawa avoids offering a dogmatic intellectual solution to the state of uncertainty.[20] Fukuzawa is more concerned with 'establishing a basis of argumentation' *(giron no honi o sadamuru koto)* whereby contradictory convictions and beliefs come into agreement. The belief in the universal validity of scientific laws brings Fukuzawa to the conviction that public debates in society as well should be based on some ultimate principle:

> When investigating things it is necessary to clear away the non-essentials and get back to their source. By doing this, details can be subsumed under generic principles…; without some one ultimate principle, nothing could be established with any certitude. Therefore one cannot discuss the right

> and wrong, the merits and demerits of an issue without first establishing a basis of argumentation.[21]

The problem at issue is that opinions are always bound to interests and that differences in viewpoints do not seem to be reconcilable. Taking as his point of departure the common observation that all views and opinions are relative, Fukuzawa attempts to establish a rule by which opposing views can be mediated. 'The criterion in terms of which something is judged relatively heavy or good'[22] is the basic principle by which Fukuzawa deals with the situation of political and social upheaval following the abolition of feudal domains and the establishment of prefectures *(haihan chiken)*. Fukuzawa is addressing the former recipients of feudal stipends who were agitating against the process of unifying the country and the equal treatment of the citizenry by the Meiji government. In the following quotation Fukuzawa uses a metaphoric language to express his strong concern for national unification:

> An old proverb says that 'The belly must be saved at the cost of the back.' Another asserts 'Sacrifice the small for the large.' Thus, in the case of the human body one must protect the stomach even at the expense of receiving a wound on the back. And in dealing with animals, the crane is of greater value than the roach, so the roach is used as food for the crane. In the change from the feudal order, in which the daimyo and samurai lived in idleness, to the system we now have, it may seem unnecessary to dispossess those with property and force on them the hardships of the propertyless. But if you think of the Japanese nation *(Nihon koku)* and the individual *han* (domains) in relative terms, then the nation is important, the *han* unimportant. Abolishing the *han* is the same as putting a greater premium on the stomach than on the back, and taking away the stipends of the daimyo and the samurai is like killing the roach to feed the crane.[23]

It is evident that Fukuzawa wants to find a solution for political crisis and national discord. Still, he does not complain about the existence of conflicting interests, but tries instead to mediate the differing opinions by putting them on a common basis of argumentation. This basis, in Fukuzawa's view, is public discussion *(giron)*. Andrew Barshay has pointed out that the emergence of a 'public world not necessarily coterminous with imperial subjecthood as officially defined' was Fukuzawa's main concern. Fukuzawa's attempt to distance himself from the government was also proof of his conviction that social life should actually take place outside the state and bureaucracy.[24]

Maruyama has also argued that Fukuzawa's encouragement of public discussion has to be considered as a pioneer effort, because the Japanese word 'ko' or *'oyake'* for 'public' had previously meant 'official, formal; ruler or government', and therefore had denoted a vertical or hierarchical relationship between the government and the people. Fukuzawa wanted to help formulate the public

sphere on a 'horizontal' basis, so that people could enter into dialogue and exchange arguments with regard to their diverse interests. His understanding of public discussion was not limited to intellectual debates, as in the case of the freedom of speech in academic clubs; instead, it corresponded to exchanges in a variety of social spheres, for example to 'in business or in academic circles, even in a drinking bout or in a legal dispute'.[25] Fukuzawa was convinced that the settlement of conflicts is most probable if people are given the opportunity 'to express frankly in word and deed what is in their hearts' and thereby to 'open both eyes and be able to see the other fellow's merits' *(ryogan o hirakite ta no shocho o miru o ebeshi)*.[26]

Due to an inability to 'open both eyes', rival parties are often engaged in fruitless disputes that are characterised by constant friction. In the spirit of the liberal tradition of 19th-century political philosophy, Fukuzawa called for tolerance of diverse opinions, which alone can enhance the progress of human society. The improvement of knowledge, therefore, can only be obtained by a dialectical discourse of free discussion; or, to put it in Fukuzawa's words, 'we know that the spirit of freedom can exist only in an atmosphere of diversity of ideas' *(jiyu no kifu wa tada taji soron no aida ni arite sonsuru mono to shirubeshi)*.[27]

The horizontal association of civil society

Fukuzawa's active support for the development of a middle-class public as a community of citizens who were free from governmental interference should not obscure the fact that he was very much aware of a distinction between the ordinary people and the intellectual class. This is why Fukuzawa has been accused of being a contradictory thinker: on the one hand a progressive liberal and on the other an apologist for authoritarianism and the privileged role of intellectuals.[28] The political scientist Sakamoto Takao has revised Fukuzawa's writings in terms of an expression of 18th-century liberalism.[29] In the following I am going to refer to some of the results of his reading. In order to make more clear what is implied by Fukuzawa's liberal nationalism, let me draw attention to the idea of society as public space that was introduced in an earlier work by Fukuzawa entitled *Seiyo jijo* (Conditions of the West) and published between the years 1866 and 1868. Fukuzawa's work on this book, which contains mainly a translation from a Scottish textbook on political economy, resulted in the creation of a new word corresponding to the English word 'society'. A product of Fukuzawa's translating activities was the Japanese term *'ningen kosai'* ('human intercourse'), which was intended to evoke a new kind of 'horizontal' relationship among the people and to replace the old 'vertical' ties between members of hierarchically distinct status groups.

The educational specialist Yanabu Akira has pointed out that the central meaning of society in terms of 'human relationships on a wide scale' did not exist in the Japanese language until the end of the Tokugawa era. It was introduced when Japanese scholars of Western learning began translating popular Western

works in the social sciences. There were several different translations of this concept in circulation simultaneously, such as the Sino-Japanese compounds *'kosai'* (intercourse) and *'ningen kosai'* (human intercourse) or the Japanese word *'majiwari'* (association; intercourse; relations), which were all coined by Fukuzawa. In addition, the Japanese terms *'kuni'* (domain; country), *'sejin'* (people; the world) and *'seken'* (the world; society on a small scale) also served to convey the notion of modern society.

It has been suggested that Fukuchi Genichiro, the chief editor of the *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun,* first published the word *'shakai'* as a translation for the English word 'society' in 1875. This term superseded all previous translations, largely because it was a newly coined term, which, unlike *'seken', 'kuni', 'majiwari'* or *'kosai',* had not been in usage in the Japanese language before that date.[30] Yanabu maintains that the Sino-Japanese compound *'shakai'* has enjoyed wide acceptance as the common word for 'society' up until today because it more aptly expresses the abstract meaning of society in terms of human relationships on a wide scale, in contrast to translations based on everyday words with concrete connotations.[31]

Although the term *'shakai'* gained wide popularity, Yanabu doubts that it corresponded to the actual social conditions which were current at the time when it was coined:

> Soon after the word *shakai* was created as a translation, it gained wide acceptance. But this does not mean that a reality began to exist in Japan which corresponded to the concept *shakai* or *society*.[32]

According to Yanabu, the gap between concept and reality is the reason why Fukuzawa did not create a translation as close as possible to the original, but instead attempted to express a more concise meaning of the concept by translating it in a way that suggested a wide range of associations. Therefore, Yanabu maintains, Fukuzawa took the common word *'seken no kosai'* (people's intercourse) from ordinary language and newly combined it with terms such as *'ningen'* (human beings), *'kazoku'* (family) or *'kunshin'* (ruler and subjects).[33] Yanabu's interpretation is compelling, but one might argue that it underestimates the creativity of Fukuzawa's 'associative translation'. Yanabu is convinced that Fukuzawa did not conceive of the Western European idea of civil society in his use of the term *'ningen kosai':*

> It is clear that the concept of society underlies Fukuzawa's word *kosai*. But Fukuzawa's intellectual endeavour did not involve the a priori formation of the concept; nor did it imply a critical analysis on the basis of the modern idea of citizenship.[34]

It can be argued, instead, that in his work as a translator Fukuzawa obviously had come into contact with theories based on the 18th-century canon of political economy. In this context, his concept *ningen kosai* may be understood as

anticipating a civil society based on a modern type of human relations. This point is vividly illustrated in Sakamoto's studies. In contrast to Yanabu, Sakamoto has pointed out that Fukuzawa was already able to conceptualise the notion of modern civil society and that he therefore has to be regarded as an advocate of a liberal market society. With reference to Japanese history, Sakamoto shows how Fukuzawa contrasts his picture of modern civil society with the traditional system of rule, which he described as a 'rule of favour and mercy' *(on'i-jijo no matsurigoto)*.[35] This anti-modern notion of authority, according to Fukuzawa, had had a detrimental influence, insofar as familial bonds had been transferred to non-familial relationships. The specifically modern character of civil society anticipated by Fukuzawa lies in the fact that social relationships are impersonal and not guided by emotions. By criticising the traditional concept of 'benevolent government' *(meibun),* Fukuzawa advocated a modern society in which people form relationships with one another as strangers *(tanin no tsukiai)*[36].

Modern civil society's character of self-regulation

In this connection, one might note that the idea of society in terms of 'human intercourse' also originated from the concept of 'spontaneous order', which is central to Adam Smith's theory of a market society. It belongs to the intellectual tradition of 18th-century moral philosophy and characterises the so-called Scottish Enlightenment, to which, besides Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson and John Millar, among others, made important contributions. It is well known that participants in the Scottish Enlightenment, which was a cosmopolitan movement whose frame of reference extended well beyond Britain, were especially interested in understanding modern society and its development.[37] Despite critical differences among these thinkers, they share an intellectual preoccupation with moral philosophy, the writing of history and political economy. Historians of science have drawn attention to the enthusiasm with which the Scottish intellectuals took up Newtonianism, and to their continuing interest in the natural sciences throughout the 18th century.[38] The close relation between physics and basic conceptions of the world was one of the predominant ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, who attempted to adapt metaphysics and ethics to the mechanical worldview established by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton. In their view the universe was a huge machine which, once it had been started up, regulated itself automatically.

In 1867 Fukuzawa introduced and translated one of the first textbooks to deal entirely with social and economic topics, the *Chambers' Educational Course: Political Economy for Use in Schools and for Private Instruction,* originally published in 1852 in Edinburgh.[39] Through this textbook, which Fukuzawa used extensively for his *Seiyo jijo,* he obviously drew upon Scottish moral philosophy. In his theory of civilisation he cited Newton, Galileo and Adam Smith and characterised them as European thinkers who had contributed to the progress of knowledge about humankind:

> Consider if you will now, since ancient times, progressive steps in civilization were always unorthodox at the time they were first proposed. When Adam Smith first expounded his economic theory, did not everyone condemn it as heresy? Was not Galileo punished as a heretic when he articulated his theory of the earth's rotation? Yet with the passage of time the mass of 'common men', guided by the intellectuals, were, before they knew it, drawn over to the side of these 'heresies'; as a result, at our present stage of civilization even school children entertain no doubts about the theories of modern economics and the earth's revolution.[40]

The idea that the progress of humankind was moving ahead hand in hand with the continuous accumulation of knowledge about nature became one of the most powerful interpretative tools for describing the development in society. This has to be considered when we remember, for example, that Newton had offered a pattern of thought that was adapted not only to chemistry and biology but also to explaining processes of social evolution.[41] The mechanical concept of society's self-regulation became widely accepted in the liberal tradition of political philosophy, as concepts such as 'balance of power', 'checks and balances' or 'balance of trade' indicate.

Fukuzawa adopted this pattern of thought in his own analysis of human relation in Japanese society, as is evident in his use of the metaphor of 'thousands of scales' which are 'always out of balance':

> Imbalance of power pervades the entire network of Japanese society [literally 'human relations']. In Chapter Two I mentioned that there is something that we can call the spirit of a nation. This imbalance of power is one element in the Japanese spirit. When today's scholars discuss the question of power, they only think in terms of the government and the people, either to rage against the despotism of the government, or to criticize the servility of the people. But if we really examine the situation in detail, we shall find this imbalance pervading the whole of life in Japan, public or private. It is as though thousands of scales were hung in Japan, and all of them were always out of balance, none ever in equilibrium.... You will find this imbalance in all relations between man and woman, between parents and children, between brothers, and between young and old. Turn from the family circle to society, and relations there will be no different.... Wherever there are social relationships there you will find this imbalance of power.[42]

Behind this sharp criticism of contemporary Japanese social relations stands Fukuzawa's conviction that the human intercourse constituting society should be based on equal and reciprocal relationships; otherwise, he thought, it tends towards absolute power and despotism. Fukuzawa's newly coined word 'human intercourse' is therefore essential for understanding that nationhood or the

national spirit of a people meant to Fukuzawa a synchronous dimension of public discourse among national citizens. Clearly, his concept of civilisation not only indicated a diachronic dimension of cultural improvement. The relationship between these two concepts can also be seen in a later publication by Fukuzawa called *Minjo isshin* (The renovation of the people's spirit, 1879). In this work Fukuzawa states that 'civilization is produced by facilitating human intercourse' and that society is a national community of citizens in which people accept the same universal values.[43]

The difference between Japanese and Chinese civilisation

Two different notions of the West

This optimistic version of national inclusion based on an equal and reciprocal public discourse is nothing new, and it is intrinsically identical to today's discourse on civil society as pursued by thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and others. But still, as has been revealed by the critique of Naoki Sakai, this kind of confidence in universalism is always accompanied by a notion of difference.[44] Fukuzawa's view on the West was not only positive but also ambivalent and critical. Although he is usually regarded as a strong proponent of the 'entering into Europe' *(nyu-O)* position, he obviously was not a proponent of the Europeanisation of Japan or mere imitation of the West. His personal commitment to the West does not exclude an awareness of the dangers inherent in international relations:

> For example, there is no greater calamity in the world than war, and yet the nations of the West are always at war. Robbery and murder are the worst of human crimes; but in the West there are robbers and murderers. There are those who form cliques to vie for the reins of power and who, when deprived of that power, decry the injustice of it all. Even worse, international diplomacy is really based on the art of deception. Surveying the situation as a whole, all we can say is that there is a general prevalence of good over bad, but we can hardly call the situation perfect. When, several thousand years hence, the levels of knowledge and virtue of the peoples of the world will have made great progress (to the point of becoming utopian), the present conditions of the nations of the West will surely seem a pitifully primitive stage. Seen in this light, civilization is an open-ended process. We cannot be satisfied with the present level of attainment of the West.[45]

This two-sided view of the West—the West as it is, with all its defects and weaknesses that can be objectified and criticised, and the West as it ought to be—is a perspective which Naoki Sakai has called 'the continuous alternation between the West as manifested in its actual existence and the West as a perspective or a

transcendental subject'.[46] One should not forget that this alternating viewpoint of the West was ever-present in Fukuzawa's advocacy of following the Western model ('taking Western Civilization as our goal').

The interplay of the ideas of Western universalism and Asian particularism

Europe as progressive and Asia as stationary

In his commitment to Western civilisation Fukuzawa adopted the views of the French historian Guizot. Although Guizot's history of civilisation tried to provide a general theoretical framework for understanding the conditions of historical progress, it is clear that it examined the development of humankind from the perspective of French culture and that it may therefore be seen as an attempt to justify the worldwide dominance of European civilisation in the 19th century. Fukuzawa's understanding of Japanese national citizenship paid particular attention to the question of why the Europeans had become a progressive part of humankind and why the non-Europeans remained stationary. In answering this question, Fukuzawa drew not only on Guizot's theory but also on Buckle's important work *History of Civilization in England*.[47] As an advocate of a positivist conception of history, Buckle attempted to demonstrate the laws that govern the course of history. His position was similar to that of the German philosopher Herder, who maintained that the development of humankind depends to a certain extent on environmental conditions.[48] According to Buckle's interpretation of universal history, the evolution of humankind depends on a number of natural and physical conditions such as geography, climate, soil quality, population, etc. As a consequence, the variable natural conditions were seen as fundamental causes of the differences among peoples and nations of the world.

The central argument of Buckle's book is the emergence and development of civilisation. Buckle regarded the basic determinants for the development of society as dependent on physical conditions and held the view that the standard of civilisation was dependent on the standard of wealth and how wealth was distributed among the populace of a country:

> For since wealth is an undoubted source of power, it is evident that, supposing other things equal, an inquiry into the distribution of wealth is an inquiry into the distribution of power, and as such, will throw great light on the origin of those social and political inequalities, the play and opposition of which form a considerable part of the history of every civilized country.[49]

In Buckle's view, the miserable material conditions in countries such as Egypt, Peru, Mexico and India were rooted in the surplus of population in these

countries, which had led in turn to a labour surplus. In contrast, the physical conditions in Europe had provided ideal conditions for the development of civilisation. A well-balanced supply of food and a steady but moderate rise in population were preconditions for both the accumulation of sufficient wealth and the improvement of the intellectual abilities of the European peoples. Since the favourable conditions of the climate helped to optimise the use of natural resources, nature was understood not as a threatening power, but in terms of natural laws which, if sufficiently understood, could be used for the benefit of humankind.[50] Therefore Buckle maintained that only European civilisation was guided by mental instead of physical or natural factors. In Europe humans did not cower before the forces of nature and were therefore able to develop according to 'mental laws'.[51]

Fukuzawa was basically in agreement with Buckle's interpretation, but his understanding of the factors that caused Asia to remain stationary differed in a way that was crucial to his definition of Japan's place in the world. In order to clear the way for Japan's entry into the international order and for its participation in universal progress, Fukuzawa had to reject or, rather, to de-essentialise the physical criteria in Buckle's definitions of non-European cultures and nations:

> According to some Western books, the reason for the despotism in Asia lies in the fact that, with its warm climates and fertile lands, Asia has become overpopulated, and because of the geographical and topographical conditions, fears and superstitions tend to multiply. It is hard to say whether this theory truly applies to Japan or not. Even if it did apply, since the causes are all natural phenomena, what can humans do about them? Therefore, I wish here only to speak about the development of despotism and to show the way in which it has been carried out. Once this is done, we may be able to devise means to deal with it.[52]

It was thus in the qualities of mind and spirit where lay the essence of the civilisation which Japan needed to learn from the West, and it was only for lack of such a spirit that Japanese civilisation had fallen behind. For Fukuzawa the blame for this deficiency was to be laid at the door of Chinese Confucianism, which had given the philosophical justification for Japan's stratified feudal system, with its imbalance in human relations. He maintained that as long as Japan's state remained in the same traditional moral spirit as China there could be no possible way of developing into a nation on a par with the West.

Fukuzawa's reinvention of Japan's history

As was suggested in the introductory section of this chapter, visions of Asia served in contemporaneous European thought as markers of the difference between the progressiveness of the West and the backwardness of non-Western peoples. To Fukuzawa, as well, the idea of progress was an article of faith, but he, of course,

could not share the view of his British and French examples that progress would be a qualification merely restricted to the West. Just like he considered it obvious that Western people had progressed in knowledge and civilisation since ancient times, he considered it only natural that the Japanese would be capable of making an identical progress. The dimension of temporal difference inherent in the idea of civilisation thus motivated Fukuzawa to search for latent elements of progressiveness in Japan's own history.

An obvious though unacknowledged influence on Fukuzawa's thought in this regard is the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill. Mill was no different from Guizot and Buckle in looking down on the East in its totality as being dominated by stagnation:

> The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is complete. This is the case over the whole East.[53]

Nonetheless, Mill's utilitarianism provided Fukuzawa with some crucial hints in his quest for a way to prove what potentiality there might be in Japan's historical past of evolving into a progressive civilisation. It was especially Mill's view that progress in society depends on competition among rival powers that became an important tool in Fukuzawa's argument. Whereas societies in the various stages of barbarism were characterised by a primitive uniformity and simplicity, civilised societies showed an increasing diversity of opinion and complexity of organisation. The clash of opposing opinions is seen as the driving force of progress, and its absence results in stagnation and decay. Mill suggested that the progress of the 'European family of nations' was caused, not by their inherent superiority, but by their 'remarkable diversity of character and culture'.[54]

The utilitarian idea of diversity as a necessary condition of progress had a significant impact. It was by means of studying the past that one could discover in what way the process of society might be expected to continue in the future. But it would have to be a study conducted on different lines from any previous historical researches in Japan, since these had been in accordance with the principles of Chinese learning. During the Tokugawa period, when historians were, almost without exception, Confucian scholars, the purpose of the bulk of historical writing was to demonstrate that historical causation had to be attributed to the moral conduct and character of the ruler and his ministers, while events which could not be accounted for by human agency were explained as the will of heaven *(tenmei)*.[55] Fukuzawa saw the course of history not as due to the activity of a morally upright ruler, but maintained that 'an essential feature of civilized progress lies in endeavouring to intensify and multiply human enterprises and needs, …to stimulate the activities of the human spirit'.[56] The need to look at the past in a different light caused Fukuzawa to fit the study of Japan's history into the framework of 19th-century European historiography.

It will need no mention that Fukuzawa was no historian and had no interest in writing a detailed history of Japan in the footsteps of his Western peers. He merely reproduced most of the salient characteristics of the thought of Guizot, Buckle and others that matched his more pragmatic purpose. In doing so he made ample use of Mill's argument that diversity leads to progress, in order to stress a sharp contrast between Japanese and Chinese history:

> [W]e may discover one more thing, and that is the difference between Japanese and Chinese civilization. In both China and Japan there evolved an absolute autocracy or theocracy in which the exalted pedigree of the ruler was Heaven-bestowed and both the most sacrosanct and the most powerful were united in one person.... Now, one view holds that, although Chinese government was autocratic, there were at least changes of dynasty, but since Japan has had unbroken imperial succession from antiquity, the minds of the Japanese people are even more ossified! However, this strikes only at the surface of the issue without grasping the heart of it. One who is well acquainted with the facts would see that just the opposite is true.[57]

For Fukuzawa, the divergence between Japan and China occurred at the beginning of the Kamakura period, since he situates in this period the first manifestation of conflicting powers in Japan's history, when the most sacrosanct and most powerful institution of imperial rule began to dissolve. The result was the following:

> [T]he most sacrosanct was not necessarily the most powerful, and the most powerful was not necessarily the most sacrosanct. The two concepts of the most sacrosanct and the most powerful were so obviously distinct that people could hold in their heads, as it were, the simultaneous existence and functioning of the two ideas. Once they did so, they could not help adding a third, the principle of reason. With the principle of reason added to the idea of reverence for the imperial dignity and the idea of military rule, none of the three concepts was able to predominate. And since no single concept predominated, there naturally followed a spirit of freedom.[58]

Fukuzawa refrains from interpreting the conflict between Japan's military government and the imperial court as the equivalent of the contest between the Roman Empire and the Christian Church in European history. But still he reinvents Japan's history in a way that makes it seem entirely different from that of Asian countries such as China, where, as Fukuzawa sees it, the theocracy had been monopolised continually by one single power:

> In summary, I say that China has endured as a theocratic autocracy over centuries, while Japan has balanced the element of military power against the element of theocracy. China has had but one element, Japan two. If you

> discuss civilization in these terms, China has never once changed and thus is not equal to Japan in her development. It is easier for Japan to adopt Western civilization than for China.[59]

In defining Japan's place in the world in terms of a Western-dominated world order it is clearly reflected that Fukuzawa was not a historian but a philosophical thinker with political concerns. The historical distinction between China and Japan, representing a thorough modification of the older China-centred East Asian system, functions as a kind of expedient strategy in Fukuzawa's work since his position was obviously influenced by the international political situation, especially by the conflict between Japan and China over Korea, which led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.

Conclusion

Fukuzawa was an intellectual who was strongly influenced by the European Enlightenment. His style of argumentation is the expression of a distinctively 'liberal' way of thinking about society and the nation. The influence of the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment and of the utilitarianism of the 19th century is clearly evident in Fukuzawa's concept of the 'nation'. The aim of this chapter has been to show how Fukuzawa deployed such perspectives in his search for 'national identity'.

First, with regard to the Japanese people, Fukuzawa delineated a cultural heritage with which he associates specific social and psychological characteristics of the 'Japanese'. Although the features Fukuzawa describes are not all positive or advantageous, they nevertheless function as a unifying code that helped to produce a national identity and to establish a sense of membership to the Japanese nation. The point I would like to stress here is that Fukuzawa's critical discourse about Japanese society does not simply describe or advocate a national identity that already exists; rather, through his discourse Fukuzawa contributes to its creation.

Second, to a large degree, Fukuzawa drew the cultural categories and images that he used to describe the 'Japanese people' from an existing theoretical framework, which was provided by Western histories of civilisation. In light of the fact that the major Western histories of civilisation represent Asia as being backward, it is interesting to see how Fukuzawa both adopted and rejected Western images of an Asian mentality.

In order to deal with the question of 'the Asian mentality' Fukuzawa distinguished two dimensions of nationhood. On the one hand, he advocated the participation of citizens in the public sphere, which he understood as a realm where feudal narrow-mindedness can be overcome by the dialectics of opinion formation; and, on the other hand, he portrayed Japanese national history as a process of dialectical opposition between imperial authority and military rule,

which bestowed upon Japan certain advantages over other Asian nations and allowed it to develop into a civilised nation on a par with the West.

In this respect, Fukuzawa's concept of 'civilisation' can be seen as being related to Japanese intellectuals' descriptions of Western, Asian and Japanese national characters that are structured within what Sakai has called 'the schema of cofiguration'.[60] By this is meant the discursive formation whereby the national polity of Japan is always posited, not only as the *other,* but also as the *superior* to China. In the optimistic imagination of Fukuzawa, Japanese nationality would eventually prove its Western universality by the same token as Chinese nationality would prove its Asian particularity. What we see here is the dichotomy in Fukuzawa's internationalism, in which Japan was included in the universal (Western) trend of making progress but China was excluded. That this view of the world, East and West, and Japan and China (Asia), was nevertheless extremely influential is evident from the fact that many Westerners and Japanese were prone to interpret Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) as a victory of Western civilisation over Chinese (Asian) civilisation.

Notes

1 Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, 'Die Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten in vergleichender Perspektive' (The construction of national identity from a comparative perspective). In Bernhard Giesen, ed., *Nationale und kulturelle Identität* (National and cultural identity). Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1996, p. 21.

2 Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1986, pp. 4–5.

3 Eisenstadt, *The Origins*. Here referred to 'Introduction', pp. 1–39.

4 Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Japanese Civilization. A Comparative View*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.

5 Eisenstadt, *Japanese Civilization,* p. 14.

6 Eisenstadt, 'Die Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten in vergleichender Perspektive', p. 35.

7 Ibid., p. 36.

8 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan—Time, Space, Nation*. M.E.Sharpe, Armonk and London, 1998, p. 10

9 The French philosopher Anne Robert Turgot was one of the first scholars to give an outline of a universal history which included aspects of economic development, major technological innovations and the continuous accumulation of knowledge as a measurement for the universal progress of humankind. Turgot's course of lectures given in December of the year 1750 under the title *Tableau philosophique des progrès successifs de l'esprit humain* may be regarded as representing an important expression of the idea of progress in the 18th century.

10 A similar concept was expressed by coining the Japanese word *'kaika'* and became a point of reference for most Western-oriented intellectuals in 19th-century Japan. The character compound *'bunmei kaika'* contains the same figure of alternation, for it includes both aspects of 'civilisation' *(bunmei)* as condition and 'civilisation' *(kaika)*

as process. In order to stress the last aspect I have translated *'kaika'* as 'cultural improvement' and not, as has usually been done, as 'enlightenment'.

11 Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan,* p. 80.
12 Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan,* pp. 17–18.
13 Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization (Bunmeiron no gairyaku).* Sophia University Tokyo, 1973, p. 1. (See the Japanese original in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu,* vol. 4. Iwanami Shoten, 1958–64, p. 3).
14 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 138.
15 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 14.
16 *Ibid.*
17 *Ibid.*
18 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 13.
19 Sakamoto, in his study on the liberalism of Fukuzawa, has stressed that the term *'wakudeki'* in Fukuzawa's argument does not refer only to an old-fashioned belief in tradition but also to modern types of credulity, be it infatuation with Western civilisation or blind trust in public opinion. See Sakamoto Takao, *Atarashii Fukuzawa Yikichi* (The new Fukuzawa Yukichi). Kodansha, 1997, pp. 150–1.
20 Maruyama Masao, *'Bunmeiron no gairyaku' wo yomu* (Reading *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization).* Iwanami Shoten, 1986, pp. 63–6.
21 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* pp. 5–6.
22 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 5.
23 *Ibid.*
24 Barshay, Andrew, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan.* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, p. 6.
25 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 9.
26 *Ibid.*
27 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 21.
28 Proponents of this critical view on Fukuzawa are Hirota Masaki, *Fukuzawa Yukichi kenkyu.* Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976; Earl H.Kinmonth, 'Fukuzawa Reconsidered: *Gakumon no susume* and Its Audience'. In *Journal of Asian Studies* 37 (1978), pp. 677–96; Yasukawa Jyunosuke *(sic!),* 'Fukuzawa Yukichi'. In Benjamin C.Duke, ed., *Ten Great Educators of Modern Japan. A Japanese Perspective.* Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1989, pp. 17–37.
29 It is interesting that the political scientist Sakamoto Takao, who has been eager to demonstrate the consistency of Fukuzawa's thought with 18th-century Scottish liberalism, is himself aiming at the revitalisation of a new Japanese nationalism today. See, for example, his *Showa-shi no ronten* (Points of dispute in the history of the Showa period). Bungei Shunju, 2000; *Kokkagaku no susume* (Encouragement of statism). Chikuma Shobo, 2001; and *Towareru Nihonjin no rekishi kankaku* (Japan's problematic sense of history). Keiso Shobo, 2001.
30 Tominaga Kenichi, 'Shakai'. In *Daihyakka jiten,* vol. 6, Heibonsha, 1985, p. 1, 188.
31 Yanabu Akira, *Honyakugo seiritsu jijo* (Conditions of the formation of translation words). Iwanami Shoten, 1982, pp. 6–7.
32 *Ibid.*
33 Yanabu, *Honyakugo,* pp. 10–11.
34 Yanabu, *Honyakugo,* p. 12.
35 Sakamoto Takao, *Shijo, dotoku, chitsujo* (Market, morals, order). Sobunsha, 1991, p. 16.

36 Fukuzawa, in his *Gakumon no susume* (Encouragement of learning), considers the Chinese concept of *taigi meibun* (literally, 'the Great Principle of duty toward one's status', a concept which refers to a benevolent relationship between ruler and subject) as similar to the emotional ties of a parent-child relationship, which, in Fukuzawa's regard, is not sufficient to guarantee a civilised alliance between government and people. (Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Encouragement of Learning*. Sophia University, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 70–1). (See the Japanese original in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu,* vol. 3, pp. 97–8).

37 Franco Venturi, 'Les Lumières dans l'Europe du 18e siècle'. First published in *Xle Congrès International des Sciences Historiques: Rapports,* IV. Histoire Moderne, Stockholm, 1960. Translated into English as The European Enlightenment'. In Stuart J.Woolf, ed., *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 132–3.

38 Ronald Hamowy, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order.* Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1987.

39 For a more detailed interpretation of Fukuzawa's translation work on this textbook, see my article 'Scottish Political Economy in Meiji-Japan (1868–1912)—Fukuzawa Yukichi and Liberal Economic Thought'. In *Japan's Socio-Economic Evolution,* edited by Sarah Metzger-Court and Werner Pascha. Curzon Press, Richmond, 1996, pp. 109–22.

40 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 10.

41 Friedrich Hinterberger and Michael Hüther, 'Von Smith bis Hayek und zurück'. In *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik,* vol. 211, no. 3–4, 1993, p. 221.

42 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 136.

43 *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu,* vol. 5. Iwanami Shoten, 1958–64, pp. 5–6.

44 Naoki Sakai, *Translation & Subjectivity. On 'Japan' and Cultural Nationalism.* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, pp. 153–8.

45 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 15.

46 Sakai, *Translation & Subjectivity,* p. 70. Sakai observes this pattern of alternation in Maruyama Masao's *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan* (Tokyo and Princeton, 1974), but the same pattern is obvious in Fukuzawa's understanding of the West as well.

47 Henry Thomas Buckle, *History of Civilization in England,* 2 vols. Routledge & Sons, London, 1904 (original edition 1857–61).

48 Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Idee zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*. 1784–91. Translated into English as *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind.* Abridged and edited by Frank E.Manuel. Reprint, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.

49 Buckle, *History of Civilization,* vol. 1, p. 48.

50 Buckle, *History of Civilization,* vol. 1, p. 46. This explains why Buckle regards the history of humankind as a part of natural history.

51 Buckle, *History of Civilization,* vol. 1, p. 246.

52 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 138.

53 John Stuart Mill, 'Liberty'. In *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government.* Everyman's Library, London and New York, 1954, p. 128.

54 Mill, *Liberty,* p. 129.

55 Carmen Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment—A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 90–2.

56 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 20.
57 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* pp. 20–1.
58 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* pp. 21–2.
59 Fukuzawa, *An Outline,* p. 23.
60 Sakai, *Translation & Subjectivity,* pp. 59–63.

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4
Tokutomi Soho and the problem of the nation-state in an imperialist world

Alistair Swale

Introduction

In relation to the broad theme of the dilemma between internationalism and nationalism in modern Japan, Tokutomi Soho (1863–1957) is a particularly striking example of the magnitude of that intellectual conflict in one and the same person. Tokutomi, the son of a well-to-do family in Minamata (Kumamoto), was one of a new generation of intellectuals that emerged in the post-Meiji Restoration years who were schooled in some of the first Western-style institutions and embraced the ideals of contemporary Western political thought. Lacking the sort of clan affiliations that would almost certainly have guaranteed him a position in the government bureaucracy, he turned to journalism and emerged as one of the most prolific and influential figures of the next 50 years. *Kokumin no Tomo* (The Nation's Friend), published from February 1887 until August 1898, was set up under the auspices of the Minyusha in which Tokutomi was the leading figure. It was undoubtedly one of the most diverse and provocative journal-style publications of that period, providing a crucial vehicle not only for the promotion of Tokutomi's liberalism but also for the development of up-and-coming writers and critics in a more general literary sense. The *Kokumin Shinbun,* by contrast, was a more clearly focused political tabloid, which during its long run of publication from 1890 to 1942 became the definitive platform for Tokutomi's commentary on his nation's development, changing its orientation very much in tandem with the process of political reorientation that was undergone by Tokutomi himself.

Tokutomi's early enthusiasm for Western political institutions was based on a theory of universal social progress as expounded by the likes of Herbert Spencer and was essentially internationalist in conception. However, the well-known diplomatic reversal of the Triple Intervention which occurred following the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) provided the greatest catalyst toward a shattering of his internationalist vision and a rather rude awakening with regard to the realities of the late 19th-century nation-state and imperialism.

Nevertheless, the transformation was not necessarily as bald and sudden as has been made out, either by Tokutomi himself in his retrospective auto biography

or by contemporary detractors of his 'betrayal' of the liberal cause following the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The aim of this chapter is to present Tokutomi's intellectual development in the sense of the addition of an element of *Realpolitik* which engendered a change in the balance of certain relatively constant elements rather than a complete reformation. For a long period after the Sino-Japanese War Tokutomi never lost sight of his intellectual roots altogether. Even amid the political turmoil of the early Taisho period he continued to push for the expansion of the electoral franchise as part of the fulfilment of the objectives of the Meiji Restoration, and indeed his own original articulation of the liberal ideal *'heiminshugi'*.[1] Moreover, his ambivalence towards international cooperation and disarmament following the First World War arguably indicated more a distrust towards the Western powers' rhetoric and a continuing concern for maintaining national power in the midst of the Western powers than an inclination to maintain an imperialistic standpoint in some intrinsic sense.

It would seem that, at least up until the end of the Meiji period, Tokutomi was able to realign himself away from populist politics to a position firmly in concert with the political elite without any apparent inconsistency with his own conception of his earlier work. This chapter is therefore also an attempt to clarify whether in fact there was some genuinely consistent position maintained by Tokutomi and, if there was, by what sort of intellectual process this was achieved.

The predicament of liberalism at century's end: Tokutomi's response to *a fin-de-siècle* conundrum

At the beginning of the last decade of the 19th century Tokutomi was one of the most prominent advocates of liberalism in Japan. By the end of that decade his position was radically altered to that of an advocate of military development and, by extension, an apologist of the government. Given that the positions held by him at the beginning and end of the decade seem somewhat contradictory and are, furthermore, subject to championing by commentators of diametrically opposed political persuasions, a question that tends to be neglected is that of what remained the same throughout. In pursuing this question, it can be established that the impetus behind the change was not merely a subjective change of political sentiment but part of a broader crisis in liberal thought at the end of the century.

Perhaps the most obvious axis for establishing some sort of consistency in Tokutomi lies within his quest for a universalistic conception of history. In his earlier works, most notably The Future Japan (*Shorai no Nihon,* 1886), we can see how he arrived at this universalistic conception, drawing largely, although not exclusively, on the works of Spencer, Buckle, Cobden and Bright. This was a rather optimistic view of world history, reflecting very much the ethos of the thinkers by whom it was developed.[2] Nevertheless, with time this view was revised. Tokutomi's biography of Yoshida Shoin (one of the leading critics of the government at the end of Edo period and mentor to a host of leading figures in the Meiji Restoration of 1868) is highly symptomatic of this change. The original

edition was published in 1893 and very much reflected the aforementioned liberal sentiments typical of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement *(Jiyu Minken Undo)*. However, Tokutomi was to revise this work radically in 1908, reforming his whole perception of the Restoration in the process. Whole chapters that had formerly portrayed Yoshida as a kind of proto-liberal were excised, and in their place a conception of Yoshida as, if anything, a proto-conservative emerges.[3]

This re-editing of *Yoshida Shoin* is often regarded negatively by those who prefer to read Tokutomi as a thoroughgoing liberal who has mysteriously forsaken his former ideals. This is not an altogether accurate depiction of Tokutomi when one considers that the second revised version of *Yoshida Shoin* is quite simply far more accurate and incisive, not only about Yoshida, but also about the Restoration in general.[4] Nevertheless, the kernel of this later sagacity was evident even in his commentary on the Restoration produced around the same time as the first edition. The following quote, which comes from *Kokumin no Tomo* (3 November 1893), resonates with far more credibility than some of Tokutomi's more simplistic work:

> In comparing the terms Osei Ishin and Osei Fukko [literally 'restoration of imperial rule' and 'return to the ancient form of imperial rule'], …we see that in fact they clearly embody two quite different and contrary orientations. 'Fukko' represents the conservative spirit in that it invokes a return to the past, while 'Ishin' signifies the progressive spirit in that it invokes a renewal. Already in these expressions we perceive that [the Restoration] is a snake with two heads…. Furthermore, it is abundantly apparent that these great but nonetheless contradictory orientations can in no wise be accommodated together within either one person's mind or within the same piece of law.[5]

Here Tokutomi has encapsulated the contradiction or, if you like, the predicament of the Japanese in the mid- to late 19th century. Tokutomi's view of world history has already become more sophisticated; he recognises that the question of Japan's future development cannot be resolved according to a unilinear view of social history, but rather according to a more complex set of considerations thrown up by the circumstances of the 'come-from-behinder', one who must find his own path through to the goal of development on a par with the nations of the West. It is a more pessimistic view, but also arguably more consistent with the increasingly imperialistic tenor of world affairs, especially in Europe. We need to remember that the 1880s mark the beginning of a resurgent conservatism and nationalism among the major powers, England included, with the 1890s providing the first clear premonitions of an all-out conflict later to be consummated in the bloodshed of the First World War. On a more commonsense level, Tokutomi's shift in outlook was an indirect, albeit unintentional, nod to Marx's dictum that men make history but they do not make it under conditions of their own choosing. If Tokutomi had been able to choose

a scenario of history it may well have been one that accommodated the liberal ideals of his earliest writings. However, the Sino-Japanese War made it obvious that that particular scenario was no longer tenable.

Consequently, the second edition of *Yoshida Shoin,* with its reconception of the Restoration, suggests a fairly thorough reconception of world history. Most importantly, it reflects more closely the reality of the Japanese position since 1868; Japan was faced with rather unique historical circumstances and Tokutomi indicates a realisation that a vision of human progress depicted in terms of 'sweetness and light' was a luxury the Japanese (and, for that matter, the Italians or Germans) could not afford. To regard the forsaking of an excessively idealistic view of human progress *per se* as a betrayal of universal principles in favour of more nationalistic or even militaristic ones is an extremely seductive interpretation which seems to fit neatly with later developments. Nevertheless, given the historical circumstances of the time, Tokutomi's shift was actually well in keeping with broader intellectual developments in Western countries as well. Moreover, even the final move from a more pessimistic, albeit realistic, view of world affairs to the later, more chauvinistic forms of thinking was the result of struggling to come to terms with issues specific to other nation-states in crisis at the time (Germany and Italy being the most immediately recognisable cases).

A feature of late 19th-century intellectual developments that provides a vital key to accurately grasping the nature of Tokutomi's personal development lies in appreciating the importance of a transition that was occurring within liberalism itself, namely the ascendancy of pro-active liberalism and utopian socialism. This was an intellectual orientation which, though very much a product of Western historical development, nonetheless ultimately had an enormous impact on Japanese intellectual circles as well. The earlier *classical* liberalism was essentially non-interventionist and rested on a confidence in the power of private (economic) endeavour to secure individual interests in the first instance, social interests in the second. Late 19th-century utopian liberalism, however, drew from a quite different intellectual wellspring: the concept of the inalienability of individual rights and the licence to ameliorate society to have them realised. The former classical branch of liberalism was rooted in the status quo (hence the ultimate proclivity with this branch of liberalism and 20th-century conservatism), while the later utopian form drew on a priori philosophical assertions regarding how humans ought to live rather than how they did live. One can see that the step from this latter form of liberalism—particularly with regard to its utopian aspirations for improvement—to the revolutionary utopianism of (Marxian) socialism was not too far at all. Indeed, both traditions can be regarded as expressions of Western utopian enthusiasm, albeit at different points on the continuum of radical activism.

While it may well be argued that engaging in strategies for defusing class conflict became an unavoidable aspect of developing towards a mature industrial society, it remains a fact that the Western responses were very much specific to their own experience and conditioned by intellectual traditions quite inimical to

Japan's political experience up to that point. Noted scholars such as Maruyama Masao and Arima Tatsuo have provided ample illustration of the tenuous nature of the liberal tradition's hold on the Japanese political imagination.6 What they might perhaps have also stressed more emphatically is that this failure of liberalism to take deep root was not so much an indictment of Japanese political culture as an indication of the intrinsic philosophical implausibility of the ultimately arcane and indigestible 'utopian' elements in the tradition of Western political thought in the latter half of the 19th century.

Within the context of an increasingly internationalised 'capitalism' (in the Marxist sense) superimposed on intensified national struggles, the utopian narrative could not be easily disregarded even by those who recognised the incongruity between fact and theory. By the end of the 19th century Britain was moving further and further away from becoming the first industrial society to undergo a Proletarian revolution in the sense that Marx's own prognostications had suggested. Yet this utopian narrative would remain the most convenient intellectual vehicle for galvanising popular disaffection against those interests visibly entrenched in power. It is a salutary observation, made by Owen Chadwick, that such forms of political thought did not have to fit contemporary reality or even cohere with a high degree of philosophical consistency; rather, more often than not they simply drew on a popular though ill-defined sense of injustice.[7]

For any intellectual keenly aware of the nature of *this fin-de-siècle* conundrum, the prospect of effectively staking out a critical and independent political position would have been bleak indeed. Worse, the prospect of being forced into the framework of contemporary political ideology regardless of one's protests to the contrary was increasing as time went on. If, for example, we observe what was happening in England, we find that Herbert Spencer, the champion of classical liberalism, found himself in the personally rather excruciating situation of being congratulated by his erstwhile antagonists, the Tories, for criticising socialism and the new liberalism when in fact there was no Tory sympathy in his mind whatsoever. Had he the added misfortune of being an intellectual who partook of a culture that later became the clear protagonist in the ensuing international conflicts, he may well have been regarded as the father of early 20th-century militarist sentiment, a conclusion that would have doubly mortified him. As it is, he continues to suffer the ignominy of having the mantle of social Darwinism draped around his shoulders, an association which is unfair to Spencer (not to mention Darwin) and simply does not line up with the political opinions and actions of the man himself.

The fact that interpretations can gravitate toward intellectual figures quite independently of their own volition is something that we would do well to bear in mind when considering Tokutomi's position in the late Meiji and early Taisho periods. As with the aforementioned cases, subtle yet clear points of distinction that emerge from a reading of a thinker's works can be easily lost in the retrospective clean-up job done on an entire generation by later intellectuals.

What this suggests in relation to Tokutomi is the possibility of a degree of oversimplification in the way that he, and indeed his liberalism, developed into the early 20th century. This is not aided by the fact that his autobiography tends to overdramatise the speed and the scope of his intellectual reorientation from the 1890s onwards. He did indeed become an ultra-nationalist eventually, but the period between the revision that occurred in the 1890s and the final phase of his life requires re-evaluation for the possibility of a more subtle line of development.

I have already suggested that Tokutomi's view as depicted in the second edition of *Yoshida Shoin* was in certain regards superior to the earlier one. This had the potential to translate into a more sophisticated and meritorious intellectual achievement. The ensuing discussion outlines where Tokutomi's later musings led him, and why they did not take him further on but only towards the relative dead-end of patriotism. A crucial aspect of appreciating the reasons for that ultimate line of development will also lie in an understanding of the increasing futility of working within a utopian tradition of liberalism and internationalism in the face of the brutal *Realpolitik* of the nation-state.

Tokutomi's changing worldview (1890s-1900s): the conversion to the gospel of power

Accounting for the shift in Tokutomi's worldview is highly problematic, to say the least. As mentioned earlier, Tokutomi did not assist us in his memoirs by tending to dismiss his time as editor of *Kokumin no Tomo* as merely a period of overexuberance.[8] In his own account of his change of heart in connection with the Triple Intervention and the incensing compromises on the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, he wrote: 'The retrocession of Liaodong shaped the destiny of my whole life; after I heard it I was spiritually a different person.' This disillusionment is described as having profound consequences with regard to his intellectual orientation, to such an extent that he repudiated his previous devotion to Western thought. Later on in his autobiography he wrote: 'Previously I had learned from books, but during the 1894–95 war I learned for the first time from reality.... The influence of this war completely transcended the influence of Spencer, Cobden and Bright.'[9]

Nevertheless, there are certain factors which cast an element of doubt over how far we can take Tokutomi's account at face value. As I will detail further on, we know that he was already well underway in terms of rethinking his political position before the Sino-Japanese War. In addition, we must note that the autobiography was written almost 40 years after the fact and therefore pertains to an outlook arrived at during the First World War. Tokutomi actually can be said to have gone through two distinct phases of intellectual reassessment, one prior to and during the Sino-Japanese War, with another one occurring prior to and during the First World War.[10] The tone of Tokutomi's post-First World War works is indeed unequivocally nationalist and preoccupied with issues peculiar to the Japanese as an ethnic entity in a way that earlier works are not; the ethnic

concern being an element that emerged in response to the distinctly racial overtones of imperial conflict in the early 20th century.[11]

On the basis of Tokutomi's own account of his intellectual development we are led to assume that when he turned his back on liberalism following the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), the earlier influence was lost altogether. However, it can be argued that various elements from the earlier phase, including those of Spencer, Cobden and Bright, were retained and actually played a continuing role in his shift in political orientation.

Certainly, speaking from a general point of view, the events following the establishment of the first parliaments leading up to the Sino-Japanese War were to make.the traditional aims of the Minyusha, namely the promotion of participatory democracy and representative government along Western lines, seem more hopeless and, in some senses, irrelevant. The Minyusha (literally 'The Nation's Friend Society'), the publishing house set up by Tokutomi along with such important liberal intellectuals as Yamaji Aizan and Takegoshi Yosaburo, was to remain an important institution for influencing political consciousness right up to its demise in 1929, but was forced to revise itself constantly in response to the changing times. The issue of treaty revision had called into question the credibility of the Western powers as exponents of enlightened diplomacy and, more particularly, raised the issue of Japanese national identity. It was difficult, therefore, for the Minyusha thinkers to avoid the label of being unpatriotic if they were to proceed in their espousal of Western values. Indeed, many of the members themselves were beginning to sense the uncomfortable coexistence of Western ideals and Japanese identity. The acrimonious and combative muddle of the first Diet assembly, followed by the outright failure of the second to survive its full term, did not provide encouraging signs of political maturity and further highlighted the difficulty which the Japanese people would have in escaping from a traditional political culture that was prone to exclusive oligarchy and deeply polarised clan affiliations.[12] By 1894 *Kokumin no Tomo* was in decline, as the traditional Freedom and People's Rights message, which after all relied to a large degree on the notion of emulating the 'successful' democracies of the West, was quickly losing traction in the consciousness of the reading public. Tokutomi even started to forge links with those formerly considered his journalistic 'arch-rivals' in the Seikyosha (literally, 'The Political Education Society'), Miyake Setsurei and Kuga Katsunan. By the mid-1890s the invective against West-worshipping through publications produced by the Seikyosha, (*Nihon* and *Nihonjin*) had succeeded in creating an intellectual climate that made addressing Japanese national identity a *sine qua non* of contemporary political commentary.[13]

Tokutomi was therefore increasingly forced to accommodate the rhetoric of national integrity and patriotism at the expense of his earlier programme of essentially Western conceptions of representative government. In 1898 he was even to abandon his traditional vehicle of communication with the masses, *Kokumin no Tomo,* and focus his main energies on a mass-circulation newspaper initiated by himself in 1890, the *Kokumin Shinbun*. Yet, aside from this tactical repositioning,

there was also the matter of how Tokutomi's thought was adapted in response to these new circumstances on a deeper level, and we find that in some regards he was quite extraordinarily innovative, especially in terms of how earlier themes were redefined and repackaged. Kenneth Pyle has suggested that the key concept in Tokutomi's reconciliation with Japan's past and present was 'power'.[14] Tokutomi saw Japan's prowess at war as being an objective, irrefutable display of Japan's success at becoming civilised:

> By their brilliant use of modern technology and strategy the Japanese demonstrated that they must also be adept in mastering borrowed political systems, academic theory, literary skills, and manufacturing and commercial techniques.[15]

Pyle takes this embracing of the gospel of power as a sign that Tokutomi had rejected the libertarian doctrines of the Manchester School and Spencer's view of social evolution.[16] However, it can equally be argued that Tokutomi did not necessarily lose altogether the influence of Spencer, Cobden and Bright.[17]

The work of Wada Mamoru has made an invaluable contribution to the clarification of the above process by illustrating that, not only was there a gradual but notable emergence of nationalism in Tokutomi's thought already from 1890, but it was also an extension of the Cobden/Bright notion of commercial competition.[18] Wada notes an essay in the June 1890 edition of *Kokumin no Tomo* entitled 'A New Home for the Japanese Race' *('Nihon jinshu no shinkokyo'),* where Tokutomi, while rejecting the use of military might to overwhelm surrounding nations, nonetheless seems to regard as more or less inevitable the possibility of the Japanese people flowing out into other lands and establishing commercial beachheads that would lead ultimately to de facto control of foreign territories. In this sense Tokutomi is espousing a conception of colonial expansion not unlike that seen in England in the previous decades; a colonialism quite at home with liberal politics domestically and fairly predatory commercial practices on the international scene. More significantly, however, this also indicates the development of an international branch to Tokutomi's earlier thought that was perhaps ill defined or immature. Wada notes that increasingly during the 1890s the Minyusha, together indeed with the majority of journalistic associations commenting on constitutional government, was shifting the focus away from such domestic issues as decreasing the weekly working hours to pursuing an agenda across a unified front, which, on the one hand, lambasted clan-based government, but also aimed to concentrate national consciousness around issues such as Japan's capacity to effect independent diplomacy. The watershed, in Wada's opinion, comes with the article 'A Greater Japan' *('Oinaru Nihon')* in the *Kokumin no Tomo* of January 1893, wherein Tokutomi begins to display overtly for the first time acceptance of the need for real power to address issues such as the protection of immigrants in Hawaii and to redress the unequal treaties.

