

Introduction to Global Politics delivers the basics and much more...
this text warrants serious consideration.

Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., Professor of Political Science, Towson University, USA

Introduction to **GLOBAL POLITICS**

Second edition

Richard W. Mansbach
and Kirsten L. Taylor



Introduction to Global Politics

Fully revised and updated, the second edition of *Introduction to Global Politics* places an increased emphasis on the themes of continuity and change. It continues to explain global politics using an historical approach, firmly linking history with the events of today. By integrating theory and political practice at individual, state, and global levels, students are introduced to key developments in global politics, helping them make sense of major trends that are shaping our world.

Key updates for this edition:

- New chapter on the causes of war and the changing nature of violence in global politics
- New chapter on technology and global politics
- Enhanced coverage of theory, including post-positivist theories
- New material on the financial crisis, BRIC, and Iran
- Uses “levels of analysis” framework throughout the text

This is a highly illustrated textbook with informative and interactive boxed material throughout. Chapter opening timelines contextualize the material that follows, and definitions of key terms are provided in a glossary at the end of the book. Every chapter ends with student activities, cultural materials, and annotated suggestions for further reading that now include websites.

Introduction to Global Politics continues to be essential reading for students of political science, global politics, and international relations

Richard W. Mansbach is Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University, USA. He is a former editor of *International Studies Quarterly*, Marshall Scholar, and three-times Fulbright Scholar.

Kirsten L. Taylor is Associate Professor of Government and International Studies at Berry College, USA.

A solid volume for either one- or two-semester introductory courses in International Politics. Aimed at today's students, who need a text with significant historical background and demand consideration of contemporary problems, *Introduction to Global Politics* delivers the basics and much more. With its useful timelines, attention-getting boxes, rich array of excerpts from key documents, and such a thorough discussion of contemporary issues as to make a supplementary work unnecessary, this text warrants serious consideration.

Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., Professor of Political Science, Towson University, USA

Introduction to Global Politics is a first-rate text. It is exhaustive in its coverage of issues and ideas, extremely well informed by history and theory, and also engagingly written and produced. Mansbach and Taylor have produced one of the best books on the market.

Nick Bisley, Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University, Australia

The publication of the first edition of *Introduction to Global Politics* gave students of International Relations a textbook that approached global politics and events and themes using the analytical perspectives and frameworks that underpin the discipline of International Relations. Thus, in one textbook, students gained not only an historical/political grounding, but also an understanding of the uses and practice of theory and analysis and the different interpretations of events that result with different frameworks of analysis. This new edition continues this approach, with the same lucid, but lively, writing style and crystal clear explanations of theory and analysis, utilizing both historical and contemporary political examples to illuminate and make more relevant the analysis. The changes in this edition reflect the changes in today's world, identifying and scrutinizing the major issues and themes, and thus equipping students with both the analytical tools and the knowledge that they need to successfully analyze global politics.

Caroline Page, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Coventry University, UK

Mansbach and Taylor expertly explain today's global political challenges in historical and cultural context, helping students to understand the alternative approaches to dealing with conflict, and to building cooperation, that human societies have imagined and attempted. Global politics emerge from these pages not as a static set of constraints and imperatives, but as a dynamic, ever-changing, multi-dimensional reality – a world in which ideas, identities, interests, and institutions are constantly evolving. This is a world in which individuals have the capacity to change the realities which are shaping their lives, a world in which knowledge and understanding open doors to new possibilities.

Edward Rhodes, Dean, School of Public Policy, George Mason University, USA

Theory, history, and current issues are masterfully woven together in this important new book. The authors' excellent use of vivid real-life examples, figures, pictures, timelines, and boxes serves to illustrate theoretical concepts in a way that will grab the attention of undergraduate and graduate students alike; and with its thought-provoking discussion and essay questions, this textbook virtually teaches itself. A major contribution to the learning and understanding of globalization, this book is evidence that globalization studies have truly come into their own.

Ersel Aydinli, Associate Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, Turkey

Introduction to Global Politics

Second edition

**Richard W. Mansbach
and Kirsten L. Taylor**

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Rachael Mansbach, no father could ask for more

and

Ron Taylor, husband and friend

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Preface

Approach

The text makes the following assumptions.

An historical approach best allows students to understand continuity as well as change.

The best way to recognize patterns of change and continuity is by looking back – in other words, by looking at history. Often, policymakers in the field of global politics are unfamiliar with earlier ideas and events – to the detriment of the policies they make. They may see contemporary global politics as completely new and different from the international politics practiced by states in the past. Practitioners and students also have an unfortunate propensity to react to events like the brutal destruction of New York’s World Trade Towers without recognizing the event’s historical roots and its relations to more general and long-term processes like Western–Islamic relations.

In addition to helping us see the roots of events in today’s world, acquaintance with past events *introduces us to consequences of change in the past*. We are currently in the midst of great change, but so were people in 1648, 1789, 1918, 1945, and 1990. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, for example, marked the onset of an era of territorial states. The French Revolution in 1789 ushered in modern nationalism and the marriage of nation and state. In 1918, with the end of World War One,

America emerged as a superpower; communism triumphed in Russia; and colonial empires eroded at an accelerating pace. In 1945, the end of World War Two coincided with the use of weapons of mass destruction and the first indications of a coming confrontation with the Soviet Union. Finally, the world that emerged in 1990, with the end of the Cold War, signaled the disappearance of the Soviet Union and communism and revealed the new significance of many issues that we shall treat in subsequent chapters, such as ethnic and nationalist conflict, the strengthening of nonstate actors including global terrorist networks, and international human rights law.

An emphasis on change in global politics helps students recognize that genuinely new developments require citizens to change their beliefs and that new problems may appear even as old ones disappear.

This text views change as constant and, on that assumption, aims to sharpen and revise the ways in which students look at the world and the policies which actors pursue. Early political thinkers, such as the Greek historian Thucydides (c.460–400 BC) and the Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), tell us much about the politics of the eras in which they lived, and some of their ideas remain germane. For example, Thucydides’ depiction of how Athenian democracy eroded in the course of war

finds echoes in today's concern that we should be careful lest we surrender our democratic freedoms in the effort to combat global terrorism. And, Machiavelli's self-interested prince seems uncomfortably similar to many of today's leaders, especially in authoritarian countries. Some of their ideas, however, are less relevant to the issues we presently confront. For instance, global institutions such as the United Nations might vanish if each state acted according to Machiavelli's advice that leaders should only keep their word when it is in their interest to do so.

Because the world around us continually changes, students must always be prepared to understand and deal with new issues and new actors and to set aside old ways of viewing the world. When we fail to do this and assume that the present and future will be just like the past, policy failures will result. Much of what politicians believe they understand about global politics is based on how states, especially the United States and Soviet Union, acted during the Cold War. These understandings drive them, in many instances, to expect that the great powers are and will continue to be the dominant actors in global politics. They also assume the future will remain like the past. Indeed, this assumption helps explain why President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were taken by surprise by political demands for democracy in the Middle East that spread from Tunisia to Egypt

and erupted in violence in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. By assuming the future will be like the past, politicians are likely to adopt ineffective policies and ignore trends that will come to dominate their decisions.

Introduction to Global Politics is designed to force students to think ahead in new, open-minded ways, even as they come to understand the historical roots of the present.

An organization that weaves theoretical and substantive issues together helps students understand abstract ideas by showing them how these ideas work in real life.

The text links abstract theory and substantive global politics as closely as possible. Each topical chapter – whether dealing with war, human rights, or globalization – includes historical background, theoretical lenses through which to view the history, and commentary about how this history links with today's events. In this way, each chapter combines the historical material with the contemporary and the abstract with the concrete.


An in-depth historical section consisting of several narrative chapters, as well as historical background in other chapters, illustrates how specific issues evolve and how existing policies and ideas about them must be constantly revisited.

We expect the text will excite students and tempt them to learn more about the world around them.

A visual tour of *Introduction to Global Politics*

Pedagogical features

Introduction to Global Politics offers numerous features to facilitate the instructor’s task, and to engage students and help them understand key ideas and events.



HISTORICAL TIMELINES Each chapter opens with a visual timeline, identifying key events and individuals mentioned in the text and providing a chronological context for the chapter ahead.

FIGURES, MAPS, AND TABLES The text uses a rich mix of visual materials, including maps, photographs, cartoons, graphs, and reproductions of paintings. Such resources bring history and concepts to life, making it easier to understand and apply concepts and trends in global politics.



Table 2.1

1050

City	Population
Córdoba	100,000
Seville	80,000
Almería	70,000
Granada	60,000
Valencia	50,000
Barcelona	40,000
Madrid	30,000
Palencia	20,000
León	15,000
London	10,000



Figure 1.1 Ne...
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Source: Getty Im...




DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS Key terms are highlighted in the text and defined in a complete glossary at the end of the book. This reinforces students' knowledge and understanding of key elements of the field.



BOXED FEATURES The text incorporates several boxed features:



- **“Did you know?”** boxes offer snapshots of information to enliven events, cases, individuals, and issues discussed in the text. Their purpose is to deepen understanding of relevant points. For instance, a box on US foreign aid compares how much assistance the US actually gives to how much the American people think it gives.



- **“Theory in the real world”** boxes are intended to illustrate the ways in which theoretical approaches underlie and bring about the real policy choices leaders make. For example, one box illustrates how both liberal and realist arguments can be seen in President Bush's justification for war in Iraq in 2003.




- **“Controversy”** boxes describe events, ideas, and norms that have generated disagreement among political leaders, scholars, or publics. These boxes portray the debates on global warming and preemptive war, for example. They alert the reader to the absence of consensus about the meaning of events, ideas, and ethics in global politics.


- **“Key documents”** boxes present excerpts from documents central to the material in the text. Having access to these documents will enable students to immerse themselves in the events being described and expands understanding of brief citations or allusions in the text. Such documents include historical speeches, agreements, and statements, such as the treaties of Westphalia and Versailles, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the United Nations Charter.



STUDENT ACTIVITIES Each chapter concludes with a list of activities that students can undertake individually or in groups, inside or outside the classroom. These include suggested discussion and essay questions dealing with key themes and events in the chapter, as well as map exercises that encourage them to apply key concepts and theories to reality, to make connections among events, and to analyze the sources and consequences of events.



CULTURAL MATERIALS Each chapter ends with a list of films and/or novels, as well as other materials in the humanities, including poetry, that are relevant to the chapter content. Each list also includes a thought question or activity for students, based on one of the listed works. Instructors may also use these resources for specialized short courses in topics such as war and film or literature and global politics.



FURTHER READING Each chapter concludes with a list of key scholarly books and articles that will provide additional treatment of the theories and histories covered therein. Students will find this list particularly helpful for developing and researching papers and other assignments.

Companion website



www.routledge.com/cw/mansbach

Visit the Companion Website for a whole host of student and instructor resources that support and enhance the textbook, including:


Lecturer resources:

- Comprehensive Testbank including multiple choice, true/false and short answer questions for each chapter
- PowerPoint lecture slides divided by chapter
- Detailed chapter outlines
- Discussion questions, to be used for class discussion or as assignable exam questions, depending on your preference



Student resources:

- Regularly updated author blog
- Annotated video clips on core people and events in global politics
- Glossary flashcards, to test your knowledge of the essential terms from the book
- Annotated web links to recommended online resources for each chapter
- Interactive map feature, bringing key maps from the book to life



Prologue

Global politics is in the midst of dramatic and accelerating change. Old theories and perspectives are fast becoming obsolete, and new thinking is imperative if we are to survive and prosper in the coming decades. With updated content, topical examples and a greater emphasis on the phenomenon of globalization, this cutting-edge edition does just that.

The text consists of six parts, each reflecting a distinctive group of issues and ideas in contemporary global politics. The second edition has been reorganized with new chapters on the role of power and the role of technology in global politics and a new section on nuclear proliferation in Chapter 7. The globalization chapter has been moved forward, and issues accompanying globalization play a more central role in the new edition.

Global change

In recent years, we have witnessed many remarkable events. Consider what the following headlines tell us about our changing world:

■ September 12, 2001, *“US Attacked; Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror”*

■ March 22, 2009, *“Predator Strikes in Pakistan: U.S. Says Drones Ravage Al Qaeda”*

These events demonstrate that distance no longer limits how or with whom wars are fought, that sovereign frontiers may no longer pose barriers to an attack, and that conflict does not occur only between states:

■ May 14, 2009, *“Europe Fines Intel \$1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case”*

■ March 23, 2005, *“In India’s Outsourcing Boom, GE Played a Starring Role”*

Giant corporations such as Microsoft, Intel, Toshiba, and their subsidiaries invest vast amounts around the globe and shift operations to countries with low labor and production costs, limiting state control over activities like trade and providing corporations with resources to compete with states for influence in global politics:

■ June 28, 2010, *“G-20 Calls for Higher Bank Capital to Avert Financial Crisis”*

■ April 20, 2002, *“Argentina Orders Banks to Close: Government Fears Economic Collapse as Cash Outflow Rises”*

The combined power of global financial networks and new technologies allows investors to withdraw funds instantaneously from any market in the world and convert currency on a vast scale. These developments make states increasingly vulnerable to economic collapse and ineffectual in preventing it:

- June 27, 2010, *“An Investment in Fighting Infectious Disease will Save Millions of Lives”*
- June 7, 2005, *“An Avian Flu Pandemic Could Kill Millions”*

Global diseases, such as AIDS and avian flu, can spread quickly around the world, abetted by cheap and convenient methods of travel. Such diseases pose security, political, economic, and social challenges, particularly for less developed countries that lack resources to provide healthcare and social services, such as vaccinations or care for orphans.

Each story reflects a major event or trend in world affairs, but how do they “fit” into the larger scheme of global politics? How are they related to one another, and what do they tell us about the world since the Cold War ended? What’s new about these events? What’s old? What are their implications, and why should we care about them? These are questions we address in this book because we believe the key theme in contemporary global politics is recognizing *both* continuity and change and, consequently, the value of history to understanding the present and the future.

No event reflects more the importance of appreciating what is new and what is old than what took place on September 11, 2001 (see Figure Pro.1). On a clear morning, a passenger jet was seen cruising, at a very low altitude, along the New York skyline. At precisely 8:46 a.m. (Eastern daylight time), as onlookers watched from the streets below and from neighboring high-rises, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center; both plane and tower burst into flames. Astonished observers and the media began to speculate as to the cause

of this spectacular “accident.” At 9:03 a.m., a second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center in a ball of flames. By 9:30 a.m., President George W. Bush announced that the United States had been the victim of a terrorist attack. Minutes later, he halted all US air traffic for the first time in history. However, the danger was not over. At 9:37 a.m., another plane, American Airlines Flight 77, crashed into the Pentagon in the outskirts of Washington, DC. The public wondered: Would the attacks end? Then, at 9:59 a.m. the unthinkable happened. The south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed. Only five minutes later, a portion of the Pentagon collapsed, while in Pennsylvania a fourth jet, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a field after passengers had waged a losing battle to wrest control of the plane from the hijackers. It is believed the plane was on its way to Camp David, the US Congress, or the White House. At 10:28 a.m., the north tower of the World Trade Center also collapsed. It was later discovered that the passenger jets had been hijacked by 19 Muslim militants, most of whom



Pro. 1 World Trade Center, New York, 9/11/01
CARMEN TAYLOR/AP/Press Association Images

were Saudi citizens who had been visiting the US on expired student visas.

Today, as 9/11 reminds us, global politics impinges on our lives more than ever. Everything from the air we breathe to the clothes we wear and even the taxes we pay has a global dimension. Global news with vivid pictures of riots and wars is accessible on satellite television and online 24 hours a day. In fact, demonstrators around the world are often instructed to wait until a CNN correspondent appears before beginning. Beyond dramatic events such as 9/11, we are reminded of how embedded we are in the world around us when we turn on our Sony TV (that may have been manufactured in the United States or in Singapore), drive to work in a Honda or Volkswagen (or an “American” car that actually has been built from parts made in many countries), buy toys or shoes made in China, or sip a glass of Molson from Canada.

For centuries, the United States enjoyed the protection of two great oceans and friendly neighbors and a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. Today, all that has changed. America’s homeland is vulnerable to threats ranging from fanatical terrorists to pandemic influenza. The United States must also confront the possibility that “**rogue states**” such as Iran will acquire nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. America’s economy is hostage to the willingness of China to keep purchasing US securities that provide the wherewithal to pay for America’s huge trade and budget deficits, and the effort of American corporations to compete in a globalized economy in which people around the world are increasingly **interdependent** leads to the outsourcing of US jobs to other countries and the reduction in benefits for workers at home. In fact, many of the most important issues in global politics such as environmental deterioration and the spread of diseases constitute **collective dilemmas**, that is, problems that no single state or group of states can solve and that, therefore, require cooperation for solutions to be found.

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were a new kind of threat that many decision makers believed to be remote. They were not carried out by another **state** on the US like Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Rather they were planned and conducted by a small network of Islamic militants. It took only 19 hijackers to cause nearly 3000 deaths in the most deadly terrorist incident in history.

The world, then, is a dangerous place that, in some respects, is becoming more dangerous every day *owing to the speed with which change is taking place*. Rapid change is dangerous because leaders cannot grasp the implications of what is happening and, therefore, are likely to misunderstand the sources and consequences of the perils they face and so fashion inappropriate policies to deal with them. Expectations are violated; old friendships wither; new foes emerge; and new dangers appear. Rapid change is also dangerous because there is less time for leaders to respond constructively to impending catastrophe. Thus, many observers regard global warming as having reached a critical juncture, but leaders have done little to limit the release of “greenhouse gases” that produce global warming or to change the energy-intensive habits of citizens. If those who believe that global warming poses imminent environmental deterioration and weather changes are correct, the failure of statesmen to take account of it and change course means a future of melted icecaps, flooded coastlines, and even submerged island states.

Among the most important changes in global politics are:

- The declining role of territory as new technologies, international economic markets, and cultural identities take prominence.
- The declining capacity of states to protect or meet the needs of citizens.

Introduction to Global Politics introduces students to key changes in global politics in order to help them make sense of trends that are shaping our

world. Some transformations portend new dangers, even as others promise a brighter, more peaceful, and more prosperous future. *All these changes, both dangerous and promising, are related to one another*, thereby producing a world that in some respects could only have been imagined by science fiction writers – one in which territory and borders matter less, and corporations compete with states to achieve objectives. Countries can fight wars thousands of miles away from their own territory, but they cannot necessarily defend their territory against military threats such as missile strikes. Territory remains important, but every day new events challenge the historical preoccupation with extending and defending every square inch.

Studying global politics today also reveals how porous the borders of nation-states have become and how easily people, ideas, and things can move across them. Firms can invest and exchange currencies with the click of a computer mouse, without ever leaving home. Currencies such as the US dollar or European euro are no longer valuable only within a single country's political boundaries, but are used all over the world. People are more mobile than ever before. As a result, states enjoy ever less control over what goes on within their borders, and institutions and groups other than states are becoming more influential in global politics. Thus, we are living in a period that challenges our preconception of states as the only actors in world affairs.


In speaking of change, we mean *the transformation of key structures and processes that has a major impact on the nature of global politics*. Where there is significant and rapid change, there are discontinuities between past and present with features of the present not recognizable in the past. For example, the shift from the medieval European order of overlapping rights, privileges, and ownership based on a feudal agrarian economy to a world of **sovereign** states enjoying exclusive legal authority over internal affairs constituted a major transformation in global politics. So, too, was the shift in security and military strat-

egy that was brought about by the introduction of nuclear weapons after World War Two. More recently, the end of the Cold War produced a dramatically different world: the United States emerged as the world's only superpower; Russia, China, and the countries of Eastern Europe joined the global economic system; **globalization** linked the fates of people around the world as never before; and suicidal fanaticism produced an unprecedented security problem. *None of these developments was predicted, and, therefore, there was little planning to deal with them.*

Global continuity and the importance of history

Nevertheless, global politics reflects continuity as well as change. Not everything is new. War, for example, has been central to global politics for millennia. If we understood its causes, we would eliminate them to prevent the loss of blood and treasure that accompany armed conflict. Instead, even as wars among states grow less frequent, wars involving terrorists, ethnic minorities, and other groups become more frequent, with the potential to become ever more deadly. Numerous efforts to explain war notwithstanding, we still quote from ancient philosophers and writers such as Thucydides, a fifth-century BC Greek historian, to understand and explain them (see Figure P.2). Thucydides sought to identify the causes and consequences of war “for eternity.” His great work, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, told the story of a war that pitted the city-state of Athens and its allies against Sparta and its allies, culminating in the destruction of Athens, the birthplace of democracy. His claim that the relative power of city-states provided an important explanation of why war erupted tells us that we should pay careful attention to rapid changes in power, for example, China's rapid increase in military and economic capabilities. Rapid change in the distribution of power is, however, only one possible cause of war. Even today, we still cannot explain

Pro. 2 Thucydides
(c.460–400 BC)



or predict the outbreak of war with certainty. The city-states of Thucydides' world gave way over the centuries to larger and more powerful political communities, territorial states, which dominated global politics for over three centuries and continue to play a major role in today's world.

Change is the other side of continuity, *which refers to the gradual evolution of structures or processes such that the present retains key features of the past*. Although global politics is constantly changing, with new events and new actors emerging all the time, there is still much to be learned from past experiences. For example, terrorism is hardly new, even though certain features of contemporary terrorism are novel. In fact, few events – however unexpected – come from out of the blue. Much that seems novel actually has roots in the past, and familiarity with history makes the present more understandable and helps us to plan for the future and avoid making the same mistakes over again. Although some aspects of every event are unique, history provides important analogies and vital lessons. Thus, events that initially seem new or are unexpected actually have deep historical roots. Even the global financial panic that began with America's subprime mortgage meltdown in late 2007 cannot be properly understood without consideration of US economic experiences and the long-term economic policies of that country as well as others that had purchased derivatives and other arcane financial assets.

Familiarity with history is needed for identifying change and continuity. Some political scientists delve far into the past in order to identify

patterns. For example, George Modelski and William R. Thompson have proposed what they call *long-cycle theory*. They argue that history indicates that there are repeated cycles of large-scale war and global leadership that last about 100 years.¹ Each cycle consists of several stages, beginning with a global war that gives rise to a new dominant world leader or "hegemon"; thereafter, the hegemon's authority is undermined and challengers to the hegemon appear; military overextension and the high costs of hegemonic leadership cause the hegemon's decline; and a new war ensues from which a new hegemon emerges. In previous cycles, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Great Britain behaved as hegemons, and today the United States plays that role.² Given the length of the current cycle, however, the US should begin to decline and competitors like China should emerge. Modelski and Thompson believe that periods of hegemonic dominance are relatively peaceful compared to periods of relative equality between a hegemon and a challenger. Long-cycle theory followed on *power-transition theory*, according to which a hegemon will be challenged by another great power at the point where the latter becomes roughly as powerful as the hegemon.³

Change is part of the natural rhythm of our lives, but when it accelerates to the point where we are "strangers in a strange land,"⁴ as many people felt in the aftermath of 9/11, people become fearful, anxious, mistrustful, and disoriented. Sometimes, as in this case, change is genuinely threatening and really does imperil the wellbeing of individuals and society. Suicide bombers, who look forward to martyrdom and paradise, are particularly menacing, as threats of retaliation cannot deter them from acting. At other times change is frightening, but does not have the same tragic consequence. For instance, for over 300 years the territorial state has been the fulcrum of global politics. Thus the discipline became known as **international politics** or international relations because it focused exclusively on relations among (*inter*) sovereign states.⁵ Such a focus is called "**state centric**." But observers now point to

the proliferation of important actors other than states such as giant corporations like IBM and ExxonMobil, international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank, and non-governmental groups like Greenpeace and Al Qaeda as evidence that sovereign states no longer enjoy unchallenged primacy – or control – in global politics (a term that allows us to speak of a wider galaxy of actors than states alone). In a state-centric world, only governments make authoritative decisions, but in the expanded world of global politics, authoritative decisions are also made by numerous domestic (*intrastate*), **transnational**, and international institutions and groups, both formal and informal, that undertake **governance** in a complex global universe in which the governments of states represent only one source of global authority.

Similarly, rapid economic change triggers fears of future poverty and social dislocation. Workers in US industries such as textiles will almost certainly lose their jobs in coming years owing to the growth of similar industries in Asia and South America, areas in which production costs are lower. The American economy will have to restructure, and former textile workers will need training and employment in other sectors. Likewise, rapid political change, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, raises anxiety about reduced status, loss of freedom, or even threats of war and violence.

Whether or not we fear changes matters less than how we react to them. Dramatic change can lead to either conflict or cooperation. Some leaders genuinely learn from novel events, while others ignore them and keep on in the same old ways. When change encourages misperception and suspicion of others, leaders may act on their own, as President Bush did with the 2003 Iraq War. Such **unilateralism**, which seemed to break with America's previous policy of **multilateralism** based on consultation and coordination with allies and friends, however well intentioned, sometimes frightens those who do not understand its motives and eats away at international coop-

eration. For example, in economics, a country may unilaterally impose tariffs on imported goods to reduce foreign competition and preserve jobs at home, and in military security, it may build new missiles to prevent an enemy missile attack. Citizens and leaders in other countries view tariffs as an assault on their workers and may interpret the missiles as a way of making their military forces obsolete. For these reasons, President Barack Obama committed the United States to greater multilateralism after his election in 2008.

Other changes, in contrast, may enhance global cooperation. International institutions such as the UN and the International Criminal Court encourage regional or global economic and political integration and work toward enforcing global peace. And the growing role of nongovernmental organizations such as the environmental advocate Greenpeace or the humanitarian group Amnesty International promotes other kinds of cooperation.

As the preceding paragraphs illustrate, the world is changing in complex ways, and knowledge of history does not tell us *how* change takes place. Is change a random or stochastic process – a product of mere chance – or is it determined by the past? Is history linear and progressive, or does it take the form of long cycles? Such questions remain unanswered. However, political, economic, social, and cultural systems are becoming more interconnected as globalization intensifies. This process erodes states' borders, challenges states' control over their citizens, reduces the importance of territory, creates dangerous new forms of violence, and fosters globe-girdling economic and cultural forces. As a consequence of the complex relationship between change and continuity, global politics is a challenging and exciting subject. Even political scientists do not agree on the nature and consequences of the changes underway in the **global system**.

Threats and opportunities

Just as global politics consists of change and continuity, so it combines factors and trends that threaten our wellbeing and even our survival with opportunities to avoid or cope with threats that we can ignore only at our peril. Some of the challenges that we must address are:

- *Environmental deterioration*, including global warming; destruction of the world's rain forests (the world's "lungs") and denuding of other forested areas; rapid urbanization owing to peasant flight to megacities in countries like Nigeria and India with accompanying pollution and urban poverty; the spread of deserts into formerly fertile regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; the elimination of species of plants and animals and reduction in biodiversity; and the accumulation of radioactive debris and nuclear waste.
- *Overpopulation* in poor countries that contributes to famine, diseases like AIDS, land hunger, political unrest, and large-scale migration to rich countries with shrinking populations, as well as aging populations in rich countries that portend labor shortages and skyrocketing welfare and health costs.
- *Resource depletion* as energy demands outstrip known reserves of petroleum and natural gas and as growing populations place greater stress on finite sources of fresh water and fertile land.
- *Religious and ethnic extremism* accompanied by *suicidal terrorism* directed against innocent civilians in order to create mayhem and cause maximum death and damage.
- The *spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (weapons of mass destruction or WMD)* to countries divided by profound political differences such as Pakistan and India and to apparently "irrational" regimes such as those in Iran and North Korea, and the growing prospect of terrorists acquiring such weapons.
- The rapid *spread of economic and financial crises* owing to interstate interdependence and economic globalization.
- High levels of *civil and trans-state warfare*.
- Widespread *human rights abuses*.
- The *collapse of states* and the spread of chaos and civil strife in selected regions.
- The rapid *global spread of pathogens* that threaten humans, livestock, and plant life and the threat of new pandemics such as avian influenza.
- The *intensification of trade disputes* that threaten to end the liberal economic regime responsible for ever higher living standards around the world since World War Two.
- *Growing disparities in wealth* between "winners" and "losers" in the course of economic globalization.
- The *prospect of cyber attacks* by states or individual hackers that could cause chaos in modern societies.
- The *absence of multilateral cooperation among major countries* to respond to global problems.

Happily, there is another side to the story. Some trends promise to enlarge human capacities and help us cope with, insulate ourselves from, and perhaps even avoid some of the worst dangers we face. Among the sources of optimism are:

- The *growing accumulation of human knowledge*, an "information revolution," and *the accessibility of new knowledge* owing to the spread of information and communication technologies.
- *Growing economic productivity globally* owing to the introduction, spread, and improvement of computer-based technologies, the spread of giant **transnational corporations** (TNCs), and the mobility of global capital.
- *The development of renewable energy sources* derived from the Sun, wind, and biomass.
- *Rapid economic development*, especially in China and India, as well as other **emerging**

economies, that augers an overall reduction in global poverty.

- *The spread of democracy and democratic institutions* beyond North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand to former Soviet bloc countries and, more recently, to the Arabic Middle East.
- *The authority of global institutions* such as the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization that coordinate national policies and enforce global norms and practices.
- *The proliferation and networking of nongovernmental organizations* that constitute global civil society and that lobby for global cooperation in dealing with global dangers, provide technical information and humanitarian aid, and foster links among peoples in different societies.
- *The regulation of key issues by informal networks of nongovernmental groups, international institutions, and government bureaucracies* – known as **international regimes** – that foster interstate cooperation.
- *A decline in interstate warfare.*
- *The proliferation of international law protecting the individual*, codifying human rights, and spreading norms of racial and gender equality.

The plan of the book

Part I consists of one chapter that introduces the role of theory in understanding the world around us. It then analyzes several theoretical perspectives that will enable you to understand the substantive material which follows, and these perspectives reappear throughout. It explains the role of theory in understanding global politics and examines several types of theory and method to help you to understand what theory is and why it is vital for understanding global politics. The chapter also introduces the use of levels of analysis, an important conceptual tool that reappears throughout

the text as an aid to understanding and explaining major events.

Part II provides the historical knowledge needed to appreciate the role of change and continuity in the issues and events that appear in later chapters. It consists of a series of historical chapters arranged chronologically that describe the evolution of global politics from Europe's Middle Ages, Confucian China, and the founding of Islam to the present. These chapters permit readers to see how history and change play out in real life. The historical narratives tell their stories from beginning to end, while examining how past events continue to affect global politics years, even centuries, later. Taken together, they tell a story of how the contemporary global system evolved. Chapter 2 focuses on the birth of the modern state in Europe and two alternative, nonstate systems that emerged in the Islamic and Chinese worlds. This chapter compares the evolution of these systems and examines historical clashes between them and the West that erupted as each tried to expand. The consequences of these collisions still loom large. Chapter 3 examines the world wars, arguably the most important events in the twentieth century, focusing on explanations of the sources and consequences of each. Chapter 4 tells the story of the Cold War, including its causes and consequences. It considers the evolution of the epic collision between East and West that set the stage for today's world. Chapter 5 explains the expansion of the global system as Europe expanded outward and built colonial empires in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the later decolonization process in these regions, and the growing role of countries in the **global south**, especially that of China. The final chapter in Part II brings us to the present, dealing with globalization, perhaps the most important feature of contemporary global politics. It examines the major features of globalization and assesses arguments in favor and against this phenomenon.

Part III opens with a chapter describing the great issues in contemporary global politics:

nuclear proliferation, the challenge from China, the conflict between Israel and Palestine, militant Islam and the War on Terrorism, and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. Each issue is placed in an historic context to highlight continuity and change within the issue. Chapter 8 opens with a discussion of the role of power in world affairs and then focuses on war – both interstate and intrastate – its causes, its variations, and the ways in which it has evolved. Chapter 9 introduces the changing role of technology in global politics, especially military technology, and its impact in the world wars and the Cold War that ushered in an era of total war. It concludes by explaining how recent information and communications technologies have affected warfare, economics, politics, and culture in our globalizing world.

Chapter 10, the first chapter in Part IV, deals with global governance, especially the changing role of international law and organization in maintaining order and peace. Chapter 11 examines the status of individuals in global politics through the prism of human rights. It explains the emergence and evolution of human rights as a key global issue following the atrocities of World War Two and concludes by discussing the role of gender in global politics.

Part V looks at a range of contemporary issues that in large measure will determine the wellbeing and even survival of humanity and that challenge the global system as a whole. The part opens

with Chapter 12, dealing with the metaphorical Biblical Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: pestilence, war, famine, and death. The chapter describes and explains myriad nonmilitary challenges to human security and survival: poverty, crime, the arms trade, population growth, migration, and disease. Chapter 13 explains how questions of identity shape behavior, especially in contemporary global life in which loyalty to one's state is challenged by national, religious, ethnic, tribal, and civilizational identities. Chapter 14 focuses on international political economy, an issue that has grown more central with economic globalization that is accompanied by the rapid spread of prosperity and/or misery. It examines different theoretical approaches to the subject, as well as key institutions and actors that manage the global economic system. Chapter 15, on the global environment, concludes Part V. It explains why the ecological challenges to human wellbeing and even our very survival have eluded efforts to achieve collaborative and innovative responses.

Part VI consists of a brief epilogue that looks ahead and examines several plausible future scenarios – a globalized world, a world in chaos, a realist world, and an authoritarian world. As the text suggests, elements of each scenario can already be “dimly seen.”

Part I

Theory and global politics



THE CHAPTERS

1. Theoretical approaches to global politics

431 to 404 BC

The Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta

1513

Niccolò Machiavelli publishes *The Prince*

1651

Publication of *Leviathan* by Thomas Hobbes

1795

Immanuel Kant publishes *Perpetual Peace*

1848

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels publish *The Communist Manifesto*

1918

Woodrow Wilson proposes the Fourteen Points

1 Theoretical approaches to global politics

In the years before the outbreak of World War Two in September 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (1869–1940) believed that he could prevent war by appeasing Adolf Hitler, that is, by allowing the German leader to unite all Germans in the Third Reich (see Figure 1.1). Only then, Chamberlain theorized, would Hitler be satisfied and cease making additional demands that threatened European peace. On returning from a meeting with Hitler on September 30, 1938, at which the British and French leaders had capitulated to Hitler’s demand that the German-populated Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia be immediately ceded to Germany and at which Hitler had signed an agreement not to enter into a war with Britain, Chamberlain read a statement to a crowd assembled in front of the prime minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street. “My good friends,” he announced, “this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace in our time.” Chamberlain’s theory proved entirely wrong. Far from satisfying Hitler, his policy had whetted the Führer’s appetite. Chamberlain was vigorously

criticized by those who believed in the theory of “realism” that we will describe shortly. Winston Churchill (1874–1965), a realist who recognized Chamberlain’s error, declared: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” Influenced by Chamberlain’s disastrous policy of appeasing Hitler, President George W. Bush and



Figure 1.1 Neville Chamberlain waving the agreement he had signed with Adolf Hitler the previous day
Source: Getty Images/Hulton Archive

1939

E. H. Carr
publishes *The
Twenty Years'
Crisis*

1989

Beginning of the
“Third Debate”

British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to invade Iraq and oust that country’s dictator, Saddam Hussein. Bush claimed that among the reasons for invading Iraq was transforming that country into a **democracy** in which Iraqis would enjoy freedom and human rights, and intervention in the name of liberty was one of the defining traits of others like Vice-President Dick Cheney, who were known as neoconservatives or “neocons.” Bush and his advisers believed, as many “liberals” did, that democratic societies were peaceful and that a democratic Iraq would no longer behave aggressively. The overthrow of Saddam, they believed, would lead to the spread of democracy throughout the Middle East, thereby bringing peace to the region. Genuine and durable democracy, however, requires more than political parties and competitive elections. It also requires the rule of law, a spirit of tolerance of different views, and willingness to compromise – attributes alien to Iraqi political life.

In the cases of Chamberlain and Bush, both used theory to make sense of the world they faced. Chamberlain’s theory was that Hitler was a “normal” politician and that appeasing him would bring peace. Bush’s theory was that appeasement merely whetted the appetite of dictators and that instituting democracy would bring with it peace.

What is theory and why do we need it?

In what follows, we address the problem of how to explain and understand global politics. No one can look at *everything* in global politics at once

without being overwhelmed. However, by focusing *only* on key factors and looking for patterns, a student of world affairs can gain clarity. Theorizing fits individual events and cases into larger patterns, allowing us to generalize about global politics. Thus, when theorists look at individual events, they ask, in the words of two international relations specialists: “Of what is this an instance?”¹ Theory simplifies the messy complexity of reality by pointing *only* to those factors that theorists believe are important.

This section begins by defining **theory**. It then explains two kinds of theory – empirical and normative – and three purposes of theory – prediction, explanation, and prescription. The section concludes by considering how theory is constructed and tested in global politics research.

Most theory in international relations involves explaining and/or predicting actors’ behavior. Such theory consists of abstract, simplified, and general propositions that answer “why” and “how” questions such as “*why* do wars begin?” or “*how* do collective identities shape our behavior?” Theory is built on assumptions – initial claims that must be accepted without further investigation – that lead theorists to point to particular features of global politics. For example, many analysts construct theories based on the assumption that states are the only relevant actors in global politics, and that, therefore, observers should focus only interstate behavior.

Empirical theory deals with what *is*. It is based on facts assumed to be *external to the observer* that can be perceived either directly or indirectly through history books, memoirs, and documents. We use empirical theory to answer

questions about how actors behave and what the consequences of their actions are. Examples of empirical propositions would be: “Suicide bombers are used by groups that are weaker than their adversaries” and “suicide bombings cause society to lose faith in the government’s ability to provide security.” Such statements are empirical because scholars believe they can collect and organize facts (**data**) about which groups conduct suicide bombings and on the consequences of suicide bombings. Moreover, other scholars can test (“replicate”) these propositions by collecting their own data.²

Empirical theory serves three purposes: prediction, explanation, and prescription. **Predictive theory** forecasts what *will* happen under specified circumstances. Much theory in global politics predicts. Its main purpose is to generalize from the specific *without* making a leap of imagination. Thus, some scholars have observed that states with democratic governments tend not to use war to settle disputes with other democracies, but, instead, use peaceful methods of dispute resolution like negotiation. In their theory, these scholars look at many individual cases to predict that democracies will not go to war with one another. In other words, predictive theory uses *induction*; that is, deriving general principles from particular facts or instances. By contrast, explanatory theory frequently relies on *deduction*; that is applying a general principle to explain particular cases. An example would be: “If democracies are peace loving and Great Britain and Australia are democracies, then Britain and Australia are peace loving.”

Explanatory theory identifies *causes* of events and answers “why” questions. It involves leaps of imagination, triggered by observations of reality. One notable example is the theory of gravity. According to legend, Sir Isaac Newton’s theory of gravity was inspired by observing an apple fall from a tree. His leap of imagination was that the force that brought the apple to the ground (gravity) might be the same force that kept the moon in its orbit around the earth. As with grav-

ity, explanatory theory frequently asserts general propositions, and those who apply such theory can use those propositions to explain specific instances. For example, Newton’s general ideas about gravity can be applied to the Sun and other planets, as well as to the Moon. In global politics, Stephen Walt wanted to explain the formation of military alliances. The basis of his theory was that states will enter alliances to balance against a common threat (the prevailing theory at the time was that states would balance against a stronger power, even if it did not pose an imminent threat). He then applied his theory to alliances among states in the Middle East.³

Although explanatory theories may permit predictions, predictive theory need not explain. Thus, the ancient Greeks developed theories that could explain the movement of the tides and its connection to what we call gravity, but with this knowledge they did not observe real tides sufficiently to predict the exact times that high and low tide would occur. As you might imagine, the Greeks were not great sailors. By contrast, the Babylonians assumed that tides were dependent on the whims of the gods – an explanatory theory that was false – but, by carefully observing tidal changes, they could accurately predict high and low tides.

Insurance companies rely on predictive theory based on statistical inference. Thus, they *infer* from particular facts the probability or likelihood of a general proposition. Without doing so, they could not stay in business. For instance, by looking at the records of many individual automobile drivers, they infer general propositions, for example, that accidents are more likely to occur in large cities and drivers under the age of 18 are more likely than their elders to be involved in accidents. Similarly, in global politics, scholars look at large numbers of wars to infer whether the existence of alliances, arms races, or nondemocratic states is connected to the outbreak of war.

Keep in mind, however, that moving from specific cases to general propositions can *never prove* general claims. Just because a researcher

finds a strong *correlation* (the statistical degree to which factors are related and change together) between arms races and war, this does not mean that arms races and war *always* occur together. It is possible that additional cases will violate the generalizations. Neither does it prove that arms races *cause* war because both factors may result from other factors of which we are unaware. In reality, theorists continuously move back and forth between specific observations and general propositions.

DID YOU KNOW?

Explaining why something happens involves identifying a “cause” and a “result.” Usually theorists distinguish between two types of cause: *necessary* and *sufficient*. If some factor *must* take place for a particular result to occur, then that factor is an **necessary cause**. Although the presence of that factor does not assure the result, the presence of the result necessarily means that the causal factor was present. For example, if wars erupted *only* following arms races, then arms races are a necessary cause of war. Although arms races may occur without war ensuing, wars never occur without arms race preceding them. Contrariwise, if the presence of some factor always guarantees a particular result, that factor is called a **sufficient cause**. If arms races are a sufficient cause of war, then, their occurrence assures that war will ensue.

Those who study global politics are also interested in evaluating whether what actors do is right or wrong, and whether they *should* or *ought* to act as they do. Answers to such questions constitute **normative theory**, which explains what is right and wrong or moral and immoral. Such theory takes the form of a claim, rather than a proposition. It cannot be tested because it is based on

beliefs, logic, and values. An example of a normative claim would be that the use of suicide bombers for political ends is immoral. There is no way to test the accuracy or the morality of this proposition. There are those who believe that using suicide bombers to kill innocents is never right and there are those who believe it is justified, at least in some circumstances. Numbers and statistics rarely sway people to change deeply held opinions on such matters.

Theory is also used for the purpose of prescription. **Prescriptive theory** recommends adopting particular policies to realize objectives. Here *ought* and *should* are used to indicate the correct course of action *if one wishes to achieve a particular end*. An example of prescriptive theory would be: “If Britain wishes to prevent the loss of jobs in its domestic textile industry to other countries, it should place tariffs on imported textiles.” This statement proposes that low tariffs (a form of tax) on imported textiles *are* correlated with a loss of British jobs in the textile industry. Data can be collected to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed relationship.

Theory is a tool scholars use to make sense of the complex reality of global politics because it *simplifies reality* and focuses on those factors that it regards as most important. Moreover, scholars use certain procedures to build good theory and evaluate its accuracy. These are known as **methodology**. People sometimes confuse theory with methodology, but, in practice, the two are quite different. Theory answers questions of whether things will happen and why they do so, but methodology describes the ways to evaluate and test theories. What methodology should a scholar use to judge a theory about the textile industry and the tariff barriers? How would she determine that imposing tariffs would achieve the desired result (saving jobs)? One methodology might involve using statistical inference to make predictions. Researchers who adopt this methodology use *quantitative* measures to achieve precision just as we use thermometers that tell temperature and barometers that tell air pressure.

They might measure annual textile tariffs and unemployment rates in the textile industry over a period of decades and then use statistical methods to evaluate the relationship between these two *variables* (factors that can change or vary). An alternative methodology might employ *qualitative* measures like detailed historical case studies to bring precise detail to the theory. Thus, we might examine two or three historical cases of tariff increases in detail to find out not only *whether* the proposed relationship exists, but also *why* it exists.

Scholars must carefully explain their methodology in order to allow others to evaluate their findings. A theory gains credibility as more researchers test it, but it may also be “falsified” and thereby discredited by repeated tests (see Figure 1.2). Data may also be misused to make a case as in citing the number of African-Americans in US prisons to claim that African-Americans commit more crimes than other groups. The problem with such data is that African-Americans tend to be poorer than other groups, and the poor tend to commit noticeable crimes like robbery. In addition, the poor have less access to legal assistance than do the wealthy, and the latter are

more likely to commit less feared “white-collar” crimes like bribery or embezzlement. Researchers, therefore, must be ethically sensitive in their analysis of data.

This section has introduced the concept of theory as a tool that observers use to simplify the world to enable them to explain and predict events and evaluate policies. Practitioners like scholars also need theory to simplify global politics. Only when they understand the patterns or regularities that actors exhibit can they can understand and manage global politics wisely. However, as we will see later, theorists have different world views that shape their theories of global politics. They do not always agree on the salient problems in global politics, or the causes of or solutions to these problems. Each argument points to different factors that we might study. But, surely, one might say, since the same facts and theories are available to everyone, why is there disagreement about events in global politics? This is the question to which we turn.

Many theories, many meanings

Observers commonly differ in interpreting events in global politics. Sometimes, it seems that they are looking at entirely different worlds when they discuss the same events. Why is this so? First, different theories and frameworks point to different factors as most important and ignore factors that others might regard as essential. Realists, for example, focus on power; Marxists emphasize class and economic conditions; liberals pay attention to institutions; and critical theorists emphasize normative factors. It is as though different photographers were moving their cameras, zooming in on what each regards to be the most important features in a scene.

Other reasons why observers view the same events through different lenses have to do with differences in background, wealth, education, culture, age, and personal experience. Since indi-




Figure 1.2 How theory evolves

viduals interpret what they see in terms of its impact on them, the meaning they assign to events will inevitably be unique to their circumstances. Whether people are Muslim affects how they view events in the Middle East and elsewhere such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Kashmir where fellow Muslims are involved.

Regardless of theoretical orientation, age also affects one's view of events, as each generation draws analogies from its youth in interpreting the present. Survivors of World War Two may recall how appeasement failed to stop Hitler and recommend using strong measures to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Their perceptions are likely to be different from those who witnessed the United States getting bogged down in the Vietnam War in the 1960s. The former may recall how appeasement whetted an aggressor's appetite and conclude that the US should get rid of Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad because he, too, is an aggressive dictator. In contrast, those whose political views formed during the Vietnam War may recall that US military forces became entrapped in Vietnam with no clear exit strategy and ultimately had to pull out without achieving victory. In consequence, they may believe that the US should use diplomatic and economic pressure rather than military force to deal with Iran. Of course, not all individuals from the same generation or the same religion will agree, as their views are also shaped by other factors. However, the general principle is that members of the same generation share the same formative events which then, to some degree, shape their views of later events.

The result of these differences is that we live in a world of many stories, each told by individuals with different perspectives, both theoretical and personal. No story is entirely true, but most contain some elements of truth. Similarly, very few of these stories are entirely wrong. As students, the more you familiarize yourselves with these different stories and see the world through the eyes of those making decisions, the more you will understand global politics.

The chapter continues by examining the several perspectives known as **levels of analysis** that we use to explain events. We can think about global politics in terms of the individual, units, or the **global political system** (sometime referred to as the global system) as a whole. Note, too, that **global politics** is more encompassing in terms of actors and issues than is **international politics**, which refers only to the interactions of states. Each perspective provides advantages and disadvantages.

One can view global politics from any of several perspectives or levels of analysis. The key question is whether the most powerful explanation for key events is to be found in the characteristics of individuals, units, or the global system as a whole.

Levels of analysis

As we observe global politics, it becomes clear that many complexly related factors are at work on the individual, unit, and global levels. *Individuals* make up states and other collective groups like states that are *units* of global politics, and those units, in turn, make up the *global system*. Events on the global level often cascade down to affect units and individuals, and vice versa: individuals and units can act in ways that have an impact on the entire global system. We refer to each of these sectors – individuals, units, and the global system – as a different level of analysis. These levels, which are used to differentiate parts and wholes, are another tool for simplifying a complex world. Each level has an important role in global politics, and each provides a different perspective on why events take place. To achieve an accurate understanding of any event requires an awareness of the constraints actors face at each level. However, scholars seeking to explain or predict an event or prescribe policy may focus only on the level that provides the greatest insight into the question at hand.

The individual

At the individual level of analysis, scholars observe the characteristics of people, such as personality traits, ways of reaching decisions, and beliefs. Research focused on individuals might ask whether leaders make rational decisions, how their personal foibles affect policy, whether they allow their biases to affect their decisions, and whether human beings in general are programmed to fight one another. Such questions reflect an individual level of analysis.

Many theorists assume that leaders are rational. This is perhaps an understandable (and some would argue necessary) simplification of reality. Assuming **rationality**, however, is an heroic assumption which can only be tested by looking at real decision makers. In its strongest version, rationality means that leaders choose the *best of all* alternatives in making policy by comparing costs and benefits. This assumption lies behind a variety of theoretical efforts ranging from realism to expected utility theory. However, the assumption is a dubious one, because leaders have limited time and information. At best, decision makers with limited time choose the best of all *available* or *known* alternatives, a process called “satisficing” that yields what is called “bounded rationality.” In Charles Lindblom’s phrase, they seem to be “muddling through”⁴ incrementally. At worst, decision makers are driven by neuroses, compulsions, passions, and personal whims that seem far removed from rationality and, sometimes, even from reality.

Furthermore, the capacity for ends–means rationality diminishes as decision makers interact in cabinet meetings, bureaucracies, governments, and other groups. Political scientist Robert Jervis offers five reasons for this:⁵

- There is a need to form governing coalitions, often including individuals with divergent views.
- Disagreement may be so deep as to prevent a decision being made.

- Inconsistencies grow as different factions come to power.
- Majorities shift among competitors for power with different preferences.
- Divergent and inconsistent bureaucratic interests and perspectives influence decisions.

The unit

On the unit level of analysis, researchers focus on actors’ **foreign policies**. They examine governments or agencies that determine how units like states behave, and on the societies on whose behalf those units work. Such actors include sovereign states like Britain, but also agencies within that country such as the Foreign Office. Among the factors studied at this level are political systems, ideology, national wealth and military power, territory and population, social identities such as religion and ethnicity, and government organization. Typical questions at this level of analysis include whether democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies, whether powerful states act differently than weak ones, whether ethnic or religious diversity in societies leads to civil conflict, and whether leaders enter conflicts with other states in order to overcome domestic unpopularity.

Because there are several types of actors, it is useful to distinguish among groups *within* states and other actors such as bureaucracies and treat such subgroups as other units. Thus, political parties and interest groups are subgroups within states. Indeed, there are additional subgroups even within political parties and interest groups.

States and other actors also may be parts of larger groupings like alliances or regions that can also be regarded as constituting still larger units. During the Cold War, for example, observers spoke of the “Free World” or First World, consisting of the United States and its allies, the Soviet bloc or Second World that included the Soviet Union and its allies, and the Third World that included countries such as India that were not

members of other blocs. Depending on the researcher's or policymaker's purpose, countries may be grouped by geography (Asian, European, African, and so forth), religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and so forth), or ideology (communism, fascism, and so forth). Theorists create such groupings because they want to emphasize selected similarities and differences among actors.

The global system

At the global level of analysis, researchers focus on structural factors, especially *distributions* of power, wealth, attitudes, and other key features of the *world as a whole*. It takes account of the interactions of all actors on the global stage and, thus, is the ultimate “whole” of which actors and individuals are “parts.” Observers who use this level of analysis are preoccupied with patterns of aggregate events and behavior across the entire world. They believe that other levels, while useful, cannot tell the entire story about what is happening because these other levels cannot account for **emergent properties**, attributes of global politics that emerge only because of the interaction of units and/or individuals. To use a simple example, consider the Cold War. Many observers expected the Cold War to end in World War Three. After all, Washington and Moscow feared and mistrusted each other, had different ideologies and political systems, and were armed to the teeth (all unit-level traits conducive to war). Yet, despite tension, the superpowers never fought one another (although they came close on several occasions). Peace between them unexpectedly “emerged” owing to the interaction of two states armed with nuclear weapons. Peace was less a consequence of the policies or intentions of either superpower (unit-level factors) and more a product of the threat of nuclear retaliation and annihilation (a system trait). The logic of nuclear weapons imposed the same constraints on *both* superpowers, despite their ideologies, political systems, and beliefs. Thus, the very weapons that

many feared would begin World War Three combined with the interaction of the superpowers may actually have prevented it.

Most scholars work at one or another level of analysis. However, a few transcend levels as does political scientist Peter Gourevitch when he shows how “domestic structure may be a consequence” of “international systems,” for example, how “political development is shaped by war and trade.”⁶ Another example is political scientist Robert Putnam's analysis of how national policies are shaped simultaneously by interactions *within* a state and *among* states at the system level. Thus, “central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.”⁷

This section has examined how we can enrich our understanding of global politics by seeking clues at several levels of analysis – individuals, collective units and their parts, and the global political system as a whole. Each level offers different insights, and different theories frequently emphasize different levels. You will encounter levels of analysis in later chapters, as they are valuable for examining complex issues.

The following section describes how theory helps us to make sense of change and continuity in global politics. It examines how several types of theory and approach have developed to simplify the welter of events in a turbulent world.

Making sense of a complex world: theory and global politics

Identifying patterns in past and present events allows us to generalize about our world. Even when confronted by the same facts, different observers, as we have seen, will tell different stories owing to their psychological predispositions, life conditions, personal experiences, and beliefs. For similar reasons, you will *not* agree with everything you read in this book. Instead, we hope to provoke you into thinking seriously about

global politics and provide you with tools and ideas to help you to construct reasoned and reasonable arguments either in favor of or opposed to the claims of theorists and practitioners.

The great debates: an introduction to different world views

We now turn to some of the approaches that theorists have used to understand global politics and see how these have evolved over time. In discussing the evolution of theory in global politics, observers have found it useful to organize the discipline's history into several phases, each of which featured a debate about theory. The first involved a debate between two theoretical perspectives: **realism** and **liberalism**. This debate centered on issues such as the relevant actors and issues in global politics and whether cooperation was the exception or the norm in relations among actors. Are states the only actors worth considering and, if not, what other actors matter? Are states preoccupied by military security above all other issues, or can other issues, like trade, be more important? Are actors, by their nature, prone to conflict or cooperation?

The second debate revolved around how to construct theory and conduct research. It involved such questions as whether theories should be based on specific observations or deduced from general principles and whether the research methods used by natural scientists could be adopted by political scientists.

Finally, the "Third Debate" involved more fundamental questions about research and theorizing. For example, is it really possible for researchers to observe global politics objectively? Thus, questions were raised about the utility of **empiricism**, sometimes called "**positivism**," and those who doubted its value were called **postpositivists**. This debate gave rise to another major theoretical school, **constructivism**, which has come to rival realism and liberalism. Others who

participated in the "Third Debate" were Marxists who believed that economic factors were most significant and critical theorists who focused on the normative side of global politics.

Each of these theoretical approaches developed in particular historical contexts. Although theories of power politics have existed for centuries in many cultures, realism (a version of power politics) arose in reaction to the alleged utopianism that dominated Western thinking in the years between World Wars One and Two. The dominance of realism was then assured by the tensions of the Cold War. Liberalism emerged with the seventeenth-century Enlightenment and the growing belief in the power of natural science and rationality to improve the human condition and foster individual liberty. It flourished following the American and French revolutions in the eighteenth century and the promise of nineteenth-century industrialization to improve the general standard of living. It then regained new life as a reaction to the senseless slaughter of World War One and again after the end of the Cold War. Marxism was a reaction to the dark side of the industrial revolution, especially the appalling living conditions of the urban working class, and it gained advocates following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the Great Depression of the 1930s, events that seemed to some to auger an imminent collapse of capitalism. Finally, the "Third Debate" erupted after the Cold War as a result of growing skepticism on the part of some theorists about the ability of social science to understand and cope with global woes such as economic and social inequality, environmental degradation, and endemic violence.

In the following sections, we will review each debate in turn to see how scholars build on one another's work and how theoretical issues and research tools have changed over time. Keep in mind that, even now, *none of these debates is settled*.

REALISM VERSUS LIBERALISM The first of the phases pitted realists against liberals (called idealists and utopians by realists). The realist,

or power politics, tradition can be traced back to ancient China and India, as well as to Western thinkers such as the historian Thucydides, the Florentine political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), and the seventeenth-century English political theorist Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). These individuals were not realists themselves, but they inform **realist** thought. What they had in common was a belief that the central elements of global politics were **power and security**. According to Machiavelli, rulers must always be preoccupied with power, even during peacetime; those who neglect military matters of power and security will surely lose power.⁸ “I put for a general inclination of all mankind,” wrote Hobbes, “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death.”⁹

Realists view global politics as a struggle for power in which leaders must remain alert to the efforts of others to acquire additional power that might endanger the security and survival of their own state. In the face of such threats, according to realists, states will balance one another’s power either by forming alliances or increasing their armaments. Power produces countervailing power, resulting in a **balance of power** (Chapter 2, pp. 46–9). In addition to focusing on global politics as a struggle for power, realists view states as the only important actors in world affairs, a view termed “state centric.” In fact, realists tend to look mainly at only major states, usually called the **great powers**. Because they regard the distribution of power as critical and believe that states act according to the relative power they possess, realists think that factors internal to states such as type of government or features of society have little impact on foreign policy. For them states are **unitary actors**.¹⁰

Although realists agree about the centrality of power, they disagree about why the search for power is so central. Traditional realists see it arising in the hearts and minds of leaders owing to psychological needs, human nature, or original sin. **Thus, they focus attention on the individual level of analysis.** According to political

scientist Hans J. Morgenthau, the most famous of America’s realists, the source is “human nature,” which “has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece.”¹¹ Or, in the words of one of America’s founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804), men are “ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.”¹²

The state of nature that Hobbes called “**the war of every man against every man**” lacked any central authority. Hobbes’s three premises are that **men are equal**, that they must interact under conditions of anarchy, and that they are motivated by competition, diffidence, and glory.¹³ Thus, Hobbes wrote, “kings and persons of sovereign authority because of their independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another.” A world like this had no place for “notions of right or wrong, justice and injustice.”¹⁴ **The Hobbesian world is anarchic**, the condition in which there is **no authority above that of the state**. This world features constant competition for power involving finite resources like territory. In such situations, the gain made by one state is equivalent to the loss by another and is called a **zero-sum game** because if we add the winner’s gains and the loser’s losses the total equals zero.

The modern debate between the realists and liberals began in 1939, shortly before the Nazi invasion of Poland, with the publication of *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939* by British historian E. H. Carr (1892–1982). Carr wrote his book “with the deliberate aim of counteracting the glaring and dangerous defect of nearly all thinking, both academic and popular about international politics in English-speaking countries from 1919 to 1939 – the almost total neglect of the factor of power.”¹⁵ With this in mind, he distinguished between “utopia and reality,” which he defined as “two methods of approach – the inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be, and the inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is.”¹⁶ Following World War One, Carr

argued, utopian liberals sought to prevent another war by utilizing international treaties, international law, free trade, and public opinion. They believed, he continued, that ethics could dominate politics and that “the ‘good’ which consists in self-interest should be subordinated to the ‘good’ which consists in loyalty and self-sacrifice for an end higher than self-interest.”¹⁷ Unfortunately, Carr concluded, in the absence of higher authority, there is no natural harmony of interests, only **national interests** that repeatedly clash.

DID YOU KNOW?

A story spread that Hobbes’s mother was so terrified by rumors of the Spanish Armada’s approach to England that she gave birth to her second son, Thomas, prematurely on April 5, 1588. In his words, “she brought forth twins – myself and fear.”

Following the war, a new generation of scholars, many of whom like Morgenthau had fled Europe during the conflict, placed the blame for World War Two squarely on **utopianism** and **idealism**, whose advocates, they believed, had failed to use power. Democratic leaders, argued realists, had tried to maintain peace in the 1920s and 1930s through morality, law, public opinion, and treaties – all of which ignored the realities of power. The problem, realists believed, was epitomized in the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Treaty (or Pact of Paris), which outlawed war. Its Article I stated: “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”¹⁸ Realists argued that Japan and Germany, both signatories, made a mockery of international law: Japan invaded China in the

1930s and Hitler violated one treaty after another on the road to war.

Realism dominated the way in which most governments have approached global politics since the 1940s. For much of that time, US policy has been based on “negotiating from positions of strength,” which means increasing or maintaining America’s military and economic power, and avoiding commitments that would limit foreign policy flexibility. In 2000, Condoleezza Rice, future national security adviser and secretary of state to George W. Bush, made a classic realist-versus-liberal argument, denouncing the foreign policy of President Bill Clinton for its “attachment to largely symbolic agreements and its pursuit of, at best, illusory ‘norms.’” “Power matters,” she argued, and a Republican administration would “proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.”¹⁹

The realist view focuses on the desire of leaders to acquire and wield power over others, thereby serving their country’s national interest usually interpreted to mean a relative increase in power. Thus, a realist might explain America’s war with Afghanistan that began in 2001 in terms of US determination to prevent a radical Islamic government from holding power and providing sanctuary for Al Qaeda terrorists.

Many contemporary realists contend that the drive for power grows out of the fact of **anarchy**. This condition is akin to a Hobbesian state of nature in which all men are equal and their very equality is the source of conflict (see Key document, opposite). For later realists, or **neorealists** (sometimes called *structural realists*), all activity in global politics flows from the fact that the structure of the global system, especially anarchy, constrains actors from taking certain actions and forces them to take others. Unlike traditional realists like Morgenthau, neorealists focus attention on the level of the global system. Like Hobbes, neorealist Kenneth Waltz reasoned deductively from an initial assumption that global politics is anarchic.²⁰ **Structure** simply refers to

KEY DOCUMENT

THOMAS HOBBES, “OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND, AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY,” *LEVIATHAN*²¹

Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of the body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another man may not pretend as well as h . . .

From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end . . . endeavour to destroy or subdue one another . . .

And from this diffidence of one another there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation – that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him; and this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is generally allowed . . .

So that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory

The first makes man invade for gain, the second for safety, and the third for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue . . .

Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For WAR, consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time where the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of *time* is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

any set of relatively fixed constraints. Anarchy for neorealists is a given within which actors must survive.

Waltz treats actors as analogous to economic firms that have to compete and survive in a free market, and regards power in global politics as analogous to money in economics. Under anarchy, actors cannot trust one another, and this fact produces a self-help system: states, having no

higher authority to turn to in times of danger, must provide for their own security. They seek power but for security and survival rather than out of innate desire. Consequently, states are consumed with achieving power and security to protect themselves from threats. Waltz concludes, “With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to

the dictates of its own reason or desire – conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur.”²² Such a system is predisposed to conflict, even when states share common interests, and the condition of the global system is such that states must always prepare for war. In arming themselves for their own protection, however, they frighten others, who then also prepare for the worst, fearing that they will become victims of aggression. This situation is called a **security dilemma**.

Because of the existence of the security dilemma, actors will try to gain more power relative to others in every transaction so they cannot be exploited at some point later on. This is known as seeking **relative gains**. The pursuit of relative gains hinders cooperation because today’s friend may become tomorrow’s foe, and modest gains made by that friend today may pose a threat in the future. Political scientist Joseph Grieco has labeled such behavior *defensive positionalism*. States, he argues, want to achieve and maintain “relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of international anarchy.”²³ John Mearsheimer labels this view of anarchy *defensive realism* because it assumes states are not inherently aggressive, but only wish to survive. He and other *offensive realists* argue that states seek to dominate each other. For them, anarchy forces states to maximize their power, for “even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powers until they completely dominate the system.”²⁴

A neorealist explanation of America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq would focus on the changing regional and global distribution of power. Iraq, it was believed, was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons that could threaten America’s regional allies, provide Iraq with regional dominance, and perhaps even pose a threat to the US

itself. American intervention, then, was necessary to prevent a potentially dramatic and unfavorable shift in the balance of power.

In contrast to realism, liberalism emerged between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in France, Britain, and the United States. Among the key figures in the development of a liberal perspective were pre-revolutionary French philosophers like Voltaire (François Marie Arouet) (1694–1778), who fought intolerance and superstition, and Denis Diderot (1713–84), who believed in the value of knowledge and social reform. Another liberal was German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who advocated science and reason, favored global citizenship, and claimed that democracies were more peaceful than autocracies. British liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries included the political philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), who argued that people had inalienable rights; the physician John Bright (1811–89) and the reformer Richard Cobden (1804–65), who both argued for free trade; John Stuart Mill (1806–73), who believed that education could end warfare; and Adam Smith (1723–90), author of *The Wealth of Nations*, father of capitalism, advocate of free trade, and opponent of slavery. Thus, some liberals like Mill stressed the individual level of analysis, while others such as Kant and Smith emphasized the unit level of analysis.

Classical liberals believed that history was progressing – improving the lives of individuals – and that such improvement was in everyone’s interest and ought to be everyone’s objective. Like Adam Smith, they believed that the process would move faster if governments stayed out of politics and economics. The free market was like an “invisible hand” that would transform the economic self-interest of greedy individuals into a general good and reflect a natural harmony of interests among people. Liberals argued, too, that global politics should be transformed into the equivalent of their domestic societies – this was their domestic analogy – free of violence and characterized by orderliness, security, and prosperity.

Most American liberals supported a particular form of liberalism – **noninterventionist liberalism** – by which the virtues of liberalism, especially its contribution to human freedom, would spread to the four corners of the world *by example alone*. Americans, these liberals asserted, were not obliged to right the wrongs of the world. Rather, they should be a shining new example and build a new world that others would copy. America, in their view, would be, like Biblical Jerusalem, “a city on the hill.” This idea was applied to America by John Winthrop (1588–1649), an early settler and a leader of the Massachusetts Bay Company and the colony it established. In a sermon that Winthrop gave in 1630, entitled “A Model of Christian Charity,” he declared: “For we must consider that we shall be as a city on the hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.” This theme has been found in American thinking since, especially in the nineteenth century and in the 1920s and 1930s, both eras of isolationism. According to noninterventionist liberals, the US example would make the entire world more like America.

However, a variant of liberalism, **interventionist liberalism**, evolved as an alternative. Example alone was not sufficient to diffuse liberal ideas; instead, it was necessary for liberal states to intervene in other countries, sometimes by force, to spread liberal ideas. Those who held this view were often inspired by deep religious and ethical convictions. They contended that history sometimes needs a push and that it is the obligation of actors to right wrongs wherever they occur. The zealous effort of French revolutionaries and the armies of Napoléon after 1789 to extend “liberty, equality, and fraternity” across Europe was an early example of such liberalism, as were the efforts of British Prime Minister William E. Gladstone (1809–98) to export human rights to regions like Turkey’s Ottoman Empire. Many interventionist liberals including Gladstone and later Americans of this stripe had a deep commitment to bringing an end to atrocities by other governments both against their populations as well as other countries.

America’s leading interventionist liberal was President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924). Like other interventionist liberals, he, too, was deeply religious. In 1917, Wilson justified US entry into World War One in order “to make the world safe for democracy.” It was to be a “war to end all wars.” Influenced by Kant, Wilson believed that peace would result from abandoning power politics and balance-of-power practices and constructing an international organization dominated by democratic and therefore peace-loving states. He articulated these principles, known as the Fourteen Points, in a joint session to Congress on January 8, 1918. The most important of these points was the principle of **national self-determination**, which stipulated that every people who believed they were a distinct nation should enjoy autonomy or have its own territorial state. In some respects, as we saw earlier, President George W. Bush was, like Wilson, a deeply religious interventionist liberal (see Figure 1.3).²⁵

The liberal view of global politics remains quite different from the realist perspective. The Liberals believe that in some areas of political intercourse, like trade, all participants can gain or all can lose (this is called a **variable-sum game**). For example, all consumers in a free trade relationship gain: more higher-quality products to choose from at lower prices. This is a variable-sum game in which all win. In these situations, liberals argue that actors are more concerned about their **absolute gains** (everybody gaining something) than about relative gains, or what they get compared to others. A variable-sum game encourages cooperation to maximize gains and minimize losses. By contrast, a zero-sum game is one of pure conflict because only one actor can win, while others necessarily lose. Unlike realists, liberals focus on individuals or humanity as a whole rather than states as the most important units in global politics. In addition, power and prudence are less important in the liberal vision than **justice**.

As with realism, liberalism has evolved, and there emerged a variant called **neoliberalism**



Figure 1.3 George W. Bush and the path to peace

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

or neoliberal institutionalism. Like neorealists, neoliberals theorize at the system level and assume that actors are both unitary and rational in the sense of judging alternatives on the basis of their costs and benefits. They emphasize that individuals everywhere depend on one another for survival and wellbeing and are linked by shared fates; they are interdependent; that is, their actions affect one another and they need one another to achieve their objectives and assure their wellbeing and security. Interdependence, in turn, produces cooperation.

According to neoliberals, states are not the only relevant political actors, and many actors are transnational rather than national or international, meaning that they are organized across several societies. States, they believe, share authority, especially in non-security issues, with **nonstate actors** ranging from transnational interest groups like the World Chamber of Commerce to international organizations like the World Trade Organization. Global actors, in their view, are increasingly interdependent. Interdependence, liberals believe, encourages actors to coordinate activities and cooperate to achieve common goals.

Neoliberals claim that international organizations help states coordinate their activities by allowing for repeated interactions, during which trust can grow. Such organizations publicize and formalize collective rules and norms of behavior, and reduce **transaction costs** like that of obtaining information. In these ways, international institutions promote order and achieve goals that states cannot achieve on their own. In particular, such institutions facilitate communication among states and provide crucial information that is needed to deal with complex technical issues.

Anarchy holds a less prominent place in liberal than in realist theories, but an exception is to be found in neoliberalism. Although neoliberals share several assumptions with realists, notably that states are the principal actors in global politics, that they exist in a condition of anarchy, and that anarchy helps explain state behavior, they see anarchy's implications differently than do realists. Unlike neorealists, neoliberals do *not* accept that conflict logically or necessarily follows from anarchy. Although they join neorealists in viewing states as rational egoists, neoliberals part with neorealists in claiming that actors try to maximize their own interests independent of the

gains or losses of others.²⁶ States seek absolute gains to their wellbeing rather than at the expense of others and are willing to cooperate to achieve common interests. However, without a higher agency to enforce agreements “cheating is both possible and profitable.”²⁷ Thus, for neoliberals, the real obstacle to cooperating under anarchy is not relative gains-seeking behavior, but the tendency of actors to cheat so as to maximize gains. By encouraging trust, international institutions can prevent this.

Liberals of all stripes believe that anarchy is modified by interdependence among actors. Actors have multiple channels of communication among governments and societies, and interact on many issues. As the world grows more complex, actors depend on one another more and more for security and prosperity, and the actions of each have a ripple effect that ultimately has an impact on others. Situations of mutual dependence constitute **complex interdependence**, a concept that political scientists Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye argue “is clearly liberal rather than realist” and stands “in opposition to a realist ideal-typical view of world politics.”²⁸ Actors are *sensitive* and may be *vulnerable* as well to one another’s behavior. Sensitivity is the speed with which changes in one part of the world affect other parts and the magnitude of those effects. Thus, when the European Central Bank raises interest rates in the European Union, the effect is global, and almost instantaneously foreign funds flow into Europe in search of higher rates of return. Vulnerability refers to the alternatives actors have in seeking to limit the effects of change. Thus, the West is highly vulnerable to oil shortages caused by events such as civil strife in Libya or Nigeria because at present there are few substitutes for oil.

The liberal belief that cooperation is possible despite anarchy is echoed in what is called “the English School” of theory. English School theorists rely on exhaustive historical analysis. Members of this school such as Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Martin Wight, Robert Jackson, Tim

Dunne, and Andrew Hurrell have long argued that, despite the absence of world government, the supremacy of sovereign states, and the distribution of authority and power among states, there can exist and historically have existed genuine international societies. International society, Bull argues, exists “when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”²⁹ Does such a society exist? Bull answers in the affirmative, arguing that “order is part of the historical record of international relations” and “there has always been present, throughout the history of the modern state system, an idea of international society.”³⁰ Practices that reflect the existence of international society include international law, balance of power, diplomacy, legal sovereignty, and rules governing war. Like liberals, English School theorists conclude that anarchy does not necessitate disorder but only refers to a situation where there is no authority above sovereign states.

Neoliberals acknowledge that the realist perspective is useful when military security is at stake, but they claim that this perspective is less useful to understanding issues in which friendly actors are interacting or in which mutual gain is possible, as in trade. Unlike neorealists, neoliberals see a way to achieve cooperation under anarchy: **international regimes**. In the neoliberal vision, international organizations, along with governments and nongovernmental groups, may join to form international regimes that, though informal, enjoy considerable authority. Such regimes provide guidelines, norms, and rules that are acceptable to states and allow the orderly management of specific issue-areas. To such regimes we owe the efficient management of international trade, weather forecasting, air traffic control, and the eradication of diseases even in the absence of **supranational** authorities. Each regime consists of principles, rules, norms, and decision-making

procedures that regulate activity. *Principles* are defined as “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude”; *norms* are standards of behavior defining the rights and obligations of actors; *rules* allow and disallow specific actions; and *decision-making procedures* refer to the practices for making and implementing collective choices.³¹

An international regime, thus viewed, is more than an international organization like NATO. Political scientist Oran Young succinctly expresses the contrast between regimes and organizations: “organizations . . . are material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets . . . Organizations generally possess legal personality in the sense that they are authorized to enter into contracts, own property . . . and so forth.”³² International organizations may contribute to international regimes, but regimes also involve bureaucracies and non-governmental groups as well.

For neoliberals, such institutions offer many benefits. They make it possible to monitor and verify agreements and make it possible to punish a state that reneges on a promise, thereby discouraging cheating. They reduce the costs involved in negotiating and implementing agree-

ments by providing access to more and better quality information, including knowledge of states’ intentions, the strength of their preferences, their willingness to abide by agreements, and the extent of their capabilities. They also reduce uncertainty in global politics by linking cooperation across a range of related issues.³³

In sum, realists are pessimists who believe that war and conflict are natural, inevitable, and irremediable. Liberals, by contrast, are optimists who believe that war and poverty can be eliminated. Realists think people are irredeemably aggressive and selfish, while liberals see them as cooperative and perfectible. Realists oppose any role for public opinion, which they regard as fickle and unwise, in making foreign policy, and see the purpose of foreign policy as improving *state* security, while liberals want to democratize global politics and believe that foreign policy should benefit *individuals*. Realists also deplore anything that erodes state sovereignty, while liberals applaud international institutions and law that limit state sovereignty.

Before leaving this debate, we should point out that realism and liberalism are perspectives for practitioners and theorists. They are not complete

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

The concept of “liberalism” has been used in a variety of ways. We are using the concept as it was developed by Europe’s classical liberals. In contemporary politics, classical liberals would appear to be “conservative” owing to their emphasis on individualism and individual liberty. The following illustrates some of these similarities and differences.

<i>Classical liberalism</i>	<i>Contemporary conservatism</i>	<i>Contemporary liberalism</i>
Maximize individual freedom	Maximize individual freedom	Maximize social welfare to enhance individual freedom for the deprived
Minimize role of government	Decrease role of government	Increase role of government
Free trade	Free trade	Managed trade

theories but, instead, are guidelines, sometimes called **paradigms**,³⁴ which highlight certain factors. Realism, for example, focuses attention and policy toward states, power, war, and military capabilities, whereas liberalism turns attention and policy toward individuals and cooperation. Finally, both schools freely mix empirical with normative claims. Thus, they assert that the world *does* operate in a particular way (empirical), but when it does not do so it *ought to* (normative). Note the contradiction; the second claim denies at least part of the first by acknowledging that sometimes the world *does not* operate as expected.

TRADITIONALISM VERSUS SCIENCE A second debate, which erupted in the 1960s, concerns methodology, that is, *how to conduct research about global politics*.³⁵ Traditional scholars studied history, philosophy, law, and institutions in order to understand the world. Their analyses often took the *form of case studies*, in which they examined specific wars and policies to understand why *these* wars broke out or policies were chosen. Often they immersed themselves in *foreign cultures, learning local languages and history to deepen their understanding of specific countries and regions*. Finally, traditionalists routinely mixed their discussions of empirical evidence with their views of what is *right and wrong*, making *normative claims*.

Following World War Two, however, the study of global politics came to involve scholars who were part of the **behavioral revolution**. Political scientists like J. David Singer and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita emulated the *research methods of mathematicians and natural scientists*, such as physicists and chemists. The behavioralists, also called behavioral scientists, argued that instead of studying law, history, and institutions, political scientists should study how people *actually* behave. To do so, however, they believed that *empirical and normative theory (facts and values) could and should be strictly separated* and that *combining them led to confusion* because *neither could prove the other*. Mixing empirical

and normative claims ran the risk, in their view, of turning scholarship into moral fervor. **Traditionalists** strongly disagreed with this, contending that, unlike natural scientists, all observers of global politics, whether they use traditional or behavioral methods pursue a *normative agenda* and that *“facts” and “values” are inseparable*. Although natural scientists do not study the orbits of planets with the objective of changing them, political scientists, whether traditional or behavioral, actually *want to understand the world in order to change it*. *They study war, for instance, not only to explain and predict it, but to eliminate it from global politics because of its harmful consequences*.

Although behavioralists, too, conduct case studies, they insist on identifying the *patterned behaviors* or *regularities* in the cases they study and, in turn, *generalizing* from them. Like natural scientists, behavioralists argue that *research requires a gradual accumulation of facts* and, with such accumulation, emerges growing recognition of their broader meaning. You will recognize these ideas from our earlier discussion of predictive theories. Only by identifying *patterns and regularities*, behavioralists assert, is it possible to formulate *general theories that can predict and explain other cases*.

Using the methods of the natural sciences, such theorists begin by positing *hypotheses*, which are tentative predictions or explanations that often take the conditional form “if x, then y.” The theorist then seeks to test the hypothesized predictions or explanations. Thus, a theorist may believe that arms races produce wars and hypothesize “if arms races take place, wars will follow.” Thereafter, she would collect as many cases of war as possible and examine them to discern whether there is a pattern in which arms races precede wars.

In order to manage large amounts of data, political scientists use *quantification*, notably statistics, a branch of mathematics that involves the collection, analysis, interpretation, and presentation of large amounts of quantitative

data. Such analysis allows them to determine whether the co-appearance or correlation of the variables they are examining (arms races and wars) constitute a genuine pattern or merely occur randomly, that is, by chance. Numbers, they argue, are more precise than words, which have multiple meanings. By contrast, algebraic equations have one meaning and only one meaning. Powerful computers made it possible to collect, store, and analyze vast amounts of information and innumerable cases, thus expanding the potential of such research.

Many issues in the traditionalist–behavioralist controversy remain still with us:

- *Complexity vs. uniformity.* Traditionalists argue that human behavior is too complex to be studied in the way that nature is, and that scientific methods, therefore, cannot be applied to politics. Humans often behave unpredictably, so their behavior exhibits less regularity than that of other creatures. By contrast, scientists claim that humans, like all creatures, are part of nature and, in principle, can be studied like other natural phenomena. Complexity, they contend, is in the mind of observers and what appears to be complex at first blush becomes less so as more is learned.
- *Trees vs. forests.* Traditionalists think it is vital to understand the individual elements, or “trees,” of global politics in depth. One cannot really understand China, for instance, unless one knows its culture, history, and language and thus is a China specialist. If one only speaks the language of statistics and studies the “forest,” one is doomed to see China through the prism of one’s own culture and never see the world as do the Chinese. Thus, scholars must be trained to specialize in one or a few countries rather than as generalists who seek broad patterns in global politics. Unfortunately, answer the scientists, the traditional approach leads to overemphasis on the specific and unique at the expense of the general. Traditionalists
- focus on individual trees in the forest and, as a result, overemphasize how each tree differs from others. By contrast, scientists, who study many instances or cases historically and/or geographically, can observe what is common among them and identify regularities.
- *Whole vs. parts.* According to traditionalists, scientists make a serious mistake by isolating what they believe are key factors. In other words, scientists tend to look at, say, alliances, ideologies, or military strategies in isolation in many cases but without understanding the context in which they operate. Only by viewing a factor in context, as it interacts with other factors, can scholars theorize intelligently. Thus, any outcome or event can only be understood as the result of interaction among numerous factors. Nonsense, respond scientists, who declare that for accuracy they must emulate the laboratory practices of natural scientists. Only by isolating individual factors can scholars understand their impact without worrying that other factors are actually producing the outcome.
- *Subjective vs. objective.* Traditionalists claim that by focusing only on those factors that can be easily quantified and measured, scientists often ignore the subjective, or non-observable, side of global politics, especially the role of ideas, emotions, culture, identity, and beliefs. This dispute leads to a more general criticism of scientists by traditionalists to the effect that, by studying what can be observed and quantified, scientists ignore the most important aspects of global politics. Scientists deny both claims, arguing that although the tools for studying subjective factors are less reliable than those for studying objective factors, those tools are improving, and scientists use them frequently to incorporate both subjective and objective factors in their analyses.

By the 1970s, it appeared that the scientists had won the day. Behavioral scholars dominated

research on global politics at many universities and were awarded a disproportionate share of government research funds. Traditional scholarship did not disappear, however, and skepticism about behavioralism remains strong in government circles and at many universities, especially in Europe.

THE “THIRD DEBATE”: POSTPOSITIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM A new debate was started in the late 1980s and early 1990s by theorists who were dissatisfied with existing theories and especially with the rigid empiricism demanded by “scientists” and their de-emphasis of norms and values. They asserted that the study of global politics had lost its soul and that empirical theory had failed to fulfill its promise. They also believed that theorists of global politics had lost interest in solving the *real* problems of people and urged a return to normative thinking.

These critics call themselves **postpositivists** and **reflexivists** because they rejected empiricism – which they called “positivism” – and used reflection and reason instead. So began what political scientist Yosef Lapid called the “Third Debate,”³⁶ which was characterized primarily by a dispute over whether objective reality can be observed and serve as the basis of theories of global politics. A distinction emerged between those called **foundationalists**, who believe that truth is accessible through empirical tests, and **anti-foundationalists**, who argue that there are no neutral, value-free tests for truth. Describing themselves as “exiles” and “dissidents” from the mainstream of global politics, anti-foundationalists contend that “truth” is inaccessible because all knowledge claims are really efforts on the part of those claiming to know the truth to acquire and maintain power over others. Language and the ideas it expresses are forms of power that reinforce social and political hierarchies. Positivists, they declare, ignore the normative implications of such hierarchies in which some individuals and groups are marginalized. “Ambiguity, uncertainty, and the ceaseless questioning of identity,” declared

Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “these are resources of the exiles . . . of those who would live and move in these paradoxical marginal spaces and times and who, in order to do so, must struggle to resist knowledgeable practices of power that would impose upon them a certain identity, a set of limitations on what can be done, an order of ‘truth.’”³⁷

Postpositivists reject the claim of empiricists that the political world is real and external to observers and that such reality can be perceived by any observer. Extreme postpositivists, notably those who call themselves “postmodernists,” argue that we can never *know anything* with certainty because language is not objective and reflects only the speaker’s version of reality. Because language is socially determined, or constructed, words and concepts have no value outside the social context in which they are defined and employed. There can be no objective reality, as every theorist’s view of the world is colored by the language she uses. Thus, post-positivists abandoned the empiricists’ demand for facts-through-observation in the belief that only insight and imagination can produce genuine theory and that the concepts needed to build theory can only be defined by the theorists and practitioners employing them. Given the subjectivity of language, at best positivists can look at what they believe to be tangible measures of abstract concepts they cannot see. And, by limiting understanding to the observation of facts, positivists leave no room for values in their thinking.³⁸ For example, theorists cannot “see” religious values, but such values nonetheless influence the decisions actors make. Positivists can only attempt to measure this concept by observing indicators like attendance at religious services and public statements of such values. Yet this approach is inadequate, because those who possess religious values may not attend services or publicly proclaim their beliefs. Because such difficulties exist in observing abstract concepts, positivists tend to give them insufficient attention in theorizing.

The problem with postpositivism, positivists counter, is that, if truth is not knowable empirically or if everyone's interpretation is equally "truthful," then nobody's opinion is better than anybody else's. Under these conditions, it becomes impossible to know what policies to follow, and theory has no prescriptive value. Moreover, postpositivists do not have an alternative framework for explaining global politics. And, even if truth remains elusive, an enhanced ability to predict and explain is valuable.

This "Third Debate" became heated because empiricists came to dislike postpositivism as much as postpositivists hated empiricism. Political scientists Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner even argued that postpositivists simply were not social scientists, declaring that "postmodernism falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise, and in international relations research it risks becoming self-referential and disengaged from the world, protests to the contrary notwithstanding."³⁹ Extreme reflexivists, claim empiricists, are not engaged in making sense of the real world. Instead, they play language games, with double entendres and wordplay in which all interpretations of global politics are equally valid. Since extreme reflexivists regard all perceptions and preferences as equally valid, they are also denounced as **relativists**. This suggests that they believe that there are no truths and that what is right or wrong varies from person to person and from society to society. One cannot, for example, claim that democracy is preferable to dictatorship, capitalism is superior to communism, or even peace is better than war because there are no neutral bases for making such claims.

During the "Third Debate," a major theoretical perspective called **constructivism** emerged out of dissatisfaction with realism and liberalism, especially their assumption that states are rational egoists and the dominant influence of scientific methodology. Constructivism was an effort to narrow the gap between empiricists and postpositivists. Constructivists claim that people act in the world according to their perceptions of that

world, and that the "real," or objective, world shapes those perceptions. These perceptions arise from people's identities that, constructivists argue, are shaped by experience and changing social norms. For example, those who think of themselves as "the poor" or "the powerless" perceive the world differently than those who identify themselves as "the rich" or "the powerful." Once people know "who they are," they understand their interests and forge policies to pursue those interests.

Unlike realists and liberals who assume that identities and interests are "givens" that remain largely unchanged, constructivists view identity formation as a crucial and dynamic process. For constructivists, interests are not inherent or predetermined, but are "learned" through experience. Where realists and liberals assume that actors are like selfish individuals, rationally comparing costs and benefits and using a "logic of consequences," constructivists view actors as social in the sense that their ideas and norms evolve in a group or social context. They make decisions based on a "logic of appropriateness" or what is normatively right. Identities change over time in the course of interaction and evolving beliefs and norms and, as a result, so do interests. Constructivists ask such questions as how do norms evolve (for example, repugnance toward slavery or ethnic cleansing), how do actors acquire their identity, and how do those identities produce actors' understanding of their interests. For example, how did the US come to see itself as the "leader of the Free World" after 1945, and what policies serve the interests of the "leader of the Free World"? Since the USSR viewed itself as "leader of the international communist movement," it necessarily defined its interests, and therefore its policies, differently than the United States. Constructivists argue that collective ideas and norms play a key role in producing identities and interests. For example, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) believe in democracy, and that belief plays a major role in how they define the alliance and its objectives. Similarly, the evolution of norms

Table 1.1 Reality in the “third debate”

<i>Positivists (empiricists)</i>	There is an <i>objective reality</i> that can be measured Even factors that cannot be observed directly, like emotions and beliefs, can be measured indirectly through behaviors, statements, and so forth
<i>Constructivists</i>	<i>Identity</i> shapes perceptions of “reality” One’s view of reality depends on one’s identity, e.g., as poor/wealthy, American/Russian, Christian/Muslim, or male/female
<i>Postpositivists</i>	<i>Language</i> shapes perceptions of “reality” There is no universal truth to be uncovered in global politics

opposed to apartheid (racial separation) in South Africa played a key role in mobilizing countries around the world to oppose that system which ended in 1994. More recently, a normative consensus has grown concerning the desirability of UN humanitarian intervention in countries that have been overwhelmed by civil violence despite the older belief that sovereignty should preclude such intervention without the permission of the government in question. Table 1.1 summarizes the difference between positivism, postpositivism, and constructivism.

THE AGENT–STRUCTURE PROBLEM Since constructivists believe that how people identify themselves shapes how they act, their position concerning what theorists today call the **agent–structure problem**⁴⁰ is more compatible with the liberal belief that actors (leaders and states, for example) or “agents” shape global politics than with the neorealist belief that structural factors such as anarchy or the global distribution of military capabilities force individuals to act as they do. For constructivists, “agents” have a capacity to act freely within the constraints of structure, and their perceptions of their environment, including structures, and their

interaction with one another influence their behavior, which in turn shapes and reshapes (or “constitutes”) structure (see Key document, below). Their beliefs and actions actually alter structure that in turn constrains or empowers them in new ways, a cycle that can be traced historically.

According to constructivists, if leaders view the global system as composed of states (“agents”), they will conclude that states can successfully address the pressing problems of global politics. And, in turning to states, they will reinforce the dominant role of states, which is a structural feature. In contrast, if actors view other entities – international organizations, for instance – as important in global politics and they turn to these entities to manage global problems, their actions actually make such entities more important. Many, but not all, constructivists remain empiricists but, unlike many empiricists, they focus on subjective factors like norms, ideas, and values.

Constructivists, some of whom believe that their approach is midway between the structural determinism of neorealists and the belief of liberals that the world is infinitely malleable, argue that there are occasions when events profoundly affect the beliefs and norms of individuals and groups. On such occasions – major wars for example – leaders begin to see the world differently and, as they interact, produce a consensus around new norms and new ways of behaving. For example, after the widespread devastation of Europe’s religious wars, leaders gradually revised the view of war, and a consensus evolved around the need to limit warfare and downplay religion and ideology as factors that intensified violence.

To some extent, the agent–structure debate overlaps levels of analysis. Those who emphasize the dominance of structure focus on the global system level where structural factors like the global distribution of power and anarchy are located. By contrast, theorists who burrow into the unit and individual levels of analysis believe that the actions and beliefs of leaders and governments have an impact on key outcomes.

KEY DOCUMENT

THE CONSTITUTIVE EFFECTS OF IDEAS

In a seminal book, constructivist Alexander Wendt examines the differences between causal and constitutive theorizing. One important concept for understanding the latter is *constitutive effects*. Wendt explains: “To understand the difference that ideas and social structures make in international politics we need to recognize the existence of *constitutive effects*. Ideas or social structures have constitutive effects when they create phenomena – properties, powers, dispositions, meanings, etc. – that are conceptually or logically dependent on those ideas or structures, that exist only ‘in virtue of’ them. The causal powers of the master do not exist apart from his relation to the slave; terrorism does not exist apart from a national security discourse that defines ‘terrorism.’ These effects . . . are not causal because they violate the requirements of independent existence and temporal asymmetry. Ordinary language bears this out: we do not say that slaves ‘cause’ masters, or that a security discourse ‘causes’ terrorism. On the other hand, it is clear that the master–slave relation and security discourse are relevant to the construction of masters or terrorism, since without them there would not be masters or terrorism. Constitutive theories seek to ‘account for’ these effects, even if not to ‘explain’ them.”⁴¹

Constructivists might explain America’s War on Terrorism as a collision between incompatible identities and the resulting clash of conflicting interests. America’s *constructed identity* is that of a democratic society and global superpower with the responsibility to protect friendly governments from the ambitions of militant Muslims such as Al Qaeda’s deceased leader, Osama bin Laden.

“Anarchy is what states make of it”

Unlike neorealists and neoliberals, constructivists challenge the idea that anarchy is a determining structural feature of global politics and argue that a self-help global system does not logically follow from anarchy. Rather, a self-help system is an institution, defined as a “relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities and interests,” constructed out of interactions among actors in anarchy. Constructivist Alexander Wendt argues that “it is through reciprocal interaction . . . that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring

social structures” that define our identities and interests.⁴² In other words, security systems based on self-help only evolve out of cycles of interaction in which actors behave in ways that are threatening to one another. Such interactions create an expectation that the “other” cannot be trusted. According to Wendt, in the absence of pre-existing social institutions, there is no reason to assume other actors will be threatening (see Key document, opposite).

Hostility need not be a product of anarchy. So how do we account for the emergence of the cycle of interactions that result in a self-help system? Some states, Wendt argues, may become predisposed to aggression either because of human nature, domestic politics, or as a result of some past wrong. By this theory, just one aggressive state forces all others to practice self-help power politics.

Having examined several principal schools of theory in global politics, we now turn to a fourth perspective, Marxism. Marxism influenced generations of scholars and politicians, especially in Europe.

KEY DOCUMENT

“ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OF IT”

In a seminal article, constructivist Alexander Wendt argued that realists were incorrect in claiming that anarchy – a key structural feature – makes hostility and conflict inevitable. Instead, using a imagined alien visit to Earth as an illustration, Wendt argued that interaction creates identities that define interests and that structure does not determine behavior

“Would we assume, a priori, that we were about to be attacked if we are ever contacted by members of an alien civilization? I think not. We would be highly alert, of course, but whether we placed our military forces on alert or launched an attack would depend on how we interpreted the import of their first gesture for our security – if only to avoid making an immediate enemy out of what may be a dangerous adversary. The possibility of error, in other words, does not force us to act on the assumption that the aliens are threatening: action depends on the probabilities we assign, and these are in key part a function of what the aliens do *prior to their gesture*, we have no systematic basis for assigning probabilities. If their first gesture is to appear with a thousand spaceships and destroy New York, we will define the situation as threatening and respond accordingly. But if they appear with one spaceship, saying what seems to be ‘we come in peace,’ we will feel ‘reassured’ and will probably respond with a gesture intended to reassure them, even if this gesture is not necessarily interpreted by them as such.”⁴³

Marxism and critical theory

For a time, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, Marxist analysis of global politics was widely applied to global politics. Karl Marx (1818–83) himself, the most influential social scientist of his era, had little to say about global politics as we know it, but his disciples sought to apply his ideas, as well as those of Russian Bolshevik leaders Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin (1870–1924) and Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), to interpreting world affairs. (Since Marxist theory focuses on economic forces, we will reserve some of this discussion for Chapter 14, which deals with international political economy, but an introduction is in order here.) Inasmuch as Marx focused on the relationships of owners and workers in states, he tended to stress the unit level of analysis, although contemporary Marxists, as we will see later, stress factors at the global system level, notably relations between rich countries that they call the “core” and poor countries that they call the “periphery.”

Marx believed it was necessary to combine an understanding of economics, political science, history, and philosophy in order to understand world affairs. Economic forces were, however, the locomotive that pulled the rest. In his view, the essential economic needs of people for goods such as food and shelter shaped all the features of society – politics, art, literature, religion, and law. His core idea, *dialectical materialism*, was that politics in general and historical change depended on the relationship between the means of production (how goods are produced) and their relationship to those who were responsible for producing goods such as peasants and workers. Marx traced the history of how various modes of production had changed, thereby changing the relationship between owners and producers, until the onset of industrial capitalism. Like earlier economic systems such as feudalism, Marx predicted that **capitalism** and capitalist society, too, would be transformed into a “higher” stage, that of **communism**, by a revolution of the workers or



"I'm using my website to spread Marxist propaganda. I'm a dot commie."

Figure 1.4 High-tech Marxism

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

proletariat to overthrow the rule of the owners or bourgeoisie (see Figure 1.4).

Workers and owners constituted economic classes, and Marx argued that history evolved through class conflict. All history, he believed, revolved around class struggle that pitted those who were being exploited against those who were exploiting. The working class or proletariat, he believed, was becoming ever more desperate and was being “pauperized” owing to capitalist efforts to cut costs by firing workers and keeping their wages low. Unemployment, boom-and-bust economic cycles, overproduction, and underconsumption were producing a crisis for capitalism, especially in the highly industrialized countries of Europe and North America where he expected revolution to erupt first. By the mid-nineteenth century when he was writing, Marx concluded that the time was approaching when the oppressed proletariat would rise up and overthrow its capitalist oppressors, thereby finally ending exploitation and class conflict.

Just as sovereign states and individuals are regarded by realists and liberals respectively as key actors in global politics, for Marx and his followers, economic classes were principal actors. “The history of all hitherto existing society,”

wrote Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–95) at the beginning of the *Communist Manifesto*, “is the history of class struggles.”⁴⁴ Even political leaders were minor players whose actions were determined by economic forces and class conflict. Far from being the main actor in global politics, Marx and Engels regarded the state as a tool of the dominant capitalist class to maintain its power, and it made no difference whether or not it was democratic. In Engels’s memorable phrase, “the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy.”⁴⁵ The state, he argued, becomes “the state of the most powerful, economically ruling class, which by its means becomes also the politically ruling class, and so acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class.”⁴⁶ However, following the communist revolution and the onset of a classless society, the state, Marx and Engels argued, would no longer have a function and would wither away.

Lenin revised Marx’s original thinking, and contemporary Marxists continue to adapt Marxism to changing conditions. Despite such revisions, Marxists still look to economic factors to explain and predict global politics. Thus, in explaining US intervention in Iraq, Marxists might argue that its purpose was to increase the profits of military industries or provide American capitalists with the means to exploit Iraq’s oil resources.

It is from the Marxist tradition associated with a group of German scholars known as the Frankfurt School of the 1920s that **critical theory** emerged in recent decades. Emphasizing normative and practical thinking, critical theorists seek to overcome what they view as obstacles to justice and human freedom and autonomy, including capitalism, science and other forms of knowledge. “Theory,” in the words of critical theorist Robert Cox, “is always *for* someone, and *for* some purpose.”⁴⁷ Liberalism, they believe, rather than achieving this goal, actually frustrated its realization and prevented realizing the aims of Europe’s Enlightenment. Liberal democracy and majority

rule, features of most Western states, are not, in their view, true democracy. Instead, influenced by Jürgen Habermas, critical theorists believe in the transforming power of publicity, social movements, and open communication to foster debate, “discourse,” and deliberation rather than majority rule.

Some critical theorists deplore the state as a form of political community because it excludes non-citizens and deprives them of rights. “Virtually all social moralities,” writes critical theorist Andrew Linklater, “have revolved around insider–outsider distinctions that devalued the suffering of distant strangers and even attached positive value to it.”⁴⁸ In the view of critical theorists, individuals should be assisted to identify with humanity as a whole,

not with particular and bounded communities. Pointing to the ways in which concepts like sovereignty and statehood have evolved since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, critical theorists echo constructivists’ belief in the importance of “agency” in changing identities and, therefore, interests. Thus, Linklater believes that: “Political communities which institutionalise new configurations of universality and difference have been one of the directions in which the Westphalian states-system could conceivably evolve.”⁴⁹

Table 1.2 summarizes the key differences among realists, liberals, constructivists, and Marxists and illustrates how the four theoretical approaches speak to one another.

Table 1.2 Realists, liberals, constructivists, and Marxists compared

	<i>Realists</i>	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Constructivists</i>	<i>Marxists</i>
<i>Level of analysis</i>	Traditional realists favor the individual level (human nature); neorealists focus on the global system	Some liberals focus on the individual and some on the state level of analysis Thus, John Stuart Mill stressed the individual level in advocating educating citizens, and Immanuel Kant emphasized the state level in advocating republic governments Neoliberals stress the global system level	Individual level in transmission of ideas and identities and in the key role of “agents” in altering “structure”	Traditional Marxists focus on the state level in emphasizing dominant economic system Contemporary or neo-Marxists stress the relations of rich and poor countries and thus the global system level of analysis
<i>World view</i>	PESSIMISTIC: wars can be managed but not eliminated and the impediments to global cooperation are impossible to overcome owing to the problem of trust in a condition of anarchy Policies should enhance power Key actors are states	OPTIMISTIC: wars are human inventions that can be prevented by reforms such as education, free trade, economic betterment, welfare, and democracy Policies should enhance justice Key actors are individuals or humanity as a whole	INDETERMINATE: changing ideas produce new identities and interests. Whether or not conflict and violence are intensified or reduced depends on the ideas that take root and attract widespread support and whether or not resulting identities and interests are compatible or not	OPTIMISTIC: history is evolving as a reflection of changing economic forces that are creating the conditions for a world revolution by the proletariat Wars are the result of class conflict. They can be eliminated by the end of capitalism and the introduction of a classless society. Policies should enhance equality Key actors are economic classes

Table 1.2 continued

	<i>Realists</i>	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Constructivists</i>	<i>Marxists</i>
<i>Human nature</i>	AGGRESSIVE and selfish with no natural harmony of interests among people. Human nature cannot be improved, and imperfect human beings cannot be perfect	BENIGN; human beings are perfectible, and there exists a harmony of interests among people	MALLEABLE; human beings change behavior as a reflection of the changing norms that govern society	BENIGN; human beings are perfectible, but only under socialism, following the elimination of classes. As long as capitalism remains, greed and selfishness dominate behavior
<i>Change</i>	Key features of global politics are permanent and immutable; evils like poverty and war cannot be eliminated	Key features of global politics are mutable and history is moving in a positive direction Interventionist liberals think that history needs a push, while non-interventionist liberals think that their own societies can provide a model for others	Key features of global politics are mutable though change is impeded by material factors. However, the evolution of ideas and resulting change in identities and interests can modify material factors that constitute global structure	Key features of global politics are mutable and history is moving in a positive direction. Marx and Engels believed that history was evolving toward socialism; Lenin believed that history had to be pushed by a “vanguard of the proletariat” – the communist party
<i>Cooperation</i>	Individuals and collective actors are naturally competitive; this propensity is assured by the anarchic nature of global politics	Individuals and states can cooperate to overcome collective problems such as global pollution, poverty, and aggression	Indeterminate. It depends on which ideas become dominant and on how universal the consensus is regarding those ideas	Socialists and capitalist states cannot cooperate. Lenin and Stalin believed that war between socialist and capitalist countries was “inevitable”; after 1956, Soviet leaders argued that “peaceful coexistence” was possible
<i>Public opinion</i>	Elitist; diplomacy should be conducted in secrecy by professional diplomats and politicians who, only in those conditions, can discuss differences freely and make deals to minimize conflict Democracy is not a virtue in carrying out foreign affairs; public opinion is ill informed, fickle, and short-sighted	Favor public diplomacy (“open covenants openly arrived at” in Woodrow Wilson’s words) and applaud public opinion as an obstacle to war	Public opinion crucial in forming intersubjective consensus regarding norms and ideas, creating a collective identity, and formulating interests	Public opinion reflects class perceptions and interests; it will mirror the dominant economic class in society
<i>National interest</i>	Leaders serve the interests of their state	States exist to serve the interests of individuals	The national interest is based on national	States serve the interests of the

	<i>Realists</i>	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Constructivists</i>	<i>Marxists</i>
	<p>by maintaining and improving its security rather than serving the interests of individuals or some vague global interests. Focus is mainly on a few states, the great powers</p> <p>International institutions are suspect as they may pursue interests other than those of their state or attempt to wrest authority from states</p>	<p>States should be limited in their ability to interfere in the lives of people</p> <p>Free trade and human rights are key regardless of state interests</p>	<p>identity; it is “what states make of it”</p>	<p>dominant economic class in society and define the national interest accordingly</p> <p>Bourgeois states define the national interest in terms of economic imperialism and dominance over the “periphery” of poor states</p>
<i>International institutions and organizations</i>	<p>States must be independent, autonomous, and free to act without limits on sovereignty</p> <p>United Nations, international treaties, or other entanglements may limit such autonomy</p>	<p>Support international organizations and institutions like the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as encouraging peace and providing ways to overcome collective dilemmas</p>	<p>Indeterminate as it depends on dominant ideas and identities</p>	<p>Support transnational institutions created by socialist societies</p>
<i>Society</i>	<p>Tend to ignore the role of <i>society</i> as opposed to government and its bureaucracies and see the relationship as one in which government operates in foreign affairs with little interference from social groups</p>	<p>Focus on society and the relations among people rather than on state bureaucracies. Emphasis on the interdependence of actors and insistence that states cooperate to overcome global dilemmas such as environmental pollution</p>	<p>Intense focus on society as the source of ideas and identities created by interactions among individuals and/or social groups</p>	<p>Focus on society, notably relations among classes – especially workers and capitalists – rather than on government</p>
<i>Relative versus absolute gain</i>	<p>Actors do and should seek <i>relative</i> rather than <i>absolute</i> gain. <i>Some</i> states always profit more than others. Moreover, states that do not seek relative gains risk allowing others to gain resources that may provide them with a strategic advantage at some point in the future</p>	<p>There are areas in political life, like trade, in which all participants can profit or all can lose (<i>variable-sum games</i>) and there are few areas of political life in which the gain made by one actor is equivalent to the loss by another (<i>zero-sum game</i>). Actors are more concerned about their <i>absolute gains</i> than about <i>relative gains</i></p>	<p>Indeterminate</p>	<p>Focus on relative gains of socialists compared to capitalists</p>

Table 1.2 continued

	<i>Realists</i>	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Constructivists</i>	<i>Marxists</i>
<i>Security</i>	Military and economic security are the principal issues of global politics; support for large defense budgets and opposition to free trade that, they fear, will make countries less independent	Human security consists of far more than military security. It includes protection from ill treatment, starvation, homelessness, disease, poverty, and other conditions that may endanger or threaten the lives and wellbeing of citizens	Indeterminate	Human security consists of far more than military security. It involves economic equality and the fulfillment of basic material needs

Feminist international relations

Feminist thinkers were attracted to postpositivism because of its emphasis on the role of language and identity in creating power relations. Since gender relations are usually unequal, gender is “a primary way of signifying relationships of power.” Gendered language reinforces such relationships. Hence, for the most part, feminist theorists agree with political scientist J. Ann Tickner that people assign “a more positive value to [stereotypically] masculine characteristics” like power and rationality and a more negative value to stereotypically feminine characteristics like weakness and emotion. Those who exhibit masculine traits wield more power than those who exhibit female traits. Those women who tend to succeed as national leaders – for example, Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, Indira Gandhi in India, and Golda Meir in Israel – tend to exhibit the same traits as their male counterparts. Such gender relations affect every aspect of human experience, including global politics.⁵⁰ In Tickner’s view, “feminists cannot be anything but skeptical of universal truth claims and explanations associated with a body of knowledge from which women have frequently been excluded as knowers and subjects.”⁵¹

Feminist theorists contend that major theoretical approaches like realism and liberalism focus on “issues that grow out of men’s experiences”⁵²

and, presumably, would be altered if account were taken of women’s experiences. Women are largely absent from most accounts of global politics and international history. Thus, feminist theorist Cynthia Enloe was moved to ask rhetorically “where are the women?”⁵³ And Christine Sylvester posed the issue as follows:

IR theory does not spin any official stories about such people or evoke “womanly” characteristics . . . Feminists, however, find evocations of “women” in IR as the Chiquita Bananas of international political economy, the Pocohontas of diplomatic practice, the women companions for men on military bases, and the Beautiful Souls wailing the tears of unheralded social conscience at the walls of war. Moreover, “men” are in IR too, dressed as states, statesmen, soldiers, decision makers, terrorists, despots and other characters with more powerful social positions than “women.”⁵⁴

How does the world look from a feminist perspective? Feminist theory, it is argued, views the world from the perspective of the disadvantaged and takes greater account of economic inequality, ecological dangers, and human rights in defining security than conventional (male) international relations theory, which emphasizes military issues. Some feminists argue that they must

abandon strict positivism because of “the contamination of its knowledge by the social biases against women.”⁵⁵ Knowledge is not value-free, and feminist theory is skeptical about claims of “objective” truth and the meanings attached to such “truth.” As we shall see in Chapter 11, feminist theory is especially relevant in evaluating violence and human rights.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined why it is beneficial to examine global politics from different perspectives or levels of analysis (individual, unit, and global system) and how each perspective enables the observer to see different aspects of events. The different perspectives help us make sense of the world, that is, develop theories that predict and explain what is happening. Empirical theory, as we have seen, involves simplifying reality and identifying patterns of behavior by focusing on what matters most. Normative theory helps us determine what is ethical.

