



ASSESSING DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATISATION

TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS,
NEW INSTITUTIONS, AND
THE CASE OF INDONESIA

OLLE TÖRNQUIST



ASSESSING DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATISATION

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
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ABBREVIATIONS

AKUT	Working Group for the Study of Development Strategies, University of Uppsala
Bappenas	Indonesian National Development Planning Board
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CIVICUS	World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CSDS	Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DEMOS	Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
EPW	Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
ICLD	Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy
IDS	Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Imparsial	Indonesian Democracy Watch
International IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm
ISAI	Institute for the Free Flow of Information, Jakarta
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
KITLV	Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies
Komnas-Ham	Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights
Kontras	Indonesian Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence
KSSP	Kerala People's Science Movement
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, United States
Musreimbang	Indonesian Institutions for Development Planning
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIAS	Nordic Institute for Asian Studies, Copenhagen
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PA	Aceh Party
PAN	Indonesian National Mandate Party
PNA	Aceh National Party

PCD-Journal	Journal of Power, Conflict and Democracy in South and Southeast Asia
PDI-P	Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
PODSU	Politics of Development Group in the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University
PT	Workers Party, Brazil
PWD	Power Welfare and Democracy Project, UGM, Jogjakarta
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation in Developing Countries
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation
Tifa	The Indonesian Soros Foundation
UGM	University of Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta
UiO	University of Oslo
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Development Planning
YLBHI	Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation

PREFACE

It came as some surprise that liberal-oriented democratisation became a major trend in Latin America by the early 1980s and then later in other parts of the Global South too. Analysts had long since explained predominant authoritarianism with reference to weak national independence and modernisation in addition to inappropriate class structures and state institutions. However, the emerging democracies were not born out of improved conditions. The rise of democracy was related instead to disorder, economic and social crisis, pacts between powerful elites, scattered civil society activism and foreign intervention. During the 1980s, two major conclusions developed and were frequently cited. The first was that ‘the end of history’ was imminent in the form of globally triumphant liberalism, and that democratisation would be possible by persuading the elite to agree on the ‘right’ economic and political institutions. The second was that democracy could *not* be designed but would remain a dangerous formality unless preceded by socio-economic change (as the structuralists maintained) or solid political institutions and the rule of law (as both illiberal and conservative institutionalists then claimed).

This book has grown out of the attempts of scholars, students and pro-democracy actors to develop a third, less extreme position. In our view, the possibility that negotiated democratisation may be rooted in essential conflicts should not be excluded. Similarly, it should not be denied that contentious transformative politics might gradually produce more favourable structures and institutions within the framework of early dimensions of democracy. There is a need, therefore, to develop rigorous analytical tools to access relevant empirical sources to thus explore and explain whether and how such conflicts and processes have developed and progressed. Our empirical results are accounted for in separate articles and books, but there have been numerous requests for a brief summary of the analytical and methodological lessons learnt. This book has been written in response to those requests: It summarises the critique of the dominating analyses and assessments of democratisation; it suggests a comprehensive alternative framework and it shows how the alternative works in reality by way of case studies of the largest of the new democracies, Indonesia.

★ ★ ★

I have benefitted immensely from cooperation with a number of scholarly colleagues in the development of theoretical and comparative perspectives as well

as from joint work with researchers, journalists, activists and key informants in carrying out empirical studies and democracy assessments.

In the first case, my mentors and friends since the AKUT-research group in Uppsala in the mid-1970s,¹ Lars Rudebeck and Björn Beckman, both of whom are pioneering scholars of politics in the context of developing countries, have continued to criticise and support. In addition to a number of joint workshops and seminars over a period of two decades (on topics such as ‘the state in the third world’, ‘class and social movements’, ‘labour regimes and democracy’, ‘democracy, civil society’ and ‘popular organisations’), the anthology with Lars on ‘Democratisation in the Third World: Concrete Cases in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective’ (1996) preceded a series of similar collective studies that were edited in Oslo with Kristian Stokke and others. Moreover, former colleagues in Uppsala, Beckman’s colleagues in Stockholm and Inga Brandell’s thought-provoking perspectives from the French discourse and the Mediterranean dynamics have remained important. The same applies to Yusuf Bangura’s insights on the political economy of alternative development strategies, Jim Scott’s comments from his hidden world of resistance and mountain hideouts and Jan Hodann’s experiences of genuine democracy support, from southern Africa to Burma, the Philippines and Aceh. Most importantly, it would have been impossible to continue this collaboratively framed work after moving from Uppsala to Oslo University without the cooperation of political geographer, Kristian Stokke. Kristian made me understand something about space, scale, symbolic politics and Pierre Bourdieu; life became less lonely in the corridors of all too often provincial political science. We have benefitted vastly, in turn, from coordinating an international network that has sustained the combination of contextual *and* comparative studies in theoretical and historical perspective (Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009, Stokke and Törnquist 2013).

This international cooperation has provided the main scholarly base for the theoretical and conceptual framework of the participatory case studies and qualitative democracy surveys that this book is based on. A major partner in this collective effort, John Harriss, has (just like Björn Beckman) gone out of his way to participate in project workshops and seminars during the practical work in Indonesia. The same applies to Gerry van Klinken, Henk Schulte Nordholt, John Sidel, Joel Rocamora and Michael Tharakan. Others involved in the collective work include, among others, Adrian G. Lavallo, Anders Sjögren, Benedicte Bull, Berit Aasen, David Jordhus-Lier, Einar Braathen, Elin Selboe, Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Gunilla Andræ, Jayadeva Uyangoda, Lars Rudebeck, Nathan Quimpo, Neera Chandhoke, Neil Webster, Nils Butenschøn, Patrick Heller, Sophie Oldfield and Thomas Carothers. In addition, a number of colleagues and experts on Scandinavian studies of power and democracy have provided methodological and comparative insights, especially Bernt Hagtvet, Björn Erik Rasch, Fredrik Engelstad, Hilde Sandvik, Jörgen Hermansson, Kalle Moene, Knut Kjeldstadli, Lars Trägårdh, Larry Rose, Olof Pettersson, Per Selle, Rania Maktabi, Sheri Berman and Øyvind Østerud. Last, but by no means least, the constructive comments by David Beetham, the main pioneer of democracy assessments, on our attempts to stand on his shoulders.

With regard to the empirical studies and democracy assessments, the initial perspectives on concerned contextual analyses were developed in the early 1990s with then dissident professor Arief Budiman at the Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana and his colleagues, including George J. Aditjondro and Ariel Heryanto, along with supportive partner Michael van Langenberg at the University of Sydney and several activist-oriented Indonesian students. As for myself, I was in Indonesia to collect information, in cooperation with Arief, on the new protests and dissident groups. I wanted to test the validity of the conclusions from my previous studies of radical movements in Indonesia, India and the Philippines, namely, that further demands for democracy would be expected (Törnquist 1984, 1984a, 1989, 1990, 1991). These demands for democracy would not just be framed in opposition to the dictatorship, but also to resist and offer an alternative to the coercive or primitive accumulation of capital.

In this work, Arief and I were sympathetic yet critical of the new strategy spearheaded by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) under the leadership of charismatic lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, to foster democracy by developing civil society organisations. We argued that even a web of active citizen groups would remain fragmented and unfocused without organised actors. Buyung's response, and challenge to us, then, was to ask us to identify such actors and to study their politics. And so we did, primarily with support from the then dynamic Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation in Developing Countries (SAREC). However, just as we were getting started in 1994, Arief and his colleagues were expelled from their university for political reasons, leaving us without an academic base in Indonesia. We agreed instead to work with our critically reflective informants who were willing and able to take on the role of researchers. These included knowledgeable activists from, first, the YLBHI and then investigative journalists involved with the Institute for the Free Flow of Information (ISAI), established in the wake of the press crackdown in 1994. Parallel to this, I also continued my own research on the ideas and experiences of the democracy actors, with the assistance of alternative media activist, Bimo Wiratmo Probo. My Indonesian case study ran in parallel with the Philippine and Kerala case studies to which I will soon return, but was only partially concluded and published (Törnquist 1997) as it would have been premature to finalise a manuscript in 1996 that predicted drastic democratically oriented changes in Indonesia over the next few years. I am currently resuming the work, but for one of several intermediary reports, see Törnquist (2000) and for an early condensed summary report on the three case studies, Törnquist (2002).

In 1996, as the end of Suharto's dictatorship seemed increasingly likely, in spite of a rather elitist and quite scattered democracy movement, the collective Indonesia project was not given as much attention as had originally been planned. Practical politics and writing that would be of immediate relevance simply seemed more important. However, once the tide had turned, we returned to the studies, although the publication of the book was delayed (Budiman and Törnquist 2001). The most influential partners in the design, implementation and analysis of the research-based democracy promotion project include, in the first instance, Mulyana W. Kusumah and colleagues at the YLBHI, then A. E. Priyono, Andreas

Harsono, Benny Subianto, Bimo Nugroho, Edy Sudarjat, M. Qodari, Nong, D. Mahmada Prasetyohadi and Stanley Adi Prasetyo at ISAI and advisers Daniel Dhakidae, Goenawan Mohammad, Ignas Kleden, Johny Simanjuntak, the late Romo Mangunwijaya, Marsillam Simanjuntak and Vedi Hadiz. As Mulyana and the YLBHI became increasingly occupied with their judicial politics and organisational misfortunes, it was the ISAI team that, notwithstanding numerous distractions, was able to produce informed and exciting analysis.

Meanwhile, I was increasingly inspired by the ways in which concerned Philippine scholars and activists had established institutes such as the Third World Studies Centre (at the University of the Philippines), the Institute for Popular Democracy in Diliman and a number of radical research-oriented NGOs. These collectives played a vital role in analysing the problems and options of fostering democracy and popular oriented development. My research in the Philippines (especially Törnquist 1990, 1993, 1998, 2002) and its relevance to this essay would have come to very little without the support of and discussions with, initially, Francisco 'Dodong' and Ana Maria 'Princess' Nemenzo as well as Randy David, and then in particular with Bernabe 'Dante' Buscayno, Bong Malonzo, Carmel Abao, the late Fatima Penilla, Gerry Bulatao, Eduardo C. Tadem, Edicio de la Torre, Etta Rosales, Isagani R. Serrano, Joel Rocamora, Jurgette Honculada, Karina Constantino-David, Lisa Dacanay, Ronald Llamas, Soliman Santos, Teresa Encarnacion-Tadem, Daniel Edralin, and their partners and so many others in Manila, Tarlac, Cebu City and General Santos, including the late Gwen Ngo Laban and her fellow activists in and around Cebu City and in the fishing cooperatives on Pandanon island, and, more recently, Nathan Quimpo.

A similar and, to me, perhaps even more important source of knowledge and inspiration for the development and implementation of research-based democracy promotion was the popular education movement in the Indian state of Kerala. Through this movement, scholars, teachers and interested activists generated and propelled a number of campaigns on, primarily, literacy, resource mapping and democratic decentralisation. This was followed by a major conference towards drafting an agenda for alternative development, which in turn was crucial a few years later in the launching of the world-renowned people's planning campaign in cooperation with the then new left front government. It is impossible to mention all the scholars and activists in this context who have facilitated and contributed to my own analyses (especially Törnquist 1995, 1998, 2000a, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2009a) as well as my attempts to learn from their work and benefit from their advice and friendship. But in the forefront are leading historian, scholarly activist and later vice chancellor in Kannur P. K. Michael Tharakan (with Sophie) and T. M. Thomas Isaac, scholar, activist, pioneer, initiator of it all and later state minister of finance. Then there was the late E. M. S Namboodiripad, rethinking communist patriarch, as well as Binoy Viswan, C. G. Santhakumar, C. P. Narayanan, the late E. M. Sreedaran, Govinda Pillai, Gouri Dasan Nair, I. S. Gulati, John Kurien, K. K. George, K. P. Kannan, M. A. Oommen, Manhavan Kutty, M. P. Parameswaran, M. K. Prasad, Rajmohan, Subrata Sinah, R. Krishnakumar, Jos Chathukalm, N. Jagajeevan, Nalini Nayak, the late P. K. Vasudevan Nair,

Srikumar Chattopadhyay, T. Gangadharan, V. Bhargavan, V. V. Raghavan and M. P. Philip. There are so many others that I remember well but whose names I have lost; in the diaspora, Govindan Parayil and fellow students of Kerala in comparative perspective, Richard Franke and Patrick Heller.

The second phase of the collaborative project in Indonesia (also mainly supported by SAREC) aimed at mapping and analysing the democracy movement since the fall of Suharto. I must admit that by this stage I privately and almost secretly (because it was not seen as particularly realistic) envisioned that we would also be able to design the research and foster organisations, education and meetings in Indonesia along similar lines as the Philippines and even Kerala. Of course, the Indonesian activists' limited base in popular movements did not prove this possible, although we took a major step in the right direction. Under the guidance of senior academics, an impressive number of investigative journalists such as Ignatius Haryanto and Santoso, then young researchers such as Donni Edwin and Muhammad Qodari, and leading intellectual activists such as Dita Sari and Rahman Tolleng were mapping and analysing the experiences of the pro-democratic actors. These case studies were, in turn, supplemented by the general analysis of concerned academics. Yet again it is impossible to mention all those who contributed to the generation of the critical results and insights that have made their way into this essay. However, coordinators Stanley Adi Prasetyo and A. E. Priyono continued their involvement from phase one; a number of leading intellectuals such as Prof. J. Nasikun, the late Th. Sumartana, Vedi Hadiz, Gerry van Klinken and Mochtar Pabottingi advised and contributed their own analysis. In addition, Björn Beckman, Joel Rocamora and Kavi Chongkittavorn added African, Philippine and Thai experiences, respectively; senior journalists such as Maria Hartiningsih contributed important insights.

As I revisit the more than seven hundred pages of basic qualitative surveys, analytical papers and comprehensive case studies from all the critical sectors of pro-democracy work, (Prasetyo et al., 2003), it is hard to imagine that we (including English language editor Teresa Birks) succeeded in spite of all the challenges. The conference held in 2002 (with supplementary support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was of course far removed from the Kerala experience. However, the discussions of the draft studies for the book and additional oral presentations, and the participation of a number of concerned scholars and leading activists from different groups, ended in broad agreement on the need for more comprehensive studies to be initiated through the establishment of a taskforce. Giving up was not an option.

This taskforce included, in addition to myself and Stanley Adi Prasetyo, three giants of the democracy movements, all of whom have sadly since passed away: Asmara Nababan (the then outgoing secretary general of the National Commission for Human Rights – Komnas HAM), Th. Sumartana (leader of Institute of Interfaith Dialogue and a chair of one of the major reformist parties, PAN) and Munir Said Thalib (the alternative Nobel prince laureate and then head of the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence, Kontras, and the Indonesian Democracy Watch, Imparaisal, before he was assassinated with the support of the Indonesian intelligence services in September 2004).

The taskforce spearheaded the third and most extensive phase of the research-based democracy promotion project – the experiences of which constitute the main base for this book: the two rounds of qualitative countrywide and participatory democracy assessment surveys. These were coordinated by the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS) in collaboration with me at the University of Oslo. Later, the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) also joined us for the final analysis of the second round of qualitative assessment surveys (Priyono et al. 2003, Samadhi et al. 2010). The main donors in this instance were the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Ford Foundation.

The results and lessons learnt from the qualitative assessment surveys (and the efforts to follow them up) that are drawn upon in this book are based primarily on seven very intensive years of work with the team from DEMOS, including the late executive director, Asmara Nababan; then research coordinators A. E. Priyono, Willy P. Samadhi and Debbie Prabawati, in addition to Attia Nur, Anton Pradjasto, Donni Edwin, Nur Iman Subono, Otto Adi Yulianto, Rita Olivia Tambunan, Sofian M. Asgart, Syafa'atun Kariadi; senior administrators Ami Priwardhani, Christina Dwi Susanti, Ingrid Silitonga, Laksmi Pratiwi, Lalang Wardoyo, Melanie Tampubolon and Shirley Doornik as well as several of the members of the board, especially Elga Sarapung, the late Munir Said Thalib, Poengky Indarti and Stanley Adi Prasetyo. Moreover, even if in practice we were short of local academic co-supervisors, I have also benefitted from the contributions made by a number of eminent local scholars who helped us with the quality control of the final reports, including not only anthropologist and democracy promoter Hans Antlöv and sociologist Tamrin Amal Tamagola in particular, but also political scientist and later presidential advisor Daniel Sparringa, critical intellectuals Francis Wahono, Herry Priyono, Kamala Chandrakirana, Meuthia Ganie-Rochman, Mochtar Pabottingi, Parsudi Suparlan and Soetandyo Wignyosoebroto and most recently Luky Djani and Surya Tjandra. Even more importantly, the team at UGM including Aris A. Mundayat, Budi Irawanto, Cornelis Lay, Mohtar Mas'ood, J. Nasikun, Nicolas Warouw, the recently elected Rector of UGM Pratikno and later Eric Hiariej, Purwo Santoso, Amalinda Savirani, Hasrul Hanif and Nur Azizah. With the support of Pratikno, Purwo and Azizah, Nico, Eric, Linda, Willy, Debbie and Hanif are currently developing a new phase in the analysis and support for democracy in cooperation with the University of Oslo, by way of following up the qualitative surveys as well as thematic case studies within the framework of public universities, but in sustained cooperation with practitioners.

Equally important are the key informants in my own research. In some instances, I have had the pleasure and privilege of having continuous discussion on their experiences and analysis since the early 1980s, in exchange for comparative insights. Two leaders of Indonesia's peasants' and workers' movement with crystal clear political perspectives, Kuntjoro and Fauzi Abdullah, both of whom passed away much too early, were among the most important informants and commentators during my studies of the new democracy movement. And

for three decades, the late senior journalist and editor, Joesoef Isak, whose knowledge and experience spanned from the 1950s and 1960s, made me understand something about the hidden agendas in radical Indonesian politics. Others – in addition to several of those already mentioned such as Dita Sari, Goenawan Mohammad, Hemasari Dharmabumi, Johny Simanjuntak, Maria Hartiningsih, Poengky Indarti and Stanley Adi Prasetyo – include Abdon Nababan, Budiman Sudjatmiko, Coki Bonar Tigor Naipospos, Damairia Pakpahan, Erwin Schweishelm, Faisal Basri, George Corputty, Handoko Wibowo, Harsutejo (who did the herculean work of translating my book on the Indonesian Communist Party), Hendardi, Imam Yudotomo, Kwik Kian Gie, Linda Holle, Max Lane, M. Nur Djuli, Muspani, Norhalis Majid, Nyoman Sunarta, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Otto Syamsuddin, Pius Rengka, Priyono Parwito, Ridha Saleh, Sahat Lumbanraja, Sarah Lerry Mboeik, Shadia Marhaban, Syaiful Bahari, Teten Masduki, Usin Abdisyah, Willy Aditya, Wardah Hafidz, Wiladi, Wilson and their partners as well as Affan Ramli, Aguswandi, Arbani Nikahi, Arie Sujito, Aris Merdeka Sirait, Arianto Sangaji, A. Tigor Nainggolan, Bakhtiar Abdullah, Dara Meutia Uning, Dick Suhadi, Eliza Kisya, Erry Syahrian, Imam Yudotomo, Irwandi Yusuf, Iskandar Lamuka, Juanda Djamal, Lely Zailani, Mahfud Masuara, Merry Ngamelubun, Mian Manurung, Muchtar Pakpahan, Muhyidin, Munawar Liza, Murizal Hamzah, Nirwana ‘Nana’ Hidayati, Philipp Kauppert, Putu Wirata, Putut Gunawan, Saiful Haq, Saleh Abdullah, Sugi, Taufiq Abda, Todung Mulya Lubis, Wempy Anggal and yet others. And of course eminent assistant, advisor and friend Nuya Kuswantin, as well as Sigit Prasetyo. Most recently, moreover, the exciting new insights from Aceh Selatan in comparative perspective through Leena Avonius and Fadhli Ali, Saiful Mahdi, T Kemal Fasya, Zubaidah Djohar and their colleagues, supported by the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy through its then director of research Anki Dellnäs, her successor Lena Johansson de Château, and its advisory board.

I am also indebted to John Harriss, Lars Rudebeck and Teresa Birks for making the text readable and for making a final control of facts and consistency. In this case, Teresa’s input has been particularly pertinent as she was also an important partner in several of the sub-projects under review (from the post-Soeharto democracy volume, Prasetyo et al. 2003, via the first survey report, Priyono et al. 2007, to an anthology on the role of democracy for peace and reconstruction in Aceh, Törnquist et al. 2011).

Needless to say, many of my students have been crucial to the process, especially by asking critical questions and spotting unintelligible formulations. Similarly, a number of comments by additional scholars and practitioners at seminars in Norway, India, Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria on previous versions and sections of the book have proven to be very useful.

Finally, the book has benefitted from supplementary financial support from Sida and the exceptional professional commitment and expertise of its then senior advisor Ms. Helena Bjuremalm, currently with International IDEA.

At this point, I can only say thank you all, and hope that you do not feel that your attempts to make me understand have been totally in vain. Some nights

ago, I had a dream that we were all together, sharing good food, drinks and analysis, but it must have been in a Gramscian heaven.

★ ★ ★

An early evaluation of the qualitative Indonesian assessment surveys and an article (in the *PCD Journal*) that summarises and expands on it are available at www.pcd.ugm.ac.id. This little book, however, is quite different. It is meant as a general guide to an alternative theoretical and methodological framework, based on both the longer period of comparative studies mentioned above and the specific democracy assessments in Indonesia. Hopefully the book may be helpful not only for scholars, democracy promoters and practitioners, but also for students who may wish to use it as a supplement to more substantive studies of democratisation.

The core of the book is composed of the generally applicable analytical and operational recommendations that are found in the first part of chapters 1–6 and in the final chapter 7. These may be read and used separately as a handbook. The remainders of chapters 1–6 are composed of empirical exploration and substantiation of the general arguments based on the results from the Indonesian pilot studies, and the empirical foundation of the concluding chapter (in the form of more practical experiences) is in the first appendix.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Why Alternative Assessments?

Democracy, Democratisation and Assessments

What is the best way to assess democratisation? Why is an alternative approach needed? To answer these questions, it is fruitful to begin with concepts that most readers can agree on. Pioneers Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter define democratisation as

the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents) or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g. state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interests associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.). (1986, p. 8)

This is both a specific and an inclusive description that neatly captures what we wish to assess. In other words, this book is not concerned with the various meanings of democracy – for which the reader may refer to the seminal work of Robert Dahl (1989) – or the various models of democracy, as discussed in the influential work of David Held (2006). Rather, it focuses on the roads and the roadmaps to democracy and how to assess their characteristics and their potential for democratisation.

We thus also need to define, however, what we mean by democracy. David Beetham (1999) argues convincingly that most scholars think about democracy in terms of *popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality*. Thus, democratisation is also dependent on how people and public affairs are defined as well as what is meant by control and political equality.

Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that however democracy is defined, it does call for a number of institutions (by which we mean rules and regulations) and certain social and economic conditions (it is difficult, for

instance, to think of democracy in a society that is socially and economically dominated by feudal landlords or dominant castes).

However, while the aforementioned definitions of democracy and democratisation provide a good point of departure, two major disputes remain: Should the definitions be minimal or maximalist, and should they be procedural or substantive?

The first dispute about democracy concerns its extension. Extension involves three dimensions. First, what institutions and conditions are necessary for democracy to emerge? Second, what people (*demos*) shall control public affairs? Third, what constitute these public affairs?

These dimensions of extension are typically distinguished between minimalist and maximalist perspectives. An example of a minimal definition would be where a restricted number of people have the freedom to elect political elites to govern a limited number of public affairs (cf. Schumpeter 1943). A maximalist liberal-socialist definition would be where almost all the people are socially and economically equal with full freedoms and rights to both elect representatives and also participate in the governing of widely defined public affairs. These are extreme examples and there are certainly positions in between. The currently dominant liberal democratic model of democracy is closer to the first extreme than the participatory and the social democratic models, which in turn are closer to the second extreme. We will return more extensively to the issue of the extension of democracy when discussing what institutions and other conditions are necessary for fostering democracy. Key questions that will be addressed include whether it is sufficient for a democracy with only a few institutions (such as constitutions, freedoms and elections) or if there is a need for additional rules and regulations (such as interest-based representation) as well as for significant political capacity of ordinary people to act on their own.

Furthermore, what individuals and groups shall have the right to decide – and thus constitute the *demos* – and what historical circumstances and power relations does this constitution of the *demos* rest upon? For example, are women, migrant labourers and people that belong to specific clans or faith groups part of the *demos*? Moreover, what is the importance to democracy of citizenship rights other than the right to decide, such as rights to social and economic entitlement? And how does a democracy that is by definition based on the right of a limited *demos* to control public affairs (and the right of a limited number of citizens to additional civil and social privileges) relate to the concept of human rights for all?

Equally fundamental, the extension of democracy is affected by what issues are deemed public affairs and what issues are deemed to belong to the sphere of the family, religious associations or private life and business. This concerns not only neoliberal versus socialist positions but also, for example, the importance of libertarian and communal views.

Finally, how is the extension of democracy affected by the fact that governance is increasingly multi-layered and polycentric: what aspects of public affairs are controlled by what people (*demos*) and at what level? Are the various issues and the *demos* located at the international level or at the central national or local

level? Are they within certain sectors and policy areas (such as gender relations, education, environment, health or business) and are they also in the sphere of co-operation with civil society and business?

In brief, the point of departure of this book with regard to the extension of democracy is that even if the predominant definitions are minimalistic, assessments need to acknowledge that many people may believe that they have more than the minimal issues in common. If the book did not do this, it would be biased in favour of the minimalist view.

Another similar reason for focusing on more comprehensively defined democracy is that minimal definitions tend to pave the way for non-democratic politics. For example, a common argument is that democracy does not help to fight corruption. On the contrary, the argument goes, democracy in itself may be fine but in order to fight corruption (and thus foster economic growth and more), it is necessary to focus on better rule of law and stronger state institutions. In this argument, however, the definition of democracy has been limited to elections and certain freedoms, while sometimes the rule of law and almost always state institutions required to implement democratic decisions are deemed external prerequisites, not to talk about interest-based representation and several other components in building democracy. Thus, it is only a narrowly defined democracy that is deemed unable to fight corruption, not a democracy that includes the relationship between elections, the rule of law, strong state institutions and more. So when democracy is defined narrowly and does not include the relations between elections, interest group representation, the rule of law and public administration, then, by definition, corruption can only be fought in ways that the advocates of the minimalist definition would say have nothing to do with democracy, such as in the case of Singapore (Khan 2005, Winters 2012, cf. Törnquist 2012).

For these reasons, the book focuses on how to assess the development of *substantial democracy* – a democracy that is normatively neither minimal nor maximal, but significant (as opposed to a formality) by being inclusive of (1) the issues that most people deem to be of common concern, (2) the persons that are subject to the government of these issues and (3) the institutional and other prerequisites that most scholars deem to be necessary for a democracy to work and make a difference.

The second dispute about democracy is between procedural and substantive definitions. On the one hand, the adherents of procedural definitions prefer to identify democracy with the institutions that they deem to be intrinsic, such as the rule of law and free and fair elections. As a consequence, such institutions are called democratic; given that they are operational, they are, by definition, bound to foster democracy. For example, if elections are free and fair, the assumption is that they foster democracy.

The supporters of substantive definitions, on the other hand, typically specify what values and principles are needed for democracy to become real, after which they list a number of institutional means to foster the values and thus also the aim of democracy. Beetham and his colleagues (2002, p. 14, 64–66), for example, argue that the values of participation, authorisation, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and solidarity are necessary to foster the aim of

democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. Thereafter, they construct a list of 23 general institutional means to realise these values, and these means, in turn, are expanded into some 85 more specific institutional arrangements. Finally, they assess whether and how these means actually promote the aim of democracy.

It is certainly necessary to discuss what institutions and other conditions are intrinsic to the development of democracy and how many indicators need to be considered. These are important themes in the following chapters. However, the main point here is to underline the premise that a substantive definition of democracy is analytically more fruitful than a procedural one in the assessment of democratisation. The main reason is simple. By identifying the aims of democracy before analysing the extent to which the institutions really foster these aims and people can use and improve them, one does not take for granted that various institutions are democratic. On the contrary, this is an empirical issue – something that remains to be found out in reality.

Substantive democracy is thus the conditions and the efficiency of the institutions, as well as people's capacity to use them, that respected scholars deem to be intrinsic in building popular control on the basis of political equality of the issues that people (who are affected by the government or lack of government of these issues) deem to be public affairs. Logically, then, substantive democratisation is the process to achieve this.

In short, it has been argued that even if there is a broad agreement that democracy means popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, this may be more or less narrowly defined. Good assessments of democratisation presuppose, however, that (1) the definitions of democracy are extensive enough to include the issues that most people hold to be of public concern as well as the building stones that various scholars deem to be necessary and (2) no conditions and institutions are classified as democratic per se but are subject to empirical analyses of the extent to which they promote the aim of democracy as well as the extent to which people can foster and use them. Hence, one should assess whether and how as well as why democratisation and democracy are more or less substantial and substantive.

The Origins of Assessments

Democracy assessments developed when existing often structural oriented theories proved insufficient in explaining the actual development of democracy and in recommending ways forward. By the 1970s, the focus of most schools of thought was on explaining why the democratisation that had been introduced after the Second World War had generally deteriorated and even proved impossible to sustain, with a few exceptions such as India. This applied to almost all theories, from liberal to Marxist modernisation perspectives as well as dependency theories. However, following the dismantling of the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s, more attention was drawn to the possibility that the authoritarian regimes in Latin America might also be undermined. Most importantly, pioneering scholars (including a team led by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead) showed that the emerging transitions toward 'uncertain democracies'

were related more to the politics of alliances and international support than to the kind of structural changes that had been emphasised in the predominant theories. Since it was possible to foster some democratisation by political design, there was an obvious need to assess the outcome and challenges.

Insufficient Structural Analyses

To understand the pros and cons of the assessments that evolved, it is necessary to discuss how democracy and democratisation were analysed at the time. A major argument in the following account is that initially dynamic analyses (such as by O'Donnell and Schmitter) of the contextual primacy of politics (which supplemented the insufficient structural approaches) were followed quite soon by studies of the crafting of supposedly universally valid and depoliticised institutions.

Until the mid-1970s, the predominant view was that capitalist modernisation and expansion – usually of an idealised Western sort – was a fundamental precondition for the development of democracy in the Global South. Both Marxists and non-Marxists carried out broad society-oriented studies. The tendency was, according to Martin Lipset (1959) and others, that economic development generated complicated social and economic structures that could not be managed by authoritarian regimes. In addition, modern as opposed to traditional values spread, particularly among the market-driven business people and the middle classes who were interested in standing up to autocratic rulers and the state apparatus whilst being independent enough to do so. The foremost dictum of this structurally based argument was Barrington Moore's (1965) 'no bourgeois, no democracy'.

There were three main concerns, however, with the modernisation arguments. The first was articulated by Samuel Huntington (1965) who contended that the rise of liberal democracies not only presupposed capitalist modernisation and middle classes, but also solid state institutions, particularly the rule of law. Without these, the discontented masses, no longer controlled by traditional institutions, would cause disruption and might even be attracted to radical ideas. As a consequence, the powerful would be unlikely to agree to even modest reforms. Thus, according to Huntington, there was a need for a 'politics of order' established ahead of political liberties and elections. In the event that the middle classes were not capable of building these institutions, Huntington added, the military might have to step in, being in many cases the only reasonably solid organisation. This argument provided the main rationale for the many 'middle class coups' in Latin America at the time, and even for the support of the military takeover in Indonesia and the subsequent mass killings of leftists in 1965–1966.

Another but non-conservative concern was promoted by comparative historical and political sociologists such as Charles Tilly (1975), Göran Therborn (1977), Dietrich Rueschemeyer, E. H. and J. D. Stephens (1992) and Collier (1999). They argued more broadly that the development of democracy rested with the general dynamics of capitalism and the role of both class and state. Capitalist development in Europe and North America had generated a large working class with both organisational capacity and an interest in democracy. Where capitalism

was successful, moreover, the dominant businesspeople were strong enough to abstain from direct government control and were willing to accept some democratisation as a means to contain protest and gain public acceptance. Thus, actual democracy resulted from both demands and needs. The demands for democracy were voiced not so much by the bourgeoisie as by the working class and sections of the middle classes. The need for democracy boiled down to the elite's requirement for the widest popular support as they engaged in state building, international state-led competition and military campaigns.

A third concern was espoused by nationalist- and Marxist-oriented comparativists with a closer focus on the Global South. These had long maintained that the European processes of democratisation were not likely to be replicated in the post-colonial world. On the one hand, scholars of imperialism and international dependency concluded that the local elite would either have to use authoritarian methods to stay in power (because of their tendency to collaborate with foreign capitalists, thus losing legitimacy), or they would have to repress labour in order to develop the economy beyond the substitution of imports by making the economy internationally attractive and competitive (Frank 1967, O'Donnell 1973, Amin 1974). On the other hand, students of class and local politics argued that popular rather than elitist-oriented democracies could only be built on the basis of structural changes such as control of foreign capital and land reform (Baran 1957, Alavi 1972, Martinussen 1980). It is true that activists who subscribed to the dependency analyses suggested more anti-capitalist reform than did the nationalist and communist leaders who referred to the studies of class-based politics and argued for broad alliances towards state-led national development. However, all agreed on the need for structural change ahead of democracy.

Actual developments in the Global South rarely bore out any of these positions. Modernisation alone was no midwife of democracy, not even when the supposedly pro-democratic middle and working classes expanded. Authoritarianism spread in countries with both market- and state-led strategies of modernisation. Even the most successful design of strong political and judicial institutions in Singapore did not generate much democracy. The exceptions include India, where basic institutional elements of democracy survived, and Taiwan and South Korea, where they developed. However, even these limited advances were difficult to explain by the application of the mainstream theories. The most successful is a combination of elements of the comparative sociological perspectives and the analyses of class and local politics. Leading examples include Mouzelis's (1986) study of the early history of democracy in Latin America and the Balkans and Migdal's (1988) analysis of weak states in comparison with the dominant web-like societies with complicated social structures and local strongmen.

Moreover, the only viable mass data-based universal conclusion about the nature of the correlation between development and democracy was that development, in terms of per capita income, tended to sustain already established democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000). At times, economic development had favoured certain classes or actors that had fostered democracy, but there was no universal pattern. More generally, to quote Antonio Cheibub and James Vreeland:

If the goal is to generate a theory that is able to unambiguously answer what democracies emerge and, on the basis of this answer, generate predictions about when it will emerge, we find that theorizing is doomed, and we should just as well go do something else. If, however, the goal is to identify different mechanisms for the emergence of democracy and characterize the conditions under which these mechanisms are more or less likely to operate, then we have a long and, we hope, fruitful agenda in front of us. (2012, p. 31)

The Puzzling Third Wave of Democracy

The main puzzle, however, was the rise in the mid-1970s of the third wave of democracy. This was often by way of negotiated processes of transition from authoritarian to various partially liberal-democratic oriented regimes, which typically stagnated. It was easy to explain why the wave of democracy spread to the previously Soviet-dominated eastern block after the fall of the Berlin Wall. But how did this wave manage to roll across the vast oceans separating the different contexts of authoritarianism in the Global South, where most of the unfavourable structural conditions were still in place? How could this happen, when most transitions were in fact directly related to disorder (rather than 'political order'); when transitions were related to economic and social crisis (instead of successful modernisation); when agreements between powerful elites (rather than radically altered relations of power) seemed to be decisive; when scatted civil society activism (rather than broad popular participation) seemed to be significant and when foreign interventionism (instead of more independence) was crucial?

The predominant explanations focused on structural adjustment, rational actors and liberal institutions. The economic modernisation aspect of the argument was that adjustment to market prices and the privatisation of public assets (many of which had already been captured by politicians, bureaucrats and military officers) had rendered the dominant groups and the middle classes less dependent on politics and state. Thus, they were able to adapt to the government of the few remaining public affairs by way of institutions normally associated with democracy such as elections, certain freedoms and the idea of rule of law. These remaining public affairs were dubbed core areas of the state (World Bank 1997). Separately, a more society-oriented thesis was that the strengthening of non-government organisations (NGOs) – within which conscientious citizens could begin to trust each other personally and thus co-operate – further improved the capacity of people to resist 'too much' state and politics and thus being able to build democracy (see Escobar and Alvares [1992] and Putnam [1993] for classic works in this area; see Beckman et al. [2001] and Harriss et al. [2004] for reviews and critique).

Most importantly, for these reasons as well as through additional international support and sometimes direct intervention, it had been possible to negotiate compromises between soft moderate rulers and dissidents. These deals were, first, to marginalise hardliners as well as radicals and popular movements. Secondly, the deals aimed at introducing basic liberal-democratic institutions such as human rights, the rule of law and elections in an 'orderly way'. According to predominant theories about the primacy of institutions, these were rules and regulations

that the crucial actors would adjust to and thus become democrats (see March and Olsen [1984] and Karl [1990] for two classics and, e.g. World Bank [1997] for general acceptance).

In short, the third wave of democracy was due to the combination of internationally supported economic liberalism, the rise of civil society and the crafting of liberal-democratic institutions.

Over the years, the initial analyses of the dynamics of political change were replaced with stereotyped classifications of stages of transition and the supportive policies that were adjusted to them. A first 'opening' stage included economic and political liberalisation and intensified struggles between 'hardliners' and 'softliners'. The second stage was the rapid 'political breakthrough' of the anti-authoritarian actors and collapse of the old regime, followed by swift elections and the building of core democratic institutions. The third stage was the rather long, drawn out 'consolidation' during which stronger democratic institutions were to be built, civil society organisations were to be strengthened, and actors were expected to play by the new rules of the game (cf. Carothers 2004). A parallel preoccupation was wider comparative studies in which the design and the role of various institutions as well as civil society were gaining prime importance (e.g. Diamond and Linz 1988 and 1989, and Linz and Stepan 1996).

Meanwhile, a similar argument was developed to explain and advance recommendations for the promotion of liberal democratic peace too. In this view, peace would be possible by making the warring actors less dependent on the disputed control of state and politics, thanks to liberal economics and civil society, and by helping them, then, to negotiate sufficient representation through parties and elections in order to manage the remaining issues at stake (see Paris [2004] and Jarstad and Sisk [2008] for reviews).

Unintended Outcome

A major conclusion was thus that previous determinist theories about the inevitability of authoritarian regimes in the Global South were insufficient because it had proved (1) possible to craft pacts between moderate rulers and dissidents in favour of liberal-democratic-oriented reforms and (2) because it had also been possible, then, to design a number of rules and regulations that major actors were expected to adjust to.

Soon enough, however, this conclusion was challenged by radical as well as conservative positions. Radicals argued that 'real democracy' could not be crafted by deals made between the already powerful actors and designed by way of better rules and regulations. This, the radicals continued, was because 'real democracy' rested with inevitable changes of power relations and because the actors in command would be able to adjust to and dominate any institution. Conservatives, for their part, argued on the basis of what they deemed to have been the European experience, namely, that democracy presupposes constitutions and especially the rule of law that take long time to develop. They also added that if these are not introduced ahead of popular sovereignty, then popular sovereignty is likely to be abused by the masses and by the leaders that incite them.

We shall return to the details, but the fact is that many of the actual developments since the democratic breakthroughs in a number of countries from the 1980s and onwards seem to speak in favour of both the radical and conservative critique. The explanations and recommendations about moderate actors 'getting the prices and institutions right' have been challenged by actual developments. Privatisation and structural adjustment to the markets have undermined many authoritarian regimes. However, already powerful actors, including those that gained private control of previously public assets and capacities, continue to dominate state and local governance, albeit more indirectly. The same applies to elections, media and citizens' organisations. Democrats in civil society have usually been unable or unwilling to build a popular base and to thus make a difference in elections. Instead, they have confined themselves to self-help, networking and lobbying activities. Most importantly, while a considerable number of the already powerful actors have adjusted to the new liberal democratic rules and regulations, they have rarely become 'good democrats'. On the basis of their economic, social and other sources of power, they have rather used and abused the institutions of human rights, the rule of law, free elections and 'good governance' that were supposed to generate democracy to their own benefit (Grugel 2002, Carothers 2004, Törnquist 2004, Freedom House 2010, *The Economist* 2011).

In similar ways, peacemaking based on economic liberalisation and civil society combined with elections without altering the relations of power have often generated corruption and power-sharing agreements between the major parties, distrust among other actors and ordinary people and new elite conflicts, especially in relation to electoral mobilisation (Stokke and Uyangoda 2011, Törnquist et al. 2011).

Current Positions on Democratisation

There have been three main responses to the deficiencies of the rational actors and institutional-oriented explanations of the rise and consolidation of democracy as well as the recommendations on how to promote it.

The first response is from the structuralists. Their basic contention is that the flawed outcome of the crafted transitions from authoritarian rule to economic and political liberties confirms their previous assertion that democracy cannot be designed, but calls first for structural change of the relations of power (Bastian and Luckham 2003, Robison and Hadiz 2004). The common conclusion, then, is that democratisation has been limited to procedures. The recommendation is that while the new liberties and human rights must be protected, primary focus should be on welfare reform, social and economic change, and thus the altering of the relations of power rather than electoral democracy, as the latter has been hijacked by the dominant actors.

The second response comes from illiberal or conservative institutionalists who just as unsurprisingly claim that actor-driven liberal democratisation has not worked because of the shortage of solid enough state and political institutions, the rule of law in particular. The argument is that constitutionalism must

precede popular sovereignty, just as in the historical development of democracy in Europe. An influential thesis is that the new freedoms and elections tend to be abused by contesting groups, thus generating more corruption and violent conflict. Thus, it is argued that democracy needs to be 'sequenced'. Popular control should be restrained until the necessary conditions in the form of the rule of law, 'good governance' and civil society organisations have been introduced. It is not clear, however, what already powerful groups would do this and why (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Similar arguments are certainly advocated in Singapore, Hanoi and Beijing too, including as a basis for how to contain corruption. Or with China's new leader Xi Jinping, 'stability is the prerequisite for reform' (*Economist* January 5–11, 2013, p. 40). In many ways, the law and governance aspects of these arguments resemble Samuel Huntington's (1965) old thesis from the cold war about the need for 'politics of order' in order to avoid social and political chaos as a result of modernisation. This called for the institutionalisation of middle class rule by (if necessary) military might – a thesis that paved the way for decades of authoritarianism. In fact, it was Huntington (1992) who responded to Fukuyama's (1989) essay about 'the end of history' (as a result of the global economic and political liberalism's cold war victory). Huntington objected to Fukuyama's thesis by pointing instead to the 'clash of civilisation', thus substituting political Islamists for obsolete communists.

Thirdly, the advocates of market-based elite pacts for liberal democratic institutions themselves continue to claim that their own thesis remains valid. Their basic defence is that neither structural variables, such as land reform, nor economic modernisation or harshly imposed institutional factors such as 'politics of order' have proved better explanations for the unexpected transitions to albeit imperfect democracy. Typically, the liberals argue that the unfavourable outcomes and, for instance, remaining clientelist practices are due, moreover, to insufficient liberalisation and institution building. This, the reasoning goes, is because inadequate resources have been made available in order to get liberal politics up and running both before and after elections. An example is that little interest has been paid to the crafting of party systems. Popular political representation based on ideology and interests is deemed unrealistic, but the party systems should at least be functional in accordance with elite-led parliamentary principles. (See, e.g. Carothers [2004] for review and debate.)

Meanwhile, a major focus of both the conservative institutionalists and the liberals has been to assess the standard of the various institutions that they focus on as a guide for what needs to be done. This may sound unproblematic, but it is not. Designing and conducting these democracy assessments has swiftly become an industry in its own right, parallel to that of measuring economic development. Many donors want to identify what countries or local governments are 'democratic enough' to qualify as partners. This is based on the quite normative assumption that the combination of structural adjustment and 'good' liberal democracy is the best way to foster social and economic development. Next they wish to measure the state of various liberal-democratic institutions in order to judge what problems should be prioritised. Then they want to evaluate the impact of their projects. National and international donor agencies, specialist

institutes (such as International IDEA, UNDP and Freedom House), organisations (such as the World Alliance for Citizen Cooperation, CIVICUS and Transparency International) and related research institutes, consultancy firms and NGOs compete over funding and the influence of their specific perspective and recommendations; consultants with good contacts are often paid staggeringly high fees.