Consequently, we can describe the development of Tokutomi's thought from 1890 onwards as the reconstitution of the existing body of thought to accommodate the world beyond domestic politics. It was not such a major transformation as might first be imagined. It entailed the rather simple acceptance that commercial might by itself was inadequate and must be embellished with more tangible means of securing one's place under the sun. Tokutomi came to recognise that militarism and industrialism were not mutually exclusive and that, in fact, it would be quite foolhardy to espouse a purely commercially oriented political philosophy while militaristic societies abounded.[19]

If we examine what Tokutomi actually wrote at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, a position that is consistent with an essentially Western conception of civilisation (and what the possessors of it are licensed to do) emerges. Regarding the implications of the war with China he wrote:

> From our own point of view, this war has been conducted in order to free our nation. So far as others are concerned, it has served the purpose of delivering a blow to obstinacy and bigotry in the world, of projecting the beneficence of civilization into a barbarous society.[20]

This and other passages in *An Argument in Favour of the Expansion of a Great Japan* (*Dai Nihon bocho ron,* published through the *Minyusha* in December 1894) present Japan as 'a guide of civilisation', 'a disseminator of humaneness', and as a 'servant of enlightenment'. Moreover, the war with China is depicted not so much as a radical departure from Japan's earlier activities as simply the transfer of domestic policies into the international arena, constituting the first step towards taking a place among the Great Powers of the world and thereby securing an equal footing with Western nations. Most importantly, the reason for the war with China was not mere expansionism but, in Tokutomi's view, the natural extension of Japan's march of progress since the Meiji Restoration. Moreover, in an article entitled 'The Romans and the Japanese' (*'Romajin to Nihonjin', Kokumin Shinbun,* July 1895), he highlighted the existence among the Japanese of a capacity for political organisation and a conception of the state, and even goes so far as to say that the Japanese are the only ethnic nation in Asia to possess them. It was ultimately these characteristics that, at least in Tokutomi's mind, constituted a legitimate basis for Japan's actions. But perhaps the most telling phrase that indicates the essence of the reorientation in Tokutomi's outlook is the reference in *An Argument in Favour of the Expansion of a Great Japan* to Japan's expansion in Asia as a natural extension from 'national life' *(kokuminteki seikatsu)* to 'global life' *(sekaiteki seikatsu)*.[21]

In the writings immediately prior to the Sino-Japanese War we see this transferral of focus from the internal to the external in Tokutomi's handling of Cobden and Bright's gospel of world markets. As he states in an article produced in 1890 entitled 'We Must Sally Forth into the World' (*'Kaigai ni yuhi subeshi', Kokumin Shinbun,* September 1890):

> Carrying out business within our country has been a task of major concern all along, nevertheless, it should not stop there. Japan is a country with limited space and resources and we are now at a point where we are having the utmost difficulty in competing with other nations. Under these circumstances, we might be tempted to undertake a programme of aggressive military expansion but, apart from this proving to be nigh impossible, it is something we ought not to pursue. Rather we must send our race *(jinshu)* to the ends of the earth to settle, to carry out trade, and thereby spread our influence. Through the power that the Japanese gain, through whatever profit or political influence that accrues to their race, it will not be impossible to find that even an area under the superficial jurisdiction of another nation is in fact regarded as part of the Japanese sphere of control.[22]

Consequently, we see the gradual transformation of an earlier almost exclusively economistic view which had been limited to the domestic sphere expanded into the sphere of international competition. Later on in 1893, this programme of mercantile expansion came to be increasingly linked to problems of Japan's foreign policy and obtaining 'a national voice' in the community of nations. It was also tied in with the broad-based movement of the time which aimed to call oligarchic cabinets to account for their failure in the revision of the unfair treaties.[23] In this sense, Tokutomi was still playing his *'heiminshugi'* card, yet gradually his position edged away from a conception of diplomacy based on mercantilism to one that acknowledged the interrelatedness of military might and economic expansion.

As for the pacifist elements in his earlier thought, these too came to be linked to some of the hard realities of international relations. By the time of *An Argument in Favour of the Expansion of a Great Japan* (1894) he was to assert that peace without military might was untenable, so much so that even following the cessation of hostilities Japan ought to redouble its efforts in military preparedness. His earlier enthusiastic apprehension of the Spencerian model, which portrayed the overall trend of the advanced societies as being a transition from the predominance of military institutions to industrial institutions, gave way to a reconceptualisation where military and commercial development were regarded as two sides of the same coin. In other words, he recognised that under the contemporary circumstances these institutions needed to advance in tandem with each other, a position (regrettably) already current in Europe.[24]

The above indicates that there was no necessity for Tokutomi to jettison Spencer, Cobden or Bright altogether as part of his reorientation in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War. It suggests, rather, that what was entailed was a reworking of the earlier elements to the effect that a more realistic model of social development was produced. Furthermore, the hypothesis of a continuity of influence makes more sense within the context of Tokutomi undergoing two broad phases in the development of his nationalism. Tokutomi latched on to the

Triple Intervention as the crucial turning point in his intellectual development, but this statement was made given the completion of a process of self-clarification that had taken over 30 years and which had seen a rationalisation of earlier stages of development.[25] As we observed above, the shift in Tokutomi's position was already apparent from the early 1890s and was later confirmed with the reconciliation between the Minyusha and the Seikyosha. Most important, however, is the fact that Tokutomi's 'conversion' was not as earth shattering to his contemporaries as we perhaps imagine. Tokutomi continued to work on *Kokumin no Tomo* but did not encounter the kind of criticism of having 'turned his back' on the cause. It was not until 1898 that Tokutomi was perceived as having betrayed his colleagues by refusing to resign along with the rest of Okuma's progressives from the cabinet. In July 1897 Tokutomi had been given a government post to handle matters of public relations for the new Matsukata-Okuma coalition, but his insistence on staying on in the position following the rupture in the coalition revealed the extent to which he had become embroiled with the oligarchy, and it contributed to the demise of the *Kokumin no Tomo* in 1898.[26]

Tokutomi and the crisis of the Japanese nation-state

In the Taisho period we see the emergence of what we may regard as the more familiar face of the 'later' Tokutomi Soho. What started out in the 1890s as an instinctive counterbalancing of a purely commercial conception of international relations now emerges as a concern with power, pure and simple. Certainly the Triple Intervention left a major impression on his conception of how the world was, and he began to devote increasing space to the notions of *gashin shotan* ('swallowing insult but seeking vengeance') and *tai-Ro hofuku* ('revenge on Russia'). As the aforementioned instance of Tokutomi's failure to side unequivocally with the forces of popular politics in 1898 illustrates, Tokutomi was becoming increasingly immersed in the mire of practical political relations. He maintained ever-deepening ties with Katsura Taro, the protégé of Yamagata Aritomo, which were to bind him in the camp of the oligarchy even after the death of Katsura himself in 1913. He became engaged in close collaboration with the government in writing about circumstances in Korea, which portrayed the nation's imperialist activities there, both prior to and after the annexation, in a wholeheartedly positive light. In *A Personal View of Recent Events* (*Jimu ikkagen,* published through the Minyusha in 1913), he was to come out with the clear enunciation of a gospel of power, where principles without power (*muryoku na dori,* i.e. moral ideals without the backing of physical force) were regarded as essentially meaningless.[27]

While the victory over Russia in 1905 did not, as it turned out, assuage his fervour for imperialism, his conception of imperialism did not altogether extinguish the early elements of *'heiminshugi'* from his discourse either. Indeed, this could hardly be feasible given that the *Kokumin Shinbun* was now in hot

competition with other mass-circulation newspapers and was to receive fierce reminders of the dangers of infuriating the public by too close an association with members of the government. The first act of vandalism exacted on the premises of the *Kokumin Shinbun* in 1905, carried out as part of a broader backlash against the government for failing to conclude a more favourable treaty with the Russians at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, was to provide a strong indication of a force in public opinion that would have to be more practically accommodated in the long term. The second major attack on the same premises in 1913, during the first Movement for Protection of Constitutional Government, was fuelled by a profound disgust with regard to the newspaper's apparent pandering to the government of the third Katsura Cabinet. It provoked Tokutomi to make a public declaration of separation from the realm of practical politics. Regardless of the fact that there remained some kind of liaison with Terauchi Masatake, the new torchbearer of the oligarchy following the death of Katsura, Tokutomi continued to proclaim long and loud the editorial integrity of the *Kokumin Shinbun* and even weighed in behind the Movement for Protection of the Constitution, invoking the ideological talisman of *'heiminshugi'*.[28]

As an exercise in the art of political repositioning, and indeed commercial reorientation, the above train of developments is not particularly surprising. The interesting aspect from the point of view of Tokutomi's intellectual development, however, is the manner in which these changes were accommodated on an ideological level. The events of 1913 made it clear that a position that espoused imperialism with regard to the world and *'heiminshugi'* at home was no longer an easy one to maintain. Up until the Russo-Japanese War, success in military exploits overseas had been seen as evidence of Japan's success in carrying out a programme of national reconstruction and tended to bring various conflicting elements within the body politic together. Now, however, the nation's success in the international arena, far from guaranteeing relative peace on the domestic political front, seemed, on the contrary, to be accompanied by increased agitation among the greater masses. Japan had witnessed a dramatic instance of mass mobilisation towards a political end; what it demonstrated graphically to both journalists such as Tokutomi and those in the oligarchy led by Katsura was the heightened potential for overt expressions of disaffection towards the agents of government, even though the urban public, on the whole, remained supportive of imperialist expansionism overseas.

Tokutomi continued to maintain an ideological balancing act between his commitment to popular political ideals and the promotion of a sense of national well-being through imperialist expansion, But he was still being forced to come to terms with the pressure of accommodating the praxis of popular politics in relation to the imperialist programme at the same time. The mature expression of a 'resolution' to this problem emerged in a publication of November 1916, *Taisho Youth and the Future of the Empire* (*Taisho no seinen to Teikoku no zento,* again produced through the Minyusha), which was, in an intriguing parallel to Tokutomi's earlier treatment of *Yoshida Shoin,* a fundamental reworking of two

earlier works, *The Future Japan* (*Shorai no Nihon,* 1886) and *The Youth of the New Japan* (*Shin Nihon no seinen,* 1887). In this work he clarifies the nature of his reconstructed political outlook by stating:

> We must pursue democracy *(heiminshugi)* within, and imperialism without; and through the promotion of the Imperial Household as the centre of all things we can bind these two together.[29]

Tokutomi was relying on a third party, the institution of the Imperial Household, to bind the increasingly discordant elements together. Furthermore, this new position entailed a redefinition of democracy away from 'individual democracy' to 'national democracy' *(kokkateki heiminshugi).* In making these adumbrations, the fount of social change and political identity—which had previously been a conception of universal social history and a converging of world civilisations—was now replaced by the particularist notion of 'an unbroken Imperial lineage across a myriad generations' *(bansei ikkei no koshitsu).* Here, Tokutomi emerges with what in their essentials are the hallmarks of Japan's later ultra-nationalism, and it is tempting to conclude that here we have caught Tokutomi red-handed as a recalcitrant of liberalism and champion of an imperialism with proto-fascist leanings. Nevertheless, there is much involved in the build-up to this position which requires review to understand what inspired Tokutomi to adopt this position and what his ultimate aims may have been beyond mere national aggrandisement.

Tokutomi's last major attempt to couch his imperialistic vision within a quasi-universalistic framework (in the sense of a universal conception of history) was 'Japan in East Asia and Japan in the Broader World' *(Toa no Nihon to udai no Nihon),* of 1904, wherein he espoused the notion of Japan entering the ranks of the great nations of the earth, with Japan constituting the flag-bearer of a civilisation that would play the role of an Eastern foil to the West. In this article the avowed aim was harmonisation, in particular, of the interests of Japan and the United States on the basis of a rather novel concept of an 'East Asian Monroe Doctrine', or, as Tokutomi himself put it, 'the Far East for those of the Far East' to complement the American counterpart.[30]

The fact remained, however, that the development of 'civilisation' in Japan could no longer be assumed to drive the Japanese nation-state in a direction compatible with the aims of Western nation-states. The looming conflict with Russia provided the clearest instance of Japan having systematically to 'neutralise' the influence of the colonial powers in the Far East in order to realise a situation of 'the Far East for those of the Far East'. The practical implication of pursuing such a policy was escalating conflict with the European colonial powers, which would, in turn, lead to a falling-out with America based on its longstanding cooperative attitude towards the European powers in East Asia, Britain in particular. Tokutomi's attempt to reconcile the increasingly conflicting interests

of Japan and the West was doomed to fail given the rather optimistic expectation that the Western powers would

- recognise Japan as an 'equal' in terms of civilisation;
- accept Japan's claim to the entirety of East Asia as a regional 'sphere of influence'.

Another, perhaps more important, source of failure in this outlook, however, was the increasingly volatile and disruptive nature of the public in politics, which was to undermine any earlier confidence in the neat coincidence of internal development and external national development. This new political configuration was to force him to redefine the kind of universalistic historical framework that he had once relied on exclusively but now found increasingly untenable.

The process whereby Tokutomi made a fundamental break with the earlier universalist and, by extension, internationalist perspective is provided by Ariyama Teruo, who notes that Tokutomi's intellectual development was characterised by a series of reactions to disappointments in Japan's quest to attain recognition as a leading nation in the world. The successes of both the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were crucial in enabling the revision of the 'unequal treaties', but they had not led to the acceptance of Japan on equal terms amongst the powers in an absolute sense, it becoming abundantly clear that the issue of race was still one of the most crucial and intractable barriers to such recognition. Accordingly, Tokutomi began to become more concerned with the promotion of a positive national identity that would make the West sit up and take notice. On one level this would entail developing a form of 'positive imperialism', a form of expansionism not merely based on military victories and subjugation but incorporating a morally informed purpose which could be justified in its own right. The basis of this morally informed purpose was ultimately to be found in the notion of Japan's manifest duty, as the leading nation of East Asia, to promote the interests of East Asians, the 'Yellow race', against those of the White race. On another level, the Japanese people would need to develop a capacity for spontaneous and confident exertions in the interest of their country; hence Tokutomi's increasing preoccupation with the mental state of Japan's youth and heightened anxiety regarding the debilitating influence of Western culture.[31]

Certainly, the failure of Japan to gain Western acceptance on the basis of her earlier military exploits was a sharp lesson in the persistence of notions of a racial pecking order still being tacitly maintained in the West, and would rekindle the sense of indignation first felt so keenly following the Triple Intervention of 1895. However, this was not the only factor impinging on the process of reorientation. Moving away from exclusively Western notions of what constituted a fully fledged nation-state brought into clearer relief the predicament of Japan as a nation-state in its own right. In other words, as Tokutomi moved away from contemplating a universalistic programme of world civilisations converging and replaced it with a more regionalistic notion of international relations (viz. 'East

Asian Monroe Doctrine'), the serious nature of dislocations within the Japanese nation-state emerged in a more salient manner.

In fact, ever since the period immediately after the Russo-Japanese War Tokutomi had been a political commentator who sensed crisis in Japanese society, while others fell into a relatively uninterested calm in the face of the stagnation that beset the country. Certainly there were agitations which aimed to break down clan-aligned factionalism in governments, but this was driven on a more fundamental level by a frustration at the meagre fruits of Japan's recent victory over Russia and a stagnant economy, rather than by a sense of the danger of the modern political landscape.[32] For Tokutomi the personal experience of having the office of his newspaper ransacked by the mob perhaps placed him in a position to be more keenly aware of the destructive potential of the politics of the masses. He was also conscious of the lack of a spiritual spine in the nation, a dynamic that drew its impetus from an indigenous and self-activated force. The gap that he perceived in this regard was increasingly being filled by an amalgam of American materialism and, of course, the rise of proletarian political movements which were more overtly fuelled by an exogenous utopianism.

The basis for Tokutomi's reappraisal of the domestic (or 'popular') side of the equation is indicated in an article which he wrote for *Chuo Koron* in March 1908. The article, entitled 'Democracy and Future Politics' *('Heiminshugi to kongo no seiji')* stated boldly that 'imperialism cannot be successfully carried out while ignoring democracy; an imperialism that ignores democracy is like a flower with no roots'. However, he also clearly indicated that in the relationship between the two respective agents of imperialism and democracy (namely the state in the case of imperialism and the people in the case of democracy) it would be the state that would literally play big brother to the people.[33]

Consequently, although *'heiminshugi'* remained a key ingredient in Tokutomi's intellectual conception of domestic politics, it was increasingly to become fundamentally reconstructed around the imperatives of the state's role as the chief agent of an imperialist power. Other countries, particularly Britain, for example, were arguably able to maintain the classic formula of democracy within and imperialism without relatively easily; Britain's empire was already established and this had been done when the relative balance of military might was clearly in her favour, some 50 years earlier. Although the cost in terms of military expenditures to maintain this empire was increasing, particularly as the subject populations began to redress the imbalance of military prowess in their own favour, such costs were nothing like those required to effect similar imperial accomplishments from scratch in the early 20th century. In the case of Japan the demands of imperialism were an enormous burden that had to be born very conspicuously by the mass of the people, and so a much stronger vehicle for galvanising the support of the public was required. The strain that had been put on the goodwill of the public *vis-á-vis* the state had to be remedied somehow, and it was the Imperial Household providing the new basis for the relationship, as mentioned above, which came to take up this strain. In the 10,000th edition of the *Kokumin*

Shinbun, produced in 1919, Tokutomi was to discuss his reconstructed *heiminshugi* in the following terms:

> If we desire to ensure that our Empire is ranked amongst the victors [in international competition], we must put into effect a perfect form of popular *(heiminteki)* training and cultivation based upon the institution of the Imperial Household. It is for this reason that we have clamoured for universal suffrage, which is the urgent issue of the moment, and have as our ultimate hope the eventual improvement and perfection of national education *(kokumin kyoiku)*.[34]

This demonstrates the ultimate resolution of the contradictory framework proposed following the Russo-Japanese War. Since the people, and indeed the course of Japan's internal development, were not going to fit in with the demands of maintaining a major military power in the contemporary world, the people would have to be educated 'properly'. Ironically, the ultimate resolution between the pull of the purely domestic interests of the nation and the pull of the interests of the nation amongst the imperialist powers was to be resolved in favour of the latter, with domestic interests being sacrificed if necessary.

Conclusion

The transition from advocate of liberal democracy to state apologist has been presented in terms of having been neither as sudden nor as simple as it might be tempting to depict. Certainly there is an element of tragedy about the course of development that we see in the life of Tokutomi; it has an almost Faustian character to it. A young man who, so far as we can tell, initially had genuine enthusiasm for more elevated political objectives is gradually enmeshed in the intrigues of political factions. Moreover, he becomes increasingly beset by the demands of maintaining a mass-circulation newspaper, in particular the need to avoid alienating the clientele public. It might be tempting to take a cynical view of Tokutomi's political commentary favouring 'democracy' following the first ransacking of his newspaper in 1905 (and even more so from 1913 onwards), as mere 'window-dressing', a gratuitous ploy to maintain circulation figures. But what surprises one is the remarkable degree of continuity that is displayed on the level of paradigm from even the pre-1890 works up until the First World War. There was not the degree of redefinition of the essential elements that we might at first expect. The universal conception of world history and social development that he established with the penning of *An Argument in Favour of the Expansion of a Great Japan* in 1894 was, in an important regard, simply the expansion of his original view that commercial power had to be balanced with military power if Japan was to take up an active role in world politics. Up until the Russo-Japanese War Tokutomi continued to talk in terms of world civilisation and the possibility of harmonising the interests of East and West.

However, as has been indicated, the virulent anti-establishment direction that was taken by domestic politics (including the first Movement for the Protection of Constitutional Government) in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War forced Tokutomi to make a fresh appraisal of the imperialist programme from the point of view of domestic political problems. The fact that he came to focus increasingly on the Imperial Household as the core axis for redefining the earlier dualism of international life and national life is not in itself particularly surprising, especially given the need for some supplementary force in the public mind to maintain full support for the imperialist vision of Japan in the world. More important, however, is what it tells us about the problem of resolving the tension between international and domestic imperatives; it was no simple matter in the case of Japan to reconcile the contemporary imperatives of international competition with the tensions and ferment within the nation. The cultural and political 'health' of Japan as a nation-state, particularly as concerned the fount of national identity, was ultimately the issue on which Tokutomi's internationalist and universalist programme foundered. Initially Tokutomi had portrayed Japan's international programme as an extension of its development as a civilised nation among nations, and it was grounded in a dynamic and universalist conception of social development that kept domestic conditions to the fore. Later these conceptions fell into disarray as the issues of destructive mass political movements and perceptions of foreign racial prejudice came into clearer relief within the contemporary *Realpolitik* of world affairs. Consideration of these factors provides the basis for a more accurate and subtle account of the failure of Tokutomi's original internationalist vision rather than a simple narrative based on the notion of 'betrayal'. The emergence of an intractable domestic crisis of political culture, which was most clear in the disturbances of 1905 and 1913 in connection with mass-participatory politics and constitutionalism, was recognised by Tokutomi as a potentially fatal blow to Japan's capacity to develop a 'positive' imperialism exercised among the major world powers.

I have argued that Tokutomi displayed considerable acumen in understanding the dimensions of Japan's predicament at the turn of the 19th century. The issue that remains, however, is how well Tokutomi grappled with the issue of the dissonance between the international and domestic imperatives of the Japanese nation-state. It is apparent from his writings prior to and during the First World War that he understood the dimensions of the problem clearly. However, at the risk of being overly severe with the benefit of hindsight, Tokutomi's ultimate failure arguably lay in the political solutions that he espoused in the face of the growing political crisis, quite literally the breakdown in the cohesiveness between the nation—in essence the Japanese citizenry—and the state, in essence a persistently oligarchic government. Tokutomi attempted to reconcile the two on the basis of the imperial household, but the premise was that it is was the citizenry who needed to be refurbished more than the institutions of government.

This chapter ultimately concludes, therefore, that in Tokutomi's day there were great dangers in adhering exclusively to the imperatives of the international

arena and that great care had to be taken to grapple with the problems of reconciling the interests of the international scene with domestic political interests so as to avoid the pitfalls of ill-judged and ill-timed political prescriptions. As it turned out, the fate of Japan came to be conceived less in terms of the practical apprehension of the dynamic nature of social development in an advanced society, and more in terms of having to aggrandise Japan's credentials for successfully competing in the world arena. If Tokutomi had retained his concern for the universal and attempted to reconcile the international and national in a more dynamic and synchronised fashion, as indeed he had started to do from 1894 to 1904, we may well have encountered an intellectual figure who made a more constructive contribution to Japan's development in the first half of the 20th century.

Notes

1 *'Heiminshugi'* was the term adopted as the result of his earliest intellectual exploration of the contemporary milieu of political thought in the English language. While it literally translates as 'commoner-ism', the specific nuance that it presents within the context of the early Meiji period is an affirmation of a casteless society, one that had only begun to be established in Japan as part of the Restoration of 1868. As an important corollary of this affirmation, Tokutomi championed full and open participation of all Japanese citizens in all areas of social life, including bureaucracy and government, with a concomitant emphasis on releasing the economic energies of Japan's budding bourgeois class. For a concise and recent discussion of Tokutomi's early *heiminshugi,* see Nishida Takeshi, *Kindai Nihon seiji shisoshi*. Nakanishiya Shuppan, 1998, pp. 131–86.

2 Tokutomi Soho, *Nihon no meicho (40): Tokutomi Soho,* ed. Sumiya Mikio. Chuo Koronsha, 1984, pp. 18–22.

3 *Ibid.,* pp. 28–32.

4 See also Ishida Takeshi, *Meiji seiji shisoshi kenkyu* (first reprint, Miraisha, 1992, pp. 6–7), concerning the contradictory aspects entailed in the embedding of the Restoration in the ancient past for a parallel commentary fitting Tokutomi's.

5 Tokutomi Soho, 'Ishin kakumei shi no hanmen'. In *Kokumin no Tomo,* no. 207, November 1893, as quoted in Ida Terutoshi, *Kindai Nihon no shisozo*. Horitsu Bunkasha, 1991, pp. 3–4.

6 See Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*. Oxford University Press, 1963; and Tatsuo Arima, *The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1969.

7 Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*. Canto, 1995, pp. 10–11.

8 Yamashita Shigekazu, *Supensaa to Nihon kindai*. Ochanomizu Shobo, 1983, p. 105. See also Wada Mamoru, *Kindai Nihon to Tokutomi Soho*. Ochanomizu Shobo, 1990, pp. 73–4.

9 See *Soho jiden*. Chuo Koronsha, 1935. Wada, *op. cit.,* pp. 180–1. Ironically, Tokutomi depicts himself as performing the kind of political about-face that he had

formerly condemned Mori Arinori for in *Kokumin no Tomo*. See I.P.Hall, *Mori Arinori*. Harvard University Press, 1973, pp. 13–14.

10 Sumiya, *op. cit.,* p. 36.

11 Kenneth B.Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity* (1885–95). Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 173–4. Pyle also notes how the post-1894 Tokutomi was still not easily reconciled with Japanese tradition:

> The Christian influence on his thinking was too deep to permit an easy acceptance of traditional values as a source of identity. Even during the war, he still expressed disdain for the cultural elements that Miyake Setsurei [of the Seikyosha] could identify with.

12 *Ibid.,* pp. 138–43, 166.

13 *Ibid.,* p. 170.

14 *Ibid.,* p. 183.

15 'The Real Meaning of the War with China' *('Sei-Shin no shin igi').* In *Kokumin Shinbun,* 5 December 1894. Pyle, *op. cit.,* p. 178.

16 *Ibid.,* p. 181.

17 For a more recent discussion of the Spencerian influence, see J.Pierson, *Tokutomi Soho, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan.* Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 126–39.1 believe that Pierson tends to understate the influence of Spencer in his treatment of *Shorai no Nippon,* maintaining the persistent misperception of Spencer as the exponent of a unilinear and deterministic notion of social evolutionism. For one of the best outlines of Spencer's sociology and its application, see J.D.Y.Peel, *Herbert Spencer The Evolution of a Sociologist.* Gregg Revivals, 1992, p. 20. In the Japanese language, see also Yamashita, *op. cit.,* pp. 116–18.

18 Wada, *op. cit.,* pp. 70–1.

19 Sumiya, *op. cit.,* pp. 34–5.

20 Tokutomi, *Dai Nihon bocho ron.* Minyusha, 1894; as per *Meiji bungaku zenshu 34, Tokutomi Soho shu,* ed. Uete Michiari. Chikuma Shobo, 1974, pp. 245–55. Cf. Wada, *op. cit.,* p. 69.

21 Tokutomi, *Dai Nihon bocho ron;* quoted in Wada, *ibid,* pp. 68–70. For *Romajin to Nihonjin,* see *Soho Bunsen,* ed. Kusano Shigematsu and Namiki Sentaro. Minyusha, 1915, p. 396. Cf. Wada, *ibid.,* p. 78.

22 Tokutomi, 'Kaigai ni yuhi subeshi'. In *Kokumin Shinbun,* 4 September 1890. Cf. Wada, *op. cit.,* p. 71.

23 Wada, *ibid.,* p. 72.

24 Wada, *ibid.,* p. 76.

25 Sumiya, *op. cit.,* p. 36–7.

26 *Ibid.,* pp. 32–3. Tokutomi felt little inclination to apologise for his actions, and this in itself suggests that, for his part, his conduct was not inconsistent with the aforementioned explanation of his intellectual development during the final years of the 19th century. (See also Pyle, *op. cit.,* p. 186).

27 'Muryoku na dori wa yuryoku na mudori ni katazu.' Tokutomi, *Jimu ikkagen.* Minyusha, 1913; as per *Meiji bungaku zenshu 34, Tokutomi Soho shu,* ed. M. Uete. Chikuma Shobo, 1974, p. 277. Cf. Wada, *op. cit.,* p. 73.

28 Wada, *ibid,* pp. 184–8. See also Ariyama Teruo, *Tokutomi Soho to Kokumin Shinbun.* Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1992, pp. 179–97.
29 Tokutomi, *Taisho no seinen to Teikoku no zento;* as per *Kindai Nihon shiso taikei, Vol. 8: Tokutomi Soho shu,* ed. Kamishima Jiro. Chikuma Shobo, 1978, p. 65. Cf. Wada, *op. cit.,* p. 95.
30 Wada, *ibid.,* p. 96. Cf. Ariyama, *op. cit.,* pp. 303–4.
31 Ariyama, *ibid.,* pp. 298–304.
32 *Ibid.,* pp. 291–5.
33 Wada, *op. cit.,* p. 98. See also Ariyama, *op. cit.,* pp. 198–201.
34 Tokutomi, 'Kokumin Shinbun ichiman go', 6–8 December 1919; as per *Minyusha shiso bungaku sosho dai ikkan, Tokutomi Soho Minyusha kankei shiryo shu,* ed. Wada Mamoru and Ariyama Teruo. Sanichi Shobo, 1986, p. 414. Cf. Wada, *op. cit.,* p. 188.

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5
Nationalist actors in the internationalist theatre
Nitobe Inazo and Ishii Kikujiro and the League of Nations[1]

Thomas W. Burkman

Introduction

Japan became a charter member of the League of Nations in 1920. As one of the Paris Peace Conference Big Five, Japan was awarded a permanent seat on the League Council. Japanese officials and the public had grave misgivings about the emerging peace organisation when Japan adhered to the League of Nations Covenant after the Great War. In policy deliberations and in the press, realists clearly articulated their fear that the status-quo order inherent in the League concept would circumscribe the rise of up-and-coming nations like Japan. Complaints were raised that disarmament schemes would interfere with imperial prerogatives, and that global standards for labour would place late-developing nations at a disadvantage. On the other hand, the cabinet of Prime Minister Hara Takashi believed that sincere League involvement would accord Japan a visible place among the family of peaceful nations, in consonance with the spirit of pacifism that was sweeping a world so recently horrified by the battlefield scenes of Europe. The business community likewise wanted to cultivate harmonious ties with the trading powers. The prime minister also believed that the practice of party government at home would be strengthened and the clique supportive of military adventurism in China would be circumscribed through Japan's involvement in the world programme of the Western powers.[2] Once the Peace Conference took irreversible steps to establish the League, Japan lost no time in positioning itself to play a full and supportive role in the organisation. Though well aware of the nation's marginal standing among the powers and smarting from the dramatic failure to secure a racial equality statement in the Covenant, Japanese were sanguine that Japan's international status would be elevated through shouldering the responsibilities of global order.

Japan took pains to see that its role in the League of Nations was commensurate with that of a major power. As the only permanent member of the Council among Asian constituents of the League, Japan could and did claim to represent East Asian interests before the world. It continued to press the issue of race equality and speak with impartiality on the European questions which formed the bulk of the League peacekeeping agenda. High-ranking Japanese

diplomats were sent to represent the nation at League meetings, in part because distance precluded the dispatch of the head of state or foreign minister—a practice common among major European states. A Japan Office of the League of Nations was set up in Paris, not in Geneva. There, League relations were managed under the watchful eye of the ambassador to France, who possessed virtual veto power over Japanese appointments to the League Secretariat. Foreign Ministry officials dispatched to Geneva and posted to the Paris office generally rose to prestigious appointments later in their careers—an indication both that the Ministry sent men of talent to conduct League business and that service connected with the League was an asset in career advancement.

Among its best and brightest appointees to the League were Nitobe Inazo and Ishii Kikujiro. Their backgrounds and roles were dissimilar. Nitobe was an educator and former colonial administrator, whom Japan nominated to serve in the employ of the League Secretariat as under-secretary-general. Ishii was a career diplomat. While posted as ambassador to Paris from 1920 to 1927, he represented Japan in the League Council and Assembly. Both Nitobe and Ishii drew praise in Geneva as exemplars of internationalism. Internationalism in this Japanese context denotes a studied acquaintance with the world outside Japan and the disposition that Japan should function harmoniously within an interstate system. Internationalism also implies a willingness to accept some limitations on independent national prerogatives in deference to the collective interests of other major nations. By any measure, both men would rank as leading internationalists of their generation. At the same time, Nitobe and Ishii were men of Meiji whose hearts beat for the nation. It became clear at the time of the Manchurian Incident that they held the sentiments and convictions which are commonly ascribed to nationalism, and which ultimately led Japan to treat the prevailing international order with disdain. Some historians have alleged a *tenko,* or turnabout, in the thinking of such Japanese leaders in the early 1930s. By probing the complex backgrounds and careers of these two men, this study will emphasise the linkages and continuity in their positions and challenge the somewhat artificial dichotomy often drawn between nationalism and internationalism.

Exemplars of internationalism

Nitobe Inazo (1862–1933) was one of the few Japanese of the early 20th century to attain a world reputation. He was known in Europe and North America for his writings explaining East Asian culture to the West. His book *Bushido* is still read by those in search of Japanese values. The son of a wealthy samurai from Morioka, he studied economics and agriculture at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and at Halle University in Germany. His career included stints as a colonial administrator in Taiwan, headmaster of the prestigious First Higher School (Ichiko) in Tokyo, and professor of colonial policy at Tokyo University. While a student at Sapporo Agricultural College, he joined the Sapporo Band—which included his lifelong friend Uchimura Kanzo—in converting to Protestant

Christianity. He later united with the Society of Friends in Baltimore and married into a prominent Philadelphia Quaker family. Widely travelled in Europe and America, he achieved a command of English said to match that of a native of the British Isles. Nitobe served from 1920 to 1926 as under-secretary-general of the League of Nations. In that capacity he organised the International Committee for Intellectual Communication (ICIC), the forerunner of today's United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). After retiring from the Secretariat he took on the chairmanship of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and contributed a regular column to the English-language *Osaka Mainichi*. Perhaps no other Japanese of his day could claim such thoroughgoing credentials of world citizenship. For his contributions in linking Japan to the world, his face adorned the 5,000-yen note from 1984 to 2003. By all reasonable measures, he was the ultimate internationalist.

Nitobe's prolific writings include his *Japanese Traits and Foreign Influences,* which reveals the ecumenical inclusiveness of his humanism. From the aesthetics, religion and intellect of East and West he drew evidence that 'fundamentally human nature is identical'.[3] The League of Nations Secretariat was just one arena where he implemented and articulated his ideology of universal values. In 1919, when Nitobe was nominated by the Japanese government to fill the highest appointment for a Japanese in the Secretariat, the Foreign Ministry was deeply conscious of the need to upgrade Japan's image, tarnished by the Twenty-One Demands and the powers' allegation of excessive engagement in the Siberian Intervention. By making conspicuous a Japanese so cultivated and well travelled, Ministry officials hoped to convince the powers of Japan's intent to play a supportive role in the emerging global order of the League of Nations. At the same time, the appointment of a former colonial administrator in Taiwan with ties to the outspoken nationalist Goto Shinpei could allay conservative fears that Japanese vital interests would be compromised in the new organisation. Nitobe himself, who just happened to be in Paris in the company of Goto, was taken by surprise at the suggestion by plenipotentiary Makino Nobuaki that he fill the under-secretary role. He grasped the opportunity as providential, a sign of 'a Guiding Hand above me'. Resigning as president of Tokyo Women's Christian College, he joined an international team in London and then Geneva in organising the Secretariat.[4]

During his tenure as under-secretary in Geneva, he conveyed the goals and spirit of the organisation to enamoured audiences in Europe and Japan. Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond frequently dispatched Nitobe to speak on behalf of the League, because, he said, 'Nitobe is the most highly qualified. He is not only a good speaker, but he gives audiences a deep and lasting impression. In this respect no one in the Secretariat can excel him.' An Asian voice lent credence to the myth of the League's universality. The reputation of the League was enhanced by his personal magnetism, and stereotypical images of Japanese as humourless, unprincipled pragmatists were countered by humane example.[5]

Ishii Kikujiro (1866–1945) was one of Japan's most distinguished diplomats of the early 20th century. His name is attached to the 1917 agreement with the United States which acknowledged Japan's special interests in China. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement exemplifies Ishii's career-long effort to secure the powers' recognition of Japan's special position on the neighbouring Asia mainland.

Ishii was born in Awa Province (now Chiba Prefecture) in the twilight years of the Tokugawa Shogunate. His adoptive father was a member of the first House of Peers. Following his graduation from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University in 1890, he entered the Foreign Ministry and was sent immediately on his first overseas assignment as attaché at the legation in Paris, where he remained until 1896. Just before the turn of the century he served as consul in Korea. There, his nation was asserting its predominance in the wake of victory in the Sino-Japanese War. From 1900 he was posted as secretary to the legation in Beijing. Just before the Russo-Japanese War erupted he became head of the Ministry's Commerce Bureau. With other section chiefs, Ishii met weekly with members of the army and navy general staffs in the Kogetsukai. This dining club exerted pressure on the government to pursue a hard line in the pre-war negotiations with Imperial Russia over the nations' respective interests in Manchuria.[6]

Ishii was centre-stage in Japanese diplomacy at key junctures of the Taisho and early Showa periods. He was ambassador in Paris (1912–15) when war broke out in Europe. He was called home to replace Kato Takaaki—architect of the Twenty-One Demands—as foreign minister. His continental European outlook was said to be the major factor in this wartime appointment.[7] After a year heading the Ministry, he was sent to Washington as a special envoy and then ambassador until June 1919. Passed over when Paris Peace Conference plenipotentiaries were selected, he represented Japan in Washington while the post-war settlement was being hammered out in Paris. Then he returned to Paris as ambassador from 1920 to 1927. In the dozen years surrounding the First World War Ishii was Japan's senior diplomat in continental Europe, and Paris was probably the place where he was happiest.[8] Roland S.Morris, American ambassador to Tokyo during the second Wilson administration, described Ishii as 'a cultivated gentleman of rare personal charm, whose mental processes seemed more European than oriental'.[9] During his second Paris posting he doubled as Japan's chief delegate to the League of Nations; he also represented Japan at the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 and the London Economic Conference in 1933. His career, more than that of any other Japanese diplomat, was intertwined with the enterprise of the League of Nations. The principles of disarmament and the peaceful resolution of international disputes were the hallmarks of his diplomatic service.

Ishii Kikujiro was Japan's ubiquitous delegate to League gatherings until 1927. He was frequently chosen to be president of the League Council and was often designated its rapporteur in the investigation of disputes. In the Upper Silesia case (1921) involving contested territory between Germany and Poland, Ishii made a noteworthy contribution. The investigatory committee which he chaired worked

late into the night for two weeks and drafted a plan which was later unanimously adopted by the League Council, endorsed by the Supreme War Council and successfully applied in the disputed territory. Such Japanese active interest in a purely European question was evidence that Japan was no longer a 'silent partner', but an active colleague in League operations.[10] Ishii earned the praise of Frank Walters, who was associated with the League from the time of the Peace Conference and who rose to be the senior British official in the Secretariat in the 1930s. Ishii, wrote Walters in his history of the League, displayed 'the personal courtesy and modesty that distinguished all Japanese statesmen in those days, combined with bold courage and wisdom'. Walters commended the Japanese entourage for setting 'a standard of courtesy, industry, and thoroughness which no others surpassed and few equalled'. He named Ishii among those diplomats who, 'by their courage and good sense, helped the Council through difficult discussions; their patience, for example, in reconciling the divisions between Germans and Poles over minority questions, had been the admiration of all'.[11]

Ishii identified security and equality with leading nations as the two objectives that had dominated Japanese external affairs since the 1850s.[12] After a decade of Japanese involvement with the League, the retired ambassador looked back to posit the organisation as the agent that had lifted Japan's claim to international equality from the realm of the ideal to concrete reality:

> In retrospect, after we won the war against Russia, our nation was accorded recognition as one of the eight Great Powers of the world. But this was nothing more than a complimentary membership. After World War I we became a permanent member of the League of Nations Council, one of five such powers. This act was no mere compliment; Japan's aspirations became concrete reality. We gained genuine respect and authority. Our special privileges were not just the talk of the newspapers, but were given expression in the Versailles Treaty. So long as the Covenant and the Treaty exist, our special privileges will be protected. The accrual of a special position in the League of Nations carries with it weighty responsibilities. If the nation carries out its important and honourable duties, peace will be established through the League of Nations, and the will of the late Emperor will be fulfilled.[13]

Writing in his 1930 memoir, Ishii was supremely confident of the efficacy of the League. He asserted that, had the organisation existed in 1914, Germany would have thought twice about invading its neighbours, and Serbia would have reported the Austrian ultimatum to the League Council.[14]

Under-Secretary Nitobe often rhapsodised when describing the League. He compared the Covenant to the Magna Carta and Geneva to Mecca, and likened 'world conscience' to the still, small voice which moved the prophet Elijah. Basking in the placid landscape of Geneva, Nitobe pictured a setting of mountains and lakes as the special environment for human harmony.[15] By contrast, in his

professional life and post-retirement assignments Ishii rarely departed from the demeanour of an official diplomat. As Ambassador Morris described him, '[h]is approach to diplomatic problems was realistic and rigidly logical, suggestive of the French rather than the English tradition'.[16] Objectivity and restraint characterised his utterances at League gatherings. But in his memoirs he did show that he had internalised the 'Geneva spirit' which Nitobe and fellow Japanese in the Secretariat found infectious. In his 1930 *Gaiko yoroku* (Diplomatic commentaries), the retired diplomat recalled the 'new Europe' which struck him in 1920 when he attended meetings of the League Council and Assembly in Geneva:

> As a result of daily contact with one another the various delegates had lost much of their fierce patriotism and replaced it with moderation and a willingness to enter into conciliatory discussion. War they now considered a crime, while peace they wanted from the bottom of their hearts. At Geneva one might have been in another planet for all its resemblance to the old order. The premiers and foreign ministers of European states large and small had become converts to peace and were congregated in this sanctuary of peace to worship peace. The author also joined this congregation, and before long was among its most fervent devotees.[17]

Ishii was a logical choice to serve as president of the League of Nations Association of Japan after he retired from diplomatic service. Writing for the Association in 1928, he paid homage to the Geneva spirit:

> The world currents of peace, stirred by the lessons of the Great War, have drifted toward Geneva and given to that place the peculiar air known as the 'Geneva atmosphere'…. This atmosphere is a specific remedy for lowering the fever of military aggression and quieting the restlessness for war. Placed under the lens of Geneva, international disputes offer truly remarkable sights. Focused in the spirit of peace the lens reveals sophistry in sharp outline and brings out in proper perspective the merits of any case. This is the distinct impression I have gained during the past seven years spent in the atmosphere of Geneva and in intimate association with the League.[18]

Ishii celebrated the conciliatory spirit which prevailed in Geneva. He noted how the commingling of diplomats at the headquarters of the League led to friendly sentiments and, in turn, to genuine camaraderie: 'Through daily association with the representatives of these states, a mutual knowledge of national affairs and local conditions was acquired, statistical reports were exchanged, political and commercial matters were discussed, friendship and benefit in many other ways were afforded.' He noted that in Geneva he saw a great deal more of the French foreign minister as a colleague on the Council than he did as Japanese ambassador in Paris.[19]

So, by word and deed, Under-Secretary Nitobe and Ambassador Ishii demonstrated their commitment to international order as framed in the League of Nations. It should be noted, however, that during the years 1920–7, when both served in Europe, no major issue involving Japan came before the League of Nations. Nitobe and Ishii carved out their internationalist reputations while grappling with intellectual and diplomatic problems which were essentially European. It must also be noted that during this period neither of the powers who were Japan's Pacific neighbours—the Soviet Union and the United States—were members of the League. In Japan's relations with the United States, the major diplomatic issue of the decade—naval arms limitation—was settled not in Geneva but in Washington in 1921–2. Amidst the two men's incantations to globalism at the shrine in Geneva, we begin to detect a counter-impulse to honour regionalism.

The regional alternative

Like most Japanese, Ishii Kikujiro never consented to global order at the expense of regional order. Japanese who, like Ishii, were schooled in world affairs understood that concrete disputes between states had to be resolved on a regional basis. At least, this is the way European powers behaved. The Corfu dispute, over an island between Italy and Greece, was resolved at a conference of foreign ministers and not in Geneva. Ishii also knew that Japan's claim to major status was based on regional predominance. The persistence of the regional impulse explains Ishii's enthusiastic endorsement of the Locarno Treaties when they were concluded by European nations in 1925. The Locarno accords addressed European security issues left unresolved at Paris and later made compelling by the re-emergence of Germany. They established procedures for arbitration of disputes, required French evacuation of the Rhineland and paved the way for German entry into the League of Nations. It is noteworthy that the Locarno arrangement was hammered out outside the League of Nations, among the countries directly concerned.

When the treaties were deposited with the League of Nations, Ishii rose in the Council to herald 'this masterly work for peace—a work of historical importance'. He was particularly impressed with the provision for compul sory arbitration of disputes. Ishii attributed the conclusion of the treaties to groundwork laid by the League of Nations, and expressed the hope that similar regional security agreements would bring stability to other troubled regions of the world.[20] He repeated this theme in 1928:

> How was it possible that France and Germany, who mixed no better than water and live charcoal, were able to conclude a treaty of arbitration? It was the influence of peace which the League of Nations had patiently, over seven years, exerted over them…The seeds sown by the League were fertilized by the Geneva atmosphere and finally yielded the Locarno Pact.

> The Geneva atmosphere relieved the tension between France and Germany and led to the Locarno Pact between them, but it did not stop there. It spread to all parts of the world, and now we see it, in the League nursery, forcing the growth of a Balkan Locarno pact and a Baltic Locarno pact. How far-reaching is the effect of the Geneva atmosphere may be judged from the fact that it is even giving rise to suggestions for a Pacific Locarno.[21]

Closely allied with Ishii's efforts on behalf of international organisation was his support for disarmament. Ishii consistently argued for arms limitation, and never overlooked an opportunity to praise arms control in meetings of the League. He lauded the results of the Washington Conference on the floor of the League Assembly in 1922. Writing eight years later, he reaffirmed that 'the Washington Conference gave heart to the friends of world peace and invigorated the movement for disarmament all over the world'. He attributed the success of the Washington and London (1930) conferences to the consistent advocacy of arms control by the League of Nations.[22] Ishii had the opportunity to contribute directly to the enterprise of disarmament when he and Admiral Saito Makoto were asked to be the empire's plenipotentiaries at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. The Geneva Conference was not a project of the League of Nations. Its intention was to bring the five naval powers of the Washington Conference together to address the unresolved issue of auxiliary ships. It broke up when France and Italy removed themselves and the remaining three powers were unable to reach a compromise.[23]

From his observation posts in Paris and Geneva, Ishii had ample opportunity to understand that when the powers dealt with such vital issues as regional détente and naval disarmament they were likely to debate and forge agreements outside the halls of the League of Nations. The founding vision of a League replacing power diplomacy had not come to pass.

Even before the Manchurian Incident, Nitobe began to doubt that 'the concern of one nation is the concern of all'. When he returned to Japan in retirement from the Secretariat in 1927, Nitobe found that the universalist vision among internationalists had begun to fade. Problems which Japanese optimists believed international organisation could address remained unsolved after ten years of Japan's conscientious involvement in the League of Nations. Uppermost among these were racial discrimination in immigration regulations—a subject which personally vexed Nitobe—and economic protectionism. Despite effective participation by Japanese diplomats and Japanese members of the League Secretariat, the League was preoccupied with European issues. Officers of the League of Nations Association of Japan expressed concern over the regionalist tendencies in the League, and the Japanese press frequently referred to the organisation as a European club. Anti-Japanese discrimination in California, capped by the US Immigration Act of 1924, called into question the efficacy of

universal morality.[24] Nitobe expressed his displeasure by vowing never to set foot on American soil until the discriminatory Act was repealed.

China alone among Japan's major continental and Pacific neighbours was on the League rolls. The absence of the Pacific powers greatly diminished the organisation's relevance to security issues facing Japan. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were regarded as Japan's rivals and potential belligerents. Absent them, the League could never play a major role in warding off threats to Japan. It could neither protect the empire from aggression nor restrain it from pursuing autonomous aims. In refusing to commit issues of vital national interest to the League, Japan was no different from the European powers, who settled the Corfu case and forged the political and security arrangements of the Locarno Treaties outside Geneva. While internationalist Japanese consistently declared—sincerely, in the opinion of this author—their support for the ideals and activities of the League until 1931, some were at the same time candid about their reservations. The League of Nations which came into being in 1920 was an entity substantially different from the edifice which had been projected in the blueprints of the Western victors of the war. It was not the embodiment of world order that Woodrow Wilson had envisioned, Nitobe had embraced and many Japanese had feared, but, rather, a partial representation of a still-fragmented world—nonetheless asserting the myth of its universality. League detractors in Japan could not but feel that their earlier pessimism had been correct. Nitobe openly acknowledged the League's limitations, but asserted that 'the imponderable advantages [Japan] has gained more than justify her presence in that parliament of the world'.[25]

The late 1920s brought new challenges to Japanese security and vital interests, challenges which the League of Nations was unwilling or unable to tackle. The ascendancy of the Guomindang in China culminated in Chiang Kai-shek's successful Northern Expedition in 1927–8, which partially suppressed warlordism and accelerated the spirit of modern nationalism which had risen in urban areas in the months following the First World War. The patriotic feelings of young Chinese were increasingly expressed through anti-Japanese propaganda and economic boycotts. The Soviet Union had consolidated its leadership under Stalin and was growing in military strength. Japan feared communist ideological influence on the Chinese nationalist movement. In 1929 the US dollar collapsed, silk exports to the United States declined precipitously, and the economic props supporting international accommodationism were irrevocably weakened. In response to these threats, frightened voices in Japan called for an autonomous diplomacy to secure reliable markets, guarantee dependable sources of raw materials and construct a defensible regional order amenable to Japanese leadership.

In retirement, Nitobe was appointed chairman of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)—a striking parallel to Ishii's appointment to the presidency of the League of Nations Association of Japan. In this capacity, Nitobe headed Japanese delegations to the Kyoto (October 1929) and Shanghai

(October 1931) IPR conferences. At these meetings Nitobe and his colleagues clearly showed their disaffection for the notion of the League of Nations as universal order, in deference to the concept of regional order working through regionally based security frameworks. In his opening address to the Kyoto gathering, the former under-secretary-general called upon the League of Nations to conduct some of its business in 'regional congresses', where directly interested parties could hammer out disagreements.[26] Two years later the smoke of battle covered Manchuria as Nitobe led the Japanese IPR representatives to Shanghai. The Japanese delegation contended that Geneva was 'too far away' and was liable to pass judgment after 'superficial observation of events'. It called for a permanent body of Pacific nations to deal 'with questions relating to the whole international situation in the Orient'.27

In a few months the League of Nations would take action to investigate the crisis in Manchuria and pass judgment on Japanese initiatives there. The former under-secretary-general and the former president of the Council would then retort that the Sino-Japanese dispute should be settled by the parties directly concerned, and that the League of Nations had neither the right nor competence to intervene.

The idea of regional order would take deep root in Japanese minds in the 1930s and go well beyond the political arrangements promoted by the Japanese IPR thinkers. In the decade after Nitobe and Ishii faded from view, regionalism would change from a defensive reaction to presumed international threats, to a positive inspiration that was fed by economic success in Manchukuo and the aspiration of Asia's colonised peoples to free themselves from the Western yoke. What eventually captured the hearts of the Japanese people was not a framework for regional security and political accommodation, but an ideology of a racial and cultural order that transcended national identity and construed Asians as having common traditions and aspirations. In this pan-nationalist context, the hopes of Asian peoples—including Chinese—for independence were to be realised under the guiding and protective hand of Japan. The system would at once foster equality among Asian national groups and a superior position for Japan as mentor and defender. Japanese pan-nationalists' understanding of world trends was that the old world order of Western imperialism, liberal capitalism and global instruments like the League of Nations was in decline and would eventually collapse. In its place was rising a new order based on regional coalitions of vanguard nations. Hence Japanese visionaries accorded cosmic significance to such epics as the Manchurian Incident, the China Affair, the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.[28] When in November 1938 Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro announced the New Order in a radio address to the Japanese people, he made it clear that the system he envisioned was designed to replace the Versailles order in Asia. 'It is well known,' said the former student of Nitobe at Ichiko, 'that international agreements such as the League of Nations Covenant have lost their dignity because of irrational principles. There must be brought about a new peace system based on reality.'[29]

After Mukden

The explosion on the South Manchurian Railway on 18 September 1931 confronted Nitobe Inazo with the most frustrating dilemma of his internationalist career. As Japanese troops poured into Manchuria, China appealed to the League of Nations. League investigations led eventually to an Assembly vote condemning Japanese action, after which Japan resigned from the League. Despite his personal pain over the Japanese invasion and official recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo, Nitobe went public as an apologist for Japanese continental policy. In defiance of his vow not to set foot in the United States while the Immigration Act held sway, Nitobe undertook a dramatic personal mission to his second homeland of North America. He was impelled by his lifelong, humanist conviction that correct knowledge brings understanding and peace. He did not deny that his government deserved criticism, but he resolved to speak advice to Japan at home and not abroad. As he traversed the United States and Canada he tried to place Japanese policy in perspective—not only the perspective of the real circumstances of Asia, but also the perspective of the expansionist and regional hegemonic impulses which had shaped the historical development of the United States. For this task Nitobe—Quaker Christian, Hopkins-educated student of America, retired League official—was as qualified as any Japanese could be. Into this mission he poured all the arts of articulation and persuasion he possessed.

Nitobe arrived in New York in May 1932, where he addressed a nation-wide radio audience on 'Japan and the League of Nations'. He depicted a China which 'does not or cannot function as a sovereign state, in the modern sense of the term'. He warned, prophetically, that a League refusal to 'recognize the justice of our claim which involves our honor and our very existence as a nation' would force Japan to withdraw from the organisation and 'carve out, unaided and alone, her own destiny'.[30]

After receiving a verbal lecture directly from Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, Nitobe went on the air again to castigate a Stimson Doctrine which refused to recognise changes in Manchuria brought about by force. Stimson's position was, he said, a 'hair-splitting interpretation' of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The unaccommodating American stance was, he alleged, a replay of the hated Triple Intervention of 1895.[31] He vindicated the intervention of one state in the affairs of its neighbour as a rightful prerogative of nations dominant in their regions. He cited the United States' response to disorder in Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador as precedents. He chafed, 'We have learned many things from America, especially in dealing with neighbouring unstable governments, and when we put the lessons into practice we are severely criticized by our teacher.'[32]

Nitobe's crash course on American hypocrisy and his appeal for mutual understanding regarding the Manchurian crisis were doomed to failure from the start. His North American audiences showed little empathy for the exigencies that moved Japan. When Matsuoka Yosuke walked out of the League of Nations Assembly in February 1933, Nitobe consoled himself with the rationale that it

was the League that had failed Japan. Small-power members had goaded the League into misapplying the Covenant 'like lawyers' in a narrow and technical way, violating the broad and tolerant intentions of the statesmen who had drafted it. He urged his countrymen to renew their commitment to international comity. Speaking at the Fifth IPR Conference in Banff in August 1933, he issued a final warning about 'the dark forces of intolerance born of ignorance'.[33] A few days later Nitobe took ill and died.

