



**FOOD, NATIONAL IDENTITY  
AND NATIONALISM**  
FROM EVERYDAY TO  
GLOBAL POLITICS

**Atsuko Ichijo and Ronald Ranta**



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
# Food, National Identity and Nationalism

From Everyday to Global Politics

Atsuko Ichijo and Ronald Ranta

*Kingston University, UK*

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Needless to say, all errors are ours.



# Introduction

Food is essential to life and therefore it is fundamentally political in many ways. This has been widely recognised as a quick glance at the range of literature on food and politics will confirm. However, despite the fact that we live in a political world based on the nation-state, the enduring power and appeal of nationalism, and the fact that food is considered in many cases to be 'national', the relationship between food and nationalism/national identity has not been systematically addressed. Of course, food can have other characteristics; it can be ethnic, regional, local, gender- or generation-specific. Clearly, *the national* does not have monopoly on food and there is constant tension and conflict between the different forces that try to appropriate food. Still, the fact is that the politics of the world we live in, of which food is an important part, is deeply entrenched in the nation-state system. That is why food and nationalism is a fascinating axis to investigate the nature of politics since it sheds light on a variety of dimensions of politics and the way it matters to us.

The current volume has two aims. First, it aims to shed light on a neglected area in the study of nationalism, that is, the relationship between food and nationalism/national identity. As we elaborate further below, while the centrality of food in and to human life is well acknowledged, the relationship between food and nationalism has not been systematically investigated in the study of nationalism despite the recent rise in interest in 'everyday nationalism'. Secondly, it attempts to draw the reader's attention to the relevance of the 'food-and-nationalism' axis to studying and understanding politics, political economy and international relations. Needless to say, nationalism is an integral aspect of politics, political economy and international relations, and food is one of the essential commodities with which political

powers at various levels are concerned. As such, neither nationalism nor food in itself constitutes a novel aspect to investigate *the political*. What the volume aims to illuminate is that food and nationalism can serve as an axis to bring together analyses of the political at different levels. For instance, the ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis can link everyday nationalism expressed in commonplace activities, such as cooking, eating and drinking, to the sensitivity surrounding food aid and thus connect the mundane to international politics and political economy. Another example is the use of banal nationalism, through the promotion of food items as authentic and part of a particular cuisine, by commercial entities. This forms and influences the way in which individuals negotiate and understand nationalism/national identities and is also related to and affected by governments’ policies on economic and food security issues. The volume therefore aims to showcase how the ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis can cut across various levels and spheres of politics and offer an integrated understanding of what is happening in our political world.

Below, we set out the background to the volume and elaborate why an investigation into the relationship between food and nationalism/national identity is a promising exercise. This introduction touches on the issues to be taken up by the following chapters as well as those that are not pursued in the volume for the reason of space.

### **Food and nationalism: The background**

There are a number of ways to investigate the link between food and nationalism. Food, or more precisely food culture, builds and sustains a particular relationship between the individual and the nation. By food culture we ‘do not simply mean a particular diet, but rather the manner and methods, in which food is prepared, commodified, and consumed by a particular society’ (Mendel and Ranta, 2014: 414). From the Egyptian ‘Pita riots’ that preceded the 2011 revolution to governments’ policies regarding their rice supplies in Asia, it is clear that food holds significance beyond the mere fulfilment of physiological needs and that how people perceive food impacts upon how they view themselves and their national identity. This is not only about food and identity in general but about how particular groups of people perceive their food culture and how this in turn helps them to imagine themselves as part of the nation; according to *National Geographic* (2008), during the ‘Tortilla riots’ in Mexico, protestors shouted *Tortillas si, Pan no!* (Tortillas yes, Bread no!). The importance of food to national identity

is neither a new phenomenon nor limited to particular geographic areas.<sup>1</sup>

In recent times, food studies has emerged as a 'mainstream topic of research', with a demonstrated importance to a number of varied fields (Counihan and Van Estrik, 2008). However, despite the growing importance of food studies, the enduring power of nationalism and the apparent relationship between food culture and national identity, writers on nationalism have made little reference to food in their research. This is interesting primarily because the link between food and identity has been explored in both anthropology (Mintz and Du Bois, 2002) and cultural studies (Ashley, Hollows, Jones and Taylor, 2004). This is because food provides an outlet for people to express 'who and what they are, to themselves and to others' (Mintz, 1986: 13). And whereas issues such as religion, language, literature, media and education have been researched and written about with regard to the imagination, construction and reproduction of the nation, most of the research about nationalism has largely overlooked the importance of food. This is true not only with regard to historical, institutional, social and cultural accounts of nations but also regarding the manifestation, imagination and expression of nationalism in popular culture and everyday life. In other words, there seems to be a discrepancy between what appears to be a cultural and anthropological truism regarding the importance of food to studies of identity and its relative absence from research on nationalism and national identity.

This is not to say that the relationship between food and nationalism has not been researched at all. Indeed, several scholars of nationalism have, to some extent, discussed the subject; for example, Palmer's argument is that the body, food and landscape should be seen as banal symbols of national belonging (1998). Still, contrary to Jacobs' (2009) assertion that 'numerous studies have examined the role of food and nationalism', the subject has not been extensively researched or written about. In this regard, we agree with Avieli (2005) that the role of food in constructing and reproducing national identities has been 'largely overlooked'. The accounts that have come out, for most parts, have been part of larger studies of food and identity (Ashley et al., 2004; Bell and Valentine, 1997) or particular aspects of food and nationalism.<sup>2</sup> What is particularly noticeable is that there has been little engagement in the studies that have come out with the everyday imagination, construction and reproduction of nationalism. In this respect, while some writers have discussed the importance of food to the understanding of national identity, the accounts provided have not sufficiently explained the ways

in which food is a medium through which, on the one hand, national identity is practised and experienced, while, on the other hand, it is imagined, constructed and reproduced.

Some might counter the idea of a national food culture with specific images, discourses and practices by highlighting regional cuisines, non-cuisines (baking, seafood, BBQ, etc.) or counter-cuisines (organic, vegan, slow food movement, etc.), and the apparent non-national aspect of these. This is indeed an important issue to address. The term 'regional' or 'local' is controversial in itself; several authors (Cook and Crang, 1996; Montanari, 2004) argue that the term 'regional' is a modern construction which has little to do with historic food traditions. Nonetheless, what has become clear, since the formation and construction of nation-states, is that regional and ethnic differences have been incorporated into and have become 'subservient to, and part of, the greater national identity' (Edensor, 2002: 66). While ethnic or local food may compete or collide with national food, the former is often incorporated in the latter. Montanari (2004) gives examples of how cookbooks *culinarily* united Italy by disseminating local and regional food knowledge nationally. Additionally, in his discussion on the role of cookbooks in the construction of an Indian national identity, Appadurai explains how Indian and colonial cookbooks integrated and tied together the diversity of regional and ethnic cuisines to the nation, even though this created strange food 'bedfellows' and reified and inflated historic traditions. According to him, national cuisine, in the case of India, 'has emerged because of, rather than despite, the increased articulation of regional and ethnic cuisines' (1988: 21).

In terms of other cuisines, these too are, to a large extent, discussed within the boundaries of nations. Thus, vegetarian and vegan cookbooks might reference Indian food and extol its virtues, while advocates of healthy eating might discuss Japanese food and its reliance on fresh produce, soy beans and fish. Overall, it is not easy to escape the discourse of nationalism in food. Additionally, many food items and practices are so closely linked to the idea of nations that it is a challenge to find a cookbook that has no references to nations or national qualities in it, even though this is not something many cookbooks set out to do. For example, in her summer-collection recipe book, celebrity chef Delia Smith (2007:14) provides a recipe for 'fried Halloumi cheese with lime and caper vinaigrette' in case of an 'unexpected vegetarian' guest. She advises the reader to use Greek Halloumi, Greek olive oil and Greek bread, which will bring about an end result 'the flavours [of which] will transport you to the Aegean in a moment'. Even when examining the slow food movement, it is hard not to notice that its promotion of local

and artisan produce is framed within a national context. Leitch (2003) explains how, in the case of the slow food movement in Italy, its defence of 'endangered' local – and therefore national – artisan produce helped articulate a larger debate over the meaning of national identity within the European Union (EU).

### **Food and nationalism: Areas for investigation**

As the preceding paragraphs have outlined, there are many possible investigatory angles into the link between food and nationalism/national identity. The current volume proposes to approach the topic in three areas: unofficial/bottom-up, official/top-down and the global level. While not conflating nationalism as an ideology with the nation-state as an apparatus of power, we recognise the importance of the nation-state in making nationalism an enduring and all-permeating ideology in our life, and consequently we propose these divisions with reference to the nation-state (Malešević, 2013). In investigating the unofficial/bottom-up aspect of food and nationalism, the analysis will focus on phenomena that are ostensibly not controlled by the nation-state. What is to be analysed is therefore approached by way of banal nationalism and everyday nationalism (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b; Skey, 2011). The second aspect, the official/top-down one, is where the relationship between food and nationalism is directly mediated by the nation-state in the form of national branding, standardisation of 'national' cuisine, protection of the agricultural sector or restriction on trade of certain food items. This can be seen as part of a growing trend of asserting national rights to food, which has been described as 'Gastronationalism' (DeSoucey, 2010: 446) and 'Culinary Nationalism' (Ferguson, 2010: 102). The nation-state, however, is increasingly compelled to take into account forces that operate beyond the nation-state framework in this globalising world as it is widely recognised (for instance, see Beeson and Bisley, 2013). It is therefore logical for the volume to proceed to examine the relationship between food and nationalism at the global level, in which the mundane life, the nation-state, international organisations and global economic and political forces come together to create particular dynamics with respect to food. These three areas are elaborated further below.

#### **Unofficial/bottom-up**

'Why do *we* ... not forget *our* national identity? The short answer is that *we* are constantly reminded that *we* live in nations' (Billig, 1995: 93).

We all notice the waved national flags, but rarely do we observe the many unwaved flags, or for that matter other banal national symbols such as coins, buildings, spaces and monuments. These banal national symbols are a constant reminder of the nation. For the most part, the food images we are exposed to on a daily basis, from food labelling and marketing strategies used by governments and corporations to advertisements and restaurants, constantly remind us that we live in a nation with particular characteristics.

Despite, or maybe because of, the rapid advancement of globalisation, we are now encountering not less but more manifestation of banal nationalism in food. Most of the restaurants we frequent and the cook-books we read are related to a particular nation. The national branding and labelling of food is literally found everywhere, conveying a particular image of the nation, constructing and reproducing it in our everyday lives. As a consequence, we become almost oblivious to the fact that the food is routinely constructed and reproduced as national. From Thai or Mexican seasoning to pure Canadian maple syrup to Turkish coffee and English mustard, the constructs convey particular images of what the product and the nation are. This is even more so when people encounter, discuss or consume nationally recognised cuisines or dishes. According to O'Connor, national cuisines are 'never perceived as value-free, symbolically-neutral source of nutrition that has come haphazardly into being' (2011: 157).

Banal nationalism is also prevalent in discourses about food, which include, but are not limited to, the writings of food authors, historians and critics, everyday talk, as well as advertisements. These discourses, using Fox and Miller-Idriss' (2008a) terminology, 'discursively construct' and reproduce the nation as well as other nations, highlighting real, perceived or imagined qualitative differences and significance. The qualitative differences these discourses point out provide the nation with food-related boundaries that remind us of who we are and who we are not. It is true that most of the information in these discourses relates to ingredients, nutrition, processes and measurements. Nonetheless, they also construct and reproduce what nations are, not only in terms of produce and dishes, but also in terms of images, traditions, scenes, people and geography, through, for example, the choice of language, context and photographs. In an article for *The Guardian*, chef Mike Robinson, presenting a goose recipe, explains in a tongue-in-cheek manner that 'the goose is our [English] traditional Christmas bird. The turkey is an American interloper that arrived on these shores fairly recently, whereas we have been eating geese at Christmas for at least

1,000 years' (Robinson, 2012). The words *our*, *these* and *we* relate to a perceived shared English national identity and food culture.

Food discourses also include a wide range of commercial advertisements and educational material. These are, at times, less subtle with the way they emphasise and assert the qualities of the nation. In Canada, the dairy farmers' lobby group promotes the 100% Canadian milk certificate because, in its words, Canadian milk is 'renowned for its high quality, purity and great taste'. According to them, dairy products made from 100% Canadian milk 'are rich in essential nutrients and are part of a healthy diet'. A new campaign they launched urges consumers to buy ice creams made only from 100% Canadian milk because 'there is nothing more satisfying on a hot day than delicious, cold, real ice cream made from 100% Canadian milk' (Canadian Newswire, 2010).

Even when examining literature on food studies, one cannot escape these national images. Literature on food studies is littered with statements on national cuisines as if these were specific and identifiable: food is American, Greek, Mexican or French.

Banal representation of nations in food discourse is not the only method for experiencing the nation through food and reminding us of who we are. Food culture, through routine and mundane activities, such as the procurement and consumption of food, also helps construct and reproduce the nation. Using Edensor's terminology and concept of nationalism in everyday life (2002), food culture 'institutionalises' our lives and identities by providing common structuring and normalising patterns of 'how things are' and 'how we do things', and, we would add, how we talk about things. These normalising structures and patterns can be viewed as social and cultural food 'rules'.<sup>3</sup> These 'rules' explain how we eat, what we eat, when we eat and where we eat. They thus help define and characterise the nation through its particular food culture. From the spaces in which we produce, procure and consume our food to the timings and traditions of our meals, these banal and mundane food activities help sustain and build a familiar sense of time, space and being. Food culture enables us, on the one hand, to imagine the nation by providing it with particular food-related boundaries, patterns and characteristics, while, on the other hand, it helps reproduce and sustain the nation through mundane and routine images and practices. Taken together with the banal representations of the nation in food, our food culture constructs the time and space of our national identity while conveying meaning and symbolism to it. What these banal and taken-for-granted social and cultural 'rules' bring about is a passive, though reflexive, sense of one's national identity. The

reflexive part of our national identity is thus prompted when we travel abroad or encounter 'other' food cultures that challenge our familiar settings. In fact, we would argue that one of our first encounters with other nations occurs through food. In short, food culture locates what is familiar and ours from what is not.

So far the role of food in constructing and reproducing familiar settings as well as the food-related boundaries of the nation has been highlighted through daily experiences, discourses and banal nationalism, among other things. There are, however, two additional elements that need to be addressed with regard to how we experience the nation, namely practising and asserting the nation through our food culture. Practising and asserting national identity through food means making choices and decisions that provide direct links to, among others, the nation's perceived or imagined history, social traditions, culture and geography. Through these decisions and choices people get to 'perform the nation'.

The nation, however, is not a monolithic entity; it is indeed made up of a variety of groups and people who at times promote competing perceptions and images of what the nation is, based on gender, class and ethnicity, among others. This can be seen most dramatically in *counter-cuisines* and *cuisines of resistance* (more on this in the following chapters). It is also important to note that food culture is not static; through their food choices, people decide whether to observe particular food traditions, rules or cultures, reproduce them, reinvent them, discontinue them, or invent and construct new ones. Indeed, examining national food culture reveals how it changes in accordance to various factors such as migration, climate, globalisation and the economy. As noted by Bell and Valentine, the history and evolution of the nation's diet is also 'the history of the nation itself' (1997: 168–169).

The nation, as performed by individuals, is about practice, routine and repetition. When groups of people make choices, for whatever reason, on a regular and repetitive basis, whether once a year or once a day, it affects the way they and others view the nation. These food-related choices instil and reinforce an abstract, reflexive, yet particular image of what the nation is and what its boundaries are. This promoted and projected image, whether the result of changing diets, climate, corporate marketing or national policies, allows us, through practice and repetition, to imagine ourselves as part of the nation. The individual as part of a larger community of people, who have similar values and sensitivities, or assumed so for the purpose of this chapter, makes similar food-related choices. This is not to argue that all members of a particular nation make



the same choices or eat the same food (far from it, food choices and preferences are often based on a variety of reasons). In other words, food culture enables us to imagine the nation by projecting a particular image of what the nation eats and what its food-related boundaries are. Avieli (2005: 167) provides an example of this process by highlighting the role of rice cakes in helping to develop and sustain Vietnamese cultural and national identity in the context of the Vietnamese new year celebrations: 'in terms of the "imagined communities" analytical framework, this food item serves as an important means for practicing and "concretizing" national identity'. Another way in which these performances assert national identity is through cuisines of resistance. Providing the example of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, Gvion explains how 'culinary knowledge becomes a means of identity creation that strengthens [communal boundaries], redefines their political identity, and forms a culture of resistance' (2006: 309). In this way, performing the nation through food can also serve as a means of resisting national hegemonic practices (Cesaro, 2000).

It does not have to be a specific food item; in many cases, performing the nation through food means taking part in food-related events, traditions or rituals. This could be a national event or holiday or a tradition such as having a BBQ on Israel's Independence Day or on Christmas Day in Australia. These food-related events, traditions and rituals might be, in reference to Hobsbawm, invented or constructed; yet they have in many cases become part of the cultural hegemony of the nation, and they are flexible to various interpretations but they endure. These events and traditions provide an opportunity not only to perform the nation but also, in the words of Foster, for 'anchoring the imagined national community in daily practice' (1991: 250). A noteworthy example is the Burns Night. The supper, normally a formal occasion, held in celebration of poet Robert Burns, has become a Scottish national event (Tyrrel, Hill and Kirkby, 2007). The event uses specific food vocabulary (haggis, cock-a-leekie, and neeps and tatties), discourse (the host addresses the haggis and proclaims its rustic and hearty virtues/qualities over that of French or Spanish food) and practices (dancing, whisky drinking and Burns' poetry reading). Burns Night provides an opportunity to imagine the nation while locating the 'performers' in a familiar setting within the boundaries of Scottish national identity.

Performing the nation does not only occur at national events and spaces. These performances also include 'invisible' spaces such as the home. Thanksgiving feast, an American national holiday, is a family event that takes place largely at the home. This in turn implies a

large measure of interpretations and variations among those celebrating, based on class, ethnicity and gender. However, the basic traditions of Thanksgiving, involving the consumption of roasted turkey, potatoes, cranberries, pumpkin pie and corn, and providing an abundance of foods, are practised by an overwhelming majority of Americans (Wallendorf and Arnould, 1991). The feast, though performed at an 'invisible' space, provides a direct link to the nation's imagined history and traditions, through what is a widely participated cultural food practice. It situates the individual within a larger community that shares similar food traditions and practices. Performing the nation also occurs during mundane and everyday situations. For example, in England, having a full English breakfast, consuming curry with lager, Sunday roast, going to the pub and afternoon tea are all examples of everyday performances of the nation.

### **Official/top-down**

National identity is not only experienced and performed by individuals through their food culture in their daily lives but also engineered by a powerful apparatus called the nation-state. Food choices are not simply about individual taste and identity. According to Warde and Martens there are various 'material, cultural, and social constraints that might limit our freedom to choose' (Ashley, Hollows, Jones and Taylor, 2004: 59). As explained by Belasco, what people decide to eat is, for most parts, 'based on a rough negotiation between dictates of identity and convenience, with somewhat lesser guidance from the considerations of responsibility' (2008: 8). In other words, food choices are based on complex negotiations between myriad factors, which include the food images people have as a result of their surroundings and upbringing. These food images, in which banal nationalism plays an important part, help influence choice and are, to some extent, constructed and reproduced from above. In fact, a wide range of agents, from social entrepreneurs to the media to the private and public sectors, but of which the nation-state is the most important and dominant, engage, for a variety of reasons, in constructing and reproducing food images, which have, in many occasions, a national element to them.

In order for individuals to experience their national identity through food, there, first of all, needs to be a nation. How and why are nations constructed and then reified and reproduced through food? The appearance of national food cultures, either in practice or in writing, appears to go hand in hand with the appearance of national narratives and movements. The construction of a national food culture can thus be

seen as part of the process of constructing, establishing or reifying nations. In fact, we argue that it is an important element of this process. Constructing, reifying, asserting and at times inventing a common food culture is a useful method through which national entrepreneurs and movements try to bring different groups of people (divided by ethnicity, religion, geography or class) together; this process is made easier if it taps into existing or imagined shared food practices and traditions. By establishing a common food culture and demarcating the food-related boundaries of the nation, national entrepreneurs and movements enable the creation of an imagined community. Additionally, national movements use food as a means of asserting the uniqueness of their nation while, at the same time, placing it on par with other nations, which, it is perceived, have unique food cultures. According to Cusack (2000; 2003; 2004), this has been one of the reasons behind many recent attempts to construct, and at times invent, national cuisines in several African states.

The construction of a national food culture often takes place in opposition to the spread of, what are perceived to be, foreign, or in some cases opposing national, influences. This is especially true with regard to post-colonial states, where the construction and reproduction of a common food culture enforce and instil the idea of the nation in relation to the colonial power (Cusack, 2004; Pilcher, 1998). This could also be seen in terms of promoting 'national', 'local' or 'traditional' food as a reaction to the growing abundance of 'foreign' foods (Caldwell, 2002; Cesaro, 2000; Eum, 2008). The nationalisation of food thus provides a method of defining what is 'ours' from 'not ours' and 'authenticating' the nation (Caldwell, 2002). No doubt that it also provides local food producers and traders with commercial advantages. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Zionist leadership in Palestine, in an effort to construct a Jewish nation and establish a Jewish state, and facing competition from the Palestinian national movement, emphasised buying only Jewish produce made using Jewish labour (*Totzeret Ha'aretz*). The campaign threatened to boycott Jewish businesses that did not fall in line. The campaign aimed to educate Jewish consumers of the values and properties of Jewish produce over non-Jewish produce while establishing a Jewish-only economy (Raviv, 2002b).

What are the means by which food culture is constructed and reproduced? We have seen examples of how in Italy and India cookbooks and food literature have been used as a means of instilling national unity through the incorporation of ethnic and regional cuisines, in addition to demarcating the food-related boundaries of the nation. Food literature

provides a great number of examples of this phenomenon, some of which date as far back as the eighteenth century.<sup>4</sup> This is true not only with regard to 'established' nations; according to Cusack (2000, 2003, 2004), constructing, or at times inventing, national cuisines and then disseminating the knowledge through education, media and literature appear to be an important way for ruling elites to bring people together in many African states.

Constructing and reproducing the nation through food are not limited to the dissemination of ideas through literature and the media. Many national movements have attempted to construct or reify nations by actively changing dietary and or consumption habits. According to Takeda (2008), the Meiji government, in the late nineteenth century, in an effort to establish Japan as a strong military nation and instigate rapid industrialisation, undertook measures to promote not only a common but also modern and healthier Japanese food culture. This was done by, for example, introducing 'western food' as well as meat and dairy products. These steps were taken through national campaigns as well as education at school and the military. In recent years, in response to food security as well as health concerns, public campaigns have been launched promoting Japanese food under the slogan of 'healthy Japanese food contributes to building a healthy Japanese nation' (Takeda, 2008: 24). What is interesting about these examples from Japan is not the promotion of healthy or nutritious food but the attempts to educate individuals about the virtues and health qualities of national food, as opposed to, one could postulate, 'foreign' food.

The importance of national food images and brands to national claims of qualitative difference and significance can also be demonstrated in the events surrounding the 'mad cow disease' and its impact on relations between Britain and the EU (Billig, 1995). The importance of beef to, first, English and then British national identity and heritage has been argued to go back as far as the sixteenth century (Rogers, 2003; Spierling, 2007). Therefore, European, in particular German and French, calls to boycott British beef, in response to the outbreak of mad cow disease, were perceived as attacks on Britain and British national identity and heritage. British tabloid media was quick to praise the virtues of British beef in comparison to French beef – which, it was claimed, was fed on sewage. It was also argued that the abysmal form of the French national football team was a consequence of switching the players' diet from British to French beef (Rogers, 2003). One tabloid went as far as using specific nationalist language relating to the Second World War, in calling on its readers to 'burn German flags' and shout at German

tourists 'we shall fight them on the beaches', in response to Germany's boycotting of British beef (Ashley et al., 2004).

The importance of national brands and images, which signify and provide evidence of national qualities, is also behind the rise of what *The Economist* (2002) describes as 'gastrodiplomacy'. The term can be roughly defined as the construction and reproduction of national food brands and images by the nation-state for political, diplomatic and commercial reasons. The most well-known example of this is that of the Thai government's investment in establishing Thai restaurants around the world, providing cookery classes, disseminating information regarding and exporting what is claimed to be 'authentic' Thai food. These actions are taken in order to improve the image of Thailand not only internationally but also domestically. However, these actions also entail the standardisation and homogenisation of Thai food culture, as well as the promotion of a specific image of Thai food and national identity. According to Rockower (2010), similar measures are and have been used by other states, such as Taiwan ('Dim Sum diplomacy'), Korea ('Kimchi Diplomacy') and India ('Samosa Diplomacy').

### **At the global level**

There is an additional level to the investigation into food and nationalism: the global level. While no society has ever existed in absolute isolation, the level of inter-dependency has undoubtedly deepened in the recent past. The emergence of the global level as a focus of politics is one of the major features of the contemporary age. The development of inter-governmental/supranational organisations such as the European Union, the entrenchment of human rights norms and the emergence of global civil society are challenging the conventional notion of the Westphalian system in the study of politics and international relations (Cerny, 2013). The now-tired description of the nation-state 'under attack' from two directions, one from below and one from above, summarises the recent concern in the study of politics.

This idea of perceived threat from multiple fronts can be seen in recent moves by states, as well as national food producers, to defend particular food practices, ingredients and dishes, by asserting national rights to them. These actions are taken against attempts to appropriate what are seen as national food brands and or images and are viewed as direct attacks on the nation's heritage and culture. This is most evident in recent food 'wars'. One of the more well-known of these is the Lebanese-Israeli hummus wars, which has to do with increasing commercial opportunities of exporting hummus, in particular to the

United States (BBC, 2009; *The Economist*, 2009; *Foreign Policy*, 2011; *Gastronomica*, 2012).

The debate over national food rights and issues of authenticity, especially with the advance of globalisation, traverses the boundaries of the nation-state and includes a myriad of actors: from individual consumers and local producers to nation-states and multinational corporations. As a consequence, discussion and mediation over food labelling, safety, origins and rights have been taken on by international organisations and are now also part of most multilateral trade negotiations. In the European Union, the 'Protected Geographical Status' framework has been put in place to ensure that only food items that have originated or are produced in a particular region can be identified as such. Currently, over a thousand food items are protected; these include vegetables, dairy products, alcoholic beverages, meat and even pastries. For example, Balsamic vinegar must be produced in Emile Romagna (Italy), Jersey Royal potatoes in Jersey (UK), Feta cheese in Greece and *Spettekaka* (cake baked on a spit) in Sweden. Another example of this phenomenon is the inclusion of food and cuisine among UNESCO's list of 'intangible cultural heritage' in need of recognition, support and protection. So far UNESCO has included Japanese *washoku*, Turkish coffee, Korean *kimchi*, Mexican cuisine, the gastronomic meal of the French and the Mediterranean diet, which is listed as encompassing the nation-states of Greece, Italy, Spain, Morocco, Portugal, Croatia and Cyprus. These measures, and others, have been advanced as supporting national agricultural and food sectors as well as rural and local communities against unfair competition and are based on economic, cultural and environmental as well as other factors. Nonetheless, these measures also demonstrate how food links the everyday to matters of state sovereignty, international political economy and global cultural rights.

As this volume suggests, the food-and-nationalism axis provides a helpful channel through which to understand the dynamics of political forces at various levels in a way that is relevant to our everyday life. For instance, gastrodplomacy is about the inter-connected nature of the contemporary world. The nation-state may behave as if it had monopoly over the image of nationhood, but its success also depends on reception, how other countries/peoples unnecessarily receive and perceive the message, and the receivers are not monolithic in their attitudes. What food item is appealing or acceptable to eat is increasingly an issue, not just because of accelerated movement of people across the globe but also because of the development of human rights discourse and continuing struggle for fairness and equality in the world. Is eating dogs acceptable?

If every culture is equal, then eating dogs should be respected as part of someone's culture. When is it acceptable to hunt, kill and eat whales and when is it not?

The debate over food, identity and human rights extends at the global level to food aid. When you are dependent on food aid, is it ethical to force you to eat what you normally avoid? And according to whose ethics? There is more confrontation of different ethical frameworks – local, ethnic, national and international – in thinking about food at the world stage. The discussion over food aid and human rights also touches upon food security and sovereignty. The United States, for example, has been accused by EU countries and many local and international NGOs of using food aid provision to famine-stricken African countries as a cover in order to advance genetically modified (GM) crops. This issue has been described by some as placing African countries between hunger and taking an unpopular stand on the GM debate (on GM and food aid debate, see Clapp, 2012). Here again, the local, the national and the 'universal' often collide spectacularly with a diverse mix of actors: consumers, producers, big capitals, civil society organisations, the nation-state and international organisations in efforts to safeguard the right to food. It also demonstrates how the link between food and nationalism sheds light on the complexity of the issue at this level, making the link a useful tool to comprehend the enormously complex dynamics of political forces.

## **The plan of the book**

The volume consists of three parts that correspond to the three areas of investigation as identified earlier. Part I, 'Unofficial/Bottom-Up: Nationalism and National Identity through Food Away from the State', investigates the relationship between food and nationalism/national identity that is not directly controlled by the nation-state.

Chapter 1, 'Everyday Creation of the Nation', focuses on the mundane and daily acts performed by individuals away from the ostensive influence of the nation-state. The chapter first investigates the theoretical framework of everyday/banal nationalism and analyses the ways in which the seemingly mundane behaviour of individuals on an everyday basis contributes or disrupts the maintenance of 'nation-ness'. Everyday action of the individual can reinforce the dominant idea of the nation; it can also contest the official version and lead to an emergence of an alternative view. The chapter then carries out empirical investigation into everyday/banal nationalism in the field of food with a case study of the

evolution of Japanese-style pasta sauce. It examines the process of making a foreign food item – pasta – into an item that is widely recognised as Japanese through accumulation of ordinary people's participation. The chapter concludes with a theoretical reflection on the case study.

Chapter 2, 'When Groups Participate in Defining the Nation', shifts the focus of analysis from the level of the individual to that of groups. Here, the ways in which 'nation-ness' is constructed, contested and maintained by various groups through collective action, which seemingly takes place away from the nation-state's direct influence, are investigated. The chapter first reviews theoretical issues regarding collective action and nationalism, paying particular attention to the role of symbols and rituals in maintaining group cohesion. It then investigates the relationship between group identity, food and the nation, and the importance of food as a way of symbolising and performing the nation through two case studies: the Burns Night and the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel. The chapter demonstrates the importance of food as a means of solidifying group identity and also as a means for constructing, maintaining and contesting national identity.

Through their actions, food retailers and suppliers construct and define national characteristics and boundaries, and thus promote the banal reproduction of nations, as well as provide, what is for many, the first encounter or point of contact with other nations. Chapter 3, 'Consuming Nations: The Construction of National Identities in the Food Industry', looks at the construction and reproduction of 'nation-ness' through food by profit-seeking entities, which are ostensibly independent from the nation-state's ideological work. It therefore focuses on the food industry, broadly defined, and seeks to understand in what ways the commercial entities contribute to the creation, contestation and maintenance of national identity and in so doing how they interact with individuals, groups and the nation-state as an actor. The chapter examines two cases: the ways in which British catering companies try to define Britishness and help construct and reproduce other national identities and the ways in which the Scotch whiskey industry negotiates between Scottishness and Britishness.

Part II, 'Official/Top-Down: The Nation-State, Food and Nationalism', examines the link between food and nationalism/national identity when the nation-state is actively involved.

In Part II, the analytical focus shifts from a 'bottom-up' to a more conventional 'top-down' one. Chapter 4, 'Food and Diet in "Official" Nationalism', highlights what the 'food-and-nationalism' angle can bring in to the study of 'top-down' nationalism. It investigates the



reasons why food and diet can be a powerful tool for the state and the state-sponsored organisations in pursuing a nationalist programme by examining the issue of food in modernising Japan in a comparative context. After supplementing the analysis of the Japanese case by looking at the recent changes in the ways in which the Japanese government tried to control rice, the chapter looks at the case of the Zionist movement in Israel/Palestine to explore the role food plays in a nationalist project in detail.

The relationship between food and nationalism and its importance to the nation-state extend far beyond the borders of the state. Food is not only used for domestic purposes and as an internal and banal symbol of the nation; it is also used internationally by the state in its diplomatic engagements. Chapter 5, 'National Food in the International Context', investigates the duality of national food: on the one hand, it can be used to indicate the attractiveness of the nation and increase its appeal, while, on the other hand, it can also be seen as a 'contested medium of cultural politics that demarcates national boundaries and identities' (DeSoucey, 2010: 433). This means that what is viewed as national food items or traditions can be used in branding and marketing the nation internationally, but it might also require state intervention and protection from foreign claims. Expanding on the idea of gastrodplomacy, the chapter investigates several cases, including the Global Thai initiative and the Japanese 'Sushi Police', to shed light on the position of food in diplomacy and what it tells us about food and nationalism.

Part III, 'Food and Nationalism/National Identity at the Global Level', moves our investigation to the global level and sees what dynamics the food-and-nationalism axis can disentangle.

As widely acknowledged, food could be an emotive issue in the contemporary world and sometimes the discussion extends to the normative level. Is it right to eat x/y/z? Is it barbaric to eat x/y/z? Is it criminal to eat x/y/z? Who says, according to what? Chapter 6, 'Norms, Food and Nationalism', investigates normative concerns related to food in reference to nationalism, making the most of the highly symbolic nature of food. The chapter is not about food taboos as widely investigated in anthropology but focuses on the question of who decides what is appropriate to eat in the international arena. The chapter illustrates the ways in which a shift in norms leads to a new form of friction between values and norms that often assumes a nationalistic hue. It aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 'food-and-nationalism' angle in investigating different levels of politics. The chapter opens with an examination of the case of whale meat eating to review how the

question about resource management has developed into a contestation of values with a nationalist tinge. It then places the whale problem in a comparative context in reference to the issues of dog meat and foie gras consumption. Using these examples, the chapter highlights the dynamic relationship between changes and shifts in dominant norms and the strengthening of the demand for the particular. Additionally, the examples provided demonstrate the tension that is inherent in the national assertion of norms and values in a globalised world.

The last chapter, 'International Organisations, Food and Nationalism', focuses on the way in which international organisations, as the global norm/standard setter, influence nationalism with reference to food. Unlike the cases of international dispute about human rights, where international organisations appear to have some power to be the ultimate judge of what is right and what is wrong, in relation to food they appear to be more likely to be used by the nation-state and other groups in order to reinforce national identities and claims rather than being able to set global norms and standards. The chapter investigates UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list and the issue of Geographical Indications in international trade, and shows that in these cases international organisations play a contradictory role of promoting universal values and norms while protecting the particular and strengthening the national.

The volume concludes with a chapter that pulls together different themes discussed in the preceding chapters and shows how these issues, manifest at different levels, are inter-related. Because food is such an essential item, it permeates into every level and aspect of human life and therefore can serve as an entry point to various issues. This in turn suggests that food can function as a point of integration of different levels and aspects of politics. These insights are then placed in the context of politics and international relations to show why food and nationalism matter to students of politics broadly defined.

## **Part I**

# **Unofficial/Bottom-Up: Nationalism and National Identity through Food Away from the State**

# 1

## Everyday Creation of the Nation

### Introduction

The chapter investigates the ways in which the nation is created, given meaning and maintained by everyday/banal acts of cooking, talking about and consuming food. The chapter pursues its aim by exploring the parameters of everyday nationalism, in particular talking and choosing the nation, and through the case study of Japanese-style pasta. In this case study, the creation, revision and maintenance of ‘Japaneseness’ are examined, with data collected from two recipe sites to which interested members of the public submit their recipes for collective evaluation without explicit commercial motive. By analysing the ways in which the Japaneseness of Japanese-style pasta is constructed, claimed and evaluated, the chapter charts the process of making a foreign food item – pasta – into an item which is widely recognised as Japanese through the accumulative participation of ordinary people. The chapter seeks to illuminate the ways in which everyday actions of the individual reinforce the dominant idea of the nation as well as contest the official version, leading to an emergence of an alternative view.

### Food and national identity: The theoretical context

The importance of food in constituting *the social* is widely acknowledged, to the point that stating ‘food plays an essential role in facilitating and maintaining social relationships’ would be met by a blank stare. The significance of food in the investigation of human society, history and various aspects of politics has been well articulated. For instance, Fischler (1988: 277) identifies two important dimensions of

human beings' relationship with food as the 'omnivore's paradox' and the 'incorporation principle'. He states:

Because we are omnivores, incorporation is an act laden with meaning. Because of the principle of incorporation, identification of foods is a key element in the construction of our identity. Finally, because identity and identification are of both vital and symbolic importance, man has 'invented' cuisine.

Cuisine in this context is understood to represent the most fundamental aspect of human life. Another anthropologist, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney (1999: 244), uses a less value-laden concept of food and describes food as 'a unique metaphor of the self of a social group'. In elaborating the mechanisms of assigning power to food, she adds, 'when each member of the social group consumes the food, it becomes a part of his or her body. Thus this important food becomes *embodied* in each individual and functions as *metonym* by being part of the self' (ibid.: 244).

Lien (2004: 6–7) not only notes 'the immediate biological implication' of food but also acknowledges food as 'a convenient medium for the expression of social and economic distinctions, and for naturalising relations of community and hierarchy', as well as its link to nutritional science, which interacts with interests of science and business. In a similar vein, Grew (1999: 6–7) points out the two major dimensions that a focus on food would bring: First, food can be used as a tool for investigating a society's political economy because its production is embedded in a particular labour system and its consumption in an ever-evolving trading pattern. Second, food has the symbolic function that works as 'an aesthetic, cultural and semiotic code' in defining and reinforcing group membership.

This brief review of literature is sufficient in reiterating the relevance of focusing on food in investigating social relations. Given that much emphasis has been placed on food's symbolic power in relation to group membership, the relationship between food and the nation is no doubt a legitimate topic for research. In investigating the relationship between food and the nation, in particular, national identity, this chapter draws from the theoretical approach called 'everyday nationalism'. The use of the approach is merited based on the fact that food represents a routinised everyday practice (Lien, 2004: 6).

The goal in studying everyday nationalism is to understand how ordinary people make sense of and enact nationalism, nationhood and national belonging in their everyday life. By ordinary people we mean

those acting outside of elite structures and not for commercial gain. The focus on everyday nationalism is articulated as a critique of conventional macro-focused analyses of nationalism that tend to prioritise the elite's behaviour propagated through the state and other formal structures in understanding nationalism. The conventional focus, according to the advocates of research into everyday nationalism, does not tell the whole story because it is a 'top-down' approach, which tends to treat ordinary people as passive recipients of messages transmitted from the above without any room for exercising their agency. The 'top-down' approach also portrays the experience of nationalism as homogeneous; it ignores the great diversity that exists in the manner in which nationalism, national identity and national belonging are experienced and understood by individuals in their everyday lives. Ultimately, therefore, the urge to study everyday nationalism corresponds to the inherent tension between agency and structure in social sciences and continued efforts to strike the right balance between the two in any investigation into social phenomena.

Interest in what is now termed as 'everyday nationalism' has been observed in different guises. In particular, Michael Billig's focus on the permeation of nationalism as a discursive form into the everyday in his *Banal Nationalism* (1995) and Tim Edensor's work on the routinised nature of national identity (2002, 2006) appear to have inspired a large number of scholars to investigate the everyday-ness of nationalism and nationhood more closely. One of the works on food and national identity inspired by the idea of banal nationalism is by Catherine Palmer (1998), in which the link between the body, food and the landscape on the one hand and national identity on the other is explored by focusing on its banality. Everyday nationalism by its very nature, which synthesises research concerns on banal nationalism and the routinised practice of national identity, opens up new and distinct research areas.

Jonathan Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2008a) have identified four areas of research into everyday nationhood: 'choosing the nation', the nation implicated in people's choice; 'talking the nation', the discursive construction of the nation through routine talks; 'performing the nation', the ritualised enactment of nationhood through symbols; and 'consuming the nation', expression of nationhood and belonging to the nation through daily consumption habits. Looking into these four areas, as Fox and Miller-Idriss contend, would provide insight as to how the nation is produced and reproduced by ordinary people and hence can address nationalism 'from below'.

### Choice

What we do with food, therefore, how we think about it and use it, inheres in what we are, as societies and as individuals.

(Ferguson, 2006)

The definition provided by Fox and Miller-Idriss regarding choosing the nation narrows it down to mainly institutional choices people make, for example, which school to enrol in.<sup>1</sup> We propose a broader and more expansive way of understanding this area, and this includes a wide range of mundane choices and decisions made by ordinary people in their everyday lives and what these mean with regard to the nation and national identities. In particular, we focus on the decisions and choices of what and how to eat and cook as well as on the manner in which people categorise and classify food in everyday life.

