Birth of the Intellectuals

1880–1900

CHRISTOPHE CHARLE



Birth of the Intellectuals

By the same author

Social History of France in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Berg, 1994)

(with J. Vincent and J. M. Winter) *Anglo-French Attitudes: Comparisons and Transfers between English and French Intellectuals since the Eighteenth Century* (Manchester University Press, 2007)

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Translated by David Fernbach and
G. M. Goshgarian

polity

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To the memory of my father (1914–1968), my mother and Martine

Introduction

> What was aroused in me was the pride of the *intellectuel*, aware that society is stronger, but pointing out to it that it is not intellectual.
>
> Julien Benda, *La Jeunesse d'un clerc*[1]

The *intellectuels*,* both as a group and as an idea, present a historical paradox that is often misinterpreted. A word that has been in current usage for less than a century has become an indispensable term in political, ideological, sociological, historical and even psychological discourse. Yet, rendered tired and commonplace by abuse of its contradictory meanings, it continues to fuel scholarly controversies, as well as fashionable essays that relaunch it when the intellectual landscape becomes too dull. As a concept, the *intellectuels* has thus escaped the usual fate of neologisms coined to denote a social group, that of a gradual neutralization or, on the other hand, a historical anchoring that grows out of date.

To investigate the period of the birth of the *intellectuel*s is to try to understand the origins of this paradox and the reasons behind it. Why, in the era of the stabilization of the Republic and democracy (1880–1900), did the *intellectuels*, in the sense of the Dreyfus Affair, appear as a group, as a schema for perceiving the social

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* There is a difference between *intellectuels* and intellectuals as the two words are used in this book. The original French term is maintained in the text for the particular sense it acquired in late nineteenth-century France, while the English indicates that it is to be understood in the broader sociological sense. The English has been retained for the title in order to indicate that the book deals with more than simply the rise of a particular type of French intellectual and tackles the broader sociological category of intellectuals, which includes those outside of France.

world and as a political category? Such is the object of the present book.

THE APPEARANCE OF THE '*INTELLECTUELS*'

To break the vicious circle of abstract or normative definitions of the *intellectuels* that form the general starting point of any essay on them, the only consistent historical approach is to analyse the foundation document of their public existence, what has become known as the 'manifesto of the *intellectuels*'. This manifesto was particular in two ways: it was not a political presentation but, in its original untitled version, a 'protest' based on the constitutional right of petition, and it was transmitted to posterity under a different name, attributed to it by its opponents.

Seeking in this way the manner in which the *intellectuels* first appeared is not therefore to fall prey to the charge of adopting an exclusively political perspective or taking the assertions of the parties involved at face value; it is rather to find out the degree to which this document and its approach must have seemed singular to a reader of the time. If such a procedure has become commonplace, that is the very index of its success, and it masks from us today the rupture it introduced in the rules of public debate.

The celebrated petition in fact assumed three things: the right to scandal (its object was to support Zola's challenging article 'J'accuse'[2] after the failure of all legal procedures to bring out the truth), the right to combine in order to give greater force to its protest (the *intellectuels* were not just particular individuals; the celebrity of some of their number was overshadowed by the assertion of an overall political and social community, whatever the symbolic capital that each might possess) and, finally, the right to claim a symbolic power based on the titles that the majority of the signatories mentioned after their names. Each of these three rights had already been used since the Revolution. Scandal, voluntary or otherwise, is a classic procedure for winning attention in the intellectual or political field; the coalition of *intellectuels* also has its predecessors but was previously rather rare, limited to a small number or the confines of a professional group; the right to symbolic power drawn from intellectual titles is also an old-established claim but was generally recognized only in the case of big names. The elements of rupture prevail here over those of continuity in two respects: the new significance attributed to the old means of action and, especially, the

combined use of these rights, which had no genuine precedent. For their opponents, the claims of the Dreyfusards were a violation of the accepted social rules. The right to scandal had become an incitement to disorder, the right to coalition a challenge to 'natural groups', and the right to symbolic power a manifestation of pathological pride, drawn from 'false doctrines'. This protest, therefore, an argument in a legal dispute, became, by the accumulation of these signs of rupture, a source of political division and a confrontation of visions of the world. Starting as an isolated event and partisan text, the manifesto of the *intellectuels* inaugurated endless debates on the social legitimacy of a group and on the social and political vision that it sought to impose.[3]

To restore to the birth of the *intellectuels* its radical novelty does not by itself avoid the pitfalls of a subject that is only too familiar. The literature devoted to the *intellectuels* in fact follows a well-established tradition: on the one hand is the heroic history of intellectuals in general, even going as far as explicit eulogy, which cuts off great cultural figures from the social and historical context to which they belong or reduces this to a secondary appendix; on the other hand is the literature of denigration which, contrary to the former, gives itself the appearance of science and theory, the better to devalue its adversaries.[4] But in a further reversal which shows the deep complicity of these two styles beneath their surface hostility, it is theoretical essays that teach us most on the history of a moment in intellectual life, whereas complacent histories are more informative on the positions that divide the *intellectuels*.[5] The long persistence of the essay tradition has prevented historians from tackling this type of subject. It has been reserved for such other disciplines as the history of ideas, the history of philosophy, sociology and literary history. These, however, have confined themselves to major authors, to dominant currents of ideas or to a few well-known intellectual styles. Historians, in the strict sense, have recently begun to challenge this division of labour between disciplines, at least for the earlier periods in which the word 'intellectual' had a very general and analogical sense.[6] It is only in the last decades or so that the more contemporary era has been at the centre of historical research, breaking this old taboo. The subject of the *intellectuels* has a dangerous reputation, as it is both political and a question of fashion. A more decisive risk that these works face is that of giving too much autonomy to a restricted sector of society or of grasping it only from the angle of political history.[7]

A sociological and historical approach to the *intellectuels*, at a given time, acquires its full sense only by locating these within

the global space of contemporary power and, more generally, in relation to the transformations in the social recruitment of fractions of the dominant class. The *intellectuels*, as this book will seek to show, most commonly reject being assimilated to a social group, see themselves as different from other elites, sometimes even to the point of claiming to be the only genuine elite; more frequently still, they practise internal distinctions: true *intellectuels* versus false *intellectuels*, semi-*intellectuels* versus major *intellectuels*, writers versus academics, old versus young, avant-garde versus successful or scholarly writers, journalists versus poets, left versus right, and so on.

'INTELLECTUELS' AND 'ELITES'

I must briefly summarize here the conclusions of my previous investigation, in which I maintained this initial differentiation or distancing in relation to other social elites.[8] The elites of the French Republic were defined by a double paradox, both in the ideology of the time and partly also in reality. The advent of political democracy, and the incontestable advance of meritocracy in relation to the era of *notables*, led to the belief that elites should be open to anyone, whatever their starting point or social inheritance. If the people are sovereign, and if merit is the key to social success, then any citizen can claim the highest functions. Now the sociology of the elites of this time displayed both the changes that had taken place since the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century and the limits to these changes. The cards had certainly been dealt anew, but within the restricted circle of the dominant class – i.e., the bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the middle classes. Besides, the expansion of the social bases of the elites was much less marked in the economic field than in the intellectual one. Administrative and political elites were in an intermediate situation in this respect. The political change of the early 1880s had temporary and limited effects on account of the refusal of the republicans to honour the promises of their predecessors of 1848, who had called for a complete meritocracy of access to higher public functions. More serious was the compartmentalization maintained and even reinforced in the school system by the closing off on itself of a privileged primary education with its own channel of advance (*école primaire supérieure*, *école normale* (for schoolmaster formation), the *Ecoles normales supérieures* of Saint-Cloud and Fontenay). This choice

consistently prevented the broadening of the bases of recruitment from the royal road leading to governing posts by way of the *lycée*, the open competitions and the *grandes écoles*.[9]

In a second aspect of this paradox, the specific dynamic of elites and the social exchange within them contributed to the growing isolation of the dominated intellectual pole, represented by the universities and to a lesser degree by writers and artists, in relation to the two other poles, the economic and the politico-administrative. In the university, owing to increasing competition, the strategies of professors had become steadily more rigid, professionalized and dependent on scholarly capital; in the fields of literature and art, the cult of originality against academicism, especially within the avant-garde, ran counter to the accumulation of social profits to be drawn from other fields, at the risk of having to accept dominated positions or exclusion from the intellectual field.[10] In business, administration and politics the opposite situation prevailed. The highest officials formed alliances, thanks to a general-staff function for influential politicians, often before retiring and becoming spokesmen for economic lobbies. In the same way, the politicians had at their disposal, in case of electoral defeat, posts reserved in the administration or a gilded retirement in the business world. Business circles, finally, had a steadily growing need for men with broad experience to represent them collectively, facilitate their relations with other elites, or tackle technical problems, drawing on the pool of engineers or state functionaries.[11]

This situation where intellectual fractions were dominated within the elites or, more broadly, within the bourgeoisie is a long-run structural constant. But it was brought home more acutely to those affected at this time by the increase in objective differentials and the build-up of various social profits by the dominant elites, whereas previously the circulation of elites was less pronounced – above all, by the evident distance between the meritocratic ideology in which these fractions had been schooled and the social reality. The malaise that resulted from this, however, was expressed differently according to the position occupied in the social field. One section of the traditional university elites, and the most professionalized groups (lawyers, doctors, a few well-known scientists or writers), managed to integrate into the dominant elites or ally with them, acting as experts, advisers or ideologists, though the price for this was renunciation of their autonomy or the loss of genuine excellence in the eyes of their peers. The growth in the number of university posts (particularly in the faculties of letters and sciences, and at lower levels of the hierarchy that were most removed from academic

notables) made this road of access to the social elites illusory, unless other social assets were also available.[12]

In the fields of literature and art, the disengagement of the state, the uncontrolled expansion in the number of producers and the increased dependence on economic mechanisms, in both the art market and publishing, further aggravated the situation of artists and writers. These transformations required a choice, according to the varying prospects of autonomous survival for the individuals concerned, between submission to the market, a double life, or withdrawal to aesthetic values with no recognition except that of their peers.[13]

Throughout the different crises of French history from the Dreyfus affair on, this contradiction between the official values of the Republic (meritocracy, the cult of great men who embodied the national spirit) and the actual laws of reproduction of its elites was one of the objective foundations for the birth of the *intellectuels* and for their enduring role in the field of power. As guardians of these values, the *intellectuels* as a whole had increasingly little means of concrete intervention in the play of forces in the democratic arena. The more they were honoured symbolically, the less they were listened to in practice. The more they cultivated their specific character, the more removed they became from other elites. But at this point we have to draw a provisional line under this initial scene setting so as not to fall into finalism or fatalism. As always in social and political history, there is a significant margin between the potential for mobilization of a group defined by abstract and objective criteria and its concrete mobilization in particular circumstances. For each singular individual, there is an opposition between the abstract rationality of the sociologist, historian or political leader and the 'bad' reasons of their other intimate solidarities that often make them deviate from a purely social logic, which a general survey cannot take into account at this stage.

OVERALL VIEW

In exploring the various dimensions of the subject, I shall start in two stages. The first part will analyse the overall conditions for the appearance of the *intellectuels* – thus, in a sense, intellectuals before the *intellectuels*. The second will deal with the gradual mobilization of the potential group around this representation, as well as with the political debate and struggle in which the *intellectuels* are

at issue. The social figure of the *intellectuel* could appeal to an old tradition, that of the philosopher, the romantic poet, the artist 'for art's sake', and more recently that of the scientist. The *intellectuel* claimed a part of this historical inheritance, which was no longer appropriate to the new state of the intellectual field in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The transformations of this time generated the need for a neologism adapted to expressing the novel situation of the intellectual professions. The expansion of the intellectual field and the growing weight of relations of economic dependence in cultural production, as well as, from another direction, the university reforms, strengthened both the importance of the intellectual professions vis-à-vis the classical liberal professions and their own internal differentiation. At the same time, this contradictory process accentuated, according to the sector of the intellectual field involved, its autonomy and its heteronomy. As a social milieu, the categories subsequently classed under the term *intellectuels* – i.e., writers, artists, and academics – thus followed opposite polarities that cut across the obvious professional divisions. These cleavages prevented them from forming a professional group like others.

The intellectual field was thus traversed by an opposition with a political dimension related to the contention between the various fractions of the dominant class, with the main intellectual currents expressing their conflicting positions. These resulted from a crisis of legitimacy of the dominant social representations. The latter had been put in question by the challenge of the political far left. The ideological couple *intellectuel*/elite which emerged at this time and expressed the political and social issue involved in the Dreyfus Affair actually made its appearance in the early 1890s, and is doubly ambiguous. The *intellectuel* might be opposed either to the 'elite' or its genuine realization. These social developments and ideological debates acquired their full significance only with the growing intervention of the *intellectuels* in the field of power – object of the second part of this book. It occurred first of all on a limited scale when the intellectual avant-gardes, partly won to the ideas of the far left, invented new forms of collective expression during the 1890s, dress rehearsals in a way for the Dreyfus Affair.

The latter will be the focus of the two final chapters. Through a reading of the various petitions and polemics opposing Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard *intellectuels*, we shall check the interpretative hypotheses elaborated in the preceding chapters, both at the level of the sociology of the two camps and at the level of the ideologies and social representations that they championed.

This complex process of the birth of the *intellectuels* explains the historical and theoretical persistence of this key notion in French culture and history in the twentieth century. The structural conditions and political circumstances that gave it its multiple dimensions could evolve considerably without seriously disturbing it, as distinct from what happened with earlier representations of the intellectual trade. Each sector of the intellectual field, in each era, was in effect able to reutilize it by one-sidedly stressing this or that aspect, justified by its multiple original meanings. Even the periodically recycled theme of its disappearance or decline is a way of acknowledging its persistence. Historically, however, from the 1900s on, it could also be said that the *intellectuels* of the Dreyfus Affair no longer existed,[14] since the political events in which they were involved had divided them so greatly. Each generation of *intellectuels* thus seems to have rewritten Péguy's *Notre jeunesse*.

History provides many other examples of these key events whose light still reaches us even though the star that emitted it has long since died.

Part I

Intellectuals before the *Intellectuels*

1

The Intellectuel: *A Historical and Social Genealogy*

> I do indeed maintain (and for me this must be a practical dogma in the life of an artist) that one has to divide one's life into two parts: live as a bourgeois and think as a demi-god.
>
> Gustave Flaubert[1]

To understand the appearance of a new social and cultural figure such as that of the *intellectuel* in the 1890s, it is necessary to situate this in the historical and social context of the turn of the century. In the first place, its content and its function were determined by a succession of earlier representations of dominant cultural figures. Since the eighteenth century at least, each period has had its social ideal of the cultural producer. Convenience of presentation here requires us to analyse each of these as the result of a regular succession, analogous to a family tree, though it is clear that they were also, in their time, the issue in an intellectual struggle before winning temporary legitimacy in the intellectual field.[2] I will confine myself here, however, to this schematic vision, as what matters at this point is less to reconstitute the successive states of the intellectual field than to determine both the degree to which the *intellectuels* of the late nineteenth century could claim attachment to it and the historical circumstances at the origin of the substitution of one figure for another – the *intellectuel* being the latest example. This apparent continuity in fact conceals the transformation of the intellectual field during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, which was the essential cause of the ideological change.

The *intellectuel* in fact emerged at the end of a new phase of cultural life. The period during which he appeared was marked not

only by an ideological or political crisis, as with the replacement of earlier figures by their successors, but also by a challenge to the very dimensions of the intellectual field, its structures and rules of operation. The elitism of earlier figures corresponded to a narrow intellectual field, closely tied to the privileged members of society. The figure of the *intellectuel* imposed itself after a phase of expansion of the intellectual professions, a broadening of the publics affected and a challenge to the most venerable cultural hierarchies (in particular the traditional university system). Nonetheless, this neologism entered the social vocabulary from the margins. The figure of the scientist, which had recently acquired the greatest legitimacy, could not play this role, as its elitism ran counter to the new 'democratic' conditions of intellectual life.

THE GALLERY OF ANCESTORS

From the 'man of letters' to the 'poet'

Without going back to the Middle Ages,[3] and keeping to the purely French genealogy that the Dreyfusard *intellectuels* claimed, the most direct ancestor of the *intellectuel* was the *philosophe* or 'man of letters' of the eighteenth century. Voltaire in particular, in his article on 'men of letters' in the *Dictionnaire philosophique*, written in 1765, gave a strangely pessimistic portrait. The man of letters was a martyr ('every philosopher is treated as the Jews treated their prophets'). The examples he cites, taken from the seventeenth century, show that 'man of letters' had a much broader sense than it does today and included not just 'literary' writers but also philosophers and scientists (among the names Voltaire cites are Descartes, Gassendi and Arnauld). Above all, however, the term is defined in opposition to the decadent academics stuck in their jargon and to schools 'where things are only said by halves'.[4] Excluded from the dominant cultural institutions, the man of letters, according to Voltaire, was also on the margins of society:

> The great misfortune still of a man of letters is generally to have nothing to hold on to. A bourgeois purchases a minor position and is supported by his colleagues. If he is treated unjustly, he immediately finds defenders. The man of letters has no support, he is like one of those flying fish: if he soars a bit, the birds eat him; if he sinks, the fish eat him.

This passage, with only slight alteration, could serve to define the *intellectuel* at the end of the nineteenth century. It also suggests how dearly the unattached intellectual has to pay for his claim to freedom and independence. If these structural conditions applying to the 'man of letters' in the eighteenth-century sense and confirmed by recent historical works[5] enable us to conclude the existence of a certain kinship with the *intellectuel*, at least an ideological one, the change of perspective should not be overlooked, not to mention the evidently new social conditions of intellectual production after the Revolution. The *philosophe*'s claim to autonomy came up against the unbridgeable barriers of the old society. The success that a few of the *philosophes* had in 'the world' should not conceal the exclusion from the sphere of privilege and legitimate culture that the great number of men of letters encountered. These excluded ones formed the 'literary bohemia' which, according to Robert Darnton, took its revenge against academic literature in the course of the Revolution. Forerunners of revolutionary ideas, and in their final generation themselves actors in the Revolution, the 'men of letters' experienced the vagaries of the Revolution's image after Thermidor.

We can follow here the demonstration given by Paul Bénichou in *Le Sacre de l'écrivain*.[6] He explains how the 'man of letters', whom the author of *Candide* had endowed with all the symbolic attributes of the *intellectuel*, could not maintain this function in the early part of the nineteenth century. The man of letters was reduced to the banal condition of a literary professional (a sense that persists in the Société des gens de lettres).[7] A liberal essayist such as Senancour, for example, distinguished the writer from the man of letters as follows: 'I do not like to see scholars or great writers denoted in this way, but rather penny-a-liners, people who make a trade of it, or at most those who are precisely or merely men of letters.'[8] The man of letters also suffered from political discredit.[9] For the section of opinion hostile to the Revolution, he was made responsible for the excesses of the Terror, allegedly because of the *philosophe*'s claim to influence in public affairs.[10] As Robert Darnton has shown, men of letters were able to find a new outlet in this activity as opinion leaders thanks to the multiplication of newspapers during the liberal phase of the Revolution and the disappearance of the corporative carapace that had controlled the book trade.[11] The authoritarian regimes that followed Bonaparte's *coup d'état* always kept these spokesmen in a marginal position, no doubt exaggerating their political influence. On top of the fears aroused by too radical a drift from the man of letters to the partisan journalist, there was the moral contempt of

the young generation of the 1820s for their elders, who had both managed to adapt to the various changes of regime and sung the praises of each in turn.[12]

The Romantics, in the first counter-revolutionary phase of the movement, rejected the *philosophes*' claim to bring a rational truth to bear on the process of history, seeing this very ambition as the source of the catastrophes that France had undergone in the last few decades. But if the Romantic 'poet' rehabilitated religious sentiment and sensibility against Reason and the critique of dogmas, he soon came up against the narrowly reactionary politics of the Restoration, as did the whole generation of 1820. In order to fulfil completely his social ideal, the writer in Senancour's sense, as well as the Romantic poet, and the scientist for Michelet and Saint-Simon, had to claim complete freedom of expression and thus indirectly inherit the political function of the *philosophe*. The diversity of these figures, of which each author had his own conception, itself explains their short symbolic life. Added to this is the contradiction between their elitism and their prophetic ambition to speak to all, at a time when a large number of obstacles deprived 'the people' of access to culture. These writers were generally aware of the problem: some denounced the iron laws of economics that made the poet's survival impossible (cf. Vigny's *Chatterton*); others, such as Michelet, attacked the cultural alienation of the people, with whom the scientist could not communicate – unless, like Saint-Simon, they held to the utopia of a union of scientists and industrialists against the parasitic aristocracy and clergy. The weaknesses of this old intellectual idea appeared when it was confronted with an intellectual field whose conditions were being rapidly transformed. It was finally ruined with the shipwreck of the illusions of 1848, which the majority of these men had shared, from Lamartine and Michelet to the utopian socialists. Relief came from a new direction, still more elitist, which deployed a different figure – that of the 'artist' – defined by reaction to the new social conditions of the intellectual profession in the era of 'industrial literature'.[13]

'The artist'

As Georges Matoré has shown, the modern notions of art and artist, as understood by champions of art for art's sake in most of the nineteenth century, appeared in competition with their still existing forerunners, approximately in the era of the Restoration and the beginnings of Romanticism.[14] The originality of their deployment, from Théophile Gautier to the Symbolists, lay in the transfer

of these terms from the aesthetic to the literary order. They were also the sign of a reaction against the symbolic decline of the man of letters. Above all, however, what is involved here is an effort of abstraction from professional divisions (visual artists, writers, musicians, etc.) in order to found a broader symbolic community, emphasizing the intense sociability that existed at this time between men of the brush and men of the pen. To be an artist in this new sense for the adherents of *Jeune France* was not to be merely a writer, a poet, a painter or a musician, it was to belong to a kind of esoteric sect, distinguished from the vulgar money seeker man of letters, from the bourgeois in general, but also from the theories of a social art championed by the political far left.[15]

Paradoxically, those who upheld this 'asocial' position found it easier to exist in the literary field, as literature authorized the double life which this ideal implied, summed up in Flaubert's well-known phrase used as epigraph to this chapter. The visual artist, even if he adopted the same aesthetic positions as those of creative writers, had much less social and financial freedom, given the constraints of the artistic system and the requirements of his clients. The writer, for his part, was able to carry out steadily this aesthetic and social programme, on condition that he had a private income (as did Flaubert and the Goncourt brothers) or a sinecure (Théophile Gautier and some of the Parnassians), or was able to work in different fields, doing hackwork in order to survive alongside his own pure works (Gautier, again, and Nerval). Visual artists, on the other hand, by virtue of the persistence of the academic system and a more open social recruitment, could live a marginal bohemian existence only for a short period of their youth.[16] If this figure of the 'artist' was closer to that of the *intellectuel*, who also transgressed professional boundaries, it still differed in another aspect in that it rested, like Romanticism, on a mystical postulate: the artist, through his genius, communicated with a spiritual Beyond, whether beauty, as with Baudelaire and the Parnassians, or stylistic perfection, as with Flaubert and the Goncourt brothers, and he rejected any political and social involvement. 'The poet', for Hugo, however, and the prophetic scientist, for Michelet and Saint-Simon, maintained an exoteric ambition based on their claim to communicate with God or History or 'the people' [*le peuple*]. Inspired from above, they had a mission to fulfil here below, and not simply to content themselves with assuring their individual salvation as artists. Michelet, in his lecture to the Collège de France of 1848, denounced this deviation in highbrow literature: 'No culture, no common literature, and no desire to have

one. The literate write for the literate; literary workingmen, several of whom are distinguished, write in the forms of the literate, and in no way for the people.'[17]

The allusion here to 'literary workingmen' refers to the worker-poets who were much honoured in the 1840s. Acquiring poet status through the patronage of some famous writers, they bore witness to the gulf between literature and the people since they owed their recognition to the bourgeoisie and to the fact that they expressed themselves in the forms of legitimate culture. The creative writer, for his part, wrote only for himself and accepted only the judgement of his peers, an index of the growing autonomy of the literary field[18] as well as a sign of his renouncing any exercise of an external symbolic power. To write for the 'happy few', as did Stendhal, to aim at literary fame *post mortem*, like Flaubert, meant at the same time rejecting the subsequent ideal of the *intellectuel* defined, as we shall see, by his opposition to the section of the avant-garde faithful to art for art's sake. To introduce this theme of a literature that was legitimate and recognized by the scholarly tradition is not, however, to describe a weak link in the long prehistory of the notion of the *intellectuel* or a new impasse. The concept of the 'artist' also carried a positive aspect that would survive in the image of the *intellectuel*. The 'artist' refused to practise art or literature as a liberal profession or an ordinary trade; that was commercial art, bourgeois art, art for the bourgeoisie and practised in a bourgeois manner.[19] He also transgressed the dominant social norm (by a bohemian life-style, or rejection of marriage like Flaubert, the Goncourt brothers and Baudelaire), established a symbolic break within the dominant class, and judged the social world in terms of a spiritual hierarchy that was basically intellectual and aesthetic, challenging the other social hierarchies.[20] The 'artist', like the *intellectuel* later on, sought to bend society to his values rather than record the common judgement, a pretension that his adversaries classed as madness, but which he simply saw, as did Flaubert in his *Dictionnaire des idées reçues*, as the denunciation of stupidity.[21]

This new type of elitism appears in many guises as part of the theme of the *intellectuel* at the end of the century. But the continuity between the two notions acquired a different significance in the wake of a shift in the representation of the dominant categories, something to which we shall return later. The artist lost his symbolic power to the extent that 'the bourgeois' was seen no longer in an aesthetic frame of reference but rather in a social or socialist one. As the 'educated classes' broadened, the people became more instructed and the bourgeois grew more schooled, the notion of artist lost

its distinctive power. In the mid-nineteenth century this ideal had held a central position in the intellectual field between bourgeois art and social art, but by the end of the century it had been pushed to the margins. The defenders of art for art's sake who had been protected by the patronage of an authoritarian power and accepted into the salons of the aristocracy under the Second Empire were deprived of this protection under the Republic and withdrew into small coteries in which masters received their disciples.[22] This loss of symbolic and social power on the part of the ideological themes developed in the first half of the nineteenth century applies equally to the changes in social conditions and general politics, though this is too well known to dwell on it here: the defeat of the intellectual utopias of 1848 and the decline in hierarchical and authoritarian conceptions of society (above all, those of the Church) in favour of optimistic and positivist evolutionism based on science. 'Literature' in the broad eighteenth-century sense of the term, which had formerly enjoyed a hegemonic position, could no longer claim to be the sole source of ideological inspiration in the mid-nineteenth century. 'The man of letters', 'the poet' and 'the artist' all sought to substitute themselves for the model of the cleric of revealed religion, while from the 1850s and 1860s science was presented as a replacement for religion altogether. This well-known phenomenon in the history of ideas conceals, however, a fact less analysed in its role in the development of social representations, which constitutes a weak link in the genesis of the *intellectual* – the advent of the scientist as an alternative symbolic emblem to earlier representations.

The 'savant'

This theme will be analysed in more detail here as, unlike the previous figures, it has not been the object of systematic work and is still more directly tied to that of the *intellectuel*. The ideology of science, its philosophical expression of positivism, the German crisis in French thought and the French image of German science have all inspired monographs of various kinds.[23] The scientist as social representation, on the other hand, is far less well known than the writer, subject of critical and literary-historic studies referred to above. He has always been seen obliquely from a perspective developed for a different arena: university history, the history of the sciences, history of the relationship between science and its applications.[24] In a certain sense the *savant* has been hidden by science, even in the writings of scientists themselves, justifying their role or serving as a strategy of social advance. But the importance of the *savant* as a social figure, as

the embryonic outline of the *intellectuel*, is not grasped if the recoil effect of this strategy of promoting a belief in science is overlooked: it engendered a belief in the *savant*, not merely within the elites but in society as a whole, a new phenomenon whose only equivalent was the cult of the *philosophe* or the man of letters among the educated public of the eighteenth century.[25]

From the time of the Revolution – and Pasteur, in the writings where he champions the promotion of scientific research, never fails to use this retrospective argument – scientists were associated with the patriotic and revolutionary work of national defence.[26] But recognition by those in power was not accompanied by a recognition from below. The *savant*, in common opinion, remained a specialist and technician, not a social type that could interest humanity as a whole. The writer or artist maintained the dual superiority over him of affecting both the elite and the mass, an ability to embody the spirit of the nation itself, and the apotheosis of Victor Hugo, in May 1885, was undoubtedly both the apogee of this and its last manifestation. It was already overtaken in the development of ideas.

Between the end of the Second Empire and the death of Pasteur, or, to take still more symbolic and firmer dates, between the death of Claude Bernard (1878) and Pasteur's jubilee at the Sorbonne (1892), the social image of the *savant* underwent a definitive change, not just for the natural sciences but also for all disciplines that staked a claim to 'science' (e.g., history or philology) in the general sense that this term (*Wissenschaft*) had in Germany, which served as a model for the new erudition. Since what were involved here were symbols on the basis of which general social representations crystallized, it is legitimate to stick to major figures, even though these are far removed from the 'average scientist' or ordinary academic as revealed by social history. For the public at large and the other fractions of the dominant class, only great men counted. They fuelled the myths and caught the social imagination. Yet, for all that, in focusing on these symbolic episodes I do not intend to return to a providentialist and event-based vision of social and cultural history that would run counter to the general position adopted in this book. The cultural events that served as support for this theme are taken here only as signs of the elaboration of a new consensus that spread out across the intellectual field and the whole of society. Solemnized by the nation itself or its representatives, by way of jubilees, state rewards and funerals, as well as speeches on the reception of new members of the Académie française, figures such as Claude Bernard, Pasteur, Berthelot, Taine, Renan and several others were celebrated as emblems of France and of a new cultural legitimacy.

This cult steadily widened: a preliminary measurable index might be the proportion of scientists honoured with national funerals during the republican period, which had a particular fondness for great men. According to a list drawn up by Avner Ben Amos, scientists came above writers here: six or seven (if Paul Bert, who was also a politician, is included) between 1878 and 1907, as against only two men of letters. Men of the pen divide – even Hugo, as this author has shown – because of their activist commitment.[27] The *savant*, however, even if he has taken a stand, disarms political passions since he embodies, at least in his professional work, the quest for truth, reason and disinterest. Claude Bernard, at the start of this list, was an exemplary model. Honoured already by the Empire (which had appointed him a senator), he was reclaimed for the Republic by the intervention of his disciple Paul Bert, a future minister, and by the positivist inspiration of his *Introduction to Experimental Medicine*, a standpoint shared by Gambetta and Ferry. The very terms used in the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, when a national funeral for the great physiologist was proposed, fixed the theme for subsequent deployment. The following passage is taken from the speech of the minister of public instruction, Agénor Bardoux:

> He was not simply the very greatest physiologist of the century, he was also the highest example of disinterestedness. Never drawn to the commonplace, he spent his life in the pursuit of truth and seeking it out in all its depths. His work is one of our glories. Scientific Europe, the tributary of his genius, stands with us in our grief. A nation honours itself in venerating its great men.[28]

By a series of biographical chances that themselves contributed to the lasting fixation of this image of the *savant*, Claude Bernard's successor at the Académie française was Ernest Renan. In the same year, Hippolyte Taine, another dominant figure of intellectual life, entered these hallowed portals. Taine was often associated with Renan in the mind of his contemporaries, similarly combining in his approach the rigour of the scholar, the struggle for freedom of thought and an opening to contemporary problems. The oratorical jousts that these receptions involved, like the duel four years later between Pasteur (elected to Littré's old chair) and Renan, managed, through the broad echo that these ceremonies received in the press, to fix definitively the outlines of the new figure of the *savant*. During the 1880s, in fact, everything worked towards the cultural domination of this image in the social imaginary. The man of letters, at the same time, lost his principal illustration with Hugo, and literature was now represented in the Académie française only by authors

who were precisely 'academic' or who, like the Parnassians, had chosen as their ideal the artist cut off from his century. The assembly that in the eyes of this era was the repository of cultural legitimacy was now dominated by men who embodied the new intellectual ideal. Challemel-Lacour, as Renan's successor, fixed in his funeral tribute the intellectual – even intellectualist – originality of the author of *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*: 'How can we fail to note that this scientific reputation, combined with the name of a bold and original writer, necessarily adds to the authority of his words? From the very start it gave M. Renan a special place.'[29]

A further step is taken here in comparison with the portrait of Claude Bernard given by Agénor Bardoux. These scientific figures are devoted to truth, but it is also admitted that the symbolic capital which they wield for this reason confers on them a moral or even political authority, applicable to questions that do not fall within the strict domain of their speciality. These intellectuals of a new type question the accepted division of labour among intellectuals. Claude Bernard, Louis Pasteur, Hippolyte Taine and Ernest Renan transgressed, in the opposite direction, the traditional frontiers between literary and scientific culture, between the general public and the scientific public. Bernard published an *Introduction to Experimental Medicine*, Renan his *Life of Jesus*; Taine practised simultaneously both academic and literary work, while Pasteur and Berthelot responded to the social demands of the day or took public political positions. The four rules observed by Renan, according to his successor ('serious in his assertions', 'prudence to the point of scruple', 'fear of hasty generalizations' and 'courage to realize his ignorance'),[30] were likewise found in Pasteur's writing: 'To believe one has found a major scientific fact, to be avid to declare it, and to force oneself for days, weeks and sometimes years to struggle against oneself, to seek to ruin one's own experiments and only announce the discovery when one has exhausted contrary hypotheses, that is indeed an arduous task.'[31]

The rules that the *savant* assigns himself are plainly the very opposite from the attitude of the prophets of the Romantic era. This change in the distribution of roles between science and literature, moreover, between the social function of the scientist and the ideological function of the man of letters, is also shown both in the individual trajectories of these men and in the reaction of contemporary culture. The oldest of them, Claude Bernard, despite being appointed to the Senate by Napoleon III, kept his distance from political or social action by a residue of distrust for compromise and concern for the purity of science.[32] Pasteur, Taine, Renan and Berthelot, on the other

hand, felt obliged to act both before and after the crisis of 1870. Renan stood as a liberal candidate for the Empire's legislature in 1869 and intervened in political debate with his book on *Intellectual and Moral Reform*. Pasteur, shortly before the fall of the Second Empire, would also have been appointed senator but for the defeat at Sedan, and in 1876 he did stand for the Senate though without success. Taine, for his part, chose indirect social action by supporting the establishment of the Ecole libre des sciences politiques and working on *Les Origines de la France contemporaine*. Berthelot, finally, undertook direct action and began a political career in 1871.[33]

These commitments attest both to the recognition of the new authority of the *savant* – not just as *notable*, as Gay-Lussac or Jean-Baptiste Dumas already were in their time, but as a representative of science – and to a new manner of approaching political and social problems, as a function of the specific methods of their specialism. Their entry into politics was for this reason ambiguous, meeting with only mediocre success, given the new conditions of the political game. In a certain fashion, nonetheless, it prefigured the new forms of specifically intellectual engagement that would come to fruition, outside the classical forms of parliamentarism, at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. Berthelot, in the preface to his book *Science and Philosophy*, acknowledged the political logic of the new social role of the *savant*:

> The scientist's life today is a multiple one, and his activity is spent in very different directions. It is not that he is pushed into this by a vain desire for agitation or popularity; he might very well prefer to remain enclosed in his laboratory and devote his entire time to his favourite studies. But he is not permitted this, though his outside intervention does not come from his own initiative. He is sought out and his services demanded, often even solicited in an imperative manner in the name of public interest, in a whole range of matters: special applications to industry or national defence, education, and finally general politics.[34]

Even if allowance is made here for the special pleading of the *savant* most involved in active politics, apologizing for this so as to remain true to the ideal of disinterest that was so important in the composition of the *savant*'s symbolic capital in the late nineteenth century, the majority of the functions depicted here by the senator for life could be found in the career of those scientists most attached to their ivory tower, whether Pasteur and his disciples or certain Paris and provincial chemists who turned to applied science, not to speak of the great medical doctors who served as legislative advisers, whether officially or behind the scenes.[35]

During the years 1892–5, marked by the jubilees of Pasteur and Berthelot and the successive decease of Taine, Renan and Pasteur, the social figure of the *savant* was thus decisively fixed, at the very moment when the anti-positivist reaction was already under way. Everything was in place for this image to take over the place that great writers had traditionally held from the eighteenth century. The memoirs of Edouard Herriot, first-year student at the Ecole normale supérieure in 1892, the year of Pasteur's apotheosis, record with hindsight the domination of this ideal of the *savant* over young *intellectuels*:

> What seduced us far more than any philosophical system was the unity and cohesion of this career, in which one discovery led to another, the most fertile demonstration was based on elementary reasoning, laboratory experiments were translated into limitless economic consequences, rescuing whole industries, such as those of beer, silk and wine. There was displayed in this combination of successes, this continuous creation, such a revelation of the power of the mind, that young *intellectuels* were bowled over by it . . . .[36]

This analysis, which gives us the state of mind of a young man for whom literature was very important, in his background and his aspirations, emphasizes the point to which the *savant* as embodied by Pasteur – in other words, the power of intelligence in the service of social progress – had become the matrix for viewing the social function of what would just a few years later be called the *intellectuel*. This state of affairs was all the more remarkable in that Pasteur himself remained, in his social conduct, very much behind the role that he was led to play. At each major celebration in which he participated, he virtually apologized for being at the centre of the new symbolic stage of the cult of science. Faithful to the old prejudice of the superiority of literature as expression of the soul, he declared that he was unworthy of the honour that was bestowed on him by his election to the Académie française, and even at the time of his jubilee and the major congresses at which he appeared as the star he sheltered behind abstractions and symbols such as Science and Fatherland. When finally faced with the conclusions of positivism, he rejected these in the name of his Christian beliefs. In some ways a *savant* despite himself, Pasteur reinforced this image more by being its living embodiment than by championing it either in its particularly philosophical implications, as did Berthelot, or in other areas, like Taine and Renan, since he saw science as something beyond himself.[37]

The savant *and the writer*

The best evidence of the emergence of this new symbolic model of the *intellectuels* is undoubtedly the way that it was adopted in an oblique fashion by writers themselves, at least by the representatives of the major mutually antagonistic literary currents of these decades: naturalists and 'psychological' novelists.[38] Literary criticism devoted to Zola, and even more so studies of Bourget and Barrès, have often questioned the seriousness of the references that Zola makes to science in *The Experimental Novel* or the preface to *Thérèse Raquin*, books that claimed the patronage of Taine and Claude Bernard, as well as by Bourget in his *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* (Bourget appealed to the authority of Taine and Renan),[39] or again by Barrès, who sought support in racist theorists or psychophysiological investigation as a basis for his nationalist theses. This use of science in literature went beyond a mere intellectual fashion. These writers perceived that the old models of intellectual activity were no longer appropriate. The 'authority' (Senancour's word) they needed to win a dominant position in the literary or intellectual field had now to be drawn from the new source of legitimacy represented by science, and thus from its living embodiment, the *savant*. The scientific assurance sought by Zola, the redeployment of concepts or analyses from accepted authorities in Barrès or Bourget, were a reaction against the purely literary attitudes of their forerunners. From the late 1880s into the 1890s, in fact, the *savant* became a central character in certain fictional works of these authors: 'Dr Pascal' in Zola's novel of 1892 with that title, which formed the final volume of *Les Rougon-Macquart*; 'Bertheroy', a transparent transposition of Berthelot, in Zola's *Paris* of 1898; 'Sixte', in Paul Bourget's *Le Disciple* (1889), the model for whom was Taine; likewise the imaginary Taine and Renan of Barrès's early works and, finally, 'Bouteiller' in *Les Déracinés*, who represents not just the scholar, but the dried-up academic as 'intellectual'.[40] The *savant*, in his laboratory or study, becomes here an issue in the confrontation between two schools vying for legitimacy in the literary field: the naturalist current and the anti-scientific psychological current. This struggle and its object thus prefigure the terms of debate in the Dreyfus Affair. But most significant is the need felt by the writers to wield this new emblem, whereas previously their opposition was based on social or literary notions that did not need such disguise.

Yet to reduce the quarrel, as is customarily done, to the alternative of scientism/anti-scientism, university versus literature, or scholarship students against sons of the rich would mean overlooking a

good deal of the implications of the theses involved and their more long-term social significance. Beyond the apparent content (limits or not of science, need for a return to religion or idealism)[41] or form (were philosophical dilettantism or the crusty rigour of the university inspired by Taine and Kantianism dangers for the education of the young?) there is already outlined the debate on the social function of the *intellectuel* and the new power that he wields from the general faith in science and the scientist, and from his audience in the student youth. This confrontation draws its importance from the symbolic reclassification that it operates within the reference models of the intellectual field: in particular, this no longer follows lines of professional cleavage (free intellectuals and writers, devoted to innovation, against official or academic intellectuals) but coincides on a purely intellectual level with corporative solidarities, a change related to the contemporary structural transformations of the intellectual field.

At the end of this survey, for all the diversity of the constitutive notions representing the successive ideal of the intellectual profession in different eras, we can establish a constant line, that of the claim to a growing autonomy, whether in relation to established religion (the case of the *philosophe*), to the dominant class (the 'poet' or 'artist') or to the other intellectual professions and the broader public (scientist, artist). It becomes increasingly hard for cultural producers to conform to an ideal that is steadily more demanding. The *philosophe* or 'man of letters' was able, given the semantic ambiguity of these terms, both slogans and actual 'estates', to become the social rationale of circles far wider than just the few great authors consecrated by the scholarly tradition, to the point of giving rise to a new intellectual snobbism and a market for 'bestsellers'.[42] The ideal of the 'poet' or 'artist', on the other hand, was limited to precisely defined genres or a small group and required, as we have seen, social assets or a double life in order to survive in the literary world without self-denial. The figure of the *savant*, finally, could scarcely apply to the literary sphere, except in terms of rather far-fetched analogy. It presupposed an additional asceticism as well as the deployment of scholarly qualifications, which the majority of intellectual aspirants could not obtain.

This growing elitism was in a certain sense an ideological response to the structural development of the literary field. The need to distinguish oneself imposed itself in relation to the rise in the number of pretenders to these positions in the field. But this constant, displayed by the history of literature and ideas across its vague notions of generations, schools or epigones, acquired a

new significance in the course of the last two or three decades of the nineteenth century. The new scale of the intellectual field challenged both the models of perception internal to this field and the more neutral and external ones of statisticians.

EXPANSION AND CRISIS OF THE INTELLECTUAL FIELD

Liberal and intellectual professions

Compilers of statistics have a quite contrary aim to that of the literary groups whose social ideals have been analysed above. They seek on the basis of categories of contemporary social judgement to make the broadest possible subdivisions of the population – i.e., the smallest number and the most exhaustive without a shocking internal heterogeneity. Their classifications, based in part on common sense, record with a certain delay the state of the perception of social divisions. But the changing number of individuals making up one or other sub-group, once a group has reached a size that makes the classification incoherent if it is still included together with its neighbours, forces a periodic refinement of this grid. The successive subdivisions of liberal and intellectual professions in the census confirm this rule and mark the deep transformations that they underwent in these decades.

In the 1872 census, for example, all categories of intellectual work were grouped together under the single heading of 'liberal professions'. The only common point in the professions thus associated, which today appear quite heterogeneous (clergy, civil servants, teachers, scientists, men of letters, lawyers, medics and paramedics, etc.), is the level of education required to practise them. This bears on the common definition of the liberal professions of the time, as Alain Desrosières cites from the *Larousse du XXème siècle*: 'a profession in which the exercise of intelligence plays a greater part than that of the hand'.[43] This very broad category corresponds to a time when the level of secondary and higher education was still sufficient to define those who counted as 'talents' under the Orleanist monarchy, with its limited franchise, and could claim derogation from its property qualification by virtue of the educational capital at their command – the guarantee, according to their representatives, of a social quality equivalent or superior to that of property-owners.

Fourteen years later, following an initial phase of expansion, the subdivisions of 1886 record better the differences of status accentuated by social development: two categories of artist are

distinguished, and the legal and medical professions are separated. These were precisely the three professions with the greatest number of practitioners and also those with an established heterogeneity of status: the division between doctors and health officers was in decline, while advocates gained increased importance under a liberal political regime, and the prestige of artists diminished with the expansion in the number of individuals who took the risk of this career. On the other hand, these classifications do not differentiate within the literary profession between men of letters and journalists (the two roles being frequently combined). In the same way, teachers are divided according to the status of their practice (private/public) rather than by the level of teaching, despite the considerable differences in both qualification and income between primary, secondary and higher. This lack of distinction is explained by the political climate of this period, marked by new educational legislation and secularization, which focused contemporary attention on horizontal divisions (private/public) rather than on vertical hierarchy. The extreme disproportion between the three levels (there were more than 150,000 *instituteurs* (schoolmasters), a few thousand *professeurs* (teachers), and scarcely a thousand in higher education) also made a division of this kind less relevant for the statistician. It is possible, too, that the notion of '*savant*', which at that time still bracketed scientists together with men of letters and publicists, was sufficient to isolate higher education from other levels.

Ten years further on, in 1896, the census instructions pressed for a more detailed analysis: 'For the liberal professions, it is necessary to distinguish between public-sector *instituteur*, private-sector *instituteur*, artistic painter, poet, etc.'[44] This concern for precision goes together with the ideological climate of the f*in de siècle*, to which we shall return, marked as it was by an obsession with overproduction in the intellectual professions as well as by the further transformations that the liberal professions had undergone in recent years. The medical profession had been reorganized by the law of 1892, the world of art was definitively freed from state tutelage and broke into rival sub-groups, higher education saw the culmination of its reform with the creation of universities in the very year of 1896, while professional associations, encouraged by the law of 1884, multiplied within the liberal professions. It is not surprising in this context of reorganization that statisticians sought to differentiate more clearly categories they had previously lumped together: advocates, formerly combined with solicitors, are now separated out; public notaries are distinguished from private legal practitioners,

as are architects from engineers; artists are divided into eight sub-groups, and the literary professions are cut in two: 'publicists' on the one hand and 'journalists (men of letters)' on the other. In fact, judging from the number of practitioners in each group, it would seem that, despite the terminology employed, journalists in the strict sense were actually classed in the census as 'publicists' (in Littré's old definition), whereas 'journalists (men of letters)' included both writers and the better class of journalist – those with an established name who also published books. The emphasis on the term 'journalist' rather than 'man of letters' to define this category, though the second term was more prestigious, comes from the frequent confusion of roles (the majority of writers at this time worked on periodicals) and from the indeterminate status of men of letters, who might also practise another profession and be classed under a different social heading.[45] The entire new philosophy of classification was based on professions with a rigid status and ran counter to such ambiguous denominations as those of man of letters – a self-attributed 'quality' rather than an organized profession. Later censuses did not take this analysis any further, showing that this was indeed a foundation period for schemes of social perception of this milieu.

Table 1.1, which combines figures from a variety of census data for the main liberal professions (men of letters, artists, teachers, legal and medical professions), records a global increase in all these categories, though highly uneven according to sector and date. While the number of journalists and men of letters almost tripled between 1872 and 1906 (it had already doubled by 1901), that of artists and those in legal professions showed an increase of less than 50 per cent, as did that of teachers, where the increase differed considerably according to level: it was very marked in higher education, around the average in primary, but very small in secondary. The rise in the number of medical practitioners, from some 16,005 in 1872 to 18,465 in 1901, was slowed down by the fall in the number of health officers (there had been 18,000 doctors and health officers in 1847).[46] These different rhythms relate to transformations in the professions. The rapid growth in literary careers was correlated with that of printing in all its forms, with the multiplication of newspapers and periodicals, and with the new possibilities of a secondary profession opened up by the growth in the number of civil servants.[47] The slower and more uncertain rise in the number of artists, on the other hand, expresses a certain saturation of the market (aggravated by the economic depression), of which the break-up of the artistic field in institutional terms and the appearance of an

autonomous art market had been the first indications at the time of the fall of the Second Empire. The moderate growth in the number of teachers was the product of republican educational policy, which aimed to compete with private education at the primary and secondary levels and expanded higher education in the provinces.[48] On the other hand, the most prestigious liberal professions with the tightest entry requirements, such as law and medicine, showed a far more modest rate of increase. These uneven rhythms have their echo in the social image of the liberal professions, and the intellectual professions in particular. If the absolute figures are taken as a sign of scarcity, an accentuated process of polarization can be distinguished: the literary and artistic pole now more or less balances the legal and medical pole. At the end of the century there were already some 17,000 men of letters, journalists and creative artists, as against 23,000 doctors and lawyers. The balance even swings in the other direction for those individuals who occupied dominant positions or were most visible – i.e., in Paris – owing to the uneven geographical concentration of the two poles. In 1886, a date at which the total figures are little different from the end of the century, and when the geographical cleavage is readily visible in the census figures, there were 10,000 men of letters and artists in Paris as against 4,652 lawyers and doctors.

At the end of this process of uneven growth in the practitioners of liberal professions, the former 'talents' had quite lost their homogeneity. Previously dominated by lawyers and doctors, defined by their formal qualifications and spread across the national territory, by the end of the century they were divided in two: on the one hand, a high-status group, with a low growth rate and provincial base; on the other hand, a series of professions whose status was on the decline as a result of the lack of legal definition of their conditions of practice and the increase in newcomers, their difficulties being further accentuated by their concentration in Paris. The change in this ratio already explains why a new term (the *intellectuels*) was needed in response to this novel situation. These professions with an unprecedented demographic weight could claim a social role competing with the personalized mode of training and local base of the traditional 'talents', disposing as they did of access to the new media that were indispensable to the operation of a democracy.

But this social influence was offset by negative factors, which can also be ascertained from table 1.1. Contrary to the classical liberal professions, the intellectual and artistic ones were marked by sudden short-term variations in their ranks. Part of this

contrast was due perhaps to changes in qualification or the social classification of individuals who combined a number of activities, as is often the case in the intellectual field. Yet the constancy of this phenomenon, and its coincidence with other variations in the cultural conjuncture, was based above all on processes of deskilling and reskilling at the margins of various fields. The good years of 1876–81, marked by a strong general economic expansion as well as a liberalization of the press, were followed by a phase of contraction, bound up with the stock exchange crash of 1882 and the disappearance of ephemeral journals. The following five years saw a new influx of beginners, without the 1881 peak being regained. This corresponds to the arrival on the market of a new literary generation and to the secondary education of 'new strata'. These newcomers in their turn fell victim to the collapse in the book trade of the early 1890s and the problems of newspapers facing concentration and the revolution of the penny press. The turn of the century, a period of new economic upswing and strong politicization, which likewise stimulated print runs, was marked by a further growth in the literary professions, which now overtook the high point of the 1880s.

This correspondence at the global level between economic and/or political cycles and the short-term progress in the number of intellectual producers shows the degree to which the journalistic and literary field was subject to general fluctuations of economic activity, as mediated primarily by the press and secondarily by the prosperity of the book trade and the theatre. Whereas, in the more established professions, it was rare for crises to lead to any significant fall in the number of practitioners, the free sector of the intellectual field forced its most fragile members to reconvert to other sectors or deskilled them in other ways. Conversely, given the absence of any statutory entrance qualifications, periods of prosperity show equally sudden influxes of newcomers hailing from other professions or from subaltern trades. Artistic milieus obey a somewhat similar mode of operation. The conjuncture, however, is different in time here, and medium-term developments are less striking. Growth takes off somewhat earlier (an increase of 18.1 per cent from 1872 to 1876, as against 9 per cent for literary professions) and slows down sooner (+50.4 per cent between 1876 and 1881 as against +76.6 per cent for men of letters); the initial crisis is less sharp (–2.3 per cent from 1881 to 1886, against –13.5 per cent for the other category) but more persistent, since the decline continues between 1886 and 1896. Finally, recovery is more modest (+1 per cent from 1896 to 1901, against +15.5 per cent in the press

and literature). Whereas men of letters were able to combine work in different fields so as to maintain their existence and attenuate difficulties, artists, with their professional speciality, found it less easy to reconvert or find complementary outlets (hence the smaller fluctuations in the central core of this milieu). Moreover, the art market depended principally on the economy – i.e., the financial resources of bourgeois or aristocratic categories as its exclusive clients – whereas the prosperity of press and publishing was bound up with technical changes, the greater or lesser restrictions of legislation, and the purchasing power of a much wider and increasingly varied public. The growth in practitioners depended accordingly on the combination of a number of circumstances.

The other liberal professions, on the contrary, limited at the entry level by the weak increase in student numbers, and in some cases by a kind of *numerus clauses*, show only a weak degree of oscillation, apart from the increase recorded in 1896, which is doubtless the result of changes in the statistical classification. The expansion of staff in higher (and, to a lesser degree, secondary) education was an intentional policy of the government of the day. Unconnected to the economic conjuncture, and even at cross currents with it, its initial effect was to provide the 'intellectual' faculties with a number of teachers and students that bears comparison with that of the 'professional' faculties, whereas previously there had been a large disproportion.[49] Before the reforms of the late 1870s, there was scarcely any mobility between the faculties (except for the rare elect who made it from the provinces to Paris), which were divided into geographical groups. Professors in the provinces could hope to play a social role only by allying themselves with local elites or, in Paris, by collaborating on newspapers and magazines, a possibility reserved largely for a few individuals or certain particular disciplines.[50] After 1880, higher education began to be structured hierarchically: in law and medicine it achieved greater specificity in relation to its parent liberal professions, while in letters and in sciences it broke the umbilical cord with secondary education and the leisured public. Its practitioners gave it social visibility, while the reform process enabled it to organize as a pressure group, particularly through the mediating role of the Société d'étude des questions d'enseignement supérieur and its organ the *Revue internationale de l'enseignement*.[51] At this time, the same as in the literary field, very different generations coexisted, with the creation of posts for young teachers in the faculties (for example, junior lecturers in letters and sciences, established in 1877, *agrégés* in law and in medicine, course instructors, tutors, etc.).

Professionals and amateurs

Indications based on official statistics give a rough picture of the change in scale of the intellectual field, but, despite their increasing precision – the result of a belated perception of the internal modifications of which these professions were the stage – they have the defect of confusing individuals who were heterogeneous in their status and degree of involvement in cultural production: in the literary sector, for example, journalists were lumped together with men of letters and publicists; in the artistic sphere, no distinction was made until the end of the period between performers, creators and reproducers. Only education, in particular higher education, was free of this ambiguity, owing to the existence of specific sources of information in the Ministry of Education. We now need therefore to make this structural analysis of the intellectual field more precise by way of a bibliographical approach. Use of a minimal material criterion (publication of one work or translation during the selected period of observation) makes it possible to reconstitute the development of the fine structures of the intellectual field and its effects on the social image of the intellectual professions.*

In professional terms (see table 1.2), the production of books was dominated by members of the liberal professions, understood in the broad sense of the time. If civil servants and the clergy (not taken into account in table 1.1) are added in, then more than 80 per cent of books were written by a member of one of these groups. If we consider the share of each in book production, the balance between the various professions scarcely varied between 1876–85 and 1891–9, despite the contrasting growth rates of the groups in question. This apparent anomaly is due to the initial disproportion between the members of intellectual professions and those of the classical liberal professions. To measure the uneven contribution of these two groups to intellectual production, this initial result has to be qualified by the data in table 1.1.[52] Respectively, lawyers made up 3.1 per cent and doctors 12.7 per cent of the authors counted in 1876–85, as against 39.2 per cent for men of letters and journalists

* As in a previous work, I have used the *Catalogue général de la librairie française* compiled by Otto Lorenz and his successors. This bibliography has the merit of giving some minimal biographical indications on the authors mentioned. Lack of information generally indicates ephemeral writers, newcomers and marginal figures. I made two samplings on the letter B for the periods 1876–85 and 1891–9 (N = 828 and 639 respectively), supplemented by a more summary counting for the test period 1866–75. Since, after the threshold of a few hundred, the results obtained at successive stages did not indicate significant further variation, I did not continue as I had originally intended to input all the authors beginning with B for the two periods.

and 33.3 per cent for teachers in secondary or higher education. If we also take into account the very varied percentage of amateurs (defined by the publication of only a single work during the period in question), a primary division of the intellectual field between professionals and amateurs becomes visible. The amateur pole takes in those professions that already provided fewer authors in proportion to their numbers: doctors and economic and liberal professions, as well as the various categories of artist, civil servants and clergy. This educated bourgeoisie, in which the legal professions were also included in 1891–9, made up the literate public, whose composition was little different (even if its numbers had increased) from what it was in the age of Enlightenment.[53] It provided the average print run for successful books (30,000 to 50,000 copies) and read the political journals, while some of its members occasionally moved on from cultural consumption to production, most often in their own professional specialism, as we shall see. The professional pole, on the other hand, was dominated by authors whose publications were a direct extension of their social position: men of letters, journalists and publicists, of course, but also politicians and, to a lesser extent, teachers in higher education and scholars (the years 1876–85).

If the composition of the amateur pole scarcely evolved between the two periods of observation, the classification of the most professional categories experienced an internal division between authors producing for a broad public and those with a limited public who had increasingly little access to the book market. Thus the share of higher-education teachers who had published just one work in each decade rose from 34.8 to 39.2 per cent between 1876–85 and 1891–9, whereas the percentage of prolific authors fell from 26.3 to 19.3 per cent, an indication both of the rejuvenation that higher education experienced at this time (younger academics not having the same opportunity to publish compilations of their work as did the more established professors) and of the shift from books to academic journals in the case of more esoteric disciplines. Scholars and members of learned societies underwent a similar decline, for analogous reasons (the proportion of authors they represented falling from 21 to 19.1 per cent). Teachers in primary and secondary education, on the other hand, crossed at this time the invisible boundary between the two groups of authors. The expansion in teaching personnel and the effort at building up education that followed the republican reforms opened up new outlets for authors of textbooks and manuals.

Poets, too, were a group of authors whose careers developed in the course of this phase of expansion in the intellectual field.

Whereas, in the decade 1876–85, some 50 per cent of their number had published no more than one collection (and only 16.6 per cent more than four), the second period found them in second place among the more professional authors (dividing into roughly equal numbers of small, medium and prolific producers). This development corresponded to a dual process. In the first place, there was the emergence of a new literary generation (the nebulous Symbolists of literary history), formerly confined to the little magazines. The most talented of these poets, or the most persistent, managed to get published because they now disposed of the minimum required readership, composed essentially of their literary confreres. This autonomizing of the avant-garde, something to which we shall return below, was accompanied by the appearance of poets for a wider readership, a fact bound up with the development of educational textbooks. Their works cultivated fine and noble feelings and, thanks to selected pieces, literary prizes, and so on, they enjoyed a captive audience in education, especially at the primary level.[54]

The differentiation of the intellectual field between occasional and regular authors and, within the latter category, between producers for the wider public and those for a limited readership was accentuated with the steady increase in the practitioners of intellectual and liberal professions. In table 1.3 we can thus see how, among the professions represented at the amateur pole, the percentage of episodic authors increases from one period to the next, just as it does for authors situated at the professional pole. For the latter, the growth in number of those seeking fame, the increased competition that resulted from it, and the contemporary problems facing the book trade and the press made it harder to maintain a regular production, except for authors already established or enjoying protected markets, in some cases by an institutional demand (textbooks), in others, such as the poets already discussed, because they were situated outside the economic circuit of book publishing (production at the author's expense, subscription sale, etc.).

The accentuation of intellectual hierarchies

Taking into account the comparative development of the various categories of author, as yielded by censuses and bibliographies, we can now cast light on the structural dynamic of the intellectual field. The overall expansion saw an accentuation in the internal imbalances and hierarchies within this field, and this contributed, by way of the pessimistic ideological sentiment that it encouraged among authors, to a change in the social image of these professions. In the

first decade under review here (1876–85), this growth, both in its rhythm and in its distribution, was the sign of a prosperous intellectual production. For the total number of authors of all types, growth was relatively moderate (11 per cent); it was somewhat stronger for literary authors (14.8 per cent), quite substantial for professional writers (32.6 per cent), and still more so for the overall category of 'men of letters/ journalists' (71.8 per cent) – i.e., those seeking to live from their pen in one way or another.[55] This hierarchical order of growth rates, running from the amateur to the professional pole, indicates the existence of increasingly important new outlets the closer one was to the literary marketplace and press. This was in fact a period of expansion in the number of titles published and the size of print runs, as well as the establishment of new periodicals. The second period was marked by a crisis in the literary field and, more generally, in the intellectual field as a whole.[56] Whereas literary production then tended to regress or stagnate, the number of aspiring authors still continued to rise. Taking authors as a whole, there was an increase of 37.8 per cent (as against 11 per cent for the earlier period); for men of letters the increase was smaller, at 21.0 per cent, but still above that of the take-off phase of growth; it was only for professional writers that the rate of increase fell relatively, though it still remained high. This scissors effect between saturated outlets (indicated better by print runs than by the number of titles) and an ever greater number of producers is still clearer if we compare it with the corresponding census category: the number of men of letters, journalists and publicists remains steady (0.96 per cent), whereas the figures cited above would have led one to expect an increase. At the end of the century, all the positions offering a regular income to supplement authors' royalties had been practically taken up. If they could not live off their literary income, these thousands of new authors must necessarily have had other resources than those provided by books and periodicals, and, if they sought to be writers, they had to rely on a second trade quite distinct from the sphere of publishing.