We reviewed several “great debates” over theory and method and examined several competing bodies of theory – realism/neorealism, liberalism/neoliberalism, the English School, constructivism, Marxism, postpositivism, critical theory, and feminist theory. Each has different assumptions, and each contributes something to our understanding of global politics. In later chapters, we will be applying levels of analysis and the several theories we have reviewed in examining global issues.

As we have seen, theorists find little to agree on about global politics. They disagree about relevant actors and issues, dominant patterns in global politics, the best way to conduct research, and even on whether empiricism is valid. No one perspective tells all; each has something to contribute. You need not agree with every perspective, or even any one of them. However, you should be able to use the language and tools of the discipline to explain different perspectives and to formulate and articulate your own view of the world.

The next chapter reviews how the territorial state and the state system evolved in Europe. We will also examine the evolution of two other, quite different political systems featuring political communities that were not territorial states and that collided with Europe’s states. These continue to have an impact on the way in which Asians and Muslims look at global politics.

Student activities

Map analysis

Take this opportunity to familiarize yourself with a world political map. Begin by dividing the map into geopolitical regions: North America; South America; Europe; Central Asia; South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific; and Africa. Which states are the largest? Which states do you think are the most influential? Select one of these states and research its role in the region. Were your expectations confirmed? Why or why not?

Cultural materials

Films provide many insights into change and continuity in seminal events in global politics. The critically acclaimed Chinese film *To Live* (1994) follows one family through China’s tumultuous history between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. *Vukovar* (1994, Serbia/Croatia/Italy) tells the story of two newlyweds, one Serb and the other Croat, who are torn apart when the Bosnian civil war (1992–95) engulfs the eponymous town. On a lighter note, the German film *Goodbye Lenin!* (2003) recounts the escapades of a young man who tries to hide the fall of communism from his mother – one of the few East Germans who still believes in the virtues of communism – after she awakens from a coma.

Science fiction offers an excellent means to assess alternative world futures. George Orwell’s

1984 and Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game* series provide two different examples. Written during the Cold War in 1949, *1984* portrays a totalitarian future in which the world is divided into three warring super-states. The government of one, Oceania, uses foreign war to prevent domestic revolt. Card's *Ender's Game* depicts a 100-year war in which insectoid aliens try to wipe out human life. Earth's government prepares for its defense by breeding child geniuses and training them as soldiers.

Films and television series also contain parallels to global politics. *Star Trek*, for example, created a future in which a twenty-first century nuclear war gives rise to a world government that eradicates poverty and disease and pursues space exploration. As founders of the United Federation of Planets, an entity akin to the UN, humans advocate peace and cooperation in interplanetary relations despite continuing conflict with other species such as Romulans, Cardassians, and Borg.

Read one of the books or view one of the TV series mentioned here and answer the following questions. How is the world portrayed *empirically* differently from our own? How is it *normatively*

different? What assumptions about global/interplanetary politics drive the characters? What messages do you think the author is trying to communicate about our world?

Further reading

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Part II

The past as prologue to the present



THE CHAPTERS

2. The evolution of the interstate system and alternative global political systems
3. The world wars
4. The Cold War
5. The global south
6. Globalization: the new frontier

350–1450

Emergence of the European state

571–632

The Prophet Muhammad's life

632

Shia–Sunni split begins

1095–1271

European Crusades

1301–1922

Ottoman Empire

1494

France's Charles VIII invades Italy

2

The evolution of the interstate system and alternative global political systems

Following the American Revolution, the Thirteen Colonies were loosely bound by the Articles of Confederation (1781) under which each “retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence,” established “a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare.”¹ Under these circumstances, the former colonies were prey to disunion and foreign dangers, and were hobbled by an inability to take united and decisive action. As a result, the Constitutional Convention convened on May 25, 1787, at the State House (now Independence Hall) in Philadelphia, where it proceeded to ignore the requirement for unanimity in amending the Articles of Confederation and drafted a constitution filled with compromises that established the sovereign state of the United States (see Figure 2.1). As befit the representative of a sovereign state, the new government, like older European governments, was given **authority** to establish tariffs, levy taxes, borrow and coin money, raise

an army and navy, and conduct foreign affairs with other sovereign states. “A firm Union,” wrote Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 9, “will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.”²

The United States was created relatively late in the evolution of the interstate system that has dominated global politics for over three centuries. That system, consisting of **territorial states** with fixed boundaries governed by central governments, was invented in Europe relatively recently and spread around the globe by Europeans as they conquered much of the rest of the world. Prior to the **territorial state**, global politics had been dominated by a variety of political forms such as **empires, tribes**, and cities. And, as we shall see later, the dominance of territorial states is eroding and, although the state remains the principal actor in global politics, it shares pride of place with actors such as transnational corporations, ethnic and religious groups, and nongovernmental organizations.

1618–48	1648	1775–83	1789–99	1911
Thirty Years' War	Treaty or Peace of Westphalia	American Revolution	French Revolution	Collapse of Imperial China

This chapter examines how states emerged in Europe and formed an interstate system that came to dominate world affairs. It describes the birth and evolution of the territorial state, and discusses how these political leviathans were transformed from the personal property of kings into communities owned by their citizens. It describes how **nationalism**, which, although having existed earlier, intensified during and after the French Revolution, and how state and nation became linked in communities that attracted the passions

and loyalties of citizens who were willing to die in their name.

After describing the emergence of the European state, we examine the evolution of two political systems that did *not* feature territorial states – imperial China and medieval Islam. Long before the state emerged in Europe, China developed an imperial polity that differed significantly from the Western state. This polity, anchored in culture and language, provided the Han Chinese with a unifying identity even during eras in which they



Figure 2.1 *The signing of the Constitution of the United States in 1787* by Howard Chandler Christy (1873–1952)

Source: Hall of Representatives, Washington D.C., USA / The Bridgeman Art Library

were divided into separate political communities governed by competing warlords. Indeed, China is home to the world's oldest continuous historical tradition and one of its richest civilizations. Chinese ideas about global politics took their own shape, influenced by Confucianism and differing from Western ideas as these evolved in Europe.

Still another political form combining tribal tradition and religious conviction was born in Arabia. Like a whirlwind, Islam, lacking any concept of a territorial community with limited boundaries, swept out of the desert and overran the Byzantine and Persian empires. Thereafter, an Islamic empire, known as the Caliphate, built a highly sophisticated civilization. In some ways, the Caliphate was governed by a supranational **theocracy**, analogous to the Catholic Church in Europe, especially during the Middle Ages.

For many Muslims, there is no place in Islam for notions of sovereign equality, nonintervention, or a society of states with exclusive jurisdictions. As Islam originally evolved, government was subordinated to religion, and there were no inherent limits to the Islamic "community." We shall examine how these two traditions – one based on the territorial state and the other on a community of believers or *umma* – collided and, in later chapters, how these colliding visions re-emerged in contemporary global politics with the militant followers of Osama bin Laden seeking to restore the ancient Caliphate. Today, Islamic militants challenge not just the West but the supremacy of territorial states in general, including their claim to an exclusive sovereign right to use force legitimately. It was Al Qaeda's rejection of and contempt for the basic norms on which international politics – or interstate relations – is based that explains the willingness of most states to align themselves against the threat of non-territorial terrorists. Thus, former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, recognizing that "the state system has been eroding," defined the challenge posed by Al Qaeda as that of "an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement

dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress."³

The concept of state sovereignty defines what a state is. According to Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention, a state "as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."⁴ Sovereignty involves two principal and related conditions: a state's authority over everything within its territorial borders (an internal hierarchy of authority) and the legal equality of states regardless of size or power (the absence of hierarchy). The first of these, the **internal face of sovereignty**, means that no legal superior exists above states. The rulers of a sovereign state enjoy a monopoly of the means of coercion over citizens and are vested with sole authority to make, uphold, and interpret laws. The second condition, the **external face of sovereignty**, is derived logically from the first. Since each sovereign is the absolute authority within its boundaries, all sovereigns are legally equal and may not intervene in one another's domestic or internal affairs. Sovereignty confers various rights on states such as access to international courts, the right to defend their independence, and a degree of respect from other states that are not available to non-sovereign groups. In essence, sovereignty, both internal and external, is a *legal* principle and should not be confused with **power** or **autonomy**.

The sovereign state is a relatively recent invention. Its capacity to mobilize resources and populations enabled Europeans to spread their institutions across the globe and allowed states to play a dominant role in global politics for three centuries. Each of the dominant theoretical approaches has its own views on the relative significance of the state and these other identities. Realists and neorealists, for instance, have been slow to grasp the changing role of nation-states in global politics. Little has changed, they argue, because there have always existed actors other

than states and the principle of state **sovereignty** has always been honored in the breach and, for this reason, is described by political scientist Stephen Krasner as “organized hypocrisy.”⁵

Liberals, many of whom see the state as an obstacle to peace, sometimes overstate the degree to which the state is in decline. They regard states as obstacles to human rights and free trade and see the growth of **transnational relations** that are thickening interdependence. Constructivists look for evolutionary change in the organization of global politics. They regard practices like sovereignty as human inventions that shape the practices of actors only until elites become committed to organizing global politics in different ways.

All three groups of theorists are partly correct. States, as realists recognize, never were the only actors in global politics, and major states surely remain key players today. Still, as liberals observe, people are interacting and organizing across state boundaries and are forming complex transnational linkages, and there has been a proliferation of international and nongovernmental groups (ranging from terrorists to global corporations and banks) that have an immense impact on states and on global outcomes. “Global cities” have emerged so that, as sociologist Saskia Sassen argues, concentrations of capital and skills in New York, Tokyo, and London among others make them global centers linked to one another through a financial “chain of production” but largely disconnected from their own hinterlands.⁶ Finally, constructivists recognize that more and more people are demanding creative solutions to problems that have defied states’ efforts and are contemplating new forms of collaboration that break out of the narrow confines of state sovereignty.

Let us now examine the emergence of the territorial state in Europe. Key steps in this process took place in Europe’s Middle Ages (c.350–1450), Italy’s city-states after about 1300, the large monarchical states of eighteenth-century Western Europe, and the nation-states of Europe after the French Revolution.

The emergence of the European interstate system

The globalization of the interstate system reflected the onset of Europe’s global primacy and remained largely unchanged until the decline of that primacy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Prior to the “European epoch,” other political forms such as empires, clans, and nomadic tribes dominated global politics and centers of regional power were located in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. As we shall see later, the decline of the European epoch has been accompanied by the emergence of old and new political forms and a shift in power away from Europe and North America.

The state, as ideally conceived, features a clearly defined territory and population and exclusive authority over that territory and population. However, for a state to come into existence, it must be “recognized” by other states as enjoying authority, and such recognition frequently reflects political considerations. Thus, the State of Israel, which was proclaimed at midnight on May 14, 1948, might not have survived had it not been recognized on that same day by the United States, in the person of President Harry Truman (1884–1972). Taking their cue from Truman, other states followed suit in recognizing the legal independence of the new Jewish state.

The territorial state was a novel form of political community when it emerged in Europe. Prior to the state’s appearance, Europe was dominated by the papacy, then a secular as well as religious power, city-states, and a large Germanic empire called the Holy Roman Empire. The pope resembled a medieval king, with a court. He ruled the papal state, had vassals who owed him allegiance and paid tribute, and made war. For its part, the Holy Roman Empire had originally been part of the empire of the Franks (a Germanic tribe) founded by Charlemagne (742–814). In 800, Charlemagne received from the pope the title of Emperor (*Imperator Augustus*), which Otto the Great reclaimed in 962, an event marking the

formal establishment of the Holy Roman Empire. The empire did not consist of territorial states, but a bewildering variety of small political entities variously called imperial counties, free lordships, ecclesiastical territories, free imperial cities, free imperial villages, and principalities that were themselves subdivided into electorates, duchies, palatine counties, margraviats, landgraviats, and princely counties. As states emerged, this bewildering welter of actors gradually disappeared.

Because of the importance of territory and sovereignty in defining the state, political scientists refer to the modern state as the “sovereign” or “territorial state.” This terminology implicitly suggests that states might have assumed some other form in their evolution. Indeed, the modern state is a product of a particular historical experience. Partly because the state was a European invention, the last three centuries can be conceived as the European epoch of global politics. Later, we shall see how non-European political forms, norms, and political ideas are challenging the European epoch and how regions like Asia are moving to the forefront of global politics. However, the importance of the state in global politics remains such that we first examine its emergence and evolution.

How did the sovereign state emerge, and how has it evolved? What has been its role in global politics? To answer these questions, we go back in time. Scholars generally begin the story with Europe’s medieval world. We divide the subsequent history into four broad stages that focus on Europe’s Middle Ages, Italy’s city-states, Europe’s religious wars, and the French Revolution.

The transition from Europe’s Middle Ages

The state emerged from Europe’s Middle Ages as local princes sought independence from the two great institutions that claimed “universal rule” and saw themselves as heirs to the original Roman Empire, the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire.

(Map 2.1 shows their boundaries as well as those of subordinate political entities in Europe around 1100.) As the two struggled for supremacy, princes played each against the other, and, as both grew weaker, princes gained more autonomy. As this process quickened, Europe’s medieval **feudal system** began to crumble.

The papal–imperial rivalry came to a climax in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries following a conflict over the investiture (appointment) of high church officials. These officials combined secular and religious authority and whoever controlled their appointment enjoyed significant political authority. The dispute, which pitted Pope Gregory VII (1020–85) against Emperor Henry IV (1050–1106), came down to the question of who should govern church affairs. In the end, the papacy triumphed, but both church and empire were sorely weakened.

Europe’s feudal system was based on a hierarchy of relationships with the pope and the Holy Roman emperor at the top, nobles below them, and peasants, who were legally bound to the land, at the bottom. Each class owed economic and military obligations to that above it, in return for which they received property rights and military protection. The system featured localized political and economic systems, with local production and commerce. During much of the Middle Ages, lords’ manors and church-run abbeys were centers of regional economic and cultural activity, and property rights were shared and overlapping. However distinct were Europe’s regions, inhabitants were bound by an overarching common identity as Christians.

War was the responsibility of a noble class of warriors called knights, who rendered military service to higher lords in return for authority over peasants and land. Many controlled their communities by means of a wooden or stone tower or castle that protected them from attack. Today, knights are recalled as chivalrous warriors. However, they could also be recalled as criminals, raiding one another and exploiting merchants and peasants. Knightly violence was so endemic



Map 2.1 Europe, 1100

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Although in theory the feudal system was hierarchical, with a feudal superior, whether called a king, prince, duke, or count, as lord over his subordinates or *vassals*, in practice, relationships were more complex. Vassals were supposed to provide service to the lord in return for military protection, but often failed to do so. In addition, one lord could have his own vassals, but also be vassal to another lord. Vassals could also pledge fealty to more than one lord.

in Europe that it strangled trade, impoverished peasants, and weakened the kingdoms that knights were sworn to protect. Thus, the distinction between war and crime was blurred.

Europe's medieval system evolved slowly under

the influence of social and economic change. In Flanders and northern Italy, self-governing towns emerged as urbanization quickened. With commerce, the need for money grew, and, despite the Church's prohibition of usury, banks appeared. By

the end of the thirteenth century, northern Italy, especially Florence, had become Europe's banking center and the Medici family its leading bankers. Northern Europe saw the emergence of the Hanseatic League, a league of cities and merchant associations, to foster trade. Between 1050 and 1500, the European economy shifted from the Mediterranean region northward. In 1050, 10 of Europe's largest cities were in Spain, led by Córdoba, the capital of Islamic Spain, and only five were in Northern Europe. By 1500, nine were in Northern Europe and 10 were in Italy, reflecting the commercial explosion that accompanied the Italian Renaissance and the shift in European political power from Spain to France (see Table 2.1).

Europe's military and economic power was also fostered by technological changes. Europeans took advantage of gunpowder, which had been invented in China during the ninth century, and European trade and naval power were fostered by the astrolabe that entered Europe from Islamic Spain in the early twelfth century, and the compass, which apparently was first used in China around 1100. These inventions, as well as

improvements in ships and clocks that aided navigation, were instrumental in later European voyages of discovery and colonization. The combination of economic and technological progress was vital in transforming Europe into the center of global political and military power.

The emergence of a new class of urban merchants and long-distance traders in southern England, Holland, Belgium, and Italy increased demands for security and freedom from the exactions of local knights. For their part, kings and princes sought to accumulate wealth in order to create armies that could resist the papacy and Holy Roman Empire and could tame local nobles, thereby permitting the formation of large territorial kingdoms. Thus, economic changes fostered the rise of a new commercial class that provided kings with the fiscal means to create their own armies, which then enabled them to assert their political independence of both the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. Italy, as we shall see shortly, was the harbinger of the emerging era of independent and ferociously competitive polities.

The European state had serious rivals, and its triumph was gradual and tentative. As sociologist Charles Tilly argues, "as seen from 1600 or so, the development of the state was very contingent; many aspiring states crumpled and fell along the way."⁷ A few princes wrested exclusive control of dynastic domains that they then expanded at the expense of neighbors, and in doing so attracted the loyalties of and joined forces with the emerging urban commercial class. People did not immediately surrender their identities as villagers, Christians, or subjects of the Holy Roman Empire, but those identities became less central to their lives as states increased their extractive and regulatory capacity.

In the end, territorial states, as political scientist Hendrik Spruyt argues, "arose because of a particular conjuncture of social and political interests in Europe"⁸ during and after the Middle Ages and weathered the challenge of other political forms such as the papacy, the Holy Roman Empire, and Italian city-states – because its terri-

Table 2.1 The 20 largest cities in Europe, 1050 and 1500

1050	Population	1500	Population
Córdoba	450,000	Paris	225,000
Palermo	350,000	Naples	125,000
Seville	90,000	Milan	100,000
Salerno	50,000	Venice	100,000
Venice	45,000	Granada	70,000
Regensburg	40,000	Prague	70,000
Toledo	37,000	Lisbon	65,000
Rome	35,000	Tours	60,000
Barbastro	35,000	Genoa	58,000
Cartagena	33,000	Ghent	55,000
Naples	30,000	Florence	55,000
Mainz	30,000	Palermo	55,000
Merida	30,000	Rome	55,000
Almeria	27,000	Bordeaux	50,000
Granada	26,000	Lyons	50,000
Speyer	25,000	Orleans	50,000
Palma	25,000	London	50,000
Laon	25,000	Bologna	50,000
London	25,000	Verona	50,000
Elvira	22,000	Brescia	49,000

torial logic mobilized societies more effectively, constructed professional bureaucracies, and organized relations among units more efficiently than did its rivals. Unlike medieval political and economic activities, which were essentially local, the new territorial states extended their reach by allying with newly prosperous merchants and commercial interests and pacifying the king's adversaries and competitors.

Machiavelli's world: Italy's city-states

Small **city-states**, not unlike those of ancient Greece, appeared in Italy in the tenth century, and it was in these cities that Europe's Renaissance, or

rebirth, emerged between the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Each city-state (see Map 2.2) had its own ruler, for example, the pope in Rome and the doge in Venice, and unceasing rivalry characterized relations among these rulers. In the resulting condition of insecurity, there emerged in Florence a brilliant political philosopher and statesman, Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli, whose most famous book was *The Prince*, introduced the idea that in order to ensure the survival of the state and its citizens, rulers must follow a political morality different than that of private persons. For example, acts that would be considered generous when undertaken by private citizens would be a wasteful expenditure of resources when undertaken by rulers. Where individuals would be seen as heroic in risking



Map 2.2
Italy, 1494

their lives to save another, Machiavelli's prince would be regarded as endangering the survival of those he was supposed to protect. Interests rather than conventional morality were, for Machiavelli, at the heart of statecraft. These cynical but prudent ideas became popular among statesmen in following centuries. Machiavelli remains as relevant today as he was in fifteenth-century Europe because realists argue that it remains impossible for actors to trust one another in global politics, and most leaders still place personal and national interests above the interests of the global community as a whole.

Italy's city-states ultimately succumbed to larger territorial states as the dominant form of political organization. Atlantic and Baltic trade routes enriched large states north of Italy: Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands. These used wealth to accumulate military power, which they then employed to amass greater wealth. Small city-states ruled by families of political upstarts and newly enriched traders could not compete militarily or economically with their larger rivals. Indeed, interstate politics in Renaissance Italy stood somewhere between what we think of as "gangster politics" and the politics of large territorial states. The dramatic shift in power northward to France and Spain became clear when an army under French King Charles VIII (1470–98) descended on Italy in 1494. In the words of contemporary historian Francesco Guicciardini: "[H]is passage into Italy gave rise to changes in dominions, subversion of kingdoms, desolation of countries, destruction of cities and the cruellest massacres, but also new fashions, new customs, new and bloody ways of waging warfare, and diseases which had been unknown up to that time."⁹

On the road to sovereignty

The Peace of Augsburg (1555) was the first legal effort to establish a peaceful coexistence between Catholics and Protestants (in this case, Lutherans)

(see Key document, below). The document granted princes new powers under the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* ("he who governs the territory decides its religion"). Thus, the prince alone, as a sovereign, could determine his subjects' religion. This was a key step toward the independence of such principalities from the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire (both of which demanded the continued dominance of Catholicism). The Peace of Augsburg did not end religious controversy, however, as Protestantism, especially Calvinism, continued to spread, and the Catholic order of Jesuits tried to reconvert Lutherans to Catholicism.

KEY DOCUMENT PEACE OF AUGSBURG, ARTICLE 15

In order to bring peace to the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation between the Roman Imperial Majesty and the Electors, Princes and Estates, let neither his Imperial Majesty nor the Electors, Princes, etc., do any violence or harm to any estate of the empire on the account of the Augsburg Confession, but let them enjoy their religious belief, liturgy and ceremonies as well as their estates and other rights and privileges in peace; and complete religious peace shall be obtained only by Christian means of amity, or under threat of punishment of the Imperial ban.¹⁰

It was in this atmosphere, after the Peace of Augsburg, that the political theorists Jean Bodin (1530–96) and Thomas Hobbes contemplated the idea of sovereignty. For them, sovereignty was an aspiration rather than a description of the world they knew. Bodin, a lawyer, lived in sixteenth-

century France during an era of religious war between Protestant Huguenots and Catholic loyalists, both supported by outside powers. The king, a member of the Valois dynasty, enjoyed little independent authority, a condition that Bodin thought had to be changed if France were to be united. In his *Six Books of the Republic* (1576),

Bodin defined sovereignty as the “power to make the laws” and argued that a sovereign state should enjoy “supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by laws.”

Living in England a century after Bodin, Hobbes described an even more authoritarian solution to the problem of civil war, which in

KEY DOCUMENT THE DESTRUCTION OF MAGDEBURG

During the Thirty Years’ War, there were few restraints in combatants’ behavior, and civilians were the main victims of soldiers’ brutality, as in the destruction by imperial troops of the fortified German city of Magdeburg on May 20, 1631, described in the following eyewitness account by the town’s mayor, Otto von Guericke:

So then General Pappenheim collected a number of his people on the ramparts by the New Town, and brought them from there into the streets of the city. Von Falckenberg was shot, and fires were kindled in different quarters; then indeed it was all over with the city . . . Nevertheless some of the soldiers and citizens did try to make a stand here and there, but the imperial troops kept bringing on more and more forces – cavalry, too – to help them, and finally they got the Krockenthor open and let in the whole imperial army and the forces of the Catholic League – Hungarians, Croats, Poles, Walloons, Italians, Spaniards, French, North and South Germans.

Thus it came about that the city and all its inhabitants fell into the hands of the enemy . . . Then was there naught but beating and burning, plundering, torture, and murder . . . When a marauding party entered a house, if its master had anything to give he might thereby purchase respite and protection for himself and his family till the next man, who also wanted something, should come along. It was only when everything had been brought forth and there was nothing left to give that the real trouble commenced. Then, what with blows and threats of shooting, stabbing, and hanging, the poor people were so terrified that if they had had anything left they would have brought it forth if it had been buried in the earth or hidden away in a thousand castles. In this frenzied rage, the great and splendid city that had stood like a fair princess in the land was now, in its hour of direst need and unutterable distress and woe, given over to the flames, and thousands of innocent men, women, and children, in the midst of a horrible din of heartrending shrieks and cries, were tortured and put to death in so cruel and shameful a manner that no words would suffice to describe, nor no tears to bewail i . . .

Thus in a single day this noble and famous city, the pride of the whole country, went up in fire and smoke; and the remnant of its citizens, with their wives and children, were taken prisoners and driven away by the enemy with a noise of weeping and wailing that could be heard from afar, while the cinders and ashes from the town were carried by the wind to Wanzleben, Egeln, and still more distant places.¹¹

England pitted royalist supporters of the Stuart King Charles I (1600–49) against parliamentary supporters of Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658). In *Leviathan*, Hobbes argued that absolutist government, whether monarchical or not, was necessary to maintain peace and security in a world in

which everyone was constantly at or on the verge of war with everyone else. In order to escape that natural state, Hobbes imagined that people would sign a social contract with the sovereign, or ruler, in which they surrendered political authority to the sovereign in return for security.



Map 2.3
Central Europe,
1648

- | | |
|---|---|
| Ruled by the Hohenzollern Dynasty | Ruled by the French Monarchy |
| Lands administered by the Roman Catholic Church | A portion of the Ottoman Empire |
| Ruled from Vienna by the Austrian Hapsburgs | Occupied by Sweden |
| Ruled by the Spanish Hapsburgs | Lands ruled from Venice |
| Ruled by the King of Denmark | Ruled from Genoa |
| Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire | |

Another critical moment in the development of the sovereign state arrived with a series of conflicts that began in 1618 and lasted 30 years, thus earning the name Thirty Years' War. Its initial stage centered on religious animosity unleashed by the Protestant Reformation. However, after 1635, political questions assumed paramount importance, pitting Protestant Sweden, Catholic France, and Germany's Protestant princes against the Catholic Hapsburg rulers of Austria and the Holy Roman Empire, Germany's Catholic princes, and, in the end, Catholic Spain. The war was fought mainly in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and Belgium) and featured unrestrained violence and widespread atrocities against civilians. This brutal war played an important role in the development of international law *between* rather than *above* states, which was a major step toward recognizing the independence and equality of these territorial entities. The war ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The peace recognized that a united Catholic empire was an unrealizable dream and that the two religions had to coexist (see Map 2.3). German lands lay in ruins, and the population of the Holy Roman Empire had declined from about 21 million to 16 million during the war. Thus, the great princes of the time recognized that limits had to be placed on war, or they and their countries would become victims of mindless slaughter and destruction.

The Treat of Westphalia between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective allies, was a rambling document consisting of 128 articles of which only two – Articles 64 and 65 – introduced the contours of state sovereignty. By its terms, Calvinism, a Protestant denomination, was officially recognized, and the Peace of Augsburg, which the warring parties had failed to observe, was restored. The treaty recognized the authority of the German princes in the Holy Roman Empire.¹² Each gained the right to govern his own territory and make independent decisions about war and peace. In this way, Europe's states acquired sov-

ereignty. A hierarchy of authority within the state in which government acts as the authoritative surrogate for subjects or citizens, and exclusive control of territory became the defining attributes of states after Westphalia.

From dynastic to popular sovereignty

Even after the state's emergence, it continued to evolve and still does so. During the eighteenth century, states featured **dynastic sovereignty**. They were governed by conservative, absolutist monarchs who had more in common with one another than with their subjects and who sought to increase their personal power and assure the future of their family dynasties. There was less a conception of national interests than of princely and dynastic interests.

The model state of the age was France under the "Sun King," Louis XIV (1638–1715). Aided by the cleric-statesmen, Cardinals Richelieu (1585–1642) and Mazarin (1602–61), the king ensured the external security of his realm with a large professional army, the administrative and technical skills of a prosperous middle class, and a series of fortifications along France's frontiers. France was a great power in an age when that label meant a state that could not be conquered even by a combination of other major states and when states appointed ambassadors (as opposed to lesser diplomats) only at the courts of the great powers.¹³ Louis reinforced the internal side of French sovereignty by centralizing authority at his court in Versailles and forcing French nobles to reside there. In this and other ways, he made the formerly rebellious nobility dependent on him and his corps of professional administrators. The king kept his realm united by recruiting to government service members of France's middle class, who depended on and were loyal to the monarch. The web of administrators successfully tamed independent nobles, guilds, and recalcitrant cities.

In contrast to the Thirty Years' War, eighteenth-century wars were relatively mild affairs in terms of objectives, although not in terms of the intensity of combat. Kings fought for limited aims, especially territory, but without the intense passion that had accompanied the earlier religious wars. They sought to increase their wealth and stature but wanted to avoid any threat to their thrones, recognizing that they had a common interest in respecting the principle of sovereignty. Europe was managed by a small number of great powers – England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria – sufficiently equal in power, so that none could dominate the rest. Although they were competitive, all were governed by dynastic monarchs who respected one another's legitimacy and right to rule. Monarchs and noble families were bound together by blood and marriage; a common language (French); common norms, manners, and customs; and, most important, common fear of the potentially disastrous consequences of unlimited war for themselves, their dynasties, and their states. The way in which wars were waged reflected these principles.

Eighteenth-century tactics called for lines of soldiers armed with inaccurate muskets and cannon to confront one another and keep shooting until one side fled or surrendered. Such tactics did not permit large-scale offensive movements and were designed to limit harm to civilians. Moreover, the logistics of this form of warfare limited movement, as baggage trains had to carry supplies for soldiers and fodder for the horses and mules necessary to move these supplies. Since taxes were low, revenue to fight wars was limited. An excellent description of warfare at the time was left by Prussia's Frederick the Great (1712–86). According to historian R. R. Palmer, for Frederick, battle “was a methodical affair” in which “armies were arrayed according to pattern, almost as regularly as chessmen at the beginning of a game: on each wing cavalry, artillery fairly evenly distributed along the rear, infantry battalions drawn up in two parallel solid lines, one a few hundred yards behind the other,

and each line, or at least the first, composed of three ranks, each rank firing at a single command while the other two reloaded.” As a result, “war became increasingly a war of position, the war of complex maneuver and subtle accumulation of small gains.” After all, “Frederick was a dynast [hereditary monarch], not a revolutionary or an adventurer.”¹⁴

The period is frequently cited as a model by realists because global politics was controlled by a small group of great powers, foreign affairs remained in the hands of professional diplomats, ideology was absent, and rulers regarded their domains as members of a European society of states. And the central and unifying norm of the era was the **balance of power**, an idea deeply rooted in the eighteenth-century mind and reflecting the principles of the science of mechanics that were in vogue. “English School” theorists also point to the period to criticize realism for its emphases on state egoism and constant conflict and its failure to recognize the existence of a “society of states.”

Balance of power, an essential element of realism, is found in many eras of global politics, including the Greek and Italian city-states, and ancient India. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, balance-of-power thinking pervaded the politics of all states. They believed that the only way to limit the power of expansive states was to confront them with equal or greater power. This aim is reflected in a treaty between England and Spain that permitted the French king's grandson to become king of Spain but forbade the union of the two kingdoms. A union of France and Spain was seen as a “great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe,” a danger which could be avoided “by an equal balance of power (which is the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship).”¹⁵

Realists believe that the balance of power was conducive to peace in the eighteenth century. However, they differ about what balance of power actually meant. Political scientist Ernst Haas noted several meanings of the term: any distribution

of power among states, an exact equilibrium of power, hegemony, a situation of stability (or peace), *Realpolitik* (the use of power to accomplish one's objectives), a universal law or outcome, and a policy prescription.¹⁶

Europe's leaders believed that, if the survival of any great power were threatened, others should join in alliance and raise armies of sufficient size to frustrate the aggressor(s). Such alliances were temporary, based on expediency, and were expected to dissolve once they had achieved their objective. A great power had no "permanent friends or enemies" and was expected to join former adversaries in new alliances if new threats to the status quo arose. No great power wished to destroy or permanently alienate a foe, and all were usually willing to offer generous terms of settlement to bring wars to an end and bring adversaries back into the "family of nations."

The balance was the keystone to a European society in which the boundaries among states were softened by the loyalties and identities of a ruling class. The balance was the product of the "common interest" of Europe's dynastic rulers in "the maintenance of order and the preservation of liberty,"¹⁷ and Europe's statesmen came to see it as an essential aspect of Europe's laws and customs. French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) believed that the balance was the result of Europeans' "identity of religion, of moral standard, of international law" and reflected a European civilization "united by an identity of religion, of moral standard, of international law."¹⁸ The balance was loudly praised by luminaries of the time as diverse as Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and Edward Gibbon.

The balance of power was *not* expected to prevent violence. In the words of one historian, "peace was no more essential to equilibrium theory than the barnacle to the boat."¹⁹ This was evident in dynastic wars of the period. Thus, during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) caused by the effort of France's King Louis XIV to place his grandson on the Spanish throne, Austria, Britain, and the Netherlands joined together to

thwart his ambitions. Some years later, in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), England and Austria allied against Prussia and allies of Prussia's Frederick the Great to reverse Frederick's seizure of Silesia following the death of Charles VI (1685–1740), Holy Roman Emperor and King of Austria. Although the war ended in stalemate, Prussia retained Silesia, setting the stage for the Seven Years' War (1756–63) in which Austria, Sweden, France, Russia, and Saxony aligned themselves against Prussia and England. Only the sudden death of Russia's Empress Elizabeth (1709–62) saved Prussia. England, for its part, took advantage of the conflict to establish its supremacy in North America, where the war was called the French and Indian War.

The balance of power in some respects contravened the norms of sovereignty. It featured respect for the independence and rights of great powers, but it had no such respect for smaller states, whose sovereignty was routinely violated. Poland, for example, a relatively small state, was partitioned on three separate occasions (1772, 1793, and 1795) among Prussia, Russia, and Austria, three large states, as part of their effort to maintain their own security and assuage their pride. Balance-of-power policies reflected the inadequacy of sovereignty in providing protection from external interference, and they substituted power for sovereignty in providing such protection. Balance-of-power rhetoric expressed the obligations that great powers were believed to owe one another when sovereignty alone provided inadequate protection.

Britain used the concept in a particularly subtle way. An island power with interest in acquiring lands outside Europe, Britain was prepared to intervene on the continent when it thought the balance was in peril, as it did to oppose the ambitions of France's Louis XIV and Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821). British statesmen called their country a "balancer," that is, a country that would join a war to prevent major shifts in power distribution. But British balancing was not limited to Europe. Thus, it was in the cause of

the balance that British leaders influenced the United States to issue the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine, announced by President James Monroe to Congress on December 2, 1822, stated that European powers could not colonize the American continents or interfere in independent republics there. This policy reflected British and US concern about European meddling in the western hemisphere, especially any Spanish effort to regain control over former colonies in Latin America.

Monroe articulated this doctrine because he saw an opportunity for a distinctive US role in the Americas, but that role could only be enforced by a country with the power to do so, meaning Britain and its navy. Britain's true aim was not to assist the United States but to rein in France, which dominated Spain. Foreign Secretary George Canning (1770–1827) encouraged America's policy as a way to limit Spanish power and, by indirection, French efforts to expand. Canning declared:

But then, Sir, the balance of power! The entry of the French army into Spain disturbed that balance, and we ought to have gone to war to restore it! I have already said, that when the French army entered Spain, we might, if we chose, have resisted or resented that measure by war. But were there no other means than war for restoring the balance of power? . . . I resolved that if France had Spain it should not be Spain with the Indies. *I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the old.*²⁰

Eventually, nationalism and democracy largely rendered ineffective the personal and family bonds among aristocratic leaders and diplomats that maintained the commitment to balance and the flexibility vital for it to work. This became evident in the pathetic exchange of telegrams between the Russian and German emperors on the eve of World War One – the “Willy–Nicky telegrams” – that failed utterly to prevent the

world war.²¹ Although the concept of balance of power still influences realist theories, it is less applicable in contemporary global politics for several reasons:

1. Balance-of-power theorists assume that there exists a state system of equivalent units and not a system consisting of different kinds of actor such as states, terrorist groups, and corporations.
2. There has to be a relatively equal distribution of power among a sufficient number of major actors to permit any of them to be stopped. The world today is dominated by one superpower, and it is difficult to imagine what coalition of adversaries could “balance” US military power.
3. It must be possible to estimate precisely the distribution of military power. In the eighteenth century, this was a relatively easy task that could be accomplished by counting population, amount of territory, and numbers of muskets and cannon. Today, such estimates are difficult to make because of the various types of warfare that might be waged (conventional, nuclear, and guerrilla among others) and because weapons are so different from one another. Questions such as how many tanks or planes are equivalent to a nuclear weapon or a submarine are impossible to answer because such weapons serve different purposes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons complicates matters. Countries such as Israel, Pakistan, India, and others regard such weapons as a source of power and prestige even though nuclear weapons can be used to achieve few political objectives except to deter others from using similar weapons.
4. Actors must be ideologically compatible to join each other in flexible alliances. During the era of dynastic war, as historian Edward Vose Gulick observes: “Europe was an in-group of states which excluded non-European countries and which displayed a high degree of homogeneity within itself.”²² Today,

governments and people are divided by religion, economic beliefs, and other ideological factors.

5. For the balance to be preserved, diplomacy must be shielded from aroused publics and conducted by dispassionate professional diplomats who can negotiate with one another flexibly and make concessions when necessary. Such diplomats understood how the balance worked, were alert to threats to it, and were willing to bargain with one another. Today's democratic leaders are under constant pressure from public opinion and are responsive to the most recent polls.

DID YOU KNOW?

Eighteenth-century diplomats could be persuaded to see virtue in each other's positions when provided with a nice fat bribe. The French statesman, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand (1754–1838), reflected the ideal of his age. Talleyrand died the wealthiest man in Europe owing to the bribes he received but thought himself an honest man because he never accepted a *sou* unless he could keep his end of a bargain.

The utility of the balance of power declined as the idea of monarchical absolutism yielded to popular control of states. The idea that the state belonged to its people rather than to its ruler evolved slowly. Key steps in the process included England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which the Stuart King James II (1633–1701) was exiled, and the new king, William III (1650–1702), agreed to the Declaration of Rights, which guaranteed constitutional government, and the American Revolution (1775–83). However, the most important single event in this process was the French Revolution (1789–99). The revolution was triggered by a combination of factors: French defeat

in the Seven Years' War and the incompetence of the country's rulers; the example of the American Revolution in which Frenchmen like the Marquis de Lafayette (1757–1834) played a key role and brought home a belief in republican government; and the financial bankruptcy of the French monarchy. Before the revolution, sovereignty was embodied in the monarch, who justified his authority through a combination of religion and dynastic descent. After the revolution, authority had to be justified by the support of the people or the nation and became known as national or **popular sovereignty**.

Nation is an ambiguous concept that refers to a group of people united by ties such as shared history, religion, blood or kinship, and language; and nationalism refers to the passionate desire on the part of such people to defend and glorify that group. A nation should *not* be confused with a state – a legal political entity, as described earlier. In eighteenth-century France, people began to view themselves as members of a great extended family whose ancestors could be traced back to ancient history. And, after the revolution erupted in 1789, “family” symbols of many kinds were adopted by “citizens” who had formerly been “subjects.” *La Marseillaise*, a song in honor of troops from the city of Marseilles who had taken part in the revolution written by Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle (1760–1836) became the country's national anthem in 1792. Around the same time, the flag, or *fleur de lis*, of the country's Bourbon dynasty was replaced by a new French flag, the *tricolore* (referring to the three colors of the French flag – red, white, and blue).

Even styles of dress and usage of words changed to reflect France's new nationalism. For example, during the revolution the name *sans-culottes* (“without knee breeches”) was applied to laborers and others in the lower classes who wore long trousers rather than the knee breeches worn by aristocrats. As for language, the French word for “state” (*état*) was largely replaced by “fatherland” or “nation” (*patrie*). The wedding of nation and state created a more powerful actor because

popular passions were placed at the service of the state's bureaucracies, including its military forces. Along with the emergence of the nation-state following the French Revolution came international or interstate politics as we have understood it in recent centuries.

The spread of nationalism changed the world forever. The revolution transformed the essential nature of states, and nationalism spread across Europe on the bayonets of Napoléon. As whole peoples became involved in war, and the capacity to wage war increased with industrialization, the size and intensity of wars expanded dramatically.

The French Revolution infused greater passion into warfare as citizens fought for their country, and it brought an end to the mild political climate of the eighteenth century. The revolution and the execution of King Louis XVI (1754–93) and Queen Marie Antoinette (1755–93) marked the transition from dynastic to national warfare (see Figure 2.2).



Figure 2.2 Heads up!

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

The fact that the revolution had transferred sovereignty from the monarch to his subjects meant that they had a stake in their country's fate. One result was to inject warfare with new energy in which eager volunteers sought to defend *their* fatherland and export its ideals regardless of personal risk. The high morale in France's revolutionary armies contrasted with the tepid commitment of soldiers in the armies of France's dynastic adversaries. Another result of nationalism was that it became costly for one country to occupy another, as local publics mobilized against occupying forces. In the long run, nationalism also became linked with ideologies such as fascism and liberalism. And, like nationalism after 1789, such ideologies produced greater willingness on the part of followers to fight to the death, making it difficult for diplomats to limit the extent or purpose of wars. Rulers increasingly made decisions about foreign policy to increase popularity at home rather than balance potential foes.

After 1789, a series of wars ensued as France sought to spread its new ideology beyond its borders. During these wars, known as the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1800), France instituted a version of conscription called the *levée en masse* (see Key document, opposite). The *levée* was proclaimed on August 23, 1793, and it raised an army of 800,000 – larger than that of France's adversaries – in less than a year. It took advantage of and encouraged mass enthusiasm to involve as many citizens as possible in the war effort. The *levée* provided the basis for the large armies that later fought for Napoléon and foreshadowed the mobilization of entire populations during the world wars of the twentieth century.

France's revolutionary wars spread domestic ideological strife into global politics as Europe's other great powers fought to prevent revolution from infecting their populations. The first of these wars began when France declared war on Hapsburg Austria on April 20, 1792. The Austrians advanced into France, where the French held their ground, and the revolutionaries began to believe

KEY DOCUMENT

THE *LEVÉE EN MASSE*

The following extract from the original proclamation of the *levée en masse* illustrates the extent to which French society was mobilized for war after 1792:

1. From this moment . . . all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.
 2. The national buildings shall be converted into barracks, the public places into workshops for arms, the soil of the cellars shall be washed in order to extract there from the saltpeter.
- [. . .]
5. The Committee of Public Safety is . . . authorized to form all the establishments, factories, workshops, and mills which shall be deemed necessary for the carrying on of these works, as well as to put in requisition, within the entire extent of the Republic, the artists and workingmen who can contribute to their success.
 6. The representatives of the people sent out for the execution of the present law . . . are invested with the unlimited powers assigned to the representatives of the people to the armies.²³

that the old world of autocracy was giving way to a new world of democracy and freedom. “From today and from this place,” rhapsodized the German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), “there begins a new epoch in the history of the world.”

France’s national army made a variety of innovations. Less fearful of desertion and more willing to exploit civilians than its predecessors, the armies of the revolution depended less on supply trains and more on living off the land. This enhanced their speed and range. Also, armies were split into independent divisions, enhancing their flexibility. Gradually, they began to employ artillery and marksmen in the rear (“fire”) and bayonet charges in the front (“shock”), and shock tactics replaced the wars of maneuver waged by dynastic armies. All in all, the era of revolutionary nationalism had a major impact both on the

manner of waging war and the tone of global politics.

As the revolution took hold at home, France sought to export its ideas to the dynastic states of Europe by propaganda and war. French revolutionaries and then Napoléon Bonaparte set out to spread an ideology based on “liberty, fraternity, and equality” as expressed in a revolutionary manifesto of August 1789 entitled the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*. France’s 1791 constitution included a series of inalienable individual rights including equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest and punishment, and freedom of speech, religion, and the press. The declaration also introduced democracy to France and denied the divine right of kings to rule. The revolution thus erected ideological barriers between states, and France came to be seen as a mortal threat to the remaining dynasties in Europe.

France's declaration was influenced by America's young democracy, and some of its ideas are found in America's Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Only six months before the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, Thomas Paine (1737–1809) published a pamphlet called *Common Sense*, which stirred the imagination of American colonists by advocating an end to British rule and adoption of republican institutions. As a result of his views, Paine became popular among French revolutionaries. In 1792, Paine came to the defense of the French Revolution in his treatise *Rights of Man*, which was a reply to British statesman Edmund Burke's (1729–97) denunciation of the revolution.

Burke, an articulate philosophical conservative and a supporter of the American Revolution, was repelled by the excesses of France's Reign of Terror (1793–94) – a period that began because France's revolutionaries feared that their country would be betrayed to foreign enemies by aristocrats and other internal traitors. Burke rebuked France for wiping away all the country's old traditions, customs, and laws in a blood bath that featured "Madame Guillotine," who stood "grim and gaunt, with long thin arms stretched out towards the sky, the last glimmer of waning night striking the triangular knife."²⁴

With the meteoric rise of Napoléon, a new and more destructive era in warfare began. Napoléon's popularity was a result of his military exploits. After putting down a royalist uprising in Paris (1795) and conducting a series of brilliant campaigns in Italy (1796), he became the idol of French patriots. In 1798, he commanded an invasion of Egypt, but this victory was reversed the same year by a British fleet commanded by Napoléon's nemesis, Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758–1805), that cut French supply lines and forced Napoléon's retreat from Egypt.

In a coup d'état on November 9–10, 1799, Napoléon seized power in France and established a new regime called the Consulate, with him as first consul and virtual dictator. He became consul for life in 1802 and emperor of France in 1804.

During this time, he continued to transform the revolutionary army, organizing it into a number of self-contained and powerful corps, each itself an army, consisting of three divisions, each with its own artillery and cavalry. With Europe at his feet in 1806, Napoléon formally abolished the Holy Roman Empire. He placed two brothers on the thrones of Holland and Westphalia, named his godson viceroy of Italy, enthroned his third brother as king of Naples, and then promoted him to king of Spain.

What Napoléon did not understand was the importance of *naval power*. Thus, his fortunes began to shift after Lord Nelson's great naval triumph over the French at Trafalgar, off Cádiz, Spain, in October 1805.²⁵ From this point forward, Britain ruled the seas, but while the victory was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars, Napoléon's defeat on land took several years more.

Napoléon's *Grande Armée* began to lose its revolutionary zeal as it incorporated soldiers who were not French, but were subjects of conquered territories. The changing demographics of the French army contributed to Napoléon's loss of Spain in 1813, but his military supremacy ended only after his fateful decision to invade Russia. In June 1812, his *Grande Armée* of more than 500,000 crossed into Russia. After a bloody victory at Borodino (1812) and occupation of Moscow, Napoléon's war-weary army succumbed to a combination of Russia's scorched earth policy and the Russian winter. It was then destroyed as it retreated from Russia.

Still, Napoléon remained a symbol of French nationalism, and the power of nationalism sustained him again. After being defeated decisively in the Battle of Nations near Leipzig in October 1813, he was exiled to the Mediterranean island of Elba from which he escaped even while his enemies were negotiating a final European peace in Vienna. In March 1815, he landed in France and rallied his compatriots. On June 18, Napoléon met his final defeat at the hands of a British–Prussian army in the Battle of Waterloo. Thereafter, he was exiled to the remote South

Atlantic island of St Helena, where he died in 1821.

Following Napoléon's defeat, a glittering assemblage of conservative statesmen – Klemens von Metternich (1773–1859) for Austria, Tsar Alexander I (1777–1825) for Russia, Prince Karl August von Hardenberg (1750–1822) for Prussia, Viscount Castlereagh (1769–1822) for Britain, and Talleyrand for France – gathered at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 where they concluded the Treaty of Paris to restore Europe's old order.²⁶ The congress limited France to its 1792 borders, restored the monarchy under Louis XVIII (1755–1824), and, consonant with balance of power, allowed France to rejoin the great powers.

The Congress of Vienna not only redrew the map of Europe but sought to prevent the re-emergence of another “superpower” like France under Bonaparte. To this end, it created the Concert of Europe “in the name of Europe which forms but a single whole.”²⁷ The concert, an informal organization of Europe's great powers, required the summoning of ad hoc international conferences when it appeared that Europe's stability was menaced either by aggression of one of their number or by domestic revolution. Recognition that domestic events could endanger global peace and allowance for intervention in domestic affairs in revolutionary conditions marked a break with the older balance of power. Four major conferences were held between 1815 and 1822, and others in 1856, 1871, 1878, and 1884. The concert was an effort to re-establish the pre-Napoleonic pattern of global politics, including international consultations to avoid major disruptions, limited objectives, and shifting defensive alliances. What it could not do was repress enthusiasm for nationalism and popular sovereignty that had been unleashed after 1789. Although the statesmen at Vienna tried to turn the clock back, they could not do so. The revolution and Napoleonic warfare had unleashed new forces in global politics.

The modern nation-state had emerged. The genie of nationalism could not be put back in the

bottle, and the nineteenth century saw its spread and intensification, which, along with industrialization, made possible ever larger wars. Along with nationalism, new ideologies like socialism and racism justified Europe's colonial expansion and swept aside the conservative consensus of the previous century. Europe's industrial revolution was accompanied by rapid urbanization and the growth of an urban working class that was attracted to new political doctrines, especially Marxian socialism. Moreover, growing citizen awareness of politics and citizens' desire to have a voice in running the state fostered the spread of democratic beliefs.

Increasingly, nineteenth-century Europe saw nationalism and democracy as natural partners, both of which challenged dynastic rule. “What had been a sovereigns' club,” declares British political scientist Adam Watson, “would become a family of independent nations.”²⁸ The democratic impulse was strongest in Western Europe, especially Britain and France, while to the east, in Russia, Prussia, and Austria, it ran up against a wall of authoritarian resistance on the part of conservative governments that feared that democracy and nationalism would spell their doom. Europe was fast dividing into liberal and conservative states.

Finally, popular democratic and national aspirations erupted in Europe in 1848 in a series of revolutions against monarchical despotism that began in Sicily and then spread like wildfire. In Austria, the Hapsburg monarch successfully resisted the revolutionary tide, and Austrian armies crushed national movements in its Italian (Lombardy) and Czech (Bohemia) provinces. In Hungary, Austrian dominance was maintained and national aspirations brutally ended with the aid of a Russian army.

Nationalists and democrats throughout Europe looked to France, whose revolution had inspired “liberty, equality, and fraternity” and from where these norms had swept across Europe. There, another Bonaparte, Louis-Napoléon (1808–73), nephew of Napoléon Bonaparte, was elected

president in 1848 following the overthrow of King Louis Philippe (1773–1850). France declared the Second Republic (the First Republic had lasted from 1792 until 1804 when Bonaparte declared himself emperor), universal suffrage was established, and Louis-Napoléon was elected president. Five years later, emulating his famous uncle, he declared himself Emperor Napoléon III, thereby beginning France's Second Empire.²⁹

Napoléon III, who stirred up and then became captive of French nationalism, was instrumental in unifying Italy, which had been the site of unsuccessful nationalist revolutions in 1830 and 1848. In 1859, France, in alliance with Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810–61), prime minister of Piedmont–Sardinia, liberated much of northern Italy from Austrian occupation. In the south, the revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82) and his “Red Shirts” seized Sicily and Naples in 1860 and advanced northward. Their union with the Piedmontese opened the way for the final unification of Italy under King Victor Emmanuel II (1820–78) in 1861. These events marked the demise of the Concert of Europe system.

A greater threat to European stability lay in the growing determination of German nationalists to unify their country, potentially the greatest power on the continent. In Prussia, in spring 1849, liberals who had been elected to the Frankfurt National Assembly drafted a constitution to create a federal union of the German states with a constitutional monarch and an elected legislature. However, Prussia's King Frederick William IV (1795–1861) contemptuously rejected the assembly's offer to elect him “Emperor of the Germans” because he believed that the only legitimate crown was one that was inherited. Throughout Europe, concessions that had been made by rulers under the threat of insurrection such as universal suffrage, liberty of the press and of assembly were cancelled, and monarchical despotism was restored in Prussia and Austria.

For the moment, the dream of a unified Germany was shattered. However, that dream

would be realized some decades later under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck (1815–98) who became Prussia's prime minister in 1862. In a prescient speech to Prussia's parliament on September 30, 1862, Bismarck, a practitioner of *Realpolitik*, warned that German unification would not be accomplished by resolutions of elected assemblies. Rather: “The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood.”³⁰ As we shall see in Chapter 3, Germany's wars of unification and the forced retirement of Bismarck would alter Europe's complexion and set in train events that exploded in war in 1914.

Europe's territorial states were never the only political actors in global politics and a host of international, transnational, and subnational polities – “sovereignty-free actors” – have joined states as actors in what political scientist James Rosenau calls the “multi-centric” world that he contrasts to the “state-centric” world of past centuries.³¹

Indeed, long before the birth of Europe's states, East Asia was ruled by the Chinese Empire. Despite periods of fragmentation, the Chinese retained a strong cultural affinity, and, for centuries, China's rulers believed their empire was the center of the political and cultural universe. By the nineteenth century, however, Europeans had penetrated and weakened China, and the Chinese Empire ended in 1911.

China: the Confucian empire

“The monumental Chinese achievement in the field of statecraft,” writes Watson, “is usually held to be the more or less effective political unity that has assured domestic peace and order for most of Chinese history.”³² The distinctive Chinese political community and its outlook on foreign affairs were formed long before Thucydides recorded the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC.

Imperial China

For much of its history China's political system, unlike Europe's state system, was a hierarchical **empire**. Unlike states, empires do not have fixed territorial boundaries and usually contain several national groups ruled from a single center (see Map 2.4). Foreign rulers who sent gifts or "tribute" to China's emperor might receive gifts and military protection in return. Such rulers accepted subordination in return for protection and trade and acknowledged "China's superiority by bowing down before the emperor, who held Heaven's Mandate (right to rule) to govern China and whose magnificent benevolence and compassion naturally attracted outsiders to come and also be transformed by civilization."³³ (See Key document, below, for an illustration of how China's rulers viewed themselves as the center of world civilization.)

China's government philosophy that, in one observer's words, "largely determined the Chinese view of life, and therefore also the Chinese

approach to foreign affairs" was strongly influenced by the sage-philosopher Confucius (551–479 BC) and that system "was already well established in its broad outlines in the first century of the Chou period (1027–221 BC)."³⁴ Confucius was writing at a turbulent time, China's "Warring States era" (fifth century BC to 221 BC), during which the "central authority of the [Chou] dynasty was progressively sapped, and the realm split into fifteen rival feudal states fringed and patched with many minor fiefs, so that the map looked like a motley of papal Italy familiar to Machiavelli."³⁵

China's outlook was built on the conviction – reinforced by its age, continuity, and geographic isolation – that the Middle Kingdom (as China styled itself) was the center of the world and that the Son of Heaven (as the emperor was called) was ruler of the universe. The Chinese Empire, according to historian John Fairbank, "remained the center of the world known to it, only vaguely aware of the other ancient centers of the west," never losing "its sense of all-embracing unity and cultural entity."³⁶



Map 2.4 Historical borders of China in four periods

KEY DOCUMENT

LETTER FROM EMPEROR QIAN LONG TO KING GEORGE III REGARDING A BRITISH REQUEST FOR TRADE PRIVILEGES (1793)³⁷

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial . . .

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the Stat . . . Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures . . . It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future . . . You, O King, from afar have yearned after the blessings of our civilization . . . I do not forget the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of the usages of our Celestial Empire.

The practical consequence of this view of the world was a belief that the political universe was centrally and hierarchically organized – a view opposite Europe's view of a horizontally organized system of legally equal sovereign states with no superior – and that all peoples were subject to the Son of Heaven. With its imperial perspective, China's view of world affairs did not distinguish, at least in theory, between foreign and domestic politics and had no conception of a world of independent states. All peoples were under the rule of Heaven, and the emperor was responsible for governing them all, whether Chinese or “barbarian” (non-Chinese). The Chinese conceived the world as a series of concentric circles with the Middle Kingdom at the center. The next circle consisted of non-Chinese tribal groups that were permitted to govern themselves. Beyond this were vassal polities that paid tribute to the Son of Heaven, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and still further out were countries like Portugal that had trade relations with China. Vassal polities were expected to provide symbolic tribute to the

emperor and their representatives had to perform the kowtow (ritual bow) when coming before the Son of Heaven.

DID YOU KNOW?

China in sixth century BC was home to one of the world's most studied military strategists, Sun Tzu, whose idea that all war is “based on deception” and who lauded the “divine art of subtlety and secrecy” greatly influence China's communist leader Mao Zedong and his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

The quality of rulership, Confucius taught, depended on adherence to traditional moral principles. Thus, China's outlook on world politics was infused with a strong normative element, as preoccupied with what *ought to be* as with what was. “Adherence to the correct teachings,” writes

Fairbank, “would be manifested in virtuous conduct and would enhance one’s authority and influence.”³⁸ In other words, moral behavior (Confucian principles) had the practical result of increasing imperial power. If an emperor ruled virtuously, the natural harmony of Heaven would prevail, not conflict as Western realists insist. Right, one might say, makes might. By contrast, a ruler’s lack of virtue and subsequent loss of the Mandate of Heaven reflected errors in policy. In the event of conflict, moral suasion and patience rather than coercion were, Confucians believed, the way to maintain order.

China’s sense of superiority and its effort to isolate the empire from outsiders clashed with European, American, and Japanese expansionism, and China’s ability to resist foreign penetration crumbled in the nineteenth century. The “foreigners” sought economic opportunities, and European and American missionaries were sent to convert the Chinese to Christianity. Britain led the way in the 1830s, shipping large amounts of opium grown in British India to China in return for tea and other Chinese goods and spreading opium addiction among the Chinese. China tried to outlaw opium in 1836, and its efforts to halt British opium triggered war in late 1839, leading to China’s humiliating defeat. The 1842 Treaty of Nanking ceded Hong Kong to Britain and effectively opened the country to British trade, causing a dramatic increase in opium imports. It also abridged China’s sovereign rights. Thus, foreigners accused of a crime enjoyed **extraterritorial** rights such as being subject to the laws of their country rather than China’s. Americans and Europeans also enjoyed virtual control over the areas in which their legations and consulates were located.

A second opium war erupted in 1856, resulting in the virtual legalization of opium in China, the right of foreigners to hold property and spread Christianity throughout the country, and foreign control of the country’s trade. By the end of the century, Germany occupied the Shantung Peninsula and Russia controlled Manchuria and

the city of Port Arthur. In 1899, the United States, without a territorial sphere of its own in China, sent notes to the major powers asking them to declare that they would uphold China’s territorial integrity and follow an open door policy in which all would enjoy equal trading rights in China.

The beginning of the end for China’s last imperial dynasty, the Qing (or Manchus) began with its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1895), which marked a giant step in Japan’s effort to build an Asian empire. Encouraged by China’s imperial government, anti-foreign agitation by a secret society called the Boxers or the “Righteous and Harmonious Fists” climaxed in 1900 with the Boxer Rebellion. Violence against foreigners in Beijing led to the dispatch of an international force of Europeans, Americans, and Japanese that suppressed the Boxers and forced China’s government to pay a huge indemnity and submit to demands that limited China’s sovereignty. After the overthrow of the Qing (1911–12), Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) became provisional president of the Republic of China but soon ceded power to the dictatorial general Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), whose death triggered the country’s descent into an era of disorder and conflict among local warlords.

China never forgot the humiliating era of “unequal treaties” to which it was subjected, and its effort to rectify the situation dominated Chinese politics for over a century. Despite the end of the Chinese Empire, traditional ideas remained strong. Communist leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976), for instance, publicly likened himself to China’s emperors, and the series of disasters that struck China in 1976, including the deaths of Mao, his long-time associate Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), and General Zhu De (1886–1976), and a deadly earthquake that leveled the city of Tangshan and killed some 250,000 people seemed to auger the withdrawal of Heaven’s Mandate and readied the country for dramatic change.

Chinese history and culture continue to exert influence in contemporary China. Today, Chinese President Hu Jintao emphasized building

a “harmonious society” that stresses political and economic stability above all else. Some analysts also cite history and culture to explain China’s apparent reluctance to permit intervention in the affairs of countries like Sudan or Zimbabwe. The next section examines this influence in what observers have described as “Asian values” and describes how these contrast with “Western values” in questions of economic development.

Asian versus Western values

Confucianism and the values it celebrates have played a pivotal role in the evolution of East Asia’s economies. This section reviews the differences between Asian and Western approaches to capitalism. These differences were evident in the tensions between the two approaches that surfaced during Asia’s 1997–98 economic crisis. That economic crisis highlighted the tension between two different political and economic paths and philosophies and showed the importance of cultural differences in global politics.

WESTERN VALUES The globalization of the world economy reflects the West’s liberal traditions of unfettered capitalism, individual self-realization, limited government, and political democracy. The idea of individual prosperity growing out of entrepreneurial behavior in a free market has Western roots. And Western individualism flourished along with a belief in private property.

These economic beliefs received a strong boost in the West in the 1980s under the influence of US President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. After a generation of growing government influence in economic life, Reagan and Thatcher demanded that economic policies return to the older liberal philosophy associated with Adam Smith and encourage individual freedom and initiative rather than social welfare. Proclaiming “the rolling back” of the state, Western politicians and economists of the 1980s embraced the idea that,

if left alone, markets would solve most economic problems. State intervention, they argued, distorted markets and reduced individual initiative. Thus, during that decade the US and British governments sought to reduce government regulation of economic and social affairs and state intervention in the economy.

Western leaders in the 1980s and 1990s insisted that individual freedom had been eroded in previous decades owing to proliferating government bureaucracies responding to the demands of interest group politics. In this, they were influenced by American economist Milton Friedman (1912–2006) who argued that: “Equality before God – personal equality – is important precisely because people are not identical. Their different values, their different tastes, their different capacities will lead them to want to lead very different lives.”³⁹ In other words, only individuals can know what they want. When elected politicians, in the name of the public good, try to reshape the social world through state intervention in the economy and the redistribution of resources, the result, Friedman claimed, is coercive government. Any government effort to regulate the lives of individuals is an attack on their freedom, a denial of their right to be the ultimate judges of their own ends. The only legitimate way to organize human and material resources is through voluntary exchange, and the only justifiable political institutions are those that guarantee individual autonomy. The market, in this tradition, is the only institution that can provide a secure basis on which business and family life can prosper. It does away with the need for central authority, because buyers and sellers, consumers and producers, and savers and investors realize their own economic interests.

Western politicians insisted that government restraint, democracy, and economic development were inseparable, and some Western observers suggested that Asia’s 1997–98 economic crisis was a result of Asians’ refusal to institute genuine democracy. According to Western liberal tradition, the free market is necessary for liberal

democracy, and liberal democracy, in turn, is vital for citizens to make informed economic decisions. To many Asians, this view reflects Western conceit. “In recent years,” wrote political scientist Samuel Huntington, “Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world.” Westerners, he continued, believe “not only that the West has led the world to modern society, but that as people in other civilizations modernize they also westernize, abandoning their traditional values, institutions, and customs and adopting those that prevail in the West.” These views, Huntington argues are “misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous.”⁴⁰

ASIAN VALUES Asia is hardly a monolithic region, and Asian cultures are diverse. Nevertheless, many Asians see their values as different from those of the West. Some, especially in East Asia, have claimed that Western values, however useful in Europe and America, are unsuited to Asian conditions and violate Asian traditions. Anglo-American social policies such as deregulation, weak trade unions, and a minimalist welfare state are, Asians argue, fundamentally incompatible with their own practices and traditional social values. Where the West emphasizes the importance of individuals and individual rights in relation to the community, Asians stress obligations of individuals to the welfare and values of the community.

For their part, Asians pursued an alternative path to economic growth featuring a high degree of state involvement in economic decisions. As first Japan and then Asia’s newly industrializing countries, especially South Korea and Taiwan, and finally the little tigers of Southeast Asia clawed their way out of poverty to prosperity, Asian politicians began to speak of the superiority of “Asian values.” As articulated by regional leaders like Singapore’s long-time leader Lee Kwan Yew, the Asian path to economic growth combined political authoritarianism with “managed” or state capitalism.

For many Asians, Western emphasis on individual liberty and the free market is alien, and Lee Kwan Yew declared: “I do not believe that democracy necessarily leads to development. I believe that what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy.”⁴¹ While Westerners seek to maximize individual freedom and prosperity, many Asians, especially in China and Korea, remain loyal to social values like equality of outcome that are associated with the teaching of Confucius. “Asian values,” in the words of one commentator “are different in kind, not in degree. They are self-reliant, yet somehow communitarian rather than individualistic; built on personal relationships and mutual obligation . . . respectful of authority and hierarchy; and state interventionist, even into the private space of individuals. The word that summed up this – in part self-contradictory – spirit was Confucianism.”⁴² Asian leaders like Lee Kwan Yew emphasize the Confucian precepts of community, hierarchy, and work that they believe explain the region’s economic growth after World War Two.

In China and South Korea, Confucian norms remain influential, and foreign observers called the ethical system behind South Korea’s dramatic economic growth New Confucianism or Confucian capitalism. Some of the assumptions of Confucian capitalism are:

- Individuals are not isolated, but are part of a complex system of human relations. Harmony and cooperation among people are more important than individual success. Therefore, obligation to the community is superior to individual rights and personal privacy.
- Confucianism is “family centered,” and social life cannot be separated from family relations. Organizations and groups are expected to run like families and reflect collective values. Confucianism is based on the “Five Relationships”: father and son, husband and wife, king and minister, elder and younger

brother, and friend and friend. The essential characteristic of these relationships except the last is *hierarchy*. Thus, the state is superior to its citizens whose duty is to serve the state, as sons are bound to serve their fathers.

- Like the father of a family who controls every aspect of family life, the state should play a leading role in economic development and public welfare.

The “chummy” relationship among Asian governments, politicians, banks, and businesses in which political influence or family ties provided preferential access to public funds and bank loans was sarcastically dubbed in the West “crony capitalism.” Western liberals regard crony capitalism as corrupt because it allows enterprises to prosper owing to political connections rather than economic performance. However, Asians regard this relationship as legitimate because it reflects Confucian obligations among family members and friends. In a Confucian society, the obligation of friends to one another is profoundly important – the glue that holds society together – just as hierarchical relations between superior and inferior in political and economic affairs are analogous to relations between father and children. In addition, Asian leaders praised their export-driven model of capitalism, which, it seemed, was surpassing Western “casino capitalism”⁴³ based on competition and free markets.

Asia’s 1997–98 financial crisis was a challenge to Asian values as Western observers were quick to point out. Combined with a dramatic upswing in the US economy in the 1990s, the crisis seemed to deny the superiority of Asian values and placed its advocates on the defensive. When the economic storm struck, Asians were traumatized to discover that their governments would have to ignore the customary practices of citizens. They were angered by having to accept “reforms” that ran counter to political, economic, and cultural norms that had governed behavior for many generations. Interest in Asian values and state capitalism, however, has grown again with the

apparent failure of Western neoliberal economic practices evident in the global downturn of 2008–10.

A very different, political community based on religion evolved in the Middle East, the Muslim Caliphate, and for several centuries it appeared destined to dominate global politics. Islam clashed with Christian Europe shortly after its birth, and the conflict between Islam and the West is a major issue in contemporary global politics. In the end, the territorial state was imposed on the Islamic world as Europe expanded its influence around the world, but, as we were grimly reminded on September 11, 2001, the contest between Islam and the West never ceased. Let us examine the emergence and evolution of the Islamic community.

Islam’s founding and expansion

In what follows, we trace Islam from its birth in Arabia in the seventh century to the twenty-first century, focusing on the emergence of the Caliphate, a political community of Muslims that extended across the Islamic community of believers, and Islam’s recurrent conflicts with the West. As we chronicle Islam, we focus on clashes between Islam and the West as Islam made inroads into Europe and as Europeans tried to reclaim Jerusalem. However, our examination also reveals historical divisions among Muslims, particularly between the Sunni and Shia sects, and between Arab and Turkish Muslims.

The Caliphate

All religions have their religious zealots, and many have contributed to bloody wars. Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was home to endless wars between Catholics and Protestants; Spain in 1492 was the scene of “ethnic cleansing” of Muslims and Jews. Hindus and Muslims in the

Indian subcontinent have almost ceaselessly experienced or been on the verge of communal violence. Similarly, Islam's spread between the eighth and fourteenth centuries occurred by war and conquest. Islam was, in political scientist Adda Bozeman's expression, an "empire-in-motion" and "the greatest of all caravans."⁴⁴ Relations among Muslims, particularly the Sunni and Shia sects, also have been prone to violence as each sought to advance its own interpretation of Islam. Yet, as in the other religions just mentioned, the vast majority of Muslims are peaceable, and Muslims in many societies, for example Indonesia and Turkey, harbor moderate religious views.

Islam enjoys a long and illustrious past during which the religion spread worldwide out of Arabia, and a great and highly cultured empire, the **Caliphate**, took form. The saga began in the seventh century in the city of Mecca, when Muhammad (571–632), a member of an Arab tribe called the *Quaraish*, launched a third great religious movement that worshipped a single god. Muslims believe Muhammad is the third and final prophet of God, or Allah (the Arabic name for God), after Moses and Jesus, and that he was visited by the Archangel Gabriel, who revealed Allah's word to him and instructed him to preach what came to be known as Islam. Muhammad recited these revelations to his companions, who compiled them in a text called the **Koran**. Muhammad's preaching on **monotheism** and social and economic justice stirred opposition in Mecca, whose inhabitants were predominantly **polytheistic** and tribal. Forced to flee by his own tribal leaders, Muhammad traveled to Medina. His flight from Mecca to Medina, known as the *Hegira*, marks the beginning of Islam. In practice, the new religion had much in common with its predecessors, Judaism and Christianity. In fact, all three regard themselves as the "children of Abraham," whom they believe to be a prophet and the first monotheist.

At the time of Islam's birth, the dominant powers in the region were the Byzantine and

Persian (Sassanid) empires. The warriors of Islam conquered these empires between 632 and 637. Islam spread rapidly beyond Arabia on Arabic fervor and horses until it reached Spain in the west and India in the east. Egypt was Islamized by 641 and was conquered in the following years. The forces of Islam completed the conquest of North Africa, reaching modern Morocco in 669. In 710, they crossed the Strait of Gibraltar, into Spain, occupying the entire Iberian Peninsula in the following eight years. Islam's advance into Europe was finally halted in 732 by the Frankish leader Charles Martel (688–741) in the Battle of Poitiers, near modern-day Tours, in France.

DID YOU KNOW?

Jihad, which is a duty of every Muslim, has two meanings. One is relatively benign, referring to the struggle of Muslims to resist passion and vice. The other, which is proclaimed by militant Muslims, refers to holy war against non-Muslims and the forcible spread of Islam.

The eighth to the eleventh centuries witnessed the flowering of Islamic civilization. In 750, the Ummayyad dynasty in Damascus, which had been established in 661, was overthrown and replaced by the Abbassid dynasty in Baghdad. Islamic culture flourished and reached its apogee under Abbassid Caliph Harun al-Rashid (786–809). The dynasty survived until the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258. During this period, Baghdad became a center of trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa. In fact, Europe owes much to Islam's preservation of classical Greek drama, philosophy, and science. "Arab scholars," as one historian observes, "were studying Aristotle when Charlemagne and his lords were reportedly learning to write their names. Scientists in Cordova, with their seventeen great libraries . . . enjoyed

luxurious baths at a time when washing the body was considered a dangerous custom at the University of Oxford.”⁴⁵

Cracks in the Islamic community

Islamic expansion was accompanied by political turmoil, especially following the death of the Prophet, and the question of who should succeed him would bedevil Muslims up to the present. When Muhammad died, a caliph (successor) was chosen to rule, but, since the caliph lacked prophetic authority, he enjoyed secular power but not authority in religious doctrine. According to the renowned Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the Caliphate was “a substitute for Muhammad inasmuch as it serves, like him, to protect the religion and to exercise leadership in the world.”⁴⁶ The first caliph was Abu Bakr (573–634). He and his three successors were known

as the “rightly guided,” or orthodox, caliphs (*rashidun*). They ruled according to the Koran and the practices of Muhammad. Thereafter, Islam divided into two hostile factions, Sunni and Shia, a division that still divides the Islamic world. In addition, the single Caliphate began dividing into rival dynasties by the end of the eighth century.

The Sunni–Shia split began when Ali ibn Abi Talib (599–661), Muhammad’s son-in-law and heir, assumed the Caliphate after the murder of his predecessor, Uthman (574–656). Civil war ensued with the defeat of Ali at the hands of Uthman’s cousin and governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya Ummayyad (602–80) at the Battle of Suffin. Those who believed that Ali was the rightful caliph took the name of Shiat Ali (the partisans of Ali). Shortly afterwards Ali was murdered. Shias believe that Ali was the last legitimate caliph and that the Caliphate should pass down *only* to direct descendants of Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and Ali, her husband. Ali’s son, Hussein



Map 2.5
Expansion of
Islam by 1500

Source:
Adapted from
*The Cambridge
Illustrated
History of the
Islamic World*

(626–80), pursued his claim to the Caliphate, but the Umayyad rulers slaughtered him and his followers at the Battle of Karbala (680), a city in modern Iraq that remains the holiest of all sites for Shia Muslims. Muhammad's family line ended in 873, but Shias believe that this last descendant had not died but is "hidden" and will ultimately return. Some centuries later, while still awaiting the last *imam's* (religious leader) reappearance, the Shia established a council of 12 religious scholars or *ulema* that select a supreme *imam*. In recent decades, the late Ayatollah (holy man) Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–89) enjoyed that status in Iran (see Map 2.5).

The dominant faction of Islam was known as Sunni. Sunnis did not demand that the caliph be a direct descendant of Muhammad and were prepared to follow Arabic tribal customs in government. Political leadership, in their view, was in the hands of the Muslim community at large. Since the first four caliphs, the religious and political authorities in Islam have never again united into a political community.

Islam and Christendom: the Crusades

Clashes between Muslims and Western Europeans continued, especially during Europe's Crusades (1095–1271) to regain the Holy Land for Christianity (see Figure 2.3). Islam still posed a threat to Europe when Pope Urban II (1035–99) declared in 1095 that Muslims had conquered Jerusalem and that they forbade Christian pilgrims to come to the city to pray. Urban wanted Christians to retake Jerusalem from the Muslims. "This royal city . . . situated at the center of the earth, is now held captive by the enemies of Christ and is subjected, by those who do not know God, to the worship of the heathen. She seeks, therefore, and desires to be liberated and ceases not to implore you to come to her aid." People shouted, "It is the will of God!"⁴⁷ He then summoned Christian Europe to free Jerusalem by

force in the First Crusade (1095–97). Many of the knights who went off to wage the crusade died of hunger, thirst, or disease, but they conquered Jerusalem in a bloody slaughter and established a Christian military presence that lasted for about 200 years in what was called the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Two additional crusades were launched in the twelfth century. The Second Crusade began after the Muslim capture of Edessa in modern-day Turkey, and it included a king of France and a Holy Roman emperor. However, the expedition was decimated and ended in failure, although the European outposts in the region were able to survive. In 1187, Jerusalem was regained by a Muslim army commanded by Prince Saladin (1138–93), then ruler of Egypt.

That event triggered the Third Crusade, the most famous of these expeditions, which was jointly commanded by the greatest princes in Christendom: Richard I "the Lion Hearted" of England (1157–99), Philip II Augustus of France



"Run for your lives!
It's the coming of Christianity!"

Figure 2.3 Onward, Christian soldiers!

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

(1165–1223), and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1122–90) (who died before reaching the Holy Land). The three were rivals, and the crusade accomplished little except the founding of several Christian cities along the Mediterranean coast. This was the last serious effort to wrest the Holy Land from Muslim control. The consequences of these expeditions are still with us, to be seen in the many crusader ruins and churches in the Middle East and in the uproar that George W. Bush caused among Muslims after the terrorist attack of 9/11 in referring to an American “crusade” against terrorism.

DID YOU KNOW?

Saladin or Salah al-Din was an ethnic Kurd who was born in Tikrit in modern Iraq, the same city in which Saddam Hussein was born.

The Ottoman Empire – Islam versus the West

With the end of the Crusades, the story of Islam turns to the Turks. Describing Turkey’s Ottoman Empire, political scientist Michael Barnett notes that it was far from being a territorial state in the European tradition. Instead: “Until the late 19th century, inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent existed within a variety of overlapping authorities and political structures. The Ottoman Empire, Islam, and local tribal and village structures all contested for and held sway over various features of peoples’ lives.” It was “great power intrusions,” notably Russian, British, and French, that primarily set forces in motion in Turkey, stirring up the desire to emulate the Western states. Nevertheless, in Turkey, as elsewhere where Islam held sway, “while the great powers established a new geopolitical map, the political loyalties of the inhab-

itants enveloped these boundaries and challenged the very legitimacy of that map.”⁴⁸

Turkish nomads first settled in Asia Minor to escape the Mongols. They converted to Islam in the eighth and ninth centuries. The Seljuks, a Turkish people, settled in the Caliphate and were employed as mercenary warriors, especially against other Turkish groups, and finally, seized power from the Arab rulers of Baghdad. As Seljuk power waned, a number of small Turkish states emerged in the frontier lands between the Byzantine and Islamic empires. Led by a Muslim warrior named Osman (1258–1324), one group, the Ottomans, began to raid Christian Byzantine towns in 1299. The Ottomans were a small Turkish tribe that arose in Anatolia after 1071 and were granted a small territory within the Islamic Empire. In 1301, the Ottomans seized power from the Seljuks, and ruled the new empire until its final dismemberment in 1922.

The Ottoman Empire, the new site of the Caliphate, expanded vigorously (see Map 2.6). First, Osman successfully defeated the redoubtable Byzantine Empire (the eastern half of the old Roman Empire and the home of eastern Christianity) in 1302. This defeat returned the clash between Islam and Christianity to center stage. Between 1362 and 1389, the Ottomans penetrated further into Christian lands in the Balkans. This climaxed in their triumph over the Serbs in Kosovo, a battle that became a central myth in later Serbian nationalism. After a period of weakness in the early fifteenth century, a new era of Ottoman expansion began, climaxing in the conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the capital of Byzantium, in 1453. And in the first decades of the sixteenth century intense conflict between Sunnis and Shiites produced Ottoman expansion into eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Arabia.

It was then that the Ottomans’ greatest ruler, Sultan Suleyman “The Magnificent” (1520–66), came to power. Under Suleyman, the conquests of Syria and Serbia were completed, the island of Rhodes was seized, the Mediterranean and Aegean



Map 2.6 Ottoman Empire, 1580

seas became Ottoman lakes, and incursions into Hungary began, which led to the capture of Buda and Pest (today, the united capital city of that country). The Ottomans even laid siege to the Hapsburg capital, Vienna. Between 1541 and 1543, they seized Hungary and Slovenia from the Catholic Hapsburg dynasty. In 1524, they penetrated Iran, then southern Iraq in 1533, leading to dominance in the Persian Gulf.

Although expansion continued – Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus as far as the Caspian Sea – and the struggle with Iran’s Shiites persisted, the Ottoman tide began to ebb with the defeat of the Turkish fleet at the hands of a European fleet in the decisive Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Indecisive and episodic war with the Hapsburgs and Iranians also continued, and rebellion in the empire was endemic. Increasingly, the Ottomans were forced to grant trade concessions to European countries such as England and Holland. European interference in Ottoman provinces grew, and in 1649 Louis XIV of France

declared his country to be the protector of the Christian Maronite community in Lebanon. Finally, the limits of Ottoman expansion were reached. Defeat followed defeat with Austria (1663–64) and Russia (1677–81), a new siege of Vienna was broken (1683), and Ottoman forces fled in disarray. The Ottomans continued to fight various European alliances until defeats led to the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which began the Ottoman withdrawal from Europe.

DID YOU KNOW?

Lepanto was the last naval engagement to feature oared galleys. Among the casualties at Lepanto was the Spaniard, Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616), author of *Don Quixote*.

Thereafter, European supremacy over the Ottoman Turks grew. Wars with Russia under Tsar Peter the Great (1672–1725) and his heirs over the next 100 years and with Venice, Austria, and the other European powers further weakened the Ottomans and gave rise to a Russian Empire ruled by the Romanov dynasty. Egypt came under the control of a military caste, the Mamelukes, and the Ottomans were expelled from Iran. Greece was liberated in 1830 with the help of Europeans including the English romantic poet Lord Byron (1788–1824), who died in the effort. Owing to a new Russian war in 1829 the Ottoman Empire, now the “sick man of Europe,” withdrew from many of its Balkan conquests, including Serbia. The Crimean War (1853–56) ended with vague Turkish promises to Russia to respect rights of non-Muslims, including Orthodox Christians, in Ottoman territories. Finally, beginning with the Treaty of San Stefano with Russia (1876) and the Congress of Berlin (1878), a series of events led to growing Austro-Russian competition with the Ottomans in the Balkans and, finally, the onset of World War One.

The last Ottoman sultan reigned between 1918 and 1922. The Sultanate was abolished on

November 1, 1922, and the office of Caliph was abolished two years later. The Turkish Republic was declared on October 29, 1923, and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1881–1938) became the new country’s first president. As a result, that part of the empire located in the Middle East was divided up among the victors of World War One, leading to the emergence of most of the states in the region (see Map 2.7). Atatürk established a modern, secular Turkish territorial state in place of the Sultanate, and in recent years the Republic of Turkey has become a vigorous democracy, governed by a popular and moderately Islamic political party and enjoying good relations with both the West and the countries of the Middle East.

Militant Muslims like Osama bin Laden have declared war on the interstate system that emerged in Europe. They recall Islam’s glorious past and nostalgically call for the restoration of the Caliphate. Such militants are among the factors that are eroding and transforming the interstate system that was born in Europe over three centuries ago. In Chapter 7, we shall return to the story of Islam.



Map 2.7 The Middle East, 1920s

CONTROVERSY

Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), an Islamist group, founded in 1953 in Jordan, declares as its ultimate goal the establishment of a modern-day Caliphate encompassing all the countries of the Muslim World and ruled by Islamic law. Unlike Al Qaeda, this group claims it uses non-violent means to this end. It asserts “Muslims have to be ‘enlightened’ through education, propaganda, and political agitation until they fully understand the need to seize the reins of power in their own countries and unite the *ummah*, the global community of believers.”⁴⁹ The group has long been popular across Europe and Central Asia, and it is gaining support across the Arab world. In August 2007, at a gathering in Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, more than 80,000 supporters assembled to call for a new Caliphate.

However, despite claims it advocates peaceful change, Hizb ut-Tahrir is fiercely anti-Western and many analysts are concerned the group seeks to radicalize Islam. The organization has been banned in many Arab countries, Central Asia, and Europe. Is a new Caliphate likely to emerge? In fact, one analysis argues that Hizb ut-Tahrir has yet “to gain significant traction in countries like Egypt or Oman whose people are reluctant to see their distinctive historical, ethnic and cultural identities submerged within a Caliphate. HT has also foundered in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states where political discourse is often simplistic and clan based. Gulf citizens recognize that a Caliphate would force them to share their oil wealth with the rest of the Muslim world.”⁵⁰

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen how the territorial state evolved in Europe out of the medieval feudal system to become the central actor in global politics for three centuries. However, the territorial state, which was globalized as Europe conquered much of the rest of the world, was historically contingent. It was never the only form of political community in world politics. Indeed, this chapter has examined two prominent stateless political communities – the Chinese and Islamic empires – that dominated different historical epochs. Both collided with expanding Western states and, although defeated, memories of them still influence the imagination of many Asians and Muslims.

Europe’s state system, however, was the scene of two great twentieth-century cataclysms, and the world wars persuaded many people, especially liberals, that the state system was no longer viable. Thus, following both wars, international and nongovernmental institutions were established

that sought to limit state sovereignty. The next chapter examines the key events that led to the Great War (World War One) in 1914 and World War Two in 1939. World War One began the process of decolonization during which the peoples of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa finally achieved political independence. It also witnessed the collapse of four mighty empires – Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian – and produced Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, creating tensions that later detonated the Cold War. World War Two accelerated the process of decolonization until virtually no area of the world remained under colonial rule.

Student activities

Map analysis

Refer to Maps 2.1 and 2.3. Compare them to a current map of Europe. How have political

boundaries and divisions changed over time? Do any political entities on these maps still exist today?

Cultural materials

Islam does not permit the depiction of people in art or architecture, instead often using geometric patterns to represent the spiritual, not physical, qualities of people and objects. Circles and repeating patterns represent the infinite nature of Allah. Such patterns are evident in two of Islam's greatest architectural achievements – the Alhambra, a palace that was built in Granada, Spain, between 1338 and 1390, and the Taj Mahal, a mausoleum in Agra, India, that was built between 1630 and 1648 by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jehan to honor his deceased wife, Mumtaz Mahal. The Taj has a black and white chessboard marble floor, four tall minarets at the corners of the mausoleum, and a grand dome in the middle.

Another trait of Islamic architecture is a focus on interior space. Traditional Islamic homes and buildings are designed with high, windowless exterior walls and an interior courtyard. The exterior walls ensure privacy and protect inhabitants from severe climate. In contrast to the plain façade, the inside of these buildings may be ornate. This style is called architecture of the veil.

Think about your own culture as it is depicted in art and architecture. For example, consider how the use of space reflects culture. Pick a home, school, office building, or place of worship. Which spaces in each type of building are considered public? Which are private? How does their design or decoration provide insight into culture? Also consider what the artwork used to decorate these spaces tells you about culture.

Further reading

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- Spruyt, Hendrik, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Story of how the territorial state in Europe triumphed over rival forms of political organization.
- Strayer, Joseph, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). How the territorial state emerged from the Middle Ages.
- Van Creveld, Martin, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Riveting analysis of the factors producing the territorial state and of those leading to its erosion.

1870	1879	1904	1914–18	1919	1931
German unification	Austro-German Dual Alliance	Anglo-French Entente Cordiale	World War One	Treaty of Versailles	Japan invades Manchuria

3 The world wars

On June 28, 1914, the heir to the throne of Austria–Hungary was assassinated during an official visit to the Bosnian city of Sarajevo. At 2 p.m. on Thursday, July 30, 1914, Tsar Nicholas II (1868–1918), Russia’s ruler, met with his foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov (1860–1927), to discuss the crisis that was engulfing Europe following the assassination. The Tsar, under pressure from his generals to mobilize Russia’s armies to meet the possibility of war, balked, declaring that he did not want the moral responsibility for “the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their deaths.”¹ The foreign minister insisted, arguing that it was vital “to do everything necessary to meet war fully armed and under conditions most favorable to us.” Nicholas finally gave way, and Sazonov telephoned the army’s chief of staff with this message: “Now you can smash your telephone [so that the tsar could not change his mind again]. Give your orders, General!”² Although the tsar’s decision made war inevitable, in his diary he wrote, “After lunch I received Sazonov and Tatischev. I went for a walk by myself. The weather was hot . . . had a delightful bathe in the sea.”³

This chapter focuses on the world wars: World War One (1914–18), then called the Great War, its causes, and its consequences, including World War Two (1939–45). Examining these wars allows

you to observe many of the issues of war and peace that we will discuss in later chapters, especially the relationship between politics and war. Analyzing the causes of the world wars also demonstrates efforts to build theory and explain war by reference to levels of analysis. These events are important in another respect as well: they began the modern era of global politics.

The chapter opens by analyzing the events that so escalated fear and hostility in Europe that war seemed inevitable in 1914. The chapter then examines explanations for the outbreak of World War One according to their levels of analysis and illustrates how scholars have used this case to generalize about causes of war (see Figure 3.1). It then describes how this war altered global politics and ushered in the modern world, reviewing the sequence of events during what E. H. Carr called the “20 years’ crisis”⁴ between 1919 and 1939 that led to another world war: the harsh treatment of Germany in the Versailles Treaty, the failure of the League of Nations, and the policy of **appeasement** practiced by the West in the 1930s. The chapter closes by assessing explanations for World War Two, again sorting them by levels of analysis.

1933	1935	1936	1938	1939–45
Hitler comes to power in Germany	Italy invades Ethiopia	Hitler reoccupies the Rhineland	The Munich agreement to divide Czechoslovakia	World War Two



Figure 3.1 *The Battle of the Somme* by Richard Caton Woodville II (1856–1927)

Source: Private collection/Mark Fiennes/The Bridgeman Art Library

Events leading to the Great War

The Great War began as a local collision between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, triggered by the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914), heir to the Hapsburg throne, by a young Bosnian-Serb nationalist named Gavrilo Princip (1894–1918). The local conflict spread because the members of two major alliances

upheld their commitments: Great Britain, France, and Russia (Triple Entente), and Germany and Austria-Hungary (Triple Alliance). Although Italy was also a member of the Triple Alliance, it failed to meet its obligations. *These alliances were unique in that, unlike the shifting balance-of-power alliances of the previous century, they were permanent, even in peacetime.*

There were both long- and short-term sources of World War One. Throughout the nineteenth century, the world had undergone profound

change. Industrialization and nationalism expanded the states' capacity to fight large wars. The century also featured growing racism associated with the popularity of **Social Darwinism**. That concept – a distortion of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection – was misapplied to states and people. Social Darwinists argued that a process of competition and struggle among human beings determined who survived. These views were associated with unfettered capitalism and were used to justify war as the means of state survival. The idea was also used to justify **imperialism** by those who claimed that some races are superior to others. Later, the Nazis eagerly seized on similar ideas.

In light of such factors, claiming that war started because of the assassination of an archduke would be trivial. Furthermore, because events like the assassination are *unique* to a single war, they tell us little about the sources of war more generally. In this section, we take a broader view, exploring many related events that led to war. We begin by examining individual-level explanations of the war including the outlook of political leaders at the time. We then turn to unit-level explanations such as the claim that certain states were ambitious and aggressive, while others were torn by ethnic and social turmoil. Finally, we consider system-level explanations including the growth in German power that changed Europe's distribution of war.

German unification and Europe's diplomatic revolution

The years between the turn of the century up to 1914 gave rise to a series of dangerous trends and events that exacerbated tensions among Europe's major countries that eventually exploded in a world war. For realists, the most important factor was a shift in the years before 1914 in Europe's **distribution of power** that resulted from the unification of Germany following three wars – Schleswig-Holstein (1864), Austro-German

(1866), and Franco-Prussian (1870) (see Map 3.1). United Germany was governed by an emperor. The emperor appointed a chancellor, who was responsible to the monarch and was charged with overseeing the government. The architect and manager of German unification before and after the wars of unification was the powerful and brilliant Prince von Bismarck.

Bismarck was a skilled practitioner of power politics and had managed the foreign affairs first of Prussia and then united Germany since 1862. Cautious and conservative by nature, following Germany's unification, he was content with maintaining the status quo in Europe and pursuing limited objectives. Although not a nationalist himself, he manipulated German nationalism for his purposes and pursued a policy of **Realpolitik**. Repeatedly he invoked nationalist feelings to cow political opponents or ram spending bills through Germany's parliament.

As a result of Bismarck's efforts, German unification greatly increased the country's territory and population as well as promoting economic expansion. Thus, Germany surpassed Britain in 1900 in steel production, vital for railroads and armaments, and outpaced the rest of the world in chemical and electrical industries. Overall, German per capita income quadrupled between 1860 and 1913, and the aggregate size of the German economy increased six-fold.⁵ Such growth fueled concern elsewhere in Europe that Germany was becoming too powerful. Still, as long as the political environment remained stable and tranquil, Germany faced little hostility.

Having unified Germany, Bismarck harbored no further territorial ambitions. Instead, he sought to preserve the status quo in Europe by enmeshing potential adversaries in a web of treaties constructed to maintain the isolation of France, which had become Germany's implacable adversary owing to Germany's seizure of France's frontier provinces Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War. To this end, he first formed the Dual Alliance (1879), by which Germany and



Map 3.1 The Unification of Germany, 1865–66

Austria–Hungary agreed to aid each other in the event either was attacked. He also organized the Three Emperors League (1872, 1881), which promised solidarity among Europe’s three conservative monarchs (Russia’s tsar, Germany’s kaiser, and Austria–Hungary’s emperor). Bismarck’s third arrangement was the Reinsurance Treaty (1887), which promised that Russia and Germany would remain benevolently neutral if either became involved in war. The parties were not bound to neutrality, however, if Germany attacked France

or if Russia attacked Austria. On the surface, the three agreements *seemed* to contradict one another because Russia and Austria were engaged in fierce competition in the **Balkans** that could spark a war between them. Bismarck did all he could to prevent this, declaring that the whole of the Balkans was “not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.”⁶

In 1890, the recently enthroned Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859–1941) dismissed Germany’s widely admired and experienced “Iron Chancellor”

Bismarck in what turned out to be a catastrophic decision. Wilhelm, like many of the kings and princes of the time, was closely linked by blood and personal friendship to other monarchs, notably his cousins King George V of Britain (1865–1936) and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, his uncle King Edward VII of Britain (1841–1910), and his grandmother, Britain's Queen Victoria (1819–1901). Unlike the previous kaiser, who had let Bismarck run matters, Kaiser Wilhelm was impulsive and stubborn and wanted to make his own decisions. Moreover, he harbored great ambitions for a German empire. Unlike Bismarck, who had no interest in competing with Britain and France for overseas colonies and imperial booty, Wilhelm eagerly sought colonies in Africa, China, and the southern Pacific to increase German trade and prestige. In time, his "world politics" (*Weltpolitik*) amassed an overseas empire of over 1 million square miles and some 13 million inhabitants. The combination of growing German military and economic power alienated and frightened other European countries and the result was a process in which adversaries began to gang up against Germany.

Wilhelm's ambition and belligerence frightened other leaders and led them to oppose his policies. The Kaiser's ambitions alone would have stirred suspicion among other European powers, but they seemed even more dangerous owing to his provocative words and behavior. He loved to wear uniforms, strut in front of his soldiers, and in the words of one observer, "always negotiated with a pistol on the table." An example of his combustible diplomacy was his outspoken support of the efforts of South Africa's Boers to defeat Great Britain in the Boer War, which inflamed British public opinion. Another was the so-called *Daily Telegraph* Affair. This curious incident involved an interview with the Kaiser that was published in London's *Daily Telegraph* on October 8, 1908, in which he referred to the English as "mad as hares" and indicated that the Germans disliked the British. In the same interview, he also insulted the Russians, French, and Japanese.

Neither the Kaiser nor Bismarck's successors as chancellor had the Iron Chancellor's subtlety or skill in manipulating Germany's complex system of alliances. After Bismarck was forced to retire, one of the Kaiser's first acts was to terminate the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, because, he claimed, it was incompatible with the Dual Alliance. In doing so, Wilhelm alienated Russia, ended French isolation, and set in motion a diplomatic revolution in Europe.

In a stroke, the Kaiser brought an end to Bismarck's delicate alliance system, and new alliances formed to counter German power. On August 18, 1892, Russia and France concluded an agreement to aid each other in the event of hostilities with the members of the Triple Alliance, pledging that their military "forces shall engage to the full with such speed that *Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.*"⁷ In 1898, following a military confrontation at an isolated desert oasis called Fashoda in the Sudan, British and French leaders negotiated an end to their colonial disputes, agreeing that Britain would control Egypt and the Suez Canal, while France would enjoy a privileged position in Morocco. Their agreement, the Entente Cordiale, was reached on April 8, 1904. In 1907 the Anglo-Russian Entente ended colonial disputes between Russia and Britain in Persia, Afghanistan, China, and India. Germany was never mentioned in either agreement, but Germans rightly regarded the end of these colonial tensions as steps toward an anti-German alliance. Indeed, Germany viewed the Anglo-Russian Entente as a last link in the Triple Entente that encircled the Germans in 1914, completing the pre-war alliance system (see Table 3.1). Germany was encircled, and mistrust between the two alliances deepened.

In sum, this diplomatic revolution formalized the division of Europe, as other countries came to fear and oppose German power and intentions. Nowhere was this dislike more evident than in Great Britain. And, as the division of Europe into hostile alliances took place, Europe's power distribution continued to change owing to arms races.

Table 3.1 Key European alliances prior to 1914

The Dual Alliance	1879	Germany, Austria–Hungary
Three Emperor’s League	1881	Germany, Russia, Austria–Hungary
Austro-Serbian Alliance	1881	Austria, Serbia
The Triple Alliance	1882	Germany, Austria–Hungary, Italy
The Austro-German-Romanian Alliance	1883	Austria–Hungary, Germany, Romania
The Franco-Russian Alliance	1894	France, Russia
The Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention	1902	Russia, Bulgaria
The Entente Cordiale	1904	France, Britain
The Anglo-Russian Entente	1907	Britain, Russia
The Triple Entente	1907	France, Britain, Russia

Arms races, nationalism, and the Balkan imbroglio

In 1898, an Anglo-German naval arms race was triggered by the first German Fleet Act. Two years later, a second German law doubled the number of ships to be built. Additional increases in German battle fleet were legislated 1906, 1908, and 1912. German naval expansion was carried out by Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), who declared, “For Germany the most dangerous naval enemy at present is England. It is also the enemy against which we most urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor.”⁸ Although the German fleet would not equal Britain’s, Britain had a great empire and global responsibilities, whereas the German navy would be concentrated in the Baltic and North Seas, where it posed an immediate danger to Britain itself and to the British home fleet.

The Anglo-German naval arms race intensified Anglo-German hostility and suspicion and sparked the more general interest in the relationship between war and arms racing described in Chapter 8 (p. 267). Although Britain viewed Germany’s growth in industry, population, trade, and even colonies as tolerable, it saw the growing German navy as a mortal threat. And British concern was well founded. Germany’s naval expansion, which involved increasing the number of big-gun battleships, then regarded as the ultimate weapon in naval warfare, seemed to threaten Britain’s dominance of the seas so essen-

tial to maintaining the British Empire. Worse, Germany’s naval expansion seemed to challenge the security of the British Isles, which for centuries had depended on naval superiority as protection from invasion. Before the arms race ended, German naval construction had caused a virtual panic in Britain. Only so long as the British navy reigned supreme, was the country invulnerable to German armies. Britain also imported much of its food and raw materials from overseas, and these were vulnerable to Germany’s growing fleet.

To meet the perceived deadly threat from Germany, Britain began constructing a new type of battleship that featured improvements in speed, armaments, and armor – notably the number and quality of its big guns. The first, *HMS Dreadnought*, was commissioned in 1905. Germany quickly began constructing its own dreadnoughts. *HMS Dreadnought* made existing battleships obsolete. It was an inherently dangerous weapon because it negated Britain’s earlier superiority in older battleships, thus threatening to alter the naval balance between the two countries in Germany’s favor. The dreadnought competition greatly intensified British fears, and on March 29, 1909, the British Foreign Secretary declared that: “[T]he situation is grave . . . (and) is created by the German program [of building a battle fleet]. Whether the program is carried out quickly or slowly the fact of its existence makes a new situation. When that program is completed, Germany, a great country close to our own shore, will have a fleet of thirty-three Dreadnoughts . . . It is true that there is not one of them in commission yet; but it is equally

true that the whole program . . . when completed . . . will be the most powerful fleet that the world has yet seen. That imposes upon us the necessity, of which we are now at the beginning – except so far as we have Dreadnoughts already – of rebuilding the whole of our fleet.”⁹

The Anglo-German naval rivalry was accompanied by an arms race on land that pitted France and Russia against Germany and Austria–Hungary. Both sides sought to conscript ever larger numbers of soldiers into their armed forces in order to be better prepared for a war they feared was imminent. Europe became an armed camp. In the words of President Woodrow Wilson’s personal adviser, Colonel Edward M. House (1858–1938), it was “militarism run stark mad.”¹⁰

The alliance system and the tensions generated by arms racing fueled nationalism all over Europe, which in turn intensified tensions and mutual suspicion. German nationalism focused on achieving a world empire to match the country’s growing economic and military might. French nationalism focused on regaining Alsace-Lorraine and reversing the verdict of the Franco-Prussian War. Russian nationalism emphasized defending fellow Slavs in Serbia and elsewhere from Austria–Hungary’s threats and regaining the prestige that Russia had lost in its defeat during the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Finally, in Austria–Hungary the nationalism of the Slavic peoples who were dominated by their Austrian–Hungarian rulers took the form of violent efforts to achieve national independence.

Many tensions plagued relations within and between Austria–Hungary and Russia stemming from security and territorial issues. The key question was which of these two empires would control the Balkans, with Russia acting as protector of the Slavs within and outside Austria–Hungary, and which would fill the power vacuum that was growing in the Balkans as Ottoman Turkey, derisively referred to as the “sick man of Europe,” retreated from the region.

Crisis diplomacy

The years before 1914 were punctuated by repeated international crises, often pitting Germany against Britain, France, and Russia. These crises tested the solidarity of the alliance system, revealed Kaiser Wilhelm’s harsh negotiating style, and reflected the waves of nationalism and ethnic conflict that were sweeping across Europe. At least four incidents merit brief attention: the First Moroccan Crisis (1905–1906), the Bosnian Crisis (1908–1909), the Second Moroccan Crisis (1911), and the Balkan Wars (1912–13).

The First Moroccan Crisis began after Britain agreed to support French claims to that country. Germany was incensed by growing French influence in Morocco, which violated an earlier treaty and excluded Germany from a strategic position in North Africa. In March 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm sailed to Morocco, where he declared Morocco’s sultan to be an independent sovereign and offered German protection against French influence. The Germans also called for a conference to discuss Morocco’s future. At the Algeiras Conference, held in 1906, Germany tried to split its adversaries but instead found itself isolated. Only Austria–Hungary supported Germany, while Britain, the United States, and Russia backed France. As a result, France achieved greater influence in Morocco than it had already enjoyed, and France and Germany were ever more alienated from each other.

Five years later, a second Moroccan crisis erupted. The crisis was triggered after France dispatched troops to the city of Fez, ostensibly to restore order. Claiming that France’s action violated the 1906 agreement that had ended the First Moroccan Crisis, Germany sent a warship to the Moroccan port of Agadir. Again, Britain backed France, and again Germany was forced to back down. The episode further poisoned Franco-German relations and reaffirmed Franco-British unity in the face of German belligerence.

Another crisis exploded in 1908, this time in the Balkans, and brought Europe to the brink of

war. The crisis centered on the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, formerly an Ottoman province in the Balkans, which had fallen under Austro-Hungarian control in 1878. In 1908, while Europe's attention was focused on other events including revolution in Turkey and Russia's defeat by Japan, Austria-Hungary decided to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina formally and make it part of its empire.