People's first encounter with issues concerning national, religious and/or ethnic identity is normally through their palates. The food people eat is directly linked to where they grow up, the groups they belong to and the cultural and social spaces they inhabit. In other words, the food people eat and cook conveys a lot of information about who they are. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a strong correlation between peoples' acquired taste and food preference and their national identities, though it is not clear whether taste fosters or expresses this identity (Ferguson, 2011). In reference to Levi-Strauss, Barthes notes that taste 'might well constitute a class of oppositions that refer to national characters (French versus English cuisine, French versus Chinese or German cuisine, and so on)' (Counihan and Van Estrik, 2008: 31). Though we agree with Mintz (1986) that food items and ingredients cannot be easily or neatly divided into national categories, it is widely accepted that certain foods are closely linked to particular images of nations, for example, rice and Japan, pasta and Italy, and corn and Mexico. One would not, for example, expect to find chilli, lime and ginger in French cuisine or chickpeas, cumin and cinnamon in Japanese cuisine. Additionally, with regard to staple foods, many nations show a particular preference for certain types of grains, for example rice or wheat (Rae Oum, 2005). The preference for certain types of staple foods cannot be explained with reference to geography alone. This is particularly noticeable in settler colonial countries, such as the United States, Australia and Israel, where settlers had a strong desire to replicate their previous food culture rather than adopt local foodways (see, with regard to the United States, Gabaccia, 1998). It leads from this that the correlation between certain foods and national identities is such

that adding or removing ingredients from nationally recognised dishes would transform and change them.

The choices individuals make everyday regarding how and what to eat and cook, therefore, are directly related to how they view and engage with their national identity – that is, by choosing whether to eat or cook specific foods people engage with their national identity and project who they are. Rae Oum (2005) demonstrates how the decision to include specific dishes, such as *kimchi*, which is seen as a Korean national dish, in the family meal is strongly correlated to expressions of Korean or American national identity within the Korean diaspora in the United States. These choices are directly related to where Koreans in the United States situate themselves within the Korean-American spectrum; Rae Oum accepts that these choices also relate to other factors such as gender and class. Additionally, he notes that the inclusion or exclusion of specific ingredients can in turn help give rise to hybridised foods and identities, for example, Hawaiian *kimchi* (with the addition of pineapple) and *bulgogi* (meat marinated in a soy-sauce blend) burger. These innovations relate to levels of cultural diffusions, desire for integration and family relations. They might, for example, arise in mixed marriages. It is interesting to note that the idea of creating cultural food hybrids is also used by multinational food corporations as a way of making their brands more appealing: in its South Korean restaurants, McDonald's offers the choice of *bulgogi* burgers. As demonstrated, the meanings assigned to food dishes and ingredients are not static or immutable. By adding or removing ingredients, and changing and adapting recipes, individuals transform and manipulate not only flavours and textures but also meanings, which can be used as a vehicle for engaging with and expressing national identities.

### Talking the nation

What is meant by the discursive construction of the nation and how do ordinary people participate in it? Discourses are means of constructing meaning and of representing ideas. For example, sociologist Uri Ram argues that nationality can be viewed as a discourse: 'a story which people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world' (quoted in De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999: 155). National discourses, which may be presented in a variety of different forms – oral, from speeches to stories, and textual, from books to newspaper articles – convey ideas about the dimensions and particularities of the nation and help bring about the idea of the nation as an imagined community: a community with shared values, culture, boundaries and history.



Much of the study on food discourses and nationalism has tended to focus on texts and in particular on the relationship between cookbooks and the formation and maintenance of national identity (see, e.g., Appadurai, 1988 and Montanari, 2004). This is because cookbooks are among the most published and accessible forms of food discourses. Nowadays, most of the cookbook writing is done by professionals working in the food industry. However, this was not the case in the past. Many of the best-known and most influential cookbooks were written by middle- and upper-class women as a way of sharing with and providing fellow women with useful housekeeping and culinary information. Cookbooks such as *Mrs Beeton's Book of Household Management* (1861) and Amelia Simmons' *American Cookery* (to use its shortened title; 1798) go beyond discussing matters relating to measurements, procedures and nutrition. They contain additional information relating to history, tradition, geography, values and identities. For example, in the introduction to her book, Simmons (1798) writes that the book has been written for 'the improvement of the rising generation of females in America' and that the recipes provided had been 'adapted to this country' (US); even the book's title conveys the idea that the recipes and advice given are related to a particular nation.

The focus on ordinary people, however, and the way in which they discursively construct the nation through food in everyday life brings up a number of methodological difficulties. Ordinary people rarely write cookbooks; so accessing how they engage with nationalism/national identities within the context of food discourses is not straightforward. Additionally, as noted by Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a), the nation is not a constant or regular topic of everyday conversation, but it is context dependent. How then should one go about collecting and analysing how ordinary people talk about and discursively construct the nation?

Most of the research done on the everyday discursive construction of the nation has been limited to interviews, focus groups, surveys and ethnographic research. A particularly innovative and useful way of examining how people discursively construct the nation is through the study of recipes, and in particular those that members of the public upload to popular cooking websites. Recipes are, first and foremost, a discursive product that identifies, describes and gives meaning to a dish. They tend to be viewed as instruction manuals. To some extent this is correct: recipes provide lists of ingredients, measurements and instructions to be followed. However, as will be demonstrated in the following sections, these ingredients and instructions also contain information regarding how members of the public perceive issues regarding taste,

identity, geography, authenticity and tradition. Moreover, the focus on recipes uploaded to popular cookery websites provides additional tools for studying how people engage with food in the everyday.

The methods and ideas suggested by Fox and Miller-Idriss limit the study of everyday discursive construction of the nation to how people talk about the nation. The study of online recipes allows for a wider engagement with how ordinary people also talk to the nation. In effect, ordinary people influence one another through their food discourses and observe, through the comments and feedbacks generated, how others perceive and/or react to these. What is particularly interesting about these exchanges is that they allow the researcher to observe how ordinary people experience and engage with the nation in everyday life in, what used to be, the hidden space of *home* and in an apolitical context. To give a brief example, 'All Recipes' is one of the most widely used international cookery website. It is a multilingual site, has over three million members and is visited tens of millions of times a month; it was recently sold for \$175 million.<sup>2</sup> 'All Recipes' has tens of thousands of unique recipes that are provided free of charge by members of the public. The first step in uploading a recipe is providing it with a title and placing it within one of the categories provided. Many of the titles proposed and the categories provided are related to the idea of nations and national cuisines. By uploading a recipe and either characterising it or categorising it based on national cuisines people are engaged in choosing the nation; the act of writing these recipes and titling them is part of the discursive construction of the nation. For instance, 'All Recipes' has 40 recipes for 'Moroccan Chicken'. These recipes provide an indication of how recipes are defined and constructed as Moroccan by members of the public in different parts of the world. By way of recipes, ordinary people transform a list of raw ingredients that correspond to ideas of taste and textures to a nationally consumed culinary artefact. In these recipes the Moroccan elements correlate to the addition of cumin, coriander and cinnamon to either the chicken marinade or sauce and the serving of the dish with *couscous*.

### Japanese-style pasta

As demonstrated earlier, a focus on recipes is particularly appropriate for an investigation of everyday nationhood in food. In our case study, this will be pursued through an in-depth analysis of recipes of Japanese-style pasta. In relation to the four areas suggested by Fox and Miller-Idriss, by identifying a dish as 'Japanese-style pasta', people are involved in

an active process of choosing the category of 'Japanese' in their routine of categorising and giving meaning to their surroundings; creating and sharing a 'Japanese-style pasta' recipe is an act of performing the nation, enacting what is meant to be Japanese food; cooking a Japanese-style pasta according to the recipe and consuming it as such represents an act of consuming the nation, a process through which the nation becomes part of the body through food. Since the concern of this chapter is to capture what meaning people attach to a nation, in this case the Japanese nation, through creating, talking about and sharing recipes, and cooking a dish, the question can only be approached qualitatively.

There are some critiques to the idea of everyday nationalism/nationhood. In a debate between Fox and Miller-Idriss on the one hand and Anthony Smith on the other (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b; Smith, 2008), Smith alerted the audience to a possible neglect of the socio-historical context in a research agenda that is focused on the 'here and now'. He further pointed to an inherent limitation of the study of everyday nationalism or 'cold' nationalism in that the proposed research agenda is necessarily confined to the study of developed Western democracies. There is also a need to elaborate further the definition of ordinary people and to problematise the relationship between the elite and the non-elite more precisely (Smith, 2008).

Some of these shortcomings can be addressed by making efforts to situate the study of everyday nationalism and nationhood in a wider socio-historical context. In our case study, the evolution of the idea of Japanese cuisine, which is entwined with modernisation of Japanese society since the nineteenth century, offers such a context. Smith's second point is not tackled in this chapter: the chapter looks at 'cold' nationalism in a largely westernised democratic society. This does not mean that everyday nationalism cannot be investigated in a context where 'hot' nationalism is dominant; on the contrary, a study of everyday nationalism in such a context would be an insightful way of finding a way of resistance or subversion mounted by the non-elite.

### **The evolution of the idea of Japanese cuisine**

On 4 December 2013, *washoku* (Japanese cuisine) was inscribed on UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, an event that recognised Japanese cuisine as one of the defining elements of Japanese culture officially and internationally.<sup>3</sup> In the inscription, *washoku* is presented as 'traditional dietary cultures of the Japanese', which projects *washoku's* timelessness. However, it is widely acknowledged among scholars studying food culture in Japan that the

term and idea of *washoku* are very modern, having emerged and developed in the process of modernisation starting in the mid-nineteenth century (Cwiertka, 2006; Harada, 2005). Enhanced exposure to foreign cuisines with the end of the so-called closed country policy was one of the impetuses for differentiating what Japanese were cooking and eating as Japanese cuisine. Another driving force was the push for homogenisation which accompanied the processes of industrialisation and modernisation, particularly in terms of building modern military forces. Cwiertka (2006: 79) singles out the institution of conscription as an important step in forging a cuisine that would bridge the regional differences. It was in the army, which was composed of conscripts from across Japan, that the idea of rice as staple and of soy sauce as *the* seasoning was established (helped by increased standardisation of soy sauce due to industrialisation). This practice was carried forward by the conscripts to different corners of Japan on their return. It is also in the army where Western food items, including meat, were introduced. *Niku-jaga* (potatoes cooked with shredded meat in a soy sauce-based broth), now a typical 'mother's taste' dish that is supposed to go with a bowl of rice, was devised in the army, which was intent on improving the conscripts' physique in order to realise a 'strong military'.

### The evolution of Japanese-style pasta

Pasta is one of the food items introduced to post-Meiji Restoration Japan from the West.<sup>4</sup> Prior to this period, except for a short period in the sixteenth century, when Christian missionaries and traders from Europe were actively engaged with Japan and introduced new food items (*tempura*, widely seen as a typical Japanese dish, is said to have been introduced by the Portuguese during this period), the major sources of influence on Japanese food were China and Korea. Pasta is a food item which is clearly marked and recognised as foreign in contemporary Japan. It took a long while for pasta to gain popularity as an everyday food. Domestic pasta production started in the 1920s, but it was an exclusive food item served only at Western-style hotels and top-end restaurants. Pasta started to become familiar to ordinary Japanese in the 1960s when all-automated pasta-making machines were introduced from Italy. Helped by an Italian food boom in the mid-1980s, the consumption of pasta grew. The domestic consumption of pasta jumped from 95,000 tons in 1975 to 265,000 tons in 2009, although in terms of average consumption per head the average Japanese lags behind (unsurprisingly) the Italian, whose consumption is about 14 times of that of the Japanese, and the Canadian, who consumes three times as much

(Japan Pasta Association). Of late, the domestic production of pasta has been stable at around 150,000 tons a year and the import at around 120,000 tons a year (Japan Pasta Association, 2013).

The origin of Japanese-style pasta is obscure, but it is widely believed that a restaurant in Tokyo called *Kabe-no-ana* (a hole in the wall) was one of the major players in devising Japanese-style pasta. The restaurant owner claims to have created *natto* pasta, cod roe pasta and soy-sauce-flavoured clam pasta in the 1950s and 1960s as a way of promoting consumption of pasta in Japan.<sup>5</sup> Japanese-style pasta gained its popularity in the Italian food boom in the 1980s and it is now an established dish.

### Data

Data were collected from two websites. The first one, Cookpad (<http://cookpad.com/>), is the biggest recipe site in Japan with more than 1,610,000 recipes available (as of January 2014). It was set up in 1998 as a site where members of the public can submit their recipes as well as search for specific recipes. As of December 2013, the site is said to be used by 80–90% of women in their twenties and thirties who cook, and by more than 20,000,000 users per month.<sup>6</sup> The basic functions of the site are offered free of charge, but the user needs to register for its ‘premium service’ (at the cost of 294 yen per month), that is, to access additional information such as suggestions from professional cooks, nutritious experts’ advice on dealing with allergy, the recipe ranking, use of the ‘my folder’ facility to save recipes and so on. In order to submit a recipe, the user needs to register with the site and acquire an ID, which is free of charge.

The second one is the official site of the Japan Pasta Association (<http://www.pasta.or.jp/index.html>). The Japan Pasta Association, a non-profit body, was set up in 1972, originally under the name of the Japan Macaroni Association, in order to improve the quality of Japanese-made pasta and to promote the consumption of pasta in Japan, and it was renamed as the Japan Pasta Association in 2002.<sup>7</sup> The Association continues to carry out research for the purpose of improving the quality of Japanese-made pasta and is also engaged with its promotion and marketing activities so as to contribute towards the general improvement of quality of food life in Japan. The Association’s website serves as a repository of recipes; there is a collection of recipes provided by cooking professionals and another submitted by members of the public. In order to submit a recipe, the user needs to register with the site to acquire an ID, which is free of charge.

These two sites were selected for the following reasons: Cookpad was selected because it is the largest recipe site in Japan that collects recipes from the public, and as such it can be seen as most representative of those who are engaged with recipe producing and sharing activities, which makes this site ideal for investigating everyday nationalism. The Japan Pasta Association's site was selected because of its 'official' status and because it offers two sets of recipes: one provided by professionals (in other words, 'official' recipes) and the other by members of the public who are conscious of the site's 'official' status. It is therefore expected that meaning making in this site is more intentional. By comparing and contrasting data from these two sites, the scope of investigation of everyday nationalism in relation to Japanese-style pasta sauce is enhanced.

The two sites were accessed on 30 December 2013 and a search was made for 'Japanese-style' pasta recipes. Cookpad returned 710 'recommended' recipes for 'Japanese-style' pasta (out of a total of 4036). The Japan Pasta Association's site returned 628 recipes as 'recommended by the Association', that is, those proposed by the 'professional', and 519 as 'everyone's pasta', that is, those submitted by the public. Data for analysis, such as the name of the dish, description and comments on the recipe, were extracted from the first 50 recipes of each data set.

### What makes a pasta dish Japanese?

There is an immediate issue that needs to be resolved at this stage: What makes a pasta dish, a dish revolving around a foreign food item, Japanese? Both sites allow the users to select the category to upload their recipes, which suggests that both websites expect the users to have a pretty good idea as to what makes a pasta dish Japanese. Nonetheless, Cookpad's blurb in the 'Japanese-style' pasta section says: 'An exact fit for Japanese taste. *Mentaiko* (cod roe marinated with chilli), cod roe, soy sauce, miso paste, pickled plums and *natto* (fermented soy beans). Let's keep creating new pasta recipes by using these Japanese food items'.<sup>8</sup> This suggests that the Japaneseness of Japanese-style pasta is defined by the inclusion of food items that can be clearly identified as Japanese. This was confirmed when a total of 100 recipes extracted from the Japan Pasta Association's website were investigated. With very few exceptions,<sup>9</sup> these recipes appear to be defined as Japanese because of the inclusion of food items that are widely seen as Japanese, including Japanese soup stock, sea weed, dried small fish, Japanese vegetables and herbs, and Japanese pickles, in addition to the items listed on Cookpad's site. It is the inclusion of these Japanese items that appear to define the

Japaneseness of Japanese-style pasta rather than the absence of clearly Western items or a particular way of cooking. In fact, many recipes very happily use non-Japanese food items such as olive oil, mayonnaise and butter. But when, for instance, butter is combined with soy sauce or mayonnaise with cod roe, it becomes Japanese in these recipes.

Harada (2005: 8–9) points out there are two aspects to what makes a dish Japanese: a) the presence of certain ingredients such as soy sauce or *miso* paste and b) the rice–*miso* soup–pickles combination. While the second criterion cannot be applied to the case of Japanese-style pasta, the recipes investigated for this chapter largely satisfy the first criterion. Cwiertka (2006: 176, 10) also refers to soy sauce as ‘the dominant flavouring agent’ in defining Japanese-style cuisine (*washoku*) and names soy sauce and fresh seafood as the two most important signifiers of Japaneseness in the context of food to the contemporary Japanese. Cod roe and *mentaiko* in Japanese-style pasta recipes can be seen as corresponding to Cwiertka’s ‘fresh seafood’ category. The collection of recipes analysed in this chapter seem to suggest overall congruence in the understanding of what makes food Japanese among the elite and ordinary people.

At the same time, the 150 recipes chosen do not represent a totally homogenised understanding of the Japaneseness of Japanese-style pasta. There is some fuzziness about the boundary of the Japaneseness. For instance, some recipes use Chinese or Korean ingredients such as *zha cai* (Chinese pickled mustard plants), chicken soup stock, which is widely associated with Chinese cuisine, and *kimchi* (Korean pickles usually made with chilli) but are still presented as Japanese in contrast to the two recipes (the ‘tropical’ and ‘not really Japanese’ ones) alluded in Note 9. This is an interesting point to consider. On the one hand, these food items are now part of everyday diet of contemporary Japanese although their ‘foreign’ origin is widely acknowledged. In this sense, these items share a similar position with curry rice and ramen; they are both ‘foreign’ in their origin but fully assimilated into Japanese food culture, and possibly they are on their way to becoming ‘Japanese’.<sup>10</sup> After all, many scholars interested in Japanese society and culture tend to single out ‘appropriation’ or ‘selective adoption’ of foreign ideas, practices and items in the Japanese context as a major characteristic of Japanese society and its culture (Garon, 1994; Gluck, 2011; Kramer, 2013).<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Cwiertka (2006: 176) emphasises the importance of drawing clear boundaries among Japanese, Western and Chinese cuisines so as to form a tripod structure in the development of the idea of Japanese cuisine. If a stricter separation of the three traditions has been key to the

establishment of Japanese cuisine, then conflation of Chinese/Korean food items as Japanese can be seen as a process of reversal. The scope of this investigation goes beyond the current chapter, which means a separate study is needed to pursue this point.

### Everyday nationhood in Japanese-style pasta recipes

In order to capture a general outline of the extracted recipes, quantitative characteristics of the data for analysis are summarised in the Table 1.1.

First, the amount of textual information of each set is counted by characters. Because a heavy use of graphic characters such as ♪ in contemporary, informal Japanese writing is common, these are separately counted. Table 1.1 highlights the varying nature of the three data sets. Recipe set B comprising 'recommended' recipes from the Japan Pasta Association is clearly more 'serious', in that it hardly uses graphic characters. What are counted as graphic characters in the Recipe set B are roman characters such as 'C' in 'vitamin C'. In contrast, recipes in the Recipe sets A and C, which are submitted by members of the public, make frequent use of graphic characters, indicating the recipe creator's positive evaluation of the product to render the description and comments more informal, and thus accessible. Second, the comments in the Recipe set B are much wordier than those in the other two. Efforts are clearly made to present a story about the recipes in the Recipe set B, while in the Recipe sets A and C, the intention is less on presenting a story but to convey the recipe creator's excitement. This suggests that comparing these three sets of recipes helps elucidate characteristics of everyday nationhood expressed in these recipes.

Table 1.1 The quantitative outline of extracted recipes

		Name	Description	Comments
Recipe set A	No. of characters	742	1,817	2,237
	No. of graphic characters	40	61	31
Recipe set B	No. of characters	724	1,090	4,753
	No. of graphic characters	0	1	11
Recipe set C	No. of characters	665	1,260	2,314
	No. of graphic characters	10	19	26

Notes: Recipe set A: 50 recipes from Cookpad

Recipe set B: 50 'recommended' recipes from the Japan Pasta Association

Recipe set C: 50 submitted recipes from the Japan Pasta Association



Table 1.2 The coding scheme

	<b>Content</b>
Self-reference	Any direct reference to 'Japan' or 'Japanese'.
Convenience	References related to convenience: 'easy', 'quick', 'time saver', 'uncomplicated', 'not much washing up' and so on.
Health benefits	References related to health benefits: 'light', 'refreshing', 'low in calories', 'nutritious', 'xxx prevention', 'anti-fatigue', 'promoting apatite', 'good for xxx' and references to nutrients (DHA, calcium, vitamin C, etc.)
Comfort	References related to comfort: 'comforting', 'relaxing' and references such as 'My mother used to make this for me', 'introduced to me 30 years ago by my husband's brother' to suggest family continuity.
Leftover	References related to leftover: when comments are made on the recipe as a means of using up left-over.
Seasonality	References to a particular season or 'in season'.

Next, the extracted textual information was coded according to the coding scheme in Table 1.2.

A few words on the coding scheme are due. In order to investigate manifestations of everyday nationalism, it was felt necessary to look for direct references to 'Japan' or 'Japanese' as an expression of awareness of the national framework while proposing a recipe. The rest of the codes represent different positive aspects that can be associated with recipes. The importance of positive quality in meaning making is well established, and in this investigation into articulation and re-articulation of Japaneseness in preparing and consuming food, four aspects have been chosen as relevant: convenience, health benefits, comfort and being economical. Convenience can be a positive quality in recipes in busy modern life, and thus importance is given to making recipes accessible and therefore more attractive. Its implication in defining Japaneseness is whether being Japanese is complicated/inaccessible or uncomplicated/accessible. Health benefits are usually positive in any situation and they constitute a particularly appreciated positive aspect in recipes. Japanese cuisine has increasingly been associated with being healthy, although this association emerged in the second half of the twentieth century (Cwierka, 2006; Kushner, 2012; Takeda, 2008). Being Japanese is therefore associated with a universally

positive quality through food. The power of food as a source of comfort is also well established (cf. Holtzman, 2006). In articulating and maintaining the sense of being Japanese, a sense of comfort can be reasonably speculated to have positive and therefore encouraging effects on maintaining and enforcing identification. The last category, being economical, relates to the use of leftovers. Avoiding waste by making clever use of leftovers is often seen as a positive attribute in recipes, although it has a whiff of austerity around it. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the idea of ‘being a good wife and a wise mother’ has been behind the development of the idea of Japanese cuisine, and there is a historical connection between being economical by not allowing any leftovers going waste and being ‘modern’ Japanese (Cwiertka, 2006; Harada, 2005). Finally, reference to seasonality is deemed to be important in defining Japaneseness because of the frequent association of Japanese cuisine with seasonality (Cwiertka, 2006). The first analytical step was therefore to collect descriptive statistics of the three data sets extracted. The initial coding has yielded the following results:

Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics of three sets of recipes

Code	Recipe Set A			Recipe Set B			Recipe Set C		
	Name	Des.	Com.	Name	Des.	Com.	Name	Des.	Com.
Self-reference	13	13	5	4	17	17	10	7	0
Convenience	10	37	21	0	2	10	1	8	3
Health benefits	1	8	2	0	11	42	2	11	4
Comfort	0	1	3	0	4	4	1	0	0
Leftover	0	4	9	0	1	2	0	0	2
Seasonality	0	0	0	1	9	22	4	7	2

Notes: Des.: The description given to the recipe by the creator

Com.: Comments given on the recipe by the creator

Table 1.3 neatly summarises the characteristics of the three data sets. The recipes from Cookpad (Recipe set A) – all submitted by the public – are mostly concerned with ‘convenience’, which arguably reflects ordinary people’s concern in their daily life: they want to cook uncomplicated but reasonably nice dishes. In terms of reflecting ‘real-life’ concerns, the number of references to making use of leftovers is higher in this data set than the rest, which reinforces the impression that Cookpad is a site which is ideal to investigate everyday nationalism.

At the same time, the recipe creators are also aware of the 'Japanese' aspect of their product. The professional recipes from the Japanese Pasta Association (Recipe set B) reveal their educational zeal by being very concerned with emphasising the various health benefits of their recipes. That Japaneseness is also frequently acknowledged suggests that the association of being healthy with Japanese cuisine is maintained and reproduced in this collection of recipes. There is also a marked emphasis on seasonality, one of the recognised features of Japanese cuisine that is absent in Recipe set A. The ordinary people's recipes from the Association's website (Recipe set C) are marked by their lower level of commitment to meaning making; the number of references to any of five codes is smaller than those in the other two data sets. Still there is a faint echo of the characteristics of the other two data sets: there is concern for convenience and seasonality and the association of Japanese cuisine with being healthy.

### **In what ways is the Japaneseness articulated and communicated?**

Of the three recipe sets investigated in this case study, Recipe set B cannot be described as embodying 'bottom-up' construction: It is comprised of the recipes proposed by an industry body to promote consumption of pasta trying to maximise their effects by utilising popular discourse about Japanese cuisine. The recipes contain more textual information and there is ample and explicit reference to health benefits and seasonality, the two major qualities widely associated with Japanese cuisine. For example, Recipe 4 named '*mentaiko* spaghetti with cabbage' is 'a spring *mentaiko* pasta combined with soft cabbage' and its Japaneseness is flagged up by *mentaiko* and its seasonality is emphasised by a direct reference to spring and the evocation of spring by the use of the word 'soft'. The comment is elaborate: 'We have added spring cabbage, which is in season, to popular *mentaiko* pasta. The spirit of spring is conjured by cabbage's soft texture and sweetness, and its pastel colour. It is easy to make because all you have to do is to mix *mentaiko* with butter or some alternative, and combine it with cooked spaghetti'. The comment includes references to the season, comfort and convenience as well as repeated mention of *mentaiko*. The reader is reminded that sensitivity to the season is important in Japanese cuisine and that seasonality signals comfort – comfort of home, being one with the environment.

Recipe 13, 'Japanese style spaghetti with *komatsuna* (a leafy vegetable), fried tofu and *jako* (dried small fish)' is described as having 'a comforting taste produced by *kombu* (sea weed) *dashi* (soup stock)'. The comment

runs: 'Several familiar food items are combined with pasta. A comforting and relaxing taste is created by *dashi* from *kombu* and *jako*. *Komatsuna*, which is in season, is rich in calcium and  $\beta$ -carotid. This is also good for preventing cold in a cold season'. The Japaneseness of the dish is signified by ingredients clearly identifiable as Japanese, especially through its emphasis on *dashi*. The recipe contains reference to the season (winter), potential health benefits and the dish's comforting effects, thus providing a more complete discursive picture of Japaneseness expressed in cooking.

In these two examples, a story of 'Japanese' dishes is carefully presented with the use of ingredients clearly marked as Japanese, which is in turn reinforced by the explicit association with health benefits and seasonality that then brings a sense of comfort. Japanese cuisine is kind to the body and lets you feel the season deeply, and consequently, Japanese food brings you comfort, reminding you of your mother, family and Mother Nature. One can clearly see that very conscious attempts are made to tell a complete and comprehensive story about the Japaneseness of the dish in these examples. In this regard, what emerges from Recipe set B resembles what Arjun Appadurai (1988) and Igor Cusack (2000, 2003, 2004) have found: a conscious attempt to define nationhood by utilising widely circulating discursive building blocks on the part of the creators.

Compared to this polished storytelling found in Recipe set B, discourse presented in Recipe sets A and C is rough and not very comprehensive. There is less conscious effort to delineate the Japaneseness in the recipes which rely on what is taken for granted.

Some recipes articulate the Japaneseness by naming ingredients that are widely understood to be Japanese. Recipe 2 from Recipe set A is a typical example. The dish is named 'Easy, rich and tasty *natto* spaghetti' and it does not make any direct reference to 'Japanese'. The recipe is described as 'By adding oyster sauce, a *natto* pasta with a very rich body and lots of *umami* is born. Chopped *takuan* (pickled *daikon* radish) sparkled over adding a lovely accent to the dish'. The creator explains the genesis of the recipe as follows: 'When eating rice with *natto*, I happened to notice a bottle of oyster sauce. When I added it as a joke, it turned out to be very tasty and that's why I have applied this to pasta'. This Japanese pasta is associated with 'richness', which is often seen as the major property of Western dishes, and its novelty lies with the use of oyster sauce, a clearly Chinese ingredient. Still, the dish's Japaneseness is beyond doubt due to its use of

two unambiguously Japanese food items (*natto* and *takuan*). In addition, there is a reference to *umami*, often seen as the fifth basic taste and widely seen as a Japanese concept, in the description. Moreover, the inspiration comes from a rice dish. A closer scrutiny of the recipe reveals that it uses the defining ingredient, soy sauce, as well. In this case, the discursive strategy, which is most likely taken by the creator unconsciously, is to reinforce the taken-for-granted Japaneseness by repetition. Because what is widely seen as Japanese is repeatedly mentioned, the dish described in the recipe becomes Japanese and can then be freely associated with a variety of meanings that are linked to Japanese cuisine.

Recipe 5 of Recipe set A also pursues the same strategy of repeatedly making reference to ingredients that are unambiguously seen as Japanese in order to highlight the Japanese aspect of the recipe. Named 'Japanese style pasta with crispy *gobo* (a root vegetable) *tempura*', it is a 'delicious Japanese style pasta born out of collaboration between crispy *gobo tempura*, succulent prawns and crunchy *mizuna* (a leafy vegetable)'. The comment runs: 'The *udon* bar I often go to serves *gobo tempura*. I thought combining this with pasta and *mizuna* would be fantastic and created this Japanese style pasta'. The main seasoning ingredients are soy sauce and fish *dashi*. As in the case of Recipe 2, the Japaneseness of the recipe is highlighted by reference to a large number of ingredients clearly identifiable as Japanese: *gobo tempura*, *mizuna*, soy sauce and *dashi*. There is no explicit reference to health benefits or seasonality, or to convenience. The association with the Japaneseness is therefore established solely by the use of Japanese ingredients. At the same time, the recipe draws from the inspiration gained at a Japanese noodle bar, which enhances the Japaneseness of the recipe.

There are two aspects to the Japaneseness that emerges from Recipes 2 and 5. First, it is defined by uniquely Japanese ingredients; being Japanese is therefore using/eating uniquely Japanese food items. Second, the Japaneseness of these recipes is further underpinned in its close connection to everyday activities, as the source of inspiration, which are, nonetheless, largely seen as uniquely Japanese. The inspiration for Recipe 2 comes from an everyday activity of eating rice with *natto* and that for Recipe 5 from a visit to an *udon* bar, part of everyday activity of any Japanese. These recipes are Japanese because they are firmly embedded in everyday, familiar life of ordinary Japanese, not because any particular meaning is invested in the recipe.

Other recipes flag up their Japaneseness by doing something similar to what the Japan Pasta Association does in their recipe: by clearly associating themselves with (a) being 'light' and 'refreshing', terms associated with health benefits; (b) comfort, which is linked to family and (c) enhanced seasonality.

The creator of Recipe 2 from Recipe set C, named 'A citrus-flavoured, simple pasta with courgette', advises the reader 'to keep seasoning to the minimum' because this is 'a light pasta with a refreshing after-taste'. The creator then says 'if you do not have courgette, it is OK to use whatever you have in the fridge. *Yuzu* (a citrus fruit) is good for preventing cold. When added to pasta, it is very refreshing'. The recipe differs from the previous two in that it gives a nod to the notion of minimising waste; if courgette, which is not a very common vegetable in Japan, is not available, anything in the fridge would do, so this recipe can also be read as one appealing to the idea of 'good wife, wise mother'. At the same time, courgette can also be seen as dispensable because it is not a recognisably Japanese ingredient. What is important in this recipe is *yuzu*, a Japanese variety of citrus fruits, which makes this pasta dish Japanese. Soy sauce is also used, so the Japaneseness of the recipe is first and foremost established by these two quintessentially Japanese ingredients and it is rooted in everyday life. *Yuzu*, however, sharpens the contour of being Japanese in this recipe because it makes the dish 'light' and 'refreshing', and being a citrus fruit it contains vitamin C, which is widely believed to help the prevention of the common cold, and its benefits are clearly spelt out in the recipe. The Japaneseness in this recipe is outlined in two ways: the use of Japanese ingredients and reference to the widely held association of Japanese cuisine with being light and health promoting. It should be noted that this discursive construction works within an even wider discursive context of renowned Japanese longevity. The recipe mobilises available discursive building blocks to describe what is meant to be Japanese and works to reinforce existing discursive formulations about being Japanese.

Evocation of 'home' in depicting the Japaneseness of the dish is seen in Recipe 6 from Recipe set A. The dish is named 'Japanese style pasta with *komatsuna* and bacon, *yuzukosho* (citrus flavoured chilli paste) flavour'. Both Japanese and non-Japanese ingredients feature in the name of the dish, and the recipe's Japaneseness is further elaborated by its evocation of the idea of 'home' in the description: 'mixing well with chop sticks, this smooth Japanese style pasta is the best. This is a

taste of home, a comforting Japanese-style pasta that you will never get tired of even if you eat it every day'. The major quality of the dish is its comforting nature: it reminds you of home, your mother's cooking, and it is so familiar that you will never become tired of. The Japaneseness that is conveyed through direct references to 'Japanese' is now closely linked to the terms that evoke familiarity: 'chop sticks' and 'a taste of home', an 'everyday reality' of ordinary Japanese. The 'homely' feel is further emphasised by two kinds of onomatopoeia (*mazemaze* describing the act of mixing and *tsurutsuru* describing the smooth surface) used in the description because they remind the reader of children's tottering speech. The creator comments: 'I wanted to eat an easy, delicious Japanese style pasta which I can make every day. So I tried it with *yuzukosho* which I love, which turned out to be a great hit'. As seen in other recipes, the Japaneseness in this recipe is first established by the use of Japanese ingredient (*yuzukosho*) and utensils which are very, if not exclusively, Japanese (chop sticks) in addition to direct references to 'Japanese'. Then, the Japaneseness in this recipe is presented as something to do with home, one's own family, which is familiar and a source of comfort. In this case, the Japanese nation is a source of 'ontological security' (Skey, 2011) rather than having a particular quality. As in the case of Recipe 2 from Recipe set C, the Japaneseness of the recipe is firmly embedded in *the familiar* and closely linked to 'everyday'.

Japanese cuisine is held to be sensitive to seasonality and some of the recipes of Japanese-style pasta make reference to seasonality. For example, Recipe 15 from Recipe set C makes a clear reference to seasonality in its name: 'pasta with seasonal mushrooms and grated *daikon*'. The Japaneseness of the recipe is flagged up by the use of grated *daikon* and the use of *mentsuyu* (soy sauce-based noodle dip). The creator describes the recipe as 'using seasonal mushrooms generously, and to your surprise, grated *daikon* is cooked before it is combined with pasta'. Grated *daikon* typically accompanies Japanese dishes as a refreshing condiment and is usually served raw. The recipe is therefore challenging a conventional way of using grated *daikon*, but its Japaneseness is in no doubt. The comment runs: 'plenty of seasonal food items of autumn are used. Cooked grated *daikon* creates harmony making this dish well-balanced and complete'. It is not just mushrooms but other seasonal ingredients that are used in this recipe, which in turn highlights the Japaneseness of the dish. Because the dish is in tune with the season and because of the innovative use of grated *daikon* – a very Japanese ingredient – the dish is 'well-balanced and complete'.

The recipe, just as other ones examined in this chapter, makes use of existing discursive frameworks about being Japanese, and appears to affirm them.

### **What the Japanese case study reveals**

Several insights have emerged from the investigation of Japanese-style pasta recipes created by members of the public from the angle of everyday nationalism. First, the recipes testify that ordinary people take part in the creation and maintenance of national identity through their everyday acts. By proposing a recipe for the category of Japanese-style pasta, they actively take part in defining and redefining Japaneseness in food. The major determining element of a recipe's Japaneseness is the use of ingredients clearly identifiable as Japanese, and in particular the inclusion of soy sauce appears to be important. These recipes however tend to play on existing discursive devices in describing the Japaneseness and giving meaning to it. They refer to the lightness or health-promoting qualities of the dish, which is linked to the well-known fact of Japanese longevity; they emphasise seasonality, taking a cue from the dominant idea that Japanese cuisine, and Japanese people in general, is sensitive to the season. The sensitivity to the season implies being in harmony with one's environment; being at ease with Mother Nature. In contrast to the recipes created by the professionals, what is noticeable in the recipes created by members of the public is that the articulation of Japaneseness is firmly embedded in 'everyday' life and is built on the familiar. These Japanese-style pasta dishes are Japanese because they are rooted in what an ordinary Japanese person would do: eating rice, going to the *udon* noodle bar, using chop sticks and using Japanese ingredients. The recipes investigated here are focused on evoking the familiar, the feel of home, implying comfort and security.

### **Concluding remarks**

The top-down method of analysing nationalism/national identity treats ordinary people as passive recipients of the national message and their experiences as fairly homogeneous. However, through the examination of seemingly mundane activities, such as cooking and eating, and everyday discourses, such as conversations and recipes, the chapter demonstrates that this is not the case. In an ostensibly apolitical context, members of the public participate in the collective



endeavour to define, re-define and give meaning to the nation. The nation is thus more than just an elite idea; it is a way of viewing, talking and acting in everyday life. In this regard, Michael Skey's (2011) suggestion that national identity provides 'ontological security' in a fast-changing world appears to apply very well. Accumulation of everyday acts such as cooking, eating and writing recipes contributes to the maintenance of the nation as a source of security for individuals. As such, the chapter illustrates the working of everyday nationalism, which reinforces the existing, dominant ideas about the nation.

# 2

## When Groups Participate in Defining the Nation

### Introduction

Chapter 1 has investigated the relationship between individuals and the nation through food using the frameworks of banal and everyday nationalism. These frameworks have enabled us to address Anthony Cohen's concern that the largely structuralist and often uncritical assumption that individuals 'by default' derive their identity from their membership of a group would undermine their agency in discussing national identity (Cohen, 1996). In this chapter, we continue to apply banal and everyday nationalism frameworks to our exploration of the relationship between food and nationalism/national identity, but only that the focus shifts to groups. It is a truism that the nation is comprised not only of individuals but also of a vast number of groups, which mediate the members' experience of the nation. However, the chapter does not subscribe to the assumption that the nation is a homogeneous entity with all sub-units falling neatly in line, but it adopts a pluralistic view that the nation consists of diverse ethnic and cultural groups who are in constant competition in their claim to nationhood. In other words, we take the view that the nation is a 'zone of conflict' (Hutchinson, 2005), a dynamic space where a variety of identities interact in the daily act of formation, revision and maintenance of the nation-ness.

### Group identity and the nation

The subject of and relationship between group identity and food is one that has been covered extensively by anthropologists, though, it is important to note that most anthropological studies have not dealt with the subject of national identity. In this regard, historians' works are

more directly focused on food and national identity. Ben Rogers (2003) has investigated the emergence of roast beef as the national symbol of England/Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, paying attention to the impact of the French Revolution and the symbolism of blood that meat invariably suggests. Rogers argues:

[E]ighteenth-century Englishmen identified their national culinary traditions not just as one set of tastes and techniques among others, but as the encapsulation of home and hearth, Church and nation. It bound their world together. And like modern-day French and Italian patriots, early Englishmen naturally found in the threat to their culinary tradition a ready representation of larger, more elusive threats to all these ultimately important things.

(Rogers, 2003: 55)

Kolleen Guy (2003) reviews the ways in which champagne, originally a regional product, became a national one by studying the social history of the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries in France, paying close attention to the forces of capitalism and industrialisation. While Guy does not pretend to contribute to a theoretical exploration of the relationship between food and national identity, she hints that the idea of *terroir*, a pivotal concept in winemaking that combines soil, topography and climate, could have fostered an organic understanding of the French nation as a response to urbanisation and the development of the capitalist marketplace. Both historians place the association between food and national identity in a particular historical context and therefore their arguments are more concrete than abstract. Rogers points to the elite men as the prime agency for establishing roast beef as a symbol of England/Britain, and Guy provides insight into the ways in which different groups responded to social change in France by making a linkage between food and national identity.