This first imbalance also led to a gap between personal vocation and actual social existence. This fact, which is a long-term constant, was perhaps more sharply felt at the end of the nineteenth century owing to both conjunctural economic factors and the ideological climate. The rapid pace of expansion in the 1880s generated a persistent illusion in the younger individuals, based on the success of the generation immediately above them, but they were seeking their own fortune at the very moment that the conjuncture was turning against them. Moreover, it was those least equipped socially – i.e.,

those least likely to have a minimum of qualifications or family resources – who risked themselves in the very fields where competition was strongest and the crisis deepest. They came up against the double competition of authors already established and amateurs able to live off a different source of income. In the face of this unequal situation, three strategies were possible: simply to abandon the field – a cyclical phenomenon, as our analysis of successive censuses has shown; reconversion to areas that were less crowded or brought a surer income; or, finally, to persist in claiming the noble status of author, but coupled with a lifestyle that was quite independent of this. These three strategies could only encourage social pessimism or various forms of resentment, and, as we shall see, this was precisely what fuelled the theme of the *intellectuel*.

The professional composition of authors of different kinds, just like the varying numbers of newcomers according to different categories of author, enables us to develop in more detail this general schema of the crisis of the intellectual field. Only medical and religious books, and to a lesser extent legal and scientific ones, were the work of individuals whose professional origins showed little diversity. Every other literary genre evidenced the competition of writers with a variety of professional backgrounds. This dispersion in the data is minimized, however, in relation to the real situation, in as much as statistical analysis forces the combination of adjacent categories. Given the negative development already discussed, this situation, constant for both periods under review, could only exacerbate existing tensions. To take the group that was both most universal and socially most fragile, because its members were supposed to live from their literary work – i.e., men of letters – this is found in no fewer than eleven different genres. It dominated the literary genres (novel, theatre, poetry, essays) but also made a strong showing in history, political writing and social sciences.

This very diversified penetration is not simply a function of the polymorphous character of a mode of expression deriving from the inheritance of the eighteenth century; it also results from one of the strategies listed above: as I have shown in detail elsewhere for the most literary authors, the combination of genres is one response to the crisis of outlets.[57] This analysis may be generalised on the basis of table 1.4. In the literary genres, men of letters lost some of their market share during the difficult decade: between 1876–85 and 1891–9, the percentage of novels authored by men of letters fell from 65.7 to 47.4. This decline favoured those writers who also practised a different trade and could survive more easily in the most crowded genre. The decline was somewhat less in the genre of drama (from

73.1 to 64.2 per cent), a lucrative production, tightly controlled by a limited and very Parisian milieu. Amateurs could write for the theatre only in unpretentious variants (sketches, monologues, etc.), with no possibility of their work being staged or with no prospect of immediate gain (it was precisely in these years that avant-garde theatre made its appearance).[58] In the field of essays, the share of men of letters saw a relative decline (from 29.6 to 17 per cent) as well as an absolute one, since it was other groups of authors who had the upper hand during the years 1891–9. Finding it hard in the field in which they excelled and where returns were highest, men of letters could more readily defend their position where royalties were lower – for instance, in poetry (where their share rose from 27.5 to 43.9 per cent), a genre marked strongly by first-time authors (36.5 per cent of these authors had no recorded profession) in which amateurs and those from other professions risked themselves less than they previously had (the number of professions represented fell from eleven to six). Yet men of letters also tried their chances in more universal genres such as history, practical life, political writing and social sciences, in all of which the focus on a topical theme or question made possible print runs as high as in general literature.

It is easier to grasp the strategies of the most professional writers, since their social existence meant that their publishing choices were dependent more than those of others on the poor conjuncture in the book trade. Apart from the regular authors of bestsellers, such as Zola, Daudet and Jules Verne, the novelists of the following generation made up for their uneven success by a breakneck pace of production, examples being Paul Adam, the Marguerite brothers and the Rosny brothers. The pressure of competition between authors, however, also affected their breakthrough strategies, whatever the sub-field in question, and this was not in a search for financial profitability – a secondary aim as it happens – but rather for access to the book market, which was more visible and guaranteed both reviews and a wider reputation. Thus in areas whose scientific legitimacy was not yet established (for instance, the social sciences) or was constantly thrown into question because of its political implications (for instance, history), quarrels between schools coincided largely with the boundaries of original profession (amateur and/or well-to-do scholars versus academics).[59] In this way, the structural changes also had intellectual effects on defining the practice of the genre in question. Amateur scholars or free intellectuals tended to champion the most accessible and general accounts, both by tradition and to maintain their contact with the broadest literate readership, from which they hailed and which

they addressed. Academics, on the other hand, who sought to distinguish themselves from this false science and be accountable only to their peers, including their foreign counterparts, accentuated all the indices of a break with the commonplace. They thus repelled the competition of those individuals inspired by impure interests; but the converse of this was that they sometimes lost the chance of being published for a wider market, as we have seen for the more esoteric disciplines. This contradiction is apparent in the development of the professional composition of the two genres bound up most closely with the university (law, economic and social sciences on the one hand, philosophy, scholarship and linguistics on the other). In both cases, the advancing hegemony of academic criteria led to a decline in the number of individuals involved (from eleven to eight and from thirteen to eleven, respectively), while the dominant groups increased their preponderance to the detriment of amateurs: lawyers and civil servants in the first case, higher and secondary teachers in the second.

These strategies of intellectual struggle were rendered more acute by the crisis in the intellectual field; at stake was survival, in the case of literary production, and the possession of legitimate authority, in that of production with a more limited circulation. They were further reinforced by the uneven proportion of new arrivals in each group of authors. Every process of expansion in a field involved a rejuvenation, but, when the expansion was followed by crisis, renewal gave rise to supplementary tensions between the generations involved, since, in the intellectual field, long establishment was a sign of relative success and an asset for the future. The period under consideration was marked by both phenomena (cf. table 1.5). In the period 1876–85, the proportion of newcomers among the different categories of author was already high, apart from politicians. This followed from the earlier take-off of expansion in the intellectual field and the opening of new outlets in a France where cultural level was rising at every station of society. This renewal took place, logically enough, because the number of authors continued to increase, for almost all types of author, almost the sole exception being that of teachers in higher education. Almost everywhere, a majority of unknown authors or beginners sought to enter the intellectual field during these years of difficulty. When these were amateurs for whom the fate of their book was only a secondary question in their career strategy, this accelerated turnover had little influence, except to impede the sale of the works of authors for whom celebrity was the only chance of social advance. For aspiring professionals, in particular men of letters (where the rate of newcomers rose from

41.9 to 44.5 per cent) and poets (from 83.3 to 99.9 per cent!), or even for the already professional writers whom I analysed in *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme* (where I counted 222 and 290 beginners respectively for two periods of observation), this near equality with earlier generations created the conditions for a social break perceived as an injustice. It was in fact only the chance result of date of birth that placed someone in good or bad starting conditions; their elders had been able to win fame and positions in the press before the conjuncture of the intellectual marketplace went into a downturn, simply by dint of having a few years' start.

Added to this acrimony, with its further negative effect on relations between writers, was the social jealousy against adjacent categories endowed with better social assets and likewise composed of beginners, who sometimes hunted on the same ground but without the same concern for survival – in other words, aristocrats or politicians whose vocation as writers multiplied in this period, whether they were seeking a further income stream or an index of social status. The exception of teachers in higher education might lead one to believe that this sector of the intellectual field was unaffected by the general crisis. This is, however, largely an illusion caused by the measuring process. The reason why fewer new authors were to be found in higher education is that there were here, as we saw, fewer new authors in general: a large section of university production did not involve books. Future academics, especially in the faculty of letters, were often teachers in secondary education when they began their work. Besides, the prolongation of theses as a function of growing specialization led to delaying their publication and increasing their cost. Those young academics who occupied the lower positions in the hierarchy created by the reforms had therefore to wait longer than their elders in order to acquire a social visibility through their book publications. In an initial period, they had to win the estimation of their peers in learned journals that lie outside the field of the statistics used here. The pressure of the new professional ideal (research), as the converse of the social demand for a higher status, came at the price of enclosure, deliberate or enforced, in an isolated sector of the overall intellectual field. This strategy of specialization ran in inverse direction to the strategy of diversification of the literary field but responded to the same structural development.

The quest for a new identity: the 'intellectuel' of the 1890s

At the end of these transformations, the intellectual field was in an unparalleled situation in which the old ideological representations

of the intellectual professions were no longer appropriate. Certainly the 'artist' was still the ideal of the poetic avant-garde, withdrawn into itself, but this weighed little against the thousands of new writers, published or aspiring, who did not have his income or his sinecures. To live as a bourgeois and think as a demi-god, like Flaubert, the means of a bourgeois were still required. The flattering image of the scientist tended to become the professional ideal of a large number of academics, and even of several writers, but the gap between the great men honoured by the Republic and the real situation of specialists and scholars constantly grew, the latter being increasingly cut off from wider society, even though its ideal of the scientist was pursued by the majority of young academics who held to the objectives of the reform of higher education. This divorce between the old representations, still dominant, and the new situation created by the expansion of the intellectual field explains the quest for a new overall term that could be at the same time a professional ideal (hence a distinctive sign) and a social rallying point, thus including a collective dimension. The manner in which the neologism '*intellectuel*' gradually spread, its somewhat contradictory content, and the context in which it appeared will show that it did indeed fulfil these two conditions required to win out against its earlier competitors.

From individual to collective

The collective identity of a new social group and the manner in which it is denoted derive in part from the image given it by those who do not belong to it and define themselves in opposition to it. A.-J. Tudesq demonstrated this for the case of the great *notables*, who acquired a genuine class consciousness only when faced with the socialist challenge of 1848. Luc Boltanski found a similar process for the 'managers': after the social crisis of 1936 they demanded an autonomous position, because both the defeated bosses and the (temporarily) triumphant organized workers had excluded them from the negotiations as being neither actual directors nor wage-earners like the others.[60] The situation of the *intellectuels* was somewhat similar. This new group was defined by other intellectuals, who rejected it on the basis of different, more traditional, conceptions: that of the man of letters or, from the revolutionary standpoint, that of the partisan ideologist. The use of the term '*intellectuel*', as a substantive and in the plural, was pioneered by two groups of writings from the 1890s: speeches with a strong political connotation, hailing from the extremes of the intellectual field, and

somewhat conservative writers with a pseudo-sociological object and a wide readership.

Joseph Reinach's brief note on the origin of the use of the word is largely verified by later lexicological works: 'The word has been floating around for some time in the small literary magazines, used by young people contemptuous of politics in order to mark their superiority over other human beings.'[61] Three elements need to be teased out here, in the connotations that the term evoked for an actor in the events of the time: 'small magazines', 'young', and 'contemptuous of politics'. Lexicographers who have hunted out early uses of the term have indeed found these chiefly on the margins of the intellectual field. The first significant use in a collective sense is to be found in *Le Désespéré* by Léon Bloy.[62] This author retraced in his book the story of his difficult beginnings in literature, settling accounts in a scarcely concealed fashion, and under transparent pseudonyms, with his fellow-writers, which made his book a *succès de scandale*: 'If he only managed to publish just a small number of articles in a journal with such resonance, he would soon regain the attention of the intellectual group who had formerly been aroused by his boldness, and whom his silence for so many months had scattered.'[63] By 'intellectual group', a first approximation to the still lacking expression the *intellectuels*, Bloy referred here to an ideological community organized around certain aesthetic slogans or principles championed by an author and forming an avant-garde readership.

The other essayists who used the neologism also had their origins in the political or literary avant-gardes. They included anarchists such as Jean Grave and Jean Lermina; men who were semi-socialist and semi-anarchist, such as Maurice Barrès, still a Boulangist journalist on *La Cocarde*, Paul Adam, a collaborator of the *Revue blanche*, or Bernard Lazare of the *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*; former Symbolists who had gone over to a reactionary conservatism, such as Hugues Rebell; ecclesiastical social theorists; and, finally, young writers still finding themselves, such as Henry Bérenger.[64]

This marginal usage is explained by the youth of the authors in question (avant-garde publications were happier to resort to neologisms), by their readership (essentially students and the younger literary generation) and by the prophylactic function of their writings. '*Intellectuels*' referred to a role required of them rather than a mere recording of the actual situation, which is why the collective image given at this stage is singularly ambiguous.

In texts of literary inspiration, '*intellectuel*' denotes the champions of dilettantism and the cerebral, of an avant-gardism and aristocratism that despised the masses – in other words, the spiritual heirs

of Renan. The word was a kind of superlative of 'artist' in the sense that Flaubert used it. The best example of this meaning can be found in an article by Henry Bérenger referring to the young Barrès of the *Culte du moi*:

> By Barbarians we mean Democracy, the numberless legion of men of the people, the economically active, all those who are no more than workers of one kind or other. By *intellectuels* we mean the elite, the rare aristocracy of thought, the small number of those who require from the moral or material Universe simply opportunities for elegant and aesthetic pleasure. It is needless for me to say that M. Maurice Barrès *is* the *intellectuel*.[65]

This elitist attitude slides imperceptibly into a political usage, since this social posture presupposes a certain contempt for the people, thus for democracy. The political theme of disdain for official politics and attraction to new currents is the most important thing. It conferred in fact on the *intellectuels* a political and voluntaristic role that they would play in 1898.

If the far left used this neologism to denote those individuals who sought to take up the cause of the popular strata that it claimed to represent, this was at least as much to keep its distance from them as to acknowledge their specificity. The ouvrierism of the anarchists and some socialist currents (sometimes present in those who, like Lafargue or Guesde, were themselves of intellectual origin) was a way of making their followers forget that they were not workers themselves. It goes a long way therefore towards explaining the political use of the term '*intellectuels*'. The new term replaced that of the old sense of 'bourgeois', which in the first half of the nineteenth century had lumped the 'talents' together with the employers. By the end of the century, 'bourgeois' was no longer suited to defining men who were often of modest origin but endowed with a high level of education. It was reserved primarily to denote employers or capitalists, influenced by the spread of Marxism. Thus Jules Lermina moved in 1894 from the ideological to the sociological meaning, making the *intellectuels* a group whose function was to contribute to the work of dominating the popular classes:

> The role of *intellectuels*, which should have been to organize equilibrium, soon acquired an opposite sense. Studying to develop among the less intellectual an ever more developed respect for thought, they based this on a contempt for matter, relegating those men of greater strength but lesser intellect to the rank of inferior beings, soon indeed to mere animals. The *intellectuels* threw a new

> decoy to these ever more degraded brutes – the religions of pity, charity and mercy.[66]

Beyond this quasi-Marxist schema, recycling the old anti-clerical position of the Enlightenment, according to which the *intellectuels*, like the priests, used ideas to keep the people in thrall, the important point is that this passage confers on the neologism '*intellectuel*' a collective and social significance. We thus move from a polemical label that could be applied to a particular group of intellectuals to a more sociological conception asserting the membership of all intellectuals in a single social group. But, in order for this new representation to gain currency, it had to find its way from writings with limited circulation into texts with a wider readership and to be put in the spotlight by a topical problem. This was achieved by the theme of 'intellectual proletarians'.

The new proletarians

As against earlier occurrences, the articles or works in which this ideological position is found had a broad outreach, to the point that it became a kind of doxa shared by all circles of opinion. It could be found in novels (such as Henry Bérenger's *La Proie*, *Le Termite* by J. H. Rosny the elder, and Paul Brulat's *Le Reporter*), in works with such critical success as *Les Déracinés* by Barrès and *Le Disciple* by Paul Bourget, or in articles in large-circulation magazines that were reprinted in book form.[67] In accounts of speeches, the journalism of Jaurès or responses to the *Enquête sur l'enseignement secondaire*, it is possible to measure the degree to which such ideas had taken root among the broad educated public, confirming dominant prejudices and recycling very old themes.[68] Roger Chartier has been able to show that the theme of overproduction of graduates was integral to conservative thought.[69] But this commonplace acquired a new dimension by virtue of its systematic character (supposedly objective statistics were used to demonstrate it, and it was illustrated by anecdotes of all kinds) and its support among almost all shades of public opinion.

The image of the *intellectuels* as a social group was reinforced by this, as the discourse on these intellectual proletarians fulfilled three complementary functions according to the political camp in question. On the right, the 'intellectual proletarian' served as a target of social fear. His existence explained why the proletarians as a whole were in revolt, as the declassed intellectual was their ready-made 'ringleader' and the propagator of subversive ideas. He was

likewise the product of a sick society which had spread education too wide, thus threatening the natural hierarchies. On the left, and the far left in particular, with Jaurès for example, the intellectual proletarian could promise an expansion of the social base of the Socialist Party and summed up the iniquities of a capitalism which could not guarantee everyone a position according to their merit.[70] In the centre, authors either came close to the conservative vision or demanded certain reforms in order to remedy a deplorable state of affairs. For Henry Bérenger, for example, this provided the occasion to describe the intellectual malaise and the new frustrations of the *intellectuels*. This pessimistic sociology made familiar the idea that the *intellectuels* formed an autonomous social group with common interests to defend, similar in this respect to the proletarians. In short, it prepared people's minds to accept a form of social identity defined by a relationship to education, thus at one and the same time a new class and a new way of seeing class relations.

The overall tenor of these writings was not new, and Leonor O'Boyle has been able to show the existence in the first half of the nineteenth century of texts whose ideas and arguments were broadly similar.[71] The novelty was of a different kind. Whereas before 1850 it was only overproduction in the liberal professions that was debated, the attempt was now made, particularly by Henry Bérenger, to depict the situation in numerical terms and to give interpretation the appearance of objective fact. The general model was that the liberal professions, previously reserved for individuals of bourgeois origin, had now been opened to men of modest background:

> These are men who were born poor, the sons of peasants, workers, petty employees or high-placed civil servants without money of their own, men who are hard-working and well behaved, who have acquired considerable knowledge by dint of work and privation, men who demand entry into the social organization, with the benefit of their university qualifications, men finally who are neither bohemians, nor rebellious, nor declassed, but quite the contrary – regimented, submissive, aspiring bourgeois – but who end up being candidates for hunger . . . . They sought to enfranchise themselves through the liberal professions, but these have chained them to servile trades. For all their bachelor's and higher degrees, these sons of proletarians have remained proletarians like their fathers, the peasants, workers and petty employees, with this simple difference that, having believed they were becoming free men, they now feel all the more enslaved.[72]

Like any other ideological claim, this passage mixes intimately together apparently objective facts, such as the increase in membership of the liberal professions, and a highly exaggerated hypothesis according to which these newcomers are all of humble origin and thus condemned to relegation or defeat unless they possess along with their diplomas the social capital needed to find a position successfully. The discourse thus distinguishes itself from the commonplace theme of failure to move on to a more sociological vision. Whatever their inherent value or intent, the new intellectuals were condemned by social laws: scarcity, competition, the unequal struggle with the more privileged. The intellectual proletarian – and this is the very justification of the latter term – is condemned to domination because he comes from the dominated classes. Such a pronouncement can even shade into contempt, as it does with Barrès (cf. the chapter in *Les Déracinés* headed 'Un prolétariat de bacheliers et de filles'), or else be deployed by revolutionaries to condemn the existing society.[73]

The statistical evidence marshalled in support of the position is based on extreme cases or an abusive generalization in which certain categories are amalgamated with others in a different situation, without it being possible to say, as Louis Pinto does, that it is downright false.[74] The figures cited in connection with the traditional liberal professions (doctors and lawyers) do not at all support the meaning intended by the author, since their situation was precisely improving in these years, as Jacques Léonard has shown for the medical profession. Henry Bérenger claimed, for instance, on the basis of information obtained from his contemporaries (already a reason for caution), that, out of 2,500 doctors in Paris, 1,200 earned less than 8,000 francs per year, and went on to equate these with intellectual proletarians.[75] Given the fact that 8,000 francs was the salary of a senior civil servant, it makes no sense to place the dividing line this high. Besides, Bérenger made no subdivision within this category, as opposed to the fine distinctions he drew further up the scale. This was a statistical manipulation to increase the base of the pyramid. He repeated the operation for the provinces, taking the same proportion of a half (5,000 out of 10,000 this time) as an estimate of the number of 'proletarian' doctors. It was a well-known fact, however, that income hierarchy was more pronounced in Paris (owing to the concentration there of specialists, together with keener competition). For advocates, the facts were more clearly massaged. Not only did Bérenger claim that only one advocate in twelve made an adequate living, which is somewhat surprising given that the official figures on which he based his work show that the majority

employed domestic servants, but he went on to add that 'The majority of advocates come from rich and comfortably off families.'[76] This remark directly implies that they do not form part of the intellectual proletariat, which he had initially defined by its humble origins. In fact, these classic liberal professions figure in his presentation only for the sake of symmetry and to give the appearance of a massive and general phenomenon to the notion of the 'intellectual proletariat'.

The only part based firmly on the level of fact and demonstration is that bearing on those professions whose development was clearly distinct from that of the old liberal professions: teachers, men of letters and publicists – precisely the future '*intellectuels*'. The intellectual proletariat was indeed, as Bérenger's study attests, the sub-basement and social hell from where the future '*intellectuels*' hailed, since, for these groups, the number of applicants was not regulated in terms of the positions available, an imbalance rendered more acute by the fact of its recent expansion: 'The surplus, save for a small minority of amateurs, forms the twofold army of independent teachers and tutors, and reporters and journalists.'[77]

By way of this study, a section of members of the intellectual field became aware of the objective worsening of their social position. We find ourselves here very close to the diffuse sentiments of the milieu itself, despite the objectivist appearance of this type of document. Whereas at the mid-century the artist had proclaimed his contempt for the bourgeois, on the eve of the public phase of the Dreyfus Affair the dominated situation of the *intellectuels* in relation to the bourgeoisie was in the process of becoming the dominant ideological theme.[78]

To organize behind a new word was to make this into a slogan, thus to adopt the new social and political attitude that went along with it. To present oneself as a 'scientist', an 'artist' or a 'man of letters', in the senses defined above, was to follow a series of specific social and/or political behaviours. The same was true for the *intellectuels*. A double shift was involved here in relation to the previous terms: from singular to plural, thus from individual to collective, and from recognition by others to self-proclamation. The scientist or artist was granted moral authority only on an individual basis, case by case, as a function of his personal eminence. The great scientist, the recognized artist or the famous author was all that counted. Scientists and artists collectively lost a portion of their symbolic aura from the fact of the mediocrity and obscurity of the majority of their numbers. For the *intellectuels* it was the other way round. It was only in the plural that they acquired importance; otherwise their attitude might pass for gratuitous originality, personal opinion or aberration.

In the notion of '*intellectuel*', numbers became strength and not the reverse. This is also why they had no need, in the last instance, to be recognized by others in order to establish their symbolic power. By virtue of being already gathered together, they extended each other mutual recognition; their internal social judgement dispensed with the external social judgement of other groups and could even go against it. Hence apparently contradictory expressions such as 'intellectual proletariat' and 'intellectual aristocracy' could arise at one and the same time, sometimes in one and the same author, and thus prefigure in the mind what was subsequently realized in the facts at the time of the Dreyfus crisis: a regrouping into opposing camps, like proletarians in the class struggle, the claim to autonomy in relation to other institutions, and an objective competition with other legitimate elites, as for any elite wielding power.

CONCLUSION

The social genealogy of the *intellectuel* displays the degree to which this neologism is the creature of its time, whereas earlier studies have always seen it as a transhistorical ideal. Transcribed in it is not only the trace of the long period of preceding representations that it replaced but also that of the immediate period of difficult circumstances of the 1890s. As the product of a crisis of representation, it enabled the *intellectuels* to grasp the crisis situation in which they found themselves. This crisis expressed the contradiction between the flattering social image of the liberal and intellectual professions and the social depreciation brought about by the influx of newcomers whom this social image only victimized.

The new collective social identity replaced earlier models for the generation in question since, by its polysemy, the result of its use in various sectors of the ideological and political field, it could be a rallying cry, a denunciation and a warning. Whatever the strategy chosen in the face of the new situation of the intellectual field, the neologism could be useful: the mark of a new elitism for those who divided their lives in two, producing creative work for their peers and rejecting the degradation of the market and hackwork; a demand for justice by those who sought a classic professional career and expected a normal reward for their work; finally, a global critique of a social situation engendering such blind alleys for those who denounced the intellectual proletariat and deployed other external survival strategies.

2

'Intellectuels' *or 'Elite'?*

> Democracy needs an elite. Such an elite represents the only kind of superiority it acknowledges: intellectual superiority.
>
> Georges Perrot, *Centenaire de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure*[1]

The progressive mobilization of the *intellectuels* in the 1890s peaked during the Dreyfus Affair. To grasp the political stakes of this mobilization, we have to put conflicts among intellectuals back in the wider context of another question: How was the status of the leading milieus legitimized? For these milieus, the advent of the Republic and the establishment of democracy constituted a crisis comparable to the one in which social representations older than that of the *intellectuel* had undergone a crisis brought on by transformations of the intellectual field. The efforts undertaken to solve it have to do with the emergence of the *intellectuels* in a threefold sense. To begin with, intellectuals forged these new representations, setting out from divisions internal to the intellectual field. Second, these new representations entailed a different political role for intellectuals, as well as a new way of exercising symbolic power. Finally, these debates served as a trial run for the polemics that the *intellectuels*' intervention in the Dreyfus Affair would trigger. Thus they allow us to understand the intellectual genealogies and later delineations of the various tendencies.

These ideological struggles had two distinguishing features. They corresponded to a precise context that was undergoing rapid change; yet, where there were lacunae in the available political vocabulary, the same terms were used with different meanings in line with the historical conjuncture and the position of the

theorist using them in the intellectual field. The use of one word for another is, however, never innocent; it often reveals more about an author's social conceptions than the long analyses he himself offers in defence of them. Thus 'elite' came into circulation in the new sense of 'leading milieu' about the same time as '*intellectuel*' did. Ideologues played on the ambiguities of both the word elite's primary meaning ('the best', as in the quotation from Georges Perrot that serves as the epigraph to the present chapter) and its secondary meaning, which was free of the class connotations of the earlier terms (ruling classes, bourgeoisie, notables, enlightened classes, and so on)[2] that were increasingly being monopolized by the political far left. The abstract nature of the word '*intellectuel*', however, was also its weak point. It touched off a debate about who was to define the basis for merit of the kind justifying admission to the 'elite'. For some, the pure 'elite' was the intellectual elite itself, which, accordingly, had a rightful claim to intellectual power. Conversely, the republicans' official position was that democracy made it possible for the best to govern, since it was the basis for freedom and equality for all: 'elite' thus designated, simply, the dominant members of the established order. The elite's social foundations were nevertheless undermined in their turn when the scandals of the late 1880s and early 1890s began to create doubts about the initial premise. In the new conjuncture, the *intellectuels* also had a political and ideological role to play in the face of this early crisis of confidence in the Republic.

THE REPUBLICAN 'ELITE' AND THE CRISIS OF THE 'RULING CLASSES'

Both the freedom of public debate and its cyclical nature explain the rapidity with which successive representations of those in the leading milieus were contested. In the space of twenty years (the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s), those who successively enjoyed political legitimacy (and were inaccurately assimilated by contemporary observers to the leading groups as a whole) had to face similar challenges to their power. In the mid-1870s, republicans rejected the former notables' claim, based on Gambetta's theory of the 'new strata', that they had a semi-hereditary right to form the 'ruling classes'. In the mid-1890s, the republicans' meritocratic optimism was, in its turn, criticized by the far left or certain intellectuals who had been won over to anarchism; the arguments invoked were quite

similar to those the republicans had used when they had been in the opposition.

The 'ruling classes'

For the Orleanists turned out of office in 1877, the 'ruling classes' were defined by their enlightenment and wealth.[3] The justification of their power was thus perfectly circular: in a still rural society, only those who enjoyed a certain affluence had access to knowledge; that affluence afforded them the leisure to devote themselves to public affairs, while higher education legitimized their capacity to lead. This apparently flawless syllogism rather thinly veiled various contradictions that the political and ideological history of the latter half of the nineteenth century brought into the broad light of day. Thanks to the well-oiled workings of a patronage system, power had too often been confiscated by the wealthiest or those privileged by birth to the detriment of the most enlightened.[4] This party's political failures, coming one after the other, bred doubts as to whether it was as competent as it claimed. Finally, the increasing numbers of teachers and students at all levels of the educational system, together with the progress of meritocratic processes observable in most careers as the century unfolded, loosened the ties between wealth, knowledge and the exercise of power. From the 1870s on, ideologues close to the Orleanists had advised the foremost members of the 'ruling classes' that they needed to invoke enlightenment as the legitimate basis for their power more often than in the past. This was, notably, the thesis advanced by Renan in *La Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, and also by Boutmy (who boasted that he was a protégé of Taine and Renan) in the brochure he wrote to introduce the Ecole libre des sciences politiques.[5] The political context at home and abroad (the defeat and the revolutionary agitation that, in Paris, paved the way for the Commune) accounts for the tone of alarm struck by these two partisans of the reformed ruling class:

> It would be madness for the threatened classes to believe that they can, by means of legal resistance, maintain the positions they still have and win back those they have lost . . . . Privilege has breathed its last; democracy will not retreat. With no choice but to bow to the right of the greatest number, the classes that have called themselves the higher classes can preserve their political hegemony only by invoking the right of the most capable. Behind the crumbling bulwark of tradition and their prerogatives, the flood of democracy must come up against a second rampart of

> lustrous practical merit, of a superiority of imposing brilliance, of capabilities that it would be madness to renounce.[6]

This political programme sounds like a battle plan for siege warfare ('positions', 'bulwark', 'rampart'). As is well known, the plan failed at the concrete level, since the ruling classes opted for the same disastrous strategy that had been theirs thirty years earlier under Guizot. Boutmy had partial success as far as his own project was concerned, but not in the sense he expected.[7] The old-style leading class's Achilles heel was the poorly resolved internal contradiction between the two elements defining it, of which the various conservative parties were, after their fashion, the political expression. Too aristocratic for the democrats, too enlightened for the Catholic conservatives for whom Enlightenment still meant Revolution and thus sin, Orleanist elitism could not but break down into two distinct tendencies in a confrontational conjuncture rather than evolving into a unifying, moderating centre, as Renan, Taine and Boutmy had all hoped. The republican vision of society had a twofold advantage. It could present itself as a synthesis, and this synthesis could claim to suppress the terms of the previous debate. This is shown by a number of famous texts by Emile Littré, Jules Ferry or the Republican Opportunists close to them.

The republican 'elite'

All these writers rejected the old-style ruling class, for it contained seeds of privilege that made it incompatible with democracy – and even baneful, according to Littré, since, on every historic occasion, this class had demonstrated its incapacity to exercise leadership by way of the political parties representing it. Witness the violation in 1830 of the *Charte* by Charles X, leading to the July Revolution; its refusal in 1848 to increase the number of eligible voters; its inability to prevent war with Prussia in 1870; the general hostility to modern society that had induced it to embrace clericalism; and, finally, its division into three factions (Legitimists, Bonapartists and Orleanists) unable to come to terms.[8] As for the republican ideologues who offered to take up the slack, they heralded, not the advent of a new ruling class, but merely that of an 'elite', of a non-exclusive aristocracy:

> This country is highly accomplished in industry, trade, literature, the fine arts and science; it must become accomplished in politics as well. This transformation, which has already been set in motion by the Republic, can be achieved by the Republic alone; for it

> implies that the new leading class be culled not just from the one at the head of the higher classes but from the one at the head of the working classes as well. Such a fusion, needful for the former as well as the latter and, in our country, exclusive of monarchy of any kind, will be gradually accomplished by the Republic.[9]

The term 'ruling class' was thus stripped of its partisan content (since different parties were to be fused) and exclusive social colouring: the new 'leading class' was to consist of the elites of different classes, the 'working classes' included. Democratic society still needed hierarchy, but it was now to be a changing hierarchy that would give everyone his chance to make it to the top. Thus there would be an elite, as there had been under the Orleanists, but it would be an elite based solely on merit, not a marriage of birth and enlightenment, as in Renan's or Boutmy's conception. Antonin Dubost, a future republican minister, explained this approach to things:

> I know petty bourgeois and even modest craftsmen, whom a lack of university degrees or their own poverty keeps far from any sort of leading class, but who would nevertheless, from a social standpoint, put many a duke, astronomer, Academician or poet to shame. The fact is that, in order to discover a capacity for politics, one has to plunge into the mass of society and examine its desires and needs in order then to find the best combinations to satisfy them.[10]

Standing Orleanist elitism on its head, the democratic credo implied that a capacity for politics, even the politics of leadership, was the most evenly distributed of all things in the world and should accordingly be accessible to everyman, irrespective of social class. This presupposed an educational project, as in Boutmy, but on an altogether different scale: a project to provide education for one and all, a programme that Jules Ferry's school reforms or the reform of university education would fulfil only very imperfectly.

Louis Liard sums up the ambition underlying the reorganization of higher education in his classic *L'Enseignement supérieur en France* (1894), a book that is testimony by an actor in the field (he was the director in charge of higher education) as much as it is objective observation. The book demonstrates the degree to which the measures adopted in this field were shaped by the concern to train a new elite: 'Many of the new regime's most enlightened men said to themselves that an elite would come about thanks to [science], and that it would be followed, thanks to dissemination among the broad

multitude, by that conscious, firm, consistent public-mindedness that the Republic and democracy cannot do without.'[11] In a certain sense, we see here the same idea that Renan had been advocating since 1871, but given greater scope by a positivist inspiration. Science, spread by a renovated university system, would remake the elite and overcome ideological divisions by enlarging the social base of the pool from which elites were drawn; it would blunt the effects of the division between professional training and disinterested academic curricula by 'endowing everyone with the scientific clarity without which the profession chosen by each would be obscure and empirical, while ensuring that the elite is drawn from the multitude and while organizing scientific work for this elite.'[12]

Despite the confidence, which Boutmy shared with the republicans, in science's power to train the 'elite', this passage also reveals an opposition between two social visions. The republicans excluded no one a priori, whereas Boutmy addressed, from the outset, a group that was socially privileged and had been selected in accordance with intellectual criteria.

The contradiction in the republican programme lay less in the meritocratic idealism underpinning it than in the simple juxtaposition of this new system with already existing elitist institutions. Louis Liard, a graduate of the Ecole normale supérieure, acknowledged the problem: 'Would [the leading educational establishments] not continue to attract and hold the elite among the younger generation, leaving only the less talented and the rejects to the universities of the future?'[13]

In the event, despite this warning and a few half-hearted attempts to reform the *grandes écoles*, the republicans contented themselves with establishing, in order to broaden the social recruitment of elites, college scholarships that benefited students in the sciences and humanities above all – that is, students on the margins of the system that trained elites.[14] This semi-failure stemmed from republican reformism's liberal philosophy. Littré, Gambetta, Liard and their co-thinkers all believed that the education of elites should be a free process, not a planned one, as it had been for the Saint-Simonian republicans of 1848, responsible, for example, for the creation of the first Ecole d'administration.[15] A minimum of enlightenment should be mandatory for everyone, but acquiring the maximum available should be left to individual initiative. To parody Guizot's famous formula,* the programme for admission to the republican

* Guizot's formula runs: 'Enrich yourselves by working and saving, and you will become voters.'

elite might have run: 'Get yourselves an education by working and saving.' That maxim made sense for these men, for they had originated in the 'new strata' which, thanks either to the enrichment of their families during the Second Empire or to their personal efforts, had had access to secondary and tertiary education. Their own success tended to make them optimistic in all things, and their example or that of other renowned men, transformed into a myth, made it possible to veil the objective limits of a system of social advancement that I have described in greater detail in *Les Elites de la République*. To promote belief in the virtues of a social ideal, one must oneself succumb to the illusions it breeds. The theme of the 'new strata' was indeed based, as Gambetta's founding text shows, on a political illusion that entered into the elites' vision. Sincerely convinced that power resided wholly in the political system and that knowledge resided wholly in academia, Gambetta and his partisans could honestly claim to have fulfilled their democratic programme by granting greater numbers of people access to both.

An evolutionist social theory grounded the republican elite's positivist vision. Social advancement occurred in stages; the bourgeoisie, the main beneficiary of secondary education, was not a class apart but the nation's non-exclusive elite. It had roots in the peasantry or working class that were never particularly deep, as Jules Ferry declared in 1880 in a speech to the High Council of Public Education: 'Our bourgeoisie is in no sense an idle class; it knows the value of time and bears the burdens of the day. In a word, it is simply the elite of hard workers of all classes.'[16]

Five years later, Ferry once again advanced this thesis in replying to critiques by intransigent republicans chafing at the slow pace of reforms:

> The rural populations are the very foundation of French society: they not only constitute an immense reservoir of labour and saving but are also a reservoir of men and women, and it is by plunging their roots into these deep social strata that the bourgeoisie, urban workers, and even those once called the ruling classes are constantly renewed. Our soldiers, schoolteachers, merchants and industrialists emerge from these strata; they form a solid base for our society, and universal suffrage for the peasantry puts the Republic on foundations of granite.[17]

The fact remains that, late in the 1880s, these encouraging words and this official optimism no longer sufficed to silence the criticisms of those in the opposition, who were no longer on the right of the governing republicans but, increasingly, on their left. Like the

ruling classes ten years earlier, the 'republican' elite was facing a crisis of its own.

THE CRISIS OF THE REPUBLICAN 'ELITE'

The republican 'elite': an anti-elite?

The republican ideal in power now found itself at the centre of the ideological field. It was therefore contested from the right and the left (tendencies that were occasionally politically allied, as in the Boulangist movement) as the result, according to their adversaries, less of a new political vision than of a questioning of the social injustices that the republicans countenanced. The terms of political and social debate were transformed accordingly, for the new ideologies drew their inspiration from a theoretical arsenal that was somewhat foreign to traditional political discourse. They postured as a new science inspired by Social Darwinism or a vulgarized version of Marxist economism. Furthermore, just as the republicans denounced the Orleanist notables' pretension to form the ruling classes, so their opponents criticized the official ideology's weak spots, characterizing it as the new discourse of a leading class on the road to collapse.

This pessimistic vision of social evolution is equally present in a certain, relatively moderate academic literature, Auguste Chirac's or Edouard Drumont's anti-Semitic pamphlets, Gustave Le Bon's popular essays, the less widely known writings of certain Social Darwinist theorists (Jules Soury, Georges Vacher de Lapouge), and even the popularized version of these Social Darwinist texts to be found in certain *romans-à-clef* that paint rather unflattering portraits of republican political personnel.[18] The echo elicited by this multi-form literature, inspired directly by the scandals in the newspapers as well as the fact that it was distributed through a wide range of channels, helped rapidly to tarnish the official image of republican personnel, fuelling doubts about their legitimacy. Thus 1883 saw the publication of the first volume of Auguste Chirac's polemic *Les Rois de la République*, the first in a long series of texts in the same vein. Here republican politicians appear as an 'anti-elite' blighted by shady deals. Two years later, Drumont's bestseller *La France juive*, which is usually held up as the breviary of modern anti-Semitism, most likely owed more of its commercial success to its shocking anecdotes about the power elite than to the unpalatable anti-Semitic theories that weave the anecdotes together.

In the late 1880s, then, republican optimism was undermined by facts (financial scandals, mounting social conflicts, political instability stemming from the divisions between moderate and radical republicans, economic depression) and also by new ideologies of evolutionist inspiration that came to opposite conclusions. For Social Darwinism, evolution led to the survival of the fittest; for socialism, the weakest could carry the day only by collectively rejecting the established order. For both, consequently, republican elitism was a lie, and the republican elite was assimilated by both anti-Semites and socialists to a financial feudal class (because of the scandals) that was cultivating a new patronage system not much different from the one the Orleanists had built up (the reference was to the massive purges carried out in the early days of the regime).

These intellectual currents criticized the official elite the more harshly, perhaps, because its ostentatious idolization of great men and science had fostered illusions about the advent of an 'Athenian' Republic. Even writers who had been republicans before the Republic, such as Zola, shared and spread this critical vision of the political class.[19]

Vacher de Lapouge summed up the complaints that intellectuals big and small directed at republican democracy:

> So as not to abandon the term, the name 'democracy' was given to a regime that had nothing in common with democracy beyond the word itself. 'Democracy' is often used to designate a regime in which power is supposedly exercised by the common people or for the common people. In reality, the common people play no more active a role in the choice of representatives than the educated class does. Representatives are, rather, designated by oligarchies with no popular mandate; they govern in the interests of coteries and, above all, in their own.[20]

Zeev Sternhell, who cites this text, rightly likens its negative vision of French parliamentary democracy to the theory of the decadence of elites developed in the same period by Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto with an eye to the political evolution of Italy and France. Still more significant than this fortuitous convergence, however, between the disappointed liberal, a professor in Lausanne, and the Guesdist part-time professor, a librarian in Montpellier – since each of these authors was unaware of the other's works – is their partial community of views with a fresh convert to socialism, a pure product of republican meritocracy who initially subscribed to the republican credo: none other than Jean Jaurès.[21]

The ideological impact of the articles by the deputy from Carmaux was incomparably greater than that of the writings, known only to initiates, of the marginal figures just named, because he wrote in a big provincial newspaper, *La Dépêche*, was an accredited academic, and had adapted Marxism to French society with more skill than Lafargue or Guesde. In his chronicles, Jaurès, too, developed the idea that the highest posts had been monopolized by the same individuals, a new aristocracy that was driving the hard-working middle class back into the ranks of the people. Using an analogy often heard in this period of the commemoration of the centenary of the Revolution, he predicted the emergence of a coalition between the proletariat and a middle class excluded from power, as in 1789, when an alliance had sprung up between the Third Estate and the popular classes against the Ancien Régime.[22] Four years later, enlightened by the regime's reactionary evolution in the face of the rise of socialism and the anarchist violence, Jaurès went still further, lumping republicans together with the financial oligarchy:

> I have since become aware that the power of resistance of privilege and social inequality is formidable, that the Republic was nothing more, for many self-styled republicans, than the replacement of the land-owning oligarchy by the financial oligarchy, the country squire by the industrialist, the clerical hierarchy by the capitalist hierarchy, priests by bankers, and dogma by money.[23]

This makes the distance covered in a decade plain to see. The republican elite, which had once levelled accusations at the 'ruling classes', was now sitting in the dock in its turn, and was described in exactly the same terms that the most radical republicans had used to denounce the notables' involvement in the big business scandals. The ideologues who attempted to refute this discourse critical of parliamentary democracy were, consequently, on the defensive and forced to do battle on the enemy's ground, once again employing a class vocabulary that had been gradually drained of its contents. The term 'elite' was no longer taken in the normative sense but was, rather, pitted against an enemy who was real enough, albeit evoked only by preterition: the 'masses' or 'multitude'. The function of the term 'elite' was to replace the term 'bourgeoisie', a word that had been confiscated by the Marxists and the far left and invested with polemical significance. The writings of essayists close to the official world can be used to demonstrate this ever more frequent utilization of the theme for purposes of apology and denial: *L'Éducation de la bourgeoisie sous la République*, which Edouard Maneuvrier

published in 1888, the 1890 article by Alfred Fouillée, 'L'Éducation et la sélection', and, finally, Jean Izoulet's 1894 *La Cité moderne et la métaphysique de la sociologie*.[24]

A non-exclusive or an exclusive elite?

Two features of these essayists' defence of the elite are significant. The ideologues were recruited from academia, which the regime had, from the first, assiduously promoted; and debate focused increasingly on secondary education, which the new regime had left essentially unreformed, in contrast to primary and higher education. What happened in secondary schools, however, determined in advance whether elites would be renewed as the republicans had promised. Yet, for pessimists, too broad an access to secondary education would exacerbate the overproduction of graduates, which some observers had begun to regard as the source of social disruption of democracy. It was not only that republicans acquired the defensive reflexes of previous ruling classes; in addition, the basic terms of the old debate resurfaced, lexical modifications aside. The transition from a non-exclusive to an exclusive vision of the elite in the space of a few years had more to do with the new political currents' hostility to the Republic than with the different social profiles of the authors we shall now analyse, for all three were products of the republican meritocracy.[25]

Edouard Maneuvrier published his book before Boulangism demonstrated, a few months later, that a segment of the popular classes had become estranged from the regime. He appealed to Gambetta's authority to urge educational reforms that would provide the political theme of the 'new strata' with a social foundation. According to Maneuvrier, the timidity of the government's reforms had maintained the bourgeois character of secondary-school education and the social obstacles that kept workers' sons out of them. His demand that secondary-school recruitment be broadened by opening secondary professional schools and that primary classes in the *lycées* be abolished essentially signified that the idea of the non-exclusive elite, rejected by Opportunists out of social conservatism, should be carried to its logical conclusion.

Maneuvrier met conservatives' objections with the argument that only a non-exclusive elite could ensure the solidity of democracy and reduce social conflict: 'From a political standpoint, what a source of strength for our democracy! What a factor of order, of stability, of security is this elite made up of workers steadily arriving

to swell the excessively thin ranks of these republicans who call themselves "Monsieur" and are *citoyens*!'[26]

The slide, in this passage, from a social to a political register points to the rise, even among the most progressive republicans, of fears of a widening gulf between republicans and workers, who had once joined forces to conquer power. The goal was to form, once again, a moderate working-class elite, a buffer class that would allay 'anger and rancour' by holding out the promise of social ascension. But, as one social crisis followed hard on the heels of the next, this conservative reformism, couched in accents that bespoke a desire to renew classic arrangements, culminated, as in Littré, in a conclusion entitled 'the aristocracy of democracy'.[27] The tone was less confident than it had been ten years earlier. The emphatic reaffirmation of meritocratic theses was now, as it were, a way of reminding the republicans in government of their duties, an exhortation to virtue, and a warning of impending danger comparable to the one that Boutmy had issued to the ruling classes in 1871:

> So far, [the bourgeoisie] has more or less succeeded in keeping the poor under control. Its prestige, however, is diminishing daily and, in proportion as the audacity of the famished people milling around it increases, the bourgeoisie is beginning to take fright. It has one and only one means of escaping the worst possible fate and taking heart again: reforming itself through education and meriting authority by meriting respect . . . . Let us prepare respected, respectable leaders for this army of democracy, leaders who owe their rank neither to favours, nor to birth, nor to fortune, but to merit; who, because they know how freely to exact obedience, will lead their troops towards honour, not pillage.[28]

The closing military metaphor, with its Napoleonic overtones, doubtless constitutes an ironical allusion to both the decadent bourgeois republic of the Directory and contemporary financial scandals. In any case, this heir of Gambetta's makes no bones about his doubts as to the merits of the established elites.

Two years later, Fouillé's essay, sparked by Leon Bourgeois's modernizing reform of secondary-school education, reflects the rise of pessimism among official thinkers. For the philosopher of '*idées-forces*', the only suitable training for future elites was a classical education. Fouillée denounced purely scientific instruction, which 'exposes society to a sort of universal social downgrading' by broadening social recruitment more than is called for.[29] Thus

the split between advocates of a non-exclusive and an exclusive elite was reinforced among republicans. The elite was now sharply distinguished from the masses: 'It is the duty of the ruling classes and government to cultivate a lofty, far-sighted view of things, to forestall blind social levelling, to react against the natural movement that drives the masses downwards. A democracy is of course far from excluding natural superiority; on the contrary, it promotes it.'[30] The slide, conspicuous here from the word 'elite', used at the beginning of the essay, to the term 'leading class', which resurfaces in this passage, attests the unconscious exclusivism that the latter expression was beginning to connote. The social downgrading associated with an expansion of secondary-school education seemed to be a greater danger than the risk of aristocratism denounced by Maneuvrier some years before. The growing elitism of the discourse is plainly correlated with social anxiety, displayed with increasing candour, in the face of the masses, who are symbolized by the expansion of socialism in France and Germany. The author evokes this anxiety at the end of his essay.[31]

With Izoulet's book, published after the wave of anarchist assassinations and the socialist successes in the 1893 elections, what had once been just a threat becomes an imminent catastrophe. The dichotomy elite/masses, already at work in Fouillée, has now become the basic social opposition. The harmonious evolutionism of the republican theorists of a non-exclusive elite has given way to a rigid organicism or a strategy of confrontation via a sort of inversion of the class enemy's theses.

It may seem odd to dwell on a forgotten 'sociologist' when, in the same period, the true founder of academic sociology, Durkheim, was beginning to work out a theory of society adapted to democracy.[32] Yet, however great the difference in these two authors' theoretical merits, historians should, incontestably, prefer the one forgotten by the history of sociology to the canonized sociologist. For Izoulet landed a quasi-official post. When, in 1897, a new chair of 'social philosophy' was created at the Collège de France, the minister chose Izoulet among all the possible candidates, including Durkheim, since his positions accorded the most closely with ruling government's theses and the goals of the anti-socialist struggle that the new chair was supposed to wage.[33] Izoulet, by way of the insistent references in his doctoral dissertation to dominant politicians and the most prominent academics, had already demonstrated that he had assigned himself the task of legitimizing the established order and, thereby, the way the governing republicans intended to respond to opposition.

The book opens with the idea that concludes Fouillée's essay: 'For my part, I am unable to take my eyes off the worrisome cloud that has begun to obscure the horizon: it is nothing other than the swelling tide of multitudes who are capable of uprooting the Elite and sweeping civilization away like a bit of straw.'[34] Redefining the givens of the problem, the 'social philosopher' drops the apologetic tone of the 1880s, and the mournful tone of the early 1890s as well, in order to adopt that of a counter-attack. The organicist metaphors, only recently reactionary thinkers' prerogative, are now mobilized in defence of the established democratic order. As in Boutmy, the 'Elite' is identified as society's brain.[35] Biology serves to guarantee a description of social divisions, but also to deny their existence, since they are identified with a natural, functional differentiation between cell types. The various elites are likened to mental faculties that join in an organic whole.[36] Thus Izoulet posits a solidarity between multitude and elite ('*the Elite* gradually makes the multitude reasonable, as, perhaps, the brain renders the body sensible').[37] Thus the author can once again sound the classic theme of the non-exclusive elite while simultaneously advertising his interest in selection and differentiation between elite and multitude.[38] Members of the elite exercise one of two specialized functions (spiritual power and temporal power). The former, performed by poets and scientists, develops the ideal; the latter (law-makers and administrators) translates it into facts. In its neo-Comtian naivety, this incessantly renewed utopia of social science in the service of state action is doubtless the point where we can most easily see Izoulet's pretension to play the role of ideologue for the central group among the then consolidating elites.[39]

Izoulet's book is thus an academic version of the attempts by intellectuals or politicians close to the ruling groups to endow the moderate republicans with a new social programme, and legitimacy as well, in the face of the attacks being launched by the extremes. It takes its place in a more general context, that of a gradual opening towards erstwhile opponents who had 'rallied to the cause', that of reconciliation in Méline, of a desire to reclassify the parties on the basis not of the old divisions (Catholicism/anti-clericalism) but on that of society itself. All the political projects just mentioned are practical versions of the ideological themes defended in Izoulet, Fouillée and Maneuvrier's variations on the elite.[40] An eternal return, in some sense, in the history of elites, in which, as in Pareto, force is replaced by ruse when the ruling aristocracy is in jeopardy. The elite, once held up by Gambetta or Ferry as an ideal for democracy as a whole, the ultimate embodiment of the social forces in the ascendant, has mutated, in their epigones,

into the inviolable foundation of the established order and crowning glory of the social hierarchy. Under the pressure of external attacks, the 'middle class' dear to the Orleanists went through the same phases.

There is, finally, one more analogy between the two successive discourses defending the 'leading class' of the 1870s and the 'elite' of the 1890s. The sophistication of the debate sparked by hostile criticism foregrounded academics – that is, intellectuals – rather than politicians, who had formed the vanguard in the phase of the conquest of power. There are two reasons for this new division of the labour of domination between fractions of the dominant class. Academics' social trajectories illustrated the fact that merit provided admission to the elites; beneficiaries and living proof of the meritocratic system's legitimacy, academics could not but rally to its defence. Furthermore, the degree to which secondary education was exclusive or non-exclusive was of greater concern to them than to any other elite, since it increased or decreased their potential audience, on the one hand, but could also devalue the titles they themselves held, on the other. Thanks to this gradual drift, the overall debate about the elite's legitimacy was, simultaneously, a debate internal to the intellectual field in which two possible conceptions of the intellectual or the elite clashed. The clash prefigured the divisions of the Dreyfus Affair.

'INTELLECTUELS' OR 'ELITE': FROM LEGITIMISM TO AVANT-GARDISM

The republican elite's ideologues did not merely register the change that affected the ideological climate between the 1880s and 1890s; they also responded to the concerns agitating academic opinion. Among academics, the dominant attitude towards the regime had been legitimist until the early 1890s. It then gave way, however, to a growing demand for autonomy or even, among younger generations, a critical avant-garde position. This development reflects academia's growing distance from political circles. It is the more significant in that the republicans did not begrudge the universities their favours.

An examination of the stages of this divorce, together with the reasons for it and its consequences, will reveal the political stakes of the rupture, the existence of which Izoulet denied, between '*intellectuels*' and 'the elite'.

The younger generation of academics: from legitimism to autonomy

For the historian, it is easier to identify dissident attitudes in a corporation dependent on the state than passive endorsement of the regime. Although we have no statistical overview at our disposal, we can utilize the wealth of available information on the academics who considered themselves the elite of this group, the *normaliens*, and, more generally, the students* who were evolving, thanks to their growing numbers, into a political force courted by the different schools of thought. Initially, everything conspired to make the elite in the universities and *grandes écoles* a bastion of support for the Republic: the state's financial effort on its behalf, the creation of new posts and scholarships, the promotion of freedom of association and, finally, official ideology's cult of science and academe. Whereas older generations had experienced the constraints of the Second Empire or *Ordre moral*, the *normaliens* now reaped greater benefit from this state largesse than any other group, and the majority of them could not but be favourably inclined towards the regime. In the 1880s, this more or less radical, more or less overt republicanism tolerated a right-wing minority dominated by practising Catholics and an ill-defined centre that took an interest in politics only in times of crisis. In this period, Jean Jaurès (class of 1878), Emile Durkheim (1879), Joseph Bédier and Lucien Herr (1883) and Charles Andler (1884), whose later political and professional destinies diverged, all unreservedly subscribed to this republican credo.[41]

The younger academic generation's attitude towards Boulangism confirms the solidity of this republican legitimism. Facing a government thrown into disarray by the emergence of this left-wing opposition, which the right sought to convert into an anti-republican weapon, only the young people in the Ecoles came forward, organizing in order to struggle against what they saw as a new form of Bonapartism. Thus, in Paris, the Student Anti-Boulangist Committee was founded on 23 and 24 April 1888; all the universities as well as the Ecole normale supérieure itself were represented in it. The Ecole normale joined by a vote of 83 to 20, with 24 abstentions: this is one indication of the balance of forces, overwhelmingly favourable to the Republic, in the 'ivory tower of the rue d'Ulm'.[42†]

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* A *normalien* is a student or alumnus of the Ecole normale supérieure, one of the *grandes écoles*. Albeit the summit of the French system of higher education, these elite 'Ecoles' are distinguished from 'universities' in French usage. The date of a *normalien*'s matriculation in the Ecole normale defines his 'class' (*promotion*).

† The Ecole normale supérieure is located on the rue d'Ulm, on Paris's Left Bank.

The committee, in existence for more than a year, took an active part in countering the Boulangists' propaganda by publishing a newspaper, organizing subscription campaigns, and holding support meetings for republican candidates. Those who were the most deeply engaged in the struggle had the impression that they were experiencing a revival of the defence of the Republic against the 2 December (1851) *coup d'état*. Certain student leaders even assigned the aspiring young intellectuals the general civic function of educating the people. In short, those who had not yet become the *intellectuels* wholeheartedly espoused the republican philosophy of a democratic elite, urging schoolteachers, for example, to mobilize as political dissidents against the insurgents:

> We demand, in the name of Truth, that you repeat everywhere that a general who disobeys is no less guilty than a mutinous soldier, and is unworthy of the uniform he wears. We beg you, in the name of the Law, to protest, if only in your hearts, against men bent on sacrificing their country's Government and Constitution to the unscrupulous ambitions of a pretender with no legitimate claim. It is your duty, in the name of the Fatherland, to imbue your students with a love of freedom and hatred of servitude.[43]

This republican legitimism of the young people in the Ecoles was grounded in their conviction that they were an active part of the non-exclusive elite leading the country. It reflected the ideology of academic reformers who, against the older faculties' traditional individualism, wished to found new universities animated by the sentiment that professors and students formed a single moral community. Ernest Lavisse, one of the reform's architects, developed this theme in a series of addresses delivered at the start of the academic year at the Paris Faculty of Letters and collected in an 1890 volume, *Etudes et étudiants*. This new ritual to mark the opening of courses, borrowed from older faculties, had not existed in the Faculty of Letters, with its ill-defined student body. The students had to be made aware of what united them; the professors had to come to feel their collegial bond. The upshot was the transition from degree candidate to student, examiner to tutor, titular holders of chairs to collegial teaching body, lecture course for a passive audience to interactive seminar. This new organization of higher learning also had, however, a civic and moral dimension that meshed with the patriotic republicanism of the manifesto of the students opposed to Boulanger: 'If a high-school student has to be a believer, a college student is, by vocation, a sceptic – that is, he should accept only demonstrated truths as true. We urge college students to be

active and energetic. We are pursuing, among them, an education to freedom.'[44]

This new academic community served as a training ground for democratic life. It took on permanent form with the foundation, first in the provinces and then in Paris, of student associations in which professors also participated.[45] The younger generation's best-educated component thus prepared, under its teachers' guidance, to join the reformed elite that the country needed if it was ever to stand up to Germany again. This optimistic image of the new republican academy was not merely a theme of official discourse. In the 1880s, the flowering of the associative movement and the success of anti-Boulangism confirmed that young people did in fact embrace these new objectives.

Yet, once the Boulangist episode blew over, an altogether different climate came to prevail. In the 1890s, when, as we have seen, the image of the republican elite was losing its lustre, young people in the Ecoles were no longer satisfied with playing their official role of defence and illustration of the regime. Increasingly, they demanded autonomy. This is attested by the emergence, in the Latin Quarter,* of small groups won over to extremist ideas by the propaganda of political parties from outside the academic world. Thus, late in 1891, the Revolutionary Socialist Internationalist Students were founded, as were various other confessional or political movements.[46] Although these were small minorities perennially divided between moderates and revolutionaries, they had symbolic importance owing to the fact that they scrambled the consensual image of the new academy and its ideal of allegiance to the ruling government. They also helped to sustain a climate of agitation in the Latin Quarter while popularizing, in a *revolutionary* sense, the theme of the 'proletarian intellectual'. They thus contributed to reinforcing the conviction of moderate academics that the established order and the elite had to be defended against the student 'masses' who sought to prevent the orderly pursuit of courses.[47]

There were, nevertheless, patent limits on this new politicization of college youth. These groups constantly hesitated between the instrumental vision of things cultivated by the Guesdists, which treated students as militants like any others and refused to grant them any autonomy from the proletariat, and another vision, more

* The quarter of central Paris in or near which the faculties of Letters, Law, Medicine and Science were all located, together with most of the *Grandes écoles* and the Collège de France.

anarchistic or inherited from French socialism, which acknowledged their autonomy as intellectuals in order to make it easier to penetrate their environment and enlist new recruits on a more ecumenical basis than Marxist orthodoxy allowed. Of these two tendencies, the second carried the day, as the debates of the International Congress of Socialist Students show. Its success provides additional evidence of the spread, in this period, of the image of the *intellectuel* (the neologism appears, notably, in the motions or clauses submitted to discussion); the term lay halfway between a name for a social group and one for a political ideal.[48] The second limit on this change in the political climate is that the admonition that one had a duty to be an intellectual was addressed to a transitory group, subject to perpetual renewal and characterized by its uncertain social status (because of the divisions between faculties and the fact that students were recruited primarily from the bourgeoisie). In adopting socialist ideas, this group marked its distance from the 'bourgeoisie' – that is, it refused to consider that it stood shoulder to shoulder with the social elites, made up an integral part of them or was training to join them, as student status had implied in the past.

The student community accordingly found itself divided in the mid-1890s between an avant-garde minority and a passive, conformist majority. Elements of the latter could, however, be rallied to the democratic ideal of the *intellectuel*. This is indicated by certain demonstrations in the Latin Quarter, which paved the way for successful mobilization in the Dreyfus Affair. A comparable division sprang up in the same period among *normaliens*. The political trajectory of Lucien Herr and the students of the Ecole normale connected with him bear witness to it.

The engaged intellectual: theory and practice (Lucien Herr and the socialist normaliens)

The case of Lucien Herr and the *normaliens* who, in this 1893–4 period, adopted political and social positions similar to his is well worth examining, both because of the role the *normaliens* would later to play in mobilizing the first Dreyfusards and because this avant-garde, setting out from a starting point classic in the extreme, realized, both practically and theoretically, the new ideal of the engaged intellectual. Comparative analysis of these *normaliens*' biographies accordingly makes it possible to determine what, in the theoretical responses that they elaborated in this new historical climate, is traceable to the external intellectual and political conjuncture and what is attributable to personal traits.