The Case for an Alternative

In spite of all the drawbacks that have been discussed in the above, however, it is a fact that the structuralist approaches remain unable to account for much of the political transformation. This brings to mind the defeatist analyses of the political economy in the face of the world economic crisis in the late 1920s – until Keynes and others pointed to the possibility and importance of governing the market.

It is true that most of the disputed studies of democratisation have focused on the elite and supposedly universally valid rules and regulations. However, there are also analyses of the role of dissenting actors, social movements, civil society organisations, their politics and policies, related power relations and the institutions that they have shaped. So instead of abandoning the idea of what Thomas Carothers (2007b) have called gradualism, there is a need to develop better assessments of the problems and options of democratisation – and to add analyses of attempts at structural change in similar but not necessarily the same ways as some social democrats in the early 1930s tried to move ahead from merely coping with the crises of capitalism (by drawing on Keynes) to also developing politics and policies to transform state and society.

We shall return to the details of such transformative politics in chapter 6, but if there is an option for concerned scholarship to contribute to democratisation, the immediate question is whether and how it can be shaped by way of assessments. The immediate answer is that it is not possible with the mainstream framework for democracy assessments – which is the obvious reason for trying to develop an alternative framework in this book. But *why* is it necessary to build an alternative? Let us proceed first with the general drawbacks of the current approaches and then with a discussion of the specific problems.

Mainstream democracy assessments suffer from multiple biases. They have come to parallel the industry of measuring economic development. Thus, the assessments are often used by governments and donors to judge whether a country or local government is ‘democratic enough’ to qualify as a partner, to specify deficits to focus on and to measure the effects of pet projects and policies. This is all done on the basis of the donor’s norms, criteria and strategies with regard to democracy support. These are typically uncontextualised, assuming that the liberal model of democracy and democratisation by way of institution building, thanks to pacts between moderate incumbents and dissidents, are universally applicable and superior – and that, as a consequence, the assessments can be supervised by parachuted experts with insufficient contextual knowledge. More seriously, critical theories and unbiased research are not really needed. The

researchers and their peers claim to know in advance what needs to be done, usually in accordance with the liberal democratic ideal. So assessments are more about mapping patterns, attitudes and opinions and of confirming and evaluating models or strategies that have already been decided on – and to get local partners to participate and enjoy a sense of ‘ownership’. Typically, and for the same reason, there is also little emphasis on accessing the best possible sources, including at the local level. In the case of opinion polls, finally, the attitudes and patterns are statistically correlated and explained inductively, without being related to theories of democratisation.

This is not to say that there is also important work being done on the basis of the mainstream assessment schemes, such as a number of participatory audits of government services. Many of the existing assessment schemes may well be further developed. But in short, the drawbacks of the main approaches to the assessments of democratisation that need to be addressed rest with five problematic assumptions about (1) the primacy of the elite, (2) the sole importance of institutions, (3) the superiority of the liberal democratic model (and the related constitution of the *demos* and public affairs), (4) the adequacy of existing sources and theory and (5) the limited need to analyse and explain change. Let us proceed with a closer look at these stumbling blocks.

1. *Elitism*: The first assumption about the primacy of the elite is rooted in the literature on how powerful moderate rational actors in many countries have been able to negotiate pacts with the support of international partners towards economic and political liberties and fledgling democracy that has already been referred to. This, the arguments goes, is partly because more radical demands and popular movements have been contained and many dissident groups have been confined to activities in civil society organisations. The problem here is the shortage of analyses of the complicated and contextual economic and political dynamics that shape, sustain and obstruct the elitist pacts, alliances and institutions such as those of the rule of law, human rights, electoral systems and political representation. Similarly, scant attention has been paid to the theoretically unexpected structural dynamics behind the widespread protests and demands for liberties and democracy that usually paved the way for negotiated transitions and ongoing protests against the abuses of power (cf. Carothers 2004, Törnquist 2004).

2. *Institutional bias*: Equally troublesome, mainstream assessment schemas are biased by giving priority to institutional theory, namely, that the ‘rules of the game’ shape the world, including democracy. There is a tendency to deem rules and regulations such as electoral and party systems, forms of government or measures to foster accountability and combat corruption as next to technologies that are generally applicable and will generate the theoretically expected outcomes in most places. Hence, it is not necessary to enquire deep into the issue as to how the institutions have emerged in the first place and whether or not institutional options such as free elections or vibrant civil society really have such positive effects in diverse contexts with different actors, relations of power and other

conditions. Consequently, the actual impact of actors and power relations are rarely included and assessed, even though they are given prime emphasis in other theories.

A number of assessment schemes certainly acknowledge that supposedly democratic institutions and freedoms do not always work well and do not always foster democracy. However, in these good cases (such as the assessment framework developed by Beetham et al. with International IDEA [2002]), the analyses of the extent to which the institutions foster democracy tend to be limited to the input side of politics in terms of affecting and making decisions but to pay less attention to the output side, that is, the capacity to implement decisions according to intentions. When the output side is given more attention to (such as in the assessments stressing 'good governance' and accountability supported by the UNDP, see UNDP 2012), the issues of popular sovereignty and whether and how policies affect further democratisation are not major priorities. Finally, non-formalised institutions that are so important in the Global South are rarely considered.

3. *Liberal bias*: The third major assumption is about the pre-eminence of the liberal democratic model. It is the institutions associated with this model that represent the focus of the predominant assessments and nothing else. Thus, additional institutions related to, for example, social democracy are ignored and the same applies to alternative rules and regulations related to participatory democracy, deliberation in Muslim communities or communities run according to customary law. The liberal institutions are deemed universal – as are the experts and researchers parachuted into various countries and distressed areas as democracy and peace promoters, much like development economists travel around the world with their tool kits.

Typically, moreover, the issue of what constitute the people (*demos*) and public affairs is taken for granted, in spite of unrelenting conflict over territories, identities, multi-level governance and privatisations. The same applies to the definition of public affairs. Hardly any of the major assessments even discuss the extension and character of public affairs, the more or less democratic governance of which is subject to review. It is as if it does not matter, or as if there is a general accepted universal standard characterised by extensive depoliticisation and privatisation. Yet the constitution of the *demos* and public affairs varies between and within countries, and it has a crucial bearing on the problems and options of democratisation.

Furthermore, the supposition that the liberal democratic model is the only possible benchmark in assessments is yet another reason for mainstream assessment analysts to assume that they already know what to look (and not look) for; that they already can predict what will happen and that they already know what should be done. Thus, most assessment exercises turn into what students of comparative politics call demonstration of theory (i.e. illustrating that a certain theory is applicable) rather than to find out if the theory makes more or less sense than rival perspectives. Much like the dogmatic Marxists of yesteryear, the assessors have the correct framework and only need to guide 'the locals' on how to collect the relevant data and complete supposedly universal forms.

4. *Uncritical and poor sources*: This brings us to the fourth assumption in current assessment studies. Given that those assessing the state of democracy typically take it for granted that they are right about what to look for and what factors and institutions will generate good results, they are ultimately also not particularly interested in academic and unbiased studies. Independent scholars who go out of their way to ask the most challenging questions find the best possible sources and test not only the argument they might think is best, but also contending arguments in order to find out what makes most sense are often regarded as less useful than the commissioning of specific studies and consultancies. The prime interest is to prove how important the assessor's perspective of, for instance, human rights or 'good governance' is; how crucial it is to support such aims and what the outcome of specific projects has been. Equally important, activists as well as politicians and bureaucrats are to be involved to get 'a sense of ownership' in the assessment programmes not as carefully selected informants.

In the Global South, it is a major challenge to get access to relevant and reliable information in a country or region at large. Social and political sciences are politically sensitive and poorly developed. In aspiring democracies, there is a shortage of independent, high quality, credible and relevant research on power and democracy in particular. Research and survey institutes and think tanks, having to survive on (and nourishing) political and economic markets, often conduct more studies than the supposedly more independent academia. Within academia, many scholars survive by conducting commissioned studies and evaluations for governments and market-driven institutes. Investigative journalism, lastly, is typically being squeezed by strong economic and political actors. This is not to suggest that all studies and especially not all information that may be accessed through investigative work are unreliable. It is crucial that students and scholars review what is available before reinventing the wheel. However, most of this information tends not to be sufficiently in-depth and grounded. Assessments are often based on quantitative surveys about popular attitudes in addition to information from metropolitan experts, scholars and NGO-directors and top-level actors within politics, administration and business (e.g., International IDEA 2000). These are certainly knowledgeable people, and the opinion polls need not be defective. However, crucial local processes as well as disadvantaged classes and groups that make up the majority of the population that in a democracy is supposed to control public affairs are poorly covered.

Most remarkably, the mainstream assessments have made very little use of the immensely rich source of knowledge that is available at central as well as local levels and in most sectors among often quite well-educated and critically reflective leading activists – including journalists, local professionals, scholars and students – in various parts of the democracy movement.

5. *Change taken for granted*: The fifth and final unfounded assumption in mainstream assessment studies is the limited need to focus on analysis of change. This is, of course, strange as the task is to assess a process (of democratisation). However, if one already takes it for granted that pacts among certain actors will

generate the 'right' liberal-democratic institutions, which in turn will make people act democratically, there is little need to address and explain change. Change is taken for granted. The only thing one needs to do is to locate the deficits with regard to the liberal-democratic institutions and to trust in the ability of the supposedly reformist elite (and civil society) and their international partners to perfect the institutions. However, when this does not happen, there is no answer as to why and what should be done.

This is the most fundamental drawback in conventional approaches – their static nature and inability to consider the processes and dynamics of democratisation. Thus, the assessments also make little sense for progressive democracy-oriented actors and their supporters who do not only need to know about the democratic deficits but also why deficits remain and what might foster change.

The Task Ahead

Given the drawbacks of the mainstream analyses and assessments of democratisation that have been discussed so far, the major challenges towards developing a more fruitful framework may be summarised in terms of how to assess (1) the substance of substantial democratisation and (2) the wider context of elite politics by way of (3) a theoretically inclusive framework that (4) also facilitates the acquiring of more and better information on the ground and the engagement of democratic actors of change. In other words, *participatory and theoretically inclusive assessments of the substance of substantial democratisation*.

1. *Assessing the substance of substantial democratisation*: It is clearly necessary to avoid assessments by measuring against procedural definitions of democracy. Rather one needs to work with substantive definitions, first distinguishing between the aims and means and then analysing the extent to which the latter have fostered the former. Fortunately, it is possible to stand on the shoulders of David Beetham and his colleagues (2002) who have already developed an approach that focuses on the substance. The main challenge is instead to extend the scope of the analysis (while keeping in mind that it still has to be implementable) so that the assessment of the substance is inclusive of more substantial processes of democratisation than has hitherto been given priority to by both scholars and practitioners. This involves identifying and considering the governance of more issues than those that are officially deemed to be public, especially when studies indicate that democracy-oriented actors would like additional issues to be subject to democratic government. The same applies to the constitution of the people that shall decide (*demos*) and the conditions that scholars with diverse focuses deem to be fundamental in processes of democratisation.

2. *Considering the wider context*: The second challenge is how to assess not only the predominant elite-led processes of democratisation and the institutions that they shape, but also the wider context of power relations, social movements, interest organisations, civil society groups and dissenting actors. This in practice requires

the herculean task of combining in a realistic way studies of diverse actors and then linking them to the role of institutions as well as structural constraints and opportunities.

3. *Inclusive framework*: The third challenge is how to extend the benchmarks for what is currently measured in assessments. Even the best schemes such as that developed by Beetham et al. take a rather extensive yet thoroughly liberal model of democracy as its point of departure. This book does not take a stand against liberal democracy, but the standards in the model may not always be viable or generate the intended effects in all contexts; there are other views and possibilities. Hence, academically good and practically fruitful assessments need to consider a wider array of dimensions and crucial factors in different models of democracy and theories of democratisation.

This is imperative in order to proceed beyond the mere exposition of pet theories (demonstrating that they work), applying instead the various relevant perspectives to comprehend both the state of affairs and the problems and options of change. The ultimate challenge is the development of a framework that allows for assessments of the dynamics of democratisation. More specifically, this process should serve to identify and collect data on all the most important variables identified by the various relevant theories and strategies of democratisation in both the international and local scholarly and public discourse. This means that basic variables related to supplementary theories of social democracy, actors of change, power relations and social movements should be added to the existing parameters that focus on liberal institutions. Similarly, relevant informal institutions must be added to the assessment of formal rules and regulation. The same applies to the crucial output side of democracy in terms of the implementation of various policies in addition to the generation of politics, policies and related institutions. A vital question in this book is certainly whether and how these demanding tasks would be possible to combine.

It is also necessary to give priority to inclusive theoretical interpretation of the data in order to avoid two other fallacies, namely, that (1) conclusions may be drawn on the basis of empiricist statistical correlations and (2) the aggregation of information on the various indicators to construct the kind of indexes that are so attractive to the media and executives by weighting the relative importance of the different factors in relation to arenas and principles of governance (cf. Bappenas and UNDP 2008).

Any such aggregation and weighting of data shall instead be transparent and based on comprehensive and competing theories about democratisation. Although the alternative method recommended in this book draws on mass data, it remains qualitative by being based on (1) the information of the experts that are interviewed (rather than on the number of opinions of randomly selected respondents) and (2) transparent theoretical arguments about the importance of each and every factor and how they relate to one another. All calculations and figures based on the mass assessment data are thus based on the strength of the information (rather than the number of answers) and in order to discuss the validity of the different arguments.

4. *Grounded facts and engagement*: The final major task is to develop a framework that enables the collection of the best possible sources in key sectors in a country or in a region as a whole and the engagement of actors of change in shaping and making use of the analyses. In reality, the calls for the combination of, on the one hand, uncompromisingly high academic standards and qualified scholars, and, on the other, extensive numbers of students who can add studies and collect data together with well connected, experienced and reflective activists in the field. Many doubt that this is possible, but this book will show that it is.

A major initial source of inspiration was the experiences of the people's educational movement in the southwestern Indian state of Kerala, the *Kerala Sasthra Sahitya Parishad* (KSSP). In the late 1980s and the 1990s, the KSSP developed a scholarly framework for the participatory mapping of local resources. As soon as local students, teachers and other activists had collected the data and analysed it, the tentative results were presented for wider discussion with activists from civil society organisations, trade unions, farmers' associations and more, in addition to political leaders and government officials. Thus, plans that were drafted locally were scaled up and gained support in numerous meetings and in a huge international conference (1994) by the people and the organisations that mattered. Leading progressive experts and politicians committed themselves to the proposals. A few years later, when the same politicians won the elections, this method and the programme became a blueprint for state-wide and world-renowned efforts at democratic decentralisation combined with a People's Planning Campaign (Törnquist with Tharakan 1995, Issac with Franke 2000, Tharakan 2004, Törnquist 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009a.)

One may well argue that similarly favourable conditions as in Kerala with its long history of popularly rooted public action are not present in most other countries and provinces. Yet it is still possible to learn from the processes that laid down the necessary foundations for such endeavours to succeed.

Qualitative (Rather than Quantitative) Surveys

Before proceeding to the details of an alternative framework, it is necessary to address the frequently asked question regarding whether the most crucial dimensions of democratisation can be addressed in surveys in the first place. Is it not the case that most factors and dynamics need to be studied in more focused and contextual studies from which, moreover, real and substantial democracy has to grow? And is it not wise to begin by identifying crucial aspects on the ground and only later go on to discuss whether and how they are generally valid?

There is much to this, yet, while the general aim of a survey is to elicit a comprehensive, detailed examination of the whole of something, there is a major difference between qualitative and quantitative surveys. Typical quantitative surveys are based on statistical methods both in the selection of the respondents and in analysing the number of opinions on democratisation that have been expressed. By contrast, the less frequently used qualitative surveys – as recommended in this book – are based on the quality (rather than the quantity) of the information given by carefully selected experts in the relevant fields. While the

number of respondents in certain populations is crucial in quantitative studies, the main point of the qualitative surveys is that the expert-informants cover all crucial areas and that they supplement each other so that the validity and reliability of their information may be controlled. The number of informants in qualitative surveys is thus decided on the basis of what institutions, contexts, relations of power and frontlines of democracy work need to be analysed. These crucial criteria will be specified in the forthcoming chapters. The ideal is thus that there should be a sufficient number of knowledgeable informants to attain 'data saturation', that is, that one has achieved a level of understanding where adding another interview brings little new information. Furthermore, while qualitative surveys often use questionnaires that are reminiscent of those in quantitative surveys, this is done in order to handle large amounts of information and there nevertheless remain many open questions that provide an as rich as possible understanding of the informants' reasoning. Finally, all the questions in our qualitative surveys are formulated in order to enable critical analyses of the validity of major arguments in the scholarly discussion of democratisation.

However, even if qualitative surveys are more appropriate for reviewing the problems and options of democratisation while providing a better basis for insightful analyses than quantitative surveys, the question remains why such qualitative surveys are so vital and why they should precede case studies. There are four main reasons.

First, broad qualitative assessments are needed to consider both central and local contexts in various parts of a country, region or locality and to include settings with different characteristics. It is, of course, possible that this could be done by way of a multitude of case studies. However, a special case for broad qualitative surveys is that the point of departure should be the commonly defined aim of democracy: popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality (Beetham 1999). Both the *demos* and public affairs need to be identified in a relatively wide empirical context.

Secondly, broad assessment studies are needed to identify the crucial problems that call for detailed thematic case studies. Moreover, the prioritisation of the cases is particularly important in countries where available knowledge is limited and much information about the processes of democratisation is sought.

It may well be argued that the informants in broad assessment studies might not know enough about ordinary people's difficulties in using and promoting democracy in residential areas and workplaces, and that as a result a number of vital topics for case studies may not be identified (cf. Törnquist with Warouw 2009). However, this is mainly to conclude that explorative ethnographic studies (in fields that we know from comparative experiences tend to be vital) are indispensable foundations in the development of survey questionnaires. Case studies, however, require the a priori identification of the issues and themes that the study of a given case is able to illuminate.

Thirdly, democratisation is multi-dimensional and involves many different actors. Elections or the rule of law may be particularly crucial, but their very existence and qualities are dependent on, for example, freedom and citizen organisations, and vice versa. This does not mean that everything is important

and related. However, there is a need to collect information on all the dimensions that are intrinsic to democracy and democratisation according to relevant theories. For instance, as already indicated when arguing in favour of rather wide definitions of democracy, it may well be vital to focus on assessing the problems of corruption or the challenges of the rule of law and ‘good governance’ more generally. But then it is also crucial to not only discuss whether elected politicians fight or generate corruption – and to say that elections equal democracy. This is, for example, often the case with political economists who have an excellent insight into rent seeking, growth coalitions and more, but not into the definitions and dynamics of democracy (cf. Khan 2005; Winters 2012). In addition, it is thus necessary to also consider the importance of the strengths and weakness of other means of democracy such as interest-based representation and the capacity of critics to keep politicians, bureaucrats and businesspeople accountable.

Lastly, it may be argued that pro-democrats are particularly important and that there should be a focus on their problems and options. However, democratisation is not just about democrats. They should not be analysed separately from other actors and organisations if it is democratisation that we are interested in and not just particular leaders or organisations. Democrats are rarely able to impose democracy on their own (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, Collier 1999). A typical pattern during the third wave of democracy has been that genuine pro-democrats have focused on civil society and extra-parliamentary actions, but have been isolated from broader sections of the population and marginalised in regular politics (cf. Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009). Democracy activists may initiate processes, and they may understand the interests and dynamics of major actors and thus make strategic interventions. However, one typical challenge is to make broader popular movements more interested in citizen-based influence than in making agreements with populist strongmen in order to obtain some welfare. Another challenge is to make non-democrats consider compromise and reform in order to avoid unrelenting conflict. Both cases are difficult to analyse without a sufficiently broad framework to include data and theories that focus on the interactions between democrats and other actors.

Structure of the Book

Given the challenges outlined above, each chapter focuses first and foremost on the generally applicable analytical and operational recommendations. These are followed, then, by illustrations in the form of results gained from the pilot studies undertaken in order to test the recommendations in the largest of the new democracies, Indonesia. (The more practical empirical foundations for the concluding chapter are, however, accounted for in an appendix.) Thus, the chapters are structured as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses what institutions or instruments are intrinsic to fostering the aims of democracy in view of the most important arguments, as well as how they might be assessed.

Chapter 3 introduces the significance of various actors in processes of democratisation as well their politics and policies of democratisation, namely, how they relate at first hand to the means of democracy. How can this be conceptualised and assessed?

Chapter 4 goes beyond institutions and actors by also discussing what aspects of the actors' power and capacity need to be assessed. What theories are most crucial in this respect and how can the arguments be refined to thus enable empirical assessments of the most crucial factors?

Chapter 5 turns to the most difficult task: how to go beyond inclusive assessments of the state of democratisation to also consider the dynamics and transformative politics.

Chapter 6 discusses how it may be possible to contribute to democratisation on the basis of the assessments, without compromising fundamental academic integrity and quality. This calls for supplementary comparative studies.

Chapter 7 concludes the book by summarising the framework for alternative democratisation assessments and then discussing whether and how it is possible at all to implement in practice. The major focus is on the challenge of combining high academic standards with the involvement of students and activists in order to gain access to and gather the best possible information as well as to improve on analyses and discuss them in the public sphere – to not just interpret the challenges but at best also help making a difference.

This chapter now continues by illustrating how alternative assessments of democratisation became important and made possible in the case of Indonesia.

The Case of Indonesia

The Rise and Crisis of Early Democracy

As in many colonies, the first wave of democracy in Indonesia grew out of the struggle against imperialism, racism and indirect rule through local strongmen. Indonesia declared independence in 1945 and after sustained resistance to the Netherlands and its allies, the new sovereign state was internationally recognised in 1949. Initially, the groups that had fought for independence were only represented through elitist negotiations in a liberal parliamentary system; there were periods of anti-communist repression and many cosmopolitan minorities from Asia and Europe had to leave. However, there were also democratic advances in the direction of somewhat equal citizenship, rule of law and justice in addition to freedoms and rights and widespread basic education with a unifying language; elections were in the pipeline. The main problems were increasing corruption, elitist party politics and predominantly clientelist political mobilisation combined with socio-religious and ethnic networks. In fact, it was young communists who built the only reasonably modern and democratic party with roots in popular movements that were based on interests and not just patronage. These leaders opted for a reformist agenda after 1951.

Advances came to a halt after the 1955 national and 1957 local elections. Ironically, there was little wrong with these elections. However, the outcome was a failure for the Western-oriented Socialist Party, and there was a stalemate

between nationalists, communists and traditional and modern-oriented Muslims. In addition, the western Western-oriented elite and the religious parties were afraid that the successful Communist Party (PKI) would be elected. When the PKI rallied behind President Sukarno and some of his local and military leaders, the Nationalist Party too began to lose followers.

Broad Agreement: Democracy Premature

In this context, almost all came to agree that democracy was premature and that the right conditions had to be generated in advance (cf. Bourchier and Legge 1994). On the one hand, liberals, socialists and modernist Muslims advocated market-led development, the rule of law and certain rights and freedoms – but not full scale popular sovereignty. They engaged in an attempted coup and regional protests; ‘their’ Vice President Hatta resigned. On the other hand, President Sukarno along with not only nationalists and communists, but also traditionally oriented Muslims and military officers who supported a unitary state, argued that the liberals, Western socialists and modernist Muslims were a threat to national unity. To counter this, Sukarno and his most committed followers developed a campaign for the ‘liberation’ of West New Guinea, the nationalisation all Dutch properties, plans for land reform and the introduction of ‘Guided Democracy’. Parliament was dissolved and a new was appointed. The elections were postponed and the main dissident parties were outlawed. The constitution was amended in favour of a strong presidency and emergency regulations granted decisive powers to the army (Feith 1962, Lev 1964).

The liberal, socialist and modernist Muslim dissidents tried to respond by way of a Western-supported rebellion from the ‘outer islands’ (Kahin and Kahin 1995, Kahin 1999). This plan failed, however, and the West had to alter its policies. The new Western recipe was to attract the anti-communists among Sukarno’s officers that had defeated the rebels (cf. Pauker 1962). This was part of a new Western strategy based on Samuel Huntington’s idea in the making that there was a need for the rule of law, strong state institutions and ‘politics of order’ ahead of democracy (Huntington 1965). In addition to providing generous support to the military officers, measures included the Western education of economists, administrators and the siblings of the officers in co-operation with US university-based area studies programmes and the Ford Foundation (Ransom 1970). This would later provide legitimacy for Suharto’s mass killings, the ousting of President Sukarno and the subsequent three decades of authoritarian ‘New Order’ – with little rule of law and much abuse of power.

The Old Left and Democracy

Only a few years earlier, however, the communists and the authoritarian but widely supported President Sukarno were still in command of what was probably the largest popular movement in the world. The communists dominated the streets and many village compounds, and might well have been victorious if elections had been held. Strikingly, however, despite being a mass movement for

radical transformation, the PKI failed to uphold the cause of democratisation. This proved devastating. The PKI's argument was that land reform and radical nationalism were a precondition for genuine democracy. The communists themselves thus set aside freedoms and elections, opting instead for Sukarno's military-supported Guided Democracy. Elections were cancelled, liberal opponents were banned and states of emergencies proclaimed as part of the struggle to 'liberate' West New Guinea and fight regional rebellions. The party could not then return to an electoral strategy when many of the officers behind the Guided Democracy turned first against the communists and then against radical popular movements in general. Fledgling democracy could no longer be employed and further developed to prevent politicians, bureaucrats and most importantly the military from using the same radical nationalism that the communists themselves had supported in order to gain control of nationalised property and state apparatus. Nor could rudimentary democracy be used to prevent local strongmen from retaining their appropriation of economic surplus in the agricultural sector as land reform did not undermine their indirect control of land (Törnquist 1984).

The seemingly favourable position of the communists and radical nationalists behind Sukarno was swiftly eroded from the second half of 1965. Within a year, the popular movements and later on Sukarno too were eliminated because a few associated leaders had engaged in the reckless so-called 30th September Movement of dissident officers and political activists aimed at weakening the anticommunist military leadership and giving the Left the upper hand, something which the PKI had failed to do with its mass-based strategy. It is now beyond doubt that even the PKI chairperson, Aidit, a few of his most trusted subordinates and some activists – but not other leaders, party organisations and associated movements – were secretly involved in the conspiracy, thus betraying the mass-based politics of the party. In the event, the army leadership, now under the command of General Suharto, took deliberate advantage of these limited actions by first triggering and then legitimising comprehensive army-led political massacres (of between a half and one million people) and general repression of many more leftists across the country, in other words about the same proportion of the population as during Stalin's purges in the late 1930s, although in this case supported by many of the allegedly liberal and Western-oriented groups as well as governments in the West (Roosa 2006).

The Rise of a New Democracy Movement and the Overthrow of Dictatorship

A few years later, the Indonesian intellectuals and technocrats behind the Huntingtonian solution realised that it was not them but the military leaders and their allies in business and administration that were running the show. This triggered limited yet liberal oriented opposition that ended in riots and repression by January 1974. One outcome was a somewhat wider distribution of the gains of authoritarian-led economic growth beyond the powerful elite and associated national and international businessmen (cf. Winters 1996).

A significant number of scholars and actors agreed, then, that democratisation had been contained. This, they argued, was because economic development had not generated liberal-cum-independent bourgeoisie and middle classes and a substantial working class as an alternative to illiberal cultural traditions and the predominance of neo-patrimonial political leadership (Liddle 1993, Crouch 1994, Robison 1996). Although over the years the West became increasingly engaged in supporting human rights and liberal democracy in southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and parts of Africa, it largely neglected the scattered popular opposition to monopolisation, corruption, collusion, nepotism and expropriation of natural and other resources in Indonesia. It is true that some funding was given to the democracy movements led by students, intellectuals, dissident lawyers and journalists that emerged and developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, these groups were fragmented and elitist. And in the final analysis, the fall of Suharto was just as much due to the collapse of the regime itself as any organised popular opposition.

One reason for the collapse was that the regime had been unable to reform and manage succession. This became obvious with the indiscriminate crack-down on dissidents in mid-1996. Another related reason was the regime's inability to handle the economic crisis in 1997 and 1998. The latter turned into a full-scale political crisis when financial capitalists realised that Suharto's political protection of their special privileges had been undermined by privatisation and deregulation of the market. Soon enough the middle classes and finally also foreign governments and agencies followed suit. Thus, riots (rather than organised revolution) were imminent and an alternative kind of power sharing was inevitable.

Nevertheless, it was only when the students spearheaded popular distrust and anger in May 1998, and when riots began to get out of hand, that the powerful actors finally withdraw their support of Suharto and realised that some democracy was inevitable. In fact, rarely has there been such a massive and rapid shift in favour of fledgling democracy by so many political and state executives, related businesspeople, moderate dissidents and foreign actors. (See, e.g. Törnquist 1997, 2000, Forrester and May 1998, Aspinall et al. 1999, Forrester 1999, Budiman and Törnquist 2001, Aspinall 2005, Lane 2008.)

Parachuting the Crafting of Democracy

The Global third wave of democracy had at last reached Indonesia. The arguments about the need for socioeconomic modernisation, solid political institutions or land reform combined with a strong national economy ahead of democracy had all been proved wrong. By August 1998, the world's experts on the crafting of democracy were parachuted into Jakarta to inform their colleagues and the main political leaders and advisers on what should be done. Joan Lintz and Alfred Stepan's (with Professors Richard Gunther, Donald L. Horowitz and Andrew Reynolds) framework for the crafting of liberal democracy was adopted as the dominant approach (Liddle 2001).

It was all very frank and direct; so not just critics such as the author of this book, but also a more seasoned naysayer, the late Professor Daniel Lev, shook his head in despair as Alfred Stepan responded to suggestions for the use of Indonesian problems as a point of departure and the need to pay more attention to contextual factors beyond the recipes generalised from Spain in particular with the ultimate punch line: ‘we just give you the framework, you fill it in!’ (Törnquist 1979–). (Before proceeding, the reader should aware that when no other references are given in the sections of the chapters on the Indonesian experiences, the sources are based on Törnquist 1979–, i.e. the author’s field notes and personal archives in the form of e-mails and written documents; everything of which can be documented.)

The Quest for an Alternative

The brief moment of silence that followed spoke more than words. Many of those attending adjusted to the idea of merely ‘filling in’ the parachuted framework, but the position of the concerned scholars and activist intellectuals was clear: frameworks are fine but is not this framework biased and little more than a generalisation of experiences from quite different contexts? Moreover, do we have to ‘fill in a framework’ for a moderate pact between incumbents and reformists that would set aside the pro-democrats and the people that precipitated the fall of Suharto? Do we have to ‘fill in a framework’ for merely designing the rules of the game while leaving power relations intact? Do we have to ‘fill in a framework’ for liberal democracy in a country with plural communities, widespread ideas of deliberation and consensus in addition to social democratic oriented ideals from the struggle against Western colonialism? Should we not take the problems we face in Indonesia as a starting point, and then learn from others?’ The follow-up questions were of course: ‘Is there no alternative framework? Is there really nothing else we can do?’ (Törnquist 1979–idem.).

It is true that most scholars and activists submitted to the well-funded crafting of elite-led liberal democracy. And others stated that the oligarchs remained in control and only substituted vote buying for investment in patrimonial patronage, which implied that democracy building ahead of structural change was almost idealistic (Robison and Hadiz 2004). But there was also a middle-of-the-road position. A number of scholars and activists felt that it might be possible to develop a more contextually as well as theoretically inclusive framework for analysing the problems and options of democracy – and to thus use democratisation to foster such structural changes. With that perspective in mind, well-respected activists and scholars established a taskforce that was charged with putting this into practice – one outcome of which was the development and testing of the general recommendations that are now refined in this book.

Uncertainties

However, the development of the broad assessment framework was not the immediate response. Initially there was a period of uncertainty, followed by two

major experiences to draw on. Of these experiences, the first was an analysis of the actors that had opposed the dictatorship and the second a study of the character of and challenges faced by the democracy moment after the fall of Suharto. First, we discuss the period of hesitation and then the formative experiences.

Following the fall of Suharto and the subsequent parachuting of the international model on how to design liberal democracy into Indonesia, a number of scholars and senior activists thus turned their attention to the need to build an alternative framework for analysing and promoting more substantial democratisation.

One of the first suggestions was the need to quickly draft an improved system for popular participation in elections and other channels. However, this suggestion was not given due priority by scholars and activists and thus the idea was lost. On the one hand, many leftists were in favour of popular councils. But that was of course unrealistic. On the other hand, radical liberals were inspired by the United States and Australia and the special role of civil society in particular. They claimed that elitist parties and groups would be best undermined through the direct election of individual candidates. But in view of the Philippine experience of this kind of electoral system in the context of decentralisation, the Indonesian result would most likely be a similar kind of bossism and personality-oriented politics as in the former US colony (Törnquist 1999). These experiences were neglected by foreign donors as well as leading pro-democrats.¹

The political reality, moreover, was that pro-democratic groups had by November 1998 already failed to convince the old supreme representative bodies as well as the quarrelling dissident leaders Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Amien Rais, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Sultan Hamengku Buwono X of the need to foster a less elitist transition to democracy.

Subsequently, the pro-democrats scattered, opting primarily for extra-parliamentary action, the return to civil society work or taking part as individual members of top-down organised parties. With the 1999 elections, most activists had either given up on organised politics or lost out in elections with their own top-down parties or as individual members of mainstream parties (cf. Törnquist 2000, Törnquist et al. 2003).

Tracing the Dynamics of the Anti-Suharto Pro-democracy Actors

Indonesia remained, however, on the brink. There was a desperate need for the pro-democrats in particular to map the situation and assess the problems and options. In response to these conditions, a group of concerned academics, human rights and media activists got together in an attempt to do something.

The first step was to finalise a book on democracy oriented political actors beyond the general development of various middle-class civil society groups that had been initiated in 1994, prior to the fall of Suharto (Budiman and Törnquist 2001). As mentioned in the preface, this study grew out of a critique of a major trend among Indonesian dissidents at the time, often spearheaded by the main legal aid organisation, the YLBHI, supported by foreign donors. While these argued that the expansion of civil society would almost by definition foster

democracy, the critics (including dissident professor Ariel Budiman and the author) suggested otherwise. They contended that there was also a need for organised and unifying actors who would be able to mobilise a greater number of people than the narrow liberal civil society groups could do on their own. In response, the then head of the YBHI, Adnan Buyung Nasution, asked Budiman and the author to carry out a study of democratic actors.

Although the research was initiated in 1994, it was immediately waylaid, first by the suppression of freedom of speech and academic rights later in the year (including a crackdown on the press and the dismissal of Budiman and others from Satya Wacana University in Salatiga, Central Java); secondly, as it became increasingly clear in 1996 that there was a potential to oust Suharto and the New Order regime.

The latter course of events provided a major organisational lesson: it is not easy to do research with reflective activists and journalists who need to adjust to constantly changing political developments. However, as compared to the subordinated academic community, committed journalists and reflective activists were well placed to mobilise the best sources as well as drafting case studies. The main problem, then, was the nature of co-operation in the team between the activists and journalists, on the one hand, and the academically trained analysts and editors, on the other hand. One of the main conclusions from this experience was the need for firm senior level direction.

The delayed study nevertheless contributed to the understanding of what actors had enabled the student uprising against Suharto in 1998 and the rapid yet limited democratisation. The research focused on seven movements and the actors that were crucial to the democratisation processes in Indonesia during the late 1980s and 1990s. First, the extensive local protests against the construction of a huge dam in central Java (Kedung Ombo) that also attracted widespread political action from students and other activists in the neighbouring university cities of Yogyakarta and Salatiga. Second, the emerging protests against Suharto within observant Muslim communities such as the land dispute over another dam construction project in Nipah, Madura, an island off Surabaya, East Java. Third, the rise of class-based trade unions and political protest by labourers, such as the extensive strikes in Medan in North Sumatra. Fourth, the closing down of the moderately dissident news magazines *Tempo*, *DeTik* and *Editor*, where most journalists were radicalised and became influential democrats. Fifth, the Papuans who fought the exploitation of their land and rights by foreign companies. Sixth, the crackdown on dissidents who joined celebrity dissident and daughter of President Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri's party, the PDI-P, which testified to the regime's inability to accommodate any critique. Seventh, attempts by Muslim and nationalist politicians in Central Java to form a united front against Suharto's Golkar Party.

The study concluded that it was the occasional combination of otherwise quite divisive citizen action groups and more traditional movements and leaders behind antiauthoritarian and generally democratic demands that made a difference. Political action grew out of various socioeconomic and political grievances and protest against repression. As the growth of capitalism was intertwined with

the state, a major yet often unspecified demand was democracy. However, the only movements that survived were those that organised in a structured and democratically oriented way beyond celebrated and often traditional leaders as well as loose networks. Yet even the most advanced actors rarely defined the actually existing pro-democracy positions. So the movement remained scattered. In one respect, however, the positions converged and boiled down to something very important – to an agreement on the need to alter the dictatorial regime and to foster human rights-based political democracy as a precondition for further advances in the rule of law, freedom of the press, more human development and so forth. In other words, the activists agreed that democratisation had to come first, not stable institutions, development or socialism.

Mapping and Analysing the Post-Suharto Democracy Movement

The most advanced democracy groups thus failed to build a broad and well-organised movement even as Suharto lost power and was forced to stand down. As a consequence, the second major attempt at research-based democracy promotion was a qualitative survey of the scattered democracy movement. This was followed up by some 40 thematic reviews and case studies of experiences, problems and options (Prasetyo et al. 2003).²

To qualify as a pro-democrat in the survey, the key informants in the form of reputed and generally accepted activists had to agree that the actor in question was both producing and consuming democracy, not just consuming and of course not abusing or avoiding democracy.

The approach was inspired by the way in which the popular education movement in the Indian state of Kerala had managed a few years earlier to mobilise and guide reflective and often well-educated activists in telling the story of their attempts at alternative development policies at central as well as local level. With some scholarly guidance, these activists (often local school teachers and retired public servants) had analysed the problems and options and then convened, discussed and agreed on a powerful joint agenda that caught people's imagination and gained political importance.

The extensive book based on the qualitative survey and case studies may have been unique in terms of the combination of, on the one hand, basic academic supervision and editing, and, on the other hand, the engagement of the activists themselves with the best access to good sources (Prasetyo et al. 2003). With this we took yet another step away from the conventional forms of research co-operation where scholars (often from other countries) commission local data collection, on the basis of which the scholar make the final analysis and publish internationally. In the mapping and analysis of the post-Suharto democracy movement, senior researchers did write some general analyses and provided direction, comments and helped this author with the final quality control, supplemented by professional editing. But investigative journalists, young local researchers and in several cases educated activists themselves researched most of the case studies, from data collection through to the first analyses until the provision of comments on the final versions. Most encouraging, the data were often unique, the scope of the

review was outstanding, the standard was sufficiently good, and the conclusions were reliable.

Politically, however, these same conclusions were discouraging. Following the broad general unity against the dictatorship, it was obvious that the movement had not been able to come together behind a clear-cut alternative. Some leaders and groups opted instead for linking up with the traditional politicians and largely became co-opted. Others decided to hold on to principled civil society work in usually quite scattered and single-issue-oriented groups, often held together by a specific project; often with foreign funding. The situation was best illustrated by the title of the summary analysis: 'floating democrats' (Törnquist et al. 2003). While ordinary people under Suharto had been prohibited from independent organising to be thus constituted as a 'floating mass' that would not undermine authoritarian economic growth, it was now the dissident groups that were 'floating' by being active and engaged, and yet confined to civil society, politically marginalised and isolated from the wider popular concerns and social movements.

Surveying Democracy from Below

There were two possible policy conclusions on the part of the democrats: to strengthen the groups and the movement itself, by primarily working from outside organised politics that had been captured by the powerful elite, and to try to take part in and compete with the elite and improve the fledgling democratic system. The scholars and activists involved discussed the matter at a conference in early 2002.³ Most of the participants opted for the latter position and entrusted a taskforce to move forward in the first instance by undertaking further research on the problems and options of further democratisation. The organisers included the most widely respected human rights activist, a leading investigative journalist and media educator, a former general secretary of the national human rights commission and a major religious reconciliation theorist also active in party politics – the late Munir Said Thalib, Stanley Adi Prasetyo, the late Asmara Nababan and the late Th. Sumartana. But unfortunately, nobody was aboard from the scattered and poorly developed mass organisations among workers and farmers. The author was associated as an academic advisor.

This position of fostering the fledgling democracy by way of concerned research called for studies of the problems and options of improved democratisation as part of the entire political system. In other words, it was necessary to map and assess the dynamics of Indonesian democracy far beyond the pro-democrats themselves, their movements and sympathisers as well as their own fields and places of activity. As indicated in the general recommendations in the first part of the chapter, it is necessary to take democracy and the process of democratisation at large as a point of departure in order to thus conduct a broad assessment study.

The only question was how this would be done analytically and operationally. In terms of implementation, two countrywide comprehensive qualitative expert surveys of Indonesia's problems and options of democratisation were carried

out between 2002 and 2008. The studies were made in co-operation between international and national scholars, local activist researchers, leading democracy groups and, in each of the qualitative surveys, about 900 experienced and reflective democracy activists from various sectors of democratisation work and most of the administrative provinces. There were also articles and books published and a number of other follow-up activities. At the time of concluding the book, a third qualitative survey is about to be carried out along the same lines but with a more solid academic base at the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta and supplemented with a series of thematic studies.

These activities called for international comparative studies of theoretical and empirical results in addition to the extensive analytical and practical work in Indonesia. The combined insights constitute the basis for the remaining chapters in the book. Chapters 2–6 focus on generally valid recommendations and empirical Indonesian illustrations with an emphasis on the theoretical and analytical issues. In the final chapter 7, thereafter, we shall return to the equally mounting challenges of combining academic principles and pro-democratic priorities and practices in mobilising resources, organising the team, collecting the information, developing conclusions, disseminating them and ensuring their relevance to pro-democratic efforts; but in this case, the more practical empirical foundations for the recommendations are in an appendix.

CHAPTER 2

THE INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Inclusive Assessments of Institutions

This book argues that four dimensions must be considered in critical assessments of democratisation: the institutional means of democracy (the ‘rules of the game’), the most important actors’ relation to these institutions, the actors’ political capacity (power) and the dynamics of democratic politics. We will return to the latter three dimensions in the following chapters and focus here on the assessment of the institutional means of democracy.

Points of Departure

It is useful to proceed from the analytical perspective that has hitherto proved most productive and gained wide acceptance, that of David Beetham (1999) and his colleagues (2002, 2008). Their definition of the aim of democracy on the level of political philosophy as popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality has been widely accepted by both scholars and activists. This helps to avoid sterile conceptual debates and enables a focus on the basic disagreements over the extension of democracy, as elaborated upon in chapter 1. Most importantly, the perspective paves the way for a separation between the aim and means of democracy, thus allowing for assessments of the substance of substantial democratisation, and not merely the procedures.

What is needed in order to reach the aim of democracy? First, a number of crucial principles or norms are defined, namely, participation, authorisation of representatives and executives, representation of opinions and social groups, governments’ responsiveness to voters and public opinion, accountability, transparency, and human, national and international solidarity. Secondly, what institutions (in terms of rules and regulations) are necessary in order to make these principles real?

The logic of separating the aims and means enables clear-cut designed assessments by asking to what extent the actually existing institutions really promote the principles and thus the aim of democracy. It also enables the identification

of those elements of democracy that are universal and those that are contextual. This is important because the specific rules and regulations around the world vary. Free and fair elections, for example, may be universally valid intrinsic institutions, but there are many kinds of electoral systems and related regulations, and their outcomes vary with a number of other institutions and contextual factors. The same applies to sweeping qualifiers such as formal, electoral, illiberal or oligarchic democracies. In this case, it is possible to focus instead on the levels or degrees of democratisation in a more disaggregated and specific way. It is similarly possible to discuss minimal or extensive democracy in terms of the constitution of public affairs and the scope and spread of the institutions. It remains necessary, however, to also discuss what institutions are deemed to be intrinsic, a matter we shall return to. Suffice to say here, that the Beetham inspired schemas are closely related to the liberal model of democracy and thus require expansion.