On the other hand, the arguments advanced in most of the anthropological studies are more abstract – that food serves as a means of forming and cementing group relations as well as a boundary-setting mechanism. This is because food and specific food items are not meaning and value neutral but can be viewed as symbols that represent particular values, ideas and sensibilities. Inspired by Mary Douglas's work, some anthropologists have introduced categories of clean, polluted, edible and inedible in discussing the power and hegemony of food in society (Cowan, 1991). As a result, and throughout the ages, food – in particular specific food items, practices, taboos, regulations and methods of

consumption and preparation – has been used to define and express group identity internally and externally (see, e.g., the role played by food in relation to group identity throughout history, Civitello, 2006; Higman, 2012; for a study of food and social memory, see Sutton, 2001). The use of food to define and express group identity is particularly evident with regard to religious identity. For example, food prohibitions, regulations regarding food and personal hygiene and preparation and consumption rules have differentiated and separated Jewish communities across the world from their neighbours (on the history and traditions of Jewish food, see Roden, 1999). The importance of food in delineating religious groups and negotiating relations between different groups within the nation is also discussed by Nir Avieli with regard to Buddhist, Catholic and Protestant communities in Vietnam (Avieli, 2009). Additionally, food can be used to signify differences within groups based on, for example, gender, age and lineage. Chan provides the example of the southern Chinese village banquet fare *poonchoi* that ‘consists of a variety of food items which are cooked separately but served together afterwards in a large basin’ (2007: 53). The dish, which is mostly consumed by invited male village elders, serves to mark out status differences relating to gender and age.

Additionally, and as noted by Palmer (1998), food culture also serves to define and demarcate group boundaries within and often in opposition to the nation; for example, separating particular minority, ethnic or sub-national groups within the state from the dominant and majoritarian core national group. In these cases, through their food choices, discourses and performances, groups imagine, contest, maintain and engage with their own identity as well as with that of the dominant national group.

What is of particular interest is that the meaning and values attached to food items and practices, which in turn help define group identity and boundaries, are not static. As demonstrated in the previous chapter with regard to Korean-Americans, specific food items can be manipulated and utilised to create new meanings and values and to redefine group membership and boundaries. Narayan (1995), in her study of the British colonial experience in India, demonstrates how the imperial setting brought about a manipulation and ‘fabrication’ of Indian food, in particular the concept of ‘curry’. This encounter also led to the adoption and incorporation, through modification and appropriation, of Indian food traditions and ideas into British food culture, resulting in hybrid ‘British’ dishes such as ‘chicken tikka masala’ and ‘mulligatawny’. This adaptation and incorporation of food is present in many

other settings as well; for example, Takeda (2008) discusses how adapted foreign food items such as '*sukiyaki*' and '*tempura*' became representative of the Japanese nation.

### **Performing the nation**

Building on the insights offered by preceding works on food and identity, some of which have been briefly reviewed above, and being mindful of the dynamic and heterogeneous nature of the nation, the chapter uses the angle of 'performing the nation' as a way of investigating how groups relate to the nation through food. Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a) have described performing the nation as the ritualised enactment of nationhood through symbols. As it has been noted, food is widely used as a symbol of the nation in ritual performances. Through the use of national symbols, members of the nation learn what is meant to be part of the nation (Kolsto, 2006). National symbols help define and express what the nation is, and although the nation is a subjective experience, the interpretation of national symbols is not arbitrary but dependent on education, history, culture and tradition (Elgenius, 2010). In terms of everyday life, national symbols are used as a means of practicing, engaging with and performing the nation (Edensor, 2002). These routine and mundane daily performances, though 'dull, rote repetition, performed mindlessly and dispassionately', play a part in rooting and ingraining the nation (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a: 549).

More often than not the importance of performing the nation is linked to specific social events and/or spaces in which individuals come together as a group to stress their belonging to the nation. For instance, Bell and Valentine (1997) provide a number of examples of drinking communities that are categorised by their membership, social structures, the type of drinks consumed, the spaces in which these are consumed and the specific rituals attached. Though they do not discuss these drinking communities in the context of the nation, the examples provided depict particular national settings, in this case Britain and England.

Though the sense of national belonging can be expressed through everyday and banal performances (Edensor, 2002), it is most visibly and dramatically done in public on particular days, utilising specific symbols and through learned rituals. Just as one cannot separate the ideas and practices of the nation from national events, such as memorial and independence days, one can also not play down the importance of the symbols that accompany such events, from monuments, flags, banners, uniforms and so on.

## Burns Supper

As an example of ‘performing the nation’, the chapter briefly investigates Burns Supper or Burns Night. This ritual to commemorate the birthday of Robert Burns (1759–1796), a Scottish poet, is an ideal material for the chapter’s purpose on several grounds. First, Burns Supper is not a state-sponsored event but voluntarily organised, although it is now increasingly associated with the promotion of tourism (Brown, 1984). Second, as the name ‘Burns Supper’ suggests, food and sharing a meal are at the centre of this ritual to affirm Scottishness; no Burns Supper is complete without haggis and Scotch whisky, and as such food is an indispensable part of performing the Scottish nation. Third, while Burns Supper celebrates Scottishness, the ritual has developed after 1707 when Scotland was united with England and Wales, under a wider framework of Britishness, and not necessarily as a venue for demanding separate Scottish statehood. As an example of a ritual to articulate and affirm national identity, Burns Supper has at least two layers: Scottish and British. This is in line with the chapter’s view that a nation is a dynamic and heterogeneous entity with competing claims.

Today, Robert Burns is globally known as the national poet of Scotland whose well-known works include *Auld Lang Syne*, *Scots Wha Hae*, *A Man’s a Man for A’ That* and *To a Mouse*. Burns Supper, which takes place on his birthday, 25 January, is held in a variety of places, from Scotland and Northern Ireland to the United States, Australia and New Zealand with the tradition of Scottish migration. The get-togethers to commemorate Burns are said to have started shortly after the poet’s death and by the nineteenth century were widely practiced. While there is no ‘officially sanctioned’ format, ‘Burns County, an official Robert Burns web site’, suggests the following itinerary (Burns Country, accessed on 23 February 2015):

- Gather – guests arrive and mix informally.
- Welcome grace – the guests are called to the table and the host offers an opening grace, usually the *Selkirk Grace* (one of Burns’s poems); soup is served.
- Parade of the haggis – the chef brings in the haggis on a large plate following a piper and places it on the host’s table.
- Address to a haggis – the poem is read over the haggis and it is sliced open. Whisky is offered to the chef, poem reader and host. The rest of the meal is served with whisky and gin.
- Song – a couple of Burns’s songs are sung.

- Immortal memory – a short speech on the life and works of Robert Burns is delivered by one of the guests. The speech is followed by a toast of appreciation.
- Toast to the lassies – a humorous speech on women followed by men drinking to the health of women.
- Reply from the lassies – another humorous speech on men and usually another toast is called for.
- Songs and poems – a selection of songs and poems by Burns are performed by the congregation.
- Closing remark – the host gives a closing remark.
- Auld Lang Syne – the evening ends with collective singing of the Bard's most famous piece of work.

As it is widely acknowledged, Burns had become a symbol of Scotland by the mid-nineteenth century (Brown, 1984: 141), and Burns Supper, in which food items such as haggis, whisky, neeps and tatties (mashed turnips and potatoes) are served, is an unmistakable example of performance voluntarily pursued by a group of people to articulate and affirm Scottishness. The power of these food items as symbols of Scottishness was observed, for instance, in nineteenth-century New Zealand. Haggis, neeps and tatties, and shortbread became widely popular among the Scottish community in Otago in the nineteenth century, for they 'facilitated a culinary journey home and an affirmation of the past' and 'helped to foster a sense of solidarity' when the Scottish migrants were trying to find their place in the new world by organising Burns Supper (Buelmann, 2012: 84). Food items, seen from this angle, form an integral part of performing the nation by virtue of being part and parcel of rituals.

Symbolism of food items associated with Burns Supper is, however, highly contextualised. Haggis, a sausage made from sheep's liver, heart and lungs mixed with minced onions, oatmeal, suet, salt and spice, occupies the centre stage of the occasion because Burns himself addressed it as 'Great chieftain o' the pudding-race!' in *Address to a Haggis* (1786). The poet's address to the haggis is the reason it is seen as representing Scottishness, rather than any inherent symbolic meaning. Whisky, on the other hand, can be seen as inherently Scottish because under current legislation only whisky made in Scotland can be Scotch whisky, as we shall see in the following chapter in more detail. However, when Burns Supper was instituted after the poet's death, the Scottishness of whisky was not clearly established, which means the symbolism of whisky as inherently Scottish is retrospectively invested.

This in itself is an interesting observation that testifies the living and evolving nature of any ritual; however, as a route through which a group of people seeks connection to the nation, whisky's importance is context dependent.

Examination of the evolution of Burns Supper in British colonies such as Australia and New Zealand further supports the context-dependent symbolism of haggis and other 'Scottish' food items. Alex Tyrrell (2011) reports that Scottish settlers in Melbourne, Australia, in the second half of the nineteenth century complained about the clannish feel of the choice of food stuff at the commemorative events of Robert Burns. While these events, presented as Burns Festivals, were popular and played an important role for the Scottish settlers to assert their distinctive Presbyterian identity that was in competition with Catholic Irish settlers, food items seen as essential in Burns Supper were pushed to the backstage. The festivals were noted for the speeches made by energetic and ambitious members of the Scottish settlers who drew on the legacy of Burns as the champion of freedom in their efforts to establish the Scottish settlers as powerful a group as possible in Melbourne. In Otago, New Zealand, where a craze for Scottish foodstuff was observed, the focus of Burns Supper gradually shifted to dancing: Burns Supper's entertainment value was increasingly found in its dancing rather than its speeches, haggis and whisky, the fumes of which would be 'distasteful' for the ladies (Bueltmann, 2012: 89). In this episode, haggis appears to have lost its symbolic power of representing Scottishness by way of association with Burns and to be downgraded to a 'distasteful' status. This suggests that haggis did not have inherent symbolic value as such. The fact that haggis was the highlight of the menu of St Andrew's Day dinner in the 1900s in Calcutta, India, also confirms the contextualised nature of haggis as representation of Scottishness (Buettner, 2002). St Andrew is a patron saint of Scotland and St Andrew's Day is Scotland's national day. However, St Andrew's Day celebration does not have an explicit link to a specific food item, although it has generalised association with anything Scottish, from Scottish dancing, Scotch whisky, tartan and so on. The fact that haggis was the centrepiece of the celebration among expatriates in Calcutta at the beginning of the twentieth century can only be explained by the close association between haggis and Scottishness, which had been established through a nearly two-century-long history of Burns Supper.

While the case of Burns Supper does not illustrate the inherent symbolic power of food in articulation of national identity, there are some



studies that suggest food items are important in rituals not only as an integral part of the ritual but also for their inherent meanings. Though it might not seem important at first sight, food and specific food items are directly linked to and are an important feature of national events, festivals and experiences; see, for example, the importance of BBQs (barbecues) to the national days of several countries, the 4th of July in the United States, Australia Day (Spillman, 1997), Israel's independence day (Avieli, 2013) and Heritage Day in South Africa. Moreover, as demonstrated by Deborah Lupton (1994), food and specific food items are often central to our memories of national events and settings. This is because there are differences between how national or important events are celebrated in various states. This is particularly noticeable within states among diaspora and immigrant communities. Lupton (1994) compares how different national diaspora communities celebrate Christmas in Australia and explores how the meaning and sensibilities attached to the event differ depending on what national groups drink and eat.

Nir Avieli (2005) examines the inherent symbolism of Vietnamese New Year rice cakes (*banh Tet*), which is part of the performance of New Year festivities. According to Avieli, *banh Tet* is not only an essential part of the festivities that are firmly connected to being Vietnamese but also a model of cosmic order that reflects 'Vietnamese rice-growing culture and its nutritional logic, and the anxiety that characterizes Vietnamese sociocultural arrangements and conventions' (Avieli, 2005: 167). Referring to legend of *banh chung* (boiled cake) and *banh day* (elastic cake), which is associated with *banh Tet*, Avieli argues that it reflects a 'sound nutritional logic... a wholesome combination of carbohydrates, proteins, fat, vitamins, and minerals' and highlights the importance of rice cultivation in Vietnamese culture (ibid.: 173–174). One of Avieli's informants then hints that *banh Tet* symbolises the independence/uniqueness of the Vietnamese people that is linked to a distinctive pre-Chinese Vietnamese culture (ibid.: 177–178). Unlike haggis, whose symbolic value is mediated by Robert Burns, the great poet, *banh Tet* is a means that allows a group of people to perform the nation in its own right as well as by virtue of being part and parcel of the most important festivities in the Vietnamese calendar.

So far, the chapter has examined food and nationalism/national identity through literal performance of the nation, that is, through performing rituals. While the example of Burns Supper emphasised the contextual nature of symbolic power vested in food, the Vietnamese New Year rice cake example has shown that food can have symbolic power on its own right, which is further enhanced by virtue of being

part of the rituals. However, performing the nation is not necessarily limited to rituals. From the perspective of everyday nationhood, mundane, quotidian acts can also be seen as 'performing the nation'.

The rest of the chapter expands the scope of performing the nation, and of food as a symbol of the nation, through the case study of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel. The case study considers the inter-related examples of hummus in the context of Arab-Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli relations, and the dual processes of 'Palestinianisation' and 'Israelisation'. It further illustrates the political nature of food in performance as well as contestation and subversion of the idea of the nation.

### Arab-Palestinians in Israel

This case study looks at the role of food as a means of evaluating and exploring the ways in which groups, in our case Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, perform the nation, but also engage with, contest and subvert the dominant idea of the nation. This is a particularly interesting case study primarily because of the complex relations between Arab-Palestinians and Jews in Israel, a state that was created for Jews and that is defined by the majority of its population as Jewish. According to Smootha (1989), Israel can be described as an ethnic democracy – a state that is based on the identity of and ruled by a majority national group. Others, such as Yiftachel, have gone even further by arguing that Israel is an ethnocracy: 'a particular regime type [that] ... facilitates the expansion, ethnicization, and control of a dominant ethnic group over contested territory and polity' (2006: 11).

Arab-Palestinians are the largest national minority in Israel; they currently constitute around 20% of the population. They are mostly descendants of Arab-Palestinians who remained within the boundaries of the state of Israel in the aftermath of the 1948 war; many of them were internally displaced as a consequence of the war. The 1948 war is described in Israel as the war of independence, while for Arab-Palestinians it is the *Nakba*, the catastrophe in which over 700,000 Arab-Palestinians became refugees. From 1948 until 1966, Arab-Palestinians in Israel lived under a military rule and their movement and political activities were restricted (Louer, 2007).

The relationship between Arab-Palestinians and the Israeli state has been and still is a complex one. The state was envisioned and established as a national home for Jews. The Jewishness of the state is reflected in the official symbols, including the state's anthem and flag, official narrative

and leading institutions. The position of Arab-Palestinians in the state is further complicated by the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the importance attached to the role of the military in Israel; related to this there have been recent calls within Jewish-Israeli society and among several leading Jewish-Israeli political parties for Arab-Palestinian citizens to declare their loyalty to the Jewish state and accept its Jewish nature.

How then do Arab-Palestinians engage with the state and its dominant Jewish cultural and political hegemony? On the one hand, advancement and social mobility depend on accommodation, at times subservience, and acceptance of the state, its institutions and social and economic forces. On the other hand, Arab-Palestinians have to navigate complex cultural and national issues, such as the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli control over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and the Palestinian refugee problem.

It is probably not surprising that the complexity of these relations is clearly manifested in Arab-Palestinian food culture in Israel. In general, two distinct processes have been observed. First, in line with Bhabha's (1997) ideas on mimicry, it is evident that Arab-Palestinians have adopted, internalised and adapted certain Jewish-Israeli culinary traits and habits. Either because of their desire for social mobility or as a result of grander processes, such as modernisation and globalisation, there is a movement among Arab-Palestinians towards Israelisation. Second, there has also been an increasing movement among Arab-Palestinians in Israel to assert and emphasise their Palestinian identity, a process which can be described as Palestinianisation. The assertion of a Palestinian national identity has gained more prominence in recent decades and especially since the second Intifada and the events of October 2000, when 13 Arab-Palestinian protestors were killed by Israeli police. The two processes are not mutually exclusive and demonstrate the shifting nature and complexity of national identities.

### **A short introduction about hummus**

The fact that food items and practices can be used to represent group identity while, at the same time, they can be manipulated and transformed, opens up a range of possible points of debate and contestation regarding the place of the nation and national identity. An interesting example to illustrate this point, and as a way of introducing our case study, is by looking at the place of hummus in the context of Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian societal relations.<sup>1</sup> What is of particular interest to us is to examine how a food item can not only be

viewed as a national symbol for more than one group but also provide a means of performing the nation as well as contesting and challenging prevailing attitudes regarding the nation in everyday and banal settings.

Hummus (a puree made of chickpeas, which is normally served with olive oil, lemon juice and *tahini*) is arguably Israel's national dish (Hirsch, 2011). Though the origins of the dish are unclear and it has been eaten across the Middle East for over several centuries, Jewish-Israeli writers have described it as the embodiment of the nation and Israel as the land of hummus (Galili, 2007). The history of hummus in the context of Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian relations is one of fascination and adaptation leading to appropriation and nationalisation (Hirsch, 2011). The history and place of hummus in Israel, as well as the journey it has taken, were illustrated to us by Sallah Kurdi, the head chef of the Jamila restaurant in Jaffa. Kurdi grew up in Jaffa, which is a mixed Jewish-Arab city. Though as an Arab-Palestinian he grew up eating hummus; it was not a dish he ate frequently. Occasionally he was sent by his mom to get some hummus for the family from local Arab-Palestinian artisan producers as a quick and cheap way of having lunch, and to give her rest from cooking. As he grew older he decided, like many Arab-Palestinians in Israel, to enter the food industry. The food industry in Israel, and the hospitality sector in particular, is one of the few to provide Arab-Palestinians with opportunities for social mobility and progression (Gvion, 2014). Kurdi worked as a chef for several Jewish-owned *Mizrahi* (a term used to denote Jews from the Middle East and North Africa) restaurants that catered mostly to middle-class Jewish-Israelis. Most of the food served in these restaurants, despite being labelled as *Mizrahi* food, was a mixture of different food cultures loosely based on Arab and Arab-Palestinian mezzes. In these *Mizrahi* restaurants he also learned to make and serve hummus.

A few years ago, Kurdi decided to open a modern Arab restaurant in Jaffa specialising in Arab-Jaffan food and in order to stress his departure from more traditional Arab and Arab-Palestinian foods, or at least the Jewish-Israeli perception of these foods, he decided not to serve hummus in any shape or form. At roughly the same time, the Israeli food industry, which had mass-produced hummus from the early 1950s, started to label some of its hummus as Arab in order to increase its perceived authenticity. If you go to any of the large Jewish-Israeli supermarkets you will find these Israeli mass-produced 'authentic' Arab hummus ranges (see Figure 2.1). We thus have a case of Jewish-Israelis producing hummus, mostly for Jewish-Israelis, marketed as 'Arab' in order to



Figure 2.1 Examples of Israeli mass-produced 'Arab' hummus

increase its perceived quality and alleged authenticity, clearly linking what is seen as a Jewish-Israeli national symbol with its Arab-Palestinian roots. Closing the circle, Kurdi complained that now, when he goes back home, he is confronted head on by the journey that the hummus has made from his childhood in Jaffa into his refrigerator: seeing his wife and kids who prefer to eat the Jewish-Israeli mass-produced, allegedly 'Arab', hummus (Mendel and Ranta, 2015).

### **Palestinianisation**

Over the past three decades there has been an evident movement among Arab-Palestinians, as a national minority group in Israel, towards stronger identification with and assertion of their Palestinian national identity. This can be seen in their growing assertiveness in Israeli cultural and political life, for example, the formation of independent Arab-Palestinian political parties. This movement can be argued to have begun during the first Palestinian popular uprising, known as the Intifada, in 1987, with Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel closely identifying with the Arab-Palestinian struggle in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the Israeli occupation (Ghanem, 2001).

This movement, which can be defined as Palestinianisation, is clearly manifested in Arab-Palestinian food culture. Through specific food-related actions, Arab-Palestinians attempt to assert their distinct national identity in distinction or in opposition to the Jewish-Israeli hegemonic national discourse as well as emphasise their own link to the land of Israel/Palestine and their history as the native population.

For example, in order to assert and emphasise their separate national identity, some Arab-Palestinian women choose to collect and cook with wild herbs and plants. Foraging is used by Arab-Palestinian women in Israel as a means of strengthening and symbolising their national connection to a land they view as their own. The choice of foraging relates to the idea of 'nature loving' as a form of romantic nationalism that emphasises the importance and knowledge of the land, its produce and the right to access it, but also of country and rural life, which include the reviving of folk traditions (Dahl, 1998).

The choice of foraging for wild herbs and plants, such as *Malukhiyah* (jute leaves), *hindibah* (chicory) and *hubeisa* (mallow/malva), is partly a result of prevailing socio-economic circumstances, that is, cuisines of poverty. However, the action should also be seen as a reflection of a distinct and conscious desire among Arab-Palestinian women to perform the nation. In addition to foraging, the importance of cooking, what are seen as traditional dishes and the restriction on the entry of Jewish-Israeli food is also stressed. Through their actions they participate in a particular national culture and discourse, draw links to a particular geography and historical narrative, and sustain their own food resources as a way of resisting Israeli cultural and social hegemony and its mass-produced food industry (Gvion, 2006).

The performance of the nation and the movement towards Palestinianisation is also evident among Arab-Palestinian chefs as well. In interviews conducted with several Arab-Palestinian chefs<sup>2</sup> a constant theme emerged of cooking food that is based on the distinct products of Israel/Palestine. In contradistinction to many Jewish-Israelis, Arab-Palestinian chefs made it clear that they were mostly not interested in imitating and in utilising foreign or Jewish food ingredients. They wanted to cook food that represented their own national identity and heritage using ingredients they perceived as belonging to their homeland. This also entailed, at least in some cases and similarly to Arab-Palestinian women, performances of the nation through collecting and foraging wild herbs and plants. Lastly, many chefs also talked about preserving traditional recipes or refusing to serve certain foods for fear that these would be appropriated by Jewish-Israelis.

Another way in which Arab-Palestinians assert and emphasise their national identity and their rootedness and connection to the land is through challenging the Jewish-Israeli hegemonic discourse. For example, Ashqar, one of the few Arab-Palestinian wineries in Israel, has launched its latest wine 'Iqrit', named after a village that was destroyed and whose inhabitants were expelled by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as part of the 1948 war and in relation to Israel's 'security needs'. The Arab-Palestinian inhabitants have not been allowed to return to the village since; however, the Israeli state allows those born in the village to be buried there (Vered, 2013). By labelling their wine 'Iqrit', and by using grapes grown on land that used to be part of the destroyed village, the winery, which is owned by descendants of those expelled from the village, draws attention to the continued discrimination of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel and to their own national heritage and claim to the land. It also links Arab-Palestinian identity in Israel with Arab-Palestinians elsewhere and with the wider Arab-Palestinian refugee problem.

Arab-Palestinians also perform the nation by discursively challenging attempts by Jewish-Israeli chefs and groups to appropriate what are perceived to be Arab-Palestinian national food dishes. There has been a long history of adoption of Arab-Palestinian food by Jewish-Israelis and its appropriation and transformation into becoming symbols of Jewish-Israeli national identity. This can be seen in food items such as *falafel* and hummus among others, but also the Israeli salad and breakfast (Mendel and Ranta, 2014, 2015). This phenomenon is not limited to early group interaction but is an ongoing and continuous one. For example, in recent years, one of the most well-known Arab-Palestinian desserts has been discussed and presented as Jewish-Israeli. The apparent attempts to appropriate *knafeh* (a cheese pastry with noodles soaked in sugar syrup), which is associated with Arab-Palestinian food and with the city of Nablus in particular, have given rise to an online campaign through social media to reclaim the dish as Palestinian (for discussion on the appropriation of the *knafeh*, see, e.g., Abunimah, 2014; Vered, 2014). The struggle over the *knafeh* adds to a number of additional Arab-Palestinian social media campaigns to reclaim symbolic foods as well as to assert the nation through the boycotting of Israeli food products.

### **Process of Israelisation**

Living in Israel, a state that is dominated politically, economically and culturally by Jewish-Israelis, raises a number of issues for Arab-Palestinians regarding, among other things, living in mixed Jewish-Arab

cities, integration, economic opportunities and social mobility. For example, a number of scholars have pointed out the importance of Hebrew-language proficiency for Arab-Palestinians as an avenue for social mobility. The importance of Hebrew as the main language of higher education and economic life has also brought about the hybridisation of the Arabic spoken by Arab-Palestinians in Israel (Mar'i, 2013). In other words, the Arabic spoken has become Israelised. The incorporation of Hebrew into their spoken Arabic is part of a wider process of Israelisation that is based on acquiring and adopting Jewish-Israeli traits and habits. This process should not surprise us, after all, and despite the fact that they see themselves as a part of a wider Arab-Palestinian nation, they have lived in Israel and have had daily contact with Jewish-Israelis since 1948. This process can be seen on the one hand as a tactical decision by Arab-Palestinians to successfully navigate life in Israel. On the other hand, the process is also about reinterpreting what it means to be not only an Arab-Palestinian but also an Israeli; through their actions, Arab-Palestinians are undermining and challenging the Jewish nature of Israeli national identity (Regev and Seroussi, 2004: 23–24). The process of Israelisation can be seen in a number of food-related areas.

To begin with, it is clear that Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel have to a certain extent adopted and acquired Jewish-Israeli food items, dishes and eating habits. The Israelisation of Arab-Palestinian food culture is partly related to the dominance of Jewish-Israeli food companies and media, but also to the impacts of modernisation and globalisation. The last two factors are relevant in understanding Arab-Palestinian adoption and consumption of fast food and frozen food, for example. As argued by Gvion, the importance of modernisation is not so much with regard to a 'break from traditions' but rather as a 'means to improve living conditions and access to higher standard of living' (Gvion, 2012: 164).

No other Jewish-Israeli food item exemplifies the process of Israelisation better than the schnitzel. Schnitzel, originally a Central European breaded veal escalope, often referred to in Europe as Vienna Schnitzel, was brought to Israel by European, mostly German and Austrian Jewish immigrants. It was quickly established as one of the most widely consumed and popular national dishes, though in Israel schnitzel is made of either turkey or chicken. In Israel there are even several restaurant chains that specialise in gourmet schnitzel (they are colloquially known in Israel as *schnitzelia*, plural *schnitzeliyut*).

Over the past few decades, schnitzel has become increasingly popular and today it is widely consumed by Arab-Palestinians in Israel. While many Arab-Palestinians do not necessarily perceive the consumption



of schnitzel as part of becoming Israeli, they nonetheless recognise the dish as coming from the Jewish-Israeli food culture. According to Gvion (2012), there are a number of reasons why the schnitzel was adopted by Arab-Palestinians; these include the growing importance of frozen and readymade food – which is often how schnitzel is sold in Israel – and the similarities between Jewish kosher and Islamic halal regulations regarding meat products. In general, most of the food items and practices that have entered Arab-Palestinian kitchens from the Jewish-Israeli food culture either fit in with the halal regulations and meal structure or are those that can be adapted and transformed.

A different side of Israelisation is occurring with regard to the presentation and marketing of Arab-Palestinian food, restaurant and chefs. In the previous section we discussed how Arab-Palestinians are emphasising and performing the nation through food. At the same time, however, Arab-Palestinian chefs, restaurant owners and food company executives are also moving in a different direction: they are trying to present their food as Israeli.

For many Arab-Palestinian chefs, working in the Jewish-Israeli food industry, in particular in *Mizrahi* restaurants, provided them with their first steps in the industry and main opportunity for advancement towards opening their own restaurants. The restaurants they subsequently opened relied to a certain extent on Jewish-Israeli food suppliers and clientele; this is true with regard to many Arab-Palestinian restaurants in mixed cities and in Arab-Palestinian cities and towns. As a result, many Arab-Palestinian chefs openly discussed their difficulty in presenting their food as Palestinian. A move to emphasise or market their restaurants, cookbooks (for example, Abbas and Rousso, 2006; Abu-Ghosh, 1996; Hinnawi, 2006) and food as Palestinian might alienate their Jewish-Israeli costumers, hinder their careers and make it harder for them to make further inroads into the Jewish-Israeli food market. As a result, Arab-Palestinian food is often represented as Levantine, Middle Eastern, regional (e.g., Jaffan or Galilean, which helps tie in with similar regional movements among Jewish-Israelis) and also Israeli or *Mizrahi*. This is particularly true with regard to Arab-Palestinian businesses that market themselves to Jewish-Israelis.

A good example of this phenomenon is the story of the Nazareth-based Diana restaurant chain (see Figure 2.2). Diana is an Arab-Palestinian restaurant chain owned by Dukhul Al-Safadi, whose family is linked to the former mixed city of Safed, which after the 1948 war was mostly emptied of its Arab-Palestinian population. The restaurant was named after the first Arab cinema in Nazareth. The restaurant's success



Figure 2.2 Diana Koshet Israeli Grill

in Nazareth, an Arab-Palestinian city frequented by tourists and Jewish-Israelis, prompted the opening of Diana franchises in several mixed and Jewish cities. In many of these restaurants the Arab-Palestinian aspect of the restaurant and the Al-Safadi family has been downplayed and instead the food has been presented as Israeli: flashy neon signs declare the restaurant to be ‘An Israeli Grill Restaurant’ (Mendel and Ranta, 2015). This phenomenon can also be observed in restaurants that operate in mainly Arab-Palestinian cities but which attract Jewish-Israeli clientele; for example, many Arab-Palestinian restaurants in Nazareth market themselves as serving *Mizrahi* food.

On the one hand, this story indicates how Arab-Palestinians have had to compromise over their food cultural heritage and national symbols in order to successfully operate in Israel and appeal to a mostly Jewish-Israeli clientele. On the other hand, however, the process of presenting Arab-Palestinian food as Israeli, though not necessarily as Jewish-Israeli, opens up new possibilities and avenues with regard to what constitutes Israeli national identity.

This last point regarding the subversion or reinterpretation of Israeli identity needs to be elaborated on. The importance of food items as symbols of the nation is very apparent in Israel. However, because many

of these symbols, such as *falafel* and hummus, are shared and/or contested, their reinterpretation raises the possibility of a more inclusive way of looking at Israeli national identity. For example, and as a way of coming back a full circle to the example used at the beginning of this case study, the idea of hummus as either an Arab-Palestinian or a Jewish-Israeli national symbol is contested. Partly as response to the rise of Arab-Palestinian chefs, restaurants and food companies and partly to do with a Jewish-Israeli consumer demand for more authentic and better quality products;<sup>3</sup> leading Jewish-Israeli food companies are marketing some of their hummus products and brands as Arab. These hummus products are often based on recipes of leading Arab-Palestinian chefs or related to specific Arab-Palestinian towns and concepts. As a result of this, and a number of related factors, Jewish-Israelis consumers perceive Arab-Palestinian hummus as better, tastier and more authentic. This raises the question of whether hummus is now perceived solely by Jewish-Israelis as their inclusive national symbol. The hummus example is repeated with many other food products, for example *tahini* (sesame paste) and *baklava* (sweet pastry).

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the relationship between group identity, food and the nation, and the importance of food as a way of symbolising and performing the nation. The two case studies and related examples presented demonstrate the importance of food as a means of solidifying group identity and also as a means for constructing, maintaining and contesting national identity. Additionally, and as shown, food is used not merely as a banal symbol of the nation but also as a way for groups to negotiate and express their national identity through performance. These performances, which range from official national events and festivals to more mundane settings and occasions, help increase and solidify the sense of group and national belonging. The two case studies also raised important questions with regard to how minority and diaspora groups engage with the nation or with dominant national hegemonic cultures and discourses. Food in this regard opens up not only possibilities for groups to contest and subvert the nation but also new avenues for researchers to examine the relationship between different national groups.

# 3

## Consuming Nations: The Construction of National Identities in the Food Industry

### Introduction

This chapter sets out to primarily examine the reasons and the ways in which food is articulated, constructed and reproduced as national by the private sector. Despite the advance of globalisation and the spread of multinational food corporations, in recent years there has been an increase in the articulation and promotion of food as national in the private sector. This has in turn helped to construct and reproduce food images, tastes and qualities as belonging to or originating from a particular national setting. The chapter explores this phenomenon through two case studies. The first case examines the rising tendency to construct and market food as national by the UK-based contract catering industry. Beyond the legal requirement to provide country of origin (CO) information for products, the chapter provides three additional reasons for this phenomenon: the celebration of diversity, cashing in on the sense of national responsibility and belonging, and the standardisation of operations and services. The second case study is on the Scotch whisky industry. Because the basis of the product's identity coincides with the geographical framework of a nation, the industry is inevitably engaged with defining, maintaining and promoting the idea of a Scottish nation in its pursuit of profit, highlighting the entrenchment/permeation of the nation-state framework in the everyday life. In other words, the private sector unwittingly acts as nationalist in maintaining and reinforcing the framework of the nation while pursuing apolitical activities such as profit maximisation, arguably another example of banal or everyday nationalism. The chapter also fills the gap in the empirical application of banal and everyday nationalism frameworks in that it focuses on the private sector and not on the individual.

## **Food, nationalism and the private sector**

Despite the increase in attention towards banal nationalism, by and large the private sector's role in constructing and reproducing nations has received little recognition in the mainstream literature, which has tended to focus on the state and, in recent years, everyday nationalism (Prideaux, 2009). The general shift towards everyday nationalism from banal nationalism in the field can be partly explained by the accumulation of scholarly examinations of the idea of banal nationalism. Scholars have identified some weaknesses in banal nationalism's ability to describe and understand the complexity of a 'national life' in that it appears to assume that a high degree of homogeneity is shared by the population, although the banal nationalism approach successfully problematises the implicit Western centricity of conventional theories of nationalism (Skey, 2009). Support for the everyday nationalism approach is therefore often based on the concern over the relative weakness of the banal nationalism framework in challenging the overtly structuralist explanation, a major feature shared by conventional theories of nationalism (Ichijo, 2013: ch. 1). More precisely, scholars prefer the everyday nationalism framework over banal nationalism because the term 'everyday' suggests something that exists beyond the influence of the state; because everyday nationalism provides multiple opportunities for individuals and groups to resist the state's projects; and because it enables the researcher to capture the ways in which nationalism is experienced by members of a nation on a daily basis as 'messy, complex and contested area of identification' (Jones and Merriman, 2009: 166–167). Given the potential of everyday nationalism approach to capture the messy and complex reality of the world, it is unfortunate that the private sector's involvement has not received much attention.

Walking down any high street in the developed world, and increasingly also in the developing, the banal reproduction of nations through food is evident almost everywhere. Most of the restaurants and cafes, which are increasingly part of global chains, either market themselves as part of a particular national food culture (Thai, French, American, etc.) or display, construct and reproduce nationalities in their menus, décor and products. Global coffee shops sell and advertise many of their coffees and teas, but also sugar and other products, as coming from and belonging to particular nations. For example, Starbucks Coffee Company highlights the place of origin of some of its coffee and tea products – Kenya, Guatemala, Ethiopia, and so on – or the food/drink culture they belong to – American, Italian, Indian, and so on – for the

purpose of conveying ideas regarding tastes, value and quality.<sup>1</sup> The increase in the articulation of food as national is also present in most food stores and supermarkets as well as food product labels. This is partly a result of national and international regulations that require food retailers to provide increasingly more information – from CO and producer/grower details to nutritional values – regarding the food they sell. Nonetheless, food products are also blatantly labelled and advertised as national as part of campaigns to promote national produce or for the purpose of national branding.<sup>2</sup> Selling national brands or relating produce to the nation helps in sustaining a culture of national belonging and taps into the idea of ethnocentric consumption exhibited by some consumers. Selling national brands also links well with the romantic ideals of cultural nationalism regarding the national landscape and heritage and with alternative food movements, such as ‘slow food’, organic and ‘local’ (on the interplay between food corporations and alternative food movements regarding issues of nationality, locality and authenticity, see, e.g., Leitch, 2003 and Pratt, 2007). The construction and promotion, as well as support for national brands and images, contribute to national claims of qualitative difference and significance. These actions help and enable the ‘authentication’ of the nation on a regular basis. As argued by Fox and Miller-Idriss, with regard to the idea of consuming the nation, ‘consumers don’t simply buy national commodities; they constitute national sensibilities, embody national pride, negotiate national meanings, thus making nationhood a salient feature of their everyday lives’ (2008a: 551).

According to Aronczyk (2008), national branding by companies has become a global trend since the 1990s. The association of products with certain images, values and qualities of nations is seen to provide some competitive advantage. The idea of the private sector promoting the nation and/or establishing national brands has also been acknowledged in other fields, such as tourism (see, e.g., Shaffer, 2001), where the private sector expects to increase profits and benefit from a stronger and more appealing national brand. For example, French chocolatiers, facing competition from European, in particular Belgian, chocolate producers, engaged in ‘authenticating’ French chocolate and constructing ‘a specifically French history of chocolate, celebrating its transformation from a primitive, foreign foodstuff to a refined French one . . . reconceptualising French chocolate as a culturally genuine food’ (Terrio, 1996: 77).

Cormack (2008) demonstrates how Tim Hortons, a Canadian coffee chain, which also operates in the United States, helps project an image of Canadian national identity by supporting and promoting

national sports (in particular ice hockey), causes and events and by addressing, through its advertisements, Canadian issues and concerns. In its drive to define itself as Canadian, the chain celebrates being 'un-American'. In one particular advertisement, its iconic brown-coffee cup was juxtaposed with a line from the Canadian national anthem.

The idea of promoting national products also taps into consumers' sense of national belonging and, to use Skey's terminology, provides ontological security and comfort (Skey, 2011). These national images and claims of value and quality provide consumers with familiar settings that remind them of who they are and which food culture, and or national identity, they are part of. This idea of consumerism as a source of comfort and familiarity can be demonstrated by examining a recent Marks & Spencer's (M&S) – a UK-based food and clothing chain – TV commercial. The commercial is also a good example of the use of banal nationalism in food. Though the M&S 'A Summer to Remember' commercial is not primarily about food – it showcases the chain's food, clothing and accessories collection – the scene is made familiar to the (British) viewer through an imagined shared food culture. The scene is a picnic or garden party, probably loosely based on the Queen's Jubilee Party, and includes a wide range of well-known British celebrities. What is probably less noticed are the details, some of which are banal and mundane, which make the scene so familiar to British audiences. The scene is set as a summer picnic and located in the 'idealised' British countryside. There are Union Flag decorations everywhere (the main cake has a Union Flag frosting); in some scenes the guests are eating cake and pork pies and in others people are eating strawberries while watching tennis (a Wimbledon tradition) or are drinking Pimm's (a particular British alcoholic beverage). The settings and the mundane details address the shared imagined British food culture that includes a particular image of a summer picnic party. This image might be familiar to some non-British audiences, but the subtle details make it a particularly poignant reminder of what being British is all about. It also strongly ties in this idea of 'Britishness' with the M&S brand. It is, therefore, not surprising that in some of the interviews on how and why M&S made the commercial, it is referred to as 'a British summer to remember'.

### **British contract catering industry**

This case study sets out to explain the reasons why and to the ways in which food is articulated, constructed and reproduced as national by

the contract catering industry in the United Kingdom. There has been little on the role of the food industry as a whole, and the hospitality industry in particular, with regard to the construction and reproduction of national identity. The industry plays a large part in the nation's perception and understanding of food through, for example, its marketing and sales strategies and the food choices they provide. In recent years, food has been increasingly articulated, constructed and reproduced as national by the industry. As it will be demonstrated, this phenomenon is a direct consequence of recent developments and trends within the catering industry in particular and within the food industry as a whole. This is important because, as argued by Wrigley (1998), among many others, British food retailers have a major impact on consumers' food choices, a process that has only increased in the last three decades.

The contract catering industry might appear, at first, an odd choice for this type of research, in particular its lack of high-street visibility and smaller size in comparison to the large supermarkets. However, the industry operates a wide range of outlets (the name given to a managed catering site) that include, but are not limited to, schools and universities, military bases, sporting venues, hospitals, corporate clients, staff restaurants and even some high-street food retailers and restaurants. As a whole, the industry serves over 1.6 billion meals per year (Frewin, 2010). At one point or another, every person in the United Kingdom has had a meal provided by the industry, and many eat at industry outlets every week. Arguably, the industry plays an important part in instilling and conveying particular ideas regarding food.

In terms of methodology, the arguments and information put forward are based on observations made and experiences gained while working in the industry. While no formal interviews were conducted, numerous informal interviews were made at all relevant levels (clients, customers,<sup>3</sup> front-of-house staff, kitchen staff, middle and senior management). Additionally, a lot of the information gained came from first-hand observation, as well as participation in meetings related to the industry's business model and its culinary developments and trends.<sup>4</sup>

### **Increased articulation of food as national**

One does not need to look far to notice the articulation and discursive construction of food as national in the industry. This is evident at several different levels: in the menus and outlet brochures that contract catering companies provide; on companies' websites; and also in many



of the industry's outlets. While, some of this has to do with increased legislative efforts to provide more detailed labelling of food, in particular CO and grower/producer information, most of the national representations discussed below have been done out of choice and were/are not required by law.