A radical partisan of Clemenceau's during his years at the Ecole normale supérieure, Lucien Herr had, by the time he became the Ecole's librarian in 1889, opted for (clandestine) socialist activism.[49] Although he made no attempt to proselytize students (Elie Halévy, a student in this period, is categorical in this regard),[50] he did secretly elaborate, first for himself and then for the minority of *normaliens* sympathetic to socialism from the classes of 1893 on, a new conception of the academic intellectual that served as the basis for the *normaliens*' Dreyfusism. Herr had been unable to take part in the struggle against Boulanger because he had been on a study mission in Germany and Russia. Charles Andler, his biographer, indirectly retraces the future librarian's state of mind, probably on the basis of his correspondence with his friend:

> It seemed that the Republic itself had been called into question. At that point, the young people in the Ecole woke up; this was solid reason for hope. Paris had its political Right Bank and Left Bank. The Right Bank acclaimed the black horse.* The Left Bank was ardently republican and anti-Boulangist. A few years of fervour followed, the prelude to the struggles of 1897.[51]

In contrast, the younger generation of German students disappointed Herr with its conservatism: 'Today's Germany presents, all in all, a sorry spectacle. It is striking how far ahead of them we are.'[52]

Thus the young scholarship student, who, like Durkheim, had a few years earlier set out for Hegel's fatherland in search of new inspiration for understanding his function as an intellectual, became aware that only the Republic could produce authentic citizen-*intellectuels*. On his return from Russia, he worked out a whole theory – which came to light only after his death – in which we can see both the grounds for his engagement as an activist and a portrait of the new *intellectuel* as he emerged from the Dreyfusards' struggle. To intellectuals who, like the anti-Boulangist students, had simply defended the established order, Herr opposed a new ideal of the critical *intellectuel* who hastens progress and prepares the necessary revolutions:

> All modern political life is premised on a negation of heredity, of continuity between succeeding generations . . . . Heightening the independence of each new generation is the condition for

* Boulanger liked to appear in public on a black horse.

> progress. Since the average human being becomes rigid in his ideas and interests after reaching maturity, the condition for progress is initiative on the part of the younger generations, who demand that social reality be better adapted to their new desires, their will and ideas . . . Insurrection, revolt – that is to say, in plain terms, scrutiny and critique – is a duty not only in exceptional, grave cases, but always.[53]

This fragment is interesting less for the originality of the ideas it contains than because it was produced by a man determined to continue to incarnate a certain academic excellence rather than throwing off the constraints of academia, as radical intellectuals of previous generations had. Above all, however, these notes exhibit the traces of contemporary political circumstances. Boulangism and anti-Boulangism had shown that the Republic and democracy are never achieved for good and all: 'The disorganization brought on by the critique and negation of forms of supremacy has emancipated the individual and made him the sole actor. Today, changes bear on, or can bear on, everything, without limit. This explains the profundity and frequency of revolutions.'[54] This radical individualism, hostile to all forms of authority and social hierarchy, might have presaged a more or less anarchistic development, very much in harmony with the climate of the literary circles of the day, as we shall see in the following chapter. It seems to me, however, that we cannot properly interpret this passage, which is necessarily somewhat obscure, like every thought jotted down in rough form, unless we relate it to the biographical information we have about the intellectual influences on Herr in this period.

The most important of them gives him a place apart in the intellectual milieu of his time: the experience of Russian realities that he gained thanks to both his study travel and his friendship with a Russian socialist who had found refuge in Paris, Pierre Lavroff. As a result of these relations, a link was forged between the academic Dreyfusard's future ideal, of which Herr here provides a first blueprint, and the revolutionary function that the Russian intelligentsia saw as its own. In Pierre Lavroff's writings, there clearly emerges the notion of a party of intellectuals, a necessity in a despotic country where intellectuals were few and far between, yet one much less strongly felt in France, where individualism reigned supreme.[55] This sense of the necessity of collective action, even for privileged groups such as the French *intellectuels*, is doubtless the most conspicuous borrowing from Russian sources in Herr's thought and practice.

That notion accounts for the altogether unprecedented engagement represented by an academic's entry into a workers' party. The other socialist intellectuals in this period were virtually all independent intellectuals active in the least stringently organized socialist tendencies (cf. the trajectory of Jaurès himself). Herr and his friend Andler, the first two *normaliens* formally to join a workers' party – that is, a party that contested the foundations of the state which, in another context, employed them – resolved this seeming contradiction to their own satisfaction:

> We were fledgling civil servants bound to the state by a bilateral agreement that had to be faithfully respected. Did we have the right to engage in destructive, clandestine propaganda activity directed against this very state?... We did not let this sophism stand in our way. We felt ourselves to be civil servants of the Republic, not of its occasional leaders; not of the semi-conservative parties that had replaced the parties of the reaction driven from office on 16 May; not of the ascendant plutocracy, the 'new strata' which, content to have been swept to power by workers' votes, had betrayed the cause of the workers after first flattering them. We felt that we were in the same circumstances as the great academics, the pride of the existing Republic, who had, under the Empire, been republicans. We pledged that we would serve the Republic with all the professional devotion of which we were capable. It was our ambition to become indispensable at the scientific level, indispensable in the posts we were called to fill. However, we believed that we had the right, outside our hours of service, to profess the social and political opinion that seemed to us to be true, even if it was not that of Monsieur Constans or Monsieur Méline. Indeed, we knew that these leaders of the day had embraced a doctrine of pure, Machiavellian defence of the privileged, and we did not feel we were bound to them. *They* were the liars.[56]

Although this text was written nearly forty years after the facts it recounts, it probably represents a rather faithful transcription of the state of mind of the assistant professor of German and the librarian of the Ecole normale: for these two pure products of republican meritocracy, both of them trained philosophers who had been raised in milieus with particularly rigid morals, must have been earnestly seeking, in order to accomplish their labour of spiritual conversion, to clarify and justify, perhaps even more to themselves than to others, the painful transgression that their

new-found convictions impelled them to commit. (The proof is that they both joined the party and published their militant articles under pseudonyms.)[57] Another interesting aspect of this passage is its demonstration of the steadily mounting disaffection with the official Republic even in the milieus that had most wholeheartedly supported it: this disaffection culminated in the affair. Socialism and collective engagement served as outlets for the disgust provoked by the moral turpitude of the Panama Scandal, the malfunctioning of the parliamentary system, or the cynicism of the opportunists who clung to their positions of power in the face of Boulangism by applying quasi-illegal methods (whence the allusion to Méline and Constans). Thirdly, this passage concerns both the new responsibilities that engaged academics wished to assume and the continuity with the generations of mid-century republicans that they claimed to embody. The alliance with the workers, sealed by membership in a socialist party, was a way of keeping the promises that the republican left had been making to Parisian workers, the vanguard in the combat for the Republic, from the time of the Second Republic on, but had honoured in the breach, although that left continued endlessly to renew them. Rejection of traditional academic reserve was thus masked by invocation of the example that their great predecessors had set. As in Jaurès somewhat later, socialism is here the true realization of the Republic: what might seem to be a break thus hides an underlying continuity.

Yet, because of its precociousness, the logic informing these two pioneers' socialist engagement was not purely political. It was sustained by other professional and intellectual choices ('It was our ambition to become indispensable at the scientific level'). The new engaged intellectuals must not be, as they had often been in the past, the socially downgraded intellectuals whose engagement was designed to make society pay for their resentment or frustration (a theme then flourishing in the discourse on the intellectual proletariat). On the contrary, they had to be intellectuals *par excellence*, scientists or scholars whose own symbolic capital lent the cause they defended its lustre. This was a twofold ideal that was hard to uphold. Herr and Andler each managed to approximate it in only one of the two registers just mentioned: Herr came into his own as an activist and inspiration to others, to the detriment of his own intellectual work, whereas Andler gradually abandoned the terrain of active politics for intellectual dominance in his field of specialization, German studies.

From 1893 on, a small but conspicuous minority of *normaliens* charted a similar course, acknowledging Andler and Herr as their

precursors. This encounter was not due, as foes of socialism or renegades from it affirmed, to proselytism on the part of the two older men, an attitude that would have contradicted their ideal, but, rather, to the convergence of several independent causal sequences: increasingly disappointed by the official Republic, the younger generations of intellectuals were the first to have personally experienced no other regime, and they sought the remedies for its faults in an ideal form of socialism. What is more, they were painfully aware of the growing gap between the classical culture in which they had been trained and the advances made by the new social sciences, history and philosophy, their disciplines of predilection. Their socialist engagement allowed these *normaliens* to align their political and intellectual choices: in pursuing these disciplines, they were developing the sciences of the contemporary, the foundations of political action. Finally, the liberal political climate created by the Ecole normale's new administration, together with the drop in the average age of the teaching body and the politicization of the Latin Quarter, removed the last of the barriers to opening the 'ivory tower of the rue d'Ulm' to the outside world. The minority who joined the socialist movement were, to be sure, set apart from the *normaliens* as a whole by certain specific social traits. The special attention that has been lavished on the ideal-typical realization of all these original traits, Charles Péguy, because of his literary talent, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that his socialist classmates also had original social profiles. Like the majority of *normaliens*, they belonged to socially mobile families on their way up; it would seem that this ascent was, in their case, faster than average. The socialist minority was closer to its popular roots, which reached back only as far as the generation of their parents (in Péguy's or Mathiez's case, for example) or, at most, of their grandparents.[58] In socialism, these young men found a way to affirm their loyalty to their families despite their change in status. Their avant-garde intellectual choices, oriented towards the social sciences or moral action, a twofold dimension made possible by their socialist engagement, were a complementary way of maintaining this tie with their origins while also aspiring to academic excellence, in line with the programme sketched by Herr and Andler. This political culture, deviant with respect to that of the other *normaliens*, nonetheless derived from an ideological tradition of the classic left: the socialist *normaliens* came from rather advanced republican milieus that had been de-Christianized or else often belonged to religious minorities (Protestant or Jewish). These specific traits were also signs of an imperfect integration into the academic milieu, either as a result

of their habitus or because these *normaliens*, as a conclusion of unpleasant experiences in their school years, had become aware of the school system's limits and defects. The intense socialist camaraderie and/or the intellectual engagement in collective undertakings such as the Durkheimian school made up for this moral or social uprooting. Such were the common traits to be found, to one extent or another, in the socialist *normaliens* of the classes immediately preceding the affair, among them C. Bahon, François Simiand (1893), E. Burnet, Félicien Challaye, A. Lévy, R. Litalien, Albert Mathiez, Charles Péguy, M. Roques, Georges Weulersse (1894), and Hubert Bourgin (1895).

The dissident minorities that materialized amid the youth in the Ecoles and at the very heart of the university should not be considered only with an eye to the role they would later play in the Dreyfus Affair. In and of themselves – their contemporaries made no mistake here – they constituted a sign of the crisis of legitimacy of the elites in power. This crisis paved the way for the political legitimation of the *intellectuel*.

CONCLUSION

As we have just seen, the two decades preceding the litigation that sparked the Dreyfus Affair (1874–94) saw one complete cycle in the ideological debates about the mode of legitimizing the leading social classes and the intellectuals' social function. In two periods, separated by an interval of twenty years, we find the same tactics of protest or defence; simply, the individuals holding the different positions changed. Yet this seeming return to the starting point should not be allowed to obscure the new fact that was decisive for the emergence of the 'party of the *intellectuels*'. The intellectuals evoked in the present chapter, whether they expressed solidarity with the elite in power or, like those won over to socialism, opposed it, increasingly spoke out in their own names, so deeply had the social image of the republicans in government deteriorated. Whether they defended the exclusive elite or continued to cultivate the idea of a non-exclusive democratic elite based on merit, they had, in both camps, the same elitist conception of their function: in one case, they took it upon themselves to assign the government its goal of maintaining the social order in the face of political assaults from the extremes, while, in the other, they led an assault on the established government as the autonomous avant-garde of a social

movement still in the process of defining itself. The theses that openly clashed during the Dreyfus Affair or the turn-of-the-century debates on reforming secondary-school education were worked out in this fashion. An essential link had, however, to be forged before these theses could be taken up by more than just the individual personalities or minorities discussed in the present chapter – in a word, before they could become battle lines cutting through first the intellectual and then the political field: the link represented by the interventions of intellectuals with access to the press. Part II proposes to analyse this progressive mobilization of the literary avant-gardes, followed by the bulk of the intellectuals (academic intellectuals or those with ties to the media).

Part II

Intellectuels and the Field of Power

3

The Emergence of the 'Party of the Intellectuals'

> As for your question, as to whether I think politics should be conducted by thinking men and philosophers: Yes, that is what I would like. And I observe that such men are rare in Parliament. . . . But I have too keen a sense of proportion to imagine for even a moment that my presence in the Palais Bourbon* might diminish the calamitous inferiority of the parliamentary world.
>
> Maurice Barrès, interview with Jules Huret, *Le Figaro*, 31 July 1893

> If the powerful, the kings, the emperors, the lords of the earth, do not agree, the free spirits, the intellectuals, those whose mission it is to judge and speak may perhaps come to an understanding. It has been said that the press is queen of the world. It is, in any case, intelligence and power and, doubtless, where there is a will, there is a way.
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> Emile Zola, address at the London Journalists' Institute, *Le Figaro*, 22 September 1893

Over the two decades preceding the Dreyfus Affair (more precisely, from 1877–9, when the republicans secured a firm grip on government, to 1897–8), relations between intellectuals and the state or politics were radically modified. Writers and academics abandoned official or ideological modes of intervention and turned to new ways of expressing their convictions. Rather than running for elective office or undertaking public opinion campaigns, the older generations' classic forms of engagement, growing numbers

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* The seat of the French National Assembly.

of them, especially among the younger generations, preferred punctual interventions that were precipitated by an event or came in response to surveys initiated by their peers. An avant-garde gradually replaced parliamentarianism and journalism aimed at the general public with a specific type of intellectual activity that sought to maintain its autonomy while contesting the legitimacy of official debate. This transformation was bound up, in part, with external changes in the political field and society as a whole.

In politics, with the emergence, on both right and left, of new forces that challenged the equilibrium struck at the moment of the republicans' victory, public debate shifted from constitutional or religious problems (the anticlerical struggle) to social questions. Our analysis of representations of the 'elite' has already brought out these new issues. They were accompanied by a gradual weakening of parliamentarianism, the most conspicuous manifestations of which from the late 1880s on were, as contemporaries saw it, scandals and increasing ministerial instability. The *intellectuels* evoked this new situation in support of their theses. Finally, in the background, longer-term social developments were on the horizon: the rise of social movements in the context of a depressed economy, a rejection of political democracy by certain political movements (an upsurge of nationalism and anti-Semitism), and the nepotism and favouritism practised by the governmental elites. This contributed to discrediting them in the eyes of the younger generation, which had experienced only the new regime's negative aspects without having profited from the initial reforms.

The *intellectuels* were not, however, mere passive spectators of these global transformations. In light of the newly emergent representations of the 'intellectual' or the 'elite', the various groups or dominant personalities in the intellectual field tried to change the rules of the game by devising new means of intervention, seeking out new audiences, and helping to elaborate or spread new ideologies that called classic political cleavages into question. Hence it would be simplistic to talk about 'politicization' of the intellectual field, as one can with respect to the 1930s. There were doubtless more and greater overlaps between the intellectual and political fields in the late 1890s than in the late 1880s. The *intellectuels* had begun to take a hand in politics and the politicians had borrowed new ideological weapons from them, but, most importantly, intellectual debates – that is, debates between *intellectuels* – had acquired a general political dimension, for the question of the *intellectuels* (who they were, what purpose they served, what they wanted or could accomplish) had become central to the dominant political

debate. Indeed, there was an essential link between the questioning of present and future society and the place that the *intellectuels* were supposed to, or claimed they should, play in it. Just as the dimensions of political debate changed once it came to include the social question, so the question of the *intellectuels* became political once the *intellectuels* swept to the centre of social debate. The rapprochement between literary and political avant-gardes typical of the 1890s was not, however, a matter of course; it was perhaps even less predictable than the emergence of committed intellectuals at the heart of academia discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas academics could see the political dimension of their social role because of their ties to the state, the independent intellectuals, for their part – above all those who opted for avant-garde positions – tried to steer clear of all involvement in political problems, since political activity entailed relations with the press, synonymous, for them, with vulgarity and economic dependence. The division between official ideologues and academics critical of the Republic is attributable to their opposed conceptions of the 'elite' and the autonomy of intellectuals. The gradual political radicalization of the literary avant-garde, for its part, stemmed from the effects of the crisis of the literary field. The younger generation, precisely because it was confined to a marginal circuit of communication, sought other collective means of expression, without, however, lapsing into dependence on the big newspapers.

THE LITERARY AVANT-GARDE AND THE POLITICAL AVANT-GARDE

Two circumstances characterized the situation of the literary field in the mid-1880s: on the one hand, the proliferation of poetic avant-garde groups that vigorously contested academic literature and naturalism and, on the other, these groups' rejection of political engagement in the name of art for art's sake. In itself, there was nothing original about this attitude, since it marked a return to the positions of the dominant writers of the Second Empire. It was not, however, justified on the same grounds, given the change in regime. Hostility to politics – that is to say, in reality, to the parliamentary system and its political personnel – was very extensive in the literary world, going far beyond the narrow circles of the avant-garde.[1] This disdain had its source in a structural factor. The political and literary fields found themselves in competition by virtue of their

function and position in the social space. Writers, like politicians, needed newspapers and reviews in order to become known or spread their ideas. At the same time, the democratic system does not favour personal patronage of the arts or the sponsorship system on which authors working in the least remunerative genres traditionally depended under the monarchy and the Empire. The new personnel, descended of a bourgeoisie more recent in its origins and traditional in its tastes, took an ever greater distance from the avant-garde's growing audacity. Finally, the reshuffling of the people in key posts redounded primarily to the benefit of the militant journalists who had helped bring the republicans to power. These parvenus' literary preferences were likewise poles apart from those of the new generation.

Anatole Baju's 'Decadent' manifesto, which appeared in the first issue of the journal, was highly representative of this marginal literary movement and offers some idea of how intense this across-the-board rejection of politics was:

> Political decadence leaves us completely cold. Moreover, it proceeds at its own pace, led by the symptomatic sect of politicians that was bound to appear in these diminished times. We abstain from all politics as something that is perfectly baneful and abjectly contemptible. Art belongs to no party; it is the one rallying point for the whole gamut of opinion.[2]

The marginal status that the avant-garde claimed implied a rejection of any activity aimed at a broad audience: journalism, the adoption of political positions, the language of the common man, and everything that characterized the then dominant school of naturalism. Jules Huret's 1891 *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire* brought out, by way of some of the respondents' answers to his questions, this central opposition to, and persistent rejection of, politics or political engagement on the part of the young literary generation. Nevertheless, certain advance signs of a certain politicization are perceptible in this *Enquête*.

The decline of art for art's sake according to Jules Huret's Enquête

Sixty-four writers were interviewed in Huret's opinion survey, but only fifty-nine entered into the spirit of the journalist's questions. Twenty-nine of the interviews contain direct or indirect allusions to politics; that is at once very few and a great many. When we take a close look at the distribution of this index of interest in public affairs, we discover that such interest was restricted almost entirely

to already established men of letters or those who did not directly belong to the avant-garde. The young writers who, for once, had a chance to leave the ghetto of the little reviews complacently turned it to advantage to air their theories or vaunt the merits of their companions-in-arms in the literary struggle. In contrast, the well-known authors, put in the dock by the young writers or shocked by some of their innovations, made rather ample use of procedures borrowed from political polemic to discredit their juniors. Thus Zola compared the Symbolists to Jules Guesde, who liked to announce the imminent outbreak of the Revolution, although no one ever saw anything resembling one: 'Everything in their system is reaction . . . . What social movement does Symbolism reflect, with its two-bit obscurity? Quite the contrary, they have everything against them: progress, because they claim to be retreating; the bourgeoisie and democracy, because they are obscure.'[3]

In contrast, the representatives of the oldest literary generation, the Parnassians, although they shared certain values with the Symbolists, saw in them a sign of the decadence and anarchy of the times. Hérédia went so far as to depict them as a kind of resurgent Internationale because of the presence of large numbers of foreigners in this literary school: 'They take their slogans from Brussels, Liège, and Geneva.'[4] The literary avant-garde was thus metaphorically identified with an extremist movement in politics or a foreign invasion. The attacks focused on the Belgians and on Moréas, of Greek origin.

Rejected as reactionaries by the naturalists and an alien body or fomenters of anarchism by the Parnassians, the Symbolists defended themselves poorly, or hardly at all, against this onslaught of a political type. Verlaine declared that he was a 'chauvinist' and tried to set himself apart from his young successors by associating himself with the reigning xenophobia while also cynically revealing his literary strategy: '"Decadent" ultimately means nothing at all. It was rather, as I've already told you, a battle-cry and a flag with nothing behind it. Do you need slogans to fight? The three stripes with the black eagle on them is enough, and then you fight!'[5]

Mallarmé, for his part, fully assumed his role as the head of a school and justified the new tendencies with a social diagnosis of the poets' situation: 'The poet's attitude in a period such as this one, in which he is on strike against society, is to sweep aside all the debased means offered to him.'[6]

This was a very clever position to take: it reconciled the radical image of the 'strike', borrowed from the events of the day (1890 was the first year in which May Day mobilized appreciable numbers),

with a refusal to make any compromise with the times: literature remained the supreme value ('the world has been created to culminate in a beautiful book!'). The two leaders' young followers, less sure of their literary position, broke down into three tendencies in the face of dominant writers' assaults. Most confined themselves to literary polemics, defining themselves in terms of aesthetic differences. A second group echoed Mallarmé's rejection of the baseness of the literature in fashion, of which naturalism was, they said, the quintessence; they happily assumed their position as the reaction while, like Verlaine, simultaneously affirming their patriotism in response to xenophobic denigration by recognized writers.[7] In contrast, the last group, a minority, carried anti-conformist logic into the political realm and expressed social aspirations similar to those of the far left.

Among the advocates of art for the sake of an idealist art with an explicitly reactionary political slant were 'Sar' Peladan, the most prophetic,[8] Albert Aurier, Rémy de Gourmont, Charles Vignier (who was overtly anti-Republican) and, finally, Maeterlinck, who debated social art with a socialist leader in order to take his distance from it. In contrast, Saint-Pol-Roux, René Ghil, and the former symbolist and ex-Boulangist Paul Adam roundly endorsed social art.[9] Thus this survey, while providing only a partial reflection of the avant-garde's political tendencies, attested, five years after the appearance of the Decadent and symbolist manifestos, that apoliticism, both in the newest literature and in that by older authors, had gone down to defeat. Political tags were used in literary struggles as a means of classifying adversaries, and the various groups themselves began mining the new political ideologies for themes with a view to setting themselves apart or discovering new sources of aesthetic inspiration.

These new political tendencies in the literary field were best expressed by writers of the middle generations. Unencumbered, like their juniors, by purely literary quarrels, they worked in the commercial sector, the one that had the most to do with the press and daily events, where competition was at its most acute. They were not, however, sufficiently well established to make trenchant judgements in the way that older writers with clearly established positions did; hence they advanced the most carefully shaded and the most realistic theses. Realism, in every sense, was the indispensable virtue for becoming fashionable and gaining favour with the middle-brow public. Thus the elder J. H. Rosny, who, with his pretensions as a theorist, posed as Zola's rival and possible successor, spontaneously compared the literary field of the day with the political patchwork:

> For quite a few years now, men of letters have tended to constitute themselves as a political force. There are literary groups and subgroups, literary lefts, rights and centres. In the end, in order to become a real force, they feel the need to agree on at least one point and, one fine day, reach an agreement, enshrining this aphorism: 'Moréas remains the regime that divides us the least.' Then they congratulate themselves on having found their Carnot.[10]

The irony of this remark notwithstanding (note the identification of Jean Moréas, the head of a literary school, with the foundation of the Republic or the election of Sadi Carnot as president), this political vision of the literary field had a major consequence for the opposing strategies of distinction: it made possible alliances or predictions about the future. It also explained why the traditional position of art for art's sake was gradually being abandoned by its partisans: increasingly, it locked them in a ghetto. Even if political labels were adopted only by analogy and did not necessarily imply a precise creed, they were becoming eminently useful in an increasingly cluttered literary field. Thus certain adepts of art for art's sake would rally to this political vision in the following years, striking down the path charted by middle-sector writers.

The latter made two diagnoses of the new tendencies. Retrospectively, they may seem contradictory; at the time, it was easier to reconcile them. Thus four of the writers surveyed allude to Boulangism and identify the avant-garde as a movement of the same stripe, while five others mention socialism. The former position was defended by Maurice Barrès, a Boulangist member of parliament and thus the most politicized of the respondents, as well as Joseph Caraguel, Edmond Haraucourt and Jean Ajalbert. Octave Mirbeau, the most committed and the most prophetic, Gustave Geffroy, Paul Bonnetain, Jean Jullien and, again, Ajalbert came out in favour of the socialist thesis. In a humoristic vein, taking up a suggestion of Huret's, Barrès developed an analogy between the struggle among the literary generations and the campaign for judicial revision. Haraucourt elaborated the same analogy more seriously, striking a hostile tone: 'There is no symbolist school. There is a party of malcontents and people in a rush. That is literary Boulangism! One has to eat.'

Ajalbert went one better: 'It's the Boulangist breach! The catapult! Today, however, they are no longer Boulangists; they are royalists, imperialists . . . they are no longer Symbolists.' Caraguel went still further: 'If, however, the buffoons started to matter, it would become necessary, however revolting certain struggles may be, to

combat this Boulangism, just as it became necessary to combat the other kind.'[11]

Ascribing literary Boulangism to the avant-garde was a polemical procedure, not an analysis based on facts, like the recognized writers' ascription of reactionary or anarchist positions to the avant-garde. The only overtly Boulangist literati who might, at the time, have passed for symbolist 'fellow travellers' were Paul Adam and Maurice Barrès. If their biographies show that they were trying to use Boulangism to catapult themselves to fame, their responses to the *Enquête* clearly dissociate their political and literary commitments. What is more, the movement's failure, already consummated by 1891, hardly made it an attractive future investment for literary strategies.[12]

The situation of socialism, in contrast, appears to have been entirely different. One writer out of ten assigned it a literary, if not a political, future. Here too, however, the term was taken in the vaguest, most ideological, and least political sense. It encompassed anarchism as well as socialism in the strict sense, a sense of justice as well as the poetry of the poor and working-class quarters, revolt as well as a science of society.[13] This blur of ill-defined periods favoured the emergence of fashions or of alliances between political and literary avant-gardes, thanks to misunderstandings of unspecified concepts. But the avant-garde as a whole was still very reticent: only Saint-Pol-Roux and René Ghil explicitly rallied to a vaguely socialist aesthetic. Ghil, for example, wrote: 'The objective is no longer art for art's sake, but altruistic art with a humanitarian objective for moral and intellectual Improvement.'[14]

Other contemporary signs in this *Enquête* show that, as suggested by the intuitions of the authors cited, this vaguely socialist tendency was becoming increasingly influential in the literary field. Thus the 1 May 1891 issue of the review *La Plume* was devoted to 'socialist literature'. Listed side by side in the table of contents were socialist or anarchist theorists or leaders (Jules Guesde, Louise Michel, Jean Allemane, Charles Malato) and literary men with, in some cases, ties to the avant-garde: Octave Mirbeau, Léon Cladel, P.-N. Roinard, Edmond Legentil, and G. de la Salle. Still more important, however, was the emergence, early in the 1890s, of reviews which, unlike the little reviews of the previous decade, devoted more and more space to political and ideological debate while also claiming to belong, on the aesthetic level, to the avant-garde. Involved here were *Revue blanche*, *Entretiens politiques et littéraires* and the more ephemeral *Art social*, which appeared from November 1891 to February 1894.

Political debate within the literary avant-garde

These new reviews had two original features. They offered a forum to everything that was 'advanced' in every field (art, literature, philosophy, politics), thus staking a claim to being complete reviews, like the leading big reviews. They presented themselves as forums in which the new cultural tendencies were expressed, because the established reviews gave youth the cold shoulder or lagged behind intellectual developments. Thus everything that had been excluded from previous reviews for a select audience met in their pages: prose writers and poets, critics and creators, the young and the less young, literature and politics. Even *Mercure de France*, the most reserved, politically speaking, took a rather similar path. These reviews, in which the neologism *intellectuel* began to come into circulation, together with the corresponding representation of society, advocated collective movements as opposed to individualism, commitment as opposed to art for art's sake, and autonomy as opposed to dependence. Thus we find an exact parallel between the themes and the practical function of these periodicals of a new type: they allied the various dominated minorities which brought to bear on the intellectual field the tactics ordinarily employed in the political field whenever a new movement sought to increase its audience. Political theses stood in for an impossible agreement over aesthetics. This conversion of the avant-garde was, however, gradual and uneven, depending on the different writers' positions. It occurred earlier in the case of secondary figures, prose writers, critics or the youngest; they discovered in it a means of distinguishing themselves from the more timorous writers who were slightly older.[15] But, above all, the ideology that attracted the most adepts was anarchism, since it was based on individualism and revolt, two central values for non-conformist literature. Disparities nevertheless subsisted between militant professions of faith and others, of an equally anarchistic tendency, which kept their distance from 'social art' or 'the people'. In the 1 February 1893 issue of *La Plume*, for example, in an article entitled 'L'Art et l'anarchie', Adolphe Retté offered a diagnosis of the new literature:

> A singular penchant currently has free rein in literature, a penchant for socialism and anarchism – particularly anarchism . . . . Our literary anarchists know as well as we do that today's bourgeois hates artists with a hatred that is no less fundamental because it often cloaks itself in the garb of an ironic benevolence . . . . If no poet has ever been preoccupied with the Bourgeoisie's social

> interests, how many will have to take greater care not to engage themselves as poets serving the people . . . . The poet's duty is to affirm the aristocracy of the Idea, the only legitimate aristocracy, for artists are artists.[16]

This reaffirmation of the themes of art for art's sake in the midst of the anarchist vogue is the more paradoxical in that its author was known to be a rather militant anarchist himself; indeed, he was subsequently arrested. However, he based his political choices on his revolt as a poet hostile to bourgeois society without betraying his art by bending it to the service of the anarchist cause: that would simply have been to trade one form of dependence for another. In response, Barrès, in the next issue (15 March), rejected this dissociation of art for art's sake from social art.[17] As for Francis Viellé-Griffin, a by no means staunchly militant writer who was protected from social hardship by his privileged situation as a rentier, he worked out a compromise position that prefigured Dreyfusard ideology. He criticized art for art's sake in the following terms:

> The artist, simply by virtue of the fact that he professes the cult of Beauty, proclaims Justice and Truth . . . . To be sure, artists, your duty is to persist in your being, to shield it from the contingencies that would diminish it, to elevate it towards the Absolute; in so doing, you duly glorify the humanity of which you represent an elite and serve it in equal measure. However, strivers, be aware of all the nobility of your effort; draw, from the vast solidarity of suffering in which you are enveloped, the power to suffer better and more profoundly in order to attain the extreme anguish known as exalted joy – and bequeath to remote futures yet another affirmation, an affirmation of the latent Divinity, a reflection of his Beauty, a work of art.[18]

Finally, Bernard Lazare, in the 25 May 1893 issue of the same review, *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, took the new logic to its height. Poets and *intellectuels* generally had to assign themselves a social and political function and be the teachers of a new Truth – although he urged this commitment on them in the pseudo-mystic terms of symbolist jargon:

> The writer, the artist truly worthy of that name, must not abuse himself for his own individual satisfaction; he has to be a teacher, like the mystagogue of an earlier day, like the hierophant. He must teach us moral, religious, social, metaphysical or scientific truths,

> it little matters which; but he must teach us in lofty fashion, not the way pedagogues do.[19]

Thus, scarcely two years after Huret's *Enquête*, the debate within the avant-garde on the writer's political function had swung back to the centre of aesthetic discussion, reaching back before art for art's sake to re-establish a continuity with the debates that had divided the Romantics. We have already examined the reasons purely internal to the literary field for this rapprochement between the literary and political avant-gardes. We now need to identify their sources outside the literary field before going on to depict the practical consequences that this new state of affairs had on writers' political behaviour.

The causes of political radicalization

The political radicalization discussed above is usually ascribed to the contemporary influence of the growing anarchist and socialist vogue in the country. On this view, it was a question, as certain journalists of the day had already suggested, of a mere fashion, comparable to other bizarre poses that the avant-garde ostentatiously struck in order to set itself apart or provoke the bourgeois.[20] For literary history, in contrast, which takes its cue from the discourse of the writers themselves, it was a way of drawing closer to the people or expressing the generosity of a Beautiful Soul (see the quotation above from the article by Viellé-Griffin). Both of these approaches are partly on the mark with respect to the fringe of writers with the most superficial engagements or those who later adopted a new political orientation, even if they were sometimes the ones with the deepest public engagements (Barrès, for example). However, such interpretations neglect the most important facet of this phenomenon, the focus of the present chapter: the enduring nature of these new avant-garde attitudes, beyond political labels or the ephemeral groups of a period, as well as their collective aspect, which itself marks a decisive turning point and presages the Dreyfus Affair. These two unprecedented features invite us to look for reasons deeper than a passing fad or a revolutionary ideology's seductive powers.

Two factors are crucial: first, the crisis and restructuring of the literary field and, second, the transition from a 'cold war' between the government and men of letters to a 'hot war'. The crisis of the literary field especially affected the writers the most attracted by the far left – that is, the avant-garde, young writers or those who rejected the dominant rules of the game. Like all crises, this one, too, froze existing hierarchies, foiled the strategies of the most dominated for

the conquest of symbolic capital, fostered pessimism, encouraged an attitude of every man for himself, and threw the differences between the most and the least socially advantaged into relief. Art for art's sake, an ideology of rentiers or writers who worked for eternity, was proving increasingly less suitable for the increasingly greater numbers of those pursuing traditional strategies, without the means or will to adopt the new ones. The discordance between these new writers' natural dispositions, the literary ideology they defended, and the real possibilities for fulfilling the programme set by it confined them permanently to the avant-garde, which was becoming, by itself, an increasingly autonomous sector of the literary field, with its own hierarchy, distinct organs of distribution and hand-to-mouth methods of survival (menial jobs, menial public sector employment and various expedients). In Huret's *Enquête*, Emile Bergerat sketches a scarcely overdrawn description of the avant-garde's situation:

> In these days of democracy, the telegraph and socialism, I do not believe that they will ever succeed in triumphing for good and all, unless they want no more than to react against two-bit pedagogy and the prose of Messieurs Ohnet, Delpit, Richebourg and Co. They will stagnate at the level of coteries, of sects. They will be mandarins gathered in the home of a rich friend who 'provides illumination'. In his four walls, they will congratulate one another and exchange quaint works written in a complicated style and published in print runs of ten.[21]

This ironic point of view of a writer who had arrived in fact jibes with certain analyses of the avant-garde's situation advanced by the new reviews, which tended to take avant-garde literature for literature as such. Lucien Muhlfeld, for example, in his literary chronicle in the January 1892 *Revue blanche*, opposed the 'publishers' crash', which affected mass-market writers, to the crisis of 'literature': 'In the past (excepting, doubtless, the fabricators of fakes, who always prosper), works by literary artists were read; and the books read were written. In future, written works of art will cease to reach the mass of readers altogether, and the books read by the multitude will not be written.'[22] The critic advocated this split between mass-market writing and a mandarins' literature for the literate, even as he rejected art for art's sake: 'With the means we have, and to the extent that our feeble authority allows, we write to assure similar, unknown intelligences, intimidated by formidable ambiances, of our affinities.'[23]

So conceived, literature for intellectuals erected itself as a countervailing power to the surrounding literary society. Thus anarchism

alone, which rejected all authority and called for the autonomy of all minorities from the corresponding majorities, was theoretically and structurally tailored to fit writers who wished to establish political and social identities and to justify themselves politically and socially.[24]

More concrete factors accelerated this ideological convergence. Certain anarchist groups and certain literary coteries, occasionally brought closer by similarly marginal lifestyles and the fact that they frequented the same places or the same quarters of the city, eventually came round to exchanging services: joint meetings, book reviews, prefaces, permission to reprint works in militant publications, contributions by theorists to new literary reviews, and so on. This encounter would not, however, have occurred as rapidly as it did if the government had not indirectly helped prove to writers over the previous years, with its policy of increasingly stiff repression of literary audacity, that literature was not immune to political influence and that not everything was possible even under the liberal Republic. Thus writers' scorn for the parliamentary system and the regime's corruption modulated into hatred for, and revolt against, a state that curbed freedom of expression, restricted the autonomy of men of letters, and prevented some from earning a living by banning their works. The series of trials or literary bans that began as early as the mid-1880s made them aware that no one was exempt from censorship: naturalist novelists, young writers or their better established colleagues, playwrights – the primary targets, since advance censorship still existed in the theatre – but also members of the avant-garde, who were subject to certain professional bans during the wave of repression that followed the anarchist assassinations. The stake of the main scandals shifted from the moral sphere – thus Louis Desprez and Henry Fèvre's novel *Autour d'un clocher* and Paul Bonnetain's *Charlot s'amuse* were dragged into court on charges of pornography[25] – to political issues properly speaking, with a series of anti-militaristic novels such as Abel Hermant's *Le Cavalier Miserey* or Lucien Descaves' *Sous-offs*, as well as plays evoking social struggles (the drama based on Zola's *Germinal* was censured), establishment political personnel (Barrès's *Une journée parlementaire* and Jules Lemaître's *Le Député Leveau*) or the French Revolution (the scandal surrounding Victorien Sardou's *Thermidor*).[26]

The regularity of these successive trials or scandals, culminating in bans or threatened bans; the authors' fame, which usually antedated their prosecution or was gained thanks to the scandals accompanying it; and the increasingly dubious motivations for them

explain the shift from individual protest (in the form of newspaper articles or actions undertaken by prosecuted writers' colleagues) to extended collective mobilizations. The writers thus sought to erect themselves as a countervailing power that denied the government's right to restrict their freedom of expression.

The earliest and most important of these collective protests that broke with traditional literary individualism was provoked by threats against Descaves' novel *Sous-offs*. It appeared in *Le Figaro* on 24 December 1889 over the signature of fifty-three writers:

> At the request of the Minister of War, legal proceedings have been initiated against a book on the eve of a legislative debate on the freedom to write. We join our voices in protest.
>
> In the past twenty years, we have become used to freedom. We have won our liberties. In the name of the writer's independence, we rise up vigorously against all forms of prosecution that would curb free expression of written thought. United in solidarity whenever art is under attack, we entreat the government to reflect.
>
> Alphonse Daudet, Georges Ohnet, Emile Zola, Edmond de Goncourt, Jean Richepin, Henry Becque, Alexis Bouvier, Paul Bourget, Paul Bonnetain, Léon Cladel, Théodore de Banville, G. de Porto Riche, Rodolphe Darzens, Oscar Méténier, Emile Michelet, Henry Céard, Louis Mullem, Emile Bergerat, René Ghil, Ernest Daudet, Jean Ajalbert, J. H. Rosny, Abel Hermant, Gustave Guiches, Georges Bois, Jean Lorrain, M. Buloz, Jacques Madeleine, Gustave Geffroy, Louis de Grammont, Jean Jullien, Gaston Salandri, Henry Lapauze, François de Nion, G. Courteline, Roger H. Milès, Boyer d'Agen, Sutter Laumann, Edmond Bazire, Frantz Jourdain, Paul Alexis, Jean Rameau, Georges Duval, Georges Ancey, Paul Margueritte, Clovis Hugues, Séverine, Maurice Barrès, Henry Bauër, Adolphe Tabarant, Eugène Morel, Robert Bernier, Henry Fèvre.

On three points, this protest broke with the tradition governing relations between men of letters and the government. The text invoked a principle, 'the writer's independence', was based on an irreversible state of affairs ('we have become used to freedom') and employed, in the guise of the professional petition, the lobbying tactic specific to parliamentary regimes. By thus putting the substantive question aside – is the book anti-militaristic or not? – the authors refused to follow the enemy onto his terrain. The manifesto took up an exalted position and played on the symbolic power of the generally well-known names, listed in no clearly identifiable order unless it was that of relative fame or the order in which the

progressive mobilization had unfolded. Almost every generation had been solicited. Most signatories were under forty (born in 1850 or thereafter), like Descaves himself, born in 1861. But the grand old men flew to his rescue as well, among them Banville (born in 1823) or Edmond de Goncourt (1822); so did the big brothers, such as Zola and Daudet (both born in 1840), Jean Richepin (1849) and Bourget, three years Richepin's junior. Younger writers also made themselves heard, such as Barrès and Ajalbert (both born in 1862).

The same deliberate diversity could be seen in the range of political opinion, represented from the most reactionary, such as Goncourt, to the most advanced, such as Séverine, a friend of Jules Vallès, Henry Bauër, a former Communard, or Clovis Hugues, a socialist member of parliament. Novelists dominated the list, but representatives of other genres also showed their solidarity, such as the playwrights Porto Riche and Henry Becque, the poets Richepin, René Ghil and Banville, and the critics or journalists Gustave Geffroy, Séverine and Sutter Laumann. The majority belonged to the naturalist and realist currents, which had acted as the mobilizing group, since the writer in question was one of their member; almost all of these naturalists and realists signed (Daudet, Goncourt, Zola, Bonnetain, Céard, Rosny, Alexis, Margueritte, Fèvre). Four significant absences are, however, worth noting. Three are easy to explain: J. K. Huysmans, a civil servant working in the Interior Ministry who had taken his distance from the Médaniens after publishing *A rebours* (1885), and Léon Hennique and Maupassant, both of whom were opposed to taking public or political positions of any kind. The last absence, that of Mirbeau, is harder to understand, since all of his ideas were in the spirit of the manifesto's.[27] The sector enjoying the greatest public success is the best represented, whereas the academic pole, associated with the government and hostile to naturalism, is completely absent, Banville excepted. The avant-garde, which defined itself by its opposition to commercial literature, also held back, as appears when the list of signatories is compared with the index of names cited in Huret's *Enquête*. This uneven distribution of names reflects the stakes of the debate. The most mobilized were those who had been in the main line of fire during earlier scandals and were also the best integrated into the literary market; they rejected state guidance on liberal grounds. This first mobilization was, then, incomplete. With this petition, men of letters affirmed a collective right to monitor the way the freedom to publish was exercised, but they did so in the name of a corporatist, apolitical conception of their profession, although the substantive issue, whether or not the army could be criticized, had an obvious political dimension. The

success of this position is explained largely by this bracketing out of politics narrowly conceived. As in Huret's *Enquête*, which this manifesto preceded by one year, the politicization of the literary field appears on the horizon: it, too, began with the middle sector, attacked head on by the government, but it also paved the way for the politicization of the avant-garde, a few of whose representatives figure on the list. What is more, anti-state positions, increasingly frequent in the newer literature, could only provide a choice target for the government, whose alarm was growing with the rise of opposition from the far left. Increasingly, it was abandoning 1880s liberalism the better to defend the established order.

Other episodes, less well known and affecting only minor or marginal writers, also helped the avant-garde realize that its audacity, which was spilling over from the aesthetic to the political realm in the broad sense, frontally exposed it, too, to repressive measures. The best-known such episode is the dismissal of Rémy de Gourmont, a well-known symbolist, from his post at the Bibliothèque nationale because of his article 'Le joujou patriotisme',* published in *Mercure de France* in 1891.[28] Once again, the anti-militarism of young university graduates occasioned a confrontation with the state.

At the end of this twofold process of increasing rigidity on the part of the government and radicalization on the part of the avant-garde sympathetic to anarchism, a certain parallelism, *mutatis mutandis*, with the political development of young people in the universities comes into view. In the avant-garde's case, there was a shift from art for art's sake to a political engagement that assigned a new dimension to literary activity; in the students' case, there was a shift from apoliticism or republican legitimism to a demand for social engagement. Within the avant-garde, Bernard Lazare played the theorist's role that, among academics, had fallen to Herr. Even before the wave of assassinations, Paul Adam explained the convergence of revolts by *intellectuels* and anarchists this way: 'What anarchism wishes to prove by violent means is that the intelligent, daring minority is becoming a force against the stupid, ferocious majority.'[29]

An active minority of the literary field ('an intelligent, daring minority'), excluded from literary as from all other forms of power, the avant-garde yet hoped, like the anarchists, to change the world, for it believed that it represented the ideas of the future. This proto-Dreyfusism became an already accomplished Dreyfusism in Bernard Lazare. Witness the article he published in *La Révolte* after

* 'The child's toy of patriotism'.

the assassinations and the initiation of the vote on the *lois scélérates*,* a reply to those who blamed the *intellectuels* for the anarchist crisis. Bernard Lazare rejected, to begin with, the charge that the writers' anarchism was an anarchism of dilettantes and, in his turn, impugned his detractors' motives: they were authors who had arrived and then made politics their bread and butter:

> The majority of our accusers, who are nearing the ends of handsome careers or only just entering the lists with the ambition of aping their elders, have always made a living off their opinions or, indeed, have cultivated opinions for the sole purpose of making a living off them. They have set their market value and going price, since the only ideas they have ever had are about returns, and they find it hard to conceive that others can be disinterested or have convictions.[30]

After thus parrying his accusers' attack, Bernard Lazare described the *intellectuels*' new function, which he associated with the Enlightenment tradition:

> Taking action does not just mean taking physical action: using a rifle, a dagger or dynamite. There is also something called intellectual action, and our adversaries are so well aware of this that they accuse us of bringing it to bear on those around us. The charge of inactivity is, therefore, baseless; at most, we are being told that we understand action the way Rousseau, Diderot or the other Encyclopedists did, not in the manner of Orsini or Fieschi . . . . There is no gainsaying that, and I believe that we are, in this way, fulfilling our role as intellectuals – I am deliberately using that noun, which the mindless adepts of the chronicle fling at us as if it were an insult . . . . I, for my part, make bold to accept it without reservation (my responsibility), although that hardly matters, since it simply adds its infinitesimal weight to the burden of responsibility that poets, philosophers, novelists, playwrights, thinkers, and all independent writers of every day and age have always taken up. Since you condemn us, condemn our elders as well: condemn Rabelais, condemn Voltaire, condemn Heine, Hugo, Byron, Shelley, all rebels, all freethinkers. We will then be in company that is surely as good as yours: between you and them, we have long since made our choice.

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* It was on the basis of these laws, passed in 1894, that many anarchist intellectuals were imprisoned or put on trial.

Not only does Bernard Lazare here assign positive value to the pejorative neologism *intellectuel*, using it to designate the politicized intellectual avant-garde; he makes it the culmination of an emancipatory literary and philosophical current under way since the Renaissance, although the moderate and conservative press considers it no more than a manifestation of the degeneration of perverts contaminated by false ideas. Thus, four years before the affair, on the occasion of the anarchist assassinations, the basic line of argument of each of the two camps had already been set. Bernard Lazare's central role in both conjunctures highlights the continuity between the two debates. Yet one element in this new state of the relations between literary and political avant-gardes is still missing: the attempt to provide a collective expression of these engagements. Here too, it was the question of anarchism in 1893–4 that would serve as a testing ground, as we shall now see.

THE POLITICAL TEMPTATION: OPINION SURVEYS AND MANIFESTOS

Two new practices were generalized over the decade preceding the Dreyfus Affair, helping to mobilize writers and, more generally, *intellectuels*: opinion surveys and manifestos. Our analyses have already provided us with two examples, which we have so far considered only with regard to their informational content: the 1891 *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire* and the December 1889 protest defending Descaves. While opinion surveys and protests began appearing as early as the late 1880s, they did not acquire the true significance that they would have in the Dreyfus Affair until 1893–4, with the 'referendum' conducted by the review *L'Ermitage* and the protest for Grave, two publications that both had to do with the issue of the avant-garde writers' anarchism. To grasp the full, long-term import of these two episodes, it is useful to examine the changes that emerge when they are compared to the cases analysed above.

The 'Parliament of the Intellectuels'

These two modes of collective intervention have their origins in the expansion of two genres. One, the opinion survey, is connected with the flowering of modern journalism,[31] the other, the petition, with political democracy. However, in the hands of those who were

from now on known as 'the *intellectuels*', they underwent a twofold transformation. In an interview, a personality of note is presented with a whole set of questions about an event or an episode that lets him or her appear to advantage. A survey, for its part, is marked by a double impoverishment: one, two or three standardized questions inspired by current events are systematically addressed to a group with some trait in common: as a rule, it is directly confronted by the problem, has specialized knowledge of it or, again, in the case of official surveys, has some degree of decision-making power. If we pursue the comparison with the parliamentary model that probably inspired journalists to begin making unofficial surveys, it might be said that the individuals questioned are assigned the status of members of an extra-parliamentary commission, or even of a pressure group or specialized parliament – in short, of a political group broadly conceived.[32] The gradual publication of a survey would, as the individual responses were released, generate discussion in the sample group. The responses of the last respondents to answer were reactions less to the questions than to their predecessors' answers; they tried to avoid constantly repeating the same positions, an inevitable tendency in this journalistic genre. There were in fact fewer possible theses than respondents, who, in this way, sought to counter the massification and standardization (which was to culminate in the closed questionnaire of the anonymous sociological survey) imposed on them by an undertaking of this sort. They strove to regain the position of subjects, as in an interview, rather than behaving as objects manipulated by a third party or an institution.

Protests evolved in the opposite direction. The petition, the democratic tool *par excellence*, was recognized in the Constitution from the Revolution on; it was, after the vote, the second degree on the scale of political participation. The petitions of the Third Republic alone, for example, fill hundreds of boxes in a series housed in the National Archives.[33] Expressions of opinion, like the surveys, these petitions were at the opposite end of the scale of social legitimacy: they depended, generally speaking, on the effect of mass participation. The petitioners' names simply served as a means of authentication in view of the ever present possibility of forgery, while the point of mentioning each signatory's profession was simply to explain his or her stake in the question at issue, more often than not one of practical, corporatist or local import. The *intellectuels*, however, purged the petition of its original anonymity as this pivotal period wore on, thanks to a whole symbolic environment. The humble official request or the register of grievances of an earlier

epoch gave way to complaints addressed to the authorities by their equals that summoned them to respond; to appeals to people of quality; and, finally, during the Dreyfus Affair, to a list of founders of new parties, as will appear in the next chapter.[34] Thus the successful protest became something very much akin to an opinion survey, since the non-signatories in a given group sometimes felt an obligation to react individually in order to justify, at a minimum, their abstention or refusal to sign. Indirectly, this widened the petition's audience by putting it at the centre of a public debate. Ultimately, as a result of these two inverse processes – the banalization of surveys and the theatralization of protests – these two modes of collective expression converged in the course of their generalization throughout the intellectual field. The surveys tended to correspond to periods of ideological calm, when the aim was to stir up polemic.[35] The protests were more likely to materialize in periods of crisis, in reaction to precise, urgent events.

To return to the analogy with parliamentary procedure, we may say that the *intellectuels* thus had at their disposal two instruments of the representative system: on the one hand (surveys), the parliamentary commission of inquiry and, on the other (petitions), the right to address questions to members of the government or to initiate motions of no confidence. This analogy is no mere stylistic flourish: it reveals the underlying function of these two means of collective expression. In the age of the proliferation of intellectuals, the growth of the mass public and the professionalization of political life, men of letters here found a means of access, for themselves, their peers or the educated public, to autonomous political activity, at a time when they were not yet able to play the leading roles in official political life, as they still had in the Romantic period. The transformation of the content or signatures of the surveys or petitions was not just due to changes in the relations between the literary field and the field of government or to the new historical conjuncture. This change was in part inscribed in the function that these modes of public intervention initially fulfilled for *intellectuels*.

Surveys, which were not limited to already well-known literary names but gave young writers, too, a chance to make their views heard (as Huret's survey did), had one additional social dimension. With the more or less openly admitted connivance of journalists or respondents, they offered an occasion to gain relative fame by way of the circular citation of names or the tactic, adopted by some, of the general response. This hijacking of the survey for purposes of self-aggrandizement (blatant in certain caricatural responses to Huret)[36] had, however, positive side-effects. The writer or fledgling

author was forced to air general ideas and take an interest in the problems of the day (social, political or philosophical) if he wanted to be admitted to this new space of dialogue, in which literature was now just one element in the intellectual field. In sum, the survey simultaneously modified writers' relations to politics and authors' relations to their profession by positioning them as *intellectuels*, in the intellectualist sense of the word: as specialists of the general, comparable to politicians.

The 1893 'referendum'

This new logic allows us to understand the sense in which the survey conducted by *L'Ermitage*, which was published in July 1893 but had been carried out in March of that year, constituted a climax. The authors of this undertaking called it, significantly, 'An Artistic and Social Referendum'. They explained their project as follows:

> The plan to conduct this referendum grows out of the social preoccupations of the day. The three moving spirits behind it, with different opinions on all the points involved, thought it would be interesting to interrogate the main writers of their generation on the most general question, the choice between freedom and discipline.[37]

This plainly comes close to being a sort of opinion poll about a social problem. The abstract formulation of this introductory description, however, masks, as its authors admit, three much more topical issues: the question of anarchism and socialism; that of the debate, raging among young writers since 1891, on social engagement; and, finally, that as to whether the young literary generation had or had not been converted to extremism. *L'Ermitage*, facing competition from its left by *Revue blanche* and *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, both of which were dominated by these tendencies, and from its right by *Mercure de France*, less socially committed and more eclectic, could pose as a new unifying centre by providing a forum for one and all, without restriction. The promoters of the survey betray the labour of euphemization that went into the presentation of their project in their comments on the difficulties of their task:

> This project presented certain problems. The question was a delicate one to pose and did not seem clear to everyone. Since literary writers are concerned only secondarily with sociology, we wanted to avoid the word 'socialism' in the formula, a source of ambiguity, as well as the word *constraint*, which has too negative a

> connotation; that is why we used the more precise paraphrase *disciplined, methodical organization*. Some, however, associated discipline with the police or dwelt on method while ignoring constraint altogether. Others, in contrast, saw a contradiction in the phrase *free organization*, believing that organization could be only a cause, not an effect.[38]

Sorcerers' apprentices of a new type, the review's managing editors experienced, on their own witness, the difficulties faced by contemporary opinion pollsters. Concerned to adopt a vocabulary that was neither too technical nor too markedly political, so as not to elicit too many non-responses or dilatory responses, they fell into the opposite trap of generalities or confusions because of the ambiguities of social terminology, the ideological uncertainties of a period in which the social sciences were in their infancy, and also, to judge by the answers they received, the respondents' pedantic verbosity. The second transgression deliberately committed by this survey (addressed primarily to 'writers of the new generation – that is, those under thirty-five') had a predictable social effect that those who conducted it did not suspect. To confront individuals who had no recognition in the social or literary sphere with a problem ordinarily reserved for mature, responsible individuals with solid social positions was to risk being met with silence by the (rare) respondents who considered themselves either unworthy to answer or not concerned:[39] the ironical pirouette of the dilettante who did not take himself seriously, the abstruse discourse of the Sunday theorist or, more frequent here, the utopian penchant for prophecy of all the dominated who seized the rostrum offered them to air their social fantasies.

Adding to the confusion, the survey's organizers sought answers from foreign writers – nominal foreigners or elective Frenchmen, but also foreigners in the real sense – whom they contacted through the correspondents of foreign reviews; such respondents' reasoning reflected altogether different social and ideological contexts. As we have seen, in Huret's *Enquête*, established writers rather consistently attacked the avant-garde as a foreign or cosmopolitan movement. The demonstrative internationalism of this 'referendum' was a reply to such xenophobia and, in the face of the rise of nationalism, an affirmation of the existence of an international intellectual community. Transgressing frontiers also made it possible to rise above day-to-day politics, the primary aim of the undertaking.

These partially contradictory objectives were accompanied by regrets, as if those conducting the survey had wished to hold out

two possible readings of their project and its results. Ultimately, the question they asked had a double thrust; the answers were interpreted through a double grid; and the survey was carried out in two distinct phases. The result of these successive adjustments was a complex question that ran as follows: 'What offers the best condition for the Social Good: free, spontaneous organization, or disciplined, methodical organization? To which of these two conceptions should the artist give preference?'[40] The first question resembles a college application essay topic, although, as the review's managing editors conceived it, it was supposed to make it possible to judge whether young writers were more inclined to liberalism, anarchism, collectivist socialism or an authoritarian regime. The follow-up introduces a distinction between what is good for society and what is best for the artist, another way of establishing a distanced relationship to politics and society or of recasting a social and political question in intellectual terms.

The double grid was another innovation. It revealed the two possible ways of utilizing the 'referendum'. The series of answers, reproduced without comment or intervening questions (in contrast to Huret's method), resembles a sampler of professions of faith, an intellectual smorgasbord, in which each writer expounds his social and political programme as if he were bent on winning votes with a view to legislating the future. By way of this simulacrum, the survey realized the political potentialities implied by the principle informing it: to replace official political personnel with the younger literary generation, envisage society from the artist's standpoint, and symbolically reverse the avant-garde's dominated position. However, the survey's authors superimposed a second grid of objectivist, quantitative political interpretation by providing, after the individual responses, an overall count, a sort of post-electoral tally of the ballots that eliminates ambiguities in the responses by means of a list of closed positions, as in an authentic referendum. However, the political classifications were here reorganized on the basis of abstract values. Thus the 'intellectual parliament' so constructed is skewed with respect to the dominant divisions, making it possible to fulfil the perennial dream of intellectuals in politics: escaping ordinary categorizations. The upshot may be seen in table 3.1.

This avant-garde parliament, with its groups, sub-groups, extremes and centre, is surprising in more than one respect. Thanks to manipulation of the questions and results, individuals who, in official classifications, were considered similar, in line with prevailing opinion (for example, 'socialists' and 'liberal anarchists'), were

here separated. Conversely, we find others whom everything separated ranged in the same camp ('aristocrats' and 'socialists' on the one hand, liberals and anarchists on the other). Thus all the political and social questions were re-evaluated with respect to the central value, freedom; this made it possible to produce a clear majority that became unanimity where it was a matter, not of social organization, but of the artist's situation:

> As for the artist's preferences, they were unanimously oriented towards freedom. In some cases, even the partisans of socialist or authoritarian constraint – d'Esparbès, Klingsor, Merrill, Michelet, Redonnel, Valin – demanded artistic freedom. The pessimists – Besnus, Gérardy, de Gourmont, Remacle, Stryienski – predicted inevitable misfortune for the artist; the optimists – des Gachons, Oliva, Sabatier, Volyinski – predicted his no less ineluctable triumph; others – Avancini, Georges Gosse, Germain, Minski, Mockel, Muhlfeld, Symons, Valette – affirmed that he should be absolutely indifferent to everything external to art.[41]

These procedures sought to show public opinion, led astray by a handful of spectacular demonstrations or declarations, that, if a minority of the avant-garde sympathized with anarchism (according to the sample, there were just eleven sympathetic answers out of a total ninety-nine, foreigners included) or socialism (ten sympathetic answers, according to table 3.1), the majority were basically moderates in the social and political domain (sixty-five said that their opinions lay between the extremes). In all cases, the respondents demanded, first and foremost, freedom for writers, something that mitigated the authoritarian declarations some made at the general level. This shows the considerable practical import of the struggle against a received idea in this period of assassinations, in which the government had from early 1894 on been orchestrating a campaign against the intellectual theorists indirectly responsible for terrorism: *L'Ermitage* wanted to clear the avant-garde of this kind of compromising complicity, all too complacently held up by rival reviews.