The crisis opened with a meeting between the Austrian and Russian foreign ministers on September 19, 1908. A trade of sorts was in the wind: Russia would ignore the Austrian annexation, and, in return, the Austrians would support Russian efforts to secure free passage for its warships past Constantinople and through the Dardanelles from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. However, a misunderstanding over timing poisoned their relations. The Austrians declared the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 3, before Russia was able to gain the consent of the other European powers for its side of the deal. Given its military weakness so soon after defeat in Asia, Russia had no choice but to swallow its anger and allow Austria to proceed with the annexation, but the residue of bitterness between the two fostered Russian willingness to settle scores in 1914.

The fate of the Balkans continued to bedevil European politics when in 1912 the Ottoman Turks tried to reverse their declining fortunes. Two wars ensued (the First and Second Balkan Wars) over the fate of the region. In alliance with Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece, Serbia attacked Turkey. An armistice was reached in December, but Greece continued the war with Turkey. Hostilities resumed in January, after the Turks rejected the terms demanded by Serbia and its allies. Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro now ganged up against Bulgaria. A final treaty brought an end to hostilities in November 1913. The outcome was inconclusive, but almost everyone in the Balkans harbored grudges against one another and sought revenge for wrongs both real and imaginary.

The final descent to war

The combustible combination of nationalism, ethnic unrest, and territorial rivalry in the Balkans sparked the final crisis that brought on war – the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his duchess during a state visit to Sarajevo in Bosnia. Inhabited largely by Slavs, Bosnia had been the scene of numerous plots against Austria-Hungary's Hapsburg rulers. Austria-Hungary placed the blame for the assassination squarely on Serbia, which for years had been agitating for the independence of Austria-Hungary's Slav subjects, and saw the crisis as an opportunity to deal with Serbia once and for all. When Russia decided to support Serbia and Germany declared for Austria-Hungary, the alliance system enlarged a Balkan conflict into a continental conflagration.

Before reacting to the assassination, Austro-Hungarian officials wanted to make certain that they would have the assistance of their powerful ally, Germany, especially if Russia were to side with its fellow Slavs in Serbia. A German commitment, they believed, would deter Russia from entering the conflict. At a conference in Berlin, the Austro-Hungarian representative concluded that the German Kaiser had agreed to the proposed Austro-Hungarian actions against Serbia, and the Kaiser and his chancellor reported this information to the Emperor Franz Joseph (1830–1916) in a telegram to Austria-Hungary's foreign minister (see Key document, overleaf). Some historians argue that at least some of Germany's leaders, far from merely hoping to deter Russia, actually hoped that war would begin so that Germany could defeat Russia before Russia's growing military power made it a mortal threat to Germany.¹¹ The Kaiser's agreement to follow Austria-Hungary is often cited by those holding Germany responsible for World War One.

KEY DOCUMENT

THE BLANK CHECK,¹² JULY 6, 1914

After the assassination in Sarajevo, Count Leopold von Berchtold (1862–1942), the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, drew up a letter for the Emperor Franz Joseph to sign and send to Wilhelm II, to convince him of Serbia's responsibility for the deaths. On July 6, Wilhelm and his Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed Berchtold that Austria–Hungary could rely on Germany for support in whatever action was necessary to deal with Serbia – in effect, offering Austria–Hungary a “blank check.”

Telegram from the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, to the German Ambassador at Vienna.

Tschirschky, July 6, 1914

Confidential. For Your Excellency's personal information and guidance

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador yesterday delivered to the Emperor a confidential personal letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph, which depicts the present situation from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and describes the measures which Vienna has in view . . .

His Majesty (Wilhelm II) desires to say that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria–Hungary and thus the Triple Alliance as a result of the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavic agitation . . .

Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria–Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria–Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship.

Berlin, July 6, 1914

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

With German encouragement, the Austrians moved first. Three weeks after the assassination, claiming to have evidence of Serbian complicity in the plot to kill the archduke, the Austrian government issued an ultimatum to Serbia. The ultimatum, which Austria–Hungary's leaders had framed so that Serbia would find it unacceptable, demanded that Serbia agree virtually to surrender its sovereignty by permitting Austria–Hungary to run the investigation of the assassination plot in Serbia. The ultimatum and the list of demands that it contained were designed to end once and for all the Serb menace to the empire's unity

(see Key document, below). By forcing Serbia to reject the ultimatum, Austria–Hungary's leaders believed they would have the excuse they needed for war. In fact, Serbia responded by accepting most of Austria's demands. Nevertheless, on July 25, Austria–Hungary mobilized its army, three days later declaring war on Serbia.

Russia did decide to come to the defense of Serbia. In a memorandum to the Russian Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg, Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov explained that he and the Tsar believed that Austria would use the assassination as a pretext to attack Serbia. The Russians recognized that the

KEY DOCUMENT

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA,¹³ VIENNA, JULY 22, 1914

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th of June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria–Hungary from the Monarchy.

The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Serbian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders . . .

[T]he Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation.

It has . . . permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Serbian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of their “Official Journal” of the 13–26 of July the following declaration:

“The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria–Hungary – i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarch territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the above mentioned propaganda . . .

The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria–Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.”

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the “Official Bulletin” of the army

The Royal Serbian Government shall further undertake:

(1) To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

(2) To dissolve immediately the society styled “Narodna Odbrana,” to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy . . .

(3) To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria–Hungary;

(4) To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

(5) To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

(6) To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th of June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

(7) To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo;

(8) To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Shabatz Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

(9) To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th of June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

(10) To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening the 25th of July.

conflict might spread but felt obliged to assist Serbia because of intense public feelings in the country.

Fulfilling its promise to back Austria–Hungary, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, and then on Russia’s ally, France. The last major power to join the contest was Britain. Even though it had no formal legal commitment to its two partners in the Triple Entente, Britain had a serious moral obligation, especially to France with which it had made secret but informal military arrangements. This included a commitment that in the event of war, Britain would defend France’s coast along the Atlantic Ocean, while the French navy would defend the Mediterranean on its southern coast. The trigger for British entry in the war was Germany’s invasion of neutral Belgium. What had begun as a limited war in the Balkans had engulfed the whole of Europe.

In 1915, Italy joined the Triple Entente, betraying its earlier obligations as a member of the Triple Alliance in return for territorial promises made in the secret Treaty of London. And, in 1917, the United States, which had been neutral but had tilted toward Britain, joined the war owing to Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine attacks on both enemy and neutral vessels that were supplying its enemies. Millions of soldiers joined the war with enthusiasm, including a young Adolf Hitler (1889–1945), but that enthusiasm quickly turned to despair.

Explaining the outbreak of World War One

How do scholars explain the outbreak of World War One, and why do they wish to do so? Levels of analysis are a tool political scientists use to untangle the causes of wars and other events. As we examine the causes of World War One, we will employ the individual, unit, and global levels. Political scientists examine individual cases like that of World War One in order to generalize about war and identify similarities it may have with other wars.

Individual-level explanations

At the individual level, we can theorize that the war broke out because of *anachronistic leaders*. Rulers were out of step with the times and failed to resist the march to war. Rulers such as the emperors Franz Joseph, Wilhelm II, and Nicholas II were products of an earlier era of dynastic states. They were unable to understand the impact of nationalism, public opinion, industrialization, and technology, and they did not know how to cope with them. And, they were generally out of touch with their own citizens. They were hereditary rulers who had not been selected for merit or intelligence, and they were dedicated to preserving their personal rule and their dynasties more than preserving international peace.

Other individual-level explanations point the finger of blame at other individual characteristics of leaders of the time: German General Helmuth von Moltke’s (1848–1916) fear of Russia, Austrian Field Marshal Conrad von Hotzendorff’s (1852–1925) hawkish views toward Serbia, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey’s (1862–1933) indecision, and Tsar Nicholas’s weakness and vacillation. Kaiser Wilhelm’s personal characteristics, as we have seen, merit special mention in this regard.

At best, however, “anachronistic leaders” is only a partial explanation, because other more “modern” leaders behaved much in the same way. Thus, neither French nor British leaders, selected by democratic elections, did much better. In addition, the argument requires us to assume that such agents *could control events*; that is, we overlook structural factors like distribution of power.

Unit-level explanations

Another explanation, at the unit-level of analysis, is the *aggressive state* argument. Some historians claim that Germany started the war to prevent Russia from becoming too powerful and so gave Austria–Hungary a “blank check” to do what it

wished to Serbia. In fact, there were two wars: one declared by Austria–Hungary against Serbia was intended as a localized conflict; the other, a general war “deliberately started” by Germany “to keep from being overtaken by Russia.”¹⁴ In other words, although Germany was Europe’s most powerful country in 1914, it feared that in a few years Russia would surpass it. Russia would then pose a mortal threat to German security, and it would be too late for Germany to defeat Russia. German Chancellor Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921), one author of the “blank check” telegram, admitted that Germany had fought a **preventive war**, but he then shifted the blame to others: “Yes, My God, in a certain sense it was a preventive war. But when war was hanging above us, when it had to come in two years even more dangerously and more inescapably, and when the generals said now it is still possible without defeat, but not in two years time.”¹⁵ Moreover, Germany was prepared to violate Belgian neutrality although it was guaranteed by an international treaty that Bethmann-Hollweg dismissed as “a scrap of paper.”¹⁶ Others point to German colonial ambitions, its desire to become a world power, and its intensifying nationalism as creating a climate in which hostility intensified.

Another unit-level explanation is that *weak states* caused the war. This argument focuses in particular on Austria–Hungary and Russia. After all, those were the two countries whose actions actually triggered war. In the case of Austria–Hungary, this explanation focuses on the national and ethnic troubles within the empire and suggests that those troubles forced Austria–Hungary into a war to defend the integrity of its empire.

After 1867, the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire became known as the Dual Monarchy because its new constitution gave the Hungarian and Austrian governments authority over their own regions and dominance over Slav peoples such as the Czechs, Ruthenians, and Poles. In this respect, the ramshackle empire resembled dynastic states of medieval Europe more than the modern nation-states that had evolved during the

Table 3.2 National–ethnic distribution within Austria–Hungary in 1914 (%)

German	24
Hungarian	20
Czech (Slavic)	13
Polish (Slavic)	10
Ruthenian (Slavic)	6
Croatian (Slavic)	5
Serb (Slavic)	4
Slovak (Slavic)	4
Slovene (Slavic)	3
Italian	3
Others	8

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Austria–Hungary’s troubles lay in its national diversity (see Table 3.2) and especially in the demands of its Slav subjects for independence from their Austrian–Hungarian masters. Slav agitation *within* Austria–Hungary was abetted by support from *outside*. Austria’s southern neighbor, Serbia, viewed itself as the kernel of a future and larger Slavic state.¹⁷ Moreover, Serbia and the Slav inhabitants of Austria–Hungary enjoyed the sympathy of Russia, another Slavic country, in which many people harbored dreams of a greater Slavic empire. Russia, too, was weakened by the social discontent of its citizens. Opposition to the government grew after its defeat at the hands of Japan, and the subsequent 1905 Revolution was a foretaste of the 1917 Russian revolutions.

This argument suggests that interstate war is the product of domestic turmoil. This explanation implies that societies composed of different groups of people or nations are more likely to go to war than homogeneous societies. As we will see in Chapter 8 (p. 263–4), one version of this argument suggests that political leaders start wars overseas to divert public attention from difficulties at home.

Another unit-level explanation has to do with the economic orientation of Europe’s major states. As a Marxist, Russian Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin explained the war by focusing on economic and class factors inside states. In his essay “Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism,” written during the war and based on the work of English economist John A. Hobson (1858–1940),

Lenin argued that, as strains within capitalist societies grew, these societies sought to ease social tension by overseas economic imperialism and acquisition of colonies that could provide raw materials, cheap labor, outlets for surplus capital investment, and markets for exports. This explanation emphasized that social peace at home could be bought for a time by exploiting imperial subjects. Lenin theorized that, in time, war would erupt out of intensified competition among capitalist societies for colonies in a world in which there was no further room to expand. Imperial latecomers like Germany, the US, and Japan became aggressive when they found how little the British and French had left for them.

Although intriguing, the imperialist explanation must explain why the 1914 war exploded in the Balkans rather than the colonial areas of Africa or Asia or between colonial powers such as Britain and France. Russia and especially Austria–Hungary, the initial adversaries, were relatively uninterested in overseas expansion. Lenin’s argument ignores the fact that colonial competition had been most intense among countries that became allies before 1914 (Britain, France, and Russia) and that their colonial rivalries had been settled before the war. Countering Lenin’s theory, one observer declared that the “war arose, immediately, out of the rivalries of two of the landlocked, contiguous, and semi-feudal, as opposed to the oceanic, capitalist and highly developed empires.”¹⁸

A variant of the Marxist analysis was the belief that World War One erupted because of the efforts of the international arms industry to sell more of its products. Firms such as Germany’s Krupp, Schneider-Creusot in France, Vickers in Britain, and Škoda in Austria–Hungary were described as “merchants of death,” willing to sell arms to anyone and everyone.

Nationalism, too, receives attention in unit-level analyses of the sources of the war, particularly as a background factor in producing a hostile atmosphere. After the nationalism that swept Europe following the French Revolution,

leaders could no longer barter territory and populations. Instead, citizens became passionately involved in foreign relations in defense of their “people.” In the case of World War One, Slavic nationalism threatened Austria–Hungary; Russian nationalism placed pressure on the tsar to aid Serbia; French nationalism demanded the return of its “lost provinces”; and nationalism everywhere rallied people behind their leaders when war finally came.

Global system-level explanations

A popular explanation at the global system-level of analysis since Thucydides is that war results from a *changing distribution of power*. In the case of World War One, this suggests that growing German industrial and military power produced a security dilemma by creating fear in Britain, France, and Russia that led to *arms racing* and *alliances* that divided Europe into armed camps. Anglo-French-Russian fear then led to the encirclement of Germany and, in turn, to growing fear in Berlin that Germany had to strike or grow weaker over time. In addition, the retreat of Ottoman Turkey from the Balkans produced a **power vacuum** in that region that both Austria–Hungary and Russia wished to fill.

A provocative system-level explanation called *system overload* contends that, in 1914, major adversaries found that their expectations about the world no longer held true and that past practices and rules of behavior were being violated. Increasingly, leaders no longer knew what to expect and were overwhelmed by what they could not understand. In this atmosphere, they could not cope, and after the assassination of the archduke, their decision-making systems suffered a “nervous breakdown.”

A related system-level argument focuses more narrowly on *technological change*, the inability of statesmen and generals to understand its implications, and the war plans of generals that put a premium on striking first. Those who make this

argument cite as evidence the role of military mobilization in the race to war and the consequent removal of authority from politicians to generals. Furthermore, when generals do not understand the implications of technological change, they prepare for the wrong kind of war, as they did when all of them planned to take the offensive in 1914.

In summary, World War One, like all wars, had *many* causes, and these must be sought at all levels of analysis. Leaders in 1914 were incompetent and did little to slow events. German policy and rhetoric after 1890 frightened its neighbors, and German leaders irresponsibly ceded the initiative to Austria–Hungary during the crisis following the archduke’s assassination. Slav discontent within Austria–Hungary did threaten to pull the empire apart and was exacerbated by Serb interference. Russian leaders did sense they could not back down in the face of threats to a fellow Slav state, especially in light of domestic discontent. Colonial rivalries had created tensions among Europe’s great powers, and arms sales did foster militarism. Arms races and alliances did produce mutual suspicions and divided Europe into armed camps. War plans did pressure governments to act impetuously and gave them little time to examine alternatives to war. During the crisis, the bureaucracies did function poorly, and leaders felt overwhelmed by events. Intense nationalism did encourage national rivalry and made it difficult for leaders to back down when push came to shove. To some extent, all the causes cited above played a role in the descent to war. Influences at the individual, unit, and global levels likely all played a part – related in complex ways that we are still trying to untangle. In the next section, we examine the war’s aftermath and how its settlement created the conditions for later conflicts.

The Peace of Versailles

World War One ended in mutual exhaustion. Germany had been defeated on the battlefield,

although no allied troops occupied German soil, and German civilians were starving owing to the British blockade of German ports. Finally, as vast numbers of fresh American troops poured into France, German leaders, having run out of replacements, recognized the inevitable. The armistice was signed on the “eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month,” or 11/11/11, in a railroad car near the French city of Compiègne, and the guns fell silent on the Western front (see Figure 3.2). Twenty-two years later Hitler took his revenge by forcing the French to surrender in the same rail car in Compiègne.

The Paris Peace Conference, held at the Palace of Versailles, opened on January 12, 1919, and was attended by political leaders from 32 countries representing three-quarters of the world’s population. At the conference, the victorious war leaders – America’s Woodrow Wilson, Britain’s David Lloyd George (1863–1945), France’s Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929), and Italy’s Vittorio Orlando (1860–1952) – thrashed out their differences and literally remade the world. Each had his own objectives, however. Great Britain sought to recreate a workable balance of power and safeguard its empire. France sought to dismember Germany and create security for itself in Europe. Italy sought the territories it had been promised during the war, and Wilson sought a liberal world that reflected his Fourteen Points. In the end, Wilson conceded his principles one after the other in order to get the last of them, a league of nations, and Germany and the other defeated powers were forced to sign treaties that produced a very different peace than they had anticipated. In the end, the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty, and the United States never joined the League of Nations. The Versailles arrangements and continued upheaval in Europe created a new world and changed the maps of Europe and the Middle East. In addition to signing the Versailles Treaty with Germany, the victors and the defeated Central Powers signed four other treaties during the meetings: St. Germain (with Austria), Trianon



Capitaine VASSELLOW Comte A. ORERNDORF General WINTERFELDT. Capitaine J. P. R. MARRIOTT M. EHZEHGER Derriere: Amiral Sir George HOPE. K.C.M.E. Amiral Sir ROSSLYN WEMTSS G.C.B. Marschal FOCM General WEYGAND
LA SIGNATURE DE L'ARMISTICE

Figure 3.2 Signing of the Armistice ending World War One

Source: Getty Images/Hulton Archive/Stringer

(with Hungary), Neuilly (with Bulgaria), and Sèvres (with Turkey).

Woodrow Wilson and the Fourteen Points

The man of the hour was President Wilson, who was greeted as a hero and fêted in the capitals of Europe. Not only had American entry into the war tilted the balance, but Wilson was the author of the Fourteen Points on the basis of which Germany surrendered.¹⁹ Wilson, a religious liberal interventionist, represented his Fourteen Points as “the general principles of the settlement” in a speech before a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918 (see Key document, overleaf). Wilson sought a forgiving and generous peace with America’s defeated enemies. However, this

was *not* what America’s allies wanted; instead, they wished to impose a harsh peace on Germany that would prevent a revival of German military power that might again endanger their security. Wilson’s idealism was not welcomed by allied leaders. Indeed, his Fourteen Points so irritated French President Clemenceau that he is said to have ridiculed the proposal by observing that “God Almighty only had Ten Commandments!”

Several of Wilson’s Fourteen Points proved highly contentious, later poisoning the peace. His first point – that diplomacy in the future should be public, leading to “open covenants” – angered the British, French, and, most especially, the Italians, who during the war had concluded several secret treaties that contained egregious territorial promises. The Italians walked out of the peace conference over the issue, angry that they were being deprived of promised territories

KEY DOCUMENT

PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS²⁰

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

- I Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
- II Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
- III The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
- IV Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
- V A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
- VI The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy . . .

- VII Belgium . . . must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.
- VIII All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.
- IX A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
- X The peoples of Austria–Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.
- XI Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality . . .
- XII The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
- XIII An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
- XIV A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

along the Dalmatian Coast of the Adriatic Sea. In fact, the triumph of **fascism** in Italy in 1922 owed much to Italian unhappiness over this issue. But Britain and France, too, objected to Wilson's position, which negated secret agreements between them and complicated their efforts to divide up Ottoman territories in the Middle East.

Freedom of the seas, the second point, was anathema to Great Britain, whose leaders perceived the demand dangerous to the British Empire. Disarmament, the fourth point, was also fiercely debated. The French especially were concerned lest they find themselves again vulnerable to Germany. In the end, the Germans were profoundly disillusioned because *only they* were disarmed.

However, it was points VIII through XIII that proved the stickiest both during the peace talks and in the long run. Each in its own way represented Wilson's deep belief in national self-determination. The next section examines the principle of national self-determination as applied in the peace agreements more closely, to see how the idea came to produce discontent.


Versailles and the principle of national self-determination

In addition to alienating Germany, Italy, and Japan,²¹ Versailles had other major consequences, some of which still influence global politics. The

treaty created the League of Nations, the organization that gave voice to the idea of **collective security**. Another consequence was to strip the Ottomans of their territories in the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire was divided into several political entities, including Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, each of which consisted of peoples from different ethnic, religious, and tribal groups. These were turned over to Britain and France as **Mandates of the League of Nations** – that is, regions entrusted to Western states that were to help prepare them for later independence. The conference also established Yugoslavia from remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the case of Iraq, the same cleavages still threaten to tear the country apart; in the case of Yugoslavia, they have already done so. Still another conse-

quence was to violate promises made to the Arabs and the Jews during World War One, especially in regard to establishing independent homelands for *both*, a failure partly but directly responsible for the current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Finally, the disaster in Europe, the postwar feebleness of the European powers, Wilson's rhetoric of self-determination, and the price paid in the war by Europe's colonies combined to set in motion the forces of decolonization (see Map 3.2).

The principle of national self-determination was among the most important outcomes of the peace conference. Then, as now, national self-determination is poorly understood. The first problem was a practical one: how to define a *nation*, an issue that still defies agreement. Is it



Map 3.2 Europe in the aftermath of World War One

a community that exists only in people's imaginations? Is it a group of people who share a language, religion, history, myth system, or race? The meaning of self-determination was also obscure. Did it mean an independent sovereign state, greater autonomy within an existing state, or some other arrangement?

A second problem had to do with *how* to divide multinational empires, especially Austria–Hungary and Ottoman Turkey, because in these places, ethnic groups lived together, especially in multinational cities like Vienna, Warsaw, and Jerusalem. The way these difficult issues were addressed at that time contributed to today's **ethnic cleansing** and helped create the problems of ethnic and religious hostility in the division of Cyprus, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the reconstruction of Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and the Arab–Palestinian dilemma.

National self-determination is a noble-sounding principle, but it has repeatedly been used to smash states along religious, tribal, and ethnic lines, with the result being chaos, violence, and state failure. In recent years, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, Sudan, as well as other states have been torn apart by groups claiming self-determination. Self-determination questions have come up in other contexts as well. For example, should African-Americans or Hispanics in North America have their own separate nations? What of self-conscious nations without territory such as the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran?

The following section turns to the interwar effort to replace the balance of power with a better system to maintain peace based on the principle of **collective security**, the principle on which the League of Nations was established. Untangling the causes for the failure of collective security and the war that followed allows political scientists to generalize further about war. In the following section, we review some of these explanations by level of analysis.

The failure of collective security

Wilson sought to base the League of Nations on the lofty principle of collective security – a principle denounced by realists as an example of idealism – under which the invasion of *any* country would automatically bring forward the combined might of *all* countries. Collective security assumed that *all* states shared a common interest in global peace and stability and that, therefore, it was in the national interest of every state to aid *any* victim of **aggression**, even if this required violating other alliances. In meeting aggression promptly, states would be serving the collective good of humankind. This assumption was succinctly summarized by the League representative of Haiti, on the occasion of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36) when he declared that: “Great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or colored, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody's Ethiopia.”²² Collective security thus required states to surrender their **autonomy** in questions of war and peace to the League. Wilson, like philosophers Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chapter 10, p. 358), believed that most potential aggressors or “bad states” would be ruled by autocrats and that peace would ensue only when the true sentiments of humankind were respected. The principle was incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations, which spelled out the obligations of member states to prevent or end aggression (see Key document, below).

Collective security was supposed to maintain peace by the certainty that all states would combine their might to punish aggressors. Like the flexible balance-of-power alliances that collective security was expected to replace, states were to have no permanent friends or enemies; and like balance of power and the later idea of credible deterrence, collective security sought to prevent aggression by the threat of war. Realists never thought much of collective security because it

KEY DOCUMENT

SELECTIONS FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT²³

ARTICLE 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled

ARTICLE 11

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations . . .

ARTICLE 12

The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council . . .

ARTICLE 14

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it . . .

ARTICLE 15

If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof . . .

The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute . . . If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations . . .

ARTICLE 16

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of

the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

required actors to entrust their security to others. Their pessimism was reinforced by a distribution of power between the world wars such that any of the dissatisfied great powers – Japan, the USSR, Germany, or Italy – individually had the military capability to resist the League’s collective sanctions. In the end, collective security was doomed by the policy of appeasement.

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

The global debate both before and after the 2003 American invasion of Iraq reflected renewed interest in some of the norms of collective security, especially the belief of some opponents of the invasion that war is illegal and illegitimate unless approved by an international organization. Realists argue that such claims are wrong, as nothing in the UN Charter requires this and, in any event, states that opposed the war had historically shown no inclination to follow such a norm. Even opponents of the Iraq war make no claim that members are obligated to aid victims of aggression. In contrast to realists, constructivists might argue that the Iraq debate and the widespread demand that countries use force only after Security Council approval reflect an evolution of norms in the direction advocated by Wilson and fellow liberals.

Appeasement and its consequences

The policy of appeasement was a deliberate policy on the part of Britain and France to satisfy German grievances in order to avoid war. To this day, it remains a topic of intense debate. Critics of appeasement contend that it whetted the appetites of the dictators in Japan, Germany, and Italy, giving them confidence and making them more aggressive.

Evidence that collective security had failed became apparent when, in 1931, Japanese troops, without authorization from their government, invaded and occupied China’s industrial province of Manchuria. Their excuse was an incident that their own officers had staged, the blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria Railway. Under pressure from militarists at home, Japan’s government set up a puppet state in Manchuria called Manchukuo and placed on its throne Henry Pu Yi who had been the last emperor of China as a child, and whose life is depicted in the 1987 film *The Last Emperor*.

The world reacted anemically to Japan’s aggression, which was an unwelcome distraction from the world’s growing economic distress. The European powers were unprepared to antagonize Japan, and the League of Nations only carried out its obligations to the extent of sending a commission led by British diplomat V. A. G. R. Bulwer-Lytton (1876–1947), the second Earl of Lytton to “study” the problem. Japan vetoed an

attempt by the League Council to impose a cease-fire, and by the time the commission reached the scene in spring 1932, Japan had already established Manchukuo, had attacked the Chinese city of Shanghai, and had seized China's province of Jehol as a buffer zone. It took a year before the League adopted its commission's report. That report supported China's claims against Japan but implied that Japan had been provoked. Its recommendations – that China and Japan sign trade and nonaggression treaties and set up a joint “special administration” over Manchuria – were “well-intentioned daydreaming.”²⁴ In the end, the League scolded Japan with no other effect than to provoke Japan to abandon the organization.

The United States, as a Pacific power, was best situated to pressure Japan. But America was not in the League, and US foreign policy was in one of **isolationism**. What realists would later denounce as utopianism was perhaps best reflected in the efforts of America's Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson (1867–1950) to deal with the issue. Frustrated by Japanese stalling, he declared in 1932 that the US would not recognize any territorial changes resulting from Japan's invasion. This act had no impact on Japanese militarists, who by this time controlled their country's foreign affairs. Even Stimson understood that his only weapons were, as he put it, “spears of straws and swords of ice.”²⁵

Hitler repeatedly justified his actions between 1933 and 1939 by invoking Wilson's principle of national self-determination, demanding that territories in Austria and Czechoslovakia with German-speaking communities be “returned” to the Third Reich. After becoming German chancellor, Hitler set out to destroy the hated Versailles Treaty. Within months, Germany left the League and began to rearm in violation of the treaty. In 1934, Germany and Poland agreed to a nonaggression pact (that Hitler never intended to keep) that effectively nullified France's alliance with Poland. Also in 1934, following the assassination of Austria's Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss (1892–

1934) by local Nazis, Germany appeared on the verge of occupying that country. To prevent this, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) sent four army divisions to the Brenner Pass on the Austrian frontier to prevent that country's occupation by Germany. There ensued a meeting among British, French, and Italian leaders in 1935 at the Italian resort of Stresa where they agreed to oppose “by all practical means any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe.” However, the “Stresa front” collapsed quickly under the weight of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.

The key factor in Mussolini's decision to invade was his desire to carve out an empire for Italy like that already ruled by Britain and France. On December 5, 1934, a skirmish took place at a small Italian base in Ethiopia, and Mussolini used this as a pretext to demand compensation. On January 3, 1935, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie (1892–1975) appealed to the League for protection against Italian aggression, but unknown to him, a few days later the British and French foreign ministers secretly agreed to let Mussolini have Ethiopia because they hoped that Italy would join them in opposing German ambitions and power. A full-scale Italian invasion of the country began in February and saw the use of poison gas and strategic bombing against Ethiopian civilians. In the words of one historian: “The gas scorched earth and contaminated water. It ravaged villages, poisoned livestock and corroded Ethiopia's will to resist.”²⁶

The year 1935 also saw dramatic gains by Hitler. In January, a plebiscite in the Saar led to that region's reunification with Germany. Then, in March 1935, Hitler violated the Versailles Treaty's limit on the size of Germany's army by announcing general conscription, as well as building programs for an air force and navy. In June, Germany and Britain reached an agreement limiting Germany to a navy one-third the size of Britain's, violating the armament clauses of the Versailles Treaty because it permitted Germany to rebuild its fleet.

In 1936, Hitler's provocative foreign policy escalated. First, he concluded an alliance with Italy (which had been alienated from Britain and France during the Ethiopian adventure) and, shortly after, an alliance with Japan. On March 7, 1936, Hitler embarked on the military reoccupation of the Rhineland (prohibited under the Versailles and the Locarno treaties), despite opposition from his generals. His action was a bluff, because the German army was not yet prepared to fight Britain and France. Indeed, Germany's military leaders might have overthrown Hitler had he met Western resistance. The West, however, backed down – an example of appeasement – due in part to military weakness and in part to public opposition to war.

In July 1936, the Spanish Civil War erupted between supporters of Spain's Republic and the fascist followers of General Francisco Franco (1892–1975). Hitler intervened to extend Nazi influence and the Spanish Civil War was soon transformed into a symbolic confrontation of left- and right-wing forces in Europe. Franco was supported by German and Italian military units and the Republic was aided to a lesser degree by the Soviet Union and volunteers from the US and several European countries. For their part, Britain, France, and the US refused to get involved. Their policy of non-intervention, combined with German and Italian help to Franco, assured the latter's triumph in 1939.

The next crisis was over Austria. In January 1938, Austrian police learned of a Nazi plot to seize power in Vienna. At a meeting between Hitler and Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg (1897–1977), Hitler threatened military intervention to force Schuschnigg to agree to admit Austrian Nazis into his government and allow Germany to control Austria's foreign policy. On returning to Vienna, Schuschnigg tried to call a referendum on the agreement, sending Hitler into a rage. On March 12, in violation of the Versailles Treaty's prohibition of German–Austrian unification or *Anschluss*, Hitler invaded his homeland in the name of the German *Volk* (people) and annexed it to the Third Reich.

Later that year, Hitler began a campaign against Czechoslovakia, claiming that that country was abusing ethnic Germans in the Czech border region of the Sudetenland. Hitler demanded that Prague hand over the region, site of the country's most formidable defenses, or face war. Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier (1884–1970) desperately sought to appease Hitler. After an initial visit to Germany, Chamberlain returned home believing that an agreement had been reached to give Germany the Sudetenland. Shortly thereafter, with Hitler threatening to attack Czechoslovakia unless the Sudetenland was ceded immediately, Chamberlain and Daladier returned to Germany, where they conferred with Hitler outside Munich. There, along with Mussolini, they agreed to force Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland.

After Munich, Chamberlain justified his action by claiming that Britain was unprepared for war and could have done nothing to save Czechoslovakia. "You have only to look at the map," he wrote in his diary, "to see that nothing France or we could do could possibly save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans, if they wanted to do it. The Austrian frontier is practically open; the great Škoda munitions works are within easy bombing distance of German aerodromes, the railways all pass through German territory, Russia is 100 miles away. Therefore we could not help Czechoslovakia – she would simply be a pretext for going to war with Germany. That we could not think of unless we

DID YOU KNOW?

Theodor Seuss Geisel (1904–91), popularly known as Dr. Seuss, was the chief editorial cartoonist and author of over 400 editorial cartoons for the New York newspaper *PM* between 1941 and 1943, many of which satirized Hitler and Mussolini.

had a reasonable prospect for being able to beat her to her knees in reasonable time, and of that I see no sign."²⁷

Appeasement reached its zenith in the Munich Agreement. This agreement convinced Hitler that the British and French would not resist him and that he could get away with occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia, which he did in March 1939,²⁸ and conquering Poland (despite unilateral British and French guarantees to that country). The Munich Agreement also persuaded Soviet dictator Josef Stalin (1879–1953) that Britain and France were not serious about forming an alliance against Hitler. Thus, on August 23, 1939, Stalin concluded a nonaggression pact with Hitler that divided Poland between them and freed Hitler to invade that country a week later (see Figure 3.3). With Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, World War Two began in Europe.



Figure 3.3 Signing the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact, August 23, 1939

Source: AP/Press Association Images

On the road to Pearl Harbor

The road that ended in Japan's surprise attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, began in China. Following its seizure of Manchuria, the Japanese army continued to expand into China. Within Japan, which had been hard hit by the economic depression, military extremists continued their campaign of terror against supporters of democracy. By 1937, they had succeeded in consolidating power. At the same time, Japan embarked on a major expansion of its armed forces.

Then, on July 7, 1937, at the 800-year-old Marco Polo Bridge across the Yongding River at the town of Wanping on the road to Beijing, Japanese units were fired at. The conflict escalated quickly across the plains of north China, beginning a full-scale war between Japan and China that did not end until 1945. Despite hideous Japanese atrocities, including the "rape of Nanking" in December 1937, Japan was unable to conquer China. For its part, the US grew increasingly concerned about Japanese imperialism, and began to aid China, evading America's Neutrality Act by arguing that China and Japan were not technically at war. In a speech in Chicago on October 5, 1937, known as the "Quarantine Speech" which clearly referred to Japan, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) declared:

The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peoples and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors . . . Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air . . . Innocent peoples, innocent nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane considerations . . . It seems to be unfor-

tunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. And mark this well: When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.²⁹

The United States had already taken tentative steps to aid Great Britain in its war against Germany. Despite isolationist sentiment, following the invasion of Poland Congress agreed to allow Britain and France to purchase arms on a cash-and-carry basis. Perceiving a growing threat from Japan, in July 1940 the US embargoed the export of high-quality scrap metal and aviation fuel to Japan – resources necessary for Tokyo to continue waging war in China. Then, following Japan's invasion of French Indochina in September 1940, the US embargoed the export of all scrap metal and steel to Japan.

In the same month, the United States agreed to provide Britain with 50 old destroyers needed to protect British convoys against German submarines in return for leasing British air and naval bases in the Western hemisphere. In March 1941, the US passed the Lend-Lease Act under which supplies were sent to Britain (and later the USSR) on credit. And, in August, Roosevelt met with Churchill, who had become British prime minister in May 1940, off the Newfoundland coast where the two leaders issued the Atlantic Charter, affirming common ideals of freedom and national self-determination. Then, in August, the US Congress enacted conscription into law by the margin of a single vote.

Japanese–American negotiations about the war in China began in spring 1941 and continued with little success throughout the year. Forty meetings were held between US Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1877–1955) and Japan's ambassador between March and December. Fearing imminent Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) in an effort to secure critical raw materials, the US embargoed the export of oil to

Japan in September. This confronted Japan with the stark choice of ending its war in China or going to war with the United States.

After the failure of one last effort to reach agreement, Japan's government, now led by General Hideki Tojo (1884–1948), decided on war. Although US intelligence had learned that war was imminent, the shock of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, and the destruction of America's battleships at anchor suddenly brought America into the war. Eighteen American ships were sunk at Pearl Harbor, and 2403 Americans died. Declaring December 7 as “a day which will live in infamy,” Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan. Germany and Italy declared war on the US three days later, making the new war a global one.

World War Two called forth an enormous effort on the part of the Grand Alliance – the US, the USSR (which Hitler invaded in June 1941), and Great Britain. Battles such as Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Anzio, Guadalcanal, and Iwo Jima became legends. New weapons of fearsome power, notably the atom bombs dropped on Japan in 1945, changed global politics for ever. As a result of the war, Germany and Japan were reduced to rubble, and only two great powers remained – the United States and the USSR. Within two years of the end of the war, these two great allies had become foes in a new conflict pitting two ways of life – capitalism and communism – against each other.

Individual-level explanations

At the individual level, the experiences and memories of individual leaders of the time were an important source of the policies of their states. Two leading examples were Hitler and Chamberlain. Hitler had been awarded several medals during World War One and, when it ended, was in hospital, having been temporarily blinded by a gas attack. He attributed Germany's

defeat to treason by Jews and socialists and was determined to reverse the “shameful” Treaty of Versailles. Much of this he related in *Mein Kampf* (see an excerpt in a Key document in Chapter 11, p. 359). Hitler, moreover, was a spellbinding orator, a demagogue with great personal charisma. As historian Ian Kershaw argues: “The underestimation of the Nazi movement by many critical outside observers in 1930 was partly rooted in the underrating of the force of the [Hitler’s] personality cult, of the clamour for the strong man and ‘charismatic’ leader among the ever-widening circles of the population in the gathering gloom of the Depression.”³⁰

For Chamberlain, who had fought in World War One, the thought of renewed carnage was inconceivable. Chamberlain was “so deeply, so desperately, anxious to avoid war that he could not conceive of its being inevitable.”³¹ Hitler intuitively knew how to take advantage of Chamberlain’s longing for peace, as well as widespread Western feeling that the Versailles Treaty had been too harsh toward Germany. In 1937, Chamberlain became Britain’s prime minister and had to lead the country through successive crises in relations with Hitler. Aware of his country’s military weakness for which he was partly responsible and desperate to delay war until Britain’s defenses were rebuilt, Chamberlain was the author of the policy of appeasement.

DID YOU KNOW?

Hitler was the first politician to make extensive use of airplanes in campaigning for office. Nowhere is Nazi propaganda more skillfully revealed than in the 1934 film by Leni Riefenstahl (1902–2003) called *Triumph of the Will*, which depicts the Nuremberg Rally.

With Hitler’s ascent to power, Germany began massive and rapid rearmament entailing enor-

mous public spending. Hitler planned to take Germany to war and demanded that the country become economically self-sufficient. To this end, Nazi Germany maximized exports and minimized imports. In 1936, Germany began an ambitious Four-Year Plan intended to increase self-sufficiency by imposing state control on essential economic sectors and encouraging the development of synthetic substitutes for vital raw materials. Owing largely to rearmament and public works, Germany’s 1939 gross national product was over 50 percent above its 1929 level, and Germany had created a military machine that threatened world domination.

Thus, the most important individual-level explanation must focus on Hitler’s ambitions and his racist ideology. Hitler’s ambitions were more radical than those of Germany’s population and of its political and military elites. Germans, however, willingly responded to Hitler’s demands to revise the terms of Versailles and restore Germany to its pre-1914 status, but it was Hitler who sought European hegemony and global domination. Hitler was “dedicated to the acquisition of power for his own gratification and to the destruction of a people whose existence was an offence to him and whose annihilation would be his crowning triumph. Both the grandiose barbarism of his political vision and the moral emptiness of his character make it impossible to compare him in any meaningful way with any other German leader.”³²

Had the West stood up to Hitler, would things have turned out differently? Either way, stand up to Hitler. Western leaders did not.

Unit-level explanations

At the unit level, the most important source of the failure of collective security was the widespread belief on the part of revisionist states that collective action was not in their national interest. Germany, Japan, and Italy were dissatisfied with the outcome of World War One, and this dis-

satisfaction, along with other factors, led to the rise of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and militarism in Japan. These governments repeatedly used threats and violence to achieve political changes in the global system, and their opponents, the status quo democracies Britain, France, and the United States, found little public support for adopting vigorous measures to halt aggression. Indeed, important unit-level factors were the spread of pacifist attitudes in the democracies and the isolationist policies of the United States.

In Italy, Mussolini established his Fascist party in 1919 whose “Blackshirts” created domestic turmoil during the following years. Italian democracy came to an end when Mussolini – supported by the Italian army, big business, and Italian political conservatives – led his followers on a march on Rome in October 1922 and was given power by King Victor Emmanuel III (1869–1947).

In Japan, democracy came to an end in the 1930s after military officers embarked on a campaign of assassinating democratic politicians. A military-dominated government was established in which senior admirals and generals occupied key cabinet positions. Once in power, Japan’s military leaders set out to establish an Asian empire that in 1940 they named “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In October 1941, General Tojo became Japan’s prime minister and led the country to war against the US and UK.

In the case of Germany, the Great Depression marked the beginning of the country’s slide toward authoritarian rule as the country’s president, the elderly World War One military hero Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934), invoked emergency powers under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to appoint a new chancellor and cabinet. For the next two years, the chancellor, Heinrich Brüning (1885–1970), called the “hunger chancellor” by opponents, governed without a majority in the Reichstag, Germany’s parliament. In September 1930, Brüning decided to hold parliamentary elections with disastrous results. Public dissatisfaction with the government’s economic performance combined with

sheer desperation to produce a dramatic increase in votes for the anti-democratic communists and Nazis to almost one-third of the German electorate. In the 1928 elections, the communists had won 54 seats in the 608-seat Reichstag and the Nazis 12; in the 1930 elections, the communists took 77 seats and the Nazis 107. Thus, in two years Hitler’s Nazis were transformed from a marginal political party to the second largest in the Reichstag. As conditions worsened, more and more Germans flocked to the Nazis. In March 1932, the Nazis won 230 seats which, along with the 89 seats won by the communists, meant that a majority of Germans were in favor of extremists who sought to end German democracy. In addition, large numbers of unemployed Germans joined the communist and Nazi paramilitary storm troopers that roamed the streets of German cities, brawling with one another and terrorizing citizens.

With the Nazis the largest party in the Reichstag, President Hindenburg was persuaded to appoint Hitler as chancellor in January 1933. Following Hitler’s appointment, the Nazis increased their total to 288 Reichstag seats in the March 1933 elections.³³ Between 1929 and 1932, membership in the Nazi Party soared from 170,000 to 1,378,000. Thereafter, Hitler eliminated his coalition partners, outlawed opposition parties and brought an end to the democratic Weimar Republic. After 1933, Germany, now called by Hitler the Third Reich,³⁴ was governed by a Nazi dictatorship, and Hitler would initiate policies to overthrow the Versailles settlement and realize his dreams of conquest.

The British government, for its part, under Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947) and Chamberlain, seemed paralyzed in the face of Japanese, Italian, and German treaty violations. At least four domestic factors contributed to convincing the British government of the need for a policy of appeasement:

- Widespread revulsion among British elites at the prospect of another world war.

- Britain's lack of military preparedness, especially its inadequate air force.
- A widespread belief that Germany had been treated too harshly by the Versailles Treaty and had legitimate grievances that should be satisfied.
- Widespread public opposition in Britain to rearmament and a strong desire to work through the League of Nations.

In sum, explanations at the unit-level of analysis focus on the internal challenges faced by major states. Thus, economic collapse aided the rise of the Nazis within Germany, driving voters to Hitler. In Britain and France, social and economic cleavages made it politically difficult for these countries to deal firmly with Germany. In Britain, there was popular opposition to rearmament; trade unions opposed the industrial conscription that it would entail, while the middle class wished greater spending on social programs. Political elites that favored rearmament were fragmented and could not unite to oppose Chamberlain's appeasement policy. France's Third Republic was plagued by a chronically unstable parliamentary system (with 35 cabinet changes between 1918 and 1940) and a hopelessly divided society. Political factions argued endlessly over whether Hitler posed a serious threat and, if so, how France should respond. On the ideological left, communists pushed for an alliance with the USSR, while socialists insisted France use the League of Nations to restrain Hitler. The political right wanted to ally with Germany (arguing "better Hitler than Blum" [France's socialist leader]) to balance the threat posed by the Soviet Union.³⁵

System-level explanations

At the system level, the rapid change in the distribution of power caused by the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 and the effects of the Versailles Treaty proved a key factor. One result was the breakup of Austria-Hungary into a num-

ber of small and relatively weak states in Central Europe and the Balkans – Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia – that would in the 1930s prove easy prey for German economic and political penetration and, ultimately, objects of German expansionism. However, of the immediate problems created by the Versailles settlement, none was greater than the anger it created among Germans who regarded it as vindictive and unfair and, in consequence, they were determined to throw off the shackles it had imposed on them. This determination, more than any other factor, helped bring about the rise of Hitler and the Nazis and, in the end, contributed to the outbreak of World War Two.

The harsh peace imposed on Germany at Versailles fundamentally altered the distribution of power in global politics. Germany lost its military and merchant fleets, and its army was limited to 100,000. Germany was also required to disarm the Rhineland along its border with France. In addition, Germany had to turn over its coalmines in the Saar region to France until a referendum could be held 15 years later. Germany also surrendered all its overseas colonies, including islands in the Pacific that Japan would use for bases in the next world war. The treaty also gave a strip of German territory to Poland so that that country would have access to the Baltic Sea through the port city of Danzig. This territory, known as the Polish Corridor, was inhabited mainly by Germans and cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. In 1939, Hitler would demand the return of Danzig and the elimination of the Polish Corridor as his excuse for invading Poland, thereby starting World War Two.

Finally, and perhaps most galling to Germans, the victors forced Germany to admit its responsibility for starting World War One in Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, which read: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence

of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." The allies used Article 231 to justify their demand that Germany pay reparations for the costs of the war.

German resentment at the Versailles Treaty was intensified by the belief that their country had not *really* been defeated. German armies remained intact, and German soil had not been invaded. Extreme nationalists fostered a myth that Germany had been "stabbed in the back" by socialists, Bolsheviks, and Jews. Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication in November 1918 and flight to Holland and the delivery of the country by its military leaders into the hands of a weak civilian government headed by socialists forced to sue for peace fostered the legend that left-wing politicians in the new Weimar Republic had betrayed their country. Hitler's subsequent rise to power was a consequence of his **anti-Semitism** and anti-communism and of his repeated demand that the terms of the Versailles Treaty be revised. Recognizing that the treaty was neither sufficiently moderate nor sufficiently harsh to keep the peace but, instead, would provoke German efforts to overthrow it and that the result would be another war, France's Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1859–1921), commander of allied armies on the Western Front in 1918, lamented: "This is not a treaty, it is an armistice for twenty years."³⁶

Another system-level source of the failure of collective security was the **multipolar** distribution of power that enabled major states like Japan, Germany, and Italy to resist collective action. By the mid-1930s, no single country had sufficient power to prevent aggression by other major states. Neither did a cohesive alliance exist among states opposed to altering the status quo. Instead, power was widely distributed among states, each of which looked only to its own national interest. No situation reflected this better than the incoherent response of the West to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. In accordance with Article 16 of its Covenant, the League declared Italy an aggressor and authorized the imposition of economic sanctions against it, but strategic materials and oil

were excluded from the embargo list. The attempt to invoke economic sanctions failed because Britain and France carried out their obligations half-heartedly. Britain, whose control of the Suez Canal gave it a stranglehold on the movement of Italian supplies to Ethiopia, was unwilling to take any action that would precipitate a break with Italy, which it saw as a potential balance-of-power ally in Europe. Winston Churchill described the dilemma when he wrote of then Prime Minister Baldwin: "The Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions."³⁷ The same unwillingness on the part of leading states to equate global opposition with national interest continued to haunt the League.

A third factor was the global economic collapse of the early 1930s, which made democratic governments and publics look inward, attend to economic issues, refuse to spend what was necessary to strengthen themselves militarily, and ignore uncomfortable and potentially costly overseas security problems. Hitler's popularity and his rise to power could not have taken place without the Great Depression and the resulting alienation of Germans from their democratic system. Germany was especially hard hit by the Depression and the drying up of American loans. By 1932, unemployment in Germany reached six million, about one-quarter of all German workers. Between 1929 and 1932, German foreign trade declined by two-thirds and industrial production by half. In March 1930, Germany's governing coalition collapsed as a result of the burgeoning costs of aiding the unemployed.

As governments and publics preoccupied by economic woes at home turned inward, they had little interest in taking bold foreign policy actions. This was clearest in Britain. Throughout the 1930s, Britain continued to respond to the economic crisis with austerity, including cuts to the country's military budget that left the country sorely unprepared for war. For much of the Depression, then Chancellor of the Exchequer

Chamberlain fought to keep Britain's budget balanced and to limit the country's military spending.

A final system-level factor was the division of the world by hostile ideologies. On the one hand, Germany's Nazis and Italy's fascists regarded Soviet communists as deadly enemies. On the other hand, Nazis and fascists were the enemies of the Western democracies. Finally, Soviet communists and Western capitalists were profoundly suspicious of one another, even after the war threw them together against Hitler.

In sum, system-level explanations for World War Two focus on the Versailles Treaty, the distribution of global power, the effects of the Great Depression, and the spread of extremist ideologies. First, as noted earlier, Versailles placed the blame for World War One on Germany, fueling German anger but not preventing German rearmament. A second, realist, explanation considers Europe's balance of power. The absence of a major power capable of balancing a rising Germany encouraged aggressive German policies. Either the US or the USSR might have played such a role, but neither was willing to become involved until late in the game. Finally, the emergence and growth of communism and fascism in Europe fueled conflicts between states.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the events leading up to the two world wars and has analyzed the sources of those wars by level of analysis. We have seen that both world wars can be attributed to numerous, reinforcing causes at each level. Several prominent theoretical explanations exist for each war, but no single explanation is sufficient.

Some of the factors contributing to World War One were German unification and the change it brought to the global balance of power, Europe's diplomatic revolution that abolished Bismarck's intricate system of alliances and established in its place rigid blocs, arms races on land and sea, the

spread of fierce nationalism, and intense competition for colonies culminating in military crises. Our understanding of the outbreak of the war is furthered by considering key individuals – such as Kaiser Wilhelm and Tsar Nicolas – who were unable and unwilling to cope with these grand transformations in global and domestic politics.

A similar complex web of factors led to the outbreak of World War Two, including the outcome of World War One, leading analysts to view the second war as a continuation of the first. In particular, the Versailles Treaty system alienated Germany, Italy, and the Japan and fueled a desire on their part to recover power and status, as well as territories and resources. Collective security failed because key states did not participate and member states chose to pursue their own national interests rather than the global collective interest. Additionally, Western leaders erroneously thought that Hitler could be appeased if he were allowed to expand into neighboring states. Hitler himself, his plans for conquest, and his racist beliefs provide an additional and critical explanation for war.

The world wars permanently altered global politics by creating many of the conditions that continue to fuel conflicts in global politics today. This is particularly true of World War One. The Versailles Treaty system's application of national self-determination planted the seeds of several of today's most intractable ethnic conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia.

World War Two also produced significant changes as we shall see in Chapter 4 where we turn to the last great struggle of the twentieth century, the Cold War. That conflict, which pitted the capitalist, democratic United States and its allies against the communist Soviet Union, never erupted into a hot war. However, the chronic hostility between the two superpowers and their allies affected all aspects of global politics until the Cold War's end in 1989.

Student activities

Map analysis

Using a blank map, identify the areas surrendered by Germany after World War One and the new states that emerged from the dissolution of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires. How would you expect these changes to alter European and global politics?

Cultural materials

The world wars have been the theme of a number of critically acclaimed films. Among the best of those depicting the futility of World War One were the 1931 version of *All Quiet on the Western Front* that could not be shown in Germany because of Nazi demonstrations against it, and the 1937 French classic, *The Grand Illusion*, directed by Jean Renoir, the son of the French impressionist painter, Auguste Renoir. The bloody and tragic struggle of ANZAC troops at Gallipoli is depicted in the 1981 film *Gallipoli*, starring a young Mel Gibson. The 1957 film *Paths of Glory* deals with the French mutinies of 1917. The classic 1951 Hollywood film, *The African Queen*, starring Humphrey Bogart and Katharine Hepburn, uses the war in East Africa as its background. British military activity in the Middle East sought to protect the Suez Canal and drive the Ottoman Turks out of the region. The most memorable of these campaigns was directed by the British adventurer T. E. Lawrence, perhaps better known as Lawrence of Arabia. Starting in Mecca, Lawrence successfully instigated the

“Arab Revolt” against the Turks. He chronicled his adventures in an exaggerated way in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, which he published in 1927. This revolt helped trigger the collapse of Turkey’s Middle Eastern empire and create the map of the region that we know today. Lawrence’s exploits were reproduced in David Lean’s 1962 film *Lawrence of Arabia*.

Although many films were made about World War Two during and immediately after that war, two releases are especially noteworthy: *Saving Private Ryan* (1999) starring Tom Hanks and *Enemy at the Gates* (2001) starring Jude Law. Watch one of these films and consider what the film tells the viewer about World Wars One and Two. Who were the dominant actors? What interests did they pursue and how did they do so? What general lessons, if any, can the film teach about great power war?

Further reading

- Brendon, Piers, *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s* (New York: Random House, 2000). Gripping account of the major events of the decade such as the Depression and the rise of the Nazis in Germany, the fascists in Italy, and the militarists in Japan.
- Keegan, John, *The Second World War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990). Readable but comprehensive single-volume history of World War Two.
- Keegan, John, *The First World War* (New York: Vintage, 1998). The best single-volume account of the war by one of the world’s leading military historians.
- Kershaw, Ian, *Hitler: 1889–1936 Hubris* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998). Comprehensive analysis of Hitler’s rise to power.
- Tuchman, Barbara W., *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962). Classic and accessible account of the onset of World War One.

1945

Yalta (February) and
Potsdam (July)
Conferences

1947

Truman Doctrine
(March) and Marshall
Plan (June)

1948–49

Berlin Blockade

1949

USSR acquires
nuclear weapons

1949

Mao Zedong
assumes power
in China

1950

NSC-68

4 The Cold War

On May 1, 1960, an American U-2 spy plane piloted by CIA employee Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet air space (see Figure 4.1). For almost five years, these planes, flying at over 70,000 feet, had been photographing the Soviet Union's most secret installations. Believing the pilot dead, Washington claimed the plane had gone off course from Iran while investigating weather conditions. The story was almost immediately shown to be false when Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894–1971) produced the pilot with photographs of the crash site near the city of Smolensk, thousands of miles from where the Americans claimed it was supposed to be. Furiously, Khrushchev demanded that US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) apologize, and, when Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev cancelled a summit meeting with Eisenhower scheduled to be held in Paris. As this incident illustrated, intelligence gathering was a major activity during the Cold War, and both sides developed sophisticated technological means to help them do so.

The **Cold War**,¹ which began soon after World War Two ended, was the climactic struggle of the second half of the twentieth century. In this conflict, the United States and its allies, including supporters of **capitalism**, engaged in ideological warfare against the Soviet Union and its allies,

advocates of **communism**, an alternative and incompatible, economic and political system.

The theme of continuity and change is visible in the Cold War. In many ways, this era marked a break with the past. It ushered in the nuclear age and featured the absence of great power war. Thus, the Cold War is described by historian John Lewis Gaddis as the “long peace” because of the remarkable absence of such wars in contrast to earlier eras.² In other ways, the period reveals continuity, with continuing emphasis on the role of great powers in driving global politics and the ever present possibility of conflict. We shall see through the remainder of the text that our understanding of Cold War politics profoundly affected the manner in which we – laypersons, scholars, and policymakers – understand and react to contemporary global issues.

The chapter begins by examining how to explain the onset of the Cold War using different levels of analysis and different theoretical lenses. The chapter then examines how the Cold War deepened as the United States adopted the Truman Doctrine and instituted a strategy of containment to halt Soviet expansionism. The military side of the conflict grew with the Soviet explosion of an atom bomb, the US adoption of NSC-68, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War. Domestically, rabid anti-

1950–53	1955–75	1961	1962	1989	1991
Korean War	Vietnam War	Berlin Wall erected	Cuban missile crisis	Berlin Wall torn down	Dissolution of the Soviet Union



Figure 4.1 American U-2 spy plane

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Still Pictures, 342-B-01-115-2-KKE70799.

communism took the form of McCarthyism in the US, just as anti-capitalism led to purges in the USSR.

The chapter then examines the Vietnam War and its consequences, as well as describing the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and its consequences, including Soviet–American *détente* in the 1970s. *Détente* ended abruptly with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and deepening Soviet–American tension during the first Reagan administration. The chapter traces how a process begun after

Mikhail Gorbachev became the Communist Party’s General Secretary culminated in ending the Cold War, and it examines alternative explanations for this epic development. The chapter concludes by looking briefly at Russia’s evolution since the Cold War’s end.

Explaining the origins of the Cold War

The Cold War's causes can be found at all levels of analysis. At the individual level, we examine how the ideologies, insecurities, and disillusionment of key leaders like Churchill, Truman (1884–1972), and Stalin fueled early Cold War tensions. At the unit level, we consider the opposing economic, social, and political systems as well as the internal sources of foreign policies. Finally, we focus on bipolarity, spheres of interest, and spiraling mistrust at the system level of analysis.

Individual-level explanations: Stalin, Churchill, Truman, and Mao

At the individual level, explanation of the Cold War's onset emphasizes the anti-communism of Western leaders like Churchill and Truman. Churchill, for example, vigorously denounced Bolshevism after the 1917 Revolution and dispatched British naval units to Archangel and Murmansk to aid the “Whites” (anti-communists) against the “Reds” (Bolsheviks).

President Roosevelt believed that the Grand Alliance that had won the war would endure. He expected the United States to remain active in world affairs and not return to the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s, and he hoped that the wartime allies would remain peacetime collaborators, especially in the new UN Security Council. Disillusioned by the failure of the League of Nations in the 1930s, Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull abandoned the unilateralism of America's past and sought to keep the peace by cooperation among the great powers, described by Roosevelt as “the Four Policemen” (the US, USSR, Britain, and China). However, Roosevelt died suddenly on April 12, 1945 and his successor, Harry Truman, was more suspicious of Soviet

motives than Roosevelt had been and pursued policies to limit Soviet influence.

Perceptions and beliefs were equally important in the East. Stalin, too, played a major role in the onset of the Cold War. He has been described as inordinately suspicious, even paranoid, by 1945, seeing enemies all around him. Whether owing to fear of the West or expansionist dreams, Stalin ordered the communization of Eastern Europe, refused to cooperate in postwar Germany, was responsible for the Korean War, and generally acted in ways that were bound to appear aggressive. Mao Zedong also contributed to growing tensions, ensuring that East Asia would become a key front in the Cold War (see Figure 4.2). Mao's ideology emphasized a “continuous revolution” that involved transforming China's politics and society as well as reasserting China's place on the global stage as a model for communist revolution elsewhere. Mao's policies were fueled by a deep insecurity owing to China's history of unequal treatment in relations with the West and a sense that reactionary forces were seeking to thwart China's ambitions. Of these reactionary forces, Mao considered the US to be “the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese people and the Chinese revolution.”³



Figure 4.2 Mao and Stalin at a ceremony for Stalin's 70th birthday in December 1949

Source: Popperfoto/Getty Images

Individual-level explanations only tell part of the story. Factors at the unit level contribute another layer to understanding the Cold War's onset.

Unit-level explanations

At the unit level, the most prominent explanation of the Cold War is that it was caused by a clash between two competing economic and political systems. From this perspective, the Cold War was a clash between Soviet communism and American capitalism and between Soviet **totalitarianism** and American democracy, with each side believing the other was driven by a messianic desire to expand its power and ideology to all corners of the world.

COMMUNISM VERSUS CAPITALISM Soviet–Western mistrust dated back to the communist overthrow of the tsarist government of Russia in February 1917 and the subsequent overthrow of Russia's provisional government by Lenin's Bolsheviks in October. Marx's predictions of revolution remained unrealized by the beginning of World War One, and so, in 1916, Lenin tried to explain why. He argued that workers in the world's highly industrialized countries had been bought off by the fruits of overseas imperialism. Instead of becoming poorer as Marx had predicted, their poverty had been eased by profits from Europe's colonial empires, earned by exploiting those whose countries had been colonized. Lenin argued that revolution would not happen spontaneously as Marx had thought. Instead, workers had to be led by a communist party, consisting of dedicated revolutionaries – a “vanguard of the proletariat.” Revolution had occurred in backward Russia first rather than in more highly developed countries because, in Lenin's words, Russia was the “weakest link in the chain” of imperialism.

Once in power, the communist party would govern according to the principle of *democratic centralism*, that is, members could debate policies

but, once a decision had been made, all were bound to obey it. Lenin used this principle to impose a dictatorship after seizing power in the USSR, and he concluded that the state would *not* wither away in the foreseeable future owing to the persistence of “class enemies.” Stalin, Lenin's successor, used the same principles to justify murderous purges and foster totalitarian rule in the USSR. He favored building “socialism in one country” (the USSR), a nationalist slogan that he used to defeat rivals like Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) and justify the hardships of Soviet citizens during the era of forced collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrialization in the 1920s and 1930s.

The young Soviet state was wary of Western intentions, especially after Western and Japanese intervention in North Russia and Siberia in summer 1918. President Woodrow Wilson justified intervention as part of the effort to keep the Russians fighting the Germans and Austrians in World War One, but Western actions owed much to an aversion to communism. “The fact is,” writes Gaddis, “that a fundamental loathing for Bolshevism influenced all of Wilson's actions with regard to Russia and the actions of his Allied counterparts.” This antipathy was mutual for “the Bolsheviks made no secret of their fundamental loathing for the West.”⁴

The United States did not recognize the Soviet government until 1933, by which time Moscow's fear of Hitler had become acute. Suspicions between the USSR, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, grew in the late 1930s as it appeared that each side was hoping the Nazis would attack the other. Such suspicions produced the Soviet–Nazi Nonaggression Treaty, signed just days before Germany invaded Poland.

Thrown together by Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and US entry into the war in December, the two continued to harbor suspicions of each other. The USSR, suffering enormous casualties, suspected that its allies were willing to let Moscow fight the war for them, a suspicion heightened by repeated delays in the

Western invasion of continental Europe before the D-Day landings in Normandy (June 6, 1944). For their part, the Americans and British were suspicious of Soviet political motives as the Red Army moved westward after 1942. With Germany's defeat, the glue that had held the alliance together disappeared.

On March 5, 1946, in a speech at Westminster College, in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill coined the term **Iron Curtain** to describe the wall between East and West (see Key document, below). Churchill blamed the Soviet Union and its desire for ideological and political-military expansion for the emerging East-West conflict. Drawing on the lessons of World War Two and the appeasement of Germany, he argued that another war could be avoided, but only if Britain

and the US acted to form a united front against the USSR.

THE SOVIET UNION: SECURITY AND IDEOLOGY Soviet actions in Europe, including refusal to demobilize its occupying forces and efforts to redraw boundaries, eroded belief in the **Yalta axioms** and triggered growing American acceptance of what historian Daniel Yergin calls the **Riga axioms**.⁵ The Riga axioms assumed that the Soviet Union was driven by Marxist-Leninist ideology rather than by power and that Soviet totalitarianism, combined with ideological fervor, was the ultimate source of its policies. According to the Riga axioms, "doctrine and ideology and a spirit of innate aggressiveness shaped Soviet policy . . . The USSR was committed to world

KEY DOCUMENT

"IRON CURTAIN SPEECH," WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, MARCH 5, 1946⁶

The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with this primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future . . . Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the aftertime.

I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain – and I doubt not here also – toward the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships.

It is my duty, however, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow . . .

In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth column constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.

revolution and unlimited expansion.”⁷ Or, as a constructivist might argue, the messianic communist identity that had taken root in the Soviet Union after the revolution had created a set of interests in spreading Marxism–Leninism that were inimical to Western capitalism and preference for the global status quo.

Nothing conveys more clearly the perception of the USSR that was emerging in official Washington early in 1946 than the “Long Telegram” sent by George F. Kennan (1904–2005), then a counselor in the US embassy in Moscow and an influential policy advisor, in response to an urgent State Department request for clarification of Soviet conduct. The Long Telegram was sent to Washington shortly after Stalin had declared that a clash between the USSR and the West was inevitable and that the West was seeking to encircle the Soviet Union.

Kennan’s view of the Soviet Union was entirely negative, with mistrust and basic incompatibility between the two superpowers dominating his analysis. He began by assessing Soviet intentions towards the United States. “We have here,” he wrote, “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that, with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi [practical compromise], that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.” Kennan then argued that Soviet ideology warped the Soviet view of reality: The USSR “is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and reformed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived.”⁸ Kennan’s prognosis of the Soviet menace was gloomy indeed:

Efforts will be made . . . to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of

national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity . . . Where individual governments stand in [the] path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office . . . In foreign countries Communists will . . . work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political, or moral.⁹

Although Kennan offered several general suggestions about what could be done to combat the Soviet threat in the Long Telegram, he had no specific prescription for US foreign policy. That would await publication of his “Mr. X” essay in the journal *Foreign Affairs* a year later.

From documents released later, we know that the Soviet Union held a similar view of American intentions. The Soviet ambassador to the US, Nikolai Novikov (1903–89), sent a secret report to Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov (1890–1986) in September 1946 outlining “the imperialist tendencies of American monopolistic capital,” which is “striving for world supremacy.”¹⁰ American policy, Novikov argued, was particularly dangerous because US leadership had changed, and the United States was embarked on a course of action to achieve “global dominance.” “The ascendance to power of President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appointment of [James] Byrnes as Secretary of State meant a strengthening of the influence of US foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic party.” The United States had instituted a military draft, increased defense expenditures, and based military forces around the world, actions that Novikov believed had the single purpose of using military power to achieve “world domination.” No longer was the United States interested in cooperating with the USSR. Instead, US policy toward other countries was “directed at limiting or dislodging the influence of the Soviet Union from neighboring countries” and securing “positions for the penetration of American capital into their economies.”¹¹

Novikov's views are a **mirror image** of those in Kennan's Long Telegram. Soviet leaders saw the US as driven by capitalist imperatives and bent on world domination. American leaders saw the Soviet Union as driven by Marxist–Leninist imperatives and bent on world revolution. Each demonized the other as expansionist while assigning benevolent motives to itself, and the private images of policy advisors like Kennan and Novikov were reflected in public utterances by their respective leaders.

Events outside Europe reinforced these perceptions, further threatening East–West cooperation. Soviet interference in Iran, which had been occupied by the USSR and Britain during the war, continued until the end of 1946. Under UN pressure, Soviet troops were withdrawn from that country in May, but a Soviet-supported separatist regime remained in Azerbaijan until December. In addition, Moscow demanded the cession of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan and a revision of the Montreux Convention governing the passage of naval vessels through the Dardanelles. By the same token, the sudden halt of US lend-lease aid to the USSR and Truman's dismissal of Secretary of Commerce (and former Vice President) Henry Wallace (1888–1965) after Wallace had argued publicly for a conciliatory policy toward Moscow were perceived as insensitive to Soviet interests.

Thus, knowledge of domestic political systems, competing ideologies, and mirror-image perceptions provides a richer understanding of the onset of the Cold War. However, to understand what took place, we also must consider how the global system and its emergent properties affected global politics.

System-level explanations

At the global-system level, neorealists focus on the bipolar distribution of military power as an explanation for the Cold War. This explanation emphasizes that postwar **bipolarity** meant that the only major security threat to each superpower

was the other superpower, thereby creating a security dilemma. Poised along the Iron Curtain, the Red Army appeared an imminent threat to Western Europe. In turn, the United States, as sole possessor of nuclear weapons, seemed threatening to the Soviet Union. From the Soviet perspective, securing Eastern Europe and Germany was vital to ensuring its security, and so, for reasons of geography and power, Soviet leaders acted like their predecessors, the tsars. As early as 1835, French political philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–59), had presciently predicted that the two great powers would collide because of their growing power and vastly different cultures:

There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend towards the same end, although they started from different points: I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place amongst the nations . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power; but these are still in the act of growth; all the others are stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty . . . The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common-sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm; the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.¹²

The bipolar division of power contributed to a breakdown in cooperation among the superpowers, the division of the world into distinct spheres of influence, and the division of Germany.

BIPOLARITY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION Although the Grand Alliance won World War Two, suspicion between West and East grew as each side came to fear that the other would threaten its security once the war ended. The United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in a bipolar world, a situation in which they were the only countries in a position to influence global politics significantly, and each was the only power that could harm the other. The former great powers – Britain, France, Germany, and Japan – were devastated. Britain had lost about one-third of its wealth and lacked food and coal to feed and heat itself, its troops in Europe, or the Germans for whom its occupation forces were responsible. France suffered not only material damage, but debilitating psychological harm owing to its collapse in 1940 and subsequent occupation by Germany. Defeated Germany, Italy, and Japan were in ruins. Germany was divided and occupied by the victors, and Japan was under American occupation. Europe’s “winners” and “losers” were all heavily in debt, and all, in varying degrees, needed US assistance to meet basic needs.

Politically, too, Europe was in a shambles. The British, French, and Dutch empires were unraveling. In France and Italy, government instability was exacerbated by powerful communist parties which enjoyed popular support owing to their reputation for having fought the Nazi occupiers during the war and to their countries’ ruinous economic condition. By contrast, following World War Two, the United States was economically vigorous and politically stable, accounting for 45 percent of world manufactures and enjoying large trade surpluses and gold reserves.¹³ American armies occupied Western Europe and Japan, its navy was the world’s largest, and it had a monopoly on a new, revolutionary weapon, the atom bomb. The Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the war against Germany, suffering more than 20 million dead and the destruction of two decades of socialist construction. Nevertheless, 175 Soviet divisions remained in the heart of Europe, a

fact that became more important as US forces in Europe were demobilized. Politically, Joseph Stalin’s ruthless regime had survived the Nazi onslaught, and no one dared oppose the aging tyrant. The Soviet Union, as one of the victors and with armies occupying Central Europe, expected to share in the spoils of war.

Thus, global leadership was suddenly handed over to the Soviet Union and the United States, neither of which had much experience in global politics. In short order, the US found itself possessing what one historian calls an “empire by invitation.”¹⁴ It did not take long for misunderstandings over Soviet–Western postwar arrangements for Germany and Eastern Europe, agreed on at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945, to poison East–West relations.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND EASTERN EUROPE Although **spheres of influence** and power politics were nowhere made explicit, they were implicit in postwar diplomacy, including the design of the new United Nations and its Security Council. This idea was even more explicit in Churchill’s October 1944 proposal to Stalin. “The moment was apt for business,” recalled Churchill, “so I said [to Stalin], ‘Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety percent predominance in Romania, for us to have ninety percent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?’”¹⁵ The spirit of the time was reflected in a letter from Kennan to fellow diplomat Charles E. Bohlen (1904–74) in which Kennan asked: “Why could we not make a decent and definite compromise with it [the USSR] – divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence – keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?”¹⁶

Several summit meetings were held to overcome the differences among the major powers, the most important of which were at Yalta in

Soviet Crimea in February 1945 and Potsdam, near Berlin, in July–August 1945. Both shaped the postwar settlement in Europe and fed the misunderstanding that would characterize Soviet–Western relations. One set of Yalta agreements dealt with representation and voting arrangements for the proposed UN organization. The Soviet Union demanded that all of its republics be seated in the UN General Assembly. Washington objected, and a bargain was struck whereby the USSR was given three seats in the General Assembly and the US could have the same number if it wished. A second agreement provided for veto power for the five permanent members of the Security Council (the US, USSR, Britain, France, and China), ensuring they would have to cooperate if the Council were to be effective.

The disposition of defeated Germany was a critical issue. Agreement was reached on creating four occupation zones in Germany (American, Soviet, British, and French), with France acquiring a zone only after much wrangling. This was a key compromise because it assured continued US involvement in European affairs and ratified the division of Germany among the victors.

Agreements were also reached on German war reparations and on establishing a coalition government including communists and noncommunists in Poland. The most controversial decision at Yalta was the “Declaration on Liberated Europe,” which pledged the participants to foster free elections and guarantee basic freedoms in all liberated countries. Stalin’s failure to honor the Declaration became a powerful rationale for US suspicions of Soviet intentions. One impetus for American willingness to strike these deals at Yalta was to get a Soviet commitment to enter the war against Japan three months after the war in Europe ended.

Further discussions were held on the future of Europe at the Potsdam Conference, some months after Germany’s surrender. By then the atmosphere had begun to deteriorate. At Potsdam, the United States was represented by Truman, who was more distrustful of Stalin’s intentions than had been his predecessor. Churchill was replaced in the middle of the conference by Clement Attlee (1883–1967) following the electoral victory of the Labour Party in Britain.

Although the question of Poland and its borders was to be a principal topic at Potsdam, the

CONTROVERSY

At the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt agreed to the reorganization of the Polish government “on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad” that would be “pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.”¹⁷ The Soviet Union failed to honor this agreement, imposing a satellite government in Poland because for Stalin it “was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia.”¹⁸ Some of Roosevelt’s critics argue that the president was duped and, in effect, gave the Soviet Union control over Poland. Roosevelt’s defenders argue that he got the best deal that possible but that the United States had little political leverage in Poland because that country was already occupied by the Red Army. In January 1945, Roosevelt himself pointed out to a group of US senators that “the occupying forces had the power in the areas where their arms were present and each knew that the others could not force things to an issue. The Russians had the power in Eastern Europe.” Shortly after Yalta, he made the same point: “Obviously the Russians are going to do things their own way in the area they occupy.”¹⁹

USSR announced it had already reached agreement with Poland's communist government on that country's new boundaries. The new boundary with Germany followed the Oder and West Neisse rivers from the Baltic Sea to Czechoslovakia, involving the surrender of East Prussia by Germany to Poland (and expulsion of German inhabitants) in compensation for Soviet annexation of territories in eastern Poland. The Soviet fait accompli, while increasing Soviet security, reduced prospects for fruitful bargaining, and disagreement was papered over in a statement indicating that the boundary question "shall await the peace settlement."²⁰

THE DIVISION OF GERMANY Expectations still remained high that the Soviet Union would be prepared to negotiate honestly over the future of Germany and Eastern Europe. The hope was that the Yalta axioms would continue to govern US–Soviet relations. This reflected a realist perspective that the USSR was a "normal state" and thus driven fundamentally by power considerations. This axiom implied that the USSR would seek to advance its interests but also recognize that its power had limits. Rational calculation would, therefore, restrain Soviet behavior. The US hoped to use rewards such as economic aid and international control of atomic energy as inducements to obtain Soviet compliance with the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and agreement on how to treat defeated Germany. Even in defeat, Germany remained the key to European security. Its central geographic position, skilled population, and economic potential made it a focus of attention.

At ministerial meetings in late 1945 and early 1946, Anglo-American fears about the USSR intensified when Moscow refused to cooperate in administering conquered Germany. Although the victors had divided Germany into administrative zones, they had agreed to treat the country as a single economic unit. This made sense because Germany's eastern sector was primarily agricultural and its western region mainly industrial. The victors had also agreed that reparations would be

paid, especially to the USSR, which had suffered so greatly at German hands. The USSR was to receive all the industrial equipment in the Soviet zone, plus one-quarter of such equipment from Western zones on condition that no reparations be taken from current German production until the country had accumulated sufficient foreign-exchange reserves to buy needed imports to feed, clothe, and house its citizens.

The Soviet Union quickly removed capital equipment from its own zone without informing its allies of what was being taken and refused to permit shipment of agricultural goods to the Western zones. The US commander in Germany, General Lucius Clay (1897–1978), responded by suspending reparations from Western zones to the USSR. Stalin's objectives in Germany were to obtain as much in reparations as possible to finance Soviet reconstruction and eliminate any prospect of a German revival that might imperil Soviet interests. However, the immediate result was a cooling of East–West relations, and the division of Germany.

The United States and Britain were determined that their zones should become economically self-sufficient, so that they would not have to underwrite the German economy and Germany could contribute to the overall recovery of Europe. To hasten the revival of the Western zones, US Secretary of State James Byrnes (1879–1972) proposed in July 1946 that they be unified. Although France initially refused, fearing Germany's revival, the British and American zones were unified in January 1947. By the spring, France had merged its zone as well. The result was to solidify the division of Germany and eliminate Western influence from the Soviet zone. In 1949, the Western zones became the Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern zone became the German Democratic Republic.

Eastern Europe was the second focus of East–West friction. Free and democratic elections were not held, as promised at Yalta; the USSR annexed the independent Baltic republics of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia; and Moscow

installed or aided new communist governments in Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, East Germany, Albania, Yugoslavia, and, finally, in February 1948, Czechoslovakia. These events profoundly affected American public opinion, especially in communities like Chicago, New York, and Buffalo with large Eastern European populations. The Czech coup and the murder of the country's foreign minister, Jan Masaryk (1886–1948), son of the country's founder, were the final steps in communizing Eastern Europe, all of which now found itself in the shadow of Soviet power.

Interpreting the beginning of the Cold War

Realists, liberals, constructivists, and Marxists would analyze the sources of the Cold War quite differently. Realists, especially neorealists, would stress the existence of power vacuums in Central Europe and East Asia created by the defeat of Germany and Japan and the weakness of other European and Asian countries. Bipolarity and the steps each took to increase its security trapped both in a security dilemma. Neither wished the other to enjoy a preponderance of power, and each tried to prevent this by arming and forging alliances. Realists also offered a geopolitical explanation of the Cold War as a consequence of traditional Russian expansionism in search of warm water ports and defensible boundaries.

Liberals would focus on Soviet authoritarianism as a key source of conflict. Soviet leaders could solidify their authority at home by focusing public attention on an alleged threat from abroad, and their abuse of human rights at home, as well as in occupied Eastern Europe, alienated US public opinion. The absence of Soviet–American economic interdependence meant that there were few impediments to Soviet–American competition.

Constructivists would focus on the contrasting identities of the superpowers that gave rise to

conflicting interests. They would point out how, after 1917, a consensus emerged among Soviet leaders about the USSR's identity as the vanguard of world Marxism. They would also focus on the emergence of an American identity as leader of "the free world." The USSR saw itself as a **socialist** state, just as the United States identified itself as a capitalist state, producing competing and incompatible world views about how societies should be organized politically and economically. Americans viewed their country as a democracy in which individual freedom and individualism were encouraged. Soviet citizens, as members of a socialist society, sought to encourage economic equality, collective responsibility, and centralized economic planning. Each regarded the other's version of democracy as a sham that gave power to the few at the expense of the many.

Marxists viewed the policies of the United States and its allies as part of a transnational capitalist effort to strangle socialism and to spread capitalism globally, make non-Western countries economic dependencies of the developed Western states, and obtain new markets for exports and new sources of key raw materials. "Capitalist encirclement" and "Western imperialism" summarized the Soviet belief that economic and class imperatives shaped Western policies after World War Two and corporations and banks, protected by Western governments that they controlled, were the engines driving capitalist expansion. Once begun, the conflict spread and deepened.

The Cold War spreads and deepens

The Cold War entered a new and more dangerous stage early in 1947. By enunciating the Truman Doctrine, the United States threw down the gauntlet and officially adopted a confrontational approach toward the Soviet Union. Tensions then spread and deepened as both the American and Soviet governments pursued policies intended to obtain military, economic, and political advantages.

Containment

Early in 1947, Great Britain informed Washington that it could no longer provide financial assistance to Turkey or to Greece, where a communist-led insurgency threatened the country's stability. Fearing that other countries were also endangered, on March 12 President Truman requested \$400 million from Congress for economic and military assistance for Turkey and Greece. Truman placed the situation in the context of broader changes he saw taking place. Truman's speech, known as the Truman Doctrine, marked America's first major Cold War commitment, as it espoused assisting "free people" anywhere who were threatened by totalitarian governments. Although the United

States had "made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria," those protests had proved insufficient. The US must thus be willing, Truman declared, "to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." Truman's sweeping language and the commitment to assist any state threatened by totalitarianism gained it the status of a "doctrine" and a lasting American policy. Yet Truman's speech (see Key document, below) was more than that: it was a virtual declaration of Cold War. The issue was overshadowing everything else on the global agenda.

KEY DOCUMENT PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS²¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States: The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance . . .

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries . . .

Meanwhile, the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.

The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid, but these are inadequate . . . Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention . . .

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion . . . We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek

to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States . . .

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence . . .

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Truman's speech became the basis for later American commitments to resisting communist expansionism beyond Europe. It was also the basis of the **containment** policy adopted by the United States during much of the Cold War. Following Truman's declaration, George Kennan, author of the Long Telegram, published an article under the pseudonym "Mr. X" in *Foreign Affairs* in which he outlined a policy of putting pressure on the Soviet Union by "the application of counterforce at a series of constantly changing geographical and political points" aimed at producing a change in both the USSR's internal structure and its international conduct. This policy was based on "patient firmness" in countering communist expansion, initially by using economic and ideological tools, but in time, as reinterpreted by US officials, coming to rely on alliances and military force.²² Thereafter, the United States embarked on a global strategy to confront what it believed to be a Soviet policy of expansionism. Changes in

nuance and tactics notwithstanding, containment remained the basis of American foreign policy for four decades.

In carrying out containment, the United States established a global alliance network. Washington fostered the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Rio Treaty) with 21 Western hemisphere countries (1947); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with 12 (later 15) European states (1949); the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand (1951); the Baghdad Pact with Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Britain (1954) (renamed the Central Treaty Organization in 1959 after Iraq left the alliance); and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with countries within and outside the region (1954). Bilateral agreements were consummated with the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan early in the 1950s, and economic and military assistance programs worldwide linked US security to that of recipients.

American officials realized that the Cold War could not be won by military force alone. Poverty and despair made people amenable to communism in countries like France and Italy. In June 1947, in a speech at Harvard University, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall (1880–1959) announced the Marshall Plan – a massive effort to help rebuild Western Europe by providing economic assistance and, if possible, attract countries in Eastern Europe from the Soviet embrace.²³ The accompanying American requirement that Europe establish common institutions to administer Marshall aid was a first step along the road to Europe's economic and political integration.

NATO and the nascent European community served to reintegrate recently defeated Germany (or at least its Western areas) into Europe and the West. For its part, the Soviet Union established a counter alliance in 1955 called the Warsaw Pact. NATO still exists, although its purposes have changed since the end of the Cold War. NATO was forged at first as a political and later a military shield behind which the United States would help Western Europe recover from World War Two. In return, the countries of Western Europe would accept American political leadership. This arrangement survived until the worst of the Cold War had passed and Europe had regained its prosperity.

From the beginning of the Cold War, crises convulsed Western Europe. These frequently involved probes in which each side sought to discover what it could get away with without causing war, often involving unilateral actions that one side viewed as justified or harmless but that provoked the other to respond. Several involved Soviet efforts to impede Western access to Berlin, the former and present capital of Germany.²⁴ Like Germany as a whole, the city was divided among the victors of World War Two and was located deep within the Soviet zone (see Map 4.1) with Western access guaranteed. In May 1948, the Soviet Union, anticipating the West's establishment of a new state from their zones in Germany, blockaded Western road, water, and rail

access to Berlin. Soviet anger had been sparked by a unilateral Western currency reform in its zones that had been implemented because of Soviet refusal to treat Germany as a single economic unit. In response to the blockade, late in July, the Western powers began a massive airlift to the beleaguered city to loosen the Soviet stranglehold. By one estimate, US and British aircraft transported “over 1.5 million tons of food, fuel, and other goods into Berlin (the highest load in one day exceeded 12,000 tons)”²⁵ during the 10 months to the end of the blockade in May 1949. The peaceful conclusion to the Berlin blockade was an important learning experience for both sides in how adversaries could confront each other in a crisis and, with imagination, avoid resort to arms.

Other dangerous crises involving Berlin took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially in August 1961, when the Soviet Union constructed the Berlin Wall, dividing Berlin in two. The Wall was intended to curtail the flight of East Germans to the West – an embarrassment to the Soviet Union and the East German communists – and it stood as a symbol of the abyss separating East and West until it was torn down in November 1989.

Militarizing the Cold War

Up to this point, the Cold War had been largely waged in Europe and had remained mainly a political and ideological contest. Events now took place that raised the stakes and began to militarize the conflict. On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union conducted its first successful test of an atom bomb, shocking the West which had believed that the USSR was still far from acquiring nuclear weapons. The USSR had been aided by espionage conducted by Soviet spies, several of whom had worked on the wartime Manhattan Project that developed the US atom bomb. The Truman administration commissioned a classified report to be written by Paul Nitze (1907–2004),²⁶



Map 4.1
Divided Germany

then head of the State Department's Policy Planning Bureau, and issued by the National Security Council in April 1950.

NSC-68 The report, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), marked a dramatic shift in American policy toward militarizing the Cold War (see Key document, opposite). Unlike Kennan's Long Telegram, NSC-68 stressed the USSR's grow-

ing military capabilities and called for massive enlargement and improvement in American military capabilities to meet the Soviet threat. What was necessary was "a build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior . . . to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites."²⁷ NSC-68 marked a shift from Kennan's belief that the Soviet threat was



Map 4.2 Korea and the 38th Parallel

largely political and ideological and that containment should rest mainly on political and economic means to a more militant form based on military power. NSC-68 saw growing Soviet military power and its willingness to use it as part of a systematic global strategy to destroy the West. Without military power, containment would be a “bluff.” Where Kennan’s version of containment was largely passive, awaiting changes in Soviet domestic society, NSC-68 advocated an active version of containment to encourage such changes and advised against any return to **isolationism**.²⁸

According to NSC-68, the United States and Soviet Union were engaged in a zero-sum conflict in which cooperation was impossible. Thus, “the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony,” was moved “by a new fanatic faith,” that leads it to try to “impose its absolute authority

over the rest of the world.”²⁹ NSC-68 declared that Soviet leaders regarded the United States as the principal threat to their ambitions and as such had to be defeated. The report predicted that the USSR would stockpile hundreds of atom bombs by 1954 and that a surprise nuclear attack on the United States would then become possible, even as the Red Army continued to threaten Western Europe. “Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air,” the report continued “might the USSR be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the attainment of our objectives.”³⁰ President Truman only added his signature to NSC-68 when North Korean forces swept across the 38th Parallel into South Korea on June 25, 1950, seeming to validate the report (see Map 4.2).

KEY DOCUMENT

NSC-68³¹

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted

with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or nonviolent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end, Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

. . . [T]he Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and doomed . . . The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability of our prosecuting a preventive war.

THE “LOSS OF CHINA” The Cold War spread beyond Europe to Asia when communists under Mao Zedong took power in China in 1949, uniting the country under a single government for the first time since the end of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. China’s turn toward communism was a result of a drawn-out civil war between communist forces and its opponents. This conflict reinforced Western fears that communism was inherently expansionist and that communists would use military means to spread their ideology. It also hardened Western resolve to contain communism’s spread.

China increasingly became an arena of conflict among quarreling warlords despite the efforts of Sun Yat-sen, provisional president of China’s new republic and founder of China’s Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), to unify the country.

Seeking allies, Sun recruited a young officer named Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) as his military aide. Sun also accepted assistance from the Communist International (Comintern) beginning in 1921 and sent Chiang to study in the Soviet Union in 1923. After Sun’s death in 1925, Chiang became leader of the Nationalists and expanded their control over large areas of China. Chiang also continued cooperating with China’s Communist Party (CCP) until 1927 when he turned upon his former allies, arresting and murdering hundreds of them in Shanghai, and starting a civil war that lasted over two decades. Shortly thereafter, Chiang became the recognized leader of China’s government. Those communists who survived fled the cities into the countryside.

Chiang’s forces pursued the communists, and in 1933, after four unsuccessful military opera-

tions aimed at destroying the communists in China's western Jiangxi Province, Chiang succeeded in encircling his communist foes. Facing the possibility of annihilation, the communists broke out of the trap in October 1934 and led by Mao began the legendary year-long "Long March," crossing 6000 miles of mountains and marshes until reaching northern Shaanxi Province, deep in the heart of China, in October 1935. Only 10 percent of Mao's original force remained.

The KMT and communists were forced into an uneasy alliance following Japan's 1937 invasion of China. Their cooperation during World War Two was virtually non-existent, each side weighing its moves with an eye to gaining territorial and other advantages over its domestic foe when their civil war resumed. As early as 1940, Chiang was using his best troops to fight the communists, and his refusal to risk his forces against Japan infuriated his American advisers, notably General Joseph W. Stilwell (1883–1946) who referred to Chiang derogatorily as "the peanut." It was hardly surprising that, after World War Two, civil war again engulfed China.

With Japan's surrender, the USSR, which had entered the Pacific war only days earlier, seized control of Manchuria and provided the communists with large amounts of Japanese arms. Stalin, however, did little to encourage Mao to seize power. Between December 1945 and January 1947, General Marshall sought unsuccessfully to foster a ceasefire between Chiang and Mao. A series of campaigns followed in which Chiang's armies, weakened by corruption and confined to the cities, began to collapse, culminating in Chiang's flight to the island of Taiwan (called Formosa by Japan) and Mao's establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, bringing about what Americans called the "loss" of China. On Taiwan, Chiang continued to call himself the legitimate ruler of the Republic of China, and until his death repeatedly threatened to re-conquer the mainland. Sino-American hostility escalated when Mao turned to the USSR for diplomatic and military assistance. In 1971, the

UN expelled the nationalist delegation and accepted a communist delegation as legitimate representatives of China. The island, which both Mao and Chiang agreed was part of China, remains a bone of contention to this day.

THE KOREAN WAR The Cold War in Asia became a hot war and the wave of anti-communist hysteria in the United States intensified when communist North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Like Berlin, divided Korea was an anomaly – fully neither in the Western nor Eastern camp. In a January 1950 speech, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893–1971) declared that South Korea was outside the US defense perimeter in East Asia. This speech, indicating that the US had no wish to get involved in a war on the Asian mainland or interfere in China's civil war, may have suggested to Stalin that North Korean aggression would be left unanswered.

On learning of the North's attack, Truman reversed the position outlined by Acheson and dispatched to South Korea US troops based in Japan as occupation forces. American intervention was authorized by the United Nations and, although most allied forces were American and South Korean, the Korean War was waged in the name of the UN. In ordering US intervention, Truman recalled the failure of the policy of appeasement that the British and French had pursued in the 1930s. He believed that this strategy had made the allies look weak and had provoked additional aggression. Truman wrote:

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time the democracies had failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be embold-

ened to override nations closer to our own shores.³²

US leaders believed the communists had invaded South Korea to probe America's willingness to resist aggression and that the invasion was a prelude to possible Soviet military action in Europe. Stalin was, in fact, behind the invasion. "In the Soviet archives," writes one historian, "are a number of documents, including this telegram, sent to Stalin by his ambassador in North Korea, General Shtykov, two days after the start of the war, which conclusively show that the North attacked the South with Stalin's full knowledge."³³

With the Korean invasion, American leaders feared that, if the United States allowed one country to "fall" to communism, others would follow and that this must not be allowed to happen. Despite American involvement, the bloody struggle continued for three more years, enlarged by the intervention, at Stalin's urging, of 200,000 Chinese "volunteers" in October 1950, just as UN forces under American General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) seemed on the verge of uniting the entire Korean peninsula.

The Korean War ended in a ceasefire in 1953, but a treaty officially ending the war has *never* been signed, and Korea remains one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints. Although the military outcome was inconclusive, the war's impact was profound. The Korean War, thousands of miles from Europe, globalized the Cold War. For Americans, the war ended what political scientist Robert Jervis calls "the incoherence which characterized US foreign and defense efforts in the period 1946–1950"³⁴ and propelled the United States in the direction of militarizing the containment doctrine. To this end, events in Asia brought about a dramatic increase in US military spending and transformed NATO from a political into a military alliance, with growing numbers of American troops based in Europe, especially West Germany, a permanent headquarters and staff in Brussels, Belgium, and a Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who has tradi-

tionally been a US officer. By 1953, US defense expenditures had soared to over 13 percent of gross national product and remained above 8 percent during much of the 1960s.³⁵ These expenditures began to decrease in the 1970s, only to rise again in the 1980s as the Reagan defense build-up began. Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures during the Cold War range from 10 to 20 percent of GNP (and higher). These expenditures fueled conventional and nuclear arms races.

The Korean War also had important domestic consequences for the United States. In 1952, General Eisenhower, hero of D-Day and the first commander of NATO, was overwhelmingly elected President of the United States partly because of dissatisfaction with Truman's failure to either end or win the war in Korea. Apparently threatening the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea, Eisenhower swiftly concluded a ceasefire with China and North Korea.

MCCARTHYISM AT HOME The "loss" of China and the Korean War intensified a climate of fear and hysteria about alleged communist infiltration of American institutions in an era called McCarthyism after Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908–57) of Wisconsin. Confrontations with the Soviet Union such as the Berlin blockade and the USSR's explosion of an atomic bomb before Americans had expected, had produced fear of a "Red Menace." Demagogic politicians like McCarthy exploited sensational allegations of espionage by Soviet agents such as Alger Hiss (1904–96), president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and physicist Klaus Fuchs (1911–88), a participant in the Manhattan Project. On February 9, 1950, McCarthy declared that he had in his hand "a list of 205, a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department."³⁶

Mao's victory in China provided McCarthy and other "red baiters" with additional fodder. Who, they wanted to know, had "lost China"? The

answer, they claimed, lay in treason by the State Department Foreign Service officers and China specialists such as John Carter Vincent (1900–72), John Stewart Service (1909–99), John Paton Davies, Jr. (1908–99), and Owen Lattimore (1900–89) whose only crime had been to predict that Mao's forces would triumph over the corrupt nationalists. Such individuals, critics reasoned, must have worked to undermine America's wartime ally, Chiang Kai-shek. Lattimore, who had given the Chinese communists "credit for having a more nearly democratic structure than the Kuomintang, despite their doctrinaire base" and were not, he argued, "mere tools of the Kremlin,"³⁷ was a special target. Writes historian Robert Newman, "by the end of March 1950 every scoundrel in the country, and some abroad, knew that Lattimore had been targeted as another Hiss. Would-be informants came crawling out of the woodwork, drawn to McCarthy as moths to light, each peddling a new version of Lattimore's evil deeds."³⁸ Lattimore and the others were disgraced and hounded out of the State Department, which was deprived of China experts for years afterwards.

A similar process unfolded in the USSR. Stalin believed himself to be surrounded by traitors and spies. Purges were conducted against Soviet citizens, including world war veterans, who had had contact with Westerners, and the number of prisoners held in the Soviet "Gulag Archipelago" (the network of Soviet forced-labor camps around the country) grew dramatically.³⁹

THE VIETNAM WAR The Asian dimension of the Cold War again became inflamed during the Vietnam War, in which the United States sought to resist the unification of that country under a communist government led by Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969).

Vietnam had become a French protectorate in 1883 and was integrated into France's colonial empire in Indochina (which also encompassed Laos and Cambodia) in 1887. Ho Chi Minh's vision for his country combined nationalism and communism. During the 1919 Versailles Peace

Conference, he had tried to persuade President Wilson that the Vietnamese should enjoy national self-determination, but his proposal fell on deaf ears.

Shortly before World War Two, French Indochina was occupied by Japan. Following Japan's defeat, France sought to reoccupy Indochina, and Ho warned the French that: "You can kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours, yet even at those odds, you will lose and I will win."⁴⁰ By the end of the French war in Indochina, the US, convinced that the struggle in Indochina was a case of communist expansion rather than anti-colonialism, was underwriting about 75 percent of the war's costs, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) was determined to hold the line against the "falling dominos" of Southeast Asia. Dulles and other American leaders viewed events in Vietnam as part of the larger Cold War, believed that the USSR and Maoist China were behind Ho, and feared that American failure to contain communism in Vietnam would be seen by America's foes as a sign of weakness and an indication that the US would not uphold its commitments elsewhere.

At a press conference shortly before the climactic French defeat at Dienbienphu in North Vietnam in 1954, President Eisenhower set forth the assumption on which later US involvement in Vietnam would be based: "You have broader considerations that might follow what you might call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over very quickly. So you have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound consequences." The "domino theory" shaped the way American leaders viewed the impending French defeat and the prospective victory of communist forces in Indochina. Indeed, the United States briefly contemplated intervening to prevent the imminent French defeat. Following that defeat, a conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland, that produced an agreement, temporarily partitioning Vietnam, with a communist

regime in the north and the anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–63) as first president of South Vietnam. The agreement also stipulated that internationally supervised elections be held throughout Vietnam in July 1956 to determine the country's future. At American urging, Diem refused to hold the elections, and a second Indochina conflict began in 1959. The north began to support violence to overthrow the government in the south in Saigon and unite Vietnam under communist rule. Thus began the second Vietnam War which lasted until 1975.

Under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the United States provided South Vietnam with advisors, supplies, and training, but after Diem's overthrow and death in a 1963 military coup, US involvement grew. In the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that resulted from claims of an attack on US naval vessels that never took place Congress gave President Lyndon B. Johnson

(1908–73) permission “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” Some 27,000 American troops were in Vietnam at the time, but additional troops began to arrive in March 1965 and, at its peak, America's military presence in South Vietnam exceeded 500,000. Commanded by General William Westmorland (1914–2005) in the crucial years between 1964 and 1968, America's conscript soldiers suffered growing casualties confronting a foe they little understood in a war in trackless jungles in which there were no front lines and in which they could not tell the difference between innocent civilians and enemy combatants.

Throughout this period, Ho followed Mao's example in fighting a “**people's war**.” Guerrillas and their supplies were sent south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Map 4.3) that ran through Laos and Cambodia. With less well-armed troops,



Map 4.3 Ho Chi Minh Trail

Vietcong guerrillas tried to avoid pitched battles, favoring ambushes and hit-and-run tactics that aimed to produce US casualties and erode political support for the war at home. Like Mao's guerrillas, Ho's forces paid special attention to building safe base camps that sometimes involved complex systems of underground tunnels.

America's use of large-scale conventional air and ground forces played into enemy hands because it led to the deaths of large numbers of civilians and destruction of their villages. As a result, the sympathies of Vietnamese civilians became increasingly pro-Vietcong. Ho understood that his goal could only be won on the political front. To this end, on January 30, 1968, the first day of Tet, the Vietnamese lunar New Year, the Vietcong launched a surprise offensive against American and South Vietnamese forces in which provincial cities throughout the country were seized. In a bold stroke, the Vietcong struck Saigon, even invading the US embassy. After bitter

fighting, American forces repelled the Tet Offensive, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy.

Military defeat notwithstanding, Ho's strategy persuaded Americans that his forces could strike when and where they wished and that the US could not win the war at acceptable cost. The Tet Offensive was a media disaster for the White House and for Johnson's presidency, and American public opinion turned against the war, with conservatives frustrated by US failure to use all its might to win and liberals viewing American intervention as immoral. Johnson declined to run for office in 1968, and Richard M. Nixon (1913–94), claiming he had a "secret plan" to end the war, was elected president. He gradually reduced the American presence while "Vietnamizing" the war by increasing the role of South Vietnamese forces. After lengthy negotiations conducted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, punctuated by American military efforts such as the "secret bombing" of Cambodia (1969–73), the 1970 inva-



Figure 4.3 South Vietnamese General Nguyen Ngoc Loan shooting Vietcong during Tet

Source: AP Photo/Eddie Adams

sion of Cambodia, and the escalation of bombing of the north, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire in January 1973, and American troops pulled out. The war ground on until 1975, engulfing the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia, in which communist governments took power. In early 1975, North Vietnam, which had ignored the ceasefire, conquered South Vietnam, and the war ended with the tumultuous flight of US officials and their Vietnamese allies from Saigon as communist troops entered the city. Vietnam was formally united on July 2, 1976 under a communist government with its capital in the northern city of Hanoi and at a cost of some three million North and South Vietnamese deaths.

The consequences of the war for the United States were far reaching. The war transformed American politics, deeply dividing the country between supporters and opponents of the conflict, and placing inhibitions on American willingness

to get involved militarily elsewhere for years afterwards. About 58,000 American soldiers died in Vietnam and the war cost the United States about \$130 billion. As morale at the front plummeted, so did morale at home. During the final years of the war, troops became reluctant to risk their lives, sometimes even refusing to fight.

The US antiwar movement mushroomed after Tet. Teach-ins against the war became common at universities. As antiwar sentiment mounted, so did violence, leading to the deaths of four students at Kent State University in Ohio and two at Jackson State College in Mississippi. Racial divisions also increased owing to the disproportionate number of African-Americans who could not obtain deferments from military conscription. In 1967, the group Vietnam Veterans Against the War was formed (see Key document, below).

The reasons for American intervention still remain unclear. They included ending Chinese

KEY DOCUMENT

JOHN KERRY'S 1971 TESTIMONY ABOUT VIETNAM

On April 22, 1971, a young Vietnam veteran named John Kerry testified against the war before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Kerry later became a senator from Massachusetts (1985) and Democratic candidate for president (2004). In his testimony, he described how many veterans became disillusioned:

We found that not only was it a civil war, an effort by a people who had for years been seeking their liberation from any colonial influence whatsoever, but also we found that the Vietnamese whom we had enthusiastically molded after our own image were hard put to take up the fight against the threat we were supposedly saving them from.

We found most people didn't even know the difference between communism and democracy. They only wanted to work in rice paddies without helicopters strafing them and bombs with napalm burning their villages and tearing their country apart. They wanted everything to do with the war, particularly with this foreign presence of the United States of America, to leave them alone in peace, and they practiced the art of survival by siding with whichever military force was present at a particular time, be it Vietcong, North Vietnamese, or American.

We found also that all too often American men were dying in those rice paddies for want of support from their allies. We saw first hand how money from American taxes was used for corrupt dictatorial regime. We saw that many people in this country had a one-sided idea of who was kept free by our flag, as blacks provided the highest percentage of casualties . . .

We rationalized destroying villages in order to save them. We saw America lose her sense of morality as she accepted very coolly a My Lai, and refused to give up the image of American soldiers who hand out chocolate bars and chewing gum . . .

We watched the US falsification of body counts, in fact the glorification of body counts. We listened while month after month we were told the back of the enemy was about to break. . . We watched while men charged up hills because a general said that hill has to be taken, and after losing one platoon, or two platoons, they marched away to leave the hill for the reoccupation by the North Vietnamese. We watched pride allow the most unimportant of battles to be blown into extravaganzas, because we couldn't lose, and we couldn't retreat, and because it didn't matter how many American bodies were lost to prove that point.⁴¹


support for “wars of national liberation,” fear that communism would expand to other countries in Southeast Asia, and concern that if America showed weakness, the USSR and its proxies would be emboldened to act aggressively elsewhere.

The Cold War winds down

At its zenith, the Cold War encompassed events across the entire world, as shown in Map 4.4. In Europe, NATO faced the Warsaw Pact. Elsewhere, countries that considered themselves to be nonaligned members of the Third World and, therefore, members of neither the Western (First World) nor Soviet (Second World) blocs repeatedly became arenas for conflict between Americans and Soviets and their proxies. Thus, when the Belgian Congo gained independence in 1960, it became an arena of Cold War conflict until the ascent of American-supported Joseph Mobutu. Similar struggles took place in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and, in countries like Somalia and Angola, civil wars raged long after the Cold War had ended, with weapons that had been supplied to local supporters by both sides at the height of the East–West conflict.

Every arena of human activity was contested during the epic struggle. Each side sought to prove that its economy, art, literature, music, sports, and technology was superior. The “space race” became a feature of the Cold War when the Soviet Union became the first country to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (1957), the first to launch a space satellite (Sputnik) (1957), and the first to put a man into space (1961).⁴² The United States placed the second man in space a month later.

Fortunately, the Cold War never led to a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Such an exchange seemed imminent on several occasions, especially during the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962, after the Soviet Union secretly installed nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. The Soviet action violated US expectations that neither superpower would meddle in the other's neighborhood. Despite rhetoric about “rolling back” communism in Eastern Europe, the US remained passive when East Berliners rioted against Soviet rule in 1953, when Hungarians staged an unsuccessful revolution against Soviet occupation in 1956, and following the Soviet 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. By contrast, in 1962 the USSR was deeply involved in an adventure only 90 miles from Florida.



Map 4.4 Cold War, 1945–60

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev apparently ordered the missiles to Cuba because he wished to compensate for the US strategic nuclear advantage in having military bases along the Soviet periphery in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He also feared that the United States would try again to overthrow Cuba's communist president, Fidel Castro, as it had in 1960 when it provided covert support for an invasion of anti-communist Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs. The missile crisis lasted 13 tense days during which President John F. Kennedy (1917–63) imposed a naval "quarantine" around Cuba and threatened war with the USSR to compel removal of Soviet missiles. Although the United States pledged not to invade Cuba as part of the final settlement of the crisis and at a later date removed obsolete missiles from Turkey, the Soviet retreat from Cuba was partly responsible for Khrushchev's 1964 ouster as head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders clearly had in mind his Cuban adventure when they accused him of "hair-brained schemes" and replaced him with Leonid Brezhnev (1906–82).