Reading through catering outlet menus, it would appear that the dishes provided by the industry require a nationality. At times, this is probably done in order to demonstrate the 'authenticity'<sup>5</sup> and inferred quality of the dishes, for example 'Moroccan tagine', 'Israeli couscous', 'French onion soup' or indeed 'English pea and ham soup'. At other times, this seems simply to be a marketing ploy to create, what is perceived to be, better-sounding dishes: lamb cooked in yogurt becomes 'Greek-style lamb'; spicy salmon with a hint of lime becomes 'Thai salmon'; and chicken cooked with peppers and basil becomes 'Italian chicken'. Catering menus include the *usual* national suspects, such as France, Italy, Mexico, and India, but also many new and up-and-coming ones such as Korea, Malaysia and Morocco. Many of the latter are a result of the increased promotion of national foods through, for example, gastrodiploacy, a concept that will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5.

This 'requirement' for a nationality is also evident with regard to British and local foods. A recent (2012) menu for a large conference venue contained, among many others, the following: Suffolk cured bacon, Chalk Farm salmon, rare-breed Cumberland sausages, Regent's Park gammon, Cornish butter, British artisanal cheese board, Devonshire crab, Havensfield farm free-ranged eggs and Denham estate venison. Particular foods are being associated with, and constructed as belonging to, particular places of origin that are presented as local, regional or national.<sup>6</sup> However, it is important to bear in mind that these local and regional food items are, then in turn, contextualised as national. In other words, the desire to stress the local and regional, by default, emphasises the national.

The contract companies' web pages contain many statements stressing the importance of British national produce, in terms of supporting farmers, local communities and tastes and quality. For example, on its website, Compass UK, one of the five biggest contract catering companies, states that 'we champion British produce across our sites, promoting the use of fresh seasonal ingredients and supporting British farmers and producers'.<sup>7</sup> The emphasis on British produce is presented on the web page as part of a broader and more sustainable approach towards food sourcing, the environment, health and local communities.

Another level of showcasing national products is the placing of particular products, those that require CO labelling, in areas of high visibility to clients and customers. This is particularly true with regard to certain organic, fair trade and sustainable produce. In addition, companies ensure that several food and beverage items, specifically those that the clients and customers (in case of staff restaurants), have access to are 'fair trade' and/or 'organic', which are all nationally labelled, for example, coffee, tea, sugar and chocolate.

An additional way in which food, as well as food culture, is constructed and represented as national is through the construction and promotion of nationally themed food areas, days and events. Most catering units have nationally themed food days, for example, Indian, sometimes referred to as curry day, in which several curries (meat, fish and vegetarian) would be provided alongside perceived Indian accompaniments, such as *bhajjis*, *rotis*, and *parathas*. At times, these food-themed events have a strong sense of commercial construction behind them, for example, the promotion of a 'British sandwich week'.<sup>8</sup> Some large outlets would also include culinary-themed sections, in which costumers would be served particular cuisines. In most cases these sections and cuisine correspond to nations. For example, at one of the University of Bath's catering outlet, there are four such sections: little Italy, pasta, old el-Paso and Tom Yum.

In large units, such as universities or multinational corporations, where there are a large number of foreign-born costumers, nationally important days, such as American 'Thanksgiving', Irish 'St Patrick's Day' and Scottish 'Burns Supper', are specifically catered for. In addition, on special occasions, such as football or rugby world cups, food items associated with the countries playing on a particular day might also be served. One of the authors, Ranta, particularly remembers working during the 2007 rugby world cup, serving corporate clients with nationally themed food during the matches. Some were easy to cook for, such as England versus the United States, others, such as Georgia versus Namibia, less so. These types of food-inspired events help to further ingrain and emphasise the idea of certain food items as national.

There are many factors that contribute to the increasing articulation of food as national in the contract catering industry, but we would like to focus on three in particular: the incorporation of certain aspects of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in particular in relation to food production and sustainability;<sup>9</sup> the growing celebration of diversity in the industry, from food cultures and ingredients to the religious, ethnic and national diversity of staff members, clients and customers; and

the standardisation of all aspects of the industry, including administration, food production and the supply chain. Taken together, these three factors, on the one hand, attest to the changing relationship people as well as businesses have towards food and national identities as a by-product of globalisation, while, on the other hand, they also provide some insights into the increasing articulation of food as national. These are by no means exclusive and, in fact, as we will demonstrate, overlap in many areas. We argue that understanding these factors is important because they impact our perception of food and identity and directly relate to similar changes that are occurring in other areas of the hospitality industry. This is partially due to the fact that the largest catering companies,<sup>10</sup> and in many occasions their main food suppliers, operate internationally and are involved in a range of additional industry areas, for example food production and retail.

### **Celebrating diversity**

According to the 2011 UK census, Britain today is more ethnically, religiously and nationally diverse than ever before. Though this diversity is a prominent feature of London, which has been described as a cosmopolitan metropolis where you can sample the world on a plate (Cook and Crang, 1996), it is not limited to it. This diversity is also very visible in the contract catering industry; companies are catering to a more diverse customer base, in particular in its higher education,<sup>11</sup> corporate, business and industry outlets. Additionally, a large proportion of employees in the catering industry are non-British; according to People 1<sup>st</sup>, a workforce development charity that specialises in the hospitality, tourism and leisure industries, over 30% of kitchen and over 80% of front-of-house staff were born outside the United Kingdom (People 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013).

Through training that emphasises tolerance and understanding, to providing front-of-house staff members with name tags with little flags (that correspond to either their country of origin or to the foreign languages they speak),<sup>12</sup> this diversity is both publically acknowledged as well as celebrated by catering companies. It is celebrated through the provision of a wide range of ethnic and national food items and dishes and the recognition of significant national, and at times, religious important days and events.

Of course, the provision of nationally recognised food items and dishes is not solely due to the desire to celebrate diversity. As Cook and Crang (1996: 134) point out, 'diversity sells'; 'adding meaningful knowledges about food commodities and their geographies' has

become a 'crucial means of adding value'. There are many reasons for the increased emphasis on the geography of food, almost to the point of it becoming a fetish, for example, the demand by clients and customers for greater food variety. However, more often than not, the important factor is the increasing reliance of many catering companies, and indeed many food retailers, on several multinational food suppliers such as Brakes. These suppliers provide a great range of fresh, frozen and readymade food items. Companies like Brakes utilise the idea that diversity sells, which in turn affects the choices they provide to contract caterers. Looking through Brakes' website<sup>13</sup> and catalogue (2012–2013) confirms this. On the one hand, Brakes has a dedicated British section, boasting its British local and regional suppliers, British menu ideas and British classic recipes. On the other hand, the website also provides a geographical culinary tour. This is particularly evident in its frozen food section, which is divided into British, children, exotic, French, Indian, Italian, oriental, Mexican, special diets and snack boxes; the exotic section contains dishes such as 'Moroccan chicken' and 'Greek-style lamb', while the oriental section contains several Thai curries. Counting the dishes and food items provided, probably up to a third of all the produce is regionally or nationally labelled, and this does not take into account nationally recognised food dishes such as pizza or sushi. What is interesting is that this is even more obvious at the lower end of the market, that is, ready-made sandwich fillings and salads. Arguably, and as has been suggested earlier, by adding a geographical location or nationality, such as Thai, Italian, Moroccan and Indian, the industry is creating 'added value', in terms of taste, authenticity and knowledge. This directly links to People 1<sup>st</sup>'s (2013) assessment of recent changes in customer behaviour with regard to the hospitality and tourism industries: while customers have become more price conscious, their expectations and knowledge have increased.

### **Corporate social responsibilities**

In its website, Catermasters provides a detailed account of the five pillars of its CSR policy. Three of the five pillars relate directly to food: supporting local communities, in other words sourcing and buying, as much as possible, from local producers; promoting healthy eating habits; and striving to ensure that all aspects of its food supply chain are sustainable (Catermasters, 2013).<sup>14</sup> The same five pillars of CSR are widely shared by many other catering companies.<sup>15</sup>

The increasing awareness of the need for a healthier and more sustainable approach to food has had a major impact on the industry. At every

opportunity, catering companies make their utmost to stress the steps they are taking with regard to providing healthier, more nutritious, ethical and sustainable food choices. This is done by, among other things, stressing their use of local, regional and artisan food producers and providing a detailed account of the sustainable initiatives they are involved in, for example, the 'Marine Fishing Stewardship'. The companies one of the authors, Ranta, worked for (which in this respect are representative of the industry as a whole) would list the names of the artisan and local producers they used on their websites, client brochures and in their menus, giving along the way the perception that these food sources are also healthier. While it is true to say that this is a slow progressing trend, in that most of the food provided by the industry is still neither local nor based on sustainable initiatives, the industry as a whole, including most of the chefs and managers involved, as well as most of the clients, is pushing for and supportive of these measures.<sup>16</sup>

What is the relationship between the promotion of local, regional, artisanal and sustainable produce by the catering industry and national identities? First and foremost, catering companies as well as many food retailers provide far more information through food labelling than has been the case in the past. This is partly a reflection of changes in legislation, but also part of the industry's drive to demonstrate its CSR credentials. In other words, the need to showcase the industry's commitment to local communities, fair and sustainable trade initiatives and artisanal produce necessitates highlighting the geography of the food provided. As a by-product of this labelling trend, food is routinely linked to particular nations and national geographies.

Second, these CSR initiatives, through stressing the quality, authenticity, freshness and sustainable nature of local, regional and artisan produce (even though in many cases these products, while originating locally, are procured from multinational food wholesalers), help construct, reproduce and reify claims of national qualities and importance – for example, the idea that local and regional food is healthier, more sustainable and more authentic, that is, better.

This is done not only with regard to British produce. Most of the large contract catering companies, as well as their food suppliers, are multinational and as a result provide *local* and artisan food from different countries; this is particularly evident in produce such as cheese, tea, coffee, chocolate, charcuterie and alcohol. This idea – that the promotion of local, regional and artisanal food promotes, or to some extent

articulates, national identities – is also suggested by Leitch (2003). She explains how, in the case of the slow food movement in Italy, its defence of ‘endangered’ local – and therefore national – artisan produce helped articulate a larger debate over the meaning of national identity within the European Union.

### **Standardisation**

As a result of the rapid growth the UK-based contract catering industry has seen during the past two decades,<sup>17</sup> and changes to food and safety legislation, the industry has gone through a wave of consolidation and subsequently standardisation; the move towards greater standardisation is also seen across the hospitality industry (People 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013). This standardisation is occurring at all levels and in all aspects of the industry, from rules and regulations to produce, suppliers and training. The issues that we will focus on are the basic unit operations, suppliers used and menus provided.

One of the main reasons for the standardisation of operations, other than cost cutting, is to make it easier to move staff members, managers, kitchen and front-of-house to work wherever they are needed. In order to facilitate this, catering companies have standardised the basic administration and day-to-day running of units. While it is true that there is a great deal of variety between units, they mostly employ similar food standards, partly as a result of food and safety legislation, have roughly the same suppliers, provide staff members with similar training, use the same bookkeeping and, at least with regard to the lower end of food services, for example coffee and tea, sandwiches and buffet menus, serve very similar dishes.

The reason why outlets provide very similar food is partly a result of the very close relationship many catering companies have with the large food suppliers they use. Most outlets have a limited range of suppliers to choose from and unit managers are, in most cases, not allowed to go beyond it. The reasons for this are varied but boil down to economies of scale and a system of kickback that both catering companies and their suppliers enjoy at the expense of the clients they cater for.<sup>18</sup> The fact that these large suppliers, like Brakes, provide virtually everything a unit needs and the kickback system makes it worthwhile for catering companies. Taking into account the basic standardisation of operations and the limited range of suppliers used, it is not a surprise that most catering companies provide very similar food and menus. What makes this particular trend important for the purpose of the chapter is that it helps

ingrain and promote throughout the industry the first two trends that we have described. So while it is true that, on the one hand, catering companies provide more diverse food choices, on the other hand, these choices are being narrowed to mass-produced, nationally labelled dishes provided by a small number of multinational suppliers. A similar process is also occurring in other areas of the food industry, from supermarkets to chain stores (Wrigley, 1998).

### **What does this all mean?**

As demonstrated above, food is increasingly being constructed and reproduced as national by the contract catering industry in the United Kingdom, though, as mentioned, this is also part of a wider development in the British food industry. This banal reproduction of nations through food helps define and categorise nations centred on perceived qualitative differences based on issues such as taste, quality, price, sustainability and so on. In other words, the industry helps to construct, reinforce and institutionalise ideas regarding nations.

There are a number of reasons behind the industry's need to articulate food as national. As mentioned earlier, some of this is done partly by default – small number of suppliers, national legislation requiring CO labels and standardisation – and partly by design. Because diversity increasingly sells well, the industry tries, wherever possible, to stress and highlight the national and geographic origins of its food. This fetishisation of geography makes food appear more appealing while at the same time links it to particular notions of taste and quality. Additionally, the need to highlight local, sustainable and artisanal products as part of its CSR means that the industry is increasingly linking its products to nations.

Having explored the ways in which the contract catering industry is entrenched in a global trend to link food to nations, and therefore to promote certain kinds of banal nationalism, the chapter now turns to the second case study to investigate further the extent to which the private sector is co-opted in a banal nationalism project.

### **The Scotch whisky industry: Lure of banal nationalism and the autonomy of the private sector**

Just as in the more generalised theme of food and identity, anthropology has been looking into the role of consumption of alcohol in the form of drinking culture in forming and maintaining group identity. Having reviewed a number of ethnographical works on the role of alcohol

consumption in a variety of communities, Thomas Wilson (2005: 3) has stated:

[D]rinking alcohol is an extremely important feature in the production and reproduction of ethnic, national, class, gender and local community identities, not only today but also historically, with little prospect for this importance and the situation to change.

There are a number of insights from anthropology into the relationship between alcohol and identity: that alcohol is 'a commodity and element in differential regimes of value in the history of our ethnic and national groups' (Wilson, 2005: 5); that 'drinking is the stuff of everyday life, quotidian culture which at the end of the day may be as important to the lifeblood of the nation as are its origin myths, heroes and grand narratives' (Wilson, 2005: 12). The case study presented here is focused not only on Scotch whisky but it also investigates the ways in which the private sector becomes unwittingly entangled with nationalism in its banal pursuit of profit, not in a clearly intentional endeavour to establish Scotch whisky drinking culture.<sup>19</sup>

From this perspective, Scotch whisky is interesting, not as a representation of a notion of the national drink of Scotland, however defined, but as a nationally defined brand, because the promotion of the brand necessarily becomes the promotion of the nation regardless of the participants' intention. This involves attributing certain meaning to, and upholding and maintaining of the idea of 'Scotland' in the banal efforts to sell more Scotch whisky. In this regard, Scotch whisky falls in the category of place brand, in particular a kind of 'strong territorial brands' that are studied intensively in the field of marketing in terms of brand building (Charters and Spielmann, 2014, and also Jones, 2003; Moss and Hume, 2000; Smith, 2008, 2010).

In general, when an industry becomes conscious of the need to add value through building brands, one of the ways of pursuing this aim is to integrate the 'product, price, promotion and place in new and far more effective ways' (Jones, 2003: 72). The advantage of place branding for the industry is to offer 'a group of competing organizations a collective, overarching brand identity' (Charters and Spielmann, 2014: 1461), and this is clearly demonstrated in the case of Scotch whisky. One of the issues that the industry has faced in its efforts to establish the 'Scotch whisky' brand is the definition of Scotch whisky. The predecessor of the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA), the present-day industry body whose declared mission is to 'protect and promote Scotch Whisky', was formed



in 1912 under the name of the Wine & Spirit Brand Association in order to protect the sector against the potential fallout of the threat of tax hike proposed by the then Chancellor Lloyd George. The Association changed its name to the Whisky Association in 1917 and finally settled with the SWA in 1942.<sup>20</sup> By its own reckoning, the major achievements of the SWA, in its more than a hundred years of history, are being able to influence legislation either on taxation on alcohol or on definition of the product; the latter was first secured in the UK law by 1933. In the following years, a dedicated piece of legislation called Scotch Whisky Act was passed in 1988 and the SWA was very active in the run-up to the passing of Scotch Whisky Regulations in 2009. The SWA is proud of its involvement in legislation that defines Scotch whisky as having to come from Scotland and promoting this definition to the UK, European and global levels (SWA, 2012a). The evolution of the SWA appears to fulfil the criteria for the emergence of a strong territorial brand identified by Charters and Spielmann (2014) – that the brand is created by co-operation of disparate actors, not by deliberate attempts by a single actor – in that the SWA is a representative of individual distilleries, who are sometimes competing with each other.

From the perspective of brand building, a clearer delineation of the place's identity that is intricately linked to a particular product is simply a necessary step for the industry's success, which has no necessary connection to any kind of nationalist project. The private sector engages with what appears to be a nationalist project of defining national identity and maintaining its integrity in order to promote the product, not to promote a particular vision of the nation in a political sense. As expected in this line of reasoning, the promotional publication of Scotch whisky published by the SWA states: 'Few products are so closely linked with the environment, culture and people of their country of origin as Scotch Whisky' (2013a: 2). The close association of the product with a certain image of Scotland is repeatedly asserted: for instance, 'Scotch Whisky is an important part of Scottish culture and identity' (SWA, 2011a: 4); 'The history of Scotch Whisky is strongly linked to Scotland's culture and communities' (SWA, 2012b: 5). What is obvious – the link between Scotch whisky and Scotland, in that Scotch whisky can only be made in Scotland – is repeatedly cited, making this connection as something to be taken for granted. While the content of Scottish identity that is associated with Scotch whisky is not usually clearly spelt out, the promotional literature places an emphasis on the importance of natural elements such as water and peat and the climate, which are often accompanied by photographs of scenes from the highlands, rural

scenes and distilleries that are typically located in a remote, rural location, suggesting that association is made with purity (being natural and uncontaminated) represented by the 'rural' as opposed to the 'urban' (Hinchliffe, 2009).

The industry's efforts to establish a clear identity for the product (Scotch whisky), which is inevitably tangled with various projects to establish identity of the place (Scotland), has been noted in various places. For instance, an industry publication singles out Diageo's 'Scotch initiative' as an attempt to attribute meaning to 'Scotland' on par with efforts made by the tourism industry: Diageo is promoting Scotland not only as a home of Scotch whisky but also as a source of knowledge and heritage, apparently drawing some inspiration from the tourism industry to place more emphasis on culture and heritage (Gray, 2012: 97). In this case, Diageo, a multinational alcoholic beverage company headquartered in London, UK, is no longer passively co-opted in nationalist endeavours of defining and maintaining national identity; it is now actively engaged in shaping the meaning associated with Scotland, which is deemed to bring about a positive influence to its products. This is an example of different dynamics between an ostensibly commercial activity – brand building – and banal nationalism. Diageo is sometimes an unwitting participant of banal nationalism in Scotland, in that it is unintentionally lending support for efforts to define and maintain certain identity profiles for Scotland, but at times it is a more conscious and focused participant in the business of national identity construction and maintenance, shifting the focus of our analysis away from routinised, taken-for-granted behaviour that characterises banal nationalism.

As with many other 'territorial brands', Scotch whisky is strongly associated with tourism promotion (Gray, 2012; SWA, 2011a). The SWA's 2011 report on Scotch whisky and tourism has a wealth of data to highlight Scotch whisky's contribution to the promotion of tourism in Scotland in particular and Britain in general: visitor centres and distilleries providing 640 jobs and contributing to the economy to the tune of £14 million; against the background of culture and heritage being responsible for more than a quarter of spending in the United Kingdom by overseas tourists, Scotch whisky stands out as an ambassador of Scotland in a crowded international market; it is particularly important in attracting tourists to rural areas; and so on (SWA, 2011a). These points are highlighted by the SWA in its efforts to impress the industry's contribution to society in the form of economic benefits. The noticeable point here is that the industry, unwittingly or otherwise, projects itself according to the nationalist logic; the industry is a good citizen because

it contributes to the welfare of the society, which is more often than not equated with the nation. Because of the multinational nature of the United Kingdom, in the case of Scotch whisky, the designation of the nation sometimes shifts from Scotland to the United Kingdom (or more likely, Britain), which somewhat obscures the overall picture of the ways in which the industry is co-opted in a nationalist project that is deemed to have an all-pervasive influence.

Still, it is fair to say that these efforts made by the Scotch whisky industry to promote Scotland are of a derivative nature, a by-product of their efforts to define Scotch whisky and to secure its legal status as a means of promoting and protecting it. The SWA itself acknowledges that the Association's greatest achievement is in this regard. The predecessor of the SWA was founded in part in response to the 1908–1909 Royal Commission, which examined the question of what whisky was. The first piece of UK law on the definition of whisky was passed in 1933; a dedicated Scotch Whisky Act was passed at Westminster in 1988, and in the same year, the Scotch Whisky geographical indication (GI) was secured. During the 1990s, against tax decimation placed by countries such as Japan, Korea and Chile, the SWA secured strong regulations on the definition of Scotch whisky and protected it as a drink coming only from Scotland through intensive lobbying activities. In 2009, Scotch Whisky Regulations were adopted by the UK government, further tightening the definition of Scotch whisky (Moss and Hume, 2000: 229; SWA, 2009, 2011c, 2012a). In its efforts to secure more preferable conditions for the product, the Scotch whisky industry has been working closely with various legislative bodies, including the Scottish Parliament, the UK Parliament, the European Parliament as well as indirectly with the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is yet another point where the industry's pursuit of profit sometimes overlaps with the political institution's promotion of the nation. The dynamics in this regard are complex due to current devolutionary measures that have brought about the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Government (initially known as Executive) with devolved powers. The SWA's initial attitude towards the Scottish Government was one of caution. As the Scottish Parliament and Government started to exercise devolved powers, however, the communication between the industry and the Scottish polity became dense and close to the extent that some in the industry started to express preference of designating legal authority in relation to the definition of Scotch whisky to the Scottish level by saying 'the Scottish Parliament is a natural home for this' (Smith, 2010: 440), arguably an expression of the industry

being co-opted in the Scottish polity's efforts to promote the Scottish framework.

What is interesting here is the SWA's reaction to the establishment of a new Scottish National Party (SNP) majority government in May 2011. The SNP's credential in putting Scotland first was firmly established, and if the Scotch whisky industry was fully integrated in banal and rather passive nationalist endeavours focusing on defining the nation's identity and on promoting it, an SNP-majority government would be seen as largely positive. The SWA's reaction was one of caution. It prepared a briefing sheet for the Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs) emphasising the industry's contribution to Scottish society and economy, which was widely known and acknowledged by political parties in Scotland, and extolled them to work even harder to protect and promote Scotch whisky (SWA, 2011b). In particular, the SWA was opposed to the SNP's manifesto commitment to introduce minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol, arguing that it was ineffective and most likely illegal in many jurisdictions, while also publicly stating its continued support for the Scottish Government Alcohol Industry Partnership to tackle alcohol-related problems such as alcohol misuse (SWA, 2011c). The SWA's uneasiness with the SNP government was mostly spelt out in its opposition to MUP, not with reference to any aspect of a nationalist project. Their concern over the prospect of referendum was framed in a language of business referring to stability and predictability that were deemed to be essential for the industry's success.

Despite the emergence of an ethno-cultural attachment to the Scottish polity within it, and despite being co-opted into a nationalist project to promote Scotland in some ways, the Scotch whisky industry demonstrated a degree of autonomy as a private sector actor with respect to the recent independence referendum. While acknowledging the firm and inseparable link between Scotch whisky and Scotland, the SWA prioritised its concern for ensuring stability and predictability as a business over its support for the possible advantage of defining Scotland more clearly with independence (SWA, 2013b, 2014a). Utmost care appeared to have been paid to be seen as a neutral participant rather than an 'anti-Scottish' one in the debate. For instance, its 2013 annual review clearly acknowledges the importance of the then forthcoming referendum in 2014, as articulated in the words of David Frost, the Chief Executive:

The people of Scotland face a historic choice in September's independence referendum. The implications are huge and the basis for the

eventual decision needs to be fully discussed. So I make no apology for dealing with it at length.

(SWA, 2013b: 4).

Frost then goes on to emphasise the Scottishness of Scotch whisky and the Scotch whisky industry:

This industry is in a special position in this debate. We can make Scotch Whisky only in Scotland and our brands are indissolubly linked with it. 35,000 jobs depend on the industry. Our operations are at the heart of many communities around Scotland and we sustain economic activity in rural and remote areas that might otherwise have difficulty in attracting it.

(SWA, 2013b: 4)

Still, he brings the reader's attention to the factors that have supported the success of the industry rather than to the possible advantage the industry may acquire should independence result from the referendum:

In short, as we consider the potential impact of constitutional change, we look for reassurance on how an independent Scotland could deliver a business, regulatory, and export environment at least as supportive as that which the industry currently enjoys.

Whatever the result on 18 September, we are committed to working with government in the future to deliver sustainable economic growth – either helping to shape the policy regime for an independent Scotland or engaging in the debate about further devolution. That is what the people of Scotland would expect and it is what I am determined to deliver.

(SWA, 2013b: 5)

In these pronouncements, the SWA is acting as an autonomous agent rather than a co-opted one, putting its business interest first against a nationalist framework and thus resisting the conforming pressures of banal nationalism. At the same time, the SWA is careful not to undermine its image of a good Scottish citizen by clearly stating its intention to work with whatever Scottish people choose.

As soon as the referendum was over, the SWA published a statement welcoming the stability the referendum result brought in and resumed its efforts to emphasise the inseparable link between Scotland and Scotch whisky: 'The Scotch Whisky industry is determined to play

a leading role in shaping discussions that are fundamental to the future success of our industry and our nation' (SWA, 2014b). The SWA also uttered what may be seen as its willingness to be part of the Scottish nationalist project. In its submission to the Smith Commission on Devolution, the SWA not only reiterated the importance of the Scotch whisky industry to Scotland but also indicated its support for further empowerment of the Scottish Parliament in regard to tax-raising, spending and policymaking (SWA, 2014c). When it made the case for more power to the Scottish Parliament, the SWA used a kind of language that would be more readily associated with the SNP than the SWA, an industry body: 'Any new powers should help to deliver the fairer and more prosperous Scotland to which so many people – on both sides of the referendum debate – aspired during the campaign' (SWA, 2014c).

The brief case study of the Scotch whisky industry has shown that the private sector can be co-opted into a nationalist project through banal nationalism, which is part and parcel of everyday life of contemporary society. However, the case study has also shown that the private sector is not completely taken over by the supposedly hegemonic power of nationalism. The Scotch whisky industry works within the framework of banal nationalism in establishing and promoting the brand, but when it comes to the constitutional question, the industry acted as an autonomous agent prioritising its business interest over and against the nationalist interest. It is worth noting that in the post-referendum period, the SWA appeared to have assumed again its more overtly pro-Scottish stance supporting devolution of more powers that are related to Scotch whisky to the Scottish Parliament, which in turn appears to suggest that the SWA is seeing Scotland as an increasingly pertinent territorial entity for the industry. This goes some way to question Andy Smith's conclusion that the United Kingdom remains to be the most significant territorial entity for the Scotch whisky industry in post-devolution Scotland (Smith, 2010). It may be simply the case that the observation presented in this chapter is better at capturing the evolution of Scotland as a space for politics due to the chapter's focus on nationalism.

## **Conclusion**

The two case studies have shown different ways in which the food industry, a private sector actor, engages with nationalism in contemporary society. The first case study illustrates how the food industry adjusts its behaviour in response to the generally prevailing nationalist framework

of reference. The contract catering industry is responding to the general trend of prioritising the national category in everyday life by presenting their products in a way that emphasises the nation and national identity in general. Here, the industry is neither interested nor involved in the promotion of a particular nation; rather it is involved in reinforcing a framework in which the world is made sense of with reference to national categories. The contract catering industry is in an abstract sense co-opted into the promotion of nationalism, but as a universal principle of organising the world, not as an expression of particular concern. In contrast, in the second case study, the Scotch whisky industry can clearly be seen as being involved in endeavours to define and promote the identity of Scotland, and in this sense, it is more ostensibly behaving as a nationalist. This is due to the nature of the product to be promoted – Scotch whisky; it is a territorially built brand, and in the case of Scotland, the territory in question roughly coincided with a nation. It appears at times that the Scotch whisky industry is fully immersed in the nationalist framework in their efforts to promote its product. However, as the SWA's behaviour during and after the independence referendum of 2014 shows, the industry is not completely co-opted in a nationalist project but is able to exercise its agency to be an independent actor, suggesting yet another aspect of the idea of banal nationalism that needs to be examined further. As Skey (2009) has pointed out, the idea of banal nationalism sometimes uncritically assigns hegemonic power to a nationalist project and assumes a high degree of homogeneity among a variety of actors. The brief analysis of the SWA's behaviour suggests more attention should be given to the autonomy of actors in their seemingly conformist actions.

Beyond showing the different ways in which the food industry relates to nationalism in their pursuit of profits, the two case studies also point to the significance of the general phenomenon of globalisation. The first case study clearly indicates the catering industry's perception of globalisation and its effects on their business as the most obvious reason why they engage in the practice of highlighting the national framework. This strategy is adopted, it seems, in order to tie people to a specific geographical location through taste so as to provide them with a degree of security and comfort (and in some cases, excitement) in a globalising world characterised by fast-paced changes. The strategy makes the most of ethno-cultural attachment people have in the course of action. Food being such a primary material is well suited to be used in this strategy. The history of the SWA's activity is also the history of an industry responding to various phases of globalisation. The SWA is determined

to protect the Scotch whisky brand because it can only be made in Scotland, not anywhere else – a powerful selling point in the globalised market. In fact, the SWA's concern is focused on protecting the Scotch whisky brand abroad, hence its focus on GI and the EU and WTO regulations, which have direct impact on their trade.<sup>21</sup> The SWA's seemingly nationalist behaviour is largely played out in response to globalisation in the form of expanding markets. The two case studies appear to suggest therefore that the main culprit in shoring up the nationalist framework is in fact globalisation, an idea that will be continuously addressed throughout the volume.



## **Part II**

# **Official/Top-Down: The Nation-State, Food and Nationalism**

# 4

## Food and Diet in 'Official' Nationalism

### Introduction

As the current volume demonstrates, the issue of food and nationalism/national identity is more often than not approached from banal or everyday nationalism angles. To repeat some of our arguments in the volume, this is because the quotidian nature of food and eating lends itself well to the investigation of nationalism in the private sphere, the kind of investigation that has become more mainstream recently in the study of nationalism. However, an investigation of food and nationalism is not complete if it ignores the relatively well-studied, official or public side, since nationalism works both in the public and in the private spheres. The current and following chapters will turn their attention to 'food and nationalism' in a more conventional setting in which the investigative focus is on what the nation-state does. In other words, Chapters 4 and 5 examine 'food and nationalism' in the context in which the nation-state is seen as the major actor of nationalism, often as the main nation-builder. The current chapter concentrates on the internal aspect of the nation-state's involvement with nation-building, while Chapter 5 considers the external dimension.

The shift of focus away from the bottom-up views to the perspective of the nation-state as the main nation-builder can indicate several approaches. The shift could facilitate the investigation of 'food and nationalism' in the increasingly contested context of the public-private distinction in modern society, taking into account the implications of the advent of welfare state, the increasing penetration of neo-liberalism and the lightning pace of technological development. As Díaz-Méndez and Gómez-Benito (2010) have shown in their investigation of the emergence and propagation of the 'Mediterranean diet'

in Spain, an investigation into this area can produce useful insights into the role of the nation-state in contemporary society, highlighting the impact of increasingly technocratic aspects of the modern state on nationalism.

It also suggests a more conventional approach to nationalism, a modernist approach in which the rise of nationalism is tied to the notion of modernisation in the broadest sense. This is a territory that has been examined and argued by eminent scholars of nationalism, including Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Michael Hecther, Tom Narin, John Breuilly, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann, to name but a few (Anderson, 1992; Breuilly, 1982; Gellner, 1983; Giddens, 1985; Hechter, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1990; Mann, 1993; Nairn, 1977). The basic tenet here is that the nation is created by nationalism, which works through the apparatus of the modern state in response to industrialisation, capitalist expansion, competition among the states and so on. The predominant focus on the structural aspect of the development of nationalism has been problematised in response to the rise of the everyday nationhood approach, which argues for attributing more importance to the individual's agency rather than treating individuals as something to be formed and moulded by institutions (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a; Ichijo, 2013).

These leading scholars of nationalism have not paid much attention to the 'food and nationalism' theme. In this line of investigation, food and diet are often subsumed in the discussion of manipulation of symbols by the state or the elite in society, as explored in the celebrated work of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*. Reflecting this situation, there are not many studies on the role of the nation-state in nationalism that focus on the ways in which food is used. A handful of studies, including Arjun Appadurai's (1988) work and Igor Cusack's (2000, 2003, 2004), apply the conventional, top-down approach to nationalism to the evolution of national cuisine and illustrate the different social forces at work, as discussed in the Introduction to this volume. The lack of attention to the apparent mundane issues of food and diet in the conventional theories of nationalism is a lacuna this chapter and the following one attempt to address. Food and diet are given particular meaning by the state and state-backed organisations in pursuit of the nation-state's objectives, most commonly to sustain the nation-state's independence. Therefore, in this line of enquiry, the focus tends to be placed on the idea of 'official' nationalism of a modernising state (Germany, Japan, Turkey, for instance) and the nationalist forces in the colonial context.

While the 'top-down' aspect of nationalism in these cases is on the whole well surveyed, what the chapter shows is that the particular quality the 'food-and-nationalism' angle can assume, when investigating these cases for modernisation, is not only about structures and institutions but also about values and meanings. As it has been pointed out mainly by anthropologists, food is not only material to sustain life but also imbued with symbolism and meanings, and food and diet easily turn into an ideological battle ground.

The chapter highlights what the 'food-and-nationalism' angle can bring to the study of 'top-down' nationalism. It investigates the reasons why food and diet can be a powerful tool for the state and the state-sponsored organisations in pursuit of a nationalist programme by examining the issue of food in modernising Japan in a comparative context. After supplementing the analysis of the Japanese case by looking at the recent changes in the ways in which the Japanese government tried to control rice, the staple food, the chapter looks at the case of the Zionist movement in Israel/Palestine to explore the role food plays in the formation and maintenance of a nationalist project in greater detail.

### **Food, diet and nationalism: Meiji Japan in a comparative light**

Meiji Japan, which came into being in 1868 as a result of a coup d'état by disgruntled middle- and lower-ranking samurais from peripheral domains with the emperor as the figure head, is often associated with a top-down form of nationalism that is led by the state in contrast to a more voluntaristic version found in, for example, eighteenth-century England (Greenfeld, 1992; Kohn, 1944). Because Japan was a latecomer to industrial and capitalist development as well as imperialism, it is often argued that the 1868 coup led to the establishment of an overtly strong and centralised state, which pursued a series of reformist programmes to modernise Japanese society. One of the major objectives of the early Meiji Japanese government was to 'enrich the country, strengthen the military', which led to the framing of a number of policies covering various areas, including diet (Cwiertka, 2006; Ichijo, 2013; Takeda, 2008). In discussing the establishment of the tripartite structure of Japanese, Chinese and Western cuisine in modern Japan, Cwiertka (2006) focuses on the role of conscription in introducing meat, a food item that had not been widely consumed since the mid-Edo period, to the diet of the ordinary Japanese. Conscription was

part and parcel of Japanese modernisation to 'strengthen the military'. While Tokugawa Japan was never militarily defeated by the Western nations, the ruling class of the time was made aware of the inferiority of the Japanese military system both in terms of equipment and organisation through several armed clashes between some domains and Western powers in the 1860s. They were also aware of the defeat of Qing China in the Opium War (1840–1842). Before the Meiji government engaged with modernisation/westernisation of the Japanese military system, Tokugawa shogunate had started to introduce western equipment and ideas. Since it did not have the modern, centralised structure of governing, Tokugawa shogunate never got a round to making specific policies related to education, health, diet and so on, with a view to 'strengthen the military'; but with a newly instituted, modern and centralised system of governance, such as compulsory primary education (introduced in 1872) and conscription (1873), the Meiji government's involvement with 'food and nationalism' is recorded and easier to trace.

The role of conscription in nation-building is well documented (see for the classical study, Weber, 1976). Cwiertka (2006: Ch. 3) points out two relevant effects of conscription to our concern with 'food and nationalism'. First, conscription contributed to the homogenisation of the food ordinary people of various parts of Japan ate, because the conscripts were subjected to a unified routine for a period of time – the very essence of homogenising effects of conscription. When they went home upon completing their service, they brought back their new knowledge of what was eaten elsewhere in Japan, thus contributing to the establishment of the idea of 'Japanese cuisine'. Secondly, it introduced meat into the diet of ordinary Japanese, from which meat had been largely absent for the preceding 200 years or so. While the establishment of the Japanese cuisine through homogenisation of diet of ordinary Japanese was probably one of unintended consequences of the Meiji government's drive to modernise Japanese society, the introduction of meat to the diet was a deliberate act by the Meiji government to achieve the objective of strengthening the military. The military introduced meat into the diet of their conscripts in order to combat the problem of vitamin B deficiency that comes with heavy reliance on polished white rice (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1999).

The (re)introduction of meat into Japanese diet in the Meiji era was a top-down affair, part and parcel of the project of 'civilisation and improvement'. Adopting a Western style of diet including menus and manners was one aspect of the national mission to modernise/

westernise Japanese society in order to catch up with the West.<sup>1</sup> The underlying assumption was the inferiority of Japanese society and people in many aspects of life, including physique. In order to compete with Westerners, the Japanese needed to eat like Westerners, many Meiji elites reasoned. And the Meiji Emperor led the way. In 1871, he eliminated the prohibition of eating meat in the imperial household and issued an order that the imperial kitchen should serve meat on a regular basis (Cwiertka, 2006; Harada, 2005; Ohnuki-Tierney, 1999). The military in this regard was merely following the lead from the top.

This top-down gesture did not go unopposed despite an extremely large amount of authority attributed to the Emperor. The idea of being defiled from eating meat persisted among the general population till about the 1920s (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1999). It is also suggested that because of the combination of the custom of meat avoidance and the scarce supply of meat, it was not until the 1960s when Japan experienced a rapid economic growth that meat became an everyday item on the table for the majority of Japanese people (Ehara, 2014). More starkly, in response to the Emperor's order to the imperial kitchen to serve meat on a regular basis, a group of nativist cult priests attempted to enter the Imperial Palace in 1872 to censure the Emperor of his decision and to ask him to reinstate the prohibition of meat eating (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1999). The incident ended with a number of deaths, but the momentum of 'civilisation and improvement' through meat eating continued unabated, perhaps testifying to the power of the modern, centralised nation-state.

The promotion of meat eating led by the Emperor, the very top of the new Japanese polity, however, did not dislodge rice from its position at the heart of Japanese diet. Meat eating was promoted *as well as*, not *instead of*, the idea of rice as the staple even in the army (Cwiertka, 2006, Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993). The representation of rice as the Japanese collective self was established in the post-Meiji era and the association of purity of white rice with Japanese spiritual superiority was overtly enhanced during the Second World War; 'white rice – symbolically the most powerful but nutritionally the most deficient – was saved for the most precious sector of the population – the soldiers'. (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993: 106). The situation during the Second World War could be easily explained by the dwindling supply of food, including meat and white rice, but the top-down promotion of meat eating as well as the preservation of the cult of white rice continued in the postwar era. The defeat in the Second World War was often attributed to poor Japanese physique and the inclusion of protein items in diet was therefore encouraged by

the postwar government.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, white rice kept its place as the essence of Japanese collective self, and the postwar 'symbolic' and constitutional emperors' chief duty is to pray for abundant harvest of rice every autumn.

### **And in Bengal, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Australia . . .**

The elite's concern over their people's diet in the context of modernisation and globalisation was shared by many others, for example, Bengali intellectuals under British rule. By the nineteenth century, the idea of 'effeminacy' as a consequence of the subjugation of the Bengali people to British rule was widely shared, both among the British rulers and the Bengali intellectuals (Sengupta, 2010). The origin of Bengali effeminacy was traced to the climate and to the indigenous diet in contrast to the meat-based diet of the British. In this line of thinking, the meat-based diet of the British, however unsuitable for the climate in Bengal, was seen to be the basis of their masculinity that manifested itself in their imperial conquest and rule. On the other hand, the indigenous Bengali diet which centred on rice, together with material security provided by the British and effects of the climate, contributed to the loss of vigour among Bengali population. Some intellectuals therefore advocated introducing more protein of animal origin into the Bengali diet by the end of the nineteenth century, which however created some tension with the exaltation of vegetarianism as a way of preserving and enhancing the tradition.