The second phase of the survey, open to writers or theorists enjoying greater public recognition, confirms that this was the implicit intention of the 'referendum'. The second set of responses, published six months after the first, seems to have been hastily thrown together, involving as it does only twenty-five individuals, nine of them foreigners, out of a potentialy much bigger population. Moreover, it was not exploited in the way the first set was, and it introduced an additional heterogeneity by inviting 'scientists' to participate alongside 'poets', to use the review's terms. There are

two possible, complementary explanations for this failure. First, recognized authors, unlike their younger counterparts, had no need for a survey of this kind to express themselves; that may be why more of them refused to respond to a review of no great importance in intellectual life. Second, better armed theoretically than their junior colleagues, the respondents, or those who failed to respond, could call the very principle of such a survey into question because of the clumsy formulation of the questions or the way the survey could be manipulated. Edmond Demolins, Le Play's successor, wrote, for example: 'You ask people for their opinion, which doesn't prove much of anything. It would be preferable to ask the facts for their opinion, for they are never wrong and never lead us astray.'[42]

Already wielding a certain intellectual authority, these interviewees did not need to play the survey game, the back door to the intellectual field. Thus it is significant that no academic, in the strict sense, responded to this survey, although its subject was similar to that of certain books recently published in the social sciences.[43]

By virtue of its innovations and defects alike, this 'referendum' constituted a watershed in the relations between the literary avant-garde and politics in the broadest sense. It forced an important segment of the literary younger generation to take a position and a political stand while inducing it to break, willy-nilly, with the facile aloofness of art for art's sake, which a majority of these young people had espoused two years earlier. But, above all, it was closely bound up with a general historical context that had helped to make the social effects of this bid to convene an intellectual parliament last. The year 1893, the year of the Panama Scandal, was also an election year in which certain writers, revolted by political corruption, made up their minds to try their luck in the political arena, as Paul Adam and Maurice Barrès had in 1889. This decision, notably in Henry Becque's case, flew in the face of the anti-parliamentary prejudice that held sway in the literary field. Henry Fèvre, however, in the 10 June 1893 issue of *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, hailed this initiative as a sign of the times:

> A few young men of letters have already announced their intention to run in the forthcoming legislative elections. Monsieur Henry Becque was the first to announce his candidacy. What is more, groups are forming, people with the same political sympathies are slowly coming together, people are feeling out their environment. Despite the confusion of a first attempt to become active, one thing has clearly emerged: young writers' desire to take part in political life, not to leave the future in the crooked, grasping

> hands of swindlers and oafs . . . . The old parliamentary personnel are . . . utterly unqualified and out of step with the time; all the parties are jaded, all the ministers are drained, all the programmes are incoherent. Young people, brimming over with youth, shrug their shoulders and cock their ears: 'What if we took a hand in things?'[44]

With no illusions about the possibility of carrying out real reforms at the parliamentary level, the author of this article nevertheless concluded that the parliament was an essential platform for promoting certain ideas. Thus, without realizing it, he nursed the same hopes that Barrès had placed in his parliamentary mandate, hopes it had proved impossible to sustain: 'Thus if, clearly, nothing positive or useful can be obtained, an eloquent, intractable minority would be enough to throw parliamentary pedantry into disarray, establishing a center of agitation in the Chamber . . . .'[45]

Fèvre did not, it should be added, content himself with commenting on the situation. In July 1893, with some of his colleagues, he created groups with the intention of intervening in the August elections.[46] Nothing came of this attempt, but it provided Huret with a pretext to carry out a new opinion survey involving four writers: Barrès, Zola, Goncourt and Paul Adam. Beyond the predictable answers of Barrès and Adam, who were already actively engaged in politics, or of Goncourt, the representative of a bygone day who professed a reactionary creed in the etymological sense of the word, Zola's response was characteristic of a man at the turning point in his life and work (he had just finished *Les Rougon-Macquart*), dreaming, like his less famous colleagues, of taking on a new role, although he was also aware of his handicaps when it came to public affairs:

> 'I believe, I am absolutely convinced, that I can effectively influence an assembly of men. I have clear, lucid ideas, I have a great deal of clarity and method in my thinking, and that is a great deal for anyone wishing to become involved in public affairs. In addition, I have, it is true, a defect, a major defect; I am no orator. That is one of my deepest regrets . . . .'
>
> 'Which reforms would you fight for?'
>
> 'Social reforms, of course . . . . But without stooping to the professionals' ignoble politicking – I continue to despise that breed from the bottom of my heart. I believe that, after Naquet's divorce laws and Rivet's campaigns in favour of illegitimate children, important work for justice and equality remains to be done. This is a vast domain; I will have a wide choice.'[47]

Thus, while *L'Ermitage*'s 'referendum' was under way, election campaigning and this survey bear witness to writers' growing aspirations to play a political role. But the responses to the survey, especially Zola's, betray the gulf separating them from real politics. All saw themselves as successful candidates or future law-makers but rejected professional 'politicians' or parliamentary politicking in horror. To reconcile this dream of repressed action with the demands of the real, another path opened up, the following year, with the protest in defence of Jean Grave.

The dress rehearsal: the protest in defence of Jean Grave

The importance of the Jean Grave Affair for the conversion of the literary avant-garde to a new mode of political action, the potential of which would be utilized to the full in the Dreyfus Affair, may be located on three levels. Simply from the standpoint of the chronology of events, the Grave Affair initiated the direct confrontation between the government and the most radical stratum of intellectuals. The moral register of previous affairs was abandoned and replaced by a directly political stake: the theorists and those in solidarity with them were held responsible for the wave of assassinations, and society blamed the *intellectuel*, in the person of the ideologue, for every imaginable disorder. Correspondingly, this episode, which has been curiously obscured by both witnesses of the day and historiography,[48] constituted a new stage in the process of mobilizing intellectuals; we need to grasp its modalities and significance, but also its limits. Finally, and in a more general sense, this affair led to a broader polemic in the press, providing the occasion for the first confrontation of the conflicting theses on the *intellectuels*' social function. We need, to begin with, to recall the circumstances surrounding this affair.

In his weekly *La Révolte*, Jean Grave published, in the form of literary supplements, texts borrowed from writers of the day that seemed to him to be in harmony with anarchist ideas. An alliance was thereby implicitly forged between certain authors and the political avant-garde. Mirbeau is a conspicuous case in point: he was won over to anarchism after a political trajectory that had begun on the extreme right.[49] In 1891, this tactic of reprinting works without paying royalties led to an altercation with the Société des gens de lettres; its president at the time was Zola, who had always bitterly defended writers' economic rights.[50] In opposition to this shopkeeper's attitude, Mirbeau went to the defence of Grave, who had, in the meantime, become his friend. In the same period, he

had begun working on a preface to Grave's *La Société mourante et l'anarchie*, in which he wrote, notably: 'The thinking and artistic younger generation in its entirety – the contemporary elite – is impatiently watching this long-expected new dawn, in which there appears not only an ideal of justice, but an ideal of beauty as well.'[51]

Grave's book, released late because Mirbeau was so slow in finishing his contribution to it, was not published by Stock until June 1893. A less expensive second edition was released late that year, at the worst possible moment: these were the days of the assassination attempts by Auguste Vaillant and Emile Henry. The conservative press launched a no-holds-barred assault on the theorists, and the anarchists provided it with arguments, in as much as Vaillant cited, for example, Mirbeau and Ibsen as witnesses at his trial.[52] Intent on showing that it was taking action, the government launched a direct attack on the *intellectuels* beginning in January 1894. The first to bear the brunt of its ire was a Dutch writer, Alexandre Cohen, who was expelled from France; Zola and Mirbeau went to his defence. Adolphe Retté, already mentioned, was imprisoned for six days in January because of his suspicious connections with the *compagnons*. Shortly thereafter, Grave, too, was sent to prison because of the second edition of his book, and the police subjected the Reclus brothers to a house search on 11 January. This repressive wave continued in February with the banning of Barrès's very anti-parliamentarian play *Une journée parlementaire*, while Grave's trial took place at the end of the month. Elisée Reclus, Octave Mirbeau, Paul Adam and Bernard Lazare, the best-known pro-anarchist writers, testified in Grave's favour, emphasizing that it made no sense to persecute a book six months after its publication; they also endeavoured to dissociate anarchist ideas from the terrorist acts of the previous few months. The four writers' courageous stance went hand in hand with their publication of articles in the mass press, notwithstanding its reluctance to print them for fear of court injunctions. On 4 March, for example, after Grave was convicted and received the maximum sentence, Mirbeau, in an article in *Le Journal*, put the trial back on the level of lofty principles:

> What was prosecuted in [the author's and publisher's] persons – this appeared clearly, luminously in the course of the proceedings – was every man's imperishable, sacred right to think and, after thinking, express his thoughts. Yes, it was human thought itself that was put on trial, in France, under a republican government that proclaims itself the great Revolution's heir and executor.[53]

The same day, *La Petite République*, which was socialist in tendency, took up the same line of argument, while publishing on its first page a collective protest against the verdict signed by 124 writers and journalists: 'All men who profess the religion of freedom and thought will unreservedly associate themselves with the protest below.' On page 2, following a reminder of expressions of sympathy and admiration from Reclus, Mirbeau, Adam and Bernard Lazare, stood a declaration: 'With the nobility of these words, the signatories associate themselves from the bottom of their hearts, and protest against this verdict.'[54]

In the introductory note to the manifesto, we can detect, from the outset, a certain ambiguity comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, to that characterizing the protest defending Descaves in 1889. Politics is bracketed out, the author is placed in the forefront as a man worthy of esteem, and what is contested and condemned is not the substance of the charges levelled against the accused but the principle of free speech. Nevertheless, the editorial commentary, like the fact that the text in its entirety appeared only in far-left newspapers (*La Petite République* and *La Justice*), invested this collective action with directly political significance. By way of Grave's case, the signatories were attacking the policy of restricting basic freedoms that the government was pursuing under cover of a struggle against anarchism:

> Are we to allow a handful of scoundrels – hoisted into positions of power thanks to who-can-say what compromises, and maintaining themselves in those positions by adroitly exploiting bourgeois cowardice in various forms – to stand for long in the path of the ineluctable forward march of the emancipation of thought that has been proceeding down the centuries, all persecution notwithstanding, and has come into its own in our century only after suffering rude, tragic shocks?[55]

There was, nevertheless, an important difference between this protest and that in favour of Descaves. The man who initiated the signature campaign was a militant and political journalist of socialist sensibilities, Henri Leyret; the characteristic traits of the *intellectuels* mobilized, to which we shall return, were traceable to this circumstance. Leyret's name was, moreover, only the second on the list; he had ceded the honour of leading it off to the much older and better known Jean Richepin (Richepin was born in 1849, Leyret in 1864).

Thus, despite the precautions taken to play down the manifesto's political import so as to collect as many signatures as possible, the end result was ambiguous. It was respectable from a quantitative

point of view (from 123 to 127 signatures, depending on whether we count the writers mentioned in the introductory note, Reclus, Mirbeau, Adam and Bernard Lazare), since it mobilized twice as many signatories as the manifesto defending Descaves had four years earlier. The quality of the signatures collected, however, was more dubious: few writers known to the general public came out in solidarity with the anarchist, as a conservative journalist working for *Le Gaulois* hastened to point out. He found only nineteen writers, one-sixth of the total, whose names would ring a bell with the public:

> Messieurs Jean Richepin, the poet of *Blasphèmes*, who (by a savoury coincidence) was himself condemned to prison for his first book, *La Chanson des Gueux*; Jean Dolent, a penetrating art critic; Félicien Champsaur, a social columnist for *Le Journal* and author of some fifteen books; Henry Bauër, a theatre critic for *L'Echo de Paris* and a fiery polemicist; Armand Silvestre, the author of *Izeïl*, an inspector of Fine Arts and a graduate of the Ecole polytechnique, where he was a classmate of Monsieur Carnot's: Emile Goudeau, a poet and novelist, the founder of the Latin Quarter's Hydropathic Club, who has since come to his senses; Jean Lorrain, a novelist and playwright whose *Yanthis* was produced only yesterday at the Odéon, a theatre benefiting from state subsidies; Emile Michelet, a fashionable lecturer, a poet and, to top things off, a Magician; Paul Alexis, whose *La Fin de Lucie Pellegrin* was banned by the censors; Catulle Mendès, a lovely poet and Anacreontic prose writer; Raoul Ponchon, a great beer-drinker and friend of Monsieur Richepin's condemned, like him, for writing inordinately free-minded verse; Laurent Tailhade, a satiric poet who has invented a new lexicon of literary insults; we are indebted to him for a remark about Vaillant throwing his bomb: 'What does it matter if the gesture is a beautiful one!'; Jean Ajalbert, the writer and lawyer chosen by Vaillant; Gustave Geffroy, an art critic and a tolerant, well-informed mind; Henri de Régnier, a distinguished symbolist poet; the parliamentary deputy Clovis Hugues and his former colleague Monsieur Maurice Barrès; Lucien Descaves, the author prosecuted for *Sous-offs*, in whose defence a similar protest was signed in 1889; and, finally, Monsieur Bergerat, Caliban* himself.[56]

This ostensibly objective list in fact veils – as does the rest of the article, where this is easier to see – a latent 'sociology' of the signatories. It is suggested by insidious fine touches, accompanied by

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* Caliban: literary pseudonym of Bergerat.

a few precautions when it is a question of fellow journalists who could reply or, if subjected to excessively personal attacks, demand satisfaction on the field of honour. Whenever he can, the conservative chronicler mentions a literary episode or previous position that explains why the authors cited should revolt against the established order and join a protest defending an anarchist. Thus attention is drawn to all those who have had a bone to pick with the law, whose writings are, from the standpoint of the proprieties, at the limits of the tolerable, or who have already taken extremist positions. In the first category are Richepin, Alexis, Ponchon and Descaves; in the second, Bauër, Silvestre, Goudeau, Lorrain and Mendès; in the third, Tailhade, Ajalbert, Hugues and Barrès. The article contains, moreover, perfidious remarks of a different sort aimed at all those protesters who criticize the state's legal system while simultaneously battening off the state budget, such as Silvestre ('an inspector of Fine Arts'), Jean Lorrain, whose plays are produced by a subsidized theatre, as well as the deputy and former deputy. The chronicler is less careful with the other signatories, showering them with scornful epithets, the fate typically reserved for avant-garde literature.[57]

The petition's adversaries could insistently claim that Grave's defenders had in fact failed to mobilize the writers who counted by referring to the strategy employed for the petition defending Descaves. Since the manifesto takes a stand on principled grounds, the principles in question had to be defended by people of all parties, whose symbolic capital was such that they could, by risking their credit for a cause, demonstrate that it involved a fundamental, unimpeachable principle. This conservative interpretation was in large measure incorrect, for it turned on an elitist conception of *intellectuels* that the movement defending Grave wished to transgress. Unable to mobilize figures of the first rank, the anarchist's supporters challenged any and all forms of elitism, as the new relationship between *intellectuels* and politics authorized them to do.

Once the avant-garde took it upon itself to address problems of all sorts (consider the 1893 referendum), encouraged by the idea that it alone embodied the truly intellectual values because, unlike middle-sector writers, it had not been corrupted by money or political compromises, it could claim to be the symbolic defender of the oppressed or of just causes without sheltering behind the oldest writers, who had not spoken out. This is shown by the disorderly presentation of the signatories (whereas, in 1889, the writers' celebrity or age had appeared between the lines) and the mix of different categories of intellectuals found side by side: writers, journalists, activists, artists, musicians, and even utter unknowns,

whose presence on a list, albeit in limited numbers, diminished its symbolic weight.[58] In this protest, lateral forms of solidarity (ties of friendship, aesthetic affinities, age, political opinions, sociability among men tied to the same review) proved more important than sectoral divisions, hierarchies based on prestige or individual fame. It provided a picture of that which characterized both the intellectual avant-garde (all that was opposed to, different from, or ahead of the rest) and 'literary anarchy', in both senses of the word.

From this standpoint, the manifesto defending Grave clearly represents a militant version of the intellectual democracy of *L'Ermitage*'s 'referendum'. Even if the author of the article in *Le Gaulois* cited above failed to realize its importance for the future because he lacked the required perspective, he plainly identified, in order to belittle it, what the two types of avant-garde had in common:

> As for the protest defending Monsieur Jean Grave, who has signed it? The majority of signatories are drawn from the world of the new reviews, *Mercure de France*, *L'Ermitage*, *Revue blanche*, and so on. The whole of the so-called symbolist world is there, or almost, all those who modestly style themselves 'men of the coming century'. There are a few painters and musicians. There are a few Belgians. (Are Belgians not to be found everywhere?) Recent French literature counts a goodly number of Belgians, Italians, Swiss and Dutchmen in its ranks.[59]

Various other sources confirm the journalist's impression but also indicate that it should be taken with a grain of salt. For example, if we compare the 1890–3 tables of contents of *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, the review closest to Grave by virtue of its political orientations, we find there the names of a dozen signatories of the petition. If, however, proceeding the other way around, we correlate the number of signatories with the total number of collaborators on the review who might have signed (excluding foreigners and the deceased), their engagement clearly seems less intense: only twelve of sixty-four potential signatories actually signed. Again, the number of signatures is appreciably smaller than the total number of young writers who had proclaimed their commitment to artistic freedom in *L'Ermitage*'s 'referendum': only nineteen of a total fifty-three acted in conformity with their former declarations. Those who published in *Mercure de France* and *Revue blanche* were rather well represented, with, respectively, twenty and fourteen signatories (the count does not exclude, it is true, people contributing to both reviews). These comparisons confirm the preceding ideological analyses or the analyses of the social image of the *intellectuel* then emerging: increasingly,

the new model of the militant intellectual near the extremes was intimately bound up with the literary avant-garde that served as its breeding-ground. Yet it is far from true that the whole of that avant-garde had been won over to militant action or was prepared concretely to demonstrate its solidarity with an extremist movement. The first *intellectuels* were still a minority within the literary minority.

There were not just negative reasons for this semi-failure of the mobilization in milieus that were, a priori, the most favourable to it. The first positive reason is political: some of the signatories signed only because their political opinions were similar to those of the accused, contradicting the theses announced in the manifesto. Others, however, probably refused to sign for fear of being charged with anarchism. The second reason is symbolic. The very 'democratic' bias of the manifesto and the absence of great names must have shocked men of letters who cherished hierarchies or were put off by a less than discriminating environment. This interpretation is corroborated by Zola's refusal to support the manifesto, although he had shown his solidarity with Descaves and expressed interest in engaging himself politically the year before or, again, had defended the above-mentioned Dutch writer. The polemic set off by this stance brings out the protest's hidden stakes.

Zola versus the intellectuels

The hostile article published in *Le Gaulois* lost no time capitalizing on Zola's absence from the list of protestors, putting forward, along the way, an insidious explanation for the abstention of the eternal candidate for admission to the Académie française: 'It will be noted that Monsieur Zola has not signed the protest in favour of Monsieur Grave . . . . The evil-minded add that, just as he was reaching for his pen in order to sign, he thought he felt the weight of the Académie's gaze bearing down on him.' In fact, in order to stifle allegations that would have had negative consequences on the petition, its initiator, Henri Leyret, reported a conversation he had had with the Master from Médan:

> Zola: 'I'm not in favor of violence.'
>
> 'No one who signed the protest, I'm quite sure, intended, by agreeing to sign, to show his solidarity with one anarchist party or the other. All have their eyes fixed on just one thing, the freedom to write, which has been called into question today!'
>
> 'The freedom to write? I deny it! Furthermore, no one has used this argument to defend Grave, not even his lawyer . . . . Besides,

> Grave is not a writer, is not one of ours; he's a politician, an activist. Let the politicians sort the matter out. As for me, I don't do politics. The day it pleases me to, I'll go into action. Until then, I want nothing to do with the activists' political misadventures. They've got what they were looking for . . . . People attack society; society defends itself. You'll admit it has every right to do so. As for you, protest if you want; that's *your* right. Courageous as ever, the new literature is perhaps doing its duty. But that's no longer appropriate for someone my age! Octave Mirbeau, Paul Adam, so many others! All these young people have plenty of swagger, as is fitting for people thirty years old. They'll get over it. The day will come when, like me, they'll have lost their bravado. I don't try to fool myself: I don't have the bravado required to protest that way. That's past and done with!'
>
> 'In that case, I shall not insist.'
>
> 'Yes, you'll see, they're just beating the air.'[60]

The far-left or far-right newspapers that pilloried Zola's attitude, the former to accuse him of cowardice, the latter to express their satisfaction that he had not put his imprimatur on disorder,[61] in fact onesidedly interpreted this interview, the interest of which resides in its contradictions and ambiguities. It seems that Zola was torn between two lines of defence and two images of himself. To begin with, he challenged the notion that the protest was apolitical. The condemned man was a politician; to defend him, one had to share his ideas. In the course of this conversation, no doubt, the above-mentioned altercations between him and Grave about rights of reproduction crossed his mind. This selfish, apolitical corporatism represented a retreat from positions that the author of *Nana* had once taken. At the same time, however, aware that this was a weak justification, Zola warmly praised the courageous, generous young literary generation, concluding with a sort of self-critique by a disabused old man. (In the process, he made Mirbeau, already well over thirty, the upper limit in Zola's view for enthusiastic activism, younger than he was; the author of *Journal d'une femme de chambre* was only eight years Zola's junior.) Zola realized that, on the terrain of literature and that of politics as well, he was furnishing his detractors with arguments. These false reasons for a false position masked, perhaps, a deeper tactical analysis that laid bare this protest's weaknesses: the moment was poorly chosen ('society defends itself'), the cause was shaky (there was no defending an anarchist without showing solidarity with his blind attacks), the individuals mobilized were not the right ones, what was involved was the 'moxy' typical of young people who

lacked all symbolic weight ('you'll see, they're just beating the air!'). These objections all go back to the implicit comparison that Zola drew with the protest defending Descaves. It had taken place before the trial and had influenced it, whereas, today, it was too late for that. The incriminated books were of two different kinds: one denounced realities, the other attacked society as a whole. In Descaves' case, all men of letters had felt concerned, whereas, in Grave's, only those sympathetic with his political orientation were mobilizing. We may draw from this the lesson that Zola himself drew four years later for 'J'accuse': intellectuals cannot be mobilized unless Truth (whereas Grave's case was thoroughly political) and Justice (but, this time, society had respected the rules of law) are at stake.

Thus, as a political and literary strategist who was, whatever he said, well advised, Zola had put his finger on the protest's weaknesses and ambiguities, even if Grave's defenders could retort that, by abstaining, the author of *Germinal* was helping to reinforce this negative image of the petition. The preponderance of dominated individuals in their respective fields negatively affected the cause being defended. The signatories' age structure, which can be partially reconstructed, was the most eloquent index of this youth and obscurity (see table 3.2) – the non-responses were further evidence of it. The overwhelming majority of the petitioners was barely thirty or younger: forty-three of the seventy-six identified individuals had been born after 1862. With one or two exceptions, they had hardly had time to make a name for themselves, even in their own milieu, and some of them, born after 1870, were still just aspiring authors, half students, half amateurs.[62] The internal contradiction besetting the enterprise thus stands out clearly enough. Classifying signatories as writers without specifying their professional category suggested that all belonged to the intellectual field. However, the fact that the lists were opened up to very young men or simple citizens and activists made this a different kind of petition, a classic mass petition. In one case, collective symbolic capital was lacking; in the other, the number of people mobilized was too small. The petition defending Grave was plainly, in this perspective, a dress rehearsal on the border-line between the old elitism of men of letters and the Dreyfusard *intellectuels*' new democracy. There were, however, no generals on its general staff, and its troops scarcely formed a company. The lesson of this attempt and this semi-failure would not be lost, even if, in the immediate context, the governmental repression that peaked in the 1894 trial of the Thirty – among whom were bona fide *intellectuels* such as Félix Fénéon – forced the best-known far-left writers, such as Bernard Lazare, to beat a retreat

while waiting for new causes, such as that of Dreyfus, who was condemned at the same moment by the war council.[63]

CONCLUSION

When we draw up a balance-sheet of all the political developments in the two intellectual milieus from which the militants of the first stage of Dreyfusism were recruited, it becomes clear that, on the eve of the legal proceedings that triggered the affair, the new conceptions of the *intellectuels*' political role already occupied the centre of cultural life and that experiments with new ways of mobilizing them had already been carried out. The structures of what would later be called the 'party of the *intellectuels*' had already partly emerged, if not in reality, then at least in its future leaders' minds. Even the semi-failures and about-faces of some suggested, to Dreyfusism's future key personalities, the path to success in a new conjuncture. Yet we must not project too idealistic an image of the role played by conscious minorities, an image all too readily credited by the intellectualism of the *normaliens* under Herr's lead or the literary avant-garde's vague anarchism.

The Dreyfus Affair alone realized the conditions capable of spawning a struggle between two groups of *intellectuels*. The *normaliens*' socialism and literary anarchism asserted their autonomy over against the established government and joined in defence of causes that brought them closer to the 'people' or defended the rights of intellectuals victimized by government repression.[64] But, because of their failure to win support – this was the price of avant-gardism – they had so far rallied only fringes of their milieus of origin, from personalities with sufficient symbolic weight to find an echo in public opinion. Furthermore, the avant-gardes still ignored and often despised each other: the hatred or disdain of the man of letters for the secondary-school or university professor who was also a civil servant was compounded with the scientist's critique or irritation in the face of the poet's superficiality or theoretical amateurishness. These traditional stereotypes evolved, however, in step with the transformation of the intellectual field: opinion surveys, for example, crossed the frontiers between professional milieus. What is more, Dreyfusism's key figures (Herr and Bernard Lazare) were distinguished by the fact that they had easy access to both types of intellectuals. Yet this social capital would not have sufficed if it had not benefited from the hidden dynamic generated by the crisis

of the intellectual field, the new representations of the *intellectuels*' social role, and the antagonisms internal to the intellectual field. A symbolic and sociological reading of the petitions of the years 1898–9 will allow us to prove these hypotheses about the final emergence of the *intellectuels.*

4

'Intellectuals' versus 'Elite': A Reading of the Dreyfus Affair

> We witnessed this singular phenomenon: chemists and mathematicians, naturalists and historians, philologists and philosophers walking hand in hand with carpenters and masons, glassblowers and zinc-workers, carters and winegrowers.
>
> Célestin Bouglé, *Pour la démocratie française*[1]

The crisis represented by the Dreyfus Affair holds a place apart in the historiography of the Third Republic. It is the only political event of this period that continues to resound in people's memories and inspire books that attract a relatively broad readership. Above all, attempts to put it in perspective have evolved in step with historiography itself. From this standpoint, it can be compared, due allowance made, only with the French Revolution.[2] Some have gone still further, regarding it as the first in a recurrent series of crises in which the terms of political and social debate differed from a combat between classes or parties, yielding to a confrontation between two visions of social organization, to employ an anachronistic expression.[3] The two final chapters of the present book do not aim to add a new stone, in a text necessarily limited in scope, to the already impressive historiographic monument erected in memory of the affair. They aim, rather, to test the hypotheses and interpretations advanced in the preceding chapters with regard to an episode that managed to assume the dimensions it did (in its own day and thereafter) only because it brought the whole social and cultural dynamic involved in the relations between intellectuals and elites into play. Hence we will not be 'returning to the event' in the proper sense or elucidating its social foundations by examining them in a political

light. The back-and-forth movement is double. The debate's political dimension can doubtless be better thrown into relief by sociology, backed up in its turn by the morphology of the intellectual field. Reciprocally, however, these two approaches assume their full significance and reveal their practical potential only in and through the political crisis in which the ignorance of overall causalities characteristic of ordinary periods becomes the occasion for a choice between clear-cut alternatives. The ambition of this new reading of the Dreyfus Affair is to verify the relevance of the general models we have already worked out: to understand, in other words, how intellectuals in the two camps mobilized, the reasons for which they did so, and the criteria they applied. We shall also analyse the relations between the ideologies involved as well as the social make-up of the two opposing groups and highlight the disparities between the ideals proclaimed – that of the *intellectuel* on the one hand and the 'elite' on the other – and the more disappointing reality of the individuals who were effectively led to act.

That is why I have privileged, as the reference points for these analyses, the lists of names in the different camps' petitions. These documents are texts containing all the aspects on which my interrogation focuses. They bring us from the level of individual opinion to that of the coalescing of collective opinions. Thus they reflected a shifting relationship to politics and exposure to a relative risk. They aimed to bring out what had been latent by dint of a chain reaction of solidarity based on ideological, geographic and/or social proximity. Finally, they were weapons in the combat, arguments and objects of new polemics that brought collective representations into focus. Above all, they offer an incomparable advantage for the historian: printed and published, repeatedly re-examined and glossed, the protests punctuated the various stages of the Dreyfus Affair, two of which were particularly intense. Early in 1898, in the wake of 'J'accuse', the Dreyfusards tried to widen the breach opened by the scandal that Zola had provoked with his famous paper. At the turn of 1899, the mobilization moved to a higher level. At a time when judicial revision seemed to be well under way, the about-faces of the government, a prisoner of public opinion, forced the revisionists to broaden their audience (petitions defending Picquart, November 1898); this, in turn, precipitated petitions by their adversaries, whose cause had been thrown onto the defensive (the Henry Memorial subscription and the creation of the Ligue de la patrie française (League of the French Fatherland) in January 1899). This radicalization and the rise of larger and opposed coalitions led the moderates to attempt a reconciliation (the 'Appeal for

Unity') in order to reduce tensions. Thus even those who rejected confrontation may be classified.

Both events and means of influencing events, the petitions constitute better tools of interpretation than the other methods for mobilizing social forces used concurrently during the Dreyfus Affair, such as political gatherings, press campaigns or street demonstrations. As long as the historian takes certain precautions and supplements the information contained in these sources, he can, thanks to the protests, produce social portraits of the two camps, setting out from the various indications that the petitions furnish: names, professions, the length of the lists, the geography of engagements and their intensity. Other scholars have already made such use of them, but in a monographic perspective or as one element in the study of a wider problem (for example, nationalism or anti-Semitism), thus effacing the specificity and supplementary significance that comparative analysis brings.[4] Many of the social or symbolic traits of a list come into view only if it is contrasted with the opposed or competing list.

My reading accordingly treats the petitions as if they were fully fledged opinion surveys that specify, additionally, the names of those surveyed and some of their social titles, allowing us to try to bring the one into relation with the other. Given the problem examined in the present book, after attempting a general interpretation that brings out the social representations contending in the political field, I shall confine detailed investigation to the central categories mentioned in the petitions and the main groups in the intellectual field.

A SYMBOLIC READING: 'NON NUMERANTUR SED PONDERATUR' (MARC BLOCH)

Weight and number

As political weapons, the petitions must be viewed from two standpoints, which, for reasons of clarity, we shall take separately. One is qualitative and symbolic, the other is quantitative and sociological. On the one hand, the presence of certain names, the way they are presented, and the order in which they appear result from the more or less explicit strategies of the initiators. These factors indirectly provide information about the ideal vision that the signatories, or those who induced them to sign, had of their role. Again, the Dreyfus Affair revived the tradition of the mass

petition as a counterweight to the helplessness of the political powers-that-be and a substitute for passive public opinion. Thus the petitions materialized the unprecedented alliance of people of quality and ordinary people, something that seemed revolutionary to contemporaries and somewhat scandalous as well, since, in this way, two opposing strategies were put to work: an elitist strategy, in which weight counted more than number, and a democratic strategy, in which big numbers were an argument in the struggle for possession of the political truth. But, as we have already seen, these oppositions between intellectuals and the rest of society, or between the elite and the multitude, seemed insurmountable to the political imagination of the day. The logic of political combat led, precisely, to surmounting them in the heat of action; indeed, the initiators were sometimes overwhelmed by the social dynamic that they had unleashed.

Various indices point to the transition from a logic of qualitative to one of quantitative mobilization. To begin with, numbers: the number of individuals listed in the first Dreyfusard petitions, excluding those mentioned twice, is 1,482. That is very few, as the first Dreyfusards themselves acknowledged.[5] Later petitions brought a change in scale: the petition defending Picquart rallied 30,000 to 40,000 signatures; the Henry subscription, 25,000; and the League of the French Fatherland, 40,000.[6] Furthermore, to mask just how thin the ranks initially were, publication of the first lists itself respected a symbolic hierarchy and a way of citing social titles that were among the reasons the text was given the now historic name 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals'.

The title effect

Two features set this first protest apart from those of late 1898. The proportion of signatories with no professional title was especially low (19.2 per cent), which is to say that a signatory made a commitment in a specific capacity, not simply as an interchangeable 'citizen'. That is the source of the paradox that scandalized the anti-Dreyfusards and helped to invest the term *intellectuel* with its full symbolic and political significance. The name of this manifesto has its origin less in the fact that most of its signatories were members of the intellectual professions (a phenomenon that was patent in the earlier protests we have already analysed) than in the use made of professional titles or diplomas outside their usual social context, as an argument of authority against another legal or political authority. This abstract way of defining oneself socially – for it was more often

a question of social titles than functions – was taken to the extreme by those who considered themselves sufficiently well known not to have to announce their title. Their name was a title all by itself: this held for certain men of letters on the first list (Jean Ajalbert, Paul Brulat, Raymond Koechlin, Fernand Gregh, and so on).[7] The second procedure by which individuals were symbolically ennobled consisted in assigning a large number of individuals a common title that was less prestigious but, borne by a multitude marching in serried ranks, produced an optical illusion: the reader was led to suppose that all the people in the same social category thought the same way. This mode of presentation was used in the three paragraphs of the first list, in which a series of, first, *agrégés*, then university graduates in letters and, finally, university graduates in the natural sciences were strung out one after the next. The order of precedence was not due to chance. As in a parade or the procession of an academic body, the greatest – that is, those closest to the top of the academic hierarchy – headed the procession.

This clever ploy did not escape Barrès's practised eye. 'Nothing but college graduates', he pointed out in a famous, harsh essay, 'marching in serried ranks behind their professors.'[8] The denigrating tone adopted by the author of *Les Déracinés* finds its explanation in the partial success of the tactic. 'College graduate' was indeed, at the time, a title rare enough to impress outsiders quite as much as more prestigious qualifications. Hence it was in the adversary's interests to deflate the title's effect by bringing the signatories down to the rank of supernumeraries or manipulated foot-soldiers, to make them into a 'crowd' [*foule*], with all the unsettling connotations the word had in the imagination of the period. Barrès's imputation was unjustified, it should be noted in passing: as a rule, the college graduates on the first lists in fact preceded their professors rather than following them like docile lambs.

These procedures for classifying and staging were, however, used only to a limited extent, for the Dreyfusards who initiated the petitions had little experience in this line. They could call on virtually no institutions prepared to give them unanimous support, apart from the small groups that had originated the signature campaign: the little reviews, the Ecole normale supérieure, the faculties of letters, or the Ecole pratique des hautes études (EPHE).[9] The title effect could even be turned against them when a member of one of these institutions was criticized by the others for illegitimately exploiting the group's institutional identity to further his political cause. Among the many examples sprinkled through the published lists that elicited corrections or counter-petitions, one of the most

interesting has to do with the image of the chartist,* a key figure in the Dreyfus Affair because certain professors at the Ecole des chartes were among the revisionist struggle's moving spirits or served as experts in the court proceedings. In the case of these men, the *intellectuel*'s symbolic power was reinforced by a power of expertise harnessed to the service of a cause (a judicious use of their 'intelligence' that contradicted the irony of anti-Dreyfusard *intellectuels*). That is why there appeared, in *Le Journal* of 22 February 1898, a protest by students or former students at the Ecole des chartes endorsing the opinion emitted by the anti-Dreyfusard professor Robert de Lasteyrie: he accused his colleagues of betraying the methods taught at the Ecole because they had not used originals in making their 'scientific' expert evaluations. According to Lasteyrie, they had violated professional ethics in order to cloak their preferences in the authority of the expert. No fewer than fifty-five chartists banded together on this occasion to destroy all the symbolic capital that the four or five Dreyfusard professors had put at the service of the revisionist cause.[10]

The rank effect

The chartists' counter-petition anticipated the model of the petition employed by the anti-Dreyfusards of the League of the French Fatherland. The League's membership lists were conceived as a reply to the opposing lists, but they also distinguished themselves from the methods, similar to advertising methods, utilized in the Henry subscription campaign launched by the *Libre Parole*, where individuals disappeared behind the sums of money collected. In the League's first lists, at any rate, signatures were systematically grouped by corporation, a way of summing up society that made it, in line with Barrès's organic vision, not a collection of individuals, but an association of different professions welded together by common national values. Individual diversity was here dissolved in the unity of a function, effaced in its turn beneath the higher unity of the Fatherland, organized by a hierarchy based on seniority and historical tradition.

Thus the members of the Académie française were placed at the head of the list because they belonged to the oldest French institution; they were ranked, not according to the depth of their commitment to the cause, as the Dreyfusards were, but, rather, by seniority

* A student at the prestigious Ecole des chartes, where archivists and librarians were trained.

and age: the first named was Legouvé, an old man born in 1807 and an Academician since 1855, followed by the Duke of Broglie (who was born in 1821 and had been elected to the Académie in 1862), Alfred Mézières (1826, elected 1874), Gaston Boissier (1823, elected 1875), and so on. The youngest Academician, Henri Lavedan, born in 1859, brought up the rear. The order in which the next names were presented was more original than this twofold traditionalism, which consisted in basing the hierarchy of intellectual legitimacy on the Académie created by Richelieu and, within it, on the order of admission to its ranks, in conformity with the 'classic(al)' thesis, in both senses, which had it that the French nation was incarnated in the French language and, therefore, in that language's official guardians. Had prevailing custom, which had inspired the Dreyfusards, been respected, the Academicians should have been followed by the writers, potential Academicians. But they were not, for the writers appeared only after several paragraphs made up of academics (in the broad sense the period gave the word),* artists and physicians.

This symbolic detail was no accident, as examination of the official list and the anecdotal history of its publication proves. Initially, the promoters of the League of the French Fatherland had wanted to conduct a carefully concerted operation, defending order in orderly fashion. At the outset, publication of the list had been scheduled to coincide with the anniversary of the Académie française and was not supposed to take place until a large number of signatures of every possible origin had been collected, in order to distinguish the list from both the Dreyfusards' somewhat anarchic spontaneity and Drumont's strident publicity campaign. According to Brunetière, interviewed by *Le Temps*, premature publication of the list in the newspapers had resulted from an indiscretion. Publication was supposed to have been deferred, he said, 'until there were two hundred eminent men'.[11] The non-authorized disclosure of the list, the order of the signatures on which differed from that of the official list, had been followed by a telegram contesting it.[12]

The University immediately followed the Académie, as even the initiators confessed (the project's two workhorses, Dausset and Syveton, were both *agrégés* – i.e., teachers at the *lycée*), in order to invert the supposed equation, which held sway in public opinion, of the defence of Dreyfus with academia, where Dreyfusard agitation

* At the time, the distinction of rank between secondary-level teachers and university professors, both known as 'members of the *Université*' (a Napoleonic inheritance), was blurred. Some secondary-school teachers had the opportunity to teach in the universities.

had been especially conspicuous. In sum, this way of presenting things sought to counteract the 'title effect' discussed above in order to modify academia's political image. Moreover, thanks to their polemics, the anti-Dreyfusards were in a certain sense responsible for this conflation of the Dreyfusard, the *intellectuel* and the academic; this had been the case even before the Dreyfus Affair entered its political phase. Since the success of the petitions for Picquart had proved that the prestige of academia was, despite all, an effective weapon for winning over public opinion, this dynamic would have to be bent to the service of nationalism. Crouslé, an old 'professor of French rhetoric at the Sorbonne', naively described the logic of distinction and the inversion of clichés that was at work in the presentation of the list: 'It seemed to me necessary to establish a separation between a certain number of individuals who have taken sides in the affair and who seem, in the public's estimation, to have dragged all of academia along after them. But it is not true that the mass is following. That is not true at all.'[13]

The provisory committee drove the point home: the first eight paragraphs of the list contained the names of academics. The only exceptions to this corporatist preponderance of academe were made for a few members of the Institut de France* or people who were professors at prestigious institutions but were not affiliated with a university. Among them was Pierre Laffitte, a professor at the Collège de France; he was the first to be named after the French Academicians, preceding the members of the Institut. This was doubtless because he was the positivist school's official leader and the guarantor of a certain ideological modernism, and thus balanced the weight of the tradition represented by the Academicians, counts and dukes placed at the head of the procession. The other two exceptions were the painters Detaille and Gérôme, who embodied, in the order of the fine arts, what the members of the Académie française embodied in the literary order. This handful of symbolic names summed up the whole gamut of the ideological tendencies brought together by the League. After the members of the Institut, the academics were listed in alphabetical order without regard for geography: the Parisian and provincial institutions were put at the same level, with special educational establishments mixed in with universities properly speaking. The aim here was to close ranks, while denying the divisions between faculties, different ranks within academia or different types of Ecoles, so as to create an

* The 'Institut de France' includes five *Académies* ('française', of sciences, of moral and political sciences, of 'inscriptions et belles-lettres', and the Académie des beaux-arts).

ostensible unanimity. The erratic presentation of the Dreyfusards' lists was, by contrast, all the more striking, since, there, a member of the Institut could follow a teaching assistant, an associate professor could precede a dean, and a professor in the small university of Clermont-Ferrand could be listed before a professor at the Sorbonne.

A 'learned disorder'

Thus two different logics of mobilization appeared but, above all, two different ways of presenting the social world, according to the '*intellectuel*' or 'elite' pole. The intellectuals' preponderance and precedence, at least in the early stage of the Dreyfusards' lists, had its origins, first and foremost, in the fact that other social groups had failed to respond to the appeal. What is more, the relative dispersion of the grouping by corporation finds its explanation, to be sure, in the difficult real conditions for producing the lists, but also in the Dreyfusards' concern to avoid creating the impression that they had limited themselves to a coterie. This strategy failed in the case of the Manifesto of the Intellectuals, as the name indicates, for the conditions for this mobilization were too unfavourable to make it possible to tap a sufficiently broad social base. On the other hand, it proved successful in the case of the petitions defending Picquart, the first of which, for example, presented names in alphabetical order without the least regard for profession: Georges Bouron, 'man of letters', preceded Duclaux, 'member of the Institut', and Trarieux, 'senator' – although the last two were leading lights in the fight for revision.[14] Similarly, in the second list of 26 November, except for the fact that Anatole France was at its head, disorder reigned supreme. All professions appeared side by side in every paragraph. People in modest social categories stood beside those in the bourgeois professions; academics, very prominent in the first protests, were now swallowed up in the broad mass. In this way, the 'party of the *intellectuels*' could claim that it had become the party of the whole nation, the party of equality, truth and justice. In this democracy of the list, the academic '*intellectuel*' and man of letters rubbed elbows with the people; *intellectuels* were merely the yeast in the social dough: 'Read the lists of these good, brave citizens. Bourgeois, workers, merchants, students, office workers, professors, artists, scholars – all defend Justice; they throng together, join forces and, resolutely, wait.'[15]

For their adversaries, in contrast, this melange revealed the anarchism that underlay Dreyfusism, while the 'intellectuals of the

hustings' became the 'source of the infection from which emanates the deregulation of the mind'.[16]

The two other petitions, the Henry subscription petition and the petition for the Appeal for Unity, which we have not yet analysed, stand at the opposite extreme from these two models.

The 'true France'

The Henry subscription, a petition *ad hominem*, brought matters down to the sub-political level of social graffiti, for the commentaries accompanying the donations expressed, above all, hatred of the other, whether it was 'Jews' in general, a particular Jew (Joseph Reinach, Alfred Dreyfus), 'intellectuals' or this or that intellectual, the Appeals Court or a judge assumed to be a traitor because of his Dreyfusard sympathies, such as Loew or Bard. All the social markers found in the other petitions disappeared here. Many donors did not sign at all or, when they did not efface their individuality in a larger group (by utilizing forms of the plural: 'some', 'several', 'a group'), indicated their social status in a way that was meant to stand as the index of a difference by virtue of its remoteness from the dominant or the '*intellectuels*'. The mass of names and the sum total of the donations were the most important element in the mobilization. Almost all donors were (or claimed to be) social 'zeros', but this sum equalled the whole, the French people. What was thus expressed was a political logic by which obscure individuals put themselves under the direction of the organization that had initiated the campaign, the newspaper, or under that of a handful of leaders with whom they stood in a charismatic relationship. In short, all the components of a totalitarian political ideology were on hand here. As in the Dreyfusard petitions, the order was erratic, with one significant exception. The first name (or names) on the lists was always that of someone who was invested with personal social authority or held elective office. Placed at the head of the first two lists were, accordingly, journalists or the anti-Semitic organizations animating the movement. At the head of the third were General Mercier and the managing editor of the anti-Dreyfusard newspaper *L'Eclair*; of the fourth, the Prince de Broglie and Marcel Koechlin, a retired army officer and the son of one of the parliamentary deputies from Alsace who had refused to accept cession of the region to Germany; of the fifth, Alphonse Humbert, a parliamentary deputy: of the sixth, Albert de Mun, also a parliamentary deputy; of the seventh, 224 junior lieutenants, representing the army's support; of the eighth, and the ninth as well, the parliamentary deputy Boysset

and an aristocratic retired army officer; of the tenth, 1,700 workers from Armentières, followed by a mayor and a count, an emblem of national unity beyond class boundaries; of the eleventh, the parliamentary deputy Cluseret and a general, the Baron de Charette (respectively, a former member of the Paris Commune and the descendant of a leader of the Chouan!);* of the twelfth, a parliamentary deputy, a captain and a count; of the thirteenth, a countess; of the fourteenth, two parliamentary deputies; of the fifteenth, an administrator of *Le Journal*, a member of the council of a *département*, a lieutenant-colonel and a count; and of the sixteenth and last, a count who was an army officer and two descendants of a pair of military heroes of the French Revolution, Hoche and Marceau.[17] This order is too systematic and too significant not to have been intended by those who published the lists. Most commentators have completely neglected it, although it reveals the whole social and political philosophy of the anti-Dreyfusards' radical faction. The political guide chosen was at antipodes from the *intellectuel*. His mandate to guide the masses was not based on an abstract competency recognized by his peers, as it was in the Dreyfusards' case, or the established cultural hierarchy, as it was in the more respectable anti-Dreyfusards' case, but sometimes was based on personal status (a title of nobility, an aptitude to command related to the fact that an individual was an army officer) and at others depended on popular choice (a journalist's readership, a parliamentary deputy's voters). This was clearly, to use Zeev Sternhell's judicious expression, a 'revolutionary right' in which the elite was replaced by the leader (who could, accordingly, be a man of the people), while the *intellectuel* and his values were identified with corruption (because he was artificial and 'Byzantine') and with unjustified pride: the titles in which the *intellectuel* draped himself distanced him from the people he despised and opposed him to the true elite whose place he wished to usurp: 'Behind this loud, corrupt mob of *intellectuels* and sell-outs . . . we have caught sight of the true France, which has been preparing, in silence, for the hour of the necessary executions.'[18]

The social register of the Elite

The petition published last, the 'Appeal for Unity', stands at the opposite extreme from this subscription campaign. Here numbers were ignored; the aim was rather to rally individuals who had the

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* A partisan movement against the French revolutionary government that sprang up in 1793 in Western France in the Vendée *departement*, south of Nantes.

greatest possible social credit but also origins which, since they were much better diversified than the Dreyfusards', surmounted social divisions. That is why, although intellectual titles or professional qualifications were complacently advertised in order to compete with the other petitions, and elitism was still more pronounced, the order in which signatures were presented broke with the hierarchies highlighted by the League of the French Fatherland. The 'Appeal for Unity', a neutral venue comparable to an encyclopedia or a dictionary, followed a strictly alphabetical order in its first lists. Jean Aicard headed up the procession, not because he was especially illustrious at the time but because his surname started with A. The first five or six names, somewhat similar to a page taken from a *Who's Who*, thus represented a whole rainbow of professions: listed one after the other were a man of letters, the former principal of a private school, a lawyer pleading at the Conseil d'Etat, a photo-engraver, a philosopher, a member of the Académie des sciences and an industrialist.[19] Mediators and men of good will, these individuals capitalized on their functions in order to intervene between people from the same milieu in the other two camps. But they had no ambition to establish a hierarchy among themselves and become a new party with natural leaders and a tractable rank and file. In sum, this way of presenting signatures was typical of a centre, since it borrowed elements from all the existing models. It adopted the practice, as the Dreyfusards had, of abstractly defining signatories by their titles, listing them without regard for social hierarchies; but, like the anti-Dreyfusards, it refused to practise a levelling social melange.

The 'Appeal for Unity' preferred to seek signatures from men whose celebrity transcended their milieu or whose political image was not too pronounced. That brings us to the second part of our symbolic reading: an examination of precisely 'what the names say'.

'What the names say'

A mere compilation of the professional occupations mentioned would provide only a partial measure of the social and ideological effect that the lists were meant to produce on the newspaper readers. It could make us forget that we have to do here with documents for publication in newspapers that were supposed immediately to strike the reader thanks to the names' evocative power alone. Those heading the various lists were especially important, because they had been promoted to the rank of witnesses for or against a real or abstract accused (Dreyfus and/or Picquart, on

the one hand, Unity, the army, and the Fatherland, on the other). In contrast, certain names, still more than the titles, were there to elicit social reverence or the desire to identify with a noble cause defended by noble men (symbolically noble on the left, noble in the social sense on the right).

The tutelary figures

Unable, at the outset, to marshal throngs of supporters or diversified milieus, the Dreyfusards, like all avant-gardes, were at pains to place celebrities of the contemporaneous intellectual world of the day centre stage. By an accident that was both involuntary and welcome, the Dreyfusards succeeded in including on their lists, in the real sense or by proxy and affiliation, the four main tutelary figures who had conferred on the word '*intellectuel*' the full range of its connotations. The first two names cited, Zola and Anatole France, were the best known but perhaps not the most important, above all for their adversaries. Zola embodied the new figure of the independent writer, a fusion of the ideal of the artist and the scientist; he claimed the mantle of positivism and Romanticism, participated in literary and social struggles alike, and was a man of scandals and successes. Anatole France, as a champion of every imaginable ambiguity, identified with post-Renanian dilettantism and combined devastating irony with attachment to the classical tradition. Still more decisive, however, was Emile Duclaux's support, thanks less to his own name, little known to the broad public, than to that of the Institut Pasteur, whose director he was. This made him the disciple and heir of the 'scientist' *par excellence*, the impartial benefactor of humanity, pride of the nation and all humanity, prince of the mind and healer of animals and the poor. A bit further on, as in a shadow play, was the silhouette of Jean Psichari, whom Barrès took the trouble to attack in a chronicle. Psichari represented the new University, since, according to his own statement of his professional title, he was a *directeur d'études* at the Ecole pratique des hautes études; but he was, above all, the son-in-law and spiritual heir of Ernest Renan, the third prefiguration of the *fin-de-siècle intellectuel*. There were those who claimed that the erudite historian and author of the *Origines du christianisme*, the man of letters who had produced *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, the aristocratic intellectual who had rallied to the Republic, the defender of erudition and idealism and the devastating critic of religious dogma would himself have been a Dreyfusard, had he, too, lived a few years longer.[20]

The fourth figure stood still further back in the wings, like a spirit conjured up by the signature of his widow, Madame Michelet. The

famous historian, author of *Le Peuple*, was a source of inspiration for certain important Dreyfusards such as Gabriel Monod, who considered himself Michelet's disciple. A prophet persecuted by the state authorities, an oracle for the students of the pre-1848 period, he remained the model of the inspired professor for all the academics who had shed their traditional reserve. We have already seen in what sense he took his place in the genealogy of the '*intellectuels*'. He brought up the rear while pointing the way for a Humanity questing for Truth. One great living figure, however, another '*intellectuel*' before his time, had not answered the call. This was Berthelot, laden down with honours and too encumbered by his political and official affiliations, a scientist caught in the trammels of politics in the classic sense, although his sons-in-law (Charles-Victor Langlois, Georges Lyon) and one of his sons manned his battle-post in his stead. Dreyfusism could even invoke Hugo, despite the fact that the official Republic had confiscated him, since his newspaper, *Le Rappel*, and its moving spirits joined the revisionist campaign.

Appreciation and depreciation

In the first phase of the Dreyfusards' fight, in which the unequal distribution of forces between the two camps forced the weakest to draw arguments from symbols rather than the number of signatories they had mustered, both positive and negative commentaries on the petitions copiously glossed the names just mentioned:

> We take note of these words of encouragement with deep pleasure, and observe that all men with powerful minds and powerful consciences are with us. That is public opinion, true public opinion. That is enlightened, carefully considered public opinion, superior to momentary passions and mindful of Justice and Truth alone. We are proud to have the approbation of men who bear the names Anatole France, Duclaux, Charles Friedel, Edouard Grimaux, Gabriel Séailles, Paul Desjardins, Georges Koechlin, Jean Psichari . . . . It is the Institut, the Sorbonne, academia in its entirety that the jurors of the Seine will have to judge along with Emile Zola and the *Aurore*; and still others will be joining them.[21]

The polemical procedure utilized here is particularly flagrant: it consists in extrapolating from a few illustrious names to the whole corporation to which they belong. The syllogism could be formulated as follows: because two famous writers (Zola and France), three illustrious scientists (Duclaux, Friedel and Grimaux), a renowned philosopher (Séailles), a reputed professor (Desjardins)

and a handful of others have endorsed the pro-Dreyfus campaign, all their colleagues should do so, too, since they share the same values ('others will be joining them'). In their persons, 'enlightened' opinion as a whole ('the Institut, the Sorbonne, academia in its entirety') has defied public opinion. The quality of this enlightened opinion compensates for the sheer, blind numbers of the broad public. A new type of aristocratism found expression here: the 'pretension' and 'pride' denounced by the anti-Dreyfusards, who rose up indignantly against it. This elitism did indeed come into contradiction with democratic values, since it erected a particular social category into a new 'capacity', a group of active citizens whose choices relegated ordinary citizens, deceived by the popular press or anti-Semitism, to the second rank. The Dreyfusards, who had initially utilized scandal as a lever to pry off the lid hiding reasons of state, thus put themselves in a false position: these elitist procedures used to contest the *res judicata* ran counter to the philosophy of the rights of man animating them. Barrès lost no time in seizing on the contradiction: 'All these aristocrats of thought make a point of affirming that they do not think like the vile mob.'[22]

Yet Barrès, in this celebrated essay in which he enshrined the term '*intellectuel*', had soon shifted his line of reasoning: this shows that the Dreyfusards had unsettled their adversaries by rallying the eminent men just mentioned to their cause. For Barrès implicitly acknowledged that intellectual elitism was legitimate while also trying to sap its foundations. On the one hand, he contested the claim that the Dreyfusards constituted a true elite by attacking the rank and file rather than the leaders with the phrase about college graduates quoted earlier: they were 'perverted geniuses' and 'feeble minds'. He thus returned to the subject of his novel *Les Déracinés*, the intellectual proletariat consisting of new barbarians who were a threat to society.[23] As for the great names, he set out to show that their motives were impure: 'Amid *this obscure elite of intellectuels*, however, a number of names stand out sharply. Have you not wondered about the reasons motivating a Zola, a France or a Joseph Bertrand?'[24]

Barrès then undertook a series of pseudo-psychological analyses (based on a more or less openly acknowledged physiological racism) aimed at establishing the famous men's murky motivations: foreign extraction in Zola's and Psichari's case, instinctive anarchism in that of Anatole France. This *ad hominem* polemic turned the procedure of extrapolating to a whole social group back on the Dreyfusards. Enlightened opinion was accordingly demoted to the level of a compendium of great men's quirks. The *intellectuels* are an 'obscure elite'

because their rank and file are embittered souls, while their leaders are the naive or mildly demented victims of an illusion.[25]

From intellectuels *to elites*

In the affair's second phase, these tactics of depreciation or appreciation proved insufficient. In proportion as the government's ill will and the anti-Dreyfusards' radicalization grew, the Dreyfusards became aware that they would have to carry out a thoroughgoing mobilization (whence the foundation of the League of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) and engage in a proselytism broadened to include the other social categories whose support they claimed – although, contrary to their contentions, these social groups had not yet been won to their cause.

This strategic shift (from an avant-garde to a mass party, to put it in contemporary terms) modified the way the petitions were presented, as we have seen, but also the symbolic utilization of the names found on them. Octave Mirbeau used military terminology to sum up the manoeuvre: 'There were only a handful of us for Dreyfus, and Monsieur Zurlinden must see where that led the Boisdeffres, Henrys, Du Patys and Esterhazys, and the point we have reached today. We will be a whole army of men for Picquart, still more unified, ready for everything.'[26] In another article published after the first lists defending Picquart, the shift in the way well-known names were being used is obvious:

> Without wishing to rank them above other protesters, I cannot help citing these four names as typical: Anatole France of the Académie française; Adolphe Carnot of the Académie des sciences, the brother of the former president of the Republic; the Count of Larmandie, a man of letters who wrote these words next to his signature: 'reactionary and Catholic, and convinced, for that very reason, that the cult of justice and truth is his duty'; Monsieur Paul Langlois, a *professeur agrégé* in the Faculty of Medicine, with a doctorate in the natural sciences, who wrote to the League of the Rights of Man: 'With everyone in the struggle! Protest today, action tomorrow!'[27]

The journalist here modified his perspective: his objective was to prove, by citing these diverse names of an earlier day, that the Dreyfusards were no longer a restricted intellectual elite but brought together representatives of all elites. Alongside academics or writers, he draws attention to people in many different walks of life: science and the upper-level civil service in the case of Adolphe Carnot (general inspector of the mines and a member of the Académie des sciences from a leading republican family), the aristocracy and law

in the case of the Count of Larmandie, medicine in the case of Paul Langlois. In short, the revisionist cause was no longer a left-wing sect confined to a narrow milieu; it recruited from all the social, political and ideological families. Thus a transition has been made from literary manifesto's symbolic logic, where the only thing that mattered was to bring together a few personalities, to a political logic marked by a division of the labour of representation between summit and base, both of which were becoming more 'representative'.

The result was the ascription of a new function to academics in the overall system. Put on an equal footing with independent intellectuals – although, because they were less well known, they rarely had been in the past – and utilized as experts to establish the truth during Zola's trial, the professors gradually became, in Dreyfusism's ascendant phase, the first of its eminent men and the movement's real leaders, since Zola had been sidelined by his exile and Anatole France, the one uncontested writer, could not answer to every need.[28] The new pedagogical relation between professors and students in the reformed faculties prepared them for this role. Their chairs provided them with a rostrum from which to mobilize students for the good cause, whereas writers had access to only a few small-circulation partisan newspapers. The anti-Semitic riots aside, it is significant that the main incidents to occur in the period of the radicalization of the affair took place in the universities and involved the relations between academics and their natural audience. In both camps' papers, the disruptions of courses and ovations, such as the opening lessons given by 'marked' professors, were so many occasions to show that the '*intellectuels*' had, or did not have, an audience among the younger generation, which was supposed to represent, after the struggles of the last phase of the Second Empire, the ascendant political tendency. This insistence on the part of the newspapers made the academic field – in the most concrete, geographical sense of the term, that is, the Latin Quarter plus a few provincial universities – the centre of gravity of the battle for public opinion.[29] The anti-Dreyfusards regarded this influence as an abuse of power and an exorbitant privilege over the common people, who were deprived of this freedom:

> However, there is, among the signatories, a troop of gentlemen who seem to me to have plenty of cheek. I shall identify them to a single end, of which no one is unaware, along with the titles and occupations with which they deck themselves out: Messieurs Edouard Beaudouin, *professor at the University of Grenoble*; A. Giry, a member of the Institut who must also be, if I am not mistaken,

> *professor at the Ecole des Chartes*; Dr Georges Hervé, *professor at the Ecole d'anthropologie*; Paul Meyer, *director of the Ecole des chartes;* Paul Passy, *associate professor at the Ecole des hautes etudes; Jean Psichari*, directeur d'études *at the Ecole des hautes études*; Gabriel Séailles, *associate professor in the Faculty of Letters*; Seignobos, *associate professor in the Faculty of Letters*.
>
> None of the above-named gentlemen is content to be an *Intellectuel*; they are professors besides and, in that capacity, tap the state budget with a will.
>
> Now I wonder what measures the government would take against, say, a post office employee, and thus also a civil servant, who took the liberty of appending his signature to a poster or petition declaring that Loew, Manau and Bard of the Criminal Court are a trio of bandits?[30]

Confronted by the professors' new audience, the journalist sought to revive all the traditional negative reflexes against this corporation: the anti-intellectualism of those excluded from the school system, the anti-state feelings of non-civil servants, and the anti-elitism that lower-level white-collar workers directed against privileged members of the administrative hierarchy. This was the only group of intellectuals to be thus directly impugned, proving that its social influence put the anti-Dreyfusards in a difficult position when the balance of forces in the Latin Quarter turned against them.

Despite its dyed-in-the-wool anti-intellectualism, the *Libre Parole* understood that it was necessary to struggle against the Dreyfusards on the same grounds, by enlisting in the nationalist cause representatives of the intellectual elite as prestigious as the academics:

> The Dreyfusards plume themselves on the fact that all men of letters are on their side. It is a curious exercise to line their partisans up opposite those who have not ceased to affirm their nationalism and respect for the army. To the signatures of Messieurs A. France, O. Mirbeau, Marcel Prévost, Paul Hervieu, Fernand Vandérem, Abel Hermant, and so on and so forth, we would do well to oppose those of Messieurs Paul Bourget, François Coppée, Brunetière, Armand Silvestre, Henry Houssaye, F. Sarcey, Maurice Barrès, Henri Lavedan, René Maizeroy, Georges d'Esparbès, Grosclaude, Maurice Talmeyr, Jean Lorrain, and a host of others.[31]

Unable to publish a real petition yet, the journalist forges an imaginary one to refurbish his cause.[32] The Henry subscription, launched a few days later, was the immediate application of this programme

and a dress rehearsal for the foundation of the League of the French Fatherland.[33] But it failed from a symbolic viewpoint, for it degenerated into a collective outpouring of animosity towards Jews and *intellectuels*, dissuading moderate anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals from giving it their imprimatur. Since then, a great deal of ink has been spilled on the fact that a few men of letters who subsequently gained fame rallied to it (above all Paul Valéry), but this is an anachronistic reading. At the time, these people were unknowns who did not even lay claim to being writers.[34] What is more, the mode of presentation chosen was hardly such as to rally the eminent names of the intellectual right: the total social melange that it effected was an affront to bourgeois individualism and the professional pride of the right-wing intellectuals likely to sign.