Analysts believe that "hot" war did not occur because both sides possessed so many nuclear weapons that such a war would lead to mutual suicide. There had been earlier temporary thaws. After Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet–American relations were briefly warmed by the "spirit of Geneva" (named after a 1955 summit conference in that city), and in 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin, and "peaceful coexistence" with the West became official Soviet policy. The missile crisis, however, marked a fundamental change in superpower relations as both sides became more careful about using nuclear weapons and, as we shall see in Chapter 8, both began to view arms control as a way of reducing the risks of nuclear war. Later crises that threatened superpower **escalation** such as the US bombing of the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong in May 1972 and US–Soviet confrontation during the 1973 Yom Kippur War provided additional impetus for the superpowers to develop procedures to avoid conflict.

The period after 1962 was known as the era of *détente* because it entailed a progressive reduction

in tension. Arms control efforts led to the banning of most nuclear tests, outlawing military tests in space (1963), a ban on nuclear weapons proliferation (1968), a limitation on the number and type of Soviet and American intercontinental ballistic missiles (1972, 1979), and elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INFs) (1987). Both sides also agreed to confidence-building measures to increase trust. Among the most important was the Helsinki Conference of 1975 in which 35 countries in Europe as well as the USSR, Canada, and the United States signed an agreement that legalized Europe's post-World War Two territorial boundaries and promised progress in human rights.

In the 1960s, a split arose between China's communists and the Soviet Union. Once in power, Mao soon became dissatisfied with the aid China received from the USSR, and, after Stalin's death in 1953, the two communist states became engaged in ideological disputes over interpretations of Marxism. Mao defended Stalinism and opposed US–Soviet détente, publicly accusing the USSR of betraying Marxism. In 1964, China became a nuclear power and began to view itself as an alternative leader of the world communist movement. Territorial disputes exacerbated the relationship and in March 1969 Chinese and Soviet forces clashed along their common border in the Xinjian region of China. The Sino-Soviet schism weakened global communism and provided a political opportunity for the United States, as Mao came to regard the USSR as a greater threat to Chinese security than the US.

Although superpower rivalry continued after the missile crisis, fear of nuclear war and the defection of China from the Soviet bloc encouraged the evolution of tacit rules that reduced the risks of conflict and allowed the expectations of the adversaries to converge around the status quo. These included:

- Avoiding direct military confrontation by using proxies such as the Vietnamese, Syrians, and Israelis involved in regional conflicts.

- Designing weapons systems that could survive an enemy attack and deploying surveillance systems, notably satellites, to make “surprise attacks” unlikely.
- Avoiding interference in the adversary's sphere of influence, as when the US refused to intervene in Hungary's 1956 revolution effort, or when the USSR remained passive during America's 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic and its 1983 invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada.
- Employing in non-military means including propaganda, espionage, subversion, overt and covert economic, political, and military assistance.
- Improving communication between Washington and Moscow, as in the establishment of a direct teletype link called the Hotline in 1963.

Nevertheless, Soviet–American détente was tentative. In the mid- and late 1970s, relations were poisoned by a new Soviet arms build-up and growing Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa. The USSR was angered by President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy and intrusive US efforts to force the Soviet Union to ease barriers to Jewish emigration from the USSR. Then, on December 24, 1979, Soviet troops crossed the border with Afghanistan to maintain communist control, bringing an abrupt end to US–Soviet détente. As early as July 1979, President Carter had authorized covert assistance to the enemies of Afghanistan's pro-Soviet government and, according to the president's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, had sought to increase the probability of a Soviet invasion in order to draw “the Russians into the Afghan trap.”⁴³ In 1980, Carter embargoed grain exports to the USSR (even though US farmers stood to lose a lucrative market), and the US boycotted the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. A US arms build-up began in the last year of the Carter administration and was accelerated by President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004).

With the 1980 election of President Reagan US–Soviet relations deteriorated, and there began a period some call the “second Cold War.” The administration’s initial strategy was to refocus American policy on the Soviet threat. It set out to “win” the arms race by taking advantage of America’s economic and technological superiority and by directly challenging the USSR in regional conflicts by supporting anti-Soviet proxies. Secretary of State Alexander Haig (1924–2010) acknowledged a tougher line in 1981 when he described Soviet power as the “central strategic phenomenon of the post-World War Two era” and added that the “threat of Soviet military intervention colors attempts to achieve international civility.”⁴⁴ President Reagan’s antipathy toward the Soviet Union was evident in his “evil empire” speech, delivered on June 8, 1982, to the UK’s House of Commons. Echoing Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, he declared: “From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than thirty years to establish their legitimacy. But none – not one regime – has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.” And he asked rhetorically whether freedom must “wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?”⁴⁵ A year later, Reagan described the contest between the United States and USSR as a “struggle between right and wrong, good and evil.”⁴⁶

The heart of the tough US policy was a massive arms build-up. A \$180-billion nuclear modernization program was begun in which new land-based and sea-based missiles and long-range bombers were added to America’s arsenal. New intermediate-range nuclear missiles were subsequently deployed in Western Europe to counter similar Soviet weapons. In 1983, Reagan also proposed a comprehensive antiballistic missile system called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (nicknamed “Star Wars” by critics) to protect America’s homeland from nuclear attack.

At first, the USSR responded in kind, continuing to deploy mobile intermediate-range

missiles, building new long-range missiles, and modernizing its nuclear submarine fleet. It also continued to assist pro-communist militants in Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea (Cambodia), and Ethiopia. Finally, it broke off arms-reduction talks after American INF deployments began in Western Europe in November 1983.

Nevertheless, even as Moscow continued to command an immense military establishment and underwrite new foreign policy ventures, cracks appeared in the country’s social and economic fabric that required dramatic repair. Isolated from currents of economic globalization, the Soviet Union was becoming a second-rate power. The centrally planned economic system established in the 1920s and 1930s that was dominated by defense and heavy industry and by collectivized agriculture had begun to atrophy.

Soviet GNP continued to rise through the 1970s, but overall economic performance was uneven. By the mid-1970s, the system began to run down. The Soviet leaders who followed Khrushchev – Brezhnev (1964–82), Yuri Andropov (1982–84), and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–85) – all elderly and in poor health, were unable to halt the economic stagnation. Corruption, alcoholism, poor service, and cynicism became widespread. Agriculture remained a problem, and, by the 1980s, the USSR was dependent on Western grain imports to make up shortfalls at home. Finally, as the Soviet economy became more complex, “muscle power” – a key to earlier growth – became less productive and high technology became critical. The Soviet economy was afflicted by technological obsolescence, low productivity, and scarcity of consumer goods, and GNP growth virtually ceased in the early 1980s. In short, the Soviet economy was no longer able to support large-scale defense spending or adventures around the world.

The end of the Cold War

On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the reins of power of the Soviet communist party

and government. He recognized that defense spending was eating up much of the Soviet budget and that the USSR was on the verge of economic collapse and had fallen far behind the United States in critical areas of technology. Indeed, concerns about the quality of Soviet technology and the absence of openness in the country were heightened on April 26, 1986, when a nuclear meltdown at the Chernobyl power plant near the city of Kiev sent radioactive debris over the western USSR, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia. This was the worst nuclear accident in history and led to the evacuation of hundreds of thousands from areas that still remain contaminated.

The Gorbachev reforms and the resolution of key issues

Gorbachev realized that, unless conditions changed, the USSR would gradually become a marginal actor in world affairs. Thus, he decided to sponsor reforms, the two most important of which he announced at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1986. They were **perestroika** – a program of economic, political, and social restructuring – and **glasnost** – a policy of openness in public discussion that would enhance the legitimacy of Soviet institutions and the communist party.

Domestic pressures were the incentive for Gorbachev to seek an end to the Cold War. Overseas adventures and unproductive military investments could not continue if domestic reform were to succeed. Gorbachev therefore set out to move Soviet thinking away from belief in the need for nuclear “superiority” toward acceptance of “sufficiency.” He would reduce Soviet force levels, adopt an unprovocative conventional-force posture, and scale back Soviet global commitments. These steps meant greater flexibility to address the crisis at home.

By the Reagan administration’s second term (1984–88), the stage was set for reordering super-power relations. A new attitude was developing in

Washington as well as Moscow. The US arms build-up was producing alarming budget deficits, and increases in military spending were no longer assured of congressional or public support. In addition, the country’s mood favored greater cooperation with the USSR, especially in arms control. President Reagan himself concluded that it was possible to end the Cold War and saw himself a man of peace. Accommodative moves by both sides followed. Negotiations on intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons began early in 1985, and the first summit meeting since 1979 between Soviet and American leaders was held in November. Additional summits followed.

Major arms control agreements were reached and efforts were made to address old regional differences. Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, and civil war ended in Angola so that Cuban troops could leave that country. The most dramatic example of Soviet–US cooperation followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Presidents Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush hastily arranged a meeting in Helsinki, Finland, and jointly condemned Saddam Hussein’s aggression. The two then cooperated in passing UN resolutions demonstrating the global community’s resolve to reverse aggression.

Since the Cold War had begun in Eastern Europe and Germany, it was fitting that the revolutionary changes that brought an end to the conflict should also take place in the same countries. Poland led the way. By the end of 1989, a noncommunist government had come to power in that country. After it became clear that the USSR would not intervene, the challenge to communist power spread. Within the year, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and other Eastern European countries had abandoned communist rule and held democratic elections, thereby fulfilling the promise of Yalta four decades later.

The key to settling the Cold War lay in Germany. Germany’s division had kindled the Cold War, and ending that division was a prerequisite for ending it. Political fissures in East

Germany, long the keystone in the Soviet empire, became apparent in spring 1989 when East Germans took advantage as barriers were dismantled between Austria and Hungary to travel to Hungary as “tourists” and then flee to West Germany. By August, a trickle had become a deluge of 5000 emigrants a week. Unlike 1961, when the USSR had prodded East Germany to build the Berlin Wall, Soviet leaders did nothing to stop this massive flight. Simultaneously, demonstrations erupted in East German cities, notably Leipzig. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall was opened. German reunification, previously unthinkable, suddenly became possible, and in November 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented a plan for reunification. In summer 1990, Gorbachev agreed to a reunified Germany that would remain within NATO, and in October the two Germanys were officially reunited.

By his reforms, Gorbachev had unintentionally begun a process that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state. It was hard for observers to believe their eyes as democratic movements led to the replacement of communist regimes with democratic ones throughout the Eastern bloc. After decades of debate about the future of Germany, that country was rapidly reunited, and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. At the Malta (December 1989) and Washington summits (June 1990), the Cold War was formally ended with commitments between the superpowers for future cooperation. Two agreements reached in late 1990 clarified the new relationship. The first was a treaty reducing and limiting conventional weapons in Europe, and the second was a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization that included a formal declaration that the two sides were no longer adversaries.

In the Soviet Union, multiparty elections were held, and nascent capitalism, including ownership of private property, was introduced, accompanied by a wave of fraudulent economic practices, organized crime, and deterioration

of medical and educational facilities. Ethnic conflict, popular unrest, growing autonomy of non-Russian regions of the USSR, and rapid decline of Soviet influence overseas were among the results of the dramatic changes, which produced resistance to Gorbachev’s policies on the part of conservative politicians and generals. This resistance climaxed in an effort to overthrow Gorbachev on August 19, 1991. In the end, he was briefly restored to his position as leader of the Communist Party with the aid of Boris Yeltsin (1931–2007), who had become Russia’s first elected president in June 1991. In August, Yeltsin suspended all activities of the Communist Party in Russia, and in a week Gorbachev called on the party’s central committee to dissolve itself. With the demise of Soviet communism, Yeltsin became the paramount leader, and Gorbachev faded from the scene. Still, as a reward for his policies, Gorbachev was awarded the 1990 Nobel Prize for Peace.

Thereafter one Soviet republic after another declared its independence: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In December 1991, several of these joined Russia in a loose grouping called the Commonwealth of Independent States that two years later became an economic common market (see Map 4.5).

The end of the Cold War was a joyful moment in global politics, which, together with the collapse of the Soviet Union, brought down the curtain on an era of global politics that had begun early in the twentieth century. The Cold War’s end altered, or in some cases removed, the rationale for many American foreign policies, including global security arrangements and budget decisions about military spending. Although the Cold War ended two decades ago, US foreign policy still lacks the coherence and consensus that existed during that epic struggle. No other issue dominated America’s foreign policy agenda until the emergence of the shadowy threat of militant Islam accompanied by the prospect of global terrorism.



Map 4.5 Commonwealth of Independent States

Explaining the end of the Cold War

As with its onset, several explanations at different levels of analysis help explain the Cold War's end.

At the individual level, the end of the Cold War owes much to Gorbachev's belief that the only way the Soviet society and economy could be revived was by cooperating with the West, obtaining Western technology, reducing defense spending, and joining the global economy from which it had isolated itself. For his part, Ronald Reagan saw himself a man of peace, and a tectonic shift took place in his attitude toward the Soviet Union. At the unit level, the Cold War's end owed

much to Soviet economic weakness, technological backwardness, and social malaise. Finally, at the level of the global system, the growth in American power combined with a decline in Soviet power may also explain the Cold War's end.

From a system perspective, neorealists argue that the Cold War's end was brought about by increased US military power and its employment overseas. This, combined with the Soviet decline, marked the Reagan years and produced a unipolar world in which the United States was dominant. Liberals point to Soviet isolation from the economic and technological advances produced by globalization, the triumph of democracy in the East bloc, and the antiwar sentiment of segments of the American public as explanations for the

Cold War's end. From a constructivist perspective, the Cold War's end can be seen as a consequence of the desire of Soviet citizens for democracy and a higher standard of living that set in train the evolution of a new set of identities and norms favoring democracy and capitalism and a decline in Soviet self-identity as leader of a global communist revolution. Russians no longer believed they had an interest in spreading Marxism-Leninism or in propping up Marxist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Russia after the Cold War

The dissolution of the USSR was traumatic for Russians who had been raised to believe in communism and the historic Soviet mission. Nevertheless, Russia, by far the largest independent state to emerge from the Soviet Union, remains a major factor in global politics. It is the largest country in the world in terms of territory, retains a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons – second only to America's – and is a major player in the global energy market. Russia has the world's largest reserves of natural gas, the second-largest coal reserves, and the eighth-largest oil reserves. It is the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second-largest exporter of oil.⁴⁷ Russia has used its gas reserves to political advantage, cutting supplies to neighbors Ukraine and Belarus when they refused to accept price hikes. Some have accused Russia of using gas as a political weapon – to punish Ukraine, for example, for electing a pro-Western government in 2005.

Russia faced enormous economic challenges following the Cold War. Following the introduction of free-market reforms in October 1991, real incomes plummeted 50 percent in six months, and production fell 24 percent in 1992 alone, and an additional 29 percent the following year. In 1992, hyperinflation of more than 2000 percent gripped the country, and the country's public health and social security systems rapidly eroded. Following Yeltsin's call for new parliamentary

elections, his political foes tried to seize power. The result was crushed in October 1993 when Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and summoned army units to Moscow to shell Russia's parliament building. One result of Russia's problems has been nostalgia for communism.

Reform in Russia has been so slow that one elderly woman remarked: "The Russian won't budge until the roasted rooster pecks him in the rear."⁴⁸ Integrating Russia into the global economy meant educating Russians in the basics of capitalism and transforming state-owned enterprises into private companies. This process was accompanied by corruption and crime, both of which continue to afflict the country to such an extent that the Russian system is called "gangster capitalism." Economic reform also posed a dilemma for Russia's leaders because it brought with it unemployment, rising prices and taxes, and declining production. Nevertheless, there was gradual improvement until Russia became victim to fallout from Asia's 1998 economic crisis, resulting in a collapsing stock market, an imploding currency, and skyrocketing interest rates. Thus, between 1991 and 2001, the ruble lost 99 percent of its value against the US dollar.⁴⁹

Since 1998, foreign investment in Russia has grown, and high oil prices have helped bring about a sustained economic recovery. In 2002, the European Union and the US declared Russia a market economy, and the process is underway to bring Russia into the World Trade Organization, thereby integrating the country into the global trade system. Serious economic problems remain, however. Poor infrastructure, red tape, complex rules, corrupt officials, burgeoning economic inequality, ethnic conflict, and the continuing economic dominance of a few "oligarchs" (tycoons) continue to deter investors, as do growing political centralization and fears about the future of democracy in Russia. Russia's reliance on energy exports could not protect it from the global financial crisis, and in 2009. Russian GDP declined by almost 8 percent, and recovery was slow in 2010.⁵⁰

In the political realm, President Vladimir Putin's policies (2000–08) gradually eroded earlier democratic reforms. Putin, who rose to power through the KGB (the Soviet security and intelligence service), gradually consolidated political power in the presidency, reversing democratic reforms undertaken by Yeltsin and producing a “managed democracy.” By 2005, he had radically restructured the political system, weakening competing political centers. Regional governments were enfeebled and power centralized at the federal level. Provincial governors, who had been democratically elected after 1995, were now appointed by the president and overseen by presidential envoys. They and other regional leaders were also removed from the upper house of Russia's parliament, the Federation Council. In addition, independent political parties were weakened during Putin's presidency, as pro-Kremlin parties received generous support from the state.

Putin also limited the reach of independent media and nongovernmental organizations. He successfully targeted and acquired control over independent media outlets, including national television channels, ORT, RTR, and NTV. Independent national newspapers also came under the control of Kremlin loyalists. And, in recent years, it has become increasingly dangerous for independent journalists to operate, especially those interested in reporting on corruption and poor governance, risking harassment, beatings, and even their lives. In 2006, investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in her apartment building for, it is widely believed, her criticisms of Putin and her reporting of the Kremlin's conduct of the conflict in Chechnya (fought from 1994–96 and again from 1999–2009 to regain control over the break-away republic).⁵¹ As regards NGOs, a law passed in Putin's second term gave the government expanded authority to harass and close down those it viewed as too political.

Putin stepped down as president in 2008, as required by Russia's constitution, and publicly backed Dmitry Medvedev as his successor.

Medvedev, a 42-year-old lawyer and technocrat had never held elected office before, but easily won election and appointed Putin as Prime Minister. Under Medvedev, Russia's democracy continued to be carefully managed. He promised democratic reform, citing it as a precondition for economic development, but radical reform is not on the horizon and, in fact, in 2011 Putin announced he would again seek the presidency in 2012. (Russia's constitution limits a president to two *consecutive* terms of office; thus, a president may run again after a term out of office.)

DID YOU KNOW?

Spy scandals are not just a Cold War relic – but they are not what they used to be. In June 2010, 10 individuals were arrested in cities across the US and charged with being Russian spies. Those charged had assumed fake identities, even pretending to be married and then having children to bolster their cover. They settled into suburban lives and sought to make connections with government officials and business leaders. All 10 pleaded guilty to the charges in federal court and were deported to Russia in a Cold War-style spy swap in which Russia released 10 Western spies.

How effective were these spies? Not very, suggests Stanislav Belkovsky, head of the Kremlin-connected Institute of National Strategy: “All those so-called spies were just buffoons, and never carried out any real functions. It just gave our special services a pretext to ask for more money, and therefore I would term it as corruption.”⁵² One of them, Anna Chapman, gained notoriety in the months following her deportation to Russia by posing for the cover of the magazine *Maxim*, launching an iPhone poker application, and getting her own action figure doll

In foreign affairs, Putin's policies – staunchly nationalist and suspicious of the United States – smacked of **revanchism**, that is, efforts to restore Russia's sphere of influence in what it called its “near abroad.” During Putin's presidency, many Western security policies, for example NATO expansion and US efforts to install an anti-missile system in Eastern Europe, were viewed as threatening Russian interests. Russia grudgingly agreed that several of its former satellites could join NATO in 1999 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), but the alliance's 2004 expansion brought it to Russia's western border and included former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin was critical of these policies, even accusing the US in 2007 of imperialism and initiating a new arms race.⁵³

Russian revanchism was apparent in August 2008 when Moscow sent military forces into South Ossetia, a disputed region in (pro-Western) Georgia that borders Russia. That region had sought independence from Georgia (itself a former Soviet republic) since 1991. This event was the first occasion since the Cold War that Russian military forces were used in a neighboring country. The decision to use force followed a Georgian air assault against separatist forces in South Ossetia. Russia then intervened in defense of the South Ossetians, many of whom hold Russian passports. This war lasted five days, during which time Russian forces expelled Georgian troops from South Ossetia as well as neighboring Abkhazia and occupied parts of Georgia. Following a ceasefire, Russia pulled its troops out of Georgia, but recognized the independence of both separatist regions.

Overall, there are causes for both optimism and pessimism about Russia. While there have been tensions between Russia and the West in recent years, President Medvedev has sought improved foreign relations with the US and Europe, as evidenced by a new treaty in 2010 to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, cooperation in imposing sanctions on Iran, opening supply routes for US forces in Afghanistan, and seeking closer foreign policy cooperation with the EU. Whether this marks a

genuine shift in Russian foreign policy depends on several factors, including Putin's political position, Russia's economic recovery, and domestic economic and political interests.⁵⁴

Conclusion

This chapter examined several explanations for the Cold War's beginning and has traced the evolution of that conflict, which dominated global politics during the second half of the twentieth century. The chapter also examined alternative explanations for the Cold War's end, ranging from a shift in the global balance of power to the emergence of new thinking in the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR left the United States alone atop the global hierarchy in what has been called a “unipolar moment.” In the next chapter, we will turn to the global south, examining the political and economic development of the world's less-developed countries – a process that occurred at the same time as and was shaped by many of the events covered here.

Student activities

Map analysis

Using Map 4.4, identify countries that were members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Go to the NATO homepage on the internet (<http://www.nato.int/>). How has NATO's membership changed since the Cold War ended in 1989? What implications does this change in membership have for US and European security?

Cultural materials

- 1 There are numerous Cold War novels and films, especially the novels of John Le Carré, for instance, *The Spy Who Came in from the*

Cold, and films based on these novels starring Michael Caine. James Michener's *The Bridges of Toko-Ri* (remade as a film starring William Holden) is a fictional work about the Korean War, as are the book and film *M.A.S.H.*, which was turned into a popular television program starring Alan Alda. In 2000, the film *Thirteen Days* starring Kevin Costner graphically retold the story of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. A variety of excellent films about the Vietnam War have also appeared, including *The Deer Hunter* (1978) starring Robert De Niro, *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), *Apocalypse Now* (1979) starring Marlon Brando, and *Platoon* (1986) starring Tom Berenger. Watch one of these films or read one of these books and consider what it tells you about the relevant era in global politics. Who were the dominant participants? What interests did they pursue and how did they do so?

- 2 In 1952, playwright Arthur Miller wrote *The Crucible* in which the 1692 Salem witch trials are substituted for the McCarthy “witch trials.” Do you think the Salem trials are a suitable metaphor for McCarthyism?

Further reading

- Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Long Peace*, new edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Classic analysis of how the US and USSR managed to avoid war with one another during four decades of tension.
- Gaddis, John Lewis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). With new material from Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese archives, Gaddis evaluates the strategic dynamics of the Cold War.
- Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Cold War* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). Accessible but comprehensive description and analysis of the major events in the Cold War from beginning to end.
- Lafeber, Walter, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2002*, updated edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002). Highly readable account of the Cold War from beginning to end.
- Zubok, Vladislav M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Comprehensive analysis of the Cold War from a Russian perspective.

1521–32	1754–63	1806–26	1807	1884–85	1899–1902	1947
Spanish conquest of the Americas	French and Indian War	Decolonization of Latin America	Slave trade declared illegal	Congress of Berlin	Boer War	Indian independence

5 The global south

In November 2006, China invited African leaders to Beijing, where President Hu Jintao announced a broad aid package including \$5 billion in new loans, debt relief, and technical assistance. China's interest in Africa has skyrocketed in recent years. China has become Africa's leading trading partner, having increased bilateral trade from \$14.6 billion in 2000 to over \$100 billion in

2010.¹ China has invested heavily in African infrastructure, including railroads in Nigeria and Angola, roads in Rwanda, and Africa's largest hydroelectric dam in Ethiopia (see Figure 5.1). China's interest in Africa is fueled by its appetite for fuel and raw materials like timber and copper, and Angola and Sudan alone provide China with 25 percent of its oil imports.



Figure 5.1
Another Asian Tsunami
Source: Zapiro

1947, 1965, 1971	1960	1977	1992–93	1994	1994	1999	2010
Indian–Pakistani wars	Harold MacMillan’s “winds of change” speech	Chinese economic reforms begin	US forces in Somalia	End of South African apartheid	Rwandan genocide	G-20 established	China overtakes Japan as 2nd largest economic power

The impact of these changes is felt throughout the **global south** as countries sell raw materials to Chinese firms that then flood their markets with manufactured goods. In Kano, Nigeria, for example, numerous Chinese restaurants have appeared; a Chinese shoe factory employs over 2000 workers; and Chinese products fill stores. Declares the owner of a Kano textile factory who has drastically cut his workforce: “Without a little protection, if the Chinese bring their finished cotton to Nigeria, you cannot compete with them . . . The gap is so wide that if you just allow them to come in, you are killing Nigerian companies.”² China’s critics claim their policies are little better than the colonial policies European powers followed earlier.

The economic development, the political (in)stability, and the growing influence of the world’s less-developed (LDCs) countries is the central focus issue of this chapter. Historically, one of the challenges facing these countries was to achieve their independence. Because the colonial history of many of these countries contributed to their contemporary political, economic, and social problems, the chapter begins by describing their colonial background and the process of **decolonization** that shaped a new generation of leaders of the LDCs. During the Cold War, many of the newly independent LDCS (collectively called the “Third World” in contrast to the “First World” – the West – and the “Second World” – the Soviet bloc) – pursued the policy of **nonalignment**, which we will examine. The chapter then considers why some LDCs since the end of the Cold War have been unable to build strong nations and economies, some even teeter-

ing on the brink of state failure, while others have experienced remarkable stability and growth.

Let us examine the historical process of Europe’s expansion that shaped the domestic and foreign policies of so many LDCs.

Europe’s empires

For centuries, Europe’s contact with the world beyond its shores was episodic, limited to acquiring luxury goods such as spices and silks from Asia, often from Arab merchants. Occasionally, intrepid explorers like the Venetian Marco Polo (1254–1324) traveled the fabled Silk Road to China, inflaming the imagination of generations of Europeans who sought wealth and fame by finding a direct route to the East. Explorers such as Christopher Columbus (1451–1506)³ took advantage of new shipbuilding techniques and new navigation aids, mapmaking, and telling time to increase Europe’s knowledge of the world across the seas and whet Europeans’ appetite for riches from the East.

The early conquerors: Spain and Portugal

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Portugal and Spain began to build vast empires based on trade. The Portuguese and Spaniards were followed by the Dutch, then the British and French (see Figure 5.2). These global powers would come into conflict when their commercial interests



Figure 5.2 Which way to the Indies?

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

overlapped. Many used trading companies to expand their empires and created military and economic institutions to protect them.

Explorers such as Columbus gave Spain its claim to the New World, and Spain's empire was established in the early 1500s by ambitious soldier-explorers called "conquistadores" who sought precious metals and chased after the mythical fountain of youth. The most famous were Hernán Cortes (1485–1547), who, with only 500 soldiers, laid waste to Mexico's Aztec Empire, and Francisco Pizarro (1475–1541), who destroyed Peru's Inca Empire and executed its ruler Atahualpa.

"America," as historian John Parry observed, "was not discovered by the Europeans; it was truly a meeting of two cultures who had not known each other previously."⁴ The conquest of the Americas destroyed sophisticated indigenous civilizations and reduced the Amerindian populations to servitude. The Amerindians were forcibly converted to Catholicism by missionaries who accompanied the conquistadores and were made to mine the silver and gold that enriched European coffers, and the conquerors brought devastating diseases from the Old World that decimated local populations. To this day, in much of the region, descendants of the Amerindians

remain poorer and politically less influential than descendants of the European conquerors.

Portugal's sixteenth-century trading empire included Brazil, East and West Africa, and the Malay Peninsula. The largest of Europe's early empires, however, was Spain's, which at its peak included all of Central and South America (except Brazil), Mexico, much of North America including Florida, Texas, the lands along the Mississippi River, the American Southwest, and many Caribbean islands. Spain's empire extended to Africa's west coast as well as Asia, including the Philippine Islands, named after Spain's King Philip II. To prevent Spaniards and Portuguese from coming to blows, the pope divided the New World between them in the 1493 Treaty of Tordesillas. Gradually the colonial economies added chocolate, coffee, tobacco, and indigo to the products exported to the Old World.

Latin America was also among the first regions to achieve independence. The 1780s witnessed a series of unsuccessful rebellions involving hundreds of thousands of Amerindians in the Andean highlands of Peru and Bolivia who were brutally suppressed. Haiti was the scene of a successful slave revolt against French rule. However, the collapse of the Portuguese and Spanish empires, when it occurred, was swift, taking place in the short span of two decades.

Following Napoléon's invasion of Spain in 1807, the Spanish began a guerrilla war that lasted until 1814. Spain's weakness provided an opportunity for those of Spanish descent known as Creoles who chafed under Spanish rule. On September 16, 1810, Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla called on Mexicans to rise up against Spain. However, the violence of Hidalgo and his Amerindian followers alienated both Spaniards and Creoles. These events precipitated a war that lasted until 1821 when Spain finally recognized Mexican independence in the Treaty of Córdoba.

Elsewhere in South America, the dominant figures in the wars of liberation were Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) and José de San Martín (1778–1850), both of whom were influenced by the American

and French revolutions with their emphasis on natural rights, science, and the liberating power of reason. Bolívar led the liberation movement that saw Venezuela declare independence in 1810. Bolívar's struggle lasted five more years. In 1819, Colombia was liberated, then Peru (1821), Ecuador (1822), and, finally, Bolivia (1826). San Martín commanded the independence forces in Argentina (1816), crossed the Andes with Bernardo O'Higgins (1778–1842) to liberate Chile (1818), and finally linked up with Bolívar in Peru. Finally, in 1823 the United States issued the Monroe Doctrine to prevent any further effort by Spain to regain its lost American possessions. According to the doctrine, Europe's powers were obligated to respect the Western hemisphere as a US sphere of interest

Holland

The Portuguese and Spaniards were followed a century later by the Dutch who had become the world's leading seafarers and first sailed around the Cape of Good Hope in 1595. Political and religious tolerance at home, representative government, and the growth of a capitalist spirit of commerce aided Holland's search for colonial supremacy. In 1602, the Dutch parliament established the Dutch East India Company, which was awarded a tax-free trade monopoly with Asia and was empowered to mint coins, establish colonies, and maintain its own armed forces. That company, like others established at the time, was a private commercial–military enterprise run by merchant adventurers who sought to exploit overseas riches. Indonesia became the center of Holland's trading empire with its capital at Batavia (now Jakarta) on the island of Java. Holland wrested control of the spice trade from Portugal and expelled the Portuguese from Malaya and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Dutch trading stations were established in India. A second company, the Dutch West India Company, established a Dutch presence in North America between

1624 and 1664 centered on the trading colony of Nieuw Amsterdam (later New York City).

France and Britain

By the late the seventeenth century, the Dutch Empire had been eclipsed by France and, more importantly, Britain whose penetration of North America and India expelled the Dutch from those regions. Spanish and Portuguese conquests of Latin America and Spain's penetration of North America, especially Florida and the Southwest, were eclipsed by the British and French colonization of the Atlantic coast and Canada. British–French rivalry in North America was an extension of their struggle for supremacy in Europe. It climaxed in the French and Indian War (1754–63), an extension in America of Europe's Seven Years' War. The war was waged over conflicting claims to “Ohio,” a vast land stretching east from the Appalachians to the Mississippi and north from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes. The war resulted in the British conquest of Canada and the Ohio Valley and a growing self-confidence of Britain's North American colonies that bore much of the brunt of the conflict. Indeed, less than two decades later British rule south of Canada would end with the Treaty of Paris that confirmed the mother country's decisive defeat in the American Revolution.

Like the Dutch, Britain used private and semi-private companies to build its empire, notably the British East India Company (1600–1874). The company ruled much of India for two centuries, enjoying a trade monopoly in the East Indies as well as sovereign rights that allowed it to wage war, negotiate treaties, print money, and make laws. After the Sepoy Rebellion (1857–59), a bloody uprising by Indian troops employed by the company, Britain reduced the company's independence and took direct control of India with a secretary of state for India in the cabinet, a viceroy as British representative to the formally independent princely states of India, and Queen Victoria

assuming the title of Empress of India. Few Indians were admitted to the civil service until the twentieth century, and there, as elsewhere, colonial rulers lived in exclusive settlements, seldom mixing with locals.

European imperialism and **colonialism** led to the destruction of indigenous peoples and culture in the New World and accelerated the slave trade from Africa to the Americas which had a devastating impact on Africa's economic and social development. That trade provided laborers for the plantation economies in the American South and the Caribbean based on exporting sugar, cotton, and tobacco. Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin in 1793 increased the demand for slaves as cotton became the most important crop in America's southern states. Merchants built coastal forts in West Africa, purchased slaves from tribal chiefs, and transported and sold them in the Americas at great profit.

The movement to abolish the slave trade began in the late eighteenth century. In 1787, Granville Sharp formed the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade. They were joined by William Wilberforce, who became the leading spokesperson for Britain's abolitionist movement. In 1807, Britain made the purchase, transport, and sale of slaves illegal, and, in 1833, slavery was declared illegal throughout the British Empire. Slavery in the United States was not abolished until the end of the Civil War. Constructivists cite the spread of opposition to slavery as reflecting changing global norms that accompanied the industrial revolution.

Late imperialism

European imperialism resumed in the nineteenth century, especially in Asia and Africa. Among the factors that produced this new scramble for territories were (1) industrialization in Europe and the need for new markets, (2) heightened nationalism in Europe, (3) the desire for naval bases and coaling stations, raw materials, and opportunities

for capital investment, (4) a desire to "export" surplus population, (5) growing missionary zeal to spread Christianity, (6) a belief that imperial possessions brought prestige, and (7) a conviction in the superiority of European civilization, bordering on racism, whose destiny and responsibility was to rule "lesser" races. This sense of destiny led the British poet Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936) to urge Americans and Europeans to "take up the White Man's burden." The US, having spread from the Atlantic to the Pacific, joined the imperial race in the late nineteenth century, seizing Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the Spanish–American War (1898) and annexing Hawaii the same year. The ability to control tropical diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, and amoebic dysentery that had previously prevented European penetration of the tropics was another factor and superior technology aided Europe's conquests. By 1914, the global south had been virtually parceled out among the Western powers. The imperial mission was vigorously advocated by industrialists, militarists, patriots, and clergy.

In Asia, France seized Indochina, and Britain occupied Burma, Malaya, and the port city of Singapore. Japan was opened to Western trade when a US naval squadron under Commodore Matthew Perry (1794–1858) sailed into Tokyo Bay in 1853 and forced Japan to sign a treaty under which two ports would be opened to US ships that could purchase such necessities as coal, food, and water.⁵ Thereafter, Japan sought to emulate the West and began to penetrate China and Korea, first defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and then Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1905). It then established a **protectorate** over Korea in 1905 and annexed that country in 1910.


Much of Asia was already in European hands when the European powers turned their attention to Africa. In 1875 less than one-tenth of Africa had been colonized, yet 20 years later only one-tenth remained independent (Ethiopia and Liberia). As in the New World and Asia, Europe's governments set up companies to explore, conquer, and con-

duct trade in Africa. The boundaries of Africa's states were imposed by European administrators with little attention to ethnic differences. In some cases, colonial administrators divided such groups into different states and, in others, enclosed hostile groups within the same state.


Britain led the race in Africa. Starting from the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, British influence spread northward into Bechuanaland in 1885 (today, Botswana), Rhodesia in 1889 (today, Zimbabwe and Zambia), and Nyasaland in 1893 (today, Malawi). Map 5.2 shows how British holdings in East Africa stretched the length of the continent from South Africa northward, all the way to Egypt on the shores of the Mediterranean, including Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. In West Africa, its colonies included Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana (the former Gold Coast). The British tended to use **indirect rule** to govern their territories, that is, governing through indigenous African leaders within the colonial administration.

Britain's closest competitor was France which unsuccessfully tried to establish a belt of colonies

stretching east to west across the continent that included the African kingdom of Dahomey (today, Benin) and a vast interior region of almost 1 million square miles called French Equatorial Africa founded in 1910 that consisted of Gabon, Middle Congo, and Ubangi-Chari-Chad (today, the Central African Republic and Chad). The French empire in Africa ultimately included three territories in North Africa – Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia – Chad and Cameroon (Federation of French Equatorial Africa) in Central Africa and what is today Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso (Federation of French West Africa), Senegal, Guinea, Chad, Niger, the Ivory Coast, Mauritania in West Africa, as well as Djibouti and the islands of Madagascar, the Comoros, and Réunion off Africa's east coast (see Map 5.2). Unlike Britain, France imposed direct rule on its colonies and sought to **assimilate** indigenous peoples, replacing local customs with French culture. Using a policy of **divide and rule** France tried to weaken pre-colonial political and social institutions in Africa.



Map 5.1 The British Empire (in brown), 1914



Map 5.2 Africa in the early twentieth century

One of the most brutal colonial ventures was in the vast region of Central Africa that today is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). That region was not explored by Europeans until 1867 when Henry Morton Stanley voyaged down the Lualaba (Upper Congo) River. Stanley's adventure impressed Léopold II, King of the Belgians, who decided to acquire the region for himself as a private citizen, hoping thereby to increase his wealth and power. Léopold sent Stanley back to establish the Congo Free State to be governed by

a company of which he was sole owner. This Stanley did with great energy, obtaining for the king a land of 900,000 square miles some 80 times the size of Belgium. Léopold's colony was harshly governed; resources were extracted with no concern for the Congolese who served as slave labor for Léopold's agents (see Key document, opposite). In addition to Belgium, Portugal and Spain retained colonies in Africa.

Colonial rivalries in Africa inevitably produced friction among the competitors. To compromise

KEY DOCUMENT

SELECTION FROM JOSEPH CONRAD'S *HEART OF DARKNESS*⁶

The exploitation of the Congo in the late nineteenth century is brilliantly evoked in Joseph Conrad's novel *Heart of Darkness* (1899):

At last we turned a bend, a rocky cliff appeared, mounds of turned-up earth by the shore, houses on a hill, others, with iron roofs, amongst a waste of excavations, or hanging to the declivity. A continuous noise of the rapids above hovered over this scene of inhabited devastation. A lot of people, mostly black and naked, moved about like ants. A jetty projected into the river . . .

A horn tooted to the right, and I saw the black people run. A heavy and dull detonation shook the ground, a puff of smoke came out of the cliff, and that was all. . . They were building a railway . . .

A slight clinking behind me made me turn my head. Six black men advanced in a file, toiling up the path. They walked erect and slow, balancing small baskets full of earth on their heads, and the clink kept time with their footsteps. Black rags were wound round their loins, and the short ends behind wagged to and fro like tails. I could see every rib, the joints of their limbs were like knots in a rope; each had an iron collar on his neck, and all were connected together with a chain whose bights swung between them, rhythmically clinking . . .

They were dying slowly – it was very clear. They were not enemies, they were not criminals, and they were nothing earthly now, – nothing but black shadows of disease and starvation, lying confusedly in the greenish gloom. Brought from all the recesses of the coast in all the legality of time contracts, lost in uncongenial surroundings, fed on unfamiliar food, they sickened, became inefficient, and were then allowed to crawl away and rest

conflicting territorial claims, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck convened a conference in Berlin in 1884–85. All the major imperialist powers were represented at the Berlin Conference, and the result was to reduce conflict among them by dividing most of Africa into **spheres of influence** in which countries that “effectively” occupied African territories would own them. In a patronizing statement of European superiority, Europeans were bound “to watch over the preservation of the native tribes and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being” and were to assist all undertakings “which aim at instructing the natives and

bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.”⁷

Germany was an imperial latecomer. Bismarck thought colonies were of little value. What mattered to him was Europe's balance of power, and he was happy to let his European adversaries busy themselves in colonial ventures. Bismarck, however, had to contend with other Germans who wished their country to build an empire equal to that of Britain and France. After Bismarck's ouster in 1890, German policy abruptly shifted, and the country joined the colonial scramble as part of an effort to build global power and prestige. By 1914, Germany had Pacific colonies including

Western Samoa, German New Guinea, a sphere of influence in China, and a number of African protectorates including Togo, the Cameroons, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanganyika, and Namibia.

The last of Europe's imperial powers was Italy. Envious of France's North African holdings, Italy seized modern Eritrea in the late 1880s and in 1889 added the southern part of Somalia. The Italians also claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia (then, the kingdom of Abyssinia), but the invading Italian army was destroyed in 1896 in a humiliating defeat at Adowa at the hands of Ethiopia's Amhara warriors.⁸ This was the greatest defeat of a European army by non-Europeans since the beginning of Europe's colonial expansion centuries earlier. A final act in Europe's conquest of Africa was Italy's 1911 seizure of Libya from the Ottoman Turks, finally giving Rome a foothold in North Africa, which it would lose in World War Two.

By the beginning of the twentieth century initial steps toward self-rule had been taken in some of Europe's colonies. However, the movement toward decolonization gathered steam with Europe's exhaustion in the two world wars. Imperial occupation of territory in the face of politically conscious and mobilized masses had become a source of weakness rather than strength. Whereas Europe's imperial expansion was facilitated by the co-optation of small local elites, by World War Two, the spread of political consciousness complicated efforts to occupy foreign territory. In earlier centuries, it took few Europeans to establish imperial control. After 1945, no number of highly armed soldiers would suffice to retain imperial possessions. The idea of national self-determination spread among colonial subjects who were educated at institutions including Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and the Sorbonne in Paris, or in European-run schools back home. Gradually, in a constructivist manner the idea that colonial subjects had a right to govern themselves and decide their own destiny gained growing acceptance among both rulers and ruled. The next section deals with this

dramatic movement that ended with the independence of a multitude of new states in Asia and Africa.

The decolonization of Asia and Africa

In retrospect, the outstanding feature of decolonization in Asia and Africa was the speed with which it took place. However, the process of throwing off colonial rule in these regions remained muted until the world wars weakened Europe's colonial powers. Colonial troops were critical to the British and French effort in both world wars, and national self-determination proved infectious, providing an ideological basis for aspiring nationalists in Asia and Africa. In 1931, British parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster by which Britain's so-called "White Dominions" (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) were given independence within the British Commonwealth, but London still had no plans to dismantle its global empire.

India: from colony to great power

Among the first steps in decolonization was a movement toward self-government in India at the end of the nineteenth century in which Indians were appointed to advise the British viceroy and participate in legislative councils. These elected representatives became spokespersons for Indian self-government and critics of the British Raj and carried with them growing Indian nationalism.

GANDHI AND INDIA'S DECOLONIZATION MOVEMENT In 1885, a number of Western-educated Indian professionals and provincial leaders met in Bombay to found the Indian National Congress, later the Indian Congress Party. At first, the Congress was little more than a debating club that sent suggestions to the government. By 1900, however, it had come to represent

Indians, mainly Hindus, from all the country's regions, although it held little appeal for the country's Muslim minority.

In 1905, Indian nationalism was roused by the ill-considered partition of Bengal by the British Viceroy Sir George Curzon (1859–1925)⁹ that seemed an effort to divide and rule the country. Led by Congress, Indian nationalists undertook a successful boycott of British goods and agitated violently against partition. Finally, during his 1911 visit to India, British King George V (1865–1936) announced a reversal of the partition and a shift of India's capital from Calcutta to a new city called New Delhi. By the 1919 Government of India Act, additional Indians were given the vote and legislative councils dominated by elected representatives were given greater authority. Nevertheless, the movement toward Indian self-government remained glacial.

The massacre of hundreds of Indians on April 13, 1919, in the city of Amritsar, the holy city of India's Sikhs, a religious minority, aroused Indian nationalists. The massacre grew out of a general strike called by India's nationalist leader Mohandas K. (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) to protest British efforts to investigate India's nationalist movement. When a huge crowd protested the deportation of two Indian nationalists from Punjab and the ban on Gandhi's entry in the province, it was fired at, and angry mobs attacked Europeans. When large numbers of Sikhs gathered to protest, the British commander opened fire on the crowd without warning. Protests erupted throughout India, and several areas were placed under martial law. In December, the Congress Party met in Amritsar and called on Britain to grant India national self-determination.

These events galvanized India's nationalist movement and its two leaders, Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964). Gandhi had studied law in London and traveled to South Africa where he sought to improve the status of that country's Indian community, returning to India in 1915. It was in South Africa that Gandhi, influenced by Russian author Leo Tolstoy's *The*

Kingdom of God is Within You and the American philosopher Henry David Thoreau's idea of **civil disobedience**, developed a protest strategy of nonviolent resistance, which involved illegal but peaceful protest like work stoppages and hunger strikes in which protesters were arrested and sometimes imprisoned. Gandhi believed that violent protest only intensified anger and oppression. Unlike Machiavelli, Gandhi argued that the ends could *not* justify the means. "The means," he declared, "may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree, and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree."¹⁰ In addition to steadfastly opposing violence, he also tried to reconcile India's Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi thus became India's "conscience," and, when he was assassinated on January 30, 1948, by a Hindu fanatic, he was mourned throughout India.

Nehru was educated at Cambridge University and returned to India in 1912 where he became a follower of Gandhi. During the 1920s, Nehru rose to the leadership of the Congress Party, advocating social reform in addition to political independence. With Gandhi's help, Nehru became leader of the Congress in 1929, and the following year tried to declare India's independence and was promptly arrested. The impact of the event was dramatic, as millions of Indians flocked to the Congress Party, and Britain was forced to recognize it as an authentic voice of Indian nationalism. Unlike Gandhi, Nehru was an admirer of socialist principles, and socialism became the basis of his policies later as prime minister of independent India.

In 1935, Britain passed the Government of India Act, providing for a gradual process toward Indian self-government. The act was a compromise between British politicians who wished to advance India's independence and those who bitterly opposed it. It was intended to assuage Indian moderates and weaken the appeal of the Congress Party, but achieved neither objective.

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Mahatma Gandhi was a **pacifist**. He translated “nonviolence” from the Hindi word *ahimsa* (avoiding harm to others). “I object to violence,” he declared, “because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it does is permanent.”¹¹ “We are,” he argued, “constantly being astonished these days at the amazing discoveries in the field of violence. But maintain that far more undreamt of and seemingly impossible discoveries will be made in the field of nonviolence.”¹² Although Gandhi’s pacifism influenced believers in nonviolence elsewhere, it had little permanent impact on his own country. Since independence, India has fought several wars with Pakistan and China, has violently repressed the secessionist aspirations of ethnic minorities like the Nagas and Assamese, and has been the scene of repeated communal violence between Hindus and Muslims and abuse of “untouchables” or Dalits (those at the bottom of India’s caste system).

DID YOU KNOW?

Mohatma Gandhi and his philosophy of nonviolent social protest greatly influence US civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–68). King became acquainted with Gandhi’s ideas at seminary in a lecture given by Dr. Mordecai W. Johnson, president of Howard University, and became convinced that Gandhi’s principle of the moral power of nonviolence could enhance the status of African-Americans.

DECOLONIZATION IN ASIA AFTER WORLD WAR TWO World War Two accelerated the decolonization movements in India and elsewhere. In areas occupied by Japan such as Dutch Indonesia, French Indochina, and British Burma, the mystique of European colonial rule vanished, and postwar European efforts to regain control failed in the face of local independence movements. In India, the Congress Party opposed Britain’s decision to bring India into the war. Led by Gandhi, a Quit India Movement against Britain was organized in 1942, whose followers

demanded immediate independence. Gandhi, Nehru, and other Congress leaders were imprisoned until the end of the war.

By 1945, Great Britain, governed by Prime Minister Clement Attlee and the socialist Labour Party became willing to accept Indian independence. In 1946, Nehru was selected president of the Congress Party and future first leader of independent India. Congress’s most formidable political opponent was the All-India Muslim League, headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) (known as the “father of Pakistan”), which demanded an independent Muslim state. As independence approached, Hindu–Muslim violence mounted. Finally, India’s last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–79), proposed the country’s partition into India, a secular state with a Hindu majority, and Pakistan, a Muslim state. On August 15, 1947, India became independent with Nehru as prime minister. India’s constitution was signed on January 26, 1949, and, in 1952, the country conducted its first democratic national elections. Despite profound poverty, the injustices of a **caste** system, and widespread ethnic and religious tensions, India has remained a secular society and the world’s most populous democracy.

The partition triggered a massive population movement, with millions of Muslims moving to

Pakistan and similar numbers of Hindus fleeing Pakistan to India. Law and order collapsed, and violence raged across the subcontinent. From this witches' brew emerged the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, one of the most dangerous flashpoints in global politics. At the time of partition, most of British India consisted of nine provinces directly ruled by London, but about 40 percent of the country consisted of princely states, governed by local rulers under British influence. The arrangement for partition allowed these rulers to choose whether to join India or Pakistan, their selection depending on the religion of the ruler and his subjects. A few, notably Kashmir, had

rulers whose religion differed from that of most subjects and were hotly contested.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE Under Indian political pressure, Kashmir's maharajah and its elected Muslim prime minister opted to join India even though a majority of the state's inhabitants were Muslim (see Key document, p. 149). Nehru then sent Indian troops to repel attacks by Muslim irregulars. The first of three Indian–Pakistani wars over Kashmir ensued, continuing until 1948 when the issue was taken to the UN Security Council.

By Resolution 91, the Security Council in 1951 imposed a ceasefire, stating that “the final



Map 5.3
The Kashmir region

disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.”¹³ Despite Pakistani demands that such a plebiscite be held, India has never permitted it, and neither country removed its troops from Kashmir. The ceasefire line still separates Pakistani- and Indian-held areas of Kashmir. Not only did the line divide Kashmir’s Muslim community, it also left India in control of the origin of the rivers of the Indus River basin on which much of Pakistan’s agriculture depends.

The Kashmir situation deteriorated in 1962 when India and China clashed over the region of Aksai Chin, which still remains in China’s hands. In addition, a small area known as the Trans-Karakoram, claimed by India, was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963. Since then, Kashmir has been divided among Pakistan, which controls the northwest region, India, which holds the central and southern areas, and China, which occupies a northeastern sector. Both India and Pakistan continue to claim the entire region (see Map 5.3).

Two wars between India and Pakistan followed in 1965 and 1971, with Indian victories in both. The second led to the division of East and West Pakistan and the emergence of a new country, Bangladesh, in place of the former East Pakistan. By a 1972 agreement, India and Pakistan pledged to settle their differences by peaceful means and abide by the original ceasefire line. However, in 1989 there began an insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir that continued until recently. Pakistan denied assisting the insurgents, but they enjoyed sympathy from elements in the Pakistani army and sanctuary in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. For its part, the Indian army used brutal tactics against those sympathizing with the insurgency and has been charged with large-scale human rights violations.

In 1999, infiltration by Muslim militants and Pakistani regulars along the rugged Kargil ridges in the Himalayas triggered another conflict in

which the Indian Army conducted a successful campaign in freezing temperatures at altitudes approaching 18,000 feet. The reason for Pakistan’s infiltration was to attract world attention to the Kashmir issue. Although the Kargil War was limited, it triggered fears that it might escalate into a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan.

South Asian politics were dramatically altered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. The US sought warmer relations with Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, and pressed Pakistan to reduce its support for Muslim insurgents in Kashmir. After a terrorist attack on India’s parliament in early 2002, tensions again rose, and there were renewed fears of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Fortunately, diplomatic efforts reduced tension, and brought about a reduction in troops along their mutual border and a renewal of direct negotiations between the two countries that culminated in a November 2003 agreement for a ceasefire along their border. Additional steps, including confidence-building measures, created optimism for permanent peace between the two South Asian rivals until a terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 by Muslim militants from Pakistan led to many Indian deaths.

Many Kashmiris seek independence for their region, but both India and Pakistan oppose this. India still regards the entire region as part of its country, and Pakistan still demands a UN plebiscite to determine the area’s future. Although a future agreement may involve some adjustment to the Line of Control, it will probably involve the continued division of Kashmir, with greater autonomy for the Kashmiris.

INDONESIA During World War Two, Japan had granted Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world and a major oil exporter consisting of almost 13,700 islands stretching 3200 miles, its independence under a government led by Sukarno (1901–70) who had collaborated with his country’s occupiers. Sukarno dreamt

KEY DOCUMENT

REQUEST FOR HELP FROM KASHMIR'S MAHARAJAH HARI SINGH TO BRITISH VICEROY LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN¹⁴

Dated: 26 October 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government.

As your Excellency is aware the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions . . .

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State . . . The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at the several points simultaneously, that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahora powerhouse which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer Capital of my Government, as first step to over-running the whole State.

The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier coming regularly in motor trucks using Mansehra–Muzaffarabad Road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provisional Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated requests made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming into my State . . .

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters. On this basis no civilized Government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen as long as I am Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country . . .

In haste and with kind regards,

Your sincerely,

Hari Singh
The Palace, Jammu
26th October, 1947

of a Greater Indonesia that would incorporate Portuguese Timor, British Malaya, and North Borneo. By the Jakarta Charter, Indonesia would be an Islamic state but one in which Muslim leaders would play a secondary role to a strong president. Shortly after Japan's surrender, Indonesian leaders declared their country's independence, and British troops entered the country a month later. Dutch efforts to resume control were unsuccessful, and disorder spread.

An agreement between the Dutch and Indonesians for Indonesian autonomy while retaining a political link to the Netherlands was signed in May 1947. However, two months later the Dutch launched a "police action" against Indonesian nationalists which ended when UN-sponsored negotiations left the Dutch temporarily in control of the areas they had seized. The Dutch resumed their effort to suppress Indonesia's nationalists by force in December 1948, arresting and exiling Sukarno. This action produced an international backlash, and the UN Security Council demanded the restoration of Indonesia's nationalist government. The Dutch were no longer able to retain their colonial status, and finally on December 27, 1949, Indonesia became an independent country.

In ensuing decades, Sukarno grew increasingly authoritarian, proclaiming himself president for life, and, much to American annoyance, establishing close ties with communist China during the Cold War. An attempted communist coup in 1965 was savagely repressed by Indonesia's army and led to murderous attacks on the country's ethnic Chinese minority. There followed a military coup in which General Mohammad Suharto (1921–2008) seized power. Suharto followed a pro-American policy and governed as a dictator until 1998. Revelations of widespread corruption tainted Suharto and members of his family. Since 1998, Indonesia has evolved into a democracy, and in 2004 Indonesian democracy was solidified by the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.


DID YOU KNOW?

Former Indonesian leader Suharto is said to have stolen between \$15 and \$35 billion from his country during this 31 years in power. Others among the most corrupt former leaders were: Ferdinand Marcos: \$5–10 billion (Philippines, 1972–86); Mobutu Sese Seko: \$5 billion (Zaire, 1965–97); Sani Abacha: \$2–5 billion (Nigeria, 1993–98); and Slobodan Milošević: \$1 billion (Yugoslavia, 1989–2000).¹⁵

Decolonization in Africa

In February 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan declared in a speech to South Africa's Parliament that ever "since the breakup of the Roman empire one of the constant facts of political life in Europe has been the emergence of independent nations" and that this desire had become worldwide. "Today," he continued, "the same thing is happening in Africa . . . The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact." Instead of resisting this tidal wave, Macmillan argued that the West must come to terms with it because, in his view, "the great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West."¹⁶ And, in December 1960, the UN General Assembly approved the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations."¹⁷

Africa's decolonization had begun and, before it was over, many new, often impoverished and unstable, countries would join the global system (Map 5.4). For the most part, the process was



Map 5.4 Decolonization in Africa

peaceful though in some cases, such as civil war in the former Belgian Congo (today, the Democratic Republic of the Congo) between 1960 and 1964, independence proved traumatic. Britain and France, the major colonial powers, realized that change was inevitable and, although France still hoped to retain some of its colonies as integral parts of its country, both recognized that it was necessary to grant their colonies independence. At the same time, nationalist political parties were established and grew.

BRITISH AFRICA The decolonization of British Africa was relatively peaceful, and the British Empire was transformed into a voluntary association called the British Commonwealth. The major exception to a peaceful transition was the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya that ended in Kenya's independence in 1963 under Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta (1884–1978).

Britain faced a different problem in the case of Southern Rhodesia. In 1889, Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) was granted a charter to found the British

South Africa Company, which ruled Zimbabwe and Zambia (collectively named Rhodesia, after him, in 1894) until 1923. Rhodesia split into Northern (Zambia) and Southern (Zimbabwe) Rhodesia in the 1960s, and Southern Rhodesia was governed by a white minority government. That government declared unilateral independence from Britain in 1965, but neither London nor the UN recognized the act. Instead, foreign economic sanctions and guerrilla war by Africans at home challenged the Rhodesian government. In 1980, the white government surrendered control to a majority African government whose first prime minister, Robert Mugabe, had been a guerrilla leader in the war of liberation against his white predecessors. By the late 1990s, Mugabe had become a tyrant, destroying his country's economy and shredding its constitution to hold power.

South Africa posed an equally complex problem. Rhodes, still to all intents and purposes working as a private individual rather than a government official, supported a conspiracy to overthrow the Boer government of Cape Colony

in South Africa. What began as an effort by British adventurers seeking personal profit became an international conflict that led to the independence of South Africa. Moreover, the Boer War showed that civilians were increasingly victims of warfare, a major change from the previous century. Rhodes' **freebooting** brought Britain into conflict with the Dutch Boer farmers who had established the Orange Free State and the Transvaal in South Africa. The unsuccessful raid on the Transvaal that he sponsored in January 1896 that sought to start a rebellion of British workers was the first in a series of events that climaxed in the Boer War (1899–1902). The Boers waged guerrilla warfare against the British, a superior enemy, and atrocities were widespread. The British won, but only after establishing camps in which over 150,000 Boer and African civilians were interned under deplorable conditions (see Controversy, below).

In 1910, Britain incorporated the Boer areas into the Union of South Africa, and the country was governed by a Boer (also called Afrikaner)

CONTROVERSY THE BOER WAR CAMPS

Controversy erupted in Britain about the use of camps to prevent civilians from aiding Boer soldiers and isolate them from violence. Ms. Emily Hobhouse, a British reformer, played a key role in publicizing and ending the appalling conditions in the British camps. She arrived in South Africa in late 1900 and visited a number of camps, including one at Bloemfontein. She later wrote of a second visit to Bloemfontein:

The population had redoubled and had swallowed up the results of improvements that had been effected. Disease was on the increase and the sight of the people made the impression of utter misery. Illness and death had left their marks on the faces of the inhabitants. Many that I had left hale and hearty, of good appearance and physically fit, had undergone such a change that I could hardly recognize them.¹⁸

Ms. Hobhouse then returned to Britain where she launched a publicity campaign against camp conditions, meeting resistance from the British government, which was more interested in winning the war than in minimizing Boer casualties – whether soldier or civilian.

government. Problems mounted after 1948, when the Afrikaner government introduced the racist policy of **apartheid**.

The struggle against apartheid both within and outside the country continued until the early 1990s, when the apartheid laws were revoked. In 1994, South Africa elected its first majority government and black president, Nelson Mandela. Mandela headed the African National Congress (ANC), which had led the resistance against the white regime and thereafter became the dominant political force in South Africa. Under Mandela's successors, President Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, South Africa became Africa's most politically influential country and plays a key role in the continent's international organizations, notably the African Union and the South African Development Community.

FRENCH AFRICA The French experience with decolonization proved more difficult than the British. In addition to Ho Chi Minh's guerrilla insurgency in Indochina, France confronted a war of liberation in Algeria. In November 1954, Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN) began a guerrilla war against French colonial authorities. France responded with a massive military effort, and the Algerian conflict raged for eight years, becoming a nightmare for the French, with both sides employing terrorist tactics. France's Algerian dilemma was complicated by the presence of a large population of European settlers who violently opposed French abandonment of the country.

Following a massacre of civilians by the FLN in Philippeville in 1955, all-out war involving a cycle of atrocities and counter-atrocities began which was vividly portrayed in the 1966 Italian film *The Battle of Algiers*. Villages were destroyed, and millions of Algerians were forcibly removed from their homes and resettled in areas under military control. As successive French governments proved incapable of dealing with the Algerian problem, dissatisfied army commanders plotted to bring to power Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), leader

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

The West Indian psychiatrist Frantz Fanon (1925–61), who served in the French army in World War Two and joined the Algerian nationalist movement in 1954, became the inspiration for Algeria's independence struggle. Fanon's books *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) were analyses of the psychological consequences of racism on both colonialists and colonized. Fanon argued that language plays a key role in colonialism. By speaking the language of the colonizers, the colonized are forced to accept the latter's cultural values and their own inferiority. Seeking to become "white," they come to see their own "blackness" as evil and are thereby alienated from themselves. Such psychological oppression, Fanon argued, can be overcome only through "collective **catharsis**" produced by violent revolution on the part of the peasantry that severs all links with the past. "The naked truth of decolonization," he declared, "evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it."¹⁹

of the Free French during World War Two and symbol of French grandeur, whom they believed could rally the nation and end the Algerian rebellion. Recognizing his country's international isolation over the Algerian question and the mounting dissatisfaction of French public opinion, de Gaulle began the process of granting Algeria its independence within a year of his return to power in 1958.

Believing that de Gaulle was selling them out, Algeria's French settlers, aided by dissident French generals, rose in revolt in January 1960 and began a terrorist campaign in France itself. A terrorist

group called the Secret Army Organization sought to assassinate de Gaulle on several occasions, one of which was the basis of the plot of Frederick Forsyth's thriller, *The Day of the Jackal*. The insurrection was quashed, and negotiations climaxed with the Evian Accords of 1962 that ended hostilities and granted Algeria its independence.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA The Portuguese were both the first Europeans to colonize Africa and the last to leave, and their departure proved difficult and violent. The two most important Portuguese colonies in Africa were Angola and Mozambique, and both had to fight for their independence and later were engulfed by bloody civil wars.²⁰

Portugal had entered Angola in the late fifteenth century, and the colony became central to the slave trade. As decolonization spread elsewhere in Africa in the 1960s, Portugal refused to budge. Its effort to retain its colonial empire dragged on for 14 years, sapping the country's economy, until the country's dictatorship was overthrown by the Portuguese army.

Ethnic politics and the Cold War played key roles in subsequent events. Three Angolan independence movements emerged, each with a different ethnic base and political ideology. One, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), enjoyed support among the Kimbundu people in the provinces surrounding the capital, Luanda, and received aid from the USSR. A second, the National Front of Angola (FNLA), attracted support from among the Bakongo of northern Angola and was aided by the United States. A third, the National Union or Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi (1934–2002), was popular among the Ovimbundu of central and western Angola and was aided by China.

Following Angola's independence in 1975, the country descended into civil war among the three movements. Troops from white-dominated South Africa aided Savimbi's UNITA faction, which by then also enjoyed American backing, in order to prevent the new Angolan government (the former

pro-communist MPLA) from helping the independence movement in neighboring South African-controlled Southwest Africa (today, Namibia).²¹ South Africa's intervention triggered the entry of Cuban troops on the side of the Angolan government. In addition to its ideological aspect, the civil war also involved conflict for control of Angola's rich resources, especially diamonds and oil.

Angola's civil war continued even after the Cold War. A 1994 peace agreement provided for the merger of government and UNITA forces, and a government of national unity took office in 1997. Violence, however, erupted again the following year and did not end until Savimbi's death in 2002. By this time, it was among the longest running conflicts in the world.

Mozambique had a similar experience. In 1962, an independence movement, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), launched a guerrilla war against Portugal. The conflict continued for over a decade until Mozambique's independence in 1975. Thereafter, FRELIMO established single-party rule and close relations with the Soviet Union and began to aid opponents of white rule in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. These governments, in turn, armed and aided an anti-FRELIMO insurrection. As many as one million died in the violence, and the country's economy was virtually destroyed. Negotiations ended the civil war in 1992 and saw the return of the more than 1.5 million Mozambique refugees who had fled the country. Since then, economic development has quickened, and the country has enjoyed amicable relations with its neighbors, including the post-apartheid government in South Africa.

In retrospect, colonialism was a clash between two vastly different cultures in which that of the colonizers began to alter the values of the colonized. Under colonialism, while the colonized might gain some benefits, very few "natives" could cross the line into the other culture, and few political, social, or economic positions were open to them. The first generation of LDC leaders

sought to bridge the gap between these two cultures and acquire the trappings of their former colonial masters. This effort involved anchoring popular loyalties in the new states and creating conditions for rapid economic development.

The politics of nonalignment, nation building, and economic development

The first generation of African and Asian leaders sought to avoid involvement in the Cold War by adopting the policy of nonalignment, while pursuing economic and political development at home.

Nonalignment

In April 1955, the representatives of 29 African and Asian countries met in the Indonesian city of Bandung. In opening the gathering, Indonesia's President Sukarno proclaimed: "We are united . . . by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common detestation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilize peace in the world." Colonialism, he continued, was still alive although it had evolved from direct control to "economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation." The LDCs, Sukarno argued, could "inject the voice of reason into world affairs."²² Thus, the nonaligned movement was born.

Nonalignment was typical of many LDCs during the Cold War. Although the LDCs were a diverse group, most rejected involvement in Cold War conflicts. **Isolationism** was not an option because LDCs needed trade and aid to develop economically. Traditional **neutralism** as practiced by countries such as Switzerland required abstaining from global politics and would limit the LDCs'

political influence. In contrast to neutralism, nonalignment involved seeking trade and aid while maintaining political independence through active involvement with a variety of states and international organizations. Far from remaining passive, the nonaligned regularly tried to play off East and West in order to get assistance from both. Nearly all carried on trade with and, in many cases, were provided arms by the superpowers.

Nonalignment did not prevent countries from taking positions on specific issues. Many condemned American involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s; virtually all opposed South African apartheid, and demanded nuclear disarmament; and most favored the Arab states in their conflict with Israel. The LDCs regularly pointed to US and European military aid to repressive governments as evidence of **neocolonialism**.

Nonalignment was justified as a strategy to prevent the Cold War from spreading to the LDCs. It sought to base interstate relations on the five principles to which Nehru and China's Premier Zhou Enlai had agreed in 1954: (1) mutual respect for one other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) noninterference in one other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.

Nonaligned states regarded the UN and related international organizations as vital in affording them a voice in world affairs and sought increases in their budgets because the LDCs enjoyed a voting majority in the UN General Assembly and IGOs were sources of economic aid. The LDCs also believed that the UN assisted in solving divisive regional and local disputes. Nevertheless, most LDCs did not support supranationalism, remained highly nationalistic, and opposed any dilution of sovereign prerogatives.

In practice, nonalignment did not mean impartiality in the Cold War. Communist countries like China and Cuba were involved in the movement, and many LDCs opposed the policies of the United States and its allies. Few had sympathy for democratic norms and practices,

and many were attracted to Soviet-style central economic planning. Some also backed Soviet and Chinese aid to “national liberation movements” that they equated with opposing neocolonialism.

Central to nonalignment was the effort to reduce global economic inequality. Demands to reform the global economic system dated from the 1961 meeting of nonaligned countries in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the LDCs’ “Group of 77” in 1964. UNCTAD sought to approach economic issues from the LDCs’ perspective and to challenge the global trading system, which favored rich states. Passage of UN Resolutions 3201 and 3202 at the UN’s Sixth Special Session in 1974 marked the formal call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The resolutions set out principles to improve the economies of LDCs, outlining six areas that needed attention to prevent conflict between rich and poor:

1. Regulating transnational corporations.
2. Transferring technology from rich to poor.
3. Reforming global trade to assist LDC development.
4. Canceling or renegotiating LDCs’ debts.
5. Increasing economic aid to LDCs.
6. Changing voting procedures in international economic institutions to give LDCs more influence.

The NIEO, however, enjoyed little success owing to the opposition of Western states.

The end of the Cold War removed the rationale for nonalignment.

Modernization and postcolonial theory

LDC leaders followed **nation-building** policies that tried to replicate Europe’s experience by creating a unifying sense of nationalism among their countries’ disparate peoples, building state institutions, defending territorial sovereignty, and

fostering economic growth. Many of these leaders were attracted to leftist variants of national development, and the issue of how the LDCs could advance their interests proved controversial.

The efforts of African and Asian leaders to make their countries more like Western states were influenced by modernization theory, which was popular in the 1950s and 1960s. Modernization theorists assumed that there was a linear progression of stages from “primitive” or traditional societies which lacked a belief in progress to modern ones through the process of industrialization. During these stages, the LDCs would acquire modern technology, amass capital investment, and improve infrastructure. Unlike Marxist theorists, who claimed that the main impediments to national development were external, modernization theorists thought that internal factors such as traditional values and the absence of capital investment prevented development.

Modernization was seen as more than a shift in technology and economics. Analysts also focused on the shift from “traditional society” to modernity that involved changes in people’s expectations, values, and beliefs. This involved examining **political culture**: the pattern of beliefs, identities, and values of members of a society. History, myths, education, experience, and ideology all were believed to reflect a people’s basic values and beliefs so that their behavior was ultimately more a product of **socialization** than of rational choice. Thus, modernization could only occur as citizens became aware of and participants in politics, making demands on governments and taking part in their decisions. Only in societies in which pragmatic values dominate would organized social groups based on common interests become involved in the policy process.²³ By contrast, in societies dominated by ideologies, groups are manipulated by leaders who shape the ideology, and such societies are likely to feature a single dominant political party that defines and upholds that ideology.

Modernization theorists were criticized for several reasons. First, they assumed that “modern”

(e.g., Western) was progressive and superior and that “traditional” was inferior. Second, they seemed to suggest that the process would make countries more alike and that this was a virtue. In other words, modernization theorists saw the United States and Europe as models that countries emerging from colonial tutelage should emulate and whose values they should adopt and whose policies they should follow. Third, they saw the process as irreversible, a claim that seems naive today in light of widespread state failure.

The leftist orientation of many early LDC leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, and Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré led them to eschew Western democratic principles, preferring to rule through a single mass party that they hoped could integrate their countries’ ethnic groups, bring an end to traditional customs, and provide centrally managed economic development. They were impressed by the centrally controlled Soviet and Chinese political and economic systems, and tried to apply socialist principles to the problems they faced. They emphasized rapid industrialization and tended to spend their limited resources on large, showy projects such as dams and factories that served as symbols of progress. In doing so, they ignored the needs of citizens, most of whom remained agrarian.

The results were disappointing. Many African governments became dictatorial, and corruption became endemic. Leaders favored their own ethnic groups, thereby intensifying political and ethnic tensions. Socialist practices discouraged foreign investment and ignored agriculture, thereby contributing to periodic famine and environmental disasters like deforestation.

The intellectual side of this Marxist orientation took the form of those called postcolonial theorists who were highly critical of Western practices. Postcolonial theorists argued that, though formal colonialism had ended, rich countries retained the ability to control the economies of LDCs through **neocolonialism**. They contended that the immense gap between rich and poor provided

the rich with **structural power** over the poor so that economic exploitation of the LDCs by rich countries and transnational corporations continue despite the end of formal colonial rule owing to their control of wealth and advanced technology. In other words, the *structure* of global politics, reflected in trade relations and control of mass media, perpetuated the inferior position of the LDCs and its **subaltern**²⁴ or subordinate peoples, condemning them to permanent weakness and poverty. In addition, Western culture and knowledge were key elements of Western power.²⁵ Those who suffer physical or psychological harm from global injustice and inequality in the form of hunger or poverty, or who cannot achieve their full potential owing to social and economic constraints are said to be victims of **structural violence**.

In some LDCs, state institutions never took root and, in recent decades, some of these countries have virtually collapsed. In other LDCs, however, a growing acceptance of free-market policies and the inflow of foreign investment began to bear fruit in the late 1990s, and, despite widespread poverty, these countries are becoming major factors in global politics.

Failed and failing states

Recent decades have witnessed significant violence within and across states in the global south. There, Europeans imposed states and borders that inhabitants never fully accepted. When colonialism ended, many governments that followed were unable to provide minimal services to citizens. A toxic combination of ethnic conflict, corruption, poverty, overpopulation, and environmental stress caused state institutions in these countries to collapse, resulting in “failed states.” Governments of “failed states” are deemed illegitimate by citizens, are unable to exercise authority over the state’s territory, cannot provide security or essential services to citizens, and usually confront armed opponents.

An analysis by the Fund for Peace associates 12 conditions with state weakness:²⁶

1. *Demographic pressures* in which population outstrips resources like food.
2. *Refugees and internally displaced persons* who have grievances against the government.
3. *Vengeance-seeking groups* with grievances based on a belief that they are unfairly treated.
4. *Chronic and sustained flight* from the country by trained and educated citizens.
5. *Uneven economic and social development* in which some groups have fewer economic and educational opportunities than others.
6. *Sharp and severe economic decline* reflected in unemployment and corruption.
7. *The loss of legitimacy by the state* in which citizens no longer regard it as authoritative and view it as serving only the interests of a corrupt minority.
8. *The absence or collapse of public services* such as education and healthcare.
9. *The rule of law and human rights* are applied unevenly.
10. *The security apparatus has fractured into “states within the state”* and take the form of militias favoring particular groups or leaders rather than providing security for the general population.
11. *The risk of fractionalized elites is high* as in Iraq where Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders vie for power.
12. *The intervention of other states and external actors* in the country’s domestic affairs.

Based on these indicators, as of 2010, there were 20 failed states, an additional 20 that were in danger of failing, and 20 more that were borderline, including major countries like Russia.²⁷ As of 2011, seven of the ten weakest states were in Africa – Somalia, Chad, Sudan, the Democratic



Map 5.5 Central Africa

Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, and Ivory Coast. Others are Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq (see Map 5.5).²⁸

We will examine several cases of failed states in Africa, including those of Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where governments have collapsed and armies have become militias for ethnic groups, warlords, and local thugs. These cases have had a considerable impact on contemporary global politics:

- In Somalia, the death of 18 US soldiers (portrayed in the film *Black Hawk Down*) drove the Clinton administration to avoid other humanitarian interventions.
- Liberia became the archetype of endless violence for nonpolitical reasons.
- Rwanda became a prototype of ethnic **genocide**.
- The DRC became a model for **transnational war**, involving soldiers from several states in the region.

In such cases, the distinction between legitimate war and crime has vanished, and civilians are victims of humanitarian disasters that uproot millions. In the violence that engulfs such countries, political ends are scarcely visible. Instead, combatants, not unlike soldiers in the Thirty Years' War, seek personal power, loot, or vengeance against opponents.

In *Somalia*, following the 1991 overthrow of dictator Mohamed Siad Barré, civil war erupted among rival clan chiefs. During the next two years, some 50,000 were killed and as many as 300,000 died in an accompanying famine. In late 1992, US forces landed in Somalia to lead an UN-sponsored effort to restore order and permit the flow of relief supplies. On October 3, 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, and US forces abruptly left the country. The clan militias were in turn defeated by an **Islamist** movement that was also confronting a weak provisional government that was being propped up by Ethiopia. In 2006, the provisional

government regained formal control, but continued to face resistance. Today, Somalia's government is a shaky coalition and faces an Islamist insurgency in the southern and central regions linked to Al Qaeda known as al-Shabab. Without an effective central government, Somalia is a haven for terrorists and criminals, including modern-day pirates. Whoever "wins" power in Somalia will find little worth winning as the country, like the Horn of Africa more generally, is the site of a devastated environment that has only 5 percent of its original habitat, and a vast quantity of arms – three cows will buy a Russian AK-47 and five cows will purchase a US M-16.²⁹ In addition, that part of Somalia that had been a British protectorate declared its independence in May 1991 and, although not recognized by the international community, still retained its independence.

Between late 1989 and 1996, the West African country of *Liberia*, which had been founded by freed American slaves in 1816, was engulfed by civil war. What began with the overthrow of the government of President Samuel K. Doe (1951–90), deteriorated into a violent war among warlords and their personal militias. The militias drafted children as young as eight years old and caused countless civilian deaths as they destroyed the country's capital, Monrovia, and ravaged its economy. The war cost 150,000 lives and displaced over one million Liberians.

A peace agreement was brokered in August 1996 by a monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with UN help under which a military contingent authorized by ECOWAS was to oversee the return of normalcy in Liberia. The next year saw the election of Charles Taylor as the country's president. Taylor had sparked the war in the first place and had helped to trigger civil war in neighboring countries Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast in search of booty, especially diamonds. Confronted by economic sanctions, international pressure, and the prospect of renewed civil strife, Taylor stepped down and

went into exile in Nigeria in August 2003. He was subsequently arrested in 2006 as he tried to cross into Cameroon and was put on trial in Freetown, Sierra Leone by the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone. After several postponements, Taylor's trial opened in 2008 with a verdict expected in 2011.

Taylor's intervention in Sierra Leone in 1991 was aimed at securing control over that country's diamond mines. Even as government forces tried to repel the invaders, a brutal anti-government group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) emerged, aiming to gain control of the country's diamonds for itself. Civil strife continued in the following years, displacing more than one-third of the country's population and marked by frequent changes in the government in Freetown, the country's capital. After the governing military junta was overthrown in 1997, a Nigerian peacekeeping force entered the country. During the next two years, RUF rebels terrorized the country, kidnapping children and forcing them to be soldiers, raping women, and hacking off the limbs of men, women, and children. Despite a series of ceasefires, the killing continued until November 2000. In 2004, an UN-sponsored international tribunal was convened to prosecute the killers.

Africa's bloodiest conflict began with the genocide of ethnic Tutsis in *Rwanda* in 1994 by ethnic Hutus. For centuries, Tutsi kings in Rwanda and neighboring Burundi had imposed a feudal system in which Hutus were serfs. Both German and Belgian colonial rulers in the region had maintained Tutsi domination. Three years before Rwanda's independence in 1962, ethnic violence erupted when elections led to Hutu-dominated governments. Thereafter, periodic spasms of tribal violence continued in both Rwanda and Burundi. In 1990 the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) began an effort to overthrow the Hutu government from bases in Uganda.

Thereafter, a conspiracy of Hutu military leaders evolved to exterminate the Tutsis, and the genocide began in April 1994 after a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was

shot down near Kigali, Rwanda's capital. In the murderous weeks that followed, some one million Tutsis were killed, often by machete-wielding Hutu neighbors, many of whom were forced against their will by militants to participate in atrocities (see Figure 5.3). After the experience of Somalia, the United States and other states, although aware of the genocide that was taking place, were unwilling to intervene.

Simultaneously, the Tutsi RPF invaded the country, occupied the capital, set up a new government, and then chased the Hutu militias out of Rwanda. Recalling these events 10 years later, a member of the International Rescue Committee wrote of how he "went to Goma, Zaire, in July 1994, just days after over one million refugees fled there from Rwanda . . . The repugnant nature of everything that happened there: murder, torture, a government killing its people, genocide – overwhelmed me and many others."³⁰ Bill Clinton later called the failure to intervene in Rwanda the greatest regret of his presidency. "All over the world," he declared, "there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed in this unimaginable terror."³¹

By the middle of July, over a million Hutus had fled to squalid camps in eastern Congo (then Zaire). There, Hutu militias took control of the camps and staged raids into Rwanda, making it impossible for civilians to return home. In autumn 1996, Tutsi-led Rwandan forces invaded several camps, forcing refugees home or deeper into the DRC and routing the Hutu militias that fled further westward into jungles. The struggle became linked to politics in Congo, which had been disintegrating politically and economically since the early 1990s and where dissatisfaction with long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko had grown.

Tutsi-related ethnic groups in the DRC, aided by the Rwandan government, clashed with elements of the Congolese army that tried to force them out of the country. By late October, anti-



Figure 5.3 Remains of genocide victims at Nyamata church, Rwanda

Source: AFP/Getty Images

Mobutu forces had formed under the command of Mobutu's long-time foe, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Kabila's rebels, aided by several African states (and thereafter by the US), all angered by Mobutu's support of rebels in their countries, began to move against him. All were seeking influence in Congo as well as a share of Congo's resources, especially diamonds, timber, and tantalum (coltan) – a metal vital in making cell phones. The eastern Congo fell into rebel hands quickly. The Congolese government in the capital of Kinshasa, long unable to exercise authority over its own forces or over the country's huge hinterland, was no longer able to exercise sovereignty. By spring 1997, all the country's major cities had fallen to Kabila's forces. Mobutu fled, and Kabila declared himself president.

Kabila himself then lost popularity owing to his authoritarian rule. He alienated his Rwandan

and Ugandan allies by turning against them and Congo's Tutsis as he sought to shore up his support among the Congolese. In mid-1998, Tutsis, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, moved against Kabila in a replay of what had happened two years earlier. Kabila, in turn, was aided by Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan, and Congo became a carcass on which other states fed. The initial conflict had become a genuinely transnational war. Between 1998 and 2008, about seven million died – over 1000 every day, many of whom were children – as a result of war and accompanying hunger and disease, making the conflict the most deadly since 1945. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and replaced by his son Joseph who began negotiations with the rebel groups, and in July the parties agreed to form a government. Elections were held in August 2006, and a runoff in October resulted in Joseph Kabila's

reelection. However, the loser, Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, disputed the outcome, and it did not end the regional divisions between the country's east and west.

State failure has had tragic consequences, giving rise to savage violence against civilians. The next section examines the possibility of similar violence in several larger states.

Others at risk of state failure


Civil violence also threatens the integrity of several other large states, notably Nigeria and Pakistan, and this section briefly describes the prospect for state failure in those states. The disintegration of Yugoslavia after 1992 showed that Europe was not immune to the disease, and events in Haiti reflected similar problems.

Nigeria, with Africa's largest population and oil reserves, faces a variety of bitter identity cleavages and also finds its future in jeopardy. As a result of boundaries imposed by Britain, the country consists of four main ethnic groups concentrated in different regions of the country: Hausa (north), Fulani (north), Ibo (east), and Yoruba (west). Each is further fragmented by clan, lineage, and village affiliations. Religion forms a second cleavage, with Hausa and Fulani largely Muslim, Ibo Catholic, and Yoruba Muslim and Anglican. Civil war erupted in 1967 after the Ibo, angered by mistreatment at the hands of the dominant Hausa, declared their region the independent Republic of Biafra. By 1970, the Ibo had lost, but their resentment remains. In recent years, religion has become a potent source of division owing to Islam's resurgence in northern Nigeria with the result that large areas were placed under Koranic law (*sharia*). Thus, ethnic, religious, and regional strains threaten to erupt into large-scale violence and menace the country's survival.

Nigerian unity is also threatened by resource conflicts. Its economy is heavily dependent on oil, accounting for over 95 percent of the country's export revenues and 65 percent of government

revenues.³² Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and the world's 10th largest crude oil producer. Its oil resources are concentrated in the Niger Delta where they have fueled conflict since the early 1990s. Minority ethnic groups in the region accuse foreign oil companies and the national government of exploitation. They complain that they have not received oil revenues promised by the Nigerian government and have suffered severe environmental damage resulting from oil extraction. Following independence in 1960, the government promised to treat the Delta region as a special development area, but instead it reduced the oil royalties to groups there. Additionally, oil spills commonly result from corroding pipes and sabotage. Such spills destroy crops, pollute groundwater, kill fish, and produce serious health problems among the local population. According to Human Rights Watch: "Since the latest escalation of violence began in early 2006, hundreds of people have been killed in clashes between rival armed groups vying for illicit patronage doled out by corrupt politicians, or between militants and government security forces. Armed gangs have carried out numerous attacks on oil facilities and kidnapped more than 500 oil workers and ordinary Nigerians for ransom during this period."³³

Pakistan, the world's sixth most populous country and an irreplaceable frontline state in NATO's war in Afghanistan, poses an even greater risk for state failure as it struggles with social, economic, and political instability, and the failure of this nuclear-armed state, says US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "poses a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world."³⁴ Indeed, "Pakistan is experiencing a near perfect storm of political, economic, and social crises all rising in the absence of an effective central government."³⁵ Some of the threats to stability include aggrieved ethnic groups, growing Islamic militancy and insurgency challenging the state's authority, internally displaced peoples, and political corruption. Pakistan is a multiethnic state in which the dominant groups are: Punjabi (45 percent), Pashtun (15 percent), and Sindhi



Map 5.6 Pakistan's ethnic patchwork

Source: "Strains Intensify in Pakistan's Ethnic Patchwork," *Washington Post*, January 7, 2008

(14 percent). As Map 5.6 indicates, each province is associated with a particular ethnic group, and there are additional ethnic and linguistic divisions within each region. Punjab is the most populous and developed region and it has dominated Pakistan's military and state institutions. Perceptions that Punjabis are colonizing their lands and exploiting their resources have fueled

resistance separatist insurgencies among the Baluch (2002–), Pashtuns (1970s), and the Sindhis (1980s).³⁶

Pakistan is also the site of a Taliban insurgency with links to Al Qaeda in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly the Northwest Frontier Province) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan.³⁷ Although

these regions are predominantly Pashtun, the Pakistani Taliban is not an ethnic movement, but an Islamist one. The group's rise began with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign weapons and funds flowed into the largely neglected tribal regions in Pakistan to support groups resisting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but also undermining local ethnic political and economic structures and giving power to previously weak *mullahs* (Islamic scholars) who opened new religious schools and increased their political influence. After Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, the Islamists remained and continued to receive support from local elites.

Even as secularists triumphed in national elections in 2007, the Pakistani Taliban became a formal organization and declared war on Pakistan's government. Its goals include imposing Islamic law in Pakistan and waging a jihad against US and NATO forces in neighboring Afghanistan. The "Taliban problem" has become increasingly serious for the Pakistani state. By 2006, it was already facing a full-scale insurgency in which the Taliban kidnapped over 1000 military and political officials. And, in 2009, the Taliban seized control of a strategically important district only 70 miles from Pakistan's capital, Islamabad and negotiated a truce that would allow them to impose Islamic law. By some accounts, the Taliban is successful because Pakistan's elite is factionalized, with elements of its military and security forces, notably the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), supporting Taliban forces with funding and training with an eye to using the Taliban to gain influence in Afghanistan and limit India's influence in that country.

While insurgency poses a direct threat to the state in Pakistan, it also has fueled a refugee problem that contributes to state failure. The insurgency had produced an estimated 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) by 2009.³⁸ Combined with refugees displaced by devastating flooding in 2010, Pakistan has the highest number of displaced persons in the world – 1.2 million.³⁹

These refugees are creating a crisis as towns try to cope with swelling populations and the burdens they place on already strained infrastructure, including roads, sewers, schools and water supplies. The government has been slow to respond, leaving refugees to rely on NGOs and the charity of host families, and producing frustration with the lack of government support.

Pakistan's government also reeks of corruption, another contributing factor to state failure. The NGO Transparency International ranked Pakistan 2.3 on a 10-point scale (with 0 as most corrupt) on its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2010.⁴⁰ In 2009, the US embassy in Islamabad reported in a leaked diplomatic cable: "Although we do not believe Pakistan is a failed state, we nonetheless recognize that the challenges the state confronts are dire . . . The bureaucracy has settled into third-world mediocrity, as demonstrated by corruption and a limited capacity to implement or articulate policy."⁴¹ Corruption is believed to extend into the country's highest institutions. Thus, in 2010, Pakistan's Supreme Court reopened a series of corruption cases against high-ranking members of government, including President Asif Ali Zardari, and, by one account, the army has become one of the country's wealthiest institutions, using its resources to use acquire political influence.⁴²

In contrast to those LDCs facing potential state failure, others have become engines of economic growth and, as a result, enjoy growing political influence.

The BRICs and global governance

Despite the difficulties confronted by the LDCs since independence, recent years have witnessed a surge in the economies of some of these countries, notably India and China, which prior to Europe's industrialization had been the world's largest economies. Growing acceptance of free-market policies in the LDCs and the inflow of

foreign investment began to bear fruit, especially in the 1990s, and, as a result, some LDCs have become major contributors to global economic growth. Collectively Brazil, Russia, India, and China are known as the BRICs, an acronym first used by the investment firm Goldman Sachs in 2003. Citing their rapid economic growth, the firm predicted that these economies would be wealthier by 2050 than the world's current economic powers.

With economic power has come enhanced political status that has begun to shift global influence away from Japan and the European and North American states, known as the G-7 (Group of 7). This shift is most notable in the rising influence of the Group of 20 (G-20), a grouping of emerging market economies created in 1999 to provide economic governance in coping with economic issues such as trade in agriculture and debt relief. Previously, the G-7 had been uniquely influential in shaping global economic policy and in managing the world's international economic institutions. (The G-8, a related group, refers to meetings of the G-7 with the addition of Russia.) The G-20, comprised of 19 major states and the European Union, represents 90 percent of the global GNP, 80 percent of all world trade, and 66 percent of the world population. G-20 finance ministers and central bankers generally meet once a year in order to develop common views on policy issues related to the management of the global economy. For example, in 2010, the G-20 agreed on proposed reforms to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would alter representation in that body and include the BRICs among its 10 leading shareholders.⁴³ These reforms give the BRICs and other LDCs more influence over day-to-day IMF operations. According to then IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, this represents "the most important reform in the governance of the institution since its creation."⁴⁴

India's economic growth is representative of what the BRICs have achieved. Until 1980, the country was "shackled" by "a mixed economy that combined the worst features of capitalism

and socialism" based on a model that was "inward-looking and import-substituting rather than outward-looking and export-promoting."⁴⁵ Thereafter, India reduced the state's role in its economy and encouraged entrepreneurship. As a result, it has one of the world's fastest growing economies, with an average growth rate of 7 percent since 1997. In the process, India has reduced population growth, enlarged its middle class, raised per capita income from \$1178 to \$3051, and become the world's fourth largest economy.⁴⁶ Brazil, too, is a rapidly emerging economic power. Brazil is Latin America's largest economy and is prospering owing to macroeconomic stability, low inflation, a floating currency, manageable debt, and political stability, as well as the discovery of massive oil reserves off its southern coast in 2007.⁴⁷ Between 1999 and 2008, Russia also experienced impressive economic growth, doubling its GDP, tripling wages in real terms, and reducing unemployment and poverty.⁴⁸

By 2008–09, the LDCs' emerging markets accounted for almost 40 percent of global **gross domestic product** (measured in **purchasing-power parity**).⁴⁹ In addition, their share of global exports rose from 20 percent in 1970 to 43 percent in 2006, and they have amassed some 70 percent of the world's **foreign-exchange reserves**, making them ever less dependent on foreign investment.⁵⁰ Between 2002 and 2007, LDCs' annual growth averaged over 7 percent a year, compared with 2.3 percent in developed countries.⁵¹ Although in 2008, when the global financial crisis began, average growth in these economies slumped to 6 percent, these countries weathered the crisis better than the advanced economies.⁵²

However, it is China that is today's emerging economic giant. As one observer declares, "Without China, the BRICs are just the BRI, a bland, soft cheese that is primarily known for the wine that goes with it. China is the muscle of the group and the Chinese know it."⁵³ China alone will soon account for 10 percent of global trade, and China and India are increasingly competing with developed countries in a range of high-tech

as well as labor-intensive products and services. Although creating pockets of unemployment as jobs are outsourced and new sources of global pollution, rapid economic growth in the LDCs will benefit developed countries in two ways. (1) The large numbers of newly enriched citizens in the LDCs will increase demand for products from developed countries, and (2) the lower cost of production in the LDCs will curb global inflation.

The rapid economic development of China and its transition from a centrally controlled Marxist economy to a market-based economy is the most important factor in the shifting economic balance between developed countries and LDCs. Let us now examine that transition.

An economic giant awakens

After 15 years of arduous negotiation, China's formal admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, marked the country's full-scale entry into the global economy and its recognition as an emerging economic superpower. For decades, observers had predicted that China would become a superpower, but after its civil war and the triumph of communism in the country, it failed to fulfill its potential. In the following sections, we examine the evolution in China's economic policies from Maoist communism to capitalist competitor and the growing economic interdependence of the West and China.

China from Mao to Deng

Mao Zedong was a dedicated Marxist who wished to follow a uniquely Chinese path to socialism. In 1957, he announced a plan for China's rapid industrialization and self-sufficiency called the Great Leap Forward. The idea was to move millions of peasants into huge communes where they could be mobilized to carry out large-scale industrial projects. Throughout China, factories,

schools, and other institutions were ordered to build furnaces to increase steel production. This effort proved disastrous for China's agricultural economy. Between 1959 and 1962, industrial production dropped precipitously, and famine gripped the country. Economic conditions deteriorated further when the Soviet Union ceased providing China with economic aid in 1960.

Economic turmoil again struck China after Mao started the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, the purpose of which was to rid the country of lingering capitalist values and reawaken revolutionary fervor among China's citizens. Mao's other objectives were to weaken China's government bureaucracy, which he viewed as insufficiently radical, and to purge opponents in China's communist party.

China's economy ground to a halt as the country descended into chaos. Radical students organized into groups of "Red Guards" attacked government and communist party officials, denouncing them as counterrevolutionaries and class enemies. Those with education were special targets, and many were killed or imprisoned. The country's schools and universities were closed; officials were purged from their jobs; and widespread violence erupted in 1967 and 1968, ending only after China's army intervened to restore order. The Cultural Revolution continued until 1976.

Following Mao's death in 1976, a power struggle ensued, and in 1977 Deng Xiaoping (1904–97), a victim of two of Mao's purges, won political power. Deng broke decisively with his predecessor, promoting China's economic growth by introducing material incentives and private property. Encouraging China's citizens to pursue the "Four Modernizations" – agriculture, industry, technology, and defense – Deng urged families to grow food for their own use on their own plots of land, set up businesses, and sell what they did not need for profit. Rural communes were broken up, and peasants were allowed to lease land.

Deng also abandoned Mao's radical social leveling – restoring education, sending students

overseas to study science and technology, and permitting inequality between rich and poor to reappear. Individual initiative and entrepreneurship became watchwords for Deng's new China. "We should," Deng declared, "let some people get rich first, both in the countryside and in the urban areas. To get rich by hard work is glorious."⁵⁴

Under the slogan "Socialism with Chinese characteristics," China's growth quickened. Deng abandoned Mao's pursuit of self-sufficiency and sought foreign technology and investment to modernize the country. To this end, China improved relations with the United States and Japan and negotiated the return of the prosperous cities of Hong Kong from Britain in 1997 and Macao from Portugal in 1999. In order to reduce China's unprofitable public sector, Deng privatized ever more of the country's enterprises, forcing them to become profitable or fail and allowing resources to be allocated by market-based pricing.

Deng's market reforms unleashed China's immense economic potential. Growing at an annual rate of 9 percent, China ranked fifth in the world in total GDP by 2003,⁵⁵ not including Hong Kong, which is a Special Administrative Region of China with exports equivalent to 50 percent of China's. During the same period the average income of China's 1.3 billion people tripled. Between 2000 and 2009, the value of China's exports soared from \$249 billion to over \$1201 billion, and the value of its imports rose from \$225 billion to over \$1005 billion.⁵⁶ In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world's second largest economy and overtook Germany as the world's leading exporter.⁵⁷

China's admission to the WTO reflected its acceptance of global trade rules, its growing interdependence with other countries, and its opening to the forces of globalization. Its entry bound it to make substantial tariff reductions, remove other trade barriers, and open up formerly closed sectors of its economy to foreign competition. US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky noted the contrast of the new China under Deng with the

old Maoist China, which she described as "a nation with neither lawyers, nor law enforcement, nor laws" in which policy was based on "fiat and the interpretations of edicts and slogans" by officials constantly fearful of being arrested. China's entry was a "defining moment" because it had accepted "an entire body of agreements, rules and enforcement procedures developed over decades under western-based legal norms."⁵⁸

Deng, however, was not prepared to let Western-style democracy emerge in China or surrender the communist party's monopoly of power. He and his successors were aware that Mikhail Gorbachev's policies had led to the collapse of the USSR and the end of communism there. Thus, the regime brutally suppressed the country's budding democracy movement, which first appeared in 1978–79 with posters in Beijing protesting corruption and authoritarianism. The movement became popular among Chinese university students in the 1980s, especially as Gorbachev instituted political and social reforms in his country. In April 1989, student protests erupted in Beijing and continued during a visit by Gorbachev. Students occupied Tiananmen Square in the city's center, but on June 4, 1989, Chinese army units brutally attacked the demonstrators, killing hundreds. After the Tiananmen Square massacre, China's democracy movement went into decline, and President George H. W. Bush suspended government-to-government sales and commercial export of weapons to China.

China's economy today

China is already an economic superpower. Its integration in the world economy has made it a leading recipient of foreign investment, roughly \$1 billion every week, and a growing factor in world trade. China's trade surplus with the rest of the world peaked in 2008 at nearly \$300 billion. Although its trade surplus narrowed in 2010, it remained enormous, at \$183 billion.⁵⁹ With a vast though shrinking pool of cheap labor, China has

become a leading destination for US and Japanese transnational corporations wishing to reduce production costs and increase global competitiveness. This has meant a loss of jobs in the United States and elsewhere as companies shift operations to China. In addition, a persistent US trade deficit with China has alarmed Americans who fear a further loss of jobs to China.

The country's rapid economic growth, however, poses political and economic dilemmas for its leaders. Despite the privatization of many enterprises, others, notably heavy industries established in the 1950s and 1960s, are unprofitable and remain state owned. China's People's Liberation Army continues to run a variety of businesses, many of which lose money. Efforts to privatize these enterprises and force them to become efficient will alienate bureaucrats who manage them and produce massive unemployment.

Already, as many as 100 million migrant workers, many peasants from China's interior, move from city to city in search of jobs. These migrants, called the "blind flow," pose huge social problems. Greater unemployment would create political discontent, especially since the country's social safety net, which had provided free health-care, housing, and education in earlier decades, has vanished. Another knotty problem is posed by widespread corruption of communist officials. Economic progress requires ousting such officials but could endanger party control.

China's uneven economic development poses an additional danger. Much of the country's growth has taken place in its coastal provinces, while the country's interior remains backward and agricultural. Regional disparities are growing. The coastal regions chafe under party control, as capitalist entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and local officials develop policies based on economic logic rather than communist ideology. These coastal regions also value warm relations between China and its leading trade partners and sources of investment, wishing to minimize differences with the US and Japan. Communist control of the

interior, however, remains strong, and the party is prepared to rouse nationalism against foreigners, especially Japan and America, to solidify its hold on power, at the risk of frightening foreign investors. The unanswered question is whether these two Chinas can coexist or whether they will grow apart.

Perhaps the most significant unanswered question about China is whether economic liberalization based on individual initiative and a free market can succeed without political reform. Many Western observers believe that a free market requires individual freedom and democratic institutions and that government intervention stifles economic growth. China's leaders are betting that China's economic growth will continue, even while they retain central control of the country. Only time will tell who is correct.

Chinese–American trade relations

The value of US exports to China between 2000 and 2009 more than quadrupled. During the same time, the value of US imports from China rose from \$100 to \$296.4 billion, increasing America's trade deficit with China in a single decade by over \$140 billion.⁶⁰ In August 2006, the monthly US trade deficit hit \$67.6 billion, the highest in history, hastening the loss of jobs overseas and running up the US debt to its trading partners. The deficit with China alone reached \$22 an all-time high of \$28 billion in August 2010.⁶¹ The US deficit with China is its largest, by far, with any country.⁶² This trend has provoked calls from American politicians to protect US industries against Chinese imports. The deficit also intensified American demands that China bring an end to unfair trading practices, including refusing to allow its currency, the yuan, to appreciate in value relative to the US dollar, thereby making American exports to China less expensive. American politicians have threatened to impose tariffs on Chinese imports unless China revalues its currency, and China began to do so slowly

in July 2005, but the issue remains a sore spot in US–China relations.

American officials also complain that intellectual piracy (the theft of inventions, trademarks, and designs and copyrighted materials) in China costs US manufacturers some \$24 billion every year and that Chinese authorities have failed to crack down on this illegal industry. Thus, the US software industry reported that up to 98 percent of the copies of US software products sold in China in 1999 were “pirated.”⁶³

DID YOU KNOW?

Walmart imports over \$30 billion worth of Chinese goods to sell in the United States, accounting for about 80 percent of the company’s total imports and 15 percent of America’s total imports of Chinese consumer products.⁶⁴

US–Chinese economic interdependence has thickened as trade has increased. Low-cost imported Chinese goods like toys provide American consumers with inexpensive products and help keep America’s inflation rate low. US trade deficits have meant a huge outflow of dollars to China and other Asian countries. China and Japan have used these funds to purchase large amounts of US securities (**bonds** and **treasury notes** that are equivalent to dollars), and these purchases have kept US interest rates low, enabling Americans to borrow money cheaply and stabilizing the dollar’s value. China is the largest holder of US treasury notes (\$906 billion in October 2010), followed by Japan (\$877 billion), and Great Britain (\$477 billion).⁶⁵ Washington can pay its **current account** deficit at relatively low interest rates by borrowing money through the sale of government bonds. This situation, however, is precarious, and some observers regard China’s vast holdings of US and corporate

securities as dangerous. China, they contend, can exert political pressure on the United States by threatening to sell those securities and buy European and Japanese securities instead. The effect would be explosive: American stock prices and the value of the dollar would plummet; the price of imported products would soar; and interest rates on everything from home mortgages to credit cards would balloon.

Others argue that fear of Chinese influence is exaggerated because, as expected in an interdependent world, China would also suffer economically: The value of the American securities China owns, as well as the US dollars it has amassed, would decline precipitously. Moreover, a sudden drop in the dollar’s value would reduce US imports of Chinese goods, and unemployment and bankruptcies would spread across China. In this view, what exists is a kind of economic mutually assured destruction in which US–Chinese fates are so linked that neither country is likely to act imprudently. The only way both countries can continue to prosper is for market forces to compel the US to reduce its trade deficit gradually as Americans learn to save more of what they earn and as the Chinese spend more.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the evolution of the global south from its colonial past to the present. The effects of colonialism are still seen globally, from India’s railway system and bureaucratic institutions that were established by Britain to the widespread use of French and English in Africa and Asia. In some cases, the colonial experience has impeded nation building and economic development and contributed to fragile and even failing states. Yet, in recent years several LDCs have achieved such political stability and high levels of economic growth that they have become prosperous and influential actors in the global system, and are moving up in the global hierarchy of political and economic power.

These transformations in the global economy and global political institutions are also shaped, positively and negatively, by globalization. In the next chapter, we examine this phenomenon with the aim of understanding the opportunities it offers to and the constraints it imposes on actors in the contemporary global system.

Student activities


Map exercise

Discuss the trends depicted in the maps of Africa in Map 5.7.

Cultural materials

Joseph Conrad's (1857–1924), *Heart of Darkness*, published in 1899, is regarded as a literary classic. It is also an indictment of Belgian brutality in the Congo during King Léopold's ownership of that territory. Read the passage from the novel in the text (p. 143). What does it tell you about Belgian imperialism? The 1979 film *Apocalypse Now*, starring Marlon Brando, involved a retelling of Conrad's novel moved to Vietnam. The film's hero is on a mission into Cambodia to assassinate a renegade Green Beret, Colonel Walter E. Kurtz (the parallel to Conrad's mysterious dying trader Georges-Antoine Kurtz) who has come to be regarded as a god among a local tribe. Why do you think director Francis Ford Coppola drew

Map 5.7



the analogy between the Belgian Congo and Vietnam?

Further reading

Cline, William R., *Trade Policy and Global Poverty* (Washington, DC: Center for International Development, 2004). Incisive account of how trade policies perpetuate poverty in the LDCs.

Handelman, Howard, *The Challenge of Third World Development*, 4th edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2005). Issues confronting the LDCs such as democracy, religion, ethnic conflict, urbanization, and agrarian reform.

Harkavy, Robert E. and Stephanie G. Neuman, *Warfare and the Third World* (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Analysis of theories and key factors in wars in the LDCs.

Rotberg, Robert I., ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Excellent collection of essays on the various sources of state failure.

Sachs, Jeffrey D., *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin, 2005). Accessible and compelling analysis of what works and what does not in economic development, featuring excellent case studies.

1989	1991	1999	2008	2009	2010	2011
Francis Fukuyama declares an "end to history"	Fragmentation of the Soviet Union	Massive anti-globalization demonstration in Seattle	Russia invades neighboring Georgia	Iranians take to the streets to protest rigged presidential election	Wikileaks releases confidential American diplomatic documents	Pro-democracy demonstrations spread through the Arab world

6

Globalization: The new frontier

On the morning of November 30, 1999, 50,000 people packed downtown Seattle, as leaders of 135 governments gathered for the third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Figure 6.1). It was a diverse group, including environmentalists, proponents of social justice, students, teachers, and workers. All were there to protest the WTO's free-trade policies. Some demanded fair trade that does not exploit the world's poorest populations or its non-renewable environmental resources. Others protested the loss of American jobs that they attributed to free trade. Hoping to halt the meeting, some engaged in civil disobedience, trying to block delegates from reaching the convention center. A few smashed store windows and started fires. Officials ordered the streets cleared and established a no-protest zone downtown. Thousands of riot police moved in with tear gas, rubber bullets, and concussion grenades, followed by the National Guard. Armored vehicles and police helicopters patrolled the city streets around the Seattle convention center. In the end, over 500 people were arrested, although most were soon released, and downtown Seattle sustained over \$2.5 million in property

damage. The WTO meeting lasted the week, but delegates left without reaching agreement. Many attributed this failure, in large part, to the anti-globalization protestors.