This tension continued into the twentieth century when the debate on diet assumed the tone of civilisational critique (Sengupta, 2010). In the twentieth century, as the publication of cookbooks aiming at middle-class women became prominent, domestic life became the base for resistance and subversion of British imperial rule in nationalist thought (Appadurai, 1988; Chatterjee, 1993). The cookbooks not only represented a gendered discourse of domesticity (women were confined in the private sphere as a wife, mother and the household manager) but also served as a vehicle to propagate civilisational thinking about Bengalis/Indians and the westerners. The diet was represented as a cultural or civilisational marker and Western materialistic culture and strength was attributed to meat eating while Indian spiritual superiority was attributed to vegetarianism. In this context, physical resistance to imperial rule would require meat eating in order to build robust health, which was indispensable for a host of things – like community's 'honour', labour's productivity and nation's 'progress', and this represented one option. The other option was to emphasise Indian ethical

and spiritual superiority embodied in refined vegetarian diet (Sengupta, 2010).

What is common in these two examples is the emergence of concerns over diet as a result of encountering the overwhelming material and military power of the West. In both Meiji Japan and colonial Bengal, elites searched for reasons of their 'inferiority' to the West in terms of diet because food was seen as the foundation of human strength. In both cases, rice, which was the staple food, was seen as inadequate to take on meat eaters and meat eating was promoted as a result. In the Japanese case, meat eating was not to replace the white rice but to be added; in the Bengali case, the tension between non-vegetarianism to 'modernise' the nation and vegetarianism to preserve the essence of the nation arose. This tension continued in the struggle for independence of India as seen in the tension between Gandhi and others as well as the continuing tension between the majority (vegetarian) Hindu population and (meat-eating) Muslim minorities. While in both cases the opposition of spirituality (the East) versus materiality (the West) emerged in the course of promoting meat eating, in the Japanese case the tension was obscured by the active participation of the emperor in the promotion of meat eating; in India, it came to represent different perspectives for the nation's future with longer lasting legacy.

It is easily expected that a top-down approach to food as a tool of pursuing a nationalist project would be prominent under an authoritarian or totalitarian regime, or under a wartime regime. The Nazis, which met both conditions, were not an exception. As they took power in Germany and started to plan for war to ensure the German society's survival in the 1930s, Nazi leaders were paying a lot of attention to food and diet (Treitel, 2009). By the means of their formidable propaganda machine that loudly propagated the idea of harmonious and homogeneous national community (Welch, 2004), the message that eating more naturally was good for the country was broadcast: it 'would promote racial health, boost physical performance, and maximize the efficient use of resources, all qualities needed to fight and win the coming war' (Treitel, 2009). In this case, eating more naturally meant less meat, which was heavily reliant on import, and more plant food which could be produced in German lands. Corrina Treitel (2009) analyses the Nazi promotion of 'natural diet' and points out a number of factors behind it. With the memory of hunger and starvation during and in the immediate aftermath of the First World War still fresh, the Nazis made achieving nutritional self-sufficiency a priority, and nudging the population away from eating meat, which was reliant on import, was



one of the ways to approach nutritional self-sufficiency. In addition, there was a long-standing call for promoting vegetarianism in order to improve the health of the nation as well as the nation's economy in Germany. The Nazis did not embrace vegetarianism as such; rather the Nazi state recommended and promoted what it called 'a mixed diet' from which 'the artificial' was removed. Instead of industrially produced bread with chemically treated wheat flour, the Germans were encouraged to eat whole-grain loaves in order to increase health, fitness and fertility. In order to encourage the Germans to take up a natural diet, the Nazi leaders turned their attention to agricultural policies, which had economic and ideological objectives. The economic objective was to achieve nutritional self-sufficiency with the introduction of a type of organic farming called biodynamics to replenish the soil that had been depleted of nitrates due to war efforts during the First World War. The ideological objective was to nurture a healthy nation firmly linked to its land, reflecting the romantic view of nationhood emphasising the organic nature of the nation.

In the minds of the Nazi leaders, the natural diet was the foundation for their war efforts, to promote racial and national health with efficient management of resources available. It was defined by down-to-earth economic considerations as well as an organic vision of the race and nation that emphasised the importance of being firmly rooted in one's environment to achieve health. The Nazi example illustrates the multi-faceted utility of 'food and nationalism' in investigating politics; because food is essential to life, it is about political economy, which any state thrives to manage. Because it has an immense capacity to carry symbolism, it can carry a variety of ideologies, some of which may be mutually contradictory but are held in one item.

Interestingly, the German ideas of 'autarky' or self-sufficiency might have been copied from its close ideological and strategic ally, Italy. Under Mussolini, fascist Italy promoted, what it termed, an 'ideal Italian diet' based on locally produced grains, legumes, fruit and vegetables, and restricted the use of meat products. The diet was promoted through direct government intervention in the economy and the agricultural sector, and restricted food imports (Helstosky, 2004). The government's intervention in the nation's diet was based on a number of elements that linked together what people ate, the requirements of the state, the Italian food markets and global supplies. In particular, the fascist government sought to reduce imports of cheap grains and the promotion of local products, at times to the detriment of the Italian public. This can be seen in the regime's promotion of humble and simple Italian

food items, such as pig's ears, lettuce soup, meat balls and polenta, in particular at the expense of what it saw as an unhealthy national obsession with pasta (Helstosky, 2003: 127). The focus on reducing pasta consumption to combat growing food and grain imports and the promotion of bread, rice and polenta as substitutes went against traditional Italian foodways, particularly in southern Italy (Garvin, 2014).

Domestic cookbooks implored upon housewives the importance of buying only Italian products and to be proud of cooking traditional and humble food, such as polenta. Basing their arguments on modernisation, nutrition and national success, national cookbooks, such as *La Cucina Futurista*, and popular magazines rallied against the expenses of the middle class and promoted the ideas of self-sufficiency (Helstosky, 2003). The propaganda campaign also included the dissemination of 'appropriate' regional cooking ideas and recipes nationally, in what can be seen as an attempt to homogenise the national cuisine. The government's intervention was also not limited to food items. Through its various publications, the state called for the reorganisation of the domestic kitchen, in terms of space, equipment and workload. The fascist state was linking together the structure and function of the domestic sphere (kitchen) with that of the national one, providing and promoting the performance of the nation at the centre of the house and domestic life (Garvin, 2014). However, while the 'fascist association between nation and food has mostly a negative impact on health and consumer expectations' it did have a direct effect on what is now seen as 'a characteristically Italian form of cuisine' (Helstosky, 2004: 19).

Food's ability to link human population to their natural environment can also be made use of by the nation-state in a more tacit manner. Charlotte Craw (2008) reports on a case of kangaroo meat eating in a settler society. The early European settlers in Australia relied on kangaroo as a source of protein, but with the introduction and spread of the European style of farming and farm animals, the consumption of kangaroo meat plummeted (at least among the settler population). From about the 1980s, upmarket restaurants started to serve kangaroo meat and its consumption has been increasingly supported by a variety of Australians. The consumption of kangaroo meat in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is framed in a multi-layered discursive context. Eating kangaroo meat can be presented as an act of correcting ecological damages brought by the European farming style. The ecological benefit of eating kangaroo meat can also be presented as a means

of pest control, which ultimately contributes to kangaroo conservation. It is also a way of getting to know the country better and of being more integrated with the natural environment. Kangaroos are seen as embodying what Australia is and illustrating the defining 'otherness' of Australia, and eating it literally ensures the maintenance of Australian distinctiveness in the international stage. It is therefore an enactment of national identity with tacit support from the state, which regards kangaroos as belonging to the Australian people through Crown and which regulates the 'harvest' of kangaroos.

### **'Food and nationalism' in a modernised state: The Japanese government's rice policy since 1945**

The direct intervention of the government in food policies to pursue nation-building and national aims is also evident in the example of Japan's rice policies. The symbolic importance of rice, in particular white rice, in Japanese society has been noted widely (Cwiertka, 2006; Franks, 1998, 2007; Knecht, 2007; Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993, 1999). As a latecomer to modernisation, the Japanese state is often seen as a strong state taking the lead in various spheres of life. Putting the two together suggests the government-led, top-down programme to protect and promote rice as the staple food for Japanese should be a feature of modern Japanese society. As reviewed briefly earlier, in Meiji Japan, the government was promoting and encouraging rice cultivation as part of its 'enrich the country, strengthen the military' strategy while advocating meat eating as a way of improving the health and fitness of the nation. As seen in the Nazi and fascist Italy examples, the importance of securing enough food, rice in the Japanese case, to feed the population was emphasised under war conditions. The idea of rice as the staple food for the Japanese had long been established by the end of the Second World War (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993). In postwar Japan, rice farmers came to be seen as the most powerful interest group that kept the Liberal Democratic Party in power for a long time, and the rice market became the symbol of the closed nature of Japanese society in successive trade negotiations, in particular since the 1980s (Franks, 1998; Horiuchi and Saito, 2010).

The Food Control System, which was in place as late as 1994, arguably embodies the assumption that the government-led promotion of rice cultivation and consumption was a prominent feature of postwar Japanese nationalism. The system was based on the 1942 Staple Food Control Act, a wartime legislation that aimed to 'guarantee a sufficient

supply of rice for its fighting soldiers and to provide for an equal distribution of rice to non-combatant citizens to keep them healthy' (Knecht, 2007: 16–17). The law attributed the central role to the state in planning and distributing the entire supply of the staple food, thus rendering the control of the country to the state (Francks, 1998; Knecht, 2007). The 1942 act was superseded by the revision in 1952, and under the 1952 act the government retained the exclusive right only to rice; salt and other items were freed from the state monopoly. The rice producers were obligated to sell rice at an officially set price to the government, which alone was authorised to sell it to third parties. The system, made up with the Food Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Zenno, the nation-wide agricultural co-operative, whole sellers and retailers of rice, worked for the farmers because it acted as a guarantee of a minimum income and for the government because it had in principle the control of the whole country, but did not benefit the consumers who had to pay 'an extraordinary high price for rice relative to the world price' (Fell and MacLaren, 2013: 617). The Food Control System afforded a high level of protection to the rice market in Japan.

The puzzle here was that the consumers did not revolt against the government's control of rice. When the closed nature of the Japanese rice market became a regular item in international negotiations in the 1980s, the majority of the consumers was against the liberalisation of rice import because Japanese rice tasted better and because in any case it was not too expensive even compared to imported rice (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993: 25). This attitude contrasted their generally relaxed attitudes towards imported food; by 1988, 35.9% of fish and shellfish 14.6% of grains, 14.8% of meat and 12.7% of fruits were imported (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993: 27). Clearly, Japanese consumers treated rice as a different kind of agricultural produce from others, suggesting that they had internalised the idea of rice as a representation of Japaneseness and that they were willingly colluding with the government, rice farmers and retailers to maintain rice sacred.

Still the statistics show that rice consumption steadily declined over the years while the idea of 'rice as the Japanese self' did not wither. Per capita consumption of rice peaked in 1962 and almost halved by the end of the 1990s (Chern et al., 2003). This could mean that the reason why the Japanese consumers acquiesced with the extortionate price for rice for a long while was because they were eating less and less of it, so they did not feel the pinch. However, what is sometimes referred to as Heisei Rice Riots of 1993–1994 suggests otherwise. Due to exceptionally

cold summer, rice crop in autumn 1993 failed and the government was forced to resort to emergency import of rice in order to make up for the shortfall. This led to a series of events, including criticisms towards the government's failure to secure the rice crop, the rumours about imported rice and panic buying of domestically produced rice (Francks, 1998, Horie, 2004; Knecht, 2007). Any panic is irrational, but this one was particularly so, given that while the supply of Japanese-produced rice fell short of the demand, there was more than enough supply from abroad. There was in a way no shortage of rice as such; it was the shortage of domestically produced rice that led to a series of panics, which may indicate the degree to which the idea of rice as the embodiment of Japaneseness had been internalised (Ishikawa, 1994). In particular, the hysteria about the imported rice was suggestive: rumours circulated to strengthen the belief that eating foreign, imported rice would be hazardous to one's health because of heavy use of chemicals in growing and during the shipping of rice (Knecht, 2007). Concern that rice importation would undermine the fundamental aspect of Japanese society of being built on rice cultivation was expressed by a variety of people (Knecht, 2007). Clearly, rice was 'not simply food to fill the stomach. Japanese attitudes and behaviours towards rice are not governed by economic rationale' (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993: 28).

What was ironic was that the Heisei Rice Riots took place while the negotiations for the Uruguay Round of GATT were taking place. In December 1993, the Japanese government agreed to a partial liberalisation of the rice market as part of conditions to the accession to the World Trade Organization (Francks, 1998). The opening up of the Japanese market did not come because of the pressure from the consumers but because of the 'external' pressure of the general trend of globalisation of trade. A year later, in December 1994, the New Food Act was passed by the Diet, which signalled the demise of the Food Control System. Under the new regime, the farmers were allowed to sell their crops freely without being subjected to the government's control. The regime was further reformed in 2004 and any one could now engage with selling and distributing rice as long as they were registered with the government. All these reforms are seen as the government's efforts to prepare the rice farmers to face up global competition.

The evolution of postwar Japanese government's rice policy suggests a weakening of officially sponsored nationalism due to the pressure of globalisation. However, the discourse around rice has not changed much. It is still the case that 'a bowl of steaming, pure white, home-grown rice remains a convenient symbol of the essential and enduring

qualities of "traditional" Japanese life' (Francks, 2007: 148). This may indicate the triumph of top-down nationalism; the idea of rice as the essence of Japaneseness has successfully been internalised by the population after years of work by the successive government. The idea that because rice embodies the Japanese national self, domestically produced rice is the best for the Japanese, which came to the surface during the Heisei Rice Riots, arguably constitutes part of the anti-globalisation movement in Japan as seen in the current opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership scheme.

The above brief survey points to the utility of food for the nation-state in pursuit of a variety of objectives. The utility stems from the life-sustaining quality of food, its fundamental role and food's symbolic capacity. The above also shows that with the advent of the modern, centralised nation-state, the use of food, diet, nutrition and health by the state in order to define and enhance the nation and that fills the nation-state frame has become much more evident. Furthermore, food provides a link between humans and the environment through agriculture – working on the land – and therefore ties humans to a particular geological and geographical location, which can also be imbued with symbolism. The latter point poses a particular challenge to a settler society such as Israel, which is explored in detail in the rest of the chapter.

### **Zionism and the creation of Jewish state in Palestine**

Nationalist ideologies do not appear on the surface to be overly concerned with ideas relating to food and diet, and in this respect Zionism is no exception. However, and as will be demonstrated, nationalist ideas and ideals regarding, among other things, the economy, national security and immigration require at times direct intervention in and engagement with food production and the public's diet.

Zionism is an ideology that arose in the late nineteenth century in Europe and that had as its main aim the creation of a separate state for Jews in Palestine. Zionism and the political movement that was spawned were born in response to the growing European failure to socially and politically integrate Jews – a process known also as emancipation – and to the rise of modern racial anti-Semitism, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. The failure of Jewish emancipation also hindered Jewish reforming attempts to modernise and secularise Jewish life. As such, Zionism sought to provide the answer to the problems faced by Jews in Europe. It was based on the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, known by Jews as *Eretz Yisrael* ('the Land of Israel') and, through the

process of settling the land, creating a new Jewish cultural and national identity that would be premised on the negation of diaspora Jewish identity and culture. The creation of a new Jewish identity and state would be achieved through the revival and monopolisation of the Hebrew language and the radical transformation and modernisation of Jewish political, cultural, social and economic life (Laqueur, 2003). Specifically with regard to food, Zionism sought to utilise food, including its production, commodification and consumption, to accomplish three main tasks: create a new Jewish identity; establish a Jewish separate economy and polity in Palestine; and support the integration of new immigrants based on a melting pot approach. The period this case study deals with is roughly from the beginning of Zionist immigration to Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century, through the establishment of a British Mandate over Palestine (1919–1948) and up to the early state period in the 1950s.

### **The ‘new’ Jew**

Though Zionism as a national movement is associated with the establishment of a settler-colonial Jewish state in Israel/Palestine, it had as one of its main aims the construction of a new Jewish identity. The ‘new’ Jew was to be an ‘antithesis’ to the ‘old’ Jew of the diaspora (Laqueur, 2003). In a similar manner to other cultural nationalist movements (see, e.g., Hutchinson, 1987), the new national identity was based on the romantic notion of an ethnic group returning to the land, to nature and to agriculture. At the heart of the construction of the ‘new’ Jew therefore was a strong emphasis on agricultural work and rural life. This included the establishment of communal agricultural settlements as the centrepiece of the Zionist movement. Agricultural work and life were expected to spiritually and physically liberate Jews on route to becoming ‘new’ Jews. The ‘new’ Jew was to be strong in body and spirit, live in the rural environment, have an ‘active lifestyle’ and be ‘physically uninhibited’ (Almog, 2000: 78–80). The historical emphasis on working the land and on communal agricultural settlements is still very evident in Israel today. The image of the early settlers is held up as a model for modern Israelis, and most of Israel’s cities and towns still pay homage to the historic importance of agriculture in their coat-of-arms, which depict idealised images of rural life and agricultural tools and produce.

In terms of food consumption, the construction of the ‘new’ Jews also necessitated the creation of a new Jewish diet. The new diet would, on the one hand, highlight the rejection of diaspora values and norms,

while, on the other hand, it would connect the settlers to their 'new-old' land and physically transform them. The new diet, in a similar way to some of the examples given above, was to be rich in fruits, fresh vegetables and dairy products rather than the Jewish Eastern European diet of meat, fish and boiled vegetables (Almog, 2000). Though the process of changing the nation's diet was directed mostly from above, according to Claudia Roden, many of the early settlers were 'happy to abandon the "Yiddish" foods of Russia and Poland as a revolt against a past identity and an old life... and foods that represented exile and martyrdom' (1999: 175). The inspiration for many of the new dishes and food ingredients came from imitating and adapting elements from the local Arab-Palestinian food culture. However, as time passed and relations between the two national communities deteriorated, imitation of Arab-Palestinian food gave way to appropriation and nationalisation. In Zionist discourse, the role and importance of Arab-Palestinian food was marginalised and 'forgotten' (Mendel and Ranta, 2014).

It is important to mention that the desire to change the settlers' diet was not only motivated by issues concerning identity. Indeed, there are a few additional motivations, among them the Zionist emphasis on self-sufficiency and the creation of a Jewish-only economy, which will be discussed later, and the importance attached to modernisation, progress and science. Some of the reasons put forward for emphasising the new diet were based on the growing importance attached to issues concerning public health and nutrition. From the 1930s onwards, a number of important food surveys were conducted in the pre-state period by leading Zionist health and academic institutions. The surveys examined and compared food consumption patterns in Palestine among various communities and made specific recommendations regarding calorie consumption and vitamin and mineral uptakes, based on the then prevailing concepts of nutrition (on food surveys in Palestine, see Guggenheim et al., 1991).

In order to change the eating habits and diets of the new and arriving settlers, the Zionist movement employed a number of mechanisms, including health initiatives, publications of journals and books and public campaigns; most of the cookbooks and cooking pamphlets circulated in the period were published by Zionist organisations. What is interesting for us is not the nutrition- and health-based reasons employed but the attempts through these changes to shape the nation's identity. This shaping is clear with regard to the ideas of orientalism, ethnicity, behaviour, gender and habits that the Zionist movements emphasised. At the heart of this change was the presumption of European cultural



superiority. In a way, even though Zionism was based on the negation of Jewish diaspora life in Europe, it still perceived itself as a European movement. The new diet and eating habits promoted were mostly based on a European understanding of the meal structure – three courses rather than presenting all of the food at once, which was common in the region. Local and *Mizrahi* (a term denoting Jews from North Africa and the Middle East) food items and ingredients were included only if they fitted in with the prevailing concepts of nutrition and were found to be useful and appropriate. These decisions were taken by mostly *Ashkenazi* (name given to European Jews) Zionist professionals with regard to mostly non-European foods; some items were not included in the nation's diet and simply categorised as 'oriental'. The foods and habits promoted were also directly linked to ideas of patriarchy and the creation of a strong and resilient nation that would be able to withstand the challenges it faced (Tene, 2002).

The points made above can be clearly seen in the introduction to the first and also popular Zionist cookbook *How to Cook in Palestine* (Meyer, 1937), and was published by WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organisation) and was continually in print well into the 1950s. The book openly called upon 'the woman who arrives from Europe' to change her life style and her cooking and eating habits. The book asked women and housewives to (1937:8)

try with greater vigour than before to free our kitchen from the diaspora tradition that has clung to it... and consciously replace the European cuisine with a healthy Israeli one... This is one of the most important mechanisms for growing roots in our old-new homeland.

Interestingly, the changes promoted by the Zionist movement were not always fully accepted. Despite the strong emphasis on changing eating habits, it is clear that many were not convinced to change theirs. There are a number of examples of official cookbooks in the decades that followed that continued to try and convince their readers to make use of local ingredients such as mint, aubergines and cumin. The failure to successfully change the nation's diet can be attributed to the high levels of immigration experienced by the Jewish community before and after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Nevertheless, the changes promoted did substantially and fundamentally alter the nation's diet and approach to food. Several of the most widely consumed and symbolic dishes in Israel, such as the Israeli salad and Israeli breakfast, can trace their beginning to these food policies.

### **Establishing a Jewish economy in Palestine**

The emphasis on a particular diet and specific food products was related not only to issues of public health and identity but also to the establishment of a separate Jewish economic and political entity in Palestine. In other words, the Zionist movement and its main institutions sought to advance the nationalist aim of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine through specific food policies. These policies were based on a number of important elements including self-sufficiency, austerity and control over agricultural labour as well as the main sources of food production. The issue of agricultural labour, as well as labour in general, was part of a wider Zionist aim, known as the conquest of labour, to ensure that only Jewish workers were employed in the Jewish economy. This meant the active and conscious separation of the Jewish economy and growing community from the Arab-Palestinian one.

Beyond the issue of promoting and controlling Jewish labour, the Zionist leadership during the British Mandate period (1919–1948) used food to further demarcate communal and national boundaries between Jews and Arab-Palestinians. The main food policy used was the promotion of and emphasis on Jewish-only products. This was epitomised in the Zionist campaign of 'Totzeret Ha'arezt' (lit. produce of the land). Writing for the Hadassah newsletter in 1940,<sup>3</sup> Sulamith Schwartz explains (quoted in Raviv, 2002b: 77):

The more we use the products of Jewish fields and factories, the more we encourage the development of Palestinian Jewish industry and agriculture, thus creating room and work for tens of thousands of new immigrants, strengthening the Palestinian Jewish economy, making it sounder and more self-reliant.

The promotion of Jewish-only products was officially marketed and publicised and several Zionist organisations, for example, the 'organisation for Totzeret Ha'arezt', were tasked with ensuring compliance. Jewish approved products were labelled as 'Hebrew' to differentiate them from non-Jewish ones. Campaigns highlighted the 'Hebrew' produce and called upon Jewish consumers to buy only 'Hebrew' bananas or watermelons. Zionist food enterprises, such as the dairy monopoly Tnuva (lit. produce), produced posters informing Jewish consumers that 'our produce' is 100% Jewish. 'The organisation for Totzeret Ha'arezt' also produced weekly- and monthly-specific poster and pamphlet campaigns.<sup>4</sup> For example, a poster depicting two young children with an orange tree background stating that 'the future of your children is in your hands and

the future is in Totzeret Ha'arezt: buy only Totzeret Ha'arezt'. Another approach was through direct appeal pamphlets and posters. For example, an appeal to the 'Jewish public of Haifa' (a mixed Jewish-Arab city) stating:

In the difficult struggle for our survival and the future of our endeavour, it is our duty to inform the Hebrew public of the internal danger we all face from the lack of loyalty to Totzeret Ha'arezt... the public committee calls upon every man and woman to strengthen the Yishuv's [the term referring to the Jewish community in Palestine] economy! To stop the firing of Hebrew workers and the destruction of families! To give a hand to the creation of work places for the survivors of the diaspora! And to defend against all conspiracies from within and from abroad!

The campaign was also featured in the leading Zionist newspapers, publications and cookbooks. For example, the *How to Cook in Palestine* cookbook directly related the recipes it provided with the Zionist campaign to promote only Jewish products. The cookbook informs its readers that the recipes are based on the available 'Totzeret Ha'arezt' agricultural and preserved produce. Moreover, among the recipe pages are advertisements targeting Jewish housewives in English and Hebrew: 'To the Jewish housewife: Serve Tozereth-Haaretz food only. In this way you will help strengthen the economic foundation of Erez-Israel. Take active part in promoting Tozereth-Haaretz' (Meyer, 1937: 26).

The campaign, which began in the 1920s, and was taken on by all leading Zionist organisations in Palestine, tied together the food produced, purchased and consumed by Jews, the land of Israel and the national aim of establishing a separate Jewish state. The campaign promoted the ideas of asceticism and austerity, calling for communal sacrifice over the individual good. Preaching the ideals of self-sufficiency – making use of what was available and produced by the Jewish community – reduction of imports and communal resilience, the same ideals that formed the bedrock of communal agricultural settlements (Raviv, 2002b).

The campaign was taken on and promoted through Zionist institutions and organisations, for example, through the provisions of Totzeret Ha'arezt lunch programmes in hospitals, workplaces, health clinics, nurseries and schools, and in the communal mess halls in collective agricultural settlements. It was not only the consumption of specific local 'Hebrew' products that was highlighted but also the links made

between individual eating habits and choices and the historic bonds between Jews and Israel. This placed the success or failure of the Zionist endeavour and project at the door of consumers.

### **Integrating new immigrants**

The relationship between food policies and Zionist aims was also evident in the application of the *tsena* (lit. austerity) measures. In the aftermath of the 1948 war, and the establishment of the state of Israel, and leading up to the early 1950s, the Israeli state and society experienced rapid change. From 1948 to 1951, Israeli population doubled as a consequence of mass migration of Jews from Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. The impact of mass migration and the fragile economic situation in the aftermath of the 1948 war – unemployment rate was over 14% – meant that the state struggled to cope. Many of the new immigrants were housed in temporary camps and were completely reliant on government support. In order to address these problems, the state initiated an austerity programme referred to in Hebrew as *tsena* (Segev, 1998). Many of the austerity measures applied directly to the production, sale and consumption of food. Additionally, and despite the fact that they were mostly necessary to tackle the economic, but also food security situation, austerity measures also provided an opportunity for the state and its apparatuses to promote national unity and homogeneity as well as integrate the new migrants. In other words, and as argued by Rozin (2006), the austerity measures were used as a way of nation-building and the public compliance with the measures was seen as a way of performing the nation in their daily lives.

With regard to food, the austerity measures were based on two important elements. First, they included direct government intervention in the economy to regulate staple food prices and the standardisation of certain staple food items. (e.g., bread). Second, it also included the rationing of available food according to a point system. The system was calculated based on age, occupation, family situation, number of dependent, etc. What the system did not try to achieve was the provision of food based on the immigrants' cultural tastes and preferences. It is now well-known that the rations provided did not meet the cultural needs of many of the new immigrants; at times, the provision did not meet their physical needs as well (Segev, 1998). The rationing system was based on the food the state already produced and the nutritional requirements of a modern diet and not on providing culturally acceptable food. As a result, many accused the state of trying to force

immigrants, particularly *Mizrahi* Jews, to become European by eating *Ashkenazi* food (Rozin, 2006).

Unlike some of the previous examples provided, in particular the case of Japan, the Israeli state was attempting to bring together a diverse group of people who came from a large number of different regions and cultures and whose only unifying element was an imagination of being part of a Jewish nation. As a result, there is no doubt that the state used the austerity measures in its attempts 'to forge a united and unified community from a diverse population of immigrants in a short period of time' (Raviv, 2002b: 85). The measures helped establish standardised food provisions in a number of different areas. For example, the state used the army, also known as the Israeli defence forces (IDF), which was based on conscription, as one of its most important tools for integrating new immigrants. With regard to food this meant that the diet offered by the IDF became the closest thing to an 'authentic Israeli kitchen'. New migrants were presented with a top-down constructed diet that was supposed to address their physical needs, but also introduce them to Israeli food, manners and culture. As a result, some of the food items provided by the IDF during the austerity period became national icons, probably none more so than the 'infamous' tinned army meat loaf ('luf' in Hebrew; Raviv, 2002a).

In order to help facilitate the integration of immigrants, the state also sought to help them learn how to use the rations provided properly. At times, it was clear that decision makers in charge of the measures took a very critical approach towards the new immigrants. They viewed them, especially *Mizrahi* Jews, as well as their eating habits as backwards and as an impediment on progress (Raviv, 2002b; Rozin, 2006). This meant having to teach immigrants how and what to cook, which included the emphasis on the European meal structure and the provision of particular food items and dishes, for example, the consumption of European-style tea and butter and jam. It also included the publication of cookbooks that demonstrated how to use the austerity rations (see, e.g., Cornfeld, 1949).

According to Raviv (2002b), the austerity period also included some efforts to address and incorporate immigrant concerns and tastes. This brought about the first inclusion of *Mizrahi*, and at times local Arab-Palestinian food into Israeli cookbooks. In other words, while the state's policies were trying to impose a more homogeneous diet on the Israeli public, it is also clear that there were some compromises along the way. These compromises helped establish what is today considered by many as Israeli food. Nevertheless, and despite some of these compromises,

the cultural dominance of Ashkenazi-Jews on the process was very evident, with the overall aim of constructing a European-western nation in Israel/Palestine. Through including a number of *Mizrahi* and Arab-Palestinian food items, which were mostly provided in book chapters titled 'oriental food', European concepts of meal structure, nutrition, hygiene and health were imposed.

## **Conclusion**

The chapter, and specifically the case studies provided, highlight the unique nature of food as a political resource connected to security and economic concerns, but also to issues of identity, integration and nation-building. In a way, the chapter illustrates the dichotomous nature of food, which comprises the entire range of the spiritual-material spectrum. It also demonstrates how the study of food is useful in bridging the gap between politics (political economy, security, propaganda, resistance of colonisation, etc.) and anthropology (symbolism, values, culture, etc.).

The case study of diet in Japan has shown that the conventional 'top-down' approach to nationalism retains a degree of explanatory power. When the Meiji government embarked on the project of modernisation, the traditional Japanese diet, which was considered to be nutritiously inferior, was included in the government's reform plans: the Japanese were encouraged to eat meat and the production of rice was to be promoted so as to strengthen the Japanese nation. The government used conscription, a quintessentially modernising and centralising method of nation-building, to propagate meat eating and it also mobilised the emperor's symbolic power. Not all were happy with this development and there were struggles over the admission of meat eating on the symbolic ground, and for the majority of the population, meat was simply too expensive to put on the table. The successive wars the new Japanese state fought helped to modernise Japanese diet while establishing the idea of rice as the Japanese self. The system of rice control, instituted during the Second World War, crumbled due to the pressure of the globalising market, but the idea lingers: domestically produced rice is the best because it is safe and nourishing. The idea, which is arguably instituted by the centralising and modernising state as a means of achieving governance, has been internalised to the extent it can now constitute the basis of anti-globalisation movement.

The case study of Zionism has showcased how food, including its production and consumption, can be mobilised for national aims and

drawn into the national framework. Through their control and manipulation of food, Zionist leaders engaged directly in nation-building and promotion of certain food-related images and values. In particular, the ideas of creating a 'new' Jew through changing the nation's diet and the ideal of 'autarky', or self-sufficiency, appear to have played an important and integral part in Zionist propaganda. The nation's diet was seen as one that has a direct impact on the nation's health, which affected productivity and security, but also on its psyche and character. The promotion of self-sufficiency drew a clear link between individual food choices and the success or failure of the nation. It is clear from some of the other examples we provided that this was also the case in other 'modernising' states. In other words, the state's actions required and necessitated the performance of the nation in the everyday.

What is clear from our two case studies and from the other examples provided is that what is often referred to and considered as national cuisine is more often than not a top-down construction based on the needs of the state. Through its apparatuses and institutions, such as the army and the education system, but also through the important mediums of cookbooks and magazines directed at housewives, the state, masking its aims through the language of modernity, economic needs and science, propagates and disseminates its ideas regarding the nation's diet. The state's needs tie-in together the symbolic nature of food, the requirements of nation-building and the state's economic and social considerations. This means that the state has vested interests in what is considered and imagined as the national cuisine and in its symbolic ownership over and use of particular food items. This gives rise, as we will discuss in the next two chapters, to competing national claims over symbolic food ownership, the linking between national food and sovereignty, and also to the use of national cuisine as a tool for diplomacy and for promoting the nation internationally.

# 5

## National Food in the International Context

### Introduction

The previous chapter has examined the important role food plays at the nation-state level and the ways in which the state uses food in its attempts to control, modernise and homogenise the nation. It also showcased the close relationship between the state's domestic political, social and economic policies and its intervention in the nation's diet. However, the relationship between food and nationalism and its importance to the nation-state extends far beyond the borders of the state. Food is not only used for domestic purposes and as an internal and banal symbol of the nation; it is also used internationally by the state in its diplomatic engagements and as a form of soft power, often referred to as *gastrodiplomacy*. In this regard, national food can be seen as exhibiting a duality; on the one hand, it can be used to indicate the attractiveness of the nation and increase its appeal, while, on the other hand, it can also be seen as a 'contested medium of cultural politics that demarcates national boundaries and identities' (DeSoucey, 2010: 433). This means that what is viewed as national food items or traditions can be used in branding and marketing the nation internationally, but this might also require state intervention and protection from foreign claims. In other words, national food is viewed by the state as a resource that can be utilised to accomplish a variety of aims but that also needs to be secured.

The concept of food as a resource that can be utilised by the state in international relations will be explored through a number of examples that will highlight the successes and failures of such initiatives. In particular, the chapter will examine the case studies of Thailand's 'Global Thai' campaign, the promotion of Taiwanese food and the failed



Japanese 'sushi police' initiative. It will then briefly examine the problematic nature of promoting particular food products as belonging to the nation, a phenomenon that leads in some cases to international contestation over the origin and authenticity of food products, through the case study of the Israeli-Lebanese 'hummus wars'.

## Gastrodiplomacy

The term 'gastrodiplomacy' first appeared in a short article by *The Economist* magazine in 2002 discussing efforts by the Thai government to promote Thai food through an ambitious 'Global Thai' plan, which we will discuss later. *The Economist* claimed that as a result of the Thai government's 'discovery' that foreigners 'like Thai food', it decided to promote and introduce Thai food globally in order to 'persuade more people to visit Thailand' but also to 'subtly help to deepen relations with other countries' (*Economist*, 2002).

The term itself can be understood to encompass three important elements: cultural diplomacy, soft power and nation branding. Sam Chapple-Sokol explains that the use of food and national cuisine as part of cultural diplomacy is meant to 'create a cross-cultural understanding in hopes of improving interactions and cooperation' between people, cultures and states (2013: 162). A number of authors, such as Paul Rockower (2014), propose a different take and use the term 'gastrodiplomacy' to refer only to track three diplomacy and interactions that occur between actors below state level.

Beyond the issue of diplomacy, the promotion of national cuisine can also be seen as a form of 'soft power', a term coined by Joseph Nye (1990) that refers to the state's ability to attract, influence and accommodate foreign actors through its culture and values rather than coerce them through the use of military and economic 'hard' power. Unlike traditional banal symbols of the nation-state, such as flags, coins and anthems, food has the power to attract and can be desired by others, thus enhancing the appeal and prestige of the state. Gastrodiplomacy allows states to use their national cuisine as a 'soft power' resource to increase the appeal and desirability of its culture, people, values and ideals. The fact that it familiarises people with a particular country and associates that country with particular tastes, textures and smells can be seen as useful for states that either do not have a good reputation or that are not particularly well-known (Rockower, 2011). Additionally, national food, because of its symbolic but also vital nature, has the ability to not only bring people together and enhance cultural

diplomacy but also promote economic growth and trade while marketing the nation. The promotion of the nation's food as a brand helps link together banal and everyday aspects of nationalism with the private sector, the state and international relations. It is also useful for the state as a means of exploiting its appeal for economic growth and trade and supporting its tourism industry.

According to Chapple-Sokol (2013: 171), 'foreign publics eating national cuisines are not only contributing to the cooks and farmers, but to their own understanding of nationhood and, along with that, their attitudes towards the other'. This is because through gastrodiploamacy the state is promoting a specific and particular image of its national cuisine. Through branding and marketing its food it is defining and refining what is considered national food as well as constructing and reproducing national boundaries. This issue of redefining, in some cases homogenising, the nation through branding and marketing its food will be discussed in greater depth later in the chapter.

The idea of using national food as an element in diplomacy and international relations has a very long history. For centuries, food and specific food items such as spices, and particularly salt, were used for important economic and diplomatic missions, either as currency or gifts to build or strengthen relations (Nirwandy and Awang, 2014). However, what is interesting in the case of gastrodiploamacy is how different it is from the historical examples of using food as a diplomatic tool, or indeed from some of the more modern uses of food in international relations, for example, the provision of food aid. This is because these types of initiatives, such as food aid, are not directly related to food as a national element.

The first major example of national food used as an integral element in cultural diplomacy comes from France in the nineteenth century. In order to increase the appeal of the state, ease relations and strengthen its diplomatic initiatives, the French state made use of its cuisine and chefs. This was done through a number of different initiatives. French ambassadors were asked to frequently entertain in order to befriend and familiarise themselves with local dignitaries. One of the highlights of such events was the provision of French food and wine. Such was the appeal of these types of initiatives that in Britain, for example, elites became enamoured by all things that were French and in particular French food and French wine, and many as a result employed French chefs (Rogers, 2004). Even more importantly, French food was used in direct support of French diplomatic efforts. Chapple-Sokol (2013) provides the example of the French diplomat, and later Prime Minister,

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, who asked the famous French chef Anton Careme, often regarded as the 'King of cooks and the cook of kings', to accompany the French delegation to the Congress of Vienna in 1814 after the abdication of Napoleon. Careme was expected not only to 'provide culinary support to the French delegation' through cooking but also to impress the European leaders who gathered at Vienna. Talleyrand and Careme are rumoured to have won over the European leaders who gathered at Vienna, and who all expressed their love of cheese, by winning an impromptu European cheese competition with the presentation of *Brie de Meaux*, which was proclaimed 'king of cheeses'.

The degree of success of the French state in this regard is evident from the fact that just as French was the language of diplomacy for a long time, French cuisine became the de facto official cuisine of diplomacy. There are many examples of states serving mostly French food during diplomatic engagements; for example, Meiji Japan entering the Westphalian system of states in the latter half of the nineteenth century adopted French cuisine as its cuisine of choice when entertaining foreign diplomats (Harada, 2005). In this sense, 'food works' in diplomacy, which has been known for a long while. What is novel about gastrodiploacy is that the emphasis is on the 'national' nature of food or cuisine, not on the state, though it does help the state in its political and economic endeavours.

## Global Thai

Thailand is often presented as the prime example of a country utilising gastrodiploacy. What is clear is that it was the first state to actively use its food in pursuit of its cultural diplomatic effort to increase its soft power. The idea of using food was a by-product of Thailand's unique situation in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, and in response to war in neighbouring Vietnam, Thailand became a rest and recuperation base for US soldiers; in addition, the United States established a number of air force bases in Thailand. The presence of large numbers of US personnel resulted in the modernisation and to some extent westernisation of the Thai hospitality and food industry, which profited from catering to the US troops. This in turn helped stir and promote Thai food globally as well as establish Thailand as a tourist destination (Murrey, 2007). The popularity of Thai food brought with it the growth and expansion of the Thai agriculture food industry.

Thailand's official engagement with gastrodiploacy began in 2002 with the launching of its 'Global Thai' programme under former Prime

Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The project aimed to significantly increase the number of Thai restaurants globally from around 5,000 to 20,000 by 2008. In order to facilitate this rapid growth of Thai restaurants, the Thai government provided a substantial amount of loans, supervised and oversaw the establishment of restaurants, created business links between global Thai restaurants and the Thai food industry, and helped to establish Thai cooking schools to train and supply Thai chefs (Sunanta, 2005).