After the Manchurian Incident exploded, Ishii Kikujiro also shouldered the daunting task of persuading the world of the rightness of Japan's policy. In his presentations he did not hesitate to point out the shortcomings of the League of Nations structure. The Lytton Commission, sent by the League to investigate the Chinese allegations of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, came to Tokyo in late February 1932. Ishii, as a veteran associate of the League and now president of the League of Nations Association of Japan, was selected to hold private discussions with Lord Lytton and make a prepared presentation to the Commission. Ishii asserted that Japan had acted in Manchuria out of self-defence. He tried to vindicate Japanese policy from every conceivable angle, and expressed doubt that the machinery of the League was competent to deal with the situation in China. Ishii went on to complain that the national self-determination doctrine embodied in the League of Nations Covenant gave peoples licence to break treaty engagements which they judged to be inconvenient. Ishii called upon the League of Nations to recognise boycotts as economic aggression and acts of war and to affirm self-defence as a legitimate recourse for the strong.[34]

Four months later the League of Nations Association published in booklet form an essay by Ishii entitled 'Manchukuo and the Manchurian Question'. Whereas Nitobe would have approached this subject by attacking China's qualifications as a nation-state, Ishii described a series of patterns of pretentious behaviour. Historically, he wrote, China had made outlandish claims on border regions. It had proceeded to treat these regions with disinterest and neglect, until a challenge to Chinese sovereignty by some foreign force stimulated China to assert its hegemony in that area. This was the case in Annam when the French challenge provoked the Chinese assertion—never previously actualised—of Chinese suzerainty. Only once or twice in its long history had China in fact ruled Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea; rather, for longer stretches of time China had been ruled by its border peoples. When China broke free of Manchu rule in 1912, the Republican government simply confiscated Manchuria and Mongolia rather than restoring them to their rightful self-rule. Even then, the region returned to near autonomy under warlord Zhang Zuolin, who at least twice proposed alliances with foreign countries. One border area after another had been separating from the heartland: Siam, Annam, Burma, Korea, Tibet, and recently Manchuria and Mongolia. The wonder is,' wrote Ishii, 'that China could have succeeded in maintaining until recent times her extravagant and often baseless pretensions of sovereignty or suzerainty over regions so extensive and so scattered.' The claim that Japan created Manchukuo was 'unfounded and

impudent'; rather, its birth was 'the natural outcome of a deeply rooted force'. As such, the independence of Manchukuo was outside the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty, the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris.[35] The factual details of Ishii's thesis are debatable; but, for Japanese readers, the skilful logic of the essay placed the birth of Manchukuo in the stream of history.

In a venture uncannily similar to that of Nitobe, Ishii too journeyed abroad on a mission to convince America that Japan's intentions were benign. His travel in the summer of 1933 to represent Japan at the London Economic Conference provided the occasion to pass through the United States. Like Nitobe, Ishii was briefed by government and military officials before his departure from Japan. Since he, unlike Nitobe, was embarking for London in an official capacity, he was summoned to the Palace for an audience with the Emperor. His Majesty was deeply concerned that Ishii's mission promote goodwill towards Japan.[36]

The viscount delivered eleven speeches in San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, New York and Boston. He spoke as an ambassador of goodwill, recalling the historic common interests of Japan and America. He drew attention to the sympathy that the United States had shown towards Japanese continental aspirations in the past, including the instance of the notes he and Secretary of State Lansing had exchanged in 1917. While he avoided public discussion of recent events in Manchuria, he did address what he deemed flaws in the existing League of Nations machinery for the settlement of international disputes. The League Covenant provided no redress for economic aggression in the form of boycotts intended to strangle a neighbour nation. 'The Covenant as it stands,' he complained, 'denounces that nation which uses force even as the last and only means of self-protection against treaty violation, as an aggressor…. Any peace organization which permits such obvious injustice and inequity is bound to be ineffectual.' As a remedy Ishii proposed that the League prohibit treaty-breaking—along with boycotts and related forms of non-military aggression—just as it forbade military aggression.[37]

Ishii's effort to persuade his American audiences of the justness of Japan's policies was no more successful than Nitobe's. After the London Economic Conference Ishii kept his post on the Privy Council but otherwise sank into oblivion. Whether his silence was self-imposed or forced upon him is not clear from the historical record. He died in a firebombing raid on Tokyo in the closing months of the Pacific War.

Nitobe and Ishii as men of Meiji

The inquiry of this chapter now comes to this: were Nitobe Inazo and Ishii Kikujiro genuine internationalists who underwent a *tenko,* or change of heart, during a national crisis? Or were they lifelong nationalists who indulged in a deviant, globalist trip while in Europe? Or does the framing of the discussion in terms of nationalism and internationalism handicap us from grasping who these men were and what impulses moved them and their nation? Let us balance the

account by looking at their personal and professional identification with the goals of the state.

The under-secretary-general who lectured on universalism throughout Europe was also a 19th-century Japanese cultivated in the mores of Confucianism, devoted to samurai honour, and schooled in the imperial intellectual framework of both Japan and the West. An exploration of this background helps explain why Nitobe could, albeit with pain, embrace Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and acquiesce in his nation's departure from his beloved League of Nations. In this section we will explore four aspects of Nitobe's nationalist persona.

First, Nitobe was loyal to the values and the ruling structure of post-Meiji Restoration Japan. While he is usually identified as a Christian, it must be remembered that the young Inazo was nurtured in a leading samurai family in the pre-Restoration hinterland of Nanbu Han (Morioka). Not until the age of nine, in 1871, did he make the trip by palanquin to Tokyo.

Nitobe's affirmation of commonplace Japanese mores is most evident in his famous treatise *Bushido*. This writing is a sophisticated though idealised exposition of the manners and morals of the Japanese. The ethic of *bushido* is presented as a kind of natural morality, a parallel to chivalry in the West. He wrote the book in the 1890s, the decade of the debut of the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education, a time when Japanese intellectual circles were alive with debate about the validity of the government-sponsored focus on a 'sacred and inviolable' emperor in the interest of authoritarian rule. In its time setting, Nitobe's book constitutes a rather aristocratic defence of official conservatism. While he quotes many political and social thinkers, Japanese and Western, he totally ignores the views of his contemporaries, like Tokutomi Soho, Nakae Chomin and Miyake Setsurei, who expressed ideas critical about the Japanese spirit. The book's passages on the role of women would be used time and again in support of subordination of the female estate. One wonders how someone married to the assertive Mary Elkinton could write in praise of a system that required the wife to be submissive! In deference to his Christian community, Nitobe explained that *bushido* built a foundation of preparation for further enlightenment through the Gospel, much as the Hebrew Bible laid the groundwork for the New Testament.[38] Because the book was believed to promote the values of discipline and loyalty to the state, it was praised by Manuel L. Quezon in the late 1930s as a potential tool for creating a fascistic, militarist regime in the Philippines.[39]

Nitobe received most of his education at the hands of the Meiji government. Unlike other prominent Christian Japanese of his generation, Nitobe spent his career in loyal and affirmative service to the government of the Meiji and Taisho periods. While his close friend Uchimura Kanzo severely criticised Japanese imperialism of the 1890s and protested Japan's war against Russia in 1904, to the detriment of his civil-service career, Nitobe and his wife Mary were drawn to embrace 'Japan's sense of the importance of her mission in the development of the Far East'.[40]

In the context of imperialism, we should not overlook Nitobe's enthusiastic and effectual participation in Japan's colonial enterprise. He was sent to study at Sapporo Agricultural College as part of the Meiji-sponsored movement to pacify and incorporate Hokkaido and its aboriginal population of Ainu into Japanese hegemony. As a civil administrator in Taiwan from 1903 to 1905, he played a significant role in the industrialisation of sugar production. He taught colonial policy in his Sapporo alma mater and at Tokyo University from 1908 to 1919. Nitobe's colonial theory emphasised benevolent rule and assimilation. Nitobe and Yanaihara Tadao, his student and successor in the chair of colonial policy at Tokyo University, promoted a Christian-influenced 'gospel' of colonisation as a means to civilisation and world peace, with clear moral obligations for the colonisers. They condoned national expansion in the name of benevolence. In Hokkaido, the Ainu were expected to accept a modernised farming economy and fade away. Nitobe pictured Korea as an ageing and dying nation with no future of its own. When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, Nitobe waxed ebullient in telling his assembled Ichiko students that Japan in that act had become a great country.[41] Colonial bureaucrats trained under Nitobe and Yanaihara would sew seeds of wrath in Korea through their assimilationist programme.

We see, therefore, a persistent affirmation of state ideology and policy throughout the career of Nitobe. It should not be surprising that this loyalty would in the end overwhelm his attachment to an alien international order. It should also not surprise us that many of the key thinkers and oper atives in the New Order in East Asia—among them Konoe Fumimaro, Royama Masamichi and Goto Ryunosuke—were former students of Nitobe.

Second, Nitobe embraced an evolutionary view of history. He believed in the irrepressible, onward march of 'superior' civilisations. At Hopkins he had been introduced to social Darwinism by the progressive economist Richard Theodore Ely, who also taught an economic interpretation of political and social change to Frederick Jackson Turner (noteworthy in American historiography for his Frontier Thesis). Nitobe accepted Herbert Spencer's view that modern Japan, like Europe and the United States, was evolving inexorably from a stage of violent militarism to a stage of peaceful industrialism, where the man of arms would become an anachronism. Yet he was conscious of the intermittent 're-barbarisation' stages to which nations on the road to industrialisation often reverted in order to survive. He accepted positively, as in his *Bushido,* the persistence of 'masculine values' in Japan as an aid in hastening the transition from militarism to industrialism.[42]

To Nitobe, Japan was in the forefront of the enterprise of bringing universal civilisation to Asia. Like Turner, he took a deep interest in frontier regions as incubators of national character. In his treatment of the classic Momotaro folktale in 1907, Nitobe drew a parallel between Momotaro's expedition to the Island of Ogres and Japan's southward advance to Taiwan and beyond. In 1910 Nitobe launched, with Yanagida Kunio and others, the Kyodokai, an association for the study of Japanese folkways (life patterns). Its members shared a belief in the inevitability of progress, and devised plans to record traditional languages and lore

before they disappeared—but made no efforts to counter the obliteration of minority cultures. Reminiscent of *genro* Yamagata Aritomo's delineation of lines of sovereignty and advantage in 1890, Nitobe painted expanding ripples of Japanese influence. With colonised Korea as a starting point, future outer limits would embrace southern and northern Manchuria.[43]

A third piece of conceptual baggage was the notion that China could not govern itself in accordance with 20th-century standards. At the time of China's Republican revolution in 1911–12, Nitobe expressed his pessimism about the viability of a unified republic on the continent. China, he said, is more suited to 'small local governments'.[44]

Nitobe believed strongly in hierarchies of race. Much as he was certain that Chinese were inherently incapable of a unified political structure, he believed that the American commitment to future independence for Filipinos was naive. During the Manchurian crisis in 1931–3 his 'Editorial Jottings' in the English *Osaka Mainichi* continued to insist that China would never become more than a federation of local political entities. He went so far as to question whether China qualified as a 'nation' under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Pulsing with the vexations that moved Japan in autumn 1931, he complained that

> the young Republic is still dominated by a crude and text-book definition of Democracy, which does not distinguish it from Demagogy. Her college boys may discourse on republican principles in the classroom, but they identify them with mobocracy when on the street.[45]

Here we see Nitobe expressing the 'Orientalism' of the modern West and Japan in their self-serving construction of Chinese civilisation and its potential in the modern world. Beginning with Stefan Tanaka, recent scholars have documented how a school of Japanese sinologists presented a picture of China as held together by an elegant culture but not by political structures viable in the 20th century.[46] Nitobe's construction of China, like his constructions of the Ainu and Koreans, served imperial purposes.

Fourth, Nitobe evidenced throughout his career a tendency to present a rosy picture of Japan to foreign audiences. Ota Yuzo has compared his discourses on things Japanese addressed to English-reading audiences and Japanese-reading audiences. For example, Nitobe praised *haiku* in his English-language *Japanese Traits and Foreign Influences* (1929) as an effective vehicle for expressing deep spiritual truths. In a Japanese-language work published around the same time, he said that *haiku* can serve to convey only superficial ideas. Ota believes that the compulsion to purvey an idealised image of Japan abroad was operating in Nitobe's efforts overseas in 1932–3 to vindicate the actions of the Japanese military in Manchuria.[47]

In sum, Nitobe Inazo was a complex mixture of Japanism, social Darwinism, and Christian humanism. The exploration of Nitobe's conservative views and affirmation of the conventional hegemonic patterns of his day helps us understand

the strong cords that bound him to the nation at a time when Japan and the international order were in conflict.

Unlike Nitobe, Ishii formed his perception of the world through experience in China rather than in the West. Ishii lacked the pre-career, intimate association with America and Europe that so marked Nitobe, and received no formal education outside Japan. He did not embrace a Western religion. Early diplomatic experience in China was more formative of his lifelong views than was exposure to Europe and America. He was known neither for broad intellectual interests nor for a large collection of admiring friends. The lesser quantity of his writings and correspondence makes it harder to get inside the man. No *deshi* followed him to write adoring reminiscences.

Ishii's long-term historical perception of Japan's international position was dominated by the bogey of an avaricious mainland, and at times bordered on paranoia. In a posthumously published memoir, *Gaiko Zuiso* (Random thoughts on diplomacy), Ishii emphasised the historical significance of Korean and Mongol attacks on Kyushu and alleged Chinese complicity in the Ezo incursions from northern Honshu. 'Our country was always threatened by powers from the continent,' he reflected. 'We never slept easily.... Under the guidance of the unbroken line of emperors, the people of Japan, firmly committed to sacrifice bone and blood to defend the fatherland, have never once from time immemorial surrendered to foreign threat.' Unaware of the history of valiant Japanese defence against invaders, the Russians suffered ignominious defeat when they moved southward through Manchuria and Korea. To secure its survival and the peace of East Asia, Japan established a special position in China after the Russo-Japanese War and made Korea one with Japan: 'Now recognized as one of the Five Powers, we are in a high position to contribute to world peace.'[48]

In 1900, as first secretary of the Japanese legation in Beijing, he survived the siege by the Boxers. In reflections penned around 1930, he recounted the desperate defensive measures taken by the legation. With no weapons or uniforms, he and his colleagues bartered with the rebels to obtain guns; his mourning coat was his fighting uniform. The Japanese lost more defenders than the other legations, and the others relied on the Japanese. In 1907 he was sent to California and British Columbia to look into anti-Japanese agitation there. He heard from White Californian workers how deeply Japanese labourers were hated. While he was in Vancouver, an anti-Oriental riot erupted. Japan Town organised its own security force, armed with swords, and escaped damage. Vancouver's Chinatown, by contrast, was undefended. Most of the Chinese shops were destroyed. The permanent lesson Ishii drew from the Beijing and Vancouver episodes was that the Japanese people, in contrast to others, had courage and drew on their own resources for self-defence.[49]

Ishii's *Gaiko yoroku* (Diplomatic commentaries), published in 1930 before the Manchurian Incident, contained much praise of the League and universalism. The memoir also went to great lengths to explain Japan's vital interests in China and Manchuria and the role that Japan had played in protecting China from Russian

incursion. After victory over the Imperial Russian menace in 1905, Japan had no alternative but to colonise Korea in the face of the danger of a Russian war of revenge. On the Twenty-One Demands, Ishii regretted the 'crude procedure' by which they were pursued, but emphasised Japan's primary goal of securing extensions on Japanese holdings in Manchuria. Over the years stability had not improved in the northeast, and retention of the Japanese position there was essential. The foreign charges of imperialism and militarism hurled at Japan at the time of the Twenty-One Demands had no justification. It was Japan's intention from 1914 to restore Shandong to China, and 'such magnanimity as the return of Shandong and Manchuria [1905] is not duplicated in history'. 'China,' he said, 'owes her present political independence and territorial integrity to her affinity with and to the protection afforded her by Japan.'[50]

In sum, on the eve of Japan's break with the existing international framework, Ishii Kikujiro viewed Japan's positive continental policy as magnanimous towards China and essential for the security of Japan. The Japanese strategy which he affirmed was structured to keep hostile foreign powers from conducting political and economic activities in East Asia inimical to Japan's security interests. Ishii interpreted 'interests' broadly to include political interests, and believed that they were self-vindicating: 'Japan's special interests in China are eternal realities, and do not require the recognition of other nations.' Apropos of events about to come, he emphasised the gravity with which Japan viewed any state of disorder on the continent:

> If China falls into a state of semi-permanent disorder, it is possible for European and American governments and people to dispose of their possessions and property and leave China, but…in the case of the Japanese government and people, it is not possible satisfactorily to do the same thing. There is the fear that the disorder may have harmful repercussions in Japan and for this reason Japan has no alternative but to devise means of quieting turmoil in China.[51]

Conclusion

In Nitobe Inazo and Ishii Kikujiro we see Japanese internationalists, who were closely identified professionally and ideologically with the League of Nations and the Geneva spirit, proving themselves in the final analysis to be capable of acquiescing in their nation's aggression in Manchuria and defiance of the League of Nations. They took that occasion to act as critics of League principles and practices. The withdrawal of Japan from the League in 1933 naturally brought grief and frustration to them and to the League of Nations Association of Japan, in which they served as officers. The Association took no action to protest Japan's resignation. President Ishii, board member Nitobe and other officers of the Association blamed the League and believed Japan had no other option when faced with the rigidity of the Assembly. Honorary President Sakatani Yoshiro

expressed the hope that, during the mandatory two-year waiting period before Japan's withdrawal became effective, the League would reconsider its position on the Manchurian problem and act in a more conciliatory manner.[52] This was not to happen.

The question of *tenko* is illuminated by probing the intellectual and professional backgrounds of Nitobe and Ishii. We see that the Nitobe who preached that 'the concern of one nation is the concern of all' was little different from the host of his Japanese contemporaries who affirmed moral conservatism and Japanese hegemonism. He genuinely believed that in promoting Japanese ascendancy in East Asia he was a participant in an inevitable evolutionary process of the advancement of civilisation. The Ishii who presided over League of Nations peacekeeping endeavours in Europe never forgot his experience of the Boxer Rebellion nor abandoned his construction of China as a historical source of and corridor for vital threats to Japan's existence. As determinants of behaviour, these personal imprints in the end proved more consequential than international humanitarian principles.

Notions supportive of imperialism infected even Japan's finest exemplars of international goodwill. When Ishii frequently spoke of international equality, he meant Japanese equality with Western nations, in which China had no rightful place. Nitobe's congenial private associations with persons of high and low ranking in the League Secretariat do not seem to have included Chinese. Both asserted with clear consciences the belief that major nations should enjoy 'special privileges' in the territory of their weaker neighbours. They lived out in their professional and personal lives 'Orientalist' attitudes towards China and the Chinese. Chinese aspirations for international respect and mutuality were treated as unrealistic or ignored as impediments to Japan's commercial and political programme.

It is important to keep in mind the geographical context. The realities of East Asian instability were very far removed from the Nitobes and Ishiis when they were posted by Japan to the League of Nations. Lac Leman, Ishii's 'sacred spot', was a singular environment, a hothouse of international comity.[53] Tokyo was a radically different context, to which Ishii and Nitobe retired after 1927. For a time genuine 'citizens of the world', they soon reverted to Japanese citizenship. They responded with patriotism to the real and perceived threats that confronted Japan, regretting only their inability to persuade the broader world they had known and loved of the rightness of Japan's actions.

The historian must also remember that Nitobe and Ishii spoke their minds in the 1930s without foreknowledge that the policy trends then underway in Japan would lead to the Pacific War. Nitobe repeatedly told his American interviewers that Japanese occupation of Manchuria would not be permanent. Nitobe and Ishii wanted the world to believe, as they did, that the establishment of Manchukuo was no more sinister than the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan and Korea, the Boxer intervention or the US machinations in Panama and Mexico—all of which were judged by nearly all enlightened, progressive Japanese at the time to be steps

in the inexorable progress of civilisation. It is true that the rules of international politics had changed at Paris in 1919, and the New World Order had been institutionalised in Geneva. Worldly-wise Japanese comprehended this. The Manchurian crisis gave them deep anxiety precisely because they knew that the League of Nations and the Western powers would object on the basis of the League Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But Japanese internationalists also believed that the new order was in large part a matter of style and rhetoric. They saw no example of Western colonial powers voluntarily emancipating their colonies before the United States announced a plan for Philippine independence in 1934; no major powers renounced their regional hegemony. The absence of the United States and the Soviet Union from the League of Nations burdened Japanese internationalists with a handicap that cannot be overemphasised. And they had seen repeated cases of League-member European powers sidestepping the organisation. By 1931 there were already signs of new regional hegemonies forming in central Europe and the Mediterranean.

Nitobe and Ishii were internationalists in that they were persons of broad international experience. They knew and valued the world outside Japan, and were held in esteem by that outer world because they could cross bridges between nations and cultures. They understood the benefits that Western learning and diplomacy had to offer Japan; they also understood more accurately than most of their compatriots the real threats that alien nations posed to Japan. They were adept at articulating the ideals of universalism embodied in the League of Nations, and in the early 1920s they appear to have voiced them with genuine sincerity. But they were also men purposefully trained by the Meiji state in modern, defensive nationalism. They were incubated in the struggle of 19th-century Japan to survive in a predatory world, not in the laboratory of Taisho democracy. The submission of the will to the state was especially deeply inculcated in men in the professional service of the nation. Had the careers of Ishii and Nitobe extended through the 1930s, it is doubtful that they would have raised their voices against the China War or the New Order in East Asia. In the final analysis, the claims of the state weighed more heavily with Nitobe Inazo and Ishii Kikujiro than did the claims of the 42 nations which in 1933 cast their votes against Japan in the League Assembly.

Notes

1 The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Shibata Shinichi of Kokugakuin University in locating memoir materials on Ishii Kikujiro. Professor Roger DesForges of the State University of New York at Buffalo and Dick Stegewerns of Osaka Sangyo University provided valuable critiques of earlier drafts of this chapter.

2 Frederick R.Dickinson develops the theme that Prime Ministers Kato Takaaki and Hara Takashi battled the forces of oligarchic rule and military adventurism in China, and that the Wilsonian programme at Versailles strengthened Hara's hand. See

Chapter 6 in Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan and the Great War, 19111919*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

3 Nitobe Inazo, *Japanese Traits and Foreign Influences*. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1927, pp. 9, 175, 189–206.

4 Kitasawa Sukeo, *The Life of Dr. Nitobe*. Hokuseido, Tokyo, 1953, p. 64; Nitobe to Anna H.Chace, 12 August 1919. Nitobe Papers, Swarthmore (PA) College, RG 5, Ser. 2.

5 Greg Gubler, 'The Diplomatic Career of Sato Naotake (1882–1971): A Samurai in Western Clothing'. PhD dissertation, Department of History, Florida State University, 1975, p. 90; Drummond quoted in Kitasawa, *Life of Dr. Nitobe,* pp. 182–3.

6 Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, pp. 70, 71.

7 Roland S.Morris, 'The Memoirs of Viscount Ishii'. In *Foreign Affairs,* 10:4 (July 1932), p. 677.

8 Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942,* p. 105; Thomas W.Burkman, 'Ishii Kikujiro'. In Warren F. Kuehl, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists*. Greenwood Press, Westport, 1983, pp. 380–1.

9 Morris, 'The Memoirs of Viscount Ishii', p. 678.

10 Matsushita Masatoshi, *Japan in the League of Nations*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1929, pp. 99–104; 'Report by Viscount Ishii', League of Nations, 29 August 1921. League of Nations Archives, Geneva, 11A/15257/14724, R632; Ishii Kikujiro, *Diplomatic Commentaries*. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1936, p. 156. *Diplomatic Commentaries* is a partial translation of Ishii's memoir *Gaiko yoroku,* published in Tokyo in 1930.

11 F.P.Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*. Oxford University Press, London, 1952, pp. 98,496.

12 Ishii Kikujiro, 'Japan'. In Council on Foreign Relations, ed., *The foreign Policy of the Powers*. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1935, p. 102.

13 Ishii Kikujiro, 'Nihon to Kokusai Renmei' (Japan and the League of Nations), c. 1930. In Ishii, *Gaiko zuiso* (Random thoughts on diplomacy). Kajima Morinosuke Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 340–1.

14 Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 170–1.

15 Thomas W.Burkman, 'The Geneva Spirit'. In John F. Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific*. Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 177, 207.

16 Morris, 'The Memoirs of Viscount Ishii', p. 678.

17 Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 136, 137.

18 Ishii Kikujiro, *The New World and Japan*. League of Nations Association, 1928; quoted in *Diplomatic Commentaries,* p. 138.

19 Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 171–2.

20 Ishii Kikujiro, quoted in *League of Nations Official Journal* 7:2 (February 1926), p. 181. On this occasion Ishii also expressed pleasure over Germany's impending entry into the League. Ishii, *Gaiko zuiso,* p. 338.

21 Ishii, *The New World and Japan;* quoted in *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 138, 139.

22 Ishii, 'Nihon to Kokusai Renmei', pp. 335–6; *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 192, 193.

23 Marc Alan Epstein, 'Naval Disarmament and the Japanese: Geneva 1927'. PhD dissertation, Department of History, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1995, pp. 318–20. See also Epstein, 'The Historians and the Geneva Naval Conference'.

In B.J.C.McKercher, ed., *Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899–1939.* Praeger, Westport, 1992, pp. 129–48. Ishii's analysis of the deadlock is found in *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 192–7.

24 Furukaki Tetsuro, 'Le Japon et la Société des Nations' (Japan and the League of Nations), 21 March 1927; Harada Ken, 'The Visit to Japan', 9 October 1924. League of Nations Archives (Geneva), Box R1573; Matsushita, *Japan in the League of Nations,* pp. 168–9.

25 Nitobe in *Japan Times;* quoted in *International Gleanings from Japan* 3:10–11 (October-November 1927), p. 8.

26 Nitobe, 'Opening Address at the Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations', 28 October 1929. In *The Works of Inazo Nitobe.* Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1972 (hereafter *Works*), IV, pp. 355, 356.

27 Takayanagi Kenzo, 'The Application of Existing Instruments of Policy'. In Bruce Lasker, ed., *Problems of the Pacific, 1931.* 1932; reprinted, Greenwood Press, New York, 1969, pp. 233–6. For an extended discussion of the issue of regionalism at the 1929 and 1931 IPR conferences, see Burkman, 'The Geneva Spirit', pp. 201–4.

28 Peter Duus, 'Imperialism Without Colonies: The Vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. In *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 7:1 (March 1996), pp. 56–69.

29 Konoe Fumimaro, translated in *Japan Times and Mail,* 4 November 1938, p. 1.

30 Nitobe Inazo, 'Japan and the League of Nations', radio broadcast, 8 May 1932. In *Works,* IV, pp. 234–9. For detail on Nitobe's ill-fated North American tours in 1932–3, see Burkman, 'The Geneva Spirit, pp. 204–7.

31 H.L.Stimson, 'Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Stimson and Dr. Inazo Nitobe', 1 June 1932. Hornbeck Papers (Hoover Institution), Box 258; Nitobe Inazo, 'Japan and the Peace Pact', radio broadcast, 20 August 1932. In *Works,* IV, pp. 240–50.

32 Nitobe Inazo, 'The Manchurian Question and Sino-Japanese Relations', 21 November 1932. In *Works,* VI, p. 232; *New York Times,* 14 August 1932, VIII, p. 2; 29 July 1932, p. 11; Nitobe, 'Japan and the United States', 28 November 1932. In *Works,* IV, p. 256.

33 J.Passmore Elkinton to Dorothy Gilbert, 15 December 1948. Nitobe Papers (Swarthmore College), NP-S, RG 5, Ser. 2; 'How Geneva Erred'. In *Tokyo Nichi Nichi,* 12 April 1933, p. 7; Nitobe, 'Text of the Address as Actually Delivered, 14 August 1933'. In *Works,* IV, pp. 301–3.

34 'Address to the League Commission by Viscount Ishii: The League of Nations and the Chinese Problem'. Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo, S1.1.1.0–33–774; Ian Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism.* Kegan Paul International, London, 1993, p. 238.

35 Ishii, 'Manchukuo and the Manchurian Question'. League of Nations Association of Japan, Tokyo, 20 October 1932, pp. 6–18.

36 Kubata Kanichiro, comp., 'Ishii Shishaku Kandanroku' (Diary of Viscount Ishii), entries for 19 April, 26 April, 30 April and 1 May 1933. In *Kokusai Mondai* 72 (March 1966), pp. 60–2.

37 Ishii Kikujiro, 'America and Japan' (speech at a luncheon at the Palace Hotel in San Francisco, 18 May 1933); 'On the League Covenant' (remarks at a luncheon at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 27 May 1933); 'The Sanctity of Treaties' (remarks at a luncheon at the Lawyers Club of New York, 31 May 1933). In

Viscount Ishii's Addresses Delivered in America, May 1933 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 16, 32, 33, 39.

38 Cyril H.Powles, 'Bushido: Its Admirers and Critics'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* pp. 108–12.

39 Grant K.Goodman, 'Philippine Bushido'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* p. 122.

40 Mary E.Nitobe to Joseph Elkinton, 6 January 1904. Nitobe Papers, Swarthmore College, RG5, Ser. 2.

41 Miwa Kimitada, 'Colonial Theories and Practices in Prewar Japan'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* pp. 164–7.

42 Donald Roden, 'Toward Remaking Manliness'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* pp. 152–4.

43 Miwa, 'Colonial Theories and Practices', pp. 167–9.

44 Nitobe interview in *Baltimore Evening Sun,* 13 January 1912, p. 2. Aware of the propensity towards national fragmentation in China in that era, some Chinese as well believed that a federated structure would best serve their nation's needs.

45 Miwa, 'Colonial Theories and Practices', p. 164; Sato Masahiro, 'Journalism: The Last Bridge'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* pp. 229–30; George Oshiro, 'The End: 1929–1933'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* pp. 257–8.

46 Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History.* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. It should be noted that views disqualifying China for modern nationhood were also common in Europe and North America at the time.

47 Ota, 'Mediation between Cultures'. In Howes, ed., *Nitobe Inazo,* pp. 240–1.

48 Ishii Kikujiro, *Gaiko zuiso,* pp. 329–35.

49 Ishii, *Gaiko zuiso,* pp. 329–31.

50 Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 80–95, 135.

51 Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries,* pp. 95, 135.

52 Ogata Sadako, 'The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations'. In Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941.* Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, pp. 474–5.

53 Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries,* p. 172.

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6
Yoshino Sakuzo
The isolated figurehead of the Taisho generation

Dick Stegewerns

Introduction

Although Yoshino Sakuzo's portrait, unlike that of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Nitobe Inazo, does not yet adorn a Japanese banknote, I think that because of his fame as the figurehead of the so-called Taisho democracy there is hardly any need for a biographical introduction. Let it suffice to say that he was born in 1878, was always top of his class, and graduated from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, the top of Japan's pyramid of education, in 1904. In 1898, at the age of 20, Yoshino was baptised in the Christian faith. He spent three years in China from 1906 to 1909 and three years in Europe from 1910 to 1913. On his return he took up the position of professor in political history at his alma mater and in 1914 he also became the leading columnist of the *Chuo Koron,* the most influential all-round magazine of the day. Due to the status of his scholarly position and, probably even more, to the radius of his journalistic side-job, Yoshino soon became one of the most prominent opinion leaders in the field of national politics and international relations in the Japan of the late 1910s and early 1920s. At the end of the 1920s his popularity gradually declined. He died at the early age of 55 in 1933.

In this contribution to the general theme of the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism in pre-war modern Japan, I analyse Yoshino's ideas on nationalism, regionalism and internationalism covering the period 1905–33. While doing so I will put particular emphasis upon the fact that, although he was a prominent mouthpiece of his generation, Yoshino's internationalism, nonetheless, was of quite a different character compared to his contemporaries.

Yoshino's early internationalism (1905–15)

According to Yoshino, Japan joined 'world politics' with its victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. During these years he published his first articles. However, at this time his conception of 'world politics' was very limited. He stated, 'We don't have direct political interests in Europe and America, so we will not interfere in their private business',[1] and one can imagine that he hoped

the same to be true for the Western powers in East Asia. Thus, when Japan was confronted with European clamour over the rise of a 'yellow peril' in the East, Yoshino did not see any reason why Japan should engage in self-reflection:

> These suspicions are nothing but a reflection of Japan's increased power… and form an objective indication of the superiority of the Japanese ethnic nation…. It is not strange that they do not like to see a strong Japan in the Orient, the region of future West European expansion…but it is inevitable…. All we can do is to show them that Japan's peaceful expansion will not intrude upon their rights and interests…and, in the meanwhile, strive to become a strong great power quickly so we can make them shut their mouth…. We should not take outside criticism into consideration.[2]

During the next decade Yoshino's conception of 'world politics' fundamentally changed and his attitude towards the outside world turned a full 180 degrees and was never to swing back. Japan had indeed become one of the countries of the world, but with the world increasingly becoming one, Yoshino no longer agreed that Japan had to aim at becoming a 'strong great power'. Now he urged it to become a first-rate country. Japan was no longer considered lacking in power, but lacking in civilisation and morality.[3] Yoshino's view of his fellow countrymen had turned very harsh, and he tended to use every piece of outside criticism as a pretext to urge them to self-reflect. As far as national policy was concerned, Yoshino was prepared to spare the people as he pointed to the 'unreligious and corrupt' political elite and their 'strong-hand rule completely void of any sort of social policy' as the main culprit:

There is no country where there is so little compassion and understanding for the weak, and law and politics are so much conceived to protect the superior class as in Japan.[4]

However, in the field of Japan's foreign policy he showed less remorse for the common man; because of their education he regarded the Japanese of his day as 'small-minded patriots' and 'egoists': 'They may have become good Japanese citizens but they lack the credentials as world citizens.'[5] Moreover, Japanese emigrants to the United States would not have been overjoyed to hear Yoshino say that at their present level of civilisation and international morality it was only natural they would be ostracised wherever they went.[6]

Such harsh remarks called for some explanation from Yoshino as to what he saw as the most prominent elements of civilisation and international morality and how one could become a world citizen. Although Yoshino is not the type to give clear definitions of the concepts he uses in his writings, it is not hard to reconstruct these. His conception of civilisation was predominantly linked to political progress—to be more specific, to modern democracy—and thus was monistic and universal. He treated democracy as the most conspicuous international trend and he determined the stage of civilisation of a country by the degree to which it had brought about constitutional government.[7] He thought a

system of a cabinet responsible to an elected parliament *(sekinin naikakusei)* the ideal manifestation of constitutional government, and only awarded the honorary title of 'a modern civilised country' to those countries he considered 'society-states', i.e. states that were based on the will of the people.[8]

Since the evolutionary process towards modern democracy had started in Europe, which, partly because of its leader position, had clearly attained the then-highest stage of constitutional government, Yoshino had no hesitation in designating Europe as the most civilised part of the world.[9] Although he regarded Japan as the first instance of modern progress in the Orient, he pointed out that the country was still in the transitional stage 'from the age of blind obedience to the age of enlightenment'. This stage, Yoshino pointed out, had not lasted that long in the case of the European pioneer countries, but in Japan it was rather extended because of the deficiencies of education.[10] Nevertheless, he already considered his country more civilised than a European entity such as the Russian Empire, which is evident from the fact that one of the reasons he supported the Russo-Japanese War was that he thought the Japanese had the task, on behalf of world civilisation, of enlightening the Russians with 'political modernism' *(seijiteki kinseishugi)*.[11]

For Yoshino it was no mere coincidence that political democracy originated in Europe and the European countries now formed the zenith of civilisation. In his opinion there were three conditions to the rise and development of democracy. First, one had to look upon human nature as virtuous. Second, one had to look upon one's fellow man as an equal—that is, in the sense that each individual, at least theoretically, has the capacity to develop without limit. The third condition was that those who had already attained a certain level of development, the pioneers *(senkakusha),* would consider it their moral duty towards society to guide those lagging behind and help them on the right track. All these qualities beneficial to the rise of democracy and civilisation Yoshino thought present in what he considered to be the major constituents of the 'Christian mentality' or 'Christian morality': the positive and optimistic view of man, the emphasis on equality and the propagation of compassion.[12]

Just as in the case of national society, the Christian mentality was at the heart of Yoshino's views on international society as well. During his stay in Germany he had seen the play *Nathan der Weise* (Nathan the Wise) by Gottfried Lessing, an event he later declared to have been the most inspiring event in his life. The play is in essence an indictment of racial and religious discrimination and tries to stimulate a sense of international friendship. It very clearly succeeded in doing so in the case of Yoshino; it made him realise that 'ethnic national and religious distinctions are merely manifestations of the fact that man is in origin one' and that therefore 'human sentiment should transcend ethnic national and religious barriers'.[13] Although Yoshino was not blind to the fact that the play itself was not altogether favourable to the Christian clergy, he nevertheless expressed his new awareness mostly by means of Christian vocabulary such as 'God's love for mankind is universal' and 'the universal brotherhood of man'.

However, it goes without saying that in Yoshino's day even the first steps towards the ideal of a brotherhood of world citizens were yet to be made. Again, Yoshino did not despair and vested his hopes in the Christian value of compassion to stimulate internationalism and, in the process, raise the general level of world civilisation. He maintained that the political and social elite of the world society, assembled in a few modern civilised states, had the public duty towards the whole of mankind of unselfishly helping the underdeveloped countries. Accordingly, the diplomacy of the modern state had to be based on 'noble ideals grounded in a religious spirit', which was to be both 'grand and cosmopolitan' *(idai naru sekaiteki seishin)*.[14] This compassionate spirit was, according to Yoshino, best represented by the ideals of international justice *(seigi)* and humanitarianism *(jindo)* and their champion Woodrow Wilson. Already before the outbreak of the First World War, Yoshino had expressed his 'highest respect' for this outspoken religious man, since he regarded him as the most eminent example of the moral political leader who was even prepared to sacrifice the interests of the state on behalf of his international ideals.[15]

In sharp contrast to his praise for Great Britain and the United States, Yoshino was extremely critical of his own country; democracy had not developed to such an extent that Japan could really be termed civilised, a cosmopolitan spirit was all but absent amongst the Japanese, and their leaders did not yet seem to have heard of the virtue of compassion in international relations. In order for Japan to be able to continue to play a part on the stage of world politics, which Yoshino considered to be increasingly ruled by internationalism and cooperativism, the country had to change its view of the outside world fundamentally and had to concentrate on contributing to the progress of world civilisation. However, knowing what had to be done, one glance at his country was sufficient to make him lose all hope. He could not even think of one specific Japanese feature that might contribute to world civilisation, and accordingly he fully recognised Japan's inferiority to the West.[16]

Harmonisation of internationalism and national interest: Yoshino's regionalism (1915–17)

So much for theory. Although the abovementioned theories on internationalism form a constant and very important current in Yoshino's ideas on international relations, he was not merely an idealist but also a pragmatist. Whereas he was willing to accept Japanese inferiority *vis-à-vis* the 'Christian civilised nations of the West' in the abstract field of world politics, in the practical case of the only part of the world Japan was confronted with in everyday international life, the adjacent arena of East Asia, Yoshino had no problem whatsoever in claiming Japanese superiority in the region. First of all there was China, since with Korea and Taiwan already being part of the Japanese Empire this was what the terms 'East Asia', 'the East' and 'the Orient' usually covered. Although he had been in China for three years, he had only gone there for financial reasons, whereas he

had actually wanted to go to Europe. His stay there did not result in any form of interest or sympathy for the country, as will be clear from the following characterisation:

> The Chinese have not been to the West, they don't speak their languages, they lack quality, they are cunning, treacherous, immoral, unfaithful, and they lack an autonomous policy.[17]

Moreover, in Yoshino's analysis China also lacked the various preconditions to become a modern nation:

> They lack the patriotism *(yukoku aimin)* necessary to help the country. The Chinese are mainly driven by private interests and hardly care about their incredibly backward political system. Even the revolutionary party is not sincere.[18]

However, China, 'the last scene of competition between the colonialist powers', could not just be cast aside as hopeless. The fact that Yoshino adhered to internationalism did not imply that he rejected imperialism. On the contrary, like most of his contemporaries he was very much aware of the need of his country to expand across its borders in order to secure its position on the world's stage, and he acknowledged both colonialism and forms of informal imperialism as means to realise this national aim. Moreover, it is evident from Yoshino's regular allusions to 'the superb colonial qualities of the British nation' that he regarded empire as an essential part and a glorious symbol of the high-level 'modern civilised state'. In the case of Japan, it was of course the weak giant China that was perceived as the natural direction its imperialist aims and ambitions should take. Thus, even if one did not have any sympathy for the country and its people, and even if one considered the Western imperialist powers morally superior, there could be no doubt that China's territory had to be safeguarded against them. While all powers openly paid tribute to the principles of equal opportunities and the open door, Yoshino was not the first to notice that these were but hollow phrases and in practice everybody was creating his own isolationist sphere of influence, a development he considered desirable neither for China nor, more importantly, for Japan.[19]

Although Yoshino was frank enough to say that 'for Japan it would be most desirable to simply place the whole of China under its influence', he admitted that this was not realistic when considering Japan's political and moral authority *vis-à-vis* the West.[20] Therefore he proposed a framework which would legitimise Japan's aims and thus would reinforce its somewhat weak position, namely 'Monroe-ism'.[21] Things could not be easier. Just because Japan was the most developed regional power, it had the authority to claim special rights and interests in its own backyard. If Great Britain and the United States were not willing to recognise Japan's special position in China, it was they who were morally wrong,

since they would deny Japan its national destiny.[22] Just as Britain was entitled to the Indian Ocean, the United States to Central and South America, and Russia to the Middle East, Japan was entitled to the Far East.[23] Japan's case was even stronger than that of some of the other powers, since Japan was overpopulated and not self-sufficient in most areas, so it could not do without the natural resources and markets 'in the safest and most convenient regions', namely China, India and the South Sea Islands.[24] While no Japanese would seriously contend stretching Japan's backyard all the way to India, Yoshino was adamant that Japan could not and should not compromise where China was concerned, since 'our development there is a matter of life and death for the future of our country'.[25] The Western powers were not entitled to a position in the Far East equal to Japan, so they were the ones who had to compromise.[26] And this, he observed, was exactly what happened in the war years of 1916, when the British replaced their anti-Japanese ambassador in Peking, and 1917, when the Americans signed the American-Japanese joint note on China, better known as the Ishii-Lansing agreement.[27] He concluded as follows:

> The Americans, following the British and French example, have recognised Japan's political superiority in the whole of China. They have admitted that they can do nothing without Japan's consent.[28]

Although the mission thus seemed completed, Yoshino was not so blind as to assume that the 'civilised British' were pleased to accept superiority by an essentially inferior country and that the 'moral Americans' had accepted the general principle of Chinese sovereignty being trampled upon. He knew that these were just the temporary effects of the abnormal situation of a power vacuum in the East as a result of a war in the West. If Japan wanted to retain its position as a superior, the country had to make serious preparations for the post-war period, when everything would be more or less back to normal and the competition between the economic and colonial rivals would start afresh. Yoshino did not propose that his country join and try to win the arms race he predicted would ensue in the post-war world. He did not think his country was able to ward off completely the post-war rush of the powers towards the markets and resources of the Far East. So slightly more humbly he proposed that for the near future Japan had 'the divine mission to moderate the rivalry amongst the Western powers and to secure the safety of the ethnic nations of the Orient'.[29] Although God had ordained that Japan be given this mission, Yoshino was not altogether confident that Japan could achieve it on its own. Japan needed an ally, and, moreover, a strong ally. Since he could think of no other alternative than the weak giant of China, the only option was that this country became strong, so that together they could proceed to form a regional bloc to ward off any further Western encroachment. Although he was not blind to the considerable amount of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, which would seem a major obstacle to such a cooperative Sino-Japanese scheme, Yoshino was rather optimistic. The source of

anti-Japanese sentiment in China, he determined, was 'the discrepancy between Japan's status and behaviour', so if the Japanese residents in China would only stop their disproportional arrogance and the Chinese would only give up their toadyism towards the West, Sino Japanese cooperation would come about naturally.[30] In this set-up it was Japan, the success story of instant nation building under the menacing gaze of the Western imperialist powers, that had to shoulder the heavy task of imbuing the Chinese, who after all were unpatriotic Mammonists, with nationalist feelings, which were considered essential to strengthening the country.

This Monroe Doctrine for East Asia implied that Japan was the regional leader and thus there was no equal relation between the two parties, but it was nonetheless based on the idea of Sino-Japanese friendship and a certain extent of mutual dependence. However, if we consider Yoshino's attitude at the time of the notorious Twenty-One Demands, it is hard to deny that he was an even stronger supporter of a hard line in China policy than the Okuma Cabinet. He was willing to disregard completely international concerns over the Japanese demands and insisted that the so-called 'Group Five Demands' should not be retracted. Japan was not to give in to China any more than was strictly necessary.[31] It goes without saying that when one professes oneself unwilling to do anything more than is strictly necessary there is no basis for such a difficult enterprise as Sino-Japanese cooperation, and calls to this end in order to secure Asia from the West can only sound hollow. It seemed as if Yoshino thought that Japan, after all, had to proceed alone.

However—and in this sense we may very well call him a *senkakusha*—not long afterwards Yoshino came to change his view of China and the Chinese fundamentally. The direct incentive was that Yoshino had been teaching since 1914 at the Hosei Gakko, a private school in Tokyo established especially for the offspring of the revolutionary Chinese who had fled the country in the wake of the failed Second Revolution, and through this side-activity, for the first time in his life, was able to befriend Chinese. Moreover, at the beginning of 1916 Yoshino was requested by Toyama Mitsuru to write a history of the Chinese revolutionary movement, an enterprise in which he was aided by Dai Tianchou (Sun Yat-sen's political secretary) and Yin Rugeng.[32] In the process Yoshino grew to respect them and to support the cause of 'young revolutionary China', and as a result his plans for a Monroe Doctrine for Asia came to be based on a form of Sino-Japanese cooperation which had considerably more substance than before.[33]

The emergence of the dilemma of internationalism and nationalism (1918)

The year 1918 is a turning point in Yoshino's thinking. Whereas his propagation of internationalism before the war had not been very convincing and as the war lingered on he seemed to lose all hopes of its implementation in his lifetime, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the American participation in the war he

suddenly became over-optimistic. He claimed that the new internationalist and pacifist world order, as exemplified by Lenin's proclamation of November 1917 and Wilson's Fourteen Principles of January 1918, was, much earlier than he had dared to dream, already taking shape.[34] When, at the Paris Peace Conference, which Yoshino termed 'the great conference of world reform', the League of Nations came into being, Yoshino was overjoyed and convinced that the world had made a decisive step on the international cooperativist road of no return. The age of imperialism was over and the dawn of the age of international democracy was glowing.[35] Even if he had to admit grudgingly every now and then that the League did not yet live up to his high hopes, he remained one of its staunchest Japanese supporters throughout his life.[36]

The new internationalist trend was not only accompanied by a new vocabulary, such as anti-imperialism, international cooperation, disarmament, etc., but also highlighted the cause of nationalism. Up until this point Yoshino had hardly dwelled on nationalism in the sense of *minzokushugi* (ethnic nationalism).[37] The closest he had reached was patriotism, of which he distinguished two forms: the first being *aikoku* (love the country) or *yukoku aimin* (care for the country and love the people), which he considered sound and even essential for the progress of a nation; and the second *kokusuishugi* (chauvinism), which he considered intolerant, extreme and detrimental to both national and international society. Yoshino promoted the former and ignored the latter and thus saw no dilemma whatsoever in prescribing patriotism or national salvation *(kyukoku)* for China and enhancing Japan's national interests in China at the same time.[38] Moreover, in a world which he tended to divide conveniently into four or five cooperating zones of 'Monroe-ism' there had been no question of a dilemma between internationalism and national interests. There seemed to be a peaceful balance amongst and within the various zones.[39]

However, when in 1918 another type of nationalism, ethnic national self-determination *(minzoku jiketsushugi),* came to the fore Yoshino could no longer deny that if this form of nationalism was propagated by China and Korea it would eventually collide with Japan's national interests, which he equated with another, minimal, sort of nationalism, namely the national right to live *(kokuminteki seizonken)*. For the first time Yoshino admitted that there was a dilemma between 'internationalism', in the form of the universal *right* to ethnic national self-determination, and 'nationalism', in the form of Japan's particularistic *need* for national subsistence through continental expansion. Although the goal of the Japanese nation was still the same, the international framework had changed. As a result, the legitimate means to achieve the goal had become more restricted and were increasingly dependent on the benevolent cooperation of other nations. Like many contemporaries, Yoshino chose not to resist but to adjust to the new 'international current':

> Once this principle [of ethnic nationalism] is accepted at the peace conference, even if its application is limited to a certain circumscribed area,

> its moral authority will know no limits and therefore it goes without saying that the post-war question of the disposal of ethnic nations will eventually be dealt with by means of the so-called principle of the self-determination of nationalities. And even if this question is not directly raised at the peace conference we should not be at ease and continue to oppress [other] ethnic nations, for this will imply that we are going against the world trend.... We should immediately reform our policy of colonial rule and be prepared for the post-war trend.[40]

Harmonisation of internationalism and minimum national needs (1919–31)

In the case of Korean and Taiwanese nationalism, with which, as Yoshino had predicted, Japan was indeed soon confronted (respectively, in March 1919 and in January 1921), harmonisation of the ethnic national rights of others and Japan's own national need was not such a difficult task. Although it was no longer politically correct to invade foreign territory and establish new colonies, this new rule did not seem to be of any consequence to the colonies which already existed. In the light of the new international trend and what he called the complete failure of Japan's colonial policy,[41] Yoshino was willing to promise the nations in the Japanese colonies autonomy and full equality with the Japanese settlers in due time, but he rejected the independence of Korea and Taiwan as too radical a proposition.[42] Although in those days it probably would have been impossible to publicly raise the call for Korean independence due to censorship, on the other hand there was no need to propagate the illusion that, once given autonomy, the Koreans would spontaneously come to share the *Yamatodamashii* (the Japanese spirit) and would even voluntarily choose to remain part of the Japanese Empire.[43] Anyhow, there were overriding strategic reasons for Yoshino to hold on to Korea, and since there was no international pressure to relinquish existing colonies he did not need to take Korean independence into serious consideration.[44]

However, in the case of China things were different. Since China was not a colony its nationalist movement could not be so lightly dismissed. Moreover, it was evident that as a result of the war the United States had become pre-eminent in the world and that also in the Asian theatre this new power could no longer be ignored, as Yoshino had been inclined to do.[45] Japan now was on the defensive and was forced to do more than merely mimic the American vocabulary of the open door, equal opportunities and sovereignty of Chinese territory. Under such circumstances Yoshino's erstwhile call for a superior position for Japan in East Asia legitimised through Monroe-ism was not timely anymore. Finally, although definitely not an expert in the field of economy, Yoshino was one of the many Japanese who drew the lesson from the war that national power in the modern world was mainly determined by economic strength and that Japan could no longer remain an agricultural state but had to become an industrial power.[46] From

that moment onwards we find Yoshino elaborating predominantly on Sino-Japanese cooperation in the field of the economy:

> The Japanese used to be extremely careless, demanding their natural resources from all over the world, but this war has finally opened our eyes and has made us look to China even more. China abounds with all sorts of natural resources, which are merely waiting for someone to come over and develop them. Almost all of the things Japan lacks can be produced in China, so Japan can become an independent economic unit when it can make use of China's natural resources. Moreover, we need China as a customer for our commercial and industrial goods. Therefore, no matter from which angle one looks at it, Japan's economic survival and development can only be attained by means of an alliance with China.[47]

Thus Yoshino also subscribed to the completely contradictory idea that Japan had to attain economic autarky by means of a Sino-Japanese economic alliance. While this awareness induced many others to cling even more to the position Japan had accumulated in Manchuria, Yoshino took a somewhat different stand:

> Our most important aim is to foster strong economic ties between Japan and China…and accordingly we must take the whole of China as the object of our China management…and not limit ourselves to merely one part such as Manchuria and Mongolia or Shandong.[48]

Judging by these statements, Yoshino seemed to be willing to consider giving up parts of Japan's position in Manchuria—that is, those parts which were based on strategic motives—in order to gain an overall stronger economic position in China. This attitude was a far cry from his earlier stand, which was marked by calls for the Chinese to show some understanding of the inevitable 'political expansion' of Japan into China and of the fact that one could not expect to live peacefully in Manchuria, 'the buffer zone between an expanding Japan and a weakening China'. At the time he mainly characterised the 'political expansion' of Japan in China as an essential element to guarantee Japan's principal objective—that is, 'the economic and social expansion' in China—and optimistically remarked that Japan's political expansion might become unnecessary if only China would become stronger.[49] Now he distanced himself from this line of argument by characterising it as the main factor in anti-Japanese feelings amongst the Chinese. Yoshino had been aware of this side-effect before, but had merely treated it as a bothersome yet bearable burden. However, with his new emphasis on the overriding need for an economic alliance this stand was no longer tenable:

> The Japanese are definitely not the only people proceeding on this same road [towards an economic alliance with China]. The Americans and the English are out there as well. Therefore it is not sufficient to just make an

> effort; we must be aware of the presence of strong competitors and make a bigger than usual effort. The precondition is to soothe Chinese feelings and foster emotional ties.[50]

To win the free economic competition in China—which Yoshino in principle thought his country, in spite of its capital and industrial demerits, was capable of achieving because of its geographical advantage and the relatively large number of former students to Japan in key positions—and to be able to 'bathe in the bliss of China's inexhaustible natural resources' Japan first had to win the free competition for China's sympathies.[51] In theory Yoshino was thus able to translate the Japanese need for a Sino-Japanese economic alliance into terms of Sino-Japanese friendship, yet it still remained to be seen if his rhetoric had any practical value—that is, to see to what extent he was willing to give in to China's claims to its right of national self-determination in order to obtain its friendship and cooperation. While in early 1917 he had already confessed that the way the Japanese had handled the Twenty-One Demands had been aggressive and counterproductive,[52] within the framework of his new scheme the time had come to give in on the content as well. This proved to be a long and difficult road for the former imperialist.