Since the end of the Cold War, arguably the most important feature of global politics has been the process of **globalization**. In what follows, we first define globalization and then discuss its major features. Globalization is a complex phenomenon with many dimensions. To illustrate this complexity, the chapter examines several perspectives on globalization and the heated debate over whether or not globalization is a positive or negative phenomenon. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the impact that globalization is having on sovereign states. This is a question that also produces heated debate. Some believe that major states continue to control the globalization process, while others argue that globalization and the technology that sustains it are creating a "borderless world" in which states enjoy less and less domestic autonomy, especially regarding their economies.

Globalization consists of processes that knit people everywhere together, thereby producing



Figure 6.1 Anti-globalization demonstration in Seattle

Source: AFP/Getty Images

worldwide interdependence and featuring the rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders. Political scientist David Held and his colleagues define it as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual.”¹ In a globalizing world, contacts among people and their ideas intensify and accelerate owing to advances in communication, travel, and commerce and produce mutual awareness and increased contact among individuals and societies. The rapid movement of large numbers of people results in cultural mixing and in the establishment of national diasporas far from home. Under these conditions, some observers believe, states enjoy ever less control of their destinies and are buffeted by forces outside their borders and beyond their sway.

States are more or less integrated into the globalized world economically, socially, and politically. As shown in Table 6.1, according to Switzerland’s KOF Index of Globalization, of 208 countries and territories, Belgium was, overall, the world’s most globalized country in 2010. Singapore ranked first in economic globalization, Switzerland first in social globalization, and France first in political globalization.² Nine of the most globalized were small, democratic, and highly developed European states, and the other was Canada. Great Britain ranked 24th, the United States 27th, Russia 42nd, and China 63rd. At or near the bottom of the rankings were the West Bank and Gaza, Timor-Leste, Somalia, and North Korea. In general, large countries ranked lower than small ones because they are more self-sufficient, and LDCs with authoritarian governments rank lower than developed countries with democratic governments.³ A country’s over-

Table 6.1 2010 KOF Index of Globalization*

Country	Globalization index	Country	Economic globalization	Country	Social globalization	Country	Political globalization
1. Belgium	92.95	1. Singapore	97.48	1. Switzerland	94.94	1. France	98.44
2. Austria	92.51	2. Ireland	93.93	2. Austria	92.77	2. Italy	98.17
3. Netherlands	91.90	3. Luxembourg	93.57	3. Canada	90.73	3. Belgium	98.14
4. Switzerland	90.55	4. Netherlands	92.40	4. Belgium	90.61	4. Austria	96.85
5. Sweden	89.75	5. Malta	92.26	5. Netherlands	88.99	5. Sweden	96.27
6. Denmark	89.68	6. Belgium	91.94	6. Denmark	88.01	6. Spain	96.14
7. Canada	88.24	7. Estonia	91.66	7. United Kingdom	87.05	7. Netherlands	95.77
8. Portugal	87.54	8. Hungary	90.45	8. Germany	85.97	8. Switzerland	95.09
9. Finland	87.31	9. Sweden	89.42	9. Sweden	85.95	9. Poland	94.63
10. Hungary	87.00	10. Austria	89.33	10. France	85.84	10. Canada	94.40
11. Ireland	86.92	11. Bahrain	89.32	11. Portugal	85.59	11. Portugal	94.36
12. Czech Republic	86.87	12. Denmark	88.58	12. Norway	85.30	12. Germany	94.21
13. France	86.18	13. Czech Republic	88.43	13. Finland	84.89	13. Denmark	93.96
14. Luxembourg	85.84	14. Cyprus	87.77	14. Slovak Republic	83.90	14. United States	93.85
15. Spain	85.71	15. Finland	87.33	15. Czech Republic	83.54	15. Egypt, Arab Rep.	93.39
16. Slovak Republic	85.07	16. Slovak Republic	87.25	16. Australia	82.96	16. Argentina	93.38
17. Singapore	84.58	17. Chile	87.14	17. Spain	82.52	17. Greece	93.11
18. Germany	84.16	18. Israel	85.15	18. Luxembourg	81.60	18. Turkey	93.11
19. Australia	83.82	19. Portugal	85.03	19. Hungary	80.79	19. Brazil	92.95
20. Norway	83.53	20. Bulgaria	84.10	20. Liechtenstein	80.11	20. India	92.69
21. Cyprus	82.45	21. Latvia	83.67	21. Singapore	79.84	21. Romania	92.42
22. Italy	82.26	22. Switzerland	82.87	22. Cyprus	79.65	22. Hungary	91.67
23. Poland	81.26	23. New Zealand	82.82	23. Ireland	78.75	23. Australia	91.45
24. United Kingdom	80.18	24. Slovenia	82.55	24. Italy	78.37	24. Finland	91.11
25. New Zealand	79.56	25. Spain	82.11	25. United States	78.29	25. Norway	90.63
26. Estonia	79.49	26. Iceland	81.58	26. Poland	76.76	26. Nigeria	90.24
27. United States	78.80	27. Lithuania	81.50	27. Malta	76.26	27. Morocco	90.07
28. Slovenia	78.78	28. Canada	81.49	28. New Zealand	75.73	28. Czech Republic	89.81
29. Croatia	76.85	29. Panama	81.09	29. San Marino	75.05	29. Japan	89.63
30. Malta	76.42	30. Georgia	79.89	30. Puerto Rico	73.97	30. Ireland	89.36
31. Greece	75.83	31. Australia	79.64	31. Slovenia	73.87	31. Pakistan	89.10
32. Bulgaria	75.41	32. United Kingdom	78.55	32. Estonia	72.97	32. Chile	88.66
33. Lithuania	74.73	33. Jamaica	78.40	33. Aruba	71.81	33. Korea, Rep.	88.23
34. Chile	73.74	34. France	78.35	34. New Caledonia	71.81	34. Bulgaria	87.60
35. Malaysia	73.69	35. Croatia	77.99	35. French Polynesia	71.51	35. Tunisia	87.33
36. Jordan	71.74	36. Malaysia	77.87	36. Croatia	71.35	36. South Africa	87.27
37. Latvia	71.61	37. Poland	77.07	37. Iceland	70.55	37. Senegal	87.20
38. Israel	71.58	38. Norway	76.92	38. Latvia	69.40	38. China	86.60
39. Romania	71.51	39. Trinidad and Tobago	76.47	39. Russian Federation	68.82	39. Jordan	86.30
40. Iceland	70.66	40. Italy	75.74	40. United Arab Emirates	68.58	40. Indonesia	85.97
41. Bahrain	69.37	41. Germany	75.53	41. Lebanon	68.27	41. Ukraine	85.55
42. Russian Federation	68.91	42. Costa Rica	75.44	42. Kuwait	68.00	42. Russian Federation	85.38
43. Qatar	68.87	43. Greece	75.16	43. Bahamas, The	67.75	43. Peru	85.36
44. Mauritius	68.29	44. Romania	75.04	44. Brunei Darussalam	67.61	44. Kenya	84.99

45. Japan	68.16	45. Oman	74.79	45. Lithuania	67.57	45. Uruguay	84.89
46. Ukraine	68.15	46. Moldova	74.57	46. Japan	67.56	46. Philippines	84.56
47. Kuwait	67.79	47. Honduras	74.54	47. Antigua and Barbuda	67.25	47. Malaysia	84.52
48. Panama	67.66	48. Mauritius	73.54	48. Macao, China	66.99	48. Ghana	83.95
49. Costa Rica	66.51	49. Bosnia and Herzegovina	72.78	49. Mauritius	66.55	49. Croatia	83.84
50. El Salvador	66.26	50. Jordan	72.09	50. Qatar	65.88	50. Slovak Republic	83.65
51. Serbia	65.97	51. Kuwait	71.47	51. Virgin Islands (U.S.)	65.58	51. Ethiopia	82.96
52. Lebanon	65.86	52. El Salvador	71.28	52. Macedonia, FYR	65.57	52. Guatemala	82.13
53. Uruguay	65.62	53. South Africa	70.13	53. Greece	65.53	53. Ecuador	81.01
54. South Africa	65.60	54. Zambia	69.88	54. Bahrain	65.17	54. Luxembourg	80.97
55. Jamaica	64.92	55. Kazakhstan	69.78	55. Samoa	64.08	55. Slovenia	80.90
56. Turkey	64.91	56. Serbia	69.33	56. Israel	63.89	56. New Zealand	80.77
57. Korea, Rep.	64.73	57. United States	69.27	57. Barbados	62.93	57. Colombia	80.75
58. Bosnia and Herzegovina	64.68	58. Peru	69.21	58. Malaysia	62.90	58. Thailand	80.48
59. Thailand	64.13	59. Thailand	69.20	59. Costa Rica	62.39	59. Cyprus	78.94
60. Moldova	63.98	60. Papua New Guinea	69.01	60. Jordan	62.21	60. Bolivia	77.69
61. Peru	63.37	61. Armenia	68.63	61. Grenada	62.10	61. El Salvador	77.11
62. Honduras	62.74	62. Macedonia, FYR	67.81	62. Belarus	61.55	62. Paraguay	76.62
63. China	62.68	63. Nigeria	67.68	63. Saudi Arabia	61.37	63. Lithuania	75.94
64. United Arab Emirates	62.43	64. Guyana	67.55	64. Ukraine	60.51	64. Bangladesh	75.94
65. Macedonia, FYR	62.18	65. Mongolia	67.16	65. Guyana	59.98	65. Sri Lanka	75.87
66. Tunisia	62.13	66. Cambodia	66.84	66. Panama	59.72	66. Mali	75.81
67. Dominican Republic	61.44	67. Uruguay	66.36	67. Bulgaria	59.49	67. Guinea	75.75
68. Egypt, Arab Rep.	61.33	68. Indonesia	65.13	68. Serbia	59.04	68. Zambia	75.45
69. Georgia	61.29	69. Vanuatu	65.03	69. Moldova	58.73	69. Bosnia and Herzegovina	75.13
70. Argentina	61.18	70. Ukraine	64.60	70. Seychelles	57.57	70. Benin	74.31
71. Mexico	60.92	71. Nicaragua	64.60	71. Bermuda	56.66	71. Niger	73.67
72. Morocco	60.85	72. Angola	64.10	72. St. Vincent and the Gren	56.52	72. Dominican Republic	73.64
73. Kazakhstan	60.84	73. Turkey	63.97	73. Cayman Islands	56.47	73. Qatar	73.60
74. Saudi Arabia	60.64	74. Tunisia	63.95	74. Suriname	56.35	74. Togo	73.48
75. Brazil	60.38	75. Namibia	63.05	75. Oman	56.31	75. Burkina Faso	73.14
76. Oman	60.28	76. Guatemala	62.31	76. St. Kitts and Nevis	55.27	76. Côte d'Ivoire	73.04
77. Guatemala	59.94	77. Korea, Rep.	62.30	77. Romania	54.96	77. Singapore	72.80
78. Colombia	59.93	78. Mozambique	62.27	78. Faeroe Islands	54.79	78. Cameroon	72.75
79. Guyana	59.74	79. Botswana	61.81	79. El Salvador	54.65	79. Gabon	72.72
80. Grenada	59.33	80. Dominican Republic	61.49	80. Dominican Republic	53.68	80. Mexico	72.34
81. Fiji	59.26	81. Mexico	61.28	81. Mexico	53.35	81. Zimbabwe	72.16
82. Kyrgyz Republic	58.97	82. Kyrgyz Republic	61.22	82. China	53.10	82. Serbia	71.91
83. Trinidad and Tobago	58.63	83. Barbados	60.85	83. Fiji	52.74	83. Honduras	71.88
84. Philippines	58.58	84. Fiji	60.47	84. Uruguay	52.74	84. Uganda	71.86
85. Samoa	58.32	85. Vietnam	60.39	85. Dominica	52.73	85. United Kingdom	71.75
86. Indonesia	57.80	86. Philippines	59.90	86. West Bank and Gaza	52.64	86. Estonia	71.62
87. Barbados	57.09	87. Belize	59.44	87. St. Lucia	52.41	87. Albania	71.60
88. Paraguay	57.00	88. Albania	59.23	88. Maldives	52.39	88. Jamaica	71.22
89. Ecuador	56.91	89. Azerbaijan	58.76	89. Belize	52.27	89. Iran, Islamic Rep.	70.29
90. Namibia	56.84	90. Ghana	58.55	90. Korea, Rep.	52.18	90. Algeria	69.67
91. Nicaragua	56.66	91. Brazil	58.18	91. Chile	51.63	91. Nepal	69.65
92. Zambia	56.29	92. Russian Federation	58.00	92. Azerbaijan	51.53	92. Mongolia	68.88
93. Nigeria	55.88	93. Bolivia	57.73	93. Kyrgyz Republic	51.45	93. Madagascar	68.16

Table 6.1 continued

Country	Globalization index	Country	Economic globalization	Country	Social globalization	Country	Political globalization
94. Albania	55.64	94. Yemen, Rep.	57.64	94. Georgia	51.35	94. Venezuela, RB	67.87
95. Azerbaijan	55.18	95. Colombia	57.44	95. Netherlands Antilles	50.47	95. Kazakhstan	67.78
96. Armenia	54.99	96. Paraguay	57.16	96. Bosnia and Herzegovina	50.41	96. Fiji	67.76
97. Antigua and Barbuda	54.64	97. China	56.82	97. Morocco	50.18	97. Kyrgyz Republic	67.49
98. Ghana	54.38	98. Egypt, Arab Rep.	56.30	98. Argentina	49.90	98. Namibia	67.35
99. Venezuela, RB	53.82	99. Mauritania	56.14	99. Venezuela, RB	49.20	99. Mozambique	66.39
100. Bolivia	53.46	100. Swaziland	55.74	100. Colombia	49.12	100. Gambia, The	65.79
101. Brunei Darussalam	53.35	101. Lesotho	55.61	101. Thailand	48.99	101. Djibouti	65.40
102. Gabon	53.27	102. Japan	54.44	102. Nicaragua	48.60	102. Malawi	64.47
103. Belize	52.70	103. Togo	54.32	103. Jamaica	48.19	103. Rwanda	64.37
104. Pakistan	52.69	104. Mali	53.03	104. Ecuador	48.04	104. Congo, Dem. Rep.	63.76
105. Sri Lanka	52.53	105. Cote d'Ivoire	52.96	105. Kazakhstan	48.01	105. Israel	63.47
106. Botswana	52.26	106. Morocco	52.60	106. Turkey	47.96	106. Chad	63.43
107. Bahamas, The	51.94	107. Argentina	51.59	107. South Africa	47.61	107. Mauritius	63.18
108. Mongolia	51.92	108. Ecuador	50.16	108. Trinidad and Tobago	47.36	108. Yemen, Rep.	62.85
109. Belarus	51.88	109. Venezuela, RB	49.32	109. Montenegro	46.99	109. Cuba	62.83
110. Côte d'Ivoire	51.41	110. Gabon	49.12	110. Egypt, Arab Rep.	45.81	110. Lebanon	62.04
111. India	51.26	111. Congo, Rep.	48.86	111. Honduras	45.80	111. Kuwait	61.93
112. Cuba	51.23	112. Syrian Arab Republic	48.34	112. Swaziland	45.32	112. Central African Republic	61.66
113. Seychelles	50.35	113. Uganda	48.06	113. Gabon	44.89	113. Cambodia	61.65
114. Senegal	49.95	114. Sri Lanka	48.05	114. Armenia	44.78	114. Sierra Leone	60.81
115. Mozambique	49.90	115. Algeria	47.15	115. Tunisia	44.47	115. Panama	60.16
116. Cambodia	49.08	116. Pakistan	46.81	116. Paraguay	44.45	116. Botswana	59.79
117. Suriname	48.98	117. Belarus	46.24	117. Namibia	44.32	117. Costa Rica	59.66
118. Gambia, The	48.43	118. Malawi	45.97	118. Peru	43.93	118. Saudi Arabia	59.50
119. Kenya	48.24	119. Chad	45.67	119. Cuba	43.90	119. Burundi	59.35
120. Algeria	48.20	120. Sierra Leone	45.53	120. Guatemala	43.67	120. Libya	59.31
121. Vanuatu	48.00	121. Zimbabwe	45.27	121. Albania	42.15	121. Syrian Arab Republic	58.30
122. Syrian Arab Republic	47.93	122. India	44.68	122. Greenland	42.11	122. Nicaragua	57.54
123. Togo	47.89	123. Kenya	43.60	123. Sri Lanka	42.00	123. Latvia	57.09
124. Vietnam	47.78	124. Madagascar	41.85	124. Brazil	41.86	124. Tanzania	56.93
125. St. Lucia	47.45	125. Guinea-Bissau	41.75	125. Syrian Arab Republic	40.99	125. Moldova	56.46
126. Swaziland	47.32	126. Tanzania	41.18	126. Philippines	40.92	126. Sudan	56.05
127. Zimbabwe	47.31	127. Haiti	40.25	127. Cape Verde	39.78	127. Vietnam	55.60
128. Libya	47.01	128. Burkina Faso	39.88	128. Libya	39.24	128. Azerbaijan	55.59
129. Djibouti	46.90	129. Senegal	39.54	129. Turkmenistan	38.84	129. Grenada	54.96
130. St. Vincent and the Grens	46.89	130. Bahamas, The	39.34	130. Botswana	38.46	130. Iraq	54.89
131. Papua New Guinea	46.08	131. Cameroon	38.32	131. Gambia, The	37.45	131. Iceland	54.49
132. Mali	45.96	132. Benin	37.89	132. Uzbekistan	36.84	132. Malta	52.98
133. Aruba	45.90	133. Bangladesh	36.48	133. Côte d'Ivoire	36.28	133. United Arab Emirates	52.71
134. Yemen, Rep.	45.80	134. Guinea	31.32	134. Senegal	36.23	134. Angola	51.00
135. Dominica	45.80	135. Nepal	30.66	135. Algeria	35.62	135. Armenia	50.74
136. New Caledonia	45.46	136. Burundi	30.63	136. Pakistan	35.22	136. Trinidad and Tobago	49.79

137. French Polynesia	45.28	137. Central African Republic	30.58	137. Djibouti	35.21	137. Vanuatu	49.36
138. Uganda	44.91	138. Ethiopia	30.04	138. Tonga	35.00	138. Georgia	49.21
139. St. Kitts and Nevis	44.68	139. Rwanda	29.74	139. Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	34.83	139. Samoa	49.20
140. Malawi	43.91	140. Niger	27.60	140. Bolivia	34.09	140. Mauritania	48.68
141. Angola	43.40	141. Iran, Islamic Rep.	23.19	141. Zimbabwe	33.52	141. Macedonia, FYR	48.41
142. Macao, China	43.05	142. Aruba	.	142. Indonesia	33.05	142. Guyana	47.69
143. Cameroon	42.82	143. Andorra	.	143. Bhutan	32.33	143. Haiti	47.65
144. Burkina Faso	42.62	144. Afghanistan	.	144. Ghana	31.73	144. Bahrain	46.17
145. Maldives	42.32	145. Netherlands Antilles	.	145. Zambia	31.32	145. Bahamas, The	45.76
146. Mauritania	42.25	146. United Arab Emirates	.	146. Sao Tome and Principe	31.28	146. Uzbekistan	45.69
147. Benin	42.16	147. American Samoa	.	147. India	31.28	147. Papua New Guinea	45.30
148. Lesotho	41.57	148. Antigua and Barbuda	.	148. Vanuatu	31.03	148. Guinea-Bissau	45.20
149. Chad	40.71	149. Bermuda	.	149. Lesotho	31.01	149. Belarus	45.03
150. Guinea	40.48	150. Brunei Darussalam	.	150. Vietnam	30.92	150. Oman	44.85
151. Madagascar	40.34	151. Bhutan	.	151. Kiribati	29.80	151. Afghanistan	44.32
152. Uzbekistan	40.27	152. Channel Islands	.	152. Kenya	29.40	152. Liberia	44.07
153. Bangladesh	39.74	153. Comoros	.	153. Tajikistan	29.15	153. Belize	43.29
154. Cape Verde	39.60	154. Cape Verde	.	154. Malawi	28.96	154. Tajikistan	42.96
155. Sierra Leone	39.38	155. Cuba	.	155. Iran, Islamic Rep.	28.80	155. Congo, Rep.	42.24
156. Turkmenistan	38.67	156. Cayman Islands	.	156. Rwanda	28.58	156. Barbados	42.22
157. Ethiopia	38.66	157. Djibouti	.	157. Comoros	28.48	157. Timor-Leste	42.11
158. Congo, Rep.	38.61	158. Dominica	.	158. Cameroon	28.15	158. St. Lucia	39.60
159. Rwanda	37.79	159. Eritrea	.	159. Mozambique	27.79	159. Cape Verde	39.31
160. Tanzania	37.39	160. Faeroe Islands	.	160. Guinea	26.84	160. Seychelles	38.93
161. Nepal	37.22	161. Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	.	161. Mongolia	26.79	161. Palau	38.51
162. Iran, Islamic Rep.	36.92	162. Gambia, The	.	162. Congo, Rep.	26.63	162. Turkmenistan	38.41
163. Guinea-Bissau	36.45	163. Equatorial Guinea	.	163. Eritrea	26.42	163. Swaziland	37.88
164. Haiti	35.90	164. Grenada	.	164. Burkina Faso	25.91	164. Suriname	37.32
165. Niger	34.82	165. Greenland	.	165. Guinea-Bissau	25.90	165. Lesotho	37.30
166. Sudan	34.77	166. Guam	.	166. Benin	25.87	166. Korea, Dem. Rep.	37.07
167. Tajikistan	34.50	167. Isle of Man	.	167. Togo	25.64	167. Lao PDR	35.99
168. Congo, Dem. Rep.	34.39	168. Iraq	.	168. Solomon Islands	25.27	168. San Marino	35.77
169. Burundi	34.35	169. Kiribati	.	169. Mauritania	25.06	169. Dominica	34.85
170. Central African Republic	33.26	170. St. Kitts and Nevis	.	170. Papua New Guinea	24.91	170. Antigua and Barbuda	34.71
171. Netherlands Antilles	33.04	171. Lao PDR	.	171. Uganda	24.90	171. Monaco	34.65
172. Sao Tome and Principe	32.52	172. Lebanon	.	172. Haiti	24.37	172. Sao Tome and Principe	34.47
173. Tonga	31.65	173. Liberia	.	173. Cambodia	24.34	173. Comoros	34.13
174. Comoros	30.67	174. Libya	.	174. Yemen, Rep.	23.84	174. Myanmar	33.55
175. Bhutan	29.31	175. St. Lucia	.	175. Lao PDR	23.14	175. Eritrea	32.89
176. Eritrea	28.93	176. Liechtenstein	.	176. Equatorial Guinea	23.05	176. Equatorial Guinea	32.87
177. Lao PDR	28.12	177. Macao, China	.	177. Nigeria	23.00	177. Somalia	32.25
178. Equatorial Guinea	26.85	178. Monaco	.	178. Nepal	22.94	178. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	31.67
179. Solomon Islands	26.35	179. Maldives	.	179. Burundi	22.05	179. Brunei Darussalam	30.80
180. Kiribati	25.45	180. Marshall Islands	.	180. Somalia	21.89	180. Liechtenstein	30.06
181. Myanmar	20.69	181. Myanmar	.	181. Chad	21.66	181. Solomon Islands	28.06
182. Andorra	.	182. Montenegro	.	182. Tanzania	21.47	182. St. Kitts and Nevis	27.93

Table 6.1 continued

Country	Globalization index	Country	Economic globalization	Country	Social globalization	Country	Political globalization
183. Afghanistan	.	183. Northern Mariana Islands	.	183. Madagascar	21.32	183. Maldives	26.40
184. American Samoa	.	184. Mayotte	.	184. Sudan	21.32	184. Tonga	26.36
185. Bermuda	.	185. New Caledonia	.	185. Mali	20.40	185. Bhutan	24.54
186. Channel Islands	.	186. Palau	.	186. Sierra Leone	20.01	186. Andorra	23.13
187. Cayman Islands	.	187. Puerto Rico	.	187. Bangladesh	19.95	187. Marshall Islands	20.19
188. Faeroe Islands	.	188. Korea, Dem. Rep.	.	188. Angola	19.03	188. Kiribati	18.58
189. Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	.	189. French Polynesia	.	189. Ethiopia	18.80	189. Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	12.78
190. Greenland	.	190. Qatar	.	190. Central African Republic	17.83	190. West Bank and Gaza	8.26
191. Guam	.	191. Saudi Arabia	.	191. Niger	17.07	191. Netherlands Antilles	5.47
192. Isle of Man	.	192. Sudan	.	192. Congo, Dem. Rep.	15.81	192. Macao, China	5.19
193. Iraq	.	193. Solomon Islands	.	193. Myanmar	12.55	193. Aruba	4.91
194. Liberia	.	194. San Marino	.	194. Andorra	.	194. Puerto Rico	4.91
195. Liechtenstein	.	195. Somalia	.	195. Afghanistan	.	195. Bermuda	3.79
196. Monaco	.	196. Sao Tome and Principe	.	196. American Samoa	.	196. Cayman Islands	3.79
197. Marshall Islands	.	197. Suriname	.	197. Channel Islands	.	197. Faeroe Islands	3.79
198. Montenegro	.	198. Seychelles	.	198. Guam	.	198. New Caledonia	3.79
199. Northern Mariana Islands	.	199. Tajikistan	.	199. Isle of Man	.	199. French Polynesia	3.79
200. Mayotte	.	200. Turkmenistan	.	200. Iraq	.	200. American Samoa	3.23
201. Palau	.	201. Timor-Leste	.	201. Liberia	.	201. Greenland	3.23
202. Puerto Rico	.	202. Tonga	.	202. Monaco	.	202. Guam	2.68
203. Korea, Dem. Rep.	.	203. Uzbekistan	.	203. Marshall Islands	.	203. Northern Mariana Islands	2.68
204. San Marino	.	204. St. Vincent and the Grens	.	204. Northern Mariana Islands	.	204. Virgin Islands (U.S.)	1.56
205. Somalia	.	205. Virgin Islands (U.S.)	.	205. Mayotte	.	205. Isle of Man	1.28
206. Timor-Leste	.	206. West Bank and Gaza	.	206. Palau	.	206. Mayotte	1.28
207. Virgin Islands (U.S.)	.	207. Samoa	.	207. Korea, Dem. Rep.	.	207. Channel Islands	1.00
208. West Bank and Gaza	.	208. Congo, Dem. Rep.	.	208. Timor-Leste	.	208. Montenegro	.

*Note: Rankings are based on data for the year 2007.

Source:

Dreher, Axel, 2006, "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a New Index," *Applied Economics* 38, 10: 1091–1110.

Updated in:

Dreher, Axel; Noel Gaston and Pim Martens, 2008, *Measuring Globalization – Gauging its Consequence*, New York: Springer.

all rank, however, may hide the fact that it scores well on one or another measure but not on others.

As our reference to economic, social, and political rankings suggest, globalization has a number of different features. The following section describes some of the most prominent attributes of globalization.

Features of globalization

In this section, we summarize globalization's key features. These include (1) the spread of communication and information technologies, (2) the declining importance of territory and the porosity of state boundaries, (3) the spread of knowledge and skills and the participation explosion, (4) the global spread of capitalism and the emergence of global markets, (5) the privatization of public functions, (6) the spread of global culture, (7) the spread of democracy, (8) the emergence of global civil society, (9) the diffusion of global power, (10) the changing nature of global violence, (11) the changing nature of security, and (12) the proliferation and deepening of nonstate identities and loyalties

The spread of communication and information technologies


Globalization is built on the proliferation of powerful computers and microelectronic technologies that help individuals and groups to communicate virtually instantaneously by email, cellular and satellite telephones, and fax machine and to move vast amounts of money and information via these technologies. It also involves the spread of satellite technology for television and radio, as well as the global marketing of films and television programs. Overall, these technological revolutions overcome physical distance in politics, economics, and war. Could Alexander Graham Bell (1847–1922), who invented the telephone, have imagined that some day people

could acquire an MSAT mobile system to allow them to make or receive calls and email from vehicles, planes, or ships, or an Immarsat satellite service that provides telephone and fax access to over 98 percent of the world, including areas beyond the reach of any other communications?

The new technologies overcome geography and produce the rapid movement of people, things, and ideas across national borders. The sovereign boundaries of states are becoming more porous every day. Even powerful countries like the United States are virtually helpless in the face of streams of migrants moving northward from Mexico, even as American guns move south to drug gangs in Mexico, or in slowing down the flood of drugs coming to European and US cities and towns from around the world. Additionally, the existence of global communications technologies makes it virtually impossible to prevent subversive ideas and ideologies from crossing a state's boundaries, despite the efforts of countries such as China and Iran to do so.

The declining importance of territory

The declining role of geographic distance means that territory is less important than in past centuries. Some territories remain important, especially if they are sources of critical raw materials like oil, are important for symbolic reasons like the city of Jerusalem, or are strategically crucial like the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which much of the world's oil passes from the Persian Gulf (Map 6.1). On the whole, however, geography is growing less crucial. Distance no longer poses a significant obstacle to important global economic, political, and military activities. Vast amounts of money can be moved around the world almost instantaneously, 24 hours a day, by electronic means. Individuals can conduct business globally from their own homes and send ideas and information back and forth via email and mobile telephone



Map 6.1 Map of the Strait of Hormuz

<http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/hormuz.htm>

regardless of distance. People living thousands of miles apart can be mobilized in cyberspace for political ends. Intercontinental missiles can deliver nuclear warheads in minutes, and terrorists can move across national borders with frightening ease.

The spread of knowledge and skills and the participation explosion

The spread of mass media and the communications and transportation revolutions enable ever more people, even in remote corners of the world, to be informed about the world, form

opinions about events, and get involved in politics in ways that were previously unimaginable. Even poor peasants have access to radio broadcasts and, increasingly, mobiles phones and internet that provide information and that give both governments and anti-government groups new ways to cajole and persuade publics. Cable and satellite television provide exposure to a vast variety of opinion and information. The internet is the most important tool of all in facilitating exchange of views, dissemination of information and propaganda, movement of money, and coordination of activities because it is relatively inexpensive and accessible. **Blogs** (short for weblogs) and bloggers influence people around the world by transmitting information and opinion on the internet.⁴

Access to information on the internet was brought home by the publication by WikiLeaks, a group dedicated to airing classified information, in April 2010, of a video that showed a US helicopter in Baghdad killing a dozen Iraqis including two journalists. The Army Counterintelligence Center had previously declared that WikiLeaks “represents a potential force protection, counterintelligence, operational security (OPSEC) and information security (INFOSEC) threat to the US Army.”⁵ In late 2010, WikiLeaks released detailed logs of events in the Iraqi and Afghan wars and began to publish some 250,000 classified US diplomatic cables that had been passed to it by an American soldier. There ensued an outcry as confidential information about the views of US diplomats of foreign leaders and policies were publicized globally.

As people acquire access to more information by means of technologies ranging from the internet to satellite television, they are likely to understand their interests and act in ways that defend them. Thus, political participation continues to grow and manifest itself in a variety of unconventional ways ranging from street demonstrations and formation of new political groups to political agitation and even terrorism. This became evident in the rapid and dramatic demo-

cratic contagion that spread across the North Africa and the Middle East in early 2011, during which authoritarian leaders were swept from power in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya exploded in civil violence, and the leaders of Yemen, Syria, and Jordan were forced to make concessions to the popular aspirations of their countries’ citizens. Underlying these events were internet, Twitter, YouTube, social networks such as Facebook, and mobile phones, especially those able to transmit videos and photographs. These enabled citizens, especially educated and urbanized professionals, to mobilize and communicate information directly to one another, undermining the capacity of governments to limit what citizens knew about events.

The global triumph of capitalism and the emergence of a global market

After the end of the Cold War, free-market capitalism as an economic ideology took root in much of the world, including Eastern Europe and the LDCs. Its spread has been accompanied by an expansion of transnational corporations, the rapid movement of investments, the outsourcing of jobs and industries “off shore,” the proliferation of integrated global networks of production and distribution, the emergence of “world cities” such as New York, London, and Shanghai, and the emergence of an urbanized economic elite. Free-market capitalism is largely responsible for driving and sustaining economic globalization. Support for the global economic system by developing societies also depends in part on the system’s ability to reduce gaps between rich and poor and bring ever more people out of poverty.

Markets stretch beyond the boundaries of states, and, as we will see later, making it more difficult for countries to control their own economies or protect themselves from the vagaries of global supply and demand or investment.

The privatization of public functions

One consequence of globalization is the need for states to compete in the global economy. Such competition encourages governments to privatize many functions that they once performed in order to keep costs and taxes low. States like Greece and Portugal are slashing expensive social welfare programs and selling off inefficient state-owned companies and are sending their citizens to the marketplace to find new suppliers for healthcare, pensions, and utilities. Privatization of costly state functions may continue if free-market capitalism continues to spread and if globalization intensifies. Privatization, however, is not only visible in the economic realm; it is even a feature in military affairs.⁶ Although states have long relied on mercenaries to fight their wars, in contemporary conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, they now turn to private military firms (PMFs) to provide logistical support, training, security, and intelligence. Contractors like Halliburton and Blackwater augmented the US military presence in Iraq, performing tasks involving security and reconstruction in that country:

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In recent years, DynCorp International has broadened its reach in program management and security. To date, we have recruited, trained, and deployed more than 6000 highly-qualified civilian peacekeepers and police trainers to 11 countries, including Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, for the Department of State.

We provide support to protect American diplomats in high-threat countries, and services to eradicate illicit narcotics crops and support drug-interdiction efforts in South America. We are engaged in the removal and destruction of landmines and light weapons in Afghanistan. We have vast international experience and operate on all continents except Antarctica.

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Our conversion program for the venerable UH1/AH1 helicopter has re-created the world's most successful rotary aircraft into one that flies higher, faster, and more efficiently. The thousands of Hueys in service around the world can now enter a new era of service to military, law enforcement, transport, and humanitarian-relief efforts.

We recently expanded our intelligence services beyond our Global Linguist Solutions translation support for the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) with DynCorp International Intelligence

Training and Solutions. Our 300 intelligence professionals provide strategic, professional, and technical advisory and support services to government and military organizations through the Phoenix Training Center and the DynCorp International Center for Professional Development.

The spread of global culture

Globalization has been accompanied by the spread of culture, originally Western, featuring shared norms based on free-market or neoliberal capitalism, **secularism**, and **consumerism**. Increasingly, societies are adopting secular norms and acting according to the rules of free-market capitalism. Homogenization of mass culture can be seen in everything from dress, diet, and education to advertising and the spreading belief in women's rights. Globalization ranges from Big Macs and designer jeans to abhorrence of torture and racism. "McDonald's," writes political scientist Benjamin Barber, "serves 20 million customers around the world every day, drawing more customers daily than there are people in Greece, Ireland, and Switzerland together."⁸ Frequently, the spread of global culture is equated with Americanization or Westernization. Whether this is accurate, global culture does represent modernity to many people.

This process, however, undermines local cultures and religious beliefs and has caused a backlash among some local political elites who believe global culture produces uniformity and undermines traditional authority, mores, and values causing social instability. "Modernization, economic development, urbanization, and globalization," argues Samuel Huntington, "have led people to rethink their identities and to redefine them in narrower, more intimate, communal terms."⁹ The spread of religious fundamentalism reflects this backlash. Barber draws a vivid contrast between local cultures that he calls "Babel" and the globalized world that he calls "Disneyland."

"Babel" is "the grim prospect of a retribalization of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality: against technology, against pop culture, and against integrated markets; against modernity itself," while "Disneyland" is a "future in shimmering pastels, a busy portrait of onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity that mesmerizes people everywhere with fast music, fast computers, and fast food [. . .] one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce."¹⁰

One factor involved in the spread of a global culture is the unique status enjoyed by English as the language of globalization. English binds elites across the globe much as Latin and French did in earlier epochs. It enjoys a special status in 75 countries, and is spoken as a native language by about 375 million people and as a second language by 375 million more.¹¹ Although more people are native speakers of Mandarin Chinese and Hindi, what makes English dominant is that it is spoken so widely compared to other languages.

The dominance of English contributes to the influence of the Anglo-American world and provides English speakers with advantages in the economic, cultural, and scientific worlds. For this reason, the demand to learn English is great. "A century ago," write two analysts, "French was the language of diplomacy and German was the leading scientific language as well as extensively used in Central and Eastern Europe. By the mid 20th century, Russian was the predominant second language throughout the Soviet sphere in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Now, however, it is English that prevails."¹² An associate editor of the British newspaper the *Observer* concludes that "rarely has a language and its hegemony been

more pervasive than Anglo-American culture,” and he describes “the globalization of English, and English literature, law, money and values” as “the cultural revolution” of his generation.”¹³ In a much simplified form of English that he calls “Globish,” the language helps people communicate who do not speak one another’s own native tongue.¹⁴ Since the most prominent English-speaking societies are democratic, the spread of English may also aid the spread of democracy.

The spread of democracy

Globalization has been accompanied by the spread of democratic norms from core areas of North America, Western Europe, and Japan to Latin America, Asia, the countries of the former Soviet bloc, and parts of Africa and the Middle East. Although it is premature to declare the global triumph of **liberal democracy** (also termed electoral democracy), as did political scientist Francis Fukuyama when he wrote of an “end to history” in 1989,¹⁵ globalization is witnessing growing acceptance of individual rights, including that of choosing one’s own leaders. Nevertheless, countries like China and Iran are also readily globalizing in the absence of democracy, and the global financial and economic crises that erupted in 2007–8 reinforced the views of some governments like those of China and Russia that democracy is not the best path to economic growth.

Although globalization may weaken conventional forms of state-based democracy, the desire of people to control their destinies seems likely to intensify. Democracy remains fragile at best in some regions, non-existent in others, and is violently contested by those whose authority would vanish if faced by free elections.

Liberal theorists believe that growing wealth is increasing the size of the world’s middle class and that such people favor democracy. Since liberals also believe that democracy produces international peace, some conclude that globalization is increasing the prospects for a peaceful world. By

contrast, Islamic militants who favor the restoration of the medieval Islamic Caliphate oppose capitalist globalization and democracy. Thus, in December 2001, Osama bin Laden denounced “this destructive, usurious global economy that America uses . . . to impose unbelief and humiliation on poor peoples.”¹⁶

The emergence of global civil society

The emergence of global **civil society** has accompanied the spread of democracy. The proliferation and networking of intergovernmental (IGOs) and transnational **nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)**, as we shall see, have led some to suggest that a global civil society is beginning to coalesce. Such a society, according to advocates, promotes cooperative governance by institutions different than governments. Nongovernmental organizations are the building blocks of civil society, whether domestic or global, occupying a social space that is independent of state control. One of the salient features of global politics in the early twenty-first century is the proliferation of NGOs that link people transnationally in many realms of human activity.¹⁷ Many NGOs enjoy consultative status at the UN,¹⁸ and about 1500 are associated with the UN’s Department of Public Information. Many of these play a growing role as sources of information, advocacy, and expertise and as lobbyists at UN-sponsored international conferences such as the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria.

Among the earliest transnational NGOs was the Red Cross. It owes its birth to Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman. Dunant (1828–1910), who was traveling in northern Italy in June 1859 hoping to meet French Emperor Napoléon III from whom he sought assistance for a business deal, came to the village of Castiglione where thousands of wounded soldiers lay following the French victory over Austria in the Battle of Solferino. There, Dunant assisted women from the

village who were trying to help the wounded. Deeply moved by his experience, Dunant later published a book in which he asked: “Would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?”¹⁹ Dunant’s question persuaded several influential Swiss reformers to establish an International Committee for Relief to the Wounded, which later changed its name to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), later to become one of the best known NGOs in global politics. The ICRC is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of civilians and soldiers in wartime.

Today, transnational NGOs, many of which like Catholic Relief Service are religion based, and single-country NGOs encompass a vast array of groups that deal with environmental, human rights, gender, humanitarian, and other global issues. They are, according to the UN, not-for-profit, voluntary citizens’ groups, which are “organized on a local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public good.”²⁰ NGOs usually are independent of governments and do not represent particular political ideologies. Until recently, most were limited to placing issues on the global agenda by publicizing them, but increasingly they have become authoritative actors in their own right, with legitimacy derived from expertise, information, and innovative political techniques.

Equally important is NGOs’ growing role in creating norms that states feel obliged to follow. For this reason, NGOs figure importantly in constructivist ideas about norm evolution in global politics.²¹ Cooperating across national borders, NGOs have formed effective networks of experts and advocates, called **epistemic communities**. Such experts and advocates frequently meet with one another at international conferences, and, as constructivists point out, the information and ideas they disseminate play an important role in changing norms that define states’ interests.

It was an epistemic community in Great Britain that pioneered opposition to the Atlantic slave trade in the early nineteenth century. This community consisted mainly of Quakers and Evangelical Christians led by British abolitionist William Wilberforce (1759–1833). By spreading information about the conditions in which African slaves were shipped from Africa and protesting the practice, Wilberforce and his followers changed the way British politicians and public opinion thought about the slave trade.

In recent years, other epistemic communities have also spurred changes in global norms. For example, the stream of information from environmental groups has convinced many governments that global warming is a genuine threat, and, in consequence, countries have concluded that their interests demand action on their part to slow the process. Other epistemic communities specializing in issues such as human rights, banning landmines, the spread of small arms, and economic development have had a similar impact.

NGOs committed to finding cooperative solutions to collective dilemmas are, according to liberal theorists, creating a global civil society in which like-minded individuals from many countries communicate ideas and pursue cooperative activities to promote democracy, human rights environmental protection, racial and religious tolerance, and similar norms. They are sources of activism and expertise and are welcomed by countries seeking to manage change in nonviolent ways. Although these groups have disparate aims, many collaborate in confronting global challenges and trying to reform what they dislike about globalization. In open societies, citizens voluntarily organize domestic NGOs and network across national frontiers in search of solutions to common problems.

As more NGOs become independent institutions, civil society deepens and democracy spreads. Citizens’ political awareness, debate, and engagement are vital for a healthy democracy. Thus, the proliferation of these voluntary institutions,

liberals contend, fosters democracy in countries in which they are located and creates conditions for the spread of democracy globally. For this reason, leaders in some countries like Russia oppose the democratizing effects of these networks and have sought to constrain them.

The idea of civic politics is that NGOs can contribute to global change and, with international organizations like the UN, as well as states, can contribute to the spread of global governance. “Global governance” and “global civil society” reflect the reality of authority at different levels and in different locations and suggest that “world order” exists on many levels and not merely at that of sovereign states. Governance, as James Rosenau observes, “encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes any actors who resort to command mechanisms to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, and pursue policies.”²² Thus, as noted earlier regarding international regimes (Chapter 1, pp. 17–18) which consist of NGOs, IGOs, and states, liberals and English School theorists believe it is possible to manage political life even in the presence of “anarchy.”

Diffusion of global power

With the end of the Cold War, observers concluded that the world had entered a period of unipolarity, with the United States as undisputed top dog.²³ Today, although the United States remains the world’s leading military power, other major powers such as China, Russia, and India are rapidly increasing their military and economic capabilities. America’s military superiority is no guarantee that it can realize its political objectives, as demonstrated in the limited success of American efforts to spread democracy, win the war in Afghanistan and bring an end to global terrorism, and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nobel economist Paul Krugman suggests that the erosion of US power endangers globalization and believes that Russia’s

invasion of its tiny neighbor, Georgia, in 2008 marked “the end of the Pax Americana” thereby raising “some real questions about the future of globalization,” because “if Russia is willing and able to use force to assert control over its self-declared sphere of influence, won’t others do the same?”²⁴

The United States also remains a leading economic power, but its superiority in this realm is also eroding as other centers of economic power, especially China, as we saw in Chapter 5 (pp. 166–8), the European Union (Chapter 10, pp. 338–43), Japan, Brazil, and India, become competitors in global trade and as US dependence on foreign energy and foreign loans remains high. The relative US economic decline is linked to the country’s enormous current accounts deficit and its emergence as the world’s leading debtor country and resulting dependence on foreign purchases of American securities. “How long,” asked President Obama’s former economic adviser, Lawrence Summers, “can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?”²⁵ Ultimately, this problem reflects overconsumption and inadequate saving by Americans and underconsumption and high saving rates in China and other emerging economies.

The changing nature of security

As we will see in Chapter 8, although interstate warfare between uniformed and organized armies still erupts from time to time, a combination of factors is reducing its occurrence. These include the declining importance of territory described earlier and the growing difficulty in occupying other countries, the role of economic interdependence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of civil war. Thus, the difference between legitimate war and crime is increasingly blurred, and violence among groups competing for power over the carcasses of failed or failing states or over sources of wealth like diamonds, oil, and cocaine may increase. Terrorism,

a weapon of the weak, will persist, as dissatisfied individuals and fanatical non-territorial groups seek vengeance for real or imagined wrongs, endeavor to prevent the erosion of local cultures and traditional beliefs via globalization, or try to spread messianic **ideologies**.

The continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, also reflects a shift from conventional warfare. American anti-proliferation policy is in tatters. Indeed, the use of force by the West against countries such as Serbia and Iraq may provoke such countries to acquire WMD to deter the United States and its partners. Although deterrence threats may prevent countries from using WMD, they are unlikely to deter terrorist groups that acquire them.

Increasingly, the knowledge revolution caused by new communications and information technologies is promoting greater recognition that there are other threats to human welfare besides those of a military nature. In Chapter 12, we will encounter a host of global problems, including poverty, drugs, famine, crime, and disease, that imperil human survival and wellbeing (see Figure 6.2). As awareness of these problems grows, so does recognition that security encompasses more than guarding against military attack. Recognition of these additional threats is likely to spread in coming decades as more information becomes available to more people, as networks of IGOs and NGOs continue to form, and as potential solutions emerge to problems that for most of history have been regarded as insoluble.

The most important globalized threats to human survival are environmental challenges. As we will see in Chapter 15, depletion of fossil fuels, fish, fresh water, and arable land continues. Human welfare is challenged by global warming, deforestation, desertification, the loss of biodiversity, and other environmental trends. To date, global responses have been spotty at best, and vested economic interests have resisted concerted global responses. It is difficult for people to focus on these trends because many of them pose long-



Figure 6.2 Regarding avian fl

Source: John Fewings

term rather than imminent hazards and solutions are expensive. However, as these threats impose growing economic burdens, markets may facilitate investments in responses such as wind and solar energy. In addition, science may provide partial answers to some of these problems. Finally, concerned individuals have mobilized their skills and influence transnationally to find answers, have formed national and transnational NGOs, and have created global networks to lobby and work for cooperative responses to environmental challenges.

DID YOU KNOW?

The spread of deserts owing to human activities directly affects the lives of more than 250 million people and one-third of the earth's surface. Between 1997 and 2020, some 60 million people are expected to move from regions in sub-Saharan Africa that had become deserts to northern Africa and Europe.²⁶

Human rights abuses constitute another threat to human security, and some of the world's most articulate NGOs are involved in securing human rights and publicizing human rights abuses. Human rights norms, like democratic norms, have spread globally. However, human rights abuses including genocide and ethnic cleansing by governments and other groups remain widespread as well. Nevertheless, despite setbacks in countries like Zimbabwe and the continued reluctance of countries like China to respect human rights, human rights norms are deepening and continue to elicit widespread support, especially as more people become prosperous and as states and international organizations adopt new human rights conventions and set legal precedents that may gradually earn broad acceptance.

The proliferation and deepening of nonstate identities and loyalties

As we will see in Chapter 13, the growing separation of nationalism from citizenship, the degree to which new technologies have made it easier for ideas to be communicated and people mobilized at great distances, and the dehumanizing and homogenizing impact of the global economy and global culture are reviving and spreading nonstate identities associated with nation, religion, ethnicity, and civilization – all providing what geographer Doreen Massey calls a “global sense of place.”²⁷ As constructivists argue, identities and interests constitute each other. Neither remains stable; instead, they are repeatedly modified and reconstituted, and, as they mix under the impact of globalization, they become hybrid.

Powerful loyalties to nonstate groups are spreading and, in some cases, these groups are leading a backlash against globalization. National, ethnic, tribal, and religious groups increasingly demand self-determination, and their aspiration for autonomy within or secession from existing states threatens the integrity of heterogeneous societies such as Nigeria, Russia, Afghanistan, and

Pakistan. Religious identities pose special obstacles to the globalization of norms and culture.

Writing of militant Islam, sociologist Manuel Castells concludes that “the explosion of Islamic movements seems to be related both to the disruption of traditional societies (including the undermining of the power of traditional clergy), and to the failure of the nation-state, created by nationalist movements, to accomplish modernization, develop the economy, and/or distribute the benefits of economic growth among the population at large.” Islamic militants oppose capitalism, socialism, and nationalism, all perceived as “failing ideologies of the post-colonial order.”²⁸ Such militants, although opposed to globalization, have, according to two observers, their own globalized vision, “an alternative form of globalization from the currently dominant, and made to seem inevitable Western capitalist one.”²⁹ They are advocates of neofundamentalism, “a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the nationalist and statist dimensions in favour of the *ummah*, the universal community of all Muslims, based on *sharia* (Islamic law)” who represent Muslims who are “uprooted, migrants and/or living in a minority” and are experiencing “the deterritorialization of Islam.”³⁰ Islam is not anchored in territory and has never accepted the division of the world into territorial states. “It is,” as one scholar suggests “embodied in people – mobile, deterritorialized people carrying ideas and practices,” and it “has been powerfully reshaped by globalization processes, particularly information and migration.”³¹

As with many areas of global politics, theorists disagree about globalization. Some regard it as historically unprecedented, whereas others see it either as having deep historical roots or only marginally different than past eras.

The historical roots of globalization

Although certain features of globalization, such as the introduction of new information and communication technologies, are arguably novel, debate swirls around the question of whether the phenomenon as a whole is new or whether it reflects continuity in global politics. One observer declares that: “It is a rather parochial conceit of contemporary commentators . . . that globalization is unique to our time. But while the processes of globalization are not new, its theorization under this name is of more recent provenance – and this fact helps to account for the claim that globalization itself is novel.”³² Sociologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse views globalization as a “deep historical process.” “Taking a long view,” he continues, “dimensions and components of globalization include the following:

- The ancient population movements across and between continents.
- Long-distance cross-cultural trade.
- The world religions – the wanderings that have gone into the making, spread, and varieties of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam.
- The diffusion of technologies including Neolithic agricultural knowhow, military technologies, numeracy, literacy, sciences and philosophies, and the development of new technologies due to intercultural contact.”³³

Some look for globalization’s origins far back in time. Thus, globalization, in journalist Nayan Chanda’s view, has been produced by our original ancestors moving beyond Africa, traders seeking commercial opportunities, proselytizers of the world’s religions, adventurers and explorers, soldiers and conquerors, slaves, tourists, and migrants in search of a better life. Thus, “if one looked under the hood of our daily existence, one could see a multitude of threads that connect us to faraway places from an ancient time:”

Without looking into the past, how does one explain that almost everything – from the cells in our bodies to the everyday objects in our lives – carries within the imprints of a long journey? Why in that first instance did human beings leave Africa and become a globalized species? Most of what we eat, drink, or use originated somewhere else than where we find these objects today . . . How, for example, did the coffee bean, grown first only in Ethiopia, end up in our cups after a journey through Java and Colombia? . . . How is the same gene mutation found in three people living in continents thousands of miles apart? How did Islam, born in the deserts of Arabia, win over a billion converts in the world? How did Europeans learn to play the violin with a bowstring – made of Mongolian horsehair? . . . The questions are as varied as they are unending, and they go to the heart of the all-embracing phenomenon of global interconnectedness.³⁴

Others seek globalization’s roots in Europe’s imperial expansion and colonization of non-European regions. Thus, one observer sees the origins of globalization in “the expansion of world trade, the transformation of political structures and reinscription of cultural norms under colonization.” “From the late fifteenth century,” he continues, “the European powers embarked on a project of exporting their own cultural practices and exploiting the resources of people across the world. Colonization laid the routes for globalization.”³⁵

Some observers look to a later date, pointing to nineteenth- and twentieth-century industrialization as the source of modern globalization. “The nineteenth and twentieth centuries,” write three observers, “represent a marked break with the past, when trade’s weight in the world economy scaled new heights and prices converged dramatically, with the process reaching its first crescendo around 1913.”³⁶ Others agree. “By 1914, there was hardly a village or town anywhere on the globe whose prices were not influenced by distant

foreign markets, whose infrastructure was not financed by foreign capital, whose engineering, manufacturing, and even business skills were not imported from abroad, or whose labor markets were not influenced by the absence of those who had emigrated or those who had immigrated.”³⁷ Such theorists believe that the process of globalization was interrupted by the world wars and the Great Depression and was not resumed until after 1945.

However, there are differences that distinguish contemporary globalization, including the velocity, volume, and visibility of the flows of persons, things and ideas globally, as well as the vulnerability of people to these flows. For these reasons, some see globalization as a recent phenomenon. Political scientist Jack Donnelly, for example, argues that “it certainly is plausible to suggest that, whatever the historical parallels or antecedents, at least the pace of change is accelerating, with important qualitative differences” so that he treats “globalization as a characteristic of the decades on either side of the year 2000.”³⁸

In addition to differing about the origins of globalization, theorists also disagree about whether globalization is solely an economic phenomenon or whether it encompasses politics, culture, security, and other areas in addition to economics. In the following section, we will review and compare three perspectives on globalization.

Competing perspectives on globalization

David Held and his colleagues identify three distinct perspectives toward globalization that they label *hyperglobalist*, *skeptical*, and *transformationalist*.

Hyperglobalists focus on the economic dimension of globalization and include both neoliberal and Marxist theorists. They believe that changes in the global economy are ushering in “a new epoch of human history”³⁹ in which territorial

states have become obsolete economic units. Globalization, in their view, has produced a single global market in which transnational corporations from many countries vigorously compete with one another. “Hyperglobalizers,” they write, “argue that economic globalization is bringing about a ‘denationalization’ of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of production, trade, and finance,” “a ‘borderless’ economy” in which “national governments are relegated to little more than transmission belts for global capital.”⁴⁰ Advocates of globalization applaud the growth in overall wealth and minimize the claim of growing inequality within and between states, whereas critics denounce the growth of inequality.

Skeptics like many of those who see globalization’s origins in the past, argue that contemporary globalization is neither new nor revolutionary. Interdependence, they contend, is no higher today than in the late nineteenth century. Skeptics, too, focus only on the economic dimension of globalization, arguing that it features high levels of interstate trade and the expansion of regional common markets such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that, they claim, actually reduce *global* economic integration. In their view, states retain a dominant role in these activities, including an ability to regulate and even unravel globalized economic processes. The power of governments, in other words, has not ebbed; state sovereignty has not eroded; and transnational corporations remain under national control. Major states, especially the United States, China, and the members of the European Union, are responsible for and could undermine higher levels of economic intercourse and the existence of global institutions such as the World Trade Organization.

Transformationalists are convinced that “globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order.”⁴¹ In this sense, they believe that globalization has no

historical parallel. According to transformationalists, one consequence of growing interconnectivity is a merging of the foreign and domestic policy arenas. In addition, microelectronic technologies such as the web are erasing physical distance and reducing the traditional role of territory as **cyberspace** becomes more important, especially in the economic realm. They perceive a “growing deterritorialization of economic activity as production and finance increasingly acquire a global and transnational dimension.”⁴² In addition, states are weakening as they are pulled in different directions – integrating into larger units like the EU and fragmenting into smaller entities as did the Soviet Union in 1991. According to transformationalists, international, subnational, and transnational groups and organizations are growing more important as state authority and power wane. And, with the declining capacity of

states and the reduced importance of territory, the role of identity based on features such as religion and ethnicity has grown in global politics. The differences between the three perspectives on globalization are summarized in Table 6.2.

Finally, the global financial and economic crises of recent years have led some observers to conclude that globalization was a phenomenon of the 1980s and 1990s and that the economic meltdown has made it obsolete. However, the technologies that enabled globalization will not vanish, and, therefore, this view is fading as economic conditions improve.

Those who believe that globalization is a new and unprecedented phenomenon, especially those described as “transformationalists,” emphasize the impact of recent information and communication technologies, the subject to which we now turn.

Table 6.2 Conceptualizing globalization: three tendencies

	<i>Hyperglobalizers</i>	<i>Skeptics</i>	<i>Transformationalists</i>
<i>What's new</i>	A global age	Trading blocs, weaker geogovernance than in earlier periods	Historically unprecedented levels of global interconnectedness
<i>Dominant features</i>	Global capitalism, global governance, global civil society	World less interdependent than in the 1890s	“Thick” (intensive and extensive) globalization
<i>Power of national governments</i>	Declining or eroding	Reinforced or enhanced	Reconstituted, restructured
<i>Driving force of globalization</i>	Capitalism and technology	States and markets	Combined forces of modernity
<i>Pattern of stratification</i>	Erosion of old hierarchies	Increased marginalization of south	New architecture of world order
<i>Dominant motif</i>	McDonald's, Madonna, etc.	National interest	Transformation of political community
<i>Conceptualization of globalization</i>	As a reordering of the framework of human action	As internationalization and regionalization	As the reordering of interregional relations and action at a distance
<i>Historical trajectory</i>	Global civilization	Regional blocs/clash of civilizations	Indeterminate: global integration and fragmentation
<i>Summary argument</i>	End of the nation-state	Internationalization depends on state acquiescence and support	Globalization transforming state power and world politics

Information and communication technologies like the internet pose challenges to governments, especially those with authoritarian regimes because they facilitate mobilization and coordination in cyberspace by professionals, insurgents, criminals, and terrorists. China's democracy movement used the fax to provide information to the world about the violent events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and that movement has employed email to mobilize and coordinate its activities. China's government is also concerned about the threat to internal security and stability that the internet, Twitter, and Facebook pose because they allow dissidents to mobilize in cyberspace, and it has tried to limit access to these media. Thus, China blocked YouTube in March 2009 because it posted videos of Chinese soldiers beating Tibetan monks.⁴³ Online blogs are also seen by Chinese officials as sites for mobilizing undesirable public protests.

Beijing tries to censor the net by using filtering technologies in which users have access to one another but only screened links to the outside world. Moreover, the Chinese government issued regulations to limit the release of information on the internet, including a prohibition against disseminating information it describes as "state secrets." The regulations cover chat rooms, email, and internet sites, and whoever puts an item on the internet, whether the original source or not, is responsible for it and risks being charged with subversion. Government regulation of the internet is not easy, however, and many Chinese users know how to use proxy servers that hide the site being served.

Groups use the internet not only to express political and ideological positions but also to mobilize and coordinate activities, frequently against existing regimes. The web is invaluable for mobilizing those with common aims who are geographically dispersed such as anti-globalization protesters against the World Trade Organization or activists lobbying for the Land Mines Treaty. Such groups can exist in cyberspace rather than on any particular national territory. Without the

internet, they could not exist at all. Thus, the internet has facilitated new forms of expression and connection among groups and the growth of new public spaces not easily controlled by states.

China again reflects the problem states face. In April 1999, a previously little known quasi-religious meditation and exercise group called Falun Gong staged a massive silent protest around the Beijing compound housing China's communist leaders. What frightened China's leaders was that the group had organized and coordinated its activities by means of email without alerting the country's extensive surveillance system. In effect, China's leaders were under siege by a movement that coalesced not on the streets but in cyberspace.

Iran's Islamic regime has also acted against the new technologies. In 2009, Iranians protesting their country's rigged presidential elections used Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to keep the world informed of the tumultuous events there. Twitter proved "to be a crucial tool in the cat-and-mouse game between the opposition and the government over enlisting world opinion,"⁴⁴ and in late 2009 a pro-government group hacked and interrupted Twitter and disrupted an Iranian opposition website. In 2011, these online communities played a critical role in spreading democratic norms across North Africa and the Arab Middle East. For its part, the Obama administration is granting a general license for the export of free internet services including Facebook and Twitter to Iran, Cuba, and Sudan in the hope that they will help open up those societies.⁴⁵

The internet is the most important technological innovation in the spread of globalization, especially in terms of overcoming geography and integrating individuals and groups in cyberspace.⁴⁶ "It was," argues economist Kenici Ohmae, "the development of the internet from the mid-1990s onward that has probably had the greatest impact on making the world of communications truly borderless."⁴⁷ The web enables global marketing, flexible production, electronic commerce, instantaneous financial flows that facilitate specu-

lation and price volatility, the global propagation of ideas and opinions, coordination and mobilization of activities by corporations and other groups, and the global diffusion of news and information. Although an increasing flow in ideas and information may increase tolerance and individual abilities for some, the internet can also be used to spread hatred between countries, races or religions.⁴⁸

The technologies that play such a central role in globalization played a key role in rapidly globalizing the financial and economic crises that began in 2007–8. The result was disastrous, as new financial instruments, unregulated by governments or international institutions, produced irresponsibility and speculation and, when financial meltdown began in the United States, integrated financial networks and institutions rapidly spread it around the world.

For better or worse, then, the internet, along with the cell phone, is revolutionizing the way in which we produce, sell, consume, communicate, learn, educate, socialize, and coordinate activities. The expansion of the internet has been nothing less than phenomenal from 213 hosts in 1981 to more than 681 million in 2009.⁴⁹ By the end of 2009, there were over 1.8 billion internet users, unequally distributed globally. Asia hosts over 738 million internet users, with 384 million users, and 346 million broadband subscribers in China alone,⁵⁰ while Africa and the Middle East host 67 and 57 million respectively. And, as of April 2011, Facebook had over 664 million users.⁵¹ A **digital divide** is evident in internet penetration which ranges from over 74 percent in North America to under 7 percent in Africa. However, the divide is diminishing as mobile phones with internet capacity become more available in the developing world.⁵²

Knowledge and information are critical commodities in the global economy as societies seek to acquire skills and norms to compete in global markets. Since the technologies that provide these have become available to people around the world, Thomas Friedman concludes that they are

making the world “flat.”⁵³ The technologies and the information that they provide are equally important for transnational corporations seeking to integrate production and marketing globally, terrorists trying to coordinate attacks, and the operation of global markets that now function 24 hours every day. E-commerce is leading to electronic money that can be moved by mobile phones. Such technologies also serve the illegal economy, including transnational criminal groups, equally well. The internet facilitates the spread of cybercrime, including identity theft, with as many as 10 million victims in 2009.⁵⁴ Criminal syndicates even hack into the records of law enforcement agencies and encrypt their own records and transactions.

The World Economic Forum that meets annually in Davos, Switzerland, along with the European Institute of Business Administration, developed a Global Information Technology Report based on a Networked Readiness Index in 2002 to measure how prepared countries are to take advantage of information and communications technologies that are vital “to leapfrog stages of development or, more generally to enhance their competitiveness.”⁵⁵ Their survey of countries and territories that account for 98 percent of the world’s gross domestic product concluded that seven of the best prepared countries in 2008–9 are European, two are North American and one is Asian (Singapore). China ranked 46th and India 54th, indicating that these two emerging economic superpowers still have much ground to cover before reaching the top technologically.

The new technologies spread globalized values as well. Societies have sought a variety of ways to integrate and/or resist the values of individualism, consumerism, and secularism that underpin the globalized culture in order to minimize the political and social turmoil that it threatens. As Friedman expressed it, individuals tend to value both an “olive tree” – “everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in this world”⁵⁶ – and a “Lexus,” a symbol for the advanced technology of a globalizing world. The

“Lexus,” or, more appropriately, the culture it represents, however, threatens local cultures. Today, governments and societies understandably seek to filter contemporary global norms and practices that are spread by unprecedented and invasive media technologies and transnational economic, political, and social institutions – both public and private.

Globalization has produced considerable disagreement about its virtues and defects. The following section examines additional sources of disagreement, including whether globalization can be reversed and whether it is a positive or negative development in global politics.

The globalization debate

Globalization is controversial in several ways. One unresolved question concerns whether the process is inexorable or whether it can be reversed. A second that is heatedly debated is whether the process is, on balance, beneficial or harmful. As we have seen, some fear that an emerging global identity will inundate local and national identities and customs and erode state sovereignty. However, as we shall see, globalization has “losers” as well as “winners,” and individuals everywhere are discovering that their welfare is determined by remote forces beyond their control or the control of their governments, including governments that were democratically elected.

It is difficult to say whether the movement toward globalization is irreversible. The process owes much to American hegemony following World War Two and, even more, since the end of the Cold War. It also flows from the desire of US leaders to encourage and sustain an open trading system, global economic growth, and the spread of Western values such as individualism, democracy, free enterprise, and open borders. Some argue that globalization could not survive if the United States and major countries such as Japan, Germany, France, and Great Britain no longer supported it. They believe that if such countries

become disillusioned with globalization, their withdrawal could bring about a collapse of the public and private institutions that sustain it. Others argue that the process is so far along that it can no longer be reversed, that it is no longer controlled by any country or countries, and that the costs for a country to cut the web of interdependence in which it is enmeshed are too high to consider.

The anti-globalizers

Globalization incites passionate critics and varied groups, including some violent extremists, have demonstrated against its principles and process at, for example, the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference, the 2001 and 2008 G-8 meetings in Genoa and Scotland, the 2007 and 2009 IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington, DC, and the 2001 and 2003 EU summits in Gothenburg, Sweden, and Athens, Greece. Using cell phones, encrypted internet messages, and email to mobilize, the groups represented at these demonstrations included union members from the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO); animal rights defenders from People for Ethical Treatment of Animals; environmental activists from Rainforest Action Network, Earth First!, and the Sierra Club; and human rights activists from Global Exchange and Direct Action Network. Militant demonstrators have used vinegar-soaked rags to counteract tear gas, have barricaded streets, and have destroyed property. Among those who have used violent tactics were South Korean farmers who rioted in Hong Kong in December 2005, claiming to have lost farmland to expanding corporations, and anarchists who have assaulted police officers and committed vandalism at WTO meetings in Seattle, Geneva, Hong Kong, and the 2010 G-20 meeting in Toronto.

Many of those who oppose globalization reserve their highest loyalties to the sovereign state, which they believe exists to protect their

interests. They argue that in democratic states, such as those in Europe and North America, citizens have a voice in determining their own fates but have little or no voice in the boardrooms of giant transnational corporations, remote international bureaucracies like the EU or WTO, or economic markets, and such institutions are not accountable to citizens. Thus, anti-globalizers argue, globalization has created a **democratic deficit** by empowering institutions in which people have no voice and unleashing economic and cultural forces over which they have no control. Globalization, they believe, is eroding the rights and capacity of people to determine their own future. The result is alienation and anxiety, as people's lives are buffeted by remote forces beyond their control or understanding.

Opponents of globalization ask hard questions about an era in which the rigors of the global marketplace force countries and industries to shed jobs, reduce welfare and health programs, and become more efficient to survive in a cutthroat world of global capitalism. Critics claim that capitalism and privatization of public functions increase poverty in the developing world and economic inequality within and between countries. If states lose authority, who will assume responsibility for the general welfare and uphold citizens' rights? Who will tend to their economic needs and deliver justice? Who will see to the national interest? Overall, then, according to critics globalization reduces the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, ranging from state contributions to public welfare to democratic debate and participation.

According to globalization's opponents, the operations of giant multinational conglomerates and financial institutions undermine national economic and social policies and, consequently, constitute a form of structural violence against the poor (see Chapter 5, p. 157). In addition, the movement of investment capital to countries with low environmental and labor standards threatens reductions in living, working, and environmental standards achieved over years of struggle. In the globalized world, argue anti-globalizers, oligarchic

corporations and banks scour the world for cheap labor, moving jobs from country to country, forcing workers into sweatshop conditions, using child labor, and destroying the environment in an effort to remain competitive and increase profits. In short, those who assail globalization sometimes refer to the search for cheap labor, minimal protection for workers, and minimal environmental standards to maximize global competitiveness as the "race to the bottom."

International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, critics argue, serve corporate interests, force countries to adopt policies that are not in citizens' interests, and place harsh conditions on loans against which populations can only feebly protest. In sum, globalization threatens a reduction in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, in the state's capacity to ensure public welfare, and in the possibilities for serious democratic participation.

In addition to eroding democratic rights and liberties of citizens, some critics of globalization denounce the way in which the global economy and global culture have homogenized distinctive local tastes, traditions, and even languages. Local cultures and languages are giving way to a superficial "Coca-Cola/McDonald's/Levi's Jeans" culture. Traditional values, argue anti-globalizers, are eroded by made-in-the-US TV programs, movies, radio, and pop music. In turn, this consumerist culture promotes narcissism and greed; spreads pornographic and violent images; and eats away at moral standards and religious beliefs. Such perceptions may fuel a backlash against globalization and against the West, which is seen as globalization's leading advocate. Furthermore, the argument continues, nation-states provided physical and psychological security to citizens, a clear identity and a sense of belonging to something larger than themselves. As culture is homogenized and the state is weakened by globalization, it leaves a psychological void that had formerly been filled by older identities – religious and tribal, for example.

Other harmful consequences of globalization, according to its opponents, are that it prompts massive migrations of people, who leave in search of jobs or to flee violence. In turn, these migrations disrupt communities, create cultural ghettos, and foster transnational criminal industries in drug smuggling and human trafficking, as desperate people seek work and women become trapped in domestic or sexual slavery. In addition, the technologies of globalization such as the internet, facilitate financial speculation and aid political fanatics and terrorists.

The pro-globalizers

Turning to advocates of globalization, one is struck by the fact that they seem to be looking at a totally different world than globalization's opponents. Pro-globalizers' view of states, for example, is profoundly negative. For them, these territorial leviathans were created to wage wars that benefit rulers but not citizens. Despite the spread of popular sovereignty, states' decisions about war and peace and the distribution of wealth, they believe, remain largely in the hands of small elites who cultivate and manipulate nationalism, patriotism, and imperialism to rally publics and paper over domestic woes.

Globalization enthusiasts claim that nationalism in particular, far from being a virtue, erects barriers between peoples, stymies efforts to deal with global problems, and produced bloodier wars, climaxing in the world wars, the use of nuclear weapons against Japan, and vast expenditures on arms during the Cold War. As globalization accelerates, argue pro-globalizers, it dissolves the barriers of nationalism and makes people more prosperous, interdependent, and cosmopolitan. As a result, the number of wars between states is declining, and the human rights abuses committed by governments are losing the protection of state sovereignty.

Although states persist, the forces of globalization, declare its advocates, are replacing

ideologies that divided the world in the twentieth century with a single ideology based on liberal democracy. And the spread of liberal democracy will assure the "democratic peace." As publics come to recognize that states cannot deal with collective dilemmas like global warming, they are turning to NGOs and international institutions that can coordinate states' activities and enhance cooperation globally, thereby enabling the world to cope with global challenges. Thus, in recent decades, international law has expanded to protect people rather than states and the range of actors has come to include corporations, NGO networks, and international institutions that oppose war, enhance prosperity, and confront collective challenges.

Although critics claim that globalization has widened the gap between rich and poor,⁵⁷ its advocates assert that it has reduced global poverty and stimulated economic growth in formerly impoverished regions such as Southeast Asia, China, and India. A global market with ever fewer barriers to trade provides consumers with an unprecedented choice of inexpensive goods. In their view, globalization has produced sustained growth and brought countless workers around the world new jobs and higher living standards. Growing world trade benefits everyone, and vast increases in foreign investment are increasing incomes in *both* rich and poor countries. Losers are associated with obsolete or uncompetitive enterprises, but the economic pie as a whole is growing, and global poverty is declining.

Globalization advocates dismiss opponents as an odd mixture of old Marxists who still hope to destroy capitalism; militant anarchists like the members of the Black Bloc, a collection of groups that cooperate in protests and that are responsible for much of the violence at anti-globalization demonstrations; animal rights activists and environmentalists who value snail darters more than jobs; labor unionists trying to keep alive industries that should die; and nationalists whose opposition to globalization is based on sentiment rather than facts or logic. More important, perhaps, the defense

of local cultures often means the defense of reprehensible practices and conditions that *should* disappear, such as genital mutilation of women in Africa, the Muslim practice of polygamy, or the Indian caste system.

According to globalization's proponents, the threat of cultural homogenization is vastly overstated and oversimplified, and local cultures can thrive alongside the global culture of modernity. "McDonald's," argues Rosenau, "may be thriving in Asia and thousands of other locations around the world, but so are Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Korean restaurants frequented widely in the United States and Europe, and much the same can be said about the direction of intercultural flows in the fields of medicine, education, and religion."⁵⁸

Pro-globalizers also reject criticism of modern technology like the internet, arguing that globalization's opponents ignore the key role these technologies play in expanding the global economy and the participation of vast numbers of people who formerly were excluded from politics. More information creates an informed citizenry, makes it harder for politicians to mislead citizens, enhances democracy, facilitates the networking of NGOs for civil society, and enables the mobilization of people for political ends. And, though a digital divide still exists between rich and poor, the new communications and transportation technologies are already speeding up economic development in the LDCs. Thus, concern that globalization erodes democracy is exaggerated. Historically, few states were actually democratic, and most of today's states are either authoritarian or imperfect democracies at best. In many LDCs, particular ethnic, racial, religious, or regional groups control governments at the expense of other groups. If anything, the enormous information accessible to more and more people and their growing ability to mobilize in cyberspace contribute to the diversity of views and enhance the quality of democracy.

The state in decline?

As we noted early in this book, the field of international relations, at least in the West, emerged as a state-centric discipline, and some scholars have been reluctant to admit that states may no longer dominate all of global politics, because without them, what was unique about *international* or *interstate* politics seems to vanish. Until recent decades, international relations scholars viewed states and their relations as all that mattered. Most realists still conceive of sovereign states as unitary actors pursuing national interests in an anarchic world dominated by security dilemmas. The dominance of realism, especially among American scholars, kept the focus on unitary states competing for power and the only (unlikely) alternatives to unitary states that most students were offered were world government or world empire.

Political scientists are not alone in arguing that states remain the only significant actors in global politics. Social scientists more generally are still deeply influenced by a vision of the world as it existed about a century ago, a world in which states dominated war making, economic policymaking, and even cultural and social policy. Historians also have tended to organize scholarship around interstate relations. Economists, too, developed their discipline with a focus on states as complete economic units, writing about "the American economy" or "China's economic system." Nevertheless, virtually all of the features of globalization we have described indicate that states are less central to global politics than in recent centuries. Let us briefly describe why this is the case.

New technologies link people transnationally, making it virtually impossible to cage people and ideas within state frontiers. These frontiers, as we have seen, are highly porous. Territory was *the* defining attribute of sovereign states and its declining significance in the face of these new technologies is accompanied by a shift in people's loyalties from a territorial home to nonterritorial

identities such as religion and ethnicity. The spread of knowledge and skills reduces the dependence of citizens on their governments and makes it easier for them to oppose their leaders. The spread of global culture undermines local cultures and traditions, while the emergence of global civil society has brought forth a host of nonstate actors that may compete with states for authority over citizens. The changing nature of global violence, notably irregular warfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, has significantly reduced the capacity of states to protect their citizens. New threats to security, such as environmental degradation and transnational crime, are global in scope and exceed the ability of individual states or groups of states to cope with them. Finally, the emergence of a global market forces states to compete globally and reduces states' control of their economies.

The last of these claims has generated intense controversy, with some theorists claiming that the exigencies of competition have altered the essential nature of sovereign states. Political economist Philip Cerny vigorously argues this position, describing what he calls the "competition state": "The key to the new role of the state lies in the way that economic competition is changing in the world," and "state structures today are being transformed into more and more market-oriented and even market-based organizations themselves, fundamentally altering the way that public and private goods are provided."⁵⁹

Others disagree. Some argue that governments do retain sufficient autonomy to determine the degree to which they intervene in domestic economic life, while others contend that states *intentionally* surrendered economic autonomy to rid themselves of burdensome obligations to citizens that they never wanted to assume in the first place. There are, after all, still differences in the level of welfare that European states provide citizens compared with the United States or China.

Still, today's trade is largely among transnational corporations or corporate subsidiaries, and

markets stretch beyond the territory of national economic units in a globalized world. At present, the resources controlled by large corporations and banks, and of certain super-rich individuals like Bill Gates or Warren Buffett, dwarf the resources of the governments of many states, and the wealth of large corporations like Walmart (as measured by sales or stock value) exceeds the gross domestic product of most sovereign states. Indeed, most states are losing or have lost at least some control over their own economies. Thus, countries like Greece and Spain, burdened by debt and buffeted by private market forces, have found themselves in a condition of economic and political near collapse that makes a mockery of their sovereign status. Nevertheless, to a large extent, the discipline of economics still thinks of global economics as a world of trading nations that has changed little since Adam Smith.

Although state sovereignty, as we shall see in the next section, was never absolute and has been frequently violated, it should assure a state's right to exist and its freedom from external intervention, but it often does not do so.

The limits of sovereignty

Many scholars still regard state sovereignty as the defining characteristic of global politics. Much of Western political philosophy focused on the state and its relationship to citizens, and the field of international relations was a logical extension that dealt with relations among states. In reality, from the outset sovereignty was always more an aspiration than a reality. For many rulers, sovereignty was a useful legal device that, as argued by realist Stephen Krasner, "was used to legitimate the right of the sovereign to collect taxes, and thereby strengthen the position of the state, and to deny such rights to the church, and thereby weaken the position of the papacy."⁶⁰

Sovereignty is treated as a given by realists, the organizing principle of global politics that gives rise to anarchy. Liberals regard sovereignty as

something to be overcome in the effort to achieve desirable goals such as safeguarding human rights, intervening in despotic states to spread democracy and end violence, spreading free trade, and enforcing global rules to end pernicious national environmental and labor practices. For constructivists, sovereignty is an institution that was “invented” by European political leaders as the necessary prerequisite for accumulating personal power and creating the territorial state and that today serves as the chief norm that provides legitimacy for states. Sovereignty is, as English School theorist Tim Dunne observes, “the founding moment of politics” that “represents the fault-line between community and anarchy.”⁶¹

Today, sovereignty tells us little about real states. Declares political scientist Peter Willetts, “many NGOs . . . have their membership measured in millions, whereas 42 of the 192 countries in the UN have populations of less than one million, of which 12 are less than 100,000.”⁶² The world’s many states include a single superpower and a host of “mini-states,” including tiny islands of the Caribbean and South Pacific. Consider the sovereign state of Tuvalu – a group of Pacific reef islands and atolls, with a population of 10,000, and an area of 9.5 square miles. In 2000, Tuvalu sold the rights to the web domain “.tv” for \$50 million in royalties for the next 12 years in a deal worth more than half its annual gross domestic product (earned from subsistence agriculture and fishing). By contrast, California with over 31 million inhabitants and the world’s fifth largest economy is not sovereign and, despite having a budget deficit of \$19 billion in 2010, is not entitled to aid from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.

Consider, too, the dramatic contrast between the prosperous and well-ordered city-state of Singapore and the state-like remains of Somalia, which has not a functioning government since the early 1990s (excepting Somaliland, which seceded from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognized), is divided among innumerable hostile clans and warlords, is in the midst of violent civil

DID YOU KNOW?

Tuvalu will probably be the first sovereign state to be destroyed by the consequences of global warming. Rising sea levels (as well as a variety of other causes) have caused coastal erosion and the contamination of the island’s drinking water by salt, and New Zealand has agreed to allow for a limited number of people from Pacific Access Countries (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu) to resettle there. Should this occur, Tuvalu could become the first virtual nation – its sovereignty would remain intact under international law, but it would only continue to exist in the Internet domain “.tv.”⁶³

war, has been victimized by repeated coups, and cannot suppress the pirates who raid shipping in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. In countries like Somalia, the idea of sovereignty is turned on its head; instead of providing citizens with security from foreign aggression by guarding the country’s borders, local militias *are the source of insecurity* for citizens who are desperate to flee violence by crossing those borders.

Often, sovereignty, which affords *legal* independence, is confused with genuine authority and autonomy. Sovereignty *asserts* that outsiders *should not* intervene in a state’s internal affairs and that citizens *should* respect its legitimacy and obey its laws, but there is no guarantee that they will follow these norms. All in all, in recent decades sovereign independence has offered only modest protection against military predation and boundary changes. In some cases, this amounts to what political scientist Robert Jackson calls “negative sovereignty,” that is, little more than protection for corrupt regimes in what he calls “quasi-states.”⁶⁴ Thus, there is a growing gap between the promise of sovereignty and the reality of global politics. With few exceptions, states are less

autonomous and less able to protect or inspire citizens than at any time in recent centuries.

Nevertheless, realists and neorealists argue that little has changed and that state sovereignty remains almost as important today as it was during the previous three centuries. Krasner identifies four aspects of state sovereignty: *domestic sovereignty*, *interdependence sovereignty*, *international legal sovereignty*, and *Westphalian sovereignty*.⁶⁵ Domestic sovereignty refers to the exercise of authority within a state; interdependence sovereignty involves control of movements across state boundaries; international legal sovereignty refers to a state's recognition by other states as their legal equal; and Westphalian sovereignty denotes the exclusion of unwanted external interference within a state. Of these four dimensions, Krasner argues, only the second, interdependence sovereignty, has significantly eroded. However, the aspects of sovereignty are interrelated. Thus, if states cannot control movement across their borders (interdependence sovereignty), they are unlikely to exercise full authority on their territory or exclude foreign interference within their boundaries.

Sovereignty notwithstanding, states have, in fact, rarely enjoyed anything like complete control over subjects or their resources. Sovereignty has never prevented states from intervening in one another's affairs. Neither France's King Louis XIV nor Napoléon Bonaparte respected neighbors' sovereign boundaries. In fact, the only European country that did not have its boundaries altered after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was Portugal. Indeed, states' use of violence in relations with one another has been the main subject of founding documents for the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as both customary and positive laws of warfare like the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) that outlawed war. In regulating state violence, a distinction is made between aggression and self-defense, and, countries routinely defend even acts of flagrant aggression against one another as "self-defense."

Although sovereignty never provided states with the protection it promised, recent decades

have witnessed a growing gap between the capacity of states to manage violence at home and act independently in global politics – the promise of sovereignty and the reality of global politics. In many states, citizens flout the authority of their governments and actively participate in global politics *directly* through groups ranging from terrorist bands, giant corporations, and humanitarian organizations to street mobs and protest groups. Such activity is a far cry from the idea that citizens only participate in global politics *indirectly* by lobbying their governments and voting. "Today," as political scientist Susan Strange argues, "it is much more doubtful that the state – or at least the majority of states – can still claim a degree of loyalty from the citizen greater than the loyalty given to family, to the firm, to the political party or even in some cases to the local football team."⁶⁶

With few exceptions, today's states are less autonomous and less able to protect or inspire citizens than at any time in recent centuries. The erosion of state institutions and frontiers is least evident in the richer and older states, especially in Europe, East Asia, and North America. By contrast, the capacity of states in postcolonial countries of the developing world to protect citizens and provide for their wellbeing has declined. No longer are states always the principal identity of its citizens, and states must share citizens' loyalties to an ever greater degree.

In Africa, the existence of governments that are extensions of tribal or clan power, along with the failure of authorities to cope with explosive socioeconomic problems of poverty, population density, disease, and environmental catastrophe, weakens loyalties to the state, while intensifying older tribal and ethnic loyalties that colonial and postcolonial leaders had sought to dampen. Ethnic conflicts in countries like Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo reflect what René Lemarchand calls the "manipulation of ethnic memory"⁶⁷ by ambitious politicians who intentionally revive and simplify complex conflicts that may go back centuries.⁶⁸ The Somali state is dead;

the country is little more than an arena for conflict among warring factions. Some states and regions, like Sierra Leone and Darfur in Sudan, have been sustained (barely) by humanitarian organizations and international institutions.

In past centuries, governments fostered nation-state identities by controlling the channels of social communication, making it difficult for “alien” identities to compete effectively. States influenced citizens’ perceptions and beliefs by filtering the information available to them. Their capacity to influence the printed word, radio, film, and television allowed them to promote patriotism and domestic unity, and to encourage amity or enmity toward “others.” Today, loyalties are in flux, and states are hard pressed to maintain the primacy of national identity. One reason that state identities are weakening is the development of new globalized communications technologies that governments have difficulty controlling.

Today, microelectronic technologies decentralize information production, and networking dramatically empowers social groups like Mexico’s Zapatistas and China’s Falun Gong. In short, technology alters how people think of themselves and who they are. The pace of technological change in recent decades has complicated states’ ability to control the flow of information and ideas to citizens. Nowhere is this more evident than in China, which simultaneously wants to retain central communist party control over ideology and use new communications technologies for economic development. As long as television, radio, and the press were the only sources of news, it was easier for the regime to control information dissemination. Today, however, as we have seen, the internet poses special problems for governments like China’s.

The same technologies threaten the ability of governments to promote a unifying national cultural tradition that differentiates “us” from “them” and anchors citizens’ loyalties. Such traditions – built on religion, language, mythology, literature and poetry, historical events, and ways of dress – promoted political legitimacy. People

can learn from satellite television, the internet, and films that there are others not only “unlike themselves” but – more important – “like themselves,” about whom they had known little before and with whom they can communicate. New categories of “us” and “them” are made available for political mobilization. Traditional societies fear that women and young people are susceptible to the attractions of Western materialism, secularism, and individualism and that the conservative and stabilizing doctrines of piety and political party may be swept aside. In this sense, Islamic fundamentalism is a backlash against Western materialism.

In sum, multiple identities can produce conflict that threatens the integrity and unity of states. Divided loyalties – real or imagined – produce social fissures. Common identities are the bases of group loyalties, just as different identities separate groups, and new technologies make it easier for transnational identities and loyalties to threaten state unity.

Nevertheless, the sovereign state is *not* vanishing, and the habit of patriotism is slow to die in many countries. But patriotism should not be confused with faith in government or politicians and, except for the burden of paying national taxes (if one does not evade them), patriotism tends to be a cheap sentiment, limited to flag waving and road signs demanding that we “support our troops.”

One response to claims of state erosion might be that citizens are prepared to die for their country but not for international or nongovernmental organizations. Yet, it is hard to imagine citizens of modern states lining up as they did between 1914 and 1918 to join armies in battles that cost thousands of lives. Indeed, readiness to die for a cause is found more frequently among ethnic or religious minorities than among ordinary citizens in an average state.

State erosion is not universally recognized partly because of three paradoxes that Susan Strange describes.⁶⁹ The first is that, while overall state power and capacity have declined, some

governments do retain a major role in public education, policing, and health and welfare. Moreover, the intervention of government agencies in certain aspects of citizens' lives has continued to increase. Government regulations create affirmative action quotas, establish high-occupancy traffic lanes, require automobile passengers to wear seatbelts, and so on. Nevertheless, states are unable to protect citizens from globalization shocks, environmental catastrophes, energy shortages, and economic cycles; and ordinary citizens today are becoming harder to persuade and satisfy.

Strange's second paradox is that, the state's "retreat" notwithstanding, there is a growing "queue" of subnational groups that want to have their own state. Diehard realists like to seize on this apparent paradox to insist that, appearances to the contrary, nothing has really changed – the state is doing fine, thank you, since everyone seems to want one. However, the major reason more states exist today than during the Cold War is that some states such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have disintegrated and have spawned weak successors such as Bosnia or Georgia.

The third paradox that Strange cites is the apparent success of the Asian state model as reflected in strong states like Japan and South Korea. The success of these states is due largely to special conditions that are ending and will not be repeated, mainly post-World War Two and Cold War development aid and technology from the United States. Economically, these states thrived because a strategic alliance existed between governments and private corporations and banks and because the West permitted them to pursue protectionist economic policies that shielded them from the worst effects of globalization. However, Asian governments now face greater pressures to adopt non-discriminatory trade and investment policies that may threaten their economic and political stability.

The global economic crisis that began in 2007–8 resuscitated the state to some extent.

Regulation, especially of financial institutions, is looked on with renewed favor, and preference for market-based solutions is no longer automatically assumed. French and German leaders, for instance, have called for such regulation, blaming the neoliberal policies of the "Anglo-Saxons" for the global crisis.⁷⁰ Governments responded with large-scale deficit spending that accounts for larger shares of GDP and the virtual, if temporary, takeover of major banks, financial firms, and private industrial giants. Government welfare and health programs are again in favor. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, having run for office as a free marketer, famously concluded that the central consequence of the crisis is "the return of the state, the end of the ideology of public powerlessness."⁷¹ State capitalism, then, is regaining popularity, especially on account of China's relative success in weathering the economic crisis. Growing state intervention is even evident in the United States, where President Barack Obama moved towards a more activist and bigger government, reflected in his health plan and in temporary government involvement in the operation of major banks and corporations like General Motors. Thus, state intervention throughout the developed world has grown – at least, temporarily – in an effort to ease the effects of recession,

Conclusion

Globalization, the leading process in global politics since the Cold War, reflects both change and continuity. Will globalization persist in the face of economic crisis? We think so. Certainly, recent years have been testing ones for globalization, and, even before the global financial and economic crisis erupted, events and trends had challenged the globalization process, and several of these intensified after the crisis began. Among the most important were the collapse of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, the proliferation of international trade disputes, the spread of inter-

national terrorism, the revival of nationalism, the growing complaints about the outsourcing of jobs from the developed to the less-developed world and resulting unemployment in the developed world, growing resistance in the developed world to the flow of migrants and asylum seekers from poor countries, and the failure to get agreement on controlling global warming. These events and trends, which constitute impediments to the free movement of persons, ideas, and things, suggested that the world was still divided into hostile “tribes” and cultures rather than uniting within a single, homogenized culture of modernity based on Western democracy, secularism, and consumerism.

CONTROVERSY

Liberals and neoliberals believe that globalization is inevitable, involving a fundamental transformation of global politics away from state control and toward market control of global economic life, due in part to technological change. Others, especially realists and neorealists, argue that globalization is the consequence of power arrangements, political and ideological preferences, and policy choices and that it is reversible if those arrangements, preferences, and choices are altered, just as global interdependence before 1914 ended in World War One and free trade ceased in the Great Depression. Globalization, they believe, will persist only so long as major states find it in their interests to promote the free movement of persons, things, and ideas across borders and to maintain the liberal economic system that has prevailed since World War Two.

Nevertheless, there is little evidence that these challenges have curbed globalization. Although the global financial crisis slowed the process and

stirred the opposition of diverse groups who fear globalization, the interconnectedness of people and the movement of persons, things, and ideas remain high and are likely to continue and even intensify. Although individual countries may be able to opt out of globalization, the economic costs to do so will be high. As a result, some problems associated with globalization – for example, the spread of disease and economic crises, transnational crime, higher energy costs, a deteriorating environment, and migration from poor to wealthy societies – are likely to become more pressing. Whether or not these problems will defy collective attempts to find solutions remains to be seen.

In the next chapter, we will turn our attention to some of the most important issues in contemporary global politics. We will examine nuclear proliferation, the evolution of US–Chinese relations, the Israeli–Palestinian question, the threat posed by militant Islam, and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Student activities

Map exercise

Using a political map, rank as “high,” “medium,” “low” countries’ relative globalization according to the “2010 KOF Index of Globalization,” http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2010.pdf.

Cultural materials

A number of modern novels deal with the spread of a globalized culture, notably with the consumerism, materialism and the spread of name brands. For example, in *Glamorama*, Bret Easton Ellis parodies name brands and emphasizes the shallowness of global culture – “a Brooks Brothers coconut hat” (p. 113), “a Mighty Morphin Power Rangers tattoo” (p. 113), “a black Prada halter

gown” (p. 37), “a Marlboro medium” (p. 141), “MTV” (p. 276), “black Armani sunglasses” (p. 276), and so forth. Peruse the book and, randomly selecting 20 pages, list the globalized brand labels, Ellis mentions.

The NGO Amnesty International uses various artistic media to promote its causes. Beginning in 1976, Amnesty International UK began to sponsor a regular “Secret Policeman’s Ball” comedy event, with participants such as Sting, John Cleese, and other members of *Monty Python’s Flying Circus*. Research an NGO in your community (including campus social, environmental, and political groups). How does it raise funds and awareness of their causes?

Further reading

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Part III

Living dangerously in a dangerous world



THE CHAPTERS

7. Great issues in contemporary global politics
8. The causes of war and the changing nature of global violence
9. Technology and the changing face of warfare

1948	1967	1968	January 1979	1979	2000–05
Israeli independence declared	Six Day War	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty comes into force	US-Chinese diplomatic relations established	Shah overthrown in Iran and Islamic regime established	Second Palestinian intifada

7 Great issues in contemporary global politics

The challenge of achieving peace in the Middle East is among the most durable issues on the global agenda. In January 2011, the Qatar-based news outlet, Al Jazeera, made public 1600 classified documents on the Middle East peace process from 1999 to 2010. The documents revealed details about negotiations on several issues at the heart of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian refugees to return to ancestral homelands in modern-day Israel, and Palestinian–Israeli security cooperation (see Figure 7.1). The earliest document is a memo on Palestinian negotiating strategy from 1999 that references the Rolling Stones: “You can’t always get what you want, but if you try sometimes you might find you can get what you need.”¹ What was significant about these documents is that they revealed a gap between the public and private positions of Palestinian negotiators. They seem to depict Palestinian leaders as eager to complete a deal with Israel and, therefore, agreeing that only 10,000 refugees could return to Israel and that

Israel would remain a “Jewish state.” Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, is quoted as saying, “On numbers of refugees, it is illogical to ask Israel to take five million, or indeed one million. That would mean the end of Israel.”² This position contradicted long-held Palestinian positions that refugees living outside Israel be granted the “right of return” to ancestral homes in Israel.

The release of these documents produced a sensation among Palestinians. For hardliners, the documents show Israel to be an obstacle to peace, rejecting Palestinian concessions, and demonstrate that “Abbas and the leadership of the PLO today are the best partner Israel could hope for.” Declared an Israeli political scientist: “Abbas . . . owes the Palestinians an explanation. We were under the assumption that Abbas was sticking to the pillars of consensus.”³

In this chapter, we examine six global issues to evaluate how the world has changed and how it has remained the same. We begin by examining the rise and decline of the global regime to limit

2001	2001	2003	February 2005	2011
Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York and Washington	American invasion of Afghanistan	Anglo-American invasion of Iraq	North Korea publicly declares it has nuclear weapons	Pro-democracy demonstrations spread across Middle East



Figure 7.1 Palestinians block the entrance to Al Jazeera’s office in Ramalla

Source: Majdi Mohammed/AP/Press Association Images

nuclear weapons proliferation. We then turn to changing Chinese–US relations, which may soon dominate global politics. This is followed by an examination of key issues involving Islam and the West: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, militant Islam, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The nuclear proliferation regime

Among the most dangerous trends in global politics is proliferation of nuclear weapons. When the Cold War ended few countries possessed nuclear weapons. Although “vertical proliferation” – increasing armaments by a nuclear power like the US or USSR – slowed after the Cold War, “horizontal proliferation” – acquisition of nuclear

weapons by *additional* states – became a serious problem. India and Pakistan, which became nuclear powers, and Israel, which also has a nuclear capability, have never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In recent decades, other countries have acquired nuclear weapons (North Korea) or are seeking to do so (Iran). A few have relinquished nuclear weapons: in 1991, South Africa voluntarily dismantled six completed bombs, and, in the 1990s, Ukraine and Belarus returned to Russia the nuclear weapons they inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Today's nuclear nonproliferation regime evolved out of arms control efforts during the Cold War. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy predicted that, if left unchecked, 15 to 20 states could join the nuclear club within the decade, a prediction increasingly likely owing to the growing number of fast-breeder reactors that generate more nuclear fuel than they consume. The nuclear nonproliferation regime was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. Although a variety of international agencies are involved in the regime, only the major powers have the capacity to enforce it. The principle underlying the regime is that proliferation must be limited, because the

more nuclear weapons states there are, the more likely that nuclear weapons will be used. This principle underpins the NPT that was signed in 1968. The NPT has four main provisions:

1. No nuclear power may transfer nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear states.
2. No non-nuclear-armed state may develop nuclear weapons technology.
3. All non-nuclear states that use nuclear energy are to have safeguards and must conclude a treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspecting nuclear facilities.
4. Nuclear weapons states should pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race.

The NPT regime is criticized for having a dual standard. The US, Russia, Britain, France, and China are recognized as nuclear weapons states because they had such weapons when the NPT was negotiated. They are supposed to make progress toward nuclear disarmament but have not done so while others are prohibited from acquiring *any* nuclear weapons (Figure 7.2).

Additional norms and rules of the regime are articulated in several organizations, agreements,




Figure 7.2 The NPT in the black market
Source: Patrick Chappatte

and informal arrangements, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and several nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs). The International Atomic Energy Agency is a key element in the regime.⁴ The IAEA was created in 1957 as part of the UN system to work with member states to support safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies. The IAEA does this primarily through safeguards agreements negotiated with member states. States describe to the IAEA all nuclear materials in their possession and all activities employing nuclear materials and regularly submit their facilities to for IAEA inspection. This allows the IAEA to verify that non-nuclear states are upholding their NPT obligation not to develop a nuclear weapons program. Since the early 1990s and the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq following the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA also has attempted to discover undeclared nuclear activities.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a third element in the regime. The NSG is an **export-control** group of 30 countries that provide nuclear materials, equipment, and technology on the global market. This group meets regularly to establish guidelines for nuclear-related exports in order to assure that such materials and technologies are not sold or transferred to countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Ultimately, participating governments implement the guidelines consonant with their national laws. There is no higher authority to compel states to implement the export controls.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an informal *arrangement* – not a treaty or organization – intended to prevent the transfer of nuclear materials to terrorists or countries suspected of developing nuclear programs. Since President George W. Bush announced the arrangement in 2003, 97 countries have expressed support for it, and 21, including the US, Britain, Russia, France, Germany, South Korea, Argentina, and Japan, are members of the Operational Experts Group

that coordinates PSI efforts. Participants patrol the seas, air, and land, searching vessels suspected of shipping WMD to potential proliferators. Interdictions are subject to international law, which does not permit ships to be searched simply because they are suspected of transporting WMD. Participants agree “to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified” and to “require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified.”⁵

Nuclear weapons-free zones constitute another element in the nonproliferation regime. These are regions in which it is illegal to “develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess, or control any nuclear explosive device.”⁶ Antarctica (Antarctic Treaty), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and, as of 2009, Africa (the Treaty of Pelindaba) are all NWFZs. These arrangements seek to prevent nuclear proliferation as well as reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons states.

Each arrangement contributes to the nonproliferation regime by reinforcing its underlying principle that steps be taken to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, but there are weaknesses in the regime. Without a global authority to coerce them, states can refuse to participate as have India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Others challenge the principle that non-nuclear weapons states should not develop a nuclear weapons capability at the same time as they participate in one or more elements of the regime. North Korea also challenged this principle when it was still a party to the NPT. Finally, even states that agree with the principle of nonproliferation may not

uphold the rules that have developed to stop it – often for domestic reasons.

We now examine the dangers of horizontal proliferation to understand why it is such a major issue.

Dangers of horizontal proliferation

Some scholars are not greatly concerned by horizontal proliferation. Kenneth Waltz argues that “with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future” because he believes that their spread will enhance deterrence and prevent war much as it did in the Cold War.⁷ There are, however, reasons why such optimism may be misplaced:

1. The leaders of some of the nuclear aspirants are ruthless and may be risk takers. Among these are North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, who has spent much of his life isolated from the world outside his country. Known as the “Dear Leader,” he succeeded his father Kim Il Sung (the “Great Leader”) in 1994 and, like his father, was elevated to almost godlike status by those around him. His ruthlessness is reflected in policies that simultaneously make North Korea’s military expenditures the highest in the world in relation to the country’s wealth, while causing massive famine that killed millions. Iran is governed by conservative Shia mullahs. In June 2005, the country elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who declared that Israel should be “wiped off the map” and declared the Holocaust a “myth,” suggesting that it was invented to provide an excuse for creating Israel.
2. More fingers on more triggers create a higher probability of a nuclear accident. As more countries acquire WMD, the likelihood increases that human mistakes or technical mishaps could lead to an accident or a fatal mistake in judgment.
3. Countries eager to obtain WMD are often involved in dangerous regional quarrels that threaten war. Pakistan and India remain at odds over Kashmir; Iran and Israel are potential enemies; and the Korean Peninsula remains one of the world’s most dangerous places.
4. The acquisition of WMD by some countries increases incentives for others to obtain similar weapons. In Asia, North Korea’s nuclear weapons place pressure on Japan also to “go nuclear,” and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Shia Iran’s would encourage Sunni Arab countries like Saudi Arabia to emulate it.
5. Newer nuclear states are armed with less sophisticated delivery systems that are vulnerable to an enemy’s first strike. This is a dangerous situation in which incentives to attack first are high and strategic stability is low.
6. Finally, proliferation heightens the possibility that nuclear weapons may find their way into the hands of terrorists who would have few scruples against using them.

Let us examine several instances of nuclear proliferation: India and Pakistan, which have had nuclear capabilities for decades, and North Korea and Iran, which pose more recent challenges.

India and Pakistan

The prospect of a nuclear India existed even before the country gained independence in 1947. And, once it was clear India intended to acquire nuclear weapons, Pakistan became a nuclear aspirant. These two powers have been nuclear rivals ever since, posing new threats to global security as well as challenges to the nonproliferation regime.

Several factors explain why India wanted to become a nuclear power. The legacy of partition and its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir played a major role. Broader regional considerations are

also involved, including territorial disputes with China over the Aksai Chin plateau and over the North East Frontier Agency, which precipitated China's attack on India in 1962. In that war, India was abandoned by its ally, the Soviet Union, and was quickly defeated. This experience convinced India's leaders, who were aware of China's own nuclear program, that they needed a capability to deter future attacks. India also viewed a nuclear weapons program as necessary to acquire great power status. This last objective is emphasized by a former participant in India's weapons program: "For us it was a matter of prestige that would justify our ancient past."⁸

Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons were a reaction to its relationship with India. Pakistan was the inferior party in that rivalry, and wars in 1965 and 1971 convinced its leaders that they could not count on external military support (the US withdrew support in 1965 on the grounds Pakistan was the aggressor). Pakistan's leaders viewed nuclear weapons as the only way to balance a militarily superior India. Thus, former President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–79, then a cabinet minister, declared in 1965: "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice."⁹ Once a decision was made to seek nuclear weapons, Pakistani efforts were driven by the additional objective of becoming the first Muslim country to possess a nuclear deterrent.

The two countries took different paths in acquiring a bomb, both of which illustrate enduring problems in the nonproliferation regime. India's efforts focused on repurposing its civilian nuclear program, begun first with a British research reactor and then with a second reactor provided by Canada. Agreements with the US and Canada specified that India could only use materials produced by the reactor for peaceful purposes. However, without safeguards to prevent it, India developed its own fuel rods "in order to stake a better legal and political claim to India's using the resultant plutonium as it saw fit, including for explosives."¹⁰ India simultaneously

built a reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from the spent fuel produced by the reactor. By 1972, Indian scientists had a basic design for a bomb. Its first nuclear test, known as Smiling Buddha, occurred on May 18, 1974. Pakistan's effort also began with an internationally supported civilian nuclear power program. In 1960, the US provided a grant to fund a research reactor. During the next several years, however, the US reduced its support owing to political instability in Pakistan and tensions that the arrangement was creating in American relations with India. This left Pakistan to seek a new path to achieving its nuclear ambitions. Its efforts received a jumpstart in 1974 when Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, began stealing secrets from his employer in the Netherlands, URENCO, a European consortium that developed centrifuge technology for refining nuclear fuel. After returning to Pakistan, Khan became a key figure in Pakistan's covert nuclear weapons program, using his international contacts to establish a clandestine network of suppliers of nuclear materials, technology, and knowhow (Chapter 12, p. 404). Pakistan did not test its first nuclear weapon until 1998, but it had weapons-grade fuel by the mid-1980s.

Both India and Pakistan violated the nonproliferation norm. Nonetheless, the international community has learned to live with their violations, largely because the two countries have refrained from using their weapons. In 2008, in a move that seemed to legitimize India's nuclear status, the United States formalized a deal, with IAEA agreement, ending a three-decade moratorium on nuclear trade with India. Pakistan has been less fortunate, perhaps because many fear that its political instability increases the risk its arsenal will be used in war or be stolen by militants.