Additionally, the Thai government also sought to use these restaurants to promote a particular image of Thailand. This was accomplished through awards given to 'successful' restaurants as well as the provision of the 'Thai Select' label. The label indicated official recognition of the restaurants' standard and the quality and authenticity of the food provided. In order to be awarded the label, Thai restaurants had to adhere not only to hygiene, safety and quality standards but also to those dealing with the Thai national image. The restaurants were required to provide and promote specific Thai dishes in their menus. Sunanta (2005) gives the example of a number of particular dishes, such as Tom Yam and Tom Kha soups, Green curry and Padthai (the Thai Select programme, which will be discussed later, includes 29 specific Thai dishes).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the restaurants were expected to emphasise a particular image of Thai culture through staff dress ('traditional' Thai dress and colours were encouraged) and the décor and atmosphere provided, including paintings, sculptures and music. The idea was to create an appealing image of Thai people, culture and geography (Murrey, 2007). This encouraged the promotion of a particular top-down idea of Thai identity and to some extent forced Thai people to engage with the image sold to non-Thais as Thai identity. One could argue that through the promotion of Thai food globally, the Thai government engaged in the homogenisation of Thai culture and identity.

The idea behind promoting Thai restaurants through the 'Global Thai' initiative was part of a wider Thai food policy that aimed to link the promotion of Thailand and its culture and geography with spurring innovation and expansion in the Thai agriculture and food industry. Thailand today is one of the largest food-processing countries in the world as well as the world's largest exporter of rice, and as a whole, agricultural products and processed food account to around a fifth of Thailand's total exports (Murrey, 2007).

The 'Global Thai' initiative was followed up by the launching of the 'Thailand the Kitchen of the World' e-book and campaign. The

e-book and campaign were designed to educate and promote Thai food and culture. According to Chapple-Sokol (2013), the ‘Thailand the Kitchen of the World’ e-book and campaign were run by the Thai Public Relations Department. The introduction of the e-book explains:

Thai food and Thai cuisine from the past to the present are distinctive in their charms and characters. The cuisine is a proud heritage of the Thai people that they believe is second to none, and it has been handed down through generations. Apart from the delicate blend of tastes and the rich nutritional value, the elaborate arrangement of Thai food and the decorations with fruit and vegetable carvings make it all the more inviting. At the same time, Thai food and Thai cooking reflect the wisdom and culture of the Thai nation. Today, Thai food and Thai cuisine stand ready to make Thailand a proud Kitchen of the World.<sup>2</sup>

The Thai gastrodiplomatic effort can be seen as a way of linking together and framing the Thai state’s economic, agricultural and diplomatic policies as part of the national discourse. Through the promotion of Thai restaurants, an initiative that has been extremely successful – from around 5,000 restaurants in 2002 to around 13,000 by 2009 (Chapple-Sokol, 2013) – the Thai government has shown how gastrodiplomacy can achieve far more than simply support a state’s diplomatic effort. It is also true that each new ‘Thai Select’ restaurant opened also acts as ‘an unofficial embassy’, supports diaspora Thai population and provides the possibility for cultural interaction (Chapple-Sokol, 2013). It also homogenises the Thai national image and food, enhances the particular national brand the Thai government seeks to promote and helps support the Thai economy. According to the Thai Department of International Trade Promotion, which runs the ‘Thai Select’ programme, as of 2015, there are 1,135 ‘Thai Select’ restaurants outside of Thailand. In a clear demonstration of the homogenising effect of the programme, there are now also 67 ‘Thai Select’ restaurants in Thailand and the programme has now also been extended to include Thai food items – the ‘Thai Select’ label appears on over 100 packaged Thai food products.<sup>3</sup>

## Taiwan

Since the launch of the ‘Global Thai’ initiative, many countries have tried to emulate it, both with regard to national branding and marketing, for example, Malaysia’s ‘Malaysian Kitchen for the World’ initiative,

and cultural diplomacy, for example, the launching of South Korea's 'Kimchi Diplomacy'.

One of the more recent gastrodipomatic campaigns has been the one launched by the Taiwanese government. Taiwan's campaign is often used as an example to demonstrate the reasons for and merits of gastrodipomacy. What is interesting about the Taiwanese example is that it is a national campaign undertaken by a unique international actor that is not widely recognised as an independent state – in fact, its nature, territory and sovereignty are a source of international tension and are in dispute. The dispute goes back to the Chinese civil war in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Chinese civil war ended in a victory for the Communist party headed by Mao Zedong and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The losing side, the nationalist party headed by Chiang Kai Shek, established themselves in Taiwan, which they proclaimed the Republic of China, in preparation for continuing their struggle for China. The island, which had been under Chinese rule for several centuries and under Japanese rule for several decades (1895–1945) preceding the war, was 'returned' to China after it was liberated from the Japanese. To this day, no official ceasefire or end to the conflict between the two sides has been achieved, though Taiwan no longer holds any aspirations for the takeover of China.

Taiwan's complex diplomatic situation, especially its fraught relationship with China, which views it as a 'renegade province', creates great difficulty for its diplomatic efforts and its ability to project its national image. It is not a member of the United Nations and, because of its tense relations with China, does not have diplomatic relations and is not recognised by a number of states. According to Rockower (2011: 109), 'Taiwan is a unique case of a nation that must conduct public diplomacy not only as a means of promotion, but also as a means for ensuring its diplomatic survival and access to the international arena'. As a consequence, one of the few avenues open to Taiwan is through cultural diplomacy and specifically through the use of gastrodipomacy. Taiwanese gastrodipomacy, to further promote Taiwan and its reputation and appeal, is predicated on the idea 'that the easiest way to win hearts and minds is through the stomach' (Rockower, 2011: 125). By promoting and supporting the spread of its food through various means, which will be discussed later, the Taiwanese government is trying to engage with the international community and achieve a number of aims. First, it seeks to be better recognised and seen as separate from China; this is done through the promotion of specific Taiwanese indigenous food culture in addition to highlighting the Taiwanese

characteristics of the traditional Chinese culture that has been preserved in the island for several centuries. This also entails the promotion and celebration of indigenous culture (there are more than a dozen non-Chinese indigenous groups) in support of the Taiwanese national identity and image. Second is to promote Taiwan as an appealing and interesting country, a country with strong democratic values, distinctive culture and good food; in other words, to enhance Taiwanese soft power, or power of influence. Lastly, through the promotion of its food, Taiwan hopes to market itself as a desirable destination for tourists and promote its products as attractive to global consumers. This helps promote economic growth and Taiwanese economic diversification and the private sector; it also supports and strengthens the domestic tourist industry.

The Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy campaign includes a number of specific elements, such as government investment in the international promotion of Taiwanese food – in 2013, for example, Taiwan was set to invest \$34.2 million in promoting its cuisine; hosting international food festivals and cooking competitions as well as launching Taiwanese food festivals abroad; supporting Taiwanese restaurants and the training of Taiwanese chefs; establishing a ‘culinary think tank’ (Chapple-Sokol, 2013: 176); supporting Taiwanese culinary tours, for example the ‘travelling night markets’; and creating networks of support to bring together the food and tourism industries (Chapple-Sokol, 2013; Rockower, 2011).

Many of the elements mentioned above are utilised in combination with other cultural diplomacy initiatives. For example, in the United Kingdom a number of Taiwanese organisations and groups – including the ‘Taiwanese Association in the UK’, the Taiwanese chamber of commerce in the United Kingdom, UK Taiwanese students groups and the Taiwanese ministry of culture – have set up annual Taiwanese festivals. These festivals promote and celebrate Taiwanese culture and business, including music, dance, film, tourism and even medical tourism. However, looking at the festivals’ website<sup>4</sup> and the range of festivals and events promoted, it is clear that food is at the forefront of this cultural diplomacy initiative.

The Taiwanese government’s gastrodiplomacy initiative in the United Kingdom was launched by President Ma Ying-Jeou in 2010 with a £20m investment to promote Taiwanese food and brands and to highlight and differentiate ‘the country from its giant and sometimes antagonistic neighbour, China, and to end the perception that Taiwan is little more than the mass-production workshop of the world’ (Booth, 2010). The initiative came to support and add to the already existing attempts to promote Taiwanese food, mostly by the Taiwanese community in the

United Kingdom and the Taiwanese food and beverage industry.<sup>5</sup> The gastrodiplomacy initiative in the United Kingdom sits alongside many similar ones undertaken by the Taiwanese government across the world. For example, in September 2014, the Taiwanese Ministry of Culture held a nine-day celebration of Taiwanese food in Paris, which included films, theatre plays and music performances.

While it is hard to assess the success of the Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy initiative, taking the United Kingdom as an example, it is clear that there is far more recognition of Taiwanese food and food culture than before. A mere example of this has been the rapid spread of the Taiwanese-based 'bubble tea' craze:

[I]t may have the word 'tea' in its name, but the Taiwanese bubble tea is about as far removed from Britain's favourite brew as it gets ... [bubble tea] is cold, fruity, comes in an array of bright colours – and it has dozens of slimy tapioca balls around in the bottom ... Yet shockingly ... the unusual drink is catching on.

(Arthurs, 2012)

The popularity of the drink is such that there are now a dozen or more companies selling it across the United Kingdom. If, as Chapple-Sokol (2013) notes, the gastrodiplomacy tool is used to reach not only policymaker elites, who remain mostly behind closed doors, but also the wider international public and engage with them, then the mere acknowledgement of Taiwan as a culinary hotspot and of the quality of its food as well as food trends and fashions, from the bubble tea to night markets, would imply its success. Additionally, it has been noted that over the past decade, Taiwan's image as a tourist destination and specifically as a culinary tourist destination has increased dramatically. The rapid increase in culinary tourism demonstrates how an international campaign to promote national food has a direct impact on the domestic sphere. In a similar way to the Thai case, the promotion of a specific idea and image of Taiwanese food, and the importance attached to culinary tourism, has led to a redefinition of Taiwanese food and as a consequence Taiwanese national identity. This has also meant the growing differentiation between Taiwanese and Chinese identities and an increasing emphasis on the local and indigenous Taiwanese identity (Chuang, 2009).

According to Chapple-Sokol (2013), Taiwan's gastrodiplomacy initiative is carried out not only to differentiate it from China but also to improve its relationship with its giant neighbour. By bringing and



promoting Taiwanese cuisine to and in mainland China, Taiwan is hoping to influence Chinese public opinion regarding the country and the relationship between the two states.

It is important to note at this stage that the supposed success of the 'Global Thai' initiative and the Taiwanese case has motivated many other governments to go down the gastrodiploacy route, and not all of them are Asian. For example, Peru has been one of the more recent converts to gastrodiploacy. The Peruvian government has viewed gastrodiploacy (*Cocina Peruana Para el Mundo: 'Peruvian Cuisine for the World'*) as a means of changing global perceptions of Peru while strengthening its economy and in particular its food and tourism industries. According to *The Economist* (2014):

[T]he Peruvian capital has become a gastronomic mecca. Until recently, tourists headed straight for Cusco, the former Inca capital, and the ruins of Machu Picchu. Now some 75,000 visit Lima every year solely to enjoy its food... [it is estimated] that restaurants alone account for 3% of Peru's GDP.

What is clear is that Peruvian food has now become a major attraction and a growing export industry. As explained by the head of public diploacy at the Peruvian embassy in Washington, 'we want our food to be as well-known as Thai in this country... we want 5,000 no 10,000 restaurants in the US. We want Peruvian restaurants everywhere' (quoted in Wilson, 2011: 17). The official support given to the promotion of food in the country has now also extended to an official application to UNESCO to recognise the country's cuisine as an intangible cultural heritage.<sup>6</sup>

The Peruvian gastrodiploacy initiative also serves an additional aim. It also helps to promote Peruvian national identity and pride domestically: 'Even so, Peru's gastronomic revolution, along with rapid economic growth over the past decade, has helped to restore national self-esteem in a country that a quarter-century ago was wracked by terrorism and hyperinflation' (*Economist*, 2014).

### Japan's 'sushi police'

Like any other thing in life, gastrodiploacy does not always succeed. Or rather, it is usually very difficult to ascertain whether it has been successful or not. In this context, the case of the Japanese 'sushi police' is exceptional, in that it is a clear-cut example of a failed attempt at pursuing government-led gastrodiploacy.

In 2006, *The Washington Post* carried an article by Anthony Faiola (2006) entitled 'Putting the Bite On Pseudo Sushi And Other Insults: Japan Plans to Scrutinize Restaurant Offerings Abroad', which reported on the Japanese government's plan for quality control of restaurants abroad that served Japanese food. 'So beware, America, home of the California roll. The Sushi Police are on their way', so warned Faiola, and a new term, 'sushi police', entered popular vocabulary. This was quickly picked up by wide Western readership and fans of Japanese food both in Japan and abroad, attracting expressions of incredulity and scepticism (Daliot-Bul, 2009; Sakamoto and Allen, 2011).

What was then dubbed as the 'sushi police' referred to the government's plan to put in place a system of authenticating Japanese restaurants abroad in a similar manner that the Thai and Italian governments were attempting in order to control the quality of Thai or Italian restaurants across the world. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) took the lead in this initiative and the idea was officially discussed for the first time at a meeting of the advisory council made up with experts in Japanese food/cuisine and cultural exchange (chefs, food manufactures, a restaurant information provider, representatives of tourism industry and the Japan Foundation) and MAFF officials on 27 November 2006 with a view to designing a system of authenticating Japanese restaurants abroad (MAFF, 2006). The government's intention was clearly about ensuring the authenticity of Japanese food served at Japanese restaurants abroad, as Minister Matsuoka, the then Minister of Agriculture, made it clear at this inaugural meeting: 'Above all, the fundamental aim is to provide authentic and proper Japanese cuisine. Not the type of thing which looks Japanese on the surface but which is not at all Japanese in its content, but I would like to provide what we can proudly call authentic Japanese cuisine'.<sup>7</sup> As Faiola and others surmised, the minister's wish was to set up a system to judge which restaurants served the 'correct/appropriate' Japanese cuisine in order to protect the cuisine's integrity. The idea was clearly built on the belief that only the Japanese knew the truth about Japanese cuisine. Notwithstanding the minister's passion for serving something authentic ostensibly as a way of promoting exports of Japanese food stuff as well as of attracting more tourists to Japan, other members of the meeting were more cautious about the idea of 'authentication'. 'Authentic to whom?' was one of the points made by a number of experts, and attention was drawn to the fuzzy boundary of Japanese cuisine as well as the importance of fusion in the development of Japanese food culture.

The intention to 'authenticate' was again interrogated in the second meeting on 1 February 2007 with contributions from those who were involved in a variety of activities to promote Japanese cuisine abroad, and the minutes clearly conveyed a change in direction away from 'authentication by the government' to 'recommendation by the private sector' (MAFF, 2007a). What was seen as problematic by many of the council members was the impression that the Japanese government was telling the world what was right and correct about things Japanese. The shift in the direction was confirmed in the third meeting on 16 March 2007. It was agreed that the implementation of the 'Japanese Restaurant Recommendation Program' would be proposed to the government (MAFF, 2007b). The aim of the programme was defined as enabling people living outside Japan to enjoy tasty and safe Japanese cuisine in Japanese restaurants, and it was noted that the programme should be pursued by the private sector, with the government assuming a supporting role. The programme also emphasised the widely spread hybrid nature of Japanese cuisine offered outside Japan and declared to be non-exclusionary and non-discriminatory in any sense (*ibid.*).

Upon this recommendation, the Organization to Promote Japanese Restaurants Abroad (JRO) was set up as the implementation body of the programme in July 2007 (Organization to Promote Japanese Restaurants Abroad, 2008). JRO's stated objectives are 'to promote the reliability of restaurants serving Japanese food overseas while providing vital information on Japanese food and food culture, and to contribute to the further development of Japanese food culture as well as the enhancement of the global dining experience'.<sup>8</sup> In the first year of its existence, it developed the 'recommendation guidelines' (which appear to have been quietly dropped since then) for the purpose of the implementation of the programme and adopted an official logo. In the subsequent years, JRO's activities have been focused on hosting training sessions and seminars for cooking professionals, developing a network of Japanese restaurant owners and food importers in various places in the world, holding symposia to discuss issues related to spreading Japanese cuisine abroad and so on, and their activities do not include anything akin to inspection, evaluation or authentication of Japanese restaurants outside Japan. Clearly, JRO is not the 'sushi police' as envisaged by Minister Matsuoka, and in this sense the gastrodiplomacy initiative of the Japanese government has clearly failed.

The 'sushi police' idea, although it was quickly shot down by the body set up by the government, was certainly an aspect of a wider

programme of official nationalism pursued by the Japanese government, and it needs to be examined in the context of the 'Cool Japan' initiative (Daliot-Bul, 2009; Sakamoto and Allen, 2011; Valaskivi, 2013). The 'Cool Japan' initiative emerged in 2002 when the Japanese government started to assess the value of Japanese popular culture, probably for the first time, within the newly emerging framework of intellectual property. The Council for Intellectual Property Strategy was set up in 2002 by the order of the then Prime Minister Koizumi. The move was christened as 'Cool Japan' in an influential article entitled 'Japan's Gross National Cool' by Douglas McGray published in *Foreign Policy* in May 2002. The surge of interest in intellectual property was due to the increased awareness on the part of Japanese policymakers of the importance of creative industry in shoring up the stagnating economy, and McGray's depiction of Japan as an emerging 'Empire of Cool' found a captive audience among Japanese policymakers who were looking into Tony Blair's UK government's 'Cool Britannia' initiative in the late 1990s. The 'Cool Japan' initiative refers to a range of government policies to promote Japanese, mainly creative, industry and export by focusing on what is deemed to be 'cool', usually popular culture such as *manga* and *anime*, but as the initiative developed it started to include a wider range of objects such as food, martial arts and traditional culture. There is a consensus that the 'sushi police' scheme emerged within a wider framework of the 'Cool Japan' initiative as an expression of the Japanese government's desire to be in full control of cultural products as the rightful owner of those (Daliot-Bul, 2009; Sakamoto and Allen, 2011; Valaskivi, 2013). While the 'sushi police' idea never materialised in the form it was originally envisaged, the 'Cool Japan' initiative has been steadily pursued by the successive Japanese government as seen in the setting up of the 'Cool Japan' unit in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2010, and in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, the initiative was repositioned to be the driving force of the regeneration of the areas hit by the disaster as well as Japan as a whole (Valaskivi, 2013). The Japanese government's application to UNESCO for the inscription of *washoku*, Japanese traditional cuisine, in the intangible cultural heritage list was also seen by the METI as an integral part of the 'Cool Japan' strategy (MAFF, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d).

The 'Cool Japan' initiative has been invariably seen as a form of soft power, in the game of which McGray argued that Japan had surpassed the United States because its popular culture was not seen as

threatening by others (McGray, 2002); it is also seen as a clear case of nation branding drawing from cultural nationalism (Daliot-Bul, 2009; Sakamoto and Allen, 2011). It is often understood as the government's efforts to project a favourable image of itself abroad in order to secure an increase in its influence in the world and to stimulate the economy by expanding export and by attracting more tourists based on culture. The 'sushi police' initiative was also conceived in this context: the aim of authenticating Japanese restaurants abroad was to promote export of Japanese agricultural products, services and skills associated with Japanese cuisine as well as to entice tourists to Japan to experience 'the real stuff' after being introduced to authentic Japanese culture at a Japanese restaurant that is authenticated by the Japanese government. However, as Daliot-But (2009) points out, the true target of the 'Cool Japan' initiative, including the 'sushi police', is in fact the domestic population; it is a means of national mobilisation, because if national culture was to be promoted abroad, the promoter is required to have enough knowledge of the very culture he/she is promoting. Culture is notoriously difficult to pin down, and its proprietorship is always contested. Sakamoto and Allen (2011) point out that the majority of the Japanese population is not very sure of the 'correct' way of having sushi as the vast number of books and other information available as to what is the correct way of ordering, eating and paying for sushi at a traditional sushi bar indicate, for instance. When the Japanese government promotes the 'Cool Japan' initiative, the Japanese people are prompted to learn about what is 'cool' about Japanese culture, to define it, to create it and then to contribute to turning it to commercial goods in order to help project a particular image of Japan. In other words, it is a national mobilisation scheme at the time of economic stagnation and other crises.

The 'sushi police' initiative failed due to the appreciation of the fuzziness and hybridity of Japanese cuisine shared by the majority of the members of the advisory council. To them, to have a government-run system to certify which restaurant serves correct Japanese cuisine was simply not the done thing. Still the minutes of the advisory council's meetings show there was clear desire to affirm the ownership of Japanese food, drawing from the assumption that they knew what authentic Japanese cuisine was because they were Japanese. While this particular initiative failed before it was put in place, the case of 'sushi police' demonstrates that gastrodiploacy draws from the un-reflected, essentialist assumption about the relationship between the nation, culture and food that persists in modern society.

## Contesting the authenticity of national food

The example of the 'sushi police' and its perceived relationship with Japanese food raise the issue of food authenticity. It is not only within the nation that the authenticity of food is a contested and problematic concept. More often than not, as states promote national food and use it as a form of soft power and a tool in cultural diplomacy, the authenticity of the nation's food is challenged and contested in the international context and as a consequence of globalisation. This brings to the fore the need to arbitrate and define to whom certain food items belong as well as to agree on what should be the accepted standards and methods of production. This contest over authenticity brought about by globalisation produces national food clashes that are not only about the nation's cultural heritage and the authenticity of particular food items but also a struggle between national and international private sector food manufacturers and producers as well as a clash between what is perceived as national at the everyday, national and international levels.

This issue will be briefly explored through the recent Israeli-Lebanese 'hummus wars'. As discussed in earlier chapters, hummus is seen in Israel as one of its national dishes and hummus and the hummus industry in Israel are serious businesses. In Israel, almost any conversation, be it among Jewish-Israelis or Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel regarding food invariably triggers a lively debate over where and how to eat hummus. Hummus has been described by a prominent Jewish-Israeli blogger as the embodiment of the nation (Galili, 2007). Beyond its importance as a food item that is consumed regularly and viewed as belonging to the nation, Israel and Israeli-owned companies are among the leading producers and exporters of hummus.

The 'hummus wars' started with a marketing stunt by the US-based food company Sabra (the name given to a Jew born in Israel), which is owned jointly by PepsiCo and one of Israel's largest food companies Strauss, to produce the world's largest hummus plate, in order to increase the sales of its salads and dips in the United States, in particular the sale of hummus. This was followed by the setting in Israel of a Guinness record for the biggest hummus plate by Osem, an Israeli food company and a competitor of Strauss. Osem produced a 400 kg hummus plate that was eaten in the main food market in Jerusalem, Mahaneh Yehuda. The two marketing stunts were reported by the Israeli business newspaper *Calcalist* (2008) as being the opening shots in the 'hummus war' between the two over the lucrative US market. The 'hummus wars' helped both companies increase their share of

the US hummus market, and by 2013 Sabra controlled over half of it (Fuchs, 2013).

The ‘hummus wars’ became truly international when a year later, in response to the breaking of the hummus Guinness record by Israeli companies, a group of Lebanese chefs broke the record and produced a hummus plate of over 2 tons. The Lebanese hummus plate came as a result of a campaign by the association of Lebanese industrialists (ALI) ‘dubbed “Hands off Our Dishes” ’ that ‘intended to stop Israel from marketing hummus and other dishes as Israeli’ (Ariel, 2012: 37). Fadi Abboud, the then head of ALI and later Lebanon’s tourism minister, claimed that Lebanon was ready to take legal action against Israel over the marketing of Lebanese food products as Israeli. Abboud stated that even though hummus is not an internationally and officially recognised Lebanese dish, its claim of ownership was based on its long historical association with the product. ALI based its claim on the precedent created by Greece’s successful litigation over the use of feta cheese – in 2002, the European Union ruled that only Greece is allowed to market cheese as feta because of the long history of the production of the cheese under the name feta in Greece (we will discuss the protected designation of origin (PDO) within the European Union in Chapter 7).

After the Lebanese Guinness record, a tit-for-tat breaking of the hummus Guinness record took place. First, in 2009 Arab-Palestinian chefs in the village of Abu Ghosh, known for its culinary prowess, broke the record in an event that was framed in patriotic terms (Israeli flags decorated the event) and which claimed to bring back the record to Israel. An Arab-Palestinian businessman and restaurant owner claimed that ‘the Lebanese can claim whatever they want, but the hummus is ours, Israelis. We, in any case, prepare it better’ (quoted in Hirsch and Tene, 2013: 40). The Israeli record did not hold for long and was broken the following year by Lebanese chefs who claimed to ‘stand together against this industrial and cultural violation and defend our economy, civilization and Lebanese heritage’ (quoted in Knafo, 2013).

Whether hummus is indeed Israeli or Lebanese, or Middle Eastern for that matter, is open to debate. What is clear, however, is that marketing and promoting of food as national in a globalised world can lead to tension and conflict and be further linked to other political issues. Abboud explained that the ‘hummus wars’ are not only about hummus; it is also about ‘the organized theft carried out by Israel, not just of land, but history, traditions, architecture, poetry, singing, music, and everything that is Arab in this region. In the imagination of the world, everything bad that originates from the Arab countries is

Arab, and everything that is pleasant and good in this region originated from Israel' (quoted in Ariel, 2012: 37). What is apparent in Abboud's words is the importance of attractive and popular food items, such as hummus, to the image projected by the nation-state. Nevertheless, and as noted by Hirsch and Tene (2013), the 'hummus wars' also exposed the close relationship between the everyday and banal manifestation of nationalism through food, the global use and marketing of national food, and the important role played by private companies in the representation of food as national. For example, the Israeli hummus plate produced at Abu Ghosh was part of an event sponsored by the village restaurants and an Israeli food company (Miki Salads) trying to make a name for itself, which provided the facilities and equipment. The company's logo was also present on the hummus plate. The 'hummus wars' also indicated the growing prominence of international organisations in mediating competing claims: the Lebanese claim was based on the Greek feta precedent and ALI threatened to use international organisations to stake the Lebanese ownership of hummus. As of 2015, there has been no Lebanese legal action taken with regard to trademarking hummus.

The example of the 'hummus wars' is not unique; as mentioned above with regard to the case of feta cheese, there have been a number of trade disputes and challenges to the authenticity and origin of food items. Another well-known food dispute has been over the rights to market a dish of fermented spicy cabbage as kimchi, also known as the 'Kimchi wars'. Kimchi is seen in South Korea as the national dish. As a result, South Korea has claimed on the one hand that the marketing of fermented cabbage as kimchi by China and Japan is an act of appropriation, while, on the other hand, South Korea has accused both countries of producing products that are not of the same standard as the Korean kimchi, specifically that they are not fermented in the same way. Unlike the above-mentioned case of hummus and Lebanon's claim to it, South Korea has appealed to several international organisations in its dispute with Japan and China (Han, 2011). It has lobbied the Codex Alimentarius – a body set up by the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health Organization to provide food recommendations, regulations and standards with regard to labelling, hygiene, health and ethics among others – for the provision of specific kimchi standards. It has also applied to have kimchi listed by UNESCO as part of its intangible cultural heritage; UNESCO accepted the Korean claim and included kimchi in its list in 2013. Closely related issues with the 'kimchi wars' will be discussed further in Chapter 7 in our efforts to untangle the role



of international organisations in food and nationalism. What needs to be noted at this point is that gastrodiploacy, which is built on cultural diplomacy, soft power and nation branding, can bring about an international dispute that usually calls for international intervention. The authenticity of national food can only be certified with reference to the international/global, a paradox that is found in the global regime of culture protection and its tension with nationalism.

## Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated the apparent usefulness of the food-and-nationalism axis in examining state interaction and the relationship between the everyday level, the state and the private sector in a globalised world. It made clear the appeal food holds as a means of winning hearts and minds and in creating an appealing national brand. As the case studies of Taiwan and Thailand indicate, gastrodiploacy is one of the more useful, though underused, tools states have in their cultural diplomacy arsenal. Though, and as we have shown with regard to Japan's 'sushi police', it is not always an easy tool to wield.

The importance of national food as a marker of national identity and its use internationally also reveals an interesting dichotomy inherent in the spread of globalisation. On the one hand, the spread of globalisation is expected to limit the scope for nationalism and nationally claimed produce by bringing about homogenisation at the global scale as seen in the idea of McDonaldisation. However, on the other hand, the desire by states to use food in the global setting requires its identification with the nation, a strengthening of the particularistic framework. This brings about a process of both globalisation and localisation in the states' efforts to use food as a tool of diplomacy to maximise their national interest. Hence the chapter has highlighted an inherently contradictory effect of globalisation on nationalism. Globalisation is not, after all, a process of flattening out the global cultural landscape but of adding more and more layers to it.

The globalisation and localisation of food and its use by states raise a number of important issues, in particular with regard to food authenticity and origin, but also with regard to mediation and arbitration. The tensions that arise from competing national claims over food necessitate an international mechanism of conflict resolution. As we will discuss in our last chapter, this means that the final arbiters of issues relating to nationalism might be the same international bodies that were heralded as bringing about the end of the nation-state.

## **Part III**

# **Food and Nationalism/National Identity at the Global Level**

# 6

## Norms, Food and Nationalism

Whether it is ideationally poor or not, there is a scholarly consensus that nationalism can be understood as a form of ideology, not just as a form of 'national sentiment' (Freeden, 1998; Malešević, 2013). It is an ideology because it is not just about *what is* but also about 'what ought to be/should be' (Özkirimli, 2005: 63). After all, in Ernest Gellner's celebrated definition, nationalism is 'a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit *should be* congruent' (Gellner, 1983: 1, emphasis added). In other words, there is no denying there is a normative dimension to nationalism; nationalism touches on what is right and what is wrong.

Nationalism's normative aspect in the international arena is most commonly discussed in reference to the principle of national self-determination. Given a concrete expression for the first time in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points (1914), the right of nations to self-determination is the fundamental principle of the society of the states today. It is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), Chapter 1, Article 1, and has been evoked by a number of groups seeking independence and securing sovereignty. This relationship between sovereignty and nationalism, by now a cornerstone of the current international system, is taken for granted in literature (Ichijo, 2009). However, as Bernard Yack has observed: 'Even a brief glance at modern history suggests that there is an important connection between popular sovereignty and the rise and spread of nationalism. For wherever popular sovereignty leads, nationalism seems to follow' (Yack, 2001: 517). Undoubtedly, examining this taken-for-granted relationship with renewed analytical rigour is in order. Achieving self-determination and securing sovereignty are intricately related to negative phenomena such as tightening of the citizenship criteria, persecution of minorities, ethnic

cleansing and genocide, and it is often in relation to these developments that the normative aspect of nationalism is interrogated (Kymlica, 1995; Moore, 1998; Yack, 2012).

This chapter, however, approaches the relationship between norms and nationalism from a different point of view. Making the most of the highly symbolic nature of food, as the previous chapters have all emphasised, it investigates normative concerns related to food in reference to nationalism. The chapter is not about food taboos as widely investigated in anthropology but focuses on the question of who decides what is appropriate to eat in the international arena. It illustrates the ways in which a shift in norms leads to a new form of friction between values and norms that often assumes a nationalistic hue. It aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 'food-and-nationalism' angle in investigating different levels of politics. The chapter opens with an examination of the case of whale meat eating to review how the question about resource management has developed into a contestation of values with a nationalist tinge. It then places the whale problem in a comparative context in reference to the issues of dog meat and foie gras consumption. Using these examples, the chapter highlights the dynamic relationship between changes and shifts in dominant norms and the strengthening of the demand for the particular. Additionally, the examples provided demonstrate the tension that is inherent in the national assertion of norms and values in a globalised world.

The chapter therefore demonstrates that the 'food-and-nationalism' angle provides another perspective to politics at the global level that is deeply embedded in people's everyday life. In other words, the chapter is also part of efforts to link international/global politics to everyday life. In Seoul today, you may find a dog meat restaurant or two. You may not think about it too much, but the fact that they are still there tells a lot about how South Korean society deals with the rest of the world if you know about the dog meat-eating controversy. Because food is ubiquitous, politics about food, which is inevitable as the previous chapters have repeatedly shown, is also ubiquitous and it can connect different levels of politics closely in a surprising manner.

### **The case of whale meat eating**

On 31 March 2014, the International Court of Justice delivered its judgement in the case concerning 'Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening)'. It found that Japan's whaling programme in the Antarctic (JARPA II) was not in accordance with three

provisions of the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICJ, 2014). Put more simply, the Court found that what the Japanese government termed as ‘scientific whaling’ did not comply with the International Whaling Commission’s regulations, to which the Japanese government had signed up to, and ordered the Japanese government to stop whaling in the Antarctic. Upon the delivery of the judgement, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Japanese government issued a statement expressing their regret over the judgement but confirming that Japan would abide by it as a state ‘that places a great importance on the international legal order and the rule of law as a basis of the international community’ (MOFA, 2014). As presented both by the Court and the Japanese government, the ruling was about the legality of whaling, an issue of international law, and not about whale meat eating. The Japanese government’s response even emphasised the presentation of Japan as a ‘good and conscientious’ member of the international community. However, by the time the ruling was delivered, the whaling problem had become deeply entangled with the issue of culture, (Bailey, 2008: 292; Blok, 2011; Peace, 2010); the minutes of the 186th Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee meeting of the Japanese Diet on 16 April 2014 contains a phrase ‘Given that whaling is part of Japan’s unique tradition and culture’, revealing that the Japanese government understood the Court’s judgement as pertaining to Japanese culture, including whale meat eating (The House of Representatives, 2014). The whaling problem, therefore, is an international dispute in which the ‘food-and-nationalism’ angle is effectively applied.

### **Whaling problem: The emergence and evolution of the issue**

What is understood as the whaling problem now usually refers to the deeply engrained division between the so-called whaling nations, such as Japan and Norway, and those who are opposed to commercial whaling at the International Whaling Committee (IWC). The IWC was set up in 1948 to administer the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) of 1946, which was signed amid growing concern over the extinction of the species (Yasuda, 2006). The IWC’s objectives include ‘to provide proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks’ and ‘thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry’ (International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946), and it was clearly set up as an international mechanism to manage the whale population and the whaling industry.

Needless to say, whaling has a long history. Human beings living in coastal regions across the world have been engaged in it since time

immemorial. What we now understand as commercial whaling was pioneered by Western nations, which started organised whaling at the end of the seventeenth century. Japanese whaling before Meiji Restoration of 1868 was of a small scale using open boats and was conducted close to the coast. What changed the whaling industry globally was the introduction of the Norwegian cannon-fired harpoons in the 1890s, which led to a rapid growth of the industry. The industry was so successful in catching whales on a large scale that concerns over the numbers of whales started to emerge in the early twentieth century. In fact, in 1925, at the League of Nations, the establishment of an international conference to prevent whale extinction was proposed, which was opposed by the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands (Yasuda, 2006). The oil price crash of the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War led to a temporary scaling down of the whaling industry worldwide; the total catch of whales dropped from 37,709 in 1940 to 8,073 in 1942 and further to 5,906 in 1945 (Whale Library, n. d., accessed on 3 April 2015). Commercial whaling was resumed in earnest in the aftermath of the Second World War. The total catch jumped to 19,348 in 1946 and then grew to 45,060 in 1950 (*ibid*). The concern over the management of whales as a resource led to the drafting of the ICRW and the establishment of the IWC. However, with the advent of substitutes to whale oil, such as kerosene, Western nations gradually scaled down commercial whaling: the United Kingdom stopped whaling in the Antarctic in 1963 and was followed by the Netherlands in 1964. Norway stopped whaling in the Antarctic in 1968.

While it is clear that the establishment of the IWC was due to a worldwide concern over the possible depletion of whale resources, from the 1970s, opponents of commercial whaling based on conservation or environmental grounds began to make their presence felt (Aron et al., 2000; Bailey, 2008; Blok, 2008, 2011; Yasuda, 2006). The United States, a former whaling powerhouse, transformed itself to a whale protector, which significantly helped the anti-whaling lobby (Bailey, 2008). According to the Japan Fisheries Agency, around that time, 'many non-whaling countries suddenly joined the IWC while advocating the anti-whaling position under the leadership of anti-whaling groups' (Japan Fisheries Agency, 2012). The division between the whaling nations and their opponents emerged around that time, but the focus of the opposition was presented as a scientific issue, that is, the size of the whale population. A moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted by the IWC in 1982 (coming into effect in 1986) on the basis of concern over a

possible extinction of whales. Under the moratorium, the catch limit for commercial whaling was set to zero and a limit was placed on aboriginal subsistence whaling. The IWC members were allowed to issue a limited number of permits for whaling for scientific research. Japan opposed to the moratorium but obliged to the Commission's ruling and started a series of scientific whaling programmes. Norway and Iceland, other opponents of the moratorium, have resorted to setting their own quota and have continued whaling. A handful of indigenous communities across the world have retained their right to whaling under the aboriginal subsistence whaling.

The 2014 ruling of the ICJ was about the legality of Japan's scientific whaling programme. The Australian government, driven by a strong anti-whaling domestic opinion (Heazel, 2013; Peace, 2010), took the Japanese government to the ICJ in 2010, claiming that Japan's 'scientific' whaling programme in the Antarctic contravened the IWC's regulation. The judgement in March 2014 caught the Japanese government by surprise as it was confident of the scientific value of its 'scientific' whaling programmes (Wada, 2014). Still, the Japanese government's policy to behave as a 'good and conscientious member' of the international community prevailed and the government revised its whaling programme to exclude lethal sampling but continued to send out whalers to carry out 'scientific research'.<sup>1</sup> In November 2014, the Japanese government submitted a new plan for whaling for research in the Antarctic (NEWREP-A) to the IWC for its approval in which the Japanese government proposed to carry out a lethal sampling of 333 minke whales<sup>2</sup> per year (The Government of Japan, 2014).

### **From the whaling problem to the whale meat problem**

The whaling problem as outlined so far appears to be a matter of international legal dispute: the issue is whether a member country (Japan) of an international organisation (the IWC) is compliant with the club's rule. In this case, the member was found to be non-compliant by an international court (the ICJ) and subsequently the member has adjusted its behaviour to comply with the club's rule – a model settlement of an international dispute without resorting to violence, one might say. The process through which the club's rule was drawn up should, of course, reflect various normative claims about how members of a club should behave, what aims the club should have and on what basis the decision should be made. Given that disagreement about the continuation of whaling hinges on proof that either the whale population is in decline or it is recovering (and a vast alley of combinations of

different possibilities – by species, by the geographical location of the water, etc.), help from science to resolve the disagreement has been sought. However, science is incapable of providing certainty for any policymaking purpose and it is not value neutral (Heazel, 2004). With science unable to solve the disagreement once and for all, the whaling problem remains as one of the long-lasting international disputes in the postwar world.

As briefly mentioned earlier, there is a scholarly consensus that the current whaling problem boils down to ethical and cultural issues, in particular when it manifests *vis-à-vis* Japan. A number of dimensions of the Japanese whaling problem have been identified. Joji Morishima, often regarded as the spokesperson for the Japanese government on this issue, has identified four: science (whether the whale population is on the decline or on the increase), cultural/ethical collision (whether it is right to kill whales), political (Western politicians appealing to anti-whaling constituencies) and economics (Morishima, 2006). According to Aron et al. (2000), there are two sides to the problem: cultural and economics.

Catalinac and Chen (2005) have identified a threat to resource security and a danger to inter-state respect for different cultures and customs as the Japanese government's concern. Bowett and Hay (2009) have pointed out four dimensions to the Japanese government's justification for the continuation of whaling: cultural (a form of aboriginal subsistence whaling), social (maintaining the social integrity and identity of the whaling community), scientific and sustainability. Hirata (2004) sees two obstacles in the diffusion of the international norm of not killing whales: domestic institutions in which existing cultural norms are embedded and the structure of political institutions. Echoing this, Peace (2010) emphasises the hegemonic status of the Japan Fisheries Agency in the whaling industry in Japan as the main factor behind the continuation of whaling since there are no commercial reasons.

The anti-whaling side's view is also seen to have a few dimensions. Yasuda (2006) has identified three: a scientific concern of the whale population size, an ethical dimension that attributes the whale a special status and the overlap of the anti-whaling and anti-Japanese feeling. Further, Ishii (2011) points out animal rights, animal welfare and the prevention of extinction of whales. While there might be a split between the conservationists, who would support whale hunting as long as the whale population is properly managed, and protectionists, who would oppose whale hunting at any cost, in the anti-whaling camp (Stoett,



1999), many scholars agree that 'not killing whales' became the default option by the end of the 1980s (Bailey, 2008), making whaling a binary good over which compromise is very difficult to reach (Hurd, 2012). Furthermore, the global anti-whaling norm thus emerged transforming 'whales into rights-bearing persons, sacred human-like creatures, whose killing is immoral and uncivilized' (Blok, 2008: 39). Consequently, the taboo of killing whales became synonymous with a taboo on eating whale meat.