Beetham's List of Institutions

What institutions are necessary, then, for fostering participation, authorisation of representatives and executives, representation, responsiveness, accountability, transparency and solidarity – and thus popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality? Beetham et al. (2002, 2008) make a long list of more than 80 categories of rules and regulations. These are closely related to the common institutions in well-developed liberal democracies. They summarise their list in terms of institutions to promote: (1) citizenship, law and rights, which basically includes nationhood and citizenship without discrimination; the rule of law, and access to justice and civil, political, economic and social rights; (2) representative and accountable government, in which they include free and fair elections; democratic political parties; effective and responsive government; democratically effective parliament; civilian control of the military and police and trustworthiness of public officials; (3) civil society and popular participation with free and democratic media, full citizen participation in public life and decentralisation to the most appropriate level of governance for people affected and (4) democracy beyond the state in terms of democratically supportive external influences through the UN system in particular and the assessed country's own support for the same system.

Problems and Additions

The arguments in favour of the importance of these kinds of institutions are convincing and thus constitute a good point of departure. Yet, five revisions and additions are needed.

The Constitution of Public Affairs and the Demos

The first relates to the extension of democracy and has been touched on in chapter 1. In the Global North, it may perhaps be assumed that state building has been concluded and that there are generally accepted definitions of the *demos* within the mainstream political system. However, privatisation,

outsourcing and other forms of new public management in addition to networks, partial self-management in civil society as well as globalisation – often labelled polycentrism and multi-level governance – have complicated the picture. It is increasingly difficult for both individuals and researchers to understand who decides what and who is responsible. The dense webs of territories, issues, principals and agents are often blurred and non-transparent.

These are sensitive issues. Advocates of, for example, direct participation and individual self-representation and empowerment often turn against ‘too-much’ state, popular movements and ‘old’ representative democracy. They argue instead for legal frameworks and citizen-rights-based democracy; they do this both with regard to local communities and specific interests and ideas that are not bound to any particular local or national political territory. There is much to this, but there are also dilemmas. The complications and conflicts related to migrants, faith and ethnicity may also be added. In more abstract terms, it becomes increasingly difficult to know who are the people and their representatives that are supposed to control what particular public affairs. If it is not possible to specify what people have the right to control what public affairs, then the very basics of democracy are at stake.

This is even more serious in the Global South because here the same problems as in the North are combined with even more explicit identity politics, as well as with clan and communal governance.

Before turning to the operational aspects, it is also necessary to discuss the very concept of public affairs and the *demos*. The understanding of public affairs is fairly uncomplicated, although it is crucial to acknowledge that what people may deem to be issues of common concern may not, of course, be formally/legally accepted as public affairs. Sometimes many people may even prefer that issues that they would ideally like to be handled publicly are taken care of by a faith or ethnic community, a clan or a neighbourhood group or even a private company – as there is simply very little trust in public institutions. In any case, the point of departure for an assessment of the substance of democratisation should be what most people deem to be matters of common concern, after which one precedes with studies of what people, what *demos*, are in control.

The concept of the *demos* is more complicated. First, the construction of the *demos* is not *only* about more or less political equality among people with the right to decide; in essence, it is more about the very definition of who shall be regarded as equals with respect to politics.

Furthermore, as touched on in chapter 1, the *demos* are not the same as the citizens. The *demos* are the people who have the right to decide about public affairs. These people are usually citizens, but they need not be. This is irrespective of whether citizens are defined ethnically (as in the German tradition) or as members of a state or local political commune (as in the French tradition). In several countries, a permanent resident may, for example, be part of the *demos* in the local municipality and have the same right to participate in various forms of sectoral public governance as the citizens. Moreover, not all citizens are part of the *demos*. In many countries where some democratisation evolves, women may not have the same right to decide about public matters as men. Similarly, the *demos*

may be segmented into various ethnic and faith groups, such as in Lebanon. (For a fine review, see Maktabi [2012].)

Moreover, one needs to study not just the substance and comprehensiveness of the rights of the *demos* but also those of the citizens (classical texts include not only Marshall [1950] and [1977] but also, more recently, e.g. Anderson [1983], Mamdani [1996] and Chatterjee [2004]). We shall return to the issue of more or less substantive and equal citizenship rights (beyond the right to claim a passport), because that certainly affects the substance of democratisation too. However, first we need to ask who belong to the *demos*; what *actual* right to decide these people have that others do not. Because without clearly defined *demos* and public affairs, there is no democracy. Thereafter, one adds the importance of citizenship and a number of other institutions.

There is thus a fundamental need to design assessments of democratisation in ways that make it possible to analyse these conflicts in an unbiased way. From the outset, it is necessary to look into the construction of public affairs and the *demos*. When this has been done, the substance and comprehensiveness of democratisation must be assessed without taking the status quo for granted, especially given the fact that this state of affairs has often been shaped under undemocratic regimes. In deciding what is to be identified as public affairs (in an assessment of the extent to which these affairs are controlled by the *demos* on the basis of political equality), it is, in other words, unacceptable to take the ruling elite's definitions for granted. Such definitions may, for instance, be closely related to official territorial divides or be in favour of privatisation. The same applies to the democracy activists' perspectives as they often focus on specific issues or a local community; a focus that by definition tends to support polycentrism.

It is necessary, then, to initiate the assessment in such wide contexts that they are concurrent with the politically conflictual development of what is defined as public affairs and *demos*. It is useful to start with regions or districts that stand out as the main political territories and arenas. But thereafter, the historical development of the *demos* and public affairs must also be taken into account. Moreover, there is a need for critical questions about what external institutions, political fields and power relations tend to condition the immediate dynamics where people live and work and have the chance to take part in politics.

The key questions, then, are not only (1) what are the official public affairs in the crucial political territories and arenas; but also (2) what topics do the informants think are of general interest in their political context and (3) what additional issues and processes beyond the local sphere do they think are necessary to engage in to control these matters.

For the latter purposes, there should ideally be a supplementary qualitative survey (and preferably also a separate quantitative survey) of what most people in the area deem to be matters of common concern in their daily work, social relations, demands and actions.

Equally important, there should be similar surveys to find out what external issues and processes must also be considered. This is because a number of external factors obviously condition local decisions. Two examples are central-level labour or agricultural policies and the granting of concessions to logging

companies. In short, what affairs do people hold to be of general interest and what additional issues and processes beyond the immediate context do these people also have to engage to be able to control these affairs?

If such studies are unrealistic, however, focus group discussions may be combined with questions to informants. The first type of question concerns the informants' own views and experiences; the second concerns their informed appraisal of what people in the area would say.

In both cases, the informants should also be asked follow-up questions such as what matters are given priority to and how in their own and others' local social and political work. This is necessary in order to thereafter get an understanding of the extent to which the issues deemed to be of common concern are formally public or privatised or handled through, for instance, various citizen or communal organisations.

This brings us to the issue of how to identify and assess the more or less democratic character of the *demoi*. In this regard, too, it is important not to take existing definitions for granted even if they must of course be recorded. Rather one needs to cast the net wide enough to also understand how individuals and groups have come to constitute communities that imagine they have a number of affairs in common and should be deemed as public, beyond private family, religious or business lives.

The key questions are thus not only (1) what are the officially constituted *demoi* (in plural) in the crucial political territories and arenas; (2) but also what people individuals in the area feel they have non-private matters in common with; (3) what people they tend to work and unite with in such regard – including crucial individuals and groups outside the localities and (4) if people know what *demoi* has the right to control what public affairs – who are the principals and agents?

Ideally, in this case too, there should be supplementary surveys to find out about the non-formalised *demoi*. Yet again, it may be necessary to rely on focus group discussions and questions to the informants about their own views and practices, as well as what they know about others.

In conclusion, we must be able to assess democratisation in such broad contexts that they are concurrent with the public affairs and the *demoi*, primarily defined in the ways just indicated. As a point of departure, it is possible to focus on the local political units where most crucial issues that are deemed to be public are managed and debated, and where most people concerned also live and work. Thereafter, one may add the central-level institutions and the fluent thematic or interregional and international political fields that condition what can be decided with regard to specific issues in the local context.

Lastly, how does one analyse what is more or less democratic with regard to the public affairs and *demoi*? What are the measures? There are two major benchmarks.

The first is that, ideally, the constitution of public affairs and *demoi* must not be politically enforced and not distorted by ethnic or religious loyalties. To do so would run against the most crucial principles of democratisation – that individuals and groups try to constitute themselves as a *demoi* on the basis of shared understanding of what matters they have in common, as well as a growing

Box 2.1 About demos and public affairs

- What are the official public affairs in the formalised political territories and arenas?
- What topics do informants and people in these contexts deem to be of general interest?
- What additional issues and processes do they think are also necessary to engage in, in order to control the local matters?
- What matters are given priority to and how in the informants' (and others') own social and political work?
- What are the officially constituted *demos* in the established political territories and arenas?
- What individuals and groups in the wider context feel that they have non-private matters in common with each other?
- What people tend to work and unite in such regards – including crucial individuals and groups outside the localities?
- Do people tend to know which *demos* has the right to control what public affairs in their political territories and sectoral and other fields, and who are the principals and agents?

recognition of the principle of political equality. Yet it should be borne in mind that ethnic and religious identities may be combined with the idea of political equality, as in the movements for civil rights in South Africa and in parts of the anti-caste struggles in India (cf. Tharakan 1988).

The shaping of public affairs and *demos* around the world certainly tends not to have been particularly democratic, especially in the processes of state building. Yet what matters most is the extent to which the *current* definition of public affairs and the *demos* are guided by the principles of political equality, and what dynamics are at work.

The other benchmark is that for a democracy to develop and exist there must be clear and transparent definitions of what *demos* have the right to control what public affairs. This may seem quite obvious and uncomplicated, but it is not. Even in supposedly well-developed democracies, as already mentioned, multi-level and network-based governance is obscure and undermines the essence of democracy. In the Global South, the situation is even more challenging.

Quality but also Comprehensiveness

Now to the second type of improvement in the analysis of institutional means of democracy. While most assessments discuss whether these institutions exist, and the best assessments also consider if the institutions are functional and generate the expected outcome – which is fine and necessary – more attention must also be given to how comprehensive they are. For example, what is the scope of the institutions that are supposed to foster gender equality? Is domestic violence a public or only private concern, and are the rules and regulations implemented?

The same applies to whether the rules and regulations are spread and present among all people or only some. Do they apply beyond the middle classes? In addition, are they enforced around the country or only in the cities?

In the same way, it is necessary to consider more clearly whether and how the rules and regulations are formal or informal. Democracy calls for clear and unambiguous rules, so formal rules tend to be preferable and should not be confused with formalities. This is to prevent the strongest from dominating everything from meetings and organisations to governments and elections. The strongest may, of course, also dominate formal institutions, but there are often better chances for the subordinated to fight for improved formal rules and regulations by democratic means. By contrast, if rules are informal or even missing, it is more likely that muscles will be needed to make a difference. However, formal democratic rules tend not to work well if they are imposed rather than grounded in collective agreements and practices. This is how democratically oriented informal practices and values have been vital in processes of democratisation.

There are two major practices involved. The first refers to the various ways in which politics and democratisation occurs through a number of interest-based organisations and civil society organisations. These organisations sometimes co-operate with central and local government and state institutions or by way of consultations that they arrange. However, there are also direct forms of citizen self-representation in public governance. All these more or less institutionalised practices of generally speaking extra-parliamentary democracy are becoming increasingly important given the universal reduction of what is deemed public affairs, increasing multilevel governance and the fragmentation of the channels of influence and the *demos*. Needless to say, therefore, analysts must include them in studies of democratisation, and we will soon suggest that special attention should be paid to rights-based citizen participation in public governance and institutionalised channels for interest and issue-based representation.

The second practice relates to the level of formalisation of institutions. In other words, it is necessary to pay special attention to whether or not these and also other institutions are more or less formalised. In fact, a number of important practices are informal. One example is the kind of 'hidden forms of resistance' with roots in local culture that James Scott (1985, 1990) has studied. Another example is how much of the low-caste and religious-based struggle against dominant caste rule in south India paved the way for democratisation. Interestingly, this seems to have been due to the combination of efforts at socio-religious reform and the struggle for equal civil rights, land reform and general welfare policies rather than demands for particularistic special favours (cf. Tharakan 1998). A third example is that some (but far from all) customary laws that have been drawn upon in resistance to state-supported primitive accumulation in Indonesia have fostered democratic change and peace building depending on contextual factors (cf. Davidson and Henley 2007).

So, just as when assessing the democratic substance of formal institutions such as those concerned with rights, justice, elections, parties and impartial implementation of decisions, the study of less official and more informal institutions has to focus on whether and how they really contribute to democratisation.

Democratic Capacity of Governments

A third addition the conventional assessments of institutional means of democracy relates to the output side of democracy. We will return to the dynamics of politics and policies, but at the level of institutions it is necessary to add questions about the capacity of the political system to implement decisions in non-corrupt ways. Democracy is not just about decisions based on political equality but also impartial implementation. In *this* respect, there is a need for sufficient state capacity (cf. Rothstein 2005, Rothstein and Teorell 2005). This is certainly not with regard to all aspects of state capacity but in relation to the implementation of decisions that are crucial for democratisation.

Impartial implementation has not been sufficiently well covered in the Beetham-based assessment schemes. It is true that the output side of democracy is considered indirectly in terms of the quality of the institutions. However, the institutions that are being assessed are mainly concerned with fostering popular control and political equality with regard to speech and discussions, the generation of laws, rights, political decisions and activities in civil society and not, for instance, the implementation of social and economic policies.

Implementation and impartiality are, however, not the same as the outcome or effect of democracy. It is true that the latter is also important in alternative assessments as long as it has a vital bearing on the standard and development of democracy. However, we will return to this dimension in chapter 5 on the dynamics of democratic politics, because the issues at stake here are implementation and impartiality.

For state capacity to be democratic, decisions must certainly be democratic. Effective rule of laws that are undemocratic do not make capacity democratic. However, if a democratic decision about freedom of speech or land or health reform or an unemployment scheme, for example, is not implemented, democracy is not real but a formality. It is also not democratic if state officials distort a decision to grant everyone freedom of speech or to provide all share-croppers with proper tenancy certificates, by only allowing some to speak and only giving certificates to a few. This, moreover, is not only about the corruption and accountability that tend to be emphasised by the UNDP and the World Bank, but also about insufficient political will and state capacity to really foster impartial implementation of, for example, welfare reforms in a country or district at large. And both will and state capacity tend to rest with political representation of groups and interests in favour of these priorities, in addition to trust in strong public institutions. Finally, however, to repeat, the assessment of state capacity is of course to be restricted to the implementation of decisions with crucial importance for democratisation.

Beyond Liberal-democratic Institutions

A fourth subject of concern in assessments of the instruments of democracy is whether Beetham's conceptual basis in Western political philosophy and related normative reasoning means that the assessment schemes he has inspired are less suitable in the Global South. There is widespread support for his substantive rather than procedural definition of democracy. This, in turn, is a

precondition for the identification of the norms and principles in the liberal democratic model as well as the institutions and practices for attaining these aims. However, it remains a valid objection that Beetham's list of institutions is limited to the liberal model. Additional institutions related to, for example, models of social and direct democracy should also be considered. This includes rules and regulations for interest and issue-based representation, direct participation and deliberation.

Realistic Number of Intrinsic Institutions

The final problem with even the best assessments of the institutional means of democracy is about time, space and realism. Given that a number of crucial dimensions have been added to Bentham's list of about 80 institutional arrangements, that supplementary means of democracy have also been added and that more will come in the following chapters, it is increasingly important to reduce the number of the rules and regulations that he has listed. The recommendation is therefore to include the dimensions mentioned above that go beyond the key liberal ones, while reducing the number of universal institutions that are necessary for fostering different versions of democracy. It would be possible to specify critical contextual aspects of these institutions thereafter.

Such a reduced list may include 13 clusters of rules and regulations that, most importantly, remain to be detailed in each context. The criteria for selection are that the institutions are both logically necessary for fostering the aim and principles of democracy and have been proven empirically to be crucial in processes of democratisation. (For more specific arguments and further sources, see at first hand Beetham et al. 2002, 2008.)

The Thirteen Sets of Intrinsic Institutions

The task is to thus assess the substance and comprehensiveness of contextual formal and informal versions of the following thirteen set of institutions.

First, the institutions to promote equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well-defined public affairs. This is to follow up on the initial analysis of the political constitution and definition of the *demos* in terms of those who have the right to control public affairs by looking at the additional importance of citizenship that only partially overlaps with the constitution of the *demos*, as already discussed in the beginning of the chapter. It is important to assess the character of citizenship, including questions about its ethnic or political-residential roots and who are, then, more or less full citizens with various rights. Given migration and identity politics, this is a sensitive issue within countries as well as internationally. It is also crucial to assess the quality of citizenship beyond the right to a passport, for instance, with regard to gender and social and economic entitlements and status.

Secondly, the rule of law. Democracy is the popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality – which calls for constitutional regulations in accordance with law. Governance according to law is necessary to both guarantee political equality and to acknowledge previous laws that have been democratically decided or accepted. These specifications are crucial as there may be a rule of

law within authoritarian systems too, where laws are decided in non-democratic ways. Similarly, the judiciary must be politically independent to be able to abide by existing laws only: thus, it may not interpret these laws in such a way that it de facto substitutes for the popularly elected legislators or support a politically partisan interpretation of the law.

The rule of law also has a wider dimension in terms of governance that is in line with International law and UN conventions. With the increasingly importance of globalisation, it is an illusion that people can be in full control of public affairs within their own borders. International law and the UN system do not provide sufficient instruments for fostering democracy on an international level as well as supporting and sustaining it behind national borders, yet they are the only generally accepted ones.

Third, equal justice. For democracies to develop and survive, laws and the system of justice must apply universally, and with the same opportunities for all. This is irrespective of whether they are citizens or not, rich or poor, men or women, have a particular faith or none at all, or a certain ethnic identity.

The fourth set of institutions refers to the enjoyment of full universal human rights, thus including not just the civil and political but also social, economic and cultural rights. Equal citizen and political rights (including the freedom of expression, freedom to organise and engage in trade union work) are generally accepted as being intrinsic to democracy. However, social, economic and cultural rights (including basic needs and education on human rights and democracy) must also be included as it cannot be taken for granted that all are citizens, that men and women are equal and that even all of those who are citizens can survive and have the chance to function as politically equal human beings. This is to proceed beyond the liberal position about equal opportunities in order to also consider the arguments of leftist liberals and social democrats that democratisation must, in addition to human rights, include the enhancement of the social capacity of the underprivileged. Otherwise, the opportunities available to them are neither fair nor just.

Fifth, democratic political representation in central and local government through parties and elections. Democratic representation (which we will discuss in more detail in chapters 4 and 5) may without any major disagreement be defined as aiming at popular control of public affairs, rooted in clear definitions of the *demos* and public affairs and based on political equality – and calling thus for the authorisation of representatives with a mandate and the obligation to be accountable, transparent and responsive.

Sixth, the set of institutions that legally guarantee citizen's rights to participation in local and central government as well as in the implementation of government decisions. This may be in the form of direct as well as indirect representation. It may also not just cover matters that affect the individual citizen (such as the planning of a local residential area) but also issues of common concern (such as more general environmental issues).

The seventh cluster of rules and regulations relates to the social democratic-oriented tradition of providing democratic channels for interest and issue-based representation in local and central government, and the implementation of

government decisions. These arrangements are thus in addition to the system of individual citizens' legally guaranteed participatory rights and may be seen as supplementary aspects of the political system. In the Scandinavian tradition, for example, such channels of representation have been particularly important for trade unions and employers associations as well as a full range of other issue and interest organisation (Esping-Andersen 1985, Rothstein 1999, Trägårdh 2007). These channels are typically set up as complements to the liberal democratic system of elections, public discourse and lobbying. More recent yet similar forms of supplementary democratic representation have most famously been developed in Brazil and Kerala with regard to budgeting and planning, as well as in the form of councils on public health and housing (Isaac and Franke 2000, Heller 2001, Schönleitner 2004, Tharakan 2004, Törnquist 2004, Heller et al. 2007, Törnquist et al. 2009a, Baiocchi et al. 2013).

The eighth set of institutions includes those that foster democratic government that is as close to the people as possible by way of geographical and sectoral decentralisation. However, since resources tend to be unevenly spread between various parts of a country, since economic and political power is often centralised, and since people must be free to travel, work and live in various places, there are several challenges to be faced. Therefore, to make local democracy real, there must also be institutions that combine decentralisation with democratic influence on other levels. In other words, there must be linkages between the central and the local. Similarly, there must be connections between democracy in geographical territories such as an entire country or a municipality and the many sectors such as those dealing with labour rights or financial transactions. Such sectors tend to become fiefdoms of political favourites and experts, or to be de facto privatised (see Dellnäs and Öjendal [2013] for a review).

Ninth, democratic control of the instruments of coercion. The relationship is clear when it comes to control of the police and the military, but it must also include the increasing number of private forces, with reference to not only militias and gangster groups, but also the various security companies and the diverse purposes for which they are engaged and deployed. Much of the more sensitive and 'dirty' repression has been subcontracted and privatised (Mietzner 2009).

The tenth set of institutions is also self-explanatory, yet complicated: transparent, impartial and accountable public governance. Democracy presupposes free access to all information that politically equal citizens need in order to control public affairs. (Even if sometimes such free access may be only for democratic representatives to thus avoid undermining human rights.) Similarly, governance must be impartial in order not to distort democratic decisions, which, in addition to transparency, calls for accountability. Accountability is complicated. The politicians themselves must be able to ensure that their decisions are implemented as intended. However, since politicians are often partisan, even when decisions have been taken, and since politicians are also among the least trusted public actors in the world, accountability may also be arranged horizontally on the basis of rules (such as by independent colleagues and separate auditing units) and professionalism (such as within universities) (Rothstein and Teorell 2005). Moreover, there

may be additional forms of vertical accountability through the participation of users and individual stakeholders as well as interest and issue-based representation (Warren 2004, 2005).

The eleventh cluster of rules and regulations fosters a government's capacity to make its own decisions and implement them effectively and impartially. In essence, this is about independence from foreign powers and private companies so as to avoid what has been labelled choiceless democracy (Makandawire 1999). However, it is also about state capacity in more general terms. State capacity, moreover, is not only about strong institutions but also (and possibly primarily) about the ability to reach out and co-operate (Migdal et al. 1994, Nordhaug and Sundstøl-Eriksen 2006). For public institutions to implement a democratic decision to, for example, establish unbiased employment exchange bureaus, the most effective method may be to do so in equal co-operation with both employers' organisations and the trade unions. To foster sports activities among the youth, the government may decide to provide grants to athletic clubs on the condition that all are welcome to their stadia and that some of the grant provides subsidies for buying expensive equipment so that anyone who is interested can take part. Such approaches may well go against the idea of liberal democracy for the need to separate between state and civil society, but must not by definition be discarded as undemocratic given that they have been crucial in successful social democratic projects in particular (Trägårdh 2007).

Twelfth, freedom of public discourse, culture and academia. There will be no democratisation without free dialogue and independent and critical search for the best possible knowledge. Yet this freedom must be combined with equal opportunities for accessing the media, academies and so forth; otherwise the

Box 2.2 The intrinsic institutional means of democracy

1. Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well-defined public affairs
2. Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)
3. Equal justice
4. Full universal human rights (including basic needs)
5. Democratic political representation through parties and elections
6. Rights-based citizen participation in public governance
7. Institutionalised channels for interest and issue-based representation
8. Local democracy made real in combination with relevant influence at other levels
9. Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private forces)
10. Transparent, impartial and accountable governance
11. Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them
12. Freedom of and equal chances to access public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights
13. Citizens' democratic self-organising

freedom remains a formality. If the media is free from state control but subject to narrow commercial criteria and at worst monopolised by a few private actors, then public discourse may undermine freedom of speech in particular and democracy in general. Conversely, if whatever free discourse such as agitation against immigrants or Muslims undermines the actual freedom of these people, it is contradictory and represents a threat against human rights.

The thirteenth and final set of democratically intrinsic institutions refers to those that guarantee citizens' democratic self-organising. This is on the basis of the right to the freedom of association, but there is also a special need in democratisation to encourage and facilitate citizens' own democratic associations and collective self-management. Such organisations may serve as the best schools and training grounds of democracy. They may be developed as citizen-based alternatives to market as well as public government solutions when people deem these to be insufficient or unsatisfactory.

Indonesia's Liberal Turnabout

The number of questions asked in the Indonesian qualitative surveys (2003–2004 and 2007–2008) about the standard of the supposedly pro-democratic institutions was enormous, covering diverse aspects of almost 40 sets of rules and regulations. The patience of the informants was as impressive as the information was overwhelming. So a basic lesson was the need to be more concise and avoid overlaps. Additional insights include the need for better focus on what constitutes public affairs and the *demos*, the government's capacity to implement decisions and the vital institutions beyond liberal democracy.

In spite of these and many other teething troubles, however, it was possible to draw a number of conclusions that challenge the established truth (Priyono et al. 2007, Samadhi and Warouw 2009). Here we will focus on the institutions and return in following chapters to look at the actors, the relevant relations of power and the political dynamics.

Impressive though Deteriorating Freedoms

One of the most remarkable conclusions from the first qualitative survey (2003–2004) was that the critical democracy activists that served as informants reported substantial advances with regard to civil and political freedoms, including in the media and civil society. This applied almost everywhere in Indonesia, except for Aceh and Papua. After more than three decades of authoritarianism and much emphasis on the supposedly deeply entrenched 'Asian values', Indonesia stood out as the beacon of freedom in Southeast Asia. This was also confirmed by other scholars (e.g. McIntyre and Ramage 2008, Aspinall 2010, Diamond 2010). Moreover, the general standard of the freedoms was outstanding as compared to the other institutional dimensions of democracy.

Four years later, by 2007, most rights were still upheld to some basic degree. But as in many other new democracies, assessments became less favourable (cf. Grugel 2002, Carothers 2004, Levitsky and Way 2012). The less positive results related

to party building and participation in elections as well as the freedoms of religion, belief, language and culture, in addition to those of speech, assembly and organisation. Similarly, freedoms had also been reduced in relation to the press, the arts, the academic world and civil society.

Some of the less positive assessments may well be due to frustration with the pace of advancement rather than actual deterioration per se, but as an ugly illustration of the latter, 2009 ended with the banning of a critical documentary film on the occupation of East Timor and a number of books that were deemed to 'disturb public order', including a well-reputed academic work on how the communist involvement in army factionalism in 1965 became the pretext for mass murder. More recently, again after 2008, there are yet additional signs of deterioration such as with regard to electoral rights, the rule of law and minority rights (cf. Mietzner 2012).

Efforts to Improve Governance

In some ways also surprising, the informants of the second qualitative survey reported general improvements in top-down efforts by government institutions to improve the miserable performance of the rule of law, the control of corruption and also the struggle against paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime since 2003–2004. It is the case, however, that the improvements were made from a very low level that most of these crucial problems remain and that even the current president seems unable to act decisively and demand that state authorities come forward with the truth and prevent the police and the attorney general from conspiring against anti-corruption officers. Yet it is obvious that the informants took a positive view of the efforts (albeit limited) of the government to foster the rule of law and to curb corruption. Thereafter, however, there have been disturbing signs at deterioration.

Countrywide Political Community

The third and perhaps most surprising result at the time was that the disintegration of Suharto's centralistic New Order had not led to the balkanisation of Indonesia through separatism and ethnic and religious cleansing that many observers and politicians had predicted. The information suggested instead that a unitary *political* (rather than ethno-nationalist) community had taken some root, especially on the formal institutional level, and that it included extensive space for local politics.

The answers to many different questions confirmed what had been reported by a number of other scholars (Aspinall and Fealy 2003, Nordholt et al. 2004, 2006, 2007, Robison and Hadiz 2004, van Klinken 2007, 2009, Hadiz 2009), namely, that the new local political space had generated additional inequalities between the provinces and regions that was often occupied by predatory powerful groups. Attempts to develop democratic politics on the basis of real issues and interests on the ground were no doubt under threat from elitist and localised identity politics as well as from economic globalisation in the form of, for example, companies in

search of lucrative natural resources. It was a victory in itself, however, that most of the ethnic and religious riots had not escalated but rather petered out. In Aceh, where foreign donors temporarily contained the military and big business after the tsunami, and where separatists were able to substitute political participation for armed struggle, decentralisation also helped pave the way for the Helsinki agreement on peace and potentially fruitful democracy. We will return to the fate of democracy in Aceh, but the initial achievements were remarkable. During recent years, however, there have been increasing problems related to the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

Monopolised Representation

The initial conclusions indicate that much of the minimum infrastructure of democratic institutions was in place and that – in spite of serious weaknesses and biases – it was solid enough to make some sense. Theoretically, this is the bottom line and the reason Indonesia may be called an emerging new democracy.

The major problems are thus neither the liberal freedoms nor the elections, given the advances in these respects – though the recent signs of deterioration are worrying and call for closer studies; neither is the widespread corruption, as at least some measures have been taken to counter it and there is widespread awareness of the problems. The main problem is instead that Indonesia's system of representation is not sufficiently open to allow for the potential inclusion of the people's main interests and efforts to control public administration, and that it has also erected enormous barriers to participation by new players.

Indonesia's democracy is thus being held back in a very basic and procedural sense. Worst, this has made it difficult to develop representation of the middle and working classes and related groups that historically tend to defend freedoms and turn against corruption.

Civic and popular organisations are being prevented from taking part in organised politics, both because it is difficult to build competitive new parties and because of the lack of institutionalised democratic channels through which popular organisations may influence daily politics. These groups, moreover, remain hampered not only by the heritage of previous repression and the continuous monopolisation of representation – but also by their own mistakes and poor political capacity to overcome fragmentation and elitism. We will return to these matters in the following chapters, suffice to say that their problems are not just about power but also a matter of undeveloped representation within and in between the groups (Nur 2009, Törnquist 2009, Törnquist et al. 2009a).

The democratic discrepancies are thus about the exclusion of both people and issues and interests from organised politics. It is not just that, as we will see in forthcoming chapters, the powerful actors in society dominate politics and the political economy. It is also that they prevent ordinary people and people's small parties (but not the petty parties of the moneyed) from taking part in politics. The main exception in Aceh has ended in the marginalisation of local parties, save the GAM-based Aceh Party that won the 2009 elections in a de facto power-sharing alliance with president Yudhoyono's Democratic Party, using

intimidation and threats that peace was at stake if its candidates did not win the 2012 executive elections. Participation in parliamentary elections in other parts of the country (even to local parliaments) calls for a 'national presence' that requires party branch offices to be located virtually all over the country. Thus, it is next to impossible to build more representative parties from below without having access to enormous funds. Similarly, only big parties, extensive coalitions of parties or moneyed actors able to mobilise huge numbers of signatures can nominate candidates for elections of governors, mayors and district heads. Even candidates for local positions must have comparatively advanced formal schooling and pay for administrative costs, thus excluding leaders from the labouring classes.

Similarly, there are no efficient measures for countering vested interests and private political financing or to promote internal party democracy. The guidelines for fostering equal gender representation have also not generated significant results.

To make things worse, there are no substantive efforts to foster direct democratic representation in public governance through local representatives and popular organisations based on interest and special knowledge such as trade unions and environmental movements. The typical picture is instead one of privileged contacts, the inclusion of knowledgeable individuals among the former activists as advisors of politicians and senior bureaucrats and the top-down selection of popular figures and groups. There is hardly any substantive representation of the crucial interests and ideas of the middle classes, workers, peasants, urban poor, women or human rights and environmental activists. When pro-democrats have a say it is primarily through lobbying, individual connections or NGO contacts with leading politicians. Similarly, there are certain pressure groups and some participatory development projects in relation to which entrepreneurial NGOs and customary groups can make themselves felt.

It is true that there are also localised and supposedly traditional forms of participatory governance, formalised under the name of *Musrembang*. This format is locally inclusive, but mainly consists of already existing groups and important figures and movements. This reflects predominant power relations and rarely fosters the inclusion of subordinated and alternative interests and ideas. Additionally, local priorities need to be confirmed on supra levels where politicians and executives are in thorough control. The supplementary and massive World Bank-financed community development programme, moreover, tends to bypass public administration in favour of civil society and market-oriented solutions, thus avoiding many of the challenges of democratisation (Sindre 2011).

Conclusion

In short, the fundamental problem of Indonesian democracy is weak popular representation. Many freedoms are available, even if there have been recent signs of deterioration expressed in the form of religious sectarianism, and the rule of law and public governance are given extensive attention. However, democratic

political relations between the state and people remain poor and are neglected. The post-centralist and post-authoritarian relations between the state and people are instead mediated, increasingly frequently by, on the one hand, market institutions and, on the other, communal, patronage and network-based groups, including through 'alternative patronage' via religious and civil associations. Worst, neither of the latter mediators is subject to democratic control.

CHAPTER 3

ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS

The Crucial Actors and Their Relations to the Institutions of Democracy

Having assessed the standard of the institutional means of democratisation, the second dimension that needs to be considered is how important actors relate to the institutions. The actors are as vital as the institutions, given that democracy is about collective action and that institutions do not emerge and change by themselves. What the actors do is of course conditioned by the institutions as well as the relations of power. However, before we can turn to the analysis of the dynamics of democratic politics (in chapter 5), this chapter will focus on the identification of the actors and how they relate to the institutions, whereas the following (chapter 4) will discuss the actors' capacity in the context of the relations of power.

Much of democratisation is not only about collective actors grounded in structural cleavages such as the middle and working classes, but it is also about leadership and institutional design. Once designed, the rules and regulations are assumed to affect what the actors do.

The first main task is thus to identify the most important actors and gain an understanding of their aims and means. This is difficult enough. Imaginative analyses were included in the original writings of, for example, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986). They focused, however, on the leading and powerful actors at the central level at the expense of the local dynamics and various broader collective organisations with a base in structural cleavages, including radical popular parties, unions, peasant organisations and also new social movements. Later on, moreover, the focus on the elite actors often turned into stereotypes as analysts and democracy-promoting experts tried to identify the 'hardliners' and 'softliners' in various countries. And researchers focusing on rational action and game theories all too often set aside crucial contextual factors altogether.

We shall return to these challenges, but given that they can be overcome, the next question is how the actors relate to the institutions – and how the institutions in turn affect the actors.

The more precise questions and interpretations of the answers should relate to the main arguments in this field, such as those about the enlightened elites

and middle and working classes. Thus, an unbiased assessment may not only focus on the links between a few specific actors and institutions that are deemed particularly important in the view of a certain theory. On the contrary, we need to compare and discuss all the vital actors and their relations to the institutions that are considered in competing explanatory frameworks for the study of democratisation.

The Main Actors

As mentioned, there are two major problems with regard to the identification of crucial actors in the mainstream analyses that have to be solved in an alternative framework. The first concerns centralism, the second elitism.

The centralist bias is simply that there has often been a narrow focus on actors related to the apex of political power. Not only in the old Soviet Union and for long in China but also in Suharto's Indonesia, for instance, the focus was on the top leaders and those who tried to influence them. Scholars and students circled in and around in the capitals talking to politicians, top-level bureaucrats, crucial officers, a few business actors, leaders of think tanks, editors of the main newspapers and so on. What happened on the ground, in the provinces and in the workplaces was largely neglected. With the dismantling of authoritarianism, however, a major factor has been localisation along with the renegotiation of loyalties and power relations. There have also been many decisive of extra-parliamentary actions, from strikes to instigated riots and religious and ethnic conflicts. Nothing of this can, of course, be understood and explained without knowledge of actors beyond the central, top levels.

To counter these weaknesses, it is essential that the identification of the actors to be included in the assessment is done more broadly. On the basis of experience to date, it has proved fruitful to focus on (1) actors related to not only the state and economic organisations that remain crucial in the central cities – but also on groups, organisations and individuals that can affect them – for example, by way of good contacts and the ability to mobilise veto powers such as by way of the military, militia groups or by strikes and actions in the street and (2) actors that relate to the local centres of political power, at the provincial or sub-provincial level. In Indonesia, for example, these centres of power after the fall of Suharto were clearly the rather large districts and municipalities, not the provinces (except for Aceh) and also not the villages.

In terms of the assessment schemes, this means that part of the assessment will relate to the central level and nationally important politics and institutions, while the other will operate with locally defined actors.

The elitist bias concerns including actors far beyond the 'hardliners' and 'softliners' within the powerful sections of the elite. The first recommendation is to simply ask key informants what actors are most powerful, directly or indirectly, with regard to politics and the governance of public affairs at the central and local levels identified in the above.

The second recommendation is to ask separately what the informers deem to be the crucial actual or potential reformers in relation to politics and governance.

In both cases, it is useful to give some guidance to the informants in the form of examples of the kind of actors that tend to be important according to international and contextually rooted literature on power and democracy. In this respect, it has proved fruitful to ask separate questions about actors within state and politics, business and (widely defined) civil society. Such a shortlist may be contextually adapted and supplemented. However, given the review in chapter 1 of the literature on democracy, it should include actors related to the business sector, the middle and working classes, the primary sectors (including big and small farmers and fisher folk) as well as social categories such as politicians and political executives, bureaucrats and the military, journalists, intellectuals and students and religious and ethnic leaders in addition to social movements, civil society organisations and a general categorisation for considering gender.

In our experience, the optimum scenario is whether the informant can give a name of the actor. Even when the actors are collective, the group or organisation must be given a name – general statements such as ‘the bureaucracy’ or ‘the big businessmen’ are not very helpful; however, specified groups of companies or sections of the administration and related figures make sense.

Naturally, broad surveys do not allow for long lists of actors. In our experience of the countrywide qualitative surveys, it is possible to manage around four actors from each major category of dominant and reformist actors in the various local contexts where the questions are asked; in local qualitative surveys, it is possible to include many more.

Actors' Position on Democracy

The second set of questions is intended to identify what are the aims of these actors and how they relate, then, to the democracy-oriented institutions, both generally and more specifically. It is useful to know about the aims of actors in terms of immediate and long-term policies at this stage, and not only when discussing their strategies later. This is because it tends to be easier to identify and assess here how the actors relate to various institutions and later on how they try to improve their political capacity once their objectives are known.

The widely accepted litmus test for a reasonably stable democracy is the extent to which crucial actors deem democracy to be ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 5). One way to go about this is to talk in terms of producing, consuming and destroying democracy with reference to its institutions. What do the actors do? Do they both produce and consume, as well as abstain from destroying – or do they only produce, only consume or at worst abuse or evade the institutions of democracy?

If this simple question is asked for each main actor in relation to the thirteen types of institutions, a clear and reasonably precise picture emerges about the position of the actors in democratisation. It will be possible to distinguish between the various actors. It may be possible to identify what institutions are most accepted and thus reasonably strong (given that they have not been hijacked). It is also possible to detect which of the institutions are least accepted

and thus weak. It is possible to identify which of the actors' position on the institutions of democracy calls for more detailed studies.

Actors' Effect on Institutions

Having identified critical relations between actors and institutions, the related politics and policies call for more detailed studies. If it is found, for instance, that pro-democratic students, intellectuals and NGOs tend to produce and consume institutions for liberties and rights but rarely engage in elections and governance, then this in itself is remarkable and the specificities merit attention. If, moreover, many dominant actors increasingly tend not to produce but only consume and even avoid and abuse a number of the institutions that are supposed to foster democracy, this too needs to be identified and detailed. What are these actors really doing? What are their politics and policies with regard to the endangered institutions?

Specific politics and policies are difficult to cover even in qualitative surveys, but some can be identified if the team asks contextualised follow-up questions on the actors' priorities with specific regard to the problematic institutions.

Institutions' Influence on Actors

Conversely, it is also possible in this way to evaluate how institutions affect the actors. A major assumption in mainstream democratisation theory is that the 'right' institutions will alter actors' behaviour. At best the 'good' institutions may even turn crooked actors into reasonable democrats. In this case, one may identify specific institutional arrangements that have been crafted to alter actors' behaviour, and then use these arrangements as a point of departure for finding out whether and how the projected positive effects have materialised. For example, have carefully designed regulations on 'good governance' and electoral and party systems prevented corruption and fostered less dirty and more representative politics?

BOX 3.1 Actors and democracy-oriented institutions

- What dominant actors and what actors of change in the framework of state and politics, business and (widely defined) civil society are most important in a contextual list of such actors constructed on the basis of the democratisation literature?
- What do they aim at in terms of short- and long-term policies?
- In promoting their aims, do these actors both produce and consume and also abstain from destroying the institutions of democracy – or do they only produce, only consume or at worst avoid and abuse them?
- To what extent have the institutions specifically designed to alter actors' behaviour in democratic direction been effective?

Adaptive Indonesian Elites and Evasive Pro-democrats

In spite of teething problems with categories and measurements, a number of remarkable results were already clear from the first Indonesian qualitative survey and then confirmed in the second.

The informants were all recruited from the ranks of experienced pro-democrats. Thus, many expected that they would be uncritically positive of their own achievements and especially critical of various democratic deficits, as well as the legacy of Suharto's military and crony-capitalists. Instead, the informants stood out as remarkably reflective and self-critical.

Politically Strong Dominant Actors and Weak Pro-democrats

First, the informants deemed that more than 50 per cent of the powerful actors in the informants' contexts were connected with civilian government and politics, about 10 per cent were primarily connected to the military and police (which had been so dominant only a few years earlier) and only 10 per cent were business people. Religious and ethnic leaders were also not deemed to be dominant. It is true that a number of the actors identified as belonging to politics and government also had a background (and sustained contacts) in the military and/or business, but the general importance of state and politics was still obvious.

Secondly, most democracy-oriented actors of change were clearly identified as being NGO activists, intellectuals, lawyers and journalists. Politicians and parties as well as ethnic and customary leaders were rated much lower. At least some of these indications may reflect the composition of the informants themselves, but the general accuracy of their estimates was never in doubt.

Adaption and Evasion

Similarly surprising, the informants argued that not only a very clear majority of the actors of change, but also most of the dominant actors, abstained from abandoning the democratic institutions: in fact, almost 90 per cent. It is true that more than 50 per cent of the dominant actors were identified as only consuming or also abusing the democratic institutions. However, Indonesia seemed to pass the litmus test of democratic institutions being deemed by almost all the main actors to be the only game in town – at least in terms of being used. This was particularly the case with regard to not only elections and public office but also several freedoms.

In addition, however, it was also clear that while the powerful elite groups adapted to the new crafted institutions, the same institutions did not turn these groups into 'good' democrats. There was a very high proportion of actors that did not produce democracy but remained consumers and abusers.

To make things worse, although the actors of change related most positively to the institutions that would foster freedoms and rights, and of course civil society and measures against corruption, they were not very engaged in elections, representation and matters of governance. On the contrary, politics beyond freedoms and rights seemed to be colonised by the dominant actors. This conclusion was confirmed by other indicators too.

The Relative Stability of Democracy Rests with Elitist Inclusion of People

As will become increasingly clear when additional information is discussed in the following chapters, Indonesia has continued to be dominated by powerful elite groups. However, the data referred to above on the important actors and how they relate to the institutions indicate that the elites were more broadly based, more localised and less militarised than under Suharto. Thus, the empirical evidence casts some doubt on the general thesis that the powerful elite from the New Order had simply captured democracy and remained in firm control (cf. Robison and Hadiz 2004). The picture that began to emerge was rather one of an extended and disbursed elite that had adjusted to the new and supposedly pro-democratic institutions.