The two cases illustrate two routes to proliferation: *repurposing civilian nuclear technology and materials for weapons* and *transferring nuclear technologies in a global black market*. Both are difficult to curb. The NPT encourages the transfer of

peaceful nuclear technologies to help developing countries obtain the energy necessary to fuel economic growth. The nuclear black market is difficult to track. As long as there is a demand for nuclear technology, this market will continue to provide them for aspiring nuclear weapons states like North Korea and Iran.

North Korea and Iran

The United States and Britain invaded Iraq in 2003 partly to prevent Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) from acquiring WMD. In fact, the other members of what President Bush had called the “axis of evil,” North Korea and Iran, were closer to acquiring usable nuclear weapons than Iraq.

North Korea began constructing a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in 1980 which became operational some years later. IAEA inspections in 1992 suggested that North Korea had diverted weapons-grade plutonium from the facility that could be used to manufacture weapons. In May 1994, North Korea removed spent fuel rods from Yongbyon but refused to allow the IAEA to inspect them in order to determine how long they had been in the reactor to find out whether some had been secretly removed earlier, possibly for diversion to nuclear weapons. When North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, the US agreed to resume negotiations on a broad range of issues provided North Korea reverse its decision and allow the IAEA to inspect the reactor. By mixing the old and new fuel rods it extracted from the reactor, however, North Korea made it impossible for IAEA inspectors to determine whether some had been clandestinely removed earlier.

As it became evident in the early 1990s that North Korea was bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, US–North Korean negotiations were held to settle the issue. Often stormy, the negotiations involved threats of sanctions and even war. The sudden death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 slowed the pace of negotiations, even as North Korea amassed

enough used nuclear fuel rods to make several bombs. A US–North Korean deal (Framework Agreement) was hammered out under which (1) North Korea would freeze its nuclear program, would not refuel its Yongbyon reactor, and would allow inspections of its used fuel rods; (2) the US and North Korea would establish diplomatic and economic relations; (3) North Korea would open its nuclear installations to international inspection within five years; (4) North Korea would replace its graphite nuclear reactor (from which plutonium can be reprocessed) with lightwater reactors provided by South Korea; (5) North Korea would remain a party to the NPT; (6) the United States would provide enough free fuel to satisfy North Korea’s interim energy needs; and (7) North Korea would ultimately dismantle key plants involved in its nuclear program.

The agreement, however, fell apart amid acrimony. Initially, things went well with an easing of US economic sanctions against North Korea and steps toward constructing the lightwater reactor. In 2002, however, the United States learned that North Korea was secretly trying to enrich uranium for making nuclear weapons, and, in October of that year, North Korea admitted this, even though that action violated both the NPT and the 1994 agreement. The following month, US fuel shipments to North Korea ceased. In retaliation, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and restarted its Yongbyon plutonium reactor, ostensibly to replace the fuel oil that the US was no longer providing. The Bush administration then announced it had no plans to attack North Korea and entered in new talks in April 2003. These “six-party talks” involved the two Koreas, Russia, China, Japan, and the US and aimed to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear program in return for economic and political benefits.

American intelligence agencies estimated that, by early 2005, North Korea had stockpiled about 13 nuclear bombs.¹¹ In February 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it had nuclear weapons that it needed to deter a US attack and

DID YOU KNOW?

Uranium enrichment is permitted under the NPT for use in generating energy but not to the level of weapons-grade uranium. Weapons-grade uranium is pure uranium at high enrichment levels of over 90 percent uranium 235. Weapons-grade plutonium is pure plutonium that is produced in heavy-water- or graphite-moderated production reactors and separated from spent fuel in reprocessing plants.¹²

was leaving the six-party talks. Nevertheless, a new round of talks was held and, in September 2005, the negotiators announced an agreement in principle under which North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons, the United States and South Korea would affirm that they have no such weapons in Korea, the US would publicly declare it would not attack the North, and the US and Japan would begin to normalize their relations with North Korea. A stumbling block, however, remained concerning whether the US and South Korea would build lightwater nuclear reactors in North Korea

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it had conducted its first test of a nuclear weapon. This test, however, did not mark the end of the nonproliferation regime as efforts continued to persuade North Korea to abandon its program. Simultaneously, the UN Security Council imposed weapons and financial sanctions on North Korea. Resolution 1718 demanded that North Korea conduct no additional nuclear tests or launch ballistic missiles, rejoin the NPT, and abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”¹³ In early 2007, a tentative agreement was reached under which North Korea would shut its Yongbyon reactor, readmit IAEA inspectors, and provide information about its nuclear programs

in return for fuel supplies, direct talks with the US leading to normalizing relations, and release of North Korean funds previously frozen in a Macao bank. North Korea did begin shutting down the Yongbyon reactor and declare its nuclear assets, but, in 2009, it conducted a second nuclear test. In late 2009, North Korea again declared its support for continuing talks, but relations with South Korea deteriorated in 2010, and in November of that year North Korea revealed the existence of a secret, state-of-the-art nuclear processing facility.

North Korea’s resistance to US counterproliferation efforts emboldened Iran to take steps toward acquiring its own nuclear weapons. Iran embarked on an effort to acquire WMD and ballistic missiles after a bloody war with Iraq (1981–88). Information surfaced in 2002 that Iran was using pilot nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak to make weapons-grade uranium. In 2003, IAEA inspectors acquired evidence of these efforts. Iran and North Korea apparently worked together on missile development, and American intelligence obtained computer files that suggested that Iran was designing a missile cone for a nuclear warhead.¹⁴

On behalf of the European Union, Britain, France, and Germany, with US approval, tried to dissuade Iran from its enrichment efforts in return for political and economic incentives, and in November 2004 Iran temporarily did so. In August 2005, Iran again began to convert uranium, (albeit not enriching it), leading the three European countries to ask the IAEA to bring the matter to the Security Council. In early 2006, Iran again began uranium enrichment at Natanz, refusing a compromise offered by Russia to enrich Iranian uranium and then return it to Iran to generate energy. New sanctions were imposed on Iran in 2007, 2008, and again in 2010. In July 2010, Iran announced it had produced 20 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, claiming this was intended for medical uses, but US officials expressed concern that Iran had acquired the technical ability to produce the highly enriched uranium necessary for weapons development.

Talks in Geneva in December 2010 and in Istanbul in January 2011, in which Western officials offered to provide Iran with nuclear fuel in exchange for its enriched uranium, achieved little, with Iran demanding as “prerequisites” for negotiating that the international community lift sanctions and recognize its right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.¹⁵

As these cases illustrate, the nonproliferation regime is designed to maintain the status quo by preventing non-nuclear weapons states from violating the global norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and discovering such violations when they occur. It is an imperfect regime, but realists would expect this in an anarchic system.

nership claim that China is a rising economic superpower preoccupied with economic growth that is becoming integrated into the global economic system and will likely remain peaceful. Thus, establishing a strong partnership makes economic sense. Those who view China as a competitor contend that this Asian giant cannot remain peaceful at its current rate of economic and military growth. Ultimately, it will try to dominate Asia. In China’s view, although the West has long tried to block its economic and political ascendance, the country must work with capitalist states to achieve prosperity and regain its rightful position as a world power. The following sections examine evolving Chinese–Western relations.

China and the United States: a new bipolarity?

Chinese–US relations have historically fluctuated between partnership and competition, always tinged with mistrust. Debates have raged in the West about whether to treat China as a strategic partner or competitor. Those who argue for part-

From hostility to engagement

China’s civil war ended with two governments – one in Beijing, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and one in Taiwan – each claiming to be China’s legitimate ruler. Beijing’s “one-China policy” stipulated that Taiwan was a “breakaway province” (see Map 7.1).



Map 7.1 China

The Sino-Soviet split marked the beginning of a period of American engagement with China, as it became clear that the two countries had a common adversary in the USSR. For Mao Zedong, it was better to “ally with the enemy far away . . . in order to fight the enemy who is at the gate,”¹⁶ and for Washington it was an opportunity to play the USSR and China off against each other. A turning point came in 1971 when, in April, Beijing took a first step toward normalizing relations by inviting a US ping pong team to China. President Nixon reciprocated in June by revoking a 21-year-old trade embargo against China. In July, Henry Kissinger, then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, secretly flew to Beijing to arrange a meeting between Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. By October, the United States ceased blocking the PRC’s entry into the UN. In February 1972, Nixon and Zhou met and agreed to cooperate against the USSR, and full diplomatic relations were established on January 1, 1979. By the terms of the bargain, the US would sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and support the PRC’s one-China policy. For its part, China renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan back into the fold.

Strategic partners or strategic rivals?

Although the two countries have become increasingly interdependent, they remain wary of each other. Serious disagreements involve Taiwan, military modernization, North Korea, human rights, and access to energy resources, and occasional crises have threatened the relationship. During the 1999 Kosovo War, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, was struck by five US satellite-guided bombs. Washington claimed that the incident was accidental; China believed it was intentional. Another US–Chinese crisis erupted after a 2001 mid-air collision between a Chinese jet fighter and a US spy plane that had to land on China’s Hainan Island. Beijing was incensed

and demanded that the US cease its surveillance efforts. Overall, the US–China relationship, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton observed in 2011 “is not a relationship that fits neatly into the black and white categories like friend and rival.”¹⁷

American efforts to pressure China on issues such as human rights and the sale of missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, by threatening to reduce economic ties proved fruitless and led President Bill Clinton in 1997 to advocate a policy of “constructive engagement” toward China by promoting economic and political ties. “The emergence of a China as a power that is stable, open and nonaggressive . . . rather than a China turned inward and confrontational,” declared Clinton, “is deeply in the interests of the American people” and is “our best hope to secure our own interest and values and to advance China’s.”¹⁸ “Constructive engagement” has remained the US policy toward China ever since.

Taiwan

From time to time, China anticipates that Taiwan might declare independence. At these moments, Taiwan re-emerges as a source of Sino-American tension. A crisis took place in 1995–96 as Taiwan was about to conduct its first democratic presidential election. The incumbent, Lee Teng-hui, was the first native Taiwanese to become president, and China viewed his efforts to strengthen diplomatic relations with other countries as threatening its one-China policy. China unsuccessfully urged the US to deny Lee’s request for a visitor’s visa, claiming he was engaged in separatist activities. Then, in an effort to influence Taiwan’s 1996 election, China fired missiles across the Taiwan Straits to frighten Taiwanese voters. The United States sent warships to the area, and China’s leaders interpreted this as American support for Taiwanese independence, souring US–Chinese relations for some time.

Since then, China has rattled sabres during each Taiwanese election to reduce the vote for

pro-independence candidates. In 2000, China threatened military action if Taiwan declared independence, and in 2005, China passed a law that in the event that pro-independence forces “cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted . . . [China] shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”¹⁹ US–Chinese relations deteriorated in January 2010 after the US proposed selling Taiwan \$6 billion in weapons, including helicopters and Patriot anti-ballistic missiles. China declared that the deal would impose “severe harm” on US–Chinese relations and have “repercussions that neither side wishes to see.”²⁰ Despite China’s opposition, the US approved the deal. China’s President Hu Jintao has declared the status of Taiwan, along with that of Tibet, are “issues that concern China’s territorial integrity and China’s core interests.”²¹

Military rivalry

To realists, China’s military modernization – termed “peaceful rise” by the PRC – forecasts US–Chinese competition. China has the second largest military budget in the world, and since the 1990s, its military build-up has included modernizing long-range ballistic missiles, developing cruise missiles, and deploying hundreds of short-range mobile missiles opposite Taiwan – all worrying American leaders who are committed to defend the island. China has developed anti-ship ballistic missiles described as “carrier killers” and a stealth fighter and is to launch an aircraft carrier in 2011. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said of China’s build-up: “I’ve been concerned about the development of the anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles ever since I took this job . . . They clearly have the potential to put some of our capabilities at risk and we have to pay attention to them.”²²

Chinese military technology remains about a generation behind America’s, but in the event of a conflict, the United States would not necessarily have a decisive advantage. China has reduced its huge conventional army and emphasized training for high-tech warfare. It has a modern navy that includes 60 submarines, amphibious lift vessels capable of carrying tanks and troops, and nearly 50 frigates (fast, maneuverable ships used to protect other warships).²³ China has also enhanced its strategic deterrent force with submarine-launched long-range missiles and has deployed land-based ICBMs able to strike anywhere in the United States. As a result, the US is pursuing a “hedging strategy” toward China to be on the safe side, reinforcing American forces in the Pacific and strengthening relations with Japan and India.

North Korea and Iran

Washington and Beijing have tried to cooperate to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Neither wants an unstable nuclear North Korea, but beyond that their aims differ. China is apprehensive about a collapse of North Korea’s regime because it fears a US-dominated Korea, is concerned about turmoil on its border, and feels obliged to help a fellow communist country. By contrast, Washington fears a nuclear North Korea because it might spark a nuclear arms race in East Asia and because North Korea might provide nuclear weapons to America’s foes. Both hope that China’s economic and political support, which keeps North Korea’s economy from imploding, will give China enough leverage to end North Korea’s nuclear program.

China has exercised less influence on North Korea than the United States would wish. Since 2003, China has hosted several rounds of multilateral talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear program but has been unwilling to exert significant pressure, perhaps fearing that too much would destabilize North Korea’s regime. China has resisted calls to impose economic sanctions on

North Korea even as other countries have done so.²⁴

China, which has a great thirst for energy and depends on Iran for 12 percent of its oil imports, has also been a reluctant partner in sanctioning that country for its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The UN Security Council has imposed four rounds of sanctions on Iran, in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010. In each instance, China has used its position as a veto-wielding member of the Security Council to water down the resolutions.²⁵ Moreover, some Chinese companies have violated sanctions and helped Iran develop nuclear weapons and missile technologies.²⁶ China argues that the US has enacted tougher unilateral sanctions than required by the UN by prohibiting US companies from working with firms accused of supporting Iran's nuclear program.²⁷

Human rights

The United States has sought to promote human rights in China – accusing Beijing of suppressing ethnic and political dissent. For example, China has harassed the Falun Gong movement. Falun Gong's millions of followers constitute a spiritual, nonpolitical movement that employs Buddhist and Taoist exercises and meditation to promote spiritual and physical wellbeing, but the Chinese government sees it as a potential source of political opposition and has outlawed the group and arrested and tortured thousands of followers. It argues that Falun Gong is a cult that harms followers by advocating natural cures over professional medical care.

China is also accused of human rights violations in dealing with ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. The majorities in both provinces, Tibetans and Uighurs respectively, argue that the Chinese government denies them basic religious, economic, and political freedoms. These tensions turned into violent street protests in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009. The Uighur protests were “one of the worst episodes of ethnic

violence in China in decades,”²⁸ and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights cited “discrimination and the failure to protect minority rights” as “underlying causes” of the violence in both cases.²⁹ China responded to the protests by arbitrarily arresting thousands of suspected protestors.³⁰

Tibet was occupied by China in 1950 after the revolution that brought the communist party to power. In March 1959, a rising of Tibetans led by the 14th **Dalai Lama** was crushed and the Dalai Lama took refuge in India. In ensuing decades, China sought to integrate Tibet, dampen opposition to Chinese rule, and encourage settlement of ethnic Han Chinese in Tibet. In 1980, China's rule of Tibet was liberalized; but, after the 1989 democracy protests in China were followed by protests of Tibetan lamas (priests), Beijing harshly repressed what it viewed as separatist tendencies in that country. Recently, unrest again gripped Tibet, followed by repression, and renewed Western criticism of Chinese human rights policies, especially its effort to colonize the country with Han Chinese.

In past years, the United States linked trade with China to improvements in that country's human rights record. However, in 1994, President Clinton severed the linkage between China's human rights policies and US–Chinese trade, admitting what was already evident, that US political and economic interests outweighed human rights concerns.

Resource rivalry

China and the United States have become strategic competitors for energy resources. The US has long been the world's largest energy consumer, but, in 2009, China passed it, consuming 2.25 billion tons of oil equivalent (representing all forms of energy consumed), compared to US 2.17 billion tons.³¹

Today, China is the world's second largest oil consumer, accounting for 10 percent of global

oil consumption, second only to the US, which accounts for 22 percent.³² Anticipating future needs China has sought to diversify its sources of oil and circumvent US influence over major oil-exporting nations and the sea lanes from the Middle East. Thus, Beijing has acquired drilling and refining rights in some 30 countries, including Sudan and Iran, countries where US companies have not been allowed to invest, as well as Brazil and Venezuela in America's backyard. China has provided Iran with technology that can be used to make nuclear weapons in exchange for oil, and its desire for Sudanese oil makes the UN Security Council unable to send an adequate peacekeeping force to Darfur. China is also the world's largest coal consumer, responsible for nearly 47 percent of global consumption. Once an exporter of coal, China's growing demand is transforming it into a coal importer, and is forcing global coal prices to rise.

Its increasing appetite for energy is prompting Chinese industry to acquire foreign coalmines and oil companies. In June 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (Cnooc), owned by the Chinese government, offered \$18.5 billion for Unocal, a major US oil company. Members of the US Congress called on the government to reject Cnooc's bid on national security grounds. These protectionist voices fear that China may keep Unocal's Asian reserves for itself and increase its ties to oil producers in Africa and Latin America, to the detriment of US influence. Recently, the US and China have both sought to acquire mines in Australia to meet growing demand.³³

We now turn to the Middle East and one of the most explosive issues in global politics, the Palestine conflict.

Israel and Palestine

Among the issues dividing the United States and the Muslim world are America's support of Israel, the continuing conflict between Israel and Palestine, and Israel's occupation of areas won in

the 1967 Six Day War. Like other Western-Islamic flashpoints, this one dates back millennia, to biblical times, when Palestine was the home of the Jewish people. In AD 70, Roman conquerors brought the biblical Jewish state to an end and destroyed Jerusalem, making Judea a Roman province. Thus began the Jewish diaspora, or "dispersion" of the Jews out of Palestine. Many settled in Babylon, and some fled to Egypt. All retained their religion, identity, customs, and their religious book, the Torah. The collective memory of Jerusalem and the desire to return to Palestine were harbored by Jews around the world.

In this section, we examine the development of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, focusing on Jewish and Palestinian nationalism and their conflicting claims to the same small territory. We also consider how successive wars produced insecurity and hostility and the efforts made to reverse the conflict spiral.

Palestine after World War One

In the late nineteenth century, with Palestine governed by the Ottoman Empire, Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) launched a movement among Jews in Europe called *Zionism*. Fueled by anti-Semitism in Europe, Zionism advocated the return of the Jewish people to their ancient homeland with the aim of founding a new Jewish state. Following Herzl's death, Chaim Weizmann (1874–1952), later first president of Israel, tried to gain Western support for a Jewish state. In 1906, Weizmann, a biochemist, met British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour (1848–1930), and the two became friends owing to Weizmann's scientific aid to Britain in World War One. Then, in 1917, in a letter to Lord Rothschild (head of the Zionist Federation in Britain), Balfour committed his country to help establish a Jewish state in Palestine. In his declaration (see Key document, opposite), Balfour acknowledged the potential problem of maintaining good relations with Arab Palestinians while endorsing a Jewish state by

KEY DOCUMENT

BALFOUR DECLARATION 1917³⁴

November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country . . .

Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour

including assurances that "civil and religious rights" of others in Palestine would be protected. At the time, Britain was aiding the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule and promising future statehood to Arab leaders in the Middle East.

With the Ottoman collapse after World War One, Britain was granted a League of Nations Mandate over Palestine. The mandate covered Palestine (what is Israel and Gaza today) and Transjordan (modern Jordan and the West Bank). The League mandate confirmed the Balfour Declaration.

The immigration of European Jews ensued. By 1922, 84,000 Jews lived in Palestine along with 643,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. During the years of the Palestine Mandate (1922–47), significant Jewish immigration from abroad, mainly from Eastern Europe, took place. The inflow swelled in the 1930s as Nazi persecution of Europe's Jews intensified. Britain sought to limit this influx, and in 1939 promised to create an Arab state within a decade and limit Jewish immigration to 75,000 for five years, followed by cessation of immigration. The Arabs rejected the proposal. As Arabs also flowed into Palestine,

tensions grew over land, water, and other scarce resources. Between the world wars, the Jewish population in Palestine swelled by 470,000 between, while the non-Jewish population grew by 588,000. In 1921 and 1929, Arab riots erupted in protest to Jewish immigration. Arab attacks against Jewish settlements took place starting in 1936 in what was called the Arab Revolt.

Following World War Two, as news of Hitler's murder of millions of Jews became known, sympathy for the survivors was widespread. Great Britain, however, fearful of antagonizing the Arabs and losing Arab oil, refused to allow Jewish immigration into Palestine and interned Jewish refugees on Cyprus. Nevertheless, some 70,000 managed to gain entry into Palestine between 1945 and 1948.

Israel: the founding

Discouraged by an insoluble conflict, Britain announced in 1947 that it would surrender its mandate in Palestine. After heated debate, the UN

General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, by which Palestine would be partitioned into Jewish and Arab states. Although Jewish leaders agreed to partition, Arab Palestinians rejected it. There then began what Israelis call their War of Independence, as Arab armies from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Lebanon sought to drive the Jewish community from Palestine. On May 14, 1948, after bitter fighting and the flight of thousands of Palestinians from their homes, Israel declared victory and, in turn, its independence. The new state of Israel was about 50 percent larger than called for in the partition plan. Israel encompassed all of the Palestinian Mandate west of the Jordan River, except the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, which were to be administered by Egypt and Jordan until their final status could be determined.

The Suez War

Following independence, Israel was beset by attacks launched from neighboring countries. Arab infiltrators murdered Jewish farmers, and Israelis retaliated against targets across the Egyptian border. Arabs also organized an economic boycott, blacklisting non-Arab enterprises that did business with Israel, and Israeli shipping was prevented from entering the Gulf of Aqaba or the Suez Canal.

These conditions set the stage for Israeli participation, along with Britain and France, in the invasion of Egypt in the 1956 Suez War. This war stoked mutual Israeli and Arab insecurity, as well as Western–Arab tensions. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–70) was an ardent Arab nationalist and advocated creating a pan-Arab state in the Middle East. Western suspicion of Nasser grew after he negotiated an agreement to purchase Soviet arms from communist Czechoslovakia even as he sought Western aid to construct the Aswan Dam as a source of hydroelectric power. Learning of the Czech arms deal,

the US withdrew its offer of aid for the Aswan project. At the same time, following a 1954 agreement, Britain was removing its troops from the Suez Canal zone in Egypt. The Suez Canal, a vital link between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, had for almost a century linked British possessions in Asia to Europe. In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the waterway.

Fearing that Nasser threatened oil supplies and was trying to oust Europe’s colonial powers from the Middle East and North Africa, British and French leaders sought his overthrow and persuaded Israel to invade Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula while preparing to intervene to “restore order.” On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces seized the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian islands in the Gulf of Aqaba, and quickly reached the Suez Canal. An Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to cease fighting was issued only *after* the Israelis had reached the canal, and British and French troops began invading Egypt on November 5.

However, the allies had made a critical error in failing to inform Washington in advance of their operation. Secretary of State Dulles, furious at not having been consulted, took steps to force the invaders out by terminating US loans, thereby threatening a financial crisis. With the US and USSR united against the invasion, on November 7, the UN General Assembly demanded that the invaders leave Egypt, and the first large UN peacekeeping mission was established – the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) (Chapter 10, p. 332). By the end of 1956, Anglo-French forces had departed, and Israel thereafter withdrew from the Sinai (except for the Gaza Strip). The war made Nasser a hero throughout the Arab world.

The Six Day War

The 1967 Six Day War changed the face of the Middle East and still casts a shadow over the region as it fostered the spread of Palestinian nationalism. Following the Suez conflict, Arab

leaders continued to refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist. Attacks from Syria's Golan Heights against Israeli settlements in Galilee heightened tension, and Arab rhetoric grew increasingly belligerent. In May 1967, Egyptian troops began to mass on Israel's border; Syrian formations gathered on the Golan Heights; and Jordan agreed to a treaty with Egypt. On May 16, the Egyptians ordered UNEF out of the Sinai. A week later, Egypt resumed its blockade of Aqaba.

Israel was in a perilous situation. It, too, had mobilized its forces; but, as a small country, surrounded by enemies and dependent on a citizen army whose soldiers were essential to its civilian economy, it saw a need to act quickly. On June 5, Israel launched a **preemptive war**. A massive

Israeli air strike destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground. When Jordan launched a ground attack on the same day, some 350,000 Palestinian Arabs fled the West Bank and crossed into Jordan. In less than a week, Israeli forces were at the gates of Cairo, Damascus, and Amman, and a ceasefire was announced. Almost overnight, Israel had tripled its territory. In addition to the Golan Heights, it had captured Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and that part of Jerusalem that had previously been in Jordanian hands. Israel declared united Jerusalem its "eternal" capital.

In November, the UN adopted Resolution 242 (see Key document overleaf), which established a framework for peace. By its terms, Israel would withdraw from territories occupied in the war in exchange for peace with its neighbors. Although both sides accepted this framework, they interpreted its meaning differently. Did the phrase "withdrawal from territories" mean *all* territories or only *some*? Israel argued that peace had to precede withdrawal from the conquered territories, whereas the Palestinians sought Israeli withdrawal first and only then an end to hostilities. Along with the land-for-peace formula, Resolution 242 called for the right of all nations to live in security and for a just settlement of the problem of Palestinians who had fled their homes. These issues still remain at the heart of Israeli–Palestinian relations (Map 7.2).

Resolution 242 fostered the growth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),³⁵ which had been established in Cairo in 1964 by Yasser Arafat (1929–2004). In Israel, any semblance of political consensus was shattered. The right-wing Likud Party sought a restoration of biblical Israel, which entailed annexing the West Bank and Gaza. The political left, notably Israel's Labor Party, was prepared to exchange the lands seized in 1967 for peace.



Map 7.2 The Middle East after the 1967 War

KEY DOCUMENT

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (NOVEMBER 22, 1967)

The Security Council

Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

...

From crisis to crisis: the Yom Kippur War, Lebanon, and Camp David

Following the Six Day War, Arab–Israeli relations resembled a fever chart, abating then worsening until the cycle went around again. Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance produced mutual suspicion and fear and attack and counterattack, including another war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and an Israeli incursion into Lebanon to ensure Israel’s security. The most important development was the emergence of a Palestinian effort to acquire statehood and end Israel’s occupation. Thereafter, Arab states surrendered their authority to speak for Palestinians after a summit conference declared the PLO to be “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”

The Yom Kippur War erupted in 1973, pitting Egypt and Syria against Israel. For some years before the war, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (1918–81), backed by the Soviet Union, had threatened to use force if Israel did not return Arab territories. Recognizing that Israel had become a permanent presence in the region, Sadat abandoned Nasser’s goal of decisive victory over Israel and focused on regaining control of territories lost in 1967. On October 6, the holiest day of the

Jewish year, Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel. Unprepared, the Israeli army suffered high casualties.

As Israel struggled to regain the initiative, the war became a full-scale Cold War crisis. The USSR and then the US sent massive amounts of supplies to their respective friends. Israeli forces invaded Syria and crossed the Suez Canal, encircling Egypt’s Third Army. The Soviet leadership then threatened to intervene. Soviet pilots began to fly Egyptian aircraft, and both superpowers prepared for possible war. Fortunately, Secretary of State Kissinger undertook direct negotiations with Soviet leaders, and a ceasefire was brokered. As a result of the fighting, both Israel and Egypt lost the equivalent of a full year’s gross national product. Israel no longer seemed invincible and became more dependent on the United States, while Egypt and Syria became dependent on the USSR. Another consequence was the doubling of oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which sought to change American policies toward the Middle East by declaring an oil embargo against the US in 1973.

Following the war, Sadat became disillusioned with the USSR as a partner, expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt, and sought improved ties

with the West and Israel. On November 19, 1977, he became the first Arab leader to visit Israel. The next year, Sadat met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1913–92) and President Jimmy Carter at Camp David, Maryland, and reached the Camp David Accords. The leaders reaffirmed Resolution 242 and agreed to a three-stage process of negotiations on the status of Palestine. The outcome was an Egyptian–Israeli agreement to conclude a peace treaty and return the Sinai to Egypt. Despite periodic strains, the separate peace between Egypt and Israel still survives. In September 1981, Sadat turned his army on his Muslim foes at home, and the following month he was assassinated by a group called Islamic Jihad, which later united with Al Qaeda. Sadat was succeeded by Vice President, Hosni Mubarak, who continued Sadat’s policies.

Despite the Camp David Accords, the situation soon deteriorated. In 1982, Israel launched “Operation Peace for Galilee” into southern Lebanon to increase the security of northern Israel and destroy the PLO infrastructure in the Lebanon where Israel’s bitterest foe, Syria, had acquired virtual dominance. During the 1982 invasion, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon, and Israel’s Christian allies staged bloody attacks on Palestinian refugee camps. In 1985, most Israeli troops withdrew from the Lebanon, although some Israeli units remained in a “security zone” north of Israel’s border.

Israel’s incursion also resulted in establishment of a militant Shia group called Hezbollah or “Party of God.” Hezbollah is dedicated to destroying Israel and advocates establishing Islamic rule in Lebanon. Aided by Iran, Hezbollah has participated in Lebanon’s political system since 1992 and become a major political force in the country. Among its actions were suicide truck bombings of the American embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983. Hezbollah operatives skyjacked TWA Flight 847 in 1985, and the group was responsible for kidnapping Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s and attacking the Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992

and the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. Hezbollah’s continued attacks against Israeli soldiers in Lebanon finally forced Israel to reconsider the costs of its Lebanese security zone from which it withdrew in 2000.

Following the assassination of Syria’s leading opponent in Lebanon in February 2005, Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafik al-Hariri (1944–2005), an action blamed on Hezbollah, world pressure mounted for an end to Syrian dominance of Lebanon and the withdrawal of its military and security forces from that country. Within months, the Syrians were out. Then, in July 2006, Hezbollah triggered a new round of violence with Israel by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers. With US approval, Israel’s set out to destroy Hezbollah, largely through airpower, but the effort proved unsuccessful. The group and its leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah emerged from the conflict with great popularity not only among Shia Muslims but from the Muslim world as a whole by resisting Israel’s military power. Hezbollah remains a key factor in Lebanese and regional politics, especially as Lebanon’s government remains weak and divided.

Oslo and the intifadas

From the 1980s, the Israel–Palestinian conflict became the focus of attention in the Middle East. On December 9, 1987, an Israeli truck driver accidentally killed four pedestrians in the Gaza Strip. Palestinians soon took to the streets violently protesting Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. The first *intifada* (“throwing off,” as a dog throws off fleas) had begun, featuring mass demonstrations and stone throwing by young Palestinians. No group was in charge of the intifada, although the PLO as well as groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas became involved.

At root, the PLO is a nationalist group seeking an independent Palestinian state, whereas Islamic militants seek a region-wide Islamic state that

would include present-day Israel. As time passed, violence grew, and the militants became more popular among Palestinians living in densely populated and impoverished conditions. Israel responded with arrests, economic sanctions, and the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. These settlements were special targets of Palestinian anger, and as Palestinian violence increased, so did the level of Israeli retaliation.

Confronted by continuing violence, the parties agreed to attend a formal international conference in Madrid, Spain in 1991, while, simultaneously, meeting secretly in Oslo, Norway. These talks, conducted out of the glare of media attention, produced the 1993 Oslo Accords. The agreement established Palestinian self-rule under a Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip and in Jericho in the West Bank. Two years later, under Oslo 2, most of the remaining West Bank towns were added to self-governing Palestine. The outlines of a future Palestinian state were evident, but the problem lay in how to achieve this objective. Progress ceased in 1995 after an Israeli extremist who objected to the surrender of biblical Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) murdered Israeli Prime Minister and 1994 Nobel Peace laureate Itzhak Rabin (1922–95).

Both sides were paralyzed by their own extremists – Palestinian militants and Israeli settlement advocates – who tried to prevent any agreement. To break the deadlock, the Clinton administration sponsored another round of Palestinian–Israeli negotiations at Camp David in 2000. But time ran out for the Clinton administration with the November presidential election. Thereafter, Israelis elected a hard-line Likud Party government led by Ariel Sharon to replace the conciliatory Labor Party government of Ehud Barak. Following this failure to achieve agreement, a second intifada erupted. Sharon himself triggered renewed violence by provocatively visiting the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

The second intifada was more violent than the first. Between 2000 and 2005, 3200 Palestinians

were killed by Israeli security forces, and almost 1000 Israeli civilians and soldiers in Israel proper and in Israeli settlements were killed by the Palestinians. It featured bloody Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli civilians, followed by Israeli economic reprisals, large-scale ground incursions in and reoccupation of Palestinian towns, and targeted assassination of Palestinian militants through helicopter and missile strikes.

The Gaza imbroglio

Yet another effort to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was undertaken by US President George W. Bush in collaboration with Russia, the UN, and members of the European Union. The proposal, or “roadmap” to peace, was made public on April 30, 2003. It entailed a series of steps each side would take toward settling their differences. In the early stages, Palestinians would “undertake an unconditional cessation of violence,” including suicide bombings, and initiate political reforms such as conducting free elections. Israel would end curfews and stop demolishing Palestinian houses, withdraw its forces from Palestinian towns that it had reoccupied, and “freeze” the building of settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. The second stage was to run from June to December 2003, after Palestinian elections, and create an independent Palestinian state with “a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy.” This state would be committed to respect Israel’s security. A final stage aimed to settle border differences, the Jerusalem question, and the refugee and settlement issues.

By 2007, little progress had been made even in the first stage. Much of 2004 witnessed growing violence by militant groups like Hamas, while Israel isolated Arafat and stepped up military reprisals and assassinations of militant leaders including Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin (1937–2004). Despairing of reaching a settlement, Israel began to construct a wall along its border in

order to prevent terrorists from infiltrating its cities and protect its West Bank settlements.

As always, domestic politics played a central role. In Israel, Prime Minister Sharon's effort to promote Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip met with bitter opposition from militant Jewish settlers and extremists in his own political party. Among Palestinians, a change in leadership occurred: Arafat's death in November 2004 accelerated a struggle between Palestinian moderates and militants, and between an older and younger generation of leaders. In elections, Mahmoud Abbas, a pragmatist associated with the PLO's dominant Fatah faction, was elected President of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Even as extremists on both sides continued trying to sabotage peace efforts, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, forcing Israeli settlers there to leave their homes.

Then, in January 2006, the domestic politics of both Israel and Palestine were dramatically muddled by two unanticipated events: Ariel Sharon's incapacitating stroke and the victory of Hamas in elections to the Palestinian Assembly. In Israel, Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became acting prime minister, even as Hamas, hitherto a terrorist organization, began to form a Palestinian government. Again, fate had intervened to undermine Israeli–Palestinian reconciliation. Feuding between Hamas and the Fatah leadership of the PA intensified, punctuated by violence. Israel and the West refused to have anything to do with Hamas until it accepted Israel's right to exist and prior agreements reached with the Palestinian Authority. All foreign funding to the Hamas-controlled government ceased, and living conditions for Palestinians in Gaza rapidly deteriorated.

Matters deteriorated in July 2006 when Hezbollah launched rockets against northern Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, and Israel retaliated against Lebanon. Hezbollah intensified rocket attacks against Israeli civilians, and Israeli troops entered Lebanon in an unsuccessful effort to push Hezbollah northward. An uneasy ceasefire was declared on August 14, 2006, follow-

ing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that called for an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the emplacement of a UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon.³⁶ Iran, as Hezbollah's major source of arms and funding, emerged from the conflict with enhanced prestige and made it clear that it would not accept UN demands that Hezbollah disarm. And, in June 2007 chaos engulfed Gaza as virtual civil war erupted between Hamas and Fatah supporters with Hamas gaining full control of Gaza. Thereafter, Israel and Egypt closed border crossings with Gaza and implemented a blockade that permitted only humanitarian supplies into Gaza, restricting exports and squeezing Gaza's economy.

As violence in Gaza escalated, the US sought to revive the stalled roadmap to peace and in 2007 hosted additional peace talks in Annapolis, Maryland. The conference, which included Israelis and Palestinians alongside representatives from over 40 countries, including some without diplomatic ties to Israel, opened with the goal of achieving a two-state solution. Significantly, Hamas was not invited to participate, and violence escalated again in late 2008 when Hamas intensified rocket and mortar attacks against Israel, which retaliated, killing 1300 Palestinians before a ceasefire was reached in January 2009.³⁷ Israel again came under international censure in 2010 when its commandos seized a Turkish aid ship that was part of flotilla attempting to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza during which nine Turks were killed.³⁸ Several weeks later, Israel agreed to allow more civilian goods into Gaza.

Impediments to peace

In addition to conflicts over the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, other issues stand in the way of a Palestine–Israeli settlement. One is the status of Jerusalem, a city holy to three great religions. Before 1967, the city was split between Israel, which controlled West Jerusalem, and Jordan,

which governed East Jerusalem. Israel regarded the 1967 unification of the city as the most important outcome of the Six Day War. Both sides, however, regard the city as their capital and want control of its holy sites, notably the remains of the Great Temple (Beit ha-Midkash) built by King Solomon – known as the Wailing or Western Wall – and the mosque of Al Aqsa that contains the Dome of the Rock from which the prophet Muhammad is said to have ascended to heaven. Moreover, many Palestinians continue to live in East Jerusalem.

Another issue involves distribution of the region's water resources. Existing resources are barely adequate to meet the demand posed by the region's population growth. Israel controls much of the water of the River Jordan and began to regulate West Bank ground water after 1967. Available water in the Middle East and North Africa is expected to fall below the scarcity level in the near future as the region's population grows. Inadequate water promises more regional tension.

One durable result of the Middle Eastern wars was the flight of Arab Palestinians from their homes. Many Arab Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab countries after the 1948 War of Independence. Their number grew dramatically during later wars. As a result, the issue of the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper is a festering and unresolved problem. Some observers see the plight of Palestinian refugees as analogous to the plight of Jewish refugees after World War Two. The UN provides significant assistance to refugees in the camps through its Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and UN Resolution 242 referred to the need for a "just settlement of the refugee problem."

The heart of the problem is deciding what "just settlement" means. Palestinians demand the right to property they left when they fled or to be reimbursed for its loss. Israelis see no moral obligation to return property abandoned during the wars that, in their view, were results of Arab aggression, and fear that the return of large numbers of

CONTROVERSY

One of the most controversial issues in Israeli–Palestinian relations involves Palestinians who fled their homes in 1948. Israel's version is that Arab leaders like Jerusalem's Grand Mufti called on the Palestinians to flee and had the Arabs accepted the UN plan for partition, there would have been no refugees. The Arab version is that the Israelis drove the Palestinian refugees from their homes. There is probably some truth to both stories.

Palestinian refugees would overwhelm Israel's Jewish population.

Several factors stand in the way of a lasting solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict:

- *The number and variety of issues reinforce mutual hostility.* Issues are linked, making it difficult to solve one without also solving others. Even worse, compromise on some issues is complicated by the fact they are highly symbolic. Disagreement over Jerusalem, for instance, reflects a fundamental clash, and compromise is difficult because there is no easy way "to split the difference" on matters of symbolic importance.
- *Non-Middle Eastern countries provide belligerents with foreign allies and make regional hostilities part of larger global tensions.* During the Cold War, Soviet–US hostility was reflected in Soviet support for Egypt, Syria, and Iraq versus US support for Israel and Saudi Arabia. Today, complicating factors include the War on Terrorism, Iranian ambitions, Iraqi instability, and outsiders' difficulty in balancing their views on the Palestine question against their need for Middle Eastern oil and their fear of inciting anger in the Arab world.
- *Both the Palestinians and Israelis have fragile political systems and are confronted by powerful*

extremists. Under Arafat, the Palestinian Authority was corrupt, authoritarian, and inept. As a result, in 2006, Palestinians gave Hamas a massive electoral victory and a mandate to form a government that must work with the PLO. They have failed to do so, and today the two factions remain divided. Israel is a democracy, but because it has a large number of political parties in its parliament and the great abyss that separates left and right, leaders are unable to form stable coalitions that are able to make hard decisions such as dividing Jerusalem or disbanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Sharon's stroke in January 2006, conflicts with Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008, and the creation of a conservative Likud government led by Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009 further clouded the future of the peace process. Thus, neither government commands the authority to take bold steps to peace, and both fear civil war if they do so.

- *The small size of the areas at stake exacerbates security problems.* The issue of size is most evident in the case of the Golan Heights. Whoever controls the Heights controls the land below in Israel and Syria. Additionally, Muslims and Jews live close to one another in Jerusalem and elsewhere. As a result, every inch of land becomes a security concern.
- *Mutual stereotypes.* On the one hand, Islamic militants identify Israelis as heirs of the Christian "Crusaders." Despite a large and growing population of religious fundamentalists, Israel is viewed as an economically developed and largely secular Westernized society. On the other, Arab societies are viewed by Israelis as characterized by poverty, illiteracy, and rapid population growth. Thus, there is a psychological barrier between Israelis and Palestinians owing to the stereotyping of each by the other.

Although the impediments to peace are enormous and there are many observers who believe the

peace process is effectively dead, there may be some room for optimism. Both sides, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, seem to realize the need for a two-state solution. Conditions have improved in the West Bank since early 2008. PA forces, with the security cooperation of Israel, have restored order in a number of West Bank towns, and consequently 2010 was "Israel's most terror-free year in a decade."³⁹ As some areas have become safer, economic projects have proliferated. In the three years before 2011, the social and economic infrastructure of the West Bank saw significant growth. More than 1700 community development programs, 120 schools, 50 medical clinics, and three hospitals were built, 1000 miles of road were paved, and 850 miles of water pipes were laid.⁴⁰ There is no guarantee that this progress can continue, and even if it does it will not be sufficient for peace (difficult political concessions still need to be made by both sides), but economic stability and growth may make the political concessions easier and more attractive.

Only time will tell whether and for how long the cycle of violence will persist. In the end, lasting peace in the region may not prove possible until one or several major power(s) physically intervene(s) to separate the foes. The Palestinian plight continues to serve as an excuse for Islamic terrorism.

US–Israeli relations: from Bush to Obama

Israel has long been an American ally, and by virtue of its relationship with Israel and its global power and influence, US active engagement has always been viewed as critical to achieving Middle East peace. When George W. Bush became US President in 2001 the US briefly disengaged from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, at least compared to previous administrations, because the War on Terrorism and growing conflict with Iraq diverted US attention and because some American policy-makers concluded that third-party intervention

in this conflict was futile. Nevertheless, in 2004, Bush made clear his policy toward Israel and the Palestinians. In a letter to Prime Minister Sharon, Bush advanced a position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that aligned closely with Israel’s interests. Bush welcomed Israeli plans to withdraw from some settlements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, but recognized that the final borders of Israeli and Palestinian states would be based on “new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers” (referring to West Bank settlements).⁴¹ In regard to Palestinian refugees, he advocated “the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.”⁴² Finally, he also recognized a “steadfast commitment to Israel’s security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.”⁴³

In the first years of the presidency of Barack Obama, US–Israeli relations appeared to deteriorate and observers wondered if the US and Israel would continue their “special relationship.” This was partly attributable to a change in Israeli leadership, from centrist Prime Minister Olmert to right-wing Prime Minister Netanyahu. Additionally, shifts in US views contributed to a condition that Israel’s ambassador to the US described (but later retracted) as the “worst in 35 years.”⁴⁴ Some Israelis viewed Obama’s Cairo speech in June 2009, in which he called for a “new beginning” in US relations with the Muslim world, as signaling that the United States would no longer favor Israel but would seek a more balanced relationship with Israel and the Palestinians. In addition, more than previous US administrations, the Obama administration has vocally opposed Israeli efforts to continue building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In contrast to President Bush, who opposed the building of new settlements but allowed for the “natural growth” of existing ones, Obama has opposed even natural growth. Thus,

US officials expressed outrage when Israel timed an announcement that new homes would be constructed in East Jerusalem to coincide with US Vice President Joseph Biden’s visit to the country.

While some observers believe such actions signal a basic course change in US policy toward Israel,⁴⁵ others not. A former American ambassador to Israel argues that the US remains a staunch supporter in all the ways that matter, for instance, shielding Israel from UN condemnation for its raid on a Turkish ship and opposing a UN report accusing Israel as well as Hamas of war crimes in the 2008–09 Gaza conflict. “At the end of the day, what every president and prime minister has come around to realizing is a fundamental truth: both countries need each other and they have to find ways of working together.”⁴⁶

Militant Islam: the “Green Menace”

There are almost 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, with large Islamic communities in the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. There are also growing communities in Europe and the United States. Most Muslims live in the less-developed world and are victims of rapid population growth, poverty, and joblessness. Confronted by challenges of modernization, secularism, and globalization, Muslim political consciousness and activism have intensified in recent decades, and Islam is divided between moderate reformers and militant fundamentalists. Thus, in referring to the latter some Western officials have gone so far as to speak of a “Green Menace” (green being the color of Islam) in terms once reserved for “Red” communists (Map 7.3).

Fundamentalism

Religious fundamentalism is a belief that one’s religious texts are infallible and historically

accurate and that seeks to return to a “pure” version of the faith. Whereas Christian fundamentalists emphasize the Bible as fundamental to their faith, Islamic fundamentalists turn to the Koran and Sunnah (the habits and sayings of Muhammad). As in Christianity and Judaism, there are different strains of Islamic fundamentalism. For most Muslims, Islam is a religion and a culture, but for some it is a political ideology that drives them to seek political change, sometimes violently. The central conviction of this ideology is that believers must “restore an older, better order that existed before the calamities of modernity.”⁴⁷

The variant of Islamic fundamentalism known as “Islamism” is a diverse worldwide **social movement** that has evolved since the 1950s and 1960s. The movement began in the Arab world where it first attracted students, mainly in science, education, and medicine, who had been exposed to Western ideas and culture. In the 1980s, Islamism or political Islam spread beyond Arab states, and became influential in Iran where a number of different groups, including conservative merchants and mullahs, newly urbanized unemployed youth, and radicalized and frustrated intelligentsia, united to overthrow the shah (king). By

the 1990s, the movement had spread to Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and several Central Asian republics. Relatively few members of the movement were violent. As with all social movements, adherents sought to acquire political power to transform society, but, in the Middle East, these groups were denied access to political systems that viewed them as threatening to existing, often secular, power structures.

One group that received renewed attention in 2011 with the historic protests to oust Egypt’s President Mubarak is the Muslim Brotherhood. This is “the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization,”⁴⁸ and has a presence in over 70 countries. The movement, founded in 1928 by an Egyptian schoolteacher, Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), initially focused on Islamic morals and good works. The Brotherhood advocated practicing Islam as a comprehensive way of life, rather than as just a religion and it continues to believe that Islamic law should be applied to all aspects of life. During its first 20 years, it evolved into a large, popular movement with its own political party and a paramilitary wing that used violence to end British occupation of Egypt. In 1948, the Brotherhood was dissolved, and later that year several of its members were

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What explains the tendency of some Islamists to radicalize and turn to violence? Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to this question. Political disenfranchisement can turn a group violent if it believes there is no other way to acquire political influence. Hamas falls in this category, but some disenfranchised Muslim groups, like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, have forsworn violence. Political scientists also try to understand the role that poverty, education, weak governments, and religion play in fueling militancy. However, none of these factors alone sufficiently explains extremism. One important element in the rise of Islamic extremism is moral outrage over the suffering of Muslims in one’s own country or elsewhere. This outrage can turn people against their own governments or foreign governments that they hold responsible. Islamist politics are further complicated by the fact that weak and/or dictatorial regimes in the Middle East restricted the media to hide their own abuses and encouraged citizens to direct pent-up outrage against foreign powers.

implicated in assassinating Egypt's prime minister. The Muslim Brotherhood was officially outlawed in 1954 for its role in an assassination attempt on President Nasser. Unable to participate openly in politics, the group went underground. In recent decades, however, "the Brotherhood has consistently and insistently distanced itself from any call for revolution [and] violence."⁴⁹ When the Brotherhood tried to re-enter politics in the 1980s by allying with legal political parties, Mubarak rewrote Egypt's constitution to prevent political parties based on "any religious background or foundation" and to ban independent candidates from running for president.⁵⁰ Mubarak's repression of any opposition was a key factor in the unrest that spread from Tunisia to Egypt in 2011 and thereafter to other Middle East countries including Libya, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain.

The extent of the Muslim Brotherhood's militancy is unclear. Its stated policy makes it a centrist Islamist group, having officially renounced violence as legitimate means for bringing about political change and declaring "constitutional rule to be closest to Islamic rule."⁵¹ Some observers, however, fear that its support for democracy is merely a tactic to acquire political power so it can pursue a more militant agenda. Throughout the Middle East, including Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the Brotherhood has tried, with mixed success, to work through normal political channels. Those who fear it point out that Hamas, originally the Palestinian Brotherhood, is an outgrowth of the Brotherhood. Moreover, elements of the Brotherhood remain passionately anti-Israeli and anti-Western.

The Muslim Brotherhood is primarily a Sunni movement, but Islamism is not limited to the Sunni world. An Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979 has had significant implications for the emergence of militant Islam worldwide.

The Iranian revolution and its consequences

The growth of militant Islam first came to the attention of Americans in 1978–79 when supporters of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, spiritual leader of Iran's Shia Muslims, overthrew the country's long-time American friend, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–80), setting off an Islamic revolution in Iran. The shah's regime was a close ally of the US. This alliance frustrated many Iranians, who viewed their shah as an American "puppet." This perception was reinforced when the US and Britain conspired to reinstall the shah in 1953, two years after Iran's parliament had nationalized a British-owned oil industry and elected Mohammed Mossadegh (1882–1967), a staunch nationalist, as prime minister. Britain boycotted Iran's oil and sought support from the US to oust the Mossadegh government.

The shah was controversial, both for his policies and his extravagant lifestyle. He pursued ambitious economic and social reforms that alienated key segments of society and made grand promises he could not fulfil. His reforms produced unemployment, inflation, and poverty, and a corrupt elite grew wealthy from Iran's oil revenues. The shah was reported to have siphoned \$20 billion dollars into his personal accounts, and he had a lavish lifestyle, including a celebration in 1971 commemorating the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire that was estimated to cost \$200 million.⁵² The shah sought to turn Iran into a modern, secular society, pouring money into education and granting women more rights. As a result, many Iranian women refused to wear headscarves or behave as Islamists demand.

Conservative Shia clerics opposed these reforms and their effects, denouncing the shah for ignoring Islam's commitment to social and economic justice and for being a Western puppet. Prominent among his critics was Ayatollah Khomeini, a cleric living in exile in Najaf, Iraq (having been expelled from Iran in 1964). From

Najaf, Khomeini delivered angry sermons calling for revolution to overthrow the regime and impose *sharia* law. His sermons were taped and distributed throughout Iran. Facing growing dissent, the shah used the Iranian Secret Police (SAVAK) and a network of informants to suppress dissent. These policies turned many of Iran's citizens against him, including the *bazaari* (conservative merchants and workers in Iran's bazaars) and university students. In November 1978, demonstrations and strikes brought the economy to a standstill and in January 1979, the shah fled for a "vacation" of "undetermined duration."⁵³

On February 1, 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran to establish an Islamic republic governed by the country's leading Shia *mullahs* (religious clerics) organized as a Council of Guardians and sworn to govern according to the teachings of the Koran. One event in particular fixed foreign attention on the revolution: the American hostage crisis.

THE HOSTAGE CRISIS In November 1979, Iranian students, reacting to President Carter's offer to allow the deposed shah to seek cancer treatment in the United States, seized the US embassy in Teheran in violation of international law. The students held the entire staff hostage, save for six diplomats who escaped, ransacked the building, and made public documents the embassy staff had not destroyed. Khomeini was not behind the hostage taking, but he turned it to his advantage, declaring it the beginning of "the second revolution, greater than the first."⁵⁴ He used the crisis to purge the new Islamic government of its liberal elements, including the prime minister.

Fifty-two US diplomats, marines, and intelligence officers were held in the embassy and then moved to other locations across Iran during the 444-day crisis. When it was clear that diplomacy would not resolve the crisis, Washington embargoed Iranian oil imports and froze billions of dollars of Iranian assets in the US, eventually breaking diplomatic relations and seeking redress through the UN Security Council and the

International Court of Justice, which ruled in America's favor. It even attempted an unsuccessful military raid 1980. The hostages were finally released in January 1981. By some accounts, it taught Iran "that kidnapping and terrorism are useful weapons against the United States"⁵⁵ and irrevocably damaged US-Iranian relations. To this day, the two countries remain suspicious of each other and do not maintain diplomatic relations.

SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR Owing to the hostage crisis, the United States "tilted" toward Iraq when that country invaded Iran in September 1980. The war, which resulted in about one million deaths, was begun by Iraq and was driven by the complex mix of regional rivalry, ethnic and religious politics, and personality. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's (1937–2006) stated rationale for invading Iran was a longstanding territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway (the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) that serves as the boundary between the two countries. He had been forced to cede this valuable waterway in 1975, leaving Iraq almost landlocked (while Iran had access to the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman), and he sought to reclaim it during Iran's temporary weakness. Another goal was to reunite Iran's Arab populations living in Khuzistan province under an "Arab" government, although this claim was probably more about gaining access to oil reserves in that territory. Saddam was also reacting to Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq, including promoting unrest among Iraq's Kurdish minority and spreading its revolution and influence to Iraq where a minority Sunni population ruled over Shias. In a word: "The war began . . . because the weaker state, Iraq, attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbor, Iran, to shape the regional status quo according to its own image."⁵⁶

Saddam thought he could achieve a quick victory, with the Iranian government still consolidating its revolution. Instead, despite assistance from the US, France, and Saudi Arabia, the conflict

lasted far longer than Iraq intended and took a huge human and economic toll. At the height of the conflict, 10 percent of Iraq's population was serving in the army. In both countries, most men of military age were mobilized. The combined cost of the war to both (direct and indirect) is estimated to have been over \$1 trillion. Iraq spent \$95 billion on the war, to which it allocated 57 percent of its GDP.⁵⁷

The war was fought like World War One, with trenches, massed attacks, and mustard and nerve gas. Civilians on both sides were victims of missile attacks, aerial bombardment, and artillery barrages. Iraq used a variety of chemical weapons against Iranians as well as its own Kurdish civilians who Saddam believed to be cooperating with the enemy. Initially, Iraqi advantages in modern weapons produced victories, but in 1982 the tide turned as Iran sent masses of armed child “martyrs” against Iraqi positions in human waves. Thereafter, the war became one of attrition, and as many as one million people died. Iraq suffered some 375,000 casualties, a number proportionally equivalent to over five million US casualties.

Each side sought to destroy the other's capacity to export oil, thereby endangering the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the West. When a US-flagged oil tanker, the *Sea Isle City*, was attacked by Iranians in October 1987, US forces retaliated by destroying two Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf. Soon, the USSR and then the United States stepped up efforts to end the war partly from fear that an Iranian-style Islamic republic might emerge in Baghdad. Finally, in August 1988, both countries, exhausted, accepted a UN demand for a ceasefire. In the end, it was as futile war: “Opportunistic in conception, clumsy but unrelentingly lethal in execution and horrific in its accumulating human toll, its result left both parties more or less where they started territorially – a pointless war fought by two regimes intent on their own survival while largely unaccountable to their publics.”⁵⁸

The war ended in stalemate, but the conditions that had produced it were unchanged. This costly

war also had broader significance for regional and politics. The war drained Iraq's economy and prompted its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, precipitating the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). In Iran, the impact of the war was simultaneously to drain popular zeal for the Islamic Revolution and intensify nationalism.⁵⁹ Along with distrust of the international community that allowed Iraq to use chemical weapons against its soldiers and civilians and to bomb its cities, nationalism fueled Iran's desire to regain regional primacy and develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Regional instability was further exacerbated by the appearance of Islamic terrorism. Let us now examine this complex threat.

9/11 and the War on Terrorism

Islamic militancy has prompted some observers to view the conflict between the West and Islam as the clash of competing civilizations described by political scientist Samuel Huntington (see Chapter 13, pp. 447–50). Militant Muslims, including Al Qaeda, claim to act on behalf of a universal Islamic community. Their enemy is variously the United States, Israel, Christianity, globalization, or the secular West. In journalist Judith Miller's words, militants argue that “rule is a prerogative not of the people, but of God, who appointed the prophet, who, in turn, prescribed the general precepts of governance in God's own words, the Koran.”⁶⁰ Since the Iranian revolution, some observers have come to view strident Islam, as Miller puts it, in “images of car bombs, murder, and young, bearded holy warriors bent on historic revenge.”⁶¹ Terrorist bombings in Bali, Nairobi, Istanbul, Madrid, and London have reinforced this perception.

Afghanistan and Iraq

Western–Islamic hostility is visible in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Afghan War began

in reaction to Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Thereafter, Washington justified the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq by calling it a new "frontline in the war on terror," implying a link – never confirmed – between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. However, both conflicts lasted much longer than their architects had expected and still pose complex challenges for Western policy.

THE AFGHAN BACKGROUND Afghanistan has a turbulent history dominated by an absence of authoritative central rule, and powerful and disputatious ethnic groups. These features help explain why both the Soviet invasion as well as earlier British incursions failed.

Taking advantage of Afghan weakness during the country's civil war between 1819 and 1826, Britain invaded Afghanistan, partly from fear of Russia's intention toward neighboring British India. This First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42) climaxed with the slaughter of a British army at the hands of the Afghans. British fears of Russia persisted, and the British re-entered the country in 1878, igniting the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Two years later, British forces again withdrew from Afghanistan and its fearful terrain of deserts and mountains. In the following years, Russia seized a slice of territory on Afghanistan's northern border. In response, Britain severed what is today Pakistan from Afghanistan and made it part of its Indian Empire. In 1919, a Third Anglo-Afghan War ended in yet another British defeat.

Persistent political instability notwithstanding, Afghanistan stayed out of the headlines until Prince Mohammad Daoud became Prime Minister in 1953 and established close ties with the USSR.

THE SOVIET INVASION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE The birth of the Islamic guerrilla movement in Afghanistan dates from a bloody 1978 communist coup. Angered by the new regime's efforts to secularize the country, conservative Islamic warriors took up arms. The regime's

incompetence triggered a Soviet invasion of the country in December 1979, and the USSR installed "their man," Babrak Karmal, who became a hated figure in Afghan eyes. Resistance against the regime and Soviet occupation ended in Moscow's 1989 withdrawal. Many Muslims were transformed into militants in resisting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where they were armed by the United States. After the Soviet withdrawal, these fighters turned their efforts toward overturning secular governments and opposing Western influence, culminating in Al Qaeda's attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.

In 1992, Afghanistan descended into warring ethnic strife. In 1996, however, a new Islamic force, the Taliban, consisting of religious graduates from traditional Islamic seminary schools or *madrasas*, took control of the country, declaring it to be an Islamic state. Afghans initially welcomed the Taliban because it had ended violence and corruption, but its imposition of an ultra-conservative brand of fundamentalism alienated the Taliban from many traditional Afghans. Religious police destroyed televisions with axes, banned music, made men wear beards, forced women to remain at home, and required them to wear the *chador* (a traditional long black robe of Islamic women).

AL QAEDA AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM

Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan became a sanctuary for Islamic militants who came from regions as disparate as Chechnya in the Russian Caucasus, Palestine, Europe, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Xinjiang in China. Most important were bin Laden and his shadowy organization of Muslim terrorists who had moved from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996. There, in 1998 and 1999, he was targeted by the Clinton administration and the CIA, and a number of efforts were made to kill or capture him, including a cruise missile strike on a terrorist training camp in 1998 following the bombing of US embassies in East Africa.

Bin Laden, a wealthy Yemen-born militant, espoused a form of Sunni Islam that interprets the Muslim duty of **jihad** to mean holy war against infidels and the forcible imposition of Islam on non-Muslims (see Key document, below). He was involved in bombings of the World Trade Center

in 1993 and the Khobar Towers housing American servicemen in Saudi Arabia in 1996. He was also instrumental in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the destroyer *USS Cole* in Yemen (see Table 7.1 for a more thorough list of Al Qaeda's

KEY DOCUMENT

EXCERPTS FROM OSAMA BIN LADEN'S 1996 "DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE AMERICANS OCCUPYING THE LAND OF THE TWO HOLY PLACES"⁶²

It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslim's blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. . . Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippines, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya and in Bosnia-Herzegovina took place, massacres that send shivers in the body and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch and hear, and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves.

The people of Islam awakened and realized that they are the main target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusaders alliance . . .

The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet . . . is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia] . . . by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies . . .

Today your brothers and sons . . . have started their Jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from of the country of the two Holy places. And there is no doubt you would like to carry out this mission too, in order to re-establish the greatness of this Umma [Islamic Community] and to liberate its' [sic] occupied sanctities . . .

It is now clear that those who claim that the blood of the American soldiers (the enemy occupying the land of the Muslims) should be protected are merely repeating what is imposed on them by the regime; fearing the aggression and interested in saving themselves. It is a duty now on every tribe in the Arab Peninsula to fight, Jihad, in the cause of Allah and to cleanse the land from those occupiers . . .

My Muslim Brothers of The World:

Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy – your enemy and their enemy – the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one's own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam.

Table 7.1 Suspected al-Qaeda terrorist acts

1993	February	Bombing of World Trade Center (WTC); 6 killed.
	October	Killing of US soldiers in Somalia.
1996	June	Truck bombing at Khobar Towers barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; killed 19 Americans.
1998	August	Bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 224 killed, including 12 Americans.
1999	December	Plot to bomb millennium celebrations in Seattle foiled when customs agents arrest an Algerian smuggling explosives into the US.
2000	October	Bombing of the <i>USS Cole</i> in port in Yemen; 17 US sailors killed.
2001	September	Destruction of World Trade Center; attack on Pentagon. Total dead 2,992.
	December	Man tried to detonate shoe bomb on flight from Paris to Miami.
2002	April	Explosion at historic synagogue in Tunisia left 21 dead, including 14 German tourists.
	May	Car exploded outside hotel in Karachi, Pakistan; killed 14, including 11 French citizens.
	June	Bomb exploded outside American consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; killed 12.
	October	Boat crashed into oil tanker off Yemeni coast; killed 1.
	October	Nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia; killed 202, mostly Australian citizens.
	November	Suicide attack on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya; killed 16.
2003	May	Suicide bombers killed 34, including 8 Americans, at housing compounds for Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
	May	4 bombs killed 33 people targeting Jewish, Spanish, and Belgian sites in Casablanca, Morocco.
	August	Suicide car bomb killed 12, injured 150 at Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia.
	November	Explosions rocked a Riyadh, Saudi Arabia housing compound; killed 17.
	November	Suicide car bombers simultaneously attacked 2 synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey; killed 25 and injured hundreds.
	November	Truck bombs detonated at London bank and British consulate in Istanbul, Turkey; killed 26.
2004	March	10 bombs on 4 trains exploded almost simultaneously during the morning rush hour in Madrid, Spain; killed 202 and injured more than 1,400.
	May	Terrorists attacked Saudi oil company offices in Khobar, Saudi Arabia; killed 22.
	June	Terrorists kidnapped and executed American Paul Johnson, Jr., in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
	September	Car bomb outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia; killed 9.
	December	Terrorists entered the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; killed 9 (including 4 attackers).
2005	July	Bombs exploded on 3 trains and a bus in London, England; killed 52.
	October	22 killed by 3 suicide bombs in Bali, Indonesia.
	November	57 killed at 3 American hotels in Amman, Jordan.
2006	August	Alleged attempt to blow up 10 planes using liquid explosives; 24 British-born Muslims arrested.
2007	June	An attempted car bombing in London; the following day an SUV carrying explosives crashes into an entrance of the Glasgow airport.
	December	60 people are killed in two suicide attacks near UN office buildings in Algiers, Algeria Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is assassinated at a campaign rally; 23 others are killed in the attack.
2008	February	Two women suicide bombers kill nearly 100 people in pet markets in eastern Baghdad.
	June	A car bomb outside the Danish Embassy in Pakistan kills 6 and injures dozens. Al Qaeda claims the attack was retaliation for the 2006 publication of political cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad.
	September	The US Embassy in Yemen is struck by a car bomb and rocket; 16 people are killed.
2009	April	Six attacks kill 36 people and injure more than 100 in Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad; two weeks later another 80 people are killed in three more suicide bombings.
	December	A double agent kills 8 American civilians in a suicide attack at a US base in Afghanistan; 7 of the dead are CIA agents. A Nigerian man on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit attempts unsuccessfully to detonate a explosive device hidden in his underwear.

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At home, America's anti-terrorist campaign led to dramatic security measures, including the 2001 passage of the Patriot Act which included a series of measures meant to enhance US security against terrorists. Some of these measures seemed to circumscribe individual rights. Of special concern to civil rights advocates was the internment of about 1000 mainly Muslim immigrants by the Justice Department. About 600 "enemy combatants" taken prisoner in Afghanistan and elsewhere were held at the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba without the rights available to accused criminals in the United States or to those defined as prisoners of war and thus protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The International Committee of the Red Cross vigorously protested their status, but the Bush administration argued that infringement of some individual rights was necessary in light of the severity of the threat.

activities). Bin Laden supported the causes of Islamic militants around the world, and Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan attracted many foreign Muslims. He also decried US support of Israel, Russia's war in Chechnya, and Serbia's war against Bosnia's Muslims. However, bin Laden's special cause was the expulsion of American economic, political, and military influence from Saudi Arabia.

On September 11, 2001, the world was horrified by televised images of hijacked aircraft crashing into New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Passengers resisted terrorists on a fourth plane that crashed into a field near Pittsburgh. Over 3000 people died. The event was the single bloodiest act of terrorism in history and transformed US foreign policy. America's War on Terrorism was waged both overseas and at home. America's CIA, FBI, and special operations forces have pursued Muslim militants in such diverse settings as the remote tribal areas along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, Djibouti and Somalia in East Africa, and Yemen.

THE AFGHAN WAR In declaring a War on Terrorism, President Bush demanded that the Taliban surrender bin Laden. The refusal of the

Taliban to do so triggered an American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 that, in alliance with a coalition of ethnic forces called the Northern Alliance, ousted the Taliban. The immediate goals of the war were to find Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants, and destroy Al Qaeda. The US achieved the first goal in less than a month. Then, in June 2002, Hamid Karzai was selected to head a coalition government consisting of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkmen representing the country's major ethnic groups. In January 2004, a new constitution was approved and Karzai was elected Afghanistan's president. Once the initial goal of ousting the Taliban was achieved and the war in Iraq unfolded, the Afghan effort became a forgotten war, inadequately funded and with insufficient troops. Efforts to find bin Laden, who was believed to have fled to Pakistan's border areas, were unsuccessful for many years. Then, in May 2011, bin Laden was killed in a raid by US Special Forces at a compound only 50 miles outside Islamabad, in Pakistan. In the intervening years, the Taliban had recovered, and by 2005 the war evolved into a violent insurgency in which the Taliban and other groups, funded by the opium trade, fight to control the country. In 2009, the NATO-led coalition suffered 500 dead, equivalent to half of *all* the soldiers killed during the previous seven years.⁶³ In an

effort to manage the escalating violence, in December 2009, President Obama committed an additional 30,000 soldiers, increasing the number of coalition troops in Afghanistan to nearly 150,000 by 2010.

The ineffectiveness and corruption of the Karzai government aided the Taliban resurgence. Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is believed to have been a drug trafficker who had a "mafia-like grip on Kandahar," and who engaged in electoral fraud to achieve his brother's re-election in 2009.⁶⁴ Another brother, Mahmoud, reportedly purchased Afghanistan's only cement plant from the government after presenting the minister of mines with a box carrying \$25 million in cash. Corruption and fraud also contribute to the failure of state institutions at all levels. Parliamentary elections in 2010 were plagued by "vote-buying, intimidation, and ballot-stuffing" on both sides,⁶⁵ and investigations of this fraud delayed the opening of parliament until January 2011.

Success in Afghanistan is complicated by the fact that Taliban and Al Qaeda elements are active in neighboring Pakistan, where NATO forces cannot engage them. The US has come to view Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theatre, and its goals include a comprehensive strategy to cooperate with Pakistan (another fragile state) and "develop and modernize" Afghanistan and its government,⁶⁶ while fighting a counterinsurgency war. Secretary of Defense Gates explained the limits of these objectives as follows:

Our goal is not a country that is free of corruption, which would be unique in the entire region. Our goal is, what do we need to do, along with our partners and the Afghans, to turn back the Taliban's military and violent capabilities, to the degree that the Afghan government forces can deal with them, and to provide some minimal capability at the local, district and provincial level for security, for dispute resolution, for perhaps a clinic within an hour's walk?⁶⁷

Only the future will tell whether these goals can be met. Evidence of military success is mixed, and more boots on the ground may accomplish little when faced with endemic corruption and broken political institutions.

The Iraq dimension

Two wars in little more than a decade led to the virtual collapse of authority in Iraq and a vicious insurgency against occupying US troops and the Iraq government. The next section traces the evolution of the Iraq issue, beginning with the country's birth after World War One.

THE BIRTH OF MODERN IRAQ Modern Iraq is a recent creation. Britain constructed the country in 1920 out of three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire which had ruled them since 1534. London's objective was to secure in a single British-controlled country the major oil resources of the region. However, the inhabitants of the three provinces – Mosul, Baghdad, and Al Basra – had little in common, resulting in an artificial entity held together by authoritarian leaders.

Today, Iraq's population is about 75 percent Arab and 20 percent Kurdish, while about 60 percent of the Arab population is Shia and 35 percent Sunni.⁶⁸ According to historian Margaret MacMillan:

In 1919 there was no *Iraqi people*; history, religion, geography pulled the people apart, not together. Basra looked south, toward India and the Gulf; Baghdad had strong links with Persia; and Mosul had closer ties with Turkey and Syria. Putting together the three Ottoman provinces and expecting to create a nation was, in European terms, like hoping to have Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs make one country. As in the Balkans, the clash of empires and civilizations had left deep fissures . . . There was no *Iraqi nationalism*, only Arab.⁶⁹

Britain went ahead in the belief that its rule of Iraq would continue. Faisal I (1885–1933), the Arab leader who along with T. E. Lawrence (1888–1935) (Lawrence of Arabia) had led the Arab revolt against the Ottomans in World War One, was made king, and Britain granted Iraq independence in 1932. Faisal remained in power with the support of the Iraqi army and the British and because he was willing to grant autonomy to Iraq's religious and ethnic groups. Faisal died in 1933 and was replaced by his son Ghazi, who was in turn succeeded by his infant son, King Faisal II in 1939.

When a coterie of anti-British Iraqi nationalists with links to Nazi Germany staged a coup in 1941, British troops returned and restored a pro-British government, which remained an ally of the West during the early Cold War. Matters changed abruptly when a 1958 military coup abolished Iraq's monarchy and proclaimed a republic with ties to Egypt's President Nasser. In 1963, officers associated with the Baath Party overthrew the regime, and turmoil ensued until a 1968 coup brought to power a Revolutionary Command Council with Saddam Hussein as vice chair. Saddam became Iraq's president in 1979. The Baath Party was nationalist, secular, and socialist. As a nationalist party, it sought Arab unity and an end to foreign influence and, consistent with this, it opposed the partition of Palestine. The Baathist government was hostile to the West and sought close ties to the USSR with which it signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR Hardly had the Iran–Iraq War ended when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, a small oil-rich country that had been founded in 1756 as an autonomous sheikdom. Kuwait, like Iraq, had been administered by Britain after World War One, becoming independent in 1961. A month later, Iraq invaded the new country, claiming it as a former province of the Ottoman Empire. British forces repelled the invasion and, in 1963, Iraq recognized Kuwaiti independence.

Following the Iraq–Iran War, Kuwait loaned Iraq huge sums to assist reconstruction, and by 1990 Iraq owed Kuwait \$10 billion. Kuwait, however, impeded Iraq's ability to repay its loans by pumping more oil than permitted by OPEC, a policy that reduced oil prices and, consequently, Iraq's oil revenue. Iraq demanded that Kuwait forgive its share of the debt and help repay what Iraq owed other Arab states. Iraq also accused Kuwait of “slant drilling” oil along their common desert border; that is, employing equipment that enabled Kuwaitis to take Iraqi oil from Kuwait's side of the border. Baghdad also accused Kuwait of ingratitude in light of the fact that Iraq had represented *all* Arabs in its war with Iran.

Iraqi pressure on Kuwait continued into the summer. Nevertheless, Saddam assured Egypt's president that he would not invade Kuwait and provided a similar assurance to America's ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie. Ambassador Glaspie responded: “I have direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.”⁷⁰ Based on this conversation, controversy erupted after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as to whether the ambassador had clearly communicated Washington's opposition to an invasion.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq sent an army of 150,000 troops and 2000 tanks into Kuwait, conquering the country in hours. The UN Security Council quickly passed resolutions condemning the invasion and ordering Iraq to withdraw, and then authorizing sanctions against Baghdad. President Bush lauded Russian–US cooperation in the UN as evidence of how the world had changed since the end of the Cold War. Invoking Woodrow Wilson's vision of collective security, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared: “Iraq's invasion of Kuwait defies every principle for which the United Nations stands. If we let it succeed, no small country can ever feel safe again. The law of the jungle would take over from the rule of law.”⁷¹ “Iraq,” added Bush, “will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. And that's not a threat. It's not a boast. It's just the way it's going to be.”⁷²

Shortly after, the Persian Gulf War began. On August 7, US forces began to deploy in Saudi Arabia, initially to deter a further Iraqi thrust toward the Saudi oilfields. The next day Saddam announced the annexation of Kuwait. In late November, another Security Council Resolution gave Iraq until January 15, 1991, to withdraw or face members' "use of all necessary means" to expel it from Kuwait. This was the first occasion since the 1950 Korean War that the Security Council had invoked Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter authorizing the use of military force. Saddam tried to deter a military response by taking Western hostages and hinting at Iraq's possible use of chemical weapons and missiles. Nevertheless, the US Congress narrowly voted to support the war – 250 to 183 in the House and 52 to 47 in the Senate.

With UN approval, the United States, which ultimately sent 400,000 troops, led a diverse coalition. The main contributors were Britain, France, and Saudi Arabia, with additional contingents from 12 other countries including Syria and Egypt. Others assisted in other ways. For instance, German and Japanese funds eased America's fiscal burden. Israel posed a delicate problem for the allies because Saddam threatened and then carried out Scud missile attacks against that country. Had Israel joined the war, Arab members would have left the coalition. Among Arab states, Iraq enjoyed little support except from Jordan, Yemen, and the PLO.

Two days after the UN deadline, Operation Desert Storm began with a massive air assault. The campaign featured high-tech weapons including Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth bombers. This was the first large-scale use of precision, or "smart," weapons. The land offensive began on February 24, 1991, and Iraqi resistance swiftly collapsed. So rapidly did coalition forces sweep northward that some Iraqi soldiers were buried alive in their entrenchments by US and British tanks equipped with bulldozer blades to breach the mounds of earth behind which Iraqi troops were hiding. Iraqi forces put up little fight,

but in an act of malicious eco-terrorism, they set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells as they fled. The war was won in 100 hours. On February 28, the Bush administration declared a ceasefire because it concluded that further slaughter of Iraqi troops would have a negative public relations effect and feared that a total collapse of Iraq would trigger conflict among Turkey, Syria, the Kurds, and Iran to fill the resulting power vacuum. That decision later proved a source of controversy in the West.

Despite Iraq's rout in what Saddam called the "mother of all battles," he had survived, and his regime brutally put down a rebellion by the Shia population in southern Iraq and then launched an equally brutal campaign against dissident Kurds in the north. Thereafter, US and British aircraft enforced "no-fly zones" to protect Iraq's Shia and Kurdish populations (Map 7.4).⁷³ UN sanctions against Iraq also were continued after the war, worsening living conditions for ordinary Iraqis as their government misused funding made available by oil sales.

By the agreement ending the war, Iraq had to meet several conditions to end sanctions, including admission of liability for damages, destruction of biological and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them, ending efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and accepting international inspectors to assure Iraqi compliance. Between 1991 and 1998, a UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made progress in dismantling and monitoring Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, but it was unable to verify Iraq's claim that it had destroyed all its WMD. Iraq's refusal to cooperate fully with UNSCOM prompted US–British air strikes in late 1998.

THE IRAQ WAR Between 1991 and 2003, US–Iraqi hostility persisted. After 9/11, Anglo-American air operations in the "no-fly zone" intensified to pressure Saddam Hussein to readmit UN arms inspectors and suppress Iraqi air defenses in anticipation of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq called "Operation Iraqi Freedom." The



Map 7.4 Iraqi ethnic groups

descent into another war with Iraq began in 2002. In his State of the Union, President Bush identified Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea, and vowed that the US would “not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Saddam, nevertheless, resisted pressure to readmit UN weapons inspectors to Iraq, while continuing to negotiate with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Hans Blix,

head of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

On September 12, 2002, President Bush went before the UN to demand that the organization enforce its resolutions against Iraq. If not, Bush declared, the United States would act unilaterally. Several of America’s European allies, notably Germany and France, as well as Russia and China, vigorously opposed US threats of war against Iraq. On October 11, US pressure increased when

DID YOU KNOW?

President Bush got his idea for the phrase “axis of evil” by combining President Ronald Reagan’s description of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” with the term axis as used in World War Two. “Axis” appeared in a speech in Milan’s cathedral by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini on November 1, 1936, describing relations between Germany and Italy. Since a mathematical axis describes a straight line around which a geometric figure can rotate, the term suggested that the two countries wanted Europe to revolve around the line connecting Berlin and Rome, their capital cities.⁷⁴

Congress authorized war against Iraq if necessary. A month later, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution demanding that Iraq permit new WMD inspections, but the Council divided over whether this resolution authorized US military action, with Washington



"I see weapons of mass destruction!"

Figure 7.3 The search for Saddam’s weapons

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

claiming that it did. Within days, Saddam accepted the resolution; inspectors arrived in Baghdad and began their work; and Iraq denied it harbored WMD (see Figure 7.3).

Despite apparent Iraqi cooperation with the UN, President Bush approved deployment of American troops to the Persian Gulf. In his 2003 State of the Union, Bush again declared that the United States was prepared to attack Iraq with or without UN approval, and the following month Secretary of State Colin Powell presented US intelligence findings to the Security Council, some of which later turned out to be inaccurate. A “coalition of the willing” – the US, Britain, and Spain – then proposed a resolution declaring that Iraq had “failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441” (see Key document, opposite) and that the time had come to authorize the use of military force. Governments that opposed war, including France, Russia, and China (permanent members of the Security Council with the right to veto resolutions) argued for more time to allow inspectors to complete their job. Claiming that Resolution 1441 did not authorize the use of force but only threatened “serious consequences,” these governments asked that inspections be extended to ensure that “the military option should only be a last resort.”⁷⁵

The United States opened its war against Iraq on March 19, 2003, with a sudden cruise missile attack on Baghdad. Described as a **decapitation attack**, the initial air strike targeted Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. Precision-guided weapons played an even larger role in this conflict than they had in the 1991 war. American and British forces, mainly in Kuwait, moved into Iraq, facing little resistance in their march toward Baghdad. By April 4, Baghdad International Airport was in coalition hands, and the following day US troops entered Baghdad. Shortly after, Baghdad fell, and British troops occupied Basra, the country’s second largest city.

On May 1, President Bush declared victory. In July, Saddam Hussein’s two sons were killed, and in December Saddam was captured without a fight

KEY DOCUMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1441 (DECEMBER 20, 2002)⁷⁶

The Security Council

. . . Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security

. . .

Deploing the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure . . . of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles . . . and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations

. . .

Deploing further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors . . .

Deploing the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballisti missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) . . . and the IAEA; and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people . . .

Deploing also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments. . . with regard to terrorism . . . end repression of its civilian population and to provide access to international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and . . . to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq . . .

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance . . .

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions . . .

3. Decides that . . . the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons . . .

13. Recalls . . . that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations . . .

and was later tried for crimes against humanity and executed in December 2006. Nevertheless, the conflict continued. Indeed, the *real* war had just begun. An insurrection against US and British occupation forces spread, beginning in 2003, killing more Americans and Britons after the “victory” than before.⁷⁷ Sunni Muslims who had been favored under Saddam and foreign jihadists waged irregular war against allied forces. They also attacked Iraqis who supported the coalition and foreign civilians involved in Iraq’s reconstruction using roadside bombs (“improvised explosive devices”), car bombs and suicide bombings.

Although advocating democracy in Iraq, Washington at first tried to prevent the majority Shia community from controlling Iraq’s government. An American plan for elections based on a complex system of caucuses was rejected by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who demanded a system of direct voting that would reflect the Shia majority. Washington agreed, and elections for a Transitional National Assembly were held in early 2005 which most Sunnis boycotted. Elections in December 2005, in which Iraq’s Sunnis did participate, saw a victory for a Shia alliance with Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister. Subsequent events saw little reduction in violence in Iraq, and by 2007, Iraq seemed on the verge of full-scale civil war.

Washington reacted to the escalating sectarian violence with a new counterinsurgency strategy designed by General David Petraeus and a “surge” of 30,000 additional troops. Simultaneously, Iraq added 100,000 new soldiers and police as well as 90,000 paid (predominantly Sunni) volunteers known as the Sons of Iraq to patrol neighborhoods.⁷⁸ The surge was successful in curtailing the overall level of violence in Iraq. Nevertheless, by then, sectarian conflict had already produced ethnic cleansing, and the surge reinforced the declining violence that accompanied the segregation of hostile groups into separate enclaves. Also, several Sunni tribes, previously allied with Al Qaeda in Iraq, abandoned the partnership as extremists seized control of local resources and

turned on Sunni leaders, in some cases even ordering their assassination.⁷⁹ When the surge ended, violence had significantly declined.

Assessed by another standard, reconciliation between Shias and Sunnis, the surge was less successful, as demonstrated in Iraq’s 2010 legislative elections in which no coalition won a majority of seats. Maliki’s Shia-led State of Law Coalition won only 89 of 325 seats and came in a close second to a Sunni-backed bloc, Iraqiya, which took 91 seats.⁸⁰ With no decisive victor, the election left a power vacuum that required nine months of negotiations to fill. As the country awaited a new unity government, sectarian violence threatened to reignite. The stalemate was broken only when Muqtada al-Sadr, a prominent anti-Western Shia cleric with links to Iran, threw his support to Maliki, who remained prime minister.

Global opposition to allied policies remained strong as it became clear that the cost of pacifying and reconstructing Iraq were vastly higher than estimated and that no weapons of mass destruction were to be found. Flawed US and British

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

The realist–liberal disagreement repeatedly appears in global politics. Realists deplored the destruction of Iraqi institutions, especially the army, as having created a power vacuum that produced civil war and meddling in Iraq by Iran, Turkey, and other Iraqi neighbors fearful that one or the other may acquire preponderant influence. By contrast, President George W. Bush adopted a liberal perspective in arguing that imposing democracy on Iraq would bring peace there and, as democracy spread elsewhere in the Middle East, peace would follow. These claims echoed those of an earlier American president, Woodrow Wilson.

intelligence, along with a desire of US and British leaders to find a “smoking gun,” was largely to blame for the faulty belief that Iraq had WMD. As violence continued, the issue became highly divisive in the United States, especially as a 2006 CIA National Intelligence Estimate concluded that allied intervention in Iraq fostered Islamic extremism and intensified the global threat of terrorism.⁸¹

The year 2011 witnessed a wave of tumultuous change throughout the Arab world as long-time authoritarian regimes and traditional rulers were confronted with demands for democracy and change.

The changing Middle East

On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself after Tunisian officials had prevented him from selling vegetables. This event triggered massive demonstrations in Tunisia that culminated with the flight of Tunisia’s long-time authoritarian president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, in January 2011. Unrest caused by police brutality, corruption, and poverty spread to Egypt, where massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square against the government of President Mubarak climaxed in establishing military rule as a transition to democratic reform. In February, a rising against Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi triggered a violent civil war between his foes, mainly located in the country’s eastern region, and his supporters. In order to bring an end to the regime’s deadly attacks on civilians the UN authorized establishment of a no-fly zone which was imposed mainly by US, British, and French aircraft that also began to aid the rebels battling Gaddafi loyalists.

Elsewhere in the Middle East unrest exploded in anti-regime demonstrations followed by government repression. In Yemen, many died in protests that began in February against long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In tiny Bahrain, Shia resentment of the Sunni-dominated government

triggered demonstrations and a government crackdown aided by troops from Saudi Arabia, and in Syria the authoritarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad was challenged by unprecedented protests that began in March. Protests also took place in Jordan against King Abdullah II.

The consequences of this anti-regime contagion are unclear. Some fear that pro-democracy movements will be taken over by Islamic movements. Others believe the result will be a vastly more democratic Middle East that will foster economic development. Some think that changes in the status quo will worsen chances for an Israeli–Palestinian settlement, while others believe they will help the peace process. Whatever the outcome in specific countries, one thing is clear: The region will never be the same again.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined major issues in contemporary global politics. Nuclear proliferation is one. As nuclear weapons spread, there is a greater likelihood they will be used. China’s growing power poses another challenge. The country has emerged from decades of self-imposed isolation to become a major player in global politics and economics. Change is the air: China has adopted capitalist methods, and memories of Mao Zedong are fading.

Other issues involve relations with the Muslim world. The Israel–Palestine question has festered for almost six decades. From time to time, resolution has seemed tantalizingly close, only to prove elusive. Related issues center on the contest between moderate and militant Muslims for influence among Muslims worldwide, the rise of Islamic terrorism, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. By 2011, dramatic change was in the air, the results of which remain to be seen.

The next chapter will examine the roots of war and violence more closely, beginning with key factors that political scientists believe contribute to or inhibit war’s outbreak. We will also consider

the changing nature of violence to understand why conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming the norm and why they are so difficult to manage.

Student activities

Map analysis

On map 7.5 below; identify the countries bordering Afghanistan. What are their policies toward Afghanistan?

Cultural materials

Numerous films and books portray the great issues depicted in this chapter. *Divine Intervention* (2002), *Rana's Wedding* (2002), and *Gaza Strip* (2002) portray Palestinian life under Israeli occupation; *Alila* (2003) and *Yana's Friends* (1999) examine life in Tel Aviv and *A Time of Favor* (2000) depicts Jewish life in a West Bank settlement. Contemporary Iraq is also making its way onto film. *Turtles Can Fly* (2004) is about refugee children in Iraqi Kurdistan as they wait for the 2003 Iraq War to begin. A Turkish film with a very different tone, *The Valley of the Wolves: Iraq* (2006), is extremely critical of US soldiers in Iraq as it depicts the deaths of innocent people and the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison. View one of these films and describe the message the film is sending about “the great struggles.”



Map 7.5 Map of Central Asia

Further reading

- Goldstein, Avery, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). Analysis of China's increasing economic and military power.
- Kamrava, Mehran, *The Modern Middle East* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). Development of the modern Middle East with an emphasis on economic development, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and democratization.
- Marsh, Christopher and June Teufel Dreyer, eds, *US–China Relations in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). Analysis of key issues in contemporary US–China relations.
- Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003). An analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- Woodward, Bob, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Detailed examination of US decision making leading up to the 2003 Iraq War.

1337–1453

Hundred Years' War

1795

Immanuel Kant publishes *Perpetual Peace*

1902

John A. Hobson publishes *Imperialism*

1913

Norman Angell publishes *The Great Illusion*

1945–49

China's Civil War

1959

Cuban Revolution

8

The causes of war and the changing nature of global violence

“Officials investigate on Sunday the stern of the South Korean *Cheonan* Navy ship after they salvaged the vessel that sunk off Baengnyeongdo island . . . south of Seoul.”

Kim Tae-Ug/Reuters

Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0419/South-Korea-s-Lee-vows-answers-on-Cheonan-Navy-ship-sinking>

On March 26, 2010, an explosion ripped apart the South Korean warship, *Cheonan*, in two, killing 46 sailors (see Figure 8.1). The incident happened in an area claimed by both North and South Korea. South Korean officials attributed the sinking to a North Korean torpedo. An international team reported in May that “the evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine . . . There is no other plausible explanation.”¹ Tensions flared again in November when North Korean troops shelled a South Korean island near their disputed boundary, killing two soldiers and two civilians.

These incidents were among the most serious since the Korean War ended in 1953. In analyzing

the *Cheonan* incident, political scientist Victor Cha suggests several possible explanations for North Korea's aggressive use of its military power: it may have been trying to exercise **coercive diplomacy** to force South Korea into providing aid to the North; it might have been **swaggering** to force the United States into dealing directly with the regime; or the incident may have been “a manifestation of internal leadership turmoil in Pyongyang and the pursuit of a hard-line” foreign policy.²

This chapter introduces the key concepts and theories employed in understanding the causes of war and the changing nature of global violence. First, it considers the ways in which actors acquire and use **power** and **influence**, two related concepts. Actors sometimes fight wars to gain more power, but they also use influence to sway others without going to war. According to realists and neorealists, power is the defining attribute of the field of global politics and *the* essential determinant of state behavior. “We assume,” wrote realist Hans Morgenthau in a widely cited passage, “that statesmen think and act in terms of interest

1990	1992–95	1994	1999	2001	2002
Iraq invades Kuwait	Bosnian War	Rwanda Genocide	NATO airstrikes in Kosovo	Terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC	The Bush doctrine is announced



Figure 8.1 South Korean naval vessel, *Cheonan*

Source: Kim Tae-Ug/Reuters

defined as power.”³ Whether one agrees with Morgenthau, it is indisputable that power has been a central feature of global politics and a subject of analysis at least since Thucydides. And the concepts and theories that grew out of this history still influence our understanding of global politics – sometimes appropriately, sometimes not. Thus, although interstate war is in decline, military force – a key element of power – remains an attractive instrument, as shown in the Korea example. For these reasons, scholars of global politics have long tried to understand power and the ways in which to use it.

Since relative military power is critical in warfare, we then turn to alternative explanations for the causes of interstate war. Because intrastate war has become more pervasive, the chapter also considers causes and tools for managing such wars. It then evaluates irregular or unconventional, war, beginning with **guerrilla wars** in which revolutionary groups, often fighting a stronger national army, employ tactics very different from those in interstate wars. Another worrisome development is the spread of global terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy that rejects the norms and rules that previously governed warfare

and protected civilians. Indeed, it is a strategy that explicitly targets innocent civilians.

The quest for power and influence

What is power, and how do we know it when we see it? Power has always been central to studies of conflict. Realists argue that global politics entails a struggle for power in which actors' interests are determined by how strong or weak they are relative to one another. They believe power is the "currency" of global politics in the sense that, like money, it is a means to achieve goals, a reserve or stockpile for future contingencies, and an asset to be used with care. In their view, all instruments of policy, including diplomacy, trade, alliances, and treaties, should be judged by how they enhance national power.⁴

According to political scientist Joseph Nye: "Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it."⁵ Most people think they know a powerful actor when they see one, but that does not mean that everyone agrees on what makes that actor powerful. It is tempting to conceptualize power as a tangible capability that permits an actor to do as it wishes. However, this definition confuses capabilities that *might* contribute to power with power itself. If we fall prey to this confusion, then we cannot satisfactorily explain how a few thousand Iraqi insurgents could resist the US superpower. Hence, most analysts agree that power is a *relationship* in which one actor can cause another to act as the first actor wishes. It is "the capacity to produce an intended effect."⁶ Part of the reason why some observers regard power as a "thing" rather than a relationship is because power has no verb form. By contrast, influence can be used as a verb that links a sentence's subject (the influencer) with the target (that which is influenced) and so conveys the idea of a relationship.

Actors can use capabilities in different ways to increase their influence. Thus, we can distinguish

between: (1) "the direct or commanding method of exercising power" by use of coercion and rewards (**hard power**) and (2) influence by virtue of cultural attraction and ideology that shape others' preferences (**soft power**).⁷ Unlike hard power, soft power consists of cultural and reputational factors that produce prestige, and it is more effective and durable than hard power because an actor's preferences are seen as legitimate. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, when warned of the pope's influence in Eastern Europe, is reputed to have asked: "The pope? How many divisions has he got?" Stalin apparently believed that because the pope lacked hard power he lacked influence. As the USSR would discover in later decades, especially after Polish cleric John Paul II became pope in 1978, papal influence among Eastern European Catholics was significant. Ultimately, John Paul played a key role in undermining Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and bringing an end to communism.

Soft power is related to **structural power**, or the power to determine the "rules of the game" and structure the choices of other actors. Such power may flow from reputational and cultural factors, including a dominant language like English and possession of expertise and knowledge, which allow a global leader to impose rules and make others follow those rules. Thus, in the nineteenth century, Great Britain exercised structural power that maintained a system of free trade and expanded and upheld international law. Similarly, after World War Two, the United States enjoyed unique structural power that allowed it to construct and maintain the Bretton-Woods system of international economic institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The idea of soft power is implicit in the postpositivist view that language or "discourse" is a source of power (Chapter 1, pp. 26–7) because it imposes specific interpretations and meanings upon political life. In turn, those who control the "meaning" of events and institutions in global

politics are able to influence others to think as they do, while ignoring alternative interpretations. Postpositivists do not regard meaning making as “an individual or a random activity.” Instead, it “proceeds from society and culture” and involves the “subjugation” of some individuals and groups by others.⁸

Hard power assumes two forms – coercion, or “sticks,” and rewards, or “carrots.” Sometimes hard power is called *situational power* because its use involves manipulating negative and positive incentives that worsen or improve an adversary’s situation. Coercion involves making an adversary modify its behavior to avoid or end punishment and other disincentives, whereas reward involves the use of positive incentives contingent on the target’s doing as the influencer wishes. Threats and promises are like debts that must be paid if actors are to keep their reputations, and they should be distinguished from coercion and rewards. As we shall see, threats are the bases of **deterrence** and **compellence** strategies.

Promises and rewards are the bases of appeasement, a strategy of achieving agreement or maintaining peace by making concessions to satisfy another actor’s justified grievances. As we saw in Chapter 3, appeasement gained an infamous reputation in the 1930s in Western efforts to satisfy Hitler, with disastrous results, and came to mean giving in to the demands of those making threats. However, the strategy was used frequently and with great success by diplomats in the eighteenth century to influence one another peacefully.

There are many purposes for which states may use military force. Among these are: **defense**, **deterrence**, **compellence**, and **swaggering**.⁹ The last three remain important strategies in the contemporary era. The first of these, deterrence, is the use or threat of force to prevent an adversary from acting in a certain way by threatening to retaliate with military force. Although deterrence can be conducted using conventional military or nuclear power, it is generally considered a strategy of the nuclear era and will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 9.

Unlike deterrence, which involves the passive use of force, compellence, also called “coercive diplomacy,” uses limited force to compel an actor to alter its behavior or undo a *fait accompli* (an action already taken). Compellence is strategic interaction that involves calculating the amount of force necessary to stop the opponent from engaging in a certain behavior and, as in deterrence, requiring that adversaries communicate their interests and intentions. If they fail to do so, war may erupt, and both parties may be worse off. Let us now will examine the factors that contribute to a successful compellence strategy.

Compellence is more complex than deterrence. It entails at least some use of coercion to convince an adversary that by failing to alter its behavior it will incur additional pain. It succeeds, *not by the pain it inflicts, but by the prospect of still greater pain in the future in the event of non-compliance*. This is bargaining pure and simple. If an adversary fails to comply, the coercing actor must decide whether to back down or intensify its use of force. Figure 8.2 summarizes the differences between deterrence and compellence.

NATO’s 1999 air strikes in Kosovo (Chapter 13, p. 444) illustrate how compellence works. NATO commenced air strikes against Serbian targets in Kosovo to compel the Serbian government to end its policy of ethnic cleansing there, gradually increasing the damage done to Serbia’s infrastructure. The Serbs ceased fighting, partly because of the threat of *additional* NATO escalation.

Coercive bargaining involving the use of force risks setting off a conflict spiral in which each actor responds to the other’s violence with its own use of violence. Such a hostile spiral resembles the game of *chicken* (see Controversy, below). This is a game in which two cars speed toward each other, straddling the road’s center line. The object is to see which driver will “chicken out” and swerve first.

Disaster occurs in chicken when both actors believe the other is bluffing, and neither swerves. In 1914, Europe’s leaders tried to bully one another to make concessions to avoid collision.




Figure 8.2 Deterrence and compellence

Source: Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?", *International Security*, 4:4 (Spring, 1980), pp. 3–35. © 1980 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

CONTROVERSY GAME THEORY

Chicken is an example of a game: an interaction among actors characterized by rules and strategies in which each actor's outcome depends partly on what other actors do and in which actors try to outwit each other. In chicken, Driver A's decision to swerve is contingent on expectations of B's behavior. If Driver A expects B will swerve, then it is in A's interest to stay on the center line. That course of action, however, will be disastrous if B does *not* swerve. The numbers in each quadrant of Figure 8.3 depict the value of the expected outcomes for each driver. If both drivers swerve (outcome 1:1), both suffer loss of reputation (a relatively small loss, depicted by -5). If only one swerves, there is a loser and a winner (outcomes 1:2 and 2:1). If neither swerves, both lose in a suicidal collision (-50).

Game theory's simplification of complex choices can be helpful to understand how actors' choices are interdependent and why cooperation can be so difficult. However, critics find that games like chicken so oversimplify reality that they ultimately lead to poor understanding and explanation of events. In particular, they find game theory's assumptions (namely, rationality) to be implausible and the structure of the game so simplistic as to ignore relevant players, options, and linkages to other issues.¹⁰

		Driver 2	
		(Swerve)	(Not swerve)
Driver 1	(Swerve) 1	$(-5, -5)$	$(-5, +5)$
	(Not swerve) 2	$(+5, -5)$	$(-50, -50)$

Figure 8.3 Game of Chicken

No one swerved, and all were losers in the resulting conflagration. Disaster can be avoided when one player is persuaded that the other is irrationally prepared to risk suicide by not swerving. Otherwise, *mutual fear forces players to cooperate and avoid the worst outcome*. The way to win a chicken game is to make an adversary believe that one is sufficiently irrational to risk mutual disaster. The game demonstrates the general problem of making credible commitments that are vital in *both* deterrence and compellence. Like adversaries in 1914, the US and the USSR engaged in a chicken game during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, but the outcome was different because the USSR “swerved.” “We were eyeball to eyeball,” declared US Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1909–94) as the crisis ended, “and the other guy just blinked.”

A number of tactics are available to a hot rodder (or a political leader) in a chicken game. He might, for example, throw the steering wheel out the window, making it impossible to swerve. This makes the commitment not to chicken out, however irrational, quite credible. It compels the second hot rodder to swerve because he has the “last clear chance” to avoid mutual suicide. “In strategy, when both parties abhor collision the advantage goes often to the one who arranges the status quo in his favor and leaves to the other the ‘last clear chance’ to stop or turn aside.”¹¹

Swaggering is more comprehensive and less focused than other uses of power. It involves employing military power for purposes beyond defense, deterrence, or compellence. Actors swagger by displaying their military might. They do so not to achieve a particular objective, like deterring or compelling another state, but to “look and feel more powerful and important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decisionmaking, to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others.”¹² Swaggering may facilitate an actor’s efforts to compel or deter, but this is not its primary purpose. Rather, it is intended to enhance prestige.

Countries frequently swagger. North Korea’s shelling of a South Korean island in 2010,

described at the chapter’s beginning, may have been intended to make that country appear more powerful and persuade others to take it more seriously. Vietnam, in celebrating the millennium anniversary of its capital city in October 2010, held what is estimated to be its largest parade ever, in which some 35,000 people marched. About one-third of the procession was military, and military helicopters carried the national flag and communist banner over the event. The parade sent a subtle message to Vietnam’s neighbor China with which it has a long-running dispute over the Paracel and Spratley archipelagos in the South China Sea that “Vietnam is not a place that you want to attack.”¹³

One way to infer power is to observe actors’ relative capabilities. **Capabilities** are an actor’s *means of achieving power*. Some capabilities are tangible and relatively easy to measure, while others like morale and leadership are intangible and can only be estimated. Tangible capabilities include:

- **Military capability.** How large an army does an actor have? How many weapons? What kinds of weapon and of what quality? In short, the greater the military capability of an actor on all these dimensions, the greater is its aggregate power. It is, however, rare for a country to rank high on all dimensions of military capability. For example, as an actor acquires more advanced weaponry, it may reduce its army’s size.
- **Economic resources.** How large is an actor’s gross national product? Is the actor industrialized? What is its level of technological development? Does it have a diversified economy?
- **Natural resources.** Does an actor have access to resources to support its military and economic capabilities?
- **Population.** How large is an actor’s population? A large population can contribute to a larger military and labor force, but it is important to consider a population’s age,

health, and education. Are there enough people of the right age to fight or work? Do they have the skills to use modern technology? Is the population united behind its government, or do cleavages threaten internal unity?

- *Geography.* How large a territory does an actor control? Does it have access to the sea? Does its terrain provide natural defenses like mountains and rivers? Do terrain, climate, and geography permit agriculture or enhance defense?

The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) illustrates how political scientists use such tangible capabilities to analyze state power. This composite, part of the Correlates of War (COW)

dataset,¹⁴ consists of six tangible indicators of power: military personnel, military expenditures, iron and steel production, energy consumption, total population, and urban population. Figure 8.4 illustrates relative US and Russian power using CINC scores between 1939 and 2001.

Tangible capabilities tell only part of the story, however. Consider the following relationships:

China versus Japan. China has a larger population and a larger economic market than Japan, but Japan has a higher level of technology. China's GDP is about twice Japan's. China also has a larger army than Japan and has nuclear weapons, but many of Japan's advanced technologies could be converted to military applications (including nuclear




Figure 8.4 US and Soviet power compared

Source: SAGE Publications Inc. Books

weapons). Finally, Japan has a military alliance with the United States. Which is more powerful, China or Japan?

Vietnam versus the United States. The US had military, economic, and resource preponderance, but failed to win its war against communist North Vietnam. After 20 years of involvement, the United States withdrew the last of its troops in 1973, and North Vietnam achieved its goal of unifying the entire country under its leadership. Which country was more powerful?

The answers to such questions are elusive, especially because specific capabilities do not produce generalized power but are only useful in *particular* contexts. Japan's technology is critical to China's effort to modernize, while China's market is a vital destination for Japan's exports. In this sense, each enjoys leverage over the other. American military superiority in Vietnam was insufficient to achieve victory because the real struggle was for what President Lyndon Johnson called "the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese. Compared to North Vietnam's combination of ideology, nationalism, and guerrilla tactics, America's military prowess was poorly suited to this task.

A second reason why an actor's advantage in tangible resources is not sufficient to judge its relative power is the role of intangible resources which determine how effectively an actor can utilize its tangible capabilities. The most important of these intangible factors are:

- *Resolve.* Economic and military resources have little value if a government lacks the will to use them. Is an actor determined to use capabilities to realize its foreign policy goals? In the case of Vietnam, Americans wearied of the prolonged struggle before their foes did and were less willing to accept high casualties than were the Vietnamese.
- *Leadership and skill.* Are leaders able to rally citizens in support of policies? Can they effec-

tively mobilize resources to pursue their policy? US policy in the Vietnam War, for example, was undermined by President Johnson's inability to mobilize public support for his policy.

- *Intelligence.* Do decision makers understand the interests and capabilities of potential foes? Do they have reliable information about adversaries' intentions and capabilities? The absence of such information has been a key impediment to Western efforts to fight global terrorism.
- *Diplomacy.* How effectively do a country's diplomats represent its interests abroad? Effective diplomats can communicate their country's interests, gauge others' interests, anticipate others' actions, and negotiate compromises.

Six key conclusions about power flow from what we have said:

1. Many elements of power cannot be measured *before* an actor uses its capabilities. For example, when observers refer to "NATO power" or the "power of Afghan insurgents," they are really describing their expectations about how well such actors can mobilize and use the resources available to them. In other words, they are referring to **potential** rather than **actual power**.
2. Power is perceptual. What matters most is how much power others *think* an actor has, rather than how much it *really* has. Sometimes, an actor can manipulate others into thinking it has more power than it really has, for example, by bluffing them into thinking it will use resources that it has no intention of using or does not even have.
3. Power is relative in the sense that "more" or "less" *always* implies a comparison with the power of others. Thus, South Africa and Nigeria are superpowers in relation to other African countries, as are China and India relative to their Asian neighbors.