The 'not killing whales' default option of the anti-whaling camp has one of its roots in the different ways in which whales were used across the globe. Many of the former industrial whaling nations mainly hunted whales for whale oil and did not include whale meat in their diet; whale meat was used for animal feed or fertilisers in contrast to Japan and Norway, and indigenous communities, where whale meat was incorporated in their food cultures (Aron et al., 2000). The different ways in which whale meat has been used across the globe appears to have shifted the focus from whaling onto the subject of whale meat eating.<sup>3</sup>

In Japan, the familiar narrative about whale meat is that the people who inhabited the Japanese archipelago had long engaged with whaling going back to Jomon period (c. 12,000 BC to c. 300 BC), and some of those living in the coastal areas were continuously engaged with whaling on a small scale. With the opening up of the country in the nineteenth century, advanced whaling techniques were introduced from the West and Japan became a major whaling country prior to the Second World War. After the War, the General Headquarters (GHQ), which occupied defeated Japan, encouraged the resumption of whaling as a cheap source of protein for the worn-out and starving nation (Hirata, 2005; Japan Fisheries Agency, 2012; Yasuda, 2006). The message is that the Japanese have been continuously engaged with whaling, suggesting that there is a long tradition, a cultural good, of whaling, and that they have been eating whales as fish: a source of sustenance for the Japanese, highlighting the whale problem's relevance to Japanese food culture. The point that the Japanese see whales as fish and not as mammals is often repeated in this official narrative; the Chinese character used to represent the whale has a component that means fish (*uo-hen*) (Hirata, 2005; Morishita, 2006). This implies that the Western idea of animal rights does not easily apply to whales in the Japanese context, in which 'traditions combine reverence for animals with an acceptance of their taking in a way that makes the Western preservationists' goals incomprehensible' (Nadelmann cited in Catalinac and Chen, 2005: 147). This line of discourse is clearly making a claim to ethical relativism: while



Figure 6.1 The menu lists 5 different items (red meat, processed sliced tail fin, bacon, skin and tendon) substantiating the claim that the Japanese do not waste any part of a whale

there are some common understandings of fundamental issues shared by different people, each national group has a different understanding of what is right and what is wrong, which is to be respected. This narrative has been continuously developed by the pro-whaling camp led by the Japan Fisheries Agency, which sees the dispute in the 'the West' versus 'Japan' binary scheme as formed out of Western cultural imperialism of Japan bashing (Blok, 2008; Hirata, 2005; Peace, 2010).

In this climate, the significance of whale meat in Japan has changed. As the population has accepted the official narrative of whale meat, many now believe that whale meat is part of their traditional diet, forgetting the fact that it was only after the Second World War that whale meat came to be widely consumed (Hirata, 2005). Whale meat is no longer an indispensable source of protein, as in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, but a highly 'select' food to be consumed at special occasions or at upmarket restaurants (Blok, 2008 see Figure 6.1). Bowett and Hay (2009) report that among young people in Japan, approval of whaling tends to go hand in hand with the approval of the consumption of whale meat, which suggests that the understanding that whaling is about Japanese culture of which eating whale meat

is an indispensable part is firmly established. Therefore, opposition to whale hunting is easily translated into opposition to whale meat eating, thus making the whaling problem a matter of culture and tradition in the Japanese mind. Still, Ishii (2011) points out that the talk of 'whale meat eating culture' was intensified in the early 2000s when the supply started to outstrip the demand; rather than eating more whale meat, the Japanese population was more interested in talking about the value of whale meat in Japanese culture.

The pamphlet 'Whales and whaling', produced by the Japan Fisheries Agency in 2012, sets out its claim of the importance of whales and whaling in Japanese culture as follows:

The long history of whaling in Japan, from prehistoric times to the present, gave rise to the worship of whales and bore fruit in the culture witnessed today in whaling songs, dances and the various traditional handicrafts that have been handed down from generation to generation. They are historical evidence that the Japanese people have lived in close association with whales. Now is the time to acknowledge the importance of our whaling tradition and food culture. Japanese are and should be proud of this.

(Japan Fisheries Agency, 2012: 22)

It then lists whale bones found in the archaeological site dating back to about 5,000 years ago as evidence of continuous association between the Japanese people and whales, explaining the Japanese dietary habit of eating whale meat in the context of Buddhism's ban on meat (whales were seen as a kind of fish), and claims that whale meat consumption became widespread in the Edo period. The 'special' relationship between the Japanese people and whales is then further articulated with an emphasis on the eternity of the association:

Whales have been utilized uninterruptedly by the Japanese people since long ago, resulting in the worship of whales and many other cultural expressions such as whaling songs, dances and traditional handicrafts handed down through generations, and it is very much alive today. Whale tombs and memorial monuments for the souls of these animals can be found throughout the land of Japan. From north to south in the country, the meat of whales has been used as food in multifarious ways. In the Hakodate region south of Hokkaido, whale soup (a[n] earthy broth made with salted whale meat, edible wild plants and vegetables) is one of the traditional foods enjoyed

during the New Year festivities. In Niigata prefecture, whale soup is consumed typically in full summer to help stand the heat. In the Kansai region centred in Osaka, whale skin or 'koro' is an indispensable ingredient for the oden hotch-potch stew and the traditional 'hari-hari nabe' whale meat pot is another famous dish from that region. Traditional recipes such as these are still alive while many new forms of original whale cuisine are being created today.

(Japan Fisheries Agency, 2012: 23).

In Japan, while whale meat has come to represent Japanese uniqueness and its long tradition and culture, in the anti-whaling countries, the whales have become the 'totem animal', talked about in an anthropomorphic language and which are to be approached with affection, respect and awe (Blok, 2008). Eating whale meat has become associated with being uncivilised, barbaric and cruel, and belonging to the 'Japanese tribe'. This seems to be more pronounced in Australia, where the level of popular identification of whales is high. Whales are represented as 'our visitors from the south' and 'our gentle giants'. This anthropomorphic and proprietary representation of whales goes with a degree of Japanese bashing: only the Japanese kill our 'Australian whales' because they are barbaric and cruel as seen in the way they behaved in the Second World War; demonization of the Japanese is now complete (Peace, 2010).

Whaling and eating whale meat are thus conflated on both sides (though other whale meat-eating nations/peoples are often absent from this discussion); the anti-whaling lobby uses high-impact visual images of whales being hunted, prompting the question of whether whaling is humane. To this, the Japanese government argues that their developed equipment and skilled whalers minimise the suffering of the harpooned whales. Since the legal framework and ethical standards that govern animal killing vary internationally and whether hunting is humane or not is 'a relative judgement' (Gales et al., 2008) and given the inability of science to provide certainty, the division between the pro-whaling and anti-whaling camps can never be settled.

This case study shows that an initially acultural disagreement about the sustainability of whaling has been transformed into a highly emotive clash of norms and values in which various nationalisms come to be mobilised. On the Japanese side, whaling has become a deeply engrained part of the unique culture of Japan that demands respect as the dispute has dragged on despite the fact that the demand for whale meat has stagnated and the whaling industry is no longer

self-sustaining. Whaling in Japan is only sustained by public subsidy to 'protect' Japan's unique culture from Western cultural imperialism. Whaling, including eating of whale meat, has been made to represent something unique about Japanese culture and the pro-whaling lobby led by the Japan Fisheries Agency has been demanding international recognition that is due to a proper nation. On the anti-whaling side, the fact that whale meat was never incorporated in their diet has helped the emergence and spread of the anthropomorphic view of whales as rights-bearing persons, which has branded eating whale meat uncivilised, barbaric and cruel, something that needs to be stopped. In this case, the opposition is between Japan and the 'West' rather than two distinct nationalisms. However, the whaling problem needs to be put in a context that has been moulded by colonialism and imperialism of the West.

### **Whale meat eating in context: The case of dog meat eating**

The case of whale meat eating shows how a clash of values and norms in a nationalist language can emerge as new values and norms are turned into global ones in a context where the influence of imperialism can be suspected due to the historical background. A similar case in this regard is the issue of dog meat eating. While there is ample archaeological evidence that early humans across the world consumed dogs, since the late twentieth century in particular, the eating of dog meat has become another site of clashes over values and norms, clashes that are also continuously evolving (Oh and Jackson, 2011; Podberscek, 2009). Dog meat is eaten in many East Asian and South East Asian countries, including South Korea, China, Vietnam and Cambodia; it was eaten in the Philippines, as seen in the derogatory description of Pilipino men as 'dog eaters' by white Americans (Okamura, 2010), though the eating of dog meat has been banned in the Philippines since 1988 (Podberscek, 2009). There are conflicting reports on the eating of dog meat in Thailand; while Podberscek (2009) includes Thailand in the group of countries in which dog meat is eaten, Nir Avieli (2011) quotes a study that suggests that dog meat is not eaten in Thailand due to the prevailing view of dogs 'as sort of degraded human beings that lack moral restraint [incest] and indulge in forbidden practices [eating its own excrement]' (Avieli, 2011: 68). In Japan, while whale meat is now given the status of the embodiment of Japanese unique culture and its consumption is encouraged as seen earlier, dog meat is not eaten.

The eating of dog meat is not a homogeneous practice within the nation-state's boundary. Reporting on his fieldwork in a small town

in Southern Vietnam, Avieli (2011) points out that dog meat eating is more prevalent in Northern Vietnam, where cultural contact with China has been stronger. Given that the current power centre is located in the north of the country, he notes there is an association between dog meat eating and power, presenting a picture of a powerful, atheist, dog meat eating North versus a gentler, Buddhist South, where dog meat is not readily consumed. As regards China, whose residents are renowned for their voracious appetite for anything that moves, the eating of dog meat is not pursued with equal rigour. Poon (2014) reports that a ban on dog eating was introduced in colonial Hong Kong in 1950 and that it did not meet strong local opposition. Furthermore, the ban was not introduced on the grounds of opposition to animal cruelty by the colonial government, which could be seen as imperial imposition, but as a measure to combat rabies. According to Poon (2014), there was no strong and emotive opposition to the eating of dog meat among the European population in twentieth-century Hong Kong and eating of dog meat was commonplace. The British authorities introduced a law against animal cruelty (the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance) in 1935, but they did not concern themselves with the actual eating of dog meat as long as the dogs were killed humanely. The clash of values and norms at this point of time in Hong Kong, if there was any, was about whether animals should be killed humanely and what constituted humane killing, not about which meat was ethical to consume.<sup>4</sup> However, the local elite, who had become ambivalent towards mainland Chinese culture, chose to support a new value and norm to respect animals. In the aftermath of the 1949 rabies panic, the local elite colluded with the British colonial authority to pass the 'Dogs and Cats Regulations', which prohibited the sales and consumption of dog meat, in 1950 as part of the rabies prevention measures. Poon (2014) identifies the local elite's ambivalence towards mainland Chinese society as one of the major reasons why they went against the call for the respect of a local custom. Although there was a view that dog meat eating was a local tradition and as such should be preserved, some sections of the local elite who were close to the colonial government and the European/Western lifestyle chose to 'sacrifice' the tradition. It is also suggested that the prohibition on dog meat eating in Hong Kong was later to be mobilised to deride the backwardness of the mainland Chinese as Hong Kong was returned to the People's Republic of China.

The ban on dog meat eating in colonial Hong Kong did not lead to an outright clash of values, which was articulated with nationalist

vocabulary, not because of the differing level of attachment to the custom of dog meat eating, for dog meat eating was never eradicated in Hong Kong, but because of a particular constellation of power among the colonial authorities, local elite and mainland China. In the largely post-colonial world of today, the eating of dog meat typically becomes an international issue when a big sporting event takes place. In the case of South Korea, there were two such events: the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the 2002 World Cup co-hosted with Japan. As for China, the occasion was the 2008 Beijing Olympics. At each global sporting event, there was an international outcry against the local custom of dog meat eating. What is interesting is that responses to the international pressure varied (Oh and Jackson, 2011; Podberscek, 2009). The Korean government 'yielded' to the international pressure to put a stop to this 'barbaric and archaic' practice at the 1988 Olympics by trying to ban the eating of dog meat and removing it from restaurant menus; the Chinese government banned dog meat on public health grounds and the Beijing officials removed dog meat from the menus of 112 official Olympic restaurants; in 2002, however, the Korean government did not respond to the pressure, now formulated as opposition against animal cruelty rather than disgust towards dog meat eating, in the same way they did in 1988 and instead tried to foster understanding and appreciation of their cultural heritage.

There are a number of factors behind these differing responses to the international opposition to dog meat eating and there is some commonality between the ways in which the problem of managing whale resources has been turned into a cultural one and those in which the Korean government responded to the international pressure to stop dog meat eating. The 1988 Korean government's response is probably largely explained by the geopolitical and geohistorical situation in which South Korea found itself at that time. Having emerged out of the military dictatorship, its priority was to be a 'good and respected member of the international community', and the government was 'ashamed' of the custom of eating dogs because the Western world was against it. It took measures to ban dog meat eating against domestic opposition, and it was soon known that the ban did not have much effect; dog meat eating continued and even expanded (Oh and Jackson, 2011; Podberscek, 2009). The Chinese government in 2008, probably more confident of its own standing in the international arena than the Korean government in 1988, chose to avoid outright confrontation of values and norms by opting for a technocratic solution of using public health as an excuse to place a ban on the sales and consumption of dog meat in public.

In 2002, the South Korean government together with some elements from Korean civil society chose to present dog meat eating as part of their culture and tradition and nothing to be meddled with by foreigners. In this instance, in a similar manner to the pro-whaling lobby in Japan, the supporters of dog meat eating mobilised a universalistic notion of cultural rights and presented it in a nationalistic language in order to fend off the cultural imperialism of the West. As noted by Oh and Jackson (2011: 48), the reaction to the international opposition to dog meat eating was fiercer in 2002 than in 1988, not because dog meat eating was central to the Korean diet, but because it was one of the arenas in which national identity could be articulated. Podbescek (2009) notes that the consumption of dog meat is low and below that of beef, pork and chicken, but many South Koreans defend dog meat eating regardless of whether they eat it or not. This bears striking semblance to the whale meat issue in Japan in which the instance of whale meat eating is promoted despite the decline of its consumption using the universalistic notion of cultural rights in response to what is perceived as Western cultural imperialism.

This is not to say that the idea of dogs as pets is absent in South Korean society in the twenty-first century; there is a growing number of people keeping dogs as pets, but there is a clear distinction between dogs for eating and dogs to be kept as pets, which may not be conducive to Western sentiment (Dugnoille, 2014; Podberscek, 2009). Dog meat eating was suppressed for religious reasons during the Koryo Dynasty (918–1392) in which Buddhism was dominant. In the following Choson Dynasty (1392–1910), Confucianism, which did not prohibit dog meat eating, became the official ideology. In fact, dog meat in Korea is often referred to as ‘Confucius meat’ because Confucius apparently loved it (Oh and Jackson, 2009; Podberscek, 2009). Confucius scholars allegedly came up with justification of eating dog meat by classifying the dogs into three categories: hunting dogs, watchdogs and food. It is also emphasised that in Korea, dog meat has always been eaten as medicine as well as food. Dog meat eating is therefore not a mere expression of one’s lowly desire to fill one’s stomach but part of complex understanding of human health with philosophical underpinning. When dog meat eating is presented as part of unique Korean culture, it is the idea of ‘Confucius meat’ that is brought up. Against this, the outcry over eating ‘our loyal friends’ from the Westerners is, more often than not, understood as yet another attempt to impose Western-centric view, reminding many Korean people of the recent colonial and imperial past of the world.



## **It is not an East–West clash: Foie gras production and consumption in France**

The clash between values and norms and the tension between the national and the global are not only a reflection of East–West and post-colonial debates regarding cultural relativism. In fact, the clash over norms and values extends far beyond East–West and post-colonial relations and affects many more countries as the following example of foie gras production and consumption in France, and the tension this produces between EU member states, demonstrates. The foie gras example also raises another important issue that has bearing on both previous case studies discussed above, namely the assertion of national rights over food, a concept often termed as ‘gastronationalism’. The term, which was coined by Michaela DeSoucey (2010), refers to food as political constructions that are utilised as markers of national cultural identity. Food in this context does not only include particular ingredients and dishes but also methods of preparation and consumption, and the related norms and values. If national food, including norms, values and practices, is seen as a resource as well as part of the nation’s heritage and culture, then these require state protection from challenges and competing claims (a point we briefly discussed in the previous chapter). In this context, gastronationalism is

a form of claims making and a project of collective identity, [it] is responsive to and reflective of the political ramifications of connecting nationalist projects with food culture at local levels. It presumes that attacks (symbolic or otherwise) against a nation’s food practices are assaults on heritage and culture, not just on the food item itself.

(DeSoucey, 2010:433)

Perhaps no country exemplifies the close relationship between food and nationalism and national identity as well as France. Not only is French food held in high esteem the world over, and as the epitome of cooking excellence, but it has also been synonymous with French culture, traditions, history and national identity, and has been so for at least the past 200 years. Ferguson claims that ‘for the West, France supplies the most striking example of a “culinary country” one where cuisine and the nation are seen to coincide’ (Ferguson, 2010: 102). Tebben goes even further and argues that ‘the French national identity is without question bound in its culinary identification by the world. Gastronomy is seen as

French and the French are seen as gastronomes' (quoted in Wright and Annes, 2013: 390).

In the previous chapter we discussed gastrodiploacy and mentioned the recognition accorded to French cuisine across Europe in the nineteenth century. In that respect, some of the most renowned chefs of the nineteenth century, such as Marie-Antoine Careme and Georges Auguste Escoffier, who have revolutionised, codified and refined many of the cooking techniques and dishes used today, contextualised their cooking style and food within the framework of French nationalism. As a result, many of the classic food terminology we use is French and many of the dishes are closely related to French cuisine and French national identity, among the very many examples are the baguette, onion soup, quiche, crème brulee, tart tatin, nicoise salad, béchamel sauce and foie gras. The impact of French cuisine and the esteem in which it is held were part of the reason why UNESCO included French gastronomy in their list of intangible cultural heritage of humanity in 2010 (UNESCO, 2010). The importance of food, its symbolism and its relationship with national identity are also apparent in many of the globalisation-inspired debates in France; these are manifested in, for example, the symbolic 'rejection' of fast food as Americanised and un-French and the perceived threat to French secularism from the sale and spread of *halal* food (Wright and Annes, 2013).

Among the many food items that have come to be seen as French, foie gras is arguably the most controversial. Foie gras (lit. fatty liver) is a food product that is made from the liver of either ducks or geese that have been fattened. Foie gras, partly because of its rich taste and delicate texture, is closely associated with French cuisine where it is served mostly as pate, mousse or parfait; it is also added to many dishes to enhance their flavour, particularly soups, sauces and stews. Foie gras holds a special place in French culinary history and tradition. This can be seen in the fact that France is both the biggest producer of foie gras as well as the biggest consumer. Additionally, most of the foie gras produced outside France is for the French market.

Foie gras, traditionally made from male geese, has increasingly been made from non-migratory male ducks (because it is more economical and practical to breed and raise ducks in large numbers) that have been specially fattened, a technique that is known as 'gavage' in French. 'Gavage' refers to the force-feeding of the birds over several weeks before their slaughter to ensure an enlarged liver, several times its normal size. The exact size of the enlarged liver depends on the specific method of force-feeding;<sup>5</sup> some methods, which are seen as more ethical because

the animal is allowed to overeat on its own and involves no force-feeding, result in 'only' the doubling in size of the liver (Youatt, 2012). Under French culinary standards, a product can only be designated as foie gras if it is produced through force-feeding. The production and consumption of foie gras in France are protected by law; under French law, foie gras is 'the protected cultural and gastronomical heritage of France'. French governments have also stated they would try to include foie gras production and consumption in UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage.

The debates over foie gras, and the calls to ban it, were initially framed as part of a broader campaign for animal welfare and the humane treatment of animals. The force-feeding of the birds is deemed as inhumane and unethical by animal rights organisations and, it is claimed, results in numerous health complications, higher mortality rates and the unnecessary suffering of the birds involved. Additionally, because foie gras is made only from male birds, the treatment and use of female ducklings is also seen as problematic (PETA, 2014). The concerns raised over the treatment of birds in the production of foie gras have been discussed by the European Union's 'Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare'. The committee's 1998 study of foie gras production concluded that 'force feeding, as currently practised, is detrimental to the welfare of the birds' (European Commission, 1998). The European Union has ruled that the practice should be allowed only in traditional areas of production. As a result of public campaigns and the European Union's own verdict, foie gras production is banned in most European countries; only five European countries continue to produce foie gras: France, Belgium, Hungary, Bulgaria and Spain.

There are several dimensions to the French foie gras case. On the one hand, this is an issue revolving around the tension between European integration, and the requirements this carries in terms of laws and values, and French cultural heritage and national identity. As DeSoucey (2010) notes, foie gras production and consumption have been a historical part of French rural life and tradition. It is also an important element in French cuisine and adds to French claims of cultural significance. The debate over foie gras in France and the backlash against efforts to ban it, therefore, are framed not as part of the animal right's discourse but as attacks against French culture and national identity. As a result, the French state is expected to intervene to protect the nation's cultural heritage. In contrast to the previous examples, in this case, the former centre of civilisation considers itself being under attack by others, and this understanding is not framed in an anti-colonial

framework. It is seen as an attack on the nation's importance, identity and culture.

On the other hand, the debate is further complicated by the fact that foie gras production is also an important part of French rural economy. This is similar to our first case study with regard to whale meat and its initial importance to the Japanese fishing industry. This means that the calls to ban foie gras are seen not only as attacks on French culture but also on French rural economy and food manufacturers. It is important to note that in France the two are often closely related; French rural life holds an emotive place in the French imagination of the nation (Ferguson, 2004). According to DeSoucey (2010), around 100,000 jobs are directly and indirectly related to the foie gras industry. In this respect, and similar to the two previous case studies, the impact of globalisation and international efforts to regulate food, including standards and norms, have a direct effect on national industries and brands. In this context, securing and protecting national food brands are seen as part of protecting and securing the nation and its economy.

The tension that exists over foie gras has not only affected France. In her study of foie gras production in Hungary, Zsuzsa Gille (2011) has demonstrated how the industry has been affected by animal rights' campaigns and European integration, which have worked against the interest of the Hungarian food industry. The solution found was to reframe foie gras production in Hungary as part of the cultural heritage of the nation-state and emphasise its importance to national identity and sovereignty. In this case, the economic importance is translated into cultural importance in order to support the industry. In other words, the universalistic value system is made use of by economic interests to protect an important industry to the national economy. Eating foie gras itself is not essential to the maintenance of Hungarian culture, but the foie gras industry is deemed to be important enough to require the state's protection – another case in which essentially an acultural issue is made cultural in order to protect what is deemed to be national interest.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter focused on the normative aspect of nationalism in the international arena and examined what the 'food-and-nationalism' angle can illuminate in our understanding of politics. Unlike conventional studies that investigate the normative aspect of nationalism in reference to the mostly negative consequences of the right to self-determination, such as ethnic cleansing and genocide, the chapter

focused on a seemingly mandarin issue of food. The examination of the cases of whale meat and dog meat eating as well as foie gras production and consumption has shown that there is fierce contestation over values in reference to what can be eaten, and that there are dynamic movements in the formulating and re-articulating of nationalist worldviews in response to changing geopolitical situations. In these cases, the eating of whale meat, dog meat and foie gras is increasingly justified in reference to the universalistic notion of cultural rights, which reflects the general emergence of a global normative framework. Rather than being forced into conforming to what is deemed to be universal (not eating whale/dog meat or not force-feeding ducks and geese), responses from contemporary Japanese, South Korean and French societies are nationalistic in emphasising the importance of whale/dog/foie gras eating in their respective culture. In the first two cases, the importance of whale/dog meat is symbolic rather than substantial; neither is essential to their national diets but the eating of these meats has been made to differentiate these societies from the rest of the world. Here the nationalist forces, which are about the particular, are actively using the universalistic discursive framework of cultural rights, thus making nationalism universal in a peculiar manner. What needs to be noted in this regard is that both cases represent a response in the post-colonial area; Japan was never colonised and Korea was colonised by Japan rather than Western powers, but a common undercurrent is detected: resistance to actual or perceived Western cultural imperialism. In this respect, these two cases shed light on ongoing efforts made by non-Western states and societies to adapt and mould the international society of states in a way that favours them. It is also interesting to note that by making whale/dog meat as important in Japanese/Korean traditional culture, people's mundane life is directly connected to the cut and thrust of international politics. In slight contrast, the foie gras example demonstrates that the global debate over norms can have an impact not only on symbolic issues but also on substantive ones. The changing of norms directly affects national food industries, which in this case are expecting protection from the state and framing their struggle within a nationalist discourse.

It is clear from the examples provided that the spread of globalisation will continue to create tension and raise debates over norms and values. This raises a number of important questions: Who should be the ultimate arbitrator when it comes to international clashes over norms and how should these be negotiated/mediated? The following chapter takes up this question.

# 7

## International Organisations, Food and Nationalism

The previous chapter finished with a question: when there is contestation of values over cuisine, food culture and diet, who would or should be the arbiter? When there is an international dispute, the first candidates for such a position are usually international organisations. At the one end of the scale, there is a range of international conventions and treaties such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, widely known as the genocide convention, as rule books on how individuals, groups and states should behave, and on the other there are mechanisms through which these rules are implemented, such as the International Criminal Court. In this context, international organisations assume the role of a judge in determining if any crime has been committed, and if so who the perpetrator is and what the punishment should be. Consequently, these international organisations in their efforts to deliver global justice are often seen as independent actors and a restraining factor on the nation-state and other entities; in other words, international organisations are understood to be the suppressors of nationalism and the imposers of global/universal norms and standards. However, in the area with which the current volume is concerned, food, rather than imposing what is deemed to be global or universal standards, international organisations appear to be unwittingly used by the nation-state and other entities in the promotion of national identity or nationalism. This may well be one of the consequences of the spread and permeation of neo-liberalism in reference to culture, as Scher (2010) argues, but the impact of neo-liberalism unfortunately falls outside the scope of this volume.

This chapter investigates this paradoxical phenomenon in relation to two fields: the preservation of culture and international trade. In particular, the chapter investigates UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage and

geographical indications (GIs) in international trade in relation to food. By doing so, it continues to highlight what the 'food-and-nationalism' angle can bring to the analysis of politics at the global level as well as brings to the fore a debate over the purpose and independence of international organisations and their effect on state sovereignty and power.

### **UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage**

UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, does not need introduction. It is one of the best-known UN institutions and has been subjected to wide-ranging investigations as an international organisation, in particular with regard to its description and engagement with national culture (see, e.g., Eriksen, 2001 and Scholze, 2008). From the current volume's point of view, what is most interesting about UNESCO is its impact as an international organisation on nationalism and the idea of national heritage; since UNESCO deals with culture, the focal point of nationalism, and efforts to build and maintain national identity, in an international context, it occupies a seemingly contradictory position vis-à-vis nationalism. On the one hand, UNESCO is working towards the universal, to pursue peace through 'humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity'<sup>1</sup> which could be seen as a constraining factor on the pursuit of the particular by the nation-state and other groups; on the other hand, UNESCO is the most authoritative guardian of a variety of cultures on the planet because diversity of culture in itself is seen as a common good, an idea that various nation-states and other groups mobilise in pursuit of their own nationalist agenda. This dichotomous position partly relates to the fact that as an international organisation UNESCO is expected to pursue and aspire to universal values, while it is, at the same time, governed by its members, most of whom are nation-states.

This interesting position of UNESCO is probably most visible in the area of world heritage. Since the adoption of the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,<sup>2</sup> widely known as the World Heritage Convention, to which 190 countries adhere, UNESCO has been playing a dual role of the promoter of universal values (peace, mutual understanding and solidarity among other things) and the protector of the particular by championing the preservation of culture and cultural artefacts. It has been at the forefront of producing and shaping 'globality' or cosmopolitanism through its World Heritage Convention, since the idea of world heritage 'rests

on the assumption that the world's most prized natural and cultural sites belong to all of us, entailing a shared responsibility for their care' (Brumann, 2014: 2177). As Brumann (2014) reports, the committees entrusted to manage and administer the World Heritage List were originally mainly staffed by specialists in cultural conservation and heritage who were operating at arm's length from the nation-state, which suggests a cosmopolitan orientation emanating from UNESCO, but these committees are increasingly staffed by career diplomats who tend to prioritise the nation-state's agenda.<sup>3</sup> From the nation-state's end, world heritage is seen mainly as an opportunity to project a positive image of itself to promote tourism and possibly trade (nation branding) and/or to increase its influence on the world stage ('soft power') rather than as a route to pursue cosmopolitan values, though plenty of lip service is paid to it. For instance, Sarina Wakefield (2012) traces how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) uses the idea of and tools associated with UNESCO's world heritage in order to establish falconry to represent its uniqueness and contribution to world culture. In a similar vein, Dong Wang (2010) argues that the application for world heritage status for Longmen Grottoes has in fact strengthened the Chinese state at various levels. UNESCO's custodianship of world heritage therefore has, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the strengthening of the position of those promoting nationalism in these cases, thereby making a case of UNESCO as a site of the creation of nationalist images.

Within the field of world heritage, of which UNESCO is the chief custodian, what is more relevant to the current volume is not the World Heritage Convention as such but the idea of 'intangible cultural heritage', otherwise known as 'living heritage', which has been formalised by UNESCO's 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.<sup>4</sup> Food culture or cuisine, which does not have tangible shape like songs and dances that would mark traditional rituals, cannot be listed as World Heritage, but starting with the inscription of the 'gastronomic meal of the French' and 'traditional Mexican cuisine' in 2010, there are at least eight elements related to food culture or cuisine in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity out of a total of 314 elements as of April 2015.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, as mentioned in the previous chapters, with regard to Peruvian and Lebanese cuisine and the production of foie gras, a number of UNESCO member states have either applied or are thinking of putting forward an official application to join the list. The idea of 'intangible cultural heritage' itself has received a lot of scholarly attention, but on the whole experts in cultural conservation and heritage seem to have a positive



view of the 2003 treaty as corrective to the World Heritage List, which tends to exclude states from the Global South because of the lack of monuments and sites deemed to be suitable (Kurin, 2004; Leimgruber, 2010).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Richard Kurin points out other positive aspects associated with the idea of intangible cultural heritage:

The Convention does some very good things. It reinforces the idea that the practice of one's culture is a human right. It seeks government recognition and respect for the varied cultural traditions practised by people within its jurisdiction. It seeks to bolster the idea that all cultures give purpose and meaning to lives and thus deserve to be safeguarded. It privileges the culture bearers over the state. It suggests that forms of safeguarding be integrated with legal, educational, and economic development efforts where appropriate so that culture retains its vitality and dynamism. Now, with this Convention, a mechanism will be put into place at the international level where those efforts may be energized and improved to take on the task. While doubts persist about the institutional machinery and the ability of the Convention to attract adequate external funding appropriate to the level of need, the Convention may still provide an important opportunity. For cultural advocates around the globe, and for many communities and tradition bearers, the International Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage is a welcome addition to the tool-kit of resources available for accomplishing valuable cultural work. (Kurin, 2004: 76)

What is suggested here is that the idea of intangible cultural heritage would enhance the universalistic aspect of UNESCO's work by establishing cultural rights as part of human rights and empowering culture bearers to the extent the World Heritage List has not managed to do. The point is emphasised by Walter Leimgruber (2010), who acknowledges in his discussion of the 2003 convention that the claim to cultural diversity is politically established and that the convention aims at the preservation of culture and the promotion of sustainable development. Nonetheless, the mechanism through which intangible cultural heritage is recognised and protected is based on the member states, thus leading to a fundamental question about the nature of international organisations: are they inter-governmental or supranational in nature? This question is most urgently asked in reference to the European Union because of its stated aim of achieving 'ever closer union'. Is the European Union an inter-governmental organisation built on voluntary

co-operation of sovereign nation-states or is it a supranational organisation in the making that will subsume various nationalisms to create a higher order of loyalty? While in the case of UNESCO, its supranational potential is not regarded as threatening state sovereignty, by contributing to the establishment of global norms, such as the respect for cultural diversity, UNESCO is also shaping the ways in which nation-states and other entities in the international arena act.

Our cases show that the idea of intangible cultural heritage is not so much used by Japan and France to project their image to the world; rather, it is mobilised as a way of responding to what they perceive as a crisis in national culture, one aspect of which is food culture and cuisine, and in order to support their own food industries.

As mentioned above, there are eight elements related to food culture and cuisine that are inscribed on the list (see Table 7.1).

The chapter now investigates food and nationalism in the cases of *washoku* and the gastronomic meal of the French from the list.

*Table 7.1* The list of elements related to food culture/cuisine in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity

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**2010**

Gastronomic meal of the French

Traditional Mexican cuisine – ancestral, ongoing community culture, the Michoacán paradigm

**2011**

Ceremonial Keşkek tradition (Turkey)

**2013**

*Kimjang*, making and sharing *kimchi* in the Republic of Korea

Mediterranean diet

Turkish coffee culture and tradition

*Washoku*, traditional dietary cultures of the Japanese, notably for the celebration of New Year

**2014**

*Lavash*, the preparation meaning and appearance of traditional bread as an expression of culture in Armenia

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*Source:* Compiled by Atsuko Ichijo based on information available from <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00559>

***Washoku***

The inscription of *washoku* on 4 December 2013 in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity was greeted with

much enthusiasm in Japan, which has added further impetus to a variety of projects to promote food culture and 'food education (*shokuiku*)'<sup>7</sup> pursued by the government, private sector and civil society groups (for a nutritionist's view, see Shiratori, 2014). In particular, the government's intensified efforts to promote Japanese cuisine abroad has been regarded as a way of increasing export of Japanese agricultural produce and attracting more tourists, as briefly discussed in Chapter 5.

The description of *washoku* on the list starts with the following sentences: 'Washoku is a social practice based on a set of skills, knowledge, practice and traditions related to the production, processing, preparation and consumption of food. It is associated with an essential spirit of respect for nature that is closely related to the sustainable use of natural resources'<sup>8</sup> In other words, it is not a particular food item or cuisine itself but the 'traditional food culture of the Japanese' that has been officially deemed suitable for recognition as part of common human heritage (Ehara, 2014; Imoo, 2014: 102). As touched upon earlier, the application for inscription in the list can be made only by an UNESCO member state, and in this case, the Japanese government, in particular the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF), was in the driving seat. The MAFF has a web page dedicated to dietary culture (<http://www.maff.go.jp/j/keikaku/syokubunka/index.html>) that includes a number of documents concerning application to UNESCO, which reinforces the impression that the inscription of *washoku* in the UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list is an outcome of yet another state-sponsored nationalist project of nation branding or exercise of 'soft power', as seen, for instance, in the case of falconry of the UAE. In other words, the case of the inscription of *washoku* appears to suggest that UNESCO, an international organisation, is used by the nation-state as a means of nation branding.

However, an investigation into the background of the application to UNESCO has highlighted a different aspect of the role of international organisations in the relationship between food and nationalism. Despite the state-led nature of the application (which is an inevitable consequence of the inter-governmental nature of UNESCO as an organisation), sources show that the idea to apply for the inscription of Japanese cuisine in the intangible cultural heritage list came from cooking professionals who were deeply concerned with the possibility of extinction of traditional Japanese cuisine, not from the government, which was planning to use it as a means of nation branding (Hashimoto, 2015). Mutsuru Suda, from the secretariat of Washoku Association of Japan (Washoku Japan),<sup>9</sup> a private-sector-run successor (formally set up

in February 2015) to the government-sponsored National Council for the Protection and Transmission of Washoku Culture, which was set up in 2013 in the run-up to the application to UNESCO, identified a heightened sense of crisis over the future of traditional Japanese cuisine shared mainly by Kyoto-based chefs of traditional Japanese cuisine as the main driving force.<sup>10</sup> According to Suda, these chefs were concerned with the low social status of chefs ('no washoku chef has received the Order of Culture') and the shortage of young chefs entering the profession; majority of the students of cooking schools across Japan were learning to be *pâtissiers* (pastry chef), followed by those learning Italian, French and Chinese cooking, whereas those learning Japanese traditional cooking were only a minority.<sup>11</sup> One of those concerned chefs, Yoshioka Murata, the owner and the chief chef of Kikunoi, a traditional Japanese restaurant (*ryotei*) in Kyoto with three Michelin stars, set up the Japanese Culinary Academy in 2004 for the purpose of 'promoting global understanding of Japanese cuisine' and 'contributing to the next generation of Japanese food chefs'.<sup>12</sup> According to Suda, it was the Japanese Culinary Academy, with strong support from Murata, that contacted MAFF about the idea of applying for the inscription of *washoku*. In Murata's own words, when he learned that the South Korean government was planning to make an application for Korean court cuisine at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, he mobilised the Academy to petition the Kyoto Prefectural government about applying to UNESCO as a way of ensuring the future of traditional Japanese cuisine (Murata, 2014). These sources show that what appeared to be a state-led initiative was originally triggered by concern held by a particular section of the private sector, and UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list was made use of by both the government and the private sector to address their concern over the perceived decline in national identity.

The *washoku* chefs' concern was quickly taken up by the government. In July 2011, the Working Group to Prepare for the Inscription of Japanese Food Culture in the Intangible Cultural Heritage List was set up by MAFF, drawing participants from other ministries (Agency for Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry), universities, cooking profession and catering industry. The government's response was quick, mainly due to the Great East Japan Earthquake that took place several months earlier in March; working towards the inscription of *washoku* was probably seen as conducive to the overall efforts of the government at that time: to rebuild and rejuvenate Japan and its national image (see the minutes of the first meeting of the Working Group, MAFF, 2011a). Also, it appeared

that the *washoku* chefs' concern chimed in with the government's concern about food in general. As seen in the law on food and nutrition education in 2005, the Japanese government had been concerned with the state of diet and nutrition in Japan in relation to a range of issues: general health of the Japanese population in the context of rapid ageing, food safety, the decline in food self-sufficiency and weakening of national identity (Cabinet Office, 2006). From the government's perspective, therefore, the UNESCO application presented an opportunity to address these concerns in the form of promotion of *washoku*, which could also be accompanied by other policies such as the promotion of export of Japanese agricultural produce.<sup>13</sup>

The minutes of the Working Group's meetings shed light on the way UNESCO as an organisation conditioned the way the application was prepared – in other words, the influence of an international organisation on the articulation and development of a nationalist project. The definition of Japanese cuisine was right from the beginning a contested issue among the members of the group. Given the prominent role played by chefs of Japanese traditional cuisine mainly based in Kyoto in starting this initiative, the idea of defining Japanese cuisine in reference to *kaiseki*, Japanese haute cuisine, normally served at top-end traditional Japanese restaurants, was initially proposed. After conducting an Internet-based questionnaire to gauge the level of national support for the application and a fact-finding trip to France to learn about their experience of having the gastronomic meal of the French inscribed, in the third meeting doubts about the suitability of representing Japanese cuisine mainly through reference to *kaiseki* were raised because it may look elitist (MAFF, 2011c). Attention was drawn to UNESCO's interest to protect ethnic/national culture that was supported by the majority of the group, not what was perceived as elite culture. The strategic importance of presenting the application as a means of preserving cultural tradition which was being threatened due to the decrease in consumption of Japanese food stuff and the number of Japanese cuisine chefs was also emphasised (*ibid.*). In other words, it was clearly articulated that the UNESCO application was not about projecting Japanese culture as part of a soft power strategy but a way of asking for help from an international organisation in protecting, preserving and promoting an expression of national particularity. The shift from the definition of Japanese cuisine in reference to *kaiseki* to *washoku* as a wide concept covering many ways the Japanese engaged with food, including home cooking to the top-end cuisine, was completed in the fourth meeting when the Working Group members learned that the South Korean

government's application to have Korean court cuisine inscribed was in the status of information reference, presumably because it was judged to be elitist (MAFF, 2011d).

Other MAFF publications on *washoku* published following the application have also presented the inscription of *washoku* in UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list as a way of asking help from the international community for Japanese efforts to preserve, protect and promote what is deemed to be invaluable common heritage for the future. *Washoku: Traditional Food Culture of the Japanese* (2013), a booklet drafted by MAFF, is peppered with concern over the fate of *washoku* – that it is 'disappearing from our tables' (2013: 1) and that *washoku* is 'in crisis' (2013: 31–32). Another shorter booklet compiling the findings from a project 'Research into Protection and Transmission of "Washoku"' (November 2014–March 2015) also highlights the withering of *washoku* in contemporary Japan and widespread concern over it (MAFF, 2015). These publications clearly reflect the Working Group's attitude that the inscription of *washoku* has very little to do with nation branding, though some derivative effects were expected by various ministries and industries, but fundamentally it is about reviving an aspect of national culture with help from an international authority.

What this case study shows is that UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage is used by the Japanese government and private groups to revive an aspect of national culture rather than for the purpose of nation branding. The private sector, which was the driving force behind the application initiative, was driven by their concern over their own survival, and their agenda coincided with the governmental objectives to rebuild and rejuvenate Japan after the 2011 earthquake as well as to address various domestic concerns about the food the Japanese ate and the diet they followed. In the convergence of different agendas and interests, UNESCO emerged as a convenient authority to back the revivalist programme. It acts as an authority to confer legitimacy to cultural practice that these different interests were concerned with, an unwitting supporter of the nation-state and what it sees as the dominant culture, not as a restraining force on cultural nationalism.