Thus, the qualitative surveys lend more support to the argument of van Klinken (2009) that decentralisation and elections have enabled diverse sections of Indonesia's elite to mobilise popular support. Elites certainly tend to mobilise such support by making use of their clientelist networks, their privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and communal leaders. Yet such elite groups have gained influence by being able to win elections, something that had not been possible for many of Suharto's oligarchs to do on their own. Thus, this interest in elections is *both* a crucial basis of the actually existing democracy *and* its major drawback. Without this elite support, the fledgling Indonesian democracy would not survive. But with the powerful elite support, it becomes the domain of crooked politicians that prosper and entrench themselves through corruption. Case studies and other reports on what have happened since the second qualitative survey confirm this, even suggesting that the standard of elections as well as anti-corruption measures that were introduced in the mid-2000 have deteriorated (cf. Mietzner 2012). It is certainly true (as was recently emphasised in Mietzner 2013) that a number of skilled former activists have joined the numerous elite-dominated parties and taken on roles as advisors in political parties as well as in some ministries and local governments. However, so long as these activities take place on an individual basis as an extension of their own personal networks, one cannot help recalling the way in which liberal technocrats tried to both serve and reform Suharto's administration. There is an obvious need for a new qualitative survey to assess the situation and the dynamics.

Indonesia thus began to resemble India, the most stable though constrained democracy in the Global South. India is dominated primarily by politically oriented powerful elites that incorporate vulnerable people into politics, win elections and of course benefit in various ways from the powers thus gained. But for these reasons, the political elites also sustain certain procedural fundamentals of democracy, while the more modern, cosmopolitan and affluent middle classes increasingly frequently opt for private solutions to their problems (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Harriss-White 2003, Chandra 2004, Chatterjee 2004, 2008, CSDS 2007, Corbridge et al. 2012). The major difference and additional problem in Indonesia is that Indonesia's system and institutions of representation and elections, which were discussed in chapter 2, are much less open than that of India.

CHAPTER 4

ACTORS AND POWER

Actors' Political Capacity

The third intrinsic dimension of democratisation to be considered in the alternative assessment is the actors' political capacity, primarily their capacity to alter the opportunity structure. This is, of course, another way of saying that power is important for what actors can do and how institutions are shaped and perform. The structure of power and opportunities for people to act are crucial in any explanation of democracy. But to really consider the problems and options of democratisation, one must also focus on the actors' capacity to alter these opportunities in their own favour. In short, this is about their capacity to at least in part create their own preconditions.

There are two separate arguments for the importance of considering actors' capacity and how this is best done. The first and basic argument is that there is *no* need for equal powers for democracy to develop – only sufficient power for people to be part of the *demos* (i.e. those with the right to control public affairs), to also benefit from other citizens' rights, to exercise these rights, and for those who are not part of the *demos* and are non-citizens to nevertheless benefit from the democratic institutions and human rights. In short, there must be effective political membership and citizenship in addition to human rights. If the informants deem the constitution of the *demos* and other citizenship rights to be fair, if they deem these citizens to be powerful enough to promote and use the democratic institutions and if they deem others too to benefit from them, the fundamental requirements regarding capacity are in place.

The second and supplementary argument is that there is also a need to analyse the dynamics and problems of democratisation (which we will return to in chapter 5). For this to be possible, it is necessary to not just know that certain capacities are available while others are not; one must also know the background and the relations of power that shape people's capacity to take part in politics and make a difference.

The literature on power and political capacity is extensive and the number of variables that are deemed important overwhelming. How might it be possible to acquire and summarise all the relevant information into a few dimensions and sets of questions? Radical priorities are necessary. The recommended method

is to look into generally acknowledged analysis of democratisation that does not only consider the elite but also various subordinate groups and movements. Moreover, the focus should be on theories that address the political aspects of collective action. Trust, for example, may well be important for collective action. However, theories that the *demos* (in the basic terms of people acting together to control public affairs) develops organically from below among self-managing, co-operating and associating people – thus generating trust in each other, which is what Robert Putnam and the World Bank call social capital (World Bank 2012) – avoid the importance of ideologies, political engagement and institutions such as of citizenship. (In fact, in Putnam's writing about Italy, it is even avoided that the supposedly trust-generated 'good government' in city-states like Sienna in northern Italy proudly shackled rebellious peasants, at least according to Lorenzetti's frescos in the city hall, which, coincidentally, were commissioned by the then city government itself.) Equally important, the issue of representation becomes redundant in these theories of civil society because people act directly through the same personal contacts and associations as those that are assumed to constitute the *demos* in the first place. So the issue of why such an association has been formed and what it is representing is a non-issue as it almost embodies the *demos* in about the same way as a populist leader.

We shall return to this in the discussion later on in this chapter about representation, but the main point here is to underline the importance of focusing on theories about the politics of collective action. Consequently, priority is given to theories about political and social movements and the sources and legitimacy of political power and popular representation, all of which partly overlap and partly supplement one another.

Taken together, there seem to be five arguments about necessary capacities in order for people to be able to promote and use democratic institutions: (1) political inclusion (versus exclusion); (2) authority and legitimacy; (3) politicisation or agenda-setting; (4) mobilisation and organisation and (5) participation and representation. These have been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Törnquist 2002, Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009). In the following section, each argument will be presented as briefly as possible. The same applies to the key questions that should be included in assessment schemes.

Political Inclusion (versus Exclusion)

According to the first argument, democratisation presupposes that people should not be excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.

On a fundamental level, this argument relates to theories about the constitution of the *demos*, unequal citizenship, identity politics and the subordination of people through various techniques of post-colonial governance (Mamdani 1996, Chatterjee 2004, Maktabi 2012). A particular area of concern includes theories on marginalisation within elite-led democracy building of popular-based movements, interest organisations such as trade unions, issue groups and various citizen associations from organised politics (Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009).

There are two key questions in this regard. Both presuppose that the crucial aspects of the political terrain where the informants live and work have been identified. These aspects include business and workplaces, civil and popular associations, movements and means of knowledge and communication, political parties, parliament, the political executive and public (and military) administration.

The first question, then, is simply whether and how the most important dominant actors and actors of change are present or excluded from these terrains. If trade unions are deemed crucial actors of change in the literature on democratisation and by the informants in our qualitative survey, are they able to get into the workplaces, to make a difference within the media and among the parties, to influence parliament and public administration? If military leaders are among the dominant actors, do they remain part of civilian government? If certain businesspeople belong to the dominant actors, are they also making themselves felt within organised politics and civil society? Are important civil society organisations and social movements confined only to their own fields or also able to take part in widely defined politics?

The second question is an open one about whether and how any actor or group not listed among the most important ones is excluded or marginalised from the vital political terrains. Democracy is not only about majorities but also about inclusion and the rights of minorities. Maybe women are not very present in some fields? What about migrant labourers? Are there any ethnic or religious minorities that tend to be excluded? What of subordinated castes and indigenous populations? Are people with certain ideological persuasions excluded?

These questions overlap in part with the earlier questions about the constitution of the *demos* and the standard of the institutions meant to support equal and inclusive citizenship, but the specific point here is the capacity of special actors and groups to be included and to fight exclusion. Besides, not everyone is part of the *demos* and a citizen of the place where they live and work. Increasingly many migrant labourers exist within and in between countries.

Authority and Legitimacy

The second argument is how politics is to transcend 'raw power'. As best analysed by Pierre Bourdieu (for a summary, see Wacquant [2005]), businesspeople's economic power is not sufficient in politics. Neither are good contacts and networks, which he refers to as social capital. Or for that matter the knowledge of professors, the influential positions of journalists, the abilities of artists or the norms set by ethnic and religious leaders, which taken together are often labelled cultural capital. Neither does a fourth type of capital, which one may call coercive capital, and which should be added to Bourdieu's categories in contexts where military force and 'people power' (to, e.g. stage a riot or block a ring road) are fairly common. What translates into political power is when actors are able to transform their accumulated capital of various kinds into authority and legitimacy. This is what Pierre Bourdieu calls symbolic capital and political power (Stokke 2002, Stokke and Selboe 2009).

Bourdieu's framework for analysing power is particularly useful in contexts of multi-layered and polycentric governance and uneven development (where

different sources of power are combined and transformed) as well as in close studies of the construction of the *demos* and public affairs.

There are two key questions here. The first is to find out about the actors' sources of power. Are they primarily accumulating and basing themselves on economic, social, coercive or cultural capital? Combinations are possible of course; the actual questions need to be contextualised in order to allow for as specific answers as possible.

The second question is more complicated. It concerns whether *and* how the actors succeed in transforming their different types of capital into symbolic capital in terms of authority and legitimacy and ultimately political power. The recommendation is to expose the informants to a number of possible and contextually plausible examples (on the basis of exploratory pilot studies) of ways of gaining authority and legitimacy, thus stimulating the informants to both select and expand on these illustrations. One example is to gain a popular mandate or get elected; another may be to provide patronage and protection; a third may be to distance oneself from a particular vested interest in favour of what is perceived of as common good; a fourth to buy up media and be projected as a good leader; yet another to associate with what is deemed morally right, or to be knowledgeable and trustworthy or at least frequently cited in the media. These are only general examples that need to be contextualised in relation to the basic powers (capital) to be transformed into political power.

Politicisation and Agenda-setting

The third argument relates to the need for even less powerful citizens to have at least some capacity to turn what others may consider private concerns into public political matters, that is, to put their issues, interests and ideologies on the political agenda.

With regard to problems of democratisation, this is the locus for in-depth studies of depoliticisation by way of technocratisation (handing over contested matters to technocrats and managers), judicialisation (taking conflicts of power and politics to court), privatisation (transferring matters to the market, family and individual) and communalisation (handing over to religious, ethnic and other communities).

The same applies to the frequent direction of certain issues and problems that many people deem to be of common concern from public governance to self-management and charity in civil society.

Consequently, there is also a need for studies of attempts at re-politicisation of such issues and problems, for instance, by way of public regulation and the development of public discourse and public service media.

Similarly, one may ask about attempts to combine, on the one hand, customary rules in matters such as forestry and fishing (to thus foster sustainable development and the rights of local people) and, on the other, democratic rules on the basis of equal political and civil rights with regard to the governance of other public affairs.

This relates to theories inspired, for instance, by Habermas (1989) on the public sphere (Seidman 1989), Gramsci on hegemony (Ransome 1992), Bourdieu on

habitus (internalised norms, understandings and patterns) and the general importance of culture (see Wacquant [2005] for a summary). However, the same indicators connect also to analysis of increasingly fragmented priorities and agendas. This applies not least to actors in civil society with a number of related difficulties in generating common platforms (Törnquist 2002, 2004, 2009, Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009a).

The basic question for assessment schemes thus overlaps with the previous issue of the constitution of public affairs discussed in chapter 2. But here the focus is, first, on what issues the most important actors define as public affairs – whether political, managerial or judicial, consider private (reserved for the market or family) or reserved for communal organisations or citizen organisations? Second, to what extent have the various actors actually managed to place their issues and policies on the political agenda?

It is equally important to know how the agenda-setting it is done. This may boil down to how the actors frame the issues and visions that they prioritise (Törnquist 2002). Having identified what issues the actors deem to be more or less public affairs, and to what extent these have been placed on the public agenda, it is necessary to ask, therefore, whether these issues and policies relate to single issues, specific interests or, for instance, targeted welfare measures? Or whether the issues and policies rather relate to strategies and programmes such as comprehensive welfare schemes.

None of these ways of framing issues and visions are necessarily more or less democratic as such. However, democracy is about collective action; the strength of collective action seems to vary with whether policies are about single issues and targeted benefits or more general programmes and universal and comprehensive benefits. Specific issues and interests and targeted measures may, for instance, shape specific constituencies such as workers, landless peasants or certain middle classes. But more general measures may facilitate broader alliances and majorities as well as long-term strategies, and possibly more feasible national policies too (Törnquist 2002).

It is also important to remember that it is not just the type but also the content of the ideas and policies that matter in processes of democratisation. A policy, for example, to provide guaranteed employment to the rural poor or unemployment benefits to retrenched workers and professionals may be immensely important both for their well-being and for their capacity to stand up and take action as full citizens in a democracy. We will return to the dynamic aspects of democratic politics in chapter 5.

Mobilisation and Organisation

Fourth, all actors must be able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This goes to the core of theories on political and social movements in relation to democracy. The theories include the arguments of Mouzelis (1986) and Tarrow (1994) that distinguish between incorporation and integration into politics. The first is typically by way of elitist populism and clientelism. The second is through independent organisation from below. Networking, moreover,

may not always foster inclusion. Rather, it may be combined with both incorporation and integration depending on the patterns of domination.

One basic element of this dilemma is the inclusion of citizens, subjects and denizens in which the latter no longer refers to privileged aliens such as ex-pats with residence permits and some citizenship rights but rather residents who may not be outright subjects of a ruler but are typically short of the necessary capacity to use most other rights other than, at best, by being subordinated parts of the *demos* and thus being able to rally behind and vote for or against leading politicians. This is emphasised by scholars such as Mamdani (1996), Chatterjee (2004), Houtzager (2005), Houtzager et al. (2005, 2007) and Harriss (2006). Previous comparative studies point to problems of combining civil society work, social movements and organised politics, the predominance of localisation and the problems of combining single and special interests and transforming such issues into broader matters of public concern (Törnquist 2002, 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009a).

The most crucial questions to be asked about each actor thus concern the mobilisation strategy. Do the actors primarily strive to incorporate people into politics, for example, by way of populism and charismatic leaders, patronage, family and clan connections, alternative protection and support and networking based on good contacts? Or do they try to integrate people into politics by fostering networks between independent actors and building organisations from below that foster central co-ordinating units? Needless to say, these general questions need to be contextualised by way of local examples.

Participation and Representation

Lastly, people must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. The main source of inspiration here is the mounting evidence that suggests that the key problem of democracy in the Global South in particular is the dominance of powerful elites and the poor standard of popular representation.

Generally, the main focus needs to be on different types of representation and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and institutions for direct participation (Törnquist 2009). But before moving ahead, it is necessary to elaborate on the concept of representation and how we can best analyse associated dilemmas. These matters are much less well known than problems of exclusion, power, politicisation and mobilisation.

The Concept of Representation

The fundament of democratic representation is the twofold construction of public affairs and of the people, the *demos*, entitled to control those public affairs on the basis of political equality. A fruitful analytical framework must facilitate analysis of both the generation and the implementation of public policies – in

addition to the attempts to bypass the democratic system and take decisions in rotary meetings, the military barracks or by way of riots in the street instead.

Representation is a complex and contentious concept. As outlined by Pitkin (1967), it presupposes the representative(s), the represented, something that is being represented and a political context. The democratic dynamics are primarily about authorisation and accountability, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness.

Representation may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic. Substantive representation is when the representative acts for the represented, for instance, a leader advancing the interests of workers. Descriptive representation is when an actor stands for the represented by being objectively similar. For example, a woman represents women and a resident in a village represents the other villagers. Symbolic representation, lastly, is when an actor is perceived by the represented to once again stand for them, but now, for instance, in terms of shared culture and identities. Yet symbolic representation may also be understood by authors such as Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005), Stokke (2002) and Ben Anderson (1983) in the wider sense of constructing the *demos*, the groups and interests that are being represented, claiming to represent on the basis of legitimate authority, thus having gained what we have earlier called symbolic capital and political power.

The Chain of Popular Sovereignty Approach

There are two main approaches to the study of democratic representation.¹ The first may be called the chain of popular sovereignty approach. It is typically students of political institutions who adhere to it, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public administration. The second is the participatory or direct–democracy approach. This is more common among political sociologists, anthropologists and students of rights and law who emphasise the importance of informal arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular movements and lobby groups as well as citizens’ action in, for example, neighbourhood groups and associations for self-management.

There are two related tendencies towards deteriorated representation within the chain of popular sovereignty. This applies to old as well as new democracies, albeit from different levels of democratic development. One is that public matters and resources have been reduced and fragmented under neoliberalism and globalisation beyond democratic representation.

The other tendency is that almost all of the links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially the case with regard to the intermediary representative institutions from civic organisation to political parties. Mass-based interest organisations have been radically weakened, most severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are shrinking, the more or less well-developed and independent roots of politicians and political parties are further weakened. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the intermediary political institutions generate further distrust in the authorisation of representatives and their mandates.

Representative politics is thus often looked upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality-oriented politics, non-programmatic organisational machines and crooked politicians (Carothers 2006).

This in turn has generated alternative routes. However, the various supplementary forms of democracy – by taking matters to court and to institutions in civil society for self-financed self-management and direct participation, pressure and informal contacts – are largely detached from the chain of popular sovereignty. Civic organisations and activists themselves are rarely subject to basic principles of democratic representation, authorisation and accountability. Moreover, communal ethnic and religious organisations as well as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular concerns and needs, typically among the weaker sections of the population with insufficient capacity to make use of civic rights. By not claiming equal civic, political and socio-economic rights for all but for specific communal privileges only, these organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the *demos* and undermine democracy.

While the advantage of the chain of popular sovereignty approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, the major drawback is that practices outside the formally recognised chain tend to be set aside, such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public affairs that have been privatised or informalised.

The Direct Democracy Approach

Unfortunately however, the direct democracy approach does not provide a good alternative, focusing instead on the other side of the coin. Interestingly, supporters include representatives of otherwise quite diverse groups. One is market oriented, supported by, for example, the World Bank (1997) and favours user and consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty). Another includes Tocquevillians who suggest that democracy works when citizens make use of their associational capacities and recognise each other as rights-bearing citizens. A third comprises communitarians in favour of local government based on ethnic, tribal and similar communities against authoritarian post-colonial governance (Escobar 2009, and cf. Davidson and Henley [2007] for critical analyses). A fourth consists of critics of globalisation such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) who argue that state and power have been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit left to fight and that many producers are increasingly regulating their own social relations. Thus, strong parties and representative democracy are unnecessary and even irrelevant.

In short, a common denominator in all these positions is that they are congruous with the idea of Putnam (1993) that the ‘real’ *demos* develops not in relation to ideologies, institutions and political engagement but organically from below and from self-managing and co-operating individuals and groups who thus foster ‘social capital’.

Representation, therefore, becomes redundant, since these individuals and groups act directly through the same contacts and associations that, supposedly, have constituted the people (*demos*) in the first place.

As a result, almost any civil organisation becomes part of the people itself. Similarly, there is thus no need to analyse differences between organisations that relate to rights-bearing citizens and people who lack sufficient capacity to use and promote their rights. The importance of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology also need not be discussed. The fact that Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary participatory budgeting, for example, have all been politically facilitated and sustained is conveniently forgotten. The same applies to the many more or less democratically oriented leaders who 'from above' have successfully claimed to represent people and in many cases they have even constructed them as a *demos*.

Many civil society activists are, however, more anxious now than before to legitimise their work in terms of who they aim to represent (Houtzager 2007, Houtzager and Lavallo 2009). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning are attempts at initiating a new layer of representation between electoral chains of popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and associational life and populism, on the other (cf. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2005, Baiocchi and Heller 2009). This is reminiscent of previous Scandinavian experiences of combining liberal political democracy and interest-based representation and co-operation between government and associations (Esping-Andersen 1985, Berman 2006, Stokke and Törnquist 2013).

In spite of these advances, a number of questions remain to be answered, such as how to guarantee the authority and accountability of representatives, and even more difficult, how to identify and agree on what parts of the *demos* should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of political equality and how to scale-up local arrangements.

Unifying Focus on the Principles of Democratic Representation

As emphasised in Törnquist (2009), there is a need to combine the two main tendencies in the study of representation (one emphasising the formal chain of popular sovereignty and the other more or less direct participation and deliberation). This can be done by focusing on the development (or restriction) of the principles of democratic representation in both formally organised politics and government, on the one hand, and other forms of governance, including in civil society, on the other.

It has proved fruitful to work with the generally accepted definition of the meaning of democracy as a point of departure (popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality). Thus, there are three basic pillars of a framework for the study of representation: (1) the people (*demos*), (2) the public concerns and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising popular control of the input as well as output of democracy, that is, policymaking and implementation.

What is, then, *democratic* representation? Democratic politics and policy making (input) and implementation (output) need to be representative in three senses: (1) by being based on clearly defined public affairs and *demos*; (2) by also building on the principles of political equality and impartiality and (3) by being subject to authorisation with a mandate and to accountability with transparency and responsiveness.




Figure 4.1 An integrated framework for the study of democratic popular representation

The actual content of what is thus being decided and implemented springs from the will of the *demos*. However, it is important to remember that the decisions must be supportive of the principles of democracy and the necessary means to develop and apply them. All this is summarised in figure 4.1.

Key Questions

In an assessment of democratisation, what are, then, the fundamental questions that need to be asked about the capacity to develop participation and representation? A general line of enquiry that has proved to work well is inspired by Harriss (2006) and Houtzager et al. (2005). Translated into the alternative assessment scheme, the question would be to ask where the major actors who dominate or foster change turn to with their issues *and* how they go about doing so. As a supplement, the informants may also be asked where, in their experience, ordinary people turn to with their various problems in the informants' contexts and field of work as well as how they do so. In both cases, there is a need to specify the issues at stake. When asking about ordinary people, the class and social category people belong to must also be considered.

The 'Where-question'

The 'where' part of the question concerns three main issues. First, to what extent the actors (and ordinary people, respectively)

1. try to influence the system of public governance directly, on their own or by way of informal fixers and good contacts, thus bypassing the more or less democratic channels of participation;
2. participate in arrangements for individual stakeholder participation such as in local planning;
3. act via political parties, independent candidates and parliaments at various levels;
4. engage in issue- and interest-based organisations such as an environmental groups or a trade union and
5. participate in organisations claiming citizens' rights, such as human rights groups, or working on the explicit basis of citizens' rights such as journalists, artists and academicians.

Secondly, the 'where' part of the questions also seeks answers on how the individual actors and mediators relate to each other. An example is to what extent the issue-, interest- and rights-based organisations co-operate and engage in lobbying politicians and parliaments.

Thirdly, where actors and ordinary people tend to go in the system of public governance. We have already dealt with the direct approaches by actors and ordinary people. However, it is also necessary to ask whether the mediators go to:

1. the political executive and related civil and military administrations;
2. the judiciary and the police;

3. policy implementing organisations jointly operated by the government and stakeholders (such as an employment exchange or an athletics stadium); or
4. private companies, citizen or community-based organisations (CBOs) that have been subcontracted by the government (such as a private bus company, hospital or school) or simply operate on the basis of their own among members or in the market?

The interview may be facilitated by drawing up a map of the different options of representation available or likely where the informants live and work, so that the actors can indicate what tracks the different main actors (and ordinary people) follow (see figure 4.2).




Figure 4.2 Linkages in democratic politics and governance

The 'How-question'

The 'how' part of the question asks about the more or less democratic character of representation along the links indicated above. Democratic representation, as we recall, has three main dimensions.

First, representation must operate within a framework where both the *demos* and public affairs are clearly defined. In other words, what are the major public matters concerning values, populations or residents and/or issues and interests that actor X tends to give priority to? In these matters, to what other people does

Box 4.1 The main aspects of actors' power and capacity to alter the opportunity structure

- Political exclusion versus inclusion.
 1. Are the main dominant actors and actors of change included or excluded from politics and related parts of society?
 2. Are other groups (minorities, migrants, dissidents, etc.) included or excluded?
- Capacity to transform economic, social, cultural and coercive capital into authority, that is, symbolic capital towards political power.
 1. What are the main actors' sources of power (economic, social, coercive and cultural capital)?
 2. How and to what extent can they transform their accumulated capital into authority and legitimacy, symbolic and political power?
- Capacity to turn concerns that others may classify as private or communal into public political matters.
 1. What problems and visions do the actors deem to be public (or private, communal or for civil society)?
 2. How and to what extent are the main actors able to put their main issues and policies on the political agenda? Do they phrase these issues and policies as single issues and interests or as parts of strategic reforms and programmes?
- Capacity to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies.
 1. Do the main actors incorporate people into politics by way of populism, charismatic leaders, patronage and/or good contacts?
 2. Or do the main actors rather try to integrate people into politics by way of networking between independent actors and/or building organisations from below, fostering co-ordination units?
- Ability to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them and develop new ones.
 1. Where *and* how do the major actors go with the matters that they consider being of common concern?
 2. Where *and* how, in the experience of the informants, do ordinary people (from the well of to the poor) go with the matters that they deem to be of common concern?

actor X relate, believing that they have these affairs in common and should thus act or at least make decisions together?

Secondly, the principles of political equality and impartiality must apply in decision making and implementation respectively.

Thirdly, the representative should be authorised with a mandate and be accountable to those being represented, which presupposes responsiveness and transparency.

The end result would thus be a number of typical tracks with annotations of more or less democratic representation in relation to various values, populations, issues and interests.

Power Matters: Indonesia

Having assessed the standard of the institutions in Indonesia assumed to promote democracy and having evaluated the extent to which the main dominant and alternative actors played by these rules, the next question concerns the actors' political capacity to genuinely promote and use, perhaps just use or even abuse and evade them.

Powerful and Hegemonic

As outlined in chapters 2 and 3, many of the institutions of democracy in Indonesia – including those concerned with elections – were carefully designed to favour powerful moderate groups and to obstruct the actors of change, while the latter were advised to limit their activities within civil society. In addition, the indicators of political capacity clearly showed that all the actors that the informants deemed to be generally powerful (economically, socially and culturally) were also politically powerful.

Access to public resources and good contacts are these actors' primary sources of power. 'Pure' economic bases are less crucial. Politics, clearly, remains the key to economic success. Alliances, moreover, are mainly made within a variety of the powerful sections of the elite in a broad sense of the term. The political legitimacy of these elites is mainly based on good connections and authoritative positions.

Ordinary people are brought into politics primarily through clientelism and populism, often combined with cultural, ethnic and religious loyalties and organisations. In addition, and to compensate for the fact that old dependency relationships are increasingly eroded, the control and use of the mass media and reputable NGOs is becoming increasingly important (cf. Manor 2010, 2012). Broader organisations based on socio-economic interests and related ideologies are, however, rare. Those combining several levels and issues towards an aggregation of agendas remain insignificant. And attempts to build from below are the weakest of all.

The powerful actors in Indonesia do not thus just benefit from favourable rules of the game such as those concerned with political parties and elections, as described in chapter 3. They are also the most capable of transforming their

economic, social, coercive and cultural capital into authoritative and legitimate power, to be present within politics, to generate broad political programmes, to mobilise people and to claim that they serve as their representatives. Remarkably, as mentioned in previous chapters, this is not primarily because Suharto's old cronies have become skilful in winning elections on their own. Rather, it is mainly due to the significant inclusion of and alliances with wider sections of the Indonesian elite with such abilities.

Democrats on the Sidelines

In contrast, the pro-democratic actors of change that the informants deemed important were not just suffering from unfavourable rules of the electoral game. Almost all indicators suggest, moreover, that they had failed to develop much significant political capacity.

Typically, activists rarely tried to mobilise followers inside public administration and to engage in organised politics, nor were they present in public and private workplaces.

Moreover, the pro-democrats related primarily to specific sections of the population, rarely building links between them. There were only few attempts, for example, to link activities in workplaces, residential areas and communities. Activists were engaged in specific localities, paying little attention to wider issues of governance, development and public welfare. There was much focus on the rule of law, human rights, corruption and civil control of the army; less on citizenship and almost nothing on representation and the capacity of governments to implement policies.

The main achievement of the democracy actors was to collect and disseminate information, engage in lobbying and pressure group activities and promote self-management and self-help. The way they gained authority and legitimacy was primarily on the basis of their superior knowledge and their participation in the public discourse.

This was, however, at the expense of organising with a view to obtaining a public mandate or to win elections. The NGOs in particular were poorly connected to social movements and popular organisations. Collective action was mainly based on individual networking and alternative patronage as opposed to participation in broad and representative organisations.

Parliaments and executive institutions were in the main approached through lobbying and individual negotiation by NGOs and criticised in the media, in addition to the engagement of a few individual ex-activists in parties and as advisors in central and local administration. Given the issues that were prioritised, lobbying and media activism was simply a more effective strategy than, at least in the short run, to engage in building mass politics, viable political parties or broad interest organisations.

Those involved in these group activities or as individuals no doubt gained some important experience. As such it was a major achievement compared with the subordination suffered under Suharto when organised politics (except in the government party) was prohibited at the grassroots level in order to turn ordinary

people into what the regime called a 'floating mass'. After Suharto, however, as indicated in chapter 1, case studies clearly show that the pro-democracy activists themselves were 'floating' by having failed to develop a solid social constituency.

Judging from the qualitative democracy surveys, then, the actors of change had not really been able to alter this but generally remained unable to generate substantial improvements in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. In many cases, they even contributed to more privatisation and polycentrism. It was not clear what people (*demos*) would control what public affairs. In addition, the groups were often marginalised or co-opted by more powerful local actors within politics, administration and business, as well as by international organisations and donors.

The following chapters will address the implications of these results, first not only in terms of how pro-democratic actors themselves tried to change, but also with regard to the risks of democratic setbacks, and then to the researchers and associated activists' recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

ACTORS AND DEMOCRATISATION

Actors' Strategies and Democratisation

This is a crucial point in the book. The focus hitherto has been on the assessment of a wide range of dimensions of democracy. Yet we still need to understand how they interact and change – in other words to analyse the dynamics of democratisation.

As emphasised in chapter 1, analysis of the dynamics of democratisation is absent in mainstream assessments, which is a major weakness. One reason for this deficit is that procedural rather than substantive definitions of democracy are inherently static given that the substance, in terms of the qualities of the institutions, is neglected. Another reason is that with narrow definitions of democracy it is particularly difficult to consider the interaction between the various dimensions of democratisation. For instance, since democracy is often only equated to certain liberties and free and fair elections, it is suggested then, even by definition, that the struggle for the rule of law and against corruption must be fought with extra-democratic means. Similarly, several aspects of the substance of democracy tend to be avoided. This relates to the importance of the impartial implementation of democratic decisions and that those decisions do not undermine democratisation.

More than that, as referred to in chapter 1, most assessments are based on several normative assumptions: first, that liberal democracy is the model to be favoured and evaluated; secondly, that institution-building is fundamental because rules and regulations are both necessary and decisive in shaping people's actions (so if the 'right' institutions are in place people will turn into democrats) and thirdly, that it is possible to craft these institutions by way of internationally supported pacts between moderate incumbents and dissidents. Consequently, there is no need for in-depth and unbiased analysis of the problems and options of developing democracy. Rather, it is sufficient to identify what institutions need to be improved and to enable the enlightened elites to craft them, after which point democracy will develop and prosper.

So what is the alternative? How is it possible to move towards the adoption of an unbiased framework that opens up for critical analysis of the dynamics of democratisation? This book has recommended the inclusion of a more complete

range of factors that, according to several theories, are critical in processes of democratisation. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have highlighted those institutions that are supposed to promote democracy, the major actors' adherence to the rules and regulations, and the same actors' political capacity to use and promote the institutions of democracy. Yet, while this is better, it is still not good enough. This, albeit more comprehensive, framework still has a tendency to produce static assessments. Identifying ways of analysing how the critical factors combine and change in the process of democratisation remains a challenge.

Strategies and Democratisation

That said, it is next to impossible to analyse the interaction between all the variables that have been specified in the previous chapters in any meaningful way. Identifying critical priorities is inevitable.

The first recommendation to this end is to identify the propelling forces. This should be possible by focusing on the major dominant and reform-oriented actors' applied strategies, and by asking when and how vital aspects of democratisations make sense according to and as a consequence of those strategies.

This is not to negate the intrinsic value of democracy. Something being sensible may mean more than being rational and utilitarian; it may even have to do with wisdom. Besides, political strategies tend to be based on values in addition to analysis and calculations.

The simple empirical question is, thus, when and how the fundamentals of democratisation fit into the actors' wider discourses, plans and actual struggles to foster various political, social and economic aims. In short, how do the actors' strategies and related government policies affect democratisation, and vice versa?

The Crucial Problems of Democratisation

Unfortunately, however, bringing the wider dynamics of applied strategies on board also requires setting additional priorities. Studying how all the actors' strategies relate to all the aspects of democratisation is not entirely realistic.

The second recommendation, therefore, is to identify what problems of democratisation are most crucial, and, then, what actors and strategies are most important in relation to these problems.

At best, the identification of the main dilemmas and actors' strategies can be based on the conclusions from previous assessments of democratisation in the country or region to be studied. If there are no such results, it is necessary to conduct pilot studies and consult conclusions from similar contexts.

For the purposes of the general recommendations in this book, however, we need to use broader empirical conclusions as a point of departure. Let us consider, therefore, the major comparative insights from a collective three volume project by a network of international scholars with a common interest in the challenges of analysing the problems of substantive (instead of formalistic) and substantial (instead of territorially and sectorally limited) democratic transformation (Harriss et al. 2009, Törnquist et al. 2009, Stokke and Törnquist 2013).¹

De-politicisation of Democracy

The third wave of democracy in the Global South in conjunction with market-driven globalisation since the mid-1980s has not only swept away many of the obstacles but also the preconditions for political advances. The major weakness of the efforts to build democracy by crafting the supposedly universally correct liberal democratic institutions is that these are uncritically exported irrespective of the fact that there may have been alternatives and a need for contextualisation. Institutions are introduced and analysed without considering contextual actors and relations of power – what may be called the de-politicisation of democracy. Moreover, the results are meagre. In contrast to the mainstream assumption that if ideal liberal democratic rules, regulations and organisations are introduced, most actors will adjust and turn democratic, and the overwhelming empirical evidence is that the powerful actors have instead dominated and adjusted the ‘parachuted’ institutions to their own interests and ideas.

The main characteristics of the de-politicised form of democratisation are as follows:

1. pacts and agreements between powerful elites on building core institutions of democracy (related to the rule of law, human rights, free and fair elections, Weberian administration and civil society), excluding ordinary people and their representatives;
2. privatisation and informal localisation of important public affairs to the market, affluent CSOs and ethnic and religious communities;
3. decentralisation of government based on ‘subsidiarity’ and the idea that people in local communities have common interests and that relations of power are not important;
4. technocratic and non-interest-based ‘good governance’ involving government, market actors, CSOs and ethnic and religious communities, again without considering power relations;
5. a number of problems of abuse and privileged control of institutions of democracy such as unequal citizenship, unequal access to justice, poorly implemented human rights, elite and money-dominated elections, corrupt administration, middle-class-dominated civil society and otherwise pre-dominance of ‘illiberal’ democratic practices;
6. some popular oriented civil society projects that contest negative politics and authoritarian states, but often neglect that political engagement and support is necessary to implement progressive projects such as participatory budgeting, planning and so on within the hegemonic framework.

Poor Popular Representation

What would be the core elements in attempts at politicising democracy? To answer this question, it is necessary to first identify the roots of the problems and then analyse these causes more closely in a comparative perspective. The answer is that problems such as corruption that were associated with the depoliticised form of democratisation were rooted in poor *democratic* representation of ordinary people and middle-class interests and aspirations.

This calls for rethinking democratic forms of representation of the people, which primarily means to:

1. Examine the political construction of the people (*demos*) and public affairs, and related problems of democracy such as unclear definitions of which people are supposed to control what popular affairs.
2. Examine problems of *democratic* representation in relation to *all* forms of governance of what are widely deemed to be public affairs, even if the means of governance have been privatised and even if some actors argue that a number of issues are no longer of common concern.
3. Examine problems of *democratic* representation in relation to *all* linkages between people and institutions of governance (i.e. direct as well as indirect representation, informal and claimed representation, etc.).
4. Examine how symbolic, descriptive and substantive representation is legitimised and authorised.
5. Examine both the input side of democratic representation, which is to be based on politically equal generation of decisions, and the output side, which is to be based on impartial implementation.

Flawed Linkages in the Political System

The de-politicisation of democracy, which boils down to weak popular representation, may be summed up in the form of flawed linkages, as shown in figure 5.1, and in the system of democratic politics and governance of public affairs that was illustrated in figure 4.2.

In other words, these flawed linkages constitute the key aspect in the struggle over more substantive (vs formalistic) and substantial (vs narrow) democracy. Thus, studies of the dynamics of democratisation may be analysed by focusing on how the actors and their strategies relate to this struggle.

What are the typical characteristics of these flawed linkages? (See Harriss et al. 2009, Törnquist et al. 2009, Stokke and Törnquist 2013.) On the basic level, citizens and the many denizens (at best being part of the *demos* and thus having the right to vote but without capacity to even claim most of the other formal rights that they may actually have) are often fragmented in terms of what issues and interests they deem to be of public rather than private, family, religious or ethnic concerns. The same applies to what people (*demos*) should then be deemed stakeholders with the right to benefits and to control the public affairs – only some members of a community or a more widely defined *demos*?

On a fundamental structural level, this reflects increasingly uneven, disintegrated and often globalised production and service provision, making it increasingly difficult for workers and other employees to come together on common interests and sometimes even to meet. However, it also reflects the weakness of states, making it necessary for people to seek private or communal solutions to basic problems of survival and security. Moreover, it is a common effect of the colonial and post-colonial governance that provides unequal status to people, rules by defining and separating various populations, along caste, ethnic or




Figure 5.1 Flawed linkages of democratic politics and governance.

religious lines in particular, and which obstructs the formation of broader solidarities based on class and related ideologies. Given that democracy presupposes clearly defined public affairs and *demos*, and given that representation calls for equally well-specified issues, principles and agents, much of both these pillars remain to be developed if democratisation and representation do not continue, as it often seems, to be built on the sand.

In many, and perhaps most cases, the actual links between people and the governance of public affairs thus bypass democratically oriented representation, and are forged instead by way of patrons, bosses and militia groups as well as ethnic and religious leaders.

But even within democratically oriented forms of representation, the paths are narrow and difficult to navigate. Political representation through elections of

individual candidates, parties and parliaments is often least trusted and deemed to be 'dirty'. Moreover, for instance, the formal as well as economic thresholds for being able to build alternative parties and run as a candidate with a fair chance to get elected are often overwhelming, thus paving the way, again, for elite-driven clientelism and populism.

Several activists and some sections of the popular movements try 'new politics' instead by way of civil society organisations and networking in addition to media, studies and research. Generally speaking, however, the various groups and projects, as we know, are atomised geographically as well as in terms of issues, interests and organisation. Some argue that this is a way of fostering independence and development from below, forming myriads of groups, ideas and autonomous people, while others worry that it undermines broader democratic work and the chances of making a difference beyond protests.

Many citizen organisations, moreover, prioritise the vision and needs of those enrolled from among new middle classes. It is true that other groups act with or on behalf of ordinary people and their problems, but the chains of democratic representation are notoriously weak and often dubious.

Furthermore, the connections between citizen groups, on the one hand, and often broader and more membership-based issue and interest organisations, on the other, tend to be strained and undemocratic. The major tendency seems to be that citizen groups relate to other organisations, to politicians and parliaments as well as to various executives in public governance by way of next to personalised networking. Occasionally, this is backed up by extra-parliamentary pressure politics (at times visualised in terms of 'people power'), which for brief periods may cause disruptions and some change, but which are difficult to follow up.

Similarly, many politicians hope to foster popular support and networks among citizen and more popular groups. There may be altruistic reasons involved, but the basic rationale is to seek support for their own agendas and priorities, thus causing additional divisions and tensions.

Much the same applies to the channels for citizen rights-based representation. This means that there are certain options for strong citizens to claim their rights through the legal system and at best to campaign for those of others too. Yet these avenues presuppose privileged skills, capacities and networks that rarely foster democratic organisation and representation. Typically, legal aid lawyers and campaigners in related fields are most prominent.

Broader issue and interest organisations are often almost equally fragmented. In many cases, they are squeezed between authoritarian government policies through attempts at political co-optation and the new emphasis on liberal democracy with civil society groups. Moreover, as long as there are few or no channels of interest representation that favour broad and democratic issue and interest representation (such as environmental groups, employers' organisations and trade unions), the main tendency of the existing issue and interest groups seems to be consolidation of their specific followers and areas, adding occasional alliances and best possible contacts from influential politicians and executives.

It is true that another main tendency is stakeholder representation; many donors such as the World Bank and a number of CSOs foster supposedly direct

participation as an alternative to crooked politics. A common problem is, however, that many of the groups, communities and individuals that engage in these practices reflect the existing power structures rather than paving the way for change. The few cases of genuinely alternative individual as well as collective representation that have emerged such as in Brazil and Kerala have rather been based on broad organisation from below, supported and scaled up by genuinely supportive politicians and political executives.

Proceeding to the very governance of public affairs, this suffers, as we know, from the combined effects of privatisation and confused multi-level and segmented administration in addition to poorly developed avenues for democratic issue and interest representation. As a consequence, it is extremely difficult to struggle for the rule of law and impartial implementation against corruption by way of improving other dimensions of democracy such as representation.

Against this backdrop, the concerned scholars in the collective project have arrived at a number of conclusions regarding political principles and dynamics towards improved popular representation (Törnquist et al. 2009, Stokke and Törnquist 2013):

1. Popular representation calls for empowered citizens and stronger popular organisations that can give voice and reform the system.
2. It also calls for improved institutional nodes and clear democratic principles of representation that ensure strong linkages between popular organisations and institutions of public governance.
3. Substantive popular representation rests, moreover, with the distribution of resources and relations of power as well as with the resistance and organised struggle for change.
4. Regarding political change towards more substantial and substantive democratisation, pressure from below is not enough in itself. The design of the public institutions for participation and representation is crucial as they affect the ways in which people organise and mobilise. Successful introduction of institutions that are favourable for democratic popular organisation and mobilisation rests with a combination of leadership and demands from below.
5. This leads to the identification of entry points for political projects or strategies.

Taken together, these five main conclusions call for transformative democratic politics. This means political agendas, strategies and alliances to introduce effective democratic institutions that may further promote ordinary people's capacities and opportunities for altering predominant structures and the capacity of elites to dominate politics. We will expand on this in chapter 6, but some of the general dimensions will also be touched upon below.

It is not easy to develop transformative strategies of combining democratic opportunities with policies to improve the rules and regulations and ordinary people's democratic capacity. Such strategies would include attempts, for instance, to open up democratic interest-based representation, and thereby also strengthen the chances of fostering welfare reforms. This could make life a little bit better for

many people while also increasing their democratic capacity to act independently of patrons and bosses. However, there would also be a number of dilemmas, the foremost of which is that privatisation, dubious multi-level governance, democratic activism and institution-building are often separated from issues of welfare and growth. Democratisation has somehow become detached from class.

An increasingly common reaction is to ask instead for stronger institutions and popular leaders. However, this tends to lead to a backlash as the propelling forces are rarely subject to basic democratic control beyond elitist citizen groups. The typical outcome is thus poor and highly asymmetric public governance with few opportunities for the users to make a difference, except for those among the middle and upper classes who can add their power as moneyed consumers in the market.

The Key Problems of Fragmentation, Representation and Transformation

In short, the flawed links that were illustrated in figure 5.1 are characterised by political fragmentation, weak democratic representation and ineffectual transformative politics.

The *political fragmentation* is not just about geographical levels but also about content (in terms of issues and interests) and the various actors. The fragmented levels refer to contradictions between central and local and between different workplaces. Typically there are defective linkages between central and local (as well as between the various localised units and between workplaces and residential areas). With regard to the content, moreover, there is a tendency towards a myriad of unco-ordinated projects, issues and specific interests. The actors, lastly, are often a multitude of organisations, groups and individuals, typically connecting with each other through informal networks.

The key questions in this respect are thus how the actors' strategies (and associated government policies) relate to the challenges of fragmentation and whether and how the strategies and policies engage in scaling-up the localised projects, the scattered contents and the myriad of actors.

It is important to remember that scaling-up has, historically, not just been from below or top-down but also through the building of strategic paths. For example, grassroots organisations have demanded the opening up of democratically institutionalised channels of influence from the central level for citizen and interests organisations. Typically, this has been in relation to the governance of public affairs and thus also possible co-operation between state and society. Such channels, in turn, have at times fostered links between local and central levels as well as more unified groups and co-ordinated programmes.

The flawed links are also characterised by *defunct popular democratic representation*. How do the actors' strategies (and associated government policies) relate to this? Do they perhaps neglect the issues of representation or do they try to solve the associated problems; and if so, how?

How do the strategies affect the constitution of the *demos* and public affairs? Some strategies may, for instance, be communitarian or class driven, while others

Box 5.1 Key questions about the dynamics of democratisation

- How do actors' strategies and related government policies affect critical aspects of democratisation and vice versa?
- In particular, first, how do the strategies and policies relate to political fragmentation with regard to geographical levels, the myriad of issues and interests and the atomised actors? How (if at all) do they foster scaling-up in these regards?
- Secondly, how do the actors' strategies and related government policies relate to deficient popular democratic representation?
- Thirdly, how (if at all) do the strategies and policies develop various kinds of transformative politics?

focus on the same rights and benefits for all. Similarly, public affairs may be more or less widely defined and related to many people or to just a few or quite specific communities.