Yoshino is well known for the fact that he was one of the very few Japanese who immediately supported the May Fourth movement in China, and he even characterised it as having exactly the same objective as those representing 'the true Japan', namely ousting bureaucratic and militarist forces.[53] However, what he deliberately did not emphasise was that the direct incentive for the movement had been the decision at the Paris Peace Conference to confer the German rights in Shandong to Japan. Ironically, on the day of the insurrection Yoshino was in Osaka delivering a speech in which he mentioned that 'Japan's demands concerning Shandong are almost identical in nature to the British demands concerning Egypt and are perfectly just'.[54] His argument that there was a clear distinction between sovereignty, which had to be restored to the Chinese, and rights, which would pass into Japanese hands, was rather technical and definitely would not help to capture the hearts of the Chinese, which after all he professed to be striving for.[55] Although he admitted that the existing Sino-Japanese treaties had been forced upon China by unjust means, he was not ready to simply start with a clean slate.[56] His dilemma was that while he was aware that Japan had to adjust its China policy—directly to the demands of Chinese nationalism and indirectly to the general framework of internationalism—he wanted to do it as far as possible on Japanese terms. To quote a comparison Yoshino often used to describe the relationship between the proletariat and the intelligentsia, China was the patient, who knew best where it hurt, but Japan was the doctor, who knew best how the pain had to be cured. Moreover, in this case the doctor had considerable interests of her own and, although she knew that it was a breach of the professional code, demanded some 'inevitable' guarantees in the field of the

future management of Manchuria and the Hanyeping Coal and Iron Company before starting to operate.[57]

However, as the Guomindang's Northern Expedition was more and more successful and he understood that the fate of Japan's rights and interests in the near future was clear, Yoshino no longer resisted. In April 1927 he took the final step in the process of compromising with internationalism by turning his former 'demands' into 'a formal request' to the Southern faction led by the Chinese nationalists:

> Although we respect the full sovereignty of the Chinese authorities to deal with our former rights and interests as they please, we hope they will be lenient insofar as these have a direct influence on the daily life of the Japanese common people.[58]

In the sense that Yoshino's demands had become merely theoretical, his stance resembled that of the so-called 'weak-kneed' Shidehara policy of 'no intervention in China', which he strongly supported. Accordingly, he completely rejected the Tanaka policy of armed intervention, although he fully subscribed to its goals.[59] Yoshino had not changed his opinion on Japan's national *needs,* but merely recognised that these could no longer prevail over China's *rights*. He considered attempts to secure Japan's needs by means of force both illegitimate and unrealistic. The national goal of expansion onto the 'Asian continent' was from now on not to be pursued by any other than peaceful economic means, and thus Japan's lot would be in China's hands. Whereas most Japanese were horrified by this prospect, Yoshino thought it inevitable and, helped by his optimistic view of mankind, placed his trust in the good intentions of the new Nationalist Chinese government.[60]

Even in the wake of the Manchurian Incident and the creation of Manchukuo, Yoshino stood firm. As early as 1922, and again at the time of the Shandong Expeditions of 1927–8 and two weeks before the incident itself, Yoshino had rejected attempts to establish a pro-Japanese marionette state in Manchuria as unrealistic and detrimental to Japan's future.[61] Now matters had come to a head he was as outspoken as ever: the army's action was 'aggressionist imperialism' *(shinryakushugiteki teikokushugi),* and the official legal recognition of Manchukuo by the Japanese cabinet would constitute 'a breach of the Nine Power Treaty and an act of animosity towards the Chinese government'.[62] In several *Chuo Koron* editorials of 1932 and 1933, which when Yoshino's diaries were made publicly recently it was discovered were written by him, there is a remarkable change in vocabulary. This change seems to suggest that he recanted *(tenko)* like many others, but closer reading tells us something different. As late as December 1932, in spite of all sorts of restrictions on freedom of speech—he had to write within the new framework of the *fait accompli* of the establishment of Manchukuo[63]—Yoshino was very critical and told the Japanese public more than the authorities wanted it to know. He emphasised that Manchuria was both in theory and in fact

a part of China, pointed out that the Japanese argument of self-defence was contrary to the facts and that the new state of Manchukuo depended completely on Japanese support and management, and was adamant that even if there was to be another Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine it was of no practical value if China was not participating.[64]

Conclusion: Yoshino's idealism and isolation (1921–33)

Although many of his generation gradually came to share his conclusions to a great extent, the problem with Yoshino was that he tended to phrase his support for internationalism, not so much by means of rational strategic and economic arguments, but more often by moral and 'religious' ones, which presented an idealistic view of mankind and human civilisation.[65] For instance, in sharp contrast to many of his contemporaries, he was much more impressed by the rhetoric of the Charter of the League of Nations and the Four Power Treaty than by the detailed and more pragmatic Five and Nine Power Treaties of the Washington Conference.[66] Moreover, his inclination to deify the British and the Americans by uncritically presenting England and America as the ideal in the respective fields of social justice and international justice and to look down upon Japan itself as 'an ideological pariah *(shisoteki tokushuburaku)* on the world stage'[67] did not go down well with most Japanese of his day.

Accordingly, rather than their leader or their representative, Yoshino more or less functioned as their moral conscience. His tragedy was that, after his glorious rise in the 1910s to the centre of the so-called 'civilisation critique' *(bunmei hihyo),* in the 1920s he had to cope with an age that was marked by an alternation of generations. Whereas Yoshino was somewhat too progressive for many of his own generation, he was rejected as far too conservative by a new radical generation, whom to a considerable extent he had reared himself. Still, although his influence as 'the conscience of the nation' was decreasing, all through the 1920s it remained considerable, even if it was only for the simple fact that he was so prominent in the pages of the *Chuo Koron*. While most of his generation turned their heads, Yoshino could not refrain from drawing their attention to abuses at home and, something even more exceptional for his day, misdeeds in Japan's colonies and informal empire. And whereas many of the reform generation in their zeal and despair tended to resort to exclusionist forms of nationalism that were completely blind to the interests of other nations, Yoshino gradually progressed to a mature internationalism which enabled him to put Japan's needs into the perspective of the rights and needs of others. In terms of Sino-Japanese relations this was reflected in a balanced view of Japanese and Chinese interests, which would inevitably lead to all forms of Japanese empire vanishing from the Chinese continent. His isolation was partly the price he had to pay for the role of pioneer he had set for himself and very admirably attained.

Notes

The author of all Japanese articles and books mentioned below is Yoshino Sakuzo. Some of the articles from 1904 and 1905 were written under his pen name Shotensei.

1 'Nichi-Ro senso to sekai seiji'. *Shinjin,* 1904.8, p. 32.
2 '[Futsu-ryo Indo ni taisuru Nihon no yashin] ni tsuite'. *Shinjin,* 1905.2, p. 54.
3 'Soho-sensei cho [Jimu ikkagen] wo yomu'. *Shinjin,* 1914.7. Reprinted in *Yoshino Sakuzo Senshu* (hereafter *YSS*), vol. 3. Iwanami Shoten, 1995, p. 82.
4 *Ibid.,* pp. 84–5; 'Seiji ni taisuru shukyo no shimei'. *Shinjin,* 1914.5, pp. 49–51.
5 'Hai-Nichi mondai to Kirisuto kyoto'. *Shinjin,* 1913.12, p. 32.
6 'Kokumin no taigai shiso wo aratameyo'. *Rikugo Zasshi,* 1915.4, pp. 50–1.
7 'Rokoku ni okeru shuminteki seiryoku no kinjo'. *Shinjin,* 1905.5. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 5, p. 12.
8 'Honpo rikken seiji no genjo'. *Shinjin,* 1905.1. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 1, p. 9; 'Kokkadamashii to wa nanzo ya'. *Shinjin,* 1905.2. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 1, pp. 78–80.
9 'Rokoku kizoku no unmei'. *Shinjin,* 1905.5. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 5, p. 14.
10 'Kato-kun no [aikokushin-ron]'. *Shinjin,* 1905.3, p. 55.
11 'Rokoku no haiboku wa sekai heiwa no motoi nari'. *Shinjin,* 1904.3, p. 26. It is interesting to see that Yoshino in this sense was very much in touch with his foreign colleagues, since Bertrand Russell at the time of the First World War completely ignored the common Allied effort against the enemy and, on the basis of the identical argument of the progress of world civilisation, expressed the hope that Germany would beat Russia (although as far as the war on the Western front was concerned he was initially somewhat more in line with government policy and was convinced that his own country would be victorious after a short war). Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*. Vintage, London, 1997, pp. 372–4.
12 'Seiji ni taisuru shukyo no shimei'. *Shinjin,* 1914.5, p. 49, 53; 'Kojinteki soi no yokuatsu'. *Shinjin,* 1920.8, p. 203. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 12, p. 203; 'Shakai to shukyo'. *Shinjin,* 1921.7. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 12, p. 209.
13 'Kenja Naatan'. *Bunka Seikatsu,* 1921.9. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 12, pp. 215–19.
14 'Seiji ni taisuru shukyo no shimei'. *Shinjin,* 1914.5, p. 59.
15 *Ibid.,* p. 57.
16 'Hai-Nichi mondai to Kirisuto kyoto'. *Shinjin,* 1913.12, pp. 32–3; 'Soho-sensei cho [Jimu ikkagen] wo yomu'. *Shinjin,* 1914.7. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 3, p. 87.
17 'Tai-Shi gaiko no gensei hihan'. *Chuo Koron,* 1915.6, pp. 78–80.
18 'Shinajin no keishikishugi'. *Shinjin,* 1906.9. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 8, pp. 182–6.
19 'Shina no seijiteki shorai'. *Shinjin,* 1914.11, pp. 49–50.
20 *Ibid.,* p. 5l.
21 'Taisengo no sekaiteki kyoso'. *Chuo Koron,* 1916.3, pp. 15–16. 'Monroe-ism' may strike the Western reader as somewhat odd, but this literal translation of the Japanese *'monro-shugi'* was a term which was widely used at the time of the First World War and, once again, after the Manchurian Incident. Often used in the context of 'A Monroe Doctrine for (East) Asia', it referred to the idea that the predominant position of the United States on the American continent was supported by both the cooperation of the weaker American brothers and the recognition of world society.

The point that the adherents to 'Monroe-ism' thus tried to make was that the Western powers, instead of interfering in Asian matters, should grant Japan, as the strongest nation of the Asian continent, the privilege to act in the same dominant way as the United States did in its own backyard.

22 'Nichi-Ro kyoyaku no seiritsu'. *Shinjin,* 1916.8, pp. 4–5; 'Waga kuni no Toho keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai'. *Toho Jiron,* 1918.1, p. 43.
23 'Shin Nichi-Ro kyoyaku no shinka'. *Chuo Koron,* 1916.8, p. 76.
24 'Waga kuni no Toho keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai'. *Toho Jiron,* 1918.1, pp. 43–4.
25 'Tai-Shi gaiko konponsaku no kettei ni kansuru Nihon seikyaku no konmei'. *Chuo Koron,* 1916.3, p. 89.
26 'Shin Nichi-Ro kyoyaku no shinka'. *Chuo Koron,* 1916.8, p. 76.
27 'Shina no jikyoku to Nihon no taido'. *Shinjin,* 1916.7, p. 4; 'Iwayuru kyodo sengen to Nichi-Bei mondai'. *Chuo Koron,* 1918.1, pp. 106–7.
28 'Nichi-Bei kyodo sengen no kaisetsu oyobi hihan'. *Chuo Koron,* 1917.12, p. 47.
29 'Taisengo no sekaiteki kyoso'. *Chuo Koron,* 1916.3, pp. 15–16.
30 'Shina no seijiteki shorai'. *Shinjin,* 1914.11, p. 53.
31 'Tai-Shi gaiko no gensei hihan'. *Chuo Koron,* 1915.6, pp. 74–8.
32 '[Sanjusannen no yume]—sono saikoku ni tsuite'. *Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun,* 1926.5. 31. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 12, p. 314.
33 'Shina mondai ni tsuite'. *Reimei Koenshu,* vol. 4,1919.6, p. 62.
34 'Shuppei-ron to gendai seinen no sekaiteki keiko'. *Shinjin,* 1918.4, pp. 12–13.
35 'Santo mondai'. *Reimei Koenshu,* vol. 5, 1919.7, p. 29; 'Teikokushugi yori kokusai minshushugi e'. *Rikugo Zasshi,* 1919.6–7. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 6, p. 35.
36 'Gendai shicho no teiryu wa kokusai kyodoshugi'. *Chuo Koron,* 1921.2, p. 67.
37 Only at the beginning of 1918 did Yoshino use *'minzokushugi'* for the first time in the title of one of his many articles. 'Kowa joken no ichi-kihon to shite tonaheraruru minzokushugi.' *Chuo Koron,* 1918.3, pp. 92–6. There is a rare article by Yoshino from October 1913 which from a political point of view analyses 'the present competition between ethnic nations', but it was a subject on which he was requested to write by the magazine *Shin-Nihon* rather than a subject he had chosen himself. Moreover, in the article he refuses to treat ethnic nationalism as an 'ism', a laudable goal to which one can rightfully aspire, and instead he rather distantly categorises the different forms of expression of what he prefers to call 'the drive towards ethnic national unity' and analyses what chances these various forms have in accomplishing their goal. Yoshino Sakuzo, 'Seijijo yori mitaru konnichi no minzoku kyoso'. *Shin-Nihon,* 1913.10, pp. 44–56.
38 'Kato-kun no [Aikokushin]-ron'. *Shinjin,* 1905.3, p. 55; 'Nihon bunmei no kenkyu'. *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi,* 1905.7, pp. 130–1; 'Shinajin no keishikishugi'. *Shinjin,* 1906.9. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 8, pp. 182–3.
39 'Shin Nichi-Ro kyoyaku no shinka'. *Chuo Koron,* 1916.8, p. 76.
40 'Kowa joken no ichi-kihon to shite tonaheraruru minzokushugi'. *Chuo Koron,* 1918. 3, pp. 95–6.
41 'Taigaiteki ryoshin no hakki'. *Chuo Koron,* 1919.4, p. 104.
42 'Chosen tochisaku'. *Chuo Koron,* 1918.10. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 9, pp. 50–1.
43 'Chosen no bodo ni tsuite'. *Chuo Koron,* 1920.11, pp. 84–5; 'Chosen mondai'. *Chuo Koron,* 1921.1, p. 191; 'Chosenjin no shakai undo ni tsuite'. *Chuo Koron,* 1923.5, pp. 193, 196.

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47 'Waga kuni no Toho keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai'. *Toho Jiron,* 1918.1, p. 53.

48 'Nichi-Bei kyodo sengen to waga tai-Shi seisaku'. *Toho Jiron,* 1917.12, p. 41.

49 'Nisshi shinzenron'. *Toho Jiron,* 1916.9, pp. 14–18, 23; 'Nichi-Ro kyoyaku no seiritsu'. *Shinjin,* 1916.8, pp. 5–6.

50 'Nichi-Bei kyodo sengen to waga tai-Shi seisaku'. *Toho Jiron,* 1917.12, p. 42.

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52 'Waga tai-Manmo seisaku to Teikaton jiken no kaiketsu'. *Toho Jiron,* 1917.3, pp. 27–8.

53 'Pekin daigaku gakusei sojo jiken ni tsuite'. *Shinjin,* 1919.6, pp. 204–7, 209, 212, 214, 217 'Shina ni okeru hai-Nichi jiken'. *Chuo Koron,* 1919.7, p. 84.

54 'Santo mondai'. *Reimei Koenshu,* vol. 5, 1919.7, pp. 27–9.

55 'Santo mondai no kyakkanteki kosatsu'. *Kaikoku Koron,* 1919.6, p. 15.

56 'Shina kinji—Washinton kaigi ni okeru Shina no chii'. *Chuo Koron,* 1922.3, p. 195–6; 'Shodai shogen susoku—Shina joyaku haiki tsucho. *Chuo Koron,* 1923.4, p. 233.

57 'Tai-Shi kokusaku togi'. *Kaizo,* 1924.11, p. 32; 'Saikin no Ei-Shi katto'. *Chuo Koron,* 1926.10, pp. 97–100.

58 'Musan seito ni kawarite Shina Nanpo seifu daihyosha ni tsugu'. *Chuo Koron,* 1927. 4, p. 1.

59 'Shina kinji', *Chuo Koron,* 1927.5, p. 109; Tanaka naikaku no Manmo seisaku ni taisuru gigi'. *Shakai Undo,* 1927.10. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 6, pp. 295–6. Shidehara Kijuro (1871–1951), a former diplomat, was minister of foreign affairs in the Minseito-led cabinets of Kato Takaaki, Wakatsuki Reijiro and Hamaguchi Osachi (June 1924-April 1927 and July 1929-December 1931). Tanaka Giichi (1864–1929), a former army general turned party leader, was minister of foreign affairs in the Seiyukai Cabinet which he headed (April 1927-July 1929). There is an ongoing debate on the question of whether the China policies of these two ministers were intrinsically different or not, but, somewhat in line with Yoshino's argument, I subscribe to the view that, notwithstanding the identical theoretical goals, the practical goals and effects were in a completely different category.

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62 'Man-Mo dokuritsu undo to Nihon'. *Chuo Koron,* 1931.11, p. 1; 'Minzoku to kaikyu to senso'. *Chuo Koron,* 1932.1, p. 32; 'Manshukoku shonin no jiki'. *Chuo Koron,* 1932.9, p. 1.
63 'Sosenkyo to taigaiko-ron'. *Fujin Saron,* 1932.2, p. 49; Yoshino diary, 1932.9.12. Reprinted in *YSS,* vol. 15.
64 'Ritton hokokusho wo yonde'. *Kaizo,* 1932.11, pp. 228–31. 'Toyo Monro-shugi no kakuritsu'. *Chuo Koron,* 1932.12, p. 1; 'Naigai tanan no shinnen'. *Chuo Koron,* 1933.1, p. 1.
65 'Heiwa shiso tettei no ki masa ni jukuseri'. *Chuo Koron,* 1922.1. Reprinted in YSS, vol. 6, pp. 230–l.
66 'Shikoku kyosho no seiritsu'. *Chuo Koron,* 1922.1, pp. 302–4; 'Washinton kaigi wo chushin to shite tadayou heiwateki kibun'. *Chuo Koron,* 1922.1, p. 311; 'Sekai heiwa to jinruiai'. *Chuo Koron,* 1922.7.15, p. 1.
67 'Santo mondai no chokusetsu kosho no kyozetsu'. *Chuo Koron,* 1921.10, p. 140.

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Part III

Case studies

The early Showa generation

7
Royama Masamichi's perception of international order from the 1920s to 1930s and the concept of the East Asian Community[1]

Kobayashi Hiroharu

Introduction

The thematic concern underlying this chapter is to trace the process from the First to the Second World War from the perspective of international order. At the same time, this is also an attempt to trace in what way the pre-war order was reconfigured and the post-war order was prepared. In my opinion, to consider how the international order was understood in Japan—which, with its military invasions of the 1930s, opened the way for the disturbance and destruction of the post-First World War international order—is also to clarify the significance of East Asia becoming the stage of world war, as well as to clarify the historical specificity of the Second World War.

This essay approaches these questions through an examination of Royama Masamichi.[2] One of the reasons to focus on Royama is that after obtaining a position in the Tokyo Imperial University Faculty of Law in 1920 Royama published numerous articles throughout the 1920s and 1930s on domestic politics and the international order from the standpoint of political science and public administration. In these articles he attempts a comprehensive analysis of the international order encompassing Japan and an examination of Japan's position within this order. They are of great interest to the questions described above, since the main characteristic of these articles is that Royama tries to position Japan as a very active element in the international order of the 1930s. Another interesting feature of Royama is that his arguments reflect a knowledge of the latest trends in Western political science, and that he maintained an enduring consciousness of intersection with Western opinion and thought. He grasped the world historical changes brought about by the First World War in a relatively objective manner and upheld a theory of international order and a critical awareness not unlike those of his Western contemporaries. In this sense, too, he provides easily accessible material for considering the international consciousness among Japanese intellectuals. It is of course impossible to treat intellectuals as a totality. On the other hand, it is also true that many intellectuals were involved in creating the concept of an East Asian Community *(To-A kyodotai)* and shared a

common set of problems concerning the global politics encompassing Japan at the time. In this sense it is possible to use Royama's theories of international politics to elucidate the inevitability of the Japanese Empire staging one portion of the world war.

And, last but not least, Royama is well known as an important member of the Showa Research Society *(Showa Kenkyukai),* which became the brain trust of Konoe Fumimaro from the latter half of the 1930s. In this function, he was the one who introduced the concept of the East Asian Community and who played an important role in its further theoretical elaboration.[3] During this period, in order to bring the expanding war in China to an end by political means, he mobilised the methods, perspectives and knowledge that he had hitherto acquired, and struggled to define the meaning and aims of Japan's war. For all these reasons, Royama offers a means to an overview of Japan's political tendencies regarding the Sino-Japanese War which differs from the perspective of the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic negotiations or the military's attempts to pacify China through the establishment of pro-Japanese regional governments.[4]

Royama Masamichi has been a focus of attention for many researchers. In the light of the abovementioned critical consciousness, I will limit myself here to an analysis of Royama's understanding of international order. Most previous research on this topic has been confined to his interpretation of an East Asian Community and merely compares him to other (intellectual) supporters of this concept. Here, in contrast, I will privilege the fact that Royama emerged in intellectual circles in the 1920s as an internationalist and will attempt to answer the questions of how and why his international political theory of the 1920s arrived at the theory of the East Asian Community in the 1930s. Specifically, my major aim is to clarify how Royama perceived the global transformations following the First World War, how he tried to situate Japan as an element in the international order after it commenced military invasion in the 1930s, and how the concept of an East Asian Community was conceived as a summation of his efforts.

The framework and characteristics of Royama's international political theory

In 1928 Royama published his first book, *Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyosei* (International politics and international administration).[5] This work is a collection of essays that he had written over a period of eight years since becoming an assistant in the Tokyo Imperial University Faculty of Law, and it served as the theoretical foundation for Royama's later articles concerning international politics. Here I will limit my analysis of the book to the areas that maintain important connections to his later articles.

Royama's understanding of international politics drew important inspiration from Leonard Woolf's *International Government* (1916).[6] Woolf's work posited international government as the regulation of various states, nations and citizens by way of international consensus, and it attempted to demonstrate the unity of

international and national interest in the development of international politics in the 19th century. In the political theory that emerged during this time, Royama attempted to discover a methodological framework for ascertaining the transformations in post-First World War international politics that were encompassing Japan.

By the 1920s international politics had arrived at a point where 'it had clearly separated from former diplomatic policy generated merely among states' and had 'come to demand its own independent concept'.[7] As its empirical foundation, the institutions and system of international politics had to be identified. From this necessity, Royama established the distinguishing characteristics of the institutions of international politics as follows:

1 The system of international politics is established from the matrix of the social totality of international social institutions, and the former functions to regulate the direction of the activity of members of the latter.
2 The institutions of international society are formed from the primary societies —which consist of tribal societies, ethnic societies, national societies— together with the secondary societies, consisting of corporations, academic societies, industrial unions, labour unions and administrative bodies.
3 Accordingly, the international political system also maintains two trajectories of development. The first is represented by diplomatic and public international institutions, which are organised around the unit or constituent member of the state or primary society. The other is represented by private international institutions formed as aggregations of individuals based on secondary societies.
4 The fundamental attributes of the international institutions that are the constituent units of this international political system are: first, that they aim to transcend the principle of the nation-state to arrive at an international principle; second, that they eradicate national discrimination among constituent members; and, third, that the character of the institutions must be permanent and administrative.[8]

What I would like to focus on here is characteristic 3. Royama summarises the qualities of public international institutions that clearly reveal the development of the international political system as follows:

> These institutions are jointly created by the various states whose international legislation and international administration, as executed by the national institutions of diplomacy, no longer fulfil the needs of international society. Pushed by the greater momentum of evolution they discard the standpoint of narrow self-interest and are forced to take the position of international policy. The nature of these institutions is generally to actively seek out the common interest of all states, and moreover to act in ways that are impossible for each state individually, but it is also important to note that

> their actions are limited to those that will not encroach upon the independence, freedom, and sovereignty of each state.[9]

As this passage shows, Royama insightfully discerned that a domain of 'international policy' transcending the interests of each individual nation-state was being established. This fundamental vantage point was an advanced aspect of his understanding of international politics.

Yet this understanding also contains a problem. It lies in Royama's explanation that the unit of primary society cannot by itself serve as the unit of the international political system, but that 'only when these primary societies take the form and perform the duty of states do they become a unit of the international political system'.[10] In other words, strictly speaking only nation-states are able to become the constituent unit of the international political system. There is no discussion of the circuits through which societies organised by tribe or ethnicity can be involved as subjects in the international political system.

There are also significant problems in Royama's conception of international society as total society. While he posits the total society as being formed of primary and secondary societies, he does not clarify precisely by which inducements and through what relationships the tribal, ethnic and national societies form primary societies, nor how they couple with the secondary societies to form international/total society. Royama does not question how international society maintains and guarantees its totality.

Next, I would like to touch upon the other theme of *International Politics and International Administration,* namely that of international administration. Royama defines the characteristics of international administration in the following manner:

1 What we normally think of as international politics is not the vertical, hierarchical relationship of imperialism, but rather international relations of mutual cooperation, and only in cases when international politics in this sense become possible does international administration emerge.
2 At the same time, the various states that comprise international political society differ in size and power, and one can recognise hierarchical relations of subjugation in their social and economic relations of dependence. Therefore elements of coercion inevitably accompany international administration.
3 The international administration that developed in the latter half of the 19th century did not erode the self-sufficiency of nations, and was limited to the minimum level of things considered no longer avoidable. During the First World War, important aspects of national administration dealing with vital questions for national citizens, such as La Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement and the Wheat Executive, could not avoid submitting to a certain type of international regulation and management. Under the League of Nations, the task of international administration has become to work towards the construction of a peaceful society.[11]

In addition, the following points are raised as the distinguishing characteristics of international administration under the League of Nations. First is the creation of a 'general policy for each state's national policy to be directed towards the creation of peace among nations and for the happiness of humanity'. From this goal, as seen in the Brussels Financial Conference (1920) or the Geneva International Economic Conference (1927), 'to greater or lesser degrees each nation's economic and social policies would be subject to international regulation, and thereby new international relations would be created'.[12] Second, by collecting and publicising information and opinions, 'what can be called world public opinion is to be made known to the public and private leaders of each state'; furthermore, by way of resolutions and recommendations 'relying on the moral force of international opinion, each state is to be moved in the direction of the League's ideals'.[13] Royama understood these tendencies to be a substantial transformation and evolution of the absolute independence of national sovereignty.

He thus accurately grasps the transformations in international politics and administration set in motion by the establishment of the League of Nations, as well as its transformative effects on national administration. One may say that a very important characteristic of Royama's consciousness of international politics is his strong awareness of the necessity for Japan not to assert unilaterally its own national interests, but rather to grasp the afore-mentioned tendencies emerging in international politics and adjust its national interest to them.

Nevertheless, here too there remains an important problem with significant implications for Royama's subsequent logic development. Among the various academic discourses treating the question of international administration, Royama strictly rejected the method that posits a supranational international society regulated by international law and which grasps international administration as the function of this type of international society.[14] This methodology formed one current of research into international politics and international administration, but Royama took a negative stance against its utopian tendencies, slighting it as a product of idealist thought. According to Royama's theory of international relations, international administration originated in the relations between states and should not be analysed from the perspective of an international and supranational society.

Here, I would like to consider the work of Tsuneto Kyo, professor of legal philosophy at Doshisha University and a representative theorist of the view of international society as rejected by Royama. In *Kokusaiho oyobi kokusai mondai* (International law and international problems, 1922), Tsuneto analysed the political aims and system of the League of Nations, speculating that they may represent an attempt to construct a system of supranational power on top of the various member states.[15] The main feature of his interpretation of the League of Nations is that he evaluated the League positively as an international body with powers of enforcement.[16] Virtually all internationalists in Japan at the time did not think of the League of Nations as a supranational power that restricted

national sovereignty. The League of Nations was supported on the presumption that national sovereignty would not be restricted.

Tsuneto appraised the League in the first place because of its exceptional characteristic as an international body. If an international organisation is formed through links among states created by treaties, the League of Nations is an international political organisation that differs from the apolitical international organisations that developed in the latter half of the 19th century. Moreover, it differs from military alliances and contains the universal significance of aiming to ensure the mutual safety of nations; the more states it includes, the greater the possibility of it completely fulfilling its task.[17] He was also keen to point out that the League is based on the 'philosophy of approaching the ideal of world peace through consecutive revolutions'.[18] According to Tsuneto, the spirit that unites the various agreements of the League is the desire to achieve world peace through the working of objective systems restricting the will of each individual nation.[19] If previous international society left the power of enforcing resolutions to international disputes entirely in the hands of the states involved, the League of Nations posits the common obligation of international society to be the resolution and implementation of international enforcement. Tsuneto refers to the former as private international enforcement, the latter as public international enforcement. From this perspective, he perceived that international society was in the process of achieving a new level of development.[20]

How was it that Tsuneto achieved such a positive perspective? The reason lies in the fact that his thought maintained a structure based on the individual and that thoroughly relativised the nation-state. In a chapter entitled 'Sekaimin no yuetsu to hiai' (The joys and sorrows of the cosmopolitan; included in *International Law and International Problems*), Tsuneto grasps the cosmopolitan as the essence of humanity, which is not premised upon race, ethnicity or nation. From there, he extracted the view that the world citizen has the right to demand of states that they guarantee the freedom and happiness of humanity, and that states have the obligation to use their power for the freedom and happiness of humanity.[21] The state here has been rendered abstract and is not limited to the state to which one belongs. One is able directly to demand respect for one's freedom and happiness from one's own state as well as from all other states, and other states are able indirectly to demand this respect from one's own state. The relationship between the individual and the state thus has three layers.[22]

Subsequently, Tsuneto advances his theory on the relation between the state and the wider world by dividing nationalism *(kokkashugi)* into two types, absolute nationalism and relative nationalism. The former acknowledges the significance of other states only as a means towards the survival and development of a specific state. The latter is also expressed as internationalist nationalism or nationalist internationalism, wherein numerous states mutually recognise the raison d'être of other states, as well as the independent value of the other states' survival and development—for this is seen as an indirect aid to the survival and development of one's own state. At the time, the majority of states adopted the latter type of

nationalist internationalism, and the focus was on the attainment of national or popular diplomacy *(kokuminteki gaiko),* as opposed to bureaucratic, elite or secret diplomacy *(himitsu gaiko),* thus still far away from the ideal of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is not explicitly described, but it indicates a way of thinking that places the individual's personality as the foundation of societal value. Within this mode of thought the state merely exists as a means to maintain and develop the individual's character, and relations between states are also based on this standard.[23]

Tsuneto's logic differs significantly from Royama's theory of international society, but from the perspective of Japanese internationalists at the time it was Tsuneto who was exceptional. In the terms of Tsuneto's divisions, the internationalism of most contemporary intellectuals would fall into the category of nationalist internationalism, and of course Royama can also be included within that group.

Now, let us return once more to Royama. I would like to touch upon the evaluation of popular nationalism *(kokuminshugi),* another point in *International Politics and International Administration* that becomes an important basis for his later theoretical activity. The third chapter, 'International Politics and Popular Nationalism' *(Kokusai seiji to kokuminshugi),* consists of an examination of nationalism in which the political scientist Royama points out that in the two areas of the overthrow of feudal power and confrontation with foreign powers popular nationalism fulfils an important historical role, and to this extent maintains a strong affinity with democracy.[24] However, at the time popular nationalism was exposed to various suspicions:

> When popular nationalism asserts the fixity of its domain, demands the purity of its members, and furthermore is based on a geographical view of national administrative institutions [that is, that general elections based on regional constituencies obstruct the election of effective representatives] it is clear that it is not in line with the political demands of a total society formed beyond the domain of the nation, and it is even more clear that it is a great barrier to the development of international political order.[25]

Within the process of pointing out such suspicions, he harbours strong misgivings concerning the request for secession that must be the inevitable result of the demand for purity among members of the nation. For separatist demands would lead to more and more smaller states, and unnatural political divisions that ignore geographical and economic relations would sow the seeds of international conflict. It is worth noting that, observing the reality of the small states created in post-war Europe, he adopted a critical position—precisely from the perspective of internationalism—against the ethnic national self-determination that was becoming a major paradigm of international politics in the post-First World War period.

However, he does not completely reject popular nationalism. Because 'the establishment of true internationalism is born for the first time when the development of popular nationalism achieves full maturity and the conflicts among nations increase in severity', his understanding is that for 'Far Eastern countries', if anything, 'the twentieth century is the age of popular nationalism'.[26] Furthermore, the post-First World War relations between the various countries concerning the Pacific have reached the 'age of a cooperative policy among the Allied Powers' ('the New Order') and he claims that the awakening of popular nationalism in China and the movement towards a unified government will serve as a 'new principle' in Pacific relations.[27] Thus Royama narrowly maintains the balance of this double evaluation of nationalism by asserting the unequal development of world history.

In essence, then, Royama's international political theory as presented in *International Politics and International Administration* grasped the systemisation of international society after the First World War as a historical trend and attempted to establish the theoretical basis for permanently situating the realisation of Japan's national interest within such an international society. At this stage, Royama's internationalism was premised upon actual international society and was placed in a complementary relation to nationalism. There were theorists, such as Tsuneto, who assumed a cosmopolitanist position by relativising nationalism from the perspective of respect for individual rights, but they constituted a rare presence in Japan at the time.

The global significance of the Manchurian Incident: the particular and the universal in world order

The Manchurian Incident and the special relationship between Japan and Manchuria

Three years after the publication of *International Politics and International Administration* Japan began a war of aggression with the Manchurian Incident. How did the Manchurian Incident affect Royama's theory of international politics?

Before considering this question I would first like to go into the characteristics of Royama's understanding of international order prior to the Manchurian Incident. First, in relation to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact Royama attaches importance to the fact that 'despite being an inferior and weak international treaty, it spread a net over all of the powerful nations in the Pacific through a non-aggression pact'.[28] In international relations among Far Eastern nations following the First World War there already 'existed a standard that could not be violated by one state's free will', but Royama emphasises the fact that a new standard was added on top of this as one aspect of American foreign policy.[29] However, we should note that what he emphasises here is not the principle of universality

represented by the non-aggression pact, but rather its restrictiveness against Japanese foreign policy.

Second, on the political functioning of the League of Nations Royama states that 'its institutional principle and methods cannot be directly applied to this region' and defines 'League of Nations-style diplomacy' as 'diplomacy that aims to ensure the status quo and mutual security'.[30] Furthermore, he characterises this 'League of Nations-style diplomacy' as the 'shield that prevents [Japan from] both the advance of the United States and the emergence of China'.[31]

Third, in 1931, as Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated, Royama encouraged attention to the fact that in Pacific relations (relations of the various nations which border the Pacific or which hold rights and interests in the region) there is a deficiency in peace institutions incorporating the United States and the Soviet Union. He then suggests the establishment of a 'peace system that would be based on regional agreements' and that would have some kind of relationship with the League.[32] Specifically, he conceives of developing such existing private institutions as the League of Nations Association of Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations into semi-public institutions that would investigate the significant problems of the Pacific and formulate a unified public opinion to guide governments.[33]

In this way, although several layers of standards were interacting in East Asia, there was no principle that would unify the whole, and he perceived this absence to be a cause of instability. The suggestion of a 'peace system based on regional agreements' was an attempt to deal with this state of affairs, but the eruption of the Manchurian Incident put off the possibility of its realisation.

After 1931 Royama's writings turned quickly towards the elucidation of the problem of special relationships within the world order. *Nichi-Man kankei no kenkyu* (Research on Japanese-Manchurian relations, 1933) was representative of this transformation, and it analyses the uniqueness of the Japan-Manchuria relationship on the levels of geography, economics, culture and politics.[34] The book claims that the Japanese assertion of the uniqueness of Japan-Manchuria relations on the level of politics had shifted from 'special rights and interests' to 'a special relationship'. The term 'special rights and interests' referred to practices based on treaties or *faits accomplis* and had been in use since the Japanese opposition in 1911 to the Four Power Consortium. Yet Royama focused on the fact that a 'special relationship' had been emphasised since the Tanaka Cabinet and that in the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol of 1932 this unified relationship was made explicit.[35] According to Royama, the development of this special relationship signifies resistance to China's attempts to further structurally incorporate Manchuria into a national framework, as well as resistance to interference by the United States and member states of the League of Nations—that is, their rejection of the special relationship.[36] The anti-special relationship position, as represented by Walter Young's *Japan's Jurisdiction and International Legal Position in Manchuria* (1931), was an attempt to establish rights and interests according to the strict interpretation of international treaties and international law, and this method was also used in the Lytton Commission Report.[37] Yet if

the Japanese-Manchurian relationship was to be grasped as a mere accumulation of rights and interests according to law, Japan stood nothing to gain since these had been previously recognised by international practice. From Japan's standpoint, this interpretation did not offer any clue to resolve the situation in Manchuria since it ignored the fact that one of the reasons for the Manchurian Incident was that Japan's position was not limited to rights and interests that had a firm basis in law and treaties. Royama thus states that the resolution of the problem lies in the opposite direction, that 'diplomacy hereafter can be established by making clear the nature of the Japan-Manchuria relationship, which had developed and exists as a de facto relationship, and by harmonizing this relationship with legal interpretations'.[38]

In this way, Royama clearly approves of the Manchurian Incident as something that attempted to construct a 'special relationship' transcending 'special rights and interests'. Based on this understanding, he tries to supply 'the special relationship' with a solid position within the whole of international relations. While the Manchurian question was still being debated in the League, this stance was best expressed by Royama's statement that, 'in light of the general situation of the world, the resolution of the Manchurian problem is something that should be carried out in conjunction with the League of Nations'.[39] Its basis was the prediction that

> [I]f the special character of the Manchurian question and the particular circumstances of China as a state are explained fully and effectively, then it will be understood that exceptional measures for the resolution of this problem must be undertaken, as the established agreements of the League will not be literally applicable in their present form.[40]

Yet in actuality such 'exceptional measures' were not easily acknowledged. In September 1932 the Japanese position worsened after its recognition of Manchukuo, and domestically there emerged a new popular nationalism which denounced the League of Nations and rejected interna tional cooperation. Against this trend, Royama asserts the significance of the 'world historical transformation' that became clear following the First World War—that 'an autonomous foreign policy centred on one's own country must be harmonised in terms of mechanisms and procedures with international diplomacy and international economic policy standing upon collective principles'[41]—and he counterattacks in the following way:

> Even were Japan to withdraw temporarily from the League of Nations, as long as it does not independently either propose a separate new international peace mechanism that includes the various nations of the world or proclaim a new international principle such as American non-interventionism or Soviet non-aggressionism, then in some form or another

> it will have to reestablish relations with the institutions of the League of Nations.[42]

Furthermore, he asserts that the establishment of a 'Far Eastern regional branch of the League of Nations' or a 'Pacific regional peace mechanism' premised on particular regional circumstances must be considered as actual issues. However, such institutions 'would not be allowed to ignore the existence of principles of world peace structures'.[43]

Even when it became clear that Japan would withdraw from the League, Royama clearly stated that 'autonomous diplomacy is a thing of the past' and that 'without using some form of collectivism, the extension and maintenance of national interests has by now become impossible'.[44] His argument was that the power to persuade world opinion resides in the assertion of particular regional relationships in a way that does not conflict with general relationships, or else in working constructively towards overcoming those conflicts.[45] It will be evident that Royama consistently takes the position that the Japanese-Manchurian relationship is an essentially international problem; he attempts to resolve it as a regional problem of the Pacific and to use this as a medium to link up to world order. At the same time, it is also significant that he asserts, not the passive right of self-defence, but, rather, an 'active justice'.[46] Yet, as to what this active justice signifies, Royama does not, at this stage, provide an answer.

One may wonder why Royama, in sharp contrast to many of his contemporaries, made the effort to understand the Manchurian problem as a world problem and persisted in asserting the need for its international resolution. The key to this question lies in his understanding of the three 'international fronts' shaping the state of affairs in the Far East. The three fronts—the League of Nations, the American-inspired Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the non-aggressionist diplomacy conducted by the Soviet Union—while differing in method and content, are similar in the sense that they represent 'international policy accompanied by a certain type of international peace mechanism'. Furthermore, he mentions that,

> [A]s a recent trend, these two countries [the United States and the Soviet Union] see the instability in the existing international peace mechanisms brought about by the present conflict between the League of Nations and Japan and realize the deficiencies in their own international peace policies, while also moving to advance a step further their own relations with the League of Nations.[47]

At the same time Royama expressed his fear that the weak Nationalist government in China, which in his view lacked the institutional foundation of a solid state and nation, might try to strengthen its anti-Japanese stand by means of these peace policies. They might prove to function as an opening for China 'to befriend distant states and attack neighbouring ones', and, conversely, there also

was the possibility that the Chinese Nationalist government would be given a place within these same peace policies.[48]

At the beginning of 1933 Royama argued that the three abovementioned world peace mechanisms, which had seemed separate and difficult to harmonise, were gradually beginning to compromise as a result of Japan's military aggression.[49] He observed that the movement of the 1920s towards the illegalisation of war, with the Kellogg-Briand Pact as its apogee, served as an important axis for this rapprochement. It thus became clear to him that, whereas in *International Politics and International Administration,* which had been written during the 1920s, he had not analysed the factors that could guarantee the coherence of the international political system, after the Manchurian Incident he could no longer shrink from paying attention to the integration of the world peace mechanisms.

'World disorder' and the status of America

Royama's international political theory from the time of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations to the eve of the Sino-Japanese War invariably unfolded around the question of world order. The Manchurian Incident had led to 'the emergence of the assertion of particularity as a repudiation of the universality of Western civilization', and this made Royama move once more towards the investigation of the question of universality.[50] The two issues he focused on were the universality of the peace mechanism centred on the United States and the response to 'world disorder' following the Manchurian Incident.

The reason that Royama started to emphasise the American position within international politics lies in his experience of travelling to the United States following the Manchurian Incident, but also in his awareness that the American policy of non-recognition had exerted a great influence on the attitude of the League towards the Manchurian situation. In this context, it became necessary, from the viewpoint of the international coordination of 'special relationships', to question once more how the universality of Western civilisation and, in particular, the 'international peace mechanism' centred on the United States were formed historically, and to elucidate their essential characteristics. In a 1935 article he explained:

> [At the Washington Conference] the open door policy which each country was made to recognize from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, was expanded a further level and incorporated into the heart of the treaty, thereby giving birth to a certain international peace mechanism centred on the United States. Furthermore, the Kellogg-Briand non-aggression pact was added, drawing signatory states from around the world. [Because of this process] a certain conscious or semi-conscious understanding was born among Americans that Western civilization was

> universal and represented a certain type of idealism that would bring happiness to all humanity.[51]

According to Royama, the recent 'international peace mechanisms' had also emerged in international politics as an assertion of this Western brand of universality.[52] His explanation of what the universality of Western civilisation consisted of is surprisingly simple. He merely discovered it 'in lifestyle, or means of production, or individual rights—things that are utilitarian, mechanical, and quantitative, and which are essential for human life'[53] or 'mainly in economic activity, such as productive activity and consumptive activity, in other words, those human activities that form the lifestyle of mankind'.[54] He does point out that the non-recognition policy was the diplomatic principle of the United States and the League, and that in the background was the existence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty, but the question of whether these things have a universality within international peace mechanisms is left unanswered. Royama never goes beyond the assertion that 'the peace view of the Western countries is generated from each country's international standing and is regulated by the same. Therefore, one must examine whether the economic, social, and regional conditions that construct this standing ultimately maintain any global universality'.[55]

That Royama was in this way unable to pursue fully the question of universality is closely related to his other key issue from this period, namely the concept of 'world disorder'. In October 1935 he discussed the content of this disorder and first of all emphasised that the Versailles Treaty, the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which had been the standard of world politics following the First World War, had lost their governing power. This was also evident from the fact that countries concerned with the maintenance of the status quo, such as Britain, had recognised the slow transformation of the status quo and were beginning to move towards pragmatism in an attempt to maintain their own interests. Faced with German remilitarisation and withdrawal from the League, as well as with Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, the argument of territorial read justment, including the redistribution of colonies, was gaining political influence. This was illustrated not only by the English and American press, but also by Colonel House's writings.[56] Even American policy towards the Far East, Royama analysed, 'while maintaining as before its leadership and aggressiveness, is unable to maintain the form of consultation among the great powers', and is thus mired in a wait-and-see position.[57]

This tendency towards appeasement on the part of Britain and America influenced the tenor of Royama's arguments, and he published his 'Constructive Criticism of World Redivision' *(Sekai saibunkatsuron e no kensetsuteki hihan)* at the beginning of 1936.[58] In this article he essentially asserts that the simple redistribution of natural resources would only trigger a new struggle for control of the international market and that it was necessary to consider a redistribution of colonies. At the same time, in order for 'the have-not countries' to persuade

the 'haves' it is necessary to prepare a transfer 'from unregulated private capitalism to a strategy for control that pursues social profit'.[59] In the case of Japan, he stressed the need to establish a 'socialistic strategy for the development of the domestic market and the improvement of the standard of living'.[60] This strategy came down to an expansion of the domestic market, which would do away with the need for export dumping, by means of the regulation of capitalism and a far-reaching programme of profit sharing. The (re)distribution of those natural resources that were indispensable to Japan was to be demanded of international society. Here, Royama's international political theory develops in close connection to domestic economic policy.

Yet even if the external issue of export dumping would thus be solved, there still remains the problem of which international organisation would be used to re-divide the colonies. Furthermore, in Japan's case the prior question is whether to return to the League, or else how to create the situation which would make possible a participation in a group mechanism. As the military's scheme of dividing Northern China advanced ever further, Royama pointed out that 'our nation now stands at the crossroads of whether our national interest will be advanced through military means or through a new form of international cooperation'.[61] In order to escape from this crossroads, Royama asserts that a new diplomatic principle must be established that will unify public opinion immediately. The first guideline he offered was to reconstruct a peace mechanism in order to make the world acknowledge the just assertions of his own country. Next he stressed the need to clarify in detail to which peace policy the Japanese claim of being 'the force of stability in East Asia' was linked. For this purpose, a council, international agreement or international peace mechanism based on localism must be constructed. Finally, he advocated the mobilisation of all domestic media and research facilities in order to streamline national public opinion on the basis of the insights of a small number of learned men.[62] In this way, Royama for the first time discusses his notion of international politics and foreign policy in relation to the concept of national unity. By now the point had been reached where the crisis in international relations and the contradictions of the domestic system under the imperial constitution had to be resolved together as one unit.

Here, I would once more like to introduce the figure of Tsuneto Kyo. Since *International Law and International Problems,* Tsuneto had pushed forward with the study of legal philosophy and did not publish many articles that were closely connected to actual political processes. However, it appears that from 1935 to 1936 he found that he could not avoid writing about international politics and international society. In 'The Concept of Politics, Especially International Politics' *(Seiji, toku ni kokusai seiji no gainen)* he criticised the view that the essence of politics is the regulation on the state level of the ruled by the rulers, arguing that the state's external functions, along with its internal functions, should be included within the concept of politics.[63] In other words, although the state's domestic political activity and its international political activity are clearly

differentiated in both form and content, they are also closely linked and form an inseparable whole.[64] 'It is inadequate only to see "foreign policy as an extension of domestic policy", for there are many cases in which conversely we should see 'domestic policy as an extension of foreign policy.'[65] These words by Tsuneto can be seen to reflect the reality of the world which Japanese intellectuals at the time were all facing. Royama's previously mentioned theory of national unity was also one response to this type of problem.

How, then, did Tsuneto try to respond to this reality? He understood international politics as something constrained by both internationalist and nationalist inclinations. In particular, he argued that the tendency among states towards exclusionism and confrontation was an essential characteristic of recent international politics. However, even though they both faced the same situation Tsuneto maintained a different stance from Royama and persisted in his pursuit of universality. In his essay 'The Essence and Social Basis of World Law' *(Sekai ho no honshitsu to sono shakaiteki kiso),* which was published in 1936, Tsuneto thoroughly criticised Tanaka Kotaro's *Sekaiho no riron* (The theory of world law) and developed his own theory of world law.[66] According to Tsuneto, the distinguishing feature of what Tanaka calls global or global character is its transborder or transnational significance. He claims that Tanaka sees the peculiarity of international law to be that its proper and effective scope is not limited to any one nation, and he criticises Tanaka's view of world society as being characterised by a variety and multiplicity of transnational qualities (even the world society of the maritime insurance industry or such fragmentary, individual domains as international marriage are designated as world society). In other words, Tanaka never questions how these multifaceted, heterogeneous world societies are intertwined and he lacks the perspective of trying to explicate world society or world law in any unified or total way.[67]

On the basis of this critique, Tsuneto attempts to establish the concept of world society on a higher plane than that of national society, higher even than that of an international society formed by two or more national societies. In historical terms, before the modern age various world societies such as East Asia, India, and the West existed as universal total societies. In the modern age, however, such oppositions were dissolved and a world society in a literal sense of the term, one that subsumes the entire human race, was established.[68] This type of world society is not envisioned merely as extensive, but also as something that maintains an intensive totality:

> The world society on the one hand includes all of the various national societies as limited total societies, but at the same time also contains another type of limited total society that is international society and thus can be called a universal total society. Consequently world law, world politics and the world economy—which essentially form the content of world society—are the combination, respectively, of national and international law,

> national and international politics, and national and international economy.[69]

Tsuneto understands both national and international societies to be limited total societies, and claims that world society alone is a universal total society. What is referred to here as international society corresponds to what Royama calls 'international peace mechanisms' or 'international fronts'. World society is the total society that subsumes all of these elements, and the concept of world law comes into being as the law that regulates this type of universal total society.

One may wonder why it was only in the mid-1930s that Tsuneto, using his critique of Tanaka Kotaro as a pretext, proposed these concepts of world society and world law. It may have been that the universalist nature of his scholarly discipline of legal philosophy could not condone the self-righteous theories of particularity of the day. However, if one considers the situation at the time—when, following Japan's lead, Italy also started military aggression, Germany announced its remilitarisation, and the international order formed after the First World War entered a period of crisis—a different explanation is required. For, on the surface, it is virtually impossible to identify any aspect of the world situation that would ground his attempt to grasp world society and world law as comprehensive bodies. If one takes these conditions into consideration, one may surmise that Tsuneto's attempt to establish world law and world society at a higher level than international society and international law signified an attempt to situate a thoroughgoing universalism against the various brands of particularist nationalism by which Japan was flooded in the wake of the Manchurian Incident. And, as he had already pointed out a decade earlier in his *International Law and International Problems,* the critique of the state must be undertaken from the universalist perspective of the world citizen.

At this stage, it is evident that Royama's internationalism and Tsuneto's cosmopolitan stance were decisively separated. Regrettably, the comparison of the two thinkers' discourses cannot be developed further. As government control over the media tightened, Tsuneto submitted to the state of affairs and stopped writing on the problems of international society and international law. On the other hand, Royama did not let up and, especially after the outbreak of complete war between Japan and China in the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, was prolific in developing his theory of international politics further.

The Sino-Japanese War and the formation of the theory of an East Asian Community

The Sino-Japanese War and the concept of world order

In spite of Royama's proposal, it was not an easy matter to establish a diplomatic principle that would unify national opinion. In 1936 the negotiations with the

Chinese Nationalist government, which were carried out principally by the Foreign Ministry, were stalled, and the military's policy of dividing Northern China advanced steadily. Royama had played a central role in the Showa Research Society since its founding in October 1933, and for this group, which was seen as Konoe's brain trust, the formation of the Konoe Cabinet in June 1937 naturally was of great significance.[70] Yet only one month after its formation Japan plunged into complete war with China and national policy came to be led by the military and the war. After this point Royama's essays focused on the question of how to bring the war to an end by political means and to construct 'a normal situation in Sino-Japanese relations'.

Here I would like to consider the four perspectives that formed the foundation of Royama's theory of international politics in the period prior to his creation of the concept of the East Asian Community. First is his understanding of the implications of the Sino-Japanese War for world order. In an article written in August 1937, when the confrontation between Japan and China was developing into a war on all fronts, he saw the principles of the Washington Conference as 'anticipating the realization of a semi-colonial, but peaceful and unified China, on the basis of which the great powers would cooperate', and argued that this premise was no longer operative. For the Soviet Union had succeeded in constructing a socialist state and had regained its voice in East Asian politics, while the Nationalist government had 'become an autonomous political force in East Asia'. It was no longer possible to respond within the framework of the Washington System and the League of Nations to the existence of the Chinese Communist Party, which operated under Soviet influence, and to the demands for recovery of sovereignty by the Nationalist government and its pro-communist leanings. Yet, because Japan, China, and the Soviet Union had yet independently to establish international relations, the politics of East Asia remained unstable.[71]

The Sino-Japanese War had thus made Royama change his theory of international politics. On the one hand, he began to situate the Nationalist government as an independent element within the international relations of East Asia. On the other, he had come to see relations with the existing 'international peace mechanisms' as mostly confrontational. In 'World Order and the China Incident' *(Sekai chitsujo to Shina Jihen),* published in July 1937, he wrote as follows:

> China stood at the crossroads of whether to accept the Japanese demands and cooperate with Japan, or else to reject these and resist Japan. The latter path was chosen, leading to the current incident.
>
> However, the Nationalist Government's anti-Japanese policy and the international order in East Asia following The European War [the First World War] are two sides of the same coin. Since Japan, in the face of the Nationalist government's anti-Japanese policy, has boldly started a war of chastisement, it is only natural that a revision to this international order, even to the world order itself, is demanded.[72]

In other words, he now entirely rejected the universality maintained by the international peace structures created after the First World War and it became necessary to seek a new world order.