### **The gastronomic meal of the French**

'The gastronomic meal of the French' was the first among a variety of food cultures of the world that was inscribed in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2010. As such it was closely studied by those who were behind the Japanese bid, and the development of the French bid also reveals how the system of

recognising world heritage maintained by an international organisation can shape the way a nationalist project evolves.

The gastronomic meal of the French is described as

a customary social practice for celebrating important moments in the lives of individuals and groups, such as births, weddings, birthdays, anniversaries, achievements and reunions. It is a festive meal bringing people together for an occasion to enjoy the art of good eating and drinking. The gastronomic meal emphasizes togetherness, the pleasure of taste, and the balance between human beings and the products of nature.<sup>14</sup>

The emphasis on the social aspect of the practice as something widely enjoyed in all corners of France was quickly noted by those behind the Japanese bid, which eventually led to the redefinition of Japanese cuisine as *washoku* to represent a variety of food items and styles enjoyed by the Japanese on a daily basis and away from a more elitist conception with a strong link to *kaiseki* as seen earlier. Based on the report from the fact-finding trip to France, the Working Group also took note of the fact that the name of the element changed from the originally proposed 'French cuisine' to 'French gastronomy' to settle on 'the gastronomic meal of the French', with qualification that, as in the nomination file (UNESCO, 2010), 'in French, the term "gastronomic" refers to the popular culture of enjoying good food and drink', a strong indication of what UNESCO gives priority to – protection and preservation of what is widely shared in a national/ethnic group, not elitist culture (MAFF, 2011c).

The above points to the curious effect UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list has. While one of the stated aims of UNESCO is to preserve the diversity of cultures on the planet, since the application to the list has to be seen as representing the whole group on behalf of which the application is made, be it a national, ethnic or regional group, it in effect encourages the homogenisation of what is presented as cultural heritage, which in turn creates a degree of tension with respect to diversity in culture in general. This is clearly seen in the nomination file of the gastronomic meal of the French. In identifying 'the communities, groups or, if applicable, individuals concerned' (C. 1.), the nomination file states:

The French. The community concerned by the element is the entire French nation people. The community is large, diverse and unified.

Its collective experience has been built over several centuries. The product of social and cultural mixes, regional plurality and contributions by immigrants, the community is united by shared practices like the gastronomic meal. Important moments in the lives of individuals and groups are celebrated in a ritualistic way through this festive meal.

(UNESCO, 2010)

Here the inherent diversity of the French nation is emphasised in a politically correct manner. However, a few pages on, the nomination file places more emphasis on the homogenising aspect of the gastronomic meal. In response to '1. Identification and Definition of the Element (cf. Criterion R.1)', the file states that the 'gastronomic meal is a homogeneous social practice in the whole community' and lists 'its meaning and social function' and 'its rites necessitating knowledge and know-how' as the source of this homogenising power. The file attempts to find a solution to the tension between diversity and homogeneity by highlighting the ritualistic aspect of the gastronomic meal: the content of the meal might vary, but it always follows a strict order to bring about unifying, if not homogenising, effects on the diverse French (UNESCO, 2010). The requirement to be inscribed in the list appears to have led to a certain redefinition of national particularity; it has to be expressed through something common and universal, which is worthy of being shared by all humanity.

In the fact-finding trip to France that the Japanese Working Group undertook, they found that there was similarity in the background to the UNESCO application, in that there was a deep concern over the perceived weakening of French food culture due to various social changes, including globalisation: the spread of fast-food was of particular concern (MAFF, 2011c). This is a point we raised in the previous chapter with regard to the production of foie gras. The preparation of the UNESCO application had more prominent state intervention than in the Japanese case from early on. The nomination file identifies the state initiative, in the late 1980s, to carry out a census of heritage-related foodways, and this resulted in the publication of the *Inventaire du patrimoine culinaire de la France* (inventory of French culinary heritage) as the beginning of the process. From 2000 onwards, the French government launched a number of major initiatives to promote research into the gastronomic meal of the French as well as to raise awareness among children through the organisation of 'Taste Week', for instance. In 2001, the European Institute of Food History and Culture (IEHCA)<sup>15</sup> was created in Tours as the



centre of research into food culture, and in 2006, it assumed the leading role in preparing an application for the inscription of French cuisine in the intangible cultural heritage list. Following President Sarkozy's public statement that the French government was to seek the inscription of French gastronomy in the intangible cultural heritage list in 2008, a new organisation, the Mission Française du Patrimoine et des Cultures Alimentaires (MFPCA),<sup>16</sup> with support from various sectors, was set up to lead the preparation of the nomination file (UNESCO, 2010).

The contrast to the Japanese experience, in terms of the degree of the state's involvement in the application process, suggests a comparative point. Those states with a tradition of powerful centralising tendency are naturally expected to be involved with a range of initiatives as seen in the French case. And because of this tradition, states like France are better placed to mobilise different forces of society in one direction. On the other hand, UNESCO is set up as an inter-governmental organisation in which the member states act as the medium between the organisation and culture (or more precisely, the bearers of culture that UNESCO affords recognition and protection), and strong/centralising states may be better placed to fulfil their expected roles. In fact, Leimgruber (2010) points out the federal nature of Switzerland as one of the obstacles for Swiss groups to make the most of the world heritage system.

The two examples provided above indicate that often the reason behind applying to UNESCO, as well as to other international organisations, is not in order to project and promote the nation abroad but to strengthen domestic industries and stop what is seen as the decline of a particular aspect of national identity. This means that international organisations are used by the state in order to legitimise their efforts to pursue cultural nationalism in response to globalisation and maintain and strengthen their version of the nation. Though appearing to function as independent actors, international organisations perform an instrumental function for states.

What is remarkable about these examples, and this is a point we alluded to in Chapters 5 and 6, is that the international organisations that are meant to limit the scope of nationalism, and in the case of UNESCO to protect the culture of local communities, end up enhancing the nationalist case. In effect, UNESCO's focus on protecting the local in the global context results in strengthening the national. It is therefore not a surprise that more and more states are applying to UNESCO to recognise their national food cultures.

## GIs and international trade

The case study of UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list in relation to food culture has shown that UNESCO, an international organisation, functions as the source of authority for the nation-state and other groups in pursuing their version of nation-rebuilding/maintenance that is primarily targeted at the domestic audience. In the case of GIs and international trade, different dynamics between the international organisations and actors at the national level can be observed. These relate to some of the tensions and challenges that occur from gastrodiploacy and the promotion of national food, which we discussed in previous chapters.

GIs are defined by the European Commission, the widely acknowledged vocal proponent of the concept (Agarwal and Barone, 2005; Charlier and Ngo, 2012; Tosato, 2013), as follows: 'A geographical indication is a distinctive sign used to identify a product as originating in the territory of a particular country, region or locality where its quality, reputation or other characteristic is linked to its geographical origin'.<sup>17</sup> This is in line with the understanding of the World Trade Organization (WTO): 'A product's quality, reputation or other characteristics can be determined by where it comes from. Geographical indications are place names (in some countries also words associated with a place) used to identify products that come from these places and have these characteristics (for example, "Champagne", "Tequila" or "Roquefort")'.<sup>18</sup> The prime function of GIs is to facilitate free trade by providing relevant and reliable information about the product to the consumer, a tool of free trade that is regulated by international organisations such as the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the WTO. GIs are therefore part of the regulatory system of international food trade such as the Codex Alimentarius International Food Standards (hereafter 'Codex standards') managed by the Codex Commission (Smythe, 2014). The Codex Commission was originally founded by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 1963 and is now an inter-governmental organisation with 185 member countries and one member organisation (the European Union). The Codex standards is the reference point in the WTO's Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement) and as such the de facto highest authority in international standards for food trade. Since the primary aim of setting up the Codex standards is to realise 'safe, good food for everyone – everywhere',<sup>19</sup> GIs, as part of this wider system, are fundamentally a

means of consumer protection deployed by the international system in its pursuit of a universalistic value: free and fair trade.

There is an additional aspect to GIs in international trade: GIs are categorised as intellectual property (IP) by the European Union and WTO and as such they have another normative implication in the fast-developing global IP protection scheme (Agarwal and Barone, 2005; Charlier and Ngo, 2012; Rippon, 2014). The protection of IP is deeply embedded in the free trade regime, and as such GIs as IP is part of the structure that supports further liberalisation of trade. The nation-state and private sector actors are generally compliant with the idea of IP protection because it is part and parcel of the current dominant convention regarding free trade. In other words, the IP protection scheme makes the nation-state and private sector actors prioritise the pursuit of a universalistic value of achieving free trade. However, GIs are by their very nature particularistic and the protection of GIs is also seen as having an empowering effect on developing countries in the free trade regime. This suggests that within a universalistic scheme of IP protection, GIs can be a disturbing factor because they are built on the particular, which suggests that GIs constitute an arena where the universal and the particular, often in the form of 'national interests', collide, and as such, this provides fascinating material for the current chapter, which looks into international organisations' role in the relationship between food and nationalism.

Because GIs are a form of IP justified by the linkage to a particular geographical area, they are seen as marketing tools as well as tools for the development of rural economies. The value of GIs as a marketing tool has been extensively explored. Among them, Agarwal and Barone (2005: 1) identify the chief strength of GIs as a marketing tool – that is, their capacity to differentiate commodity products by associating them to 'unique quality characteristics associated with a particular location or quality images that are based on the history, tradition, and folklore in a region'. While GIs are not without some drawbacks, differentiation in general is a positive quality because it can allow the sellers to command higher premiums on the product, which explains why producers are in general favourable to defining a GI. It is also expected that a successful definition of a GI leads to the promotion of tourism as touched upon in Chapter 3 in reference to the Scotch whisky industry.

GIs as a differentiation tool can benefit private sector actors as well as regions/nation-states. Agarwal and Barone (2005: 2) quote a study of the effect of GI on speciality salts such as French *fleur de sel* and report that 'as a consequence of the success of GI strategies for these

salt products, gourmet cooks pay as much as \$80 a pound for such varieties versus 30¢ per pound for common table salt'. In terms of the GI's developmental potential, Jena and Grote (2010) acknowledge that there is theoretical justification for GI protection in India and conclude that two prominent GI products of India, *basmati* rice and Darjeeling tea, have achieved an increased access to the export market, and this has led to a significant increase in export earnings by the producers, resulting in an improvement of living standards for agricultural workers. Adopting a more comprehensive perspective to regional development, Suh and MacPherson (2007) assess that securing GI for Boseong green tea for the first time in South Korea in 2002 has had a positive impact on the revitalisation of the local economy. The protection of GI as part of the trade liberalisation movement prompted the local officials to design an economic development plan with Boseong green tea cultivation and processing at the centre but also incorporating tourism. With the granting of GI for Boseong green tea, all three aspects of the local economic structure, cultivation, processing and tourism, have seen a positive impact. In addition, there has been an indication of ripple effects to adjacent regions. Suh and MacPherson (2007) conclude that Boseong green tea is one of the success stories facilitated by GI, with Boseong green tea-related income accounting for more than 40% of the regional economy. After conducting a comparative analysis of the impact of GI in the two cases, tequila in Mexico and Comté cheese in France, Bowen (2010: 211) concludes that 'the GI for Comté cheese has had very positive effects on the maintenance of the local economy and landscape' because it fits with the local conditions and is better than in the case of tequila. These cases demonstrate the attraction of GIs to the private sector as well as the nation-state as a means of economic success rather than of realising free trade.

In the field of GIs, the European Union features prominently as seen in its enthusiastic lobbying for the protection of GIs for alcoholic beverages and in disputes with its trading partners about, say, cheese. In a sense, it is only natural that the European Union has high visibility in trade issues since it is fundamentally a trading bloc and because the European Commission negotiates trade issues on behalf of all member states. There are many examples of the European Union standing up for the member states' collective interests in food trade, and the most well-known cases are related to cheese. First, the European Union has been involved with a dispute regarding the standardisation of parmesan cheese with the Codex Commission (Araki, 2013). The currently valid 2011 Codex standards regarding cheese and other

dairy products contain 16 standards for individual cheese: Mozzarella, Cheddar, Danbo, Edam, Gouda, Havarti, Samsøe, Emmentaler, Tilsiter, Saint-Paulin, Provolone, Cottage Cheese, Coulommiers, Cream Cheese, Camembert and Brie.<sup>20</sup> In 1996, the Milk and Dairy Products Committee, a sub-committee of the Codex Commission, opened the discussion about defining the Codex standard for parmesan cheese but the European Union opposed the proposal on the basis that *parmigiano reggiano* had already been registered as a GI under its scheme by then and therefore it should be managed by the European Union's GI protection scheme. Faced with a strong opposition from the European Union, the Milk and Dairy Products Committee effectively shelved the discussion in 2005. In this instance, the European Union has resisted the attempt to standardise parmesan cheese at the global level in order to protect its own GI protection regime, and by inference, the member states' interest. A similar stance is observed in the European Union's ongoing dispute with the United States about GI protection, especially with regard to cheese. On 11 March 2014, *The Guardian*, quoting Associate Press in Washington, reported that 'the EU wants to ban the use of European names like parmesan and gruyere on cheeses made in the US'.<sup>21</sup> According to the article, the European Union insisted that US-based manufacturers could not use the name 'parmesan' because their product was not produced in Parma, Italy, and 'feta' cheese produced by them had to be labelled as 'feta-like' or 'feta-style' as agreed with Canada. The small and medium-sized producers of cheese in the United States were worried about the possible cost of complying with this requirement and large manufacturers such as Kraft, which had been selling grated parmesan cheese for a long while, regarded this as a trade barrier. As in the case of the dispute with the Codex Commission, the European Union appears to be prioritising the protection of IP of its member states over the contribution to liberalising trade.

However, the European Union is also involved with disputes regarding GIs with its member states, too. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, a judicial arbiter of the European Union, has ruled that the attempts by some member states to establish national quality signs such as Belgium's 'Walloon' sign and Germany's 'Markenqualität aus deutschen Landen' sign are non-compliant with the principle of free movement of goods (Charlier and Ngo, 2012). In other words, in the field of GIs, the European Union sometimes acts primarily as the supporter of free trade and effectively works to undermine each member state's national interests and sometimes as the protector of the member states' interest, on whose behalf it engages in disputes with the

WTO or the Codex Commission. This highlights the unique nature of the European Union as an international organisation; it is a regional organisation that is deeply embedded in the free trade regime with contradictory effects on the power of the nation-state.

The examination of GIs in relation to food and nationalism directs our attention to an issue that has also surfaced in the discussion of UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage list: globalisation and its relationship with neo-liberalism. In the field of cultural conservation, globalisation is clearly a source of concern; it means homogenisation and flattening out of the diverse cultural landscape mainly through the penetration of market forces to every sphere of life. Intangible cultural practices such as food culture, dances and songs need to be inscribed in the list and firmly embedded in a commercial structure of tourism promotion and regional economic development in order to withstand the pressure of globalisation. Obviously, culture is not static and the bearers of culture do interact with globalisation, which will lead to changes and transformations, but the motivation behind UNESCO's list is to mobilise the state structure and market forces in order to protect common human heritage. In the case of GIs, the effects of globalisation as an expression of neo-liberalism are more complex. The idea of GIs as IP is the very product of neo-liberalism and GIs are primarily a tool to promote free and fair trade. However, GIs are valuable because of their grounding in a particular geographical location. In other words, GIs, the product of neo-liberalism, draw their strength from the particular, the antithesis of the universalism envisaged in neo-liberalism. Is globalisation as neo-liberalism weakening or strengthening nationalism? What are the roles of international organisations in this context in which contradictory and competing forces and interests interact? This is yet another theme to be developed further in the future.

## **Conclusion**

One of the main debates in international relations and global politics revolves around the purpose and function of international organisations. In the context of growing interdependence and the spread of globalisation, international organisations appear to promote universal values in opposition to national ones. Particularly in our case, international organisations are seen at the forefront of attempts to promote international free trade and universal food standards and also support food culture as a common good. This emphasis on the global at the expense of the national would suggest that international organisations

act in a manner that constrains nationalist forces and state power. Additionally, the need for international mediation over conflicting national food claims, in terms of standards, trade rights, cultural ownership and brands, would further indicate the enhancement of international organisations' power at the expense of states and would suggest the gradual erosion of state sovereignty.

However, as the two case studies provided demonstrate, in the case of food, international organisations' need to protect local communities and consumers, promote free trade and secure intellectual property rights, which in effect helps bolster nationalist claims. In particular, UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage campaign and the European Union's support for geographical indications highlight the contradictory position international organisations occupy in the international system. In pursuit of a universal value (free trade) and the protection of the particular and the local (GI as IP), international organisations support the nation-state domestically, in its pursuit of cultural nationalism, and globally, by supporting national claims of food ownership. This last point is particularly controversial because the concept of food authenticity, as we have shown in previous chapters, is problematic and highly contested.

# Conclusion: Food, Nationalism and Politics

The current volume has set out with two major aims: to investigate the relationship between food and nationalism, which has been largely neglected in the study of nationalism, and to demonstrate that the 'food-and-nationalism' axis provides a useful angle to study politics at various levels. We have argued in our Introduction that it is high time that the relationship between food and nationalism was taken seriously in the study of politics in general and in the study of nationalism more specifically. Food is essential to life and as such it is important in a multitude of ways; it literally sustains life; it is imbued with meanings; it is highly symbolic and emotive; and therefore it is highly political as a number of anthropologists have argued. Food features prominently in politics: in defining the problems that are important for a society ('it is part of our cultural heritage to eat dog meat and therefore foreigners should not meddle with it'); in the contest over power and values in public as seen in the Zionist attempt to create new Jews through diet and the sometimes hostile responses to it; and in 'the authoritative allocation of values, rights and duties for the community as a whole' as seen in the European Union's granting of a Geographical Indication (Huysmans, 2005: 75). On the other hand, politics today is permeated by the ideology of nationalism as a nation-centric worldview. Notwithstanding the all-too-often conflation of the nation and the state, today's politics is fundamentally shaped by nationalism from the everyday to global levels. Given all these, the relationship between food and nationalism, a largely neglected topic in the study of nationalism, deserves serious attention, and that is what the current volume has set out to do and it has, in our view, provided an outline for this important research area.



Has the volume shown that the ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis is a useful tool in the study of politics? We think it has. Both food and nationalism are ubiquitous in modern life, and the variety of cases examined in the volume suggests that the axis provides a number of entry points to investigate politics in many, if not all, aspects of life. The fact that a range of whale meat products are itemised in a wine bar’s menu (see Figure 6.1) leads to a realisation of the formation of a particular discourse about the food culture of a group in response to certain normative pressure from the outside, which is then legitimised in reference to globally shared norms. The collision of *the universal* and *the particular* or *the global* and *the national* then enters into people’s life in a mundane manner, connecting the everyday reality of people to ‘high’ politics. Behind the increased exposure to foreign food and cuisine, the ‘food-and-nationalism’ angle reveals there are gastrodiploacy initiatives, nation branding, the emergence of global norms about consumer protection, the idea of corporate social responsibility and the promotion of free trade. The reason why we are served Costa Rican coffee, not an anonymous one, is a complex interaction among all these movements, initiatives and strategies, not just profit motives. The ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis can therefore be made into a useful pedagogical tool in the study of nationalism by allowing students to link their everyday life experience to more abstract ideas in politics. This is primarily because the ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis has an almost unique potential for illuminating the way in which these various levels of politics and analysis overlap, connect and influence one another.

The current volume draws from an admittedly eclectic collection of cases. Some, such as Japanese-style pasta, changes and shifts in the food culture of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel and the use of food by the Zionist movement are drawn from research conducted by the authors; the study of the role of the British catering industry in ‘nationalising food’ is drawn from the personal experience of one of the authors; others are based on a wide range of literature from social history, anthropology, management studies, political economy and so on. The volume’s prime motive is to illuminate what the ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis can do and suggest new and fresh areas for research, not to prove something. That is why this eclectic approach is valid and appropriate. Furthermore, the fact that the volume has drawn from a range of sources shows the attractiveness of the ‘food-and-nationalism’ axis: it is necessarily inter-disciplinary and as such has potential to offer a more holistic understanding of the world we live in, which is inherently complex and nuanced.

The volume has also examined a number of concepts and approaches related to the 'food-and-nationalism' theme. Given the quotidian nature of food, the idea of everyday nationhood and the banal nationalism approach are the natural starting points of the volume's investigation. These ideas have proven to be useful in examining the ways in which individuals and groups relate to the idea of the nation as expected. The volume's particular contribution with respect to everyday nationhood and banal nationalism is Chapter 3, which shows that the activities of private sector actors (profit-making entities) are shaped and conditioned by the framework of nationalism; for example, by presenting a *couscous* dish not as a generic one but as a Moroccan dish, ostensibly to add value and increase sales, the catering industry is reinforcing the idea that the world is meaningfully divided into nations, a fundamental tenet in nationalism. This is, as far as we can see, a new insight into everyday and banal nationalism.

The volume has also found that conventional modernist approaches to nationalism, as a critique to which banal and everyday nationalism approaches have been developed, have some explanatory power in the investigation of the relationship between food and nationalism. Various governments' concern with the nation's diet is often entwined with modernisation and with the rapid expansion of the state's power to intervene in people's life. The government thus becomes concerned with the nation's diet in its attempt to strengthen the country and uses institutions such as compulsory education and conscription to influence what people eat. In other words, food can be a tool of governance, in particular, in an authoritarian regime in order to propagate a certain idea of the nation in a top-down manner.

In modern society, food primarily comes across as something to be consumed for the majority of people. Therefore, insights from studies in marketing, tourism and trade are relevant to the volume in broadening this perspective. We have investigated the issue of branding in the case of the private sector actors, nation branding and gastrodiploacy pursued by the nation-state and gastronationalism in the international arena. What we have found is that food has been used as a useful tool for promoting a particular image of the nation-state not only domestically but also internationally. The nation-state's claim of ownership and promotion of national foods also links well with the increase in demands by consumers to receive more and better information about the food they purchase and consume, and the private sector's desire to add value and increase sales. Nevertheless, the state's 'ownership' of national food also leads, sometimes as an unintended consequence, to

the homogenisation of the nation. The case study of the 'Thai Select' label is particularly instructive in this regard. In contradistinction, the case of Japanese 'sushi police' demonstrated that such top-down involvement can also lead to the weakening of the concept of the nation. What is clear from our investigation is the usefulness of the 'food-and-nationalism' axis for understanding the various political process and policies involved and for demonstrating how they all relate to and influence one another.

Since the 'food-and-nationalism' theme is vast, naturally there are a number of areas and topics that the current volume could not cover adequately. For instance, there are a number of areas that we touched upon but within the scope of this volume did not explore further, for example, food riots, food security, sovereignty and transnational movements. Specifically with regard to transnational movements, we need to acknowledge that the volume does not deal with the issue of diasporas adequately. In Chapter 2, we investigated the ways in which groups engage with the idea of the nation through food. Because of the situation they are in, the importance of rituals in maintaining social cohesion and connection to the homeland is markedly high in the case of diaspora groups, and ideally the role of food in this process is a very relevant topic to the volume. However, our expertise and knowledge could not cover the issue and it remains another topic for further research. While it has not captured the diaspora experience, Chapter 2 shows that nations are, in fact, 'zones of conflict' (Hutchinson, 2005) by analysing the food culture of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel. The case study shows that they, as a minority group, have a number of competing strategies to engage with the dominant national identity: assimilation and differentiation, which has the potential to lead to further contestation about the meaning of being an Arab-Palestinian in Israel. Another issue we only touched upon briefly in our Introduction, but that would be very interesting to explore further, is the relationship between 'food and nationalism' and food technology, in particular biotechnology and the use of genetically modified (GM) food/crops. One of the main reasons we believe the 'food-and-nationalism' axis would be a useful tool to analyse the current GM debates is that it encapsulates all of the issues we have discussed in the volume and specifically the interplay between the local, national and global. The debate over GM food/crops is contextualised in many countries within a national debate over Americanisation and the impact of globalisation on national sovereignty and culture.

Through its investigation, the current volume has highlighted that globalisation is an underlying factor that defines and redefines the relationship between food and nationalism. What is meant by globalisation here is a kind of social change through which connection between different parts of the globe increases, a process that has been going on since humans started to migrate from Africa and that has intensified from the mid-twentieth century with the rapid development in technology. Globalisation is, in this sense, an essential condition of human life, not a novel phenomenon that emerged in the 1980s. Our investigation into food and nationalism has confirmed this view of globalisation. Individuals in modern society are exposed to an increased range of food items and food cultures because of globalisation; people encounter foreign cuisines on a daily basis and know that some people in the world eat what they would not eat. This is because globalisation, in the form of an increase in international trade, has brought a range of new food items and cuisines to ordinary people's life. As the exposure to foreign food items/cuisine/food culture increases, the value of *the particular* also increases as the means of differentiation or as the indication of quality. This then leads to the re-arrangement of inter-group relationship. Hummus simultaneously becomes 'Arab' and 'Israeli' in what is dubbed as the 'hummus war'. The contestation over hummus provides a good example of the tensions that arise from the interplay between the local, national and global, as a result of globalisation.

The significance of globalisation is not limited to trade and travel. Our investigation has suggested that nationalism in relation to food is often engaged with an emergence of global ethical or normative frameworks. Even in the area of international trade in which Count of Origin (CO) and GIs are largely seen as tools for increasing export of agricultural stuff (and attracting more tourists), they represent global standards, a set of ideas about what a particular good should be for the purpose of consumer protection. The principle that the consumer should be protected by increased transparency and better regulation by the nation-state or international organisations is a norm that is increasingly shared in many parts of the world. While this is associated with international trade, something that is very material, it has contributed to the building of global normative frameworks. Chapter 3 points out the impact of the idea of corporate social responsibility on the strengthening of the nationalist framework in categorising food items. Corporate social responsibility may still be an ideal of advanced consumer society, but it is spreading fast with the expansion of international trade and corporate

activities, thus pushing the trend to associate food items and cuisine with a particular national or ethnic group forward.

The presence of global ethical/normative frameworks is felt in other cases as well. For instance, the re-affirmation of the right to eat whale meat, dog meat or foie gras in the face of opposition based on the idea of animal rights, one of the emerging global norms, is justified in reference to respect for cultural rights, yet another global norm. In regard to global norms, the volume has found that international organisations play a complex role in relation to food and nationalism. UNESCO, whose mission is to preserve the diversity of cultures of the world as a universal good in its own right, has developed the idea of world heritage, which appears to be used as a means of nation branding by the member states; in other words, UNESCO is a venue for the nation-states to project their images externally. When it comes to the intangible cultural heritage list, however, UNESCO appears to be used by the nation-state, and to a certain extent by the private sector as well, to engage with the domestic audience; the French and Japanese governments, both managed to have their respective cuisine inscribed in the list, are more concerned with tackling what they consider to be the decline of national culture and the UNESCO acts as an indisputable authority to authenticate the particular: national culture. In this sense, the nation-state is trying to make the most of the international/global authority an international organisations possess in order to deal with nation-rebuilding.

The sometimes paradoxical role that international organisations play is also highlighted in the investigation of the European Union's role in relation to GIs. On the one hand, the European Union supports the GI system as a means of promoting free trade and strengthening consumer protection; both are universalistic orientations. In this sense, the European Union is acting as the enforcer of global standards for the good of humanities. However, the European Union is also locked in a number of disputes with its trading partners because of its protection of GIs. In this regard, the European Union is acting as the protector of the member states' interest, in other words particularistic interest by emphasising the GIs as intellectual property (IP). The protection of IP is, in turn, a universalistic value; IP should be protected because it is the right thing to do. *The national* is again protected in reference to *the universal*.

Our investigation into food and nationalism has after all highlighted the complex interplay between the effects of globalisation and the world that is based on a nation-centric ideology. It has demonstrated that

globalisation does not simply bring about the homogenisation of culture, but rather it adds more layers to the cultural landscape. What is clear from our volume is that this layering of culture can be analysed and untangled through the 'food-and-nationalism' axis, which brings together and highlights the ways in which the *banal and everyday* interact with *the national* and *the global*.

# Notes

## Introduction

1. For example, Avieli (2005) demonstrates the historical relations between the farming and consumption of rice and Vietnamese identity from the late eighteenth century; Orlove (1997) discusses the importance of beef to Chileans at the beginning of the twentieth century; and Rogers (2003) provides examples, from the arts and literature, of the connection between English and then British national identity and roast beef from as far back as the late sixteenth century.
2. For example, cookbooks (Appadurai, 1988); diplomacy (Wilson, 2011); the construction of national brands (Cormack, 2008; DeSoucey, 2010); a particular food item (Orlove and Schmidt, 1995; Raviv, 2003; Rogers, 2003); food discourse (Takeda, 2008); a historical account of food and identity for a particular nation (Pilcher, 1996, 1998; Raviv, 2002b; Rogers, 2004; Wilk, 1999); or a particular food event (Tyrrel et al., 2007; O'Connor, 2011).
3. The concept of food rules is borrowed from Ashkenazi and Jacob (2000).
4. For example, Ferguson (2006), Jacobs (2009), Montanari (2004), Pilcher (1998) and Rogers (2002b).

## 1 Everyday Creation of the Nation

1. In the current chapter we build upon the ideas of Fox and Miller-Idriss with regard to the first two areas identified: choosing and talking the nation. 'Performing the nation' is dealt with in Chapter 2, where the discussion is focused on the role of food items as symbols in rituals; while 'consuming the nation' is discussed in Chapter 3, where individual food consumption is related to the private sector's construction of national brands and nationality.
2. <http://press.allrecipes.com/press/>; accessed on 10 November 2014.
3. For more details, see UNESCO's web site: <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/en/news/Seventeen-new-elements-inscribed-on-the-lists-of-the-Convention-00072>. This will be further investigated in Chapter 7.
4. For the history of pasta in Japan, see the Japan Pasta Association's web site: <http://www.pasta.or.jp/content/dictionary/index.html>.
5. <http://www.kabenoana.com/column/column1.html>; accessed on 2 January 2014
6. [https://info.cookpad.com/outline\\_of\\_service](https://info.cookpad.com/outline_of_service); accessed on 30 December 2013

7. <http://www.pasta.or.jp/association/greeting/index.html>; accessed on 30 December 2013
8. <http://cookpad.com/category/133>, accessed on 30 December 2013. There are five sub-categories under 'Japanese style pasta' on this site: *mentaiko*/cod roe (152 recipes), soy sauce (321 recipes), miso paste (58 recipes), pickled plums (62 recipes) and *natto* (117 recipes) making a total of 710.
9. One was described as 'tropical' using *nam pla* (fish sauce) and bitter squash (*goya*) despite being listed under the Japanese style pasta and the other was explained as 'not really Japanese' because of the main ingredient, *botago*. The recipe creator was aware that *botago* was a European food item but categorised it as a Japanese style pasta because *botago* was commonly thought to be a Japanese food item under the name of *karasumi*.
10. For an insightful study of the development of ramen in Japan and its implication to politics, see Kushner (2012).
11. Kramer (2013) suggests the adoption of 'shukyo' as translation for religion in Meiji Japan was a case of appropriation rather than transplantation based on pre-Meiji discussions of politics and religion. Gluck (2011) describes social change in Japan that took place since the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853 as 'blended modernity' rather than 'Westernisation' recognising the element of agency on the part of Japanese society.

## 2 When Groups Participate in Defining the Nation

1. We will come back to the complexity of hummus as a national symbol in our discussion of the Israeli-Lebanese 'hummus wars' in Chapter 5.
2. Between 2012 and 2014, several field research trips to Israel were undertaken. During the trips a number of leading Arab-Palestinian chefs were interviewed, including, among others, Sallah Kurdi (Jamila restaurant), Hussam Abbas (Al Babur) and Habib Daoud (Izbeh).
3. The relationship between national identity, product quality and consumerism will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.

## 3 Consuming Nations: The Construction of National Identities in the Food Industry

1. <http://www.starbucks.co.uk/menu/beverage-list>; accessed on 26 September 2014
2. National branding is a particular and deliberate action to convey ideas, images and values regarding national identity through the branding and marketing of products (Aronczyk, 2008: 105).
3. The term 'client' is used to denote the person or organisation that issues the contract, while the term 'costumer' is reserved for those who are the beneficiaries of the services provided.
4. Ronald Ranta had been part of the food and hospitality industry, a career that has spanned more than two decades. During that time he worked his way up from a commis chef position to that of a head chef in the restaurant world and later head chef and chef-manager in the contract catering



industry. The period worked in the contract catering industry lasted from 2002 to 2011, during which he worked mainly, though not exclusively, in London. During this period, he had the opportunity of either directly running the day-to-day operations of a number of outlets, as a head chef or chef-manager, or providing a range of covering and supporting cooking and administrative roles for additional outlets. From 2002 to 2003, he worked for several contact catering companies as an agency support sous- and head chef, and chef-manager. From 2004 onwards, he worked for 'In House Catering', a small contract catering company specialising mainly in directors dining and corporate events. In 2009, the company was bought by 'Catermasters', a mid-sized company that has a more traditional range of contract catering operations, and for which he worked for until 2011.

5. Notwithstanding the fact that the term is itself problematic.
6. The term 'regional' or 'local' is controversial in itself; several authors (Cook and Crang, 1996; Montanari, 2004) argue that the term 'regional' is a modern construction that has little to do with historic food traditions.
7. <http://www.compass-group.co.uk/sourcing.htm>; accessed on 26 September 2014
8. <http://www.compass-group.co.uk/british-sandwich-week.htm>; accessed on 26 September 2014
9. We would like to make it clear that we do not intend to explore the concept of CSR; we merely allude to some aspects that are pertinent for the purpose of the chapter.
10. While the UK contract catering industry is diverse and there are a large number of firms involved, the industry is dominated by five large multinational companies: Compass, Eilor, Sodexo, BaxterStorey and Aramark.
11. According to the UK Council for International Student Affairs, non-British students made up 15% of first-degree students and over 50% of postgraduate students during 2012–2013 (<http://www.ukcisa.org.uk/Info-for-universities-colleges-schools/Policy-research-statistics/Research-statistics/International-students-in-UK-HE/>; accessed on 21 December 2014).
12. The name-flag tags have been used by a large number of travel and hospitality companies, for example, Costa Coffee and British Airways.
13. <http://www.brake.co.uk/?m=1>; accessed on 27 April 2015
14. <http://www.catermasters.co.uk/>; accessed 21 September 2013.
15. See, for example, Aramark (2013), Baxter storey (2013), Compass UK (2013), Eilor UK (2013) and Sodexo UK (2013).
16. Whether this is due to increased awareness, clients' demands or pure corporate marketing strategies is not important for the purpose of this chapter.
17. In terms of overall turnover, number of outlets and meals served, these have more than doubled (Caterer, 2010).
18. Suppliers would normally charge slightly higher than market prices, an expense that is billed not to the catering companies but to the clients, and in return catering companies receive an annual kickback, supposedly to compensate for spoiled food or damaged goods provided.
19. One example of this line of enquiry is Ian Russell's ethnographic investigation into North-East Scottish identity (Russell, 2007).

20. Details of the Scotch Whisky Association are found on SWA's website: <http://www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/>
21. The role of GIs in food and nationalism is investigated in Chapter 7.

#### **4 Food and Diet in 'Official' Nationalism**

1. For an insightful discussion of the differentiation of modernisation and Westernisation in non-Western societies (Ottoman, Turkey and Meiji, Japan in particular) in the nineteenth century, see Esenbel (1994).
2. The consumption of whale meat in Japan needs to be seen in this context. In the aftermath of the Second World War, whales were seen as a cheap and accessible source of protein to nurture Japanese population.
3. Hadassah is the Women's Zionist Organisation of America. During the Mandate period it was active in providing health and welfare support to the Jewish population.
4. The poster and pamphlets discussed are available online through the Zionist archive: <http://www.zionistarchives.org.il/en/Pages/TozeretHaaretz.aspx#!prettyPhoto>; accessed on 21 December 2014.

#### **5 National Food in the International Context**

1. <http://www.thaiselect.com/main.php?filename=index>
2. <http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook2/kitchen/intro.html>
3. <http://www.thaiselect.com/main.php?filename=index>
4. <http://www.taiwanfestival.co.uk/>
5. *Ibid.*
6. The issue of intangible cultural heritage is discussed further in Chapter 7.
7. This is not official translation by MAFF. This is translated from the Japanese original by Atsuko Ichijo.
8. <http://jronet.org.e.rl.hp.transer.com/about/>; accessed on 27 April 2015.

#### **6 Norms, Food and Nationalism**

1. It was reported that two whaling ships returned from the Antarctic without any catch on 29 March 2015 (*Japan Times*, 30 March 2015).
2. The Japanese government has been maintaining that the population of Antarctic minke whales has recovered and is on the increase (*Japan Fisheries Agency*, 2012).
3. The reverse side of the coin is that the establishment of a view in Japan that 'Japanese people have never wasted whales; they use the whole whale from the tip to toe, even blood, unlike Western nations which wasted whale meat' (Onishi and Yamamoto, 2014). An example of this understanding is shown in Figure 6.1. This helps presenting the whaling problem as a cultural clash rather than a resource management problem.
4. Poon (2014) reports on a fascinating court case in which a Chinese resident was prosecuted for killing a rat that ran havoc. The local magistrate's judgement was that killing a pest in itself was not illegal but the rat should have

been killed humanely without being tortured. The resident was found guilty of animal cruelty and was fined. The incredulous resident paid the fine but confessed that he did not understand the ruling.

5. Traditional foie gras production was based on manual force feeding of migratory birds. In recent decades this has given way to a more industrial system based on mechanical force feeding of caged and housed ducks. There are claims that mechanical force feeding is actually safer than manual (Gille, 2011).

## 7 International Organisations, Food and Nationalism

1. (UNESCO, <http://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco>)
2. <http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/>
3. Brumann (2014) reports on a more nuance and complex change in UNESCO. While career diplomats are more likely to follow their governments' instruction, they still aspire for different kinds of cosmopolitan values such as peace. His fine ethnography of diplomacy, however, falls outside the scope of this volume.
4. <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00006>
5. <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00559>
6. Leimgruber (2010) provides an interesting critique of the 2003 convention from the compatibility of a few ideas underpinning the convention and the type of state. According to him, there is no equivalent of 'intangible culture' in German and what is used in order to adhere to the convention roughly translates as 'immaterial culture'. The assumption that 'intangible culture' belongs to a national/ethnic group in the convention also poses a problem for German-speaking people because of the term 'Volkskultur', which has negative connotation with respect to Nazi. He also points out that the federal state like Switzerland cannot relate to UNESCO in the same manner as more centralised states such as France.
7. *Shokuiku* (食育) is an idea that children should be educated to be able to live a healthy food life by acquiring knowledge about food and ability to choose food items through a variety of experiences, and what is particular in Japan is that the idea was legislated in 2005 in the form of Basic Law on *Shokuiku* (food and nutrition education). Perhaps conscious of the law's peculiarity, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery has published a leaflet in English entitled *What is 'Shokuiku (Food Education)'* which is available from their website (<http://www.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/shokuiku.pdf>).
8. <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&RL=00869>
9. <http://washokujapan.jp/>
10. Interview on 9 April 2015.
11. This is also confirmed by Murata in the second meeting of the Working Group to Prepare for the Inscription of Japanese Food Culture in the Intangible Cultural Heritage List (MAFF, 2011b).
12. <http://culinary-academy.jp/english>
13. Needless to say, due to the nuclear incident that followed the earthquake, export of Japanese agricultural produce came to a halt in 2011. The impact of

the earthquake and the nuclear incident in the preparation of the UNESCO application can be seen in the minutes of the second meeting of the Working Group (MAFF, 2011b). The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, on the other hand, clearly understood the inscription of *washoku* in the intangible cultural heritage list as part of its 'Cool Japan' strategy (MAFF, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d).

14. <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&RL=00437>
15. [http://www.iehca.eu/IEHCA\\_v4/iehca.html](http://www.iehca.eu/IEHCA_v4/iehca.html)
16. While MFPCA was tasked to continue engaging with the promotion of the gastronomic meal of the French after the inscription, its website suggests that its activities have been considerably slowed down of late. See: <http://mfpcablogspot.fr/>; accessed on 3 May 2015.
17. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/>; accessed on 3 May 2015
18. [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/trips\\_e/gi\\_background\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm); accessed on 3 May 2015
19. <http://www.codexalimentarius.org/about-codex/en/>; accessed on 3 May 2015
20. <http://www.codexalimentarius.org/standards/list-of-standards/en/?provide=standards&orderField=fullReference&sort=asc&num1=CODEX>
21. <http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/mar/11/europe-trade-talks-cheese-back-parmesan-feta>

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