4. Capabilities that are useful in one context may be of little value in another. Thus, the quality of military forces promises great power in the event of war but affords no advantage in a trade dispute. Indeed, employing the wrong capabilities may actually harm one's interests. If Britain or France threatened military action in the event of a trade dispute with each other – perhaps, owing to subsidies for home industries – the threat would be counterproductive, alienating a friendly country.
5. An actor's relative power can only be inferred by observing whether a target has altered its behavior, in what direction, and to what extent *as a result* of the actor's effort. Hence, relative power only becomes visible *after* it has been exerted.¹⁶ A powerful actor can alter the behavior of those it seeks to influence, whereas a weak one cannot. Analysis that is simple in theory, however, is complex in practice. For one thing, it is difficult to determine what *caused* the change in a target's behavior. Perhaps, the target had previously decided to change its policies. We speak of the *chameleon effect* (named after the small lizard that changes colors to blend with its surroundings) when a target changes policies because it wants to rather than because of the power of an influencer. We speak of the *satellite effect* when actors behave in tandem, and observers misinterpret the direction of the influence. Thus, during the Cold War, when Ukraine and the USSR voted the same way in the UN, an ill-informed observer might erroneously have concluded that Ukraine was exerting power over the Soviet Union rather than the reverse.
6. Sometimes a power relationship remains almost invisible and can only be inferred. Deterrence reflects the puzzle. Deterrence aims to prevent an adversary from pursuing aggressive goals by threatening military force in retaliation if it does so. The problem is that when deterrence is successful, the adversary

will *not have acted*. During the Cold War, the USSR did not attack the US, but we could not know whether it ever intended to do so. Paradoxically, it is easier for us to know when deterrence has failed, because then an adversary will have visibly defied the threat.

In sum, power is central to analyzing global politics, especially for realists who try to discern the relationship between power and war. Realists regard war as the most important fact of global politics. Historically, states have repeatedly resorted to war to get what they want, and the threat of war has served as a principal instrument for exercising influence. But are wars necessary to achieve objectives? How do wars happen? Can they be prevented? Such questions have long fascinated scholars and practitioners alike. We now turn to an examination of the many kinds of war and their many possible causes.

The causes of interstate war

Explaining war between states has long been a central objective of social scientists. "Genesis," declares one prominent scholar, "records two thousand years of history from biblical creation to the time [of] . . . the first war. Never again would two thousand years pass – or even two hundred – without war."¹⁷ War, however, is a concept that in popular discourse refers to a variety of activities. Conflicts defined as wars vary widely in their *scope* – from internal violence among subnational groups to confrontations between neighboring states, even world wars. They also vary in *intensity* – from a few hundred deaths to tens of thousands, even millions, of deaths. And they vary in *duration* – from, as in the 1967 Six Day War, a few short days (or hours in the event of a nuclear exchange) to decades, as in the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453).

The first step in analyzing complex events like war is to define and categorize the concept in order to assure that everyone is studying the same

phenomenon. In practice, this means distinguishing between *interstate* and *intrastate* wars – those waged *between* and *within* states. Because international relations scholars have long focused on interstate relations, there is a substantial body of theory explaining war between states. One widely accepted working definition of interstate war among behavioral scholars is “a military conflict waged between (or among) national entities, at least one of which is a *state*, which results in at least 1000 battle deaths of military personnel.”¹⁸ This definition is arbitrary, as any must necessarily be, but it allows for the systematic collection and analysis of war data by scholars who share an identical definition of the phenomenon that they are studying. Recent research has expanded a typology of war to include, in addition to interstate war, extra-state wars between a state and a nonstate actor outside its borders and intrastate wars between or among two groups within a state’s borders.¹⁹

In this section, we introduce the factors that observers believe contribute to the outbreak of *interstate war* and, where possible, consider how actors try to manage these factors to reduce the likelihood of war. It is helpful to separate the sources of war according to the level of analysis at which they operate. Although explanations from each level increase our understanding of war, no single explanation is adequate.

The individual level: human nature and psychology

Abstract collectivities like states do not make decisions about war and peace. Real people, with passions, ambitions, and physical and psychological limitations, make decisions. Thus, at the individual level of analysis, explanations for war are found in the nature and behavior of individuals. Are individuals naturally aggressive and war prone? Are there certain beliefs and personality traits that make some leaders more likely to resort to war to resolve disputes? If these

are primary causes of war, the implications for managing conflict are sobering, because, if factors that trigger war cannot be changed, then policies cannot be fashioned to prevent its outbreak, and we might shrug our shoulders, conclude that sooner or later war will again erupt, and turn our energy to more rewarding research problems

THE DESIRE FOR POWER Classic realist arguments about the sources of war look to human nature and in particular the lust for power. This desire to dominate applies to states as well as to individuals. One might argue humans are evil and this is the source of the lust for power. It is the sin of narcissism or pride that drives humans to acquire more power, and, thus, the balance of power is the only mechanism that can suppress human malevolence and malignant power.²⁰ Most classical realists view human nature, rather than evil, as the source of this desire, but its consequences are similar – humans are **egoists** with an innate desire to amass power so as to dominate others. This innate lust for power, *animus dominandi*, is the source of conflict, as it “concerns itself not with the individual’s survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured.” It follows, “the selfishness of man has limits; his will to power has none.”²¹

INNATE AGGRESSION A scientific variation of the “desire for power” that also finds its causes in human nature views war as a product of inherent aggressiveness. Such explanations view aggression as an instinct necessary for the preservation of the individual and the species. This instinct is a product of evolution that serves several survival functions: it distributes members of a species evenly over territory, limiting the stress placed on resources, it increases the likelihood the strongest members of a species will produce offspring, and it predisposes parents to protect their young.²²

Advocates of evolutionary approaches argue that they provide insights that mainstream

approaches do not. In particular, “they allow researchers to explain what rational choice theories take as given – the tendency of humans to make decisions in light of their perception of their own self-interest. Rational choice . . . cannot explain why this tends to be the case.”²³

Individual decision makers also play a major role in decisions to go to war. In the next section, we examine the impact of how such decisions are made.

DECISION MAKERS AND WAR In their effort to understand the causes of war, political scientists have tried to explain and predict the decisions that leaders make, to evaluate good and bad decision making, and to determine when decision making will lead to war. Some decision makers make decisions on the basis of preconceptions, do not search for alternatives, and only want information that confirms their preconceptions, while others use their experience to make decisions, actively seek alternatives, and want as much information as possible.²⁴ Some leaders are enthusiastic about challenges, optimistic, active, and flexible, whereas others are rigid, passive, and would prefer to avoid challenges.²⁵ Let us examine four models of foreign policy decision making that seek to explain these decision-making styles and their impact on foreign policy: the rational actor model (RAM), the cognitive model, the affective model, and prospect theory. None provides complete understanding of any particular decision, but each affords different insights and suggests how decision making can lead to war through misperception or misunderstanding.

Realists favor the *rational actor model (RAM)*. This model assumes that decision makers want to minimize losses and maximize gains. It also assumes that they have a set of clearly defined preferences, which they can consistently rank from the most to the least desirable. In this model, whenever a decision must be made, leaders begin by recognizing and defining a problem to be addressed. At this stage, they gather information about the issue, including other actors’ definition

of the situation and their intentions and capabilities. Decision makers then determine their own goals and canvass all policy options, evaluating each according to its costs and probability of success. Finally, they select the option that will achieve their preferences at the least cost.

In reality, decision makers never have perfect information and, with limited time and information, are aware of relatively few alternatives in any situation. Instead, a rational decision maker is one who when faced with two alternatives “will choose the one which yields the more preferred outcome.”²⁶ According to **expected utility theory**, the most common application of this approach, leaders consider the consequences (utility) associated with alternative courses of action, including the risks entailed and the possibility of punishment and rewards. They then compare the costs and benefits of alternative outcomes and consider the probability of each occurring. Thus, two states in a dispute will compare the “expected utility” (expected benefits minus costs) of war, negotiation, and appeasement. They will go to war when they believe that the expected utility of war exceeds the expected utility of negotiation or appeasement.

Rational actor models are valuable for simplifying reality and making logical assumptions, and many scholars incorporate rationality as a simplifying assumption even if they do not explicitly state this. For reasons noted earlier, decision makers are, however, incapable of *perfect* rationality. At best, they are capable of *limited* or *bounded* rationality. Recognizing this, expected-utility (also called rational-choice) theorists have incorporated bounded rationality into models of conflict and war, and these allow for incomplete information, miscalculations, and misperception.²⁷ Critics of this approach argue that it is impossible to determine accurately the utility of a given outcome or the probability of that outcome. Instead, decision makers are limited to describing outcomes in vague terms such as “good” and “bad” and can only guess at the likelihood of their occurring.

Other theorists employ cognitive and affective models of decision making that do not assume rationality to provide an even more accurate account of how decisions are really made. A *cognitive approach* to decision making involves assessing distortions in perception owing to ambiguities in real-life situations under conditions of stress. It assumes that decision makers cannot assimilate and interpret all the information needed to make rational decisions, that they see what they *expect* to see, and that they assume others to see the world as they do. Worse, decision makers are uncomfortable when information contradicts their expectations about the world around them, and they unconsciously interpret such information in ways that make it conform to their expectations, using shallow analogies and other “tricks” to reduce uncertainty.

Cognitive self-delusion helps explain why misperception is common in foreign policy. Decision makers tend to emphasize the significance of information that they expect, while ignoring information they do not expect or wish to hear.²⁸ Decision makers also assume that, if their intentions are peaceful, other leaders will recognize that fact. Yet, when decision makers perceive others to be acting in a hostile way they tend to conclude that such hostility is intentional. Thus, in 2002, US President George W. Bush dismissed intelligence that indicated Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction because it was, he believed, what Iraqi officials wanted him to believe.²⁹

Cognitive errors also result when decision makers reason from analogy, assuming that a current situation is like a past situation that decision makers remember. American leaders, for example, tended to compare Saddam Hussein with Hitler and to conclude that appeasement would encourage Saddam to be aggressive as it did Hitler. Such reasoning is dangerous because rarely are two situations sufficiently alike to draw such analogies or schemas (simplified models), and false analogies are likely to produce the wrong “lessons” and inappropriate policies.³⁰ These cases involve cognitive errors caused by using

“heuristics” (efficient rules of thumb or simplified shortcuts) to oversimplify complex situations.

Other theorists use *affective models*, arguing that leaders’ personal emotions such as insecurity and hostility also distort perceptions and reduce the quality of decision making.³¹ Stress is one emotion that seems to have a clear, but nonlinear, relationship to decision making. In the absence of stress, leaders may be careless in seeking information or analyzing policy options. Moderate levels of stress enhance decision making by forcing leaders to search carefully for information and evaluate available options critically before reaching decisions, but high stress levels can produce severe decision-making pathologies like procrastination or uncritical acceptance of all incoming information. Other emotions, like shame and humiliation, also play into decision making. Leaders, being human, seek to avoid these feelings and so they may act to maintain or restore their self-esteem. In the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev may have decided to place missiles in Cuba to redress prior humiliations, including his country’s strategic inferiority in global power, and to prevent future humiliations, such as the ousting of Fidel Castro.³²

Finally, *prospect theory* offers an additional perspective that considers how “framing” of problems influences decision making. The theory suggests that people tend “to make decisions based upon the value that they attach to particular choices”³³ in respect to a given reference point and that they treat gains and losses from that reference point differently. Simply put, *leaders do not want to lose what they already have*. They are prepared to take risks when there is the “prospect” of making gains, but they will be cautious when there is a “prospect” of losses. Because “losses subjectively hurt more than gains feel good . . . the sting of loss is more acute than is the enjoyment derived from an equal gain.”³⁴

None of these models assumes that physical or psychological factors *necessarily* produce decision-making pathologies that make bad decisions more likely. However, they *can* lead to poor decision

making, which helps explain why some wars occur.

In practice, most foreign policy decisions are not made by leaders in isolation but rather by *groups* of individuals such as America's National Security Council, a group of key foreign policy decision makers such as the secretaries of state and defense over which the president presides. A collective pathology, called *groupthink*, describes the way in which members of a small cohesive group unconsciously tend to develop a number of shared illusions that impede objective evaluation of a situation. Additionally, subtle in-group pressures compel members of a group to think alike and reach consensus however foolish a decision may be.³⁵ Individuals may hesitate to express doubts openly about a proposed course of action if they believe they are in the minority or fear that their criticism will destroy a consensus. Groupthink can produce poor decisions because participants are willing to accept poor compromises rather than standing up for policies that they believe are better.

The unit level: foreign policy and war

Individuals and groups tell only part of the story of why wars erupt. A more complete picture requires that we examine characteristics of states that political scientists believe contribute to or inhibit the decision to go to war. Among these factors, the most prominent are bureaucratic and organizational politics, regime type, economic systems, nationalism and public opinion, and domestic politics.

BUREAUCRATIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS Specifically, government agencies compete with one another for prestige, larger staffs and budgets and recommend policies that justify their requests. Each agency has its own policy preferences and defines problems in ways that give it more responsibility and political clout

relative to rival agencies. As a result of bureaucratic and interest group infighting and compromise, by the time policies are implemented, they usually no longer reflect what any single agency intended.

A second model, the *organizational-process model*, also focuses on government agencies, but it assumes that foreign policy is a product of the coordinated effort of large national agencies. No single agency is fully responsible for making national policy, but, each, with its own procedures for gathering and processing information and defining problems, is responsible for some part of it. Each organization has its own **standard operating procedures** (SOPs) that are designed to manage and respond to routine problems quickly and efficiently. For example, the US State Department has a set of procedures for issuing visas to foreigners. However, standard procedures may be ineffective in non-routine situations that require novel or complex responses. Thus, after 9/11, the State Department drastically reduced the circumstances under which a post could waive the requirement to personally interview *all* visa applicants.

CULTURE Other explanations view warfare as ingrained in culture. War is an "invention" – a social institution, much like marriage, trial by jury, or the use of fire. It is so pervasive that we may assume it is a product of human nature, but the cultural perspective views it otherwise. Once war is accepted as the way certain situations are handled, societies will view war as a possibility, regardless of its desirability: Thus, "a bold and warlike people . . . may label warfare as desirable as well as possible, a mild people . . . may label warfare as undesirable, but to the minds of both peoples the possibility of warfare is present. Their thoughts, their hopes, their plans are oriented about this idea – that warfare may be selected as the way to meet some situation."³⁶

From this perspective, the only way to limit war is replace it with a new institution to resolve disputes. Once accomplished, societies would no longer view war as an option.

REGIME TYPE Political theorists have long been interested in whether democracies are more peaceful than other forms of government. **Democratic peace theory** posits that democracies are more peaceful, at least in relations with one another. This claim originated with German philosopher Immanuel Kant. In his philosophical sketch *Perpetual Peace*, Kant argued that for reason to prevail people must enter civil society and create the state. But only one kind of state, Kant argued, can foster individual moral development and international peace – one with legal equality of citizens and representative institutions, especially an autonomous legislature (although not necessarily based on democracy). Kant thought that republics like these produce cooperation because they act in citizens' interests, and peace serves those interests. In war, only profiteers and the ruling aristocratic elite can benefit. Thus, Kant concluded, as more states became liberal republics, they would gradually form a peace among themselves, which he called a “pacific union” or “pacific federation.” This system would not be a world government or world state, but more like a nonaggression pact among democracies in which they would agree to avoid violence in resolving disputes.

Kant's ideas about democracy and peace were taken up by “scientific” scholars enthused by the end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of liberal democracy over communism.³⁷ Although it does not appear that democracies are less willing to fight wars than other regimes in general, it does appear that democracies do not fight one another.

Democratic peace theory provides two explanations for peaceful relations among democracies. The first rests on democratic norms. According to this, democracies are defined by respect for individual rights and liberties and nonviolent means of conflict resolution. Democratic leaders expect that other democracies will abide by the same norms, thus preventing rash decisions to go to war. A second explanation rests on democratic institutions, claiming that conflict among democracies is rare because domestic checks and balances among the branches of government slow the decision to go to war and make the process visible to outsiders.

Despite evidence in support of the proposition, democratic peace theory has remained a subject of intense debate. Research findings, for example, vary depending on how one defines a democracy.³⁸ Furthermore, one study shows that, even

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD THE BUSH DOCTRINE

Democratic peace theory had a key place in the foreign policy of President George W. Bush. The Bush doctrine stated that the US should act to spread democracy. According to the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002): “America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness . . . because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order.” The doctrine optimistically predicts that, once democratic institutions exist in Iraq, democracy will spread to neighboring countries that will in turn adopt peaceful policies. “No other system of government,” declared President Bush, “has done more to protect minorities, to secure the rights of labor, to raise the status of women, or to channel human energy to the pursuits of peace . . . When it comes to the desire for liberty and justice, there is no clash of civilizations. People everywhere are capable of freedom, and worthy of freedom.”³⁹ However, since countries in transition to democracy may be more warlike than other regimes, efforts to spread democracy may actually lead to more wars.

though democracies do not fight one another, countries that are making the transition from dictatorship to democracy actually “become more aggressive and war prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.”⁴⁰ Theorists also debate whether democracy, rather than some other factor, is the reason for peaceful relations.⁴¹ For example, democratic societies are usually wealthier than other states, suggesting that *wealth* rather than democracy may be the key factor in causing peace (more on this later).

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND WAR Other explanations for war-prone foreign policies focus on unit-level economic factors. Just as some scholars believe that democracy and peace are related, others have probed the relationship between capitalism and peace. Liberals and Marxists reach opposite conclusions about the relationship between capitalism and war. Liberals believe that free-market capitalism in which competition fosters wealth brings peace. Marxists, by contrast, believe that capitalism makes the capitalist class of owners wealthy at the expense of workers and that these gaps in wealth produce class conflict that will climax in revolution that will end capitalism.

Liberal theory sees free trade as promoting economic efficiency and prosperity. It is only when there are barriers to trade that actors may go to war to acquire raw materials. Free-market societies, they believe, are inherently opposed to war because it is bad for business, so that the expansion of free trade and finance creates interests within society that restrain warlike leaders. As states become economically interdependent, they come to recognize that their prosperity depends on the prosperity of others. In addition, war wastes economic resources and severs trade so that all combatants end up as losers. The liberal British economist Sir Norman Angell, winner of the 1933 Nobel Peace Prize, argued that no country could profit from war, because war destroys the economic interdependence among peoples that is the source of their wealth. Shortly before the outbreak

of World War One, Angell argued that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depended on the expansion of political frontiers; that a nation’s political and economic frontiers did not necessarily coincide; that military power was socially and economically futile, and could have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; and that it was impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another – to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another.⁴²

In a modern version of this argument, economic interdependence and the creation of commercial institutions like free-trade areas, customs unions, common markets, and monetary unions produce peace in three ways: (1) they make war costly for society and for political leaders, (2) they provide information about other states’ capabilities and intentions thereby reducing misperceptions and unjustified fears that cause war, and (3) they build trust by regularly bringing high-level political leaders together.⁴³

In contrast to liberal theory, Marxists anticipate global conflict as capitalism spreads. Emphasizing the exploitative nature of capitalism, British economist John A. Hobson developed an influential theory of imperialism (Chapter 3, p. 82), in which imperialism was seen as a product of the two dilemmas of capitalist society: overproduction and underconsumption.⁴⁴ Under capitalism, business owners and industry profit by paying workers low wages, and impoverished workers are unable to purchase the goods and services produced by modern industry. However, rather than paying higher wages or investing profits in domestic welfare programs, capitalists seek new foreign markets to sell surplus goods and invest profits. Their frantic search for new colonies and markets, he concluded, would cause European states to collide. Lenin grafted Hobson’s views onto Marxism, arguing that underconsumption and overproduction were root causes of imperialism and that, once the world was fully divided among capitalist states, expansion could only come at someone else’s expense, thereby leading to war.⁴⁵

NATIONALISM AND PUBLIC OPINION As noted in Chapter 3, nationalism and nationalist public opinion can also contribute to war, but their role is ambiguous. Are nationalist feelings actually a source of war or do governments manipulate those feelings to rally support for war? Liberals see public opinion as inherently peaceful, but nationalism and excessive patriotism, sometimes called *chauvinism*, on the part of publics can intensify wars and make them difficult to end.

DID YOU KNOW?

The term *chauvinism* was derived from Nicolas Chauvin, a vociferously patriotic French soldier under Napoléon.

Surprisingly, there has been relatively little theorizing about the impact of nationalism on war. Nation-states are *more likely* to become involved in wars when national groups pursue the recovery of lost territories, believe that only they deserve statehood, and oppress other nationalities in their countries.⁴⁶ A nationalist ideology requires that all fellow nationals be gathered in a single national state. Serbian nationalism after 1992 illustrates the potential impact of nationalism in foreign policy (Chapter 13, pp. 428–9). As Yugoslavia came apart, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević sought to extend Serbia's control over Serbs living in neighboring successor states, especially Croatia and Bosnia. Serbia also antagonized its neighbors by repressing national minorities in territories under its control, especially Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Albanians in Kosovo. As this case suggests, leaders may rouse nationalism to rally support for themselves, using national symbols to stir up passions. Once passions are inflamed, wars become difficult to prevent or to manage.

The impact of public opinion on foreign policy varies. In democracies, where public opinion

matters most, the public rarely speaks with a single voice on national security issues, and it must compete with numerous domestic and foreign interest groups to have its preferences heard by decision makers. At best, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the public influences leaders as opposed to being influenced by them. Elite-centric models regard public opinion as emotional and subjective, and thus a poor guide for foreign policy. They view the executive branch as having significant power in transmitting information on global issues and shaping public opinion. Other models find greater balance between public opinion and elite influence in the foreign policy process. The strongest of these alternatives maintains that public opinion sets the boundaries for acceptable, and thus politically feasible, policies. However, the weight of public opinion may also vary across the foreign policy process. One study posits that in non-crisis situations the public is most attentive, and thus applies the most pressure early in the policymaking process when leaders are selecting a policy. In crisis situations public attention builds slowly and becomes more influential as a policy is implemented.⁴⁷

Still another model of public opinion contends that, when a crisis unfolds, the public tends to rally around its leaders and their policies. Thus, when diplomatic efforts to avoid war with Iraq failed in 2003, public support for the war among Americans grew rapidly, as did support for the president and congress. Polls in the months leading up to the war found that the percentage of Americans supporting war remained steady, between 52 and 59 percent. As diplomacy began to break down in March 2003, support for war increased to 64 percent. Once the bombing campaign began, it increased further to 72 percent, and President Bush's personal rating jumped 13 percent during this time.⁴⁸

DOMESTIC POLITICS: WAR AS A DIVER - SION FROM DOMESTIC ISSUES Some theorists believe that domestic political conditions can be a cause of war. According to the “scapegoat

hypothesis” or the diversionary theory of war, political parties and governments may provoke conflict overseas to divert public attention from problems at home. Political leaders blame other countries for their own woes and in this way provide an “enemy” against which the public can unite and, in doing so, forget contentious domestic issues.

The evidence in support of the diversionary theory of war is mixed. When are leaders likely to employ force abroad to divert attention away from problems at home? One explanation hinges on the strength of domestic opposition. If political opposition is weak, there is less incentive to adopt a diversionary policy. One study found that leaders of democratic states may use force to divert attention away from domestic economic conditions, but that authoritarian states, in which opposition is controlled, do not. This finding seems contrary to the democratic peace proposition, but the conditions that nullify the democratic peace are rare.⁴⁹ A second explanation turns to the availability of a meaningful external target for a diversionary war. The likelihood of conflict increases when there is an enemy whose defeat will demonstrate the leader is competent, despite his inability to manage domestic problems.⁵⁰

Each of these theories contributes to understanding foreign policy decisions to go to war. For example, some wars of aggression such as Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait had strong economic motives. Nationalism was a powerful force in triggering the three wars of German unification in the late nineteenth century and in the outbreak and duration of the world wars. Slavic nationalist yearnings in Austria–Hungary threatened to destroy that empire prior to 1914, and its rulers decided to attack Serbia partly to paper over internal divisions.

The system level and war

Neorealists, in particular, emphasize the global system in explaining the outbreak of war. For

neorealists, the global system, a set of interacting and interdependent units, is greater than the sum of its parts, and it influences these parts. In other words, the global system predisposes behavior among actors.

For neorealist Kenneth Waltz, three elements differentiate global systems: (1) ordering principles, (2) character of the units, and (3) the distribution of power. First, systems can be classified according to their *ordering principle*, that is, the way in which units are related to one another. Anarchy for neorealists is an international order within which actors must struggle to survive. As we observed in Chapter 1, such a system is decentralized. An alternative ordering principle might be centralized and hierarchical – as in world government or **empire** such as ancient Rome and imperial China. Whereas domestic systems are “centralized and hierarchic,” the international political system is “decentralized and anarchic.” Under anarchy, actors “stand in relation of coordination” and “each is the equal of all the others.” “None is entitled to command; none is required to obey.”⁵¹

Second, systems can be classified by their type of *units* or parts. The principal units can be states, empires, or some other type of actor. One can even envision a system in which corporations, ethnic groups, or religious groups are the principal actors. According to neorealists, under anarchy, states “remain like units”⁵² because all confront the same challenges to security and must act in the same way to survive. Although neorealists admit that states are not the only actors in global politics, they remain skeptical about the possibility that other actors like transnational corporations will successfully challenge them.

Finally, systems are classified according to the distribution of capabilities among the units, a feature called system **polarity**. Because the first two elements change slowly, neorealists emphasize the importance of changes in the distribution of capabilities among actors. A system’s distribution of power may be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. In a **unipolar** system, there is one

dominant actor, a **hegemon** that is so powerful that no other actor or coalition can challenge its dominance. A **bipolar** system is characterized by two dominant actors or blocs, and a **multipolar** system has three or more dominant actors or blocs.

Taken together, the elements of a system impose **structure**, or a set of opportunities and constraints on the behavior of actors within the system. What follows are examples of how the elements of a system affect the actors within it:

- If states are the dominant units in a global system, other actors, such as international organizations and transnational corporations, will have little influence.
- If a system has a hierarchical structure, great powers may limit the autonomy of lesser units.
- If a system is unipolar, the dominant actor will face few constraints on its behavior and can determine rules in the system, and may restrict the autonomy of other actors.

Let us now examine three related system-level properties that are associated with war: the balance of power, the security dilemma, and arms races.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER Rapid change in the distribution of capabilities among actors is often cited as a cause of war. Thucydides, for example, argued in his *History* that what made the Peloponnesian “war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”⁵³ Theorists differ, however, about whether rough equality of power among major actors or a preponderance of power in the hands of one actor is more conducive to peace.

According to balance-of-power theory, peace is likely when power is distributed so that no one actor can dominate others. Major actors must constantly monitor others’ capabilities and form alliances to counterbalance those that become too powerful. In this theory, power creates counterbalancing power, regardless of actors’ intentions.⁵⁴ Actors can balance in two ways. First, “internal balancing,” involves actors’ increasing their own

CONTROVERSY

Theorists disagree about whether a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar system is most stable and peaceful. Advocates of bipolarity believe that in a bipolar world, the two principal actors can monitor each other’s power and intentions, thereby removing much of the uncertainty in global politics that is associated with the outbreak of war. A unipolar world will tempt one or more actors to try to challenge the hegemon. A multipolar world, in some views, produces dangerous uncertainty because there are so many major actors. “It is to a great extent,” wrote Waltz during the Cold War, “that the world since the war has enjoyed a stability seldom known where three or more powers have sought to cooperate with each other or have competed for existence.”⁵⁵ Two superpowers “supreme in their power have to use force less often” and are “able to moderate each other’s use of violence and to absorb possibly destabilizing changes that emanate from uses of violence that they do not or cannot control.”⁵⁶

Others argue that multipolarity moderates hostility because actors have common as well as clashing interests that produce shifting alliances in which there are no permanent enemies.⁵⁷ Finally, some theorists believe that global politics is most peaceful when there is a single dominant power that is strong enough to enforce peace.

capabilities perhaps by increasing military budgets or developing new weapons. In this way, they maximize their freedom of action and are not bound by pledges to or dependence on others for security. Internal balancing, however, cannot be accomplished quickly and is inadequate when facing an imminent threat. “External balancing” entails restoring a favorable balance of power by concluding **alliances** with one others to counter an aggressive foe. Balance-of-power alliances must be fluid arrangements that change as old threats fade and new ones emerge, and there must be no permanent friends or enemies or ideological barriers to limit alliance flexibility (Figure 8.5). Although alliances allow for rapid response, they impose costs on actors, committing them to certain joint policies, limiting their autonomy, and leaving them dependent on others for security.

Some realists argue that states will modify balancing behavior when they do not fear for



Figure 8.5 European equilibrium

Source: Robert D. Farber University Archives & Special Collections Department, Brandeis University

their survival. According to the theory of “soft balancing,” second-tier powers like France, Germany, India, and Russia that do not have the capability to challenge a dominant power like the United States will form diplomatic coalitions with the implicit threat of “upgrading” their alliances.⁵⁸ For instance, in the months prior to the 2003 Iraq War, a coalition led by France, Germany, and Russia vigorously opposed US steps toward an invasion. In the UN Security Council, these states threatened to veto any resolution calling for the use of force, issuing a statement in February 2003 that “We will not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force.”⁵⁹

Balance-of-power advocates believe that relative equality in power among major actors reduces the likelihood of war because equality produces uncertainty about a war’s outcome and such uncertainty induces caution. Would the United States have initiated war against Iraq in 2003 if its leaders believed they had a 50–50 chance of losing?

Other theorists believe that global politics is most stable when a single actor is preponderant, that is, sufficiently powerful so that other actors cannot challenge its leadership. A hegemon fears no one and has no reason to go to war, and weak countries do not dare start a war. But hegemony is not a permanent condition and some theorists note regular cycles of preponderance and war throughout history. Thus, according to *power transition theory*, hegemons develop extensive global commitments and shape the global order to reflect their interest in maintaining hegemony.⁶⁰ In turn, others accept the hegemon’s leadership because they lack the power to challenge it and benefit from global services that the hegemon provides – especially security and economic leadership. It is, however, expensive for a hegemon to maintain its dominance. As it gradually loses power, others grow relatively stronger, and, when their power approximates that of the declining hegemon, *hegemonic war* will ensue, as a challenger seeks to overtake the hegemon and the hegemon tries to retain its status.

SECURITY DILEMMAS AND ARMS RACES

As we noted in Chapter 1, some theorists, especially neorealists, attribute wars to a security dilemma that arises from anarchy in which “Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.”⁶¹

In an anarchic world, actors have to provide their own security. This is a *self-help* world in which actors cannot trust each other to cooperate because each knows that others are also looking out for their own best interests. For Thomas Hobbes, anarchy pits all against all and produces a situation in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” “Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that

condition called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man.”⁶² Under these conditions, actors prepare for the worst case, but doing so makes everyone less secure. This paradox is known as the *security dilemma*.

A security dilemma occurs when one actor unilaterally seeks to improve its security, perhaps by improving its weaponry. Others may, however, perceive this action as hostile, thereby increasing their insecurity. Since the worst case would be to permit another actor to gain a decisive military advantage, they may also modernize their weaponry. The outcome is greater tension and higher defense expenditures for *all* actors even though all are acting defensively to protect themselves. The

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

During his campaign and first year in office, President George W. Bush advocated developing national missile defense to protect the US from a nuclear weapon launched by a “rogue state” like North Korea. US officials argued that a missile defense was necessary in a world in which Americans could never be certain of adversaries’ intentions. Opponents pointed out that such a program would provoke an arms race. They argued that in response, other actors would develop their own anti-missile systems and/or add additional missiles capable of overwhelming US defenses.

Despite American assurances that its missile defense program does not seek to reduce the capability of Russia or China to retaliate in case of a US nuclear attack, both countries might feel less secure once even a modest US missile defense system were deployed. Why? If the United States were later to enlarge this system and feel “invulnerable” to retaliation, it might become more reckless – more willing to go to the brink of war to get its way because it would have less to fear from nuclear war. It would not matter whether the US actually intended to start a war. What matters is that Chinese and Russian leaders *believe* war to be possible in the future and so deploy additional missiles to overwhelm US missile defenses. Of course, neither may have any intention of *using* their missiles against the United States, but they may deploy them to deter an American attack. For its part, the US might not assume that Russia’s or China’s intentions were peaceful, and might further expand its missile defense system. What results is an arms race and growing tension, with a corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear exchange might actually occur – even though no one sought that outcome.

This remains an ongoing issue in US–Russian relations. As recently as December 2010, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, interviewed on American television, declared: “If antimissile and radar systems are set up near our border. . . they will undermine our nuclear capabilities. . . So, it’s only natural that we’re alarmed by this prospect, and we are obligated to take some measures in response.”⁶³

result is an **arms race**, an escalating spiral of fear and insecurity that is destabilizing and can produce war. The Anglo-German naval arms race before World War One and, more recently, US efforts to deploy a missile defense system are widely cited as examples of unfolding security dilemmas.

The logic of security dilemmas – actors that are interdependent and hostile but unable to trust each other – is reflected in that of French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag-hare parable. Rousseau illustrated the problem of creating trust among actors in an anarchic setting in a story about the state of nature, an imaginary world before society existed. He imagined five hungry men who seek to cooperate in trapping a stag that would be sufficient to feed *all* of them. Rousseau then imagined that a hare, enough to feed only one of them, appears. What, he asks, will the men do? His answer was that each must try to capture the hare because he knows that the others may do the same out of self-interest.⁶⁴ Thus, instead of cooperating, the men become competitors, which is precisely what neorealists believe that individuals and states will do when faced with a choice between relying on the possibility of trusting others and cooperating or the certainty of acting alone. Rousseau’s parable implies that cooperation is difficult because of the absence of trust.

The problem of building trust under anarchy is also reflected in the *prisoner’s dilemma* game. In its classic form, this dilemma involves the arrest of two robbery suspects. The police have insufficient

evidence to convict them of the crime, but they can be convicted of a lesser crime. The police isolate the suspects in separate cells, where they cannot communicate, and offer each the same deal. If both confess, each will receive a sentence of eight years in prison. If neither confesses, both will receive one-year prison sentences. However, if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be released without jail time, while the latter will receive a 10-year sentence.

Figure 8.6 illustrates the logic of the dilemma. Each cell shows the prison time that corresponds to each strategy. If Prisoners 1 and 2 both refuse to confess, they receive a one-year sentence. If both squeal, they get eight-year sentences. If only Prisoner 1 confesses, he will go free, but Prisoner 2 will go to jail for 10 years. Each player has two strategies: to cooperate (not confess) or to defect (confess). Defection is the dominant strategy because both wish to avoid the worst case, which is 10 years in prison. Were they able to communicate in a way that created trust, neither would confess, and both would be better off. As in the stag-hare parable, neither is prepared to trust the other lest she receive a 10-year sentence – the “sucker” payoff.

The dilemma arises because the best solution for both would be not to confess (1,1). However, since both players fear becoming the “sucker,” neither cooperates. A similar situation exists in disarmament negotiations when each actor, in the absence of clear proof that the other is disarming, has a powerful incentive to keep some of its arms hidden in order to prevent the worst possible

		Prisoner 2	
		(Not confess)	(Squeal)
Prisoner 1	(Not confess)	1	2
	(Squeal)	2	(0,10)

Figure 8.6 Prisoner’s dilemma matrix

outcome, one in which it had disarmed but its adversary had not. As US President Ronald Reagan declared repeatedly: “Trust but verify.”

How do you create trust where none exists? If prisoner’s dilemma games are repeated, cooperation tends to develop. If one player takes a risk and does not confess, the other may rethink its position, and trust begins to develop. In time, players reciprocate each other’s trust, thereby overcoming the dilemma. A single prisoner’s dilemma game, like Rousseau’s stag-hare parable, is an end-of-the-world or one-shot event which does not permit **reciprocity**. By suggesting that reciprocity is indispensable in creating common interest in not cheating, we acknowledge that global politics involves repeated interaction in which each actor’s behavior conditions others’ expectations for the future.⁶⁵ The “shadow of the future” may dampen the degree to which security dilemmas produce war.

Some constructivists believe that the security dilemma has been weakened in the modern era by emerging norms respecting the right of sovereign states to exist. The international system, they argue, has gone through a qualitative structural change in which the “kill or be killed logic of the Hobbesian state of nature has been replaced by the live and let live logic of the Lockean⁶⁶ anarchical society.” Sovereignty is no longer just “a property of individual states, but also an *institution* shared by many states” and formalized in international law which is “a key part of the deep structure” of global politics.⁶⁷

Disarmament and **arms control** are among the approaches to reducing the risk of security dilemmas in a nuclear age. Those favoring disarmament believe that weapons themselves cause war and that reducing their number and even eliminating them are needed to prevent war. Those who advocate arms control believe that certain *types* of weapon are more likely to trigger war than others and that the way to prevent war is not simply to eliminate weapons wholesale but to reinforce stability in deterrence relationships by reducing first-strike incentives. Arms control

seeks to prevent arms races from driving security policy and involves restricting or eliminating certain classes of weapons that may reduce strategic stability. Arms control may also involve limiting research and development, as well as deployment, of new, qualitatively different but dangerous weapons. In some cases, arms control may even increase the number of weapons that are believed to stabilize strategic relations. Thus, in the 1960s, some American strategists, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sought to encourage the USSR to acquire spy satellites that they believed would reduce Soviet fears of a US nuclear attack.

Realists tend to promote arms control rather than disarmament because they see arms as vital to preserving security and deterrence, while they regard disarmament as dangerous and utopian. Beginning in the late 1960s, realists promoted arms control agreements like the 1972 ban on antiballistic missiles. This ban, they believed, would preserve the stability of deterrence by assuring that each side could retaliate if attacked by the other, which, in turn, would keep the Cold War from turning hot. For their part, liberals favor disarmament because they believe that if weapons exist, sooner or later they will be used. Constructivists see both policies as useful in creating precedents that may promote a future consensus in favor of further steps to reduce tension.

Arms control and disarmament can be achieved in a number of ways. First, actors can place *numerical limits* on weapons and delivery systems. The major bilateral arms control and disarmament agreements of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (see Table 8.1) included such limits, as does the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the US and Russia in 2010. A second way arms control and disarmament can be achieved is for actors to *restrict weapons development, testing, and deployment*. Thus, the multilateral 1967 Outer Space Treaty banned the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Table 8.1 Summary of key arms control and disarmament agreements

<i>Treaty</i>	<i>Year signed</i>	<i>Parties (as of 2010)</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Status in 2010</i>
<i>Nuclear weapons</i>				
Outer Space Treaty	1967	97	Bans nuclear weapons in space and prohibits military activities on celestial bodies.	Entered into force 1967.
Nuclear Nonproliferation (NPT) Treaty	1968	188	Limited proliferation of nuclear weapons to the known nuclear powers as of January 1, 1967. Non-nuclear states pledged not to engage in nuclear weapons programs. Nuclear-weapons states pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons knowledge or materials, but to share peaceful nuclear energy technology with non-nuclear states.	Entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. 2010 review conference urged US, Russia, France, Britain and China to accelerate arms reductions and urged Israel to sign the NPT.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I	1972	US USSR	Interim five-year agreement limited the number of land- and sea-based strategic offensive nuclear weapons to those already in existence or under construction.	Expired in 1997.
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	1972	US USSR	Permanently limited the weapons and radars that could be used in a missile defense system. Signatories could only deploy two limited systems; restricted research and development and testing of new systems.	Abrogated in 2002 by the US to permit research on and deployment of a limited ABM system.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II	1979	US USSR	Set limits on the number and types of strategic missile launchers each state could have.	Never entered into force.
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	1987	US USSR	Superpowers agreed to eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5,500 kilometers. Reductions were completed by June 1, 1991.	Entered into force 1988.
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I	1991	US Russia Belarus* Ukraine* Kazakhstan*	1,600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for each side, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads; limited the throw-weight of ballistic missiles; 15-year agreement with the option to extend for successive five-year periods.	Entered into force 1994; all parties met the agreement's December 2001 implementation deadline.
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II	1993	US Russia	Cap of 3,000–3,500 strategic nuclear warheads for both sides.	Never entered into force; superseded by SORT.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	1996	170	Prohibits any nuclear explosion for peaceful or weapons purposes.	Not ratified.
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) or Moscow Treaty	2002	US Russia	Parties agreed to limit strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.	Entered into force 2003 and due to expire in 2012.

<i>Treaty</i>	<i>Year signed</i>	<i>Parties (as of 2010)</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Status in 2010</i>
New START Treaty	2010	US Russia	Parties agreed to limit deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and limit to 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons.	Replaces START I, START II, and SORT.
<i>Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs)</i>				
Treaty of Tlatelolco	1967	33	Creates an NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean	Entered into force 1968.
Treaty of Rarotonga	1985	13	Creates an NWFZ in the South Pacific	Entered into force 1986.
Treaty of Bangkok	1995	10	Creates an NWFZ in Southeast Asia	Entered into force 1997.
Treaty of Pelindaba	1996	0	Creates an NWFZ in Africa	Not yet in force; ten more signatories must ratify.
n/a	n/a	0	Central Asian NWFZ	Negotiated in 2002, no treaty signed.
<i>Biological and chemical weapons</i>				
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	1972	150	Bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents; reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol that bans the use of biological weapons; allows biodefense programs.	Entered into force 1975.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	1993	161	Bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer, and use of chemical weapons and requires their destruction within a specified period of time (depending on the weapon).	Entered into force 1997.
<i>Conventional weapons</i>				
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty	1990	30	Set equal limit on the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains; adapted in 1999 to replace the alliance limits with national arms ceilings.	Entered into force 1992. Suspended by Russia in 2008 owing to Russian–Georgian and Russian–Moldovan relations and non-coverage of Baltic states by the treaty. Possibly a reaction to US plans for ABM deployment in Central Europe.
Open Skies Treaty	1992	26	Allows each party to conduct short-notice, unarmed reconnaissance flights over the others' territories to collect data on military resources and activities.	Entered into force 2002.
Ottawa Landmine Convention	1997	141	Obligates states to give up anti-personnel landmines and to destroy their stockpiles.	Entered into force 1999.

* START I was negotiated and signed by the US and the USSR, but the USSR disintegrated in December 1991, leaving Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as independent nuclear powers. The Lisbon Agreement (May 1992) made these new states parties to START I.

(CTBT) prohibited nuclear testing for peaceful or military purposes. Third, actors can *limit the transfer of weapons* among countries. The biological and conventional weapons conventions contain such restrictions, as does the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which bans the transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear powers.

Even when actors agree that arms control and disarmament help preserve security, it remains difficult to negotiate agreements because actors wish to maintain sufficient arms as insurance against future conflict. Since they cannot predict one another's future intentions, it is in their interest to maintain arms sufficient to counter future as well as present threats.

Agreements also face technical obstacles. First, weapons are not always easily comparable. How, for example, can one compare a relatively slow-moving bomber that can carry many nuclear weapons to a missile that can achieve intercontinental range in a matter of minutes but may only have a single nuclear warhead? Weapons vary in terms of their quality, accuracy, mobility (and hence vulnerability to attack), and destructive power. Second, how can actors verify one another's compliance? Will they permit "onsite" inspection or rely on "national technical means" like satellite surveillance? Confidence-building measures help to overcome problems like these. As time passed, US–Soviet agreements became more substantial. Early agreements placed relatively few limits on weapons, but they had the broader goal of building trust between the superpowers, thereby increasing their confidence in each other and enabling more ambitious agreements later on.

As the previous sections have shown, there are many causes for interstate war at each level of analysis and there are many tools available to actors to manage conflict. In today's global system, however, internal and unconventional conflicts pose new risks, and it is to these that we now turn.

The causes of intrastate war

The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the nature of war: a substantial increase in the number of civil wars. The 1990s saw a proliferation of ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts among subnational groups. As shown in Table 8.2, *intrastate*, or civil, wars are much more prevalent today in global politics than *interstate* wars. This trend is most apparent from 1980 onward.

Understanding the causes of intrastate wars is imperative in order to manage and prevent them. Such wars destroy national economies, leaving civilian populations impoverished. They can spill over into neighboring states and become regional problems, particularly when transnational ethnic communities are involved; and participants often contribute to and profit from transnational criminal networks. We now consider the dominant explanations for intrastate wars – ethnic and non-ethnic – by levels of analysis. Bear in mind that,

Table 8.2 Numbers of wars between 1820 and 2007*⁶⁸

Decade	International wars	Civil wars	Nonstate wars ²	Total wars
1820–29	13	8	10	31
1830–39	6	19	10	35
1840–49	15	17	3	35
1850–59	17	8	12	37
1860–69	19	23	6	48
1870–79	18	12	1	31
1880–89	15	4	5	24
1890–99	25	16	1	42
1900–09	21	9	0	30
1910–19	18	17	1	36
1920–29	9	20	1	30
1930–39	13	8	0	21
1940–49	8	11	4	23
1950–59	12	11	1	24
1960–69	9	24	1	34
1970–79	13	35	2	50
1980–89	6	30	0	36
1990–99	9	40	1	51
2000–07	5	20	0	25

* Nonstate wars take place between nonsovereign actors.

in general, intrastate wars are complex, and, thus, several of the following factors must be considered to explain the outbreak of any particular war. As in efforts to discern the causes of interstate conflict, much of the research on the causes of intrastate violence is empirical in nature, reflecting the efforts of theorists to identify patterned behavior.

Individual-level explanations

It is necessary to tread carefully in the realm of individual-level explanations of civil, and particularly ethnic, conflicts. Civil wars occur in a political, economic, and historical context in which a variety of factors reinforce the incentive and opportunity for war. Individual-level explanations provide insights about the passions of ordinary citizens and leaders' motives in many of today's most violent intrastate conflicts such as the Rwanda genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Psychologists have tried to understand the complex relationship between individual identity and intergroup conflict. One effort, *social identity theory*, emphasizes the role of psychological processes in explaining conflict among groups. Its central proposition is that *individuals seek – indeed have a psychological need – to belong to groups that have positive and distinct identities*. Each individual's social identity comes from belonging to a group (or groups) that has some value attached to it. Individuals in groups engage in social comparison with other groups to assess their group's and their own position and status. Individuals whose group membership provides a negative or indistinct social identity will seek to alter that identity. They may try to be absorbed into a dominant group, redefine previously negative characteristics of their group, create new dimensions for comparison, or engage in direct competition with the dominant group.⁶⁹ When the first three options are unavailable, as when there are historic injustices, resource inequalities, or

privileged groups that are unwilling to allow change, conflict is likely.

Unit-level explanations

There are also several possible sources for intrastate wars at the unit level. Dominant explanations emphasize deep, historical animosities, conflicts over scarce resources, redressing past and present injustices, and security dilemmas arising from domestic anarchy:

- *Ethnic hatred*. There is controversy over the extent to which ethnic hatred is a genuine cause of intrastate wars, even those that appear to be identity wars. Some of the earliest explanations for ethnic warfare emphasized ancient, or primordial, animosities. From this perspective, some groups have deep grievances that reach far back into history. The only way to achieve peace is by the presence of strong central authority, and when such authority disappears, conflict reignites. This is one explanation for recurring conflict in the Balkans. Serb nationalists, for instance, trace the conflict between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians back to the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Pojle in which the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Turks. Serb nationalism has long sought to “avenge Kosovo,” even though both Serbs and Albanians probably fought side by side in this battle.
- This explanation is controversial and unsatisfying. If ancient hostility is the primary factor in contemporary identity conflicts, then the long periods of peace among such groups is difficult to explain. In addition, it follows that it will be virtually impossible to prevent future conflict, and the future looks bleak for the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other regions characterized by religious and ethnic heterogeneity. In fact, many ethnic and national groups live together peacefully

and resolve disputes without war. The Czechs and Slovaks, for example, opted for a peaceful “Velvet Divorce” that was finalized on January 1, 1993. Thus, political scientist Paul Collier concludes that ethnic strife is really a “myth,” and that “conflicts in ethnically diverse countries can be ethnically patterned without being ethnically caused.”⁷⁰

- *Economic explanations.* Collier argues that historical grievances are an excuse for ambitious leaders and contends that economic incentives and opportunities provide more persuasive explanations for civil wars.⁷¹ Studies suggest that there is a higher incidence of civil war in low-income countries with weak governing structures that depend heavily on natural resources for their export earnings. Thus, one rational-choice economic explanation is loot seeking – war for private gain. Valuable natural resources like petroleum (Iraq), diamonds (Sierra Leone), or timber (Cambodia) offer incentives for conflict because they provide rebels with the means to fund and equip their groups and, if they succeed, to grow rich from corruption. But the mere presence of natural resources is not sufficient for conflict. War is more likely to erupt if rebels have workers to take advantage of the resource and if a government is too weak to defend its natural resources.
- A variant of the loot-seeking argument focuses on the gain from war itself. Leaders on both sides of the conflict create infrastructure in government and society to wage war and invest heavily in weapons and training of soldiers. They profit personally from these investments and so have little incentive to stop fighting.
- *Justice seeking.* Alternatively, civil wars may be a product of groups seeking revenge and justice for past and present wrongs. Such wars are likely to break out when there is significant social fragmentation, with large numbers of unemployed young men, political repression, or social fragmentation.

According to the *theory of relative deprivation*, people rebel when they receive less than they believe that they deserve and, thus, seek to right economic or political injustice. Such groups believe that they are deprived of wealth that is given to other groups or that they are being denied a voice in the political system. But it is not just recognizing deprivation that causes war. Rather, the incentives to rebel include a group’s perception that the deprivation is unfair, that others receive what they are denied, and that the state is unwilling to remedy the injustice. This theory also explains why both relatively privileged and deprived groups may mobilize. The former, like Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese and India’s Sikhs, mobilize to protect their advantaged position, while the latter, like India’s Dalits or “untouchables,” mobilize to end discrimination.⁷²

- Minorities in Nigeria mobilize over such distributional issues (see also Chapter 5, p. 162). There are about 40 distinct ethnic minorities in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, all of which have seen little political or economic gain from Nigeria’s oil riches, despite the fact that the region accounts for 75 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings (and oil accounts for over 90 percent of Nigeria’s national revenue).⁷³ Rather, they remain impoverished while oil wealth flows to dominant ethnic groups in other parts of the country. The government has responded to their demands for improved economic and political status with violent repression. Thus, observers speak of the “resource curse” because the great wealth it brings produces corruption on the part of leaders who skim off profits for themselves and their cronies, inflation, indifference to other economic sectors, environmental damage, inequality, resentment, and, in the end, strife.
- *Security dilemmas.* Although realists regard security dilemmas as a source of interstate conflict in anarchic global systems, they can

also be sources of conflict *within* states when governing structures disintegrate and create a condition of domestic anarchy in which each group's efforts to defend itself appear threatening to others. The dilemma is intensified by the inability to distinguish adequately between offensive and defensive weapons and the tendency of each party's rhetoric to signal offensive intentions. Domestic security dilemmas can be particularly severe because they are likely to be coupled with predatory goals, given the economic dimension to many civil conflicts.⁷⁴

The fallout of interstate conflict the global level of analysis

At the global level, some *intrastate* conflicts begin as a result of *interstate* conflict, as when a conflict between a state containing a minority transnational ethnic group (for example, Serbs in 1914) and an *irredentist* neighbor (for example, Serbia in 1914) creates an ethnic conflict *within* a state (for example, Austria–Hungary in 1914). The irredentist state's claims to its ethnic kin may create expectations among that group that it will gain independence from the status quo state, producing antagonism between the ethnic group and its government. If irredentist claims appear threatening, the status quo state may repress the minority ethnic group, reducing its civil and political liberties, and intensify efforts to assimilate it into the majority population. In the face of such repression, the ethnic group may try to break free from the status quo state, either to join the irredentist state or establish its own independent state.⁷⁵ Interstate conflict can be a contributing factor to the outbreak of intrastate conflict in regions like Africa and Central Asia where there are numerous transnational ethnic groups.

Internal conflict may also be a product of rivalries that lead external powers to side with different factions that become their proxies in

countries in which those external powers are competing. During the Cold War, the United States and USSR competed with each other in many less-developed countries, each backing its own faction. Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia are only a few of the countries in which such competition took place.

Managing intrastate war

There are major obstacles to managing intrastate conflicts because participants often must live together after the conflict ends. It is difficult to negotiate agreements that all parties can, literally, live with. Thus, negotiation resolves relatively few civil conflicts. Between 1940 and 1990, only 20 percent of civil wars (compared to 55 percent of interstate wars) were ended by negotiation. Rather, most internal wars “ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side.”⁷⁶ There are inherent qualities to civil wars that make them difficult to resolve. One factor is that adversaries cannot keep their separate militias if they negotiate a peace. This poses an obstacle to settlement because there is no neutral police force or governing authority to enforce a peace agreement. In Iraq, for example, the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations rely on their own armed militias for security. Each group views its armed forces as its only “remaining means of protection.” Thus, settlement increases the vulnerability of at least one party; this vulnerability makes it unlikely that a party will abide by the agreement to disarm and increases its sensitivity to any treaty violations by other groups. So, what can be done to ease this dilemma?

Foreign intervention

External countries or international organizations can intervene to provide diplomatic support, military security, and economic aid, but the role of these third parties is complicated. Most analysts

agree that foreign intervention entails risk and under some circumstances may intensify, rather than resolve, existing conflicts. Analysts also disagree over the details of what kind of assistance helps most and how much is appropriate.

Outside parties can intervene to guarantee the implementation of an agreement and protect foes as they disarm. Third-party intervention may even be necessary to end a civil war. One analysis of 41 civil wars finds that a credible third-party guarantee provides the best explanation of war termination, but it only succeeds when the third party has a self-interest in upholding the bargain, is willing and able to use force to punish those who violate the agreement, and is able to signal its willingness to do so, for example by stationing sufficient forces on the ground to deter violations.⁷⁷

Successful third-party intervention requires that external forces remain until the vulnerability of rival groups is lessened, either by installing a new, neutral government, or rebuilding trust and reducing insecurity. Significantly, external actors do not have to be neutral parties and, in the case of a large power disparity between adversaries, third-party forces biased in favor of the minority can be beneficial.⁷⁸

Third parties can also intervene by providing foreign aid. Sometimes such aid, in the form of donations of cash and weapons from the **diaspora**, can fuel conflicts. Aid that is carefully timed and distributed, however, can be used to manage a conflict, particularly in the delicate early stages of peace implementation. For instance, after a peace is reached, there may remain large numbers of young men who have spent most of their lives fighting and who lack the skills or emotional stability to be integrated into a peaceful society. The domestic reforms necessary to ensure a peace are costly and governments recovering from civil war are cash strapped. Foreign economic assistance may be used to aid former soldiers in becoming economically productive members of society or integrating them into a national army.

Power-sharing agreements

The division of political power among combatants provides another way of managing ethnic conflict. According to the power-sharing model, authority must be decentralized and shared among ethnic communities. Democratic institutions that provide combatants equal opportunity to participate in elections are insufficient, because it takes time for such institutions to take root and, in the meantime, one group may co-opt governing institutions and exclude others from participating. The kinds of arrangement that are most successful at protecting all groups include **federalism** and **consociationalism**.

Since 2003, Iraq has adopted both of these arrangements in its early stages of nation building. The Iraqi constitution of October 2005 created a federal system in which Kurds have an autonomous region in northern Iraq, Shiites have an autonomous region in the south, and Sunnis dominate central Iraq. Iraq's interim executive leaders also represented a consociational bargain. A Kurd, Jalal Talabani, was selected as Iraq's interim president; a Shiite, Ibrahim Jaafari, became the interim prime minister and was succeeded by another Shiite, Nouri al-Maliki; and a Sunni was named to fill one of Iraq's two vice presidential slots. Such political bargains are designed to ensure that all groups have a political voice and that none feels permanently disenfranchised.

Power-sharing arrangements may, however, not be sufficient to resolve conflicts. Indeed, federal arrangements may actually create conditions for future wars of secession. In Iraq, oil reserves located in the Kurdish and Shiite regions provide each group with an economic incentive to seek autonomy or even independence. Sunnis, with little oil, would naturally fight to keep Iraq intact. Additionally, sharing executive power requires a long-term commitment to cooperate. Peace is only sustained as long as all parties adhere to the bargain.

Physical separation

When opposing groups are intermixed, as in Iraq's capital Baghdad, physically separating them can also limit conflicts, particularly ethnic wars. The strategy of territorial division removes some of the immediate causes of such wars, including ethnic cleansing. Of course, this solution may also entail the forcible transfer of populations, which is expensive and does not eliminate hostility between groups, and may even intensify it. The conflict between Greece and Turkey after World War One was brought to an end only after the forcible transfer of populations between the two countries.

As noted earlier, one significant shift in warfare has been a relative increase in intrastate wars. With this change, we have also seen a transformation in the ways in which wars are fought. Because many of today's most deadly conflicts are characterized by an asymmetry in power, one or more parties tend to rely on unconventional, and sometimes primitive, weapons and tactics. We now turn to this dangerous trend in warfare: irregular warfare.

Irregular warfare

In recent years, the developing world has been the site of much of the world's bloodiest violence in the form of intermittent irregular or unconventional warfare. Such warfare is very different from the conventional wars in the developed world that characterized much of the three centuries after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Europe's dynastic states, conscious of the devastation of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, followed policies in which civilians were largely left alone by warring armies as long as *they did not themselves take up arms*. Thus, a distinction arose between legitimate warfare and crime. When civilians took up arms they were regarded by states as rebels and criminals. The distinction between war and crime does not

exist in many of the conflicts that currently afflict the developing world, and, although the term guerrilla (meaning "little war" in Spanish) was first used by Spanish irregulars who rose up against Napoléon's occupation of their country, guerrilla warfare has been a feature of conflict in the less-developed countries (LDCs).

In recent years, the collapse of states in the developing world has produced regional and global instability and bred warriors whose use of new and more deadly forms of violence is inspired by religion, nationalism, and greed. These conflicts have witnessed a proliferation of civil strife in which the distinction between civilians and soldiers has blurred. Often combatants fight on behalf of nonstate groups, including bands of domestic insurgents, foreign terrorists, revolutionaries, and even criminals. As a rule, combatants in the LDCs lack the organizational skills, high technology, and material resources needed to wage conventional war and, instead, utilize forms of violence suited to the poor and weak. We now briefly explore the evolution and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

Guerrillas, anti-colonial struggles, and revolutionary war

Unconventional warfare has existed in much of history. In what follows, we show how such warfare has served the interests of those seeking to topple governments in the developing world, especially in the hands of Chinese, Latin American, and Vietnamese revolutionaries.

In 500 BC, Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote a military treatise, *The Art of War*, in which he argued that it was wise to avoid conventional battles and instead use deception whenever possible. In his view, "the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without any lengthy operations in the field."⁷⁹ Sun Tzu regarded unconventional warfare as the strategy for the

weak when fighting the strong, with whom they cannot compete in conventional warfare.

According to the Old Testament, Joshua used guerrilla tactics against his enemies. So did American Minutemen during the Revolutionary War, French snipers (*francs-tireurs*) in the Franco-Prussian War, Philippine insurgents against US forces after the Spanish–American War, Boer raiders in the Boer War, and the partisan resistance against the Nazis in World War Two. All these cases involved the weak in conflict against the strong.

Guerrilla strategists drew inspiration from the tactics pioneered by Mao Zedong during China's civil war, especially his wedding of guerrilla tactics to political warfare. Mao argued that guerrilla forces should befriend local populations and blend in with them. "The people are like water and the army is like fish." In this way, Mao used China's rural areas to cut off and surround his enemies who controlled most of China's cities. Mao called his strategy "people's war" and described it as beginning with ambushes and skirmishes and ending in conventional battle as enemy forces became weaker.

Mao had a profound influence on Ho Chi Minh and his Vietnamese revolutionaries, and his ideas also influenced Latin American revolutionaries, especially Fidel Castro and Ernesto (Ché) Guevara in their successful campaign to overthrow Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Ché, who was Argentinian, served as a minister in Castro's government before reappearing in 1966 as a guerrilla leader in Bolivia, where a year later he was captured and executed. Ché wrote two books on guerrilla warfare in which he recommended its use to America's opponents in the developing world. His ideas were widely read throughout the LDCs where they inspired the use of unconventional warfare by revolutionaries.

Guerrilla tactics also proved effective when used by anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia. They played a key role in the Algerian Revolution (1954–62) against France, as well as the independence struggles of Angola, Mozambique,

Zimbabwe, and Namibia. They were also employed effectively by the African National Congress in its struggle to overthrow the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Global terrorism reflects a dangerous trend in irregular warfare. Ignoring legal and normative limits, modern terrorists are willing to push violence as far as possible, including the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Global terrorism

The nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia (August 2003) like the destruction of New York's World Trade Towers (September 2001), the bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain (March 2004), and the bombings on London's public transport system (July 2005) all reflect the danger of **terrorism** to the security of civilians and governments. Terrorism involves the threat or use of violence against noncombatants by either states or militant groups. It, too, is a weapon of the weak to influence the strong that aims to demoralize and intimidate adversaries. The term "terrorist" is pejorative and is rarely used to describe friends. According to a widely cited aphorism, "one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter," meaning that terrorism is in the eye of the beholder. "Terrorism," by contrast, is defined by the *means* used rather than the *causes* being pursued.

HISTORICAL TERRORISM Terrorism dates back centuries and was often associated with religion. The Zealots, Jewish opponents of Rome's occupation of Palestine in the first century AD, killed Romans in daylight and in front of witnesses in order to frighten Roman authorities and those who might collaborate with them. Terrorism was also practiced by the Assassins, or "hashish eaters," eleventh-century militant Shia Muslims who murdered those who refused to adopt their version of Islam. A Hindu religious cult called the Thugees also used terrorism – ritually strangling victims as sacrifices to Kali, the

goddess of destruction. Until eliminated by the British in the nineteenth century, the Thugees committed as many as a million murders.

During the French Revolution, the state used terrorism against its actual, imagined, or potential enemies. “Terror,” declared French revolutionary Maximilien Robespierre in 1794, “is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most urgent needs.”⁸⁰ Ironically, in the end, Robespierre also fell victim to the guillotine where he was executed without a trial.

In the nineteenth century, **anarchists** who opposed governments of any kind used terrorism widely. Although most anarchists pursued their cause peacefully, some advocated violence. Several world leaders were victims of assassination, called “propaganda of the deed” by anarchists, between 1881 and 1901, including US President William H. McKinley, France’s President Marie-François Sadi Carnot, and Italy’s King Umberto I. These assassinations influenced a Russian group called People’s Will, which tried but failed to assassinate Tsar Alexander II in 1881. One of the group’s members was Alexander Ulyanov, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s older brother.

Lenin, Russia’s revolutionary leader, was responsible for launching the Red Terror against enemies in the summer of 1918 following the Bolshevik Revolution. But Lenin’s use of state terror paled before the murderous acts of his successor Josef Stalin, who during the Soviet effort to collectivize farms and industrialize society killed millions of Soviet citizens. By 1934, the Gulag or system of prison camps for Soviet political prisoners held several million people accused of all sorts of trumped-up crimes. The Gulag, later made infamous in Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s novel *The Gulag Archipelago*, consisted of labor camps that stretched across Siberia and the Soviet far north in which over a million died.

Many of those who were sent to the Gulag were victims of the Great Purge (1936–38), in which

Stalin eliminated all his enemies – real and imagined. The purge featured public trials of Stalin’s old comrades such as Nikolai Bukharin and Lev Kamenev, and of any Bolshevik who had offended the dictator, even in a minor way. Victims included two-thirds of the officer corps of the Soviet Army, and nine-tenths of the members of communist republic and regional central committees. Unable to arrest his arch-foe Leon Trotsky, who had fled the Soviet Union, Stalin arranged for his assassination in Mexico City by a Stalinist agent, Ramón Mercader.

DID YOU KNOW?

Referring to the betrayal of 10 Russian spies arrested in the US in June 2010 by a mole in Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declared that a “Mercader” – the name of Stalin’s hit man who assassinated Leon Trotsky – had been sent to deal with the traitor.

Other examples of state sponsors of terrorism used against citizens or foreign enemies include Libya, under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who was responsible for the 1988 bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, with the loss of 270 lives. North Korea, Iraq, and Iran – the “axis of evil” in the words of President George W. Bush – have also used state-sponsored terrorism against enemies.

Concern about global terrorism grew in the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of revolutionary left-wing groups in Europe. Among these were the Baader-Meinhof Gang, also known as the Red Army Faction, which assassinated businessmen and politicians to protest capitalism, and Italy’s Red Brigades, which engaged in kidnapping, bombing, and assassination of policemen and is remembered for the kidnapping and murder of Italy’s former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978.

Other European groups like Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain and the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland used terrorist tactics to seek national independence for their people. More important was the proliferation of Palestinian terrorists after Israel's triumph in the Six Day War in 1967. Loosely organized under the rubric of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), some groups used terrorism to force others to recognize the plight of Palestinians and to intimidate supporters of Israel. One group, the small Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), even hijacked the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* in 1985, murdering an elderly Jewish-American who was confined to a wheelchair. Other groups resorted to skyjackings and murder. One of the most notorious of these was Black September, which took its name from the month in which it was violently expelled from Jordan in 1970. Black September was responsible for killing 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany. The Lebanon-based Shia group Hezbollah, specialized in kidnapping Westerners and was responsible for murdering Jewish citizens outside the Middle East, for example, in Argentina.

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM These groups, whether European or Middle Eastern, used violence more selectively than today's terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Their political objectives were generally clear as they sought to air grievances, influence adversaries to change policies,

provoke enemies to overreact, and, by doing so, produce new sympathizers for their cause. Implicit in their use of terror was that people could avoid being victims simply by switching sides. By contrast, today's religious and ethnic terrorists display a fanaticism that muddles their political message.⁸¹ They are less concerned by the number of lives they take and offer few incentives for potential victims to avoid their fate. Suicide bombings were pioneered by Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),⁸² which used women (called "blackbirds") with explosives strapped to themselves to murder enemies. Palestinian suicide bombers, too, can conduct a war of attrition at low cost. However, such bombings pose serious moral questions, and defenders cannot easily deter those who want to become martyrs.

The number of victims claimed by terrorist attacks has risen in recent years. As Table 8.3 shows, there were 10,999 terrorist attacks in 2009. These attacks resulted in 14,971 fatalities. The reduction on worldwide terrorist attacks is attributable, at least in part, to declining violence in Iraq. If terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological, or chemical – they may smuggle them into the United States, Europe, or elsewhere, and use them to kill thousands or even millions.⁸³ Although it is hard to imagine what might justify such actions, the fanaticism and anger of such post-9/11 terrorists make such attacks plausible. If their objective is to do as much harm as possible, an attacker has no

Table 8.3 International terrorist attacks, 2005–09

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Terrorist attacks worldwide	11,203	14,443	14,435	11,725	10,999
Attacks resulting in at least one death, injury, or kidnapping	7,963	11,278	11,097	8,411	7,875
Terrorist attacks in Iraq	3,438	6,631	6,210	3,256	2,458
Terrorist attacks in Afghanistan	494	962	1,124	1,222	2,126

Source: US State Department, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009* (August 2010), pp. 292–3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf>

motive to warn the target or reveal its identity at all.

In sum, five features distinguish these “new terrorists”:

1. Their level of fanaticism and devotion to their cause is greater than their predecessors’.
2. Their willingness to kill large numbers of innocent people indiscriminately contrasts with their predecessors’ violence against specific individuals of symbolic importance.
3. Many of the new terrorists are prepared to give up their own lives in suicidal attacks.
4. Many of the new terrorist groups are transnational, linked globally to similar groups.
5. Such groups make use of modern technologies like the internet, and some seek to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

Terrorism, then, is not a new phenomenon, yet some aspects of terrorist activity today are new. One is the use of modern technology against the very states that have pioneered its use in modern warfare. A second is its global range. A third is the

growing destructiveness of modern terrorists and the absence of clear political motives on their part. Terrorists seek to avoid conventional wars with organized and uniformed armies in the field. All, to some extent, oppose the status quo, are fighting states, and accelerate the erosion of state authority. Finally, terrorists ignore existing global norms, especially those intended to protect innocent civilians.

It remains unclear what motivates individuals to turn to extremist terrorism. There is no single identifiable path that transforms someone into a terrorist. We do know that it is overly simplistic to attribute terrorism to any single cause, including poverty, religion, or frustration with government. Yet, there are certain factors that seem to make individuals more susceptible to terrorism, including being brought up with a violent world view and experiencing frustration with a government’s local and foreign policies, especially policies pertaining to the treatment of one’s own ethnic or religious group. These sorts of experience, while not sufficient to turn someone into a terrorist, make an individual more

CONTROVERSY

While little controversy surrounds the definition of terrorism – the targeting of civilians to intimidate adversaries and air grievances – the application of the concept is much more controversial. Terrorism is a label applied to one’s enemies and never one’s friends. And using this label has the effect of closing off debate and discussion about the goals and tactics employed by actors. There is a tendency to accept uncritically that those labeled as terrorists employ illegitimate tactics and, similarly, that those actors engaged in counterterrorism employ legitimate tactics.

Some observers question the tactics employed by military forces engaged in counterterrorism activities, especially those that produce civilian casualties. In fact, military action in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. In Iraq alone, the nonprofit organization Iraq Body Count estimates that almost 3,800 civilians were killed by coalition forces between 2005 and 2010.⁸⁴ Another study estimates that in 2009 over 300 civilian deaths occurred in night raids conducted in Iraq by foreign troops to catch suspected terrorists.⁸⁵ Should these deaths be regarded as legitimate “collateral damage” and allowed under the laws of war, or should they be considered unjustified, and disproportionate to the foreign powers’ political and military objectives?

susceptible to recruitment and radicalization. Future terrorists may then be recruited and indoctrinated through prayer groups, social clubs, charitable organizations, criminal gangs, and prisons. But, here too, membership in these kinds of group does not provide a sufficient explanation. After all, most members of such organizations never become radicalized.

Conclusion

This chapter began by examining one of the most important and controversial theoretical concepts in the study of global politics – power. We have seen how realists view power as the currency of global politics and how it defines the discipline. Power is necessary to survive, but it is an elusive concept – difficult to define, measure, and compare. There are many different kinds of power – hard, soft, and structural – and it has many different uses, with deterrence and compellence being two of the most important today.

We then examined theories regarding the causes of interstate wars. Political scientists are very interested in uncovering the causes of wars in order to prescribe policies that will better manage, and even prevent, conflict. Some possible causes of war, like human nature and culture, may predispose us to conflict. Other factors associated with war are more easily managed. The process by which states make and implement policies, for example, may also trigger war. Assuming rationality is questionable, cognitive and affective decision-making models examine how leaders may pursue policies on the basis of their biases and emotions. Bureaucratic and organizational models of decision making help explain how intra-governmental and societal dynamics influence foreign policy and sometimes contribute to war. We also examined how regime type, economic systems, nationalism and public opinion, and domestic politics can create conditions conducive to war or peace.

Finally, we examined guerrilla warfare and

terrorism, two unconventional forms of conflict and violence that characterize the modern world and that blur the distinction between war and crime. In the next chapter, we turn to the central role that technology has played shaping the nature of conflict and war and the threats and opportunities posed by some recent technologies.

Student activities

Map analysis

Locate as many current wars as you can on a map. You can find lists of current conflicts at GlobalSecurity.org and the International Crisis Group (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/>). Indicate which conflicts are conventional interstate wars, which are guerrilla insurgencies, and which are products of failed states. What trends can you identify?

Cultural materials

- 1 General Sherman's 1864 march through Georgia and his scorched-earth tactics provided the background for the 1939 Hollywood extravaganza *Gone With the Wind*, regarded by many as the greatest film of all time, and it was celebrated in the Henry Clay Work (1832–84) song *Marching Through Georgia*:

Bring the good old bugle, boys! we'll sing
another song –
Sing it with a spirit that will start the world
along –
Sing it as we used to sing it fifty thousand
strong,
While we were marching through Georgia.
[Chorus] "Hurrah! Hurrah! we bring the
Jubilee!
Hurrah! Hurrah! the flag that makes you
free!"

So we sang the chorus from Atlanta to the sea,
While we were marching through Georgia.

Considering what you have read about the development of war and warfare in this chapter, do you think the devastation wrought against civilians by Sherman's march through Georgia was justified?

- 2 In Yemen, the government uses poetry to moderate Islamic extremism, one source of terrorism in the Islamic world. There is a long tradition in this country of the government sending poets to remote areas to communicate the government's message to villagers who are often skeptical of soldiers and government officials, but who respect poets.

One of the most recent in a long line of poets is Amin al-Mashreqi. His poems attempt to weaken religious extremism by appealing to countrymen's sense of national pride. He writes:

O men of arms, why do you love injustice?
You must live in law and order
Get up, wake up, or be forever regretful,
Don't be infamous among the nations.

What is Mashreqi's message? What message would you convey to extremists to turn them away from terrorism?

Further reading

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- Keegan, John, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). Extraordinary account of the origins and evolution of warfare from the battle of Megiddo (1469 BC) to the nuclear age.
- Pape, Robert, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005). Systematic and thoughtful analysis of suicide terrorism.
- Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Classic examination of the causes of war from three levels of analysis.

1832	April 1915	September 1916	1921, 1923	February 1945	March 1945
Clausewitz's <i>On War</i> posthumously published	Poison gas first used, second battle of Ypres	First use of massed tanks, Battle of Cambrai	General Billy Mitchell conducts tests of aerial bombing of ships	Bombing of Dresden	Fire bombing of Tokyo

9

Technology and the changing face of warfare

At 8:15 on the morning of August 6, 1945, a single B-29 bomber, the *Enola Gay*, piloted by Paul W. Tibbets (1915–2007) dropped a nuclear bomb, known as “Little Boy,” on the Japanese city of Hiroshima (see Figure 9.1). Hiroshima had been selected as the target because it had not been previously bombed, thereby making it easier for American observers to judge the effects of the atom bomb. The atomic explosion cut a blast of light across Hiroshima’s sky “from east to west, from the city toward the hills. It seemed a sheet of sun.”¹ It is estimated that 140,000 of Hiroshima’s 350,000 inhabitants were killed in the atomic blast and as a result of radiation. Five square miles were devastated, and more than 60 percent of the city’s buildings were destroyed.² Although nuclear weapons have not been used in combat since World War Two, wars today are just as violent. Between 1998 and 2008, warfare in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had caused some 5.4 million deaths from violence, disease and starvation, making it the deadliest conflict since the Second World War.³

The bombing of Hiroshima and, three days later, Nagasaki ended World War Two and marked a giant step toward the possibility of total war.



Figure 9.1 1940s – atomic burst

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Still Pictures, 342-AF-58189

August 6, 8, 1945	1954	1957	1991	2007
Atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan	US adopts strategy of massive retaliation	Soviet Union tests first ICBM	Precision guided weapons first extensively used in Persian Gulf War	Estonia targeted by Russian cyberattack

Movement toward total war can occur in two related ways: (1) increases in destructive power and (2) the breakdown of norms protecting innocent civilians in wartime. Both characterized the destructive Thirty Years' War. During the two centuries after 1648, European leaders tried to limit warfare in ways that would reduce civilian casualties and material damage, both of which threatened their states' wealth and stability. And, in ensuing centuries, international law evolved to protect civilians in wartime.

This chapter examines the critical role that technology has played and continues to play in global politics. War in the eighteenth century was limited both in terms of strategy and technology. After 1648, Europeans came to regard warfare as an instrument of statecraft, and the spokesperson for this perspective and eloquent opponent of **absolute war** was a Prussian military thinker and general named Karl Maria von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Clausewitz, a realist at heart, witnessed the explosion in the size and intensity of warfare brought about by the French Revolution and Napoléon Bonaparte, and he feared that this trend would sever the link between politics and violence. The chapter begins by describing Clausewitz's ideas on war, ideas that reflected the views of European statesmen that wars had to be carefully managed and controlled in order to avoid the bloodshed and destruction of Europe's earlier religious wars. Clausewitz was inspired to express his fears for the future in a classic work of military strategy that is still widely used today.

The chapter then describes how changes, notably in technology, made his fears a reality and in large measure rendered his ideas obsolete.

Following the discussion of Clausewitz, the chapter traces the expansion of war after the eighteenth century, in particular during the two world wars of the twentieth century and the impact of technological change on the conduct of those wars. The end of World War Two came suddenly with the nuclear annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, events that brought the world into the nuclear age. Changing nuclear weapons technologies and the evolution in nuclear strategy that accompanied them dominated much of the Cold War, and we will examine the elements of and changes in the strategy of nuclear deterrence from 1945 to the present. Although nuclear weapons and other **weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** still threaten our survival, continued technological innovation has produced a generation of “smart weapons,” especially in the United States, that limit casualties and have revolutionized conventional warfare. “Smart weapons” depend importantly on the introduction of information and communication technologies and make use of sophisticated computers. As a result, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects and dangers of **cyberwar** (information warfare) and **cyber attacks**.

We turn now to Clausewitz, and examine how, in *On War (Vom Kriege)*, he laid out a vision of the relationship between war and politics.

War as an extension of politics

Clausewitz argued that war was a *political* instrument, like diplomacy or foreign aid. For this

reason, he can be regarded as a traditional realist (as defined in Chapter 1). In this, he echoed Thucydides who had described over two millennia earlier, in his *History*, the dreadful consequences of unlimited war in ancient Greece.

Clausewitz feared that unless politicians controlled war it would degenerate into a “fight” with no clear objectives except that of destroying the enemy. Clausewitz had served in the Prussian army until captured in 1806, later helped reorganize it, served in the Russian army (1812–14), and finally fought at the climactic battle of Waterloo (June 18, 1815) that brought about Napoléon’s final downfall. Napoleonic warfare led him to caution that war was being transformed into a struggle among whole peoples without limits and without clear political objectives. In his three-volume masterpiece, *On War*, published after his death, he explained the relationship between war and politics.

KEY DOCUMENT KARL MARIA VON CLAUSEWITZ, “WHAT IS WAR?”⁴

Now, if we reflect that War has its root in a political object, then, naturally this original motive which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct . . . Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it . . . We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means . . . [T]he political view is the object. War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

Clausewitz believed that the rise of nationalism and the use of large conscript armies could produce absolute war, that is, wars to the death rather than wars waged for precise and limited political objectives. He particularly feared leaving war to the generals because their idea of “victory” – the destruction of enemy armies – contradicted the aim of politicians, who viewed victory as attaining the political objectives for which they had begun the war. Such ends could range from limited to large, and, Clausewitz asserted, wars should be *fought only at the level necessary to achieve them*. “If the aim of the military action,” he wrote, “is an equivalent for the political objective, that action will in general diminish as the political objective diminishes,” and this explains why “there may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a War of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation.”⁵ Generals, he argued, should not be allowed to make decisions regarding when to start or end wars or how to fight them because they would use *all* the means at their disposal to destroy an enemy’s capacity to fight, even though that might convert a limited conflict into an unlimited one.

In this way, Clausewitz foresaw World War One, in which generals dictated to political leaders the timing of military mobilization and pressed politicians to take the offensive and strike first. In effect, the insistence of the military commanders on adhering to pre-existing war plans like Germany’s Schlieffen Plan and mobilization schedules took decision making out of the hands of civilian leaders and limited the time such leaders had to negotiate with one another to prevent the war’s outbreak. The generals also pressured statesmen to uphold alliance commitments, thereby spreading a limited war across Europe. Clausewitz’s thinking is evident in Robert F. Kennedy’s (1925–68) recollection of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis: “I thought, as I listened, of the many times that I had heard the military take positions which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know.”⁶

Wars, Clausewitz argued, should be “political acts,” “intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.”⁷ They were not mere slugfests animated by hatred and fanaticism in which the “victor” was the gladiator who remained alive at the end. Instead, Clausewitz argued, force should be only a *means* – a “real political instrument,” as was diplomacy, in a politician’s arsenal. Wars should be a continuation of politics by other means or instruments of forceful **bargaining**, and not ends in themselves. Since wars should only be initiated to achieve the political aims of civilian leaders, it was logical, he contended, that, if the “original reasons were forgotten, means and ends would become confused.” In that case, he believed, the use of violence would become irrational. For war to be usable, it must be limited. Several developments, however, especially industrialization, enlarged warfare precisely in the direction that Clausewitz had feared.

Let us now examine how warfare came to threaten the survival of humanity itself. Factors at all three levels of analysis pressed the level of violence upward during the two world wars. Nationalistic leaders came to power; states became militarized and fell under the sway of uncompromising ideologies like nationalism, Marxism, fascism and Nazism; and, at the system level, **industrialization** and, most important, advances in military technology made possible previously unimagined levels of violence. The destructive power of weaponry and the vulnerability of civilians increased significantly in the nineteenth century and then in the two world wars of the twentieth. The introduction of nuclear weapons after 1945 and the spread of biological and chemical weapons were especially dramatic steps on the path to total war. Such weapons of mass destruction are inherently indiscriminate and therefore pose an unprecedented threat to civilians. Although both the United States and Soviet Union engaged in a continual effort to develop new and better weapons, they did not let this competition run out of control, and both worked to prevent additional countries from acquiring WMD.

On the road to total war: the world wars

Beginning in the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the industrial age, a great expansion of war and a rapid evolution of military technology took place, climaxing with the development of WMD in the twentieth century. The combination of nationalism and developing technology in that epoch transformed Clausewitz’s fears into a reality far more dangerous than even he had imagined.

The industrialization that marked the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a great impact on all social institutions, including war. The reasons were threefold. First, industrialization made the home front, where weapons and supplies were manufactured, as important to the war effort as the armies in the field; it also made economic installations and the civilians who worked in factories legitimate targets of enemy attack. The wars that followed involved submarines that were used to try and starve civilians, strategic bombing of urban centers, and weapons of ever greater destructive power. Second, industrialization dramatically increased the production and standardization of armaments and other supplies necessary to deploy large armies all year round, sustain increased firepower, and adopt strategies of **attrition**. Finally, industrialization concentrated large numbers of people in cities, where they came under the spell of ideologies such as nationalism and socialism. Greater public involvement in politics forced rulers to find ideological goals to justify war. Fueled by ideological goals, wars became more difficult to end or limit through compromise.

The impact of technology, industrialization and public involvement in war and peace had already been evident in the American Civil War (1861–65), in which railroads and the telegraph and the mass production of industrialization were available to hundreds of thousands of fighting men, especially in the north. Clausewitz’s fear of unlimited war was visible when General William T. Sherman (1820–91) conducted his march

through Georgia from November 16 to December 21, 1864, laying waste to the region from “Atlanta to the sea.” Sherman is said to have coined the phrase “War is Hell” in an 1880 speech in Ohio.

Although America’s Civil War was dismissed by Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke as “two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned,”⁸ in many ways, it previewed World War One. Although much of World War One took place in France and Belgium, it was also fought in Central Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, and Africa. It was the first truly modern war and the first total war in the sense that it was waged by huge armies of conscripted citizens, equipped with modern weapons and sustained by modern industry. For the first time, whole societies were mobilized in the struggle for victory. Casualties were higher than in any previous conflict, “Sucking up lives at the rate of 5000, and sometimes 50,000 a day” on the Western front, “the known dead per capita of population were 1 to 28 for France, 1 to 32 for Germany, 1 to 57 for England and 1 to 107 for Russia.”⁹ In the five-month Battle of the Somme (July–November 1916), Britain and France paid a price of 600,000 casualties in return for 125 square miles of mud. At the Battle of Verdun, from February to December of 1916, the combatants suffered 1.2 million casualties. During the conflict, a total of over 10 million were killed, and another 20

million were wounded. To sustain a war of this magnitude required both the fruits of industrialization and the fervor of nationalist **xenophobia**.

World War Two, in many ways a continuation of the previous world war, was even more global, reaching Asia and Europe, as well as North Africa and the South Pacific. World War Two began with Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, pitting Britain and France against Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Following the conquest of Poland and a period of deceptive calm (called the “phony war”), Germany conquered Norway and Denmark and then invaded France, forcing that country to surrender in May 1940 and Britain to evacuate its army hurriedly from Dunkirk in France. The Germans then sought to bring Britain to its knees in the aerial Battle of Britain (1940) and the intense bombing of British cities called the Blitz, in both of which British deployment of radar was decisive in compensating for British inferiority in numbers of aircraft and pilots. Germany and Italy also sought to destroy Britain’s links to its colonial possessions in Asia by extending the war to North Africa, attempting to seize the vital British-controlled Suez Canal in Egypt, and using submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic in an effort to starve Britain.

The failure of these efforts and Hitler’s abiding hatred of Bolshevism and the Soviet Union led Hitler to abandon plans to invade the British Isles and turn east. On June 22, 1941, Hitler invaded the USSR, despite the nonaggression treaty signed by Germany and the Soviet Union less than two years earlier. By the time the Germans surrendered in May 1945, at least 20 million Soviet citizens had died.

The war again expanded following the surprise Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was accompanied by its conquest of much of Southeast Asia, including the British naval base at Singapore and the US-owned Philippines. The Pacific campaign, regarded as secondary to the war against Germany, was fought largely by the Americans and British. General Douglas

DID YOU KNOW?

The total cost of World War One in 1918 dollars was about \$125 billion for the Allies and \$60 billion for Germany and Austria–Hungary. That breaks down to about \$38 billion for Germany, \$35 billion for Great Britain, \$24 billion for France, \$22 billion each for Russia and the United States, and \$20 billion for Austria–Hungary.

MacArthur (1880–1964) commanded army troops moving northward through New Guinea and the Philippines, and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885–1966) commanded naval and marine forces moving westward in an island-hopping campaign. The latter included some of the bloodiest battles of the war in terms of casualties as a ratio of troop involved – Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa – in which Japanese soldiers fought to the death and Japanese *kamikaze* pilots engaged in suicide missions against allied warships. This was a new tactic that terrified defenders and foreshadowed the “suicide bombings” of today. When making their final attack Japanese suicide pilots were told to remember that:

- Crashing bodily into a target is not easy. It causes the enemy great damage. Therefore, the enemy will exert every means to avoid a hit.
- Suddenly, you may become confused. You are liable to make an error. But hold on to the unshakeable conviction to the last moment that you will sink the enemy ship.
- Remember when diving into the enemy to shout at the top of your lungs: “Hissatsu!” (“Sink without fail!”) At that moment, all the cherry blossoms at Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo will smile brightly at you.¹⁰

Until the Anglo-American landings in Normandy, France, on D-Day, June 6, 1944, the war in Europe against Germany was conducted mainly by the Soviet Union. Confronted by overwhelming military forces on two fronts, Germany finally surrendered in May 1945. The war in Asia lasted until August 1945, when Japan surrendered shortly after the atom bomb attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Tokyo.¹¹

Technology and interstate war

As the previous section on the changing nature of war suggests, military technology is a key factor

in the conduct of war. Adversaries, however, rarely understand the implications of changing technology. Often, leaders study the previous war to prepare for the next one. The failure to recognize that warfare has changed and adapt to those changes is especially prevalent among winners of earlier wars. By contrast, losers are more apt to learn from past errors. Sometimes modest technological innovations have a profound impact, such as the introduction of stirrups in China and later in Europe enabling mounted warriors to use handheld weapons, especially bows and arrows, without falling off their horses.

Technology and the conduct of World War One

Among the most important results of the Industrial Revolution were the development of railways and steamships, both critical for fighting World War One. So, too, was the invention of the Bessemer process in 1850 for making steel. Another advance was made possible by the canning of food – introduced by a French chef in 1795 who sought to win a prize offered by Napoléon for a way to prevent military food supplies from spoiling. Canned food made it possible to feed large armies in distant places and to campaign even in winter when fresh food was unavailable.

Virtually all of Europe’s statesmen and generals failed to appreciate the extent to which technological innovation had tipped the strategic balance away from offensive to defensive dominance. And interstate war is most likely, reasons political scientist Robert Jervis, when the offense has the advantage giving countries an incentive to attack first and when it is not possible to distinguish between offensive and defensive postures, thereby forcing countries to assume the worst.¹² Both conditions existed in 1914.

Some technological advances in warfare had already been introduced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but their implications for

warfare were not appreciated by generals and statesmen in 1914. For example, in 1873 Joseph Glidden (1813–1906) from DeKalb, Illinois received a patent for “barbed wire” (also called “the devil’s rope” and “concertina wire”), a simple device that later became a deadly barrier to frontal infantry and cavalry assaults. In World War One, during the hours of darkness, “wiring parties” inserted wiring posts in front of their trenches and then attached to them reels of barbed wire. After many bloody episodes, instead of charging the enemy, attacking forces began to fire artillery across the field of battle to punch holes in the wire.

Another technological advance that enhanced the defense was the machine gun that could be used with deadly effect against masses of infantry and cavalry advancing across open ground. It was invented in 1884 by the American Hiram Maxim and could fire over 500 rounds a minute.¹³ The machine gun was enhanced by the invention of smokeless gun power, which was thought to have been invented by a Prussian artillery captain around 1864. It was not until 1885, however, that a French inventor successfully made smokeless powder that could be used in guns, making it difficult to ascertain where an enemy was located. The British were among the first to adopt the machine gun, using it extensively in colonial conflicts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also, the 1905 Russo-Japanese War witnessed the extensive and destructive impact of the weapon against advancing infantry and cavalry.

Other technological developments that altered the tactical nature of warfare in ways disadvantageous to an offensive strategy were breech-loaded and rifled guns, which stabilized bullets by spinning them in flight. Although developed earlier, this innovation was widely deployed in the nineteenth century, dramatically increasing the range, accuracy, speed, and quality of firearms, especially French artillery. Few military leaders in 1914 recognized how effective artillery could be used against masses of infantry and cavalry

moving across no man’s land or massing behind the lines in preparation for an attack. The best known artillery piece was manufactured by the German firm of Krupp. It was nicknamed “Big Bertha” or “Fat Bertha” in honor of Gustav Krupp’s wife. “Big Bertha” could fire a 2200-pound shell at a range of nine to 15 miles. This 43-ton howitzer (a cannon with a bore diameter greater than 30 mm that fires shells in a curved trajectory) had a crew of 200, had to be moved by tractors, and took over six hours to reassemble.

The implications of the new military innovations were there to see if Europe’s leaders had studied the right conflicts, for example, the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War. In the Civil War, Union armies commanded by General Ulysses S. Grant (1822–85) forged a victorious strategy against the Confederacy out of huge mass armies, and engaged in a war of attrition that depended on massed artillery, trenches, industrialization, and resupply by railroad. Instead, Europe’s statesmen and generals looked to the successful experience of the three wars of German unification (1863, 1866, and 1870) where few of the military innovations just described had played a major role. These wars had ended quickly, in single battles, won by the side that had struck first. As a result, the main lesson that leaders drew was that taking the offensive right away was necessary for survival. Ignoring the enormous increases in firepower, French strategists,¹⁴ for example, concluded that the secret of getting soldiers across open ground even in the presence of machine guns and artillery lay in the moral dimension of war, specifically in the resolve of the troops. Railroads, military strategists believed, were critical in enabling them to mobilize and move huge armies to a single point where they could launch an overwhelming offensive to smash through an enemy front. In World War One, however, railroads would prove more important for transporting the fruits of industrialization, especially the vast numbers of artillery shells and other ordnance necessary for modern armies.

Nowhere was the single-minded preference of Europe's generals for offensive operations more clearly revealed than in the military plans prepared in advance by all the major states. The best known, Germany's Schlieffen Plan, named for Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913), Chief of Germany's Great General Staff between 1891 and 1905, had been repeatedly revised prior to 1914. Like other European war plans made before 1914, the Schlieffen Plan was based on the primacy of the offensive, the key to which was military mobilization, which was viewed by statesmen and generals in 1914 in somewhat the same way strategists in the nuclear era thought about a nuclear first strike (see p. 300). Military mobilization encompassed calling up troops from around the country, gathering them together at mobilization centers where they received arms and supplies, and transporting them and their logistical support to the front. In other words, winning required a country to invest significant time and expense so that it could strike its adversary before the latter could launch its own offensive. German leaders endowed mobilization with special importance because they foresaw a two-front war against France and Russia and concluded that the only way they could triumph was by striking rapidly against France in the west and, after defeating the French Army, wheeling eastward to confront Russia which, as the least advanced of the European powers, would take longest to mobilize and prepare for war.

The importance generals attached to mobilizing and striking first as the key to survival and victory meant that there was little time for diplomacy or negotiation to prevent war from breaking out. If mobilization timetables were ignored or enemies were permitted to mobilize first, the generals argued, then they would not take responsibility for the consequences. *This belief effectively shifted the decision about whether and when to go to war from political leaders to generals.* Political leaders had little time to consider matters, as they were being pressured by their generals to go to war quickly or be held responsible

for their countries' defeat. In this respect, the plans forced leaders to reverse completely the relationship between war and politics and between politicians and generals that Clausewitz had advocated a century earlier. For the Germans in 1914, according to the Schlieffen Plan, this meant attacking Belgium and France before Russia could mobilize, thereby enlarging the conflict.

During the war, other innovations further transformed the nature of warfare. Among the most important were the airplane and the tank, both of which evolved in the years after 1918 to become the bases for Nazi tactics 20 years later. The airplane had only been invented 11 years before the war, and until the war's final stages was mainly used for scouting and engaging in aerial combat with enemy planes. However, the gigantic German dirigibles called *Zeppelins* repeatedly bombed Britain. By 1918, planes had also begun to strafe and bomb enemy positions.

DID YOU KNOW?

The tank was so named in a British effort to keep their innovation a secret from the Germans. Initially, these weapons were shipped to France in crates marked "tanks" so that they appeared to be the large tank-like bathtubs that were in use near the front.

The tank was first used by the British on September 15, 1916 (see Figure 9.2). Initially, it had little impact on the war because early models tended to break down frequently. Mud fouled their treads; drivers could not see where they were going; and they were intolerably hot inside and so noisy that they announced the beginning of attacks clearly to the enemy. Tanks were improved, however, so that in November 1917, the British massed some 400 of them in the Battle of Cambrai, which finally enabled the Allies to break through Germany's strongest defensive fortification known as the Hindenburg Line.



Figure 9.2 Tank in action

Source: Courtesy of the Council, National Army Museum, London, UK

World War One was also the setting for the first large-scale use of submarines in combat. This weapon, which continues to play a key role in military strategy, proved invaluable to the Germans in the Great War as a means of disrupting Britain's supply routes, even while the British surface fleet enforced a blockade on Germany. On September 5, 1914, a German U-boat (*Unterseeboot*) fired the first wartime torpedo, sinking a British light cruiser in Scottish waters. A little over two weeks later another German U-boat sunk three British cruisers in just over an hour off the Dutch coast. In October, U-boats claimed their first merchant vessel.

Under international law of the time, naval vessels were supposed to take the crews of enemy ships aboard before sinking them. Initially, Germany tried to follow this custom, but in time it proved impossible owing to the small size of

submarines and the danger to submarines in surfacing to take aboard enemy sailors. As both sides sought to starve each other by preventing supplies from getting through (the British by resort to surface blockade), the toll taken by submarines in ships and lives, including civilians, grew dramatically. In February 1915, Germany declared all the waters off the British coast a war zone in which all ships, including neutral ones, would be sunk without warning. While making tactical sense, the decision was politically sensitive, especially after the German sinking of the British liner *Lusitania* in May 1915 with the loss of 1200 civilians, including 128 Americans. In September, fearing the anger of still neutral America, Germany agreed to cease unrestricted submarine warfare but resumed it again in February 1917 in a desperate gamble to bring Britain to its knees quickly. This decision, fol-

lowed by the sinking of other US ships and the publication of a German effort to bring Mexico into the war against the United States,¹⁵ finally brought an enraged America into the war on April 6, 1917.¹⁶

World War One also saw the first use of poison gas in warfare, and gas became a much feared weapon – one of indiscriminate terror. Heavier than air, gas could be delivered with devastating effect on soldiers in their trenches. The Germans first used poison gas in the second Battle of Ypres on April 22, 1915. Thought initially to be a smoke-screen, the attack sent surviving French and Algerian defenders into panic. The British first used poison gas in September 1915 at Loos. Unlike the Germans, who had used shells to deliver gas, the British released it from opened canisters, so that depending on the wind, the gas might shift back on the British themselves. Many gas victims were blinded, and the injuries it caused were intensely painful. The possibility of a poison gas attack meant that soldiers had to put on crude gas masks; and, if these proved ineffective, an attack could leave a victim in agony for days and weeks before he finally succumbed to his injuries. Chlorine and mustard gas were the most widely used, and 85,000 soldiers died, with over 1 million injured (including a young Adolf Hitler), from

gas attacks. Overall, the combination of modern technology and the resulting war of trench warfare and attrition produced unprecedented casualties.

Technology and the conduct of World War Two

Having lost World War One, Germany turned its imagination to the next war, as did Japan, which had been embittered by the refusal of the Western allies to meet its demands in Asia. German generals were impressed by the role tanks had played in the final stages of the war in France and by the ideas of French reformers like the young Colonel Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) who advocated wars of mobility, featuring tanks and airplanes.¹⁷ German planners were struck by the potential of aerial bombardment and submarine warfare, both of which had been introduced during World War One. As a result, they developed the strategy of *Blitzkrieg* (“lightning war”) that combined mechanized and armored warfare with tactical air support and psychological warfare. They first tested part of this strategy during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), especially in an infamous air attack on the Basque town of Guernica (see below).

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD GUERNICA

At 4:30 p.m. – the busiest time of the day – on April 26, 1937, without provocation, German bombers of the Condor Legion attacked Guernica, in Spain, in order to test the tactics of the new *Luftwaffe* (air force) and its new *Blitzkrieg* strategy. For over three hours, the squadron rained bombs and gunfire on the helpless town. Over one-third of Guernica’s residents were killed or wounded. One survivor recalled that the “air was alive with the cries of the wounded. I saw a man crawling down the street, dragging his broken legs . . . Pieces of people and animals were lying everywhere. In the wreckage there was a young woman. I could not take my eyes off her. Bones stuck through her dress. Her head twisted right around her neck. She lay, mouth open, her tongue hanging out.”¹⁸ Guernica is remembered today, partly owing to the passionate antiwar painting by Picasso (1881–1973) that hangs in the Prado Museum in Madrid, Spain.

Blitzkrieg depended on concentrating large numbers of tanks and mechanized vehicles in a small area, then punching through enemy defenses and wheeling behind his defending armies, severing supply routes and surrounding pockets of resistance in the process. The armored *Panzers* (tanks) were closely supported by aircraft, the most notorious of which was the dive-bombing *Stuka*. In the invasion of France, this aircraft was used to bomb and strafe refugees, partly to “herd” them in ways that would clog roads and bridges and impede the movement of French army units. In order to cause maximum fear among civilians, the *Stuka* was equipped with sirens called “Jericho Trumpets.”

In contrast to Germany, France assumed that coming wars would resemble World War One – that is, wars of attrition dominated by static defenses in which both sides try to wear each other down. Looking to the past, France built a line of fortifications along its frontier with Germany from Belgium to the Swiss Alps called the Maginot Line after former minister of war, André Maginot (1877–1932). Their strategy proved ineffective, however, because in invading

France in 1940, the Germans avoided the Maginot Line entirely and swept through Luxembourg and the Ardennes Forest.

For its part, Japan was impressed by the claim of US General Billy Mitchell (1879–1936) that even the largest battleships were vulnerable to airpower. After World War One, Mitchell, a leading US airman of that war, tried to get the US Navy to pay attention to the vulnerability of naval ships to airpower. To make his case, he conducted bombing tests in 1921 and 1923 that sank several battleships, including the German battleship *Ostfriesland* and the old US battleship *Alabama*, but Navy officials were not persuaded to explore these new ideas about warfare. Japanese officials were, however, and they used the time to build aircraft carriers, six of which were involved in their attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in 1941. In addition, they developed land-based Japanese aircraft that they later used to sink the British battleship *Prince of Wales* only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Only after the US lost its battleships at Pearl Harbor did it emulate Japan and rely increasingly on naval aircraft in its island-hopping campaign.

CONTROVERSY

Between February 13 and 15, 1945, British and American bombers destroyed the German city of Dresden. Since then controversy has raged over the necessity and utility for the raid on a city that many claim had no military value. By 1945, the city housed numerous refugees fleeing from the East from where Russian forces were rapidly advancing as well as large numbers of German casualties. The allies’ purpose in bombing Dresden was to disrupt German communications and transportation to the Eastern front. Another possible purpose was to illustrate Western military power to the advancing Soviet army. Two waves of British bombers dropping high explosives and incendiaries attacked during the night and early morning followed by US heavy bombers the following day. Much of the old city was burned down, with temperatures reaching 1500°C (2700°F) in a firestorm in the city’s center. Between 25,000 and 35,000 Germans died in the raids, and the Nazis cited the attack in propaganda, urging Germans to resist to the end. The American novelist Kurt Vonnegut (1922–2007) was one of seven US prisoners of war who survived the bombing in the Slaughterhouse Five meatpacking cellar, from which he witnessed the effects of the bombing. His 1969 novel of the same name was based on his experience.

Large-scale strategic bombing was a central feature of World War Two and was a major step toward Clausewitz's much feared absolute war. German attacks on London, Warsaw, and Rotterdam indiscriminately targeted civilians. The allies did the same with greater effect. In "Operation Gomorrah," British and American bombers attacked the German city of Hamburg on July 27–28, 1943, creating a "firestorm" with incendiaries and killing over 42,000 civilians. In "Operating Meetinghouse," American B-29s, also

using incendiaries, raided Tokyo on March 9–10, and, as in Hamburg, these created firestorms, sucking oxygen from the air and asphyxiating thousands of victims. In Tokyo, a raid destroyed about 16 square miles of the city and killed over 100,000 people. The atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 brought total warfare close to reality (see Key document, below). German atrocities against foes, however, especially the murder of millions of European Jews in the Holocaust, constituted an unprecedented

KEY DOCUMENT

THE ORDER TO BOMB HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI¹⁹

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General

United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.
2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.
3. Discussion of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiqués on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for specific clearance . . .

(Sgd) THOS. T. HANDY

THOS. T. HANDY

General, G.S.C.

Acting Chief of Staff

copy for General Groves

TOP SECRET

erosion of the protections previously accorded civilians in wartime.

Technology and the Cold War standoff

Along with the explosive power of nuclear weapons came new technologies to deliver them. Thus, the 1940s and 1950s saw significant improvements in aircraft. Propeller-driven B-29s that could deliver a single atom bomb were replaced first by the turboprop B-36, and then by the all-jet B-52. The B-52 was used in Vietnam and remains in use today. Also, beginning in the 1960s, both the USSR and the US introduced **intercontinental ballistic missiles** (ICBMs), which allowed each to attack the other in minutes. Along with this development came the miniaturization of nuclear weapons so that each bomber or missile could deliver payloads measured in megatons (millions of tons of TNT) rather than kilotons (thousands of tons of TNT) as had been the case with the atom bombs of 1945. These technologies heightened the threat to non-combatants, making them the principal victims of nuclear war, and doing away with states' **hard shell of impermeability**²⁰ that armies and frontiers had once provided.

Along with these technological advances came new efforts to manage and limit wars, particularly because the Cold War was dominated by fear that conflict between the two superpowers would end in mutual annihilation. Moreover, nuclear war, according to some scientists, would have four related environmental consequences – “obscuring smoke in the troposphere, obscuring dust in the stratosphere, the fallout of radioactive debris, and the partial destruction of the ozone layer” – that combined would cause a period of darkness and cold on earth, a **nuclear winter**.²¹ These conditions would destroy agriculture in the northern hemisphere and make water unavailable owing to freezing and contamination. Such concerns produced intense debate about the morality of nuclear war.

World leaders also sought ways to defend their countries against missiles. Proposed technologies included space satellites to give warning of attacks, an **antiballistic missile** system – missiles that shoot down other missiles – proposed by the United States in 1967, and President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, popularly known as “Star Wars” because it was based on satellite-based sensors and weapons. In 2001, former President George W. Bush approved a limited system of ground-based antiballistic missiles in Eastern Europe that could, it was claimed, destroy a small number of enemy missiles, especially those launched by “rogue states” like Iran. President Barack Obama altered plans to deploy this system, partly to reduce tensions with Russia and partly because many observers believed the technology would not work and because an enemy could overwhelm the system merely by using additional missiles.

In recent years, concern has grown about chemical and biological weapons that are relatively inexpensive and potentially available to terrorists and “rogue” states. Chemical weapons, which employ toxic chemical compounds, can be grouped into several types of agent: *nerve agents* (e.g., sarin gas) prevent nerve messages from being transmitted throughout the body; *blood agents* (e.g., hydrogen cyanide) prevent the transfer of oxygen to tissue; *choking agents* (e.g., chlorine) irritate the respiratory tract; and *blistering agents* (e.g., mustard gas) cause painful burns and blisters. Biological weapons deliberately inflict disease by means of microorganisms, like viruses and bacteria, and naturally occurring toxins like venom. These weapons are frightening because they are relatively cheap to make and easy to disperse – and cannot discriminate between combatants and civilians or between friend and foe.