Second is Royama's perspective of 'an international conflict line concerning the development of China', which dealt with the relation between the international order and China's anti-Japanese policy. He made use of it to analyse the China policies of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union and Japan itself. He defined the League policy since 1931 of financial and technological aid to China, led by England and supported by the United States and various European countries, as a means of countering Japan's continental policy. He had to admit that it had succeeded to a certain extent in absorbing indigenous capital and nurturing government capital, and had given birth to the Nationalist government's confidence in economic reconstruction. The Soviet policy was branded an attempt to establish a Soviet sector under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party by means of Russian support. Royama warned that if the Chiang Kai-shek regime were to collapse, the possibility existed that the Soviet social revolution would emerge as the sole possible path of salvation. Japan's China policy was rather neutrally characterised by the development plans for Manchuria and Northern China. He pointed out, however, that because of the lack of surplus capital the role of national policy corporations *(kokusaku gaisha)* and privileged corporations was substantial, and there was a strong tendency for direct management and development by the Japanese.[73] By means of a comparison of these various policies Royama highlighted the weaknesses of the Japanese method of development. There was little activity of free capital, joint enterprises were unsuccessful, and there was little friendly cooperation between Japanese and Chinese in the form of cultural associations. This gave the mistaken impression to the Chinese that Japanese methods were not 'development' but rather 'invasion'.[74]

Royama's third perspective was related to the question of how to overcome these weaknesses. As the war in China increasingly intensified into full-scale war, it became clear that a genuine response to China's anti-Japanese movement was needed. In September 1937 the Autonomous Government of Chanan, one of the puppet regimes instated in the Northern part of China by the Japanese army, was established in Zhangjiakou. As the activities of the army, such as the manoeuvring to install friendly regimes in the occupied areas, seemed to go ahead of those of all other interested parties, an anxious Royama attempted to consider the fundamental destination of the war.

In October 1937 he asserted that underlying the intensification of the war was the Western nations' use of their worldview to shape China's own understanding of the China problem, and the fact that China's cultural and national goals were provided by Westerners.[75] He claimed that the most pressing question was how to create a 'cultural basis for Japan's political strategy in North China'.[76] First of all, he referred to the difficulty of rejecting the Three Principles of the People *(sanminshugi),* and instead proposed that it was best to position the three elements

in the hierarchical order of: first, the principle of livelihood; second, the principle of democracy; and, last, the principle of nationalism. He also advised the construction of a philosophical culture with moral authority, from which one could anticipate the sympathy of students and intellectuals, the introduction of life-science research into the customs, habits, villages and industry of North China, and the reform of the educational system. And in order to avoid giving the impression that Japan's economic expansion was imperialist expansion and thus becoming the target of the Communist Party's national liberation slogans, Royama advocated the adoption of a policy to adjust the demands of Japanese capitalism according to the interests of both the Japanese and Chinese masses.[77]

Accordingly, in December of the same year Royama confronted the occupation policy of North China by strongly criticising the method of establishing new regimes and demarcating defined areas as their domain. Japan's direct involvement in China's politics and administration should be limited to special districts; other districts should be entrusted to the autonomy of the central Chinese government that would undoubtedly be established in the near future as an institution to bring the war to an end. He proposed that Japan's political and diplomatic involvement should, along with the military facilities that would no doubt remain, take the form of regulated national policy companies like the South Manchurian Railway Company.[78] Thus Royama held strong misgivings and issued warnings concerning the subordination of politics to war brought about by the limitless expansion of the war.

In 1938 Royama developed his fourth perspective, a new theory on world policy. The occasion for this was Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's infamous January declaration that he would no longer deal with the Chinese Nationalist government. The members of the Showa Research Society were shocked by this pronouncement, which differed completely from their own conception. Royama interpreted it as a declaration in favour of a protracted war and set about working to change the course of the Konoe Cabinet. His 'Protracted War and Japan's World Policy' *(Choki sen to Nihon no sekai seisaku),* in February, was the first essay written with this aim and represents an important intellectual effort to bring the war to an end by establishing a war aim with both internal and external persuasiveness, one that would forcefully set the direction of the war in China. In this essay, the war is grasped as a movement for the reorganization of Japan and China into one 'regional livelihood community'. He defined this as 'a new imperial system based on technological construction, cultural contact, and regional relations', which differs from both the British-style commercial network of imperial organisation and the German-style coexistence of metropolitan state and colony.[79] This probably came down to the abovementioned creation of a regional economic bloc based on harmonisation of the demands of Japanese capitalism with the public interest of both China and Japan.

Furthermore, in order to establish and apply this 'reorganization into one regional livelihood community' and to gain recognition from the major powers, Royama advocated the need to create an additional leadership institution based on

fresh talent. This leadership was to be supported by a new popular union which would transcend the established political organisations and administration. He also considered it necessary to form national policy 'by establishing a close relationship between the people and the parliamentary, military, and bureaucratic institutions'.[80] These new ideas link directly to his concept of an East Asian Community, which he launched in late 1938. In order to contain the war within the oppressive situation that the enlargement of the battlefield did not provide any prospect of conclusion to the war, there was an inevitable call for the establishment of a diplomatic principle—which Royama had already indicated before the outbreak of the war in China—that maintained 'a relative permanence, matched domestic goals, and for which national unity is pursuable, with a content that encourages the autonomous cooperation of the people'.[81]

The East Asian Community and regionalism

In December 1937, with the expansion of the war uncontained and by now plunging towards the conquest of Nanjing, the Showa Research Society, of which Royama was a participant, submitted to the Konoe Cabinet a policy for the containment of the war and a proposal for peace conditions. Afterwards, at important stages in June and September 1938, the group released opinion papers and proposals. During the same period, intellectuals associated with the Showa Research Society began to debate the significance of the war and the direction of its conclusion. In July Miki Kiyoshi published 'The Meaning of World History in Contemporary Japan' *(Gendai Nihon ni okeru sekaishi no igi)* in *Kaizo,* and in October Ozaki Hotsumi published 'After the Battle of Hankou' *(Kanko-sengo ni kuru mono)* in the magazine *Tairiku*. These actions influenced Konoe by way of Cabinet Chief Secretary Kazami Akira, who was also a member of the standing committee of the Showa Research Society. They provided the support for Konoe's correction of his course in November 1938, when he adjusted the January declaration by means of the release of his 'Declaration of a New Order in East Asia'. The concept of the East Asian Community, which emerged as the central theme of journalism for the following year or more, was nothing other than an attempt to seek a theoretical grounding for the 'New Order'. Ozaki Hotsumi saw the formation of the theory of an East Asian Community essentially as 'a result of the clear realization of the difficulty of imposing an economic structure on the various countries of East Asia through unilateral Japanese methods' and wrote that 'the most profound cause for the emergence of the "theory of an East Asian Community" was the reconceptualization of the question of Chinese ethnic nationalism'.[82]

Royama's 'Theory of the East Asian Cooperative Community' *(To-A kyodotai no riron),* published in the November 1938 issue of *Kaizo,* can be seen as the forerunner of the intellectual debate on an East Asian Community.[83] Although there were differences in opinion amongst the various theorists, Royama's concept of an East Asian Community was developed systematically and can be seen as

forming an archetype.[84] In this section I would like to build upon my previous examination of Royama's theory and understanding of international politics in order to clarify the structure of his concept of an East Asian Community and to analyse its historical significance.

The fundamental framework for Royama's theory of the East Asian Community was presented in the form of three essays published in *Kaizo* between late 1938 and late 1939. The overall structure was indicated in the aforementioned 'The Theory of the East Asian Community'. Subsequently Royama published 'The Formation of a National Community' *(Kokumin kyodotai no keisei),* in May 1939,[85] and 'The Prospects of a New World Order' *(Sekai shinchitsujo no tenbo),* in November of that same year.[86] His argument is centred around the construction of an East Asian Community and addresses, respectively, Japan's role as its leader and the reorganisation of the world order premised on this East Asian Community. The following analysis is developed according to each level of his argument.

To start with 'The Theory of the East Asian Community', this article viewed the war in China as having 'the world historical significance of the awakening and unification of the East' and attempted to posit the construction of a 'regional unit of common destiny' *(chiikiteki unmei kyodotai)* as its governing principle. The introduction of the notion of regionalism or regionality is the most significant aspect of Royama's theory of the East Asian Community. One can say that by applying regionalism to the above-mentioned argument concerning 'the reorganization into one regional livelihood community' he developed the theory of the East Asian Community into a sharper edged and more inclusive form.

Whereas theories of an East Asian Community and an East Asian League are usually founded on affinities or commonalities of culture and ethnicity,[87] Royama made regionalism his leading principle:

> There are those who assert the need for the cooperation of the Chinese ethnic nation, but even before that the argument must convince the Japanese ethnic nation…. I believe that by introducing the concept of regionality the relationship between the continental question and the process of the Japanese ethnic nation's political and economic development will be elucidated.[88]

Royama's theory attempted, in the first place, to explain the historical necessity and the objective preconditions of 'continental management' to the Japanese people themselves, and to establish what he had previously emphasised, a comprehensive national policy and political war aims that would assemble all domestic forces.

Therefore it was natural that in his search for a leading force capable of bringing about an East Asian Community he arrived at the principle of regionalism, to which Japan's continental development was inherent. He described it as 'not imperialism, but regionalism for the purpose of defence or

development', and he considered the project of regional development to be 'the supreme goal of Japan's continental management'. He raised the examples of Taiwan, Korea and Manchukuo to show that the principle of the development and management of neighbouring regions was historically consistent. The motivation for the Orient forming a 'regional unit of common destiny', he argued, 'must arise from the awareness that the fate that rules the existence of peoples is linked to a specific region', and accordingly he stressed that only a political movement with this awareness would be capable of creating such a community.[89]

Next, the concept of an East Asian Cooperative Community of course had to deal theoretically with Chinese ethnic nationalism. In order to be able to conduct Sino-Japanese relations on the precondition that the position that Japan had built up on the continent from the Manchurian Incident through the Sino-Japanese War would be maintained, it was essential to 'overcome' *(chokoku)* the greatest barrier of Chinese nationalism. Royama stated explicitly, 'I firmly believe that the concept of the regional unit of common destiny is the philosophical weapon for overcoming the tragedy of the Orient produced by misguided ethnic nationalism.'[90]

It is clear that the essence of the theory of the East Asian Community that is presented here is nothing more than the imperialism that Japan tried to build by means of war. However, if we want to understand the uniqueness of Royama's brand of East Asian Community thought, we should go beyond simply the essentials and enter into a consideration of the specific contents of his theory.

In order to prevent the East Asian Community from ending up as just 'an imperialistic semi-colony', Royama presented the following conditions:

1 The political structure of an alliance should be adopted as a political guarantee to insure the survival of the ethnic nations in a specific regional unit of common destiny.
2 While respecting the differences of each ethnic national culture within the community, constructive development towards unification should be undertaken.
3 For the sake of rational planning to improve residents' lives and subsistence, established administrative regions should be reconsidered and 'new administrative regions and autonomous governments which possess a functional relation with nature and culture' should be constructed.
4 Capital should be activated with the goal of cooperation with indigenous or ethnic national capital.
5 Autarky or bloc-systems should be avoided, and instead an 'organic unification' should be brought about which 'aims to construct the basis for the betterment of the lives of each ethnic nation, by eliminating the relations of oppression and the crippled state of world culture'.[91]

Among these conditions only the first, concerning the political structure, is explained in some detail. The East Asian Community is construed as a state alliance comprising Japan, Manchuria and China. Although Japan is the leading power of this alliance, *it is not supposed to uphold any institutions to execute direct power over the people of the other member states. The administrative institutions of the alliance will, with the exception of some particular matters, exert their authority over the various nations only through the member states.* Concerning 'the New Chinese Republic' that was supposed to take part in the East Asian Community, Royama pointed out that this should be created by the Chinese ethnic nation, which 'is aware of the East Asian region's fated solidarity, is primarily driven by the spirit of anti-communism, and strives for Sino-Japanese cooperation'. Accordingly, the Nationalist and Communist parties, the two parts of the anti-Japanese common front, were to be excluded. Furthermore, the political structure of the New Chinese Republic was to be 'a federation of local autonomous governments'. Even were a central government to be formed in the future, he prophesised that it would undoubtedly take the form of a federation which, to a certain extent, recognised the existing self-governing bodies and their zones of jurisdiction.[92]

Royama's thoughts on the political system of the East Asian Community are further developed in an essay of December 1939. He advocated that Japan recognise the sovereignty of the new Chinese central government, as proposed by Wang Jingwei, and would not interfere with the execution of its powers. In North China a special administrative zone with the right of self-rule was to be established, but it was not supposed to violate the powers of the central government, such as diplomacy, taxation rights and the right to appoint key personnel. On the other hand, *problems requiring economic or diplomatic cooperation were not to be dealt with through the Wang government, but through legitimate joint committees comprising Japan, Manchuria and China.*[93]

The sections with emphasis represent conceptions that contrast with the formation of a puppet regime under military rule through the appointment of Japanese advisers, which later became an important point of contention in the ongoing and difficult negotiations with the Wang Jingwei regime. The Japanese demands in the negotiations were aimed at achieving mastery over all of China and the creation of a colonial situation with a strong element of military administration. Royama sought to evade this set-up, which would undermine his call against 'an imperialist semi-colony'. Nevertheless, to the extent that he attempted to give broad powers of self-rule to local administrations and to leave open the option of entering into special regional agreements with them, he seemed quite willing to compromise. He also remained completely silent on the question of the withdrawal of troops, another focal point in the negotiations with Wang.

As for Royama's second condition on ethnic national culture, he stated that differences of ethnic nationality should be respected and that all attempts to crush ethnic national consciousness through 'assimilationist imperialism' were out of the question. However, Royama's position was that the theory that each ethnic

nation is entitled to its own state, which relies on the concepts of ethnic national self-determination and the sovereignty of the modern state, would invite ethnic separatism in the Orient and thus could not be applied as it was.[94] For it was clear that once he recognised ethnic national self-determination the question of Korean and Taiwanese independence would also arise.

His third and fourth conditions indicated an awareness that without rational and planned economic development to bring about improvement in the residents' standard of living it would be difficult to gain the support of residents and assure regional stability. As a practical matter, their object was to concretise the slogan of 'a Sino-Japanese economic alliance'. They were clearly based on the same developmental perspective of Chinese capitalism as England and the United States also showed in their aid policies towards China. I will deal with the 'organic unification' of the fifth condition later on when I discuss Royama's theory of a New World Order.

Now let us consider the second article, 'The Formation of a National Community', published in May 1939. Royama stated that in order to construct an East Asian Community, Japan, as its leading power, needed 'a new system for its state and ethnic nation'. Without this, 'the East Asian Cooperative Community would become an isolated, unrealistic thing'. From this theoretical need he wrote 'The Formation of a National Community'. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that in fact Royama was critical of the theories on national reorganisation that emerged in the latter half of 1938 and was also dissatisfied with the spiritualist tendency of the national spiritual mobilisation movement:

> Just as the moral and ethical appeals for the formation of a new order do not go beyond educational proclamations and are as yet not considered from the viewpoint of their role in the formation of a new order, the operations towards its formation are fragmented and rubricated without end into exhortations to thrift and restraint on consumption and prices and the like. As such they often rely on a one-dimensional analysis of the established order and both legislatively and administratively they are carried out dependent on established techniques.[95]

In order to overcome this situation, he defined the national community as follows:

> The national cooperative community is a new order that moves a step beyond the 'state' to the ethnic nation *(minzoku)* or the political nation *(kokumin),* which represent a more fundamental form of human life and existence, and attempts to guarantee the meaning and fulfilment of their goals. At the same time, it is also a three-dimensional social existence which includes the elements 'economy' and 'society' that scholarship and common opinion up until this day have always positioned as conceptually opposed to 'the state'.[96]

The 'national community' was to be the principle of political unification that ordered the entirety of national life and made the goals of individuals' life actions correspond to the totality—in other words, that drew forth the spontaneous participation of the people. In contrast to the national spiritual mobilisation movement, the national community was principally concerned with economic and political unification. On the one hand, it hoped to bring about spontaneous support for economic regulation, based on the needs of a wartime economy. On the other hand, it sought to nurture a new nation-wide mass organisation that would function as the political foundation of a 'functionalist or technocratic' leadership.

The theory of the East Asian Community, which was thus assembled out of the concepts of regionalism and the national community, was provisionally brought to completion with the third article, 'The Prospects of a New World Order'. It was published in November 1939, two months after the start of the Second World War. The regionalist theory of an East Asian Community had been construed within the context of mutual interaction with the world order. But also, as a practical issue it could not ignore the world order, in this case the destruction of the existing one. From the perspective that 'the acquisition of foreign currency and the guarantee of import trade is by now an absolute condition for the solution of the China Incident and the long-term construction of the New Order in East Asia', he discussed in this article what the prospective new world order would have in store for regionalism.[97] In other words, on the level of order what would be the points of intersection between the New East Asian Order and the New World Order?

In Royama's conception of a New World Order, the currents of ethnic nationalism and anti-imperialism were important questions that needed to be dealt with on the level of the world order. He stated clearly that it was no longer possible to maintain a world order that completely rejected these tendencies:

> The problems that are at the core of the construction of a new order are twofold. The first is the coordination of the demands and policies of the imperialist powers that have differing relations or attitudes in relation to a specific region. The second is the existence of demands or desires for ethnic national states in a particular region. A new system that resolves both of these problems within a new order, (…) in other words, a system that does not ignore the desires of ethnic nations and at the same time allows for the external development of states that have arrived at the imperialist stage—this is referred to as the new order.[98]

If the East Asian Community was able to offer an effective resolution to these problems and proved indeed that it was capable of establishing a new order, then it would exert a strong influence on the subsequent formation of world order. Royama referred to this state of affairs as 'the structural relation between East Asia and the world'.

One thing I would like to emphasise here is that after the start of the Second World War Royama considered the construction of this type of new order not as limited merely to Japan, but as a common tendency among Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Moreover, he situated these movements as attempts to establish organic, multidimensional structures within specified regions. Accordingly, he broke through the limitation of grasping the East Asian Community according to particularism alone and attempted to see in it a universality connected to the world order. Maybe we could describe this as a reconfiguration of universality, one that is based on principles different from those expressed by the League of Nations Covenant.

The abovementioned fifth condition for a non-imperialistic East Asian Community, namely the question of organic unification within the region, also links up to this issue of universality. The relationship between Japan and the East Asian continent is discussed as similar to the relationship between Germany and central Europe, Italy and the Mediterranean, and Royama even pointed out that if one only grasped these relations in terms of regional economic development they also had something in common with the relationship of the United States and the other parts of the American continent. He asserted accordingly that this type of regional economic development centred on great powers was a global tendency and could not be ignored and, moreover, that the world order should be reorganised by the handful of regional units in this world which enjoy this kind of organic unity and balance.[99] Such was the nature of Royama's 'New World Order', and it was on the basis of this concept that he rejected the League of Nations as a mere primitive federation of states.

In the above I have tried to make clear that the reason Royama used regionalism as the paradigm for his theory of the East Asian Community was because he was intensely conscious of the world order. Yet his argument also contained a large lacuna. Royama never considers the question of what principle would tie together the 'organically unified' regions to form the world order. In this sense, the new world order is no different from the division of the world into a few large regions ruled by their respective regional great power. On the surface, it maintained a structure that would inevitably be assimilated into the conception of divided rule of the world by the five powers of Japan, Germany, Italy, the United States and the Soviet Union, which was the premise of the liaison meeting of government and Imperial Headquarters of September 1940.

Royama's inability to present a principle that would link up the East Asian Community to a new world order was also the inevitable result of the route his argument had followed. The point of departure for the League of Nations—namely 'the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations [and] the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments'—was entirely rejected as soon as he took the position, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, to privilege actual relations and to make legal relations follow suit. However, in the midst of the ever-expanding invasion into China, letting oneself be led principally by the facts meant that it

was impossible to present any universal principle of international society that could take its place.

Conclusion

The main feature of Royama's theory of the East Asian Community was that it was primarily based on the concept of regionalism and argued that the world order would be constructed on this foundation. Regionalism signified the reconfiguration of the world order according to a different principle than that of the League of Nations; it represented, not an insular particularism, but, rather, a particularity that would be closely related to a new type of universality. Finally, I would like to summarise its historical significance, including its implications for the post-war period.

First is the question of whether this regionalism had the potential to be recognised as a principle of world order. Article 21 of the League of Nations Covenant stated that 'Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace'. Royama's regionalism can also be seen to have based itself on this article for authority. Yet Article 20 of the League Covenant forbids the signing of international agreements that are inconsistent with the terms of the covenant, and regional agreements are restrained under the overall model. This is where the League Covenant differs completely from the regionalism represented by the idea of an East Asian Community.

However, by late 1939, after the start of the Second World War, there was potentially receptiveness towards the concept of using regional order as a foundation for the formation of world order. In truth, with regard to the general post-war international structure, the fundamental question of whether to establish an international structure on top of regionally divided structures as a controlling mechanism or to form a structure of large and small states with equal sovereignty was an issue which persisted until the establishment of the United Nations Charter in 1945. In 1943, for example, Churchill transmitted to the American side the proposal that the world be divided into three regional councils (Europe, the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific) and that the representatives of these three regional councils, together with Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, would form a world council.[100]

Against this view was American Secretary of State Hull, who asserted consistently that the post-war world system must be a global, universalist structure based on the principle of equal sovereignty, one that would take precedence over regional structures. Within the American State Department, research into the question of a post-war international system began at about the same time as Hitler's invasions, and this was also precisely around the time that Royama wrote 'The Quest for a New World Order' *(Sekai shinchitsujo no mosaku)*.[101] The American conception, led by Hull, of a universalist world system and the East

Asian Community theory were, indeed, at opposite ends of conceiving world order, and Churchill's conception can be situated somewhere in between them.

However, since in the post-war order the United States overpowered England and established its authority in the field of world politics, the post-war international system was conceived from the point of overcoming the type of regionalism represented by the East Asian Community and instead recognising once more the universal significance of the various principles formed in the 1920s. This development was also connected to the seemingly contradictory fact that the United States, despite the collapse of the League of Nations, began to examine the reconstruction of a global international structure immediately after the start of the Second World War. From America's point of view, its position within world politics had become unthinkable without a world system tied to universalist principles.

Notes

1 This essay is a revised version of 'Senkanki no kokusai chitsujo ninshiki to To-A kyodotairon no keisei—Royama Masamichi o chushin to shite'. *Nihonshi Kenkyu,* no. 424 (December 1997). The translation is by Seiji M.Lippit and Dick Stegewerns.

2 In the area of international political theory alone, there are the following works: Baba Shuichi, '1930-nendai ni okeru Nihon chishikijin no doko'. In *Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kiyo,* no. 19 (1970); Mitani Taichiro, 'Kokusai kankyo no hendo to chishikijin'. In Hosoya Chihiro *et al.* eds, *Nichibei kankeishi masumedia to chishikijin.* Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1972; Gomi Toshiki, '1930-nendai Nihon no shin-kokusai chitsujo koso: Royama Masamichi no baai'. *Kokusaigaku Ronshu* 2.1 (July 1979); and '1930-nendai no kokusai seijikan ni okeru gyakusetsu'. *Gaiko Jiho* (August 1984); Yamaguchi Hiroshi, 'To-A shin-chitsujo no shoso: To-A kyodotairon wo chushin ni', parts 1 and 2. *Meiji Daigaku Daigakuin Kiyo Seiji Keizaigakuhen* 26–7 (1989–90); Sawada Jiro, 'Nitchu sensoka ni okeru Royama Masamichi no tai-Ei-Bei ninshiki'. *Hogaku Seijigaku Ronkyu* 7 (1990). On Royama's domestic political theory, see Ozeki Motoaki, 'Minponshugi no shuen to nidaiseitosei-ron no kaizo'. *Shirin* 80.1 (January 1997). Ozeki's essay examines the extent to which Royama drew on Yoshino's theory of a two-party political system and tried to reform it. Furthermore, Sakai Tetsuya ('[To-A kyodotai-ron] kara [kindaika-ron] e'. *Nenpo Seijigaku: Nihon gaiko ni okeru Ajia-shugi*. Iwanami Shoten, 1998) attempts, like the present essay, to trace Royama's international political theory from the 1920s to the 1930s. However, while Sakai emphasises the academic demand for and intellectual genealogy of Royama's theories of the state and international politics, I will stress here that Royama's concept of an East Asian Community emanated directly from his international awareness itself.

3 Among recent works treating the New Order in East Asia and the theory of East Asian Community are the following: Shoji Junichiro, 'Nitchu senso no boppatsu to Konoe Fumimaro kokusai seigiron'. *Kokusai Seiji* 91 (May 1989); Sakai Tetsuya, 'To-A shinchitsujo no seiji-keizaigaku'. *Kokusai Seiji* 97 (May 1991); Shinobu

Seizaburo. *Seidan no rekishigaku*. Keiso Shobo, 1992; Shiozaki Hiroaki, 'Showa Kenkyukai to Miki Kiyoshi no kyodoshugi'. *Nihon Rekishi* 542 (July 1993).

4 Hatano Sumio, in *Taiheiyo senso to Ajia gaiko* (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996), understands the problem of the 'treatment of occupied territories' as an aspect of wartime diplomacy, and attempts to investigate the significance of the policy of ethnic national liberation, which was said to be one of Japan's war aims. This chapter is an attempt to clarify the international consciousness that formed the background to the Japanese external policy as described by Hatano.

5 Royama Masamichi, *Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyosei*. Ganshodo Shoten, 1928.

6 L.S.Woolf, *International Government*. George Allen & Unwin, London 1916. That he received suggestions from Woolf is mentioned in Royama's preface.

7 Royama, *Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyosei,* p. 10. Originally it appeared as 'Kokusai seiji-soshiki to sono tan'i mondai'. *Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi* 22.7 (October 1923).

8 *Ibid.,* pp. 16–23.

9 *Ibid.,* p. 19.

10 *Ibid.,* p. 14.

11 *Ibid.,* pp. 263–307. This portion corresponds to Chapter 13, 'Kokusai gyosei no gainen', a retitled version of 'Kokusai gyoseiron' I (*Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi* 27.5, May 1928), and Chapter 14, 'Kokusai gyosei no hattatsu', written as a continuation, and Chapter 15, 'Kokusai Renmei ni okeru kokusai gyosei'.

12 *Ibid.,* pp. 296–7.

13 *Ibid.,* p. 298.

14 *Ibid.,* pp. 255–8.

15 Tsuneto Kyo, *Kokusaiho oyobi kokusai mondai,* Kobundo Shobo, 1922, p. 130.

16 *Ibid.,* p. 171.

17 *Ibid.,* pp. 122–5.

18 *Ibid.,* p. 148.

19 *Ibid.,* p. 149.

20 *Ibid.,* pp. 159–63.

21 *Ibid.,* pp. 50–6.

22 *Ibid.,* pp. 73–8.

23 *Ibid.,* pp. 78–9.

24 Royama, *op. cit.,* pp. 34–5. Originally appeared as 'Kokusai seiji chitsujo to kokuminshugi' (International political order and nationalism). In *Gaiko Jiho,* vol. 39, no. 458 (January 1924).

25 *Ibid.,* p. 38.

26 *Ibid.,* pp. 176–9. Chapter 10, 'Kyokuto shoho no kokumin undo to Nihon'. Originally appeared as 'Kyokuto shoho no kokuminshugiteki suisei'. In *Gaiko Jiho,* vol. 40, no. 475 (September 1924).

27 *Ibid.,* pp. 189–9.

28 Royama Masamichi, 'Fusenjoyaku to Taiheiyo no shorai'. *Chuo Koron,* 1928.10. Reprinted in *Nihon seiji dokoron*. Koyo Shoin, 1933, p. 545 (hereafter *Doko*).

29 Royama, *Doko,* p. 546.

30 Royama, *Doko,* p. 545.

31 Royama, *Doko,* p. 546.

32 Royama, 'Taiheiyo ni okeru heiwa kikan no mondai', *Gaiko jiho,* vol. 57, no. 626 (January 1931). In *Doko,* p. 532.

33 Royama, *Doko,* p. 534.

34 Royama, *Nichi-Man kankei no kenkyu*. Shibun Shoin, 1933.
35 *Ibid.,* pp. 190–3.
36 *Ibid.,* p. 194.
37 *Ibid.,* p. 219.
38 *Ibid.,* p. 225.
39 Royama, 'Kokusai renmei to tomo ni kaiketsu subeshi'. *Kokusai chishiki,* vol. 12, no. 8 (August 1932). In *Sekai no henkyoku to Nihon no sekai seisaku*. Ganshodo Shoten, 1938, p. 23 (hereafter *Henkyoku*).
40 *Ibid.*
41 Royama, 'Sekai no saininshiki to chihoteki kokusai renmei'. *Kokusai Chishiki,* vol. 13, no. 1 (January 1933). In *Henkyoku,* p. 99.
42 *Ibid.,* p. 102.
43 *Ibid.,* pp. 102–3.
44 Royama, 'Dainiji sekaisenso to kokusai renmei'. *Chuo Koron* (March 1933). In *Henkyoku,* p. 42.
45 Royama, 'Hatanseru kokusai kiko no saikento'. *Gaiko Jiho,* vol. 66, no. 680 (April 1933). In *Henkyoku,* p. 58.
46 Royama, *Nichi-Man kankei no kenkyu,* pp. 259–60; 289.
47 Royama, *Henkyoku,* pp. 51–2.
48 Royama, *Henkyoku,* p. 44.
49 Royama, *Henkyoku,* p. 103.
50 Royama, '"Kiki" no kanten yori mitaru Nichi-Bei kankei'. *Kaizo,* vol. 17, no. 3 (March 1935). In *Henkyoku,* p. 118.
51 Royama, 'Taiheiyo seiji kyotei no kanosei'. *Chuo Koron* (March 1938). In *Henkyoku,* p. 130.
52 Royama, *Henkyoku,* p. 130.
53 Royama, *Henkyoku,* p. 130.
54 *Ibid.,* p. 136.
55 Royama, 'Zenrin gaiko to Taiheiyo mondai'. *Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi,* vol. 33, no. 3 (March 1934). In *Henkyoku,* p. 170.
56 Royama, 'Sekai no henkyoku to sono shindoko'. *Gaiko Jiho,* vol. 76, no. 740 (October 1935). Reprinted in *Henkyoku,* pp. 76–90.
57 Royama, 'Kafu kaigi igo no gaiko kokubo'. *Keizai Orai,* vol. 10, no. 5 (May 1935). In *Henkyoku,* p. 176.
58 Royama, 'Sekai bunkatsuron e no kensetsuteki hihan', parts 1 and 2. *Kaigo Jiho* vol. 77, nos. 746 and 749 (January-February 1936). Reprinted in *Henkyoku,* pp. 259–82.
59 *Ibid.,* p. 269.
60 *Ibid.,* p. 269.
61 *Ibid.,* p. 278.
62 *Ibid.,* pp. 279–80.
63 In *Ritsumeikan Daigaku sanjugoshunen kinen ronbunshu,* 1935. Also included in *Ho to dotoku*. Iwanami Shoten, 1969. Hereafter, page numbers from *Ho to dotoku* will be used.
64 Tsuneto Kyo, *Ho to dotoku,* pp. 223–6.
65 *Ibid.,* p. 227.
66 *Koho Zasshi* (February-May 1936). Tanaka Kotaro, *Sekaiho no riron,* 3 vols. Iwanami Shoten, 1932–4. Tanaka was a legal scholar specialising in commercial law and legal philosophy. He was professor at Tokyo Imperial University from 1923 until 1946.

In *Sekaiho no riron* he posited that world society consists of bodies and societies of a transnational nature, and that the laws that regulate these transnational bodies and societies have the character of world law.

67 Tsuneto, *Ho to dotoku,* pp. 232–4, 249.
68 *Ibid.,* pp. 277–80.
69 *Ibid.,* p. 280.
70 Sakai Saburo, *Showa kenkyukai.* Chuo Koronsha, 1992.
71 Royama Masamichi, *Henkyoku,* pp. 188–92.
72 Royama, 'Sekai chitsujo to Shina jihen'. *Gaiko Jiho,* vol. 85, no. 794 (January 1938). In *Henkyoku,* pp. 198–9.
73 Royama, 'Shina kaihatsu no kokusai sokokusen'. *Kaizo,* vol. 19, no. 13 (November 1938). Reprinted in *Henkyoku,* pp. 221–31.
74 *Ibid.,* p. 233.
75 Royama, 'Jihen o meguru gaijin no kansatsu'. In *Henkyoku,* p. 208.
76 Royama, 'Hokushi kosaku no bunkateki kiso'. *Nihon Hyoron* (November 1937). Reprinted in *Henkyoku,* pp. 210–20.
77 *Ibid.,* pp. 210–20.
78 Royama, 'Hokushi no seiji oyobi kyoiku'. *Chuo Koron* (December 1937; special issue). Reprinted in *Henkyoku,* pp. 239–49.
79 Royama, 'Chokisen to Nihon no sekai seisaku' (February 1938, magazine unknown). Reprinted in *Henkyoku* pp. 302–6.
80 *Ibid.,* pp. 307–9.
81 Royama, 'Sekai seisaku to waga gaiko gensoku' (March 1935, magazine unknown). In *Henkyoku,* p. 325.
82 Ozaki Hotsumi, *'To-A kyodotai'* no rinen to sono seiritsu no kyakkanteki kiso'. *Chuo Koron* (January 1939). In *Ozaki Hotsumi chosakushu,* vol. 2. Keiso shobo, 1977, p. 311.
83 Royama, 'To-A kyodotai no riron'. *Kaizo* (November 1938). Reprinted in *To-A to sekai: shinchitsujo e no ronsaku.* Kaizosha, 1941, (hereafter *To-A*), pp. 3–40.
84 According to Ozaki Hotsumi, the various proposals regarding the New Order in East Asia were divided into theories of an East Asian League and theories of an East Asian Community. The latter are once again divided into the theories propounded by Sugihara Masami of *Kaibo Jidai,* by Yamazaki Yasuzumi of *Hyoron* and by the Showa Research Society. As for the points of commonality between the authors, he points out that 'they are sincerely moved by the serious, tragic, and difficult aspects' brought about by the Sino-Japanese War, 'they erect the facade that the unification of East Asia does not signify an intent to alienate themselves from the rest of the world but is merely meant to be a first step in achieving world harmony', and they are rather idealistic and are a fair distance from what the great majority of Japanese vaguely think. Ozaki Hotsumi, 'To-A shinchitsujoron no genzai oyobi shorai'. *To-A mondai,* inaugural issue (April 1939). In *Ozaki Hotsumi chosakushu, vol. 2,* pp. 252–4.
85 Royama, 'Kokumin kyodotai no keisei'. *Kaizo* (May 1939). Reprinted in *To-A,* pp. 41–73.
86 Royama, 'Sekai shinchitsujo no tenbo'. *Kaizo* (November 1939). Reprinted in *To-A,* pp. 74–104.
87 Takata Yasuma harshly criticised the fact that Royama's theory of the East Asian Community was based on regionalism, demanding whether, while affirming Japanese ethnic nationalism, he 'was saying that we should order the Chinese and

Mongols to deny their own ethnic nationalism?' Takata wrote that 'the key to the union of East Asia lies with the ethnic nation', and tried to place the 'common bonds of blood and culture' as the basis of the union of East Asia. 'To-A to minzoku genri', *Kaizo* (November 1939), pp. 25–37.

88 Royama, 'To-A shinchitsujo no kensetsu genri'. *Kogyo Kokusaku,* vol. 2, no. 4 (April 1939). In *To-A,* p. 142.

89 Royama, *To-A,* pp. 19–28. Takata Yasuma criticised this point, writing that 'the Professor's theory of the East Asian Community does not go beyond stressing the need to complete the political unification of East Asia and saying that this is what we should aim for'. 'Shina no minzoku mondai'. *Bungei Shunju* (March 1939), p. 36.

90 Royama, 'To-A kyodotai no riron'. In *To-A,* pp. 23–4.

91 *Ibid.,* pp. 29–32.

92 *Ibid.,* pp. 32–8.

93 Royama, 'Jihen shori to shin chuo seiken'. *Nihon Hyoron* (December 1939). Reprinted in *To-A,* pp. 237–59.

94 Royama, 'To-A kyodotai to teikokushugi'. *Chuo Koron* (September 1939). In *To-A,* p. 174.

95 Royama, 'Kokumin kyodotai no keisei'. In *To-A,* p. 49.

96 *Ibid.,* p. 47.

97 *Ibid.,* p. 57.

98 Royama, 'Sekai shinchitsujo no tenbo'. In *To-A,* pp. 91.

99 Royama, 'To-A kyodotai no riron'. In *To-A,* pp. 22–3.

100 Kase Shunsaku, *Kokusai rengo,* Keio Tsushin, 1992, pp. 10–12. Kihira Eisaku, *Pakkusu Amerikana e no michi,* Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1996, pp. 116–18.

101 Kase, *Kokusai rengo,* p. 9.

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8
Nationalism and internationalism in Japan's economic liberalism
The case of Ishibashi Tanzan

Kurt W.Radtke

I regard the state as one enterprise.[1]

The desire to Japanize the world will lead to Japan's destruction. The desire to globalise Japan will lead to Japan becoming a global power.[2]

Introduction: nationalism versus internationalism, or economism versus ideological value systems?

Nationalism and internationalism

The historian Nakamura Masanori views modern Japanese history in the context of an oscillation throughout modern history between 'internationalism and nationalism, Westernisation and chauvinism'.[3]

In other words, he conceptualises the choices faced by modernising Japan in terms of tensions between an emphasis on the maintenance and defence of Japanese values, and the acceptance of the free interaction of Japan within a larger framework that would integrate Japan as one member of a broadly conceived international community. A somewhat similar dichotomy is applied by those who see pre-war Japan engaged in a struggle between democracy and dictatorship, the latter represented by either the army or 'fascism'. However, nationalism and internationalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive antonyms. Depending on the way the terms are interpreted, a nationalist may very well be able to favour cooperation with other nations in an international order that provides equal and fair chances to all nations. Ishibashi Tanzan was one of the few Japanese who represented this alternative, wishing to enhance Japan's national interest through cooperation within a wider international order. Different from nativists, who saw the Japanese state in mythical terms, Ishibashi dared to compare the state to an enterprise, an organisation with rational goals that needed to be run in a rational manner.

A self-taught economist, Ishibashi Tanzan became the editor of pre-war Japan's leading business journal, the *Toyo Keizai Shinpo* (Oriental economist), and even

became prime minister in 1956, a position he had to give up after only a few months due to health problems.[4] He left an interesting record of comments on domestic and international events, especially before 1945, which are distinguished by a near obsessive search for objectivity and economic rationality. Known as one of the strongest supporters of political liberalism in pre-war Japan, he also introduced economic liberalism to Japan by making the work of the British economist Keynes known to a wider public. It was Keynesian policies as well as the 'Manchuria boom' that helped the Japanese economy to escape from the worldwide recession sooner than most other major countries. Despite the general trend towards economic blocs, Ishibashi kept pleading for a liberalised global economy. He supported the principle of equal economic opportunities for all nations and opposed isolationism. Yet it would be wrong to regard him as a proponent of Westernisation. Ishibashi faced a different dilemma: he consistently advocated economic rationality as an alternative to those who wished to use ideological or value systems such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism and Marxism to function as guiding beacons in the formulation of policies. It seems as if Ishibashi regarded economic rationality as a way to escape from—in his eyes—a fruitless, and even dangerous, tendency to see the world as engaged in struggle between different cultures and ideological systems. He thus anticipated issues that have become core issues in the current debates on globalisation. By focusing on value-free economism Ishibashi tended to play down the fact that definitions of 'economy' and 'economic rationality' are themselves dependent on value systems.

In a recent book, *Jidaimatsu* (End of an era), Sakaiya Taichi, a well-known commentator on social and political issues and former head of the Economic Planning Agency during the Obuchi Cabinet, argued that Japanese pre-war society had already essentially internalised concepts of a modern industrialising society.[5] In his view, Japan succeeded in rapid post-war reconstruction despite the collapse of the 'Great Japanese Empire' since Japan's quintessential aim, namely building a modern industrial society, was in agreement with the principles propounded by the occupation forces. He thus perceives an important continuity in modern Japanese history that transcends the chauvinist, nationalist currents so vociferous in pre-war Japan. Pre-war discourse in terms of Japan as an 'emperor state' was but one side of the coin—the nativist ideological justification *(tatemae),* so to speak, at times hides from direct view Japan's true intentions *(honne),* namely the more important concepts of a modern industrialising society in Japan:

> Military and civil officials as well as business circles all aimed towards a modern industrial society geared towards mass production and compromised with fanciful Japanists pleading for a patriarchal emperor system.[6]

Although military officials were interested in industrial modernisation, their own organisation was not always an example of successful modernisa tion. Sakaiya concedes that in purely organisational terms Japanese military forces were not

truly unified as they ought to be in a modern nation-state, while Japanese nationalists often claim(ed) that they were the epitome and symbol of Japan's march towards modernity. Some may object strongly to this interpretation, since historical sources appear to show that Japan was willing to sacrifice concepts of a modern economy and society to those of a militarised emperor state. In Sakaiya's view, however, we cannot simply identify the contents of written sources with the ultimate true goals cherished by society:

> [In a situation of crisis] the intentions of organisations that differ from state goals and the hysterics of the abnormal situation of war play their own role. We may argue that the Japanese Empire in its final phase was in a situation where the *honne* and *tatemae* were considerably at variance…. When the Pacific War intensified…the deficiencies in military strength and the absence of feelings of moral justice *(seigikan)* became apparent…. In addition, contemporary Japanese neither had the ability nor the enthusiasm to spread the ideals of their patriarchal emperor system abroad…. The establishment of Shinto temples abroad based on traditional myths of the Japanese people was merely a means of gaining points in domestic politics.[7]

Sakaiya subsequently explains Japan's 'reckless war', not as an abandonment of modernisation and economism *(keizaishugi),* but as a way to secure the means for modernisation such as the assured supply of raw materials.[8]

Japan thus combined social, cultural, political and organisational features of a pre-modern society with an overall consensus on leading Japan into the modern age. It was, in his view, this particular structure of Japan that explains why the emperor was able during the last days of the war to persuade Japanese leaders to accept surrender, and, once the leaders had accepted surrender, to make the people accept surrender peacefully.[9]

Although the proponents of a revivalist nativist ideology were obviously not opposed to modernisation as a tool to strengthen Japan's international and military power, they were fundamentally opposed to the primacy of the principle of rational organisation and policies guiding the modernisation of the economy and society. A leading scholar in the field of Japan's relations with the United States, Hosoya Chihiro, summarises this as follows:

> This new [revivalist nativist] approach, known as the *Kodo* policy, was marked by the following characteristics: 1) The pursuit of economic interests as a national goal was degraded; 2) positive interference in the domestic affairs of China was supported, provided that it was not designed to attain Japan's selfish interests; 3) the consciousness of a confrontation with the Western powers, rather than co-operation with them, was assumed to underlie Japan's foreign policy; and 4) the resort to force to realise international justice was accepted.[10]

Ishibashi may be said to represent the side of Japan that emphasised economic growth as a means of modernisation and pointed out that economic rationality was not merely a means to achieve greater efficiency. It was also a means to avoid the divisive power of ideologies of any persuasion. He was one of the few Japanese who attempted an escape from the zero-sum thinking prevalent at the time, and that was characteristic for a period that put exaggerated emphasis on competition among nations.

Value systems, ideologies and political legitimisation in Japan

A remark is in order here about the composition of belief and value systems in Japan. To some, Japan is most of all a 'Buddhist' country; to others, Japan seems a paragon of Confucian values. As in China and Korea, 'Confucianism' in Japan denotes a large reservoir of normative statements and ideas concerning the art of governing and controlling people. This does not, however, make it into a *consistent* political theory. Different from China and Korea, Confucianism never attained the status of a popular, (quasi-) religious creed; nor did any particular interpretation of Confucianism acquire the status of 'orthodoxy' in Tokugawa Japan.[11] Everyday Japanese ethics did not of necessity require legitimisation through reference to a (quasi-)religious belief system. This may be one of the reasons why the reception of Western ideologies in Japan differed from that in China and Korea. They were generally introduced as useful 'means' to aid modernisation whose validity needed to be born out by their efficiency, but not as value systems to be emulated because of their (presumed) ethical superiority. Kita Ikki[12] once noted that socialism in Japan turns into statism; in other words, it is deprived of its moral roots in the individual.[13]

It is thus not surprising that the language of policy debates among top Japanese decision-makers as recorded in foreign policy documents, different from the language of the popular media, remained in the realm of *Realpolitik*. It was largely devoid of explicit references to any specific ideology, since they were not needed to rationalise and legitimise policy decisions.[14]

After 1945 Ishibashi Tanzan repeatedly argued that the 'ideologised' perception of Japan (i.e. as a fascist country) by foreign countries had destroyed chances for (economic) cooperation. He consistently refused to establish a link between Japan's capitalist economy and what was perceived as Japan's 'economic aggression' in China (see pp. 182–6 below). Yet Ishibashi's emphasis on (economic) rationality also proved a weakness, because it made him de-emphasise the link between moral values and economic choices. He admitted that, 'in the last analysis, economic problems, too, are problems of one's philosophy of life',[15] but in the context of the 1930s it may have been rather difficult to engage in meaningful policy debate by basing one's arguments on liberalism that was clearly rooted in Western morality.

Ishibashi's attempts to avoid subjective or nationalist partiality may also have roots in the Confucian tenet that extols impartiality over particularistic interests,

and also in the basic Buddhist tendency to uncover illusions and delusion, including self-delusion. His defence of the modern capitalist order was not an absolute, principled stance. In fact, like many others, he tries to separate the issue of economic organisation from personal, individual-oriented value systems. This results in a certain tension between Ishibashi's liberal economic rationalism and his convictions as a Japanese liberal:

> The high regard we have for the system of private property is merely [the result of] the introduction of Western ideas during the recent few decades. However, the system of private property has originally arisen merely for the sake of convenience of mankind. Therefore, if it would produce a situation where the disadvantages of that system as a whole would [outweigh] its advantages, of course, there would be no reason for its continued existence.[16]

A similar dilemma is encountered in the thinking of others who comment on the role of individuals in Japanese society, such as Nakano Seigo,[17] too:

> While accepting the industrial power resulting from private capitalism he did not surrender his intuitionist conception of the individual. The notion of individualism as a legal, class, or economic phenomenon was not of utmost importance to him. Yet he took part in the processes of Diet politics, supported private industry, and defended 'liberty', even though his concept of 'liberty' had little intrinsic relationship with the processes of parliamentary government or capitalism. One need not stretch the imagination to foresee the inevitable disillusionment that would accompany his recognition of that fact…. Nakano's extremism in tone of voice, choice of words, and strategy stemmed in large measure from his inability to solve this dilemma of establishing a meaningful relationship between the indigenous tradition of individualism and modern organisation. Indeed, might this not be one of the key dilemmas of Japanese development in the twentieth century.[18]

Traditional Japanese individualism objected to the creation of a rule-based society in which all individuals were subject to the same rules. What Tetsuo Najita sees as a key dilemma of Japanese development is in fact an issue that goes far beyond Japan and has become the centre of attention in discussions on globalisation. At issue is the (British) belief that the participation of free individuals in a market economy will contribute to the growth of democratic individualism, a kind of individualism transcending mere economic egoism. Only the future will tell whether this assumption has some basis or whether, after all, British individualism exists independently of the specific form of economic organisation. It is hardly conceivable that it was British-style economic organisation (market economy) that produced Western-style ethically motivated individualism. Ishibashi separated

nationalism and imperialism from systems of organisation such as capitalism and communism:

> This nationalism, this imperialism is not the sole property of Japan (or of China), these are ideas, feelings which are equally the property of the countries of the world—in particular the powers among them.[19]

Another contemporary, Uchida Ryohei, agreed that nationalism and expansionism are in fact undesirable, but added that these are phenomena that can hardly be suppressed.[20] Those who argue nowadays that nationalism is outdated in the age of globalism would do well to heed the historical experience of previous generations.

Ishibashi was a staunch supporter of a capitalist system. Adherents of (economic) liberalism in Asia and elsewhere tend to be grouped among 'pro-Western', or at least 'internationalist', intellectuals and economic commentators. Like supporters of an internationalist liberal order elsewhere, and in particular in the age of globalisation, Ishibashi felt obliged to gain support from his home audience by showing that he did pursue national interests, while arguing for international cooperation. His reluctance to use the 'moral' argument in support of a liberal order is most likely also due to this factor.

Japanese leadership in Asia

Ishibashi remained in favour of cooperation with foreign countries, in particular the US and Great Britain, but, like many others, maintained that such cooperation should always leave enough room for an independent Japanese role in Asia. More than that, Ishibashi wanted Japan to act as a global leader, convinced that adopting true internationalist policies would eventually benefit Japan as a nation. Ishibashi Tanzan would combine ideas of a liberalised global economy with a Japanese role as leader *(meishu)* in Asia:

> I believe that if Japan moves towards a more liberal, laissez-faire policy towards Taiwan, Korea and China these peoples will not turn away from Japan. They will hold Japan in high esteem and regard Japan as leader of an alliance.[21]

This traditional Asian concept of leadership emphasises voluntary compliance of followers towards the leader, not only due to the leader's military and economic strength, but also because the leader is recognised as having superior moral and cultural qualities.[22]

For a long time Ishibashi was rather critical of Japan's ability to provide genuine leadership. Elsewhere he refers to Japan's dependence on foreign civilisation in opposition to claims by some Japanese who defended colonisation of Manchuria with reference to the benefits Japanese civilisation might bring about:

> Speaking generally, the civilisation underlying Japan's image of a civilised country which it shows China at present, is in fact mainly one that has been transmitted from Europe and America. Further, speaking at the level of relations between individuals, a not inconsiderable number of outstanding Japanese who have played a pioneering role in the fortunes of our nation until now, have achieved their competence *(hito to natta)* due to the guidance and education by Europeans and Americans. How many among our fellow countrymen who are involved in relations with China have in fact engaged in the guidance and education of Chinese with such a kind heart?… To tell the truth, there does not exist in our country an independent civilisation which ought to be transferred to a backward country (the proof is that they cannot study without taking recourse to foreign languages), so if it's only [a matter of] assimilating civilisation, Manchuria and Mongolia have no need to rely on Japan. What [can] be added is merely the power of kindness. One of these days advisors and so on will enter the new state, and it is essential to consider this point during the selection of [qualified] advisors.[23]

In these rather sharp comments Ishibashi points out that Japan (still) lacks the moral qualifications that would make Japan a leader in the eyes of other Asian nations striving for modernisation. Should Japan therefore submit to 'Western' leadership? Ishibashi's plea for cooperation with Great Britain in the mid-1930s did not imply any (ideological) commitment or even subjection to the goals of British foreign policy.[24]

Ishibashi pleaded for Japanese cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, since without their cooperation there was little chance for the creation of a new international system encompassing both the West and the East. In this sense, Ishibashi was an 'internationalist'. American and British willingness to continue (economic) cooperation would also strengthen the hand of Japan's internationalists. At the same time, Ishibashi urged that Great Britain and the United States should not treat Japan like an ideological enemy. These issues were forcefully expressed in his reaction to attacks on Japan by Bertrand Russell and a member of the American silver lobby, Senator Pittman.[25] After the war Ishibashi repeated once more his conviction that 'ideologised' perception destroyed chances for (economic) cooperation. In the post-1945 era Japan has usually similarly defined its international position, not in terms of an abstract international system, but in terms of a basic preference for a United States-centred strategy. Needless to say, in contrast to the pre-war period, the room for developing a truly independent Japanese policy towards Asia has been severely limited. The alternative, an omni-directional internationalism centred on the United Nations has usually been dismissed as too idealistic. Ishibashi Tanzan made no secret of the fact that he wanted to exert himself for the benefit of Japan, but he avoided becoming a narrow-minded nationalist—to him, internationalist cooperation was

beneficial to Japan as long as other nations also practised fair and equal internationalism.

The tension between a rational and a just political order in Ishibashi Tanzan's liberalism

Global politics, modernisation and ideologies

While he pleaded for a liberalised global economy, Ishibashi should not be mistaken as 'pro-British' or 'pro-American'. Ishibashi was, for instance, opposed to uncritical idolatry and imitation of things Western, of 'aping Whites' *(hakujin no mane)*.[26] Moreover, as was to be expected, a developing country like Japan would complain of limited access to foreign markets, complaints that continued to be voiced for many years after 1945. Like most other Japanese, Ishibashi too proved a fierce critic of the foreign (economic) policy in the 1930s of, in particular, Great Britain and the United States, which he regarded as highly hypocritical. He saw an obvious conflict between the Anglo-Saxon open-door policy in China and policies in which other countries were refused market access to areas such as the Indian subcontinent under British rule. He reserved harsh criticism for Japan and the Japanese as well. He deplored aggressive Japanese attitudes towards China, which were often mingled with contempt for China's inability to build a modern unified nation-state.[27] After the war he stressed the need for Japan to maintain meaningful economic links with the Asian mainland, especially communist China, the People's Republic of China (PRC). His attitudes were apparently not always appreciated in the United States and Britain by scholars and politicians alike. In 1946 Ishibashi became minister of finance in the first Yoshida Cabinet, but the occupation forces in Japan purged him from his government position, and it was an open secret that the United States did not wish to see him become prime minister in 1956.[28]

Although Ishibashi has been awarded the label 'Japanese liberal' by most writers, the term 'liberal' needs further comment—after all, American 'liberalism' is a far cry from British liberalism or traditional German liberalism.[29] Moreover, the label is slightly misleading. Ishibashi's attachment to parliamentary democracy and a free-market economy was not based simply on an emotional belief in a liberal value system. Repudiating nationalist-chauvinistic egoism, he argued that the reasonable adjustment of (conflicting) interests made more sense than pursuing hegemonic policies. Generally speaking, Ishibashi presented his view as based on rational arguments that would seek to give adequate weight to conflicting interests. Being deeply aware of the divisive power of ideologies, he used mainly non-ideological arguments to push his case. Quite a few of Ishibashi's ideas concerning the domestic and international order are not fundamentally different from those of many of his Japanese contemporaries. He failed to appeal to a public likely to be swayed by jingoistic, nationalist arguments. His cool rationalism

was unlikely to generate support for liberal ideas as a value system. We should, however, guard against conceptualising this in terms of a clash between 'Western liberal' ideas and 'traditional Japanese beliefs'. Since the Meiji period Japan had already undergone many changes, and it would be difficult to describe Japanese society in the 1930s as a traditional society confronting the 'West'.