Moreover, what importance is given to the principles of political equality as opposed to privileges for the few? What of the impartial implementation of decisions in contrast to nepotism, collusion and corruption? What importance is given to the authority of responsive and accountable representatives with mandates?

These questions about actors' strategies apply equally to organised political actors and, for instance, to trade unions and CSOs.

Lastly, the flawed links are also associated with *poorly developed transformative politics*. This boils down to the neglect of political manoeuvres and reforms that may enhance the opportunities for ordinary people to use and promote democracy by improving their lives, and vice versa.

Strategies, for instance, to foster rural employment or kindergartens are obviously not issues of political democracy as such, but they may well be crucial in enhancing landless people's and especially women's democratic citizenship.

How do the actors' strategies (and associated government policies) relate to such dynamics of reforms generating more advanced reforms? What are the different proposals and practices to foster change or maintain the status quo?

Rethinking Indonesian Pro-democrats

In spite of being fairly comprehensive, the qualitative Indonesian pilot surveys also suffered from static analysis of a wide range of crucial factors. The analytical tools for how to also assess the dynamics of democratisation recommended in the first part of the chapter had not yet been fully developed. Steps in this direction were taken, however, with special studies for considering the challenges of the most important pro-democratic strategies.

Having summarised the historical legacies, the focus was on the experiences of pioneering current actors who were trying to find ways to overcome the dilemmas that had been identified in the qualitative surveys. The priority of

the initial study was to analyse the ways in which these rethinking actors tried to combine their engagement in civil society with entering organised politics as well (Nur 2009). A parallel and theoretically comparative study looked more closely at the associated strategies with regard to the problems of fragmentation and the need to scale-up – from local to central (and vice versa), from single issues to more comprehensive policies and programmes, and from separate to more unified actions and organisations (Törnquist et al. 2009a). A third more comprehensive local set of studies were conducted on the role of democracy for peace and reconstruction in Aceh (Törnquist et al. 2011). The main results were as follows.

The Historical Legacies

Indonesian democratic politics continue to suffer from the physical elimination in the mid-1960 of one of the world's most extensive popular movements against remnants of colonialism. The movements were related to the Communist Party of Indonesia and radical nationalist President Sukarno. They had given up on democratisation and were therefore unable to contain and provide a successful alternative to the most powerful groups in the army as well as public administration, business and agriculture. These powerful groups had supported President Sukarno, but at the same time – quite unexpectedly in the mainstream leftist analysis – used nationalism and the state for their own purposes of accumulating resources and capital, as well as containing popular aspiration (Törnquist 1984).

After the massacres and Suharto's ascendancy in 1965–1966, the new dissident groups were quite different and had their roots in three different political tendencies (e.g. Törnquist 1997, Aspinall 2005, Lane 2008). One strand was composed of the liberal and socialist-oriented intellectuals, including student groups, that had been critical of the authoritarianism of Sukarno and the PKI's radical nationalism. Some had even supported the military's repressive anti-communism. However, this was before they came to understand that with Suharto came the mass killings, which they found abhorrent, and that the military, rather than the middle-class technocrats and intellectuals, would be at the helm. Another strand of the slowly emerging democracy movement came from the non-communist trade unions and the civil society organisations that focused on the farmers and urban poor. And a third strand belonged to a new generation of civil society groups concerned with alternative development, often focusing on the environment or issues of human rights and corruption.

Over the years, most of these groups came to agree that the authoritarian state was a major obstacle and that civil society was the basis for any alternative. Class differences were not at the forefront and the new groups were neither based on extensive membership nor country-wide organisations outside the major cities, functioning rather as influential networks. The focus was on specific issues and human rights. While there were occasional radical actions, a common concern was how to avoid provoking major repression.

By the late 1980s, leftist-oriented students tried to challenge this cautious approach. They argued that any substantive improvement called for radical

change. Democracy was crucial for the transformation of Indonesia's repressive and exploitative model of development. Such change, they said, called for political leadership and closer links between civil society groups, activists and ordinary people. These points were widely accepted, but there was no agreement on how to implement them. While occasionally forming temporary coalitions, most groups kept to their own projects in opposing the regime. Moreover, the radical would-be political leaders made good use of the NGOs to win supporters, gain contacts and resources and build their own organisations. Thus, the groups were suspicious of each other. Meanwhile, other activists tried to reach out to ordinary people by relating to existing socio-religious organisations. However, prior to the fall of Suharto, they only rarely linked up with separatist or nationalist leaders in East Timor, Papua and Aceh; this was mostly to avoid accusations of betraying the country.

In spite of the quite separate groups, it is nevertheless correct to talk about a democracy movement in the sense that they agreed on the need for political change and democratisation. However, there was no ideological unity or country-wide co-ordination, and almost no attempts at forming united fronts and parties. While important in undermining the legitimacy of the Suharto regime, the movement stood for no coherent alternative. A major claim was that civil society and the people themselves should run the country. The movement failed to develop an alternative transitional arrangement and snap elite-negotiated elections meant that activists lost momentum. They became socially and politically marginalised.

Why was it so difficult for the various factions of the democracy movement to come together and form a genuine political alternative, before and after the fall of Suharto? The answer is simple: there was not a strong enough reason for any of the actors involved to do so. Given the polycentric nature of the movement, and the single issue and special interests that were prioritised, lobbying, individual engagement in parties and public administration and media activism was simply a more effective strategy, at least in the short run, than engaging in mass politics and building viable political parties, or broad interest-based organisations.

Rethinking Activists

How did these political innovators try to overcome their own social and political marginalisation in addition to the powerful elite's monopolisation of the political system? Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish between society and party-cum-candidate-driven projects. Within these it is possible, in turn, to identify eight trends or types of projects and experiences (Törnquist et al. 2009a, 2013).²

Society-driven Projects

The first project was characterised by attempts at *democratising popular communities* such as customary (*adat*) groups, indigenous populations and Muslim congregations on the basis of equal though alternative citizenship. This was meant to provide the foundations for locally rooted governance and thus base interventions

in mainstream politics. Typically, however, a community would not claim equal citizenship rights for all the people in the locality but only for itself as a specific community. It was also unclear what public affairs (such as natural resources or citizen rights and obligations) that this community rather than people in general or several communities together would control and on what grounds. It is therefore likely that it would take the introduction of broader and more inclusive political formation by a locally trusted yet nationally widespread cluster of equal rights-based movements to unleash the full democratic potential of the different communities.

The second project was marked by efforts to bypass 'crooked politics' by building new models of '*direct politics*' to develop media and public discourse, social auditing, struggle against corruption and participatory budgeting. Yet again it was not clear what people would control what public affairs and how decisions would be taken, who was represented and to whom activists and their groups were accountable. While many issues were no doubt important, it seemed as if the most powerful and resourceful actors with best contacts tended to dominate. This applied also within the nationally introduced scheme for participatory budgeting, *Musreimbang* and the donor funded and more civil society and market-driven community development programme, which were both addressed in chapter 2. Finally, the media and the public discourse, in general, have over the years been increasingly dominated by moneyed political and business interests.

The third type of strategy that could be identified was that CSOs and labour leaders facilitated *trade union-based politics and parties*. In some cases, this was combined not only with community organising in neighbourhoods, but also with ethnic and religious groups. Commonly, however, the differences between the unions, their leaders and associated communities were also scaled-up, thus preventing broader joint work and linkages with other pro-democratic constituencies and wider popular issues. As a consequence, many unions and associated movements were more inclined to return to lobbying and pressure politics, at times in extra-democratic forms. Exciting recent new attempts relate more to co-ordination with advocates for political contracts such as on welfare issues and labour laws, and attempts to act within mainstream parties to which we shall return.

A similar, fourth kind of project was the promotion by CSOs and associated leaders of broader *social movement-based politics and parties*. One such attempt was based on environmental groups and another on fledgling farmers and agricultural workers' organisations. The former attempt continues in the direction of a green party, which may well gain some ground but possibly remain rather marginal if it is not able to develop broad alliances. The other more agrarian-based and more comprehensive party project, however, collapsed when it failed to form a sufficient number of local units around the country to be eligible in elections. To counter the common suspicion (among the NGOs and workers and farmers' groups supposed to form the basis of the party) that the propelling political activists would cater to their own interests, it was agreed that candidates in elections would come directly from the basic organisations. However, these organisations

obviously deemed the political project to be too risky and expensive as compared to their usual practices of fostering clients and members' interests as pressure and lobby groups via individual top level contacts. Moreover, the questions of how to develop and decide on joint platforms and priorities as well as to elect and keep candidates accountable were never really resolved.

The fifth and most common society-driven project that stood out was characterised by groups that tried to make an impact by negotiating *political contracts* of co-operation with strong political actors who needed to broaden their alliances and support base beyond predominantly clientelist arrangements. These politicians thus engaged in programmes that attracted wider sections of the population that wanted, for instance, less corrupt governance and better public welfare systems. Pro-democracy groups, in exchange for lending their good names and endorsing the politicians in elections, typically tried to sign a memorandum of understanding with the politicians, with the aim of increasing the capacity of wider sections of the population. Many of the actual arrangements were, however, only statements of intent and limited to rather narrow issues. Furthermore, most civil and popular actors lacked sufficient bargaining power to enforce the deals. They were typically unable to deliver a substantial number of votes, and lacked an organisation that was able to keep successful politicians accountable after the elections. Yet, lessons are learnt, broader alliances may be added and improved strategies seem to evolve in relation to the sixth project of building fronts from within, especially within the nationalist-populist PDI-P party, and the eighth strategy (to which we will return) of launching local parties and independent candidates.

Party-cum-candidate-driven Projects

The sixth project was to build political *fronts from within* an already powerful party or social movement (or to take over the weak local chapters of such parties), turning parts of them and the advisers of their elected ministers and local executives into instruments of change. The problem, however, included the risk of being co-opted and the uphill task of building strength enough to advance when being unable to build fractions inside the party or movement. In spite of these dilemmas, new attempts continue to be made, with some success when in combination with CSOs and related movements outside the party. The best case so far is from the city of Solo (Surakarta) on Central Java where civil society and social movement activists related to populist leaders within the PDI-P party who in turn related to the executive positions in the municipality and were in need of extra-parliamentary support in the competition against the elected councillors (Partikno and Lay 2013). Partially this may now be replicated with the recent election of the said Mayor of Solo, Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), to the Governor of Jakarta.

The seventh major project was to build a national *ideology-driven party* with well-educated and solidly organised cadres to provide political guidance and co-ordination to the CSOs and the social movements. However, there were simply very few strong and broad popular movements to guide. Those in the making were often not convinced of the need to subordinate themselves to external

would-be leaders with parachuted agendas. Yet new attempts are being developed. Those with firmer bases in popular movements may gain some importance in critical political junctures – when, however, it may also be attractive to bypass rather than further develop democratically poorly organised politics.

The eighth and final type of project was to fight for the legalising of *local parties and independent candidates* in elections. This project was mainly developed and initially also proved successful in the autonomous war-torn and tsunami-affected province of Aceh. Remarkably, proponents even managed to exchange a revised Indonesian law to admit local parties in Aceh for a successful peace agreement. Moreover, reform-oriented ex-guerrilla commanders and civil society activists took this opportunity to their hearts and built an alliance, launched coalitions of independent candidates and won the 2006 elections of local executives. They did so in spite of resistance from semi-aristocratic GAM leaders in exile and mainstream Indonesian politicians. Thus, it was possible to envisage the new institutions as a model for the country at large as well as for other conflict areas (Törnquist et al. 2011).

These advances, however, were rapidly undermined – and the lost opportunities call for a brief extended analysis.

Lost Opportunities in Aceh

To start with, the international diplomatic and development aid agencies made little effort to employ their massive post-tsunami reconstruction programmes to develop better governance in Aceh in co-operation with the new, democratically elected political executives. This helped to make it possible for the semi-aristocratic ex-GAM leaders and local strongmen with access to sections of the former command structure of the rebel movement to become dominant, to develop power sharing agreements with former enemies in Jakarta and to do their utmost to marginalise the civil society activists as well as the reformist ex-GAM leaders (Törnquist et al. 2011, Törnquist 2013, Törnquist 1979–idem.).

Moreover, the activists and reformists leaders themselves were not very successful in using their new positions as political executives in the provincial government and most of the districts to foster inclusive alternative development. Thus, they were unable to resist clientelism and corruption after 2006 when faced with trying to retain the positions that they either won in the elections or had been appointed to. They also neglected the need to promote popular movements and democratic channels for interest group representation as crucial supplements to liberal democratic party politics, elections and lobby groups; channels of influence that the powerful local elite were more skilled in abusing for their own purposes.

Meanwhile, moreover, the autocratic ex-GAM leaders skilfully formed and developed their own local Aceh Party (PA) without really having to compete with any organised alternative. So when the civil society activists were harassed and isolated by the PA and Governor Irwandi, and when PA entered into a tactical understanding with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democratic Party in the 2009 parliamentary elections, the civil society parties suffered disastrous electoral losses and were disqualified from further participation. Thereafter, PA

was thus relieved from the need to compete against local parties and could proceed by doing away with both Irwandi and other reformists by arguably undemocratic means, first by marginalising them inside the party and then by trying to prevent them even from running as independents in the upcoming local elections, arguing that the Helsinki agreement had only allowed for independent candidates in the 2006 elections.

After the Helsinki agreement, however, Indonesia as a whole had also agreed to the inclusion of independent candidates in the election of political executives. This certainly applied to Aceh too—especially since the intention of the Helsinki agreement was inclusion rather than exclusion of vital actors. Thus, PA's opponents in civil society groups and dissenting leaders appealed to the Constitutional Court—which on two occasions supported them by upholding the national right of independent candidates (pioneered in Aceh). Finally, moreover, some elements of the 2006 alliance between reformist former rebels and civil society activists seemed to re-emerge. So maybe there was thus a possibility to re-establish elements of transformative politics by combining the projects discussed above of political contracts and the idea of independent candidates for the elections of governor and heads of districts that were scheduled for 2011.

PA responded, however, by resisting the legal system, obstructing democracy by boycotting the elections and fuelling fears that the newly found peace was in jeopardy. In Jakarta, moreover, almost everyone from President Yudhoyono and former President Megawati to former general-turned business tycoon and presidential candidate, Prabowo, calculated that they had to strike favourable alliances with PA in order not to lose out in the province. Thus, it was even more widely argued that democracy had to be set aside in order to 'save peace'. Eventually, the Constitutional Court postponed the elections for a brief period to allow PA to change its mind, and this decision was widely accepted in Aceh. However, predictably the postponement was extended for quite a long period and only took place in 2012. Thus, PA could benefit at the expense of the other candidates and even received additional financial support and advice from powerful allies in Jakarta, including former generals who used to fight GAM (*Tempo* 2012) (later on Prabowo proved having offered most funds to PA in return for a power-sharing deal with PA in face of the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections). Meanwhile, PA itself focused on its organisational and clientelist strength within the old command structure of GAM and added intimidation and the argument that if it was not elected, peace might be at risk. So given that the PA's critics, who banked on their personal appeal and support from within the same command structure, abstained from building an effective organisational and political alternative, the PA's landslide victory was not very surprising (Törnquist 1979–idem.). The marginalised commanders, including former Governor Irwandi, the propelling former GAM-leaders behind the democratic peace accord and other progressive political activists and their civil society partners are now finally building a professedly social democratic party, the Aceh National Party (PNA). However, given the political manipulations in the lead up to the 2009 and 2012 elections, and that PA has now gained almost total political (and economic) hegemony in the province in strategic alliance

with the political and economic elite in Jakarta, the once promising process of democratisation has been severely undermined.

Beyond Aceh itself, these developments have thus pointed to the partial viability of combining the idea of independent candidates and political contracts, while the question of how CSOs can expand and relate to organised politics remains unresolved.

The Risks: A Return to the 'Politics of Order'

Meanwhile, the monopolisation of organised politics and the established forms of representation nourish a general lack of trust in democracy and public institutions. The cautious optimism at the time of the second democracy qualitative survey (in 2007 and 2008) of the attempts made at fighting corruption, even by the authorities and President Yudhoyono's regime, has over the years given way to outright democracy bashing, and the feeling that advances require more than democracy (cf. Törnquist 2012). A recent review of the fate of democratisation suggests, moreover, that the dominant and mostly elected elite has been successful in containing and even reversing critical aspects of the democratic advances, including those concerned with managing elections, efforts at curbing corruption and minority rights (Mietzner 2012).

Given the predominant narrow and institutionalist definition of democracy in terms of freedoms and elections, the common argument is that it takes other measures to curb corruption and promote welfare measures. As pro-democrats have lost ground, the counter argument that effective anti-corruption and the combination of welfare and growth would call instead for improved democratic representation of the middle and working classes as well as supplementary forms of representation to supervise public governance are typically deemed unrealistic.

Most worrying, the upper- and middle-class groups that rarely manage to win elections may well use the general discontent with elitist democracy to 'strengthen the rule of law', 'prevent disruptive populist rule', and, the argument goes, thus build stronger preconditions for democracy. Their views find an echo in the current international support for proper 'sequencing of democracy' (cf. Carothers 2007a, 2007b), which resembles Samuel Huntington's thesis from the 1960s about the need for 'politics of order'. A concrete example is the alliance in Thailand from 2006 onward between metropolitan middle classes (that fail to win elections), the king and the military as well as the similarly unholy alliances in Egypt after Mubarak.

Indonesia has been down this path once before, when it gave rise to Suharto's New Order regime in the 1960s. In contemporary Indonesia, former Vice-President Jusuf Kalla often stated that it was premature democratic elections that lay behind various conflicts and that profitable business-driven development would provide the best remedy. Other illustrations include the fostering of 'people power demonstrations' against corruption and abusive politicians, on the one hand, and presidentialism, stronger executives and the 'streamlining' of the party system towards a majoritarian two-party system, on the other. The latter is often accompanied by a general admiration of Singapore as well as China's attempts

to promote some stability and economic growth ahead of 'excessive democracy'. Meanwhile, religious Indonesian activists also argue for the need to reduce the public sphere, this time in favour of religious values, communities and leaders.

Conclusion

Ironically, the actors of change in Indonesia have thus gone from the disassociation of interest-based mass politics with democratisation in the 1950s and early 1960s, which ended in physical elimination, to the acknowledgment in the late 1980s onwards that democratisation is crucial and primary, but then having embraced strategies in favour of polycentrism, individual freedoms and privatisation, neglected the importance of socio-economic reforms to strengthen ordinary people's democratic capacity, thus disconnecting, once again, democracy and mass politics.

Generally, the new projects that have been identified in the second part of this chapter did not point to new transformative politics. On the contrary, they reflected already existing priorities and organisational practices among the pro-democrats. Their aims were modified, but not their politics. The main focus was still on issues of immediate concern to the groups and movements. Only rarely did they emphasise interests of wider concern, which would have called for broad alliances and mass politics. There were no major attempts to combine the focus on civil rights with questions of social and economic welfare and growth. This would have put politics, viable political parties and broad interest-based organisations on top of the agenda. When attempts at co-operation were made, the groups behind the various projects suffered from poorly developed links within the groups and organisations themselves as well as in relation to political parties, parliaments and state institutions. The poor links boiled down to problems of representation. The combination of political contracts and independent candidates has emerged as a potentially viable opening, especially when related to union interests in public welfare and regulations against outsourcing, but all the problems of alliances between broader groups and aspirations remain unresolved.

It remains an open question what will happen if and when these dilemmas combine with the lack of engagement on the part of the dominating political elite to facilitate the political inclusion of dissidents and subordinate class-based demands through electoral reform and supplementary forms of representation to curb corruption and develop welfare policies. It may well be that some once pro-democratic-oriented groups will turn to extra-democratic protest and even riots in the name of 'people power demonstrations'. And such protests may well be hijacked and used as an excuse for the re-introduction of 'politics of order'.

To discuss possible ways forward, these problems need to be analysed in comparative theoretical perspective, with the search for cases where similar dilemmas have been tackled more successfully. This is a major aim of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

FROM RESULTS TO RECOMMENDATIONS

Supplementing Results with Practitioners' Experiences and Comparative Insights

The primary aim of the alternative assessments discussed in this book is to describe and explain the state and dynamics of democratisation. However ideally, the assessments should also provide an important contribution to the wider discussion on the options of democratisation. This is for two reasons. First, because it is crucial to add uncompromising academic research and propositions to the public discourse on democracy. This discourse tends to be dominated by powerful domestic and foreign interests. Second, because the democracy activists and their supporters who contribute their knowledge and contacts to the assessments are usually eager to use the results in their deliberations on how to move forward and then it is a necessary to provide the best inputs. At best, the results and conclusions may thus serve as a point of departure for discussions on more unifying priorities and broader alliances.

The main recommendation is to gain new insights by way of comparisons. But before elaborating on how the comparisons may be carried out, we need to discuss the foundation for recommendations in the form of solid knowledge and practitioners' experience.

Research-based Recommendations

Recommendations are often produced in an ad hoc manner and not seen as a solid scholarly exercise, but rather the business of consultants and political advisors. This can be avoided. Credible research-based democracy engagement is not impossible.

The first recommendation to this end is that results need to be presented in relation to the major arguments on democratisation and associated politics found in the relevant academic and public discourse. Otherwise, the results do not make sense in policy discussions that hit the front pages and are on most people's minds. If presented only with summaries of data on various variables,

most practitioners (who are short of time) will either ignore the results or only pick up on whatever tends to support their own theses.

Secondly, it is necessary to go beyond the predominant tendency of identifying democratic deficits and then listing what needs be done, as when making an inventory of the contents of a fridge in order to write a shopping list. Given that there is no outlet for missing democracy ingredients, these kinds of seemingly neutral lists open up the potential for arbitrary interpretation of the results.

Thirdly, it is equally problematic to suggest new and better institutions. Such recommendations tend to be made on the basis of discussions of supposedly universal models such as electoral systems. The trouble is that these models often do not work in the same way in different contexts. Moreover, there is little in the identification of various ideal institutions (to, e.g. foster the rule of law or participatory planning) that informs us about how they can emerge and take root.

Fourthly, it is wise to draw on results that inform us about actors' relations to democracy and their capacity to use and promote the institutions. It is fine, for instance, to be able to point out that while certain powerful actors appear to adapt to elections and freedoms, they may actually abuse them. But how can one move forward when the same information says little about how to counter crooked politicians?

Fifth, it also helps – but still remains insufficient – to identify the processes and causes of, for instance, the political marginalisation of ordinary people, and thus be able to suggest what dynamics need to be altered. The reason for inefficiency in this case is that there are so many factors other than those that have been researched that need to be considered in order to suggest alternative strategies. It is one thing to say what should be removed and quite another to say who will do it and what should replace it. To move towards attaining this, one has to both add studies of the other important factors that matter in building alternatives and search for relevant lessons from other cases where democrats have been more successful in inducing positive processes.

Co-operation with Practitioners

A basic way of considering additional factors that have not been researched, but which actors of change need to consider, is through co-operation with the practitioners. Ideally, scholars themselves would engage in systematised dialogue with senior and critically reflective activists, politicians and executives. This is more productive than just leaving the initial follow up to the busy and by necessity partisan practitioners themselves.

That said, democratisation cannot be designed by skilled managers, technocrats and scholars alone. Scholarly autonomy is fundamental, but abstaining from engaging with the practitioners to discuss tentative results and possible ways forward opens up the potential for arbitrary interpretations of the results. Researchers can never consider all the crucial contextual factors. The same applies for the habits and values that matter and must be respected in democratic processes.

Co-operation between academic scholars and practitioners calls for mutual respect for each other's tasks and principles, which must be made clear for all parties involved. This is inherently conflictual. It implies, for instance, tough discussions with the ministries, donors and those others who commission research, who increasingly prefer academic researchers to act as consultants. The same applies to activists and associated NGOs who like to use research and researchers to foster their own position and arguments. It often helps, then, to conduct discussions in a neutral arena that is as academically autonomous as possible. It is not for scholars to act as backseat drivers in politics, but also not for enlightened practitioners to undermine best possible scholarship. Fortunately, however, there is no harm in searching for common ground in favour of democratic norms and aims.

We shall return to the operational dilemmas of co-operation in the final chapter on practical implementation of the alternative assessments.

The Need for Comparative Insights

In addition to research-based results and co-operation with experienced practitioners, the main way of gaining new insights is, however, to access relevant knowledge from other contexts where pro-democrats have learnt hard lessons and/or have been more successful than in the country or region under review when it comes to the major challenges that have been identified in the assessments. How might this be possible? What comparisons need to be made?

There is a disturbing history to the learning from others. This is because of the biases of most theories about modernisation, according to which both socio-economic and political development was universal. As a result, it is often believed that almost all that countries in the Global South in particular needed to do was copy the North. Most liberal as well as Marxist analysis of modernisation concluded that Europe and North America were ahead of the rest of the world and would pave the way, for good and for bad. This was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s by students of colonialism and dependence in particular. They argued, quite correctly, that European and North American-led modernisation in the Global South had often held back rather than fostered democracy, including human rights. However, the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. For example, a major but quite dubious conclusion at the time was that the development of democracy in the South was contingent on, first, the weakening of foreign dominance and, thereafter, the development of 'another' democracy on the basis of unique historical conditions. The only agreement between modernisation and dependency theorists was, thus, that democracy was premature in the South. While the former claimed that there was too little externally imposed modernisation for democracy to take root, the latter suggested that there was too much of this. This was obviously reflected in the priorities within international development co-operation too. Thus, support for democracy was played down, except for propagandistic cold war purposes.

Priorities changed with the transitions from authoritarianism to fledgling democracy in southern Europe and Latin America in the late 1970s and early

1980s. Surprisingly, as have been discussed in previous chapters, some democratisation was possible in spite of harsh conditions. For most researchers who applied a comparative perspective and acknowledged that there were huge differences between most of the cases, the most apparent common factors that fostered transitions to freedoms and elections were not popular grievances with authoritarian abuse of power. These scholars pointed instead to the importance of holding back radical popular groups and the crafting of pacts between moderate elites in favour of economic and political liberal institutions. Once again, then, the 'right institutions' were based on the most developed European and North American models. Once again, international development co-operation adjusted. And once again, donors continued to stipulate quite normatively that liberal institutions are crucial for development, that development aid will be reduced if they are not at hand, and that if they are weak they should be improved by better and moderate pacts between the elites (e.g. Sida 2010).

The biases and other drawbacks of these perspectives have already been discussed in previous chapters. But do these negative aspects mean that it will be forever impossible to compare experiences from contexts and outcomes quite different from each other? Do we have to give up on comparative studies of democracy in various countries in the Global South and between the Global South and the Global North? This book argues that we do not, if we take context seriously.

Upside Down Comparisons by Contrasting Contexts

It is true that narrowing down comparisons to thematic fields such as state, social movements and democracy was an important, yet insufficient step forward, as recommended by historical sociologists such as Barrington Moore (1965), Theda Skocpol (1979), Joel Migdal (1988), Göran Therborn (1995), Dietrich Rueschemeyer and E. H. and J. D. Stephens (1992). This allowed for more contextual analysis, but the themes and problems remained too generally formulated. When less structuralist and more elite actor and institutionalist approaches were added, as by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986), Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) or Larry Diamond (1988–1989, 2005), at least some aspects of the perspective reverted to yesterday's analyses based on Western liberal democratic assumptions. It should be possible to move ahead, however, by turning the modernisation comparisons upside down.

The point of departure for turning the comparisons upside down is that the theme and problems to be addressed are formulated in the very context of a particular country (or part of it) in the Global South – not in general/universal terms, and especially not using an idealised version of the modernised North as model context. Thereafter, but only thereafter, should one examine the other contexts with similar processes and issues as well as hard lessons and innovative solutions.

The focus is thus on related processes and issues with different outcomes in different contexts. These differences must be respected. For example, there are basic structural and other differences as well as varied political outcomes in India and Scandinavia. Hence, it will rarely be possible to use macro-causal

experimental methods based on explaining different outcomes in similar contexts or similar outcomes in different contexts. However, the method of focused contrasting of contexts can make a lot of sense. The general characteristics of this method – as spelt out in Skocpol and Somers' (1980, pp. 178–181) seminal article on comparisons – is to identify what is unique in each of the cases (which should be as different as possible) and how that which is unique affect processes that are assumed to be in common. Furthermore, themes and questions or ideal types are used to point out the differences. At best, the cases should, as per Clifford Geertz in his *Islam Observed*, 'form a kind of commentary on one another's character' (quoted from Skocpol and Somers 2012, p. 179). Furthermore, as the analysis gives priority to process (rather than to full contexts or widely defined thematic problems), it ought to be possible to identify crucial similarities and differences by tracing the historical dynamics (cf. Alexander and George 2005). Finally, the contrasting of contexts is not to develop universal theories but as per Reinhard Bendix in his *Kings or People* 'to sharpen our understanding of the contexts in which more detailed causal interferences can be drawn' (quoted from Skocpol and Somers 2012, p. 180).

Thus, the reading of experiences against each other sharpen our senses and it may be possible for us to not just be able to see similarities and differences but also to make more specific analyses of the lessons learnt from the two experiences. Once a problem has been identified in the first context and an interesting experience or resolution to a similar problem has been located in a quite different context, one may trace the political processes through which the interesting or even positive outcome came about. In doing so, one needs to specify different conditions to thus cast light of the problems and options in each case. However, it may also be possible to open up discussion beyond structural conditions – a discussion about politics that may alter the conditions, or in other words, transformative politics. The question is, then, whether and how it might be feasible to adapt critical elements of the *politics* of priorities, alliances, coalitions, organisation and so on to other contexts. Thus, the dynamics – including power relations, opportunities and forms of mobilisation and organisation, alliances, compromises, institutional arrangements and political ideas that have been associated with problematic as well as positive outcomes – may be identified and be used to frame and inspire further discussion on what might be learnt.

This is obviously not the same as trying to export ideal models, processes or strategies from the second more successful case. On the contrary, it is only to identify the relations, alliances, principles and so forth that seem to have been critical – and then to ask if factors in the first case can be identified that might foster tendencies similar to those encountered in the more successful case and contain those opposing them.

Interestingly, in addition to being able to suggest insights from one context to another, the upside down comparison by contrasting contexts may also help to generate new perspectives and questions about what actually happened in the more successful case. This is because developments that have not proved particularly problematic have rarely been subject to research. Scandinavian historians, for example, have not really focused on one of the major miracles in comparison

BOX 6.1 From results to recommendations

- Present results in relation to major international and contextual arguments on democratisation and related politics.
- Try to advance beyond (1) identifying democratic deficits to list what should be done and what better institutions need to be built; (2) finding that, for instance, actors adapt to but abuse elections or that most people are marginalised and that something should be done in these respects and (3) identifying problematic processes and causes for stumbling blocks.
- In principled co-operation with practitioners, identify what other factors need to be considered in order to move forward; search for hard lessons and positive experiences of how similar problems have been handled in other contexts to initiate discussions on positive alternatives.
- When engaging in comparative studies of relevant positive experiences, begin by focusing on the processes that have been defined in the problematic context in question.
- Apply, then, the method of contrasting contexts by identifying what is unique in each of the different cases and how that which is unique affect the processes that are assumed to be common, that is, the processes that are problematic in the case taken as a point of departure and have been addressed more successfully or by way of hard lessons in the other contrasting case.

with the current Global South: that fragmented popular groups and movements managed to come together, gain democratic political hegemony and then even combine equity and growth.

Comparing Problems of Transformative Politics: An Example

What would a comparative approach to insights and recommendations look like more precisely? The following argument may serve as an example. It is first based on general conclusions about the dilemmas of democratisation in the Global South that call for new insights and then on comparisons with cases such as Brazil and Scandinavia.

As noted in chapter 5, the major general challenges of democratisation that seem to apply in a number of contexts were identified in a comparative three volume project by a network of concerned international scholars edited by John Harriss, Kristian Stokke, Neil Webster and the author (Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009, Stokke and Törnquist 2013). One key challenge was the de-politicisation of democracy, including privatisation, elitism, technocratic and non-interest-based crafting of often localised institutions in state and civil society, abuse of public resources and non-political citizen action. This de-politicisation, in turn, it was argued, was of course not only due to dominant structures and actors but partly also because of the fragmentation of

the democratic agents of change, geographically as well as in terms of issues, interests, networks and organisation. This fragmentation, moreover, was also rooted in defective popular democratic representation, including fundamentals such as blurred definitions of what constitute public affairs and the *demos*. The problems of representation applied to the shrinking, formally organised public sphere and politics as well as to the issues that people still deem to be of public concern, but which are increasingly frequently handled by subcontracted or self-appointed groups and companies.

Lastly, it was concluded that moving forward towards more substantive (instead of formalistic) and substantial (rather than narrow) democratisation requires empowered citizens, stronger popular organisations and democratic institutional nodes in the links between politics and society.

Such nodes for linking politics and society could, for instance, facilitate initial welfare reforms to make citizens more capable of standing up for their own rights and interests and of building their own organisations. Similarly, well-designed nodes could also make it more rational and easier for such organisations to unify and affect public governance. Policies and strategies to such effect were categorised as transformative politics.

In search of hard lessons and positive experiences of transformative politics in contrasting contexts, the engaged scholars turned in the first instance to inspiring cases such as the growth of the social movement-based Workers Party (PT) in Brazil (as well as similar attempts in the Philippines) and the initiation of local participatory budgeting and governance as in the world-renowned case of Porto Alegre – which however proved difficult to scale up. The same applied to the initial post-apartheid combination of trade unions and citizen organisations in South Africa, which later on run into problems of party-political hegemony, and political decentralisation including a people's planning campaign in Kerala and the brief period of successful democratisation towards peace and reconstruction in Aceh – which both faced serious problems of political control and representation (Harriss et al. 2004, Törnquist et al. 2009, Törnquist 2011).

In all these cases, there were, thus, clear indications that substantive progress, with regard to participatory planning, for example, was associated with advanced political co-ordination among the groups themselves as well as between the groups and democracy-oriented politicians and local governments. When successful, this co-ordination could open up favourable channels of influence for actors of change and thus also strengthen their organisations and joint work (cf. Webster et al. 2009, Stokke and Törnquist 2013).

However, when these efforts declined, this was usually, again, related to problems of co-ordination, scaling-up and insufficiently institutionalised democratic representation. In other words, ordinary people continued to face problems of using democratic instruments, especially representation, in order to develop and to oversee the implementation of the kind of welfare policies combined with inclusive economic growth that they visualised and that might, in turn, have made democracy more substantial and substantive.

These challenges, therefore, led the scholars to proceed to the historically most successful attempts at tackling similar problems: those gaining prominence

in Scandinavia in the 1920s and 1930s under social democratic leadership. These positive experiences may be summarised in terms of fostering a combination of two factors. The first was the rise of strong, independent interest-based movements among small farmers and workers in particular and associated citizen-rights-based organisations more generally, which linked up politically. The second was the evolvment of democracy and effective and trustworthy central- and local-level government institutions. This in turn contributed to social pacts between trade unions and employers on how to combine welfare and economic growth. The bottom line was not the contradictions between state and civil society but the linkages between them.

So what, if anything, could possibly be gained from reading the *general* challenges of transformative politics in the Global South (as defined on the basis of the comparative empirical results that have been spelled out above) against not only positive and negative lessons in the Global South itself such as in Brazil, South Africa and the Indian state of Kerala, but also against the old Scandinavian experiences and, perhaps, vice versa? What were the main experiences in Scandinavia – particularly in the most paradigmatic cases of Sweden and Norway – of developing transformative politics in order to promote people’s chances of fostering democracy when proposing, struggling for and supervising the implementation of welfare-based growth?

The Scandinavian Trail¹

The historical experiences of Scandinavian social democracy serve as an important point of reference in current discussions on how to combat poverty and inequality by way of structural changes. These historical changes came about through democratisation and state-led economic growth. After several years of enabling political struggles to which we shall return, it was possible to develop alliances for economic growth based on the generation of full employment in broadly defined productive sectors combined with universal social security arrangements. This is in contrast to the often unsuccessful neoliberal and institutionalist approaches suggested by the IMF and the World Bank (UNRISD 2010). Moreover, as already indicated, the strategy for equality and growth was made possible through the politics of building strong supportive movements, coalitions of powerful actors and trustworthy public institutions.

Later on welfare-based growth has also been achieved in developmental states such as South Korea and Taiwan. However, since this was done by way of authoritarian and consumerist politics, the Scandinavian experience may be deemed more relevant in discussion on the role of democratisation.

By the second half of the 1920s, Sweden and Norway, which had been among the poorest countries in Europe, were characterised by late-developing aggressive and rapidly advancing capitalism with extensive industrial conflict, widespread poverty followed by deep economic depression and unemployment too. The conflict between capital and labour gained crucial importance and the working class was increasing, but there were additional cleavages and very many people remained within small-scale agriculture, forestry and fishing in particular. Neither the conservatives and liberals (that dominated politically) nor the

Left had any viable political and economic strategy for addressing the economic crisis, unemployment in particular. This partly calls to mind the situation of the current left of centre actors in many parts of the Global South. The main focus of interest should thus be on the successful transformative politics that made possible and initiated, and then also benefitted from, the welfare-based growth, which evolved in the early 1930s and which continued for a number of decades thereafter, shaping, in the process, a politically hegemonic Nordic Model that have by now been embraced by even neo-conservatives, but the core aspects of which have deteriorated since the 1980s, especially in Sweden.

The fundamental conditions for success in Norway and Sweden in combining welfare measures and growth were not limited to the benefits of early Keynesian stimulation of the economy and favourable export markets as tend to be emphasised by mainstream economic historians. It was equally critical that the advantages could be sustained. This was largely due to central-level collective agreements between employers' associations and trade unions, with the support of the new social democratic governments. It remains vital to analyse, therefore, the specific social and political dynamics that enabled the rise of this social pact, especially with regard to what was structurally determined and what rested with more or less well thought out politics. But first, the logic of the pact itself and the issue of whether it remains a valid proposition.

Social Pact for Inclusive Growth, Still Relevant?

On the one hand, trade unions abstained from struggle on the organisational aspect of socialism, including the ownership of the means of production, focusing instead on the expected outcome in terms of political and economic equality. The first victory was collective agreements with the employers on comparatively equal wages. This was to the benefit of the low-paid majority of the workers and casual labourers. It also created more jobs by increasing the competitiveness and expansion of the modern export industry. It enforced investment and economic growth in weak sectors, thus making development much less uneven than in many of the now industrialising countries. As the tax basis increased, the wage earners also obtained basic welfare from the state, including unemployment schemes, pensions, social security, improved housing, better conditions for women and children, and more equal access to education and training. In addition, the workers came to influence the central and local governments' executive boards and commissions (and to some extent corporate boardrooms too).

On the other hand, the dynamic entrepreneurs secured industrial peace, wage levels based on what companies exposed to international competition could pay and a public insurance system that took responsibility for social welfare and support to the unemployed. Most importantly, these social benefits were productive by enabling the flexible labour market and the option for rationalising production (without expensive conflicts) that promoted growth.

These agreements were not made in order to negate class struggle. The aim was rather to channel it through as democratic institutions as possible, thus allowing for negotiations leading to both social and economic development. This is how economic growth and public revenues increased by way of comparatively

equal wages, full employment, social security and more gender equality. This is how democratic regulation of society became more important to the trade unions and politicians close to them than the issue of ownership.

Would pacts like these be feasible today? Several of the imbalances and conflicts are clearly dissimilar from those encountered today, both in the Global North and South. First, Scandinavia was unique because of the absence of strong feudalism and thus instead the presence of strong independent farmers. Secondly, the accumulation regimes are different today. The Fordist model of mass production of homogenous goods in vertically integrated firms within territorial national economies, which dominated in the North and was also attempted in the South, has changed with globalisation marked by the dominance of finance capital and the flexibilisation in terms of products, management and labour. Keynesian national welfare states, it is claimed, have often been replaced by a Schumpeterian post-national workfare regimes (Jessop 2002), focusing on competitiveness in liberalised global markets, attempts at reducing costs and adopting market-solutions in public management as well as applying polycentric network-based governance.

Most importantly, the new growth and industrialisation rarely seem to generate the same conditions for socially and politically rather homogeneous working class action that fostered democratic transformative politics not just in Scandinavia but also in the Euro-American context as a whole. India is a major challenging case in point. The exploitation of natural resources is devastating though not as relatively important for economic growth as in Indonesia, Brazil or Nigeria; however, the accumulation of capital with heavy emphasis on service, new technology and middle-class consumption is significantly more exclusive of ordinary people than in the labour-intensive industrialisation of the East Asian countries not to talk of the classic industrialisation of the Euro-American contexts (e.g. not only Sanyal 2007 and Chatterjee 2008 but also Bardhan 2009). Globally related financial and crony capitalism seem to dominate at the expense of industrial entrepreneurs (Mehta and Walton 2012). Enormous sections of labour are casual/subcontracted and (or) migrants and (or) located in the unregulated so-called informal sectors. Meanwhile, unions tend to be weak and scattered, primarily confined to the formal sectors; employers too are far from united. In short, there are few structural conditions for the kind of social pacts between organised capital and labour for welfare-based growth that were so crucial in the most famous transformative democratic politics of Scandinavia (Bardhan 2011a).

However, it is certainly a major achievement that much of the analyses of how capitalism and class conflicts evolve in the Global South now recognise that this may be quite different as compared to the contexts that Marx, Lenin, Mao and other giants used as a basis for their generalisations. However, there is a need for an additional step, then, in order to not just conclude that primitive accumulation of capital, and the following capitalist development in say Indonesia or China, is not as in Marx' England and later on in much of the Euro-American contexts. Rather one should also study whether and how this may generate new interests, dynamics and perhaps form a basis for transformative politics. For

example, organised labour remains at the centre of the most vital sectors in the new accumulation regimes and there are exciting signs of unified action between labour in formal and informal sectors in favour of welfare measures, labour laws, the cost of inputs such as oil and electricity in production and also high costs due to corruption (cf. Andrae and Beckman 2011).

Also it is important to recall that much of the historical transformative politics in Scandinavia did foster the then prevailing aspects of globalisation in the form of free international trade rather than resisting it. The major exception was the defence of small farmers during the much longer period that was needed for structural adjustment in agriculture. Similarly, natural resources were crucial in the Swedish and Norwegian development of capitalism too. Uneven development was not a major hindrance as such. Similar to the economically successful countries in the South today, the Scandinavian dynamics of growth in the late 1920s and 1930s were to a large extent related to the internationalised, modern aspects of the economy, while a majority of the population remained in agriculture and other low-productivity sectors. Moreover, as in the South today, there were severe problems of unemployment and poverty among large sections of the Scandinavian populations. While the main competitors in providing jobs and welfare were the Nazi and Fascist projects, these also had ethno-nationalist and communitarian components similar to contemporary identity politics in both the Global North and South.

Most importantly in the framework of global capitalism, the social pacts fostered international competitiveness based on innovation and productivity more than on low wages. Thanks to the pacts, productivity increases were accepted rather than resisted. Special welfare measures, social security, education and training, support for women and children, compressed wages combined with good services for all and channels for democratic influence on the part of interest organisations and individual stakeholders in addition to parliamentary elections (also generating trust in public governance) are often useful means of developing modernisation-based competitive production and services today too, in the North as well as the South. The challenge today is rather to foster international alliances between likeminded partners to avoid selfish nationalism and thus prevent the undermining of strategies towards global Keynesianism in terms of production for the needs of the many and not just the privileged – combined with measures for sustaining the environment and technological innovations generating jobs in the North and enabling non-devastating industrialisation for mass consumption in the South – that could enable the combination of welfare and growth at both ends, North and South.