Thus the Dreyfusard newspapers commented condescendingly on these 'infamous' lists: 'The only "intellectual" we see there is Monsieur François Coppée' (*La Petite République*, 1 January 1899); or, again, 'incapable of pitting names against those who affirm their respect for law and the courts' (Yves Guyot, *Le Siècle*, 16 December 1898). A few days earlier, none other than Guyot had issued a challenge to the anti-Dreyfusards: 'Why do you not oppose one list to the other? . . . They may pretend to despise the intellectuals: they know well that they would have provoked peals of laughter if they had been able to oppose only the signatures of Basiles and Ratapoils.'[35]

Thus, by the end of 1898, the Dreyfusard *intellectuels* had won their bet. Even their adversaries, in order to strengthen their own case, had collected illustrious names and thereby acknowledged the legitimacy of the *intellectuels*' mode of political intervention. A transition had clearly been made from '*Intellectuels*', with all the initial scornful connotations, to *intellectuels* without the capital I – men of the mind who were also champions of a political tendency. Barrès, because of his ambivalent position as an intellectual who had refused to become a (Dreyfusard) *intellectuel*, was certainly the person who did the most to domesticate the idea in his proper camp, even if he denied it; he did so in opposition to the theses initially proposed by Brunetière, for example.[36]

The French Fatherland's petitions, in which Barrès played so important a part, are, from this point of view, the logical culmination and successful transformation of the abortive undertaking of the Henry subscription. By mobilizing celebrities who had so far remained silent, the League's leaders could now turn back against the Dreyfusards the insolent elitism with which the latter had overwhelmed them in December. Barrès, for example, wrote:

> The essential point is that it will no longer be possible to maintain that the intelligence and the *intellectuels* – to use those barbaric expressions of bad French one last time – are all in one camp. The fact that people believed this had odious consequences. The thesis of Dreyfus's innocence, albeit scarcely tenable, garnered strong support as a result, especially abroad.[37]

The Dreyfusards were somewhat taken aback by this counter-offensive on their own ground. To disparage the mobilization of *intellectuels* on the other side, they had to fall back on the same arguments that Brunetière and Barrès had only recently used against *them*. The *ad hominem* attacks were coupled with a denunciation of the motley nature of an alliance of individuals in fact united on the sole basis of rejection of the opposing camp. The League of the French Fatherland, in the Dreyfusards' estimation, was nothing but a fragile coalition of moderates, anti-Semites and radical nationalists, with the anti-Semites and nationalists manipulating the moderates in the interests of their dubious enterprise of subverting the Republic. The imputation was the mirror image of the anti-Dreyfusards' charge that Dreyfusism was just what anarchism had been waiting for. Francis de Pressensé developed the first of these two theses in *L'Aurore* of 2 January 1899:

> Assuredly, among this appeal's signatories are a few whose names will go down in literary history. It would, however, be a naive illusion to convince oneself that, because one is a member of the Académie, one has a right to the title of intellectual. That noble company is intent on becoming *the last of the salons*. It is recruited on the basis of mysterious laws . . . .
>
> I would not like to violate the proprieties for anything in the world, but I would, after all, very much like to know who could ever have dreamed of treating a Costa de Beauregard or a d'Audiffret-Pasquier as a thinker or writer. These gentlemen have a tendency to forget that the hierarchy of titles and uniforms has nothing to seek in the realm of the intellect, and that just one scientific discovery, one word of truth and beauty, one sincere, lively work singularly outweighs every expression of the Academicians' approbation.[38]

Once the word '*intellectuel*' was no longer restricted to Dreyfusards but had spread throughout the intellectual field, the contending parties had to wage a new type of symbolic struggle if they were not to tear down what they had previously built up. Earlier, the Dreyfusards had taken the titles that the Académie française or

academia had bestowed on their backers as proof that their cause was well founded. As soon as the opposing camp threw into the scales equally eminent or even superior titles (in view of the still very great prestige that the Académie enjoyed in this period), the polemic shifted to the issue of their intrinsic value, just as, in the eighteenth century, the mushrooming of titles of nobility had made it necessary to certify their authenticity ('because one is a member of the Académie, one has a right to the title of intellectual'). The Dreyfusard intellectual honoured his title, whereas the anti-Dreyfusards, according to de Pressensé, made the mistake of confounding social honour with intellectual merit. For the anti-Dreyfusards, in his view, the Academician's green robes made, not the man, but the intellectual; thus the anti-Dreyfusards sacrificed the *intellectuel*'s autonomy to the traditions of social recognition. The way of presenting signatures adopted by the leaders of the League of the French Fatherland, together with their hierarchic mobilization procedures, provided grounds for these criticisms. The revisionists failed, however, to note the two movements' divergent social aims: beyond right-wing intellectuals, in the face of a helpless official elite and the arrogant elite of the *intellectuels*, the French Fatherland sought to unite the whole of the country's true elite and give it the political place it deserved. De Pressensé reduced his adversaries' enterprise to a literary quarrel of the sort that had been eminently classical in France for two hundred years (ancients versus moderns, innovators versus Academicians, individualists versus guardians of order): 'they are the mandarins of the world of letters; they have never felt the pulse of life.'

The second kind of criticism that left-wing intellectuals addressed to their counterparts on the right is more interesting; it brings out the different structures of the two adverse parties. Jaurès developed this thesis better than any other in his famous article 'La Classe intellectuelle'. For the socialist leader, right-wing intellectuals held no claim to the title of *intellectuel*, not because their symbolic capital was of doubtful value, but because their mobilization was based on illusory grounds and because they were working for others, not themselves: 'The militarists of the Académie française may, if they wish, add Monsieur de Broglie's name to Monsieur Brunetière's, and Monsieur Bourget's to Monsieur de Mun's. A league's value is not based on signatures, but on the idea that it defends.'[39] In other words – *Le Temps* took up the same idea – the League of the French Fatherland had no political future, despite the success of the initial mobilization and its leaders' prestige, because it was founded on an ambiguity. Moderates and nationalists formed a negative coalition.

Their names, marshalled like a detachment on parade, had nothing in common. They were an army without a general that could disband at any moment. Although they put themselves forward as a party, the intellectuals of the right lacked autonomy; they existed in order symbolically to defend the social order, not their cause:

> But there is something else in this mobilization of reactionary intellectuals. Contemporary society, its vices and crimes notwithstanding, does not wish to perish and intends to restore authority at all costs. It demands that those whose profession it is to think offer an example themselves and give the sign that thought has abdicated . . . . Consciously or not, the intellectuals of the reaction serve to accomplish this task.[40]

Jaurès here develops, doubtless for the first time, theses that would do yeoman's service in later intellectual battles. On the one hand, he maintains that the expression 'intellectual of the right' is a contradiction in terms; on the other, his depiction confers on right-wing intellectuals the traits of the ruling class's organic intellectuals. This teleological, mechanistic vision ('society demands'), which one would expect, rather, from a Guesdist, illustrates the strained relations between the *intellectuels* and the parties in the socialist tradition. At the end of his article, Jaurès also criticizes the Dreyfusard intellectuals' weakness: without the workers' support, they would not have been able to promote their cause. The sociological composition of the lists should make it possible to settle these debates about the social images of the two camps.

A SOCIOLOGICAL READING: THE MOBILIZATION

Overall composition

Social analysis of the data on profession presented in the petitions' lists must contend with a basic difficulty, that of the non-responses. Like refusals to answer in the opinion polls, they often lend the question asked its significance.[41] The transition from a mobilization based on signatories' titles to one that brings big numbers into play implies, correspondingly, a mechanical increase in the number of individuals with no social identity. Even if we have to eliminate them to ensure that we have homogeneous bases for statistical comparison, we should take care not to forget that this variation is invested with social significance. The fact that someone mentions his name, address, title or profession brings into play a whole series

of social and political attitudes that skew the final conclusions. Contrary to the democratic credo founding a mobilization based on a petition, all social groups are not equals in this public vote. All sorts of people in dependent or dominated positions (blue-collar and white-collar workers, middle-level or lower-level civil servants, domestics, journalists working for a paper involved in the conflict) are caught up in a hierarchical network that either prevents them from taking public stands (the civil servants' legal obligation to exercise discretion, various kinds of social pressure in the case of private-sector workers) or, if they disregard it, tends to encourage them to sign manifestos consonant with the dominant spirit of conformity or, again, to sign without revealing their identity (recourse to anonymity or generic self-description, renunciation of one's individuality).

Thus it is no accident that the petition with the most impoverished symbolic context and the most commonplace style is the Henry subscription, the petition in which anonymity and collective signatures are most frequent.[42] Thus we could, setting out from this criterion of the quality of social information, establish a hierarchical scale of political mobilization: from the challenge thrown down by the (Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard) individual who broadcasts his full personal identity (surname, forename, profession and sometimes address) and political identity (addition of a profession of faith), a sort of martyr's act patterned after that of the leaders, to, at the other extreme, total obscurity, the printed social graffiti in which individuals melt into the mass, echoing, in chorus, a cry of hatred: 'Down with the Jews! Down with the intellectuals!' Between these two extremes lie the intermediate variants, such as the group signature, in which relative social indignity is masked by number and an affirmation of professional identity or local political community ('workers', 'students of', 'inhabitants of').[43] A miniature social struggle is thus waged at the level of the formulation marking one's espousal of, or distance from, the model of the dominant, the important, the elite or, in contrast, affirmation of a dominated or republican model, with no attribution of a particular social title. The importance of this social play around distinction or its absence is proved by the polemical fashion in which partisans or adversaries of a given petition made use of it. Thus the Dreyfusards were suspicious of the convenient anonymity of the Henry Memorial petition, which made it possible to multiply fictitious names without limit by subdividing the donations received into smaller units. The militant anti-Dreyfusards, for their part, took collective subscriptions as an argument for the claim that they had rallied the united

people to their side, although it may be presumed that these mass endorsements resulted from pressure from above (by employers or others). Finally, each petition gave rise to a series of rectifications, in which people declared that their signatures were invalid, that they had been the victims of pranks or that they had the same name as someone else.[44]

Statistical analysis, even bearing in mind that it rides roughshod over all such qualitative nuances, schematizes, to one degree or another, these manifold differences in the signatories' level of involvement or support. A site of political combat by virtue of its very form, a petition is neither an exhaustive census nor an exact photograph, since it combines diverse modes of expressing an opinion and diverse forms of social definition.[45] Since these variations depended on the nature of the petition and on the point in the campaign at which a signature was collected (the quality of the transcription declined with the ongoing publication of the lists), the deformation that numerical treatment entails systematically underestimates the proportion of dependent groups or the importance of people in the public eye, who were already little inclined to sign and did so in a minimal mode. The differences in the social composition of the petitions analysed are thus partially effaced; they would be more conspicuous if we had homogeneous information on all the individuals considered. For example, if we carry out a fictitious conversion of the percentages, preferentially attributing non-responses to the middle and popular classes, their proportion in the League of the French Fatherland increases from 40 per cent to 65 per cent, a circumstance that would modify, notably, the conclusions of J.-P. Rioux's analysis, established solely on the basis of known professions.[46]

We will never know whether this hypothesis is right, despite its sociological probability as indicated by the findings of contemporaneous polls.[47] It is, at any rate, of heuristic interest in that it shows that the mobilization and hierarchization of public opinion are produced, as they are on the symbolic plan as well, from the top down, by virtue of social complicities or analogies between different groups. The groups over-represented in the lists can thus be identified with the leading groups that carry the others along in their wake as the result of a homology of position. The most caricatural case is that of the Manifesto of the Intellectuals, whose initiators succeeded in recruiting signatories only in the immediate circle of their professional relations. Two-thirds of the identifiable signatories belonged to intellectual categories in the most ordinary sense (teaching: 22 per cent; literary and artistic professions, 26.4 per cent; students, 18.5 per cent). One year later, these groups

remained the most heavily represented in the petitions defending Picquart (allowance made for their weight in the population or their place in the other petitions); yet these three groups now represented only 39.3 per cent of the total. Dreyfusism had now found an audience beyond the main intellectual professions and even beyond their avant-gardes, since the total numbers to which these percentages relate had been multiplied by 30 to 40. Thus the Manifesto of the Intellectuals was indeed an intellectual manifesto, but it was far from having reached a significant fraction of all potential intellectuals, contrary to what the ostentatious display of illustrious signatures was intended to suggest. The petitions defending Picquart were, from this point of view, much more successful, but they ran up against the opposed radicalization of the anti-Dreyfusards, who now made their presence in intellectual milieus known.

The shift from a qualitative to a quantitative logic also made it necessary to gain access to social milieus encompassing large numbers of people. The new recruits, as the evolution of the percentages shows, were drawn not from the bourgeois professions but from the middle and popular classes: the legal professions were poorly mobilized (their share rose from 4.1 per cent to 5 per cent) and the mobilization of the medical professions was only slightly higher (increasing from 4.9 per cent to 6.5 per cent), whereas there was a qualitative leap of blue-collar and white-collar workers (it would have been higher still if there had been fewer non-responses), whose share went from 5.3 per cent to 29.8 per cent. This change had to do with the new political conjuncture (the struggle for revision was no longer a desperate enterprise and involved a larger segment of public opinion) but, as well, with the work of mobilization initiated by the intellectuals: a campaign based on rallies, the foundation of provincial branches of the League of the Rights of Man, an alliance with far-left political and syndicalist groupings. *L'Aurore* provides an account of this mass action, written as it unfolded:

> The good news that will enlighten minds and liberate consciences must make its way into the smallest villages. That is everyone's task, the task of the committees in the *départements* and *arrondissements*,* of socialist or republican groups, of the individuals themselves. If every protester were to send to his friends in the provinces, his relatives, or simply his acquaintances brochures, pictures, newspapers and, in a word, everything capable of serving the cause we are defending in the name of the principles

* Roughly equivalent to a county and a city district, respectively.

> of goodness and truth, France would soon have unanimously agreed to condemn the criminals on the General Staff and their accomplices in the gutter press and the parliament.[48]

The alliance between the people and the *intellectuels* described here, a central theme of Dreyfusard propaganda, was in fact a prettified depiction of the statistical reality of the petitions. From this point of view, the Henry subscription mobilized popular milieus more successfully than did the petitions for Picquart: all the identifiable modest categories taken together accounted for 43.4 per cent of the total, and the figure would surely have been higher had there been fewer poorly identified individuals. Thus this subscription successfully accomplished one of its goals, that of eliciting a reflex of popular, and populist, solidarity with a poor widow attacked by an evil Jew from the big bourgeoisie: 'A constant stream of all classes of society flows past the counter of the newspaper's administrative offices from 9 a.m. to midnight: workers in their work coats, rentiers in elegant tailcoats, and young, bare-headed working women rub shoulders there with modest office workers and poor country priests in threadbare frocks.'[49]

According to table 4.1, Dreyfusism rallied 'the people' in Michelet's sense of the word, as well as a segment of the *intellectuels*,[50] while radical anti-Dreyfusism rallied the army and another segment of the people. As for socially respectable anti-Dreyfusism and the moderates (the signatories of the Appeal for Unity), they brought together diverse fractions of the social elite, at least as far as the identifiable signatories are concerned. In the two last-named petitions, the diverse dominant groups were of equal weight, with a few minor variations depending on the list: in the League for the French Fatherland, members of the teaching profession, with 11.9 per cent of the total, were as well represented as members of the liberal professions (12.1 per cent for the legal professions and 12.2 per cent for the medical professions). The slight preponderance of the literary and artistic professions (16.6 per cent) was smaller than in the Dreyfusards' case, although the initiator had been the Académie française, owing to a more successful mobilization of people in leading positions in the private sector, who were generally under-represented in petitions of this kind: industrialists, engineers, and various categories of managerial and supervisory personnel made up 14.3 per cent of the total. Civil servants were the only poorly represented group in the League of the French Fatherland, the more so as the individuals who can be identified with the state administration were, for the most part, as will appear in detail later, former civil servants or retirees. The

Appeal for Unity was more elitist, with 1,166 identified signatures, as opposed to 9,921 for the League. What is more, the representation of the various elites was not as well balanced here; it inverted that of the League, so to speak. More than in the other petitions, the state-sector elites were powerfully represented: civil servants and politicians made up 14.2 per cent, as opposed to 4.5 per cent in the case of the anti-Dreyfusards. The teaching professions were still more heavily dominant than among the signatories of the Manifesto of the Intellectuals (more than one-quarter of the total), whereas members of the other liberal professions were in no hurry to sign (the same held for the Dreyfusards). The economic elite (industrialists and engineers) was, in contrast, charmed by this unifying ideology that sought to put an end to sterile quarrels that troubled the smooth course of business: 9.8 per cent of the total, as opposed to 6.5 per cent for the League of the French Fatherland.

Despite the uncertainties detracting from the quality of these data, we can, by way of this comparison of the composition of the lists, establish a synoptic schema of the two contending camps' political and social divisions.[51] The overall pattern shows that the elites were structured around two main poles. The more academic and literary elite pole was situated in the Dreyfusard camp; the centre was dominated by the elites' middle zone (public-sector elites allied with the academic or literary establishment); on the right were the categories that dominated the different fields or were tied to the old fractions that had lost power in 1880. This configuration is homologous with the logic of the division of the elites in the face of the social issues described above and in *Les Elites de la République*. We have to be wary, however, of oversimplifications. On the one hand, the graduation of the percentages implies that there were overlaps between the camps (no category is to be found on just one side or the other). On the other hand, our classification simplifies the internal diversity of the groups: two formally identical categories can include very different social positions. Furthermore, we should weight the raw percentages to take account of the size of each group in the population and the relative autonomy of the political field, which privileges intervention by individuals traditionally destined to take public positions and excludes the groups for which taking a position in this way involves a risk.

The composition of a few leading groups

The three main sets that we need to examine in detail, because of their weight in the total, their symbolic function and their militant

engagement, are the teaching professions, the literary and artistic professions, and students. Two issues must be resolved. Are those who were dubbed *intellectuels* identical in the two camps? How many *intellectuels* were mobilized, and at what rate?

The teaching professions

The intervention of academics (in the broad sense then prevailing, which encompassed both secondary and higher education) is the factor contemporaries found most striking, accustomed as they were, since the Empire, to seeing the government keep academia on a tight leash. Not only were professors over-represented (above all on the left, but on the right as well) (see table 4.2), they also laid claim, by virtue of their numbers and their symbolic function, to the place of honour, traditionally held by 'men of letters' from the eighteenth century on.[52] The quantitative verdict corresponds to the impressions people had at the time: 261 professors in secondary and tertiary education signed the Manifesto of the Intellectuals, as opposed to just 230 men of letters or journalists. Since those in the category in question, moreover, very frequently held titles (academics with doctoral degrees, *agrégés* and *normaliens* preponderated), the new breed of *intellectuel* was naturally identified with academia. As for the intellectual rearguard (to simplify) of the Henry subscription, exactly the opposite situation prevailed: most of the slogans targeted the *intellectuels* who were identified with one fraction of academia, the one that overwhelmed all the others with its titles.[53] The intellectuals among this petition's signatories were recruited essentially from among secondary-school teachers, whereas elementary schoolteachers, the intellectual proletariat, were not as under-represented as on the other lists. Of the rare tertiary-level teachers who were avowed foes of the *intellectuels*, six were employed, notably, by Catholic institutions of higher learning. On the left, this category was non-existent.[54]

In the other petitions, the balance among the three levels of the teaching profession was virtually identical. From this standpoint, the similarity between the petitions defending Picquart and the French Fatherland's membership lists is striking. Early in 1899, both camps reached their broadest audience. Although, in absolute numbers, the balance was tipped towards the right after all, the Dreyfusards' success resided in the fact that the revisionists had expanded their initial circle: the proportion represented by elementary education was no longer negligible, and teachers in Paris had been joined by those in the provinces. In contrast, the 'Appeal for Unity', for lack of a mobilizing structure, lapsed back into the elitist

schema of the first stage of Dreyfusism: those in higher education accounted for 40 per cent of the total and, expressed as a ratio, were six times more heavily represented than those in secondary-school education. These similarities and differences alike explain contemporaries' double observation: in question was a kind of fratricide – in the literal sense, since we could cite academics from the same family in the two different camps – that obeyed a comparable principle of engagement on both sides.[55] The quantitative indicators reveal the practical principle informing signatories' interventions: those with the highest academic titles felt that they were qualified, and had a vocation, to throw their opinions into the scales. Relative to their weight in the population, those in higher education provided between four and five times as many signatures as those in secondary education and fifty times as many as those in elementary education. The crucial key here was the freedom to make a commitment that was authorized by autonomy from the administrative hierarchy. It may be presumed that the very rare elementary-school teachers who took the liberty of braving their superiors' ire were geographically less isolated than others or formed an elite peculiar to their profession.

It is tempting, following J.-P. Rioux, to establish a correlation between the considerable number of secondary-school teachers found, despite all, in the right-wing camp and the expression either of social resentment of the Dreyfusards, perceived as privileged (because they taught at the tertiary level or held titles that few others did), or, more generally, of a structural malaise affecting aspiring members of the bourgeoisie seeking political revenge, in this way, for their dominated status within the dominant class.[56] Two considerations, however, militate against this interpretation. First, a non-negligible number of secondary-school teachers rallied to the Dreyfusard camp, despite the higher risks that revisionists ran.[57] Second, secondary-school education was not homogeneous: divisions between disciplines, between the institutions at which these teachers taught, between generations, and between career prospects are all mediations that it is essential to assess before establishing any one-to-one relationship between a political opinion and a professional situation.[58]

Artists and men of letters

It is, in contrast, easier to establish overall correlations in the case of independent intellectuals, faced with an economic market that was, depending on their social assets, more or less restrictive. This relationship enables us to understand the double imbalance

between the proportion of the world of the arts and that of the literary milieu and, within the latter, between the professionals most affected on a daily basis by the struggle for survival (journalists) and those the least dependent on it (writers). In all the lists, the under-representation of artists of every kind is flagrant. Although this group was a big one, like elementary-school teachers, the overwhelming majority of artists, because most were obscure, did not feel that they were in a position to intervene politically. Those who did dare to sign had prestigious titles (they belonged to the Académie des beaux-arts, had won the Prix de Rome, and so on), enjoyed public favour (famous actors and actresses such as Sarah Bernhardt, Mounet-Sully or Coquelin), or had close relations with the literary avant-garde that had been at pains to defend them and, in turn, mobilized them in defence of Dreyfus (impressionists such as Monet or Pissarro; the Nabi group, which had ties to *Revue blanche*).[59]

The mobilization of publicists and journalists was animated, *mutatis mutandis*, by similar principles. Apart from the avant-garde (of the left or far right) charged with producing propaganda on a day-to-day basis for each of the two causes, most journalists, especially in the provinces, were content to adopt a prudent wait-and-see attitude. Since the overwhelming majority of newspapers were indifferent or hostile to Dreyfus, their editors had no real reason to advertise non-conformist positions.[60] Late in 1898, however, the new dimensions of the Dreyfus Affair induced intellectuals of this type to intervene more widely. The publicists had soon attained numerical superiority among individuals from the literary milieu who signed the petitions defending Picquart, whereas there had been parity between them and men of letters in the 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals'. There was a similar evolution on the right, but in the opposite direction. The Henry subscription, an operation launched by journalists, found an intellectual echo among newspaper editors, above all. Few patented men of letters risked entering this dubious battle at the literary proletariat's side: 156 journalists signed, as opposed to just twelve writers. In contrast, the elitism of the League for the French Fatherland tended to re-establish the balance of forces in favour of the noblest segment of the literary field: on Rioux's count, 394 men of letters signed, as opposed to 699 publicists. When we use indices weighted to take account of the populations involved, this in fact amounts to an over-representation of the book as compared to the newspaper: the indices are, respectively, 4.7 and 3.5. That is, they are similar to those for the Manifesto of the Intellectuals and the Appeal for Unity (respectively, 6.9 and 3.2, and 7.3 and 3.4; see table 4.2).

It would be interesting to develop the internal differentiation of these milieus with respect to the types of press organs represented and the journalists' exact editorial functions. To do so, however, we would first have to produce a biographical index of the journalists, a virtually impossible task for so heterogeneous and poorly studied a group.[61] We can nevertheless conclude, on the basis of indications furnished by the lists themselves, that we have to do first and foremost, in the Dreyfusard camp, with the partisan press, deeply engaged periodicals (for example, socialist or anticlerical newspapers) or intellectual periodicals: conspicuously present were collaborators on academic reviews, such as *Revue philosophique* and *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, or reviews that addressed a cultivated public, such as *Gazette des beaux-arts* or *Revue bleue*.[62] In contrast, the anti-Dreyfusards' camp was dominated not only by the right and far-right press (*La Croix*, *La Libre Parole*, *L'Intransigeant*, *Le Soleil*) but also by reviews aimed at a broad, conformist public: the main collaborators of *Revue des deux mondes* (Ferdinand Brunetière, René Doumic, Georges Goyau), *Nouvelle Revue* (Madame Adam, the principal managing editor), *Annales politiques et littéraires* (Brisson *père* and Brisson *fils*, Francisque Sarcey), *Revue hebdomadaire* (Félix Jeantet) or, again, the big newspapers: while the editorial board of the moderate Le *Temps* was divided (six editors subscribed to the Henry Memorial, others joined the League of the French Fatherland, and a few were moderate or dyed-in-the-wool Dreyfusards), the editors of *Le Gaulois*, *Le Journal*, *L'Eclair* and *Le Figaro*, following their newspaper's general line, supported the anti-Dreyfusards.

Students

In line with the received idea that youth represents the future, the Dreyfusards tried to enlist young people in the faculties and *grandes écoles* on their side and to use them in their opinion campaign, since no other conscripts were available until part of the socialist left rallied to their cause. The opposing camp also did not neglect the students' activist function (organization of disruptions in Dreyfusard professors' courses, violent street demonstrations during the trials). While it is relatively easy to measure the degree to which students were mobilized on both sides, it is harder to understand the origin and significance of the positions they took and to relate them to data specific to the student milieu, about which we still do not know much.[63]

A considerable number of the students who signed petitions failed to indicate what they were studying. It is not possible (as in the case of the other non-responses) to formulate a hypothesis about

the distribution of students 'with no further indication'. Since it is a question of a privileged stratum of the younger generation, no discipline was, as yet, relatively discredited on the scale of prestige. Thus our analysis will suffer from a margin of uncertainty, the more so as the label 'student' was, according to contemporaries, very elastic. On the basis of the total number of names to be found in the two main petitions (in favour of Picquart and the League of the French Fatherland), an estimated 15 per cent of all university students clearly expressed their feelings when the affair was at its height; this is the highest proportion of engagement for any group, apart from teachers in higher education (who were much fewer).

The breakdown of students by discipline is still more significant. The distribution of those who signed the Manifesto of the Intellectuals reflects the classical schema opposing intellectual to professional faculties: nearly one-third of the first Dreyfusard students were in letters and 9 per cent were in the sciences; in contrast, 17.1 per cent were law students and 21.9 per cent were medical students. This relative majority of 'sorbonnards' was not, however, as clear-cut as the clichés of the day might suggest: nearly 40 per cent of the Dreyfusard students of the first hour were registered at the Place du Panthéon (Law) or the Boulevard Saint-Germain (Medicine).* The stereotype spread by the newspapers and certain contemporary witnesses such as Barrès or Péguy matches the measurable statistical reality of the anti-Dreyfusards more closely: 73 per cent of the identifiable students made a contribution to the Henry Memorial and nearly 80 per cent of the students who joined the League of the French Fatherland were law or medical students (mainly the latter). This disparity between the homogeneity of the conservative camp and the diversity of the Dreyfusard milieu can be understood diachronically. Dreyfusard academics, in the minority as far as public opinion and the elites were concerned, proselytized primarily among their natural audience, whatever faculty they happened to belong to. The tiered percentages of Dreyfusard students in different disciplines thus depended on how many professors in that discipline had been won over to the revisionist cause. The mobilization of anti-Dreyfusard students, on the other hand, came about as a result less of their teachers' influence than of a reflex of social contagion and a reaction against non-conformist professors. The students' right-wing commitment was the firmer the lower the proportion of Dreyfusards on the faculty and the

* That is, who were law students or medical students, respectively. A 'sorbonnard' is a student at the Sorbonne, and thus a student in letters or science.

more inclined their professors were to make a commitment. That is why the mobilization of law students was less intense than that of medical students: the low level of politicization in law derived from an individualistic style of learning and law professors' refusal to commit themselves. This contrasted with the sociability of hospitals and laboratories and the fact that professors of medicine, whom we shall consider again below, had fewer reservations about making a commitment (see tables 4.3 to 4.6).

A few empirical data may be cited in support of these hypotheses about the two models of student mobilization. Signatories' explanations of their decision to contribute to the Henry Memorial are explicit in this regard. One medical student signed: 'Pelloux (M.), a medical student, not an intellectual.' A student at the Ecole des chartes wrote beside his name: 'in protest against the machinations of his director'. Another student there was more measured: 'who does not like Meyer' (Paul Meyer was the director of the Ecole des chartes). A student at Bordeaux took no pains to fine-tune his opinion: 'in favour of hanging Stapfer with Dreyfus's guts'. A law student vented his hatred: 'a law student who broke his walking-stick beating down the Dreyfusard Buisson's door'. Students in science and medicine expressed a similar rejection of certain professors: 'a former student of Duclaux, a professor he once considered worthy of esteem'; 'five assistant interns revolted by the attitude of some of their teachers'; 'three trainees in the surgery ward at Laënnec who have had their fill of the intellectual-anarchist preaching of the charming *agrégé*'; or, again: 'five anti-Semitic students indignant over the Sorbonne professors' Dreyfusism'.[64]

Sociology, then, cannot account directly for the political balance of forces; if it could, the law students' preferences would have carried the day, since law had the most students and their social origins were the most bourgeois. The mediation of the political climate peculiar to each institution played a major role in dampening or quickening students' reactions. Where Dreyfusism dominated (essentially, in the humanities), a majority of students followed the trend; where it was in the minority, but on prominent display, it inspired intense engagements on both sides, rooted in sympathy or antipathy (such was the case in medicine). In law, in contrast, conservatism probably dominated, but did not publicly call attention to itself because it did not feel threatened by a minority that was too weak to threaten it and was not relayed at the faculty level. The incident provoked by Edouard Beaudouin, one of the rare Dreyfusard law professors at Grenoble, when he delivered his traditional address at the beginning of the academic year, is highly typical of this climate:

> I told these young men to safeguard their freedom of thought and capacity for independent judgement; I told them to take their reason and their conscience for guides, not the fanaticism of public opinion, the slogans of the political parties or the coteries of high society; in short, I told them to be intellectuals. I used the word. I used the word and I said it very loudly. You can see the people's emotion from here. But you have to know the following. Since, in this address, I was speaking, not as a citizen and private individual, but as a professor and in the name of the Law Faculty, I had no intention to blurt out the word *intellectuel* without first warning the parties concerned; I was at pains to act not only with courage (if there's any courage in this) but also correctly. So I sent the dean my written report eight days before the session, recommending the words at the end to his particular attention, and requesting that he correct me if he found my words subversive. My dean is an excellent man, naturally calm and extraordinarily moderate, but he is very liberal . . . . The next day, however, the adventures began. The rector let me know that the general at the head of the division found that the army was alarmed. The dean informed me that two or three of my colleagues (I don't wish to name any of them) are in a state of high dudgeon and want to draw up a statement of protest.[65]

Science students followed in the footsteps of their classmates in letters from the same social category and geographical area, but somewhat less briskly, in step with their professors, who were much less militant than their colleagues in letters, in line with a venerable tradition that assigned the latter the official political role of spokesmen.[66]

To mask the disrupting effect due to the unequal conditions of the mobilization, we can assess the political balance of forces in each discipline by tallying signatures in the petitions in favour of Picquart and the League of the French Fatherland. The tiered percentages then turn out to match the expected stereotypes, even if they put populations of very different sizes on the same level. Thus the rare students at the *grandes écoles* who signed a petition almost always did so in the prevailing conformist sense. Everything encouraged them to do so: their discipline's elitist ideal, which corresponded to that of the French Fatherland, as well as the spirit of seriousness and practical bent of a curriculum oriented towards state administration or the private sector. Finally, the fact that these students were recruited from the more bourgeois strata could not fail to encourage students of the Ecole centrale, the Ecole des mines or the schools

of commerce to come to the rescue of the imperiled fatherland or the social order. At the centre of the graph, but dominated by the right, we find students of law, pharmacy and medicine who had already started working in their professions (as interns or assistant interns). They were exposed to certain social and institutional features of the conditions of study prevailing in the *grandes écoles* but also to the effects of ordinary university life: the influence of *intellectuel* teachers, camaraderie with students in other disciplines, residence outside their institutions, and the greater sensitivity to politics typical of the big urban student neighbourhoods. These factors took full effect in the intellectual disciplines, which explains their Dreyfusard majorities: in letters and the sciences, at the Ecole des beaux-arts and, just barely, in medicine. The students in these disciplines, which had non-exclusive recruitment practices, held critical and scientistic ideals in high esteem and, led to less practically oriented careers, could be more easily converted by their professors or the action of the active minorities in their midst that had rallied to revision: *normaliens* and activists from anarchist or socialist student groups. Thus the Dreyfus Affair prefigured, on a reduced scale, divisions that would come into play later, in the 1920s, during the war in Algeria, and in May 1968.[67]

Civil servants: a masked category

It would be worthwhile studying other social groups as well, if the sources allowed us to do so with the same precision. Unfortunately, we quickly run up against the obstacle represented by the deceptive terminology of self-chosen designations. What is more, when we turn from the most important categories, the populations concerned become so small that we no longer have a reliable statistical base. Every error of identification and every inexact observation can alter the quantitative conclusions. It would be important, for example, to correlate the sociological analyses of the upper-level administration elaborated in *Les Elites de la République* with the political verdicts of the petitions. But the heavy statutory restrictions limiting this group's actions make the signatories who claim, despite all, to be upper-level civil servants especially atypical. Very few indeed (especially at the highest level of the state) ran the risk of revealing their private feelings; the silence of this majority might have been owing to an anti-Dreyfusism that was afraid to express itself or did so only tardily,[68] respect for the discretion required of those at the uppermost levels of the hierarchy or, again, a prudent opportunism that adapted to the fluctuations in the positions of the politicians on whom these civil servants depended. More generally,

the way elites or intellectuals mobilized in the course of this crisis was at odds with the legal or legitimate forms to which the administrative elites' professional culture made them partial. Hence it is not surprising that the civil servants we encounter in the petitions' lists are not very representative of their milieu. The overwhelming majority of state administrators among members of the League of the French Fatherland were retired civil servants: this holds for 77 out of 85 judges, all the civil servants at the prefectural level, and the majority of military men or members of the highest state agencies [*grand corps*]. The only civil servants who were still actively employed belonged to technical corps, which are less subject to political contingencies (they represented 20 per cent of all civil servants who signed a petition). The statutory obligations were not the only reason that retirees predominated; the League's political orientation was another. The League of the French Fatherland, the elite's response to the *intellectuels*, also represented, in civil servants' eyes, the older, recently purged or recalled administrative elite's ideological revenge on the government in place. Similarly, in the Dreyfusards' view, the Henry subscription, because of the massive presence of army officers on these lists, passed for a kind of symbolic *coup d'état* or an appeal for a providential *coup d'état* against the Republic.[69] For the technical civil servants, anti-Dreyfusism was invested with twofold significance: it was a way of manifesting an apolitical, patriotic unanimity, in line with one possible reading of the League's proclamation or, conversely, a way of asserting, in the political debate, a competent elite's claim to power against political personnel incapable of mastering the national crisis. This was the option, for example, taken by Henry Le Chatelier, an academic but also a mining engineer, a theorist belonging to the new type of elite who justified his very unusual engagement in this way.[70]

In the Dreyfusard camp, the small number of activist civil servants makes any overall interpretation a risky business. As in the anti-Dreyfusard camp, retirees or the least political civil servants predominated. The only ones to run the risk of taking a public stand (for Dreyfusism was more costly in terms of sanctions than the opposite stance) were the individuals the most closely tied to academia or those involved in a network of intellectual sociability. In this category were Dumesnil, a former member of the High Council of Public Education; Mascart, an engineer in the Public Roads Administration and the son of a professor at the Collège de France; and Arthur Fontaine, head of labour administration, closely associated with the literary and artistic avant-garde.[71]

CONCLUSION

The petitions called forth by the Dreyfus Affair appear, at the end of this double reading, as the approximate realization of two coalitions that closely reflected the opposed ideological models of the 'elite' and the '*intellectuel*'. The differences between the ideal held up by the protagonists and the concrete sociology of the individuals who rallied to it are traceable to the fact that the groups concerned did not have the same possibility or desire to manifest themselves in this way and also to the relative autonomy of the political field. Yet these global results are still inadequate. Individuals who are identical externally speaking can have different concrete reactions: one abstains, another signs for or against Dreyfusism, a third is more radical or less so. Invoking the infinite diversity of temperaments and individual psychology is just a convenient escape hatch. Insufficiently refined instruments of analysis must also be called into question. To move from gross general correspondences to a finer understanding of people's reasons for making a commitment and the modalities of their choice, a simple correlation realizable for the eminently accessible category of students, we have to introduce new parameters that define individuals' positions and shed light on the stands they took. It is possible to undertake such precise investigation only of academics and men of letters, about whom we have minimal biographical information. It would not be unthinkable for other groups who played important parts in the evolution of the crisis (army officers, the bourgeois professions, political activists), on condition that we first establish a prosopography for those groups. A more positive justification for restricting our examination to the *intellectuels* of left and right may, however, also be advanced. On a plausible hypothesis, these two types of *intellectuels* condensed, as spokesmen for the coalitions locked in struggle, the traits of the other groups gathered under their lead. The object of our last chapter is to test this hypothesis.

5

'Intellectuals' of the Left and 'Intellectuals' of the Right

> Am I a 'leading class'? I have no idea: but what I do know is that I have, if not hatred for the plutocracy . . . then an instinctive, invincible mistrust of it.
>
> F. Brunetière, 'La Nation et l'armée'[1]

Historians interested in the reasons for which *intellectuels* took stands in the Dreyfus Affair generally content themselves with the two parties' own idealist explanations, justifications which, moreover, varied as the crisis deepened and the political situation became more complex. It was a question, for the Dreyfusards, of defending moral values (Truth, Justice) and, for the anti-Dreyfusards, of defending social institutions considered to be above everything else (the Fatherland, the army). For Julien Benda, who sang the Dreyfusards' praises, and for Barrès, who criticized them, they were Kantian subjects devoted to the Universal. Barrès wrote:

> I would prove the power Kantianism has to lead people astray by the attitude of certain academics in the debates over the Dreyfus Affair. Monsieur Séailles knows well, and I beg Monsieur Boutroux to rest assured, that not a single word they find in what I write can offend them: but the testimony of the one in favour of revision, and the hesitant wish of the other (although he also declares himself a follower of Leibniz) to intervene in its favour, represent a very significant and altogether curious access of Kantianism, like the behaviour of the most upright, the most honest and – when they act outside the realm of hard facts, in pure abstraction – the most dangerous minds.[2]

Benda replied:

> Behold a whole phalanx of people not only who conceive general ideas but in whom these ideas cause the corresponding emotions, which, in their turn, cause acts, which run, the better part of the time, directly counter to the individual's immediate interest. Behold a lieutenant-colonel who, out of devotion to an abstraction, ruins his career and accepts three months of detention; a novelist who confronts the savagery of the mob; thousands of young men who sign protests that can compromise their future and, perhaps, their personal safety; and lo! in the clear light of this drama, humanity displays one of its newly formed attributes, one that has become indispensable to social life – I mean, not intellectualism, but intellectual sensibility.[3]

The anti-revisionists, for their part, were supposedly disciples of Taine and Darwin struggling to prevent the decomposition of the social body and to secure the pre-eminence of a new elite charged with warding off the threat of domestic or foreign perils.

These theoretical justifications certainly did contribute to mobilizing the two groups of intellectuals. Yet, by themselves, they are insufficient and have to be augmented by an investigation of their social resonance. If formally identical individuals could be sensitive to different value systems, it was because they encountered in them their vision of the world, itself fashioned by their social trajectory and relative position in the field to which they belonged, or their relation to the field of power. I shall therefore attempt, in the present chapter, to generalize and refine the interpretive model that I proposed for writers in an essay I published in 1977. This schema should be enriched and made more flexible as a function, notably, of the specificity of the academic field.[4]

THE ACADEMIC FIELD: ANCIENTS AND MODERNS

We shall use the term 'academic' to encompass all the personnel in higher education, whatever their hierarchical rank, while leaving aside, for lack of information, a few marginal groups (assistants to professors of science, teaching assistants in medical school laboratory courses, and so on), as well as groups whose massive engagement on just one side does not call for differential analysis (for example, professors at Catholic institutions of higher learning) because their post entails a definition, both social and ideological, of its holders.[5]

To define individuals' political option, I will restrict myself, as in the previous chapter, to the formal signature of a petition. This choice, natural for the largest groups, might be contested in the case of academics, where other sources sometimes allow us to discover the private choice of some of those who did not feel a need to make it publicly known. In fact, the decision not to seek fuller information flows from my basic hypothesis. Since the objective is to understand the adoption of a new model of political behaviour and the openly flagged espousal of two intellectual ideals, only the public nature of this espousal is an adequate index of conviction; and, because of the ever present possibility of an about-face or the ideological contradictions of some, even that is not always adequate.[6] As for my decision not to take the Henry subscription or the 'Appeal for Unity' into account, it is justified by external and internal factors. The subscription for commander Henry, as we have seen, was a dress rehearsal – an abortive one – for the foundation of the League of the French Fatherland. The rare academics who subscribed are also found, with one exception, on this League's membership lists. The 'Appeal for Unity' is more ambiguous, but it basically recruited its signatories among moderate Dreyfusards, some of whom had been unwilling to sign in favour of Picquart (this is clearly how their adversaries, who saw the appeal as a manoeuvre, understood matters). Yet this late, harmless engagement lost part of its novelty and did not have the intensity of the other subscriptions. I will take it into consideration only as a source of additional information and will draw no statistics from it.

To draw up as complete a biographical index of the two camps as possible, even if they are restrictively defined, is a more delicate task than the simple tallies we have so far produced. The problems must be analysed, lest we succumb to the illusion that quantification necessarily implies rigour. Lists taken from journals have the press's inherent defects: typographical errors, occasional uncertainty of identities because two or more people have the same names, imprecision in the description of professions, double occurrences of the same signature, fictitious or unauthorized signatures, and so on. In the case of doubtful identifications, I have systematically referred to the *Annuaire de l'Instruction publique*, but the length of certain lists inevitably entails the risk of forgetting or of mix-ups, even after several readings.

The second set of problems is spawned by the necessity of making comparisons with bigger populations in order to weight the percentages obtained. How, for example, are we to classify an honorary professor or a professor who has more than one post? To

count the latter as just one individual may be proof of arithmetical rigour but can engender social bias: by virtue of their multiple professional affiliations, professors with more than one post counted more than others in the mobilization networks. By the same token, to count only actively employed professors would be to neglect the oblique forms of patronage that honorary professors exercise over their junior colleagues. Both modes of calculation have their own explanatory virtues as far as the rate of engagement is concerned.

The rate of engagement

Notwithstanding their over-representation compared to other social groups, academic signatories of the petitions were in the minority, as appears when we compare their numbers to those of their milieu: somewhat fewer than 30 per cent behaved like *intellectuels* (see table 5.1). In other words, although academics crystallized the new model of the *intellectuel* and were its basic embodiment, the majority of those teaching in higher education did not explicitly espouse this ideal. Every statistic can be regarded in both senses. The identification of the two groups in contemporaries' minds (especially among the Dreyfusards) has to do not only with the symbolic weight of the names to be found on the lists but also with the fact that, for once, the university was more heavily mobilized than literature: the rate of engagement of writers – a professional designation that is admittedly harder to define socially – was 24 per cent.

A third factor accounts for this confusion: the differentiated structure of the rate of engagement, depending on the institution of higher learning. The most 'intellectual' among them (those corresponding to the ordinary definition of a university) were also the ones in which a majority adopted the new mode of social behaviour. Here statistics confirm the stereotypes based on the best-known personalities: topping the list (from the 'most intellectual' downwards) were teachers at the Ecole des chartes, the Ecole normale supérieure, and the Ecole pratique des hautes études (EPHE, fourth and fifth sections),* followed by those of the Paris Faculty of Letters, the Collège de France, and the Paris Science Faculty.

The correlation with the disciplines in which the most deeply engaged students were to be found is particularly striking and

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* The EPHE, founded in 1868, was a modern institution oriented towards research. The 4th section specialized in historical and philological disciplines, the 5th section in religious sciences. The first three sections were oriented towards mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology.

confirms the interpretation in terms of networks of contagion: each type of institution reacted according to the structure of the student body and its professors' role or professional ideal. To account for variations in the rate of engagement, we would have to repeat our analysis of the differentiation of the Parisian academic field – and, more generally, intellectual field – as well as our analysis of the relations between academic elites and the power of the different faculties. I have carried out these analyses elsewhere.[7] The consistency between political attitudes and the morphological and social data make it unnecessary to dwell on this observation. The academic field's dominated pole, like the literary field's dominated pole, was more inclined to engage in this new form of public intervention because it was wholly excluded from other possible forms of power.

Yet secondary factors complicate this overly simple correlation: the intensity of mobilization decreases with distance from the centre of Paris, while the proximity of legitimate – that is to say, literary – culture increases it. Thus, in this respect, science professors in Paris and, especially, the provinces lagged behind their colleagues in letters and also, in the provinces, in medicine. Furthermore, intervening in the political debate in the intellectual mode represented a break with classic forms of power in the provinces – the power of the notables, whether or not they were of intellectual origin. This explains the low participation of jurists, who were more legalistic. Such intervention further presupposed a sufficiently independent institutional position, among both Dreyfusards, mobilized by an ideology of professional excellence, and, no less, anti-Dreyfusards, motivated by a globally elitist image of their function. Such autonomy alone made it possible to surmount the social or ideological constraints that tended to encourage discretion. The last-named factor counted more for the Dreyfusards, who were non-conformist and in a minority, than for their adversaries, who were braced up by public opinion or protected by the ambiguous theme of patriotic unanimity.

We can, however, go beyond the classic opposition between Paris and the provinces, which recurs in all kinds of phenomena involving social or political mobilization. It is possible to chart a geography of engagement based on analysis of the major disparities between universities (see map 5.1). By the analogous logic of the division between centre and periphery, it should be possible to establish a correlation between intensity of engagement and university size. In fact, Rennes, Nancy and Bordeaux, which furnished the greatest number of academic signatures, were far from being the cities with the most students or professors. This correlation

does obtain, however, in the detailed geography of academic Dreyfusism. Since Dreyfusism was in a position of weakness in the provinces, it could come forward openly only where the academic community was big enough to dare to defy public opinion. The University of Toulouse constituted the only exception to this correlation: the second biggest university in France, it ranked seventh in the number of Dreyfusards. This divergence is the more surprising in that a famous Dreyfusard, Jaurès, was an associate professor in Toulouse (and could thus have used old connections to proselytize). What is more, a study of the immediately preceding period has shown that professors frequently took part in local political affairs. That may hold the key to the anomaly: an academic centre far from Paris and big enough not to feel its attraction, the University of Toulouse doubtless marked, with its relative abstention, its refusal to join a political fight that was remote and Parisian; this was a way of affirming its southern-French specificity, as it had through more concrete achievements in preceding years: new institutes, new laboratories, academic chairs with regional ties and a new medical school.[8]

Other peculiar local features come into play and help account for the distribution of opinion according to university. The distinctly Dreyfusard universities of Lyons and Lille owe this choice to the leftist political context of the two cities in the period and, above all, to the tension generated by the existence of Catholic universities in competition with those of the state. This situation fostered a climate of passionate opposition on both sides: as we have seen, both professors and students at Catholic institutions were massively anti-Dreyfusard.[9] In Bordeaux, where this ideological opposition did not exist, Dreyfusism was, rather, the expression of an old reformist tradition of academic life. With the support of dynamic rectors and a city council that had long since been won over to the Republic, the university served as a testing ground for academic innovations.[10] It was in Bordeaux, notably, that the first course in the social sciences was established; we know, thanks to the biographers of its founder, Durkheim, the militant role he played in mobilizing his colleagues in Dreyfus's favour.[11] Conversely, the most anti-Dreyfusard universities were located in the most markedly right-wing regions or those most clearly won over to nationalism. Victor Basch, one of the rare Dreyfusard professors in Rennes, judged the city to be 'passionately clerical and resolutely anti-Semitic'.[12] It was one of the most heavily mobilized provincial universities and one of the most hostile to revision. Similarly, Nancy, a university located near the German border in a solidly nationalist region (Barrès had been elected here)

that was heavily exposed to anti-Semitic agitation, stood out as a bastion of anti-Dreyfusism.[13]

The case of only slightly engaged universities is also interesting, for it allows us to confirm the preceding hypotheses *a contrario*. These universities generally combined two handicaps that explain their professors' lack of interest in the struggles of the *intellectuels*. Their faculties were limited in size (in Clermont, twenty-five professors in all the faculties taken together; thirty-nine in Poitiers) and had little intellectual prestige. Avoided by ambitious professors, they remained outside the academic field delimited by involvement in the new professorial ideal spawned by the academic reform, and they were firmly embedded in local solidarity networks. Even if anti-Dreyfusism found readier expression there than Dreyfusism, the small cities' lacklustre political climate and the professors' dominated situation in the world of local notables hardly favoured academics' politicization. Thus, in Poitiers, no professor signed, with one exception, a retiree who, at the time, was living in the Doubs district. A succinct biographical analysis of the faculty accounts for this apathy and confirms the interpretation we have advanced. Of thirty-nine professors, only one later left the university to teach elsewhere. This general immobility among professors in science and letters went hand in hand with the predominance, in law and medicine, of academics who had been born in the region where they taught and sometimes held local elective office; this trait distanced them a little more from the remote national political debate.[14]

Lack of mobility explains, more generally, the opposition between intellectual and professional faculties. The professors on intellectual faculties were more inclined to adapt to the *intellectuels*' new political behaviour in that they were more likely to move within the academic space or had a greater desire to do so. Movement from one university to another was less frequent in law and, above all, in medicine, where professors were recruited from their home institutions. The opposition between engagement and abstention was also a function of the division between academics who considered themselves to be involved, first and foremost, in the academic or intellectual field and those who, on the contrary, saw themselves first and foremost as notables implanted in local society. In the case of the anti-Dreyfusards, among whom the contradictions between the two models, notable and intellectual, were not as pronounced, the break was not as sharp. It is probable that a more detailed analysis would allow us to distinguish, within this movement, the professors behaving as notables and those motivated by the new ideal of the 'elite'.

This differentiation was not confined to the provinces. We find it in the Parisian institutions of higher learning as well. The most typical case was that of the Law Faculty, the least engaged of all faculties (even less than certain provincial law faculties) and the most heavily anti-Dreyfusard. We have to take these peculiar features of the teaching body and its relations with the government into account. The Law Faculty still held high-level positions of power and maintained relations with the political authorities in the form of its professors' electoral mandates or posts in which they utilized their expertise, and also, indirectly, by way of family connections or friendships with representatives of administrative or political elites.[15] Thus the three professors who joined the League of the French Fatherland were also fully fledged politicians. Their engagement was accordingly not an engagement of *intellectuels* but simply the extension of a classic engagement.[16] Opposite this traditionalist legal pole stood the most Dreyfusard Parisian institutions: they were the most engaged and, at the same time, the ones that most nearly approximated the ideal of the research university inspired by Germany. Among them were the Ecole des chartes, the EPHE, and the Ecole normale supérieure. But is this not to put forward a very abstract explanation for a phenomenon related to the purely random nature of the events responsible for the fact that the *intellectuels*' mobilization campaign began in these three institutions, around Paul Meyer, Gabriel Monod and Lucien Herr, with Bernard Lazare, an EPHE alumnus, serving as the link to the Dreyfus family?[17] In fact, Bernard Lazare knocked at a good many other doors as well on his proselytizing mission. If he found greater understanding here rather than elsewhere, it was not only, as the *intellectuels* themselves said, because their profession as researchers and scientists made them more sensitive to rational objections to prejudice or the *res judicata*, but also, and above all, because their position as an avant-garde in the academic field shielded them against pressures for social conformity. This avant-gardism was itself a first form of engagement, the expression of a strategic choice that diverged from the classic careers in their milieu.[18] To make an engagement in the *intellectuel* mode, people had to be available and thus somewhat peripheral, on condition, to be sure, that they were not preoccupied with other forms of solidarity (familial or political, for example).

The political orientation of the Collège de France provides confirmation *a contrario* of this interpretation. A research institution whose professors were often innovators, the Collège de France should have had positions close to those of the institutions we have

already mentioned. Yet its rate of involvement was lower than that in the Paris Faculty of Letters, and the majority of its teaching staff was anti-Dreyfusard. This global tally, however, neglects the professors' internal diversity and multiple ties to the outside world. The high abstention rate can be ascribed to the scientists' massive lack of interest (a phenomenon we have already observed in the Faculty of Sciences). The borderline between the two camps coincided with that between types of chair. The professors holding the most political chairs (political economy or history of the sciences – which was in fact the chair for teaching positivism, held by Pierre Laffitte) leaned to the right, like those holding the classical chairs (Greek, Latin and Slavic literature); the tenured occupants of the learned chairs (Louis Havet, Gaston Paris, Sylvain Lévi, Paul Meyer) were active in the revisionist cause.[19] With this last example, we have moved from the general reasons impelling academics to behave like *intellectuels* to the particular motivations for their choice between the two parties.

The foundations of academic Dreyfusism and anti-Dreyfusism

For the sake of convenience, the various factors conditioning support for Dreyfusism or anti-Dreyfusism will be examined separately. They should in fact be weighted and assessed globally, as so many dimensions of a space of reference in which each professor must be situated: no one of these factors taken separately provides an explanation, and any simple correlation can be reversed by a disrupting secondary factor. However, the unequal precision of the data, varying with the type of professor, makes it impossible for us to produce this overall picture of the conditions shaping academics' engagement. In any case, a mechanistic reading of the shaping factors mentioned would be an error of interpretation.

If we adopt the model of the *intellectuel* that relates it to espousal of the new academic ideal, as the preceding analyses suggest we should, an individual's position should depend on the generation to which he belonged and/or his rank in the academic hierarchy. According to tables 5.2 and 5.3, Dreyfusism and anti-Dreyfusism appear, in this regard, as a new quarrel of Ancients and Moderns, of established versus aspiring academics. Honorary professors, tenured professors and those in positions of academic power form a majority of those belonging to the League of the French Fatherland, whereas three-quarters of the non-tenured professors who took a position were Dreyfusards. This 'horizontal' reading of table 5.2, which accentuates the opposition, could, however, be contested: a

'vertical' reading shows that tenured faculty made up a majority of the Dreyfusards. But it must not be forgotten that, in the academic pyramid of the day, tenured professors outnumbered teachers of lower rank. Even read vertically, the equilibrium between the two groups underscores the relative over-representation of the youngest academics among Dreyfus's partisans. This first approach does not suffice to demonstrate a clear break between the generations, since, naturally, the best-known Dreyfusard leaders were patently older professors, for reasons of symbolic prestige. In terms of decade of birth, the data for three of the four faculties corroborate the age difference between the two camps. Of the scientists among the Dreyfusards, 40.5 per cent were aged under forty in 1899, as opposed to only 16.2 per cent of their anti-Dreyfusard counterparts. In medicine, where careers progressed more slowly, the difference was not as clear-cut; young *agrégés* nevertheless made up one-third of the Dreyfusard ranks, as opposed to 20 per cent of their adversary's. In letters, finally, the cutting-edge faculty among *intellectuels*, the gulf between the two generations was still wider, in as much as the absolute majority of the revisionist camp was under forty. We would see a still sharper break if we took into consideration teachers at the EPHE and the Ecole normale supérieure, who were younger and still more solidly in the revisionist camp. Those who rallied to the new model of political behaviour were thus clearly, at the outset, members of the younger academic generation, whose entry into higher education was correlative with the increase in the number of posts and the new academic ideal that 'intellectualized' the teaching profession. Logically, in law, where the reorganization had a smaller impact on teaching (here the *agrégés* exercised functions virtually identical to the professors') and recruitment by means of a single competitive procedure homogenized faculty from the outset, age was less of a discriminating factor. We nevertheless find a division that is a function of age if we calculate, not the age distribution, but the average age of the two parties: there is a seven-year disparity between their average ages.

For the academics, age is the only universal indicator, but it is a poor variable. The more revelatory criteria that we shall now proceed to examine all have the disadvantage of bearing on only one segment of the population in question, above all teachers in letters and the sciences, the disciplines in which the mobilization originated. Education is the leading pertinent index. Globally, having studied at the Ecole normale supérieure facilitated politicization. Holding a diploma from the Ecole conferred superior prestige in this period, spurring its graduates to play a leading

role in academia and protecting them from hierarchical pressures, since its alumni held a significant number of positions of power (from the minister of higher education through a number of rectors and deans to the director of higher education). Furthermore, the historical conjuncture conferred a specific function on the network of *normaliens*. The Ecole normale had been, as we know, one of the centres of the pro-Dreyfus mobilization.[20] The bonds of comradeship or friendship established between classmates at the Ecole thus gradually came to serve as channels of conversion. This hypothesis is confirmed by examination of the classes to which *normaliens* in academic posts in the provinces belonged. Whereas the anti-Dreyfusard *normaliens* belonged to classes that were widely scattered between the class of 1834 and that of 1887, the dates at which Dreyfusards entered the Ecole were much more compactly clustered (between 1867 and 1890), with a sequence of classes in which they formed a majority (1878–87). To put it in terms of Dreyfusism's leading lights, they were grouped between Jaurès's class and the date Charles Andler left the Ecole, with Lucien Herr (class of 1883) standing, symbolically and concretely, at the nodal point in between. The classes follow one after the other, practically without interruption (taking into consideration that a period of study lasted three years), with the result that all the Dreyfusard *normaliens* had been contemporaries at the Ecole at least part of the time. Dreyfusism, based on a modern form of militancy, had its inception in a concrete intellectual community. In contrast, anti-Dreyfusism was based on a model of hierarchical recruitment, corresponding to congregation by concentric imitation in the absence of any pre-existing social bond. One converted or was converted to revision, whereas one joined the League of the French Fatherland. The EPHE played an analogous role in a minor key. A certain number of Dreyfusard academics in letters, scattered throughout the provinces, were alumni of this Ecole and, notably, disciples of Gabriel Monod and Louis Havet, two of the recruiting officers of Dreyfusism whose correspondence shows that they systematically mustered up their former students – to be sure, not always with success.[21]

Thanks to Victor Karady's biographical index of all the academics in letters, which he very kindly put at my disposal, I have been able to differentiate the profiles of this type of Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard with greater precision. The former had much more mobile careers than the latter. Twenty-four such Dreyfusards out of the thirty-five known to us held, at the time of the affair, the post in higher education to which they had been first named, a trait

related to their youth. Only seven had begun their teaching career somewhere else. The careers of ten of them would end where they had begun. Overall, seven remained loyal to the same university throughout their professorial careers. The anti-Dreyfusards had different trajectories. Half spent their whole careers in a single institution. Those who had begun them elsewhere retired from the post they had held during the affair. Only one made it to Paris, as opposed to more than half of the known Dreyfusards who did not die prematurely. This index of the greater success of the academic avant-garde may be interpreted in one of two ways. It can be said that, as reform-minded professors – hence as professors faithful to the spirit of the new Sorbonne – they reaped the fruits of their efforts. The pessimistic interpretation would have it that, as members of the Dreyfusard network, they profited from selective co-option by their political friends, who had become the masters of the Sorbonne Faculty of Letters, whereas the academic right fell victim to the radical Republic's ostracism.[22] Although the fact that nominations to these posts were staggered over a long period makes the idea of a prolonged academic conspiracy dubious, even if a few scandalous appointments lend some colour to this mythology, it is probable that long-standing ideological affinities did help facilitate professional patronage.

Religious oppositions constitute the other trait differentiating academic Dreyfusards from their anti-Dreyfusard peers. This, too, provided the occasion for a pejorative interpretation by the far right. Minority religious confessions were over-represented among Dreyfusards, and not just among their leaders: of thirty-two individuals whose religious affiliation is known, at least eight were Jews or Protestants, whereas almost all the anti-Dreyfusards whose religion is known were Catholics. In Paris, the phenomenon was still more pronounced: of twelve teachers at the EPHE (fourth section), half were of Jewish or Protestant origin; this held for all the professors of the Ecole's section for religious studies. Finally, at the Collège de France, of eight revisionist professors, five were Jews or Protestants. The point is nevertheless not to accredit the thesis of a Jewish–Protestant conspiracy, an extrapolation from this heavy presence of religious minorities in intellectual Dreyfusism. In the first place, not all Jews and Protestants in academia were declared Dreyfusards (the best-known case of abstention being Bergson's); what is more, a reflex of elementary prudence could have predisposed many of them to discretion in the hostile context of the period, a tendency that was quite frequent among non-intellectuals.[23] This privileged engagement of

religious minorities had to do with long-standing realities: Jews' or Protestants' attachment to republican values had long served them as guarantees against the intolerance and clericalism of the majority of the Catholic right. The rejection of the anti-Semitism animating many anti-Dreyfusards was an extension of their centuries-old struggle for religious equality.