We may point out that modernisation—or its more recent phase, globalisation—has affected and changed the rich countries of both Europe and Northern America. Globalisation may not simply be conceived as the victory of internationalist, borderless capitalism over Soviet-style nationalist and totalitarian politics, if only for the reason that capitalism is also undergoing significant changes in this process. Are we, however, moving in the direction of a new age whose order and systems are more 'rational'? Several hundred huge corporations have pushed forward economic internationalisation and horizontal cooperation. In the area of security, alliance systems—the largest one being the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)—tend to create a strictly hierarchically organised political order in which 'sovereign' states do not simply share tasks, but there is a clear and hierarchical division of labour. This has inevitably led to an order that pretends to be equitable but denies equal rights to all nations—and it is not difficult to see that this fosters tendencies towards latent, or not so latent, nationalism. In the age of 'globalisation' the pursuit of parochial national interest seems to have become outdated due to the pressures of a rationally organised global economy. In my view, however, it is not difficult to perceive that strong players hide their pursuit of egoistic goals by presenting them as inevitable consequences of the demands of a new global, rational system.

Ishibashi wrote in an age when the rational pursuit of purely national goals was the order of the day, and internationalism was easily associated with unrealistic idealism. Studying Ishibashi and his times may help us to conceptualise the linkage between issues such as rationalism, equitability, nationalism and internationalism in the global order. Ishibashi's realism demanded that he focus on the actual power and role of the Great Powers. Yet somewhere in the background of Ishibashi's arguments lurks a view of some impartial principle of justice operating in the international system[30]—and he uses historical examples to warn against the hubris of unrestrained leadership:

> The expulsion of Germany from Qingdao [i.e. the German colony in Shandong province, technically a 'leasehold territory'] was because Germany had a weak point which would lead to its expulsion. Also, the expulsion of Russia from Manchuria was likewise because Russia had a weak point which would lead to its expulsion. Thus, that [weak point] lies in the seizure of territory. If those two countries had had no territorial ambitions, if they had endeavoured in the development of China with an understanding identical to an investment in an enterprise by a capitalist, whether it's the laying of railways in China, the building of harbours, the commencement of enterprises—banks and others—, these two countries

would definitely not have fallen into such disgrace. Therefore, it goes without saying that they would have undoubtedly been able to evade the loss of large amounts of money.[31]

Ishibashi was a member of the Showa Kenkyukai, Konoe Fumimaro's advisory think-tank'.[32] Konoe had been appointed prime minister in June 1937 in order to mediate in the conflict between the political parties and the army. Konoe was not a liberal himself, but he was willing to include a liberal such as Ishibashi in the Showa Kenkyukai. Despite Ishibashi's liberal credentials his role should not be confused with that of a 'dissident' in the modern sense of the word. On some issues he made statements, some of which are quoted below, which are surprisingly close to (internal) policy statements by Foreign (and later Prime) Minister Hirota Koki, who can hardly be called a 'liberal'. Although Ishibashi has been classified as one of the 'radical liberals' of the Taisho period,[33] his attachment to parliamentary democracy and a free-market economy was based on rational arguments, rather than being rooted in a consistent value system that emphasises a moral order beyond market rationality.

Generally speaking, European and Chinese civilisation stress the importance of maintaining 'unity of principles and thought' in an individual—expressed both in terms of coherent individuality and an attachment to a set of mutually non-contradictory principles of behaviour. Since these are judged to be indispensable to any description of 'identity', their relatively subordinate role in Japanese society has also plagued many a biographical study of Japanese personalities. In Japan an individual's overall consistency with 'society', the 'spirit of the age' (for want of a better term) is an important social injunction, requiring us to check carefully which utterances are the result of 'social obligation' and which are expressions of an individual stance. Needless to say, the two cannot always be neatly separated.[34]

A related question concerns the individual commitment to a particular ideology, which in Japan seems to be of a slightly different nature, since we observe a fairly high frequency of such sudden 'conversions' to an opposite belief. At the same time, such conversions appear to be socially acceptable. This is a question that links the study of political systems and politically legitimate behaviour with the cultural psychology of individuals. In Japan there is little social pressure to maintain long-term consistency in intellectual allegiance to one particular set of ideas or ideology.[35]

In order to understand the relationship between individuals and their society it is essential to have a clear grasp of the mechanisms that force the individual to commit him- or herself to social groups. In Japan commitment to abstract religious, moral or political systems plays a much smaller role in the process of socialisation than in the Christian or Islamic world.[36]

Much attention has been given to the rise of rightist (or 'fascist') thinking as 'ideology' in Japan, but there is a surprising dearth of studies concerning the direct effect of ideologised perception on specific policy debates. While Ishibashi's liberalism marks him as belonging to a rather small category of Japanese liberal

journalists and political commentators, such as Hasegawa Nyozekan or Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, it is not actually all that surprising to note that many of his views also reflected trends shared by quite a few of his not so liberal contemporaries.[37]

In his younger years Ishibashi had launched vehement attacks against the 'privileged classes' of Japan—attacks that seem to have much in common with attacks on the established order from both the 'right' and the 'left'.[38] His attacks did not, however, lead him to question the Japanese 'system' as such. Ishibashi supported democracy and a free economy since they make for a reasonable reconciliation of conflicting interests, and the existence of privileged classes is seen as an aberration of an essentially sound system. He seems to have overlooked that getting rid of privileged classes would have meant abolishing a fundamental feature of Japanese society—and in pre-modern Japan, as in most other pre-modern societies, the maintenance of a privileged hierarchy as such was perceived as having a moral value, and not as an aberration. In Japan we observe a preference to resolve domestic conflicts and disputes on policy 'pragmatically'. The ability of one party to settle disputes is therefore easily construed as proving moral superiority, and there is little need to legitimise policies by reference to general moral principles. This manner of settling disputes and differences between particularistic or individual interests and 'the common good' is far removed from the way European-style liberalism seeks to solve such conflicts.

Writing after the end of the First World War, Ishibashi himself acknowledged that numerous Japanese had misconceptions about the relationship between individualism and the interests of society as a whole, as if support for individualism implied the negation of the latter:

> When after the outbreak of the European War [as the First World War used to be called in Japan at the time] the German forces were predominant and the strength of the allied armies was not up to them, those in our country who are short-sighted immediately took this to be the destruction of individualism and glorified militarism. However, now the war has finally resulted in the surrender of the German forces, and the allied forces scored a full triumph. And now opinion appearing in our newspaper and magazines —those *[sic]* of politicians, entrepreneurs, and scholars all in one voice sing the praises of democracy…. They praise militarism, they glorify democracy, but they don't know what is militarism, what is democracy…. It is not unlikely that they will keep running after others, and cannot create new [concepts] independently *(shudoteki)*…. Do have a look at Adam Smith's economics…. His advocacy of freedom of action for each individual does definitely not mean that every individual may have everything his own way. It's because he believed that the granting of liberty *(jiyu)* to the activities of individuals is the best method to advance the benefit of society as a whole…. Respect for the individual shown by the English so-called liberals has to be understood in this way…. Whatever the original meaning of democracy, the [type of] democracy that claimed victory in the last war is an

> individualism that has amended the ways of unified organisation, in other words, an individualism that recognises the joint intervention towards, and management of the maintenance and development of the common good (koeki)…. This [way of] thinking has destroyed minority politics at the level of domestic politics, and [has given] rise to majority politics. At the level of economic politics it is the repudiation of unrestrained liberalism and the establishment of the ideal of the common good *(koekishugi)*. In external affairs it has brought about the decline of imperialism and developed the ideal of a truly internationalist League of Nations *(kokusairenmeishugi)*.[39]

The last sentence is particularly suggestive, since Ishibashi here extends the validity of his argument from the domestic to the international level, creating the prospect of a liberalist resolution of conflicts, not only between the individual and society, but also among nation-states.

Defending national interests by cooperating within an international system

It has often been argued that the advance of democracy in Japan after the Meiji period was paralleled by the rise of a new style of foreign policy during the 1920s in which Japan had chosen international cooperation rather than confrontation and aggression. Ishibashi does not fully concur, since he observes a consistent line in Japanese policies towards Asia which has little to do with a new spirit of democratic international cooperation.

In order to understand his argument it becomes necessary to sketch the historic background and context in some detail. Paternalistic attitudes and policies of economic, if not military, aggression towards China had commenced long before modern political ideologies, both left and right, were used either to support or to attack Japanese policy towards the Asian mainland. The appearance of foreign powers in East Asia during the 18th and 19th centuries had fostered ideas concerning the spread of Japanese power, already visible in the writing of Sato Nobuhiro (late 18th century), who influenced Yoshida Shoin, the latter arguing for the expansion of Japanese power over Kamchatka, 'Manchuria', Korea, the Ryukyu's, Taiwan, the Philippines, China and India.[40]

The Chinese defeat in the Opium War (1839–42) had signalled the end of the pretence of a separate Chinese-led East Asian international order,[41] requiring Japan to face the challenge of a global international system and stimulating ideas about Asian cooperation to prevent the conquest of Asia by the Western colonial powers. As in Europe, towards the end of the 19th century attention was paid to issues such as the maintenance of a balanced peace and the deeper reasons for the origin of wars.[42]

From the late 19th century onwards a large part of Japan's foreign policy had been determined by the search for 'equal economic opportunities', a search that predated subsequent attempts towards autarky ('economic security').[43] Japanese

frustrations over the perceived inability of mainland Asia to introduce reforms to ward off the White intruders induced many Japanese to argue for a 'go-it-alone' policy, subsequently well expressed in Fukuzawa Yukichi's essay 'Away from Asia' *(datsu-A ron)*. While the basic aim of Japanese equality with the Great Powers was shared by most politicians and political commentators, there were important differences of opinion concerning the road towards equality. These differences depended on two things:

- the definition of 'equality';
- the degree of confidence in the ability of the Japanese economy to gain and maintain access to international markets in order to survive.

It is important to understand that in the Japanese definition 'equality' did *not* refer to a general principle underlying the international system, but was merely conceived in terms of Japan achieving a place in the international order as equal as possible to that of the Great Powers. By the same token, Japan did not oppose colonisation of other countries and territories as such.

In the face of colonisation by the 'Great Powers', East Asia searched for ways to conceptualise changes in the international order (in Asia and beyond) and how to respond. The creation of a new global 'balance' received attention from commentators of virtually every political conviction. Whereas Chinese politicians such as Sun Yat-sen or Li Dazhao would argue for complete Chinese independence before collaboration with Japan could be pursued, Japanese pan-Asianists came to view Chinese independence as an unrealistic dream—at least for the time being.[44] The principle of 'equality' with other foreign powers was used to defend Japan's 'special position' on Chinese territory, and no further justification was deemed necessary.

In the wake of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) the powers had been able (by means of the Triple Intervention) to force Japan to reduce its war booty by refusing to let Japan hang on to the Liaodong Peninsula. While Japan was mentally prepared to have to make concessions to the Great Powers, China fell into quite a different category. Any sign of compromise towards China might be interpreted as a sign of Japanese weakness—impermissible in an age of Great Power rivalry, since it might in turn endanger Japan's occupation of Taiwan and her aspirations on the Asian mainland. A still pre-modern China was thus generally not considered to be equal politically. Something similar may be said about the Japanese approach to the Chinese market. The aim was equality *in* the Chinese market with other foreign powers such as Great Britain, but not economic equality *with* China.

As Okuma Shigenobu, one of the leading figures in the Meiji elite, put it, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance aimed, among other things, to assure equal access by all countries to the Chinese market.[45] However, Japan's activities in the China market were limited in areas where the British claimed 'special influence'. This was the background for Prime Minister Hara Takashi's willingness at the time of

the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to give up Japanese special rights in Shandong and Fujian in exchange for the opening-up of the spheres of influence of Great Britain and France in China.[46] Hara argued for Japan's cooperation with Great Britain and the United States in the Chinese market, while reserving the right to an independent Japanese role in Asia.[47] This was also inspired by Japanese fears of international isolation in the wake of the First World War.[48]

Yet Hara, too, like most other politicians and commentators, wished to treat 'Manchuria and Mongolia' as separate from the rest of China, being Japan's 'own' backyard. Needless to say, the geographical term 'Manchuria and Mongolia' *(Man-Mo)* was a Japanese one that did not exist on the Asian mainland. Usually, Japan's expansionism was considered to be on a par with what the Western powers were doing. Goto Shinpei, the 'father of Japanese professional colonialism', and the young Konoe Fumimaro opposed British and United States leadership (in Asia) from a similar point of view.[49]

Pan-Asianists during the first two decades of the 20th century were inspired by the existence of the American Monroe Doctrine to demand a Japanese 'Monroe Doctrine' for East Asia. To them, the Monroe Doctrine proved the true nature of American plans for a global order as only superficially based on equality. The Japanese right wing or the military would ignore Chinese aspirations for political and military independence as pipe-dreams; yet even beyond the military, there was virtually no Japanese who would acknowledge the right of any Chinese government to economic independence.

Ishibashi's liberal critique of the Shidehara foreign policy

During the 1920s Ishibashi was often critical of Japan's foreign policy, also known as the 'Shidehara policy', after Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro. According to Ishibashi, the basic strategic aims of Shidehara's foreign policy did not differ substantially from those of his predecessors or his successor Tanaka Giichi—the main distinction being Shidehara's reluctance to employ military means to press Japanese claims on the Asian mainland. Shidehara saw cooperation with the United States and Britain as an indispensable condition for the protection of Japan's interests on the Asian mainland, but according to Ishibashi one should not mistake this for a policy informed by a 'pro-Western' attitude.

While others praised Shidehara for his moderate and flexible approach in policy towards China, worthy of a democratic politician, Ishibashi criticised the foreign minister for 'refusing to give one inch on Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria'.[50] Yet Ishibashi himself also strongly defended Japan's interest whenever he saw legitimate Japanese interests at stake. Although Ishibashi repeatedly acknowledged the legitimacy of rising Chinese nationalism, this did not prevent him from advocating the pursuit of Japan's national economic interest, and he failed to see that China would perceive this pursuit as 'Japanese economic imperialism'. One of the reasons was that Ishibashi's realism made it difficult for him to imagine that China would be able to become an equal partner

with the West and Japan in jointly supporting an international order. This dilemma is clearly expressed in Ishibashi's comments on Japan's conquest of 'Manchuria' in 1931, and his understanding of the nature of Japan's political situation at home and Japan's foreign policies in the wake of the rise of the militarists.

Ishibashi on fascism in Japan

Post-1945 writing on Asian history tended to regard the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as proof that Japan had been hijacked by militarists leading Japan on the road towards fascism. In explaining the rise of fascism, major questions have been whether fascism occurred as a natural consequence of the adoption of capitalism and how to conceptualise the relationship between fascism and capitalism. We find Ishibashi's answers to these questions in his contemporary comments on the nature of Sino-Japanese relations. Soon after the Manchurian Incident he emphasised the continuity in the developments leading up to this event:

> As the gentlemen of the Investigation Committee of the League of Nations have known for some time, the current Manchurian Incident commenced with the bombing incident of the Manchurian Railway last November…. [However,] the cause of the incident had already been in existence for a very long time. What was it? It may be said to be a clash of popular nationalism *(kokuminshugi)* or of imperialism. Japan has felt the need, from the Sino-Japanese war long ago in the years 1894–5, to have a foothold on the Chinese mainland for the sake of its national economy. And that feeling strengthened ever more after the Russo-Japanese war…. From the first there have also been differing opinions concerning this question…. However, it is difficult to go against the tide when the feelings of a majority of citizens tend to advocate an advance on the [Asian] mainland. If one attempts to solve this Sino-Japanese dispute in a fundamental way, there is no alternative to eradicating the nationalistic, and the imperialistic feelings in China and Japan. However, that is in fact impossible. Because as long as Japan does not give up its advance on the mainland, it is from the beginning unreasonable to demand from China to abandon its nationalism. But then, it is also after all immensely unreasonable to argue for a halt to Japan's advance on the mainland. The reason is that this nationalism, this imperialism is not the sole property of Japan (or of China), these are ideas, feelings which are equally the property of the countries of the world—in particular the powers among them.[51]

In an article published in March 1933, about one year later, he changed his interpretation. Being a staunch advocate of capitalism, Ishibashi wished to dissociate capitalism from the kind of irrational policies put in place in the wake of the Manchurian Incident:

> We [witness] the spectacle of politicians, capitalists, entrepreneurs and a great section of the general public thinking uncritically in a similar way. Why do they explain this Incident in an extremely simpleminded fashion as a mere continuation of our country's policy towards the mainland since the Sino-Japanese and the Sino-Russian War, without admitting that it has a special and peculiar character of its own?… It definitely did not arise from capitalist avarice…. The truth can only be grasped clearly if we see the Manchurian Incident exactly in the opposite way, as an anti-capitalist movement [i.e. by the military who are running affairs in Manchuria]…. What should be done? The situation is serious, but there are ways to deal with it. To put it briefly, the solution is to embark on a reconstruction of domestic politics and the economy. It is not invariably necessary that this has to be radical along the lines advocated by extremists. If those who are presently in a dominant position in politics and the economy have the genuine intention to commence reflecting on the currents of our times, harden their resolve towards reconstruction. and start in an orderly fashion with those things that can be achieved [now], it is my feeling that the solution to the problem is easier than we imagine.[52]

Ishibashi thus argued that the military expansion in 'Manchuria' was 'not caused by capitalistic avarice' which had developed into an 'imperialist war', but was due to anti-capitalist ideologies and therefore, according to his reasoning, to non-rational ideological motives.[53] It was in fact a way of reasoning which also underlay his pleading against Japan's so-called 'Twenty-One Demands' in 1915, which he ascribed to irrational Japanese feelings of 'jealousy' with regard to foreign powers which possessed special rights in China.[54] In order to oppose the policy of an extreme increase in the defence budget for 1936 he stressed that this was an non-rational approach as well:

> If one adopts measures the same as in wartime one ends up wasting the national strength without [actually] fighting.[55]

Ishibashi was a representative of a small minority in Japan who pleaded for a *rational* approach in economic policies. Writers on both the left and the right were likely to be opposed to the primacy of economic rational goals.

> [The socialist Kotoku Shusui had written] in 1901, [that] the function of socialism was to bring harmony to society by removing the economic cause of strife; social harmony was its objective, and it was to be achieved not by laws or government discipline but by giving morals primacy over economics…. Sakai Toshihiko argued that if it were possible to achieve a unity of private and public interest, 'that hateful thing called *economic relationships* in society disappears and a relationship of love, warm and pure, spreads its wings freely'.[56]

Non-Japanese tended to believe that it was Japanese fascists or nationalists who were behind Japan's expansionism, and that this would make it more difficult to negotiate with the Japanese government. On the contrary, Ishibashi argued that Japan's leaders in the period after the Manchurian Incident were less interested in economics as such, and as a consequence the governments of Great Britain and the United States would not find it too difficult to achieve a compromise with Japan in matters of trade:

> There may be some amongst government and opposition in England who assume that compromise is difficult because of the so-called hard-line policies of Japan. That however is an idea where one is a captive of one's own standpoint and the standpoint of the counterpart [remains] invisible. The forces regarded by the [outside] world as the so-called fascists of Japan do not interfere in matters of trade—one may say to an absolute degree. Not only that, it goes so far that these forces regard concessions concerning trade problems possible on the basis of their particular non-commercial ideology. Therefore, at least at the level of economics, Japan approaches negotiations [with Great Britain and the United States] from an absolutely pure-economic standpoint.[57]

Where other 'Asianists' argued in favour of a politically and militarily unified Asia, Ishibashi would focus on 'purely' economic issues in the hope and expectation that a peaceful adjustment of economic interests at the international level was not only desirable but also possible. In an article published in summer 1935 Ishibashi warned China against adopting policies that would put up barriers against Japanese economic positions in China; to him, Japan's commercial penetration of the Chinese market was part of Japan's 'liberal foreign policy' *(jiyushugi gaiko)*.[58] In this article Ishibashi uses the term *'jiyushugi'* (liberalism) in a rather narrow, economist interpretation, referring to Japan's freedom to conduct economic activities in international markets. This is very close to Foreign Minister Shidehara's so-called 'liberal' policies.

Industrialised countries in the past, as in the present, find it difficult to accept the right of other countries to limit, or even prevent, market access. Writing in 1936, Ishibashi justifies the pursuit of economic interests beyond national borders in terms that are also fairly characteristic of this age of globalisation:

> By having the powers open their colonies to [free] trade and other [similar] methods, we create a world where it is possible to conduct a more liberal trade. Here [we face the choice] whether to advance with a policy that improves our national destiny, or whether we stubbornly advocate the monopolisation [literally, monopoly-ism] of the Far East [by Japan]…. The essence of the judgement lies in the question which choice is beneficial to our country.

> I don't hesitate to give an answer. Of course, I opt for the first [alternative]. But this definitely does not mean abandoning [the acquisition of] benefits for Japan in the Far East. It is merely the *relinquishment of monopolisation* [literally, monopoly]. The Far East will be opened up equally to the peoples of the [whole] world. And moreover, the whole world will also be opened up equally to all the peoples. The stage of our activities will expand in a manner fair to the whole world…. If, on the contrary, we take the monopolisation of the Far East as our broad policy, perhaps our country can obtain the benefits [to be had] in the Far East on a large scale. But, the world beyond the Far East will be closed to us. Even if not absolutely closed, all kinds of obstacles will be added. However, although speaking of benefits in the Far East, it is doubtful whether we can indeed secure them well. This may be observed [in the case of the] most recent relations between China and Japan. Or else, there may be those who feel apprehensive whether the powers will indeed, in accordance with my demands, open up trade with their colonies and their sincerity in adjusting import and export [rules]. Never has any country given such a promise. However, all countries in the world have suffered under the present lack of liberal trade, and there is nobody who does not feel panic in the face of the accompanying international insecurity. The repeatedly issued statements by American government leaders…are, in other words, a cry of distress showing their anguish. But they are unable to discover the key towards breaking the present global deadlock. So they are waiting whether there is anybody acting as a pioneer in breaking the present deadlock and providing a clue. If our country in such a situation takes as its policy the opening up [of all barriers] I firmly believe that we can certainly get the world moving under our leadership. Looking back, the international policy of our country has so far never gone beyond following in the footsteps of Europe and America, and aping them. After all, something like the 'Monopolisation of the Far East' is nothing else. But the time has already come when Japan, too, may abandon its stingy stance, and may embrace a grand vision and assume global leadership. Then, for the first time, there will be a bright future for our national destiny.[59]

We may wonder whether Ishibashi entertained any hopes that Japan might realistically take the first step in acting as a paragon for an open global trade system. If not, this essay should be seen as a strong condemnation of claims by nationalists that Japan was able to become a leader of Asia, or even a world leader.

In the shadow of the coming war

A review of Ishibashi's comments on the relationship between Japanese society in the 1930s and the danger of fascism indicates that he does not see a direct link between Japan's social structure at that time and the rise of fascism. Nevertheless,

he concedes that a general deterioration in the economic situation would pose some dangers. After the dissolution of parliament by Prime Minister Hayashi Senjuro in March 1937 he remarked:

> Whenever such an incident occurs many people are anxious whether the fascists are not again increasing their strength politically, or else whether in the economy [the trend towards] a so-called controlled economy is not becoming extreme. However, as I have always been saying, I do not think that fascism or a controlled economy will appear in Japan in the shape that people are afraid of. To begin with, from an economic point of view, there is no basis in Japan for the appearance of dictatorial politics such as in Russia, Italy, Germany and so on…Society does not merely move [according to] ideology. If the Japanese economic situation were more pitiable, if the life of the citizen were extremely distressed as in Russia after the war, or in Italy, or in Germany at the time Hitler appeared, and under such circumstances an economic situation would develop where public peace could not be maintained, and further at the international level independence could not be maintained, it may not be excluded that fascism may occur in Japan. While it is unfortunate for aspirants of dictatorial politics, that is not the case in Japan now. The attempt to carry out dictatorship through an imported ideology is just like the dream communists had, who thought that it would be possible to communise Japan, which has no economic background against which communism is expected to occur. On that point I am not worried that fascism is going to become more intense. Further, also on the political level, the establishment of dictatorial politics in Japan goes against the polity of Japan, and can therefore not be carried out by any possibility.[60]

In this sense, Ishibashi's arguments lend support to those post-war historians who denied the applicability of the Western concept of 'fascism' to the study of 20th-century Japanese history. It was Foreign Minister Matsuoka himself who, in a speech in 1940, assured his public that Japan would eventually evolve into a fascist state, but that this could not be achieved by force as in Germany.[61] The imposition of any kind of ideological principles would not just run counter to Japan's emperor system; this would also make it difficult to strive for the pragmatic solution of political issues. In an editorial of February 1937 in which he attacked the exclusion of political parties from the new cabinet under Prime Minister Hayashi, Ishibashi had the following to say:

> The most dangerous thing in politics is an absolutism based on ideology. Such as 'we can absolutely not coexist with this or that country', or 'we can fundamentally not stand in one line with this or that group'. If we adopt a stance that is characterised by such absolutism in politics, in economics, and further in international relations, we will not be satisfied until we will reach

> a point where we end up conquering the other side or admitting defeat. And then, as a result, this attitude will turn into an extreme imperialism in the international [realm], and into dictatorial politics at the level of the state. In order to have the running of politics become a smooth [affair], it must not be absolutist in such a way. The interests in our society are a complicated [matter]. The [perceived] advantages of the head of the household [as employer] and a day labourer employed by him clash. Not always do the interests of traders and farmers coincide. Even if our mouths are full of 'totalitarianism', nobody will perhaps close their eyes to this reality. In that case, therefore, the duty of a politician lies in weighing how to afford the greatest satisfaction to the majority whose interests are [all] different. It is wrong for one class to suppress the opinions and aspirations of others in the name of the state.[62]

Ishibashi would refuse to surrender to any kind of system of thought that would restrict a pragmatic approach towards solving the economic and political problems of the day. His advocacy of economic rationalism itself was not seen in terms of adopting a narrow system of thought and policies.

Conclusion

Ishibashi had been trying to advocate economic rationalism as a means to pursue Japanese national interest without compromising his internation-alism. He had hoped that other Western countries—i.e. the United States and Great Britain—would follow similar policies, thus weakening the position of Japan's radical nationalists at home. A policy of increased trade links with the Great Powers might have prevented progress towards the eventual showdown, and it might also have enabled China and Japan to establish a certain *modus vivendi* on condition that China was able to achieve a stable political order and economic development.

Perhaps Ishibashi was unrealistic in hoping for a change in European and American policies which might have strengthened the hand of Japanese 'internationalists'. Japan was unable to challenge the superior economic might of the West economically, even in the China market. If Japan was to present a challenge it would have to be by other means—by using military force, perhaps in the hope that Japanese military action in Asia would not be countered by Western military force. For nearly a decade after 1931 that assumption seemed to be correct.

Ishibashi might have argued that the existence of inappropriate perceptions on the side of the Western powers, which regarded Japan as an ideological enemy due to the presence of 'fascist' voices in Japan, also contributed to the increasing stalemate between Japan and the United States and Great Britain. He was deeply aware of the divisive power of ideologies, and, although himself a supporter of liberal humanism and a free society, used mainly non-ideological arguments to

push his case. It is perhaps tragic that he lived in an age where ideologies of European extraction, both left and right, contributed to the origin of the Second World War and numerous other conflicts.

More than half a century later, American policies towards China face a choice similar to the pre-war situation: emphasise the possibility of change through increasing economic cooperation, or isolate China because of the presence of an ideological adversary (the Communist Party). There is no proof that increasing economic cooperation will indeed lead to the weakening of the ideological factor. History cannot provide proof as do the natural sciences.

Ishibashi Tanzan's approach to foreign policy was an attempt to strive towards equity in the international order at the same time as pursuing a rational approach to economic policy, including support for a liberalised international trade system. We have now arrived at the threshold of a new age where economic rationalism seems to have triumphed over the old ideologies, and developments in (former) communist countries appear to indicate that the age of ideologies belongs to the past. There is a certain irony in the fact that the seeming triumph of economic rationalism has produced a new danger, namely the replacement of genuine human values in the name of 'economic necessity'.

Ishibashi used his own particular brand of rationalism and economic objectivity to fight attacks on human values. What we need now is to accept that the choice between different economic policies can in fact never be left to the discretion of a masterly programmed computer. We cannot evade the personal responsibility of making choices. We are morally obliged to choose those economic policies that combine material benefits with consideration for human values. As stated in my introduction to this chapter, nationalism and internationalism are not mutually exclusive values; nor are they absolute values by themselves. Just as economic systems need to be evaluated by their performance, so we need to judge in what way nationalism and internationalism contribute to creating more humane conditions for future generations.

Notes

1 Ishibashi Tanzan, *Zenshu,* vol. 9, p. 366. From a speech entitled 'The Economic Prognoses of Business Circles for 1935 and Capitalism' *(Showa 10nen no keizaikai no yoso to shihonshugi),* delivered on 26 January 1935.

2 Uchimura Kanzo in Nomura, *Kindai Nihon no Chugoku ninshiki,* p. 29; quoting a statement by Uchimura written in 1905.

3 Referred to in Gavan McCormack 'The Japanese Movement to "Correct" History'. In *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States.* Edited by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p. 67.

4 On Ishibashi Tanzan, see Sharon Nolte, *Liberalism in Modern Japan: Ishibashi Tanzan and His Teachers, 1905–1960;* in Japanese, see, in particular, the works of Cho Yukio, Masuda Hiroshi, Matsuo Takayoshi, Tanaka Hiroshi and Tsutsui Kiyotada (see bibliography). For a list of my own publications related to Ishibashi, please refer

to the bibliography. For a selection of Ishibashi's writings, see Masuda Hiroshi, *Shonihonshugi: Ishibashi Tanzan gaiko ronshu, 1913–1967*.

5 This passage is adapted from my article 'History, Citizens and Morality in the Twentieth Century: Remembering Traumatic Events in China and Japan'. Sakaiya's or Ishibashi's economism should definitely not be confused with the kind of economism prevailing in US and British ideology since the 1980s, better known under the name 'new liberalism'.

6 Sakaiya Taichi, *Jidaimatsu,* pp. 107–11.

7 Sakaiya Taichi, *Jidaimatsu,* pp. 110–11, 105–7.

8 Sakaiya Taichi, *Jidaimatsu,* p. 107.

9 Sakaiya Taichi, *Jidaimatsu,* pp. 122–3.

10 Hosoya Chihiro, 'Retrogression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process', pp. 88–9.

11 Attempts by some scholars in the early years of the Tokugawa period, such as Hayashi Razan, to establish Confucianism as the state orthodoxy failed.

12 Kita Ikki (1883–1937), considered a leading theoretician of Japanese fascism.

13 Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hashikawa Bunzo, *Kindai Nihon to Chugoku,* p. 249.

14 A good impression may be gained from Hanzawa's study entitled 'Tanaka Giichi naikakuki o chushin to suru Hokuto Ajia'. To some, Ishibashi's lack of concern regarding communism in the Soviet Union or China looks unique, but is shared by Foreign Minister Shidehara and many others (e.g. Usui Katsumi, *Chugoku o meguru kindai Nihon no gaiko,* p. 86–7). Ishibashi's argumentation is a set pattern for Japanese commentators, who are full of cynicism concerning Western 'ideals'.

15 'Kekkyoku keizai no mondai mo atama no kangaekata no mondai de arimasu', in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, p. 414.

16 Editorial in *Toyo Keizai Shinpo,* 29 July 1933: 'The Urgent Task of the Revision of the Public Peace Preservation Law for the Sake of the Preservation of Public Peace', in *Zenshu,* vol. 9, pp. 22–3.

17 Nakano Seigo (1886–1943), first known as a liberal journalist, later one of the leaders of the fascist movement in Japan.

18 Tetsuo Najita, 'Nakano Seigo', pp. 397–8, 418.

19 'The Global Significance of the Sino-Japanese Clash' *(Nisshi shototsu no sekaiteki imi),* editorial of 5 March 1932, in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* pp. 114–15.

20 For an excellent study of Uchida Ryohei, see Hatsuse Ryuhei, *Dentoteki uyoku. Uchida Ryohei no kenkyu,* 1980.

21 In an article entitled 'Dai-Nihonshugi no genso' (The chimera of 'Great-Japanism') written in July 1921, in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 64. Miyazawa Kiichi and Kosaka Masataka also distinguished between Western ideas of leadership and Japanese 'passive' attitudes when interviewed about Japan's reluctance to act as an 'Asian leader' despite pressure from some Western nations. *Utsukushii Nihon e no chosen,* pp. 104–5.

22 In the West this concept of leadership was introduced by Antonio Gramsci, a socialist scholar whose arguments on hegemony have become household words in international relations theory.

23 Editorial of 27 February 1932: 'The Establishment of the New State Manchuria-Mongolia and Our Policies' *(Man-Mo shinkokka no seiritsu to wagakokumin no taisaku),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 8, p. 68–9.

24 Editorial of 3 October 1936: 'The Need for British-Japanese Co-operation' *(Nichi-ei ryokoku teikei no hitsuyo),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, p. 102. On this point, see also Ishibashi's article, written in 1923, entitled 'Fundamental Concepts for the Reconstruction of Foreign Relations' *(Gaiko tatenaoshi no konpon kannen),* in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 77.

25 Editorial of 4 January 1936: 'Pittman's Thesis on British-American Alliance and Restraining Japan' *(Beikoku Pittoman shi no eibei rengo nihon yokuatsuron),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, pp. 83ff.; editorial of 29 August 1936: 'Refutation of a Rash Thesis on Foreign Relations' *(Fukinshin naru gaikoron o hai-su),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, pp. 90ff. The strongly anti-Japanese Senator Pittman was a leading member of the American silver lobby, whose price manipulations were the direct cause of the outflow of silver from China, thus bringing about the collapse of the Chinese currency, with huge economic losses for China. Little attention has been given in US historiography to these events, apart from repeated references in Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1964.

26 'The Illusion of Great-Japan-ism' *(Dainihonshugi no genso),* 30 July 1921 and 6 August 1921, originally an editorial in the journal *Toyo Keizai Shinpo,* in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 64.

27 'China, in relation to our country, is the oldest amity country, and an elder brother *(senpaikoku)* which cleared the way to civilisation for us *(wagakuni no bunka o hiraite kureta).* Editorial of 26 September 1931: 'What is the Basic Policy for the Solution of the Manchurian-Mongolian Problem?' *(Manmo mondai kaiketsu no konpon hoshin ikaga?),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 8, p. 22. Yet respect for China did not preclude criticism, such as of 'unrealistic' Chinese policies. Editorial in *Toyo Keizai Shinpo* of 28 July 1928, in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* pp. 91ff.

28 He was purged by the American occupation forces in May 1947. The case of his purge is dealt with in Masuda Hiroshi, *Ishibashi Tanzan: Senryo seisaku e no teiko,* 1988. See also Braddick, 'Against the Grain: Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan and the "China Question"'.

29 The best-known representative of the latter is arguably the German quality weekly *Die Zeit* and its magazine *Zeit-Punkte.* For a good survey of the dilemmas faced by liberalism in Germany, see the special issue of this weekly entitled 'Was heißt heute liberal?' (What is the meaning of liberalism today?), in *Zeit-Punkte, Nr.* 1, 1995.

30 On Ishibashi's radical ideas concerning global liberalised trade, see Radtke, 'Ishibashi Tanzan: A Liberal Nationalist', p. 87ff.

31 Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* pp. 23–4; 'Dai-ni no Ro-Doku taru nakare', 5 February 1915.

32 Sakai Saburo, *Showa kenkyukai—aru chishikijin shudan no kiseki,* 1979.

33 See Matsuo Takayoshi, 'Kyushinteki jiyushugi no seiritsu katei'.

34 This has important implications for the roles played by ethics and 'commitment' to principles in Japan. See Imamichi Tomonobu's comment entitled 'Ethics, East and West', in *Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan:*

> In the East…ethics is the study of intersubjectivity—the study of the community—while in the West it emerges as the study of individuality or subjectivity, thus giving rise to different perceptions on ethical thinking. A

> beautiful heart was one filled with the love to care for and nurture all things. This spirit of raising up the other even if it means self-sacrifice is at the very core of Japanese ethical concepts, no matter what form they take.
>
> (Imamichi Tomonobu, 'Ethics, East and West', in *Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan,* vol. 2, 1983, p. 232)

It must be emphasised that the meaning of the term 'East' as opposed to 'West' differs with each author—Chinese authors tend to equate 'China' with the 'East' (Asia), as opposed to the 'West', whereas Japanese authors are prone to take Japan as a synonym for the 'East'.

35 See also Tetsuo Najita's comments on Nakano Seigo in his 'Nakano Seigo', p. 393.

36 The issue of individual commitment is a theme in political novels, which provide clues rarely found in other sources, including historical documents. See, for instance, Hotta Yoshie's novel *Hiroba no kodoku* (Solitude of the square); on the related problem of 'conversion', see Crowley, 'Intellectuals as Visionaries of the New Asian Order', pp. 320ff.

37 The writings of both commentators provide deep insights into the politics and society of pre-war Japan, and have unfortunately so far found little attention outside Japan. See the translation by John Bester of Hasegawa's work: *The Japanese Character. A Cultural Profile.* For a general treatment, see also Nomura Koichi, *Kindai Nihon no Chugoku ninshiki,* 1981.

38 In an article published in 1919: 'Japan [Received] a Sound Thrashing' *(Fukurodataki no Nihon),* in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 50.

39 'The Change of Ideas Brought about by the Great War' *(Taisen no motaraseru shiso no henka),* editorial of 25 November 1919, in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 42–4.

40 Sato Nobuhiro (1769–1850) was a scholar who, deeply impressed by the economic misery and social instability of his age, designed the model of a state in which all people would become employees of the state; he also studied artillery, foreign trade and ways to defend Japan. On the significance of Yoshida Shoin, see H.J.J.M.van Straelen, *Yoshida Shoin, Forerunner of the Meiji Restoration: A Biographical Study.*

41 Pretence, insofar as Japan, for instance, was factually not part of the *Chinese pax sinica.*

42 See, e.g., the ideas of Okuma Shigenobu on 'Harmonisation of Eastern and Western Civilisation' set forth in a book with that title *(Tozai bunmei no chowa).* There is a brief outline in Kawahara and Fujii, eds, *Nitchu kankeishi no kiso chishiki,* p. 141.

43 Michael A.Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War,* passim.

44 The best study of the attitude of Japanese professional China-watchers (in the army) and their appraisal of the possibility of cooperation is Tobe Ryoichi, *Nihon rikugun to Chugoku,* 1999.

45 Speech by Okuma in 1902; cited in Nomura, *Kindai Nihon no Chugoku ninshiki,* p. 9.

46 Usui Katsumi, *op. cit.,* pp. 25, 39.

47 Hara Takashi, *Hara Takashi Nikki,* vol. 8, p. 250. Entry for 19 June 1919.

48 Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hashikawa Bunzo, *Kindai Nihon to chugoku,* p. 9.

49 For Goto, see Kitaoka Shinichi, *Goto Shinpei: gaiko to bijon,* Tokyo, 1988. Konoe Fumimaro, 'Ei-Bei hon'i no heiwashugi o haisu' (Against the peace system centred on Britain and America), published in 1918, in Konoe Fumimaro, *Seidanroku,* 1936, p. 232ff.
50 Nolte, *Liberalism in Modern Japan,* p. 165.
51 'The Global Significance of the Sino-Japanese Clash' *(Nisshi shototsu no sekaiteki imi),* editorial of 5 March 1932, in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* pp. 114–15.
52 Editorial of 4 March 1933: 'Really an Imperialist War?' *(Hatashite teikokushugi senso ka),* in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 118f.
53 *Ibid.*
54 'What is the Value of the New Sino-Japanese Treaty' *(Nisshi shin joyaku no kachi ikaga),* 15 June 1915, in Masuda, *Shonihonshugi,* p. 26f. Such reasoning was also at the root of his support for a non-expansionist 'Small Japan' *(Shonihonshugi).*
55 'The Arms Race and Prices *(Gunbi kakucho kyoso to bukka),* 'in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, pp. 294–5. For further arguments, see also 'An Evaluation of the Ideas of the Military on Financial Policy' *(Gunbu no zaisei iken wo hyo-su),* 16 November 1936, in *Zenshu,* p. 202ff.
56 Duus and Scheiner, 'Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901–1931', pp. 663–4. Emphasis in the original.
57 Editorial of 3 October 1936: 'The Need for British-Japanese Co-operation' *(Nichi-Ei ryokoku teikei no hitsuyo),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, p. 102.
58 'China's Policy Towards Japan' *(Shina no tai-Nichi seisaku),* editorial of 6 July 1935, in *Zenshu,* p. 92.
59 Editorial, *Toyo Keizai Shinpo,* 19 September 1936: 'Raise the [slogan of] "Global Access" and Guide the Anguished Powers' *(Sekai kaihoshugi o kakagete. onoseru rekkyo o shido seyo),* in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, p. 98. Emphasis added.
60 Speech at the Economic Club *(Keizai Kurabu)* on 2 April 1937, in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, p. 343.
61 A cable from the US embassy in Tokyo addressed to the Secretary of State, Washington. No. 606, 5 p.m., 21 July 1940, 'strictly confidential'.
62 *Toyo Keizai Shinpo,* 13 February 1937. 'Why does the Hayashi Cabinet Exclude Political Parties?', in *Zenshu,* vol. 10, p. 73.

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9
The relation between national socialism and social democracy in the formation of the international policy of the Shakai Taishuto[1]

Oikawa Eijiro

Introduction

In this chapter the Shakai Taishuto (Social Masses Party), which existed from July 1932 to July 1940 and was the largest proletariat party of the pre-war period (later to re-emerge in the post-war period as the Japan Socialist Party), will be examined, with particular attention to the process of factional conflicts. In doing this, I will clarify how the various factions within the party dealt with the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism during the 1930s.[2]

At the beginning of the 1930s the internationalist mood which had swayed the 1920s dropped considerably as a result of the Manchurian Incident, and instead a pronounced nationalist tendency came to the fore. Nevertheless, the 1930s were also a period in which the efforts to restore international relations remained strong. There were two major approaches to confronting the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism. One was aimed at returning to the international order of the 1920s, the so-called Versailles-Washington System. The other approach was to stay completely aloof from the old order and, instead, to reconstruct Japan's international relations on the basis of an alliance with the Soviet Union, which had been excluded from this same system. However, it is important to take note that the difference between these two approaches did not simply come down to the choice of whether one preferred cooperation with the Western capitalist nations or with the communist Soviet Union. One of the reasons was that this question was inseparably tied up with the question of Japan's China policy. In order to realise the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, the first approach emphasised the need to negotiate with the Chinese Nationalist government. However, the second approach certainly did not emphasise the need to negotiate with the Chinese Communist Party, but rather the need to eradicate its influence. In Japan in the 1930s the fear of communism was almost universal, and the scenario of international cooperation that was aimed at forming an alliance with the Soviet Union was no exception to this general trend. The latter approach thus can be better described as an attempt to bring about the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations in the form of an alliance between the Japanese and Chinese nations *(kokumin)* or masses (taishu) in which the good

services of the Soviet Union are employed to control the activities of the Chinese Communist Party. Due to developments in the situation in China, during the 1930s the comparative weight of these two approaches gradually shifted from the former to the latter. Below, I will describe this process as a shift in the relations between the social democrats and the national socialists within the Shakai Taishuto.

However, before entering into the discussion in detail, it would be best to clarify the respective characteristics of the three main currents in socialist thought at the time, namely 'social democracy', 'communism' and 'national socialism'. 'Social democracy' denotes a branch of political thought which emphasised 'negotiation' with capitalists through legitimate representatives, in the form of political parties and unions, in order to realise social improvement. In Japan at this time there were three main factions in the democratic socialist movement: the 'left', 'right' and 'central' factions. The 'right' faction rejected communism altogether while adhering in international matters to the spirit of the Second International. In contrast to this, the 'left' faction, though placing a distance between itself and the Japanese Communist Party, accepted the notion of communism and adhered to the Third International. The 'central' faction was a group which attempted to maintain an independent, albeit less clearly defined, position in relation to the factions on both the left and the right. The social democratic movement of this period, both in its manifestation as proletariat parties and in its manifestation as labour unions, was clearly divided between these factions, and the respective proletariat parties were intimately related to their corresponding labour unions. Within this structure the faction that enjoyed the greatest stability as a political force was the 'right' faction, which had at its base the country's largest trade union, the Nihon Rodo Sodomei (Japan Federation of Labour; abbreviated here as Sodomei).

'Communism', as almost goes without saying, was a revolutionary ideology which did not countenance in any wise the possibility of 'negotiation' in the manner of social democracy. The communists regarded the directives of the Soviet Comintern as absolute. Accordingly, they emphasised class conflict and merely involved themselves in labour unions and political parties with the sole objective of guiding the revolution. The left wing of the social democrats was in fact formerly a faction derived from this bloc which nonetheless undertook, for the time being, to pursue legitimated 'negotiation'.

National socialism was opposed to both social democracy and communism and constituted a vital part of 'Japanese fascism'. While national socialists naturally maintained a firm anti-communist stance, they differed from the right wing of the social democrats in advocating revolutionary policies as the only effective means of combating the revolutionism of the communists themselves. Nevertheless, unlike the communists, they saw the origin of social contradictions in the conflict, not between capitalists and workers, but between capitalism itself and the interests of the nation on an everyday level, their activities being an attempt to fulfil the demands of the nation as a whole. It was precisely for such reasons that the national

socialists rejected the activities of social democratic unionism, in that these were driving, at least as they saw it, a wedge between organised labour and the unorganised masses. A good example of this outlook is found in an article entitled 'A Mass Movement Based on Consumers' *(Shohisha honi no taishu undo)* by Takabatake Motoyuki, the founder of Japanese national socialism, which appeared in the inaugural issue of *Taishu Undo* (Mass movement, a publication initiated by Takabatake himself in May 1921).[3] Stating how 'the interests of the labouring class as both consumers and producers at the same time cannot be easily reconciled', he goes on to relate the following:

> If the labour union of a train company were to go on strike to obtain a higher wage and the demand were eventually to be met by the employer, the fact would remain that (assuming the extra cost to the employer were compensated by raising the train fares) the ones to suffer for the sake of the rail employees would be the general public, especially those who constitute the majority of the population in the cities, the Proletariat.[4]

In other words, with wages going up, prices increase and the burden of all workers increases. Takabatake went on to insist that the internal contradiction of the citizen could be overcome when one regarded the 'working class' largely as 'consumers'. Basically, it was only when people were organised at the level of production that a conflict between the positions of 'those who make' and 'those who buy' emerged, and so he envisioned attaining an ideal society by organising all relations on the basis of the 'position of the buyer'. By conceiving of the difference between the position of 'those who make' and 'those who buy' as a general internal conflict rather than as a conflict between capitalists and workers, Takabatake on the one hand denied the classical framework of class conflict inherent in communism and on the other presented a critical perspective of the capitalist system with its tendency to emphasise 'the position of the producer'. This consumer-based stance was later, as the Showa Depression (1929–32) intensified, to constitute the rallying point for adherents to social democracy—especially to those in the central and right factions—and was ultimately, after the reorganisation in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, inherited by the corresponding parts of the Shakai Taishuto.

In most research on 'national socialism' within the Japanese setting, it has mainly been described as part of the xenophobic trend which peaked at the point of the Manchurian Incident but then waned as political life later stabilised. Indeed, even when referring to the Shakai Taishuto, the dominant view has been to characterise the party as a coalition between the right and central factions of the social democrats, and, moreover, these factions were treated as having no connection whatsoever with national socialism. However, one should not forget that the xenophobic outlook of the national socialists was strongly connected to the aforementioned consumer-based stance. Therefore it is less than helpful to limit our interpretation of national socialism to the parameters of xenophobia. Rather,

by retracing the movement according to the characteristics of its economic conceptions it is possible to make its historical context clearer and thereby enhance our understanding of fascism within modernity.

Consequently, in this chapter the Shakai Taishuto is not treated as simply the indiscriminate agglomeration of the central and right-wing factions of the social democratic movement, but, rather, as a political combination between a non-exclusionist group within the national socialist camp and the right wing of the social democratic camp. The central faction was in fact nothing but a relatively minor player dragged along by the national socialist faction. Furthermore, both the non-exclusionary national socialists and the right-wing faction of the social democrat movement had in common a commitment to international cooperation in the wake of the Manchurian Incident. Put another way, these factions both demonstrated a capacity independently, albeit by different means, to grapple with the dilemma of internationalism and nationalism. The shifts and changes in the relation between these factions within the Shakai Taishuto also provide us with an important perspective on the development of this dilemma.

The emergence of national socialism and the establishment of the Shakai Taishuto

In February of 1930 the 17th general election (the second entailing full male suffrage) was carried out under the auspices of the Hamaguchi Cabinet. In the midst of the deepening economic depression it led to the resounding defeat of the proletarian parties. This forced these parties to engage in a round of soul-searching and became the catalyst for those who subscribed to national socialist views to come to the fore within these parties. For the Shakai Minshuto (Social Democratic Party, the right-wing faction of the social democratic movement) in particular, which had enjoyed positive results in the previous election, this change in fortunes presented a serious situation.[5] Accordingly, it began to run a series of articles in the party organ which propounded national socialist-inspired notions of the 'consumer class'.[6] This evidently was an attempt to concentrate on the general population who were not organised through labour unions and to reorganise them on the basis of their 'position as consumers', something which clearly drew on Takabatake's ideas. Furthermore, the 'socialism' being expounded by one of the party's executives, Kamei Kanichiro, emphasised the role of the 'consumer' in the following manner:

> Producing commodities to eat or use for the consumer is the object of production. Consequently, the economic system should, at the very least, be changed from being one based on the interests of the producer to one that serves the consumer.[7]

This was clearly linked to similar developments that were occurring within the leadership of the Zenkoku Taishuto (National Masses Party, the central and left

wings of the social democratic movement). For example, from early on Aso Hisashi advocated establishing a new party with Takabatake Motoyuki as its leader,[8] and Kono Mitsu was roundly criticised by the left-wing faction within the party, who found his views too similar to the notions of 'socialism' expounded by the Shakai Minshuto's Kamei Kanichiro.[9]

In short, the deepening economic crisis of the Showa period led to those who held national socialist economic conceptions in both the central and right factions of the social democrats to come to the fore. Nevertheless, this did not lead directly to the formation of a national socialist political party. The main reason for this is that following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September of 1931 a major schism emerged among national socialists between the more radically exclusionist faction and the more conciliatory internationally minded faction, the latter of which actually went on to form the Shakai Taishuto with the right wing of the social democratic movement. In order to outline the developments leading to the formation of this new party it will suffice to go back to the general election of February 1932, during which the Shakai Minshuto, in response to the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria, indicated a major shift towards nationalism. This is evident from the open support for the war expressed by party candidates such as Kamei Kanichiro and Nishio Suehiro.[10] However, as time went on the ideological conflict between the overly nationalistic Akamatsu Katsumaro, the leader of the national socialist faction in the party, and Nishio, the leader of the right-wing faction, came to a head and culminated in the national socialist faction breaking away from the Shakai Minshuto on 15 April.[11]

As for the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto (National Labour Farmer Masses Party, the direct descendant of the Zenkoku Taishuto and consisting of the central and left factions of the social democratic movement), a temporary barrage of opposition to the Manchurian Incident was launched by the left wing, but this was met by a resounding defeat in the February elections. Using this as an opportunity for realignment, the central factions sought to break away from the left from March onwards.[12] Through Tadokoro Teruaki and Inamura Ryuichi they produced a new international policy embodied in the 'Far Eastern Socialist International', which stood in contradistinction to the Second International of the right wing and the Third International of the left wing.[13] The rationale of the 'Far Eastern International' was to promote socialism and increase solidarity among the peoples of Asia. However, in its catch-cry it incorporated an avowal to topple not only Anglo-American capitalism but also the Chinese bourgeoisie. The engine of this movement was to be the anti-capitalist forces of Japan that reflected the position of the consumers.[14] It will be clear that the incorporation of these ideas provided a national socialist legitimisation of the Manchurian Incident. Moreover, it is important to note the following aspect of Tadokoro's characterisation of the Far Eastern International:

> In the first instance the aim is to provide international support for the establishment of socialism in Japan. In the second instance it is to function

> as a bulwark in support of any Japanese socialist government that should eventuate. In that sense the relation [between Japan and the Far Eastern International] is identical to that between the Soviet Union and the Third International.[15]

In other words, the conceptualisation entailed in the Far Eastern International was a nationalistic regionalism which sought to protect socialism in Japan, the leading country. Furthermore, in connection with the aforementioned aspect of contradistinction with the Second and Third Internationals, the Far Eastern International clearly indicated a conscious enmity both towards the Chinese bourgeoisie, which was aligned to the Western powers, and towards the Chinese Communist Party, which was aligned to the Soviet Union.