Another hindrance is, of course, that there is more social fragmentation and there are more complex cleavages in the new growth countries than there was in the twentieth century Euro-American contexts where the working class and conflict between labour and capital translated into the organisation of major interest groups and political parties. The authoritarian character of industrial expansion in China and Vietnam in particular undoubtedly adds to this. However, in spite of the problems of democratisation in most of the Global South, the space for ordinary people to make peaceful and democratically oriented advances has

increased, similar to the emergence of democracy in Scandinavia during the early part of the twentieth century. While Scandinavia was more socially homogeneous than most countries of the Global South, while extended families and religion did no longer play a major economic and political role, and while the cleavages were less complex, one may discuss the extent to which these factors are an absolute prerequisite for democratic transformative politics given the advances in Kerala in particular where the progressive movements arose and made headway within a socially and religiously extremely fragmented context with a multitude of cleavages and still important extended families.

It is true that much of the democracy and social-welfare-based growth model has deteriorated in Scandinavia, especially in Sweden. But in fact, in spite of neoliberalism, many middle-class voters and companies in Scandinavia remain supportive of at least those parts of the welfare state that are to their own benefit. It is certainly troublesome that their support is limited to the extent that the welfare measures and participation and democracy are to the benefit of those middle classes and skilled workers that are in demand (i.e. those with good jobs) (cf. Andersson 2009a). However, this narrow work-fare model (spearheaded by, among others, Tony Blair and the neo-conservatives that have been in power in Sweden since 2006 and those that may win the next Norwegian elections) is, as has been indicated in the above, not about structurally unavoidable priorities but largely a matter of short term rather than strategic perspective on sustainable welfare-based growth as well as about individual rather than collective action. Hence, it remains possible to affect them with transformative politics.

This takes us, therefore, to the main stumbling block: whether welfare-based growth is *politically* feasible today. Maybe the *political* preconditions were exceptionally favourable in late 1920s and early 1930s Scandinavia, while they are now quite different and less favourable, both in the North and the South.

Political Conditions

The political preconditions in terms of unified and nationally organised trade unions and employers' organisations of equal strength, comparatively corruption-free public institutions and positive governments that played major roles in enabling the social pacts for welfare-based growth are certainly very rarely at hand in the wider world (nor perhaps any longer in Scandinavia). It is true that some of the additional structural conditions that separated Scandinavia from the paradigmatic cases at the time of capitalist development in western Europe are more similar to those in today's post-colonial countries, the foremost being the relatively late industrialisation and thus comparatively weak bourgeoisie and young working class. However at the same time, the Global South, as we have seen, is often characterised by limited state capacity, and the ethnic, social and political fragmentation of popular and interest-based organisations. There is also the weakness of the organised Left as well as the polycentric and middle class character of much of the new citizen rights-based activism.

In addition, several of the positive political factors in Norway and Sweden during the first part of the twentieth century had historical roots that do not always apply elsewhere. Several scholars maintain that crucial elements of

the additional forms of interest representation and universal welfare state had emerged in Scandinavia well before social democrats gained political power. The same applies to the favourable alliance between the state and the comparatively poor church that was, thus, not rich enough to offer alternative welfare. In short, one argument is that not only the social and economic conditions (such as the relative lack of feudalism and instead independent small farmers) but also political historical factors were so unique that the Scandinavian experiences are irrelevant outside of its own context. And an associated thesis is that the Scandinavian model is so rooted in history since the middle ages that several of its aspects cannot be claimed by social democrats, but belong to conservatives – and partially even to ethno-nationalists too, at times with fascist inclinations (see Andersson [2009] for a critical review).

Beyond dubious politically invented histories about the Nordic work ethic, rationality and more (which must be negated just like, for instance, Hindu-chauvinist reinvention of India's history), it is certainly important to study the ways in which social democracy related to actual historical conditions and transformed them.

Another basic point of departure is to recall the historical and structural differences between the Scandinavian countries. For example, there was feudalism in Denmark and the bourgeoisie was much weaker in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden. The Swedish (and Danish) state capacity, moreover, was much stronger than that of Norway, which did not gain full independence until 1905 and was more diverse and localised.

Moreover, the early, localised and liberal-oriented welfare measures were significant but radically transformed into the special Scandinavian welfare state model (with its specific characteristics as compared to the liberal Anglo-Saxon and conservative Central and South European welfare states). Previous forms of corporatist representation were transformed too.

In short, there is little doubt that much of the Scandinavian late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was characterised by poverty, economic crisis, social and economic conflict and poor representation of labour and women in particular. This was in sharp contrast to the Scandinavian model that emerged a few years later and combined democratisation, welfare and growth. Hence, the very transformation into a remarkably similar common Scandinavian model in countries quite different from each other was no doubt shaped by parallel social democratic policies and politics, which, perhaps even more remarkably, were flexible enough to adapt to different preconditions. In conclusion, much of the development of strong social and political movements, organisations and positive governments with incorrupt state apparatuses was less about historically rooted structures than about social democratic politics and policies. Politics was definitely not always down to well-thought out long-term strategies. There was much trial and error. Yet, for several centuries, most of it turned into transformative politics. So reading these experiences against the current dilemmas of weak popular politics and representation in the very different contexts of the Global South may be particularly useful – not because politics and strategies can be exported but because transformative politics was indeed crucial and because

one can gain new insights by comparing the associated problems and options in quite different contexts.

So what were the major aspects of transformative politics in Scandinavia that *enabled* the latter much more well-known advances?

1. The dynamics of popular organisation, state and universal welfare programmes

Two significant processes may be identified. The first of these is rooted in the relatively early development in Sweden and Norway of universal welfare programmes through state and local authorities. This is in contrast to targeted and means tested measures with supplementary self-help and education through civil organisations, which constituted and remain the predominant pattern in other contexts, including the Global South. It is particularly important to understand Scandinavian historical dynamics whereby the universal schemes evolved through authorities accountable to elected politicians and the representatives of issue and interest-based organisations. There were certainly elements of universalism ahead of the social democratic hegemony. But most remarkably, social democrats adjusted to this idea and further developed it – in spite of the fact that the short-term cost for the labour movement was less strong popular organisations and parties than if these had been able to provide special benefits to their followers.

The longer term benefit for the social democrats and its allies, however, was that the popular movements themselves were able to contain the kind of special interests that are so common in post-colonial pressure politics. The major gains were the focus on the common good and the obvious chance of gaining support from popular majorities. This enabled the social democrats and more radical socialist allies to include not just permanently employed workers but also most of the casual workers, the unemployed, small farmers and business actors and especially, later on, civil servants and private employees within an ideology of turning Norway and Sweden into democratic inclusionary ‘people’s homes’ based on solidarity and generalised welfare schemes. As has already been noted, crucial elements of this have now deteriorated, especially in Sweden. However, the focus here is on how they became politically possible.

This may be of some interest in post-colonial countries with both substantial informal employment and an agricultural population that is threatened by exclusion and primitive accumulation. It may also add an important dimension to the discussion about when and how different welfare programmes may foster transformative politics.

This was anyway how the social democrats succeeded in winning elections and in providing a viable alternative to the ‘national-socialist’ welfare programmes that gained popularity in many other countries during the 1930s and early 1940s. Some aspects of this way of confronting ethnic national chauvinism may be of interest today, too, including not only in Scandinavia with its own problems of accepting immigrants in general and Muslims in particular, but also in other contexts of sectarian politics.

Universal state support to the individual (rather than the family – as in the less generous conservative welfare state model, or through the market and civil

society – as in the liberal model adopting a system of means tested basic subsidies) was certainly also a matter of providing each and every citizen with as much substantive political equality and freedom as possible. In fact, a democratically controlled state was in this regard deemed to be a better ally of ordinary people (and later on middle classes too) than the family and church or the market and self-help civil society organisations. Freedom-seeking youth and women fighting for equal rights and independence were among the prime beneficiaries.

2. Unification and interest-based representation

The second process relates more specifically to the challenges encountered in most countries in the Global South of poor popular organisation and representation from below of interests and ideas. Remarkably, the initially quite fragmented and localised labour groups in Scandinavia – and almost as importantly the leading employers too – co-ordinated their respective organisations at an early stage. It would be particularly interesting to read and explain this comparatively puzzling historical process towards unification in view of the current fragmentation and polycentrism of various left oriented groups in much of the Global South.

An example of transformative Scandinavian politics is especially exciting: the corporate interest representation. Just as in the case of universal welfare schemes, there were examples of corporatist interest representation ahead of the social democratic regimes (Rothstein 1999). However, social democrats adjusted and transformed corporatism too. The demands from below of various groups for the representation of interest and issue-based organisations in public governance turned into fairly democratic social or plural corporatism. This did not just lead to immediately favourable welfare and production-oriented policies. It also generated rules and regulations for collective representation that fostered broad, national and democratic organisations. One might wish to know if any similar provision of channels of influence and associated rules and regulations have been tried out or envisioned in some countries in the Global South.

Over the years, this kind of interest-based representation in Scandinavia with various associated institutions (as well as the participation of individual stakeholders in so many areas including local planning) has been negatively affected by deteriorating standards of democratic representation and is now undermined by neoliberal new-public management and policies. However, this could be altered and in any case, the social-corporatist additional forms of democratic representation did over a period of decades succeed in supplementing both the liberal democratic general elections where the winner takes all, and the autonomous civil society organisations that are often dominated by influential citizens and generate a myriad of lobby and pressure groups.

A final and perhaps especially important factor in the Global South, where corruption is at the top of the agenda and many actors deem politics and democracy to be a major problem, is the Scandinavian development of and confidence in high state capacity, including in matters that are crucial to democracy. It is true that the major battle against corruption, particularly in Sweden, took place in the late nineteenth century and related to the need for an efficient state to support

rapid late economic development. However, the process of democratisation added to this, especially in the form of the extensive system of representation of the key interest organisations in most sectors of society. The combination of collective popular action for supplementary popular representation and a general right to information about all steps in the handling of public matters (with certain exceptions that had to be well justified) fostered public spheres for co-operation, control and influence. This representation and freedom of information contributed to the containment of corruption and favouritism.

Potential Global Alliances

So far the argument has suggested that reading the challenges of transformative politics in selected countries in the Global South and related experiences in Norway and Sweden against each other may be useful for both the discussion of possible options in the South and for a deeper understanding of the historical and contemporary challenges in Scandinavia. However, there is also another reason to engage: the need for a North–South alliance of the likeminded, as an alternative to the eno-liberal Washington consensus. Why is there such a need and would an alliance be realistic?

From the point of view of the Global South, an additional factor to those already mentioned that hinders democratic transformative politics is the new geopolitics after the fall of the Berlin wall. The end of the cold war undermined a number of authoritarian regimes, but there are also fewer rival powers that may extend support to progressive local actors. The alternatives look bleak. The pink tide Latin American regimes are not able to make a global difference; Asia in particular must somehow come into the picture. International trade unionism remains weak too, and globalised civil society groups are often fragmented. Social democratic parties and regimes in the Global North have not yet offered any more democratic alternative and firm support for equity-based economic growth. There is promotion of environmental protection in the South but without a focus on the political economy that is sustaining the current devastation, and without priority to technological innovations and products that could generate jobs in the North and enable production of mass consumption goods in the South for the needs ordinary people without destroying nature. Cheap import based on low wages and poor environmental protection in the Global South is appreciated; priority is given to nationalistic-oriented investment in the competitiveness of home-based companies within the framework of the existing relations of power in the global markets. So would there be any reasons at all, then, for more interest in the North in favour of transformative democratic politics in the South for more welfare-based growth and environmental sustainability?

On the one hand, the current globalisation certainly undermines the combination of welfare and growth policies within national borders. The transfer of much of the regular production to the Global South and the post-industrial development in countries such as Norway and Sweden reduces the social basis of social democracy among workers and employees in industry and the public sector, while there are more and more entrepreneurs, experts and service sector employees. The latter groups, it is often argued, are able to regulate social

relations on their own without strong parties, trade unions and representative democracy. All they need, the argument goes, are purchasing power, laws, rights, their own civil societies, direct participation and self-representation.

On the other hand, even if the working class is reduced in Scandinavia, it is instead expanding together with dynamic businessmen and large groups of poor people in many countries with rapid economic growth in the Global South – upon whose markets and export of cheap products countries such as Norway and Sweden are increasingly dependent. The domination of this process, without restraint, by vested interests in profit and middle-class consumption will lead not only to the continuation of uneven social and economic development combined with environmental destruction in the Global South. Further consequences may be less investment and jobs in the North. This is because lower wages and less demanding regulations in the South attract relocation of production; but it is also because these low wages in the South – and the poverty of all those who do not even get a low paid job – do not generate much demand for other products still produced in the North. Hence in the North, tax revenues with which to finance the welfare state may be reduced, with growing inequalities, more conflicts, more immigrants without jobs and a number of environmental challenges. In this context, those parts of the welfare state that are to the benefit of people with good jobs and that can be used to foster competitiveness in the framework of the uneven global development may be sustained. However, there will be insufficient economic foundations for the inclusive combination of equity and growth without support for a similar strategy in the South too.

In addition to these economic factors, there may also be social and political reasons for an alliance of the likeminded. This is because uneven development in the South and selfish enhancement of modernisation-based competitiveness in the North will make it increasingly difficult to maintain strong trade unions and other organisations as well as associated political parties in the North. These organisations have not only been crucial for welfare-based growth but also the development of inclusive forms of democracy. As we know, Scandinavian democracy does not only consist of freedoms, rule of law and elections, but also the separate institutionalised representation of various ideas and interests. This separate interest-based representation, in turn, has been crucial in the development of state capacity, radical reduction of corruption and remarkable trust in public institutions. There are already significant negative tendencies, particularly in Sweden.

The negative aspects of this scenario may be of concern not only to the core social democrats, socialists and some environmentalists but also, more broadly, to enlightened middle-class citizens and businesspeople that show an interest in at least sustaining those parts of the democratic system, welfare state, ‘good governance’, economic growth and nature that they already enjoy, because in the long run this will hardly be possible if they only cater to their own immediate needs. This broader engagement calls instead for collective action and some solidarity, for the various actors cannot manage this on their own, either individually or through direct participation in the framework of laws and rights only, beyond parties, trade unions and representative democracy. The ‘direct

participationists' are as wrong as the neoliberals. For some common platform to emerge, there is a need for innovative politics towards alternative structural reforms, environmental policies and renewed welfare systems as part of an alliance with likeminded partners in the South for transformative politics to tame globalisation and foster democratic and environmentally sustainable welfare-based growth at both ends.

Reaching Conclusions on Indonesia Based on Comparative Experiences

Having read the general problems of democratisation with regard to fragmentation and representation against the insights gleaned from cases such as Brazil and Kerala as well as historical Scandinavian experiences, what tentative conclusions were reached in Indonesia?

Preconditions

The first comment from many of the researchers and activists involved in the assessments was that the positive experiences of not only Scandinavia but also Brazil, and partly Kerala too, were based on different structural conditions as compared to Indonesia, including deeper rooted capitalist development with a larger working class and less social fragmentation and complex cleavages. Furthermore, it was argued that not just favourable structural determinants but also political facilitation by broad popular movements and civil society groups as well as central and local governments played a major role in the more successful cases, but that these capacities were also not at hand or feasible in Indonesia. Hence, the comparisons were deemed invalid.

Others, however, including this author, responded by arguing that given the different dynamics of capitalist development in diverse contexts, we should study the specific dynamics more closely and not conclude from the outset that only one or a few types of capitalist expansion may generate conflicts that may in turn lead to progressive change. It was also contended that contrasting contexts would still be useful as it would cast new light on similar processes in what were otherwise dissimilar cases.

Finally, it was added that it is the innovative processes behind the outcomes that should be examined and, if possible, learnt from, rather than the successful outcomes themselves. For example, even the world-renowned decentralisation and people's planning campaign in Kerala was partly due in spite of, rather than thanks to, the political support of the left front parties, associated movements and local and state governments. Several leftist politicians supported the efforts, but major parts of the leading Communist Party of India-Marxist and other leftist parties and related interest associations were hesitant. To learn from the Kerala experience, it is thus necessary to return to at least the early 1980s when decentralisation and participatory planning from below seemed quite impossible and ask how this situation could change within some fifteen years (Törnquist and Tharakan 1995, Issac and Franke 2000).

The same applies to the idealised Scandinavian model (which has by now been partly undermined). The model did not grow out of as unique and supportive historical conditions as is generally taken for granted. The most important lessons come instead from the transformative politics during the period before social democracy became hegemonic, that is, when the foundations for the major advances were shaped. The first key period of transformation unfolded in the early part of the twentieth century when various popular movements and unions acted on their own but came to link up politically; the second in the late 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, when poverty, economic crisis, extensive conflicts in the labour market, weak governments and emerging threats from fascist and Nazi welfare policies were countered by an alliance between the labour movement and the small farmers and social pacts. Hence, the most potentially useful lessons relate to the social democratic politics that tackled these challenges and later on sustained advances.

Moreover, 'everything good' in cases such as Kerala and Scandinavia was not achieved in some idealised grassroots-based manner from below. It is true that the initial perspectives and capacities of CSOs, popular movements and associated political parties were built from below, but this was always in relation to politics and state. In partial contrast to liberal, syndicalist and of course communitarian traditions, the vision was not that individuals and communities would take care of problems on their own. The idea was rather that real individual freedom for all called for collective capacities to foster more equality and economic development within the framework of public governance. In fact, much of the strength of the very popular organisations and the associated parties (not to talk of the outcomes in terms of welfare, participation and growth) is thus due to the positive effects of public policies that were demanded and shaped over the years by the actors of change, in not only conflict but also co-operation with their adversaries such as employers' organisations and corporate leaders.

This is the essence of transformative politics. Struggles for social reform such as unemployment insurance schemes, further education, training or decently paid public works for those who lose their jobs improved both the individual political capacity of the workers, who could act somewhat independently of their employers, and the strength of their trade unions, which often took part in running the schemes. Such policies also enhanced the opportunities for companies to not only increase productivity and profitability, in some cases retrench the workforce, but also make new investments and create new jobs. Similarly, especially in Scandinavia, agreements between the government at various levels and both the trade unions and the employers' organisations to co-operate in a number of policy areas (with due respect for each other and with representatives selected autonomously by each party) fostered both trust in public governance and the broadening and unification of the organisations. If the latter had not broadened and unified their organisations, they would have been unable to make a difference in the negotiations and co-operation. Yet there are obviously also numerous cases in which such attempts at transformative politics were weak or backfired. However, the point is that the main focus should be directed on the dynamics of such processes, not the end product.

Indonesian Implications

The fundamental question that the scholars and activists asked, therefore, was what stumbling blocks and also openings were present in the context of Indonesia. The focus was on four openings.

One opening is related to what James Manor (2010, 2013) has later and with reference to other parts of Asia and Africa labelled post-clientelism. The basic argument is that mainstream political leaders can no longer rely only on clientelism, bossism and huge financial resources. To win elections, they also need additional means of mobilisation. Thus, many try to add and include populist measures and identity politics. Yet others who want to build a reputation for being more modern and democratic also try to link up with well-reputed leaders and activists in civil society and interest organisations in an attempt to win extra votes. This may well end up in the co-optation of activists. However, there are also examples of increasingly well-prepared progressives who try to develop transformative politics and make gradual advances, for instance, in the city of Solo in Central Java (Pratikno and Lay 2013) and most recently in the election of the new Governor of Jakarta. One aspect of the co-operation to this end may, for instance, be demands (in return for the support of powerful politicians) for preferential treatment of genuine interest-based organisations and their democratic inclusion in public governance. Thus, it may be possible to facilitate local- and central-level coalitions for sustainable and welfare-based economic development.

A second opening was referred to in the first part of this chapter in terms of the needs as well as demands in rapidly late-industrialising countries such as Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria and Indonesia for general schemes towards the provision of social security and unemployment benefits, as well as agreements between employers and trade unions on a range of other issues including employment conditions (cf. Beckman 2004, Chatterjee 2008, Beckman 2009, UNRISD 2010, Harriss 2011, Baiocchi et al. 2013, Bull 2013, Harriss 2013, Jordhus Lier 2013). If this observation is correct, it may be possible to identify associated opportunities for demands, policies and agreements, even on the basis of co-operation between otherwise quite separated workers in formal and informal sectors, urban poor and migrant labourers. As a consequence, government agencies too may become more interested in introducing new welfare policies. The main aim of many dominant actors may certainly be to contain social unrest, but strategically thinking actors of change may also take advantage of this. A fundamental problem, however, is how to negotiate social pacts with employers to increase production and employment in order to avoid populist welfare measures without sufficient tax basis when rents from oil and other natural resources cannot temporarily substitute for this (as currently in much of Latin America).

Yet another opening seemed to be the more frequent protests against corruption beyond politicians' and bureaucrats' everyday misuse or abuse of public office for private gain, which can be compared to theft, by also involving accumulation of capital and class formation by public as well as private actors through, for example, privileged control of government licences, concessions and procurement as well as the use of politics to grab seize land and natural resources. Thus,

anti-corruption becomes an issue of interests and class, not just the rule of law. Similarly, increasing numbers of workers demanding decent wages oppose the high costs of production due to the extraction of rents by powerful actors; such concerns may well form the basis for agreements with those entrepreneurs who might also like to reduce such costs.

A final, though more tentative, option mentioned in the first part of the chapter was that the globalisation of finance and production in addition to trade do not just contribute to uneven development in the Global South, with their associated environmental destruction and growing inequalities, but also affect old industrialised countries in the form of environmental problems, de-industrialisation and more. As a consequence, enlightened left of centre governments in the North and related international development agencies and civil society organisations might be convinced to at least consider redirecting, in their own interest, some of their co-operation in favour of likeminded partners and policies in the South towards fostering common efforts at disciplining globalisation.

Socio-political Blocks

Given such openings, what priorities are key to fostering the kind of transformative politics envisioned above? As a point of departure, the Indonesian team of researchers and activists emphasised the potential importance of campaigns related to relatively progressive party or independent candidates in elections of local political executives. (Local parties were also thought of as an entry point but were only viable in Aceh – and with dubious results.)

The crucial point was, however, to form independent socio-political blocks in relation to such candidates (and parties). It was argued that such blocks had to be initiated at central, intermediary and local levels. First, there was the need to counter fragmentation between various civil society organisations, social movements and political groups by promoting organisation on an intermediate level – ‘above’ the typically specific and issue-oriented CSOs, popular organisations and social movements and ‘below’ the top-down party-political initiatives to win voters and clients, irrespective of whether the latter are party-based united fronts or party-dominated popular fronts. Second, there could be joint demands at this level for institutional arrangements to be implemented by progressive politicians and administrators ‘from above’ that would create better options for popular representation while also stimulating broader organisation and joint action among citizen and popular organisations.

The team acknowledged that the parties and candidates as well as the CSOs and popular groupings would certainly like to form and dominate their own supportive groups and movements and coalitions. However, it was argued that such shortcuts might fail as they would be too narrow and partisan to generate sufficient majorities in elections. Those politicians and supportive groups that really wanted to make a difference by winning the people’s mandate would thus have to opt for more inclusive and broad socio-political blocks.

The importance of inclusiveness and scope would, in turn, call for blocks with a decisive degree of independence of the elitist politicians as well as of the

fragmented CSOs and popular oriented groups. Effective socio-political blocks would, therefore, have to be initiated by taskforces with sufficient operational capacity that were not only separate from but also widely trusted by sympathetic politicians as well as the fragmented groups and movements. Such taskforces could be elected, for instance, at central- and local-level assemblies in the run up to critical elections.

Democratic Principles and Critical Policies

To gain momentum and serve as a platform for agents of change, moreover, the socio-political blocks would have to go beyond the support of particular figures by emphasising the basic democratic principles and instruments that would enable ordinary people to get involved and use democracy to foster and implement welfare-based development strategies. While the democratic institutions would be needed, then, to generate trust in co-operation, prevent elite-capture, enable the political blocks to develop welfare policies and fight for their implementation, the welfare policies in turn would be needed to strengthen the social and political capacity of the people and their organisations.

On the basis of the qualitative assessment surveys, it was argued that to support such dynamics democratic representation was particularly vital. Given the comparative experiences, the creation of supplementary democratic channels for issue and interest-based representation were deemed fundamental in order to facilitate the growth of broad popular movements and organisations. Similarly, the comparative experiences suggested that various benefits should be as universal as possible rather than targeted and means tested to enable wide inclusion and broader alliances beyond special interests and groups.

Strategic Policy Areas

Five policy areas, it was argued, seem most critical in the Indonesian context. The first relates to long-term strategies in favour of *welfare policies that would also generate inclusive economic growth*. In view of the international experiences, the challenge would be to identify – nationally as well as locally – entrepreneurs, industrialists and other producers that could be in favour of modernisation and growth on the basis of not just the lowest possible wages but also efficiency and, at least in the long run, increasing purchasing power of ordinary people. Hence, such entrepreneurs might immediately benefit from, for instance, well-organised unions so as to gain trustworthy agreements with labour as well as public welfare and unemployment schemes. Such schemes would, in turn, be likely to enable the entrepreneurs to increase productivity and benefit from a more flexible labour market. On the basis of such an alliance and growth coalition, and given that the politicians that had promised to facilitate them must secure the widest possible support in order to win and sustain powerful positions, it may then be possible to generalise collective agreements and associated welfare policies to include other labourers as well, and not just those with the best bargaining power.

The second policy area would include *sustainable development*. Much of Indonesia's extensive primitive accumulation is about privileged access to

agricultural as well as urban land, forest, mineral and other natural resources in addition to water and also the privilege of not having to share the responsibility for sustaining the environment. Effective policies for addressing this thus call for much more than the buying and selling of emission rights. Primarily, it calls instead for democratic inclusion in public governance of the strategic parties involved (including those badly affected at the very local level) by way of firm linkages to the first policy area of fostering welfare-based growth coalitions – nationally and locally.²

The third policy area was of course *anti-corruption* – but not by more or less authoritarian governance reforms and not only by way of civil society watchdog organisations and horizontal accountability whereby bureaucrats keep a check on each other. The main additional focus would have to be accountability through collective action for and by way of democratic inclusion of stakeholders and users in public governance.

The fourth policy area would be *preferential social, economic and political treatment of subordinate women* to foster gender equality in favour of enhanced engagement in public action. Beyond the fighting of destructive values and harassment, the specific task would be to identify realistic demands for as universal reform as possible in order to improve the lives of women (such as by better child care, public transportation, education and training and effective support for political engagement, when necessary through quotas on representation) – to thus increase ordinary women’s opportunities for engaging in public life and accessing essential services and production. This would not only be to foster gender equality. The inclusion of women is crucial for economic development; policies in favour of women’s inclusion in public life would boost the pro-democratic forces.

The fifth and final policy area would be *improved and democratised education and public discourse*. Education, media, scholarship and culture towards critical citizenship were crucial in the democratic struggle against colonialism and in building the new country, but suffered immensely from authoritarianism since the late 1950s onwards. There was a brief and very important period of awakening in the struggle against Suharto, but then again the history books were censored and commercialism and moneyed political interests gained the initiative. Broad educational and cultural movements combined with independent scholarship and journalism would constitute a dynamic pillar in revitalised democratisation.

Between Movement and Party

Lastly, it was envisioned that if such socio-political blocks in favour of democratic principles to foster progressive reform within the five policy areas were to be relatively independent of parties and crooked individual politicians – to thus be able to provide as powerful as possible support to the committed political actors while also keeping them accountable – there would be yet another advantage: it should be possible for a whole range of civil society groups, social movements and organisations and even donors to support the blocks, even though these actors do not usually want to engage in party-partisan politics.

The promotion of these recommendations on the basis of the qualitative assessment surveys and associated studies lost some momentum with different views within the team of analysts and activists on NGOish versus broad membership-based democracy work and the principles for co-operation between activists and academicians. However, these divisions were rarely about the substance of the main conclusions and recommendations. Moreover, the recently initiated third qualitative assessment survey and thematic studies with a solid academic basis, combined with the co-operation of graduate students and practitioners, are likely to generate updated and further improved recommendations.

Most importantly, several of the openings that were identified on the basis of the research and that have been presented above have now gained increasing importance, including the wider alliances (with deeper roots amongst organised labour as well as movements within informal labour) in favour of public welfare policies and more popular based political leadership against corruption.

We will return to the issue of whether and how assessments of democratisation can make a difference in such contexts in the final chapter on implementation.

CHAPTER 7

THEORY IN PRACTICE

Is It Possible?

Is the alternative perspective suggested in this book realistic? Can the recommendations on design, theory, method and co-operation with practitioners be applied in practice?

The first crucial point to be made is that even though the recommendations have applied to assessments made on a grand scale such as in Indonesia, nothing prevents the application of the recommendations on regional or local scales such as in a particular province, district, municipality or village. In fact, the recommendation regarding grand studies is to combine assessments of crucial local contexts to which are then added assessments of centrally based instruments of democracy (and the actors involved) that are supposed to reach out in a country or region as a whole, to thus also draw conclusions for the country in general. So one may well engage only in a local study, although the importance of the external factors and influences must, of course, be given special attention.

In addition, it is certainly also possible to only use certain aspects of the assessment framework. In several cases, there may already exist, for example, useful assessments of the institutions of democracy, while there may be a lack of studies of the actors' relation to the institutions and the actors' capacity to use emerging institutions, and/or how their strategies affect democratisation and vice versa.

But irrespective of the matters of scale, let us now proceed by summarising the general tasks before turning to whether and how they may be implemented. Meanwhile, it should also be added that this final chapter differs from the previous ones by not having a second section with Indonesian illustrations. This is because there are few analytical results to refer to, only practical experiences – which may be of less general interest. Yet these experiences constitute the main empirical basis for the general recommendations that we will focus on, so they need to be accounted for. And old mistakes should not be repeated. So the empirical background for most of what follows is in Appendix 1 titled 'Implementation against Odds: The Indonesian Story'.

The Alternative in a Nutshell

The alternative framework was developed in response to the weaknesses in the mainstream analyses and assessments of democratisation. One was the narrow focus on elitist manoeuvring with little attention to cleavages, conflicts, broader movements affecting the elite and the capacity of ordinary people to gain access to organised politics. Another was the bias in favour of analysing institutions and procedures assuming that they equalled democracy. Those paying attention to the substance of democracy by assessing whether institutional means fostered the aims of democracy focused, however, on the input side and rarely considered the output in terms of the capacity to implement policies and decisions. Moreover, the political constitution of the *demos* and public affairs was typically neglected. There was also a bias in favour of institutions associated with liberal democracy, presupposing lobbying and networking, for example, but neglecting organised channels for supplementary interest-based representation and other institutionalised linkages between state and civil society. Dynamics, outcome and change was taken for granted as the possibility to build the 'right' institutions was taken for granted and also that such institutions were assumed to generate the expected results. Hence, critical academic research and engagement in getting the best possible sources on the ground were also not major priorities, given that it was already clear from the outset what was the best means to promote democracy, that they could be crafted and that they would generate good outcome. Many analyses and assessments thus turned into the demonstration of theory rather than examining alternative arguments and searching for new knowledge.

As a consequence, the major task of an alternative approach and framework was to enable analyses of the substance (rather than the procedures) of substantial (rather than narrowly defined) democratisation. Such a framework should also consider the political construction of the *demos* and public affairs. Most importantly, the alternative should acknowledge that democratisation is multi-dimensional, includes many actors (not just pro-democrats) and be theoretically inclusive (rather than exclusive) by considering institutional means other than those associated with the hegemonic liberal model and by discussing the validity of several theoretical arguments about the processes of democratisation, including those stressing the importance of relations of power, social movements and the capacity of actors to affect democratisation. In addition, the alternative should focus more on the quality of the information than the numbers of responses, include local contexts, not just the central level, give priority to the importance of academic standards and searching for the best possible sources and involve the well-informed and critically reflective practitioners in order both to gain access to such sources and to develop and foster recommendations on the basis of the results and relevant international comparisons.

How would all this be possible within a coherent analytical framework? Key questions were developed to analyse the politics of defining the *demos* and public affairs in various contexts and issue areas. A limited but theoretically inclusive list of thirteen formal as well as informal institutional means to build democracy was constructed, and questions were asked about their substantive scope and

territorial spread as well as, of course, whether and how they really fostered the aim of democracy.

The next step was to identify the major dominant actors as well as potential actors of change in each context. This, in turn, formed the basis for a series of questions on how the actors related to the democratisation. First, we asked whether and how they promoted, used, abused or obstructed the institutional means of democracy. Second, we asked five sets of questions about the actors' capacity to affect democratisation; each set of which related to key theories of inclusion and exclusion in politics, the ability to gain political power (legitimacy and authority), the ability to put one's issues on the agenda, the capacity to mobilise and organise support, and the capacity (and will) to build democratic representation in relations between actors and their followers as well as institutions of public governance.

Finally, the alternative framework also considered the two most difficult questions: (1) how to proceed beyond descriptive studies to also analyse processes and the political dynamics and (2) how to develop genuinely research-based recommendations. The first of these tasks was resolved by first summarising the major problems of democratisation that had been identified in the descriptive studies and then study over time how the major actors' strategies in support of their ideas and interests affected this major problem (in our case, the challenge of popular representation). The second task was addressed by adding pro-democratic practitioners' experiences as well as relevant comparative insights (on tackling such problems) from other contexts to the assessment results.

However, one major stumbling block remained. Even if all these analytical steps and indicators were acceptable, and even if they would be possible to apply in principle, how would it be possible to also implement them in practice – especially in countries and local contexts with weak independent academia, scarcity of previous studies, poor data banks and so many people who may not always trust researchers asking sensitive questions? Let us conclude the book by discussing this ultimate challenge.

Who Can Do the Job and How?

As outlined in chapter 1, mainstream frameworks for assessing democratisation typically take for granted that one particular kind of democracy is ideal and that certain specific institutions and factors will generate this ideal. Hence, there is not much interest in independent and theoretically unbiased studies, and thus to go out of one's way to find the best possible sources on the ground in often large countries. In addition to making quick appraisals as a basis for various policies and programmes of democracy supporters as well as campaigners, a common pre-occupation is to engage the most famous and important reformists and analysts in judging the state of affairs and to involve, on the one hand, bureaucracies and, on the other, democracy activists in order to provide them a sense of 'ownership'. Quick appraisals and the inclusion of practitioners are certainly not wrong, but biased points of departure generate poor assessments of little use other than to confirm initial assumptions.

There are no shortcuts here. As already indicated, unbiased studies do require adherence to academic principles. Anything else is in contradiction to one of the basic foundations of democracy, independent knowledge gained by reliable means. Democracy assessments should therefore be partisan in the positive sense that only the best (possible) knowledge is good enough to foster democratisation. What does this mean?

It means that in order to make sense to pro-democrats, who need to deliberate on strategies rather than get their own predisposed views confirmed, the assessments must be reliable and trustworthy by not being biased in favour of any particular position.

It also means that only the most reliable, trustworthy and empirically grounded assessment makes an impact when pro-democrats wish to compete with dominant political actors and donors over hegemonic views of democracy and democracy building.

Similarly, for an assessment to make sense to the most knowledgeable informants, they must have full trust in the research team. For this to happen, the informants have to be accepted and treated as partners rather than respondents, customers and targets. Their identities, data and views must not be politically and commercially abused. They have to have access to the results in order to be able to supplement them and to use them in furthering democracy.

There are a number of implications. One is that alternative democracy assessments should ideally be based within well-respected academia, or temporarily and provisionally – when it is necessary to take shelter from autocrats – in a civil society organisation, supervised by committed academics with integrity.

Second, the researchers should ideally be concerned scholars, PhD students and investigative journalists, with master students as assistants.

Third, there must be firm rules and regulations that prevent political and commercial abuse of data and that guarantee transparency, full access and popularly written summaries of activities and results made available to dedicated informants, partners and journalists. Similarly, scholars and other participants should not make statements and comments that are not firmly grounded in the assessments results.

Fourth, all this may benefit from co-operation with concerned scholars and academia abroad, which may also provide some protection. However then again, it is crucial that this is not in the form of aid and consultancies, but academic-based partnership – to sustain the integrity and reputation of both parties.

Harsh Realities

Typically, however, much of what is needed in order to live up to these ambitions is unavailable. Existing research with useful results tends not to exist. The same applies to reliable data banks. While it is therefore necessary to collect and discuss the best sources with the best experts, these typically happen to be partisan by being pro-democracy activists who may also not be willing to engage in time-consuming questionnaires and to answer sensitive questions.

Unfortunately, skilled and concerned scholars are also few and far between. The shortage of committed scholars and good academics is particularly serious in

the field of social and political sciences. These areas have often been de-prioritised and kept under firm control by authoritarian regimes. In such cases, many critical scholars and students have therefore left their countries or opted for making their way in the market, within the media, in NGOs and think tanks with funding from dissenting national and international actors. This provides some space but not full freedom. The donors involved have vested interests. These interests become increasingly obvious when common dictatorial enemies have faded away. Meanwhile, NGOs compete over niches. Funding and market-driven research is unreliable. Within academia, with some freedoms in the processes of democratisation as well as in stagnated older democracies, social and political scientists are often low paid and short of resources. Thus, many of them have to depend on donors and the market; among the best ways to gain a good reputation, good positions and to advance is to get a scholarship in prestigious institutes in the Global North. So in this context, who is in a position to carry out critical assessments of democratisation on the basis of academic principles?

A frequent answer is that foreign, decently paid and reputed scholars with integrity and commitment should be given sufficient funds to work out an analytical framework and commission local collection of data. The reputed scholars would carry out the analysis, supported by comments from local assistants, write up the conclusions and submit the reports for local and international consumption and build an attractive career. However, there are major problems with this. Even when the scholar(s) are not parachuted but knowledgeable of the context, the local researchers and crucial informants are not involved as equal partners but are relegated to the role of assistants. Moreover, even when attempts are made to compensate for this, the assessments are thus not fully part of the difficult task of building local capacity required to carry out unbiased and academically rigorous assessments and evolve in co-operation with public academies, within which the projects can also stimulate and benefit from graduate and post-graduate training.

Scholarly Partnership

The initial recommendation is, instead, to introduce assessments of democratisation in equal partnership with concerned senior international and local scholars as well as up and coming researchers and investigative journalists who in many cases are also active in various democracy organisations. These upcoming researchers and journalists are often the best possible investigators as well being those who know most about various experiences from the struggle for democracy and have access to knowledge on the ground. Ideally, these investigators should then also try to support and become part of public academic education and research (Törnquist 1979–idem.). In practice, this is more easily said than done. There are at least six tasks that need to be managed.

The first task is that the international and local academic directors must be able to specify the framework, concepts and methods. These need to be so clear cut that there is as little confusion as possible between the supervisors, researchers

and journalists. There needs to be absolutely no contradiction between theory and concepts, on the one hand, and practical work, on the other. Particularly when inexperienced researchers are involved, the crucial arguments, variables and methods must, from the outset, be beyond doubt. This is, of course, an ideal that is impossible to attain, especially in pioneering studies where changes will always have to be made along the way. However, the aim should be clear: engaging in data collection without having the analytical instruments in as good order as possible is no shortcut – quite the contrary.

Second, the young researchers and investigative journalists must be able to rely on committed and available local supervisors who communicate well with the senior academic directors. If this does not work, it will be difficult for the researchers and investigative journalists to do a good job. For even if the concepts and methods have been made reasonably clear by the academic directors from the outset, new questions will emerge and there will always be challenges of interpretation and modifications that the researchers and investigative journalists need to follow up. If such questions are not asked and responded to immediately, many tasks end up having to be redone, something which is time consuming, expensive and extremely frustrating.

Third, even if local, scholarly supervisors are available and do good work, the academic directors must be given substantive briefings and have continuous access to draft reports. This is not about control and inability to delegate. The reason is instead that even the best possible initial advice is never good enough. New insights and results emerge almost continuously. Hence, there must be dialogue, revisions and supplementary advice along the way. This, in turn, requires substantial resources for advanced administrative support to help with briefings and (when necessary) translation of drafts and minutes.

Fourth, writing up analyses is difficult. This applies especially within social and political sciences where the ability to put one's thoughts and experiences into words is part of the very analysis. Yet almost every researcher and the investigative journalist in particular, likes to think that although comments are welcome, there is no real need for skilled editing beyond technicalities. As will be clear from the Indonesian pilot cases, this is entirely not the case. Professional editor(s) who know the substance as well as style and language must work in an on-going capacity with the team. This relates to the writing of briefings and popular articles as well as extensive reports.

Fifth, the directors and the local supervisors must also, as the work progresses, contribute insights to the team from the results of previously conducted research and basic theories and arguments that relate to those aspects of democratisation that are being assessed. (However, there should also be further education in between surveys, preferably in the directors' and local supervisors' academic institutions.) If this does not happen, it will be the dubious privilege of the academic directors to undertake the final but not so good analysis – as the team members have been de fact turned into coolies that are unable to collect and manage the information in an innovative way and contribute to discussions.

Sixth, contact between the team and academia should be developed to the benefit of not just the team, but also wider and better democracy assessments in

the framework of public universities. Independent qualitative democracy surveys may ideally be institutionalised and contribute to the long path of democratisation by being integrated into mainstream education and research. Reports can be used in teaching. Students can engage in supplementary data collection and case studies as part of their thesis writing. Scholars can use qualitative survey data and conclusions in more advanced in-depth studies.

This too is not easy, given, for instance, that low-paid academics may not find democracy assessment a rewarding enough project. It is often difficult within the hierarchical world of universities to fully accept and integrate in a respectful way researchers who have done pioneering assessment studies outside the academy. It is crucial in this context to support leading local agents of change by way of international academic partnership, the joint aims and principles of which these colleagues can refer to.

Co-operation between Scholars and Practitioners

The other major recommendation relates to the more extensive co-operation. Several aspects of the tasks discussed in the above are applicable to any extensive contextually oriented research where scholars co-operate with local assistants, especially in the Global South. In the case of democratisation assessments, however, the same tasks need to be combined with twelve stages of co-operation between the scholars and the practitioners, as outlined below (Törnquist 1979–idem.). As already mentioned, this co-operation is needed both to gain access to the best sources and then to discuss the results and possible recommendations – but also in order for the scholars to support the practitioners in disseminating and advocating the conclusions.

The first and most fundamental step is when concerned scholars and practitioners come together and agree to co-operate in assessing democratisation. This certainly involves trust between individuals based on previous experiences. However, it also and more importantly requires a joint understanding of the importance of (1) gaining best possible knowledge to gain an advantage in the public discourse, (2) developing that knowledge in a way that might in itself generate co-operation between the democrats as well as (3) serving as a basis for both good academic studies and popular education and mobilisation.

This is thus a major way in which scholars can contribute to democratisation on the basis of uncompromisingly good academic scholarship.

In situations where authoritarian rule prevents work from within academies such as public universities, it is of course necessary to begin by building research and studies oriented civil society organisations with the participation of, among others, scholars and students who can combine the work in such organisations with the development of the necessary academic space.

Secondly, there is a need to mobilise funding that does not undermine the purposes of the assessment. A number of not only international but also national organisations and survey institutes are eager to provide funding in exchange for the application of their perspectives and assessment schemes. This should be countered on the basis of as much independent capacity and bargaining power as

possible. One way of moving in that direction is to build a platform by seeking primary co-operation with donors who understand the potential of combining support for good research-based academic education and democratisation. With this as a room of one's own, to use Virginia Wolf's metaphor, it is possible to negotiate additional funding on a better footing and resist hostile bids.

The third step, then, is to select critical cases of (1) the most important local political contexts as well as (2) crucial centrally governed political fields (sometimes called policy areas) often relating to ministries and executive sub-units at various levels. Details were discussed in chapter 2 in relation to the identification of public affairs and the *demos*.

What constitutes critical cases? There are two main criteria. One criterion is that the proponents of the main scholarly theories of the politics and political economy of the country should agree that the suggested political contexts and fields are not exceptional, but typical, and that it is possible to analyse them in accordance with their respective theories. If, in spite of this, the assessment-researcher is able to demonstrate that any of the theories neglect crucial developments in the suggested contexts and fields that the scholars say that their theories can explain, then there is certainly a more general problem with the theory. The other criterion is an entirely practical and operational one: that concerned scholars, journalists and democracy activists must be both available in the selected context and interested in gathering the information, discussing the results and making use of them.

The fourth step comes when key informants within these political contexts and fields have to be identified. These key informants will also function as local contact persons and representatives of the central-level research team by advising on the selection of informants and appointment of local assistants to carry out the interviews. Moreover, the local representatives will be responsible for organising the training of the assistants and the follow-up discussions of the results and possible recommendations. These representatives must thus be as trusted and accountable as the central research team. One implication is that their names too need to be public, assuming that there are no serious security risks involved.