With this religious opposition between the two camps, we have moved from the external to the internal reasons motivating engagement. On condition that we once again widen our field of inquiry, we can ask, with a famous Dreyfusard sociologist, Durkheim, if taking sides in the affair was not the continuation of a primary intellectual choice, that of the discipline an individual taught. The author of *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, in his reply to Brunetière's article 'Après le procès', in which the latter maintained that the *intellectuels* had no right to question the *res judicata* in the name of their putative expertise, went beyond a defence of the universality of reason, Dreyfusism's foundation, in order to propose an explanation of 'intellectuals' individualism' as an effect of acquired professional habits that made them more critical than others in the face of aberrations of the reason of state. Durkheim went on to furnish a hypothetical interpretation:

> If, therefore, in the last few months, a certain number of artists and, above all, scientists have concluded that they must refuse to approve a verdict the legality of which seemed dubious to them, it is not because, in their capacity as chemists or philologists, philosophers or historians, they claim some sort of special privilege for themselves and a sort of right to review the *res judicata* . . . . Since the exercise of the scientific method has accustomed them to reserving judgement for as long as they feel that they are insufficiently informed, it is only natural that they should yield less easily to the prompting of the multitude and the prestige of authority.[24]

Durkheim's list of specialties was not a product of chance: 'chemists' evokes the role of Emile Duclaux or Edouard Grimaux, 'philologists' that of Louis Havet or Michel Bréal, 'philosophers' that of Gabriel Séailles or Ferdinand Buisson, and 'historians' that of Gabriel Monod, Charles Seignobos or Alphonse Aulard – to mention only the celebrities. Did there exist, more generally, a close correspondence between certain disciplines and the privileging of certain political choices? To establish a correlation of that sort is to risk several pitfalls that are hard to avoid. First, one and the same discipline can take several quite different forms. Second, it

becomes necessary to lump individuals together in categories that efface the specificity of intellectual content. Finally, there are more specialties in certain fields such as medicine than professors whose opinions we know, and this makes establishing any correlation a hazardous affair. I have therefore excluded counts of the Faculty of Medicine.

When we limit ourselves to the faculties and other institutions of higher learning in letters, the sciences and law, we can present the results in one of two ways. Establishing a simple correlation in the form of a double-entry table, the method that sticks the most closely to the facts, glosses over the significant disparities in disciplines with a small number of chairs. Overall, it confirms Durkheim's schema: clustered around the Dreyfusard pole were history, philosophy, the physical and life sciences, archeology and philology. At the opposite pole were the legal disciplines, classical literature, geography and political economy. More revelatory, in contrast, is an analysis in which we assign the numbers of those in the two camps a positive or negative sign, making it possible to calculate an algebraic sum for each discipline and thus to establish, based on this criterion, an index of the intensity of engagement on both sides (see table 5.5). It then appears that history and philosophy, followed by philology and archeology, were the disciplines with the greatest affinities for Dreyfusism. They were followed by the new disciplines (the social sciences and foreign literatures) and then the experimental and life sciences. Clustered at the centre of the schema, close to zero, are the chairs that did not foster clear-cut engagement: mathematics and the peripheral legal disciplines. The opposite camp was dominated by professors in the traditional literary disciplines, jurists with an economic orientation (commercial law, political economy, finance) and, still further to the right, the professors who govern civil society: civil law professors. This schema is in conformity with that of the 'parliament of science' dear to Kant: attachment to the established order of teaching goes hand in hand with the previous choice of a discipline linked to the tradition or based on the right-wing *intellectuel*'s elitist ideal. On the other hand, the same individuals tend to feel an attraction for a certain spirit of intellectual and disciplinary innovation and an *intellectuel* approach to politics. Such convergence is not automatic: thus history and philosophy, in which we find the most Dreyfusards, are also disciplines in which there are many anti-Dreyfusards. These disciplines are distinguished by the fact that they are age-old subjects linked to a certain tradition, although they may also include an innovative fringe; thus these sub-sets

epitomize the overall opposition traversing the academic field. This particularity is a factor motivating not just engagement on the left but engagement in both camps. What is more, history and philosophy had long had a more general political vocation than the purely literary disciplines or the disciplines imported from Germany that could appeal to individuals tempted by apolitical erudition.

We find comparable divisions in the sciences, *mutatis mutandis*. Mathematics, by a symbolic coincidence, occupies the zero position. Thus mathematics did not predispose its practitioners to any particular political or ideological position. Long in the dominant position in the science faculties, a noble discipline *par excellence*, mathematics encouraged intervention (in this period, mathematicians often held positions of academic power) in the name of professional excellence, but in an elitist sense – by analogy with classical philology, dominant, for its part, in the Faculties of Letters – as well as a critical one, in the name of Truth and Reason, which were simultaneously mathematical and Dreyfusard values.[25] The physical and life sciences, in contrast, long in a dominated position, but on their way to gaining recognition thanks to their contribution to material progress, formed a milieu that favoured Dreyfusard political reflexes, except in those who, albeit dominated as well, preferred to withdraw from the world out of a sense that social activism was not respectable – whence a higher abstention rate. This abstract inventory is incapable of accounting for the full range of positions taken by academics during the affair. It holds globally, but never case by case. For each individual, more personal factors came into play: political heritage, family situation, precise personal trajectory. Because we lack exhaustive biographies of all these individuals, a good many exceptions remain incomprehensible: from the far-left professor who, after producing contradictory justifications, declared that he was an anti-Dreyfusard, to the Catholic militant who adopted the opposite stance. In between were all the double forms of engagement amid non-engagement, of an official refusal to choose accompanied by private avowal of one's preferences, or of apolitical politicization owing probably to conflicting influences that paralyzed or neutralized a professor's capacity for choice; Ernest Lavisse might be taken as paradigmatic here.[26] If the academics' engagement seemed so novel to their contemporaries, it is because it represented a break with the distance from the world that has always been academia's characteristic feature. This break with tradition was nevertheless not entirely a matter of chance, as we have seen. On the contrary: abandoning traditional abstentionism and asserting a new identity as an autonomous intellectual or loyal

member of the elite called for much stronger, well-thought-out reasons. It remains to be seen whether these fundamental reasons can account for the engagement of men of letters, who had much less freedom of action than they themselves thought.

THE LITERARY FIELD: THE QUARREL OF THE GENERATIONS

The literary field will be only partially analysed here, since I have already proposed elsewhere a model for understanding the engagements of writers in the main literary groups. Thus I will not repeat this interpretation but, rather, try to determine whether the discriminating factors brought out with respect to academics can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to men of letters. If so, this should make it possible to understand the mobilization of the most obscure, those not defined by the literary options of the groups or eminent personalities in the political battle referred to in that earlier analysis. Such a project may seem to be partially unrealizable: I have already pointed out the inadequacies of the data available on a considerable number of academics about whom we have public sources at our disposition, and the situation is much less favourable when it comes to the literary foot-soldiers, about whom the only accessible indication is that they defined themselves in the petitions as 'men of letters'.

This preliminary obstacle nevertheless founds the legitimacy of our inquiry. The fact that an individual entered the occupational title 'man of letters' next to his name is not a matter of indifference under these circumstances because of the symbolic way the lists were presented and the fact that such an individual could, like many other petitioners, have maintained relative anonymity. As a professional description, such an indication has only relative value, unlike academic functions or titles, which were labels the utilization of which was legally controlled and could be verified by other sources. An obscure scribbler or even someone who did not write at all could call himself a man of letters without fear of contradiction, because the use of that term was not regulated in any way. This choice was an indication less of the vanity associated with literature in France than of a demand, in a certain sense, that one be taken, precisely, for an *intellectuel*, not an ordinary citizen. Studying the 'men of letters' of the two main petitions is a way of finding out who, academics aside, laid claim to the new social and political identity implied by appending a signature to a collective statement and by self-definition through an intellectual function.

Having thus defined our perspective, the problems of documentation remain crucial. The hypothesis guiding our search for data runs as follows. The unknown men of letters who wished to show their solidarity with the famous minorities at the head of the movement probably did so, in both camps, on the basis of an affinity with their camp's leading group: that is, in the Dreyfusards' case, with the avant-garde and the least conformist of the middle-sector writers and, in the anti-Dreyfusards' case, with representatives of academic literature and the more established middle sector. To bring out these analogies of position in the absence of the real biographies that we will probably never be able to establish, I have turned, as in other stages of my research, to the summary information furnished by Otto Lorenz's *Catalogue général de la librairie française*: decade of birth, length of involvement in the literary profession, volume and type of production. If – as suggested by the conclusions drawn from the example of the literary field, the morphology of the literary field, and the evolution in the way elites were structured – the affair was plainly a crisis in which each camp's tensions and frustrations as well as its relation to the government found expression, the cathartic function of an engagement by 'men of letters' should, in its turn, be reflected in these summary indications, since we have already encountered it in other groups that were better protected or little inclined to take a public stand.

Men of letters and 'men of letters'

Among Dreyfusards as well as anti-Dreyfusards, the number of individuals who laid claim to the occupational title 'man of letters' (including related descriptions such as 'poet', 'playwright' or 'critic') was around 300: 320 in the Dreyfusards' case, 290 in that of their adversaries. This virtual equilibrium between the two parties and the revisionists' slight advantage (whereas the opposite holds in the academic field) attest the exceptional enthusiasm for this new form of engagement, whether in defence of Truth or Order. These numbers show the extent to which contagion was facilitated by the characteristics of the literary field in France: concentration in Paris, writers' involvement with the periodical press, and the existence of numerous places where they could meet and socialize. The relative rate of engagement was doubtless a little lower than that of teachers in higher education (and would be even if we were to include the publicists left out of account here), because fewer people were employed in higher learning and because those who were had a more highly developed *esprit de corps*. However, in absolute terms,

the men of letters clearly constituted, for a newspaper reader, the bulk of the petitions' rank and file and a segment of the most famous general staff.[27] Yet, for two reasons, the writers' engagement did not impress contemporaries as much as the professors'. In the first place, the writers' petition was not a radical novelty, as we saw in the last chapter. Furthermore, the ambiguity of the notion 'man of letters' did it a disservice, since a majority were unknowns boasting that that was their occupation. Comparison with the bibliography leaves no room for appeal: 18.7 per cent of the men of letters who signed the Manifesto of the Intellectuals had no published book to their credit in the years preceding the petition. The proportion rises to 46.3 per cent in the petitions defending Picquart (excluding those who had already signed the Manifesto of the Intellectuals) and 32.9 per cent for the French Fatherland's membership list (see table 5.5).

How are we to understand such a deficit? Is it merely a question of a widespread intellectual imposture, an expression of the social snobbery connected with a prestigious group, or an indication of the fluctuation of the literary field's ill-defined margins? All three explanations are doubtless valid, but a fourth seems to me to be more decisive. Some of these 'pseudo' men of letters had never published a book, but they collaborated on newspapers or reviews or had functions in the apparatus of the literary world. 'Man of letters' is a more flattering term than 'publicist', 'critic' or 'journalist', for the word betokens rejection of the forms of economic and hierarchical dependence that accompanied the growing domination of literary life by money or press organs. With this white lie about their identity, the petitioners, even if they did not formally satisfy the minimal conditions warranting a claim to the title of author, aspired to satisfy them some day in the future. They hoped to leave their subaltern positions after achieving success, like the most prestigious of their seniors, beginning with Zola, who had scaled all the rungs of the publishing ladder, from a menial job with the publisher Hachette to universal glory.

The size of this fringe of men of letters by anticipation confirms our earlier analyses of the pressures of competition, the intellectual professions' tendential social decline, and the proliferation of obstacles an aspiring writer had to surmount to escape from literature's hell. A minority of the 'virtual' writers who had published nothing before 1900 managed, in the years thereafter, to place a foot on the first rung of the ladder of fame. For them and all those who would not get even that far, the petition was a sort of collective literary manifesto answering to the same principle as a literary manifesto in the strict sense. When a handful of writers sign a text defining new

aesthetic principles, the contents of their programme matters less than the intention they express in it in order to differentiate themselves from other recognized writers and thus, indirectly, present themselves as authors, although, as a rule, they have published little or nothing.[28] The petitions of the Dreyfus Affair furnished one whole segment of the literary field, which lacked the means to make that kind of lofty affirmation, with an occasion to smuggle itself into the intellectual field thanks to a political alliance with their more distinguished seniors, the men animating the movement who needed reinforcements in their combat.

Are we reading too much into a gesture that was, after all, anodyne? Other indices taken from the sources would appear to credit our thesis. The variation in the proportion of 'pseudo' men of letters evolved with the tenor and political situation of the lists. The proportion was smallest in the case of the founding text that inspired the greatest engagement, had a more political content, and came on the heels of the scandal aroused by 'J'accuse'. In other words, the aspiring literati lacked the self-confidence to sign the riskiest petition, putting aside the fact that they were less likely to have been solicited for lack of connections to the initiators. What is more, the most dominated of those in the literary field would, by signing, have somewhat reduced their chances of gaining access to the periodicals, which, at the time, were almost all in the opposing camp. Only the independent avant-garde could afford the luxury of this provocation, because it had nothing to gain from the newspapers. By the turn of 1899, the situation had changed. There was less censorship of revisionist demands. Both camps had renounced the search for names carrying symbolic weight and were privileging numbers. The organizers no longer hesitated to publish the signatures of 'men of letters' of lesser merit. The goal of both camps at this point was to show that it had more *intellectuels* on its side than the other did. It was necessary, especially on the left, to recruit from the reserves outside the intellectual field, among men of letters as well as last-minute Dreyfusards, even those who were unpublished. The League of the French Fatherland, for its part, remained more selective in its lists: whence a lower proportion of 'pseudo' men of letters and a total number of writers slightly lower than that in the revisionist camp.

We can also use an argument *a contrario* to prove that the signatures of men of letters had hidden social significance. The Henry subscription, a petition directed against the *intellectuels*, was distinguished, as we have seen, by the nearly total absence of 'men of letters'. The intellectual proletariat was to be found here, but its members unabashedly identified themselves as 'journalists'.

For these signatories, putting their lowliness and social stigma on display was a way of pillorying the *intellectuels*' arrogance while flagging, in the name of anti-Semitic populism, the fact that they themselves were an integral part of the 'true France', the France of the little man and the untitled. In the *intellectuels*' petitions, the opposite principle carried the day. This hypothesis also allows us to account for concrete facts. Lorenz and other sources show that the range covered by the term 'man of letters' was very broad. Thus we find, among the individuals whom accredited men of letters would not have recognized as such, authors working in literary sub-genres, women of letters who wrote children's novels, popular novelists, obscure publicists, the publishers of fugitive reviews,[29] and even signatories who signposted their dominated position by calling themselves 'poet-songwriters'.[30] We even find – the consequence of the reciprocal effect of ideology on society – a petitioner who identified himself as 'an intellectual proletarian'!

Thus, paradoxically – but the contradictory unity of the term *intellectuel* resides here – the men of letters' claim to collective autonomy was based, at this general level, on premises that reversed that of the academics. In the academic field, over-selection with respect to the base population founded, if not the pretension, then, at least, the legitimacy of posing as a group wielding professional power. In the literary field, the leading figures excepted, it was the other way around. Adopting the posture of an *intellectuel*, as indicated by a signature accompanied by the occupational description 'man of letters', was a way of striking a symbolic blow against the objective situation. While only academics with titles deemed themselves qualified to come forward as *intellectuels*, writers, thanks to their traditional prestige in France, could present themselves as such without having published anything. 'Intellectual', for the professors, was a gratifying title that allowed them to transcend the limitations associated with being a scholar or scientist,[31] whereas, in the literary field, thanks to the alchemy of the collective, this new role partially closed the gap, as long as the struggle lasted, between unknown and famous writers or between scribblers with political pretensions and engaged Academicians. Thus men of letters as a group regained, for the space of a crisis, the lustre that their social situation had been losing for the previous two decades as a result of the transformations of the literary field.

This interpretation must not, however, obscure the difference between the two camps. Other traits allow us to characterize the two parties' rank and file. Their engagement cannot be reduced to two variants of the same *ressentiment*.

The literary generations

As in the academics' case, there existed a generational conflict between Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard writers, too, revealed by the distribution of the petitioners' decade of birth (see table 5.6). It was more pronounced among writers, since they represented a less select population, and it diminished as the mobilization grew. The quality of our data, however, can undermine these conclusions. For, basically, apart from a few young Dreyfusards destined for brilliant literary careers, our information comes from Otto Lorenz's *Catalogue*. But the fact that a large segment of 'men of letters', those without published works, did not figure in that bibliography by definition means that we do not know a great many birthdays. If the elitism and over-representation of the avant-garde account for the satisfactory rate of response (nearly two-thirds) in the 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals', non-responses outnumber responses in the petition defending Picquart, signed by many phantom men of letters. This index is therefore shakier. Nevertheless, if our first hypothesis about 'pseudo' writers is on the mark, it is safe to assume that our aspiring authors were primarily young men. This would make the generation gap revealed by table 5.6 still wider.

Over two-thirds of the men of letters who signed the 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals' were under forty in 1899. The proportion remains close to 50 per cent in the petitions defending Picquart. But scarcely one-quarter of the writers who joined the League for the French Fatherland were under forty. As in the academics' case, so here, too, we find an effect of the two camps' opposed modes of mobilization, which set out from the avant-garde on the one hand and the Academy and established literature on the other. Dreyfusism did not rally the young 'by nature', but it did presuppose less complete integration into the established intellectual and social order, something that tends to apply to the young, even if a few older members of the Dreyfusard leadership had been able to 'stay young' or 'become young' again – that is to say, to take risks.[32] This youth could be a militant force, as both the success of the petitions defending Picquart and the mobilization by ricochet of the students attest; but it was a handicap when it came to the respectability of the cause defended, as Anatole France saw when Fernand Gregh solicited his signature:

> He read it. 'Given what I think', he responded in no time, 'I cannot not sign . . . . And who am I with?'

> 'The whole younger generation.'
>
> 'Yes, fine, but I need a few people my own age. Otherwise, I'll look a bit ridiculous. Who do you have?'
>
> 'Zola.'
>
> 'Oh, Zola! Zola doesn't count. He goes without saying. That's his career.'[33]

Barrès did not fail to turn this argument against the Dreyfusard 'semi-intellectuals'. Dreyfusard intellectuals' youth confirms the accuracy of his denunciation of the intellectual proletarians. The young, hence proletarian, intellectual is a threat to the established order: he is, in effect, a potential failure who resents society because of his failure and turns his pretensions against it. The hasty polemical generalization might just as well serve to explain the anti-Semitic passion of some of Barrès's allies, whereas part of the Dreyfusard avant-garde was recruited, rather, from among privileged literary men faithful to art for art's sake. The age pyramid of Barrès's partisans, in contrast, is much less unbalanced and quite similar to that of all the authors mentioned by Lorenz. In their fifties or forties, these were writers who were, if not famous, then at least better established and well integrated into the literary institutions: the fact that they had managed to persevere in literature beyond a certain age was, by social conformists' criteria, a sign of relative success.

This quarrel of the generations, as much state of mind as objective fact, influenced the political perception of the problem posed. The patriotic and nationalist themes diffused by the League of the French Fatherland had a better chance of finding an echo among mature men marked by the 1870 defeat than in younger age groups, for which it was at most a childhood memory.[34] The young writers, who had also not experienced the militant phase of the establishment of the Republic, remembered, as in the days of the anarchist wave, its faults above all (the scandals and the parliament's helplessness, of which the affair was one more sign) rather than its accomplishments – the high level of freedom that the very magnitude of this crisis presupposed, an argument the anti-Dreyfusards never tired of repeating.[35] This chronological gap also entailed relations of different kinds with the army, the institution at the centre of the debate: defence of the army was a slogan that could be endorsed all the more easily by men who had themselves escaped the obligations of the new universal military service or had experienced only the heroic, temporary version of service in 1870:

> Not for a minute do they consider that, without these soldiers – without the 'invisible and present' protection that they provide

> even their foes – they would not have the leisure to torture rabbits in their laboratories, or find it easy to convene Peace Congresses, or enjoy the liberty to insult common sense and the courts with such paradoxes.[36]

The young writers, in contrast, had more often been subjected to the new draft law, at the origins of an anti-militaristic current and the first clashes between the government and the intellectuals, as we have seen.[37] Finally – the last influence that came with belonging to a single generation – the newest literature was not as remote from literary academia as before; this facilitated the emergence of a commonality of views between the two types of intellectuals. For the writers of the younger generations had studied in the Faculties of Letters or the learned schools much more frequently than in the past. A system of common cultural references thus brought (young) professors and (young) writers together.[38]

Producers and reproducers

This difference in generations and historical perspectives between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards shaped the other distinctive traits of the writers in both camps. Two indices have been retained despite their limits, the only two that can be used in a global statistical analysis: the volume of work produced in the previous decade and its distribution among the various genres (see tables 5.7 and 5.8). These parameters, if we regard them in the light of the morphological data already established, have greater social significance than might seem to be the case. The number of books published attests the level of commitment to a literary career, of professionalization and of relative recognition since, in a difficult period for the book trade such as the one preceding the Dreyfus Affair, being able to publish was particularly significant in this respect.

The difference between Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard men of letters is appreciable: 57.4 per cent of the pro-Picquart petitioners had not published more than one book before 1899, as opposed to only 47.2 per cent of the members of the League of the French Fatherland. The Dreyfusards of the first wave, in contrast, were more deeply committed to the literary profession, confirming our previous hypotheses: only 45.5 per cent had written just one book. If we ignore the phantom men of letters, the small producers represented just 22.7 per cent among the Dreyfusards (as opposed to an average 29.3 per cent overall in Lorenz) and, respectively, 26.8 per cent and 28.7 per cent in the two Dreyfusard petitions. These figures

evince two strategies for gaining admission to the literary field. The first *intellectuels* were small and middle-sized producers seeking to make a career in the noble mode by producing substantial work. In the course of the year 1898, they were joined by marginal figures in the literary field who had not yet managed to find a publisher. Conversely, the proportion of professional writers did not increase, in spite of more intensive mobilization; very few recognized writers rallied to the Dreyfusards in the second period of the revisionist campaign. The situation of the authors of the League of the French Fatherland was quite different. The movement, which began with the most recognized writers, in accord with the norms of the day, succeeded in rallying the literary pyramid's upper and middle levels. Prolific writers, for example, were much better represented than among the Dreyfusards: 13.4 per cent as opposed to 7.1 per cent. This index does not coincide with that of recognition, but it does at least point to men of letters who, thanks to the regularity and multiplicity of their production, were in the public eye or successful enough to publish regularly. Among their number were authors as different as popular novelists (Charles Mérouvel, Marc Mario), high-society novelists (Jean Lorrain, Gyp), novelists working in a variety of sub-genres (Georges Montorgueil, Frédéric Masson) and the best-selling authors who published in the newspapers (Barrès, Léon Daudet), to say nothing of the Academicians.

In short, with respect to the quantitative criterion, we clearly have, in the one camp, literature that was seeking to become established while rejecting excessive literary industrialism and, on the other, literature that had already arrived (as well as arriviste literature), ensuring its survival through an economic strategy based on the book. For their contemporaries, the anti-Dreyfusards were, with a handful of exceptions, notorious authors, to whom the Dreyfusards could oppose only a very few names, the more so as some of their allies, less obscure in our time for reasons having to do with the literary-historical tradition (the Symbolists, etc.), were still very poorly known.

Thus we find, when we consider the whole set of writers, the same structure as for the most literary authors. Barring a few exceptions (Emile Zola, Anatole France, Maurice Bouchor), the Dreyfusards had virtually nothing to lose by engaging themselves as *intellectuels*. Some were camped in the margins of the literary field, others did not practise the writer's trade with a view to economic survival, and still others were seeking, through collective protest, to improve their relative position by publicly associating themselves, by way of engaged literature, with a channel of symbolic promotion. Thus literary

sincerity and well-understood literary 'interest' went hand in hand. From an outsider's standpoint, the *intellectuels* might be taken for a kind of new, extended literary group, an analogy encouraged by the presence of certain members of the avant-garde in their ranks. Yet we cannot speak of Dreyfusard careerism, as certain disenchanted Dreyfusards did, for very few of these new men of letters who were obscure before the affair succeeded in improving their position in the literary field thanks to friendships, collaboration with newspapers, or the assumption of new responsibilities in certain political organizations. The writers who opted for the avant-garde as a strategy for entering the literary field were subjected to the same fate: only a minority managed to keep their heads above water. Inversely, however, their audacity brought them much greater rewards than the mediocre, obscure security of a conformist literary career.

The anti-Dreyfusards, in contrast, ran no great risk by joining the League of the French Fatherland. Indeed, the League could pass for an auxiliary of the Société des gens de lettres, devoted to the social order and established literature.[39] Literary foot-soldiers sought to penetrate this elite phalanx as well, albeit in smaller numbers. Those who called the tune maintained their eminent positions in the literary world thanks to regular production and connections with the major press. The anti-Dreyfusard segment of the literary field had no avant-garde: poets were under-represented there (13.6 per cent as opposed to 29.3 per cent and 19.5 per cent, respectively, in the revisionist petitions). Similarly, there were few playwrights, a handful of exceptions aside, and novelists held only a limited place, except for the most prolific. In contrast, mixed or miscellaneous genres were more frequent here than in literary production in general. This characteristic was consonant with the right-wing *intellectuels*' range of ideological themes. Literary critics (Lemaître, Brunetière, Doumic) or academic historians played a big role at the head of the League because they cultivated a literature defending literary values. Critics who wrote for the major papers or reviews were encouraged by their professional activity to close ranks with the Fatherland, incarnated in the literary tradition whose guardians they were. Maurras's, Brunetière's, or Lemaître's literary and political trajectories were, from this standpoint, normal in the double sense of 'norm'. Thus the break constituted by the Dreyfus Affair reactivated the traditional division that had since the seventeenth century opposed *précieux* and purists, avant-garde and criticism, producers and reproducers.

Lavisse, in his subtle denunciation of the Manifesto of the League of the French Fatherland, pointed up all the ambiguity involved in

referring to the notion of 'tradition', a concept subject to extreme caution for a historian not simply content with celebrating the past.[40] This over-representation of essayists, commentators, and guardians of the temple and the national heritage against the troublemakers who targeted the language, state or army stemmed from the convergence between these authors' literary activity and the League's political objective. They were the literary variant of the old-style academics whose union with defenders of the literary order summed up one whole side of French political culture and national literature.

Dreyfusism's best-represented genres and, above all, within those genres, its specific literary styles were a negative version of the other camp's. Here poetry was solidly represented, notably experimental poetry, along with non-conformist theatre and the engaged novel or novel with a social objective cultivated by Zola, France or Mirbeau before the affair.

LEFT-WING *INTELLECTUELS* AND RIGHT-WING *INTELLECTUELS*

The specificity of each type of *intellectuel*, as well as the fact that we have diverse kinds of data of varying precision, have forced us to take a segmented approach, considering the factors promoting engagement separately. To establish a synoptic schema of left-wing and right-wing *intellectuels*, we must now update the system of the pertinent oppositions accounting for the distribution of the various groups, whether they belonged to the literary or the academic field. The two axes dividing this ideal political and intellectual space are, on the one hand (see figure 5.1), a vertical axis representing age and public recognition and, on the other, a horizontal axis representing autonomy at one end and heteronomy at the other.

The dominated dominant and the dominant dominated

Combining these two factors makes it possible to oppose, on either side of the vertical axis, two types of dominated *intellectuels*. On the left-hand side of figure 5.1, the Dreyfusards assert their autonomy from the (literary) market or the practical dependence of knowledge, at the price of confinement to the avant-garde ghetto, groups of like-minded peers (political associations, coteries, small reviews, specialized reviews) or even, in the case of the youngest,

professional risks (exclusion from certain newspapers, administrative sanctions against young professors). On the upper right-hand side are the radical, nationalist or anti-Semitic anti-Dreyfusards. Like the Dreyfusards just mentioned, they, too, are in a dominated position but, for lack of sufficient intellectual or social assets, try to establish an identity by default through hatred of the adverse party's relatively more privileged members or the claim to speak for the most dominated, exploited by privileged minorities. Their social and intellectual situation stands wholly under the sign of heteronomy and domination. They belong to the economically most dependent fractions of the literary and journalistic field and can leave their depressed status, scorned by all (not just their adversaries, but also their intellectual allies on the major newspapers), only by forging a mythical social function for themselves, that of the clerics and crusaders of a persecuted Church, a disgraced army or a decadent nation. This mythical function points back to an ideal golden age, one that preceded the reign of money or democracy. These extremist *intellectuels* or anti-*intellectuels*, Dreyfusards by excess and anti-Dreyfusards by default, are those for whom the factors immediately shaping their position in the intellectual field leave the least room for double games, variations or disengagement. For them, engagement in the Dreyfus Affair was the next best way to consolidate or establish their right of entry to the intellectual field, to whose margins they were relegated by their age or dominated position (consider the case of the 'men of letters' who never became writers, so many of whom signed the petition defending Picquart). These *intellectuels* or anti-*intellectuels* with no occupational status in fact quite closely resembled the stereotypes around which the neologism 'intellectual' crystallized, as a new, uprooted social group and as possible fomenters of trouble; students represented their outer circle and breeding ground.

We have seen that the 'conflict of faculties' corresponded to the same polarities as this opposition between the dominated dominant and the dominant dominated: heteronomous versus autonomous faculties, old versus recent faculties, autonomous Ecoles (the Ecole normale, the EPHE) versus heteronomous *grandes écoles* or Catholic universities, ascending faculties (letters, sciences) as opposed to threatened or handicapped faculties (medicine).

The 'middle' intellectuals

In contrast, the higher individuals rose in the scale of age or recognition, the more complicated the modes of autonomy or heteronomy

became as result of the hazards of biographical trajectory, and the further the bipolar schema is diffracted into multiple mediate oppositions. For example, the differentiation Paris/provinces – rather closely correlated with Dreyfusism and anti-Dreyfusism among both academics and students or journalists, in that proximity to the country's intellectual centre favoured autonomy, and thus engagement and Dreyfusism – was in certain sub-spaces divided in two or inverted.

Thus cultivating the most Parisian of literary genres, the *théâtre de boulevard* (commercial theatre), disposed individuals to prefer abstention to engagement, even anti-Dreyfusard engagement, because of the playwrights' economic dependence. Conversely, certain academic groups that, in Paris, out of solidarity with other dominant elites, refused to get involved in conflicts between *intellectuels* could, in the provinces, because they were more uprooted or belonged to generations sharing the new academic ideal, take more advanced positions than professors with the highest titles (for example, certain *agrégés* in law or medicine).

The whole of this middle zone of the intellectual field was in fact determined in its choices not only by the 'objective' factors accounting for the synoptic schema but, in part, by attraction to, or repulsion from, the *intellectuels* the most like them. Only the intellectual field's extremes (the most and least recognized, the most and least autonomous) had, by excess or default, an overall apprehension of things close to the theoretical framework established after the fact. All the intellectuals located between the two poles grasped their real position only partially. Thanks to this half-truth or half-lie, they could avoid awareness of their own decline or their deviation from their original ambitions. Thus they continued to have the ardour of someone who takes an addictive interest in a game and still thinks he has as much of a future as younger people do. Paradoxically, this undying enthusiasm (the belief that one has a great work to write or that one can still succeed) is the condition for attaining success at a very advanced age – that is, for ultimately achieving recognition. Analyses such as those we have attempted here accordingly run the risk of an aporia. Every objective fact utilized can be partially neutralized by another that is unknown because less immediate, less general, and more subjective (in the sense of the way the subject perceives, or fails to perceive, this objective fact). We have seen, for example, that, by virtue of their historical or political proximity to the ideal of the Rights of Man, academics of Jewish or Protestant origin tended to be Dreyfusards. Yet there are ways of feeling Jewish or Protestant that, conversely, foster heteronomy, out of a desire not

to jeopardize the cause with which one secretly sympathizes by reinforcing, through one's presence, the adverse camp's dominant stereotype; or, less courageously, in order not to compromise bonds of social solidarity with certain Catholic milieus.[41]

By making a commitment, these middle *intellectuels* chose, in some sense, the age they assigned themselves. In a certain way, the Dreyfusards, above all those of the first wave, became younger, given the age structure of Dreyfusard academics and writers alike. By demanding political autonomy, they drew closer to the avant-garde, even if, objectively, they had previously belonged to the middle sector (the major press organs and reviews). They effectively closed doors and risked regressing with respect to their previous trajectories. This costly wager, a stake it was hard to defend, led in most cases to the division of former groups of allies, such as the naturalists. It could be defended thanks only to, say, past activism (for example, Mirbeau or Geffroy), unfaltering fidelity to a prestigious model (for example, Paul Brulat's or Paul Alexis's fidelity to Zola), a network of structured friendships (the *normaliens* of the classes between Herr's and Andler's) or a review with a tight-knit editorial board – in short, spaces of autonomy conquered against the dominant heteronomous polarities.

The case of Barrès, a kind of negative version of the Academician Anatole France's pro-Dreyfus engagement, in its turn a departure from France's previous trajectory,[42] shows, *a contrario*, that Dreyfusism or anti-Dreyfusism represented a virtually irreversible leap for individuals in a middle position as indicated by the various factors represented in figure 5.1. Barrès's social image for his peers, and, above all, among youth, inclined them to consider him, tendentially, a Dreyfusard. Involved very early in politics, and a partisan of extreme positions, somewhat like Bernard Lazare, Barrès embodied a certain literary intellectualism at the start of his career: he was a fellow traveller of the avant-garde and anarchism and had many of the traits of the future *intellectuel* in the estimation of his colleagues, who knew little about his electoral flip-flops.[43] Because he had stood official godfather to the *intellectuels*, he had, the better to distinguish himself from them and destroy the mask that clung stubbornly to him, to fight on the front lines, at the juncture between the dominated and dominant anti-Dreyfusards, thus proving to himself and others that he was not accommodating the dictates of a new, temporary about-face but had made the strategic choice of the end of his youth, the final effort of the aspirant stepping up his pace in order to reach, at last, the literary field's dominant pole, since he is not really a politician. All the ideological themes that

Barrès proceeded to elaborate expressed, via denunciation of the *intellectuels*, his abjuration of one whole chapter of his youth. He had got over a phase and accepted the laws of society, as he saw it; he had joined the reaction and lost his autonomy, as his adversaries saw it; what was certain was that he had entered a new category by distancing himself from the pole to which he had been closest by taking a leading part among those who were dominated and heteronomous, before being promoted to the ranks of the dominant *tout court* with the gradual disappearance of his seniors among the Academicians.

By posing, via a rejection of Dreyfusism, as the leading right-wing *intellectuel* before the establishment took a stand, and by situating the debate at the level of principles rather than the invidious passions of the vulgar journalists of the anti-Semitic press, Barrès was in fact staking a claim to autonomy, as he had done only recently by defending Grave. Among the Dreyfusards, he would simply have followed the crowd, since both the leading and the secondary roles had been filled by people with greater recognition. If he was not to be consigned to the passive status of a signatory like his ex-friends of the avant-garde, he had only one choice: to write the right-wing intellectuals' 'J'accuse' (which thereby effectively turned out to be an 'I accuse the left-wing *intellectuels*') in order to rally them to his side. This tactic proved all the more beneficial in that, because of the right-wing intellectuals' slowness to mobilize, no one had as yet assumed this function on the right of the intellectual field. In the above-cited article, Barrès posed as the anti-Zola, anti-France or anti-Psichari – that is, in fact, as the anti-Renan – serving notice of his intention to become the other camp's Zola, France or Renan – or, to cite the foreign models dear to his heart, its Goethe and Disraeli. The sad thing for him was that he never found – but this was hardly astonishing under the Republic – either his Grand Duke of Weimar, like Goethe, or his Queen Victoria, like Disraeli.[44]

Dominant among the dominated and dominated among the dominant

Above a certain threshold of academic or literary recognition, the play of forces was once again simplified. As with the dominated, the pressure of immediate conditions or conflicts internal to the *intellectuels* in a middle position lessened. At this level, the *intellectuels* increasingly came to resemble their ego-ideal, free men who took a stand on the basis of convictions or spiritual conversions. Through a symbolic reading of the petitions, we have shown that, among the left-wing *intellectuels* as well as their adversaries, the leading actors' social

image served as a concrete support for painting an ideal-typical portrait of the intellectuals in both camps, who rallied, by way of identification, their respective movements. It thus appeared, contrary to the usual idealist vision, that their function as authorized spokesmen for the major divisions among *intellectuels* stemmed from all these individual traits raised to the level of types – that is, from the sum of the attributes accumulated over their previous trajectory – which defined their social and intellectual position, precisely that which made them unique. Their success was the sign that they stood where the major breaks in the intellectual field were to be found.

Thus the antagonism between naturalists and 'psychologue' writers, or, to take a concrete example, between Zola and Brunetière, had by 1894 already been perceived by students in the streets of the Latin Quarter. For, to disrupt the course that Brunetière, freshly elected to the Academy, gave at the Sorbonne, hostile students unsettled him with the cry 'Down with Brunetière! Long live Zola!'[45] They thus pitted modern literature against tradition, the novelist of the social inquiry against the critic hostile to naturalism, the man of scandals against 'literature's police prefect' (Jules Renard), the self-taught man with no university degree against the pedantic associate professor at the Ecole normale supérieure, the engaged journalist to the managing editor of *Revue des deux mondes*, and so on. This symbolic opposition was the more premonitory in that Zola, as we have seen, was vacillating at this point and distancing himself from the young *intellectuels* by refusing to defend Jean Grave, at the price of embarrassed explanations. Thus, by putting the weight of his symbolic capital at the service of revision, Zola returned to his 'normal' position, linked to his earlier trajectory, instead of backing up and ceding to conformity as he had been tempted to do three years earlier, when he still believed that he could attain classic recognition from the Académie française. Mallarmé, from whom everything separated him at the literary level, but who sympathized with his act, sent him a congratulatory telegram after his court condemnation, demonstrating his sure grasp of the very complex logic of the dominant individual's position among those dominated by the dominant class:

> My dear Zola, transfixed by the sublimity radiating from your Act, I did not feel that I had a right, by applauding you, to distract you or break a silence that grows more poignant by the hour. We have just been presented with the spectacle, for all time, of limpid intuition confronted by genius in the contest between the powers. I venerate this courage and admire the fact that a man has been able

> to step forth, new, upright and heroic, from the glorious labour of an œuvre that would have left all others exhausted and satisfied. It is the hand of that condemned man which, as if I did not know him, like someone in the anonymous crowd, I beg to touch, passionately, because of the honour one feels when one does so.[46]

Thus this opposition between two types of dominant intellectuals around whom the battle of the Dreyfus Affair was organized in fact already existed; yet, without the affair, it would never have become a division traversing the whole intellectual field. 'Objectively', indeed, the antagonism between the two groups of dominated intellectuals was more fundamental and ran deeper because it was bound up with two divergent options as to the social function of intellectuals. These options became conscious, however, only when the recognized intellectuals in the two parties rallied to them or issued appeals to rally to them. These intellectuals shared certain traits that founded their authority and inclination to make a commitment. Thus their divergence was not purely social, like the one underlying the opposition between the two dominated groups. Setting out from opposed horizons, dominant left-wing and right-wing *intellectuels* followed two trajectories in opposite directions that, paradoxically, brought them closer to each other in the social space (they were the only ones to have access to the major means of influencing opinion). This required them, in return, to react to each other in order to honour the obligations that came with their eminent position. Without this already existing dynamic, we cannot account for the vigour of their combat or the asymmetry of their intellectual profiles. The Dreyfusard camp needed those with the widest recognition to head it, whereas, among anti-Dreyfusards, those with the least recognition amid the recognized fulfilled this avant-garde function. These junior members of the Elite, because of their age (for example, Barrès), insufficient prestige (criticism was less dignified than creative work, as in Brunetière's case), antecedents (Lemaître was an academic and reconverted critic) or style (Coppée was, in the poets' view, the most prosaic of the poets), brought the fervour of new converts (which, moreover, some of them were in the religious sense as well) to their defence of the cause of order. Their engagement gained them, as it were, the right of entry to, and fully fledged membership in, the traditional or better established elites.

Conversely, the left, suffering from an overabundance of young people, turned all the more eagerly to standard-bearers with the attributes of seniority or social prestige. These opposed,

contradictory demands explain the indirect similarities or certain criss-crossing patterns in contemporaries' predictions as well as the academics' new function as *intellectuels*. The latter, once they reached a certain rank, enjoyed greater autonomy than independent intellectuals, who were only very rarely not dependent on resources provided by the newspapers, most of which were anti-Dreyfusard at the time. The academics, who were rarer, because there were fewer of them in absolute terms, were also choice recruits because of their new prestige in the society of the period; this sometimes rapidly propelled them to the first rank, if that was what they wanted.

For the professors, nevertheless, the choice between autonomy and heteronomy was harder to make, unless they were in marginal disciplines or were consulted in their capacity as experts on what was at stake in the controversy. In such cases, their earlier academic trajectory already included the choice of autonomy. Their engagement, on the left, netted them an additional advantage: it gave them a new student audience that defended them; they made contact with other intellectuals who consulted them or with whom they could associate on an equal footing (the foundation of the League of the Rights of Man). In contrast, those of their colleagues who made the opposite choice in a spirit of social or ideological conformity locked themselves into a follow-the-leader position, for the starring roles, on the right, had fallen to intellectuals capable of affecting the broadest possible public.

We can nevertheless, when the sources are precise enough, discover a profound social logic in these apparently minor differences among interchangeable individuals. We may adduce, in this connection, the example of two equally learned professors at the Collège de France, Louis Havet and Auguste Longnon. Longnon, the tenured holder, since 1892, of the chair of the historical geography of France, was the self-taught son of a master shoemaker who had been promoted to the summit of learning thanks to a series of lucky biographical accidents, his perseverance, and social and intellectual backers. His research on old French toponymy and history was based on a profoundly jingoist view of history and a very strong attachment to his native region, Champagne. By the same token, his anti-Dreyfusism and membership in the League of the French Fatherland were a logical consequence of this socially dominated trajectory and his way of irremediably associating himself with the dominant by identifying with them politically, as he had earlier identified with a certain idea of France.[47] In contrast, Havet had, from the outset, all the assets of a member of the establishment. The son of Ernest Havet, a professor at the Collège de France and a

member of the Institut de France, and the son-in-law of a Treasury high official who was himself the son of a member of the provisional government of 1848, Havet had initially been a liberal, an erudite classical scholar who had been trained at the EPHE and subsequently taught there; he was an active participant in the milieu of the academic reformers. Privileged as the possessor of this extraordinary social, intellectual and political capital, he was able to shake free of prejudice and conformity. His ardent Dreyfusism offered him an occasion to affirm his position as an aristocrat of the mind for whom the autonomy of the corporation to which he belonged by birthright could be opposed to all authorities of whatever kind.[48]

These left-wing and right-wing intellectual figures, at a certain remove from day-to-day struggles, also served both camps as symbols of the cause they defended. They accordingly gave up some of their individuality in order to become the permanent guarantors of the conflicting ideologies. The scientists, better shielded than all others from pedestrian issues, performed this role still more effectively: Emile Duclaux and Charles Richet are examples.[49] For their friends, their lifelong devotion to research was the proof *a contrario* that only a powerful moral imperative could have induced them to shed their traditional reserve. For their adversaries, on the other hand, they were making illegitimate use of their intelligence, which was cut off from the real world. We may, moreover, note that, if scientists with academic titles were held up as illustrious examples by the League of the French Fatherland, they were confined to a passive role. They served above all to demonstrate that science was not exclusively on the revisionist side; however, so as not to contradict the right-wing *intellectuels*' ideology, they left the initiative to those used to speaking in public or writing for the outside world.[50]

With these *intellectuels*, we reach the outer limits of the schema of the requirements for engagement. These scientists' presence was the most conspicuous sign of the revolution in social representations implied by the new figure of the *intellectuel* and his universality. This active engagement, however, especially on the left, was possible only at an advanced age: the most exemplary case is that of Duclaux, who became a leader of the League of the Rights of Man. Thus, after making a career as a professor and garnering every possible mark of recognition, he began a second intellectual career. The other scientists on the lists, especially those who were very young at the time and would later serve in their turn, in the period between the two world wars, as moral guarantors for left-wing *intellectuels* such as Jean Perrin or Paul Langevin, made long-term commitments only much later, after acquiring all the attributes requisite for the

aura of a 'great scientist'. In this section of the intellectual field, the repulsive phenomena that dissuaded many from adopting the new role of the *intellectuel* also made themselves felt. Autonomy or heteronomy could then be invoked against all forms of regimentation. Excessive social visibility forged multiple types of social or institutional solidarity that neutralized each other. (Thus Marcellin Berthelot and Marcel Proust's father, a professor of medicine and government expert on hygienic questions, both refused to take positions, although their sons or sons-in-law were ardent Dreyfusards.) Others preferred the neutralist solution of the Appeal for Unity to a clear-cut choice (Raymond Poincaré, Ernest Lavisse and Emile Boutroux are examples).

CONCLUSION

Histories of the Dreyfus Affair usually affirm, following contemporaries, that it was, above all, a debate internal to the intellectual field or dominant social groups.[51] Without gainsaying this self-evident truth, the analyses proposed here show that these appearances concealed a more complex combat, in which larger social stakes found a new translation. This holds even if we do not take popular anti-Semitism or the socialist intervention into consideration. Behind the struggle between Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard *intellectuels* (the anti-Dreyfusards rejected the term '*intellectuel*' while adopting the kinds of political behaviour it presupposed), a general opposition developed between *intellectuels* in the political sense and 'elite' in the social sense. Each party criticized the other for posing as a new aristocracy or reviving a caste mentality. Thus the struggle turned on the legitimate definition of the dominant as well as the mode of social domination involved.

The ideological representations that served the conflicting coalitions as cement and as means of mobilization extended and amplified the objective facts but also distorted them and inverted their significance. Roughly speaking, the petitions defending Picquart clearly realized an alliance between the elite of the people and the *intellectuels*. Approximately, again, the League of the French Fatherland was a coalition of diverse elites under the lead of the most organic *intellectuels*. Yet differences between the programme and its supporters continued to exist, for the political field's relative autonomy determined a more pronounced abstention on the part of certain elites or groups in each camp. Among the anti-Dreyfusards,

elites other than the dominant *intellectuels* were less well represented because the issue was remote from their most immediate interests. Similarly, the dominated *intellectuels* sought, with greater or lesser success, to replace public opinion (that is, in a democratic system, the people) and rouse it to civic vigilance, since the people's official representatives were derelict or reticent. The symbolic autonomy conquered by the *intellectuels* during the Dreyfus Affair was thus only provisional and attained by proxy for the basic social groups.

The political fight also offered *intellectuels* on both sides a chance to reverse, for a limited period, their respective positions in the intellectual field. The Dreyfusards, seeking support among the people, were promoted by the struggle to a dominant role (consider the metaphor of the 'intellectual party') over this target group; this justified their aspiration to break free of their dominated situation vis-à-vis the other elites. This explains the creation of the League of the Rights of Man, the public lectures, the flowering of the Popular University movement, the organization of petition campaigns, the demonstrations, and the convergence with certain far-left tendencies that transformed certain Dreyfusards into new professional politicians. Over against them, the anti-Dreyfusards, who claimed to be defending the true 'elite' against troublemakers, deliberately put themselves in a dominated position vis-à-vis the army, prohibited by its legal status from intervening; in their view, the officer corps symbolized the ideal of an elite wedded to the nation.[52] This reversal explains why Dreyfusard intellectuals were in advance of political and social developments: Dreyfusism prefigured and prepared the embryonic new left parties, later headed by certain Dreyfusards (Jaurès, Blum, Herriot), which realized an alliance of *intellectuels* and workers.[53] Right-wing intellectuals, in contrast, although they sought to endow the conservative camp with a new partisan structure distinct from the traditional political groups, ultimately butted up against the old ideological deadweights. The Dreyfus Affair ended up reactivating old divisions that had begun to lose their edge in the 1890s in the face of the far-left threat. Dreyfusism was able to win over the moderates, whereas, at the heart of anti-Dreyfusism, the moderates and the dominant elites tailed after the most radical elements that were prepared to abandon the republican framework. The Appeal for Unity could have provided the grounds for this third party of elites for which the theological disputes of the affair were foreign. However, this regrouping, because of its extreme elitism, was unable to rally other social groups.

The Dreyfus Affair is thus clearly at the origins of the modern ideologies of left and right and of their partly mythical, partly real

mythologies. The *intellectuels* on both sides were distributed in such a way as to represent, by analogy or proximity, the overall oppositions between the various elites or social fractions. On the left, a few prestigious leaders combined innovation and external recognition and enjoyed maximum political freedom. They had the support of younger generations eager to make themselves heard but also of the obscure *hoi polloi*, excluded from the intellectual field and seeking vengeance for its unjust fate; it served as a link with the people in the broadest sense of the term, dominated in society as it was dominated in intellectual milieus. On the right, the intellectual elite, as an organized agency [*corps constitué*] tied to the state since its domestication by the Academy in the seventeenth century, was hedged round by all the agents of the defence of the symbolic order, the writers who plied their trade as if it were a bourgeois profession, and the academics who regarded themselves as notables. The avant-garde, in this case, was made up of the newspaper proletariat; its function was symmetrical with that of the excluded elements on the left, but it reacted to its alienation in travestied fashion by attacking the new pseudo-aristocracies, *intellectuels* and 'Jews', while cultivating a nostalgic relationship to the old elites in decline (the aristocracy, the army, *la vieille France*). In condensed form, we have here two integral social structures, two versions of France. Each was capable of excluding the other, for the union of these heterogeneous groups was based on a rejection of the others and on the antithetical significance they attributed to history, an extension of their own trajectories: the left-wing *intellectuels*' optimism about a democratic wave that would break down all caste barriers, a legacy of Michelet's messianism, versus the right-wing *intellectuels*' pessimism about the besieged fortress of the 'elite' under threat from the mob or the nation corrupted by foreign minorities.[54]

General Conclusion to the English Edition

Christophe Charle

> O genealogist upon the market-place! How many chronicles of families and connexions? And may the dead seize the quick, as it is said in the tables of the law, if I have not seen each thing in its own shadow and the virtues of its age . . . but over and above the actions of men on the earth, many omens on the way, many seeds on its way, and under unleavened fine weather, in one great breath of the earth, the whole feather of harvest!
>
> Saint-John Perse, *Anabasis*[1]

Since the French publication of this book in 1990, a huge bibliography has been published on intellectuals in France, in Europe and outside Europe. It is impossible to sum up all this literature, and there are already some good overviews on it.[2] The most important is that the question of the 'birth of *intellectuels*', which seemed, thirty years ago, a specifically French question, has become a European and even a global question, since the debates on the place and role of intellectuals in politics and society or culture in different nations has emerged as an indicator of deeper crisis as it was in *fin-de-siècle* France. This does not mean that the French case should be a universal key to understanding other historical situations, but that similar factors were at work during the twentieth century as in other periods all over the world. Therefore the model presented here may have a more general application to further inquiries on other cases.

A FRENCH 'SONDERWEG'?

The originality of the French case is proven by the terminology itself. The term '*intellectuel*', when it was exported, took on a pejorative nuance. This was exemplified by Germany[3] and the Anglophone countries,[4] where the word never really acquired the initial legitimacy it had gained in France or was confined to a general sociological register. It had to compete with more prestigious native words such as '*professional*', '*scholar*', '*man of letters*', '*freie Berufe*', '*Bildungsbürgertum*' or '*Intelligenz*'. Only Russia, beginning in this period, had a similarly specific concept, 'intelligentsia', albeit derived from a Latin root.[5] However, as a result of the difference in social and cultural contexts, the Russian term covered a very different semantic field, despite the current confusion that tends to make 'intelligentsia', in French, a synonym for or a 'hard' version of *intellectuel*. The initial 'intelligentsia' was a thin stratum made up of the cultural and political avant-garde that was also to be found in France among the first '*intellectuels*'; but this Russian 'intelligentsia' was more like France's Bohemians and political activists than its *fin-de-siècle* academics with their entrenched social positions.

Underscoring the specificity of the French case is a way of overcoming the permanent confusion sown by the different senses of the word, but it does not suffice to explain its origin. Since Tocqueville's reflections, it is not possible to avoid invoking the particularities of French political and cultural history (basically, the heritage of the Enlightenment, the *philosophes* and the French Revolution); however, as the attempt at a genealogy has shown, to stop at that attests a blind culturalism that glosses over the caesuras of the nineteenth century. The possible prototypes of '*intellectuel*' differed appreciably from it and were closely bound up with the state of the contemporaneous intellectual field. The new term benefited from the inherited tradition but broke with it as well, for it corresponded to a radically new political and social juncture.

COMPETING ELITES

The situation and image of the Republic's elites constituted one of the most important elements of this specific historical conjuncture. The meritocratic ideal that was part of the republican programme challenged the traditional rules for old-style reproduction

of the ruling class. If, contrary to this ideal, it was still basically elements descended of the dominant class that had every chance of rising to the top, the door for those from other social categories had been opened at least partway. Family-based social reproduction no longer enjoyed the legitimacy it once had, in spite of the real state of affairs, which was perpetuated in most European countries of the day.[6] But the *intellectuel* was the product, in its purest form, at least in the social imagination, of the new mode of reproduction of elites. He accordingly had a right to demand power and a position apart in democratic society, above all if he was connected with academia. Yet this flamboyant Dreyfusism, which is to be found in a virtually pure state in Julien Benda's famous pamphlet *La Trahison des clercs*, a sort of secularization of the medieval cleric, found itself confronting those nostalgic for the 'Elite', another name for the old-style ruling class, whose social base was supposed to be the army and the military hierarchy as idealized by a Brunetière. In the army, the man of action's virtues represented a different type of merit, far superior, for the anti-Dreyfusards, to mere intellectual virtues. The survival of the nation, put in its army officers' hands, seemed more vital to this intellectual fraction than abstract defence of the Truth. In this perspective, the *intellectuels* merely constituted a gratuitous elite, a mandarin class that existed for its own sake. Scholars and academics educated only an infinitesimal fraction of the younger generation through what they said and wrote, whereas army officers, once universal conscription was established, educated the whole nation.[7] This conception did not necessarily imply a call for intervention 'from the barracks', although recourse to the military might have been the solution envisaged for certain crises in which the Dreyfus Affair was restaged between, not *intellectuels*, but factions in the ill wind of defeat in 1940 or classes under the shock of massive social conflicts (for example, during the Popular Front in 1936 or in May–June 1968).

The pendant to this new ideal of the (competent and self-recruited) Elite was an exacerbation of the break between the dominant elites and the intellectuals, steadily growing in numbers and on the way to social decline. This distancing of the intellectuals from the field of power was one of the sources of their invention of new forms of political intervention – that is, precisely, of modes of '*intellectuel*' action. Only the adoption of a comparative international perspective would make it possible to sustain and shed further light on this thesis. Simplifying, it might be suggested that the specificity of the French case had two foundations in addition to the French cultural heritage, usually the only one taken into account. The first one is

the centralization of intellectual and cultural life; the second is the constant crisis of legitimacy of political elites.

INTELLECTUALS OUTSIDE FRANCE: A COMPARATIVE SKETCH

In no other country could one find such geographic centralization of the intellectual field, the indispensable condition, at least in this period, for its autonomization and also the competition between it and the field of power. In Germany, for example, there existed a profound geographical and social gulf between academics and independent intellectuals. The former enjoyed the highest social legitimacy, whereas, in France, men of letters did, as a rule. What is more, academics as well as writers and journalists in Germany were divided by a decentralized structure linked to the federal structure of the nation. The second difference resides in the models for representing elites. In imperial Germany, professors by no means called their own social function into question.[8] They continued to identify with the ruling elite and to consider themselves fully fledged members of it. The mechanisms for exactly reproducing university personnel, together with government interventions, protected professors from dissidence or non-conformity, marginalized at the level of the *Privatdozenten*. Comparative sociological data on academics show, with all the necessary reservations implied by the difference between the two countries' social structures and the variations in our coding methods, that German professors were the products of a self-recruitment in intellectual milieus and, in particular, academic milieus in the strict sense that was clearly more effective than the self-recruitment of Parisian professors.[9]

The recurring crisis of legitimacy of French elites is a constant phenomenon during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This second factor explains why French *intellectuels* may recur regularly as actors in other crises (in the interwar period, the Occupation,[10] during the Cold War and the Algerian war, in May–June 1968, for example). But it explains too how the French example gave the impulse in other countries to similar 'births' of intellectuals – for example, during the Weimar Republic in Germany, in pre-fascist Italy, in Spain after the disaster of 1898 or during the Second Republic, during the 1930s in the UK when anti-fascism was in the ascendant, and in twentieth-century Latin America, Africa or Asia when the old ruling classes or the colonial order were

contested by new social and political movements born in towns and universities.[11]

In all these conjunctures, *intellectuels*, in the French meaning, filled the temporary gap created by the crisis of representations of the elites or older ruling classes. They could do so all the better in that everyone accepts the legitimacy of literature or science, a situation altogether peculiar to France at the end of the nineteenth century but which began to appear in other countries engaged in a modernization process or the development of schooling and academic education.[12]

INTELLECTUAL VERSUS PROFESSIONAL

This path is neither obligatory nor a one-way route. Over and against the *intellectuel* now stood the figure of the professional, constructed on the Anglo-American model, and later stood the figure of the expert or the technocrat. These new social types accepted the division of labour internal to the dominant class, whereas the *intellectuel* aspired to the universal and defended his own values. The professional or expert hoped to gain access to the level of the true social elite by means of personal success. Conducting his career the way the owner of a company manages his enterprise, he sought to achieve the post of a notable (this applied to the classic liberal professions in the provinces), wealth (this applied to popular novelists, playwrights who wrote for the commercial theatre, commercial lawyers, and doctors catering to fashionable society) or the status of an expert (this applied to scientists, engineers, doctors and jurists). For some, all three objectives were combined. Less conspicuous, because situated outside the political domain, this model was a pole of attraction for a considerable number of intellectuals in the ordinary sense of the word. Their main, self-appointed mission was to ward off threats to society, particularly the one that intimidated them above all: the uncontrolled expansion of the intellectual field, the result of an excessive increase in the number of graduates. This explains why they embraced the status of an exclusive elite.[13]

The same alternative may be found in countries where modern intellectuals aspired to power: in Weimar Germany as in pre-fascist Italy (and even during the Nazi and fascist era), conservative intellectuals were inspired by this organic vision of elites or aspired to the role of expert in an authoritarian but enlightened state. This explains why, during the twentieth century, so many intellectuals

in Europe did not follow the democratic and Dreyfusard model but rather the elitist and even totalitarian one.

In the final analysis, what is most striking is the relative permanence of the French intellectual and political debate, despite the change in the intellectual field's dimensions and conditions between the turn of the century and Sartre's death (1980). The *intellectuels* of the Dreyfus Affair continue to interest us, although the political and social context has, in the space of a century, been completely transformed. To understand this paradox, we must try to think of the *intellectuels* of yesterday and today in global fashion. If most studies of intellectuals, including those of a vaguely theoretical or sociological cast, soon seem dated and parochial, it is because their authors fail to take into account the various dimensions of the question, as we have tried to do here. The question is accordingly reduced to just one of its aspects – political, ideological or sociological – and the issue is settled in anachronistic fashion. Thus the morphology of the intellectual field modulates, in line with a predilection for decrying social misery that goes back to the 1890s, into a discourse about the obsession with excess, and the reconstructed genealogies of the *intellectuels* fall to the level of surveys of the history of ideas that neglect the breaks and treat the constants as eternal. The intellectuals' relationship to politics is reduced to a consideration of official politics and atypical minorities or vanguard groups.

Admittedly, it becomes increasingly difficult to keep track of all the links in the chain as we approach the present and the intellectual field begins to break down into sub-fields whose local structures mask their subordination to more global conditions. The historian and sociologist are themselves caught up in these sub-sets and have an increasingly harder time of it not to interpret everything in the light of their indigenous experience. If they try to broaden their horizons, they have to rely on biased information furnished by other intellectuals, neither historians nor sociologists, who straightforwardly transcribe their partial (in both senses) apprehension of their professional sub-space. Studying the *intellectuels* before their emergence and at the moment when they emerged was thus the easiest way of broaching the problem. Yet we should not, stumbling into another recurrent pitfall in studies of intellectuals, let ourselves be carried away by a nostalgic quest for origins.

Sounding these methodical precautions is a way of emphasizing how hard it is not to succumb to the illusion of familiarity that a subject of this kind breeds, in spite of the constant effort of distancing that I have made here. I wanted to break with the heroic history of the intellectuals and show just how much they were children of

their time, without, however, reducing them to the role of marionettes controlled by obscure forces.