The respective national socialist orientations of the central faction's Aso, Tadokoro and Inamura, of other Zenkoku Rono Taishuto executives such as Miwa Juso, Kono Mitsu and Asanuma Inajiro, and of the national socialist faction of the Shakai Minshuto, which was centred on Akamatsu and Kamei, were regarded as being of a piece.[16] In fact, they had all already proposed economic conceptions that drew on a national socialist pedigree in response to the Showa Depression and, moreover, the concept of a 'Far Eastern International' was indeed instigated by Inamura in consultation with Akamatsu.[17] Moreover, according to Kamei's memoirs, Aso, Akamatsu and Kamei were also involved in secret discussions with the military of the Sakurakai in order to topple the cabinet.[18]

For that reason, it was viewed with surprise when the new party that formed in the wake of the aforementioned schism within the Shakai Minshuto was not a national socialist alliance but a coalition, in the form of the Shakai Taishuto, between those national socialists that were aligned to the central faction of the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto on the one hand, and the right-wing social democrats of the Shakai Minshuto, on the other. Yamakawa Hitoshi, who functioned as the ideological leader of the left-wing faction of the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto, explained the development in the following terms:

> The initiative of the central faction [of the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto] was not an attempt to join with the national socialists under Akamatsu. On the contrary, it intended to absorb the group that would remain within the Shakai Minshuto after having expelled Akamatsu.... It's simply the case that leaders such as Inamura Ryuichi were deluded in the central faction's pursuit of that aim.[19]

As Yamakawa states, Akamatsu's group was certainly ousted from the mainstream within the national socialist forces. This was because it was not only the national socialist faction of the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto including the likes of Tadokoro and Inamura that joined the Shakai Taishuto, but also, as in the case of Kamei Kanichiro, those who within the Shakai Minshuto had been rather opposed to the right-wing faction and were formerly regarded as part of Akamatsu's circle.[20]

In this sense one could say that the national socialist forces, which initially derived their impetus from the Showa Depression, were led to an internal schism by the Manchurian Incident.

When viewed in this way, it becomes difficult to regard the establishment of the Shakai Taishuto as the broad, equal alliance of the social democratic central and right-wing factions, sandwiched between the factions of the left and the extreme right. Moreover, when considered in the context of the Showa Depression it raises further questions regarding why the political forces that broadly shared national socialist economic conceptions were not able to take the path of coordinated action or, more particularly, why one part of these forces chose the option of cooperating with the social democrats.

In that connection, one thing that needs to be re-ascertained is the point that nationalist sentiment was deepening not only among the national socialists but also on the right wing of the social democrats, and that this was the pre-existing basis which guaranteed their future cooperation. For example, while the right-wing Nishio Suehiro's support for the Manchurian Incident at the time of the 1932 general election has already been touched upon, it is also pertinent to note that the remainder of the Shakai Minshuto, after the split with Akamatsu, was to go on to describe the national socialist concept of a 'Far Eastern International' as 'essentially the same position as that maintained by our party up until today'.[21] The right wing, which was founded on the labour union Sodomei and which since the 1920s had supported the formation of the 'Oriental Labour Conference' through the Second International, thus suddenly regarded the 'Far Eastern International' as essentially the same thing. The leftist Yamakawa Hitoshi openly pondered the right wing's position when he asked, 'where on earth is the theoretical justification or necessity for a break away from Akamatsu's national socialism?'[22] Indeed, his doubts are largely understandable when one considers the commonality between the national socialist faction and the social democratic right-wing faction within the Shakai Minshuto. This is even further accentuated by the new union platform adopted by the Sodomei in November 1932, which decisively showed the right wing's shift toward nationalism.

The second point that needs to be noted in relation to the formation of the Shakai Taishuto is, as mentioned earlier, the gap that emerged in the wake of the Manchurian Incident between those who supported interna tional conciliation and those who rejected it. Let us first have a look at the worldview of Akamatsu Katsumaro, a strong proponent of exclusionism. The following is from a debate he engaged in with Royama Masamichi, a political scientist at Tokyo University:

Royama: Do you really believe it possible to construct a socialist country without regard for international relations? If one is of the opinion that world capitalism will not recover that may well be the unavoidable conclusion, but I don't hold that outlook.

Akamatsu: That may be a matter of opinion but I have personally given up on the possibility. I think the [collapse (censored in the original)] of world capitalism is perfectly clear.

Royama: If the premises differ then the conclusions must also be different. Your view that it is possible to establish a planned economy by considering only the domestic aspect of the country while forgetting things like international cooperation and international effort is completely at odds with mine.[23]

Thus one can conclude that Akamatsu's national socialism was based on the premise of the collapse of international society. It was for this reason that, as the international political situation gradually stabilised, his influence was bound to decline.[24]

In contrast to this position, what do we find with regard to the international consciousness of those national socialists who chose to participate in the Shakai Taishuto? In the next section I will discuss in more detail the international policy of the Shakai Taishuto, which was formulated mainly under the influence of the national socialists, but let it suffice here to mention that at the same time as it continued in the vein of the nationalistic 'Far Eastern International' it also combined this with a willingness to work towards the elimination of economic blocs and the recovery of the world economy. In particular, the opposition to the withdrawal from the League of Nations voiced by the Shakai Taishuto was, despite having some conditions attached, at the very least closer to the position of the right-wing social democrats who respected the League than to the xenophobic group of Akamatsu, who favoured immediate withdrawal.[25]

The Shakai Taishuto thus was a political party that brought together the mainstream faction of the national socialists and the right-wing faction of the social democrats, and expelled that segment of the national socialists which was anti-international. The thing that tied these two factions together was their sense of nationalism and their willingness to pursue international cooperation, and thus also the fact that they were both facing the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism. Nevertheless, although they both came to grapple with this dilemma, there were considerable differences in the manner in which they tried to tackle it. In the next section I will explore the duality of cooperation and conflict in their relationship more fully.

The national socialist faction and the right-wing social democratic faction

The Shakai Taishuto was formed in July 1932, at a time when Japan was under enormous pressure from both within and without. Domestically, the existence of party-based cabinets had been terminated by the May 15th Incident, and internationally Japan was becoming increasingly isolated because of the difficulty of getting recognition for the puppet state that was Manchukuo. In the face of

these circumstances, a group centred around the leadership of the national socialist faction within the party issued 'An Outline of International Policy' in October 1932.[26] As it was based on the conceptions of the 'Far Eastern International', there was a strong emphasis on defining a different position from those entailed in the Second and Third Internationals, with priority placed on concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The immediate objective of this faction's international policy was to improve relations with the Soviets, who had become increasingly incensed over developments in Manchuria. This would in turn enable expenditures on armaments within Japan to be reduced and economic cooperation between the two countries to be promoted in a way which would ultimately assist in improving the lot of ordinary citizens, who were being hit hard by the Depression.[27] In this way, the economic perspective entailed in the 'consumer-based' view of the masses as laid out in the previous section came to be reflected in the demand for a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the international policy of the national socialist faction can be seen to have had an even broader objective:

> Firstly, our international policy is, just as in the case of our domestic policy, premised on the downfall of capitalism in our country. Secondly, we support the independence of the ethnic nations of India, the Philippines, Indochina and China from the tyranny of Anglo-American capitalism. Thirdly, we aim to root out the national bourgeoisie and the feudal military cliques in the various Far Eastern countries.... In order to realize these ideals we would demand from our bourgeois government that it concludes an alliance with the Soviet Union and rejects the line of foreign policy that blindly follows the West.[28]

Behind this call to bring down not only the bourgeoisie of Japan and the West but also that of the Far East lay the perception that:

> If we only succeed in bringing about a socialist revolution in Japan, the masses of China will without fail understand our relationship with Manchuria correctly.[29]

In other words, they purport that if their notion of 'socialism' were to be realised, this would lead to the cessation of ethnically based conflict over the Manchurian question and to the development of mutual understanding, if not with the Chinese bourgeoisie, then at least with the far more important Chinese masses. Of course, when they referred to 'socialism' it was 'national socialism' based on their notions of the 'consumer', a principle which guaranteed transcendence beyond ethnic or national interests. Nevertheless, this position ultimately amounted to little more than a regionalistic notion of amalgamation, with Japan firmly at the centre. Within this context the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was conceived of as a step towards the realisation of a form of cooperation

between the 'Far Eastern International' and the Soviet 'Third International', eventually leading to a union that could replace the League of Nations as the stage of international cooperation.

The international policy of the social democratic right wing, which was founded on the Sodomei labour union, was distinct from that initiated by the leadership of the national socialist faction. The main difference lay in the fact that the right-wing faction advocated involvement in the League of Nations and continued to keep the League at the forefront of their considerations even after Japan formally left it. An important factor guaranteeing that the link with the League would be maintained was the connection with the International Labour Organisation (ILO). This permanent organ was established in 1919, at the same time as the League, and had a closely cooperative relationship with the Second International. Japan was a permanent member of the ILO. On the occasion of the Sixth General Meeting in 1924 the right to elect the labour representative for Japan was for the first time bestowed on the labour associations and, accordingly, Suzuki Bunji, president of the largest union Sodomei, attended the conference. From that point on, Sodomei maintained a positive attitude towards cooperation with the ILO. Even during the turbulent events surrounding Japan's secession from the League of Nations in February 1933, Matsuoka Komakichi and others in the leadership of Sodomei communicated to the prime minister and the minister for the interior their determination to prevent Japan from leaving the ILO.[30]

It was in the above context that Nishio Suehiro, a prominent leader of both the Sodomei and the Shakai Taishuto's right-wing faction, attended the ILO meeting in July 1932 and made a plea for understanding of the situation in Manchuria. In connection with the Manchurian Incident, he referred to the increasing demarcation of the world into economic blocs and China's continued political instability, and he argued that the ILO should take these two factors into account when dealing with the matter.[31] Basically Nishio was arguing that, as a result of the Western powers developing economic blocs, Japan was being forced to rely increasingly on China as a trading partner, but that the relationship was not going well due to the political instability there. In other words, the Manchurian Incident was something that occurred largely due to Japan's economy being driven into a corner. Since this sort of argument appeared at the same time in the *Toyo Keizai Shinpo*,[32] a highly regarded liberal economic journal, it can be taken to represent the opinions of those from the more conciliatory camp.

However, the factor that the right wing regarded as being the main cause of the political instability in China was the existence of the Chinese Communist Party. During the 1920s they had been struggling for Sino-Japanese cooperation at the scene of the Oriental Labour Conference of the Second International, but already at this time they had turned down all Chinese demands for the restitution of national sovereignty as 'unhealthy', China having been 'contaminated' by communism.[33] After the Manchurian Incident they merely continued to criticise the advance of the Communist Party as an example of 'political instability'.[34] Thus the 'anti-communism' of Sodomei in effect put the lid on questioning Japan's

imperialist expansion and revealed a self-serving conception of the relationship between Japan and China which would impede future development.

In the 1930s the stage for resolving the issue of the relationship between Japan and China as conceived by the right-wing social democrats eventually shifted from the Oriental Labour Conference to the ILO. One of the subgroups of the ILO, which aimed to bring about an international alliance of fellow unionists, was the Asian Labour Conference, which in 1934 held its first meeting. The greatest obstacle preventing such an international alliance at the time was the question of the 'social dumping' of Japanese manufactured goods. This question had led to trade friction, especially with British India, as a result of which England had taken the countermeasure of raising tariff barriers in order to shut out Japanese products. Since the Sodomei regarded the formation of regional economic blocs as an indirect cause of the Manchurian Incident and was concerned to overcome this international trend, the British reaction, which only reinforced this tendency, could not be overlooked. It is interesting, however, to see that they did not simply rail against the moves of Western countries to shut out Japanese goods as basely unfair, but retained a concern to upbraid the capitalists of their own country to obtain improvements in workers' conditions:

> If we do not participate in the ILO in good faith, trying as much as possible to agree on and ratify the items on the agenda, it will be very difficult to combat the notion of social dumping from a truly proper position.[35]

The right-wing social democrats' aim of bringing about an international unionist alliance was premised on a stable relation between capital and labour. As this citation shows, from this point of view they perceived the exploitative relation between labour and capital in Japan as one of the factors that caused instability in international relations.

In relation to the Asian Labour Conference, which was to be the platform for promoting solidarity between China and Japan, their emphasis on harmonious labour-capital relations also meant that they fully anticipated that the Chinese bourgeoisie would be their negotiating partners. This was already evident during the 1920s. When in 1927 the Tanaka Cabinet intervened militarily in Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition, the Japanese social democrats organised a protest movement against these so-called Shandong Expeditions. However, this movement was ultimately frustrated by a schism between the right and the left, thus reflecting the antagonism between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party in China itself. As opposed to the left faction, which supported the Chinese communists, the right faction—centred on the Sodomei—supported the Nationalist government, which was based on the Chinese bourgeoisie. The idea of a Sino-Japanese alliance, which the right-wing social democrats held in the 1930s, thus was a mere extension of their earlier stance. And, while there might have been a tendency to overindulge in 'anti-communism' and maintain a rather self-serving notion of solidarity between the two countries, the right-wing faction

nonetheless acknowledged that part of the key to political stability in China would include the growth of Chinese capitalism. In stark contrast to this, the insistence by the Shakai Taishuto's national socialist faction on 'solidarity' between the Chinese and Japanese masses, in the form of toppling the Chinese bourgeoisie, was clearly of a different nature.

One further point that accentuates the difference between the social democratic right-wing faction and the national socialist faction is the standoff between the right-wing union Sodomei and the centrist union Zenro (common abbreviation of Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Domei, the National Labour Unions Federation). When the Japan Labour Club (Nihon Rodo Kurabu) was set up in June 1931, the Sodomei strongly opposed the incorporation of the centrist union.[36] Basically, this opposition hinged on Zenro's refusal to recognise the ILO, an act which the right-wing faction denounced as exhibiting 'communist tendencies'.[37] Eventually, in September of the following year, the centrist union joined the Labour Club, to form the Japan Labour Unions Conference (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi), but the issue of dispute regarding the ILO remained unresolved.[38] The central faction, which was enthusiastic about the idea of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, ended up basically supporting the line being pushed by the national socialist faction within the Shakai Taishuto. The choice between either the ILO or the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was to severely restrict the foreign policy of both labour unions, a situation which continued until they amalgamated in 1936 into one unified labour union.

Yet it must be remembered that the kind of conflict that emerged between the right-wing social democrats and the national socialist faction over the issue of the non-aggression pact was something that occurred above and beyond the basis of mutual understanding that they shared (as was dealt with in the previous section, pp. 201–2). They maintained a united stand on recognising the legitimacy of the Manchurian campaign along with being averse to the notion of withdrawing from the League of Nations. Also, with regard to the World Economic Conference that was held in June 1933 they both expressed approval.[39] The main reason was, of course, their common sense of danger regarding the development of economic blocs in the world economy. As it turned out, the World Economic Conference did not yield the anticipated benefits and largely ended in failure. Accordingly, the right-wing social democrats continued to use the ILO as an avenue for tackling the issue of social dumping, and thus combating the formation of economic blocs. In contrast to this, the national socialist faction chose to propose the idea of an 'Oriental Economic Conference' as their preferred vehicle for realising their aims.[40] This was to be a conference of representatives of government, capitalists, workers and farmers from all Asian countries, including China, as well as from the Soviet Union and 'Manchuria'. In this sense it would be the realisation in concrete terms of the aims of the Far Eastern International. Ultimately this move was rejected within the Shakai Taishuto following criticism that it was a de facto attempt to establish an economic bloc.[41] Nevertheless, given that within the national socialist faction itself at that point in time there was still a

clear tendency to refer to economic blocs as the hotbeds of exclusionist forces (they actually used the term 'fascism' for these), it could in fact be said that the aim of this faction was not to establish such an economic bloc, but, rather, to dismantle it.[42] Consequently, it emerges that the essential difference between the right-wing social democrats and the national socialist faction was simply a difference in the methods they adopted to handle international cooperation in the wake of the Manchurian Incident or, in other words, a difference in their approach to resolving the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism.

However, as far as the domestic economy was concerned, the views of the two factions were incompatible. Whereas the social democrats attached major importance to labour unions, the national socialists even went so far as to fundamentally reject the existence of labour unions, with the argument that these divided the nation into organised workers on the one hand and the unorganised masses on the other. When the national socialist faction referred to 'socialism', what they meant was an attempt to improve the livelihood of the people as a whole, including the mass of ordinary people who were not organised in trade unions. During the economic recession of the early Showa period they saw their role as competing with the exclusionist forces of fascism to capture the increasingly 'anti-capitalist' middle classes. As far as they were concerned, 'fascism' was a capitalistic force permeated by the interests of the ruling elite, who aimed to deflect the anti-capitalist demands of the middle classes in the direction of exclusionist and anti-foreign politics.[43] It was also under the same banner of 'anti-capitalism' that the national socialist faction was to go on to justify the reformist actions of the military, but one should note how in doing so they defined the 'anti-capitalist' demands of the middle classes:

> The demands of the increasingly anti-capitalist middle classes…are, in the economic sphere, for the establishment of a 'state controlled economy' that will reflect the interests of consumers…and, in the political sphere, for the establishment of a supra-class popular power which will represent their middle class political ideology. In other words…the transition from parliamentary politics to despotic politics.[44]

In short, their 'anti-capitalism' constituted a call for the establishment of a controlled economy on the basis of a dictatorship that would reflect the interests of 'consumers', and thus their stance was almost indistinguishable from the fascists' programme. In an attempt to meet this demand of the national socialist faction the Shakai Taishuto proposed a 'National Economic Forum', which, like the aforementioned 'Oriental Economic Conference', was intended to be an all-encompassing institution composed of representatives from various occupational and professional interests and even to act as an unquestionable authority over parliament and the cabinet.[45] Although this proposal was also scuppered due to resistance within the party, it lingered on through the advocacy of 'Prefectural Economic Forums' during the 1935 prefectural elections,[46] and eventually was

adopted in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association during the Sino-Japanese War. Indeed, this conception of political organisation was a dominant motif of the national socialist faction throughout this period.

However, the main reason that national socialism had been able to come to the fore was the fact that due to the Showa Depression the difficulty in earning an livelihood of the vast body of the population that was not organised into labour unions was becoming a broad social problem and because many social democrats realised that the unions' constant demands for increased wages was not consistent with this problem. Nevertheless, the improvement in the economy meant that the differences between the national socialist faction and the right-wing social democrats regarding the appropriate means of enacting reform would of necessity largely disappear. From 1934 onwards the formerly strenuous calls within the party to address the three areas of unemployment, rural poverty and general living conditions began to lose their vigour.[47] The domestic economic recovery thus made the conflict between the economic conceptions of the two factions fade temporarily from view.

Within the rapidly changing situation in the Far East during the mid-1930s, it was instead increasingly in the international policy of the Shakai Taishuto that the economic conceptions of the national socialist faction were reflected. In the next section I will trace the deepening level of coordination between the national socialists and the right-wing social democrats, and follow the process whereby the balance between the two factions in the field of solving the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism gradually shifted in favour of the national socialists.

The Shakai Taishuto and the changing situation in the Far East

Fluctuations in the China situation and their impact

The Far Eastern situation, which had become extremely tense due to the Manchurian Incident, was temporarily alleviated by the so-called 'Hirota diplomacy'. So far as relations with the Soviet Union were concerned, the negotiations over the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway that began in May of 1933 had advanced to the point where, in March 1935, they were ready to sign an agreement. Hirota went on to turn the negotiations toward the matter of a non-aggression pact, which, as exemplified by the support of Finance Minister Takahashi, who sought to restrain military expenditures, gathered increasing support within the country. It was also, incidentally, in line with the diplomatic line taken by the national socialists.

At the same time, the Soviet Union was resisting the rise of the Nazi regime by moving closer to the Western capitalist powers. The reopening of diplomatic ties with the United States in November 1933, the joining of the League of Nations

in November 1934 and the establishment of a mutual assistance pact with France in May 1935 signified this. Eventually this led up to the 'popular-front strategy' that was decided upon at the Seventh Comintern Convention in July of that year. This strategy sought to counter the rise of fascism by means of an alliance with the more moderate and democratic forces within the capitalist camp and implied a major change of direction for the communists, who up until that point had looked upon all capitalist forces with enmity.

An international situation where the Soviet Union was becoming reconciled with the Western nations served to diminish the contradictions between the central and right-wing-aligned social democrats in the trade unions. In October 1933 the delegate nominated by the Japan Labour Unions Conference to attend the ILO was not from the right wing, as it had been in the past, but from the central faction.[48] In this way, at the 18th ILO convention of June 1934 Kikukawa Tadao, a representative of the Zenro, functioned as the national labour representative. The change was further accentuated by a speech Kikukawa delivered at the time, in which he emphasised the importance of the ILO.[49] Furthermore, it was also during this period that the previously mentioned Asian Labour Conference was formed. The fact that this Conference, to which the right wing attached such importance, was finally established, after a great deal of vacillating since the late 1920s, during an ILO meeting that a representative of the central faction was attending can be said to indicate the extent to which these factions had grown closer.

This was also the time that within the Guomindang government the line of appeasement towards Japan advocated by Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei and Huang Fu was strengthened, and as a result the tense Sino-Japanese relations saw some relaxation. It opened the way for overtures by Foreign Minister Hirota to the Chinese Nationalists. This, of course, was a development very much to the liking of the right-wing social democrats, who were anxious to cultivate solidarity between the two countries and who conceived of the Asian Labour Conference as the best stage to achieve this. Accordingly, the right-wing faction called upon China to participate.

However, China's participation was never realised. In December 1935, when the right-wing faction's Matsuoka Komakichi met with the Guomindang government's Wang Zhengting, the latter replied that China would only permit a representative to attend on the condition that there would be no representative of Manchukuo. Matsuoka attempted to get his counterpart to reconsider, but the meeting ended to all intents and purposes in division.[50] In the background to this rupture were changes in the climate of Far Eastern relations, in the sense of the Japanese military's attempt to separate the north of China from the rest.

Hirota's so-called 'three principles' of October 1935 adopted 'defence against communism' as the new basis for Sino-Japanese solidarity and thus amounted to an official recognition after the fact of the Japanese army's move since June of that year to separate off the north of China. It will be clear that this new guideline reversed the trend towards reconciliation between the two countries, and one

may well characterise Wang Zhengting's resurrection of the Manchukuo issue as a direct response to the U-turn in Hirota's diplomacy. As it turned out, the Guomindang government's subsequent decision in November of that year to accept English assistance in reforming its monetary system was a reciprocal change in policy in response to the Japanese army's encroachment on the North. This, along with the First of August Declaration of the Communists earlier on that year, which called for a united popular front against the Japanese, signified the beginning of a new phase in the Far Eastern situation. The change was sealed when the antagonistic Imperial Army went even further to promote a so-called 'Movement for the Autonomy of Northern China', actually setting up the Ji Dong Anti-Communist Autonomous Committee on 25 November 1935.

In response to these developments the right-wing social democrats roundly condemned the British supply of funds to China, stating that '[s]o far as Japan is concerned, …we must preserve the peasants' movement towards autonomy'.[51] When one considers that the warming of relations between Japan and China had, as is typified by the well-known 'Amo Declaration' of April 1934, been predicated on the exclusion of assistance from the Western powers to China, this anti-English rhetoric is not altogether unusual. Although the right-wing social democrats were basically antagonistic towards the Western powers' creation of economic blocs, indicating that this was one of the causes of the Manchurian Incident, they somehow could not help feeling that the British in China were acting outside their legitimate sphere within the world economy. Be that as it may, it will need no mention that the main factor obstructing Sino-Japanese solidarity was not so much British meddling in 'Asian affairs' as the Japanese attempt to separate the north of China from the rest of the country, an endeavour which of course destroyed the basis of all attempts towards such solidarity. In that sense, when one considers that the 'movement for autonomy' was part and parcel of the army's strategy, one cannot help but conclude that the right-wing social democrats' demand to support this same movement was tantamount to relinquishing the notion of solidarity between the two countries altogether.

The notion that came increasingly to the fore instead was that advocated by the leadership of the national socialist faction. From the viewpoint of the Far Eastern International, they had from the very first been critical of Foreign Minister Hirota's earlier advances to the Guomindang.[52] The slogan 'down with the Chinese bourgeoisie', which was propounded by the Far Eastern International was of course completely at loggerheads with the right faction's concept of a Sino-Japanese alliance, which attached major importance to China's bourgeoisie and the Nationalist government it was represented by, but took a benign attitude towards the army's separatist manoeuvres in North China.

In June 1935 the Shakai Taishuto dispatched a 'China and Manchuria Inspection Group' under the command of Kamei Kanichiro, the head of the national socialist faction. The report of the group concluded that 'the main issues in our relations with China are the problem of our Soviet Union policy and the

problem of the Communist Party'. Concerning the latter, the report made the following analysis:

> The Communist Party is [already] there. For Japan's influence to grow it will be necessary to somehow secure the lives of the Chinese people and capture their hearts.[53]

The object of Sino-Japanese solidarity as laid out in the Far Eastern International was to subjugate the Chinese population to Japan's power according to national socialist conceptions of economic control. This object entailed not only expelling Anglo-American capitalism from the Far East, but also restraining the sphere of influence of the Chinese Communist Party, which the national socialist faction in essence regarded as the root of the problems in China. This is also where the Soviet Union fits in, because it was through its good offices that the Chinese communists were to be contained. Fighting communism in China and establishing a non-aggression pact thus formed a related set of objectives in the national socialists' Soviet policy.

Although there were, of course, the shared elements of anti-communism and an anti-English stance based on condemnation of British assistance to China, it will nonetheless be clear that the national socialist argument for containing Chinese communism with the assistance of the Soviet Union was quite distinct from the right-wing social democrats' emphasis on a Sino-Japanese alliance and cooperation with the Guomindang. Instead, the former was a position that seemed almost to complete the military's attempt to invade North China. And, as Hirota's foreign policy came increasingly under the sway of the military, it was the national socialists' position that became the dominant influence on the Shakai Taishuto's China policy. On the other hand, the shared but originally right-wing objective of fighting economic blocs continued to exist. This is also evident from the aforementioned report by the mission under the leadership of the national socialist faction's Kamei Kanichiro, which emphasised the need for 'a raft of trade agreements and customs provisions with the aim of rebuilding the world economy on the basis of new principles'.[54] To the extent that the aim of destroying economic blocs called for furthering international cooperation, nationalism and internationalism continued to coexist in the conceptions of the national socialist faction.

The national socialist faction's gradual establishment of dominance over the Shakai Taishuto's party policy, 1936–7

In January 1936 the right-wing social democrat-aligned Sodomei and the central-faction-aligned Zenro unions merged to form the Zen-Nihon Rodo Sodomei (All-Japan Federation of Labour). Moreover, at the meeting of the international subcommittee of the Shakai Taishuto held in April of that year, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and support for the English Labour

Party were both agreed upon as part of 'the foreign policy to be set forth in the Imperial Diet'.[55] The joint initiatives of the two factions signify primarily the realisation of genuine cooperation between them at both the union and party political levels. As mentioned before, the thaw in relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers had largely dissolved the differences between the two camps. This led, first, to Zenro's participation in the ILO, a development which was clearly a compromise by the central faction towards the right-wing faction. The ensuing formation of the joint union can also best be characterised as the absorption of the central faction by the right-wing faction, the latter boasting a much higher degree and longer tradition of organisation. In particular, the right-wing's rejection of a proposal to include the left-wing social democrats in order to form a genuine popular front indicates its ascendancy rather conclusively and confirms the deeply 'anti-communist' impression of its orientation.[56]

In this period an ideological rightist labour movement that advocated 'labour-capital unity' was emerging, inspired by the so-called 'Movement for Clarification of the National Polity' *(Kokutai Meicho Undo)* that started out with the controversy over the 'Emperor Organ Theory' in 1935. This development made the Ministry for the Interior embark on a policy shift to use this line of argument actively in its own favour.[57] Since the labour policy of the Ministry, and in particular that of its Social Division, had until then supported the 'labour-capital harmony' line of the right-wing social democrats, the emergence of a 'labour-capital unity' stance was regarded as something of a crisis by that faction. Nishio Suehiro, for example, issued a warning against this new nationalistic labour movement, stating: 'I generally support this initiative in the area of education, but I must reject it in the political context as fascism.'[58] It therefore seems safe to conclude that the right-wing faction's move to align itself with the central faction was also intended to counter this stance. Nevertheless, one thing to keep in mind here is the fact that, especially from 1936 onwards, pronouncements by the leadership of the national socialist faction within the Shakai Taishuto were couched precisely in terms of this very same 'labour-capital unity' argument.

The year 1936 also was the year that popular-front movements like those in France and Spain began to become more active. Even in the Far East, instances such as the formation of the Second Nationalist-Communist United Front in the wake of the Xian Incident of December that year indicated that this was a broad movement occurring regardless of which part of the world one looked at. On the other hand, the Hirota Cabinet, which was established following the 26 February Incident, concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. As the popular-front movement spread to East Asia the leaders of the national socialist faction within the Shakai Taishuto were increasingly anxious. However, the countermeasure they proposed was not aimed towards Germany and against the Soviet Union, but towards China. They proposed preventing the diffusion of communism by improving the standard of living of the Chinese masses, that is by establishing a controlled economy based on 'the consumer', and thus maintaining Sino-Japanese relations in the form of the relation between fellow consumers.

The Shakai Taishuto opposed the Anti-Comintern Pact as contributing to an international armed conflict between the popular-front movement and the fascists. They recognised the object of fighting the popular-front movement but rejected the method of cooperating with the fascists. In order to counter communist tendencies among the peoples on the Asian continent, they asserted the need to stress 'a classless society as a whole [rather than] a society based on class conflict', 'a creative socialism opposed to both communism and capitalism'.[59] From this we can infer, first, that they perceived the increasing anti-capitalism of the Chinese people as commensurate with burgeoning communism and, second, that they would seek to capture the support of the Chinese people by engaging in direct competition with communism. One can say that this programme to counter the popular front on the Far Eastern stage was a reflection of the national socialist faction's internal policy, which had entailed attempting to compete with 'fascism' for the favour of the middle classes by means of establishing organs of vocational representatives that were 'beyond class' and 'based on the interests of the consumer'. Both the Xian Incident of December 1936 and the movement towards the formation of a popular front within Japan itself helped to fuel the sense of crisis. It was precisely because of such considerations that Kamei Kanichiro, at the general meeting of the Parliamentary Budget Committee in May 1936, warned that 'the strategic balance between Japan and the Soviet Union will most likely change in favour of the latter in the first half of next year'.[60] And Kono Mitsu's remarks in support of an Anglo-Japanese alliance as opposed to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, arguing specifically that 'we must either align with the English or seek their cooperation if we are to contain Russia', also reflect this same sense of crisis.[61]

As for the right-wing faction of the social democrats, we find that, while they indicated reservations regarding the notion of 'labour-capital unity', they nonetheless accorded with the essential points of the national socialist platform in its entirety. We can find these arguments, for example, in *Rodo,* the organ of the newly formed Zen-Nihon Rodo Sodomei. Of course, on issues concerning the ILO, the Asian Labour Conference and the incorporation of the central faction of the social democrats, the right-wing Sodomei still held the strongest position within the new labour federation. Even the national socialists regarded the Asian Labour Conference as an important lever towards Sino-Japanese cooperation.[62] And, moreover, there was considerable common ground in the form of the usual aims of expelling the Western powers from the Far East and bringing to an end the development of economic blocs, and of the new aim of reinstating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Under such conditions there was no necessity for the right-wing faction to exclude the national socialists. However, this still does not explain why they ultimately chose to accede to the national socialists as far as the party's China policy was concerned. In order to understand their choice we once again must focus on the right-wing social democrats' profound opposition to communism.

At the second general meeting of the Asian Labour Conference, held in Tokyo in May 1937, there was already an indication that a representative of the Shanghai

commercial community would take part.[63] In connection with this, at a certain roundtable talk Matsuoka Komakichi touched on the Guomindang's condition that there would be no representative from Manchukuo, stating that, '[i]n actual fact, there is no group in Manchuria that would be able to attend [but in any event] there is no need for us to go so far as to promise that no representative from Manchukuo will attend in order to have China attend'.[64] Compared to Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, the noted liberal journalist of foreign policy who was attending the same colloquium and offered a more conciliatory line by stating that 'even if we have to obtain the forbearance of the Manchurian representatives it is still better that the Chinese take part', it is evident that Matsuoka's was a quite obstinate position. It can nonetheless be said to reveal the traditional depth of anti-communist feeling within the right-wing faction of the social democrats, which, as before, saw Chinese nationalist demands for the recovery of national sovereignty as tainted by communism. The stubborn anti-communist stance of the right faction in the end impeded all plans for cooperation with the Chinese Nationalist government and resulted in the complete bankruptcy of its conception of a Sino-Japanese alliance. Accordingly, the national socialist faction was able to gain dominance in the field of the Shakai Taishuto's China policy.

Within the rapidly changing situation in the Far East, it was thus that the choice between the separate prescriptions offered by the two factions to solve the dilemma between nationalism and internationalism was made in favour of the national socialist faction. Summarising, we might say that the above implied the establishment of a mutually advantageous relationship between the right-wing faction of the social democrats, with their superiority in the 'hard' organisational area, and the national socialist faction, with their superiority in the 'soft' ideological area.

Finally, let me make some reference to the leap forward enjoyed by the Shakai Taishuto in the elections. The party, which had already secured good results in the prefectural assembly elections of 1935, managed in the 19th general election of February 1936 to increase its number of seats in parliament from three to eighteen. Furthermore, in the 20th general election of April 1937 they established themselves as the third-ranked party in parliament with an extraordinary leap to 37 seats. It was no wonder, therefore, that the leadership of the national socialist faction regarded these results as the 'go sign' for their policy platform. However, as has been pointed out in previous research, there were a number of diverse expectations bound up in the rising support for the Shakai Taishuto. For example, Kawai Eijiro, the noted liberal theorist of social policy at Tokyo University, expressed the following demand towards the party:

> There is a fascist tendency within part of the leadership and this will have to be expelled.... Our objective is socialism but we must oppose Marxism.[65]

This utterance confirms an anti-fascist as well as an anti-communist position and thus indicates support for the right-wing faction of the social democrats.

Nevertheless, we should not neglect that such a position was bound up with the following expectation:

> We must strive to avoid war. However, …if it is inevitable in order to protect our state and nation, we will have no alternative but to go to war. I am opposed to a simplistic doctrine of pacifism.

The combination of anti-communism with a view of war that was essentially proactive countenanced the possibility of war with the Nationalist-Communist United Front of China and formed part of the background to the right-wing social democrats eventually being dragged along with the national socialists' programme.

The Shakai Taishuto during the Sino-Japanese War

The full-scale war that commenced between Japan and China in July 1937 was a direct consequence of the Japanese army's expansionist operations in Northern China. However, for the national socialist faction, whose sense of impending threat from the Soviet and Chinese communists was increasingly sharpening, the war was the result of the Chinese bourgeoisie's broad shift towards an anti-Japanese position and the ensuing Nationalist-Communist United Front, and so they actively supported the war effort. For example, Aso Hisashi, the national socialist chief secretary of the party, defined the war as 'a battle between Japan and the Soviet Union for the right to lead the Chinese masses, who have been deeply infiltrated by the Soviets'. He stated that 'the question of which side could genuinely provide the Chinese with a happy and stable lifestyle along with the benefits of a high degree of culture' would be the decisive factor in that contest.[66] When Kamei Kanichiro stated during the extraordinary session of the Diet in July that 'the capitalist system of defence may lose against a totalitarian one', he was articulating this same sense of crisis towards both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party.[67]

The right-wing faction of the social democrats, who had also taken a position of full support towards the war, joined forces with the national socialists to form a delegation to America whereby they intended to explain that the war was a means of defending Japan against the threat of communism.[68] The perception of the conflict by both factions was thus fundamentally the same. The action that epitomised their cooperation was the joint response to the Industrial Patriotic Movement. This movement, which started in earnest from July 1938, entailed the establishment of Industrial Patriotic Committees at each factory, with the aim of preventing strikes according to the ideals of 'labour-capital unity'. The national socialist faction, which had already indicated a policy position more or less identical to this line, proceeded actively to engage in the movement. As for the right-wing social democrats, while they feared to some extent that these new committees would compete with the union organisations, they nonetheless

concurred with the idea in its general outline and sought to advance 'the movement to eradicate strikes'. The cooperative relationship between the two factions was ratified at the July meeting of the Shakai Taishuto's Labour Committee, and the national socialists' Kono Mitsu, the Labour Division Head, publicly declared that 'without cooperation with the labour unions the object of the Industrial Patriotic Committees cannot be achieved'.[69]

However, as the war became protracted and the situation became far removed from that initially imagined, major conflicts began to emerge between the two factions within the party. We can perhaps best follow this process of fragmentation on the basis of Kono's statements. Kono, on the one hand, had placed some distance between himself and other members of the national socialist leadership and, on the other hand, had a strong connection with the unions through his position of Labour Division Head, which in effect made him into the 'pipeline' between the two factions.[70] He is almost unquestionably the most suitable person to employ in the task of examining the relationship between the two factions.

To start with, in October 1938 Kono declared that 'the argument of yore that characterized the advance of Japanese products on the world market as a form of social dumping has come to an end'. As mentioned above, the solution to the question of social dumping at the ILO was a matter that the social democratic right wing had emphasised all through the mid-1930s. Although this statement by Kono thus seems to be a confirmation of the progress of the vision held by the right-wing faction, his true intentions were of a somewhat different nature:

> When it comes to considering economic policy the question arises of whether one should take the option of seeking self-sufficiency through economic blocs or return to the principle of international free trade.[71]

In other words, in opposition to the principle of free trade there had now clearly emerged an alternative framework of 'economic blocs'. Moreover, he went on to state his belief that 'regional systems will become the basis of international relations in the future, with Europe for the Europeans, America for the Americans and Asia for the Asians', insisting that the Japanese ought to engage actively in the construction of such blocs.[72] When one recalls that originally the dismantling of economic blocs had been part of the foundation that the cooperation between the two factions was based on, it will be evident that Kono was bidding farewell to the line set out by the right-wing faction. This shift should be seen in connection to the move afoot at the time to pull out of the ILO.

When in November 1937 the ILO adopted a resolution condemning Japan for its aggression against China, a movement emerged, centred on the ideological rightist unions and the Nihon Kakushinto of Akamatsu Katsumaro, to pull out of the organisation. This movement at once turned into a major political issue in the 73rd Imperial Diet of the following year with the establishment of an alliance between these groups and the Kokumin Domei of Adachi Kenzo and Kiyose

Ichiro. In the end the government resolved to break off all formal relations with any institution linked to the League of Nations, and on 3 November 1938 accordingly declared Japan's withdrawal from the ILO.[73] This was, by the way, the same day that the Konoe Cabinet issued its famous 'New Order in East Asia' declaration.

For the right wing of the social democrats, who regarded the ILO as the central stage for pursuing foreign policy, such a situation was nothing less than disastrous. In sharp contrast, Kono, who had been on his second inspection tour of China in July of that year, published a pamphlet entitled *Shin To-A no kensetsu* (Building the new Far East) and, subsequently, as the spokesman on 'the policy towards the continent' at the Seventh Convention of the Shakai Taishuto, enthusiastically pursued the conversion of the party's international policy.[74] In keeping with Konoe's 'New Order in East Asia' declaration, the Convention eventually adopted the catch-cry of an 'East Asian Community Body'.[75] Kono commented on the Konoe declaration as follows:

> In this declaration is expressed the intent to relinquish the Nine Power Treaty and thereby break away from the old form of international relations. Nevertheless, we must also go one step further to consider what sort of international system should be erected in its place.[76]

The Nine Power Treaty was an accord which undertook to guarantee the sovereignty of China's territory. The thing that Kono seems to be countenancing here is the possibility of breaking China up as part of a process of establishing a new economic bloc in the Far East, something which, in turn, was part of the broader process of establishing a new world order based on the concept of regionalism.

On the other hand, this was also undeniably an attempt to move in accord with the situation in the European region where a standoff had developed between Britain and Germany. The Shakai Taishuto was becoming increasingly positive in the matter of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, to such an extent that by the end of 1938 it had started the 'Movement to Promote the Conclusion of a Military Alliance among Japan, Germany, and Italy'.[77] The drive to strengthen the anti-communist accord, which was centred mainly on the army, aimed to strengthen military ties with Germany and eventually had the scope of its enmity expanded from the Soviet Union to include Britain and France. This, however, produced a serious confrontation with pro-British interests which had traditionally been centred in the Foreign Ministry. The national socialist faction, which regarded Germany as at the forefront of establishing a new world order, positively supported the strengthening of relations with the Axis powers. Moreover, on the basis of the anti-British sentiment that emerged in the wake of the Tianjin Settlement Incident of 1939, it also organised an anti-British mass meeting on 21August that year.[78] Regarding the national socialist faction's activities, Katayama Tetsu of the right-wing social democrats remarked wryly, 'It

is at times like these…that we could do with a newspaper or magazine that would attack this tendency to worship Germany.'[79] As was established in the previous section, the right-wingers had themselves arrived at an anti-British position of sorts so far as expelling the Western powers from the Far East was concerned. Nevertheless, the national socialist faction was going beyond the scope of that, to actually campaign on one side in the standoff between Britain and Germany in Europe, something the right-wing social democrats would not accept.

When it came to the issue of analysing the causes of the war between China and Japan, the national socialist faction focused firmly on the Nationalist-Communist United Front, and made sure to point out the advance of Chinese ethnic nationalism as the most important factor in its formation. In that regard they had a more accurate perception of the situation than their right-wing social democrat counterparts, who still tended to regard developments in China merely as the result of the 'aberration' of communism. The prescription that the national socialist faction presented, and which came to have great currency within the debates of the period, was the notion of an 'East Asian Community'. Kono, who was one of the supporters of the idea, realised that as part of achieving this objective it would be essential to come up with an intellectual device that would facilitate the pro-Japanification of the Chinese. The thing that he came out with was a 're-interpretation of the Three Principles of the People'. From within Sun Yat-sen's triptych of 'ethnic nationalism, democracy and livelihood', he regarded an excessive emphasis on 'ethnic nationalism' as having contributed to the war between China and Japan, whereas a reorientation towards 'livelihood' would by contrast fulfil more precisely the intention of that doctrine.[80] By emphasising the element of 'livelihood', which was in essence an extension of their earlier 'consumer-based' economic conceptualisations,[81] the national socialists aimed to remove the antagonistic notion of ethnic nationalism from the Chinese people and, once this was achieved, to realise cooperation between the East Asian comrades. In this sense the whole thing was nothing but a reissue of the 'Far Eastern International', albeit with the important difference this time around that it was being construed within the new context of economic regionalism.

The key to the success of this 'East Asian Community', however, was first and foremost sought in the reform on national socialist lines of Japan itself. To this end the national socialist faction gave a very positive meaning to the Industrial Patriotic Movement, largely denying in the process the logic of social democracy. As Kono stated, 'It is simply no good any more if there is conflict between the capital and labour organizations.' He was also to comment that '[t]he trade unions of Japan have not fully understood the significance of the Industrial Patriotic Movement'.[82] Considering these remarks it is hardly surprising that the trade union aligned with the central faction broke away from the merger with the right-wing faction union (in the form of the Zen-Nihon Rodo Sodomei) in order to restyle itself as an industrial patriotic club (Sanpo Kurabu) in November 1939.

It was at the time of these developments—to be specific, on 23 August 1939—that the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union was

concluded, presenting many people all over the world with an enormous surprise. On the same day the Shakai Taishuto convened an emergency meeting wherein the national socialist faction and right-wing social democrats' faction exchanged views on the matter. It seems that on this occasion the right wing's Matsuoka Komakichi and Nishio Suehiro expressed dissent against Kamei Kanichiro and Mizutani Chozaburo, who had spoken out in favour of a similar Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact.[83]

As was pointed out earlier, it was already implicit in the concept of a 'New Order in East Asia' that this brand of regionalism would entail some revision of the Nine Power Treaty. Similarly, the main reason the national socialist faction insisted on a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union in parallel with the arrangement made by the Germans was simply to define the respective spheres of influence. The Shakai Taishuto's secretary-general, Aso Hisashi, made remarks on the subject to Konoe Fumimaro in a letter as follows:

> Within this broad region of the Orient why is there any need for us to come into conflict with the Russians? The natural avenue of release for the instinctive drive of the Russian nation to seek the sunshine of the south lies indeed within this vast area and through some bold discussions with Japan they may very well find it.[84]

It should be recalled that, at this time, among the army and the reformist elements within the Foreign Ministry, a similar notion of alliance between Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union was beginning to emerge. The noted liberal Ishibashi Tanzan, in his *Toyo Keizai Shinpo,* warned of the dangers of such a move, condemning it as tantamount to a justification for carving up China.[85] It must be said that the national socialist faction's notion of establishing an economic bloc in East Asia by liaising with the Soviet Union about spheres of influence did indeed amount to what Ishibashi condemned.

In any case, this radical conception of a three-way alliance did not gain much currency at the time. If anything, the perception of the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union as a betrayal of the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact was more dominant. For instance, when at the Eighth Convention of the Shakai Taishuto, held on 9 December 1939, a resolution in support of the government of Wang Jingwei was passed, the party president, Abe Isoo, commented on the circumstances as follows:

> In one segment of the party there was support for the notion of negotiation between [Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union (censored in the original)], but as a whole the party resolved to put its support behind the central Chinese government of Wang Jingwei.[85]

Wang Jingwei had embraced Konoe's declaration of a 'New Order in East Asia', fleeing the temporary Nationalist capital of Chongqing and establishing a pro-

Japanese government in Nanjing. At the time, he emphasised an anti-communist line while pushing for the 'cultivation of Chinese native capital'.[87] In essence, the decision to support Wang's government was in keeping with the identical line of nurturing Chinese capitalism advocated by the right-wing social democrats and signified a snub to the national socialist faction's arguments in favour of dividing the Chinese mainland. Thus the impact of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union generated an advantage of sorts within the Shakai Taishuto for the right-wing social democrats.

It was for reasons such as this that the break-up of the Shakai Taishuto in February 1940 can be regarded as an attempt by the weaker national socialists to turn the tide against their counterparts. The immediate catalyst was Saito Takao's now famous anti-military speech. Both the national socialists and the right-wing social democrats regarded as ill judged this speech in which Saito criticised Japan's war with China, but the preoccupation of the national socialists with having him expelled from parliament led to a manifest standoff between themselves and the right-wing social democrats, who did not favour such a drastic move. This ultimately developed into a situation where the national socialist faction expelled the social democratic right-wing faction from the Shakai Taishuto. The latter eventually moved to set up a new party, the Kinro Kokumino, but before this happened the party was proscribed in May by the Home Office. Subsequently trade unions were being forced to disband in July. In the aftermath of the expulsion of the right-wing faction, the national socialist faction dissolved the Shakai Taishuto in July in order to incorporate itself directly into Konoe Fumimaro's 'movement for a new political order'. This movement was aimed at the formation of a new political party that would promote the nationalistic design of a new order for East Asia. At this point, the economic conceptions of national socialism ceased to have an interna-tionalist character and began to be promoted solely on the basis of nationalism.

Conclusion

Above, I have tried to describe the process by which in the Japan of the 1930s, against the background of the changing political situation in China, the approach to the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism shifted from a social democratic approach to a national socialist one. The Shakai Taishuto, the biggest pre-war socialist party, was established under the historical condition of the 1930s comprised by this same dilemma. It was thus a party that considered the solution of this dilemma, if possible on the basis of mass support, as one of its main tasks. The two different approaches that came to the fore in the factional conflict within the Shakai Taishuto show very well where the points of divergence lay between the various political currents of this period. As the Sino-Japanese war became protracted, the process by which the national socialist approach abandoned its emphasis on internationalism and instead gave priority to the formation of an economic bloc can be characterised as the process of the dilemma of nationalism

and internationalism converging into nationalism. And, at the same time, it was also the process of the Shakai Taishuto itself—which was established on the premise of this dilemma—falling apart. Thereupon, the political scene moved to the new and different stage of the 1940s.

The method of viewing the internationalism of the 1930s as a mere choice of allies between either Britain and America or Russia at first seems a transparent and neutral choice between different yet equal, interchangeable states. However, as I have tried to show, when one takes a close look at China, the locus that most strongly prescribed the politics of this period, it becomes clear that this method is incorrect. While the one approach emphasises negotiating with the Chinese Nationalist Party, the other does not emphasise negotiating with the Chinese Communist Party, but instead advocates eradicating its influence. In other words, one must take heed that in the Chinese context the power politics of two interchangeable symmetrical alternatives turn into two options that are asymmetric and not interchangeable. Moreover, if one considers that the former approach is tainted by a deeply rooted anti-communism, one cannot help but confirm how strongly the Japanese political situation during this period was circumscribed in its entirety by ideology. In my opinion it is exactly the ideological weight of this anti-communism which makes up the historical distinctiveness of this period's dilemma of nationalism and internationalism. In this respect I would like to stress that one should not just mechanically discuss and draw easy lessons from the universal theme of the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism, which can be found at all times and in all places. Rather, one must trace in what particular way this universal dilemma expresses itself in a certain place at a certain time. Such an endeavour will also provide us with a prudent perspective towards the opaque yet hard to resist 'trends' that, often unnoticed, give direction to our own society.

Notes

1 This article is a revised version of 'Shakai Taishuto no kokka shakaishugi to kokusai seisaku' (The national socialism and international policy of the Shakai Taishuto). *Shirin,* vol. 79, no. 4 (July 1996). The translation is by Alistair Swale.

2 Concerning the Shakai Taishuto, the following works are of particular note: Kanda Fuhito, 'Fashizumu-ka no shakai minshushugi', in *Sengo Nihonshi,* vol. 5, Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, ed., Aoki Shoten, 1962; Takahashi Hikohiro, 'Shakai Taishuto no kenkyu', in *Musan seito no kenkyu,* Masujima Hiroshi, Takahashi Hikohiro and Ono Setsuko, eds, Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1969; Yoshimi Yoshiaki, 'Shakai Taishuto no hoko tenkan', in *Rekishi Koron,* May 1976; Narita Kiichiro, 'Shakai Taishuto ni okeru shinto undo', in *Rekishi Hyoron,* no. 342, 1978; Yamamuro Takenori, 'Shakai Taishuto shoron', in *Nenpo: Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 5,* Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1983; Ozeki Motoaki, '1930-nendai ni okeru han-kisei seito seiryoku no shocho ni kansuru ichi kosatsu', in *Nihonshi Kenkyu,* no. 304, 1987; Arima Manabu, 'Tadokoro Teruaki to Manshu jihen-ki no Shakai Minshuto',

in *Shien,* no. 125, 1988; Koizumi Hiroshi, 'Shakai Taishuto no kokka shakaishugiteki kakuitsu-ka to shoshimin', in *Shirin,* no. 73–3, 1990; Ooka Satoshi, 'Nitchu senso-ki no Jichi Yogo Undo ni tsuite', in *Rekishigaku Kenkyu,* no. 666, 1994.

3 Regarding Takabatake's conception of 'consumer-based' socialism, see Arima Manabu, 'Takabatake Motoyuki to kokka shakaishugi-ha no doko', in *Shigaku Zasshi,* no. 83–10, 1974; Tanaka Masato, *Takabatake Motoyuki,* Gendai Hyoronsha, 1978; Yamamoto Kazushige, 'Nihon ni okeru kokka shakaishugi rodo undo', in *Nihon Rekishi,* no. 532, 1992.

4 Takabatake Motoyuki, *Hihan Marukusushugi,* Nihon Hyoronsha, 1929, p. 228.

5 Yamamuro Takenori, 'Seito naikaku-ki no goho musan seito', in *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu,* no. 38–2, 1986.

6 Akamatsu Katsumaro, 'Genka no kyakkan josei to wagakuni shakai undo no doko', in *Shakai Minshu Shinbun,* May-October 1930.

7 Kamei Kanichiro, 'Shakai Minshuto no shakai seisaku', in *Kizoku, shihonka, rodosha,* Chuseido, 1931, p 138.

8 Tanaka Masato, *op. cit.,* p. 263.

9 Regarding the Zenkoku Taishuto, see Ono Setsuko, 'Zenkoku Taishuto no bunseki', in *Musan seito no kenkyu,* Masujima Hiroshi, Takahashi Hikohiro and Ono Setsuko, eds. Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1969, pp. 344–64; Arima Manabu, *op. cit.*.

10 *Shakai Undo Tsushin* (hereafter *Shatsu*), February 18 and 25, 1932.

11 *Rodo,* May 1932.

12 Takahashi Hikohiro, 'Zenkoku Rono Taishuto no bunseki', in *Musan seito no kenkyu,* Masujima Hiroshi, Takahashi Hikohiro and Ono Setsuko, eds. Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1969, pp. 365–435; Arima Manabu, *op. cit.*.

13 Shatsu, 26 March 1932.

14 'Zenkoku Nomin Kumiai Taikai', in *Naigai shakai mondai chosa shiryo,* no. 144, 25 May 1932.

15 Tadokoro Teruaki, 'Ajia gasshukoku-ron', in *Nihon Kokumin,* July 1932, p. 230.

16 See, for example, 'Kokka shakaishugi undo no kinjo', in *Naigai shakai mondai chosa shiryo,* no. 143, March 15, 1932, p. 32–3.

17 Inamura Ryuichi, 'Shadaito ridatsu ni taisuru seimei', 23 January 1938, as held among the Hayashi Torao papers at the National Diet Library (Kensei Shiryoshitsu).

18 Kamei Kanichiro, *Gojunen [gomu fusen] wo otte* (as contained in *Kamei Kanichiro-shi danwa sokkiroku,* Nihon Kindaishi Kenkyukai, 1970), p. 193.

19 *Shatsu,* April 26, 1932.