It is crucial that the research team arranges joint workshops and training sessions with the key informants-cum-local representatives in the selected contexts. These partners need to fully comprehend the aims and means of the assessment and be able to communicate them locally. It is important to bring people together in the workshops and training sessions, but relevant information should also be available on a website forum too. Sensitive information and communication may only be accessible to the key informants and the research team.

Later the key informants from the various selected contexts around the country and in the different political fields may also wish to co-operate in building networks and organisations for monitoring democratisation and facilitating co-operation among the many and usually fragmented democracy actors.

The fifth step is the selection of the actual informants. The local representatives should assist in this by applying the strict criteria decided upon by the research team. The recommendation is *not* to make the selection based on conventional

sociological criteria such as informants representing businesspeople, workers, farmers, women, youth and so on. The foremost requirement is for grounded experts; at least two experts independent of one other within the actual and potentially most important frontlines of democratisation in each context. This is the reason for the term qualitative assessment survey – a survey based on expert-informant's assessments in which the quality of information is most important – in contrast with a quantitative survey of the opinions of randomly selected respondents in which the number of opinions is most crucial.

These actual frontlines need to be identified on the basis of previous reviews of the actors and issues of democratisation. It is crucial that this is done in close contact with the democracy movement in order to obtain good information and build trust as well as partnerships. Yet it is also vital not only to include the issues focused on by the most visible and committed activists, but to also include the everyday struggles and conflicts that take place on the ground. It is clear from comparative studies that such potentially important fields are found among women and youth (not just adult men) in residential areas, workplaces and organised politics. With a list of frontlines and solid criteria for the selection of informants, the local representatives can go ahead and suggest informants from their contexts and political field.

Sixthly, the research team needs to support the training of the field assistants by the local representatives. The training is critical. The assistants not only need to be supportive of the aims and methods of the assessment, but they must also be entirely committed to maintaining the political sensitivity of the study, the security and integrity of the informants and the importance of adjusting to the informants' time schedules and the time it takes to engage with them and answer all the questions. Furthermore, the assistants need to understand the logic of each and every question to the extent that they are able to provide locally relevant concrete examples of what the questions refer to.

The seventh very critical step is the consolidation of local interviews. This is yet another task to be carried out by the key informant/representative. At this juncture, it should be particularly clear why it is so important that the key informant is a widely respected and committed person with integrity of some influence. His or her instructions must be respected. He or she needs to supervise the interviewing and ensure that the results are delivered on time.

The eighth phase is when the central research team has collected, tabulated and made the preliminary analysis of the data. At this point, there should be an internal briefing and discussion on the results with the key informants, so that possible updates and corrections can be added.

Ninth is the public central-level presentation of the general results in the form of an executive report. Ahead of this it is crucial that special briefings have been given to associated democracy-oriented journalists. As the time comes to publish the results, the supplementary use of the webpage and other social media becomes crucial too.

The tenth step is to follow up the executive report with presentations of the results in the political contexts and fields where assessments have been made by the research team and key informants. Both general and contextually specific

results should be presented. It is crucial that all informants and field assistants are invited. For the open sessions, media representatives and crucial pro-democrats that have not been involved in the actual assessments should also be invited. For the initial closed meetings, there are three main agendas: first to make additional corrections and updates; second to discuss possible recommendations and third to plan local follow-up activities, including studies and politics for fostering democratisation and in order to select local taskforces for these purposes. In the following public sessions, the corrected and updated results are disseminated. Here the media and others can ask questions, and the team and local activists can discuss plans for further activities.

The eleventh step is to support the ongoing work of the key informants and the selected taskforces. Typically, this involves the provision of the qualitative survey results and other relevant studies and developments as well as the facilitation of contact between the local key informants and taskforces in the country at large. The aim is joint organising and activities by way of democratic membership-based organisations where all concerned are invited and included. This is crucial in order to avoid the kind of elitist and fragmented work that tends to characterise the NGO sector in many countries. At this point, well-functioning websites are particularly important.

The twelfth and final step is the dissemination of the full report from the assessment study not only in the form of a book but also as a condensed summary via academic publishers, concerned journalists, the local key informants and taskforces. One crucial taskforce needs to focus on the usage and expansion of the assessments within education and research. All the results need to be made available publicly with the exclusion of identities and data that can be abused politically and commercially.

Box 7.1 Implementing the framework

- The application of the framework on a grand scale has proved feasible – but it is also possible to use it on a less ambitious level by focusing, for instance, on a province, district, municipality or village.
- It is also possible to only use parts of the framework, such as the actors' relation to the institutional means of democracy, or their capacity to use emerging institutions, or how their strategies affect democracy.
- In any case, the assessment needs to be up to critical academic standards in order to make a difference on the merits of good quality and trustworthiness.
- As this is often difficult due to weak academic institutions and poor sources, one way forward is to build partnerships between concerned senior and young scholars and investigative journalists.
- Most importantly, one may also develop co-operation with the most knowledgeable sources and best partners in fostering dissemination and public discourse – the (carefully selected) critically reflective practitioners, and proceed according to a strict plan of action.

Conclusion – Still Relevant?

The widespread interest in assessing democratisation grew out of the third wave of democracy. During the 1980s and 1990s, two factors gave rise to assessments. First, it was assumed quite normatively that structural adjustment supplemented by ‘good’ liberal democratic governance would be the best systems for fostering development. Hence, it was necessary to find out what countries might be democratic enough to receive development aid. Second, the idea of fostering elitist pacts for democratic institution-building generated a demand for mapping the performance of existing institutions to thus identify what institutions should be strengthened and measure the effect of institution building. This trend remains, but it has been weakened by the various setbacks. The crafted processes of democratisation have typically stagnated or are backsliding. As we know, the advocates of designing liberal democracy hold on to the original agenda and try to improve it. However, the new major tendency is once again to focus on the structural and institutional conditions for democratisation, be they social, economic or in the form of the rule of law and ‘politics of order’ or ‘stability’; be they expressed from radical or conservative perspectives or by Chinese leaders. So why bother about democracy assessments anymore?

This book is a modest attempt at proposing a quite different way of assessing democratisation for radically different purposes. The ultimate aim is to contribute to a third position in support of less biased and thus better analyses; analyses that precisely by being better can provide helpful knowledge for those who try to use the poorly developed democratic openings to shape better institutions of representation and better capacities among wider sections of the population – typically by welfare reform towards less exclusionary growth to also help increase people’s political power – and to thus build democracies that are more substantive and substantial, thus widening the space for ordinary people to use democracy, to set their agendas towards a better life *and* to implement them. Such a process may be called transformative democratic politics; assessments towards that end are increasingly relevant.

APPENDIX 1 IMPLEMENTATION AGAINST ODDS: THE INDONESIAN STORY

According to a seasoned Swedish donor representative, ‘even a well recorded failure of this pioneering assessment project would be good enough as there would be much to learn’.¹

We certainly did better than a ‘recorded failure’, though the aims and strategies of the research proved overambitious. Some sails should have been taken in and more hands called on deck. The problems were less serious in the initial stages than when it came to making comprehensive analyses, and to the drafting of policy recommendations together with relevant pro-democrats.

The following is an attempt to tell the story in brief, based on Törnquist 1979–idem. and with a special focus on the 6 tasks on scholarly partnership and the 12 stages of co-operation between researchers and practitioners that were identified in the general part of this chapter.

The Conditions

By 2002, in Indonesia there was a shortage of almost everything: time, funds, committed academics, educated researchers, reliable previous research and data banks. One source of inspiration was the comparative studies of social and political movements (including Törnquist 2002) and assessments of theoretically defined democratic institutions such as those by David Beetham (2002). Another more practical and political example of what might be possible was the concerned scholarship and participatory practices in Kerala in the 1980s and 1990s that were mentioned in chapter 1.

Indonesia, however, was quite different from Kerala’s long history of progressive popular action for citizenship rights, political independence and land reform against caste oppression, colonialism and landlordism. Even the mass-based educational movement that was crucial in Indonesia during the struggle for independence had been suppressed or domesticated by socio-religious organisations. But various associations of journalists, human rights and peace and reconciliation activists had been crucial in the democracy movement; and they were prepared to engage alongside a number of widely trusted leaders and a few academics.

As mentioned in the second part of chapter 1, a number of leaders of the major pro-democracy organisations together with this author were entrusted

by a conference of activists and scholars discussing a previous study of the pro-democracy movement in early 2002 to initiate broader democracy analyses. To facilitate this, the leaders and a few concerned Indonesian scholars established an organisation called DEMOS (The Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies). DEMOS in turn formed a research team.

The team that consisted of investigative journalists and young researchers who had reviewed the democracy movement. The 'juniors' were backed up by the organisers of DEMOS and an academic supervisor. The former included the most widely respected human rights activist, a former general secretary of the national human rights commission, a major reconciliation theorist and campaigner and a leading investigative journalist and media educator (later on national human rights commissioner) – most of whom, sadly, are no longer with us: the late Munir Said Thalib (assassinated by the Indonesian security agencies), the late Asmara Nababan, the late Th. Sumartana and Stanley Adi Prasetyo. Unfortunately, however, they were not accompanied by representatives from Indonesia's scattered and often poorly developed mass organisations of white- and blue-collar workers and farmers. Further, this author was involved not as a consultant but as academic director in his capacity as professor at the University of Oslo, the principles of which I was thus obliged to honour and DEMOS promised to respect. This base was significant for the author's integrity as well as for the quality and credibility of the project.

Financial Resources and Institutional Co-operation

The decision with regard to funding was *not* to ask for co-operation within the framework or pet strategies of any donors or democracy-building organisations, but only on the basis of our own theoretical framework and strategic plan. As a result, we worked out a project proposal in much the same way as when an academic applies for funding from a research council. The major difference was that many tasks would be carried out in co-operation with democracy activists and organisations. The proposal (which was well anchored in Indonesia though initiated by this author) was sent from the University of Oslo as the lead partner in co-operation with DEMOS, the Indonesian research organisation. Fortunately both the Norwegian and Swedish authorities for international development co-operation (NORAD and Sida) responded positively. Some direct support was also granted to DEMOS for specific parts of the project by the Ford Foundation, the Tifa Soros Foundation and the local office of the European Union. International IDEA, however, abandoned a promising partnership, possibly because it wanted to give priority to its own assessments scheme. Other international organisations with their own formats also seemed to look upon us more as competitors than as possible partners, but cordial relations were sustained with the UNDP.

Our strict principles meant, however, that the main donors had only limited interest in making use of the results that they had contributed to. Most importantly, they did not follow up the results by even considering providing support to the more than one thousand committed pro-democrats who engaged with the project and had so many ideas on how to move ahead through a diversity of

locally rooted pro-democracy initiatives and with so many individual and organisational contacts around the country.

This was a huge loss of a unique opportunity that remains hard to digest. But the blame can not be placed only at the door of our donors. It was also due to DEMOS' insufficient facilitation of a membership organisation composed of the people who engaged in the assessment work. With a reasonably efficient and trustworthy membership-based organisation of all the people involved, it would have been easier to convince our Scandinavian donors to come forward. On the contrary, DEMOS' leaders advocated localised 'non-imposed' initiatives. They also warned against broad membership as it might open up the potential for external manipulation and hijacking.²

An additional institutional dilemma generated severe problems over the years. Norwegian and Swedish funding through the University of Oslo meant support for partnership and academic principles. After the initial three years and the first qualitative survey, however, the Swedish donors wanted to withdraw because of its limited interest in Indonesia; and while Norway was willing to act as the lead donor and thus shoulder the administration of the Swedish funds too, Norway in turn shifted the responsibility for the project from its development aid authority to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Jakarta as part of a major overhaul of its international co-operation. Thus it was also decided that support should be given directly to DEMOS 'as any Indonesian NGO', rather than via the University of Oslo, which would instead be engaged by DEMOS for whatever co-operation and advice that it deemed necessary. While this may have been well intended to foster more contextual Norwegian judgement and Indonesian 'ownership', it ignored that DEMOS was a research organisation established as a substitute for a sufficiently good academic base in the public university system (from which many of those involved had been thrown out under Suharto) and that the University of Oslo was not an NGO or a semi-private research institute or consultancy firm.

The new Norwegian policy thus undermined the chances of sustaining the academic-based partnership and credible democracy assessments that were originally agreed on. This was because the policy strengthened the position of those within DEMOS who were sceptical of the principles of independent, unbiased and high-quality research through co-operation with scholars and academic institutions. These critics claimed to be more nationally independent and wanted to give priority to the dynamics of NGO activism based on less qualified research – with external academics in the consultancy business giving advice and providing respectability, though not sharing the responsibility and thus, in reality, not being able to guarantee that the research was up to the mark.

It was possible to manage these problems for a few years thanks to the personal respect and understanding between the executive and academic directors (Nababan and this author) on sustaining the original model in spite of the changes imposed by Norway. But then tensions increased within the framework of a follow-up project in Aceh. This project had been initiated just after the tsunami by this author in consultation with democracy activists inside and outside Aceh. Thereafter the project was developed in co-operation between DEMOS

and Indonesian and Aceh pro-democrats with the aim of fostering civil-society-based democratisation in the province. This, we postulated on the basis of our emerging research results, would be possible within the new political space that was about to be created thanks to Indonesian decentralisation and some actors' interest in fostering peace by allowing local political parties. The initially positive but then deteriorating developments in Aceh have already been discussed in the Indonesian part of chapter 5, but the point here is that as these negative tendencies evolved in Aceh, and as there was a particular need to stand up for the genuine democrats in the province, the Norwegian authorities did not support the fulfilment of the original aim of the project in spite of obvious and serious mismanagement, perhaps for 'diplomatic reasons'. We shall return to the effects on the research later.

A few months later, when Nababan retired and the new executive director (with major responsibility for the Aceh project too) entirely excluded the academic principles in a proposed new general contract of co-operation between DEMOS and the University of Oslo, it was thus impossible for this author, and certainly also for the University of Oslo, to sustain the co-operation.

Later the Norwegian authorities have fostered 'institution-to-institution co-operation agreements', to reduce the number of small projects calling for time-consuming administration as well as the importance of individuals. Institutional co-operation in terms of being guided by rules and regulations is obviously fundamental. But it is vital to recall that while companies, policy or assignment-driven research institutes are directed from top-down, a rector, dean or head of department in proper academic institutions cannot instruct a professor what research the latter should engage in, and instead help to defend these principles and facilitate the research – which has been made clear by the University of Oslo too, as an institution. We will return to the alternative forms of co-operation that have evolved through partnership between Gadjah Mada University and the University of Oslo.

Working with Activists to Identify Sources

Engaging key people and organisations able to carry out the research and access the best sources was even more challenging. The comprehensive and inclusive analytical framework was crucial but a precondition was that we could develop a method for accessing the facts. Research on power and democracy had been obstructed under Suharto, and now it remained poor and faced new challenges.

There was one major reason for the new problems. Under Suharto, Indonesia became so centralised that it was thought possible to monitor and analyse major developments by going to the offices of leading individuals in Jakarta and a few other major cities (just as in the former Soviet Union). After Suharto, much of this disintegrated and a localised political system evolved based on a combination of patron-clientelism, bureaucratic and military organisation and increasingly privatised robber capitalism (e.g. Aspinall and Fealy 2003, Nordholt 2004, Samuel and Nordholt 2004, Nordholt and Hoogenboom 2006, Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, van Klinken 2007 and 2009, Hadiz 2009). Moreover,

popular protest and emerging organisations were also dispersed and fragmented (Budiman and Törnquist 2001, Törnquist 2002, Prasetyo et al. 2003).

Thus there was very little reliable data and most assessments of democracy were based on the opinions of metropolitan air conditioned experts, journalists, NGO leaders and liberal politicians. The frequently proposed shortcut to gaining better knowledge was the use of quantitative opinion surveys. But aside from the problems of reaching out and asking good questions, the most important information needed at this point was *not* people's views of democracy (even if that was interesting too) but how actually existing democracy was developing and what mechanisms, actors and relations of power were proving decisive.

In short, there was a need to substitute for the missing detailed research in a number of crucial fields. In the long run, close research should be added, of course, but for the foreseeable future: what informants would be the best substitute? Who would know best?

Our answer lay with the well-educated and experienced pro-democracy activists on the ground with a long track record and reputation for being able to reflect critically. If a sufficient number of such expert-informants could be identified around the country, we would thus gain access to the best possible sources. These people would be capable, moreover, of understanding and answering our insufficiently contextualised questions. Finally, the informants would also be interested in making use of the results of the assessment.

The only two problems were, first, how to identify and engage all the informants? Second, why should they trust the integrity of the team enough to commit to answering hundreds of sensitive questions on how they judged the problems and options of democratisation in a country with a rather dubious reputation in terms of civil and political freedoms?

Given, first, that during the Suharto regime we had been thrown out of the public universities, second, that academic integrity remained an endangered quality and third, that the room for manoeuvre within public universities was still quite narrow, the answer lay with the establishment of DEMOS as a joint venture between committed academicians and well-reputed democracy activists representing leading human rights and media organisations in co-operation with the University of Oslo (via this author's professorship).

Successes

Thus it was possible to develop a national network of experienced and reliable key informants-cum-local representatives spanning all the 33 provinces who were prepared to have their track record scrutinised publicly. These key informants in turn began to mobilise some 900 reliable informants along 13 or so major frontlines of democracy work who would be able to answer our many questions. These frontlines had been identified in the earlier qualitative survey and case studies on the post-Suharto democracy movement. Together with the research team, the key informants also recruited and trained reliable field assistants.

As previously mentioned, two country-wide qualitative expert surveys were carried out and analysed, one in 2003 and 2004, another in 2007 and 2008;

and both surveys were to be followed up with local qualitative surveys and thematic studies. The frontlines along which the informants were selected in each province in the first and second surveys were almost the same. These not only reflected the priorities of the main democracy groups but also the everyday struggles of major importance in the processes of democratisation that had been vital, though not as visible. In Indonesia, (1) the struggle of the peasants, agricultural labourers and fisher folk for their social and economic interests and basic rights; (2) the struggle of labour for better working conditions and standards of living; (3) the struggle for the social and economic interests and basic rights of the urban poor; (4) The promotion of human rights; (5) the struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance'; (6) democratisation of political parties and the party system; (7) the promotion of pluralism, religious and ethnic reconciliation and conflict resolution; (8) the improvement of democratisation of education; (9) the promotion of professionalism as part of 'good governance' in public and private sectors; (10) the promotion of freedom, independence and quality of media; (11) the promotion of gender equality and feminist perspectives; (12) the improvement of supplementary representation at the local level and (13) the promotion of sustainable development.

The first of the qualitative surveys conducted was carried out in two rounds in order to use the first to test the framework and the methodology, develop experience and produce quick preliminary results that could be useful for pro-democrats in the run up to the 2004 general elections. This learning by doing was wise and thereafter the quality of the work improved substantially. Taken together the huge operations in 2003–2004 and 2007–2008 of enrolling informants and collecting information in co-operation with the democracy movement around the country was remarkably successful. Almost all the informants in both qualitative country-wide surveys went out of their way to answer the questions. This often called for several sessions and six to eight hours work. It is a significant indication of the democratic commitment of the participants as well as their trust in the idea of independent research, the organisation and the team.

Sceptics did not support our idea of co-operating with key informants-cum-local representatives from the democracy movement in carrying out the research and select senior democracy activists as informants (i.e. those to be interviewed in the actual qualitative surveys). In reality, however, these partners and informants proved to be extraordinarily committed to the idea and principles of the research; and the reliability in terms of the consistency of the answers given to several related questions was quite high too. Equally important: the sceptics' perception that the pro-democrats were likely to make overly critical assessments proved entirely mistaken. In fact, the senior activists' answers were generally balanced and nuanced.

Stumbling Blocks

There were certainly also problems with the data collection. One was the criterion that required the identification of the most seasoned and critically reflective informants within each of the frontlines of democracy work. Another was that

the local key informants' selection of the informants unintentionally side-lined women and activists outside the NGO sector. Women as well as ordinary workers, small farmers and the urban poor have been remarkably active in the democracy struggle, though rarely in leading positions. This is now being considered in forthcoming qualitative surveys.

Second, the frontlines of democracy work are not written in stone and hence change over the years. Problems of human rights and corruption, for instance, remain crucial, but it is important to consider that much of the struggle for democracy may have shifted to the everyday conflicts and initiatives taking place in residential areas and workplaces.

Third, insufficient use was made of the remarkable national scope of the qualitative survey that succeeded in collecting information at the local level throughout the country, and not just in the main cities and towns. The informants were asked to assess the standard of a range of indicators at the local level. And if they were most active with regard to all-Indonesia politics, they were asked to do the same along a specific political field such as agricultural or industrial policies and conflicts. Yet we failed to aggregate the data within these contexts and fields, focusing instead on the general Indonesia-wide level and on the basis of broadly defined regions that did not always correspond to the contexts and political fields where the informants had made their specific assessments.

It is indeed methodologically dubious to aggregate local assessments in this way and to make statements about 'all-Indonesia', but it was about the best we could do at the time. For the future, the general recommendation made in chapter 2 is, however, that the local level contexts should be related to the nodes of local political dynamics and that the central contexts should be in the form of the crucial political fields that condition local democracy such as centrally directed labour or agricultural policies. In Indonesia, the focal points of local politics are the 500 or so districts to which most of the decentralised formal powers have been devolved, and where critical elections of local officials and legislatures take place. (The semi-autonomous province of Aceh is the only exception in terms of having more powers than its districts.) Obviously, the inclusion of a sufficient number of informants from various sectors in almost 500 districts is unrealistic, but critical cases may be selected.

Making the Model Work: Advances and Setbacks with the First Survey

As has been mentioned, the operational model developed and improved upon along the way was that concerned academics would begin by designing an inclusive draft framework for data collection and analysis. This framework had to be specific enough to enable a team of committed investigative journalists with some basic academic training to guide and co-ordinate experienced and critically thinking activists around the country in collecting reliable local information as quickly as possible. Once the data had been collected the assumption was that the team would be able to tabulate and classify the information from the interviews and then input the systematised information into computerised

databases. Finally, the academic director and local advisors would guide and supervise the analysis process.

The analysis process, in turn, was planned in four stages. First, a quick general analysis that could be of immediate use for the pro-democrats who had engaged in the qualitative survey work. This quick analysis was to be published as executive reports and disseminated more widely via the media. Second, extended and specified analysis in co-operation with local key informants in order to correct mistakes in the first analysis and to generate refined results that would make sense to activists on the ground. Third, comprehensive analysis, in extended co-operation with local advisers and published in book form. Fourth, supplementary local qualitative surveys as well as case studies identified in the surveys and carried out by the team in co-operation with practitioners in order to facilitate more specific recommendations.

The experiences from implementing this plan were mixed, so let us look further into the details in search for lessons to be learnt.

Too abstract Framework, Yet Possible to Gain Data, Analyse and Disseminate

The initial stumbling block was expected: how to reduce all the questions we wanted to ask to a manageable number, and how to train the team and local key informants on the logic and possible theoretical interpretations, so that they in turn could train local participants and contribute contextual examples relating to each of the 33 provinces and 13 frontlines of democratisation? Needless to say, we should have developed more contextualised questions. But ideally, then, the team would have ended up with some 33 times 13 contextual versions of the about 300 questions (which we will return to in the following chapters on the analytical framework). This would have taken us to a total of around 129,000 specific questions.

As this was clearly excessive, attempts were made to develop instead general Indonesian examples of the questions that the key informants and field assistants could use as points of departure for developing additional local examples. It is true that this process was not sufficiently well managed, but the informants remained engaged and the team was able to keep the process going. This will be easier with the new recommendation (in chapter 2) that the focus should be on a limited number of critical local contexts as well as centrally based country-wide political sectors or policy areas.

Remarkably, moreover, as we know, very few informants dropped out, in spite of all the time that the extensive questionnaire required; and the level of consistency between the answers to different but related questions was found to be quite high. Further, the central team did an excellent job by consolidating almost all the overwhelming mass of data gathered from around the country with minimal delay.

It was consequently possible to produce the initial executive reports on the results in relation to different arguments about democratisation in Indonesia just before our self-imposed deadlines (DEMOS 2004, 2005, 2008). It is true that the

academic director had to engage extensively in the interpretation of the data and the final analysis, but it nevertheless remained a collective task. And the capacity of the researchers to do much of the work on their own increased substantially as we moved from the first to the second qualitative survey.

The main findings and analysis of the first two reports were also republished in a series of popularised articles in the leading weekly news magazine *Tempo* (DEMOS 2004–2005). The same applied, albeit on a lesser scale, after the second qualitative survey (DEMOS 2008a). This called for extensive editorial assistance, but it succeeded. Interestingly, however, this publishing required separate financing, in spite of the fact that the previous case studies and the democracy qualitative survey had grown in part out of close co-operation with the pro-democratic media community. A major reason was the new commercial competition between the media and that public dissemination of advanced qualitative democracy surveys was not deemed profitable. (This is in contrast to what still seems to be the case for advanced magazines in India such as *Frontline*.) There were also reports published by journalists in other media and in editorials and opinion pages (e.g. Törnquist 2004–2008).

Generally speaking, however, the public discourse was less widespread than expected given the initial engagement of journalists and cultural workers with the project.

Finally, the executive reports were also used as a basis for a number of seminars with several of the informants and local activists in regional centres, although the outcomes were quite uneven. One obstacle and lesson was that our data was not aggregated to fit the politically relevant contexts well enough. A second problem was that DEMOS did not really engage in facilitating the work and organising informants and assistants who, in turn, we hoped would take the data and results as a point of departure for discussions on priorities and co-operation between pro-democracy activists and politicians.

Delayed Analyses: Insufficient Local Supervision, Editing and Support

The most serious dilemma was much less expected: how to finalise the analysis of the data and write up both brief summary and full reports.

The analysis had to be carried out and published as quickly as possible. To make sense, moreover, the reports had to identify the implications of the qualitative survey on the major contending arguments about democratisation: were these arguments refuted or vindicated and were there alternative, more fruitful perspectives?

First, it was essential to provide quick and clear-cut results to the committed journalists and local informants and activists who were expected to engage in public discussion and provide supplementary input. Ideally, these discussions would in turn have been followed by more thorough political deliberation by civil society and political groups convened by the key informants in each province (and clusters of key informants) to initiate joint agendas. It is true that the first general analysis (published in the executive reports with the academic

director) could serve as a synopsis and general guide for briefings. Yet writing for the media and activists is a separate task and art, and that was not well mastered by the team, so not very much was produced. Thus the full potential of the results could not be utilised in local democracy promotion.

Meanwhile another section of the central-level research team was to have written up the more comprehensive reports. However, while the team understood well the data it had collected, tabulated and systematised, it was not so well read in the various existing theories and arguments that they would need to confront the data with, and to thus judge the pros and cons of these often contending theses. Thus the initial drafts of the comprehensive reports were delayed and of poor quality. With regard to the first comprehensive report, the team, the academic director and a committed external editor, who was finally brought on board, had to engage in permanent rescue missions that were expensive and highly frustrating for all parties involved. As a result, the time-consuming rewriting of the full report until it was up to international academic standards (Priyono et al. 2007) meant that most of the scheduled local qualitative surveys³ and the thematic follow-up studies⁴ were neglected and had to be shelved almost completely.

Instead of commenting and correcting and commenting again on the manuscripts for the major report from the national qualitative survey, the academic director could, of course, have written the report on his own (and gained the credit for it). But that would have meant abandoning the whole idea of participatory research and capacity building.

In hindsight the problem boils down to three factors, the first of which was the lack of committed Indonesian supervisors with relevant academic training. This was due in part to this author and DEMOS' mistake of not having put enough effort from the outset into identifying and engaging available scholars and senior students. (There was certainly also a problem of combining the work in Indonesian and English, but that was well known from the outset and could have been managed.⁵) Basically, however, very few competent scholars and senior students were available. This was both because of the poor standard of democracy studies at Indonesian universities and research institutes and because scholars still tend to be on low incomes and thus seek higher remuneration from consultancy-type work on expert markets and/or career possibilities than we could offer. Besides, there was also little time in which to engage additional supervisors with good ideas in the middle of permanent crises and rescue missions.

The second major factor behind the problems was too little engagement and investment in good editors and translators. In spite of the severe difficulties in producing good briefings and reports, this neglect was never really acknowledged until the conclusion of the report from the second qualitative survey, produced in co-operation with scholars at the University of Gadjah Mada.⁶

The third major cause of the problems was the insufficient involvement of the activists and journalists that had initiated the project in the first place. This was partly due to the fact that several had lost some momentum in their own work. As a result, their activities were confined to citizen associations, and they continued to operate in relative isolation from popular movements. Similarly, aspects

of the journalistic commitment to public democratic discourse (in addition to basic freedoms and professional work ethics) were lost with the increasing commercialisation of the media and the purchase of and investment in major media outlets by corporations with vested political interests.

Crucial but Aborted Advances with the Second Survey

By contrast, it must be noted that there were huge improvements in the management and reporting of the second qualitative survey carried out in 2007 and 2008. Unfortunately, however, the advances were undermined by NGOish consolidation and fear for academic co-operation.

NGOish Consolidation

After the conclusion and reporting from the first qualitative survey, the major general strategy for addressing the problems was consolidation in terms of enhancing the abilities of the research team. Unfortunately, this also implied that the research organisation become introspective in trying to manage problems that were more rooted in the insufficient involvement of external translators, editors and supervisors than in the individual qualities of the members of the team itself, with one or two exceptions.

In so doing DEMOS ironically transformed itself into the type of archetypical NGO that had been identified as a major hurdle in pro-democracy work in both the previous case studies on 'floating democrats' and the new qualitative survey results themselves: an atomised association that nourished its own networks and advocacy projects rather than paving the way for broader and more unified agendas and campaigns.

The NGOish consolidation also affected the opportunities for using the delayed research reports as a basis for recommendations in co-operation with informants and the activists and organisations that they were assumed to be able to engage locally. Briefings to the informants and the facilitation of communication between them remained neglected.

As already mentioned, one argument in the team was that activism should evolve locally and without direction; another was that a broad membership of DEMOS would open up the potential for political manipulation and hijacking. References to the development of popular educational movements in other contexts, from Kerala to Scandinavia, were not attended to; and neither did compromise proposals on the launching of separate or parallel organisations.

As a partial central-level alternative, the DEMOS officer in charge brought together and facilitated a group of informants and activists from various parts of the country with an interest in following up the assessment results. While these were all fine and admirable activists, serious questions were asked about how they had been selected and their representativeness.

Nevertheless, it represented a step forward, and the academic director designed initial memoranda (in late 2005 and early 2007) on possible recommendations. There were two main arguments. One concerned the need for civil society-based

pro-democrats to engage in organised politics, not just in civil society. The other addressed the way in which this might be best achieved through so-called intermediary socio-political blocks in between party politics and civil society and social movement activism. They would have to be initiated by leading pro-democrats and their organisations on various levels. The substance was elaborated upon in chapter 6.

The ideas were discussed by the research team and the group of particularly interested activists DEMOS had assembled. Separately, several activists who had not been invited by DEMOS also discussed the matter, including with this author. During 2008, the conclusions from these discussions were supplemented by the results from the second qualitative survey, ongoing case studies (Nur 2009, Törnquist et al. 2009a) and the conclusion of the studies in Aceh (Törnquist et al. 2011). Thus the full report from the second qualitative survey (Samadhi and Warouw 2009) has a specific chapter on the idea of a socio-political block strategy (Mundayat and Piryono 2009).

However, the delay in the assessment work, the problems of inclusion and representation of various interested actors as well as the termination of the cooperation between DEMOS and the University of Oslo (which also mirrored conflicts inside DEMOS) constrained further initiatives. Later DEMOS went on to produce a separate training manual, but without much substance and without the involvement of the researchers, leading activists and the academic director (DEMOS 2009).

Promising but Threatening Academic Partnership

The second strategy for addressing the problems of conducting good analyses and publishing briefings and reports as well as facilitating an inclusive educational movement was to work more closely with supportive scholars and students within academia. This is how crucial advances were made in the implementation and analysis of the second qualitative survey (2007–2008) as well as the concluding report. By then a core team of committed researchers had received sufficient training and experience. They knew how to master the process and to make sufficient use of instructions and advice from local academics that had been brought on board to support the team and the academic director. And they appreciated and benefitted from good editing. (DEMOS 2008a and Samadhi and Warouw 2009) This testified to the fact that the basic roadmap was feasible – with sufficient training and academic advice. Yet, the advances were stalled.

There were several reasons for the cooperation with the academia. One was the much needed professional development of the key researchers. They had to be able to better understand and apply the theories and arguments of democracy to the data collated. They needed more knowledge of the methodologies available to carry out qualitative assessment surveys and research case studies. They had to be able to write up good reports.

Another reason was the need to engage local supervisors in order to speed up the pace of the work, improve quality and integrate new results from the rapidly expanding university studies of democracy. Local supervisors would also reduce

the workload and dominance of the main academic director in order to facilitate instead more equal academic partnership between him and local researchers.

Yet a reason was that these needs – as well as the importance of reaching out and initiating at least widespread education and related activism – should be combined with efforts to rebuild democracy studies and research at university level. In 1994, we were thrown out of the Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java, where a promising Masters programme and related research had been initiated by Indonesian scholars (including Arief Budiman, Ariel Heryanto and George Aditjondro) with international support from the University of Sydney and individual scholars such as this author. Parallel to the work with DEMOS, minor portions of the Norwegian support that was in the hands of the academic director had thus been used to facilitate committed colleagues at one of Indonesia's foremost higher education institutes, the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta which, then, also backed up DEMOS.

These attempts were intensified and combined in late 2006 with the founding of a Norwegian-supported Masters and PhD programme in democracy studies at UGM and the launch of an associated journal and publishing house (the PCD Press; www.pcd.ugm.ac.id). This was followed by the collaboration on the analysis and writing up of the results from the second qualitative survey, in association with additional supervisors at UGM (Samadhi and Warouw 2009). The plan from late 2008 onwards was to further develop this cooperation between civil society and university-based researchers.

However, a major unavoidable effect of the university strategy was that academic advisors become more influential than had previously been the case. This was obviously threatening to some sections in DEMOS. By early 2009, as mentioned above, the then new leaders of DEMOS no longer wanted to sustain a partnership based on academic principles. These leaders opted to use academics as supporting consultants instead. Thus the cooperation with first the University of Oslo and then UGM had to be terminated.

The Way Ahead

In this process DEMOS' main researchers opted for sustaining the original model by moving ahead with their own studies and developing new research together with the supportive scholars inside UGM.

At the time of writing, the qualitative survey work and the originally planned case studies have thus been resumed within the Masters and PhD programmes mentioned above and an associated comprehensive research programme at UGM on 'Power, Welfare and Democracy'. This programme retains extensive joint work with practitioners on the ground and develops cooperation with other universities around the country as well as international academic partners, including the University of Oslo. This is an environment in which basic regular qualitative surveys can be supplemented with a cluster of thematic studies into key problems and areas; studies that can be more varied, less extensive and more flexibly defined within a broad and continuously improved framework. Fortunately, the efforts have gained Norwegian support.

With the transition from an NGO to a major public university, however, a number of new organisational problems emerge. Those agents of change at UGM who try to combine their own need for supportive colleagues and institutions with efforts to develop sufficiently strong leadership to overcome irrelevant status barriers, career-based project competition and compartmentalisation within universities need to be supported. It must also be possible to appreciate and integrate researchers with their crucial experiences outside the academic hierarchy, not least because they have had to work in the NGO sector for many years. Meanwhile, tolerance to the engagement of colleagues who seek outside activities and extra income have to be reduced. Finally, the donors on their part prioritise quite naturally top-level administrative institutional agreements between themselves and university leaders, therefore having to be reminded of the need to also respect academic institutions in terms of rules and regulations for the autonomy and freedom of the active scholars to decide about priorities, design and implementation, given that the very idea of independent academies and academicians is that they are not ordinary state institutions and employees, or for that matter consultants or activists. This continue to be crucial in the efforts at democratisation in Indonesia; in the distressful era of New Public Management, it also needs to be kept in mind in countries like Norway.

APPENDIX 2 THE QUESTIONNAIRES
FOR THE 2013 THIRD INDONESIAN
DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT

(A): LOCAL QUESTIONNAIRE

A	B	C

NO QUESTIONNAIRE

A. CODES OF REGION

TOWN	13	Manado	24	Sidoarjo	
01	Banda Aceh	14	Ternate	25	Kutai Kartanegara
02	Medan	15	Denpasar	26	Poso
03	Batam	16	Kupang	27	Belu
04	Bekasi	17	Ambon	28	Jayapura
05	Bandung			29	Manokwari
06	Pekalongan	DISTRICT			
07	Surakarta	18	Aceh Selatan		
08	Surabaya	19	Kerinci	SPECIAL REGION	
09	Pontianak	20	Bengkulu	30	DI Yogyakarta
10	Banjarmasin	21	Lampung Selatan	31	DKI Jakarta
11	Balikpapan	22	Tangerang		
12	Makassar	23	Batang		

B. CODES OF FRONTLINE OF DEMOCRATIC WORK ALONG WHICH THE INFORMANT IS ACTIVE

01	Issues of Education, including both services and content	08	Issues of Clan, Ethnic, and Religious Relations
02	Issues of Health Services	09	Issues of Media, Culture and Social Media
03	Issues of Ecology, Environment and Natural Resources (incl. mining, forestry, fishery, etc.)	10	Issues of Security Sector and Welfare Reform
04	Issues of Labour Movement and related policies	11	Issues of Anti-corruption, Transparent and Accountable Government
05	Issues of Informal Sectors (incl. urban poor issues)	12	Issues of Human Rights and Law (incl. minority rights)
06	Issues of Agrarian Movements, Land Reform and Land Grabbing	13	Issues of Party and Electoral rules and regulations
07	Issues of Women, Gender Equality and Children	14	Issues of Industry and Business

C. NUMBER OF INFORMANT IN TOWN/DISTRICT (01–30)

INTERVIEW PROCESS

NO	DATE	PART (NUMBER)	TIME	
			START	END
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

VALIDATION

Interviewed by:

(name)

Local assistant

(sign)

Checked and validated by:

(name)

Key informant

(sign)

STATEMENT OF AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENT

This survey is based on the combined efforts of concerned scholars, students and experienced and reflective practitioners of democracy. The study would not be possible without the dedicated involvement of the informants in particular. We know that it will

take a lot of your important time to answer all the questions, but we hope that you like to contribute thus to the production of an independent baseline of knowledge for further efforts at democratisation, and we like to express our sincere thanks for your commitment and patience. We shall certainly keep you updated on the results and we are looking forward to further cooperation on various follow up activities.

Please note that the research team based at the UGM, supervised by us, Professors (Dr.) Purwo Santoso (UGM) and Olle Törnquist (UiO), is committed to keep all information about the informants in strict confidence, only use it to secure the validity and reliability of the survey, as well as to keep the information separated from the answers to all the substantive questions and only use the thus anonymised information for the purpose of non-commercial and independent academic research in accordance with strict academic principles. All members of the team, including local key-informants and research assistants, have signed a statement of commitment to this effect.

The survey is supported by the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo and by additional financial support from the Royal Embassy of Norway to Indonesia. The financial support is given to the universities without any other formal or informal conditions than to conduct the best possible independent academic study for the benefit of democracy and thus based welfare and development, and, of course, to account for all funds used and make the results available for the public.

The survey is to follow up and broaden two previous surveys which were carried out in partnership between the civil society organisation, Demos, and the University of Oslo, in cooperation with the Indonesian Democracy Movement, between 2004 and 2008 about the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. The comprehensive previous results were reported on in Priyono et al. (2007) and Samadhi et al. (2009).¹ The transfer of the responsibility to UGM

¹ Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W.P. and Törnquist, O. with Birks, T. (2007). Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS; Samadhi, W. P. and Warouw, N. (Eds.) (2009). Building Democracy on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. Jakarta and Yogyakarta; Demos and PCD Press. (1st edition: December 2008; 2nd edition 2009).

is to (a) sustain the academic basis and quality of the surveys while continuing the cooperation with democratic practitioners and (b) to foster the utilisation of the results in the wide academic and public education and information as well as in academic follow-up studies. A reference group of leading democracy activists and intellectuals serves to support this cooperation and contribution to the public discourse. The founding members of the group include Danang Widoyoko, Daniel Dhakidae, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Handoko Wibowo, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Mohtar Mas'oeed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Wardah Hafidz, and Wiladi Budiharga. The ultimate aim of the survey is to generate the best possible knowledge as a basis for attempts at democratic transformative politics through the combination of democratisation and reforms towards welfare based and sustainable social and economic development.

The survey is not built on the number of answers and of statistical analysis but on the quality of the assessments by the informants of the problems and options of democratisation and the interpretation of this information with the help of a number of relevant theories. For further information about the rationale and academic foundations of the survey, see Törnquist (2013).²

The survey is carried out both in a number of local contexts around the country and with regard to crucial national level institutions of public governance. The focus is on six pillars of democracy: (1) the constitution of the *demos* (people) and public affairs; (2) the institutions (rules and regulations) of democracy; (3) the actors; (4) how the actors relate to these institutions; (5) the political capacity of the actors and (6) how their strategies affect democratisation.

Once again, on behalf of the full team, thank you very much for engaging in this effort.

Yogyakarta and Oslo, March 2013
Purwo Santoso and Olle Törnquist

² Törnquist, O. (2013). *Assessing the Dynamics of Democratisation: Transformative Politics. New Institutions and the Case of Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave.



BASELINE SURVEY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

PWD Project
UGM-UiO research cooperation
2013

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In this part we focus on the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs. Both topics are related to definition of democracy, e.g. ‘popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality’ (Beetham 1999). More specifically, we want to explore what constitutes public issues, who shall control them, and how.

PART
1

THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE DEMOS AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

- Q1.1.** In your assessment, which of the issue areas that are listed in the Table A below do **people in your town/district** think are public issues, irrespective of whether the current local government addresses them or not?
- Q1.2.** In your assessment, which of these issue areas that are listed in the Table A below do **people in your town/district** deem to be the most important in your town/district? (*Pick one from the list*)

TABLE A				
NO	PUBLIC ISSUE ACCORDING TO PEOPLE	Q1.1.		Q1.2.
		ACCEPTED AS PUBLIC ISSUES		THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUE
		YES	NO	
A	Education	[]	[]	[]
B	Health services	[]	[]	[]
C	Physical security	[]	[]	[]
D	Fishery	[]	[]	[]
E	Agriculture	[]	[]	[]
F	The informal sector, such as street vendors,	[]	[]	[]
G	Industry	[]	[]	[]
I	Welfare and social security	[]	[]	[]

TABLE A				
NO	PUBLIC ISSUE ACCORDING TO PEOPLE	Q1.1.		Q1.2.
		ACCEPTED AS PUBLIC ISSUES		THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUE
		YES	NO	
J	Public transportations	[]	[]	[]
K	Traffic	[]	[]	[]
L	Public housing	[]	[]	[]
M	Discrimination against minority groups (gender, ethnic, religion)	[]	[]	[]
N	Regulations of the rights of children	[]	[]	[]
O	Religion-based regulations	[]	[]	[]
P	Others	[]	[]	[]

Q1.3. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below do **people in your town/district** think are left outside local government attention in your district/town and left to the market, self-help among communities and private solutions?

Q1.4. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below that **people** say have been left out of public governance do they think should instead be subject to public governance?

TABLE B					
NO	ISSUES	Q1.3.			Q1.4.
		MARKET	SELF-HELP	FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL	SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
A	Education	[]	[]	[]	[]
B	Health	[]	[]	[]	[]
C	Physical security	[]	[]	[]	[]
D	Fishery	[]	[]	[]	[]
E	Agriculture	[]	[]	[]	[]

TABLE B					
NO	ISSUES	Q1.3.			Q1.4.
		MARKET	SELF-HELP	FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL	SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
F	The informal sector, such as street vendors	[]	[]	[]	[]
G	Industry	[]	[]	[]	[]
H	Wages & labour regulations	[]	[]	[]	[]
I	Welfare and social security	[]	[]	[]	[]
J	Public transportations	[]	[]	[]	[]
K	Traffic	[]	[]	[]	[]
L	Public housing	[]	[]	[]	[]
M	Discrimination against minority groups (gender, ethnic, religion)	[]	[]	[]	[]
N	Regulations of the rights of children	[]	[]	[]	[]
O	Religion-based regulations	[]	[]	[]	[]
P	Others	[]	[]	[]	[]

Q1.5. We return now to the issues that people deem to be most important (Q 1.2). In your assessment, do **people in your town/district** know who and what institutions are supposed to control and manage the problem that they deem to be most important?