Yet this history cannot be an altogether 'cold history'. At the level of professional ethics, the Dreyfusard intellectuals, in their search for the Truth, remain models for our time. They proved capable of abandoning the comfort of their libraries or quiet of their laboratories and of resisting the storms of a public opinion led astray by the media of the day. In short, they succeeded in maintaining, to use Durkheim's terms, 'the best of their professional habits'.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 Julien Benda, *La Jeunesse d'un clerc* (1937), Paris: Gallimard, 1968, p. 116.
2 The original title of Zola's famous paper was 'Lettre ouverte au Président de la République', *L'Aurore*, 13 January 1898.
3 On the posterity of these themes in other crises, see Michel Winock, 'Les Intellectuels dans le siècle', *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'Histoire*, April–June 1984, pp. 3–14, and 'Les Affaires Dreyfus', ibid., January–March 1985, pp. 19–37.
4 To give just a few examples from a copious literature: on the eulogy side, J. Benda, *La Jeunesse d'un clerc*; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Plaidoyer pour les intellectuels* (1965), new edn, Paris: Gallimard, 1972; and Régis Debray, *Le Scribe*, Paris: Grasset, 1980; on the critical side, Paul Lafargue, *Le Socialisme et les intellectuels*, Paris: Giard & Brière, 1900; Eduard Berth, *Les Méfaits des intellectuels*, Paris: Rivière, 1914; Paul Nizan, *Les Chiens de garde* (1932), new edn, Paris: Maspero, 1960; and Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, London: Secker & Warburg, 1957.
5 In the first case, Julien Benda, *La Trahison des clercs* (1927), new edn, Paris: Grasset, 1975; in the second, André Bellessort, *Les Intellectuels et l'avènement de la Troisième République (1871–75)*, Paris: Grasset, 1931; and Hubert Bourgin, *L'Ecole normale et la politique, de Jaurès à Léon Blum* (1938), New York: Gordon & Breach, 1970.

6 Especially the pioneering work of Jacques Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages* (1957), Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. On the modern era, Robert Mandrou, *Histoire de la pensée européenne*, 3: *Des humanistes aux hommes de science (XVIe et XVIIe siècles)*, Paris: Seuil, 1973: 'I have therefore chosen the option of reconstituting the role of intellectuals in the institutions established for them – and in the margin of these, in order to take the measure, as far as is possible, of their audience in their own time' (p. 10). The author does not question the legitimacy of using the term 'intellectual', confining himself to a reference to Gramsci's theoretical analyses (p. 9). The proceedings of the Mátrafüred colloquium, which gathered communications on this theme stretching from the thirteenth to the twentieth century, and for two very different countries, France and Hungary, make it possible, on the other hand, to emphasize national discontinuities and specificities and thus qualify the notion to keep it from too universal a utilization. Cf. Jacques Le Goff and Béla Köpeczi (eds), *Intellectuels français, intellectuels hongrois, XIIIe–XXe siècles*, Paris: CNRS, 1985, in particular the questionnaire completed by the participants, pp. 313–24.

7 See the synthesis by Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, *Les Intellectuels en France de l'affaire Dreyfus à nos jours*, Paris: A. Colin, 1986, and Sirinelli, *Génération intellectuelle, khâgneux et normaliens dans l'entre-deux-guerres*, Paris: Fayard, 1988; in a perspective closer to the present work, Anna Boschetti, *Sartre et 'les Temps Modernes'*, Paris: Minuit, 1985. I already commenced my study of the *intellectuels* in *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme, roman, théâtre, politique*, Paris: Presses de l'ENS, 1979, a work based on a PhD defended in 1975.

8 Christophe Charle, *Les Elites de la République (1880–1900)*, Paris: Fayard, 1987, 2nd enlarged edn, 2006. This book, like the present work, was based on a revised (and partly expanded) *thèse d'Etat* defended in January 1986 at the University of Paris 1, under the supervision of Maurice Agulhon: *Intellectuels et élites en France (1880–1900)*, 2 vols, mimeograph, 1985.

9 Charle, *Les Elites*, chs 1 and 2; also A.-J. Tudesq, *Les Grands Notables en France (1840–1849)*, 2 vols, Paris: PUF, 1964; for a synthetic view of the evolution of nineteenth-century French elites, see Charle, *A Social History of France in the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford: Berg, 1994.

10 Charle, *Les Elites*, chs 3 and 4.

11 J. Estèbe, *Les Ministres de la République (1871–1914)*, Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1982.

12 Charle, *Les Elites*, ch. 8.

13 Charle, *La Crise littéraire*, and 'Le Champ de la production littéraire (1830–1890)', in R. Chartier and H. J. Martin (eds), *Histoire de l'édition française*, vol. 3, Paris: Promodis, 1985, pp. 127–57. On artists, see the thesis by Marie-Claude Genet-Delacroix, *Art et Etat sous la IIIème République: 1870–1940*, Paris : Publications de la Sorbonne, 1992; Pierre Vaisse, *La Troisième République et les peintres*, Paris : Flammarion, 1995.

14 See Christophe Prochasson, *Les Intellectuels, le socialisme et la guerre 1900–1938*, Paris: Seuil, 1993, ch. 1; Vincent Duclert, *L'Affaire Dreyfus: quand la justice éclaire la République*, Toulouse: Privat, 2010.

CHAPTER 1 THE *INTELLECTUEL*

1 Gustave Flaubert, *Correspondance*, ed. J. Bruneau, Paris: Gallimard, 1980, vol. 2, p. 402 (*The Letters of Gustave Flaubert*, vol. 1, London: Picador, 2001).

2 Cf. Alain Viala, *Naissance de l'écrivain*, Paris: Minuit, 1985; Eric Walter, 'Les Auteurs et le champ littéraire', and Robert Bied, 'Le Monde des auteurs', in R. Chartier and H.-J. Martin (eds), *Histoire de l'édition française*, vol. 2, 1984, pp. 382–401 and 588–605; Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground and the Old Regime*, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1982, and 'A police inspector sorts his files: the anatomy of the republic of letters', in *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History*, London: Allen Lane, 1984; Jean-Philippe Genet, 'La Mesure des champs culturels', *Histoire et mesure*, 2(1), 1987, pp. 137–53; and Daniel Roche, *Les Républicains des lettres*, Paris: Fayard, 1988.

3 Cf. Jacques Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; in his Introduction, the author defines intellectuals as 'those whose profession it was to think and to share their thoughts . . . . Before the present age, that milieu had undoubtedly never been so well-defined, and had never had a better awareness of itself than it did in the Middle Ages.' The communications of Le Goff and Jacques Verger at the Franco-Hungarian colloquium of Mátrafüred in October 1980 were more restrictive. They emphasize the limits of the autonomy of the category defined above by Le Goff in relation to both the Church and the royal power, and above all the exclusion of literary and artistic figures (cf. Le Goff, 'Les Intellectuels au Moyen Age', and J. Verger, 'Les Professeurs

des universités françaises à la fin du Moyen Age', in J. Le Goff and B. Köpeczi (eds), *Intellectuels français/ intellectuels hongrois*, Paris: CNRS, 1985, pp. 11–22 and 23–39).

4 Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1964, p. 255.

5 See the references in note 2 above. All these studies confirm an incomplete autonomization of the literary field and the intellectual field in general (the two often being confused at this time owing to the poor state of the universities), a situation that generated ambivalent attitudes in writers, who swung between the desire for integration into the academy and dependence or a fall into menial work and bohemianism.

6 Paul Bénichou, *Le Sacre de l'écrivain (1750–1830)*, Paris: José Corti, 1973. This author defines his project on p. 25 as a prehistory of intellectuals: 'The idea of a broad corporation, including writers, scientists, philosophers, publicists in general, indeed all that we comprise today under the heading of *the intellectuals*, seems to be well founded' (original emphasis).

7 Balzac, one of the promoters of the Société des gens de lettres, took as his model the Société des auteurs dramatiques, whose founder, Beaumarchais, had basically utilitarian aims (cf. *Centenaire de la Société des gens de lettres*, Paris, 1934, p. 6, and the commentary by A. Prassoloff in R. Chartier and H. J. Martin (eds), *Histoire de l'édition française*, vol. x, Paris: Promodis, pp. 148–9).

8 Senancour, *Obermann*, letter lxxix, vol. 3, p. 184, quoted in Bénichou, *Le Sacre de l'écrivain*, p. 207.

9 'Our greatest misfortunes have arisen from the ambition of men of letters, who, to play the part of important figures, have thrown themselves into morals and politics and made a game of ruining society and the state to give themselves an appearance of philosophy' (J. L. Geoffroy, *Débats* (*feuilleton dramatique*), 17 September 1803, quoted in Bénichou, *Le Sacre de l'écrivain*, p. 117). Tocqueville takes up the same theme, also having in mind undoubtedly the role of the Romantics in 1848: 'Thus the philosopher's cloak provided safe cover for the passions of the day and the political ferment was canalised into literature, the result being that our writers now became the leaders of public opinion and played for a while the part which normally, in free countries, falls to the professional politician' (Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1955, p. 142). A few pages later, Tocqueville concludes: 'The result was nothing short of disastrous; for what is a merit in the writer may well be a vice

in the statesman and the very qualities which go to make great literature can lead to catastrophic revolutions' (p. 147).

10 Bénichou, *Le Sacre de l'écrivain*, pp. 124–33.

11 Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground and the Old Regime*, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1982; F. Barbier, C. Jolly and S. Juratic (eds), *Livre et Révolution*, colloquium organized by the IHMC (CNRS), 20–22 May 1987, Paris: Aux amateurs de livres, 1989; Jean-Claude Bonnet (ed.), *La Carmagnole des muses, l'homme de lettres et l'artiste dans la Révolution*, Paris: A. Colin, 1988.

12 Alan B. Spitzer, *The French Generation of 1820*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

13 Cf. Jules Michelet, 'Une année au Collège de France', in *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris: Flammarion, 1877, p. 563: 'The day when the poet and the people recognize and understand one another, a joyous and fraternal new era will begin', and: 'What can the scientist do without the people, and the people without the scientist? Nothing. The two must cooperate in social action' (p. 535). The interchangeability of the words *poet* and *scientist* is notable. Saint-Simon, for his part, wrote in 1817: 'As long as those in government protect the scientists (those of theory and those of application), we remain in the ancien régime, but from the moment that the scientists protect the government, the new regime genuinely begins' ('L'Industrie' (1817), in *Oeuvres*, vol. 2, new edn, Paris: Anthropos, 1966, p. 29).

14 Georges Matoré, 'Le Champ notionnel d'art et d'artiste entre 1827 et 1834', in *La Méthode en lexicologie*, new edn, Paris: Didier, 1973, pp. 93–117.

15 Albert Cassagne, *La Théorie de l'art pour l'art en France chez les derniers romantiques et les premiers réalistes* (1906), new edn, Paris: L. Dorbon, 1959.

16 Pierre Bourdieu, 'L'Invention de la vie d'artiste', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 2, March 1975, pp. 67–93. On Flaubert's income, see J.-P. Chaline, 'A la recherche de la bourgeoisie rouennaise au XIXème siècle', *Les Amis de Flaubert*, December 1969, pp. 18–30; the author, from investigation of the tax records, estimates the fortune left by Flaubert's father at 500,000 francs, situating him at the summit of Rouen society. On the Goncourt brothers, see A. Billy, *Les Frères Goncourt: la vie littéraire à Paris pendant la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle*, Paris: Flammarion, 1954. On the Romantic bohemia, see C. Borgal, *De quoi vivait Gérard de Nerval?*, Paris: Deux Rives, 1950, p. 111; Cesar Graña, *Bohemian versus Bourgeois*, New York & London: Basic Books, 1964, p. 79,

and the debatable essay by Jerrold Seigel, *Bohemian Paris: Culture, Politics, and the Boundaries of Bourgeois Life, 1830–1930*, New York: Viking, 1986, part I.

17 Michelet, 'Une année au Collège de France', p. 414.

18 Pierre Bourdieu, 'Le Marché des biens symboliques', *l'Année sociologique*, 22, 1971, pp. 49–126, esp. pp. 55–7.

19 Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996. See also the following passage in Flaubert's *Letters*: 'Success, compliments, consideration, money, the love of women and the admiration of men, in fact all that one desires, is in different degrees for the mediocre (from Scribe to Enault). It is those such as Arsène Houssaye and Du Camp who have found a way of having this discussed' (letter to Louise Colet of 20 June 1853; vol. 2, p. 357). See also p. 441: 'Let me be allowed to view them as writers who have lost their way' (to Louise Colet, 26 September 1853).

20 'If nothing changes in the next few years, a closer companionship will form among liberal intelligences than that of all the clandestine societies. At a distance from the crowd, a new mysticism will grow . . . . But a certain truth seems to me to emerge from all this. We have no need for the vulgar, the element of number, for majorities, for approval or consecration. 1789 demolished royalty and the nobility, 1848 the bourgeoisie and 1851 *the people*. There is no longer *anything*, besides a morass of imbeciles and rabble' (letter of 22 September 1853; original emphasis). The hermeticism of the symbolist circles was the direct heir to the universal misanthropy of the artist à la Flaubert.

21 On the link between madness and extreme forms of Romanticism, cf. Graña, *Bohemian versus Bourgeois*, p. 79.

22 Cf. the Auteuil circle of the Goncourt brothers, Mallarmé's Tuesdays, the Parnassians' salons, and the dinners of the little literary reviews at the *fin de siècle* (A. Glinoer and V. Laisney, *L'Âge des cenacles: confraternités littéraires et artistiques au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Fayard, 2013).

23 C. Digeon, *La Crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870–1914*, Paris: PUF, 1959, esp. ch. 7, pp. 364–83 ; H. W. Paul, *The Sorcerer's Apprentice: The French Scientist's Image of German Science, 1840–1919*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972. See also *Romantisme*, no. 21–2 (1978), entitled 'Le(s) Positivisme(s)'.

24 Robert Fox and George Weisz (eds), *The Organization of Science and Technology (1808–1914)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; Fox has recently given a synthesis of his contributions to the theme, published after this book was written and revised:

The Savant and the State: Science and Cultural Politics in Nineteenth-Century France, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.

25 The only analysis of this phenomenon in relation to medicine is that of Jacques Léonard, *Les Médecins de l'Ouest au XIXe siècle*, Lille: Atelier de reproduction des thèses de Lille III, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 931–2. For the revolutionary and imperial periods, see the book by Nicole Dhombres and Jean Dhombres, *Naissance d'un nouveau pouvoir: sciences et savants en France (1793–1824)*, Paris: Masson, 1989.

26 Louis Pasteur, *Quelques réflexions sur la science en France*, Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1871, p. 31, and 'Science et Patrie' (29 January 1876), in *Lettres et discours*, Besançon: Bibliophiles comtois, 1927, pp. 183–4.

27 Avner Ben Amos, 'Les Funérailles de Victor Hugo', in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, 1: *La République*, Paris: Gallimard, 1984, pp. 473–522, esp. the list on pp. 516–17, and *Funerals, Politics, and Memory in Modern France, 1789–1996*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 235–42 (on scientists' official funerals), 248–51 (on musicians' official funerals), 392–4 (list of official funerals).

28 Cited in Claude Bernard, *Lettres à Madame R., 1869–78*, Saint-Julien-en-Beaujolais: Fondation Mérieux, 1974, p. 172.

29 Paul-Armand Challemel-Lacour, *Discours de réception à l'Académie française, 25 Janvier 1894*, Paris: Didot, 1895, p. 277. This recognition of the influence of the *savant* is all the more significant in that it was expressed by a philosopher who had gone into politics.

30 Ibid.

31 Louis Pasteur, 'Discours prononcé en présence du Président de la République lors de l'inauguration de l'Institut Pasteur le 14 novembre 1888', in *Lettres et discours*, p. 346.

32 Bernard, *Lettres à Madame R.*, p. 78, where he deplores Paul Bert's move into a career as prefect ('he is not inspired by the fire of science') and expresses his criticism of politicians: 'those who govern us are generally foreign to the scientific spirit' (p. 38).

33 See René Pasteur Valléry-Radot, *La Vie de Pasteur* (1900), new edn, Paris: Flammarion, 1946, p. 229; H. Taine, *Taine: sa vie et sa correspondance*, Paris: Hachette, vol. 3, 1907, p. 158, and *Derniers essais de critique et d'histoire*, Paris: Hachette, 1894, pp. 78–97; also his article on the Ecole libre des sciences politiques (17 October 1871); Jean Pommier, *Renan d'après des documents inédits*, Paris: Perrin, 1923, pp. 211, 288; Henry Laurens (ed.), *Ernest Renan: la science, la religion, la République*, Paris: O. Jacob, 2013; Jean Jacques, *Berthelot, 1827–1907: autopsie d'un mythe*, Paris: Belin, 1987.

34 Marcellin Berthelot, *Science et philosophie*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1886, pp. i–ii.
35 Jacques Léonard, *Les Médecins de l'Ouest au XIXe siècle*, vol. 3, p. 1254; R. Fox, 'L'Attitude des professeurs des facultés des sciences face à l'industrialisation en France de 1850 à 1914', in C. Charle and R. Ferré (eds), *Le Personnel de l'enseignement supérieur en France aux XIXe et XXe siècles*, Paris: CNRS, 1985, pp. 135–47; Mary Jo Nye, *Science in the Provinces: Scientific Communities and Provincial Leadership in France, 1860–1930*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
36 Edouard Herriot, *Jadis*, Paris: Flammarion, 1948, vol. 1, p. 76.
37 Pasteur Valléry-Radot, *La Vie de Pasteur*, pp. 439, 446, 465, 552–3, 578, etc.
38 Christophe Charle, *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme*, Paris: Presses de l'ENS, 1979; R. Ponton, 'Naissance du roman psychologique', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 4 July 1975, pp. 66–85.
39 Paul Bourget, *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*, 5th edn, Paris: Lemerre, 1889, p. 37: 'Taken as a whole, M. Renan's work is a work of science. Is it then legitimate to view such a work otherwise than from a scientific standpoint? It is the claim of scientists that the result of their works remains something independent from their person.' The image of Taine given in this book is in a similar vein: 'The master spoke in his slightly monotonous voice, giving a vaguely foreign accent to the words of his short sentences; and even this monotony, these few gestures, this absorbed physiognomy, this concern not to add to the genuine eloquence of the documents the factitious eloquence of presentation – all these little details managed to seduce us. This man, so modest that he seemed not to suspect his European reputation, and so simple that he seemed not concerned by anything but to serve the truth, became for us the apostle of the new Faith' (ibid., p. 180). Nothing could be further removed from the emphasis of the Romantic prophets.
40 On the origins of Bouteiller as a symbolic figure, see the study by J.-F. Sirinelli: 'Littérature et politique: le cas Burdeau-Bouteiller', *Revue historique*, vol. 272(1), 1985, pp. 97–118; on the consistency of these attacks against the figure of the professor as prefiguring the future '*intellectuel*', see Louis Pinto, 'La Formation de la représentation de l'intellectuel vers 1900', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 55, November 1984, pp. 23–32, esp. pp. 27–8. On Bourget's youth, see Michel Mansuy, *Un moderne: Paul Bourget, de l'enfance au 'Disciple'*, Besançon: Jacques & Demontrond, 1961.

41 Cf. Ferdinand Brunetière's well-known article 'Après une visite au Vatican', *Revue des deux mondes*, 1 January 1895, pp. 97–116, where the author attacks Renan, the chemists, physicists and philological sciences; see also Zola's indignant response at the banquet in honour of Berthelot on 4 April 1895 (account in the *Revue internationale de l'enseignement*, 1895, 1, p. 386, in the Berthelot file in the archives of the Collège de France, series cxii). On the overall ideological context of such confrontations, see René Ternois, *Zola et son temps: 'Lourdes, Rome, Paris'*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1961, ch. 17; also the investigation of this theme by Bernard Lazare in the *Echo de Paris*, 12 January and 6 April 1895.
42 Robert Darnton, *The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the 'Encyclopédie'*, Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press, 1979.
43 Alain Desrosières, 'Eléments pour l'histoire des nomenclatures professionnelles', in *Pour une histoire de la statistique*, Paris: INSEE, 1978, pp. 155–231, quotation on p. 162.
44 Introduction to the 1896 census, cited by Desrosières, 'Eléments pour l'histoire des nomenclatures professionnelles'.
45 On all these developments, see Léonard, *Les Médecins de l'Ouest au XIXe siècle*, vol. 2, ch. 13; Henri Avenel, *Annuaire de la presse*, Paris: Flammarion, 1898; Marc Martin, *Médias et journalistes de la République*, Paris: O. Jacob, 1997; Christian Delporte, *Les Journalistes en France 1880–1950*, Paris: Seuil, 1999. Emile Littré defined the publicist as follows: '1) Someone who writes on public law, who is versed in this science; 2) a political writer' (*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*, Paris: Hachette, vol. 3, 1882).
46 Léonard, *Les Médecins de l'Ouest au XIXe siècle*, vol. 3, p. ccxxxii.
47 Christophe Charle, *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme*, Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure, 1979, pt I, and *Les Elites de la République (1880–1900)*, Paris: Fayard, 1987, 2nd enlarged edn, 2006, p. 43.
48 Cynthia White and Harrison White, *Canvases and Careers: Institutional Change in the French Painting World*, New York: Wiley, 1965. The Salon des indépendants was founded in 1884, the Société nationale des beaux-arts in 1890, the Société des artistes français in 1891, etc. (J.-P. Bouillon, 'Sociétés d'artistes et institutions officielles dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle', *Romantisme*, no. 54, 1986, pp. 89–113). On the relationship with bourgeois customers, see Albert Boime, 'Entrepreneurial patronage in nineteenth-century France', in Edward C. Carter (ed.), *Enterprise and Entrepreneurs in 19th and 20th Century*

France, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. On the evolution of education, Antoine Prost, *Histoire de l'enseignement en France, 1800–1967*, Paris: A. Colin, 1968; F. Mayeur, in L. H. Parias (ed.), *Histoire générale de l'enseignement et de l'éducation*, Paris: Nouvelle librairie de France, 1981, vol. 3; and chs 7 and 8, by V. Karady, in J. Verger (ed.), *Histoire des universités en France*, Toulouse: Privat, 1986.

49 In 1876 there were a total of 7,868 students of law and medicine, as against 531 in letters and sciences (ratio 1:14.8); by 1890 the respective figures were 10,413 and 3,112 (ratio 1:3.3); by 1914, they were 24,998 and 13,916 (ratio 1:1.7). Data from George Weisz, *The Emergence of Modern Universities in France, 1863–1914*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 236 (table 7.2).

50 Cf. Charle, *Les Elites de la République*, pp. 226–48; R. Fox, *The Savant and the State*, chs 2 and 6; V. Karady, 'Lettres et sciences, effet de structure dans la sélection et la carrière des professeurs de faculté (1810–1914)', in C. Charle and R. Ferré (éd.), *Le Personnel de l'enseignement supérieur en France*, pp. 29–45.

51 Weisz, *The Emergence of Modern Universities*, ch. 1.

52 These ratios were obtained by taking the average of the three samples to give an approximate number for the authors cited in Lorenz, which was then related to the census figures.

53 Darnton, *The Business of Enlightenment*, and Daniel Roche, *Le Siècle des Lumières en province: académies et académiciens provinciaux, 1680–1789*, Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1978.

54 On primary-school authors, see R. Ponton, 'Traditions littéraires et tradition scolaire : l'exemple des manuels de lecture de l'école primaire française, quelques hypothèses de travail', *Lendemains*, 36, 1984, pp. 53–63.

55 The first ratio here, that for authors, was calculated on the basis of the total number of authors as obtained by the method explained in note 52 – that for men of letters is given in table 1.1; the ratio for professional authors is taken from Charle, *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme*, p. 42.

56 Ibid., pp. 34ff., and Charle, 'Le Champ de la production littéraire'.

57 Charle, *La Crise littéraire*. See also the strategies of the second Naturalist generation of authors, those most affected by the crisis of the publishing industry at the end of the 1880s (pp. 104ff.).

58 F. Pruner, *Les Luttes d'Antoine: au Théâtre libre*, vol. 1, Paris: Minard, 1964; J. Robichez, *Lugné-Poe et les débuts de l'Œuvre*, Paris: L'Arche, 1957; for the birth of a committed political theatre

in this period, see also Xavier Durand, 'L'Art social au théâtre: deux expériences (1893, 1897)', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 91, April–June 1975, pp. 13–33.

59 See Philippe Besnard (ed.), *The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Founding of French Sociology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; for political science, see P. Favre, *Naissances de la science politique en France (1870–1914)*, Paris: Fayard, 1989. A similar phenomenon is found even in such an old-established discipline as history: C.-O. Carbonell, *Histoire et historiens en France: une mutation idéologique des historiens français (1865–1885)*, Toulouse: Privat, 1976; likewise in philosophy: J.-L. Fabiani, *Les Philosophes de la République*, Paris: Minuit, 1988.

60 A.-J. Tudesq, *Les Grands Notables en France (1840–1849)*, Paris: PUF, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 1232–3; L. Boltanski, *Les Cadres*, Paris: Minuit, 1982, pp. 63–128 (*The Making of a Class: Cadres in French Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

61 Joseph Reinach, *Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus*, Paris: Charpentier-Fasquelle, vol. 3, 1903, p. 246.

62 Reinach mentions in the same passage a use of the word by Maupassant in 1879, but without giving a reference for this. It would, if confirmed, be the earliest usage, except for that of Saint-Simon around 1820, in a different sense. A link could thus be established with Flaubert and 'the artist'.

63 Léon Bloy, *Le Désespéré* (1886), new edn by J. Bollery and J. Petit, Paris: Mercure de France, 1964, p. 204.

64 See the three complementary studies by G. Idt, 'L'Intellectuel avant l'affaire Dreyfus', *Cahiers de lexicologie*, 14–15, 1969, pp. 35–46; T. Field, 'Vers une nouvelle datation du substantif intellectuel', *Travaux de linguistique et de littérature publiés par le Centre de philologie et de littérature romanes de l'université de Strasbourg*, 14(2), 1976, pp. 159–76; W. M. Johnston, 'The origins of the term "*intellectuels*" in French novels and essays of the 1890s', *Journal of European Studies*, 4, 1974, pp. 43–56.

65 Henry Bérenger, 'La Jeunesse intellectuelle et le roman français contemporain', *L'Université de Paris*, no. 31, January 1890, p. 28 (original emphasis), cited in W. M. Johnston, 'The origins of the term "*intellectuels*"', p. 45.

66 Jules Lermina, *Question sociale: ventre et cerveau*, Paris: Chamuel, 1894, p. 13; also on p. 32: 'Let us fatten up the intellectuals, multiply their sinecures, broaden ever more the circle of officialdom.'

67 Henry Bérenger, 'Les Prolétaires intellectuels en France', *Revue des revues*, 15 January 1898, pp. 125–45, published in book form

together with other studies by J. Finot and R. Pottier, Paris: Editions de la Revue, 1898.

68 Cf. for example Jean Jaurès, 'Les Etudiants socialistes', *La Dépêche*, 13 May 1893, in *Oeuvres: Etudes socialistes*, 1, Paris: Rieder, 1931, p. 41: 'There is also an intellectual proletariat.'

69 Roger Chartier, 'Espace social et imaginaire social, les intellectuels frustrés au XVIIe siècle', *Annales ESC*, no. 2, March–April 1982, pp. 389–400.

70 Cf. for example, Jean Jaurès, 'La Classe moyenne et la question sociale', 17 March 1889, in *Œuvres*, pp. 21–5: 'There is scarcely any room left, in poor but educated young people, for honest high ambitions' (p. 24).

71 Leonor O'Boyle, 'The problem of an excess of educated men in Western Europe (1800–1850)', *Journal of Modern History*, 4, 1970, pp. 471–95.

72 Bérenger, 'Les Prolétaires intellectuels en France', pp. 126–7.

73 Ibid., p. 128.

74 Louis Pinto, 'Les Intellectuels vers 1900: une nouvelle classe moyenne', in G. Grunberg, G. Lavau and N. Mayer (eds), *L'Univers politique des classes moyennes*, Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1983, pp. 140–55.

75 Bérenger, 'Les Prolétaires intellectuels en France', p. 118.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., p. 130.

78 Henry Bérenger, *La Conscience nationale*, Paris: Colin, 1898, p. 165.

CHAPTER 2 '*INTELLECTUELS*' OR 'ELITE'?

1 Georges Perrot, *Centenaire de l'Ecole normale supérieure*, Paris: Hachette, 1895, p. xlv.

2 On the interchangeable nature of these expressions throughout the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century, see A.-J. Tudesq, *Les Grands Notables en France (1840–1849)*, 2 vols, Paris: PUF, 1964; and Jean Dubois, *Le Vocabulaire politique et social de 1869 à 1872*, Paris: Larousse, 1962, pp. 15–16.

3 See for example: H. Passy, 'De l'inégalité des richesses et des causes qui la produisent', *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, 2nd series, vol. 3, 1848, pp. 25–6.

4 A.-J. Tudesq, *Les Grands Notables*, *passim*, and examples quoted in Christophe Charle, *Les Hauts Fonctionnaires en France au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1980, pp. 33–9.

5 Emile Boutmy, *Quelques idées sur la création d'une faculté libre d'enseignement supérieur*, Paris: Laîné, 1871.
6 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
7 See Dominique Damamme, 'Genèse sociale d'une institution scolaire: l'Ecole libre des sciences politiques', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 70, November 1987, pp. 31–46; Christophe Charle, 'Sciences-Po entre l'élite et le pouvoir', *Le Débat*, no. 64, March–April 1991, pp. 93–108.
8 See Emile Littré, 'Des conditions du gouvernement en France', *Revue de philosophie positive* (1876), repr. in *De l'établissement de la troisième République*, Paris: Aux bureaux de la philosophie positive, 1880, pp. 364–8. See also Claude Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1982, p. 208.
9 Littré, 'Des conditions du gouvernement en France', p. 383.
10 Antonin Dubost, *Des conditions du gouvernement en France*, quoted ibid., p. 376.
11 Louis Liard, *L'Enseignement supérieur en France*, Paris: A. Colin, 1894, vol. 2, p. 344.
12 Ibid., p. 351.
13 Ibid., p. 348.
14 See V. Karady, 'Les Professeurs de la République, le marché scolaire, les réformes universitaires et les transformations de la fonction professorale à la fin du XIXe siècle', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 47–8, June 1983, esp. p. 97.
15 Vincent Wright, 'L'ENA de 1848–49: un échec révélateur', *Revue historique*, January–February 1973, pp. 21–42; G. Thuillier, *L'ENA avant l'ENA*, Paris: PUF, 1983.
16 Jules Ferry, '31 mai 1880', in *Discours et opinions de Jules Ferry*, Paris: A. Colin, 1895, vol. 3, p. 508.
17 Jules Ferry, 'Discours de Bordeaux du 30 août 1885', ibid., vol. 7, pp. 41–2.
18 See G. Valbert, 'La Force et la faiblesse des gouvernements démocratiques', *Revue des deux mondes*, 1 July 1880, esp. p. 214; Auguste Chirac, *Les Rois de la République*, 2 vols, Paris: Arnould, 1883–6; Edouard Drumont, *La France juive*, Paris: Flammarion, 1886; on Jules Soury, one of Barrès's mentors, see Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire 1885–1914: les origines françaises du fascisme*, Paris: Seuil, 1978, pp. 159ff.; and on Vacher de Lapouge, ibid., pp. 164–70.
19 On Zola's criticisms of the republicans in power, see, for example R. Ternois, *Zola et son temps: 'Lourdes, Rome, Paris'*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1961, p. 46.
20 Georges Vacher de Lapouge, *L'Aryen, son rôle social: cours libre de*

science politique, professé à l'Université de Montpellier (1889–1890), Paris: Fontemoing, 1899, p. 469, note quoted by Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire*, pp. 166–7.

21 On Jaurès's biography, see Vincent Duclert and Gilles Candar, *Jean Jaurès*, Paris: Fayard, 2014.

22 Jean Jaurès, 'Le Capitalisme et la classe moyenne', 10 March 1889, in *Oeuvres: Etudes socialistes*, 1, Paris: Rieder, 1931, pp. 18–21; 'La Classe moyenne et la question sociale', 17 March 1889, ibid., p. 23.

23 Jaurès, 'Réponses et questions', 11 January 1893, ibid., p. 131.

24 Edouard Maneuvrier, *L'Education de la bourgeoisie sous la République*, Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1888; Alfred Fouillée, 'L'Education et la sélection', *Revue des deux mondes*, 1 June 1890, pp. 561–88; Jean Izoulet, *La Cité moderne et la métaphysique de la sociologie*, Paris: Alcan, 1894.

25 Two of them (Maneuvrier and Izoulet) were graduates of the Ecole normale supérieure; all three had passed the highest competitive state examination, the *agrégation*, in philosophy; Maneuvrier was the son of a cutler, Izoulet the son of a schoolteacher, and Fouillée the son of an administrator in a slate factory who died young (sources: E. Boutroux, 'Edouard Maneuvrier', *Annuaire de l'association amicale des anciens élèves de l'Ecole normale supérieure*, Paris: Hachette, 1918, pp. 43–7, birth certificate, and statement of civil status issued by the municipal registrar in Limoges; E. Bocquillon, *Izoulet et son oeuvre*, Paris: Baudinière, 1943, p. 36, and extracts from Izoulet's autobiography; P. Janet, 'Notice sur la vie et les ouvrages d'Alfred Fouillée', *Travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, 86, 1916, pp. 4–5).

26 Maneuvrier, *L'Education de la bourgeoisie*, p. 250.

27 Ibid., pp. 382–3.

28 Ibid., p. 384.

29 Fouillée, ' L'Education et la sélection', p. 578.

30 Ibid., p. 580.

31 Ibid., p. 587.

32 J.-C. Filloux, *Durkheim et le socialisme*, Geneva: Droz, 1977; B. Lacroix, *Durkheim et le politique*, Paris: Presses de la FNSP/ Presses de l'université de Montréal, 1981; Marcel Fournier, *Emile Durkheim: A Biography*, trans. David Macey, Cambridge: Polity, 2013.

33 See Archives nationales, File F17 13556. According to William Logue (*From Philosophy to Sociology: The Evolution of French Liberalism, 1870–1914*, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press,

1983, pp. 111–12), Izoulet had served as Paul Bert's secretary in 1881–2 and had the backing of Raymond Poincaré and Léon Bourgeois, two republican leaders, at the time the chair was created.

34 Izoulet, *La Cité moderne*, p. v.
35 Ibid., p. 52.
36 Ibid., p. 86.
37 Ibid., p.119 (emphasis added).
38 Ibid., p. 193.
39 Christophe Charle, *Les Elites de la République (1880–1900)*, Paris: Fayard, 1987, 2nd enlarged edn, 2006, ch. 8.
40 On this new political climate, see Pierre Sorlin, *Waldeck-Rousseau*, Paris: A. Colin, 1966, pp. 361–4 and 380–6; Edmond Demolins, *La Nécessité d'un programme social et d'un nouveau classement des partis*, Paris: Didot, 1895.
41 On Durkheim: 'Gambetta was his hero' (Maurice Holleaux), quoted in G. Davy, 'Emile Durkheim', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 26, 1919, p. 189; Harvey Goldberg, *Jean Jaurès*, Paris: Fayard, 1970, pp. 32–3 (*The life of Jean Jaurès*, Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1962); Charles Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr*, Paris: Rieder, 1932, p. 27; Ernest Tonnelat, *Charles Andler: sa vie et son œuvre*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1948, pp. 30–1; and we have Joseph Bédier's own testimony in the biographical note that he wrote about his late brother (*Annuaire de l'association amicale des anciens élèves de l'Ecole normale supérieure*, Paris: Hachette, 1893, pp. 48–51).
42 On this episode, see the files BA/27 and BA/1644 in the Archives of the Police Prefecture. On this period in the history of the Ecole normale, see also Romain Rolland's posthumously published account, written as the events unfolded: *Le Cloître de la rue d'Ulm: journal de Romain Rolland à l'Ecole normale (1886–89)*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1952, p. 214; On 2 December 1887, the students of the Ecole normale held a fictive election for the presidency of the Republic: Jules Ferry won a majority of 25 votes (p. 161). In the true parliamentary vote, Ferry was severely beaten because of his colonial policy in Indochina.
43 *Le Réveil du Quartier latin*, organe des étudiants, no. 29, 2 December 1888 (Archives of Police Prefecture, BA/27).
44 Ernest Lavisse, *Etudes et étudiants*, Paris: A. Colin, 1890, p. xxi.
45 George Weisz, 'Associations et manifestations: les étudiants français de la Belle Epoque', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 120, July–September 1982, pp. 31–44, esp. pp. 32–6; Pierre Moulinier, *La Naissance de l'étudiant moderne*, Paris: Belin, 2002.

46 See the article 'Ceux de demain' ('Those of tomorrow') by Edouard Fuster in *Le Figaro*, 29 March 1893: 'Young people in transition, cast between two classes and two historical periods, no more the partisans of the dominant bourgeoisie than of the impatient people, they believe that they are destined for the role of scapegoats . . . . Left to their own devices, the students have banded together. That is the commencement of politics; it is always the best politics' (Archives of the Paris Police Department, BA/27). The student groups Fuster mentions are the (Catholic) Cercle de Luxembourg, the (Protestant) Cercle d'Aubigné, the Union française de la jeunesse, the Union de la jeunesse républicaine, the Etudiants socialistes révolutionnaires internationalistes, the Cercle radical-socialiste and the Ligue démocratique des Ecoles.

47 See Y. Cohen, 'Avoir vingt ans en 1900: à la recherche d'un nouveau socialisme', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 120, July–September 1982, pp. 11–29. On the general climate in the Latin Quarter in these years, the serious incidents of July 1893 and the agitation in Aulard's courses.

48 For example, the Guesdist tendency among the students proclaimed: 'Intellectuals today, these young men will be manual labourers tomorrow' (quoted by Y. Cohen, ibid., p. 16 in *Le Socialiste*, 13 April 1893).

49 Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr*; D. Lindenberg and P. A. Meyer, *Lucien Herr: le socialisme et son destin*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1977; Lucien Herr, *Choix d'écrits*, ed. M. Roques, Paris: Rieder, 1932; Catalogue of the exhibition *Lucien Herr et l'Ecole normale*, Paris: PENS, 1977.

50 'There was not a single socialist among us throughout these rather dull years, which ran from the end of Boulangism (just before I entered the Ecole) to the beginning of the Panama Canal scandals (just after I left it)' (letter from Elie Halévy to Charles Andler, 24 August 1929, in Halévy, *Correspondance 1891–1937*, Paris: de Fallois, 1996, p. 697).

51 Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr*, p. 28.

52 Letter from Herr, quoted ibid., p. 34.

53 Lucien Herr, 'Le Progrès intellectuel et l'affranchissement (1888–9)', handwritten fragments in *Choix d'écrits*, vol. 1, p. 27.

54 Ibid., p. 30.

55 On Herr's relationship with Russia and Lavroff, see Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr*, p. 97, and Lindenberg and Meyer, *Lucien Herr*, pp. 66–8; on Lavroff, see his bio-bibliographical notice at the beginning of Pierre Lavroff, *Lettres historiques*, Paris: Reinwald, 1903.

Here is a sentence taken from this book in which Lavroff portrays the revolutionary intellectual. It is manifestly akin to Herr's theses and the ideal of militant Dreyfusism: 'The individuals with a gift for critical thought who should unite to form a party possess, precisely by virtue of the fact that they are more capable and more energetic than others, a markedly distinct personality' (p. 127).

56 Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr*, pp. 92–3.

57 Ibid., and S. Fraisse, 'L. Herr journaliste (1890–1905)', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 92, July–September 1975, pp. 93–102, esp. p. 95, citing an article of Herr's sharply critical of Jules Ferry: 'We are fed up with his authoritarian nit-picking and underhanded diplomacy' (*Le Parti ouvrier*, 24 May 1890).

58 I present a more detailed version of these analyses, together with the empirical evidence for them, in 'Avant-garde intellectuelle et avant-garde politique, les normaliens et le socialisme (1867–1914)' in *Paris, fin de siècle*, Paris: Seuil, 1998, pp. 227–74.

CHAPTER 3 THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'PARTY OF THE INTELLECTUALS'

1 See J. Estèbe, *Les Ministres de la République (1871–1914)*, doctoral thesis, Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 116ff.

2 *Le Décadent*, 10 April 1886, quoted in J.-F. Six, *1886, naissance du XXe siècle en France*, Paris: Seuil, 1986, p. 136; on the avant-garde at this time, see N. Richard, *A l'aube du symbolisme*, Paris: Nizet, 1961, and *Le Mouvement décadent*, Paris: Nizet, 1968.

3 Jules Huret, *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire* (1891), new edn, Vanves: Thot, 1982, pp. 159–60.

4 Ibid., p. 260.

5 Ibid., pp. 82, 84.

6 Ibid., p. 78.

7 This was, for example, Moréas's position: he took Hugo, the pride of the nation, as the typical committed poet, making him his whipping boy. After his adversaries counter-attacked, he had to tone down his remarks, rejecting anti-patriotism in a letter published as an appendix to the *Enquête* (pp. 85, 347).

8 'Outside the religions, there is no great art; and, when one has a Latin education, there is only the void outside Catholicism. That is the reason that I, like Mage, teach that the intellectuel's highest duty lies wholly in the manifestation of the Divine. That is the

reason that I hold that the end of France is only a few years away' (ibid., p. 61). Note the early use of the term '*intellectuel*'.

9 Paul Adam: 'Art, it is my opinion, has its goal in itself' (ibid., p. 64).

10 Ibid., p. 205.

11 Ibid., pp. 280, 233, 205.

12 C. Doty, *From Cultural Rebellion to Counterrevolution: The Politics of Maurice Barrès*, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1976, and J. A. Duncan, *Les Romans de Paul Adam*, Berne: Peter Lang, 1977, pp. 16–20.

13 'If tomorrow's literature were purely socialist, after all, I would not be surprised. I would not be angry, either. After so much pity of the Slavic sort, a bit of authentic, simple justice seems to be in order' (Paul Bonnetain, in Huret, *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire*, p. 214); 'It must be said that naturalism follows the movement of modern scientific, socialist thought' (Jean Jullien, ibid., p.231); 'The spirit of revolt is progressing . . . . Yes, everything will change at the same time: literature, art, education, everything, after the general upheaval' (Octave Mirbeau, ibid., p.193); 'The very flexible genre of the novel, very well suited for making all possible combinations, could become partially socialist, socialist in the very broad, very lofty sense of the word . . . . This poetry of the poor Suburb is the literary lesson that one can learn every day' (Gustave Geffroy, ibid., pp. 208–9). All these authors are realist or naturalist novelists.

14 Huret, *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire*, p. 105 (capitalized in the original).

15 Consider, for example, the trajectories of Félix Fénéon and Paul Léautaud, peripheral members of the avant-garde without significant social advantages. Léautaud, the son of a prompter in the Comédie française, had to go to work at the age of fifteen; he worked in various low-level trades and then began frequenting the literary cafés of the Latin Quarter: this was the origin of his vocation as a writer and his vaguely anarchist sympathies. Fénéon followed much the same path. These two writers were able to give up the jobs they had taken to survive by becoming critics and secretaries of avant-garde reviews. See F. Fénéon, *Oeuvres plus que complètes*, Geneva: Droz, 1970, and E. Silve, *Paul Léautaud et le Mercure de France*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1985, pp. 13–17.

16 *La Plume*, 1 February 1893, pp. 145–6.

17 Ibid., 15 March 1893, p. 116.

18 *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, no. 39, p. 247.

19 *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, no. 43, 25 May 1893, p. 475. On

Bernard Lazare's positions in favour of Social Art, see Nelly Wilson, *Bernard-Lazare: Antisemitism and the Problem of Jewish Identity in late Nineteenth-Century France*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 17.

20 J. Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France*, Paris: Sudel, 1951, pp. 123ff.; E. W. Herbert, *The Artist and Social Reform*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961, ch. 4; a paper in *Le Gaulois* (12 January 1894); and A. Hamon, *Psychologie de l'anarchiste-socialiste*, Paris: Stock, 1895 (interviews of writers near to the anarchist movement).

21 Huret, *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire*, p. 299.

22 *Revue blanche*, January 1892, p. 54.

23 Ibid., p. 55.

24 Paul Adam went further and rejected the law of the majority opposing 'Paris, the city of intelligence' to ignorant voters of the provinces who form the majority ('Souhaits anarchistes', *Le Journal*, 2 January 1894).

25 *Lettres inédites de Louis Desprez à Emile Zola*, Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1952; Christophe Charle, *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme*, Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure, 1979, p. 98.

26 Lucien Descaves, *Souvenirs d'un ours*, Paris: Editions de Paris, 1946, pp. 107–10; L. A. Carter, *Zola and the Theater*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963. On the scandal provoked by Barrès's play, see his plea in an article published in *Le Journal*, 24 February 1894.

27 Reg Carr, *Anarchism in France: The Case of Octave Mirbeau*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977.

28 See Hubert Juin's introduction to Rémy de Gourmont, *Histoires magiques: et autre récits*, Paris: UGE, 1982, pp. 26–8.

29 *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, 12 December 1891, p. 207, quoted in J. A. Duncan, *Les Romans de Paul Adam*, pp. 23–4.

30 *La Révolte*, literary supplement, no. 24, 'Anarchie et littérature', 24 February–3 March 1894.

31 On the technique of the interview as characteristic of modern journalism, see the remarks by Michael B. Palmer, *Des petits journaux aux grandes agences*, Paris: Aubier, 1983, esp. p. 91.

32 This kind of survey involved academics more often than others; it accompanied the process of reforming higher education from beginning to end. Renan was the first professor to be interviewed in a survey aimed at the general public: he figures in Huret's *Enquête*, where he appears ill at ease.

33 See, for the fourth legislature, the material filed under call numbers C 5634–5639.

34 Besides the petition for Descaves or the students' petition against Boulanger, we might mention the very academic petition against the Eiffel Tower (in *Le Temps*, 14 February 1887), which was not political and resembled an ordinary petition, that of a committee in defence of an aesthetic cause, Paris heritage.
35 Thus, after 1894, *Mercure de France* or *Revue blanche* multiplied surveys. For example, in the first of these: 'Une enquête franco-allemande', April 1895, pp. 1–65, and 'Alexandre Dumas fils et les écrivains nouveaux', January 1896, pp. 82–97; in the second: 'Enquête sur l'influence des lettres scandinaves', vol. 12, no. 89, 15 February 1897, and 'Quelques opinions sur l'oeuvre de Taine', vol. 13, no. 101, 15 August 1897.
36 See, in René Ghil's reply to Huret, the list of those he claims as his disciples (p. 117).
37 *L'Ermitage*, July 1893, p. 21.
38 Ibid., pp. 21–2 (original emphasis). On *L'Ermitage*, see the memoirs of its founder, who reveals his deliberate apolitical eclecticism: Henri Mazel, *Aux beaux temps du symbolisme*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1943, p. 16. On the rivalry with *Revue blanche*, see A. B. Jackson, *La Revue blanche 1889–1903*, Paris: Minard, 1960, pp. 24ff.
39 A few of the responses were tantamount to non-responses, and it is certain that the questionnaire was sent to other writers who did not respond, although the referendum's organizers did not admit just how big the deficit was: 'If certain poets or aesthetes are not to be found in the preceding pages, the reason is that they preferred to abstain; for we invited all those worthy to respond to do so, without discrimination and, above all, free of all sociological presumption about their opinion' (*L'Ermitage*, July 1893, p. 22).
40 Ibid., p. 1.
41 Ibid., p. 24.
42 *L'Ermitage*, December 1893, p. 258.
43 We find answers from 'independent' sociologists such as Edmond Demolins, Gabriel Tarde or Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, but interviews were conducted neither with Jean Izoulet nor with Emile Durkheim, who had just published, respectively, *La Cité future* et *De la division du travail social*.
44 *Entretiens politiques et littéraires*, 10 June 1893, p. 492.
45 Ibid., p. 495.
46 Jules Huret, *Interviews de littérature et d'art*, Vanves: Thot, 1984, p. 41 (paper published in *Le Figaro*, 4 August 1893).
47 Ibid., p. 44–5.

48 Reg Carr (*Anarchism in France*, p. 76) makes inaccurate mention of it, referring to *l'Echo de Paris* where it is not cited. Nelly Wilson points out that Bernard Lazare gathered a few signatures (*Bernard-Lazare*, pp. 96–8); as for Jean Grave, he makes scant, embarrassed allusion to the affair in his memoirs (*Quarante ans de propagande anarchiste*, ed. Mireille Delfau, Paris: Flammarion, 1973, pp. 276–7, 304).
49 Carr, *Anarchism in France*, pp. 25ff.
50 Grave, *Quarante ans de propagande anarchiste*, ch. 12.
51 Octave Mirbeau, preface to *La Société mourante et l'anarchie*, quoted in Carr, *Anarchism in France*, p. 51. It took Mirbeau eighteen months to write his preface.
52 Carr, *Anarchism in France*, p. 64.
53 Octave Mirbeau, 'Au Palais', *Le Journal*, 4 March 1894. The following day, Bernard Lazare published an article, 'Quelques mots', in the same daily.
54 A few extracts from the evidence given by writers called to the bar by the defence show that the tactic was clearly to present Grave as a writer defended by other writers.

Elisée Reclus: 'From an intellectual point of view, I consider Jean Grave to be a member of the elite.'

Octave Mirbeau: 'Monsieur Grave enjoys a great deal of authority in our world.'

Paul Adam: 'I am not personally acquainted with Monsieur Grave, but I would be very proud to have written his book.'

Bernard Lazare: 'I consider him to be a writer of rare merit. His book seems very beautiful to me. Many of us would be proud to have written it.'

55 H. Tucou, 'Une protestation', *La Petite République*, 4 March 1894, p. 1.
56 Tout Paris, 'Autour d'une protestation', *Le Gaulois*, 5 March 1894.
57 'What do these gentlemen generally do? They talk about what they will never write. A few of them will be, in a few years, provincial notaries or grocers.' The scorn expressed for the avant-garde is the stronger in that the journalist is himself obscure (the article appeared under a pseudonym).
58 See the list in the appendix. Among the journalists were Jean Drault, one of the editors of the (anti-Semitic) *Libre Parole*, and John Labusquière of the (socialist) *Cri du people*; among the activists were Charles Châtel, the managing editor of (the anarchist) *L'En-dehors*; and among the artists were the post-impressionist painters Paul Gauguin, Maximilien Luce and Paul Signac.

59 *Le Gaulois*, 5 March 1894.
60 Conversation quoted in *Le Figaro*, 8 March 1894: 'M. Zola et l'anarchie'.
61 On the right, *Le Gaulois* and *Le Figaro* supported him; on the left, *La Petite République* (8, 10, 13 March 1894) and *La Justice* (4 and 13 March 1894) criticized him.
62 Among the very young men who would go on to make a name for themselves but had, at the time, barely begun to write, were Léon-Paul Fargue, born in 1876, Paul Fort, born in 1872 ('scarcely twenty', according to *Le Gaulois*, which made him two years younger than he was), Alfred Jarry, born in 1873, and Paul Léautaud, born in 1872, who earned a living as clerk for a solicitor and frequented literary cafés.
63 Wilson, *Bernard-Lazare*, p. 64. *Archives of the Police Prefecture*, BA/79 and BA/80.
64 Consider, for example, the *normaliens*' subscription in favour of the Workers' Glassworks in Carmaux, which would have been unthinkable only a few years earlier: forty-five students subscribed, on the urging of *normaliens* who had been won over to socialism (November 1896) (see *Revue socialiste*, 1896, p. 640, quoted in G. Leroy, *Péguy entre l'ordre et la révolution*, Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1979, p. 64).

CHAPTER 4 'INTELLECTUALS' VERSUS 'ELITE'

1 Célestin Bouglé, *Pour la démocratie française*, Paris: Cornély, 1900, p. 95.
2 Moreover, the French Revolution and its ideas, as is well known, were the founding references constantly used by the Dreyfusards. See Emile Zola, *La Vérité en marche: l'affaire Dreyfus*, new edn, Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1969, 'Lettre à la France (6 January 1898)', p. 101, and 'Déclaration au jury (22 February 1898)', p. 132: 'It is now a question of knowing whether France is still the France of the Rights of Man, the France that gave the world freedom and should give it justice.'
3 See Michel Winock, 'Les Affaires Dreyfus', *Vingtième siècle: revue d'histoire*, no. 5, January–February 1985, pp. 19–37; we could stand Winock's thesis on its head: the common point between the crises evoked and the Dreyfus Affair resides less in the return of the ideological themes inaugurated by the affair (these were still older: see the preceding note) than in the specifically new role

played by the new socio-political category, the *intellectuels*, in the course of the crisis.

4 See J.-P. Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme: la Ligue de la patrie française 1899–1904*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1977, pp. 20–30; Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, London: Associated University Presses, 1982, ch. 4; H. L. Wesseling, 'Engagement tegen nil en dank Franse Intellectuelen en de Dreyfus Affaire', *Tijdschrift voor de Geschiednis*, 87, 1974, pp. 410–24 (statistical analysis of the 'Manifeste des intellectuels'). A broader view of non-intellectual Dreyfusards has been proposed recently by Marie Aynié, *Les Amis inconnus: se mobiliser pour Dreyfus*, Toulouse: Privat, 2011. It confirms my conclusions.

5 'The most serious statistics do indeed show that no more than two thousand Frenchmen were, in January 1898, prepared to stand up for an innocent man's rights and demand a completely new trial for Dreyfus in solidarity with Zola' (H. Rainaldy, in *Hommage des artistes à Picquart*, Paris: Société libre des gens de lettres, 1899, p. 1).

6 Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*; Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, pp. 20–1. My estimate for the lists for Picquart is based on an extrapolation from a series of polls in the volume cited in note 5, which brings together all the lists. Because of the frequent repetitions from one list to the next, as well as the homonyms, it is very hard to produce an exact total, even when an exhaustive count is made.

7 In fact, as I have showed in 'Champ littéraire et champ du pouvoir: les écrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus', *Annales ESC*, no. 2, March–April 1977, pp. 240–64, and as we shall see in the next chapter, most of the writers, even those who did not spell out, after their names, that they were 'men of letters' were not very well known beyond the circle of literary insiders. It is therefore likely – unless these men overestimated their celebrity – that these writers without a title were trying to benefit from the positive effect of their proximity to ranking figures such as Emile Zola, Anatole France or Octave Mirbeau. They were also preaching by example, since the petition did away with hierarchies. Everyone had his place there, whatever his position in the literary field.

8 M. Barrès, 'La Protestation des intellectuels', *Le Journal*, 1 February 1898, repr. in *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme* (1902), new edn in *L'Oeuvre de Maurice Barrès*, Paris: Club de l'honnête homme, 1966, vol. 5, pp. 56–65. The published text differs in several

important ways from that of the article, especially as far as *ad hominem* attacks are concerned.

9 See F. Gregh, *L'Age d'or*, Paris: Grasset, 1947, pp. 290–1; The catalogue for the exhibition 'Lucien Herr et l'Ecole normale' (Paris: Ecole normale supérieure, 15–30 June 197, p. 18) includes a list of intellectuals from whom signatures were to be solicited, drawn up by Lucien Herr himself.

10 *Le Journal*, 22 February 1898, and *L'Eclair*, 10 February 1898, Robert de Lasteyrie's protestation.

11 *Le Temps*, 1 January 1899.

12 Ibid.

13 *Le Temps*, 7 January 1899.

14 *Hommage des artistes à Picquart*, p. 3, and *L'Aurore*, 25 and 26 November 1898.

15 Extract from Henry Leyret in *L'Aurore*, 27 November 1898.

16 Maurice Barrès, 'L'Anarchie de l'estrade', *Le Journal*, 23 December 1898.

17 *La Libre Parole*, 14 to 29 December 1898. Stephen Wilson's study, based on Pierre Quillard's *Le Monument Henry*, Paris: Stock, 1899, neglects this aspect of the petition. Quillard's book is a good example of the manipulation of a petition by the adversary: by grouping signatures based on professional categories or ideological themes, the symbolist poet sought to provide an objective vision of them that revealed their profound social and ideological significance. This is already an *intellectuel* reading, similar to the work of the historian.

18 Edouard Drumont, 'Ce que disent les chiffres', *La Libre Parole*, 29 December 1898.

19 *Le Temps*, 24 January 1899.

20 'Renan would have signed between Séailles and Buisson, and it is Monsieur Bergson who transmits his real sentiments to us' (Camille Mauclair, 'L'Université courageuse', *L'Aurore*, 11 December 1898).

21 *L'Aurore*, 15 January 1898.

22 Maurice Barrès, 'La Protestation des intellectuels', *Le Journal*, 1 February 1898. *L'Aurore*, unsurprisingly, gives an opposite vision.

23 H. Leyret, 'Des hommes d'action', *L'Aurore*, 23 February 1898.

24 Barrès, 'La Protestation des intellectuels' (original emphasis).

25 The relations between Anatole France and Maurice Barrès were at the same time admiring and critical: that is why the author of *Les Déracinés* takes precautions when criticizing the engagement of one of his literary models: see M.-C. Bancquart, *Anatole France:*

un sceptique passionné, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984, esp. p. 258. Lucien Herr falls back on the same procedure in his famous essay against Barrès, 'A M. Maurice Barrès', *Revue blanche*, 15, 1898, pp. 241–5.

26 Octave Mirbeau, 'La Fête des sauvages', *L'Aurore*, 24 November 1898.

27 Henry Leyret, 'La Révolte des consciences', *L'Aurore*, 27 November 1898.

28 Bancquart, *Anatole France: un sceptique passionné*, p. 243, and J. Suffel, 'Anatole France et l'affaire Dreyfus', in G. Leroy (ed.), *Les Ecrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus*, Paris: PUF, 1983, pp. 235–42. On the identification between the fictive hero of the *Histoire contemporaine*, the novel where Anatole France transposes the Dreyfus Affair, and true academics of that time, see G. Geffroy, 'M. Bergeret', *L'Aurore*, 20 January 1898: 'In these hastily established lists of names strung out by the hundreds, which are going to become thousands, no one can help seeing the fictive and real names of Monsieur Bergeret, an associate professor on the Faculty of Letters at ***. He is there, he constantly recurs, he bursts forth daily, he returns like a refrain at each new paragraph.'

29 The first appeal to students was Zola's 'Lettre à la jeunesse', 14 December 1897, repr. in *La Vérité en marche: l'affaire Dreyfus*, pp. 91–8. Zola here evoked the role in the opposition, at the end of the Second Empire, of young people who were then students. On the disorders in the Latin Quarter after the publication of 'J'accuse', see *L'Aurore*, 16 January 1898; *L'Eclair* of 23 January 1898 mentions demonstrations hostile to a Dreyfusard professor in Rennes. Compare the incidents that took place during Seignobos's and Buisson's courses at the Sorbonne (respectively, *L'Aurore*, 26 November 1898 and 2 December 1898). The Dreyfusard newspapers consistently claimed that the disorders were provoked by pseudo-students, whereas the real students, they said, were on their side. See also F. Jayot, 'Les Etudiants parisiens de 1890 à 1906', master's thesis, Université de Paris X-Nanterre, 1973.

30 A. de Boisandré, 'Rendez l'argent', *Libre Parole*, 26 November 1898 (original emphasis).

31 *Libre Parole*, 29 November 1898.

32 Arthur Meyer has recourse to the same line of argument in *Le Gaulois*. It earned him this reply by René Dubreuil in *Le Siècle* of 20 November 1898: 'In an echo that has the pretension of being sly, he lists the intellectuals protesting in favour of Picquart . . . .

We, the patriots, have Sarcey, Barrès, Coppée, Talmeyr, Jean Lorrain, Armand Silvestre. Those are names that Monsieur Arthur Meyer should not boast about having. Monsieur Sarcey digests his dinner and cares as little about the Republic and the Truth as he cares about his first critique. Monsieur Coppée thinks only about his rheumatism and warms himself in churches. Messieurs Barrès and Talmeyr are two wrecks who wash up here and there at the whim of winds and scandals. Monsieur Jean Lorrain . . . Shh! And Monsieur Armand Silvestre, for his part, deserves all the sympathy of the army and navy, which he illustrated brilliantly with commandant Lanpete and admiral Le Kelpuduke' ('Les Patriotes de M. Arthur Meyer'). As we see here, personal attacks were usual in journalistic polemics at that time.

33 See Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, and Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, pp. 9–16. The League gradually became more radical, drawing closer to the anti-Semites in proportion as moderate elements left it. Coppée and Barrès, on the edges of the two movements, were among the League's most influential leaders.

34 On Valéry's anti-Dreyfusard position during the Dreyfus Affair, see Marcel Thomas, 'Le Cas Valéry', in Leroy (ed.), *Les Ecrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus*, pp. 103–12. At the time, Valéry was a civil servant working in the War Ministry, and, except for the fact that he attended Mallarmé's Tuesday evening soirees, he in no way claimed to be a writer. His dissident position from his literary master may be explained by his professional occupation linked to the army and his friendship with the anti-Dreyfusard and anti-Semitic painter Degas.

35 Yves Guyot, 'Où sont les vôtres?', *Le Siècle*, 13 December 1898.

36 B. Guinaudeau, 'L'intellectuel', *L'Aurore*, 2 February 1898: 'It is an act typical of the "Intellectual" to subject to crushing disdain the whole younger literary generation that he earlier exploited to his own ends, whose reviews, newspapers and naivety he took advantage of. It is an act typical of the "Intellectual" to flatter the multitude, because he thinks it is anti-Semitic and because he is preparing to ask the voters of Nancy for a parliamentary mandate.' Barrès, in view of his initial literary position close to the avant-garde, is here depicted as a 'traitor' to the Dreyfusism that he should have supported. On Barrès's image as an *intellectuel*, see Henry Bérenger's remarks, cited in chapter 1 above.