20 Later Kono Mitsu was to recall that 'Generally speaking, I thought that Kamei would go wherever Akamatsu went, and so it was unusual to find that he remained'. In *Gendaishi wo tsukuru hitobito,* Nakamura Takafusa, Ito Takashi and Hara Akira, eds, Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1971, p. 82.

21 *Shakai Minshu Shinbun,* 3 May 1932.

22 Shatsu, 26 April 1932.

23 'Jihyo zadankai, fashizumu hihan', *Keizai Orai,* January 1932, p. 57.

24 Tanaka Masato, 'Manshu Jihen to kokka shakaishugi', in *Nihon shakaishugi undoshi ron,* Watanabe Toru and Asukai Masamichi, eds, Sanichi Shobo, 1973.

25 *Shakai Taishu Shinbun* (hereafter *Shatai*), 1 April 1933; *Shatsu,* 23 February 1933; *Rodo,* March 1933.

26 Shatai, 25 October 1932.
27 *Shakai Undo Jokyo* (hereafter *Jokyo*), 1932, p. 683.
28 'Kyokuto kokusai seisaku to Nisso domei', in *Shakai Shinbun,* October 1932.
29 *Shatai,* 5 January 1933.
30 *Jokyo,* 1933, p. 1, 057.
31 *Rodo,* July 1932.
32 Eguchi Keiichi, 'Santo Shuppei, Manshu Jihen to Toyo Keizai Shinpo', in *Nihon teikokushugishi ron,* Aoki Shoten, 1975.
33 *Sodomei gojunenshi,* vol. 2, Koyosha, 1966, p. 135.
34 *Rodo,* January 1934.
35 *Rodo,* May 1934.
36 *Jokyo,* 1931, p. 728.
37 Nihon Rodo Sodomei, *Dainijukai Zenkoku Taikai hokokusho,* November 1931, p. 61.
38 Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyujo, *Nihon rodo nenkan,* 1934, p. 271.
39 *Rodo,* May 1933; Shakai Taishuto, *Kin no buso to Nihon no shorai,* Shadaito Panfuretto, June 1933, p. 62.
40 'Tenkanki kensetsu seisaku-an', in *Jokyo,* 1933, p. 572.
41 *Shatsu,* 24 July 1933.
42 Shakai Taishuto, 'Showa kyunendo ippan kosaku kyoryoku hoshin sho', in *Shakai Taishuto Showa Hachinendo Taikai gian,* Shakai Taishuto Shuppanbu, 1933, p. 2–3.
43 Shakai Taishuto Zosho Henshuiinkai, *Musan kaikyu yori mitaru shin Nihon no kensetsu taiko,* June 1933. Regarding 'A Theory of a Third Capitalist Power', see Narita, 'Shakai Taishuto ni okeru shinto undo', *op. cit.*, and Yoshimi Yoshiaki, 'Senzen ni okeru [Nihon fashizumu]-kan no hensen', *Rekishigaku Kenkyu,* no. 451, 1977.
44 Shakai Taishuto, 'Showa kyunendo ippan kosaku kyoryoku hoshinsho', *ibid,* p. 3.
45 'Tenkanki kensetsu seisaku-an', *op. cit.*.
46 *Jokyo,* 1935, p. 797.
47 Yamamuro Takenori, 'Shakai Taishuto shoron', *op. cit.,* p. 77.
48 *Jokyo,* 1933, p. 991.
49 *Shatsu,* 12 April 1934.
50 *Sodomei gojunenshi,* vol. 2 *(op. cit.),* p. 508.
51 *Rodo,* December 1935.
52 *Shatai,* 28 April 1935.
53 Shakai Taishuto, *Kiki ni tatsu kokusai seikyoku,* Shakai Taishuto Shuppanbu, January 1936, p. 36.
54 *Idem,* p. 46.
55 *Jokyo,* 1936, p. 646.
56 Kanda Fuhito, 'Nihon ni okeru Toitsu Sensen ni tsuite', *Gendai Shiso,* no. 10, 1972.
57 Miwa Yasushi, *Nihon fashizumu to rodo undo,* Azekura Shobo, 1988, p. 153
58 *Rodo Keizai* (Tokyo), July 1935.
59 *Jokyo,* 1936, p. 682.
60 Shakai Taishuto, *Tokubetsu gikai toso hokokusho,* Shakai Taishuto Shuppanbu, July 1936, p. 36.
61 'Zadankai; tai-So seisaku wo do suru', *Gekkan Roshiya,* April 1937, p. 54.
62 Shakai Taishuto, *Daigokai Taikai gian,* Shakai Taishuto Shuppanbu, December 1936, p. 6.
63 *Shatsu,* 10 December 1936.

64 'Minzokushugi to musan undo', *Myonichi,* May 1937, p. 25.
65 Kawai Eijiro, 'Shakai Taishuto e no kibo', *Myonichi,* June 1937, p. 19.
66 Aso Hisashi, 'Shina Jihen to Nihon no taishu', *Bungei Shunju,* October 1937, p. 72.
67 *Teikoku Gikai Shugiin gijiroku kiroku,* vol. 69, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1948, p. 43.
68 *Rodo,* November 1937.
69 Kono Mitsu, 'Senji rodo kokusaku to Sangyo Hokoku undo', in *Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun,* September 1938, p. 26.
70 *Gendaishi wo tsukuru hitobito (1) (op. cit.),* p. 87.
71 Kono Mitsu, 'Senji-ka no Rodo mondai', *Keizai Joho,* 21 October 1938, p. 21.
72 Kono Mitsu, 'Cheko mondai kaiketsu no To-A jikyoku e no eikyo', *Keizai Joho,* 11 October 1938, p. 41.
73 *Sodomei gojunenshi,* vol. 2 *(op. cit.),* p. 687.
74 See Yokozeki Itaru, 'Senji taisei to shakai minshushugisha'. In *Nihon Fashizumu 2,* edited by Nihon Gendaishi Kenkyukai, 1982, p. 69. Also, regarding Kono's various articles, see 'Daiyonbu; Shinjinkai-in shippitsu ronbun mokuroku: Kono Mitsu, Miwa Juso', in the final volume of *Tokyo Teidai Shinjinkai kenkyu noto dainanago,* edited by the Nakamura Katsunori Research Group within the Political Studies Division of the Law Faculty at Keio Gijuku University.
75 Shakai Taishuto, *Dainanakai Zenkoku Taikai gian,* Shakai Taishuto Shuppanbu, November 1938.
76 'Choki kensetsu e no michi', *Nihon Hyoron,* December 1938, p. 125.
77 *Shatai,* 15 May 1939.
78 *Jokyo,* 1939, p. 481.
79 Katayama Tetsu, 'Seikai Orai e no kitai', *Seikai Orai,* October 1939, p. 85.
80 Kono Mitsu, 'Jihen no zento to Chu-Shina kensetsu horyaku', *Nihon Hyoron,* October 1938, p. 125.
81 Kono Mitsu, 'Son Bun, sanminshugi, chishiki taishu', *Chuo Koron,* November 1938, p. 161.
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83 *Jokyo,* 1939, p. 482.
84 Aso Hisashi, 'Konoe Fumimaro-ate Aso Hisashi shokan', *Gendaishi shiryo,* vol. 44, Imai Seiichi and Ito Takashi, eds, Misuzu Shobo, 1974, p. 155.
85 Ishibashi Tanzan, 'Kiken naru Nisso teikeiron', *Toyo Keizai Shinpo,* 16 December 1939.
86 Abe Isoo, 'Abe Isoo-shi ichimon itto roku', *Seikai Orai,* June 1940, p. 125.
87 'Mizutani Chozaburo, 'Wahei kyukoku e no maishin', *Seikai Orai,* March 1940, p. 144.

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10
A melancholic nationalism
Yokomitsu Riichi and the aesthetic of cultural mourning

Seiji M.Lippit

> Without even being aware of it, the younger generation had changed even its soul into the Western style; it was an age in which the melancholy of the wandering traveller, who had no soil upon which to rest, was ever deepening.[1]

The rhetoric of return

Writing in memory of his friend Kataoka Teppei, Yokomitsu Riichi (1898–1947) once noted that the writer, who had died in 1944, represented an archetypal figure of Showa literary history. 'A founder of the New Sensationist movement and the discoverer of the sensibility of speed, he converted to dialectical materialism, then further converted to a longing for tradition and to the building of bridges with China', Yokomitsu wrote. 'Who else, among the literary figures of the past twenty years, has embodied all of these things in one person?'[2] As Inoue Ken has pointed out, however, Yokomitsu himself might also fit his own description as an archetypal figure of this period.[3] Together with Kataoka, Yokomitsu had been one of the leading members of the New Sensationists *(shinkankakuha),* the central movement of modernist fiction in 1920s Japan. His writings of this period were characterised by formal experimentation and by an emphasis on representations of urban space and various phenomena of modern culture. Yet by the mid-1930s, and especially with the publication of his final, unfinished, novel *Ryoshu* (Melancholy journey)—which began in 1937 and continued throughout the war years—he became known as an exemplary figure of the 'return' to Japanese tradition and the withdrawal into a discourse of cultural essentialism. Yokomitsu was active in his support for the war effort, for which he was denounced in the post-war period, most prominently in an article written by Odagiri Hideo which appeared in the journal *Shin Nihon bungaku* (New Japanese literature) in 1946.[4]

In this sense, Yokomitsu can be seen as embodying a certain significant line of transformation in Japanese literature from the 1920s through the war years, a shift from an engagement with modernism to the articulation of a nationalist aesthetic. As Yokomitsu himself indicated, other similar exam ples may also be found in the

literature of this period—including, to varying degrees, those of Hagiwara Sakutaro, Kawabata Yasunari and Tanizaki Jun'ichiro. Yet Yokomitsu's novel *Melancholy Journey* is of particular significance in that its subject is the very experience of what Yokomitsu referred to as an ideological conversion *(tenko).* This essay, in turn, will seek to trace the dynamics of this transformation through an examination of *Shanhai* (Shanghai, 1928–32) and *Melancholy Journey,* his first and last novels, which are also representative of his early and late writings. In particular, it aims to identify the moments of both continuity and rupture between the two periods of Yokomitsu's career; although there is a sense in which this relationship may indeed be characterised as an ideological conversion, Yokomitsu's nationalist project cannot simply be explained as a rejection of his earlier engagement with modernism. Rather, it represents an attempt to work through and overcome the sense of a crisis in national subjectivity that had already been articulated in the earlier writings.

Both *Shanghai* and *Melancholy Journey* can in fact be seen to deal with the question of nationalism within an international context. The underlying theme of his writings remained the exploration of ways in which consciousness is shaped and transformed through conflicts with an external world that is perceived to be in continual flux; this opposition, in turn, was typically framed as a conflict between national consciousness and transnational space. In both of these novels, for example, exteriority is materialised as a space located outside national borders. In *Shanghai,* however, any resolution to the conflict between internal (national) consciousness and the external (transnational) environment remains irrevocably blocked. The novel's image system is organised around the representation of corporeal sensation, the visceral experience of dislocation and fragmentation that the city of Shanghai presented to Yokomitsu. Yet by the time of *Melancholy Journey* this image system had been translated into an aesthetics of *affect,* marked in particular by the representation of melancholy. The conflicts of *Shanghai,* presented primarily in corporeal terms, are transposed onto a problematics of spirit *(seishin),* a disembodied space within which a resolution to the conflict of national identity is pursued through a retreat into an imagined concept of an Eastern tradition. (Although, as the rhetoric of illness in *Melancholy Journey* indicates, this 'resolution' is never more than phantasmatic.) In the later work, the experience of 'homelessness', of a fundamental disconnection from a shared cultural tradition, is transformed into the basis for a (violent) reconstruction of a national subjectivity.

Modernism and Taisho cosmopolitanism

Japanese modernist fiction of the 1920s and early 1930s has typically been analysed in terms of formal experimentation—as the 'revolution of literature', in contrast to the 'literature of revolution' of the Marxist writers. Indeed, the writings of the New Sensationist group, which coalesced around the journal *Bungei jidai* (Literary age) in 1924, can be situated within a general dismantling of

the formal structures of the modern novel, involving, most significantly, a rejection of the 'colloquial writing' that had become the central medium of literary expression by this time. Yokomitsu, for example, once described his style during the 1920s as a 'rebellious war against the national language' *(kokugo to no futeinaru kessen);* his theory of literary formalism, which he began to articulate in the late 1920s, emphasised the materiality of the written word and the ways in which writing necessarily exceeds the boundaries of the author's consciousness.[5] Stylistically, New Sensationist writings were characterised by fragmented sentences and unconventional grammatical constructions and tropes, and they tended to focus on the representation of exteriority—typically materialised as city space—in contrast to the seemingly limitless interiority that marked the confessional form of the *watakushi shosetsu* (I-novel).[6] It was an attempt to represent in language the extensive transformations in Japanese culture in the 1920s, most notably the reconfiguration of the landscape of Tokyo following the devastating 1923 earthquake and the accelerated spread of new technologies and media. As their name indicates, the works of the New Sensationist writers emphasised the depiction of corporeal sensations rather than contemplation or intellectual grasp of phenomena.

As Yokomitsu's reference to the 'national language' suggests, this linguistic 'rebellion' was more than simply a matter of form, but was also implicated in questions concerning the representation of subjectivity and modern culture in literature. Some critics, for example, have analysed New Sensationist writings as chronicling the dissolution of the concept of self, which had occupied a central position in early 20th-century literary discourse. In particular, the form of confessional fiction that rose to prominence in the Taisho period focused on the representation of interiority and everyday experience; its critical articulation as a genre in the 1920s (as the *watakushi shosetsu*) was, in turn, organised around a conception of self as the basis of literary production and consumption.[7] Modernist literature, especially as articulated in Yokomitsu's theory of formalism, was conceived as a rejection of this central role of the self in determining literary value.

More specifically, however, modernism marks the disintegration of a certain discourse of modernity associated with Taisho literature—what is at times referred to as Taisho cosmopolitanism. In many ways, the dominant conceptions of subjectivity found in Taisho literary writings had been framed within a discourse of a universalised and cosmopolitan modernity—one that reflected advances in the nation's modernisation and a lessening consciousness of distance between Japan and Western civilisation, which had haunted writers of a previous generation.[8] The connection between the category of self and a generalised conception of 'humanity' *(jinrui)* is reflected, for example, in the writings of Mushanokoji Saneatsu, who considered himself and his generation to be 'children of the world' and yet also pursued the construction of an enclosed and narcissistic world in his fiction.[9] To a certain extent, the subject of Taisho cosmopolitanism took the form of a universal and disembodied self, which, as Leslie Pincus has

noted, 'encouraged adherents to withdraw into an expanded and enriched realm of interiority while distancing themselves from more immediate and more material social realities'.[10] If, as the critic Aeba Takao has written, the literary representation of modernity first achieved completion in the Taisho period, its content can be defined as this conception of a universalised literary and artistic world.[11]

This type of cosmopolitanism was also manifested in the writings of Akutagawa Ryunosuke, who is often seen as an emblematic figure of Taisho literature. One of the frequently noted characteristics of Akutagawa's fiction was his extensive borrowing from multiple literary traditions; his works drew on a wide range of sources in Japanese, Chinese, European and American writing. For Akutagawa, the function of literature, and of the novel or *shosetsu* in particular, was essentially linked to this process of assimilation and appropriation, which provided access to an expansive world of culture. Yet, as is symbolised by the fragmentation of his late writings, this idealised conception of literature dissolved in the 1920s within the rise of a politicised literary practice and the influx of new technologies of cultural production associated with mass culture; the disintegration of the novel form in the modernist fiction of this period can be seen as a collapse of the cosmopolitan consciousness of a universalised modernity, a rupture in the imaginary circuit running between an outwardly cosmopolitan discourse and the withdrawal into the representation of interiority. The consciousness of universality found in the works of the *Shirakaba* (White Birch) writers or in the early writings of Akutagawa here disintegrates into unassimilable and disjointed fragments. In turn, the disembodied self of cosmopolitanism is replaced, in modernist writings, by more material, corporeal representations of subjectivity. The emphasis on *sensation* in New Sensationism, the reduction of external phenomena to fragmentary sense perception, thus marks the collapse of an abstract, phantasmal subjectivity that linked the literary representation of interiority to a universal field of modern culture.

Shanghai and the abjection of modernity

As critics such as Sofue Shoji have suggested, the humanistic conception of a universal culture that was expressed in Taisho literature had been based, to a significant extent, on a systematic exclusion of the representation of Asia and questions concerning Japanese imperialism in particular.[12] Within certain literary writings of the 1920s, however, it is possible to identify the emergence of Asia as a site that frames essential conflicts within the Japanese consciousness of national identity. Yokomitsu, for example, situated the fracture of subjectivity and the disintegrating image of modernity within an explicitly historical and political framework in his novel *Shanghai,* which he began serialising in the journal *Kaizo* in 1928. In this work, the rupture in the consciousness of modernity is represented as a reflection of Japan's contradictory position in the world—i.e. its simultaneous location in Asia and the West. The novel revolves around an

irresolvable conflict between an identification with the imperialist powers of the West and an identification with Asia.

The novel is set in 1925 amidst the events known as the May 30th incident, which was sparked initially by the killing of a striking Chinese worker by a foreman at a Japanese-owned textile factory in Shanghai; then, after troops under British command fired into a crowd of demonstrators on 30 May, the protests quickly expanded into a general strike and anti-imperialist movement. Against this historical backdrop, Yokomitsu used the city (which he had originally intended to depict as an abstract representation of Asia, stripped of proper names) to frame an image of modernity as a kind of grotesque body.[13] The city is literally turned inside out, as Shanghai contains within it an internalised world represented by the International Settlement. Of this colonised space within the city, Yokomitsu wrote: 'There is no other place in the world where the character of modernity is so clearly revealed.'[14] In the novel the Settlement is represented as an indigestible kernel of the outside world that functions as a perpetual wound on the body of the city, upsetting the stability of national, cultural and individual borderlines.

For Yokomitsu, Shanghai represents a materialisation of the core conflicts of modern Japanese subjectivity. These centred primarily on the disjunction between an identification with the West—embodied in Japan's assumption of the role of imperial power—and the consciousness of historical and cultural ties to other Asian countries.[15] Within the space represented by the city, Japan occupies an uncertain, borderline position. In turn, the ambiguity of this complex subject position is represented in the novel by multiple encodings of urban space. As Maeda Ai has pointed out, Yokomitsu's depiction of the city is organised around three different types of space—those of empire, revolution and destitution.[16] Thus the narrative moves from the International Settlement and its colonial institutions (including banks, bathhouses, and dance halls), through the mass demonstrations in the streets and factories, to the abject slums of the city. The protagonist of the novel, Sanki, is situated on the borderlines of these different zones, occupying, in effect, all three subject positions at the same time.

Yokomitsu's novel describes the city through images of decay and waste, a familiar characteristic of Japanese colonial travel writings.[17] Shanghai, as a space characterised by images of abjection, evokes sensations of both fascination and disgust in the Japanese who enter into it. Komori Yoichi has written that the city in Yokomitsu's work reduces its inhabitants to material, corporeal entities that exist outside the structures of national identification; this effect is reflected, for example, in Yokomitsu's statement that Shanghai is a place 'where the consciousness and traditions of each ethnic nation *[minzoku]* do them no good'.[18] As the anti-imperialist movement grows in the city, Sanki is thrown into the midst of demonstrations, in which individual bodies flow together into a terrifying mass. In the course of the narrative, he begins gradually to lose the imaginary supports of his identity. By the end of the novel his body, which he had previously referred to as Japanese territory, a material extension of the nation-

state, has been entirely hollowed out—literally deterritorialised. Yokomitsu writes: 'He felt as if his body had lost all weight and become transparent. The landscape before him and behind him mixed together without distinction in this body without bones.'[19] In the scene which follows, Sanki is thrown by Chinese strikers into a boat filled with excrement, a symbolic immersion of his body into the space of abjection represented by the city.

Ultimately, the novel outlines a crisis of subjectivity without resolution: the work ends in a state of suspension, with the economy of Shanghai almost entirely shut down by the general strike. After extricating himself from the boat, Sanki stumbles to the home of Osugi, a Japanese woman in exile from her native country who has become a prostitute after being fired from her job as a bathhouse hostess. The final scene takes place in the absolute darkness of Osugi's room and is narrated from her perspective. For one brief moment the flow of the global economy has been interrupted, allowing Osugi to escape her destitute existence, although she anticipates that troops will soon land in the city to restore order and to reinstate the economic system that fixes her identity. At this point the possibility of a return to Japan does not exist.

This crisis of subjectivity, left in suspension in *Shanghai,* provides the general framework for Yokomitsu's literary output in the late 1930s and through the 1940s. A number of Yokomitsu's later works carry forward the thematics of exile and dislocation, but from the mid-1930s onwards they are also consumed with the attempt to overcome this crisis. His writings during the later period reflect a progressive internalisation of the thematic of his first novel: for its 'material', corporeal economy, Yokomitsu substituted an imaginary economy of 'spirit'. In his later writings, he transformed the sensations of fragmentation and displacement into an aesthetic of loss and mourning. The withdrawal from the representation of materiality into the depiction of interiority marks the end of Yokomitsu's formalism, which he had defined as a 'materialist theory of literature' and which had attempted to reduce language to the materiality of writing.[20] This theory of formalism had expressed a sense of estrangement from the Japanese language, which was perceived to be radically exterior, a material thing irreducible to consciousness. In turn, Yokomitsu described his withdrawal into interiority as the end of his resistance to the national language and the beginning of his 'subjugation' to it.[21]

In fact, one of the first significant signs of this shift in Yokomitsu's use of language can be traced back to the short story 'Machine' *(Kikai),* published in the journal *Kaizo* in September 1930.[22] The work treats similar themes as *Shanghai,* which are here framed in terms of a technological corrosion of subjectivity—the story can be situated within the context of both discourse on 'mechanised civilisation' *(kikai bunmei)* and the introduction of psycho-analysis in the early Showa period. In this work the expansive world of modernity—with all of its irreducible conflicts of identity—has imploded into the mind of the narrator. The story takes place almost entirely within the confined space of a nameplate factory in Tokyo, where the protagonist works with chemical processes that gradually

corrode his consciousness. With 'Machine', Yokomitsu abandoned his prior emphasis on the description of external phenomena for the use of an explicitly colloquial first-person narration.

By the end of the story the narrator comes to experience a radical disassociation between his consciousness and his actions, between interiority and exteriority. He feels that there is a 'machine' that occupies the borderline between the two, and which in fact guides his actions. After one of his co-workers has been found murdered at the end of the story, the narrator states: 'I no longer understand myself. I only feel the sharp menace of an approaching machine, aimed at me. Someone must judge me. How can I know what I have done?'[23] The machine of the title thus signifies a violence that is institutionalised in social and economic structures (represented in the story by the factory) but which has simultaneously been internalised into the narrator's unconscious. In effect, the 'machine', as a marker of radical alterity, represents a structure analogous to the city in *Shanghai;* yet it is all the more uncanny because it exists inside, and functions as the very basis for subjectivity. In this sense, while 'Machine' can be considered an extension of Yokomitsu's modernist project, it also prefigured a turn towards the exclusive representation of the problems of consciousness, which he would later articulate as the question of spirit. As Odagiri Hideo has claimed, this work marked a decisive turn in Yokomitsu's career.[24]

Throughout most of the 1930s the overriding theme of Yokomitsu's writings would be what he referred to as the excess of 'self-consciousness' and the 'spirit of anxiety' that haunted intellectuals in the early Showa period.[25] The culmination of this thematic can be found in Yokomitsu's last novel. *Ryoshu,* whose title can be literally translated as 'the melancholy of travel'. By this point Yokomitsu had fully abandoned his earlier New Sensationist style, adopting more conventional novelistic prose. The turn towards interiority that was indicated by 'Machine' here arrives at a discourse on the interiority of Japanese culture.

From sense to sentiment

The novel, which marks Yokomitsu's separation from what he termed the 'European spirit' and a return to a native cultural tradition, has to a great extent determined Yokomitsu's problematic position within the canon of 20th-century Japanese literature.[26] Even before he had started work on this novel, he had noted —in his essay 'Theory of the Pure Novel' (*Junsui shosetsu ron,* 1935)—the need to distinguish Asian and European sensibility (while also remarking that the 'tradition of Japanese literature is French literature and Russian literature').[27] Yet never before had he so explicitly attempted to challenge the value of Western civilisation.

The novel in many ways parallels the structure of *Shanghai*. Both works were based on Yokomitsu's own experience of travelling abroad; both feature as protagonists Japanese men who are struggling with questions of their own cultural identity. Yokomitsu journeyed to Europe in February 1936; he spent the bulk of

his time in Paris, but also travelled throughout Europe and attended the opening ceremonies of the Berlin Olympics before returning to Japan in August. His trip was sponsored by the *Tokyo Nichinichi* and *Osaka Mainichi* newspapers, which ran advertisements heralding the future publication of Yokomitsu's observations.[28] Yokomitsu did in fact publish a series of reports in the newspapers, and after his return he began serialising the novel *Melancholy Journey* early in 1937. He worked on it for roughly a decade and it was published (although still unfinished) in a five-volume set by Kaizosha in 1946, the year before his death.

Particular passages in *Melancholy Journey,* such as the depiction of the June 1936 general strike in Paris, echo scenes from *Shanghai,* as Ban Etsu has pointed out.[29] More generally, the point of intersection between the two novels is the representation of displacement and homelessness. In *Shanghai* it is the basis for the main character's fragmented consciousness and his ultimate alienation from national identification, which finds its most extreme expression in the scene of Sanki's body being emptied out at the end of the novel. This thematic is extended in *Melancholy Journey*. Yet with the change in emphasis from 'matter' *(busshitsu)* to 'spirit' *(seishin)* there is also an attendant shift from the representation of corporeal sensations to affect in Yokomitsu's writings.[30] *Melancholy Journey* thus describes a retreat into the disembodied realm of spirit, which is characterised by an overriding emphasis on sentiment. The visceral sensation of displacement experienced by *Shanghai's* Sanki is translated into the feeling of melancholy, or *urei,* that is expressed in the title of the novel.

The sentiment signifies an overpowering sense of sadness, loss and separation. Virtually all of the characters are afflicted by this melancholy. One critic has described it as a kind of pathology, and in fact the novel is filled with expressions referring to illness and psychological disorder.[31] This indication of a hidden trauma forms the affective undercurrent of the work as well as its ideological core. For Yokomitsu, this sentiment is even the defining characteristic of an entire generation of intellectuals. He writes, for example:

> Without even being aware of it, the younger generation had changed even its soul into the Western style; it was an age in which the melancholy of the wandering traveller, who had no soil upon which to rest, was ever deepening.[32]

It is possible to read this pervasive sentiment of melancholy in the novel as the expression of an underlying work of extended mourning in which the characters are engaged. Specifically, it seems to function both as the symptom of an incomplete separation from the European spirit and as a radical alienation from any unsullied cultural identity existing prior to the encounter with the West.

The first half of the work is set in Paris and consists of a running dialogue between the two male protagonists, Yashiro and Kuji. Kuji is depicted as an ardent admirer of European civilisation who upholds ideals of rationalism and humanism. At one point he exclaims: 'Why wasn't I born in Paris?'[33] In contrast,

Yashiro arrives in Europe with a markedly hostile attitude, like 'a soldier going to the battlefield'.[34] While he is at times overwhelmed by the beauty of the city, he becomes increasingly conscious of an irreducible rift between Japan and the West —what he will later articulate as the difference between Eastern morality and Western science. He is resentful of the European and American colonisation of Asia, and even more so of Japanese intellectuals who slavishly worship the West. The dialogic design that Yokomitsu originally intended for the novel is reflected in its structure—the narrative of the first section of the novel is filtered through Yashiro's perspective, while after several chapters the perspective shifts to that of Kuji.

The third major character of the novel is Chizuko, a Japanese woman who had shared passage with Kuji and Yashiro to Europe and who quickly comes to signify the feminised body of the motherland. The feelings that Kuji and Yashiro harbour towards the Japanese woman are thus explicitly presented as a reflection of their feelings towards Japanese culture. During the long ship voyage, for example, Kuji draws close to Chizuko, but on their arrival in Europe he quickly rejects her in favour of a French woman. (Later, however, he will realise that he had loved Chizuko all along.) Meanwhile, Yashiro feels increasingly drawn to Chizuko, a desire that is represented as an extension of his longing for home. Upon their arrival in the port of Marseilles, Yashiro and Chizuko find themselves left alone on the ship—in an apparently hysterical symptom of his aversion to Europe, one of Yashiro's legs has gone numb and he is unable to walk. Their conversation in this scene marks the beginning of Yashiro's attraction for Chizuko, but he is aware that he is merely transferring his love for Japan to her: 'It is not as though I love Chizuko at all. It is only that I miss Japan so much.'[35]

This seemingly accidental relationship between Chizuko and Yashiro occupies the bulk of the narrative of the work. Later, it is revealed that Chizuko is Catholic, a fact that poses certain problems for Yashiro, with his increasing obsession with traditional Japanese culture and with native religious practices in particular. Each time, for example, that he sees Chizuko knelt down in prayer, Yashiro evokes a mental image of the *torii* gate at the Ise Shrine in response. Yokomitsu also reveals that one of Yashiro's ances tors, a daimyo in Kyushu, was defeated at the hands of another lord who had converted to Catholicism and who used cannons and guns brought in from Europe to his advantage. In this context, Chizuko, as a Catholic, can be taken as an emblem of a specifically modern Japanese culture, one that has already internalised the foreign other. To this extent, Yashiro's continuing ambivalence towards Chizuko reflects his own uneasy relationship with modern Japan.

In the course of the narrative, Yokomitsu abandons the dialogic structure of the novel; Kuji almost entirely drops out of the picture. This shift occurs around the time that Yashiro returns to Japan, a decisive turning point in the novel. It may have been that Yokomitsu discarded this structure as he increasingly withdrew into a nationalist ideology in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Another reason that Kuji is largely eliminated from the narrative, however, is that to a

certain extent there is no need for this externalisation of the conflict, since it exists in its totality within Yashiro himself. For the same reason, Chizuko remains a highly opaque character throughout the novel—the narrative never provides direct access to her feelings or thoughts. She has no subjectivity of her own because, ultimately, she is merely one of the self-images of Yashiro that are externalised in other characters. Kuji and Chizuko are virtually interchangeable figures from Yashiro's perspective; when Kuji makes a reappearance near the very end of the novel, for example, Yashiro feels that they are 'more husband and wife' than he and Chizuko.[36]

In this sense, Yashiro's relationships with the other characters, as well as his experience of foreign cultures, are ultimately reduced to a narcissistic circuit of desire. Both Kuji and Chizuko are projections of Yashiro's internal conflict—which is precisely the conflict of the internalised other. In addition, Yashiro's journey to Paris is not undertaken in order for him to study Europe, but rather to study himself; he admits as much to Chizuko on the ship when he says:

> It seems that I didn't come in order to see a foreign life or a foreign landscape but rather to see myself. Of course I will see the scenery and visit museums too, but what interests me most of all is seeing the changes take place in myself.[37]

Yokomitsu poses the question of where, for Japanese intellectuals in this historical moment, 'the West' is located. It is not located in Europe, as a specific place, as Yashiro discovers through his journey to Paris. Rather, it is situated internally—as image—and the struggle Yashiro undergoes is thus an internal struggle. The West exists as a phantasm and a spectre for Yashiro, just as it did for generations of Japanese writers, and the crisis presented in Yokomitsu's novel originates in the fact that for the modern Japanese intellectual the rejection of the West is, to a significant extent, a rejection of oneself.[38]

The aesthetic of mourning

The process of Yashiro's separation from the European spirit begins early in the work, soon after the ship docks at Marseilles, when the group enters a cathedral. There, he is startled by the apparition of a bloodstained corpse, which he soon realises is a lifelike sculpture of Christ. For Yashiro, the uncanniness of its resemblance to an actual body is an emblem of a 'barbaric' aesthetic that insists on shocking people with a literal faithfulness to reality. The figure of Christ functions, then, as the literal embodiment of European culture, which in turn is presented as a lifeless body—the material remains of a former ideal which now evokes only sensations of revulsion and shock.

Yashiro's encounter with the corpse sets in motion a process of separation from the European spirit, which is represented in the work as a type of mourning over a lost ideal—a process that begins with the identification of its lifeless remains.[39] Yet

this act of mourning remains blocked and incomplete throughout the work; Yashiro discovers that his rejection of the West can never be absolute, for there is always a residue, a remainder that cannot be eradicated. The 'European spirit' is no longer an ideal, and yet it remains irrevocably inside, as a type of phantasm: 'Every day, [Yashiro] was engaged in a hidden struggle, contriving ways to escape from the power of the phantasm *[gen'ei]* of the West that never failed to rise up in his mind.'[40] In this sense, Yashiro's encounter with Europe is not only a confrontation with the other, but, more importantly, a revelation of the other existing within. This already suggests the origins of the trauma, of Yashiro's melancholy, which is based on the difficulty of overcoming something that belongs essentially to oneself.[41] Yashiro finds it impossible to recover any authentic self existing prior to the intervention of the foreign other, precisely because this intervention is constitutive of the self—like the 'machine' of his earlier work, the European spirit signifies an alterity that has always been inside.

For this reason, there is a noticeable gap between Yashiro's protestations of love for his country, his seemingly unshakeable belief in his identity as a Japanese and the underlying melancholy that torments him throughout the work. By the time of his return to Japan midway through the narrative, for example, Yashiro claims to have cleansed himself completely of any emotional attachment to European culture, saying that the one thing in which he can have faith was his identity as a Japanese. He refers to a period of illness that those returning to Japan seem inevitably to suffer, an illness that he describes as a natural *misogi,* a purification of the diseased traces of the other. Hence he states upon his return: 'I thought of my foreign trip as a method of detecting the impurities and agents of disease within me—in other words, it was like examining myself from end to end with x-rays.'[42] Yet, despite this determination, Yashiro's crisis of identity continues even after his return to Japan. In fact, in some ways it is precisely *after* his return that his true crisis begins. Thus Yokomitsu writes of Yashiro after his arrival in Japan: 'He felt the wandering of his own body, to which the smell of foreign countries still lingered, and he lamented the fact that the melancholy of travel would only deepen within him from now on.'[43] At another point, Yashiro realises that it is only after coming back to Japan that his real (i.e. psychological and ideological) journey begins.

The 'melancholy of travel' thus functions as a metaphor for a sense of cultural homelessness; it is the literary analogue to Kobayashi Hideo's essay 'Literature of the Lost Home' (*Kokyo o ushinatta bungaku,* 1933), which articulated contemporary writers' consciousness of an essential displacement, the absence of any stable ground for cultural identity. Yet what distinguishes Yokomitsu's later work from the argument of Kobayashi's essay is precisely the attempt to overcome this homelessness. As Kamei Katsuichiro wrote, *Melancholy Journey* is a work expressing 'the realisation of the sadness of a double alterity *[niju no ihojinsei]* and the path of escape from it'.[44] The path of escape here takes the form of a search for a homeland that is acknowledged to be lost and which can thus exist only as an imaginary construct—it cannot be discovered in the external world. As

Yokomitsu writes in the novel, '[e]ven things of the past, when they are evoked in thought, become real'.[45] This is the ultimate destination of the work of mourning described in the novel.

A phantasmatic return

Soon after his return to Japan, Yashiro suffers the shock of his father's death, which occurs in his own home, stained thereafter by this traumatic memory. Yokomitsu depicts Yashiro's father as a representative figure of the Meiji period, someone who received instruction from Fukuzawa Yukichi. He is clearly a reflection of Yokomitsu's own father—both were engineers engaged in building railway tunnels, a symbol of the nation's modernisation. After his father's death, Yashiro's feelings of melancholy explicitly take on the character of mourning. The process of mourning his father—especially the act of bringing his ashes to rest in his ancestral home—is superimposed upon Yashiro's own search for a lost cultural tradition. The two forms of mourning become inseparable; as Yashiro states: 'Recently, whenever I think about anything of importance, I can't help but think of it in conjunction with my father's death.'[46]

The meanings encompassed by Yashiro's father as a symbol also reveal the complexity of the double loss suffered by his son. On the one hand, the father represents the tradition of an ancient culture, the embodiment of a bloodline that leads back to Fujiwara no Mototsune, and which includes feudal lords of the 16th century. At the same time, his father is also a symbol of the age of 'civilisation and enlightenment' associated with the Meiji period, precisely the moment at which the West provided an idealised image of the other. In a sense, both are lost to Yashiro and both are being mourned—this constitutes the 'double alterity' of which Kamei wrote.[47]

Following his father's death, Yashiro travels to Kyushu, a journey that functions as symbolic repetition of his voyage to Europe. Of course, the intention here is not 'separation' but rather a return to his own ancestral heritage, the reception of his father's legacy. Yet in the end he finds that this return is impossible; in the final instance, he senses that he remains alienated from the ancient landscape, with which no reconciliation is possible. Thus Yokomitsu writes: Then, when [Yashiro] was alone and looked up at the mountains, he realized for the first time that even here he remained a traveller to the end.' Also: 'Among those who took even one step away from their homes, there was likely none whose spirit did not wander between the place where they lived and the home they imagined in their hearts.'[48] In this scene Yashiro finds the path of return to an ancient culture blocked to him in the natural landscape. In a rigorous sense, then, the 'return to Japan' cannot take place—it can only be achieved by the construction of an artificial homeland, something not found, but, rather, made.

This process can be compared to the nationalist aesthetic of the Japanese Romantics, which, as Kevin Doak has pointed out, was based on an awareness

that access to an authentic, pre-modern culture has already been irrevocably cut off. Doak writes, for example, that the 'Japanese romantics made clear…the artificial nature of "ethnicity" or "culture" in modern Japan and, hence, the need to consciously produce within the context of the modern world what will appear as native, traditional, and pure'.[49] In this context, 'irony', one of the key terms in Yasuda Yojuro's writings, can be seen to indicate a consciousness of the essential absence of any authentic national culture. Yasuda's expression of a 'nostalgia for a home that is unknown to me' *(shirazaru kokyo e no nosutarujii)* describes the functioning of this nationalist discourse, which evokes a sense of nostalgia for something that needs to be constructed, in order to substitute in the realm of aesthetics for something that is lost in the world.[50]

What Yokomitsu's novel describes is the difficulty of a simple return to a cultural homeland. To purify the self of traces of the West is finally impossible—precisely because the two do not have an independent existence. Instead, the return is only possible through the fabrication of another, displaced, space that will be ideologically encoded as a cultural home. There are two possibilities presented in the novel as the basis for the construction of this culture. The first is the principle of what Yokomitsu refers to as ancient Shinto *(ko-Shinto)*. Yashiro claims that this faith is characterised by the 'innate desire of the Japanese to deny all oppositions'.[51] Unlike Christianity and Buddhism, Yashiro claims, ancient Shinto does not exclude other belief systems; rather, it is able to assimilate anything from the outside. In this sense, ancient Shinto provides, for Yashiro, a mystical realm in which all of the conflicts that haunt him will supposedly be resolved, precisely because the very principle of conflict is not recognised.

Yet there is also one moment in the text in which the artificially constructed homeland takes on material form, one that is not confined to the realm of aesthetics or religious practice. It is in the middle of the narrative, in the process of Yashiro's return to Japan. Like Yokomitsu himself, Yashiro returns to Japan by way of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Hence, for Yashiro the border of Japan is displaced as the border of Manchuria: he had left from Yokohama, but 'returns' to the Japanese-controlled territory. Between his departure and his return the borders of 'Japan' have thus shifted significantly. By this point the colonised space has been imbued with all of the characteristics that he has attributed to Japan in his mind. Thus, as the train approaches the Manchurian border, 'Yashiro's heart began to beat quickly when he thought he would soon be breathing Japanese air'.[52] It is just after daybreak when Yashiro disembarks from the train in the border town of Manzhouli, and he feels a 'pleasure as if he were seeing the light of day for the first time'; it is, he whispers repeatedly, 'a truly beautiful place'. When the police detective who has met him at the station tells him that there are many people who commit suicide in the border town, Yashiro thinks that it is in fact 'beautiful enough to make one want to die'.[53] In this way, Manchuria has been encoded with the affective and aesthetic values associated with the concept of home.

In the second half of the novel, the concept of Asia—or, more specifically, 'the new Asia'—functions in the text as a displaced homeland. As Kamiya Tadataka has

pointed out, Yokomitsu deployed the concept of the 'Eastern spirit' as a means of overcoming the European spirit.[54] In his work entitled 'Oshu kiko' (European travelogue, 1937), Yokomitsu had written:

> Is there really nothing for us to take pride in? Is there no other possibility of our existence than in completely despising the culture of our own country? I do not think that the three-thousand-year history of Asia was without value.[55]

Yokomitsu's 'return' is governed by the logic of this displacement from 'our own country' to Asia. Near the very end of the work, the character Tono, a novelist whom critics have read as a representation of Yokomitsu, delivers an address entitled 'The New Asia'. The theme of the speech is the melancholy afflicting the entire nation; at the very beginning he states: 'In life there must always be a certain amount of melancholy; otherwise it would be impossible to lead the nation *[kokumin]* to health.'[56] The inference here is that the construction of a 'new Asia' is the path of recovery from the national melancholia. The recourse to this imperialist discourse in this sense represents an attempt to overcome the loss of the native cultural ideal.

Conclusion

Ironically, then, the actual trajectory of 'return' delineated by the corpus of Yokomitsu's writing does not pass from the West to Japan, but rather from Shanghai to the 'new Asia'. But, whereas for Yokomitsu in the 1920s Shanghai served as setting for an unresolvable conflict—the undecidability of Japan's position between Asia and the West—this conflict has been violently overcome in the process of his 'return'. Yokomitsu's nationalist discourse in his later work was in this sense not a simple rejection of his earlier writings, but rather an attempt to work through and overcome the conflicts that they presented. In this sense modernism, as represented by Yokomitsu's *Shanghai,* was not an uncritical embrace of the West. Rather, within the disintegration of a cosmopolitan ideology based on an underlying identification with European civilisation it explored the essential condition of displacement and exile characterising Japan's modernity. In turn, the nationalist 'conversion' of which Yokomitsu wrote represented an attempt to overcome this internal division through the construction of a cultural essence. In *Melancholy Journey,* Asia as the site of conflict is transformed into the very basis for the restoration of self: the space that previously staged the anxiety concerning cultural identity is now shifted and reterritorialised as cultural home. It is the phantasmal destination of a journey whose inescapable melancholy nevertheless betrays the lingering presence of the original crisis, just below the surface.

Notes

1 Yokomitsu Riichi, *Ryoshu* (Melancholy journey), in *Teihon Yokomitsu Riichi zenshu,* vol. 8, Kawade shobo shinsha, 1982, p. 501 (hereafter *TYRZ*). In translating *Ryoshu* as 'melancholy journey', I follow Chia-ning Chang, in his translation of Kato Shuichi's *A Sheep's Song: A Writer's Reminiscences of Japan and the World,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999, p. 141.
2 Yokomitsu, 'Tenkeijin no shi', in *TYRZ* 14, p. 290.
3 Inoue Ken, *Yokomitsu Riichi: Hyoden to kenkyu,* Ofusha, 1994, p. 447.
4 Odagiri Hideo, 'Bungaku ni okeru senso sekinin no tsuikyu', *shin Nihon bungaku,* 1. 3 (May-June 1946), pp. 64–5. For a discussion of Odagiri's article and the general question of war responsibility among Japanese writers, see Victor Koschmann, 'Victimization and the Writerly Subject: Writers' War Responsibility in Early Postwar Japan', *Tamkang Review* 26.1–2 (1995), pp. 61–75.
5 Yokomitsu Riichi, 'Kakikata soshi jo', in *TYRZ* 16, p, 369.
6 For a more detailed description of the New Sensationist style, see Dennis Keene, *Yokomitsu Riichi: Modernist,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1980, pp. 86–130.
7 On the discourse of the self in modern Japanese literature, including theories of the I-novel, see Tomi Suzuki, *Narrating the Self: Fictions of Japanese Modernity,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996, pp. 33–58.
8 See Kojin Karatani, 'The Discursive Space of Modern Japan', translated by Seiji M. Lippit, *boundary* 2, 18.3, pp. 201–6.
9 Mushanokoji Saneatsu, *Mushanokoji Saneatsu zenshu,* vol. 1, Shogakukan, 1987, p. 395. Quoted in Paul Anderer, *Other Worlds: Arishima Takeo and the Bounds of Modern Japanese Fiction,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1984, p. 5.
10 Leslie Pincus, *Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki Shuzo and the Rise of National Aesthetics,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, p. 39.
11 Aeba Takao, *Nihon kindai no seikimatsu,* Bungei Shunju, 1990, p. 58.
12 Sofue Shoji, *Kindai Nihon bungaku e no tansaku,* Miraisha, 1990, pp. 72–94. Sofue argues that the conceptual boundaries of 'Taisho literature' are symboli cally represented by the founding and collapse of the journal *Shirakaba* in 1910 and 1923. He notes that these dates also correspond to significant domestic and international events—the annexation of Korea and the beginning of the so-called Imperial Treason incident, on the one hand, and the murder of Osugi Sakae, Ito Noe and other leftist activists as well as the massacre of Koreans following the earthquake, on the other. Sofue claims that Taisho writers, while often sensitive to domestic political questions, tended to ignore questions relating to Japanese imperialism. See also James A. Fujii's discussion of the exclusion of the *topos* of imperialism in Natsume Soseki's *Kokoro* (1914) in *Complicit Fictions: The Subject in the Modern Japanese Prose Narrative,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, pp. 126–50; Yanagida Izumi, Katsumoto Seiichiro and Ino Kenji, eds, *Zadankai: Taisho bungakushi,* Iwanami Shoten, 1965, pp. 21–2; and Yamaguchi Masao, Karatani Kojin, Murai Osamu and Kawamura Minato, 'Shokuminchishugi to kindai Nihon', *Hihyo Kukan* 7 (October 1992), pp. 6–41.
13 Yokomitsu Riichi to Yamamoto Sanehiko, 15 June 1928, in *TYRZ* 16, p. 98. On Shanghai as grotesque body in Yokomitsu's work, see Suga Hidemi, *Tantei no*

kuritikku, Shichosha, 1988, pp. 68–9. See also Komori Yoichi's analysis of representations of the body in the novel in *Kozo to shite no katari,* Shinyosha, 1988, pp. 507–37.

14 Yokomitsu, 'Shinakai', in *TYRZ* 13, p. 439.

15 In her analysis of the complex political trajectories of Chinese modernism, Shumei Shih has pointed out the particular complications imposed by the semi-colonial status of China during this time; she notes, for example, that 'the *multiple* and *multilayered* colonization of China by competing foreign powers vying for more power and profit resulted in specific colonial experiences'. Shih, 'Gender, Race, and Semicolonialism: Liu Na'ou's Urban Shanghai Landscape', *Journal of Asian Studies* 55. 4 (November 1996), p. 939. This complex network of competing interests can also be seen to affect the core conflicts of Yokomitsu's novel.

16 Maeda Ai, 'Shanhai 1925', in *Toshi kukan no naka no bungaku,* volume 5 of *Maeda Ai chosakushu,* Chikuma Shobo, 1989, p. 495.

17 See, for example, Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, pp. 397–423.

18 Komori, *Kozo to shite no katari,* pp. 514–19; Yokomitsu, 'Seianji no hibun', in *TYRZ* 13, p. 414.

19 Yokomitsu, *Shanhai,* in *TYRZ* 3, p. 290.

20 Yokomitsu, 'Yuibutsuronteki bungakuron ni tsuite', in *TYRZ* 13, pp. 98–107.

21 Yokomitsu, *'Kakikata soshi jo',* in *TYRZ* 16, p. 369.

22 Some critics have also pointed to his work 'Tori' (Bird), published a few months earlier than 'Machine', as marking the shift in style. See Dennis Keene, *op. cit.,* p. 169.

23 Yokomitsu Riichi, 'Machine', translated by Edward Seidensticker. In Ivan Morris, ed., *Modern Japanese Stories,* Charles E.Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1962, p. 244.

24 Odagiri Hideo, 'Yokomitsu Riichi *Shanhai* no hyoka', in *Odagiri Hideo chosakushu,* vol. 1, Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1970, pp. 270–1.

25 Yokomitsu, 'Junsui shosetsu ron', in *TYRZ* 13, p. 241.

26 As Furuya Tsunatake writes, Yokomitsu's standing in the literary world underwent a sudden change for the worse on the appearance of his first publications after returning from Europe (*Yokomitsu Riichi: Watashi no sakka kenkyu,* Kindai sakka kenkyu sosho, vol. 23, Nihon Tosho Sentaa, 1984, pp. 115–16). Yokomitsu himself notes the negative reactions, in particular to one instalment of his travel essay that he sent from Europe, which was entitled The Paris of Disappointment' *(Shitsubo no Pari).* This is also reflected in the novelist Tono's statement in *Melancholy Journey:* 'Ever since I returned from abroad, my reputation has become very negative' (*TYRZ* 9, p. 195). For discussion of the critical reception of *Melancholy Journey,* see Kamiya Tadataka, 'Yokomitsu Riichi *Ryoshu:* Kukyo to iu shudai', in *Showa no chohen shosetsu,* edited by Yasukawa Sadao, Shibundo, 1992, pp. 183–91; and Ban Etsu, *Yokomitsu Riichi bungaku no seisei,* Ofusha, 1999, pp. 217–26.

27 Yokomitsu, 'Junsui shosetsu ron', in *TRYZ* 13, pp. 244–5. See Kevin Michael Doak, *Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994, p. 112.

28 Inoue Ken, *Hyoden Yokomitsu Riichi,* Ofusha, 1975, p. 297.

29 Ban, *Yokomitsu Riichi bungaku no seisei,* p. 228.

30 Donald Keene points out that *Melancholy Journey* marks Yokomitsu's shift from a 'professed materialism' to 'an insistence on the spiritual supremacy of the Japanese'

(*Dawn to the West: Japanese Literature of the Modern Era,* Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1984, p. 664).

31 See Inamura Hiroshi, 'Yokomitsu Riichi: Karuchaa shokku no byori', in *Nihon kindai bungaku kenkyu taisei: Yokomitsu Riichi,* edited by Kamiya Tadataka, Kokusho kankokai, 1992, pp. 279–83.
32 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 8, p. 501.
33 *Ibid.,* p. 58.
34 *Ibid.,* p. 11.
35 *Ibid.,* p. 38.
36 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 9, p. 279.
37 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 8, p. 39.
38 A similar point was made by Shimomura Torataro at the 'Overcoming Modernity' symposium of 1942. Shimomura wrote: 'Modernity is ourselves, and the overcoming of modernity is the overcoming of ourselves' ('Kindai no chokoku no hoko', in Kawakami Tetsutaro *et al., Kindai no chokoku,* Fuzanbo, 1979, p. 113).
39 See William Haver's explanation of this process:

> [T]he historicization which is the work of mourning depends, if it is to be undertaken at all, upon what in the Freudian vocabulary would be called 'reality testing', the witnessing and verification that the corpse is in fact (and in its facticity) nothing but dead meat, the material, abject residue of a cathected object.
>
> (William Haver, *The Body of This Death: Historicity and Sociality in the Time of AIDS,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996, p. 58)

40 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 8, p. 572.
41 To this extent, Yashiro's melancholy can be related to the Freudian concept of melancholia, the symptom of an incomplete or pathological mourning. In 'Mourning and Melancholia', Freud writes that in certain cases of melancholia the loss may not arise from the actual death of an object, but rather from the fact that it 'has been lost as an object of love' ('Mourning and Melancholia', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* edited by James Strachey, vol. XIV, Hogarth Press, London, 1957, p. 245). What distinguishes melancholia from other cases of mourning for Freud is that the emotional investment has not been successfully withdrawn from the lost object, but rather displaced on to the ego itself—in effect, melancholia indicates 'an *identification* of the ego with the abandoned object' (p. 249). See also Haver's extended discussion of mourning and melancholia in *The Body of This Death,* especially pp. 58–73.
42 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 9, p. 81.
43 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 8, p. 490.
44 Quoted in Hanada Toshinori, 'Yokomitsu Riichi no senso to heiwa', *Kokubungaku: kaishaku to kyozai no kenkyu* 35.13(1991), p. 71.
45 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 9, p. 146.
46 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 9, p. 127.
47 In *Gendai bungaku ni arawareta chishikijin no shozo* (1952), Kamei wrote of *Ryoshu:* 'Contemporary Japanese intellectuals are of course strangers with regard to the

West. But with regard to their own country as well, they are already a type of *étranger*' (*Kamei Katsuichiro zenshu,* vol. 4, Kodansha, 1972, p. 176).

48 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 9, pp. 236–7.

49 Doak, *op. cit.,* p. xviii.

50 Yasuda Yojuro, 'Futari no shijin', in *Nihon Romanha,* edited by Nihon Bungaku Kenkyu Shiryo Kankokai, Yuseido, 1977, p. 160. See also Harry Harootunian's discussion of the attempt by inter-war intellectuals to overcome social division and dislocation through the mobilisation of a 'national aesthetic' in 'Overcome by Modernity: Fantasizing Everyday Life and the Discourse on the Social in Interwar Japan', *Parallax* (2 February 1996), pp. 77–88.

51 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 8, p. 620.

52 *Ibid..,* p. 465. This passage reflects Yokomitsu's own experience; in his European travelogue, 'Oshu kiko', Yokomitsu wrote: 'Three hours until Manzhouli. I got into bed but could not fall asleep. I am looking forward to the way Japan appears to me' (TYRZ 13, p. 391).

53 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 8, pp. 478–9.

54 Kamiya Tadataka, *Yokomitsu Riichi ron,* Sobunsha, 1978, p. 47.

55 Yokomitsu, 'Oshu kiko', in *TYRZ* 13, p. 377.

56 Yokomitsu, *Ryoshu,* in *TYRZ* 9, p. 292.

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