- a. [] Yes, they know very well
- b. [] Yes, but they know only partially
- c. [] No, they don't really know much about this

Q1.6. In your assessment, who and what institution (as listed in Table C) do **people in your town/district** think should handle the problem you just said that they deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

Q1.7. And how should this be done?

TABLE C	
Q1.6.	Q1.7.
WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM	HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED
a. <input type="checkbox"/> The individual	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Proceed directly to Q1.9.
b. <input type="checkbox"/> The family	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Proceed directly to Q1.9.
c. <input type="checkbox"/> On the market	a. <input type="checkbox"/> By paying for help/services b. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to the market:
d. <input type="checkbox"/> Citizens' and people's own organisations	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done through community organisations (for example, self-management groups and cooperatives but also religious and cultural (adat) groups) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by joint interest/issue organisations c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to groups in civil society
e. <input type="checkbox"/> State and/or local government	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by town/district government (including local politicians) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by provincial/ national government (including politicians) c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to state/local government:
f. <input type="checkbox"/> State and stakeholders' organisations	a. <input type="checkbox"/> By the town/district government and local stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discretion of the politicians and bureaucrats. b. <input type="checkbox"/> By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (a). c. <input type="checkbox"/> By town/district government and local stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint their representatives. d. <input type="checkbox"/> By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (c). e. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to state and stakeholders' organisations:

Q1.8. In **your own** assessment, who in this town/district discuss actively the issue that you just said people deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

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Q1.9. What additional issues do **you yourself** think are also necessary for people at the local level to engage in, in order to control their 'local' problems?

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Q1.10. In **your assesment**, what (if any) are the problems of identifying the 'demos' (those who shall decide about public affairs) among all the people who think that certain problems are of public concern (as specified in question Q 1.2) and are involved in discussing public issues (as specified in Q1.8)?

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This part focuses on the institutional means that are supposed to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A substantial democracy that is comprehensive by not being too narrowly defined requires thus also that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high.



THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

Q2.1. What is **your** general assessment about the situation in your town/district with regard to the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad? Please give priority to the institutions that you are most well informed about and then continue to the rest on the list! (*If you absolutely do not know, you can of course abstain from answering*)

Q2.2. In **your** assessment, has the quality of the means of democracy (rules and regulations) improved or worsened or remained the same since the first Pemilukada (direct elections of local executives) during 2008/2009 in your town/district?

In answering those questions (Q2.1 and Q2.2), please consider and combine these three aspects:

- 1) *How effective are the existing rules and regulations in fostering the 13 means of democracy mentioned in Table D below?*
- 2) *How comprehensive are the existing rules and regulations in terms of covering all or only a few aspects of these means of democracy, for instance only a few of the many human rights?*
- 3) *How comprehensive are these rules and regulations applied to the entire town/district?*

TABLE D			
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2
		GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
1	<p>EQUAL AND INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP</p> <p>This is with regard to consensus on equality without discrimination. For example: No discrimination of indogenous people, or Chinese and ex-tapol (tahanan politik/political prisoner) as well as of minority/imigrant/internally displaced persons and refugees, The legar framework includes (1) <u>Law and implementing regulations</u>, such as Antidiscrimination Law (UU No 40/2008), and (2) <u>Implementing agencies</u>, such as National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u></p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsenerd</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
2	<p>RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN CONVENTIONS)</p> <p>This is with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the laws, and the implementation of the ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For example: Does the government implement all ratified universal declarations, as well as international covenants and conventions through (1) the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u>, such as Constitutional Law, Law No.7/1984, the law No. 39/1999, the Law No. 11/2005, the Law No. 12/2005 and other related laws, and (2) <u>implementing agencies</u> such as National and Regional Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u>.</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsenerd</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
3	<p>EQUAL JUSTICE</p> <p>This is with regard to secure equal access for all people to justice, including poor people. Please consider the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u> such as the Constitutional Law and the Antidiscrimination Law as well as <u>implementing agencies</u>, such as courts, legal aid agencies, and also consider <u>other practices</u>.</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsenerd</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>

TABLE D			
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2
		GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
4	<p>THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING BASIC NEEDS)</p> <p>This is with regard to the respect for and promotion of civil and political rights as well as the protection and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Please consider the <u>laws and implementing regulations, implementing</u> state agencies (courts, police) and societal agencies such as legal aid organisations and also consider <u>other practices.</u></p>	<p>a. [] Good b. [] Fair c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved b. [] Worsened c. [] Not change</p>
5	<p>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH PARTIES AND ELECTIONS</p> <p>This is with regard to the extent to which elections and parties offer people the chance to choose the persons and parties they want to represent them, articulate their interest and control the government and its policies. One may also consider the chances to form parties and participate in elections, the chances for independent candidates to participate and the quality of democratic decisions inside parties.</p>	<p>a. [] Good b. [] Fair c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved b. [] Worsened c. [] Not change</p>
6	<p>RIGHTS-BASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is with regard to public participation in the process of policy making and implementation. To what extent is it possible in principle (according to law) and in practice for citizens to take part in and be consulted in various public matters such as, for example, the planning of residential and industrial areas, the deciding of budget priorities, the running of schools and hospitals, the regulation of market places and public transportation, the regulation of local economic activities and the upholding of law and order?</p>	<p>a. [] Good b. [] Fair c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved b. [] Worsened c. [] Not change</p>

TABLE D			
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2
		GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
7	<p>INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>To what extent are there institutionalised channels of influence for the organisations of immediately concerned stakeholders with regard to various public matters such as, for example, for traders to have a say on local market places, for trade unions to have a say on labour regulations, for employers and labourers to have a say on support for local production and for parents to influence the schools? Please consider both the legal framework and actual practices.</p>	<p>a. [] Good b. [] Fair c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved b. [] Worsened c. [] Not change</p>
8	<p>LOCAL DEMOCRACY MADE REAL IN COMBINATION WITH INFLUENCE ON OTHER LEVELS WHEN NECESSARY</p> <p>This is with regard to what extent the local democracy and regional autonomy work. Has it become more possible for ordinary people to control and influence local politics or is it controlled by powerful actors and by various actors from outside the town/district? Has decentralisation made a difference? Please consider the <u>laws and implementing regulations</u> as well as other practices.</p>	<p>a. [] Good b. [] Fair c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved b. [] Worsened c. [] Not change</p>
9	<p>DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION (INCLUDING PRIVATE MILITIAS, ETC)</p> <p>This is with regard to the capacity of democratic political institutions to control various instruments of coercion. To what extent are police and military as well as private security organisations and various gangs subordinated to democratic control and regulations? Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p>	<p>a. [] Good b. [] Fair c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved b. [] Worsened c. [] Not change</p>

TABLE D			
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2
		GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
10	<p>TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is about the institutionalisation and implementation of transparent, impartial and accountable governance. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p>	<p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p>
11	<p>GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM</p> <p>This is with regard to whether governments are subject to backseat driving by powerful actors and conditions beyond the control of government and, most importantly, the extent to which the government and its bureaucrats are capable of really implementing its laws and decisions. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p>	<p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p>
12	<p>FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSE, CULTURE AND ACADEMIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS</p> <p>Please consider both laws and implementation regarding, for example, National Education System Law, regulations on art festival, public polling, and other practices, such as writing opinion article in mass media.</p>	<p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p>
13	<p>CITIZENS' DEMOCRATIC SELF-ORGANISING</p> <p>Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices regarding both rights to organise and the independence of organisations to elect accountable leaders.</p>	<p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p>	<p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p>

Q2.3. In **your** assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy (listed in Table E)?

Q2.4. In **your** assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy (listed in Table E)?

TABLE E			
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.3	Q2.4
		INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT SUPPORT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT LIMIT OR CONTRADICT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)
3	Equal justice
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance

TABLE E			
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.3	Q2.4
		INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT SUPPORT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT LIMIT OR CONTRADICT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising

Democracy is not just about the intrinsic institutional means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. From this part and onwards, we will focus on the actors and their issues. First, we identify who are the main actors in public affairs.



MAIN ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors – individual or collective – in the discussion about public issues in your town/district? *(Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table F)*

TABLE F	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
A. STATE AND GOVERNMENT	
(1)
(2)

TABLE F	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
(3)
(4)
B. POLITICAL SOCIETY (including parties and political movements, pressure groups and interest groups)	
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

TABLE F	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
C. BUSINESS LIFE	
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
D. CIVIL SOCIETY (for instance NGOs, trade unions, peasant organisations, neighborhood groups, civic communities)	
(1)
(2)

TABLE F	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
(3)
(4)

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your town/district? *(Please mention two actors)*

Q3.2. DOMINANT ACTORS	
DOMINANT ACTOR 1 (DOM-1)
DOMINANT ACTOR 2 (DOM-2)

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important sub-ordinated (alternative actors) in favour of change and more popular control of public affairs in your town/district? *(Please mention two actors)*

Q3.3. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 1 (ALT-1)
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 2 (ALT-2)

In this part, we want to explore how the main actors that you have identified relate to the means of democracy. It is basic to a democracy that the major actors are willing to apply the rules of the game. More specifically, we want to explore how they use the various rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy. Do the actors promote or abuse or avoid them?



MAIN ACTORS' RELATION TO THE MEANS OF DEMOCRACY

Q4.1. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
3	Equal justice	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.2. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the alternative actors** (Q3.3) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
	 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
		b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.3. In your assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
		b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.4. In your assesment, how (if at all) do the **alternative actors** (Q3.3) **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
		b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R

In politics as in sports: even if all players follow the rules of the game, it also matters if some are strong while others are weak.

This part focuses on the political capacity of the actors. There are five aspects of capacity to be explored: a) whether people are politically included or excluded from vital parts of public life, b) whether actors possess authority and legitimacy, c) whether they can put their issues on the public agenda, d) whether they can mobilise and organise followers, and e) whether they can participate and build representation. We want to ask you to assess the capacity of the four dominant and alternative actors that were identified in the previous part (Part 3 Q3.2 and Q3.3).

PART
5

ACTORS' CAPACITY

A. POLITICAL INCLUSION (VERSUS EXCLUSION) – *Democratisation presupposes that people are not excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.*

What is the capacity of the main actors to exclude others or overcome political exclusion and marginalisation?

Q5.1. In your assessment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your town/district? (*You may select more than one option*)

- a. Politics (examples: registered as voters, eligible to run for public positions)
- b. Economy (examples: property rights, access to business permit)
- c. Social and culture (examples: eligible for community gathering, freedom of expressing cultural identity)

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.3.	Q5.4	
	WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED	SECTORS OF INCLUSION	EXAMPLES
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 1
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1
	c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2
	d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)

ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 1
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1
	c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2
	d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

Q5.5. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS EXCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)		b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)		b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.6.	Q5.7.	
	WHOM ARE BEING EXCLUDED	SECTORS OF EXCLUSION	EXAMPLES
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

Q5.8. WHAT DO THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION?			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	ALT-1
DOM-2	ALT-2

Q5.9. In your assesment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalising people in your town/district? *(You may indicate more than one option)*

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the they (Q5.9) exclude people? *(Please provide examples!)*

Q5.9.		Q5.10.
OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE		SECTORS OF EXCLUSION
a. <input type="checkbox"/> POLITICAL ACTORS
b. <input type="checkbox"/> BUSINESS ACTORS
c. <input type="checkbox"/> SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTORS

Q5.11. What kind of favours, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalised in your town/district need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

a. Special favours and preferential treatments

Explain:

.....
.....

b. Equal rights for all

B. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY – *Knowledge of the predominant ways in which various resources (capital) are transformed into legitimate authority is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy. Economic resources are about money and other assets; social resources are about good contacts and networks; cultural resources are about knowledge; coercive resources are about armed, physical or other forms of force.*

What is the capacity of the actors to transform their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources (capital) into legitimate and political authority as a leader or leading organisation, to thus become politically powerful?

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? (*Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them*)

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.12. ACTOR'S PRIME BASES			
	ECONOMIC RESOURCES (ECONOMIC CAPITAL)	GOOD CONTACTS (SOCIAL CAPITAL)	KNOWLEDGE/ INFORMATION (CULTURAL CAPITAL)	MEANS OF COMPULSION (COERCIVE CAPITAL)
DOM-1	[]	[]	[]	[]
DOM-2	[]	[]	[]	[]
ALT-1	[]	[]	[]	[]
ALT-2	[]	[]	[]	[]

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a *legitimate and authoritative* political leader?

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.13.	
	EASY OR DIFFICULT TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL LEADER	WHY?
DOM-1	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult
DOM-2	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult
ALT-1	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult
ALT-2	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult

Q5.14. How successful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.14.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.15.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.15.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
ALT-1
ALT-2

C. POLITICISATION AND AGENDA SETTING – *In Part 3 you have already identified the priorities of the dominant and the sub-ordinated actors of change give priority to. Now we want to know how the actors try to put ‘their issues’ on the top of the political agenda.*

What is the capacity of the actors to turn problems that they deem to be of common concern into public matters, i.e. to put them on the ‘political agenda’?

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alternative actors give priority to?

Q5.16. ISSUES THAT DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS’ GIVE PRIORITY TO	
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.17.
	METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? *(Pick only one option per actor)*

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.18.
	METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans

Q5.19. How successful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.19.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.20.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

D. MOBILISATION AND ORGANISATION – *Democracy presupposes that all actors are able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation – i.e. to politicise the people.*

What is the capacity of the actors to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies?

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

TABLE L	
MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21.
	METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
DOM-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
DOM-2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
ALT-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi

TABLE L	
MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21.
	METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
	h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
ALT-2	a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilise people that you have indicated in Q5.23 (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.22.
	HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.22.
	HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilising and organising support for demands and policies?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.23.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.24.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

E. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION – People must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. These may be institutions for public governance of various kinds but also associational or private governance. The main focus needs be, then, on different types of representation in relation to these institutions and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and/or institutions for direct participation.

What is the pattern and capacity of the actors to use and improve existing means of participation and representation?

Where do the **dominant actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.25. To what institution of governance?

Q5.26. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

DOMINANT ACTORS	Q5.25.	Q5.26.
	WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	MEDIATORS
DOM-1	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
DOM-2	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, Including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Where do the **sub-ordinated/alternative actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?

Q5.28. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	Q5.27.	Q5.28.
	WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	MEDIATORS
ALT-1	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
ALT-2	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question ?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.29.
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.29.
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.30.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.31.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Now we turn to how ordinary people seek representation. Please indicate the most two important channels and the three important mediators.

Where in your judgement do **ordinary people** go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institutions of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediator?

Q5.32.	Q5.33.
CHANNELS	MEDIATORS
a. <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions for private governance b. <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. <input type="checkbox"/> Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. <input type="checkbox"/> Civil and military administration e. <input type="checkbox"/> The judiciary and police f. <input type="checkbox"/> The political executive	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Civil society organisations b. <input type="checkbox"/> Media c. <input type="checkbox"/> Issue and interest organisations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. <input type="checkbox"/> Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. <input type="checkbox"/> Informal leaders g. <input type="checkbox"/> Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.34. In your judgment, *why* do **ordinary people** go to the specific institutions and mediators etc? (*Open question*)

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.1.
	ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS
ALT-1
ALT-2

6.2. What are major challenges related to democratisation that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratisation that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.2.	Q6.3.
	MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION	EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.2.	Q6.3.
	MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION	EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION
ALT-1	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
ALT-2	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

APPENDIX 2 THE QUESTIONNAIRES
FOR THE 2013 THIRD INDONESIAN
DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT

(B): NATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE

		A	B
9	9		

NO QUESTIONNAIRE

A. CODES OF FRONTLINE OF DEMOCRATIC WORK ALONG WHICH THE INFORMANT IS ACTIVE

01	Issues of Education, including both services and content	08	Issues of Clan, Ethnic, and Religious Relations
02	Issues of Health Services	09	Issues of Media, Culture and Social Media
03	Issues of Ecology, Environment and Natural Resources (incl. mining, forestry, fishery, etc.)	10	Issues of Security Sector and Welfare Reform
04	Issues of Labour Movement and related policies	11	Issues of Anti-corruption, Transparent and Accountable Government
05	Issues of Informal Sectors (incl. urban poor issues)	12	Issues of Human Rights and Law (incl. minority rights)
06	Issues of Agrarian Movements, Land Reform and Land Grabbing	13	Issues of Party and Electoral rules and regulations
07	Issues of Women, Gender Equality and Children	14	Issues of Industry and Business

B. NUMBER OF INFORMANT (01-50)

INTERVIEW PROCESS

NO	DATE	PART (NUMBER)	TIME	
			START	END
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

VALIDATION

Interviewed by:

(name) Local assistant (sign)

Checked and validated by:

(name) Key informant (sign)

This survey is based on the combined efforts of concerned scholars, students and experienced and reflective practitioners of democracy. The study would not be possible without the dedicated involvement of the informants in particular. We know that it will

take a lot of your important time to answer all the questions, but we hope that you like to contribute thus to the production of an independent baseline of knowledge for further efforts at democratisation, and we like to express our sincere thanks for your commitment and patience. We shall certainly keep you updated on the results and we are looking forward to further cooperation on various follow up activities.

Please note that the research team based at the UGM, supervised by us, Professors (Dr.) Purwo Santoso (UGM) and Olle Törnquist (UiO), is committed to keep all information about the informants in strict confidence, only use it to secure the validity and reliability of the survey, as well as to keep the information separated from the answers to all the substantive questions and only use the thus anonymised information for the purpose of non-commercial and independent academic research in accordance with strict academic principles. All members of the team, including local key-informants and research assistants, have signed a statement of commitment to this effect.

The survey is supported by the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo and by additional financial support from the Royal Embassy of Norway to Indonesia. The financial support is given to the universities without any other formal or informal conditions than to conduct the best possible independent academic study for the benefit of democracy and thus based welfare and development, and, of course, to account for all funds used and make the results available for the public.

The survey is to follow up and broaden two previous surveys which were carried out in partnership between the civil society organisation Demos and the University of Oslo, in cooperation with the Indonesian Democracy Movement, between 2004 and 2008 about the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. The comprehensive previous results were reported on in Priyono et al. (2007) and Samadhi et al. (2009).¹ The transfer

STATEMENT OF AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENT

¹ Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W.P. and Törnquist, O. with Birks, T. (2007). Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS; Samadhi, W. P. and Warouw, N. (Eds.) (2009). Building Democracy on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. Jakarta and Yogyakarta; Demos and PCD Press. (1st edition: December 2008; 2nd edition 2009).

of the responsibility to UGM is to (a) sustain the academic basis and quality of the surveys while continuing the cooperation with democratic practitioners and (b) to foster the utilisation of the results in the wide academic and public education and information as well as in academic follow-up studies. A reference group of leading democracy activists and intellectuals serves to support this cooperation and contribution to the public discourse. The founding members of the group include Danang Widoyoko, Daniel Dhakidae, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Handoko Wibowo, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Mohtar Mas'oeed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Wardah Hafidz, and Wiladi Budiharga. The ultimate aim of the survey is to generate the best possible knowledge as a basis for attempts at democratic transformative politics through the combination of democratisation and reforms towards welfare based and sustainable social and economic development.

The survey is not built on the number of answers and of statistical analysis but on the quality of the assessments by the informants of the problems and options of democratisation and the interpretation of this information with the help of a number of relevant theories. For further information about the rationale and academic foundations of the survey, see Törnquist (2013).²

The survey is carried out both in a number of local contexts around the country and with regard to crucial national level institutions of public governance. The focus is on six pillars of democracy: (1) the constitution of the *demos* (people) and public affairs; (2) the institutions (rules and regulations) of democracy; (3) the actors; (4) how the actors relate to these institutions; (5) the political capacity of the actors and (6) how their strategies affect democratisation.

Once again, on behalf of the full team, thank you very much for engaging in this effort.

Yogyakarta and Oslo, March 2013
Purwo Santoso and Olle Törnquist

² Törnquist, O. (2013). *Assessing the Dynamics of Democratisation: Transformative Politics. New Institutions and the Case of Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave.



BASELINE SURVEY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

PWD Project
UGM-UiO research cooperation
2013

Purwo Santoso, Olle Törnquist *Project Directors*

Eric Hiariej *Deputy*

Amalinda Savirani *Survey Coordinator*

Hasrul Hanif, Willy Purna Samadhi, and local teams in
the survey are as *Researchers*

Debbie Prabawati, Wening Hapsari *Network and Administration*

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ABOUT THE INFORMANT

NAME

SEX

FEMALE

MALE

AGE

ADDRESS

CITY

PROVINCE

PROFESSION

ORGANISATION

LOCATION OF
ACTIVITY

CONTACT

PHONE/MOBILE

EMAIL

In this part we focus on the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs. Both topics are related to definition of democracy, e.g. ‘popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality’ (Beetham 1999). More specifically, we want to explore what constitutes public issues, who shall control them, and how.

PART
1

THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE DEMOS AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

A. Informant’s Assessment on Public Issues

Q1.1. In your assessment, what are the major public issues in your political field/sector?

Q1.2. Give real illustrations/examples for each issue.

Q1.1. MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUE	Q1.2. ILLUSTRATION/EXAMPLE
1.	1.
2.	2.

Q1.1. MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUE	Q1.2. ILLUSTRATION/EXAMPLE
3.	3.
4.	4.
5.	5.
6.	6.

B. People’s Assessment of Public Issues

Q1.3. In your assessment, do **people in general** think that the issues that you listed in the above (Q1.1) should be matters of major public concern in your political field/sector?

Q1.4. Please give concrete examples for each type of issue.

Q1.3. MAJOR PUBLIC CONCERN ACCORDING TO PEOPLE IN GENERAL	Q1.4. CONCRETE EXAMPLE
1.	1.
2.	2.
3.	3.
4.	4.
5.	5.
6.	6.

Q1.5. According to **people in general**, which issue is the most important within your political field/sector?

.....

Q1.6. With regard to the issue that people in general think is most important in your political field/sector (Q 1.5), in your assessment, **do people** know who and what institution that are supposed to control and manage that issue?

- a. Yes, they know very well
- b. Yes, but they know only partially
- c. No, they don't really know much about this

Q1.7. Again with regard to the issue that people in general think is most important in your political field/sector (Q 1.5), in your assessment, who and what institution **do people** think should handle that issue?? Do people think the problem should be handled primarily on the market, by organisations in society, by the state/government, or state and stakeholders' organisations together?

Q1.8. And how should this be done?

<p style="text-align: center;">Q1.8. WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Q1.9. HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED</p>
<p>A. <input type="checkbox"/> On the market</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> By paying for help/services b. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to the market: </p>
<p>B. <input type="checkbox"/> By citizens' and people's own organisations</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done through community organisations (for example, self-management groups and cooperatives but also religious and cultural (adat) groups) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by joint interest/issue organisations c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to groups in civil society: </p>
<p>C. <input type="checkbox"/> By state and/or local government</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by government (including politicians) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by provincial/ national government (including politicians) c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to state/government </p>

<p>Q1.8. WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM</p>	<p>Q1.9. HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED</p>
<p>D. [] By state and stakeholder's organisations</p>	<p>a. [] By the government and stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discussion of the politicians and bureaucrats.</p> <p>b. [] By the provincial/local government according to the same method of selection as in (a).</p> <p>c. [] By government and stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint its representatives.</p> <p>d. [] By the provincial/ local government according to the same method of selection as in (c).</p> <p>e. [] In other ways related to state and stakeholders' organisations: </p>

C. Constitution of the demos (the people who shall have control of public issues)

Q1.9. In your assessment, who within your political field/sector discuss actively the issue that you just said people have deemed to be most important (Q1.5)?

.....

Q1.10. What additional issues and tasks within your political field/sector do you yourself think are also necessary for people to engage in order to control their problems?

.....

Q1.11. In your assessment, are there any problems within your political field/sector with regard to who have the right to decide and control public affairs (and to thus be part of the political demos)?

.....

This part focuses on the institutional means that are supposed to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A substantial democracy that is comprehensive by not being too narrowly defined requires thus also that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high.



PART
2

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

- Q2.1.** What rules and regulations related to these 13 means (listed in Table A) of democracy are applicable or not applicable in your political field/sector?
- Q2.2.** What is your general assessment about the situation in your political field/sector regarding the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad?
- Q2.3.** In your assessment, has the thus combined performance of the rules and regulations improved or worsened or remained the same since 2007 in your political field/sector?
To answer the questions, ask the informant to consider and combine these three aspects:
- 1) How effective are the existing rules and regulations in fostering the 13 means of democracy listed in Table A below?*
 - 2) How comprehensive are the existing rules and regulations in terms of covering all or only a few aspects of these means of democracy, for instance only a few of the many human rights?*
 - 3) How comprehensively are these rules and regulations applied in the country as a whole?*

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
1	<p>EQUAL AND INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP</p> <p>This is with regard to consensus on equality without discrimination. For example: No discrimination of indogenous people, or Chinese and ex-tapol (tahanan politik/political prisoner) as well as of minority/imigrant/ internally displaced persons and refugees, The legar framework includes (1) <u>Law and implementing regulations</u>, such as Antidiscrimination Law (UU No 40/2008), and (2) <u>Implementing agencies</u>, such as National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u></p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
2	<p>RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN CONVENTIONS)</p> <p>This is with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the laws, and the implementation of the ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For example: Does the government implement all ratified universal declarations, as well as</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
	international covenants and conventions through (1) the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u> , such as Constitutional Law, Law No.7/1984, the law No.39/1999, the Law No. 11/2005, the Law No. 12/2005 and other related laws, and (2) <u>implementing agencies</u> such as National and Regional Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u> .			
3	EQUAL JUSTICE This is with regard to secure equal access for all people to justice, including poor people. Please consider the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u> such as the Constitutional Law and the Antidiscrimination Law as well as <u>implementing agencies</u> , such as courts, legal aid agencies, and also consider <u>other practices</u> .	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change
4	THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING BASIC NEEDS) This is with regard to the respect for and promotion of civil and political rights as well as the protection and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Please consider the <u>laws and implementing regulations</u> , <u>implementing</u> state agencies (courts, police) and societal	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
	agencies such as legal aid organisations and also consider <u>other practices</u> .			
5	<p>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH PARTIES AND ELECTIONS</p> <p>This is with regard to the extent to which elections and parties offer people the chance to choose the persons and parties they want to represent them, articulate their interest and control the government and its policies. One may also consider the chances to form parties and participate in elections, the chances for independent candidates to participate and the quality of democratic decisions inside parties.</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
6	<p>RIGHTS-BASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is with regard to public participation in the process of policy making and implementation. To what extent is it possible in principle (according to law) and in practice for citizens to take part in and be consulted in various public matters such as, for example, the planning of residential and industrial areas, the deciding of budget priorities, the running of schools and hospitals,</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
	the regulation of market places and public transportation, the regulation of local economic activities and the upholding of law and order?			
7	<p>INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>To what extent are there institutionalised channels of influence for the organisations of immediately concerned stakeholders with regard to various public matters such as, for example, for traders to have a say on local marketplaces, for trade unions to have a say on labour regulations, for employers and labourers to have a say on support for local production and for parents to influence the schools? Please consider both the legal framework and actual practices.</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
8	<p>LOCAL DEMOCRACY MADE REAL IN COMBINATION WITH INFLUENCE ON OTHER LEVELS WHEN NECESSARY</p> <p>This is with regard to what extent the local democracy and regional autonomy work. Has it become more possible for ordinary</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
	people to control and influence local politics or is it controlled by powerful actors and by various actors from outside the town/ district? Has decentralisation made a difference? Please coinsider the laws and implementing regulations as well as other practices.			
9	<p>DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION (INCLUDING PRIVATE MILITIAS, ETC)</p> <p>This is with regard to the capacity of democratic political institutions to control various instruments of coercion.To what extent are police and military as well as private security organisations and various gangs subordinated to democratic control and regulations? Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
10	<p>TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is about the institutionalisation and implementation of transparent, impartial and</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
	accountable governance. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.			
11	<p>GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM</p> <p>This is with regard to whether governments are subject to backseat driving by powerful actors and conditions beyond the control of government and, most importantly, the extent to which the government and its bureaucrats are capable of really implementing its laws and decisions. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>
12	<p>FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSE, CULTURE AND ACADEMIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS</p> <p>Please consider both laws and implementation regarding, for example, National Education System Law, regulations on art festival, public polling, and</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p>	<p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p>

TABLE A				
NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3
		HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	GENERAL ASSESSMENT	IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE
	other practices, such as writing opinion article in mass media.			
13	CITIZENS' DEMOCRATIC SELF-ORGANISING Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices regarding both rights to organise and the independence of organisations to elect accountable leaders.	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change

Q2.4. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy (listed in Table B) apply to your political field/sector according to your answer to Q2.1?

TABLE B			
NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.4.
			INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	[]
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	[]

TABLE B			
NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.4.
			INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
3	Equal justice	[]
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	[]
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	[]
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	[]
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	[]
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	[]
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	[]

TABLE B			
NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.4.
			INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	[]
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	[]
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	[]
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	[]

Q2.5. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy (listed in Table C) that apply to your political field/sector according to your answer to Q2.1?

TABLE C			
NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.5.
			INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	[]

TABLE C			
NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.5.
			INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	[]
3	Equal justice	[]
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	[]
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	[]
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	[]
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	[]
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	[]

TABLE C			
NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.5.
			INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	[]
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	[]
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	[]
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	[]
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	[]

Democracy is not just about the intrinsic institutional means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. From this part and onwards, we will focus on the actors and their issues. First, we identify who are the main actors in public affairs.

PART
3

**MAIN ACTORS IN
PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors – individual or collective – in controlling and disputing public issues in your political field/sector? *(Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table D)*

TABLE D	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
A. STATE AND GOVERNMENT	
(1)
(2)

TABLE D	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
(3)
(4)
B. POLITICAL SOCIETY (including parties and political movements, pressure groups and interest groups)	
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

TABLE D	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
C. BUSINESS LIFE	
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
D. CIVIL SOCIETY (for instance NGOs, trade unions, peasant organisations, neighborhood groups, civic communities)	
(1)
(2)

TABLE D	
Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
(3)
(4)

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your political field/sector? *(Please mention two actors)*

Q3.2. DOMINANT ACTORS	
DOMINANT ACTOR 1 (DOM-1)
DOMINANT ACTOR 2 (DOM-2)

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important subordinated (alternative actors) in favour of change and more popular control of public affairs in your political field/sector? *(Please mention two actors)*

Q3.3. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 1 (ALT-1)
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 2 (ALT-2)

In politics as in sports: even if all players follow the rules of the game, it also matters if some are strong while others are weak.

This part focuses on the political capacity of the actors. There are five aspects of capacity to be explored: a) whether people are politically included or excluded from vital parts of public life, b) whether actors possess authority and legitimacy, c) whether they can put their issues on the public agenda, d) whether they can mobilise and organise followers, and e) whether they can participate and build representation. We want to ask you to assess the capacity of the four dominant and alternative actors that were identified in the previous part (Part 3 Q3.2 and Q3.3).

PART
5

ACTORS' CAPACITY

A. POLITICAL INCLUSION (VERSUS EXCLUSION) – *Democratisation presupposes that people are not excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.*

What is the capacity of the main actors to exclude others or overcome political exclusion and marginalisation?

-
- Q5.1.** In your assesment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your political field/sector? *(You may select more than one option)*
- a. Politics (examples: registered as voters, eligible to run for public positions)
 - b. Economy (examples: property rights, access to business permit)
 - c. Social and culture (examples: eligible for community gathering, freedom of expressing cultural identity)

Q5.2. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 include other main actors or other people?

Q5.2. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS INCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7)	ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7)
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7)	ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7)

Q5.3. Whom are being included by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.4. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors include other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.3.	Q5.4	
	WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED	SECTORS OF INCLUSION	EXAMPLES
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.3.	Q5.4	
	WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED	SECTORS OF INCLUSION	EXAMPLES
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2		
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1
	c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2
	d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)
	
	
	
	
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2		
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1
	c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2
	d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)
	
	
	
	

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

Q5.5. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS EXCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)		b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes
	b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)		b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8)

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.7. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors exclude other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.6.	Q5.7,	
	WHOM ARE BEING EXCLUDED	SECTORS OF EXCLUSION	EXAMPLES
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain)

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

Q5.8. WHAT DO THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION?			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	ALT-1
DOM-2	ALT-2

Q5.9. In your assesment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalising people in your political field/sector? *(You may indicate more than one option)*

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do they (Q5.9) exclude people? *(Please provide examples!)*

Q5.9.		Q5.10.
OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE		SECTORS OF EXCLUSION
a. [] POLITICAL ACTORS

Q5.9.		Q5.10.
OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE		SECTORS OF EXCLUSION
b. <input type="checkbox"/> BUSINESS ACTORS
c. <input type="checkbox"/> SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTORS

Q5.11. What kind of favours, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalised in your political field/sector need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

- a. Special favours and preferential treatments

Explain:

.....

.....

- b. Equal rights for all

B. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY – *Knowledge of the predominant ways in which various resources (capital) are transformed into legitimate authority is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy. Economic resources are about money and other assets; social resources are about good contacts and networks; cultural resources are about knowledge; coercive resources are about armed, physical or other forms of force.*

What is the capacity of the actors to transform their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources (capital) into legitimate and political authority as a leader or leading organisation, to thus become politically powerful?

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? (*Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them*)

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.12. ACTOR'S PRIME BASES			
	ECONOMIC RESOURCES (ECONOMIC CAPITAL)	GOOD CONTACTS (SOCIAL CAPITAL)	KNOWLEDGE/ INFORMATION (CULTURAL CAPITAL)	MEANS OF COMPULSION (COERCIVE CAPITAL)
DOM-1	[]	[]	[]	[]
DOM-2	[]	[]	[]	[]
ALT-1	[]	[]	[]	[]
ALT-2	[]	[]	[]	[]

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a *legitimate and authoritative* political leader?

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.13.	
	EASY OR DIFFICULT TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL LEADER	WHY?
DOM-1	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult
DOM-2	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult
ALT-1	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult
ALT-2	a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult

Q5.14. How successful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.14.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.15.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.15.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
ALT-1
ALT-2

C. POLITICISATION AND AGENDA SETTING – *In Part 3 you have already identified the priorities of the dominant and the sub-ordinated actors of change. Now we want to know how the actors try to put ‘their issues’ on the top of the political agenda.*

What is the capacity of the actors to turn problems that they deem to be of common concern into public matters, i.e. to put them on the ‘political agenda’?

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alternative actors give priority to?

Q5.16. ISSUES THAT DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS’ GIVE PRIORITY TO	
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

Q5.17.	
MAIN ACTORS	METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others:

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? (*Pick only one option per actor*)

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.18.
	METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans
DOM-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-1	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-2	a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans

Q5.19. How successful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.19.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.20.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

D. MOBILISATION AND ORGANISATION – *Democracy presupposes that all actors are able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation – i.e. to politicise the people.*

What is the capacity of the actors to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies?

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies? (Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)

TABLE L	
MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21.
	METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
DOM-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
DOM-2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
ALT-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi

TABLE L	
MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21.
	METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
	h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
ALT-2	a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilise people that you have indicated in Q5.21 (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.22.
	HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.22.
	HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilising and organising support for demands and policies?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.23.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.24.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

E. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION – *People must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. These may be institutions for public governance of various kinds but also associational or private governance. The main focus needs be, then, on different types of representation in relation to these institutions and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and/or institutions for direct participation.*

What is the pattern and capacity of the actors to use and improve existing means of participation and representation?

Where do the **dominant actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.25. To what institution of governance?

Q5.26. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

DOMINANT ACTORS	Q5.25.	Q5.26.
	WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	MEDIATORS
DOM-1	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
DOM-2	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Where do the **sub-ordinated/alternative actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?**Q5.28.** Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	Q5.27.	Q5.28.
	WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	MEDIATORS
ALT-1	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
ALT-2	a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.29.
DOM-1
DOM-2

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.29.
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.30.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.31.
	CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1
DOM-2
ALT-1
ALT-2

Now we turn to how ordinary people seek representation. Please indicate the most two important channels and the three important mediators.

Where in your judgement do **ordinary people** go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institutions of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediator?

Q5.32.	Q5.33.
CHANNELS	MEDIATORS
a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive	a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.34. In your judgment, why do **ordinary people** go to the specific institutions and mediators etc? (*Open question*)

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Finally, it is crucial to understand the dynamic dimensions of democratisation. This can best be done by identifying actors' strategies to reach their aims and to thereafter study how their strategies influence the major challenges of democratisation.

PART
6

STRATEGIES
(DYNAMICS) OF
DEMOCRATISATION

Q6.1. What are dominant and alternative actors' main strategies to reach their own aims?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.1.
	ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS
DOM-1	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
DOM-2	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.1.
	ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS
ALT-1
ALT-2

Q6.2. What are major challenges related to democratisation that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

Q6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratisation that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.2.	Q6.3.
	MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION	EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION
DOM-1
DOM-2

Finally, we want to ask informant's own reflections of the efforts of pro-democrats since the previous surveys to engage in organised politics.



REFLECTION

Q7.1. In your experiences, what are the major problems and options that have appeared since 2007 within your political field/sector with regard to the efforts of many civil society organisations and social movements to engage in politics?

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

NOTES

Preface

1. Originally a Swedish acronym, over the years ‘AKUT’ come to refer to concerned scholarly work on acute issues.

Introduction

1. Including Mulyana W. Kusumah, who focused on electoral watch and the electoral commission, and Todung Mulya Lubis, who initiated an NGO for electoral reforms.
2. The main financial sponsor of the projects was the then Department for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries (SAREC) within the Swedish Development Aid Authority (SIDA) in cooperation with first the University of Oslo, then the University of Oslo, on the Scandinavian side, and first the Indonesian Legal Aid Association (YLBHI) and then the Institute for the Studies of the Free Flow of Information (ISAI) on the Indonesian side.
3. Supplementary support for the conference and the second book was provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as parts of its fostering of a Human Rights Dialogue with Indonesia.

4 Actors and Power

1. The following sections on representation draw particularly closely on Törnquist (2009), which in turn benefitted from the collective work of Törnquist et al. (2009) and Harriss et al. (2004) as well as inspiration from the public discourse on the Norwegian research programme on power and democracy (cf. Østerud 2003, 2005) and the working papers by Stokke (2002), Houtzager et al. (2005), and Castiglione and Warren (2005) in addition to identifying if and how the framework and concepts would make sense in reality together with the activist-research NGO and DEMOS.

5 Actors and Democratisation

1. The following summary draws on the introductory chapter to Stokke and Törnquist (2013).
2. The following few sections draw closely on these two previous analyses.

6 From Results to Recommendations

1. The following sections are largely based on this authors' contribution to a position paper towards establishing dialogue between Indian and Scandinavian scholars on 'Agendas for transformative politics: Indian and Scandinavian perspectives on democracy, economic development and well-being', (Chandhoke et al. 2012) and his contribution to an introductory chapter in Stokke and Törnquist (2013). For further references in English, see at first hand Berman (2006), Andersson (2006), Esping-Andersen (1985, 1990), Kangas and Palme (2005), Moene and Wallerstein (2006), Przeworski (1985), Rothstein (2004), Swenson (2002) and Trägårdh (2007).
2. A recent local example is that of the district of South Aceh. As already indicated in the section on the lost opportunities in Aceh in chapter 5, contextual research in theoretical perspective shows that the inclusive democratic model that facilitated peace and reconstruction in the autonomous province has been weakened by the dominance of powerful elites, insufficiently accountable and development-oriented government and the lack of interest-based organisations beyond clientelism, middle-class NGOs and lobby groups (Törnquist et al. 2011, Törnquist 2013). In South Aceh, these tendencies are very explicit. A local research team has mapped the problems of public action and tried to understand why it is so difficult for the crucial actors and ordinary people to come together and discuss and decide on welfare and development priorities in spite of being able to benefit from the new civil and political rights and elections. A major conclusion points to the basic problem is the weak position and capacity of development-oriented administrators, producers and labourers (Avonius et al. 2013). Numerous schemes for consultation as well as associations and community and customary groups are present, but they materialise mainly when top-down instructions are given and funding is provided. Most importantly, they tend to be driven by the already powerful vested interests and they usually fail to represent potential actors of change. On the basis of how similar problems were addressed historically in Scandinavia, one may therefore study the potential of a supplementary development forum with a clear focus on fostering a welfare-based growth coalition associated with the productive sectors with the best development potential such as fishing, and based on key representative actors from government as well as the businesspeople, small-scale producers and labour involved. Most importantly, it should also provide preferential treatment in support of better democratic interest-based representation of such key actors to thus enhance their capacity and power to foster political transformation.

Appendix 1 Implementation against Odds: the Indonesian Story

1. Statement by Helena Bjuremalm at conference on Democracy as Actual Practice: What Does Democracy Really Bring, Uppsala University Collegium for Development Studies and Sida, March 12–13, 2003.
2. The author was certainly of a different opinion but had no powers beyond the design and quality of the research.
3. A special test case on how to use local assessments in democratisation was initiated in post-tsunami Aceh in early 2005. The purpose was to foster civil society participation in local democratisation. Data presented in the initial part of the first national qualitative democracy survey (published in January 2005) indicated

that there would be some space in Aceh for local democratisation. Having been delayed for a year, primarily because it was deemed politically sensitive by potential Swedish and Norwegian donors, Norway did, fortunately, provide funding and the project could get started.

The 'entry point' would be to use participatory research among civil society groups in order to map and analyse the problems and options of democracy in peace building and reconstruction. The main aim was to foster civil society participation in the new democratic politics following the tsunami in late December 2004 and the Helsinki peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in mid-2005. This in turn was to counterbalance the dominance of traditional parties and a political organisation based on the old command structure of the previously armed and quite authoritarian-led GAM.

However, the participatory research with civil society activists was mismanaged. Data was incomplete and poorly analysed, discussed and reported. Thus the results were insufficient as a basis for joint political engagement and capacity building. As a consequence, the intervention could not help to contain the political marginalisation of civil society initiatives in Acehnese politics in the 2009 elections. In spite of the problems, and possibly with diplomatic sensitivities in mind, the Norwegian donors chose not to restate the original aims and methods of the project. This may be understandable, but speaks very clearly about the negative effects of subordinating research-based democracy promotion in favour of the priorities of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the integrity of the academic partners and their collaborators on both sides.

Ultimately the research element of the project had to be rescued by this author in cooperation with consistent and committed local partners within the framework of a broader, separate project (financed by the Norwegian Research Council) on the role of democracy within the context of post-tsunami efforts at peace in Sri Lanka and Aceh (Törnquist et al. 2011). But by this point the political momentum had passed, and the potential for civil society activists to build new democratic politics with the reformist former GAM commanders had largely vanished. Thus the loss of another major opportunity that remains hard to digest.

4. There were, however, a few potentially fine case studies on how civil society actors tried to engage in politics. Partially, these results could be drawn upon in books and articles.
5. The main academic director was available electronically every day for questions and discussion, but he was engaged only on a limited part-time basis and only physically present with the team during three and later five intensive work periods per year – and then discussion took place in English. These drawbacks in terms of presence and language in particular were well known from the outset, but no one could find a better alternative, such as mobilising a resident academic director. Thus the plan was to use regular translations and good local supervisors and editors. The academic director saw this as a priority, but in reality much too little attention and resources were made available by the team and operations managers.
6. Teresa Birks, who had made the previous book on the pro-democracy actor readable (Prasetyo et al. 2003), was engaged as editor with DEMOS but was never really integrated into the team and when she left she was not replaced by a similarly qualified individual. She anyway helped the academic director in rescuing the first basic report when it had to be rewritten.

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