37 Maurice Barrès, 'La Patrie française', *Le Journal*, 2 January 1899 (original emphasis).

38 Francis de Pressensé, 'La Nouvelle Ligue des patriotes', *L'Aurore*, 2 January 1899 (original emphasis).
39 Jean Jaurès, 'La Classe intellectuelle', *La Petite République*, 7 January 1899.
40 Ibid.
41 See Pierre Bourdieu, 'Question de politique', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 16, February 1977, pp. 55–89.
42 Stephen Wilson, 'Le Monument Henry: la structure de l'antisémitisme en France, 1898–1899', *Annales ESC*, 32(2), 1977, p. 266; Luc Boltanski makes similar observations about letters of denunciation sent to *Le Monde:* Luc Boltanski, Yann Darré and Marie-Ange Schiltz, 'La Dénonciation', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, no. 51, March 1984, pp. 55–89.
43 See *Hommage des artistes à Picquart*, pp. 38, 42, 46, 48, 49: 'all leather-workers'; 'a group from Arcueil-Cachan'; 'the members of the committee of the Radical-Socialist Republican Union of Saint-Ouen'; 'Lycée Condorcet'; 'from (North) Quiévry'; 'a group of Alsatians'; 'clerks of the Simon company'; and so on.
44 For example: 'Monsieur Georges Colomb, assistant director of a research team at the Sorbonne, has written to us to say, in order to avoid all confusion, that he is not the academic named Colomb who contributed to the subscription.' Note published in *Le Temps*, reproduced in Quillard, *Le Monument Henry*, p. 147.
45 Because of the haste with which compositors set the newspapers of the day, these problems are compounded by others stemming from typographical errors, people with the same names, interpolations, and false signatures.
46 Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, pp. 22–7.
47 See Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction: critique sociale du jugement*, Paris: Minuit, 1979, pp. 466ff., and Daniel Gaxie, *Le Cens caché: inégalités culturelles et ségrégation politique*, Paris: Seuil, 1978.
48 Henry Leyret, 'Paris parle, la province bouge', *L'Aurore*, 27 November 1898.
49 *Libre Parole*, 16 December 1898.
50 A detailed analysis of the workers identified as such on the lists shows that it is a question of a working-class aristocracy: of 831 workers in the trades on which the poll bears, 440 were textile workers (producers of socks and linens), 102 were compositors, and almost all the others were also skilled workers: 59 were mechanics, 11 were pipe fitters, 8 were leather-workers, 6 were bronze fitters, 7 were electricians, 4 were bookbinders, 4 were foremen, 4 were tailors and 3 were

jewellers. This represents two-thirds of all the workers. The craftsmen also plied noble trades: 12 made luxury furniture, 11 were cabinet-makers and 17 produced game boards. The white-collar workers were recruited from the ranks of travelling salesmen (42), business agents (55) and accountants (66).

51 There is considerable overlap between the petitions for Picquart and the academic signatories of the 'Appeal for Unity'. It was thus partly a question of a gesture of appeasement on the part of the moderate Dreyfusards, who feared an unrestrained socialist or anti-militarist upsurge. The Anti-Dreyfusards, however, refused to endorse this appeal, invoking the duplicity of certain signatories committed to the adverse camp.

52 See the article by Clemenceau, 'Le Syndicat grandit': 'Thinkers were the first to go into action . . . . Even in our France, where so many people are held in check by Catholicism, by places and positions, and by favours of all kinds, where centralization makes the government the universal distributor, men of learning, scientists, teachers and scholars, all enemies of public agitation, freed themselves to the point of protesting in front of everyone, defending cynically violated right' (*L'Aurore*, 18 January 1898).

53 See Drumont's article (in *Libre Parole*, 5 December 1898) in which he speaks of 'the reconstitution of an immoral, vain, pretentious, grotesque oligarchy of people with ranks and diplomas, of *agrégés* and doctors of philosophy, the counterparts of the Inclytes, the Most Illustrious, the candidates and the dignitaries.' (Note the assimilation of academics to the Byzantine Aristocracy and its ridiculous titles.) See also Quillard, *Le Monument Henry*, pp. 634ff.: 'against these stupid peacocks known as intellectuals'.

54 The Catholic Dreyfusards, whose uncomfortable position is analysed in detail by Jean-Marie Mayeur, did not come, as a rule, from this traditionalist milieu: 'Les Catholiques Dreyfusards', *Revue historique*, no. 530, April–June 1979, pp. 337–61.

55 Among the examples of brothers divided between the two camps are the Beauregard brothers, one a professor in the Law Faculty, the other at the School of Pharmacy. The former joined the League of the French Fatherland, while the latter signed the Dreyfusard petitions. The Croiset brothers were in almost exactly the same situation: Maurice, a professor at the Collège de France, joined the League, whereas Alfred was more or less Dreyfusard, even if he did not sign any texts because of his functions as dean of the Faculty of Letters.

56 Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, pp. 28–9, and G. Vincent, 'Les Professeurs de l'enseignement secondaire dans la société de la Belle Epoque', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, January–March 1966, pp. 49–86.

57 Consider Albert Mathiez's run-ins with his hierarchical superiors in his provincial *lycée*: J. Friguglietti, *Albert Mathiez: historien révolutionnaire*, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 1974, p. 41. Clemenceau, in an article in *L'Aurore* (18 January 1898), adduces an example of pressure. Teachers in higher education were not spared, either: consider the case of Paul Stapfer, the dean of the Faculty of Letters in Bordeaux, who was suspended after he gave an oration at the rector's funeral, and the incident that saw Andrade, a professor in Rennes, clash with a militant Anti-Dreyfusard student; see, respectively, *La Petite République*, 29 July 1898; *L'Aurore*, 25 February 1898; *Le Journal*, 19 and 23 January 1898 (on a demonstration against Victor Basch in Rennes).

58 A prosopographical study should be carried out here; it would probably confirm the conclusions drawn from an analysis of the academics, given the connections between the recruitment procedures for the two populations.

59 A certain number of artists, for example, illustrated the above-cited book *Hommage des artistes à Picquart*; on the political division of the former impressionists see Philip Nord, *Impressionists and Politics*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 100ff.

60 J. Ponty, 'La Presse quotidienne et l'affaire Dreyfus en 1898–99', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, April–June 1974, p. 220. See, too, Paul Brulat's contemporary account: 'The press's will has played an abominable role, because the press is a prisoner, because almost the whole press is in the hands of speculators whose one and only concern is to sell paper. The writers are not to blame; they cannot say what they think. I am aware that most of them are animated by generous feelings and would speak out in favour of revision' (*Violence et raison*, Paris: Stock, 1898, p. 17).

61 Moreover, the vaguely defined term 'publicist' requires that we proceed with caution where the status of the individuals so defined is concerned.

62 Examples are Xavier Léon, editor of the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, F. Pillon, editor of *L'Année philosophique*, D. Bellet (*Journal des économistes*), H. Ferrari, editor of the *Revue bleue*, Léon Marillier, akin to the historian Seignobos, editor of *Revue d'histoire des religions*, and J. Leclercq from the *Gazette des beaux-arts*. On the difficulty of publishing a Dreyfusard article in the

mass-circulation periodicals, see Durkheim's testimony, written when he was contemplating writing his article: 'Now, to whom should I offer it? Since *Revue de Paris* has ceased publication, I see only *Revue bleue* . . . Ah! If only *Le Temps* would take it! But it will make very sure not to. As for *Le Siècle*, that would be to bring coals to Newcastle: its readers are already convinced, and others won't read it' (letter of 22 March 1898, in Durkheim, *Textes*, ed. V. Karady, Paris: Minuit, 1975, vol. 2, pp. 423–4).

63 J.-C. Caron, *Génération romantique: les étudiants et le quartier latin*, Paris: A. Colin, 1994, and P. Moulinier, *Naissance de l'étudiant moderne*, Paris: Belin, 2002.

64 Quillard, *Le Monument Henry*, respectively pp. 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186 and 188.

65 Letter to Louis Havet, 13 November 1898 (Correspondance L. Havet, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscripts Department, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 22487, fols 90–91) (original emphasis). In the end, a compromise was reached: the text was not modified, but all pledged to make sure that the incident would not make the rounds of the newspapers.

66 We find the same difference in degree of mobilization among *normaliens* in the sciences and the humanities during the Sainte-Beuve Affair at the end of the Second Empire. (See R. Fayolle, 'Sainte-Beuve et l'Ecole normale: l'affaire de 1867', *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, July–September 1967, pp. 557–76, esp. p. 564 the list of signatories.)

67 This was probably the first manifestation of the structure of affinity between disciplines and political opinions. Earlier, it had not been possible to talk about students in the humanities and the sciences, apart from Ecole normale students. Under the previous regimes, liberal young people chose to study law or medicine or enrolled at the Ecole polytechnique (See Caron, *Génération romantique*). On the 1920s, see J.-F. Sirinelli, *Génération intellectuelle: khâgneux et normaliens dans l'entre-deux-guerres*, Paris, Fayard, 1988, ch. 8. On the Algerian war, 'La Guerre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français', *Cahiers de l'IHTP*, no. 10, November 1988, esp. A. Monchablon, 'Syndicalisme étudiant et génération algérienne', pp. 119–29. On the post-1968 situation, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo academicus*, Paris: Minuit, 1984, p. 221: the rates of student participation in the elections at universities, faculty by faculty.

68 See A. Gérard, *Mémoires*, Paris: Plon, 1922, pp. 307–10: a republican diplomat recounts his discussion with Arthur Ranc, a Dreyfusard who claimed that Gambetta, who had influenced both of them, would have been a revisionist, whereas Gérard

maintained that, on the contrary, he would have defended the army, a position Gérard himself approved. For his part, P. Cambon, another diplomat, deplored the damage that the affair was doing France abroad (*Correspondance*, Paris: Grasset, 1940, vol. 1, p. 437: 'government of subalterns' and vol. 2, p. 25).

69 The officers thus formally disobeyed an order from the minister of war, Freycinet (see Wilson, 'Le Monument Henry', p. 273).

70 When the prefect of the *département* of Seine-et-Oise confused him with this brother, Le Chatelier spelled out his political attitude as follows: 'But my activity has always been limited to the circle of my personal relations, with two exceptions: my signatures for the French Fatherland and of the petition about the *fiches*. I have never cultivated personal relations with a member of parliament or any campaign committee whatsoever. I hold that a nation always has the government it deserves and that, to reform the government, the only practical procedure is to reform mores' (letter of 13 October 1907, National Archives, F14 11630 and F12 5188). On his elitism, see François Le Chatelier, *Henry Le Chatelier*, Paris: La Revue de métallurgie, 1968, p. 209 ('the *fiches*' refers to a scandal caused by the discovery of secret files kept by officials about the political orientations of officers to determine their careers. A press campaign and a petition forced the minister of war, General André, to renounce his functions in ` 1905).

71 On Arthur Fontaine, see M. Cointepas, *Arthur Fontaine: un réformateur, pacifiste et mécène au sommet de la Troisième République*, Rennes: PUR, 2008. Fontaine was a friend of Lucien Herr, who was thus able to win him over.

CHAPTER 5 'INTELLECTUALS' OF THE LEFT AND 'INTELLECTUALS' OF THE RIGHT

1 Ferdinand Brunetière, 'La Nation et l'armée: conférence pour la Ligue de la Patrie française, 26 avril 1899', in *Discours de combat*, Paris: Perrin, 1900, p. 237.

2 *Le Journal*, 12 March 1898.

3 'Notes d'un byzantin', *Revue blanche*, 17, 1898, p. 616.

4 Most of the criticisms levelled at my attempt have to do primarily with the fact that it is too absolute, or else they bear on the always possible exceptions, involving secondary factors not taken into

account for each individual. These criticisms do not, however, contest its general objective, and that is an encouragement to continue working along the same lines. (See Christophe Charle, 'Champ littéraire et champ du pouvoir: les écrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus', *Annales ESC*, no. 2, March–April 1977, pp. 240–64, and W. Rabi, 'Ecrivains juifs face à l'Affaire', in G. Leroy (ed.), *Les Ecrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus*, Paris: PUF, 1983, p. 22). Rabi criticizes me on the grounds that my schema does not pay enough attention to religion of origin, but 'religion' as such is not the only factor of political choice in the Dreyfus Affair; Michel Winock ('Les Affaires Dreyfus', *Vingtième siècle: revue d'histoire*, no. 5, January–February 1985, p. 22) takes issue with the reduction of the value systems in play to a sociology of the two camps. The supplementary elements introduced here show that it is a question not of reduction but of homologies between levels of historical reality, with a whole range of forms of play in the margin between positions, the taking of a position, and interpretations of these values themselves. Dreyfusism and anti-Dreyfusism are not as homogeneous as Winock claims in order to bolster his thesis of a transhistorical permanence of the debate.

5 Consider, for example, the case of Amédée de Margerie, professor at the Catholic University of Lille (B. Auffray, *Pierre de Margerie et la vie diplomatique de son temps*, Paris: Klincksieck, 1976, pp. 123–4).

6 See, for example, Paul Hervieu's recantations (Fernand Gregh, *L'Âge d'or*, Paris: Grasset, 1947, p. 291, and P. Baron, 'Paul Hervieu, écrivain dreyfusard', *Cahiers naturalistes*, no. 43, 1972, pp. 83–105); Gide's regrets after signing the 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals' (M. Thomas, 'Le Cas Valéry', in Leroy (ed.), *Les Ecrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 107); or, again, certain moderates' resignations from the League of the French Fatherland (J.-P. Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme: la Ligue de la patrie française 1899–1904*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1977, p. 35).

7 Christophe Charle, *Les Elites de la République (1880–1900)*, Paris: Fayard, 1987, 2nd enlarged edn, 2006, pp. 410–23, and *La République des universitaires (1870–1940)*, Paris: Seuil, 1994.

8 M.-J. Nye, *Science in the Provinces: Scientific Communities and Provincial Leadership in France 1860–1930*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, ch. 4; J. M. Burney, *Toulouse et son université: facultés et étudiants dans la France provinciale du 19e siècle*, Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail/Paris: CNRS, 1989; *L'Université de Toulouse 1229–1929, son passé son présent*, Toulouse: Privat, 1929, p. 132, on the Toulouse School of Law.

9 On the role of Catholic students in Lille's anti-Semitic riots, see Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, London: Associated University Presses, 1982, p.112; On the atmosphere in Lyons, see A. Louat, 'L'Universitaire à Lyon de 1870 à 1914', master's thesis, Université Lyon II, 1970, pp. 168–75. On the Dreyfusard milieu in Lyons, see F. Baldensperger's memoirs (*Une vie parmi d'autres*, Paris: Conard, 1940, pp. 149–50) and Joseph Reinach's judgement: 'In the provinces, wherever Catholic universities were to be found, the split was very clear. In Lille, students at the private universities burned Zola in effigy' (*Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus*, Paris: Charpentier-Fasquelle, vol. 3, 1903, p. 249).

10 Charles Bigot, 'Nécrologie de Charles Zévort', *Annuaire de l'Association amicale des anciens élèves de l'Ecole normale supérieure*, Paris: Hachette, 1888, p. 28; Bordeaux had two different rectors at its head, Charles Zévort and Louis Liard, later director of higher learning at the minister for Public Instruction. See too M.-J. Nye, *Science in the Provinces*, ch. 6.

11 Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work*, London: Allen Lane, 1973, pp. 333ff.; Emile Durkheim, *Textes*, ed. V. Karady, Paris: Minuit, 1975, vol. 2, pp. 424–9; Marcel Fournier, *Emile Durkheim: A Biography*, trans. David Macey, Cambridge: Polity, 2013.

12 Letter from Victor Basch to Joseph Reinach, 7 June 1899, Bibliothèque nationale, Manuscripts Department, Papiers Reinach, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises, 15579. In 1901 the anti-Dreyfusard list obtained 59.1 per cent of votes in Rennes. Rennes is also one of the towns where anti-Semitic riots were important (see Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, map p. 108, and note 16, p. 121).

13 Marcel Prenant, *Toute une vie à gauche*, Paris: Encre, 1980, pp. 12–13; the *département* of Meurthe-et-Moselle came in eighth in the Henry memorial subscription: anti-Semitic riots raged there for three days (Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, p. 110). See too Zeev Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, Paris, A. Colin, 1972, pp. 232ff., and Nye, *Science in the Provinces*, ch. 2 on the atmosphere of rivalry with Germany, in particular among academics in the sciences.

14 This information is drawn from the biographical notes in the book by the dean, P. Boissonnade, *Histoire de l'Université de Poitiers 1432–1932*, Poitiers, 1932.

15 On the official responsibilities of professors at the Paris Law Faculty, see Charle, *Les Elites de la République*, pp. 411–20.

16 The professors in question were Léveillé, Beauregard and Sauzet. When remarks that could have been interpreted as favourable to Dreyfusism were attributed to Dean Garsonnet, he hastened to protest (*L'Aurore*, 2 December 1898).

17 Nelly Wilson, *Bernard-Lazare: Antisemitism and the Problem of Jewish Identity in late Nineteenth-Century France*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 185ff., on the failure of the steps undertaken to mobilize certain leading intellectuals such as the great scientist Marcellin Berthelot.

18 Charles Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr* (1932), new edn, Paris: Maspero, 1977, pp. 69–70; on Gabriel Monod's trajectory, see C.-O. Carbonell, *Histoire et historiens en France: une mutation idéologique des historiens français (1865–1885)*, Toulouse: Privat, 1976, *passim*, and M. Rebérioux, 'Histoire, historiens et dreyfusisme', *Revue historique*, no. 518, April–June, 1976, pp. 407–32.

19 Consider the list of the remaining professors whose opinions are known. Dreyfusards: Albert Réville (history of religions), Edouard Chavannes (Chinese literature), Philippe Berger (Renan's successor, Hebraic literature), Michel Bréal (Sanskrit); anti-Dreyfusards: Henry Le Chatelier (mineral chemistry), Arthur Chuquet (German literature), Paul Foucart (Greek epigraphy), Auguste Longnon (historical geography of France), Adrien Barbier de Meynard (Arabic language), Camille Jordan (mathematics).

20 See R. J. Smith, 'L'Atmosphère politique à l'Ecole normale supérieure à la fin du XIXe siècle', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, April–June 1973, pp. 33–44; Hubert Bourgin, *L'Ecole normale et la politique de Jaurès à Léon Blum* (1938), repr. New York: Gordon & Breach, 1970; testimonies by Raoul Blanchard (*Ma jeunesse sous l'aile de Péguy*, Paris: Fayard, 1961, pp. 204–13), and Paul Dimoff, *La Rue d'Ulm à la Belle époque 1899–1903: mémoires d'un normalien supérieur*, Nancy: Thomas, 1970, p. 49. To make up for the absence of graduates of the Ecole polytechnique and the military academy of Saint-Cyr, who boycotted the official balls of the Dreyfusard president of the Republic, Emile Loubet, Dreyfus's supporters turned to the *normaliens*: 'we knew that they were almost unanimously Dreyfusards.'

21 See, in Louis Havet's correspondence, the letter (dated 28 June 1898) from Paul Delaruelle, who refused to join the League of the Rights of Man, although he inwardly supported it (Bibliothèque nationale Manuscripts Department, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 24494 fols 7–8); or the letter (22 January 1898) from Duvau, likewise a former student of Havet, who did not believe that

Dreyfus was innocent in spite of his teacher's arguments (ibid., 24493 (2), fols 331–2).

22 See Péguy's denunciations against the Sorbonne professors in the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* or the pamphlet by Agathon (*L'Esprit de la nouvelle Sorbonne*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1911, pp. 98–9), who attributes a controlling influence over recruitment to Durkheim. My further study on these themes shows that, in spite of true manoeuvres, these contemporary criticisms were quite exaggerated (Charle, *La République des universitaires*).

23 Henri Hauser, professor of history in Clermont, qualifies himself as 'shepherd of a timorous flock' (Bibliothèque nationale, Manuscripts Department, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises, 24494, letter to Louis Havet, 18 July 1899).

24 Emile Durkheim, 'L'Individualisme et les intellectuels', *Revue bleue*, 2 July 1898, pp. 7–13, at p. 10.

25 Among the Sorbonne mathematicians, Darboux, a Protestant, and Appell, an agnostic who had, however, been educated as a Catholic, were Dreyfusards; Emile Picard, a practising Catholic, joined the League for the French Fatherland; Poincaré signed the 'Appeal for Unity' (*Le Temps*, 26 January 1899) like his brother-in-law, the philosopher Emile Boutroux.

26 Lavisse, who was inwardly on the Dreyfusards' side, could not make too strong a commitment in that direction because of his close connections with the army: his brother was a colonel, and he himself conducted examinations at the military academy in Saint-Cyr. He felt that he was under an obligation to resign from these positions when he wanted to air his opinion in public.

27 This holds, notably, for the League for the French Fatherland: François Coppée was its honorary president, Jules Lemaître was its president, and Maurice Barrès was one of its delegates. Thus writers formed one-third of the movement's leadership (Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, p. 33).

28 On the strategies employed by the literary manifestos of the day, see Christophe Charle, *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme*, Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure, 1979, p. 67 (on the Group of Médan), p. 103 (the 'Manifesto of the Five'); and R. Ponton, 'Le Champ littéraire de 1865 à 1905', PhD dissertation, EHESS, 1977, on the Parnassian group or the Symbolists. The major texts have been collected in B. Mitchell, *Les Manifestes littéraires de la Belle Epoque 1886–1914*, Paris: Seghers, 1966.

29 Among these literary foot-soldiers were, for example, Pierre Maël, who wrote for *Revue Mame*, a review for adolescents;

Madame François Deschamps, an author of books for the Bibliothèque rose (i.e., for young children); Hector France and Marc Mario, popular novelists; G. Prolo, the managing editor of *L'Anticlérical*; and Michel Zévaco, a popular novelist, also on *L'Anticlérical*'s editorial board.

30 For example: Francisque Corbie among anti-Dreyfusards, Edmond Legentil and Léo Lelièvre in the opposite camp.

31 Consider: 'But are an excellent paleographer, a linguist, an eminent prosodist or an accomplished chemist "intellectuals"? Why? Does mastery of Syriac or Chinese confer the title of "intellectual" on a fellow? How are we to prove that a *Treatise of Microbiology* that is perhaps just a compilation, destined to be sold, twenty-five years from now, for the paper it is printed on, calls for greater intelligence than is needed to judge one's fellow men and command armies?' (Ferdinand Brunetière, 'Après le procès', *Revue des deux mondes*, 1898, pp. 442–3). The best sociologist of left-wing intellectuals is almost always a right-wing intellectual, and vice-versa.

32 The age structure of the signatories of the petition defending Jean Grave (see chapter 3) is clearly very similar to that of the signatories of the 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals'. However, while we find individuals common to both lists, the big change in the size of the population involved makes them a tiny minority. This is further proof of the phenomenon that the literary younger generation was attracted by the political extremes.

33 Gregh, *L'Age d'or*, p. 291.

34 This was one of the arguments invoked by Brunetière (who had volunteered in 1870) in response to Dreyfusard anti-militarism. Conversely, to demonstrate their patriotism, certain Dreyfusards stated next to their signatures that they had taken part in the war against Prussia (See Ferdinand Brunetière, 'La Nation et l'armée: conférence pour la Ligue de la Patrie française, 26 april 1899', in *Discours de combat*, Paris: Perrin, 1900, p. 233).

35 The anarchist influence on certain Dreyfusards of the first wave also contributed to this anti-militarism: for these men, the army was an instrument of social oppression, not national defence (see Wilson, *Bernard-Lazare*, p. 163, on the poor relations between Bernard Lazare and Picquart).

36 Brunetière, 'La Nation et l'armée', p. 225.

37 See the discussion of the Descaves Affair in chapter 3. Descaves and Abel Hermant, the author of a controversial anti-militaristic book, figured among the Dreyfusards. On the change in the attitude towards Germany among the generation born in the 1860s,

see C. Digeon, *La Crise allemande de la pensée française*, Paris: PUF, 1959, pp. 386–7.

38 R. Ponton, 'Le Champ littéraire de 1865 à 1905', pp. 47ff.; these are the cases of Bernard Lazare and Pierre Quillard, first-hour Dreyfusards.

39 Consider the incidents that took place in the Société des gens de lettres after Zola's trial (*L'Aurore*, 28 March 1898 and *La Petite République*, 30 March 1898).

40 Letter from Lavisse to *Le Temps*, 2 January 1899.

41 Thus Elie Halévy, who was convinced of Dreyfus's innocence, still had scruples about taking a stand because he belonged to two religious minorities, a circumstance that could, in his estimation, skew his judgement: 'Until last Sunday, I had resolved not to believe in the possibility of his innocence. But intolerable doubts are beginning to weigh on my conscience. Even if he is guilty, Dreyfus is the victim of an appalling machination. I, however, have a Jewish name and am a Protestant: have I fallen victim to the illusion of a caste? Answer me fast, because, at this moment, I find life odious' (letter to Celestin Bouglé, 4 December 1897, in Halévy, *Correspondance 1891–1937*, Paris: de Fallois, 1996, p. 202). The best-known example of a Jewish academic refusing to take a public position in the affair is that of Bergson, who was tied by marriage to respectable Jewish society, unless it was a question in his case of a principled apolitical stance, as is suggested by all the other positions he took thereafter (Philippe Soulez and Frédéric Worms, *Bergson biographie*, Paris: Flammarion, 1997).

42 I analyse in detail Anatole France's evolution in Charle, 'Champ littéraire et champ du pouvoir, les écrivains et l'affaire Dreyfus', pp. 254–8.

43 See the previous chapter and, on Barrès's popularity in the Latin Quarter around 1893, C. Doty, *From Cultural Rebellion to Counterrevolution: The Politics of Maurice Barrès*, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1976, p. 126. Barrès's break with the avant-garde and socialist left occurred as early as 1896, in connection with a by-election in Neuilly-Boulogne in which he ran against official socialist candidates and adapted his positions to the orientations of the wards there. This was likewise the period in which he modified the thrust of his novel *Les Déracinés* in order to defend the nationalist ideology that the Dreyfus Affair would give him an occasion to popularize. Léon Blum, his initial admiration for Barrès notwithstanding, plainly remarked the ideological gulf between them in his review of *Les Déracinés* for *Revue blanche*. It is therefore quite surprising that Blum should

wonder, in his *Souvenirs sur l'Affaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1935, pp. 88–9), why Barrès finally refused to join the Dreyfusards in 1898.

44 Forty years later, Malraux's trajectory would, in many respects, be similar, because of the homology between the two writers' positions in the literary fields of their day. Malraux, friendly with the surrealists and fellow traveller of the communists and left-wing intellectuals in the 1930s, found in 1944–5, in contrast to Barrès, his great man: De Gaulle. This made him a familiar of statesmen and the statesman of culture in 1958. The dream of the philosopher-king, a friend of kings, was thus fulfilled for him for a decade by the Gaullist Republican monarchy.

45 *La Petite République*, 9 March 1894, and Henri Dabot, *Calendriers d'un bourgeois du Quartier latin*, 2nd series, Paris: A. Doal, 1905, p. 143.

46 Stéphane Mallarmé, *Correspondance*, vol. 10, November 1897–September 1898, ed. H. Mondor and L. J. Austin, Paris: Gallimard, 1984, p. 108 (letter dated 23 February 1898).

47 Georges Perrot, 'Notice sur la vie et les travaux de. M. Armand-Auguste Longnon', *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*, 57, 1913, pp. 596–637. On Longnon's nationalism, see his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France (4 December 1889: 'De la formation de l'unité française', quoted by Maurice Agulhon, *Leçon inaugurale de la chaire d'histoire de la France contemporaine, fait le 11 avril 1986,* Paris: Collège de France, 1986, p. 10).

48 Maurice Holleaux, 'Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Louis Havet', *Recueil de l'Institut*, 1939, no. 21bis, and Bibliothèque nationale, Manuscripts Department, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises, Papiers Louis Havet, 24486–24509.

49 Mme E. Duclaux, *La Vie d'Emile Duclaux*, Laval: Barnéoud, 1906; on pure science ideology defended by Richet, see Charles Richet, *Le Savant*, Paris: Hachette, 1923, esp. p. 45.

50 See the reports on the League of the French Fatherland's reunions, in National Archives, box F7 13229.

51 See A. Réville, 'Psychologie de l'affaire Dreyfus', *Le Siècle*, 5 October 1898: 'In future, people will perhaps find it rather difficult to explain how our nation could, around a question that is itself highly individual and purely legal in nature, divide into two camps unequal in number, but not in intellectual and moral value, which were equally impassioned and equally opinionated down to the moment when events resembling thunderbolts that none could foresee decidedly tilted the scales of public opinion towards the side defended by what had initially been a minority.'

52 'And a little "intellectual" abandons his beloved studies in his turn, and the first favour he receives in the barracks is that his vanity is deflated. He is taught that, while intelligence is a force, there are others as well, which are a match for it and are more valuable' (Brunetière, 'La nation et l'armée', p. 233).
53 See M. Leymarie (ed.), *La Postérité de l'affaire Dreyfus*, Lille: Presses du septentrion, 1998.
54 Célestin Bouglé, *Pour la démocratie française*, Paris: Cornély, 1900, p. 137: 'Are you for the dyke or the wave?' The reference to Michelet may be found on p. 139. On corruption by 'dirty immigrants' [*métèques*], in M. Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme* (1902), new edn in *L'Oeuvre de Maurice Barrès*, Paris: Club de l'honnête homme, 1966, vol. 5, p. 52 (about Zola's Italian origins) and p. 64 ('Jean Psichari ou le métèque').

GENERAL CONCLUSION TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

1 Saint-John Perse, *Anabasis*, trans. T. S. Eliot, New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1938, p. 69.
2 See Christophe Charle, *La République des universitaires (1870–1940)*, Paris: Seuil, 1994; *Les Intellectuels en Europe au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Seuil, 1996; *Paris fin de siècle*, Paris: Seuil, 1998; J.-F. Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions françaises*, Paris: Fayard, 1990; P. Ory and J.-F. Sirinelli, *Les Intellectuels en France de l'affaire Dreyfus à nos jours*, Paris: Perrin, 2004; J. Julliard and M. Winock (eds), *Dictionnaire des intellectuels français*, Paris: Seuil, 1996, 2nd enlarged edn, 2002. On Britain: S. Collini, *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; on Germany: G. Hübinger and W. J. Mommsen (eds), *Intellektuelle im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1993; G. Hübinger, *Gelehrte, Politik und Öffentlichkeit: Eine Intellektuellengeschichte*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006; on Italy: F. Attal, *Histoire des intellectuels italiens au XXe siècle*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013; on New York: T. Bender, *New York Intellect*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987; on Europe and the world: M. C. Granjon and M. Trebitsch (eds), *Pour une histoire comparée des intellectuels*, Brussels: Complexe, 1998; J. Jennings and A. Kemp-Welch (eds), *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie*, London: Routledge, 1997.
3 See D. Bering, *Die Intellektuellen: Geschichte eines Schimpfwortes*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978.

4 See S. Collini, *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
5 See Michael Confino, 'On intellectuals and intellectual traditions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia', *Daedalus*, 101(2), 1972, pp. 117–49.
6 See A. J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1981; H. Siegrist (ed.), *Bürgerliche Berufe*, Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988; J. Kocka and A. Mitchell (eds), *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Oxford: Berg, 1993; Christophe Charle, *La Crise des sociétés impériales (1900–1940): essai d'histoire sociale comparée de l'Allemagne, de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne*, Paris: Seuil, 2001, part I.
7 See H. Lyautey, *Le Rôle social de l'officier*, 1891.
8 See Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969; Charles McClelland, *State, Society, and University in Germany, 1700–1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; J. E. Craig, *Scholarship and Nation Building: The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian Society (1870–1939)*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; Charle, *La République des universitaires*, part I.
9 See Craig, *Scholarship and Nation Building*, pp. 147–57; Charle, *Les Intellectuels en Europe*.
10 Gisèle Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains 1940–1953*, Paris: Fayard, 1999, and *La Responsabilité de l'écrivain*, Paris: Seuil, 2011.
11 For Mexico, see Annick Lempérière, *Intellectuels: état et société au Mexique: les clercs de la nation*, Paris: l'Harmattan, 1992; for Brazil: S. Miceli, *Les Intellectuels et le pouvoir au Brésil 1920–1945*, Grenoble: PUG, 1981; for Italy, Attal, *Histoire des intellectuels italiens*; for Spain, Paul Aubert, *La Frustration de l'intellectuel libéral: Espagne 1898–1939*, Cabris: Sulliver, 2010; on Germany: Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1969; Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins*; and so on.
12 See P. P. Clark, 'Literary culture in France and the United States', *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(5), 1979, pp. 1057–77.
13 See Maria Malatesta, *Professionisti e gentiluomini: storia delle professioni nell'Europa contemporanea*, Turin: Einaudi, 2006; *Professional Men, Professional Women: The European Professions from the 19th Century until Today*, London: Sage, 2011.

Appendices

Table 1.1 Absolute number of individuals occupied in intellectual professions 1872–1906 (inter-census increases expressed in percentages)

Year	*Writers and journalists*	*Artists*	*Primary school teachers*	*High-school teachers*	*Academics*	*Legal professions*	*Physicians*
1872	3,826	22,615	110,000[a]	?	488[b]	?	16,005
Change	+9.0%	+18.1%	—	?	—	?	−10.7%
1876	4,173	26,749	?	7,396[d]	?	30,341	14,700[c]
Change	+76.6%	+50.4%	+12.7%	?	+3.0%	+3.6%	+3.4%
1881	7,372	40,235	124,000[a]	?	503[b]	31,462	15,200[c]
Change	−13.5%	−2.3%	+8.8%	+31.8%	+54.0%	−1.3%	+5.3%
1886	6,376	39,276	136,000[a]	9,751[d]	775[e]	31,037	16,005[c]
Change	+11.7%	−16.6%	+7.4%	—	—	+0.3%	—
1891	7,125	32,755	147,000[a]	?	?	31,150	*
Change	−10.8%	−3.2%	+3.4%	−7.8%	—	+41.1%	−0.5%
1896	6,354	31,692	152,000[a]	8,988[d]	?	43,982	15,925
Change	+15.5%	+1.0%	+4.6%	—	—	+1.3%	+15.9%
1901	7,342	32,032	159,000[a]	?	?	44,566	18,465
Change	+24.5%	+11.1%	?	+3.2%	+35.2%	+2.1%	+11.9%
1906	9,148	35,593	?	9,283[d]	1,048[e]	45,512	20,673

Sources: [a]A. Prost, *L'enseignement en France (1800–1967)*, Paris, A. Colin, 1968, pp. 108 and 294 (both private and state schools); [b]figures for 1865 and 1880 from G. Weisz, *The Emergence of Modern Universities in France (1863–1914)*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 318; [c]P. Brouardel, quoted in J. Léonard, *Les médecins de l'Ouest au XIXe siècle*, Lille, Atelier de reproduction des thèses de Lille III, vol. 3, p. ccxxxii; [d]Prost, *L'enseignement en France*, p. 371 (state schools only, including administrative staff and tutors; the last two figures are for 1898 and 1909); [e]Prost, *L'enseignement en France*, p. 235, for 1888 and 1909); *no specific data for physicians; all other figures are from censuses.

Table 1.2 Occupation of authors in three samples between 1866 and 1899 (%)

Occupations	*1866–75*	*1876–85*	*1891–9*
Writers	16.0	16.4	14.4
Physicians	12.3	13.8	14.8
Civil servants	11.9	15.4	14.4
Clergy	10.6	11.7	12.2
Legal professions	6.1	7.1	6.1
Academics	6.5	10.3	8.7
Primary and secondary schoolteachers	9.0	8.5	9.8
Independent scholars, members of learned societies	8.6	3.7	4.0
Commercial and financial professions	4.9	4.3	4.5
Other professionals	3.7	1.5	2.2
Aristocracy	2.0	2.0	2.8
Politicians	2.0	1.4	1.4
Poets	2.2	0.7	0.4
Engineers, technical professions	2.4	2.5	4.5
N =	243	828	639

Note: The legal professions include barristers, notaries, solicitors, judges, etc. The commercial and financial professions include entrepreneurs, dealers and merchants, etc.
Source: Otto Lorenz, *Catalogue général de la librairie française*, Paris: Lorenz, of the quoted years.

Table 1.3A Percentage of authors having published only one book for each occupational category in 1876–1885 and 1891–1899

Least professional authors	*1876–85*	*Least professional authors*	*1891–9*
Unknown occupation	65.3	Unknown occupation	72.5
Physicians	73.0	Physicians	74.4
Commercial and financial professions	66.6	Commercial and financial professions	65.5
Other professionals	61.5	Other professionals	64.2
Civil Servants	60.1	Legal professions	61.5
Clergy	60.1	Engineers	58.6
Engineers	57.1	Civil Servants	56.5
Primary and secondary schoolteachers	56.3	Clergy	56.4
Average	52.3	Average	54.5
Most professional authors		*Most professional authors*	
Legal professions	50.8	Independent scholars and members of learned societies	50.0
Poets	50.0	Aristocracy	42.1
Aristocracy	47.0	Primary and secondary schoolteachers	41.2
Independent scholars and members of learned societies	45.1	Academics	39.2
Academics	34.8	Poets	33.3
Politicians	33.3	Politicians	33.3
Writers	25.7	Writers	29.3

Table 1.3B Percentage of authors having published four books or more for each occupational category in 1876–1885 and 1891–1899

Most professional authors	*1876–85*	*Most professional authors*	*1891–9*
Writers	40.9	Writers	36.6
Politicians	33.3	Politicians	33.3
Independent scholars, members of learned societies	32.1	Poets	33.3
Academics	26.3	Aristocracy	26.1
Engineers	23.7	Academics	19.3
Aristocracy	23.2	Independent scholars, members of learned societies	19.1
		Engineers	17.0
		Clergy	16.4
		Primary and secondary schoolteachers	15.2
Average	18.5	Average	15.0
Least professional authors		*Least professional authors*	
Poets	16.6	Other professionals	14.2
Primary and secondary schoolteachers	15.4		
Clergy	14.6		
Civil servants	14.6		
Legal professionals	13.3	Physicians	6.6
Commercial and financial professions	8.2	Civil servants	4.1
Other professionals	7.6	Commercial and financial professions	3.4
Physicians	4.2	Legal professionals	2.5

Table 1.4 Occupations of authors by genre

Period	*1876–85*		*1891–9*	
Subject	*A*	*B*	*A*	*B*
Medicine	4	Physicians (78.4) Academics (15.9)	4	Physicians (84.0) Academics (13.6)
Fiction	9	Writers (65.7) Civil servants (8.5)	9	Writers (47.4) Civil servants (6.7)
Theatre	7	Writers (73.1) Civil servants	6	Writers (64.2) Civil servants
Poetry	11	Writers (27.5) No information (27.5)	6	Writers (43.9) No information (43.5)
Essays	13	Writers (29.6) Lawyers	11	Clergy (19.1) Civil servants (17.0)
History	13	Clergy (19.7) Civil servants (18.2)	13	Civil servants (18.3) Clergy (17.5)
Sciences	9	Academics (38.0) Physicians (20.0)	8	Primary and secondary schoolteachers (32.5) Academics (30.2)
Law, economics, social sciences	11	Lawyers (36.3) Civil servants (27.2)	8	Lawyers (49.1) Civil servants (26.2)
Religion	5	Clergy (86.5) Writers	4	Clergy (86.2) Writers
Practical matters	10	Physicians (43.2) Secondary schoolteachers	11	Physicians (23.2) Secondary schoolteachers (16.6)
Politics	9	Politicians (18.1) Civil servants (18.1)	8	Writers (23.5) Clergy (17.6)
Translations	8	Civil servants (27.2) Secondary schoolteachers (22.7)	7	No information (29.4) Civil servants (23.5)
Technical writing	11	Civil servants (36.8) Commercial and financial professions	10	Civil servants (36.9) Engineers (23.8)
Philosophy, erudition, linguistics	13	Secondary schoolteachers (20.0) Academics (18.8)	11	Secondary schoolteachers (22.7) Academics (16.6)

Notes: Column A: number of different occupations represented; column B: percentage for the two most represented professions

Table 1.5 Percentage of newcomers within each category of authors

Profession	*1876–85*	*Profession*	*1891–9*
Poets	83.3	Poets	99.9
Physicians	70.4	Other professionals	71.1
Commercial and financial professions	66.6	Engineers	68.9
Lawyers	61.0	Physicians	68.8
Engineers	57.1	Civil Servants	66.4
Clergy	56.7	Commercial and financial professions	65.5
Primary and secondary schoolteachers	53.5	Aristocracy	63.1
Aristocracy	47.0	Clergy	57.1
Other professionals	46.1	Primary and secondary schoolteachers	56.4
Academics	44.1	Independent scholars, members of learned societies	50.0
Writers	41.9	Writers	44.5
Independent scholars, members of learned societies	38.7	Politicians	44.4
Politicians	16.6	Academics	32.1
No information	73.0	No Information	81.3

Source: O. Lorenz, *Catalogue général de la librairie française*.

Table 3.1 Post-electoral tally of the ballots in the 1893 'referendum'

23 partisans of constraint:	Aristocrats: 6
	Socialists: 10
	Authoritarians: 7
24 intermediate opinions:	Accepting both: 4
	Hesitant: 3
	Deciding on a case-by-case basis: 6
	Indifferent: 11
52 partisans of freedom:	Qualified liberals: 14
	Liberals pure and simple: 27
	Anarchistic liberals: 11

Source: *L'Ermitage*, July 1893, p. 23.

Table 3.2 Signatories of the petition for Jean Grave by birth cohort (%)

Born	*Before 1840*	*1840–9*	*1850–9*	*1860–9*	*1870 and later*	*Not known*	*N =*
Including the not known	1.6	5.8	13.2	31.4	10.7	37.2	121
Excluding the not known	2.6	9.2	21.0	50.0	17.0	—	76

Note: Not counted: Octave Mirbeau, Paul Adam, Elisée Reclus, Bernard Lazare and an unknown name with two spellings.
Sources: *La Justice* and *La Petite République*, 4 March 1894, and Otto Lorenz, *Catalogue général de la librairie française* for matching names and dates of birth.

Table 4.1 Occupation of signatories for the main petitions during the Dreyfus Affair (percentages, excluding unknown occupations)

	Manifeste des Intellectuels (January 1898)	*Pétitions pour Picquart (sondages)*	*Appel à l'Union (1899)*	*Ligue de la Patrie française (1899)*	*Souscription pour le monument Henry*
Politicians	1.0	2.2	8.5	2.6	?
Armed forces	1.6	0.5	—	3.4	28.6
Civil servants	0.4	1.0	5.7	1.9	[a]
Judges	0.08	0.1	0.3	1.3	0.2
Clergy	0.3	1.1	3.3[b]	0.1	3.1[c]
Education	22.0	9.4	25.3	11.9	0.9
Legal professions	4.1	5.0	6.0	12.1	0.9
Writers, journalists, artists	26.4	19.9	13.6	16.6	1.0
Medicine	5.0	6.5	7.7	12.2	1.4
Students	18.5	10.0	13.7	16.0	8.6
Private sector	12.3	12.0	13.0	13.2	3.0
Landowners, agriculture	0.8	2.0	1.8	4.6	0.5
Workers, clerks, manual professions	5.3	29.8	0.9	3.7	47.9[a]
Other	2.0	0.5	0.2	0.4	3.9[d]
N =	1,200	4,352[e]	1,166	9,921	c.15,000[f]

Notes: [a]It seems that civil servants are mixed with clerks in the source; [b]Protestant ministers only; [c]Catholic priests only; [d]other professionals (no precise details); [e]based on samples representing c. 10 per cent of the total and c. 20 per cent of those who had an identifiable occupation; [f]estimate

Sources: 'Manifesto of the intellectuals', in *Hommage à Zola*, Paris: Société libre d'édition des gens de lettres, 1898 (personal counts); 'Pétition pour Picquart', in *Hommage des artistes à Picquart*, Paris: Société libre d'édition des gens de lettres, 1899 (samples); 'Appeal to the Union': lists published by *Le Temps*, January–February 1899; League of the French Fatherland, statistics established by J.-P. Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme*, pp. 23–4 (his figures have been adjusted to fit my own categories); Henry subscription: statistics established by Stephen Wilson, 'Le Monument Henry', p. 271; I have computed the totals thanks to the original document for some categories such as 'education', 'literary and law professions', etc. (P. Quillard, *Le Monument Henry*).

Private sector: entrepreneurs, dealers and merchants, engineers, architects, managers, shopkeepers, etc.; Various: members of associations, political groups and other professions difficult to categorize.

Table 4.2 Occupational breakdown of signatories employed in education, letters, journalism and fine arts

a) Percentages

Education	*Manifeste des Intellectuels (January 1898)*	*Pétitions pour Picquart (sondages)*	*Appel à l'Union (1899)*	*Ligue de la Patrie française (1899)*	*Souscription pour le monument Henry*	*Census break-down*
Primary education	1.2	8.3	5.0	2.1	16.8	93.3
Secondary education	79.5	57.2	54.3	65.6	72.0	5.8
Academics	11.7	24.4	34.7	25.0	11.0	0.7
Other*	7.5	10.0	5.7	7.1	—	**

Notes: *research; ** included with academics

b) Relative participation index (percentage of signatories for each category divided by the size of each category in the 1896 census)

Primary education	0.01	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.1
Secondary education	13.7	9.8	9.3	11.3	12.4
Academics*	27.4	49.1	57.7	45.8	15.7

Note: *including research.

a) Percentages

Letters, fine arts	*Manifeste des Intellectuels (January 1898)*	*Pétitions pour Picquart (sondages)*	*Appel à l'Union (1899)*	*Ligue de la Patrie française (1899)*	*Souscription pour le monument Henry*	*Census break-down*
Writers	34.3	18.4	36.0	23.4	5.0	4.9
Publicists, Journalists	37.5	35.1	40.5	41.5	65.8	11.7
Artists	27.7	46.3	23.4	34.9	29.1	83.2
Various	7.5	10.0	5.7	7.1	—	***

Note: ***included in preceding categories.

b) Relative participation index (percentage of signatories for each category divided by the size of each category in the 1896 census)

Writers	6.9	3.7	7.3	4.7	1.0
Publicists, Journalists	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.5	5.6
Artists	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3

Sources: Schoolteachers (1891 and 1898) from A. Prost, *L'enseignement en France (1800–1967)*, Paris, A. Colin, 1968, pp. 294 and 371; academics from *Annuaire de l'Instruction publique*, 1898; letters and fine arts from 1896 published census returns. Members of the *Institut* have been counted with academics; editors of newspapers and magazines with journalists.

Table 4.3 Distribution of the students who signed petitions according to their discipline or school (absolute numbers and percentages)

Discipline or school	*Manifeste des Intellectuels (January 1898)*		*Pétitions pour Picquart (sondages)*		*Ligue de la Patrie française (1899)*		*Souscription pour le monument Henry*	
Law	82	17.1%	251	16.7%	329	21.0%	51	9.5%
Students	47		141		187*		44	
Doctors	35		110		142		7	
Medicine	105	21.9%	338	22.5%	334	21.3%	141	26.2%
Students	58		165		230			
Externs, interns	47		108		169			
Letters	156	32.6%	232	15.4%	72	4.6%	21	3.9%
Students	40		117		24		?	
With a 'licence'	116		115		48		?	
Sciences	45	9.4%	100	6.6%	21	1.3%	40	7.4%
Students	5		35		5		3	
PCN (1st year)	–		–		–		37	
With a licence or doctorate	40		65		16		–	
Pharmacy	9	1.8%	70	4.6%	73	4.6%	8	1.4%
Students	8		59		68		7	
Externs, interns	1		11		5		1	
Other schools	15	3.1%	180	12.0%	291	16.6%	97	18.0%
Beaux-Arts	9		35		13		7	
Arts déco	1		4		–		14	
Protestant theology	1		28		–		1	
Catholic faculties	–		–		**		8***	
Business schools	–		53		52		1	
HEC	1		12		60		–	
Ecole Normale Supérieure****	–		3		2		–	
Ecole centrale	–		4		17		5	
Ecole des chartes	–		2		–		21	
Ecole des mines	–		4		82		26	
Schools of agronomy or agriculture	–		19		28		–	
Ecole de Physique et Chimie industrielles	1		2		–		–	

Table 4.3 *continued*

Discipline or school	*Manifeste des Intellectuels (January 1898)*		*Pétitions pour Picquart (sondages)*		*Ligue de la Patrie française (1899)*		*Souscription pour le monument Henry*	
Ecole Vétérinaire	–		2		–		–	
Arts et métiers	–		1		2		–	
Ecole du Louvre	–		1		–		–	
EPHE	1		2		1		–	
Ecole Coloniale	1		4		1		–	
Ecole de Rome	–		–		1		–	
Sciences po	–		–		2		–	
Langues orientales	–		–		1		–	
Military schools	–		–		28		14	
Foreign students	–		4		–		–	
Other students	66	13.8%	322	21.4%	441	28.2%	179	33.3%
Other 'licenciés'	–		6		2		–	
N =	478		1,499		1,563		537	

Notes: *including 42 from the Catholic faculties; **see Law; ***several 'groups' of indeterminate number should be added; ****most ENS students are mixed with humanities and science students. N.B.: For the Picquart petition, unlike the previous table, this is an exhaustive collation. HEC: Hautes études commerciales (business school); EPHE: Ecole pratique des hautes études.

Table 4.4 Simplified distribution of student signatories according to the five main faculties

a) Distribution of signatories among the five main faculties (%)

Faculty	*Manifesto of the Intellectuals*	*Hommage to Picquart*	*League of the French Fatherland*	*Henry subscription*	*Student population distribution*
Law	20.6	25.3	39.6	19.5	33.4
Medicine	26.4	34.1	40.2	54.0	22.7
Letters	39.3	23.4	8.6	8.0	16.6
Sciences	11.3	10.0	2.5	15.3*	17.2
Pharmacy	2.2	7.0	8.8	3.0	10.0

b) Ratio of over- or under-representation of signatories compared to observed population distribution

Law	0.6	0.7	1.1	0.5
Medicine	1.1	1.5	1.7	2.3
Letters	2.3	1.4	0.5	0.4
Sciences	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.8*
Pharmacy	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.3

Note: *percentage is inflated by the number of PCN students who are in reality first-year medical students.
Source: Based on *Statistique de l'enseignement supérieur 1889–1899*, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1900; data for 1897–8).

Table 4.5 Distribution of Dreyfusards (signatories of the Soutien à Picquart) and Anti-Dreyfusards (signatories of the Patrie française) among students

	Dreyfusards (%)	*Anti-Dreyfusards (%)*	*N =*
Law	43.2	56.8	580
Medicine:	50.3	49.7	672
Students only	58.2	41.8	395
Externs, interns	38.9	61.1	277
Letters	76.3	23.7	304
Sciences	82.6	17.4	121
Protestant theology	96.5	3.5*	29
Ecole des mines	4.6	95.4	86
Beaux-Arts	72.9	27.1	48
Pharmacy	48.9	51.1	127
Ecole des chartes	8.7	91.3*	23
Ecole Centrale	19.0	81.0	21
Schools of commerce	36.7	63.3	177
Catholic faculties	–	100	50

Note: *Includes the Henry subscription.

Table 4.6 Educational establishments ranked by opinion

Percentage	*Institution*
	Dreyfusards
96.5	Protestant Theology
82.6	Faculty of Sciences
76.3	Faculty of Letters
72.9	Beaux-Arts
–	
–	
50.3	Faculty of Medicine
	Anti-Dreyfusards
51.1	Pharmacy
56.8	Faculty of Law
61.1	Interns or externs (medicine)
63.3	Schools of commerce
–	
81.0	Ecole centrale (engineering)
91.3	Ecole des chartes
95.4	Ecoles des mines
100	Catholic faculties

Table 5.1 Proportion of academics who signed petitions and distribution between Dreyfusards and Anti-Dreyfusards

Institution	*Participation (%)*	*Dreyfusards*	*Anti-Dreyfusards*
Ecole des chartes	66.6	83.3	16.6
ENS	60.6	73.6	26.4
EPHE 4è–5è	50.0	80.0	20.0
Faculty of Letters	46.1–53.8[a]	64.2–58.3[a]	35.7–41.7[a]
Collège de France	50.0	38.0	62.0
Faculty of Sciences	50.0	70.0	30.0
Faculty of Medicine	19.8[b]	58.8	41.2
National Museum of Natural History	15.0	16.6	83.3
Faculty of Law	8.8		100.0
Average Paris	43.3–45.0[c]	60.6	39.4
Faculty of Letters	34.2	58.3	41.7
Faculty of Sciences	17.4	46.8	53.2
Faculty of Medicine	18.2	40.7	59.2
Faculty of Law	24.0	30.9	69.1
Average provinces	22.6	44.8	55.2
National average	29.4–28.7[c]	51.9	48.1

Notes: [a]depending on whether four moderate Dreyfusards are included or not; [b]with scientific staff in laboratories and clinics, etc.; [c]first figure includes professors occupying several chairs: both figures are based on the higher estimate for the Faculty of Letters.



Map 5.1 Number of Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards in each academic town (the majority of Dreyfusards are in the hatched zones)

Table 5.2 Distribution of Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards among faculty by birth cohort (%)

Born		*Before 1820*	*1820–9*	*1830–9*	*1840–9*	*1850–9*	*1860–9*	*1870 and later*
Faculties of sciences	Dreyfusards	3.1	9.3	18.7	18.7	28.1	34.3	6.2
	Anti-Dreyfusards	2.7	8.1	18.9	29.7	24.3	16.2	–
Faculties of medicine	Dreyfusards	–	7.5	7.5	17.5	30.0	32.5	5.0
	Anti-Dreyfusards	–	13.6	11.3	25.0	29.5	15.9	4.5
Faculties of law	Dreyfusards	–	–	–	15.3	46.1	10.7	7.6
	Anti-Dreyfusards	–	–	15.6	21.8	40.6	18.7	3.1
Faculties of letters	Dreyfusards	–	2.2	–	26.6	20.0	46.6	4.4
	Anti-Dreyfusards	–	8.8	11.7	29.4	26.4	23.5	–

Sources: Biographical dictionaries; information given by V. Karady (faculties of letters), J. Leonard and F. Huguet (faculties of medicine); Archives Nationales: F17 3555* (faculties of sciences) and AJ 1904, 1907, 1908 (lists of candidates applying for the law *agrégation*).

Table 5.3 Distribution of Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards according to academic status

Paris	*Dreyfusards*	*Anti-Dreyfusards*	
Honorary professors	–	–	(1)
Professors	17	20	(2)
Other categories[a]	20	8	(4)
Provinces			
Honorary professors	3	8	(1)
Deans and directors	1	12	(2)
Professors	41	69	(3)
Other categories[a]	40	14	(4)
Total (1)–(3)	62	110	
%	*36.0*	*64.0*	
Total (4)	60	22	
%	*73.1*	*26.8*	

Note: [a] adjunct professors, assistant professors (maîtres de conférences), lecturers (chargé de cours), *agrégés*.

Table 5.4 Index of Dreyfusism and anti-Dreyfusism by discipline

Index	*Discipline*
+10	History
+9	–
+8	Philosophy
+7	–
+6	Archaeology, Philology
+5	Physics
+4	Natural sciences
+3	Social sciences, foreign literature
+2	–
+1	International law
0	Roman law, public law, chemistry, mathematics
−1	Astronomy, civil procedure, criminal law
−2	Greek literature
−3	French law, Latin literature, geography
−4	French literature
−5	Economics, finance
−6	–
−7	–
−8	Civil law

Table 5.5 Percentage of writers, signatories of either Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard petitions, who have published at least one book during the period mentioned

*Quoted in Lorenz**	*MI*	*HP–MI*	*HP+MI*	*LP–ACF*	*LP+ACF*
1891–9	69.5	46.8	55.9	64.4	67.2
1900–5	11.7	6.7	8.7	2.6	2.4
Missing	18.8	46.3	35.3	32.9	30.3

Notes: *Authors mentioned at least once in Otto Lorenz, *Catalogue général de la librairie française*; MI = Manifesto of the Intellectuals; HP–MI: petitions for Picquart excluding signatories of the MI; HP+MI: petitions for Picquart without excluding them; LP–ACF: signatories for the League of the French Fatherland without members of the French *Académie*; LP+ACF: with the members of the French *Académie*.

Table 5.6 Writers, signatories of either Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard petitions, by birth decade (missing data excluded)

Born	*MI*	*HP–MI*	*HP+MI*	*LP–ACF*	*LP+ACF*
1820–9 or before	–	5.0	2.4	10.6	13.9
1830–9	3.6	6.2	4.9	9.9	10.3
1840–9	9.7	11.2	10.4	17.0	19.5
1850–9	18.2	26.2	22.2	31.9	29.8
1860–9	36.5	33.7	35.1	24.1	20.7
After 1869	31.7	17.5	24.7	6.3	5.4
No answer	35.9	58.3	49.3	47.5	43.8

Note: For abbreviations, see table 5.5.

Table 5.7 Distribution of writers, signatories of either Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard petitions, according to the number of titles they published in the decade 1891–1899 (%)

	0	*1*	*2–5*	*6–10*	*>10*
Manifesto of intellectuals	26.7	18.9	29.1	15.7	9.4
Petitions for Picquart	41.2	16.2	24.3	10.9	7.1
League of the French Fatherland	31.7	15.5	30.6	8.2	13.4

Source: O. Lorenz, *Catalogue général de la librairie française.*

Table 5.8 Distribution of writers, signatories of either Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard petitions, by genre

	Fiction	*Theatre*	*Poetry*	*Other*	*All writers*
Manifesto of the intellectuals	27.5	12.8	29.3	17.4	12.8
Petitions for Picquart	21.1	29.2	19.5	21.9	8.1
League of the French Fatherland	24.2	13.2	13.6	36.0	12.7



Figure 5.1 Left-wing *intellectuels* and right-wing *intellectuels*

Notes: The horizontal scale gives the percentage of Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards and the vertical axis gives the average age of groups. The chosen scale accentuates the gaps. Some qualitative variables on the literary field are added. The figure plots statistical data from tables in chapters 4 and 5 following the model in *La Crise littéraire à l'époque du naturalisme.*

List of Signatures to the Protest in Defence of Jean Grave

Paul Adam
Jean Ajalbert
Paul Alexis
Alphonse Allais
Raoul d'Arigny
Raoul Aubry
Georges Auriol
Marcel Baillot
Maurice Barrès
Henri Bauër
Emile Bergerat
Bernard-Lazare
Emile Besnus
Jules Bois
Antonin Bunand
Pierre Burel
L. Capazza
Jean Carrère
A. N. Cauzel
F. A. Cazals
Félicien Champsaur
G. Charpentier
Charles Châtel
Auguste Cheylack
J. Colbert
Rodolphe Darzens
Gaston Dauville
tEienne Decrept
Lucien Descaves
Georges Docquois
Jean Dolent
Jean Drault
Léon-Paul Fargue
Lucien Faure
Paul Fort
Hector France
Henri Gauge
Paul Gauguin
Léon Gausson
Gustave Geffroy
Emile Goudeau
Baron G. Gowlowski
Henry de Groux
Bernard Guinaudeau
Emile Halfegt
Ludovic Hamilo
Augustin Hamon
L. Hayet
A. Ferdinand Herold
Eugène Héros
Hettange
Charles-Henry Hirsch
Huot
Henry Huot

Marie Huot
Clovis Hugues
André Ibels
H. G. Ibels
Alfred Jarry
Francis Jourdain
Gustave Kahn
John Labusquière
E. M. Laumann
Paul Léautaud
Julien Leclercq
M. Le Coq
Marc Legrand
Guillaume Le Rouge
Henry Leyret
Albert Livet
Jean Lorrain
Maximilien Luce
Roland de Marès
Auguste Marin
Louis Marsolleau
Paul Masson
Pierre Masson
Camille Mauclair
Louis Mayer
Catulle Mendès
Alexandre Mercier
H. Mercier
Charles Merkl
Stuart Merrill
Jules Méry
Georges Meunier
Emile Michelet
Octave Mirbeau
Albert Mockel
Charles Morice
Alfred Mortier
Gabriel Mourey
Abel Pelletier
H. Petitjean
Raoul Ponchon
Emile Poral
M. Pottecher
J. Prévet
Maurice Pujo
L. de la Quintinie
Henri Quittard
Rachilde
Yveling Rambaud
Elisée Reclus
Henri de Régnier
Jules Renard
Adolphe Retté
Jean Richepin
Jehan Rictus
Henri Rivière
Clément Rochel
P. N. Roinard
Camille de Sainte-Croix
Saint-Pol Roux
Charles Saunier
Paul Signac
Armand Silvestre
Henri Spont
Georges Street
Laurent Tailhade
Alfred Vallette
Adolphe Van Bever
Pierre Véber
André Veidaux
Verrière

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