Following World War One, the use of chemicals was banned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. And by 2003, most countries had become party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which banned production and use of all chemical

weapons, and required the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons by 2012. Nevertheless, a number of countries are believed to have acquired such weapons, including Iran. Iran and Iraq used gas warfare in their 1981–88 war, and Saddam Hussein used gas against Iraq’s Kurdish citizens in 1989. Also, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention outlawed the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. Several incidents hold out the prospect, however, that terrorists could acquire chemical or biological weapons. In March 1995, a Japanese Buddhist sect, Aum Shinrikyo, released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway station killing 12 people and sickening thousands more; and, in 2001, unknown terrorists tried to spread anthrax in the United States through the US Mail.

Changing technology in the nuclear age was accompanied by new strategies. It is to the evolution of those strategies that we now turn.

Strategies in a nuclear age

Deterrence, which aims to *prevent* an enemy from attacking, has been the principal strategy during the nuclear age. Because deterrence relies on threats, many actors view it as cheaper than defense *unless the deterrent threat needs be carried out*. Deterrence is a strategic interaction that relies on threats, usually of military retaliation, that constitute commitments to use force in the event of aggression. Deterrence assumes that actors are rational enough to weigh the likely costs and benefits of a course of action. Its goal is to convince an adversary that the costs of attacking will exceed the benefits. To this end, deterrence uses military force passively, meaning that actors do not actually use force but rely on the *threat* of force to influence an adversary. While the strategy is not new, its significance grew during the Cold War when nuclear weapons threatened the survival of the principal adversaries.

Elements of deterrence

For an actor to persuade a rival that the costs of aggression would be greater than the benefits, it must exercise the “three Cs” of deterrence: communication, capability, and credibility. First, the deterring actor must *communicate* to a challenger what actions are unacceptable and what punishment will ensue if it misbehaves. Second, a deterring actor must demonstrate that it has the *capability* to back up its threats. Thus, if it threatens to employ weapons it is known not to have, the threat would be worthless. Third, threats and commitments must be *credible*; that is, a deterring actor must convince its adversary that the threatened punishment will actually be carried out if its threats are ignored. Actors sometimes even confront adversaries over relatively unimportant matters merely to enhance their “bargaining reputation” for “toughness,” thereby enhancing their credibility in other situations. Thus, the major justification for American intervention in Korea in 1950 was to prove that the US would not countenance communist expansion *anywhere* and would resist Soviet expansion in Europe just as it was resisting communist aggression in Korea. And, according to former Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton (1921–67), “70 percent” of America’s reason for getting involved in Vietnam was to enhance other commitments.²²

Credibility does not require certainty. If stakes are high, as in a nuclear confrontation, a threat can be credible as long as there is at least *some* probability, however modest, that it will be carried out. This is why few people play “Russian roulette” – a game played by placing a single round in a revolver, spinning the cylinder, aiming the revolver at one’s own head, and pulling the trigger – even when the prize for winning is high. Russian roulette, like nuclear confrontation, entails some probability of being killed. Economist Thomas Schelling calls the possibility that matters could get out of hand leading to mutual disaster a “threat that leaves something to chance,”²³ and he suggests that all that is needed

for a threat to be credible is to show that in a confrontation “*the final decision is not altogether under the threatener’s control.*”²⁴ Thus, no matter how careful actors are during a crisis and however much they wish to avoid war, there is some chance that a collision will take place as it did in 1914.

Paradoxically, to make deterrence credible, an actor must make its enemy think it is sufficiently irrational to risk its own annihilation for the sake of preventing aggression.²⁵ However, *if deterrence fails, meaning that the adversary does not heed the deterrent warning*, an actor may not wish to carry out its threat because both would perish in the process. As political scientist Edward Rhodes declares: “This seeming paradox reflects the difference between what is rational to threaten and commit oneself to do in advance – *ex ante* – and what is rational to do if the threat fails – *ex post*. The *ex ante* self-denial of future rationality may be a means of credibly committing oneself to the execution of deterrent threats that would be irrational *ex post* to carry out.”²⁶ When the specter of nuclear war looms, as it did in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it is preferable for an actor to persuade its enemy that it is not crazy after all. Instead, it becomes rational to step back from the brink of a nuclear abyss by behaving flexibly and avoiding escalation. In short, deterrence only works when threats are credible, but too much credibility can be dangerous. How to balance the need for strength and risk taking with an image of reasonableness and credibility is an unsolved puzzle of the nuclear age.

During the Cold War, deterrence assumed four forms, distinguished by the immediacy of the threat they were designed to prevent and the scope of the territory being protected. The first two, general and immediate deterrence, are distinguished by the imminence of the challenge. *General deterrence* does not try to deal with any *particular* threat, but instead is a broad effort to create an atmosphere in which others will not contemplate aggression. Two ways an actor may accomplish this are to alter the global balance of

military power in its favor and develop new weapons. Neither is accomplished quickly, making general deterrence a long-term strategy.

During the Cold War, the US pursued general deterrence by creating a global alliance structure that covered almost every geographic region: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, the Australia–New Zealand–US alliance, the US–Japan alliance in the Pacific, and the Rio Pact in the Western Hemisphere. This extended network of alliances communicated to the Soviet Union that the US had global interests and that the USSR and its allies could not wage aggression in any region unchallenged.

Immediate deterrence operates when an actor makes an explicit retaliatory threat in response to a specific challenge to its interests. Immediate deterrence operated during the Cuban missile crisis, when US officials (before learning of the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba) informed Moscow that “it would be of the gravest consequence if the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba” and that “it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”²⁷

Both general and immediate deterrence can be either primary or extended. *Primary deterrence* involves preventing an enemy from attacking one’s homeland, and *extended deterrence* involves preventing aggression against an ally. America’s nuclear umbrella, which extended over allies in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific during the Cold War, constituted extended deterrence. The US pledged to retaliate, even to use nuclear weapons, if the USSR attacked a US ally like West Germany or Japan. The Key document that follows is an example of Cold War deterrence policy.

Extended deterrence is more difficult to achieve than primary deterrence, because a threat to retaliate after an attack on one’s homeland is inherently more credible than a commitment to

KEY DOCUMENT

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE MC 14/2 (REVISED)

The US nuclear deterrence strategy was adopted by the NATO alliance. The following document contains NATO's 1957 strategic concept outlining how nuclear deterrence would operate. Note how the document refers not only to the capabilities underlying deterrence, but also to the allies' will to use those capabilities.

FINAL DECISION ON MC 14/2 (Revised)
 A Report by the Military Committee on
 OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE
 DEFENSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AREA²⁸
 Section IV
 THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

23. The overall defensive concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to promote the preservation of peace and to provide for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area by confronting the potential aggressor with NATO forces that are so organized, disposed, trained and equipped that he will conclude that the chances of a favorable decision are too small to be acceptable, and that fatal risks would be involved if he launched or supported an armed attack.

24. Our chief objective is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all the forces at our disposal, including nuclear weapons, which the defense of NATO would require.

25. In preparation for a general war, should one be forced upon us,

- a. We must first ensure the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive by all available means and develop the capability to absorb and survive the enemy's onslaught.
- b. Concurrently and closely related to the attainment of this aim, we must develop our ability to use our land, sea and air forces for defense of the territories and sea areas of NATO as far forward as possible to maintain the integrity of the NATO area, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset. We must have the ability to continue these operations in combination with the nuclear counter-offensive until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed.

risk suicide to aid an ally. On the one hand, the guarantor must be tough and willing to take risks to convince an enemy that its commitment is credible. On the other, the guarantor must be

prudent enough to reassure its allies that it will not trigger a war in which they will be embroiled against their will. The appearance of prudence, however, although reassuring to allies, may also

be taken as a lack of resolve. To overcome this dilemma, the US stationed troops in vulnerable locations, for example in the city of Berlin and right on the borders between East and West Germany and North and South Korea to serve as “tripwires.” Such troops would be unable to defend themselves in the event of an enemy attack but were positioned so that the US would *automatically* become involved if an attack took place. This had the effect of increasing the credibility of US commitments to defend its European and Asian allies.

Two additional concepts at the heart of any deterrence relationship are **strategic stability** and **vulnerability**. Strategic stability refers to the incentives or disincentives actors have to attack an adversary first. If actors fear that their ability to retaliate is at risk, they may be tempted to use nuclear weapons first – “use them or lose them” – especially during crises when tempers are frayed and stress is high. Such a relationship is *unstable*. This, as we saw, was the situation in 1914 when major powers felt they had to mobilize or lose the war. By contrast, if actors believe their retaliatory systems can survive an enemy first-strike attack, they will feel less pressure to use those weapons quickly, and the relationship is *stable*.

It is a paradox of deterrence that stability, and therefore safety, actually increases if foes lack the means to defend their civilians. As long as each can destroy an enemy’s population no matter which of them acts first, strategic stability will remain high. Although it appears to turn common sense on its head, effective civil defense efforts or antiballistic missiles reduce stability (even though they may save lives if war occurs). The reason is that *such efforts reduce the deterrent effect of a threat to retaliate*. If the logic appears odd, imagine awakening to a news report that an enemy’s citizens had moved into air-raid shelters during the night. One might reasonably conclude that the enemy were planning to attack and was making sure its citizens would survive the inevitable retaliation. In sum, the greater the vulnerability of both actors’ retaliatory forces, the more likely

they are to use nuclear weapons quickly to avoid their being destroyed first, and the lower is strategic stability. By contrast, the greater the vulnerability of population centers, the higher the strategic stability, as citizens are held hostage to their governments’ behavior; that is, each can wipe out the other so neither better start a war.

Nuclear deterrence in the Cold War

Although deterrence was the basis of US military policy during the Cold War, the strategy was repeatedly refined to make threats more credible in response to changing circumstances. Early in the nuclear era, the United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, while the USSR maintained conventional military superiority (manpower, tanks, and artillery), especially in Europe. With their monopoly of nuclear weapons, the US and its allies had two options to counter a Soviet attack. They could build up strong conventional forces to *repel* a conventional attack, or they could rely on their nuclear superiority to *deter* the USSR from attacking. Conventional forces are costly, requiring large investments in armies (including housing, food, and logistics). Nuclear weapons are relatively cheap because few weapons afford enormous destructive power.

Unwilling to sacrifice “butter” for “guns,” the nuclear option was attractive to the US in the 1950s. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a policy that relied on nuclear weapons to deter the USSR or its allies. The NATO allies maintained minimal conventional forces near the Iron Curtain to mark a “line in the sand” or “tripwire” that Soviet forces dare not cross. If they did so, the United States *might* escalate to the nuclear level right away. This strategy was called “massive retaliation.” “It should not be stated in advance,” wrote Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “precisely what would be the scope of military action if new aggression occurred” because “the choice in this respect is ours and not his.”²⁹

DID YOU KNOW?

The “guns–butter” metaphor was used by Nazi leader Hermann Göring in a 1935 radio address to the German people in which he declared: “Some people in international life are very hard of hearing. They can only be made to listen if they hear guns go off. We have no butter, comrades, but I ask you: would you rather have butter or guns? Shall we bring in lard, or iron ores? I tell you, being prepared makes us powerful. Butter only makes us fat!”³⁰

However, two problems arose in regard to massive retaliation. The first was the possibility that the USSR might limit itself to low-level aggression that would seem insufficiently important to merit nuclear retaliation. Would an American threat to use nuclear weapons be credible, for example, in the event of Soviet harassment of Western efforts to resupply Berlin? Massive retaliation seemed “incredible” when confronted by “salami tactics,” that is, small demands (like thin slices of a salami) that collectively add up to something larger (the whole salami).³¹

Second, once the USSR became a nuclear power in 1949 and gained a long-range delivery capability in 1957, it could retaliate if the United States used nuclear weapons first as it threatened to do according to the doctrine of massive retaliation. Even worse, both superpowers had a dangerous **first-strike capability** because, during a crisis, each, fearing an enemy attack, might be tempted to attack first lest it lose its retaliatory force in the enemy’s first strike. For strategic stability, the nuclear forces of each had to be able to survive the other’s first strike and still be able to retaliate with a second strike that would destroy the enemy’s population centers. Only then would neither superpower have an incentive to attack the other first. Thus, in an era of two or more nuclear

powers, a **second-strike capability** was crucial for credible deterrence.

On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched the world’s first artificial satellite into space. The satellite, called *Sputnik*, was a test version of an intercontinental ballistic missile, and its successful launch meant that the USSR would soon be able to strike the US homeland in minutes. Prior to 1957, nuclear warheads could be delivered only by strategic bombers, warplanes designed to travel great distances and drop weapons on enemy territory. The United States had more advanced bombers and, because many were based in Europe, it also had a capacity to send them over Soviet territory quickly in the event of war. This gave the US a decisive first-strike advantage. However, *Sputnik* changed this. Suddenly, the United States was vulnerable to nuclear attack, and massive retaliation was no longer credible. If US territory were vulnerable to a nuclear strike, who would believe that Washington would escalate quickly to the nuclear level in response to a Soviet provocation in Europe or Asia? US decision makers feared that if they continued to rely on massive retaliation, they might invite a preemptive first strike from Moscow.

Therefore, after *Sputnik’s* launch, Albert Wohlstetter, an influential policy analyst at the RAND thinktank, argued that to keep the threat of nuclear retaliation credible, the United States needed a second-strike capability (see Key document, below).³² It had to acquire more weapons and also protect its existing weapons so that they could survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate against the USSR.

The development of ballistic missiles in the late 1950s and 1960s raised new fears about vulnerability. First-generation missiles on both sides sat above ground and because their liquid fuel was too volatile to be left on board, they had to be fueled before launch. Such weapons made tempting targets for a first strike. A second generation of missiles was developed that used less volatile solid fuel and were based in underground concrete silos, making them difficult to destroy and easy to

KEY DOCUMENT

EXCERPTS FROM ALBERT WOHLSTETTER “THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR”³³

Because of its crucial role in the Western strategy of defense I should like to examine the stability of the thermonuclear balance which it is generally supposed would make aggression irrational or even insane. The balance I believe is in fact precarious. . . Is deterrence a necessary consequence of both sides having a nuclear delivery capability and is all-out war nearly obsolete? Is mutual extinction the only outcome of a general war? . . . To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means in other words a capability to strike second. In the last year or two there has been a growing awareness of the importance of the distinction between a “strike-first” and “strike-second” capability but little if any recognition of the implications of this distinction for the balance of terror theory . . . Some of the complexities can be suggested by referring to the successive obstacles to be hurdled by any system providing a capability to strike second that is to strike back. Such deterrent systems must have (a) a stable “steady-state” peacetime operation . . . They must have also the ability (b) to survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their mission, (e) to penetrate enemy active defenses, that is fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (f) to destroy the target in spite of any passive civil defense . . .

launch quickly. Even more revolutionary were submarine-launched missiles that were invulnerable owing to a combination of concealment and mobility. In time, US and Soviet nuclear-powered submarines with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) would spend months at a time lying silent and undetected under the polar icepack, ready to retaliate if war began.

DID YOU KNOW?

It is estimated that 128,000 nuclear warheads were built worldwide between 1945 and 2002. All but 2 percent of these warheads were built by the US and the USSR.³⁴

By the late 1960s, the strategic balance began to change toward relative “parity” or equivalence in US and Soviet force levels. Although the USSR

depended more than the United States on land-based missiles, the two sides were roughly equal after taking account of the quantity and quality of nuclear warheads and nuclear launch vehicles (planes and missiles). Moreover, once both had achieved a second-strike capability, any nuclear war would result in **mutual assured destruction** (MAD). Most observers viewed MAD as highly stable because mutual vulnerability meant that neither side had an incentive to start a nuclear war.

Thus, the United States and USSR began to seek ways to manage their arsenals and preserve a stable balance. One valuable tool to this end was arms control (Chapter 8, pp. 267–72). During the 1960s and 1970s, technological change also contributed to stability, especially the proliferation of space satellites that enabled first the US and then both superpowers to recognize a nuclear launch quickly and to verify arms control agreements.³⁵ Technology, however, sometimes stabilizes and sometimes destabilizes deterrence, depending on

two factors: *destructiveness* and *accuracy* of weapons. A combination of highly destructive and accurate nuclear weapons can reduce strategic stability because they raise the possibility of a successful first-strike attack on an enemy's retaliatory force. During the 1980s, a number of new weapons such as America's highly accurate Minuteman III and MIRVed (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) missiles threatened to destabilize MAD for this reason.

As American threats to use nuclear weapons first for purposes of extended deterrence grew less credible in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States adopted a new security policy for NATO called *flexible response*. This was still a deterrence strategy, but the threat of retaliation was less clear than before. Now, the US threatened that if its allies were attacked, the West would respond in a "balanced and proportional way" short of nuclear war. But if an enemy continued to escalate a conflict, the US would *eventually* respond with nuclear weapons. Under this policy, the "line in the sand" was ambiguous. There was no clear tripwire that would automatically trigger a nuclear war. Given the vulnerability of US territory to a nuclear strike, officials believed that flexible response was more credible. To a degree, flexible response remained the foundation of US deterrence policy until the end of the Cold War.

Nuclear deterrence today

When the Cold War ended, the United States did not immediately abandon nuclear deterrence, and it remains a central element of US security policy. However, deterrence is poorly suited for dealing with some of the threats the US now faces. First, threats have grown more diffuse, and it is not always clear who must be deterred. Second, deterrence is a psychological as much as a political-military strategy that assumes rational decision makers who carefully evaluate costs and benefits. Today, concern focuses on aspiring nuclear powers, like North Korea and Iran, whose

leaders, may be willing to take more risks than were Cold War adversaries, including gambling with the lives of their citizens. The perception that "rogue states" are less rational means that the leaders of such states may not evaluate costs and benefits in the same way – and may value striking the US or its allies more than they value protecting their own populations against retaliation. Third, the utility of deterrence has also been challenged by the emergence of shadowy terrorist networks like Al Qaeda. Not only does it appear that these actors are not rational in the sense just described; but, for the most part, they do not operate from a single state and use suicidal fanatics who are virtually impossible to deter. With no territorial entity to retaliate against and with terrorist leaders dispersed and hidden, the US cannot issue a credible retaliatory threat. Indeed, in the event of a terrorist attack using WMD, the victim may not even know the attacker's identity. Technology has been applied with some success, especially in airports, to detecting terrorists, but there are still few technological "fixes" to protect against suicide bombers.

This section has introduced the concept of deterrence and has provided an overview of how deterrence operated during the Cold War and after. However, deterrence is only one strategy for using force. The next section examines how the introduction of "smart" or precision weapons in contemporary conflicts.

The era of smart weapons

Taking advantage of advances in microelectronic technologies, the United States is pioneering a new form of high-tech "smart" warfare that aims to reduce the need for weapons of mass destruction and that promises to reduce American and enemy casualties, especially among civilians. Smart weapons are so accurate and lethal that they render conventional enemy aircraft and tanks virtually useless, but it remains unclear whether such warfare can be used effectively

against the major threats in global politics. This weapons advantage also has drawbacks. Some observers believe that even the most high-tech weapons will prove ineffective in fighting terrorism or guerrilla warfare. This leads some to ask if this is the right strategy for the United States, or whether Washington should be developing a leaner, more flexible military establishment that relies more heavily on “boots on the ground” than on technology for warfare in countries like Afghanistan.³⁶

Starting in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States began to unveil a new generation of precision-guided weapons that can hit targets with unprecedented accuracy. Microelectronic technologies allow US commanders to keep track of entire battlefields and communicate with and coordinate forces on the ground, at sea, and in the air. Improved versions of these systems were used in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001). In 2003, American and British forces swept across the Iraqi desert, while much of the US arsenal consisted of precision weapons ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (remote-controlled planes with television cameras and sometimes armed with missiles) to Tomahawk cruise missiles (unmanned aircraft that are self-contained bombs) and laser-guided munitions dropped by bombers (including stealth aircraft that cannot be seen by radar) and fired by naval vessels far from their targets. Predator and the larger Reaper drones have been used in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan where Al Qaeda militants and Afghan and Pakistani Taliban enjoy sanctuary.³⁷

These technologies amount to what some call a “revolution in military affairs” that is bringing about a dramatic improvement in communication, coordination, planning, and intelligence that will include a Pentagon internet or “internet in the sky” that would provide comprehensive information to soldiers in the field.³⁸ This new military internet will coordinate military operations and provide US commanders with instantaneous intelligence about their enemies’

movements in battle. Smart weapons promise to reduce US and enemy casualties because, unlike the artillery, gravity bombs, and nuclear weapons of previous eras, they can hit military targets with minimal harm to surrounding areas and innocent civilians. Advocates of such warfare argue that soldiers will not have to slog it out in mud, jungle, or desert or fight it out house to house, and that civilians will be relatively safe in warfare.

These improvements are part of an “American Way of War” that emphasizes speed, accuracy, precision, and stealth. At the heart of this strategy, according to the American military thinker Steven Metz, “is a vast improvement in the quality and quantity of information made available to military commanders by improvements in computers and other devices for collecting, analyzing, storing, and transmitting data”³⁹ in order to manage the battlefield. The goal is to create a “system of systems” linking sensors in space, on the ground, in the air, and at sea in order to provide unprecedented information for purposes of command, control, and coordination in battle. The near future may see innovations that dwarf today’s weapons – robots for combat and intelligence as well as nanotechnology (technology for microscopic devices).⁴⁰ One element in the “American Way of War” – the unwillingness to put soldiers at risk and the effort to reduce casualties – is rooted in a perception that citizens are less willing to die for their country than was the case in earlier wars.⁴¹ In addition, Western norms are increasingly incompatible with large-scale collateral damage to adversaries (see following box). Defending against – and then retaliating for – terrorist assaults on homeland targets is one thing; fighting in expensive foreign wars without a powerfully convincing “national interest” at stake is another. High-tech war is one possible answer to limiting the destructiveness of war and reducing casualties and collateral damage. In this, its use is in the tradition of limiting violence by the Church in the Middle Ages, the kings of the eighteenth century, and liberals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

On May 1, 2003, George W. Bush announced from the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. His description of the conduct of the conflict exemplifies the “American Way of War”

In the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For hundreds of years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan Allied forces destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who started the conflict were safe until the final days. Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation

Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.²



Figure 9.3 Smart bombs/simple bombs

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

High-tech war has benefits, but questions exist about its overall effectiveness (see Figure 9.3). For example, in 2003, American technology pounded Iraq’s army, but some of its main military units survived only to fight on in a lengthy postwar period of irregular warfare. In the War on Terrorism launched in Afghanistan by the United States after September 11, 2001, high-tech warfare proved of little value in managing a bewildering

array of rival ethnicities, religious factions, criminal networks, and warlord bands. At first, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were put to flight easily. However, the search for Osama bin Laden and most of the Al Qaeda leadership came up short because of difficult terrain and dependence on unreliable Afghan and Pakistani proxies, and the Taliban was able to renew its capacity to wage irregular warfare.

High-tech systems themselves, like computers, are vulnerable to high-tech retaliation in the form of cyberwar (computers attacking computers). Information technology is critical high-tech warfare, “from logistics and command and control to targeting and guidance”⁴³ and is vulnerable to cyber attack. The next section focuses on the growing challenge posed by cyberwar.

Cyberwar

With the growing importance of cyberspace, it is not surprising that it is becoming an arena of intense rivalry, with growing security implications.⁴⁴ Currently, the internet, for instance, is, like a power vacuum, an arena under no one’s control.

Cyberwar is war in cyberspace, the “fifth domain” after land, sea, air, and space.⁴⁵ Concerns about the exposure of US computer systems to cyber attack led the Clinton administration to plan for a comprehensive computer monitoring system, and the threat of cyber attacks has led to cyberwar games at the US Military Academy.⁴⁶ In addition, the Obama administration created a cyber-security office in the White House, and the US Department of Defense created a new Cyber Command. “Instead of using explosives to kill and destroy, the warrior of the future” may be armed “with a laptop computer from a motel room.” “Hacking, virus writing, and crashing data information systems – as well as defending against enemy hackers and virus writers – may become core military skills, as important as the ability to shoot.”⁴⁷ Future war “may see attacks via **computer viruses, worms, logic bombs, and trojan horses** rather than bullets, bombs, and missiles”⁴⁸ (collectively called “malware”). “Indeed,” declared President Obama, “in today’s world, acts of terror could come not only from a few extremists in suicide vests but from a few key strokes on the computer – a weapon of mass disruption . . . From now on, our digital infrastructure – the networks and computers we depend on every day – will be

treated as they should be: as a strategic national asset. Protecting this infrastructure will be a national security priority,”⁴⁹ and the US and Russia have held talks aimed at improving Internet security and limiting the likelihood of cyberwar.⁵⁰

“Information dominance,” declares one observer, “for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and real time military operations – enhances the relative power of great powers,” but “both civilian and military dependence on computers and other forms of information technology may raise new vulnerabilities.”⁵¹ As this implies, cyberwar can involve **espionage** or, worse, can threaten massive destruction.

Espionage was the aim of a Chinese-based electronic spying operation called “Ghost-Net” that in 2009 infiltrated computers around the world.⁵² “Ghost-Net is capable of taking full control of infected computers, including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices,” and “it demonstrates the ease by which computer-based malware can be used to build a robust, low-cost intelligence capability and infect a network of potentially high-value targets.”⁵³ Chinese officials hacked into Google’s computer system, leading Google to leave China, and Chinese and European hackers broke into some 2400 corporate and government computers to steal secrets over an 18-month period.⁵⁴ Chinese cyber intelligence led Britain’s MI5 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure to warn British businesses “that Chinese intelligence agencies were engaged in a wide-ranging effort to hack into British companies’ computers and to blackmail British businesspeople over sexual relationships and other improprieties.”⁵⁵ The potential for destruction in cyberwar was apparent when in 2008 it was discovered that hackers had penetrated America’s electric grid and planted software that could degrade the system.⁵⁶ Declare security specialists Richard Clarke and Robert Knake: “The extent of Chinese government hacking against US, European, and Japanese industries and research

facilities is without precedent in the history of espionage. Exabytes of data have been copied from universities, industrial labs, and government facilities.”⁵⁷

Chinese hackers are interested in cyberwar as a form of asymmetric warfare, that is, warfare that assists weaker countries to fight on an equal footing with stronger ones. Russian “cyber warriors” are even more skillful than Chinese. Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008) were both victims of cyber attack by Russian hackers⁵⁸ called a “distributed denial of service attack” (DDOS). In “Web War 1,” Estonia was the world’s first victim of a sustained cyber attack and was vulnerable because the country is highly dependent on internet connectivity. Beginning on April 26, 2007, and “fueled with step-by-step instructions so simple that any internet user could follow,”⁵⁹ the cyber attack began, apparently in retaliation for removal of a Soviet war memorial from central Tallinn.⁶⁰ North Korea also launched a DDOS cyber attack against US and South Korean public and private websites in 2009 after a cyberwar exercise organized by the United States.⁶¹ Among the issues these incidents raise is whether they should be regarded as equivalent to armed attacks that require retaliation.

Overall, offensive cyber capabilities have outpaced defensive capabilities, creating incentives for a cyber first strike in the event of a war. Geography would be no impediment to such a strike, which would take seconds to complete. The United States has a robust capability for launching cyber attacks organized around the National Security Administration and the Department of Defense, but its defensive capability, especially in the private sector, is poor even as the country is vulnerable to attack owing to the dependence of key industries and services on computerized information and communications networks. Clarke and Knake paint an apocalyptic picture of a cyber attack on the US once an enemy gains control of critical American computer systems:

Within a quarter of an hour, 157 major metropolitan areas have been thrown into

knots by a nationwide power blackout hitting during rush hour. Poison gas clouds are wafting toward Wilmington and Houston. Refineries are burning up oil supplies in several cities. Subways have crashed in New York, Oakland, Washington, and Los Angeles. Freight trains have derailed outside major junctions and marshaling yards on four major railroads. Aircraft are literally falling out of the sky as a result of midair collisions across the country. Pipelines carrying natural gas to the Northeast have exploded, leaving millions in the cold. The financial system has also frozen solid because of terabytes of information at data centers being wiped out. Weather, navigation, and communications satellites are spinning out of their orbits into space. And the U.S. military is a series of isolated units, struggling to communicate with each other.⁶²

Even individuals, including dedicated terrorists, can penetrate valued secure sites. In China, a single 27-year-old hacker, “with a junior high school education slapped cartoon pandas onto millions of computers to hide a destructive spy program,” and created chaos for months.⁶³ In some cases, individual hackers are attacking computer sites as a means of political protest.⁶⁴ The technologies needed for hacking are inexpensive and readily available; insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan using off-the-shelf software costing \$26 have hacked into unmanned American drones.⁶⁵ Cyber attacks could, thus, become a new weapon in the hands of terrorists.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined how technology affects all realms of global politics. We first reviewed the role of technological change in both world wars and how statesmen and generals misunderstood its implications and consequences. Thereafter, we discussed the impact of

technology in the nuclear age, focusing on the technological arms race between the US and USSR and the strategies that evolved to meet this arms race. With the end of the Cold War, the US and then other countries began to adopt “smart” weapons with which to fight conventional wars, weapons that utilize new information and communication technologies such as the internet. These technologies, as we have seen, also lie behind globalization. Growing dependence on these technologies for military and civilian purposes has, however, as we noted, made them a focus of potential cyber warfare and cyber attacks.⁶⁶

In the next chapter, we will turn our attention to international law and organization – institutions that play a key role in global governance and in the management of violence in world affairs. The chapter reviews the evolution of these institutions, especially the League of Nations, the United Nations and the European Union, and examines their activities today.

Student activities

Map analysis

To determine relative vulnerability to cyber attack, first, go to Internet World Stats (“List of Countries Classified by Internet Penetration Rates”) at <http://www.internetworldstats.com/list4.htm#low>. Then, on a world map, locate the most and least penetrated countries to determine relative vulnerability.

Cultural materials

Several excellent films depict the danger of the nuclear standoff between the US and USSR in the Cold War. These include the black comedy *Dr. Strangelove* (1964), the frightening *Fail Safe* (1964), and *The Day After* (1983) about the results of nuclear war. *WarGames* (1983) depicts how a high school student accidentally hacks into a military supercomputer, thereby almost beginning World War Three.

Further reading

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- Clarke, Richard A. and Robert Knake, *Cyber War* (New York: HarperCollins, 2010). A grim but complete picture of cyberwar and the capabilities it affords potential enemies.
- Gray, Colin S., *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Systematic analysis of strategic issues in the post-Cold War era ranging from outer space to cyberspace and from nuclear war to irregular violence.
- Keegan, John, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). An account of the origins and evolution of warfare from the battle of Megiddo (1469 BC) to the nuclear age.
- Van Creveld, Martin, *Technology and War* (New York: Free Press, 1991). An historical survey of the impact of changing technology on the nature of war.

Part IV

Global actors and institutions



THE CHAPTERS

10. International law and organization and the quest for peace
11. Human rights: the individual in global politics

1919

League of Nations created

1945

United Nations is established

1945

League of Arab States formed

1948

The Organization of American States established

1949

North Atlantic Treaty Organization created

1957

The Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community

10

International law and organization and the quest for peace

On August 2, 1990, 4000 Iraqi tanks spilled across the border into Kuwait, occupying that country. In the following days, the UN Security Council condemned Iraq's actions, calling on it to withdraw its forces unconditionally (Resolution 660) and imposing economic sanctions (Resolution 661) to compel compliance. In November, the Security Council escalated its efforts and in Resolution 678 authorized a US-led coalition to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait if Iraq did not remove them voluntarily by January 15, 1991. The deadline came and went and, on January 17, the coalition initiated air attacks against Iraqi targets, followed by a ground war on February 24. Within three days Kuwait City was liberated, and on February 28, Resolution 687 declared a cease-fire that required Iraq to report and unconditionally remove all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, and to submit its facilities to onsite inspections.

Between 1992 and 2002, the Security Council passed another 39 resolutions to implement sanctions and ensure inspections. Of these, Resolution

1441, unanimously passed on November 8, 2002, offered Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" or face "serious consequences."¹ Although Iraq acceded to these demands, US officials remained dissatisfied with Iraq's description of its weapons programs. Subsequent reports by UN weapons inspectors in early 2003 found that Iraq had not fully disarmed but was cooperating with the inspectors, who indicated that they needed more time to finish their work.

By this time, the American military build-up in the region was almost complete, and American and British leaders argued that Resolution 1441 gave them authority to invade Iraq (see Figure 10.1). The other permanent members of the Council disagreed, arguing that another resolution was necessary to authorize a war² and that they would veto such a resolution. On March 17, without waiting for completion of international inspections, President George W. Bush declared that diplomacy was over. The 2003 invasion to topple Saddam Hussein posed a new challenge for

1963	1967	1994	2002	2009
Organization of African Unity formed	Association of Southeast Asian Nations established	North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect	African Union replaced the OAU	Treaty of Lisbon streamlined decision making in the EU



Figure 10.1 Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell

Source: AP Photo/Elise Amendola, File

the UN and triggered a debate, still unresolved, over whether a country can legally resort to force without UN authorization. Historically, states have enjoyed a sovereign right to use force at their discretion, and the change in this norm is uneven across countries.

This chapter examines the role of international law and international organizations (IGOs) in global politics. We open with a discussion of

international law – its sources, origins, and evolution, with special attention to the idea of just war. We then turn to international organizations, briefly examining the League of Nations and focusing on the United Nations (UN), its establishment, principal agencies, and, most important, the evolution of its efforts to keep peace. Consonant with the theme of continuity and change, the chapter shows that the UN retains

many features of the failed League of Nations, while adapting to new circumstances and pioneering new approaches to maintaining peace. Change and continuity are also evident in comparing the UN at its outset with the UN during the Cold War years and after and in the challenges the UN faces as new forms of conflict spread. At the end of the day, the UN's future is cloudy, and it remains unclear whether the organization will suffer the same ignominious end as did the League. The chapter concludes with the evolution of regional IGOs, focusing on the most successful of these, the European Union (EU).

The “law of nations”

Historically, international law has reflected the absence of any central authority above states and the decentralization of force in global politics. Much of international law, even today, deals with the rights and duties of sovereign states. International law differs from domestic law in a number of ways. First, there is no authoritative legislature in global politics to make law. Instead, international law emerges from the customs of states and the treaties they sign with one another. Second, there is no executive that can enforce international law. Third, there is no independent judiciary with the authority to interpret such law. While some observers believe that the UN is evolving to become a legislator and enforcer of international law, states still bear the principal burden of enforcing and interpreting the law for themselves.

Although international law cannot be enforced as domestic law is, it does anchor and legitimate certain norms and expectations of behavior while creating a moral climate in which some forms of behavior are seen as wrong and unjust. Today, for example, norms have evolved against aggressive war. Increasingly, too, as we shall see, norms are evolving against the mistreatment of individuals by their governments. Despite the absence of an enforcement mechanism, most countries obey

international law most of the time. They do so for several reasons – because it helps accomplish their objectives, because they want other countries to reciprocate, and because they fear reprisals and would lose others' trust.

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

The dominant theoretical approaches disagree on the significance of international law. Realists tend to dismiss international law because of the absence of a means to enforce it and label legal enthusiasts “idealists.” Liberals strongly support international law and would like to replace reliance on power with reliance on legal norms. Constructivists view the evolution of international law as a reflection of changing global norms even though it is often violated.

But where does international law originate and evolve? The next section addresses these questions.

Sources and evolution of international law

The sources of international law are described by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Article 38 of its statute. Thus, when the ICJ is asked to render advisory opinions about the meaning of international law, it draws from the following sources:

- a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
- b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

- c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
- d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.³

Because there is no global legislative body, custom has historically been the most important source of international law. Custom and the precedents it sets as a source of law date back to the Roman concept of *jus gentium* (law of nations). **Customary law** arises from established and repeated practice over lengthy periods of time that becomes widely, but not necessarily universally, accepted. For example, the International Court of Justice cited “customary rules” regarding the use of force in its 1986 ruling against the United States in a case involving the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors: “In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of a State should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule.”⁴ The International Committee of the Red Cross has identified 161 rules that have emerged through custom, including the principle of proportionality in attack in war, the obligation to protect medical personnel and journalists, and the prohibition of attacks on objects needed for civilian survival.⁵

Thus, international law has always been based on a set of practices that are constantly evolving. Such practices become habitual because people find that they are useful in a practical sense, enabling actors to cooperate tacitly and achieve desired objectives informally. Often, customs arise among actors through the practice of reciprocity; that is, actors treat others as they themselves are treated.

Like custom, treaties are agreements that actors enter into voluntarily and, like contracts, that impose obligations on signatories. However, if treaties are widely observed, they may come to be

regarded as customary and thus place obligations on countries that have not signed them. Today, treaties have become more important sources of international law than custom, and many of the law-making treaties signed in recent decades, often drafted by the UN International Law Commission, have codified and formalized long-standing customs. After they are signed, such treaties have to be ratified by the signatories’ legislatures that must also enact the laws needed to implement them.

There has also been a proliferation of multi-lateral law-making treaties in areas such as human rights, the environment, and arms control and disarmament. The Geneva Conventions, for example, consist of four law-making treaties. The first to protect the sick and wounded in wars was adopted in 1864 and revised in 1949; the second and third concerning the treatment of the wounded and of prisoners of war were adopted in 1929; and the fourth, which extended protections to civilians, was adopted in 1949. Another important example is the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention that deals with issues such as the sovereignty of coastal states beyond their land territory and the rights of such states over the seabed and subsoil.⁶ Thus, a state enjoys sovereignty over the seas extending 12 nautical miles off its shores although it must allow ships from other countries “innocent passage” in those waters. Resources beyond the 12-mile limit were defined as “the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States.”⁷ Other law-making treaties include the arms control and disarmament agreements, whether bilateral like the 1991 START accord or multilateral like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Sovereign states designed international law to benefit themselves, maintain the system, and manage violence so that it would not threaten that system. Sovereignty itself is a cornerstone of international law, entailing recognition that there

is no higher authority above states, that states are supreme within their territorial boundaries, and that other states must not intervene in their internal affairs. Thus, its founders at no time considered the UN a means of undermining sovereignty which is enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states that the organization “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,” and that: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Under Article 51, states retain “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Thus, the law that states promulgated for themselves emphasized their independence and equality – two of the key features of sovereignty – and their unique right to deal with one another.

Indeed, the emergence of the state system and international law are inseparable. Part of that process was a shift away from the medieval idea that rulers were constrained by a higher law to the idea that law exists *between* rather than *above* states. Previously, the only limit on sovereigns was believed to be **natural law**, or that imposed from above by God. By contrast, law between states is voluntary, requiring the consent of the participants. The belief that international law requires the consent of actors is called **legal positivism**. As we shall see in Chapter 11, the disagreement between those who believe in natural law and those who are legal positivists still persists.

Early scholars of international law were mainly churchmen, but the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is usually referred to as the “father of international law.”⁷⁸ During the Thirty Years’ War in 1625, Grotius published *On the Law of War and Peace*, which he wrote because of “a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of.” “I observed,” he continued, “that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any

respect for law, divine or human.”⁷⁹ While asserting the importance of natural law, Grotius argued that the customs of nations also had the force of law and, as in contract law, interstate agreements are binding. Violations of such agreements, he believed, caused war because they infringed on others’ rights.

Grotius believed that once a body of law had been established and codified, states could form stable expectations of one another’s obligations and would, as a result, be less likely to go to war because of misunderstanding. He also believed that international law could curb the sorts of abuses against civilians that were taking place during the Thirty Years’ War. In sum, Grotius envisioned an international society of sovereign states that were bound together by a shared set of norms and laws and his work greatly influenced “English School” scholars who call themselves “Grotians.”

International law deals with a variety of subjects but, not surprisingly, over the centuries much of it has dealt with issues of war and peace. We now examine the development of law pertaining to the just cause and conduct of wars.

DID YOU KNOW?

The term international law was coined by the British utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) in his *Principles of International Law* (1786–89).

The just war tradition

Just war theory had its origins in ancient Greece and Rome. However, to a large extent, it had religious origins, especially in the thought of Christian theologians like St. Augustine (354–86) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1227–74). Augustine argued that just war could be waged only in self-defense and to restore peace. A “just war” is “one

that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.”¹⁰ Aquinas claimed that war had to be authorized by a legitimate ruler with a just cause such as self-defense, and it had to be waged against evil. “Belligerents,” he declared “should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”¹¹

Grotius was a pioneer in trying to determine whether war is ever justified and, if so, under what conditions. For Grotius, a war could be just only if it met certain criteria. A war was just if it had a just cause, such as when it was a response to aggression or to an insult to God. Grotius argued that a just war had to be declared by the proper authorities and had to have a moral intent. Finally, a just war had to be waged in a just manner. In this, he meant that soldiers should not employ brutal practices and that the means that they used should be proportional to the goals being sought. Justice, in his view, also required that the war offer a reasonable prospect for achieving its goals. Otherwise, it would result in a waste of life and treasure. In this way, Grotius distinguished between just reasons for war (*jus ad bellum*) and just conduct of war (*jus in bello*). *One can think that a war is just while condemning the way it is fought*, a position of great importance in the development of international law governing war crimes and crimes against humanity in contrast to laws that make it illegal to plan and carry out aggressive war.

JUS AD BELLUM Let us examine Grotius’s criteria for just war more closely. Grotius believed that the most important just cause for war is self-defense. The right of self-defense has long been recognized as a legitimate reason for war, a right clearly stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, defining aggression creates heroic problems, and almost all belligerents justify their actions by accusing their adversary of committing aggression (see Controversy box, below).

It is not even clear that a country that attacks first is the aggressor. After all, the key US justification for invading Iraq in 2003 was that Iraq was the actual aggressor because it was developing weapons of mass destruction and because it had flouted UN resolutions calling for Iraq to comply with weapons inspections. Needless to say this contention was controversial. Had there existed evidence of an imminent Iraqi attack on the US or against a third state, America’s action would have been easier to justify.

Grotius’s requirement that a war must be declared by proper authorities is also open to interpretation. Historically, this has been taken to mean that war must be declared by a sovereign, whether a king or a democratic legislature. However, what if war is declared by a tyrant who enjoys little public support or by a government that has been imposed on a country by another country? More recently, some observers claim that war is illegal unless it is approved by the UN Security Council. The refusal of the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force prior to the 2003 US and British invasion of Iraq prompted Secretary-General Kofi Annan to declare in 2004 that “From our point of view and the UN charter point of view, it [the invasion] was illegal.”¹²

Grotius also believed that a just war requires good intentions and must not be undertaken for reasons of self-interest. But most leaders are able to persuade themselves and often their citizens that the national interest is the same as the general interest. Hitler, for example, argued that the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941 was undertaken to defend the world from the threat of communism. President Bush has argued that America’s invasion of Iraq was undertaken to spur the spread of democracy around the world.

Grotius’s requirement that war only be initiated if it has a reasonable chance of achieving its goals raises a knotty ethical question: if the cause is sufficiently important, such as ridding the world of a tyrant like Hitler, how can the effort of small countries like Greece or Norway to resist the Nazis, however futile, be regarded as unjust?

CONTROVERSY

Defining aggression is a highly contested issue in global politics. There is consensus that aggression involves a premeditated attack by one actor on another, but there agreement ends. Which side is the aggressor if one side uses military force first based on evidence that the other is on the verge of using force against it? In June 1967, for example, Israel attacked neighboring Arab states after it had overwhelming evidence of an imminent Arab attack and with the knowledge that unless it attacked first it would lose the war. Was Israel the aggressor because it attacked first, or were its foes aggressors because they had mobilized military forces around Israel? Is it aggression if one actor takes steps that may endanger a foe sometime in the future even though it is not planning for an immediate conflict

In 1981, Israel destroyed Iraq's French-built Osirak nuclear facility near Baghdad, claiming that Saddam Hussein was going to use it to produce nuclear weapons. Although the US scolded Israel for the action, only two decades later the United States justified its attack on Iraq on the claim that the same Iraqi dictator was trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Was Israel an aggressor in 1981, or the US in 2003, or Saddam Hussein for trying to acquire WMD?

Finally, are there non-military forms of aggression that justify the use of violence? What of trade sanctions or embargos? What of spreading propaganda or inciting violence by foreign opponents of governments? Such acts intentionally aim to harm others, but if we accept such a broad definition of aggression, would there be any "innocent" members of the global community? The problem of defining aggression is illustrated in the difficulty facing the International Criminal Court in reaching a consensus on its meaning.¹³

Furthermore, how can we measure a "reasonable chance" of success?

JUS IN BELLO Also controversial is Grotius's requirement that the ends be proportional to the means used. This contention assumes that minimizing the loss of blood and treasure in war is desirable in itself and that, as a matter of course, punishment should reflect the extent of an offense. As a rule, Grotius's injunction that just wars must be waged justly has been the basis for international law regarding the laws of war. Two general principles are involved here: **discrimination** and **proportionality**. The first involves the question of what constitute legitimate targets in war, while the second concerns the amount of force that is permissible. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets are viewed as illegal. Thus, some argue that the use of nuclear

weapons is illegal even in the absence of a specific ban on such weapons because they necessarily involve the deaths of innocent civilians and the destruction of protected sites such as hospitals and churches. The principle of discrimination, however, became increasingly difficult to apply in the twentieth century, as civilians became part of the war effort as workers in armaments factories. In addition, the spread of irregular warfare has made it increasingly difficult for soldiers to know who is and who is not a potential enemy. When civilians strap suicide bombs to their bodies, soldiers have no choice but to consider them as legitimate targets.

The principle of proportionality applies both to the waging of war and, as we have seen, to the definition of a just war. Soldiers must try to limit violence to that which is necessary to achieve an objective. Enemies who surrender should not be

killed, neither should those who are wounded and no longer capable of fighting. This principle governed the US decision to cease attacking Iraqi soldiers who were fleeing Kuwait in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recalls that the decision was made to end attacks on the Iraqis who were fleeing northward along what came to be called the “highway of death.” As Powell explained: “You don’t do unnecessary killing if it can be avoided. At some point you decide you’ve accomplished your objectives and you stop.”¹⁴

CONTROVERSY

The question of proportionality was hotly debated following the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. On December 19th, 2008, an Israel–Hamas ceasefire ended, and Hamas intensified rocket attacks on Israel. On December 27, Israel began to bomb Hamas targets, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Gazan civilians, and the following week it sent troops into Gaza. Was Israel’s attack proportional to Hamas’ action? Is “proportionality” relevant as long as Hamas publicly declares it wants to destroy Israel?

Those who violate these principles, whether or not they are obeying orders or whether or not they know the law, should, Grotius demanded, be held accountable for their actions. However, through much of history, leaders have evaded this responsibility and only since World War Two have serious efforts been made to arrest and try those who are responsible for war crimes (Chapter 11, pp. 362–4).

In practice, few national leaders have paid much attention to the just war tradition, and, despite the limits on warfare that were its aim, civilians have increasingly become the victims of

warfare. The ratio of civilian to military deaths in wartime has reached new highs and shows little prospect of declining. However, international organizations are increasingly involved in efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence and warfare and to bring an end to violence when it does erupt.

International organizations

International organizations depend on states for their creation, purposes, and survival. Realists repeatedly make this point, arguing that IGOs can be no more than instruments of major states and can survive only so long as those states wish them to. By contrast, liberals believe that IGOs can become greater than the sum of their parts (members) and can behave independently of states. For their part, constructivists look for evolutionary change in the organization of global politics based on gradual shifts in people’s norms away from the narrow nationalism of the past toward greater concern with transnational issues that threaten human wellbeing. Constructivists recognize that more and more people are demanding creative solutions to problems that have defied states’ efforts and are contemplating new forms of transnational collaboration that go beyond the narrow confines of state sovereignty. Constructivists conclude that IGOs could evolve from being the tools of states into more independent institutions *provided that norms evolve in that direction*.

Thus, we can imagine three types of IGO. The first fit the realist model and only do what their leading member states ask of them. The second, according to liberals, are organizations that can collaborate with states to achieve collective goals that would be difficult for states to coordinate on their own, like preventing the spread of disease. In the case of conflict, semi-autonomous IGOs might **mediate** or **arbitrate** disputes, suggest ways to reach agreement, provide forums for diplomats to meet, or separate adversaries, helping them end

conflicts without “losing face.” The third are IGOs that have acquired genuine autonomy and can pursue their own policies. As we shall see in the discussion that follows, IGOs can evolve from one to another of these and may exhibit features of all three at the same time.

We begin by considering the ideas of early liberal thinkers about the possibility for creating an IGO to keep peace and then examine three pioneering institutional experiments: the League, UN, and the EU.

The desire for an international organization to keep the peace has a long history and is associated with liberal thinkers, especially two eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both believed that such organizations could reduce interstate conflict. Like liberals generally, both extolled the power of rationality and thought that people would pursue their rational self-interest if they knew what it was. They assumed the perfectibility of people and states and the possibility that IGOs could overcome anarchy.

Kant believed, as we saw in Chapter 8, that republics were a source of peace. Interstate relations, he thought, were analogous to those among individuals in an imaginary state of nature. States could escape anarchy by improving internally to make “perpetual peace” possible and by creating international law (which would encompass IGOs, today). Kant thus regarded IGOs as one of three related and reinforcing elements, along with democracy and economic interdependence, in establishing peace (see Figure 10.2).¹⁵

Rousseau’s analysis parallels Kant’s, although he reached a somewhat different conclusion. Like Kant, Rousseau saw the condition of states as analogous to that of individuals in a state of nature. He too argued for the need to escape from the state of nature into civil society. But Rousseau proposed something closer to a world state that “must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his private interest to clash with that of the whole body.”¹⁶




Figure 10.2 The Kantian triangle

Both Kant and Rousseau recognized that international organizations had existed throughout history to mitigate conflict. One of the earliest, first recorded in 776 BC, was the Greek Olympic Games. Every four years, freeborn Greek males came from all over the Greek world to compete at the sanctuary of the god Zeus located at Olympia. Many leading athletes were soldiers who traveled directly from battle to the games. During the games, war among Greek city-states ceased, and soldiers laid down their arms for seven days before, during, and after the festival, because fighting was disrespectful to the gods. And the winners’ first obligation was to their gods, not their city-state.

Since then, other IGOs have tried to encourage cooperation. As we saw in Chapter 2, a loose organization called the Concert of Europe was formed after Napoléon’s defeat in 1815. The Concert was not a full-fledged IGO but rather an informal mechanism for consultation that helped states cooperate while retaining their autonomy, and it was not equipped to deal with the powerful forces that propelled Europe after the mid-nineteenth century. Other ancestors of modern IGOs were the 1899 and 1907 conferences convened in the Hague, the Netherlands. The first, sponsored by Russia’s tsar, drew representatives from 26 countries, and unsuccessfully tried to bring about international disarmament, although it succeeded in banning aerial bombing, chemical

warfare, and the use of hollow point (*dumdum*) bullets. It also established a Permanent Court of Arbitration, located in the Peace Palace in the Hague, to arbitrate disagreements among countries. The 1907 Hague Convention attracted 46 countries, and placed additional limits on warfare, including restrictions on submarines and armed merchant vessels.

These conferences were novel in that they aimed to remedy defects in the global system itself rather than resolve a particular war. Both led to agreements that provided important precedents for later changes in international law. The two Hague conventions, along with the Geneva Conventions, were expressions of the laws of war, and constructivists regard these precedents as important in changing our views of the need to manage violence.

The League of Nations was the first effort at establishing a *universal* IGO to keep peace. The League was a bold but flawed experiment. The next section reviews some of the key features of that organization and its efforts to prevent war.

The League of Nations

Unlike the Concert of Europe, which had been a product of a realist vision of global politics, the League of Nations was a liberal effort to bring an end to war by doing away with the balance of power and creating a supranational international organization. Its efforts to maintain peace during the 1920s seemed to bode well for its future, but, even in those early years, disagreements among leading members about its purposes and the absence of major states were causes for concern. It proved unable to surmount major challenges to the existing global order in the 1930s (see Chapter 3) and became largely irrelevant for resolving key issues leading up to World War Two. What follows describes the League's origins, organization, and history.

Origins and controversies

The League Covenant was incorporated as the first 26 articles of the Versailles Treaty. It was originally the 14th of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and Wilson fought doggedly for its inclusion in the peace treaty. During World War One, influential groups in Britain, the United States, and France had called for a permanent international organization to maintain peace. The League Covenant described the major institutions of the new organization and their responsibilities, as well as the rights and responsibilities of members. The Covenant established three permanent organs – the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. It also linked the existing International Labor Organization (ILO) and, in 1921, the Permanent Court of International Justice to the new organization.

The Assembly acted as a regular diplomatic conference in which each member enjoyed a single vote regardless of size or power. In this sense, it reflected the principle of sovereign equality among states. The Assembly was empowered to deal “with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.” Like the Assembly, the League Council could deal with all matters affecting world peace, and neither body was superior to the other. Although provision was made for permanent as well as elected members on the Council, permanent members enjoyed no special status. Decisions of both the Assembly and the Council required *unanimous votes*, a provision which gave every member, large or small, a veto over League decisions. This rule reflected the powerful influence in global politics of ideas like sovereignty, equality, and self-determination, but made it nearly impossible for the League to reach decisions on consequential issues. Even League decisions were only recommendations.

The Covenant, like the later UN Charter, laid out a series of alternatives in the event of a threat to the peace. Among its less dramatic options were arbitration, judicial settlement, and investigation.

If the Council became involved it was obligated to investigate and issue a report. The Covenant then specified members' collective obligations in the event war continued. An aggressor would "be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League" and be subject to "severance of all trade or financial relations" by other states. And, according to Article 16, if necessary, the Council could recommend the use of military force on the part of members to bring an end to aggression. In sum, aggression would be met by collective sanctions and, if necessary, by collective force. However, unlike Wilson's original conception of collective security (Chapter 3, p. 89), the obligations outlined in the Covenant were voluntary and limited.

The United States never joined the League, and its absence, along with the absence of at least one other great power throughout the League's history was a key source of the League's ineffectiveness. The USSR did not join the League until 1934 and was expelled in 1939; Germany joined in 1926 but left in 1933 when Hitler came to power; Japan left the League in 1933; and Italy in 1937.

America's refusal to join the League illustrates the links between global and domestic politics. By the US Constitution, the President may sign an international treaty on behalf of his country, but the Senate must ratify that treaty by at least a two-thirds majority. By 1919, the United States was weary of war and overseas involvement and beginning to look inward. Also, many senators and Americans generally were wary of the implications for US sovereignty of the commitment under Article 10 of the Covenant to aid all victims of aggression. Still, Wilson might have had his League had he been prepared to compromise with his opponents, but he was not and instead chose to fight by taking his case to the country.

The fight over the League began when Wilson returned from Europe in February 1919. Senate opposition was led by Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, who was the Republican majority leader and chairperson of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge announced his oppo-

sition to the mutual guarantee contained in Article 10 of the Covenant, but the debate was suspended by the adjournment of the 65th Congress and Wilson's return to Paris. The 66th Congress was deeply divided when it opened in May 1919, and Wilson might have won the day had he been willing to divide the difference. Those who supported US membership in the League were called internationalists. They were mainly Democrats. A plurality of senators, both Republican and Democrat, took a middle position, seeking to add mild reservations to the treaty in order to safeguard American sovereignty. A small group of Republicans, including Lodge, demanded major changes in the treaty and were called "strong reservationists," but only about 15 senators were genuine "irreconcilables."

In the end, Wilson adamantly refused to compromise. The Versailles Treaty, including the League Covenant, was submitted to the Senate for ratification on July 10, 1919, setting the stage for one of the great dramas in American foreign policy history. Throughout the summer, Lodge conducted hearings on the treaty, and beginning in September, Wilson set out on an 8000-mile journey around the country, delivering 40 speeches in 22 cities in support of the League. On September 25 in Pueblo, Colorado, the president collapsed and was rushed home to Washington, where he suffered an incapacitating stroke (see Key document, opposite).

A month later the Senate considered Lodge's reservations to the treaty, which included exemption from the commitment under Article 10 to aid victims of aggression. Basically what united the treaty's opponents was their belief that only Congress could authorize the use of force by the US and could therefore override League decisions to use force. Despite British and French willingness to accept American reservations to the treaty, Wilson refused, and in May 1920 the Senate defeated the effort to ratify the Versailles Treaty and the League Covenant.

Thus, the United States never joined the League and Congress turned down President

KEY DOCUMENT

WILSON'S APPEAL FOR SUPPORT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Why, my fellow citizens, this is one of the great charters of human liberty, and the man who picks flaws in it . . . forgets the magnitude of the thing, forgets the majesty of the thing, forgets that the counsels of more than twenty nations combined and were rendered unanimous in the adoption of this great instrument . . .

I do not believe, if you have not read it yourself and have only listened to certain speeches that I have read, that you know anything that is in it. Why, my fellow citizens, the heart of the Covenant is that there shall be no war . . .

The bulk of it is concerned with arrangements under which all the members of the League . . . that they never will go to war without first having done one or other of two things – either submit the question at issue to arbitration, in which case they agree absolutely to abide by the verdict, or, if they do not care to submit it to arbitration, submitted it to discussion by the council of the League of Nations . . . All that you are told about in this Covenant, so far as I can learn, is that there is an Article X. I will repeat Article X to you; I think I can repeat it verbatim, the heart of it at any rate. Every member of the League promises to respect and preserve as against external aggression . . . the territorial integrity and existing political independence of every other member of the League; and if it is necessary to enforce this promise – I mean, for the nations to act in concert with arms in their hands to enforce it – then the council of the League shall advise what action is necessary. Some gentlemen who doubt the meaning of English words have thought that advice did not mean advice, but I do not know anything else that it does mean, and I have studied English most of my life and speak it with reasonable correctness.

The point is this: The council cannot give that advice without the vote of the United States . . .

I tell you, my fellow citizens, I can predict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the method by which to prevent it.

But I did not come here this morning, I remind myself, so much to expound the treaty as to talk about these interesting things that we hear about that are called “reservations”. A reservation is an assent with a big but. We agree – but. Now, I want to call your attention to some of these buts . . .

Now – every lawyer will follow me in this – if you take a contract and change the words, even though you do not change the sense, you have to get the other parties to accept those words. Is not that true? Therefore, every reservation will have to be taken back to all the signatories of this treaty . . .

[W]e cannot rewrite this treaty. We must take it or leave it, and gentlemen, after all the rest of the world has signed it, will find it very difficult to make any other kind of treaty. As I took the liberty of saying the other night, it is a case of “put up or shut up.” [. . .] The world cannot deal with nations who say, “We won’t play!” The world cannot have anything to do with an arrangement in which every nation says, “We will take care of ourselves.”¹⁷

Warren G. Harding's (1865–1923) compromise effort to join the World Court as a non-member of the League. Although the League became something quite different from what Wilson had envisioned, it thrived in its early years, and the 1920s created optimism that the great experiment might yet work.

The League's record in securing peace

The 1920s were fortunate years for the League, largely because leaders and peoples remembered the carnage of World War One so well that the prospect of another war appalled them. In addition, this was an era of prosperity, and satisfaction with the state of things was high. Few wanted to end prosperity or stoke the fires of war again.

The League had several early successes in securing peace. These included settling a Swedish–Finnish dispute over the Åland Islands in the Baltic Sea (1920–21), preventing conflict over the boundaries of Albania (1921), dividing the region of Upper Silesia (1922), and avoiding a conflict between Greece and Bulgaria (1925). Despite these accomplishments, however, League weaknesses were already apparent. For example, the League was unable to act when Poland seized Vilnius from Lithuania in 1920 and when France occupied the industrial Ruhr in 1923 in an effort to force Germany to pay the reparations it owed. Germans responded with passive resistance secretly financed by the German government through money that it printed. The result was catastrophic inflation in Germany that wiped out people's savings.

It became clear that the League was largely powerless in disputes that involved major states. Thus, in 1923 the murder of an Italian diplomat in Greece led Italy's fascist dictator Benito Mussolini to bombard and then occupy the Greek island of Corfu. Instead of acting decisively, the League left the matter in the hands of a "conference of ambassadors," and, under British and

French pressure, the Greeks actually had to pay Italy an indemnity before Italian troops would leave the island.

The moderation of the 1920s evaporated as political and economic conditions worsened in the 1930s. The Great Depression became worldwide in the early 1930s and with it spread a willingness to seek desperate solutions to economic woes. In this atmosphere, accumulated dissatisfaction led to authoritarian solutions in countries that had never accepted the outcome of World War One – fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and militarism in Japan.

Examples of League paralysis followed. Germany's withdrawal from the League and from the League-sponsored World Disarmament Conference in 1933 following Hitler's installation as German chancellor was a major blow, indicating that the Nazis were not prepared to cooperate with League efforts to strengthen peace. League failure to stop the Chaco War (1932–35) between Bolivia and Paraguay over a largely uninhabited region of South America further eroded confidence in the organization.

After Italy's 1935 invasion of Ethiopia (see Chapter 3, p. 92), the League proved helpless in the face of a series of conflicts and aggressive acts by Hitler and others, including the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), Germany's 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland, Japan's renewed invasion of China in 1937, Hitler's 1938 occupation of Austria and his threat to attack Czechoslovakia later that year. All these events were dominated by Europe's leading states with the League relegated to insignificance. The League's last memorable act was expelling the USSR from the organization in December 1939 following the Soviet attack on Finland. This act, coming a few months *after* Germany's invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939) and the beginning of World War Two, was especially futile in that the League seemed blissfully unaware of the real danger to Europe's security. By 1940, only a few employees remained at the League headquarters in Geneva, and the organization was officially disbanded in 1946.

The League of Nations proved a noble but failed experiment in international organization. Of 37 disputes between 1920 and 1937, only 14 were referred to the League, and only six of these were settled by League efforts.¹⁸

For liberals, the idea of an international organization to keep the peace remained alive even during the dark days of World War Two, and under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, US planning for the League's successor began even while war still raged. Intensive planning among the allies climaxed at the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in April 1945. Although those who attended the San Francisco meeting made some changes to earlier ideas in deference to small countries, the crux of the UN Charter was settled in bargaining among the Big Three (the US, Britain, and the USSR).

The United Nations

The United Nations is a great experiment in cooperating to maintain peace and security. Its founders tried to avoid the League's shortcomings, while pursuing similar goals. Unlike the League, the UN has become a universal organization. Fifty-one states were charter members, and membership later exploded, especially during decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s and, more recently, with the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia. Today, the UN has 192 members, the most recent of which was Montenegro in 2006, and this may shortly increase to 193 since South Sudan voted for independence from Sudan. The Holy See (the Vatican), Palestine, and the EU are not members, but maintain permanent UN representation.

This section begins by examining early expectations for the United Nations and then describing the responsibilities of the UN's principal organs or agencies. As we shall see, these have evolved in response to changes in global politics.

Early expectations

The UN's birth reflected recognition that a new international institution was needed to help states cooperate to attack the sources of war. In the words of Article 1 of the Charter, the UN's purpose was to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of **aggression** or other breaches of the peace."¹⁹ However, during the Cold War, superpower deadlock spurred the UN to develop novel **peacekeeping** techniques. The end of the Cold War again altered the global political landscape, as the United States and Russia began to cooperate on a variety of issues. Although initial hopes were high, expectations about the UN and its future were tempered as the extent of post-Cold War problems became apparent.

The Charter's framers sought to update the League Covenant. For example, the UN, more than the League, emphasizes global economic and social issues, reflecting a belief that one cause of conflict is poverty. To avoid the political divisions of 1919 that had prevented American entry in the League, US leaders adopted a policy of bipartisanism in which both Democrats and Republicans were widely consulted in planning the UN. Furthermore, the UN's founding was kept separate from the peace settlement that ended World War Two.

Although an effort was made to present the UN as a new organization, many of its features were adopted from the League, and most of its organs had League parallels.

UN organs

The UN organs are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Council (see Figure 10.3).²⁰ Despite differences in state power, the UN maintains the fiction of




Figure 10.3 The United Nations system

Source: Courtesy of the United Nations

“sovereign equality” in the General Assembly, where all countries from the United States to Kiribati have a single vote. In ridding itself of the League requirement for unanimous voting, the UN made it easier for decisions to be made. The General Assembly has to approve the UN budget (Article 17) and receives regular reports from other UN organs, including the Security Council (Article 15). The Assembly can discuss any issue relating to maintaining peace (Article 12), but *not* if a matter is before the Security Council. General Assembly resolutions are *not* binding, and public debate in the Assembly often takes place only *after* member states have failed to resolve conflicts by quiet diplomacy. The purpose of such debate is less to solve problems than publicize grievances, embarrass foes, and rally allies. The debates make good theater but deepen disagreement and make it harder for participants to compromise.

In the UN’s early years, the General Assembly consisted mainly of America’s European and Latin American allies, and the organization as a whole served as a reliable tool of Western foreign policy. But, as membership grew, the West found itself less able to command voting majorities in the Assembly, as these coalesced around the less-developed countries (LDCs) which had strong interests in redistributing global wealth. During the last decades of the Cold War, the Soviet bloc and the LDCs found they had mutual interests in opposing the US, and, for that reason, Washington tended to ignore the Assembly.

The UN Security Council enjoys “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and has authority to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.” In contrast to the League Council, the Security Council does not have to wait for a dispute to be brought to it before it acts, and the UN’s founders believed that the Council would play a dominant role in keeping peace. Its key powers regarding peace and security are found in the Charter’s Chapters Six (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”) and Seven (“Action with Respect to

Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”).

The Charter permits the Security Council to order a spectrum of actions ranging from enquiry and mediation to “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication.” In recent years, the Council has imposed sanctions against countries such as Iraq, Serbia, Libya, North Korea, and Iran, but they are rarely imposed because they create hardships for innocent citizens and political complications for countries that enforce them. Finally, if sanctions prove inadequate, the Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” To this end, the Charter states that members “shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.” Only twice has the Council authorized force to enforce the peace: in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea and in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The structure of the League and UN councils also differs. Like the League Council, the Security Council has permanent and temporary members, but with a difference in voting. Under the Charter, the “Big Five” (the US, the USSR [now Russia], China, France, and Britain) were designated permanent members, and six (later 10) states were elected to rotate as non-permanent members. Voting on most issues requires that the majority include *all* permanent members, giving each a **veto** (Article 27). The veto reflects recognition that an IGO cannot run roughshod over major states. Recalling League failures in the 1930s, the UN’s architects realized that pivotal states must be supportive if collective action is to work.

An important precedent was set when the Soviet representative’s absence from the Council during a vote on the Korean War was counted as an abstention and implied neither consent nor disagreement. This interpretation allows permanent members to dissociate themselves from a Council resolution without being obstructionist.

Permanent members that wish to show disapproval but do not want to alienate those that support a resolution can abstain from voting. During the era of US dominance in the UN, the USSR cast the most vetoes as a defense against US voting majorities in the Council, mainly to prevent admission of new pro-American members. Declining US influence in the UN led the US to cast its first veto in 1970. By 2008, of a total of 261 vetoes, the USSR/Russia had cast 124, the US 82 (many of which blocked resolutions aimed against Israel), Britain 32, France 18, and China 6.²¹

The Secretariat is the UN executive organ and is directed by a secretary-general who manages the organization's bureaucracy and finances and oversees the operation of all agencies and personnel, from technicians and policemen to doctors and soldiers. With operations in New York as well as in Vienna, Geneva, and Nairobi, the Secretariat, as of 2010, employed a large corps of 44,000 international civil servants who have an astonishing range of responsibilities.²² By Article 100, UN employees must not receive instructions from outside the organization, though this policy is often breached.

The criteria for employment (Article 101) are to be "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity." These criteria are difficult to fulfill, however, owing to an additional requirement that employees be hired from all geographic regions, some of which have few trained personnel. On the plus side, the UN has been a kind of school for civil servants from LDCs, many of whom return home to serve their countries effectively. On the minus side, it has also meant that, while most of its employees are dedicated and honest, the UN has always been plagued by some incompetent officials who rarely return home and enjoy sinecures in New York, Geneva, or Vienna.

The secretary-general, who is appointed by the General Assembly on the Security Council's recommendation, is the world's leading civil servant. Between 1946 and 2010, the UN had only eight secretaries-general, the most recent

being Ban Ki-moon (1944–) of South Korea, who replaced Ghana's Kofi Annan after two terms (1996–2006). In large measure, their personalities and skills have determined their effectiveness. For example, Sweden's Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–61) was an activist, Austria's Kurt Waldheim (1971–81) and Peru's Javier Pérez de Cuellar (1982–92) were accused of being anti-Western, and Egypt's Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992–96) was a spokesperson for the interests of LDCs.

The secretary-general's position is a difficult one because he must navigate between the conflicting interests and demands of member states. The safest path is to do only what powerful states demand, as did the League's secretaries-general between 1919 and 1933. But that is also a formula for institutional failure. Like the UN itself, the secretary-general has to walk a fine line between following the wishes of powerful members and taking initiatives to meet UN responsibilities. This is especially difficult when major states are divided and when UN actions are scrutinized for any trace of partiality. Boutros-Ghali was viewed by the Clinton administration as unwilling to reform the UN, and, as a result, the US prevented his reelection to a second term. By contrast, Kofi Annan was able to maintain the confidence of most members, despite criticizing the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, until he was accused (and later exonerated) in 2004 of involvement in a scandal concerning Iraq's sale of oil in return for food while Saddam Hussein was in power.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), made up of 15 justices who reflect geographic and political diversity, is the successor to the League's Permanent Court of Justice. The ICJ can decide cases brought to it or provide advisory opinions when asked to do so. Few states have accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, and most have decided, case by case, whether to allow the ICJ to render a binding decision.

The ICJ is valuable when the parties to a dispute *want* to resolve their differences, as did Singapore and Malaysia in 2003 when they found themselves in a territorial dispute over

two small islands. However, it is rarely useful in highly politicized cases. For example, in an advisory opinion to the General Assembly during its 2003–04 session, the ICJ stirred up a hornet’s nest by ruling that the “security fence” constructed by Israel for protection against terrorist attacks was illegal because it involved annexing Palestinian territory and it violated the human rights of about 56,000 Palestinians, by enclosing them in enclaves cut off from the rest of the West Bank.²³ Israel refused to accept the ICJ’s decision, invoking its right of self-defense, and both Israel and the United States denied the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the matter.

Unlike the League, the UN’s founders recognized that conflict arises from many sources including poverty, hunger, and ignorance. To confront these issues, they established the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with the task of reporting on global “economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters” about which it may make recommendations, and incorporated a group of specialized agencies that are responsible for particular functional tasks.

Economic and social issues

ECOSOC is a large institution that accounts for 70 percent of the UN’s budget and employees, and it consults with many of the nongovernmental groups that are registered with it. ECOSOC also oversees the **specialized agencies** (Table 10.1) whose tasks range from improving food security (Food and Agriculture Organization) and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy (International Atomic Energy Agency) to promoting cooperation in telecommunications (International Telecommunication Union). The most important of these are the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund that we examine in Chapter 14.

Several of these predate the UN. For example, the Universal Postal Union was established in 1874; the International Labor Organization is the

only surviving major institution established by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles; and the World Health Organization is a successor to the League’s Health Organization. The nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth witnessed the emergence of other “specialized agencies” intended to meet peoples’ needs for economic and social welfare. Among these were the Central Rhine Commission (1804) and the European Commission for the Control of the Danube (1856) to facilitate navigation. Such organizations, the antecedents of the UN specialized agencies, were based on functionalism, or the idea that states were economically and socially interdependent and that if they overcame economic and social problems war would be less likely.

Functionalists believed that creating organizations to respond to limited global problems would be like casting stones into a pond, each producing ever widening ripples into new areas. Success would bring greater success, and additional institutions would be built to meet other human needs. Global efforts to address one demand (like monitoring disease) would produce new demands (like reducing carbon emissions). Functionalists believed that states would more readily surrender non-political technical and economic responsibilities than core sovereign responsibilities like military security. Such steps, they thought, would gradually erode state sovereignty until there emerged a complex network of international agencies to perform states’ welfare functions, thereby reducing the prospect of war. Convinced of the possibility of change in global politics, functionalists were optimists with much in common with contemporary neoliberals, especially their high hopes for the role of IGOs in improving the prospects for peace.

In practice, functional institutions like the UN’s specialized agencies have done little to limit state sovereignty. And, although such organizations facilitate interstate cooperation, the tasks they perform are rarely non-political because they redistribute funding and welfare in ways that produce “winners” and “losers.” For example, in the 1980s

Table 10.1 The UN specialized agencies

<i>Specialized agency</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Year created</i>	<i>Description</i>
Food and Agriculture Organization	FAO	1945	Aids states in improving the production, sale, and distribution of agricultural products.
International Civil Aviation Organization	ICAO	1974	Draws up rules for civil aviation and promotes aircraft safety.
International Fund for Agricultural Development	IFAD	1977	Seeks to reduce rural poverty and improve nutrition for the poor by promoting food production, social development, environmental sustainability, and good governance.
International Labor Organization	ILO	1919	Provides labor standards and promotes workers' rights and welfare.
International Maritime Organization	IMO	1948	Promotes interstate cooperation on shipping issues such as maritime safety, oceanic pollution from ships, and piracy.
International Telecommunication Union	ITU	1856	Seeks to improve global telecommunications, especially in poor countries.
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	UNESCO	1946	Fosters cooperation in education, science, and culture, encourages the preservation of cultural treasures and maintains a World Heritage List that, by 2004, consisted of 788 sites ranging from Australia's Tasmanian Wilderness to the Acropolis in Athens and the Statue of Liberty in New York.
UN Industrial Development Organization	UNIDO	1966	Encourages technological transfer to and industrial development in less-developed countries.
Universal Postal Union	UPU	1874	Seeks to standardize and improve postal service globally but especially in poorer countries.
World Health Organization	WHO	1946	Seeks to prevent disease and encourage primary health care. WHO played a key role in limiting the spread of the deadly ebola virus in Africa in 1995 and in coping with the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in 2003.
World Intellectual Property Organization	WIPO	1967	Tries to protect the rights of authors, inventors, and others who create intellectual property from illegal theft and use.
World Meteorological Organization	WMO	1951	Coordinates the exchange of weather information and is involved in a variety of environmental issues including climate change and ozone depletion.

the US, United Kingdom, and Singapore withdrew from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), a specialized agency that is intended to foster education and preservation of global cultural monuments, claiming it supported limiting press reporting in the developing world. The UK rejoined in 1997, the US in 2003, and Singapore in 2007, after UNESCO implemented a number of structural and policy reforms.

Despite its attention to economic and social issues, the United Nations has been deeply

involved since its establishment in trying to prevent wars or end them once they have begun. The next section examines the evolution of these efforts and their relative success.

The UN and the maintenance of peace


Although the UN record is mixed, it has enjoyed more success in maintaining peace than did the

League. The UN has used many mechanisms in this effort, including nonbinding resolutions, fact-finding missions, observers, economic and military sanctions, peacekeeping forces, and, on a few occasions, military force.

UN missions are approved by the Security Council and planned by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Since 1948, there have been 63 missions, most since 1988 of which 15 remain at present. The first – the Special Committee on the Balkans (1947–52) – consisted of 36 observers who were sent to confirm that Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were complying with recommendations during Greece's communist-led civil war. The largest mission to date has been the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (1992–95) in Bosnia, which at top strength numbered almost 40,000 military and over 5000 civilian personnel. The smallest consisted of only two representatives

of the secretary-general who were sent to observe events in the Dominican Republic following US intervention in that country in 1965.

Currently, 114 countries are providing peacekeeping personnel in missions around the world (see Map 10.1 and Table 10.2) involving 118,072 military and civilian personnel at a cost of about \$8 billion,²⁴ the largest of which is the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which began in 2007 and currently consists of 23,055 uniformed personnel (troops, military observers, and police) from some 70 countries plus an additional 4334 civilians.²⁵ Some of these missions are very dangerous. Almost 2500 UN peacekeepers were killed between 1948 and 2008, and in 2003, 22 UN employees, including UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, were victims of a suicide bombing in Iraq. In 2009 and early 2010, 218 additional peacekeepers died, mainly as a result of the earthquake in Haiti, attacks in Darfur,



Map 10.1 Ongoing UN peacekeeping missions

Table 10.2 Current UN Peacekeeping Operations

UNTSO	Since May 1948	Fatalities: 54 Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$46,809,000 (gross)
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization		
Strength: military observers 154; international civilian 88; local civilian 121		
Fatalities: 50		
Appropriation 2010–2011: \$60,704,800 (gross)		
UNMOGIP	Since January 1949	MONUC
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan		
Strength: military observers 44; international civilian 23; local civilian 47		
Fatalities: 11		
Appropriation 2010–2011: \$16,146,000 (gross)		
UNFICYP	Since March 1964	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Strength: troops 858; police 68; international civilian 40; local civilian 114		
Fatalities: 180		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$54,412,700 (gross) including voluntary contributions of one third from Cyprus and \$6.5 million from Greece		
UNDOF	Since June 1974	Strength: troops 18,877; military observers 713; police 1,206; international civilian 991; local civilian 2,746; UN volunteer 638
Fatalities: 160		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$1,346,584,00 (gross)		
UNIFIL	Since March 1978	UNMIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon		
Strength: troops 12,067; international civilian 319; local civilian 657		
Fatalities: 287		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$589,799,200 (gross)		
MINURSO	Since April 1991	United Nations Mission in Liberia
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara		
Strength: troops 20; military observers 213; police 6; international civilian 93; local civilian 161; UN volunteer 20		
Fatalities: 15		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$53,527,600 (gross)		
UNMIK	Since June 1999	Strength: troops 7,983; military observers 127; police 1,319; international civilian 441; local civilian 989; UN volunteer 215
Fatalities: 144		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$560,978,700 (gross)		
UNOCI	Since April 2004	UNOCI
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire		
Current strength: troops 7,189; military observers 195; police 1,147; international civilian: 401; local civilian 697; UN volunteer 292		
Fatalities: 66		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$491,774,100 (gross)		
MINUSTAH	Since June 2004	MINUSTAH
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti		
Current strength: troops 8,454; police 2,462; international civilian 471; local civilian 1,235; UN volunteer 203		
Fatalities: 158		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$611,751,200 (gross)		
UNMIS	Since March 2005	UNMIS
United Nations Mission in the Sudan		
Current strength: troops 9,435; military observers 479; police 697; international civilian 862; local civilian 2,631; UN volunteer 395		
Fatalities: 54		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$958,350,200 (gross)		
UNMIT	Since August 2006	UNMIT
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste		
Current strength: military observers 33; police 1,497; international civilian 362; local civilian 902; UN volunteer 172		
Fatalities: 8		
Approved budget 07/09–06/10: \$205,939,400		

UNAMID

Since July 2007

African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur**Current strength:** troops 17,060; military observers 238; police 4,789; international civilian 1,134; local civilian 2,557; UN volunteer 429**Authorized strength:** troops 19,315; military observers 240; police 6,432; international civilian 1,579; local civilian 3,455; UN volunteer 548**Fatalities:** 63**Approved budget 07/09–06/10:** \$1,598,942,200**MINURCAT**

Since September 2007

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad**Current strength:** troops 2,918; military observers 23; police 208; international civilian 421; local civilian 567; UN volunteer 157**Fatalities:** 6**Approved budget 07/09–06/10:** \$690,753,100Source <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/bnote.htm>

and an assault on UN staff at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.²⁶

MAINTAINING PEACE DURING THE COLD WAR

The UN's founders hoped that the victorious World War Two allies would continue cooperating to maintain peace. Yet even as the UN was being established, Cold War clouds were gathering, and, with both superpowers having a veto, the Security Council was paralyzed almost from the outset. Owing to differences between the superpowers, peace enforcement was impossible, and any effort to mobilize the UN against either would result in the institution's collapse. The Council came to resemble a debating club and, for many of the great events of the Cold War, it had to sit on the sidelines.

The Charter did not originally provide for peacekeeping. Chapter Six dealt with peaceful settlement of disputes, assuming that if conflicts could be postponed and the parties made to discuss their differences, wars triggered by national pride, ignorance, or emotion could be prevented. However, the techniques of peaceful settlement – “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means” (Article 33) – are useful *only* if adversaries want to avoid conflict. They are ineffective when hostility is deep seated and adversaries are willing to go to war to achieve their ends.

Unlike Chapter Six, Chapter Seven sought to deal with overt aggression by means of peace

enforcement. As initially conceived, the Security Council was to have primary responsibility in enforcing peace. Articles 39–42 of Chapter Seven empower the Council to require member states to take whatever action, including force, is needed to maintain or restore peace. Articles 43 and 45 sought to give the Council “teeth” by calling for agreements to provide the UN with a permanent military force that has never been established.

Under these circumstances, the UN role in maintaining peace evolved, shifting authority from the Council to the Assembly where, in the 1950s, the United States enjoyed paramount influence. Following China's intervention in Korea, the General Assembly acted to circumvent the veto in the Security Council by adopting the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which permits the Assembly to meet in emergency session if the Council is deadlocked. The Assembly itself could then recommend “collective measures in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression.”

Although the Security Council remained deadlocked, the UN developed an innovative process to allow it to act in cases in which the superpowers were not directly involved. A technique was needed that was more robust than Chapter Six but less provocative than Chapter Seven. Peacekeeping, drawing on elements from both, was this technique, a sort of “Chapter Six-and-a-Half.”

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Arab–Israeli conflict and postcolonial conflicts in Africa and Asia threatened to entangle the superpowers.

KEY DOCUMENT

EXCERPTS FROM CHAPTER SEVEN OF THE UN CHARTER

Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security . . .

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Concern that Soviet or US involvement in local wars might lead to superpower confrontation convinced Secretary-General Hammarskjöld that the UN had to act to prevent this. “Preventive action,” he declared, “must, in the first place, aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative from which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to a counter action from the other side.”²⁷

The first explicit peacekeeping mission took place in 1956 following the Anglo-French–Israeli effort to seize the Suez Canal. A UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was sent to the Sinai Desert to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces. UNEF helped both sides to “save face” by creating a buffer zone between them. Egypt demanded that UNEF leave just before the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War, but peacekeepers (UNEF II) returned after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, remaining until

the 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty was concluded.

Following UNEF, peacekeeping became popular. Between 1960 and 1963, the Operation in the Congo (ONUC) oversaw the withdrawal of Belgian colonial forces, tried to maintain law and order, and maintained the independence and territorial integrity of the new country. The Congo operation was so complex that it almost proved too much for the UN. It illustrated how dangerous it was for the UN to get involved in civil wars and how difficult it was to remain impartial in such conflicts.

Another major mission began in Cyprus in 1964, where the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was sent to prevent a resumption of fighting between the island’s Greek majority and Turkish minority communities. Consisting of military contingents and civilian police, the mission successfully interposed itself between the two

communities. However, overcoming the underlying division proved elusive, and in 1974 Turkish forces invaded the island to protect the Turkish minority. Over four decades after the mission began UNFICYP remains in Cyprus as evidence that the presence of a peacekeeping force does not solve underlying political differences between adversaries.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping missions involved fact finding, monitoring of borders, verification of agreements, supervision of disarmament, demobilization of enemy forces, and maintenance of security in elections. However, as long as the Cold War persisted, operations remained limited in scope and objective. Key features of successful peacekeeping during the Cold War were:

- Adversaries must be states, not parties to a civil war.
- The physical line separating adversaries must be clear.
- Both sides in a conflict must consent to a UN presence, and UN forces should remain only so long as both wish them to.
- UN forces must be impartial, and personnel must be drawn from countries that are not deeply involved in the Cold War.
- The use of force should be minimal, and UN soldiers should be only lightly armed for self-defense.
- A mission should have a narrow mandate to prevent confrontations while foes seek solutions.

Peacekeeping was never intended to solve highly contentious issues. Instead, it was to facilitate a solution by delaying or limiting violence, thereby creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiation. Some have argued that peacekeeping sometimes had a negative result: allowing disagreements to fester so that they became more difficult to resolve. However, the Cold War's end seemed to offer the possibility for more vigorous UN action in the service of peace.

MAINTAINING PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR The onset of US–Russian cooperation seemed to herald the dawn of a new era in UN peace enforcement. Following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the superpowers agreed to invoke peace enforcement for the first time since the Korean War. In ensuing years, the UN embarked on a series of ambitious, complex, and controversial missions involving **humanitarian intervention** and state building that stretched its capabilities and ignored features of earlier peacekeeping such as gaining the approval of warring parties in advance and not using soldiers from the superpowers. However, by the late 1990s, US disenchantment with the cost of UN operations and American propensity to act outside the UN framework as it did in Iraq in 2003 created a new crisis for the organization.

The most formidable challenge facing the UN today is civil strife and the collapse of central authority in LDCs, especially in Africa. Domestic conflict has been accompanied by the rise of warlords and rogue militias that engage in ruthless savagery against civilian populations. Humanitarian concerns and the need to restore order have led the UN to intervene in the domestic affairs of such states despite the norm of sovereignty and with varying success to reconstruct state institutions. However, these new conflicts feature several traits that distinguish them from those the successful first-generation peacekeeping operations:

- No clear line separates foes, which are not just states, but rebel groups, warlords, and ethnic communities engaged in unconventional warfare.
- Peacekeepers find it difficult to be impartial; they may identify aggressors and lay blame, particularly for gross human rights violations like ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.
- Frequently, parties do not consent to a UN presence because they have something to gain from conflict or view the UN as their adversary.

- Peacekeepers are more heavily armed because missions are more dangerous.
- Missions have broad mandates to solve conflicts by rebuilding governing institutions, ensuring respect for human rights, and delivering humanitarian aid.

In 1991, the small Asian country of Cambodia became a testing ground for humanitarian intervention. Cambodia was a victim of the Vietnam War and, after falling under the rule of the communist Khmer Rouge, had experienced a murderous campaign at the hands of its own leaders, during which some 1.7 million Cambodians died. After the regime was ousted following a war with Vietnam in 1978, low-level violence continued between remnants of the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese-supported government. In 1991, when the parties agreed to end the conflict, political authority in Cambodia was divided between the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and a council of Cambodians from the country's various political factions. UNTAC oversaw preparations for elections and began efforts to rebuild the shattered country until its mission ended in 1993. At its peak, the UN contingent consisted of 15,991 troops and more than 50,000 Cambodians to organize elections.

The most complex post-Cold War UN operation was the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which operated in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. Some 42 countries, including the United States, contributed troops to the mission. UNPROFOR originated as a temporary effort to protect areas in Croatia in the midst of Yugoslavia's collapse. When the conflict expanded into a civil war in Bosnia among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, UNPROFOR imposed a no-fly zone in Bosnia. It also tried to assure the delivery of supplies to Sarajevo, which was under siege and artillery bombardment by Bosnian Serb forces in the surrounding hills. From the Serb perspective, UN efforts to protect Bosnian Muslims meant that the UNPROFOR was taking sides and was another enemy.

UNPROFOR was also charged with protecting other Bosnian Muslim towns similarly besieged. One unit, a battalion of lightly armed Dutch soldiers, was responsible for protecting the town of Srebrenica. In what became Europe's worst massacre since World War Two, Bosnian Serb forces overran the city in June 1995, killing some 7500 Bosnian Muslims in a UN "safe area." The Dutch battalion offered no resistance and allowed the Serbs to take away Muslims who had sought refuge at the UN base.

Such UN operations were larger and more complex than those during the Cold War, and it is unlikely that such operations can be sustained in future without large-scale involvement of major states. Thus, the Bosnian conflict was brought to an end only after NATO intervention. Even where they are not directly involved, the UN has to rely on major countries for logistics, transport, and funding. The demands placed on UN personnel are so extensive that they threaten to overwhelm the organization's capacity. Whole armies and large-scale contingents of administrators, not small contingents of peacekeepers, are necessary where governments have collapsed, violence is endemic, and refugees number in the millions. Thus, growing burdens and the reluctance of leading members to provide necessary resources threaten the UN's continued effectiveness as an agent of peace and security. UN burdens are growing rapidly at a time when the United States is hesitant to entrust its interests to the organization. In the next section, we address the question of America's sometimes strained relations with the United Nations.

UN budgetary woes

The United Nations depends on members for funding. They are assessed on the basis of their capacity to pay as determined by national income, and the scale is regularly reviewed. Until recently, the maximum percentage paid by any single member was set at 25 percent, an amount paid

only by the United States. However, under US pressure this ceiling was reduced to 22 percent in 2000. Under the present scale, Japan is assessed at 12.53 percent, Germany 8.018 percent, and China only 3.189 percent.²⁸ Almost half the member states pay the minimum of 0.01 percent. Assessments pay for the organization's regular budget. UN peacekeeping is also funded by a system of assessments. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's proposed two-year budget for 2010–11 of \$5.4 billion, with large increases for UN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, created the conditions for heated debate. One issue is the claim that Brazil, Russia, India, and China do not contribute according to their ability to pay.²⁹ Overall expenditures by the UN and its agencies run to about \$30 billion or \$4 per capita based on members' populations.³⁰

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union was the UN's leading deadbeat, but in recent decades the United States has had this dubious distinction. American enthusiasm for the UN waned in the 1970s as it became apparent that the US could no longer dominate the organization. Confronting vocal opposition to American policies toward Vietnam, South Africa, and the Middle East among many developing countries, combined with demands for greater US economic aid, political conservatives in the United States grew fearful that the UN threatened US national interests. Like those of an earlier generation, some Americans fear the UN as a threat to US sovereignty. Some also believe that the US financial contribution to the organization is too high, that the UN bureaucracy is corrupt, and that the UN has become a vehicle for anti-American rhetoric. Increasingly, conservatives argued that the United States does not need the United Nations as much as the UN needs the United States and that the United States should not support UN actions that are not in America's national interest.

As US criticism of the UN grew in the late 1970s, so did congressional reluctance to meet America's financial obligations to the UN. Matters worsened during the Reagan years (1980–88),

when the United States refused to fund programs that aided the Palestine Liberation Organization or SWAPO (the armed independence movement in Namibia). By the end of 1988, the United States still owed most of its regular and peacekeeping dues. President George H.W. Bush persuaded Congress to reverse its policy and by 1992 had reduced the US debt to the UN. During the Clinton years (1992–2000), acrimonious domestic debate ensued over UN financing, producing several compromises that reduced but did not eliminate the US debt. Under the George W. Bush administration (2000–08), the United States unsuccessfully tried to cap the UN budget until the organization instituted far reaching reforms desired by Washington. As of October 31, 2009, members' arrears to the regular budget were \$829 million, of which the US owed 93 percent.³¹ By May 2010, there remained a total shortfall of \$1.061 billion and \$1.24 billion in the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets respectively.³²

One way the United Nations has tried to cope with financial crisis is through agreements with corporations for joint development projects. In an unprecedented act of philanthropy, in September 1997 CNN founder Ted Turner announced that he would donate \$1 billion in the following decade, and in 2000 he added another \$34 million to cover America's unmet obligation.³³ And in January 1999, Secretary-General Annan proposed a "Global Compact" between the UN and business leaders that specifies the nature of cooperation in human rights, labor standards, and environmental practices. As of July 2009, over 5300 businesses in 130 countries around the world,³⁴ including business giants Citigroup, Nestlé, Nike, and Starbucks, participated.

The UN and the future

The debate over UN financing was symptomatic of larger issues concerning America's role in the world and UN's relevance. Is it in the interest of the world's only superpower to limit its capacity

to act as it wishes, or is the legitimacy conferred by acting within the constraints of the UN important enough to justify those constraints? These questions were sharply posed in the 2002–03 debate in the UN Security Council over whether to invade Iraq.

Many of America's friends believed that in invading Iraq, the US was overreacting to terrorism and thought that the Iraq war would only increase the terrorist threat.³⁵ Indeed, despite Britain's "special relationship" with the United States and its key role in America's "coalition of the willing" that invaded Iraq in 2003, in June 2006 two-thirds of Britons said their opinion of the US had worsened in recent years. This led a prominent British political scientist to declare that "there has probably never been a time when America was held in such low esteem on this side of the Atlantic."³⁶

When small countries behave unilaterally, it is one thing; but when the United States does, it is another. If the UN's most powerful member acts without regard to the organization, the UN is likely to become more and more irrelevant, as did the League of Nations. **Unilateralism** in Iraq provided the United States with flexibility that would have been unthinkable had the UN been involved. But the cost, especially in legitimacy, was high, a fact recognized by the Obama administration. Without UN support, many people around the world, including many Americans, claimed that the US had no right to do what it did in Iraq. American willingness to act without UN approval was not new. Washington paid little attention to the United Nations during the Vietnam War, and in 1999 neither the US nor its NATO allies obtained UN approval for intervention in Kosovo. Unilateralism is not a US monopoly. It has been mirrored by Iranian and North Korean intransigence about their development of nuclear weapons (in both cases condemned in Security Council resolutions), China's refusal to loosen its hold on Tibet, Israeli unilateralism in occupied Palestine, and Russian policy in Chechnya.

In recent years, American dissatisfaction with the UN combined with revelations about inefficiency and, in some cases, corruption has produced calls for reforming the organization. For example, the UN's reputation was tarnished by accusations of corruption in Kosovo and in the Iraq oil-for-food program, and allegations of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers persist. The organization has also been accused of firing those who reveal misconduct.³⁷ However, there is little agreement about what type of reform is needed.

In November 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan set up a "high-level panel of eminent personalities" to look into the possibility of UN reform. Among the ideas considered was changing Security Council membership. The "G-4 proposal" called for adding four non-permanent members and six permanent members, including Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, plus two African countries. The "African Union proposal" was to add five new non-permanent seats and six new permanent seats (two for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America, and one for Western Europe). The "Uniting for Consensus Proposal" involved adding 10 new non-permanent seats chosen by regional groups.³⁸ Although the "Big Five" would retain their preeminence, major countries such as Japan, Germany, and India would acquire greater status than before. The suggested changes in Council membership have been controversial and are unlikely to be adopted.

Significant divisions also exist regarding the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council. Some countries oppose the veto but believe, if it is retained, it should extend to new permanent members of the Council (e.g., Algeria, Angola, Egypt). Others contend that new permanent members should not be given the veto (e.g., Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Russia). Still others want to limit the use of the veto either to Chapter Seven of the Charter or in the case of serious human rights violations (e.g., Chile, Iraq, Jordan, Switzerland). Finally, some countries such as Argentina, Sudan and Venezuela, seek to abolish it.³⁹

DID YOU KNOW?

A large minority of Americans holds unfavorable views of the UN, in sharp contrast to majorities in Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Kenya, Nigeria, Mexico, South Korea, and Indonesia, who hold favorable views of the UN. In fact, many publics around the world tend to favor strengthening the UN's authority to manage international conflict, investigate human rights violations, and regulate the international arms trade. For some of these peoples, the real problem with the UN is the dominance of the US. A common view in several Muslim countries, for instance, is that "the US basically controls the UN and can almost always make the UN do what the US wants."⁴⁰

Any significant reform of the Security Council will be difficult, as the organization is still mired in a power structure that reflects the balance of power following World War Two. Major structural changes, such as enlarging the Council and reallocating veto power, require the support of two-

thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all UN members, including the veto powers on the Security Council.⁴¹ Thus, the very structure that was intended to ensure that the major powers remained engaged in the UN now serves as a key obstacle to ensuring the organization remains relevant in a transforming global system.

The 2003 panel also identified six key challenges facing the UN in coming years: interstate conflict, internal violence, social and economic threats, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and crime. With these threats in mind, the panel also considered greater scope for UN humanitarian intervention and the preventive use of force (as the United States undertook against Iraq) but only after a "serious and sober assessment" of the threat by the Security Council.⁴² In addition, the secretary-general proposed that the UN pressure rich countries to contribute 0.7 percent of the gross national income as foreign aid and codify rules on using military force as recommended by his panel.⁴³

The six challenges all require a stronger UN than presently exists (Figure 10.4). For instance, problems of internal violence, social malaise, economic decline, terrorism, and crime produce state failure. As such failures proliferate pressure



Figure 10.4
UN reform?

Source: original
artist @
cartoonstock

will grow for the UN to intervene in situations that are so desperate that the organization will literally have to manage those countries. Running a country, however, is not an easy job as the UN discovered in Kosovo where efforts to hold local elections and foster local control face virulent Serb opposition and efforts to limit local control enflame Albanian nationalists in the region.

In sum, none of the roles available to IGOs described at the beginning of this chapter alone can do justice to the UN. On the one hand, the policies of dominant states prevent the UN from pursuing the genuinely independent role advocated by liberals. On the other, the UN is more than an instrument of leading states, as realists claim. Instead, as constructivists expect, norms are evolving such that the UN seems to play a greater role in maintaining peace than in the past. Whether this will happen or whether the UN will suffer the same fate as the League of Nations remains to be seen.

We now turn to regional IGOs, some of which have become major actors in global politics. The EU is the most complex and advanced of these institutions, and we examine its evolution and Europe's political integration since World War Two. We then examine several other regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe.

Regional international organizations

The regional distribution of IGOs varies significantly, with Europe the principal site of such organizations. Its evolution, one of the world's most promising experiments in interstate organization, reflects the functionalist ideas that we looked at earlier.

The European Union

The most far reaching experiment in regional organization today is the European Union (EU).

Even Stephen Krasner, a realist who believes that the sovereign state remains as dominant today as in the past, admits that the EU is something different. "The European Union," he writes, "offers another example of an alternative bundle of characteristics: it has territory, recognition, control, national authority, extranational authority, and supranational authority." He continues: "There is no commonly accepted term for the European Union. Is it a state, a commonwealth, a dominion, a confederation of states, a federation of states?" Krasner concludes that the EU is unique and that it "is not a model other parts of the world can imitate."⁴⁴

Labels aside, the key question is: To what extent is the EU more than the sum of its member states? Liberals argue that over time European governments have surrendered bits and pieces of their sovereignty to the EU. In fact, the EU is a complex hybrid polity in which authority is shared among EU bureaucrats, historic nation-states, large provincial regions, and even cities. States are penetrated by European influences through law, regulations, bureaucratic contacts, political exchange, and the appointment of national politicians to community positions. In turn, the domestic politics of member states affect the community as a whole. In Europe, declare three observers, "the state has become too big for the little things and too small for the big things."⁴⁵

Let us examine the origins of Europe's efforts to integrate. The story begins at the end of World War Two, when Europe's leaders and publics concluded that, after three major wars in under a century, the time had come to build an edifice to prevent a fourth.

FROM THE END OF WORLD WAR TWO TO THE SCHUMAN PLAN Following World War Two, the United States sought to revive Europe's economy as part of an effort to restart global economic activity, renew Europe as a market for American goods, and reduce the attraction of communism to Europeans. The first step was

creating an environment in which reconstruction could take place. To this end, the US adopted a two-prong strategy. The first, providing Europe with the means to rebuild, began with the Marshall Plan. The second, to strengthen European security, culminated in the 1949 formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Both prongs sought a united Western Europe as a counterweight to the USSR.

The Marshall Plan offered economic assistance, subject to European coordination of the relief effort (Chapter 4, p. 115). This was a first step on the long road toward European unity. In 1948, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)⁴⁶ was established to coordinate Marshall aid. Until the European Economic Community was established, the OEEC played an important role in encouraging trade and providing Europe with currency convertibility. Despite the OEEC, Europe's aid request was little more than a list of individual country requests rather than a serious effort at broad cooperation. Nevertheless, the division of Germany and the key role of West Germany on the Cold War's frontline assured continued US interest in European integration. A European entity, it was thought, would make the new Germany part of something larger than itself, thereby assuaging the fears of other Europeans about a resurgence of German nationalism while allowing the Germans to contribute to Europe's reconstruction and security.

The key to Western Europe's industrial potential was the Ruhr Basin, site of Europe's largest coal and steel production. Placing this region under international control would force France and West Germany, enemies for much of the previous century, to cooperate. The first big step toward European integration was largely the work of a far sighted French economist and former League of Nations official, Jean Monnet (1888–1979). "There will be no peace in Europe," Monnet declared in 1943, "if States re-establish themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of prestige

policies and economic protectionism. If the countries of Europe once more protect themselves against each other, it will once more be necessary to build up vast armies."⁴⁷ On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman (1886–1963), in a speech prepared by Monnet, proposed the integration of the French and German coal and steel industries under a supranational institution called the High Authority. Joined by Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the Schuman Plan became the basis for the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Europe has become what political scientist Karl W. Deutsch in the 1950s described as a "pluralistic security community" – a group of independent sovereign states among which war is unthinkable.⁴⁸ In the decades after Deutsch wrote, Europe achieved the three conditions that he believed were necessary for such a community: (1) "Compatibility of major political values," (2) "Capacity of the governments . . . of the participating countries to respond to one another's messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence," and (3) "Mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another's economic, political, and social behavior."⁴⁹

THE CONTINUING PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION The ECSC sparked enthusiasm for additional European integration. Although a proposal for an integrated European army died in 1954, West German rearmament was accomplished with the country's 1955 admission to NATO. That year the foreign ministers of the six ECSC members met in Messina, Sicily, to examine other ways to advance European integration.

However, the prospect of integration was given a dramatic push by the 1956 Suez War which persuaded French leaders that France could no longer act alone. According to one version, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) said to French Premier Guy Mollet (1905–75) that: “France and England will never be powers comparable to the United States . . . There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world: that is to unite Europe . . . We have no time to waste; Europe will be your revenge.”⁵⁰ The result was the 1957 Treaty of Rome that created the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to pool resources for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market. The Common Market involved eliminating all tariffs on trade among members and creating a common external tariff. It also entailed common policies in agriculture and transportation and the free movement of people among member states. The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which was enacted to provide Europe’s politically powerful farmers with a guaranteed income by maintaining price supports, became a European institution, an obstacle to free trade in agriculture, and a drain on Europe’s financial resources. Community decisions, made by a Council of Ministers but carried out by a High Commission responsible to the community as a whole, required only a majority, as members renounced their right to block decisions unilaterally.

Britain initially refused to join, fearing the loss of sovereign independence, and, instead, sponsored a loose free-trade group called the European Free Trade Association. Although Britain changed its view in 1961, its efforts to join the Common Market were twice vetoed by France’s President Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), and Britain, Ireland, and Denmark only became members in 1973.

The next step was the 1967 Merger Treaty under which the institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM were merged into the European Community (EC). By 1968, all tariffs among

members had been eliminated, and the following year agreement was reached on a scheme for regular financing of the EC budget based on member contributions. In 1979, the first direct elections were held for a European Parliament. Thereafter, Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), and Spain (1986) joined the EC. The EC’s enlargement led to the creation of the European Regional Development Fund under which wealthier members provided development aid to poorer members.

The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 was a giant step toward the surrender of sovereignty by EC members. It involved some 300 rules for removing impediments to the formation of a single internal economic market and required members to harmonize policies and standards in areas such as tax, health, safety, labor, and environmental policy.

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was an even bigger step, formally creating the European Union. Europe was given a new structure that consisted of “three pillars” (Figure 10.5). The European Community remained the EU’s core but with the addition of a second pillar involving cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a third in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Progress in these last two has been slow. The CFSP tries to foster foreign policy dialogue to forge a common European position on global issues. Although some common positions have been adopted, Europeans remained divided on questions such as how to deal with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991–92. Efforts to establish a common policy on European defense outside of NATO have also foundered despite the formation of a Common Security and Defense Policy in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and a commitment to build an all-European rapid-reaction force to deal with sudden crises without US assistance. Standing above and coordinating the activities of the three pillars is the European Council where national leaders meet and bargain. Administration is in the hands of the European Commission with commissioners in charge of specific administrative departments (see Figure 10.6).




Figure 10.5 The three pillars of the European Union

Source: Ragnar Mueller/Wolfgang Schumann (2008), *European Union*, http://www.dadalos-europe.org/int/grundkurs2/etappe_4.htm




Figure 10.6 EU institutions

Source: http://europa.eu/abc/euslides/index_en.htm

The Maastricht Treaty also began a process of transforming the EU into a single Economic and Monetary Union by linking members' national currencies and committing members to the creation of a single European currency. The year 2000 saw the introduction of a new "eurozone" with the replacement of national currencies by a single currency called the euro and the establishment of a European Central Bank responsible for monetary policy for the EU as a whole. Although Britain, Sweden, and Denmark opted out from the decision, the countries that joined the eurozone accepted stringent requirements (called the

Stability and Growth Pact), including limits on domestic inflation, budget deficits, and long-term interest rates. Since then, the euro has become a major reserve currency and a rival to the US dollar in international transactions.

Another major development was the EU's eastward expansion. In 2004, 10 more states were admitted to the EU: Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta, and Cyprus. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined, and preliminary negotiations have begun regarding the admission of Iceland, Serbia, and Turkey. To be admitted, a state must

have a stable market economy and democratic institutions.

Expansion has, however, complicated efforts to harmonize members' foreign policies. Several new members, notably Poland, supported American intervention in Iraq despite German and French opposition. Nevertheless, Europe has taken tentative steps to coordinate foreign policies. It now has the equivalent of a foreign minister. EU policemen began serving in Bosnia in 2003, and EU soldiers were deployed some months later in Macedonia to reduce the risk of civil strife there. The EU has undertaken several peacekeeping missions, for example along the border between Ukraine and Transdniestria, a region that seceded from Moldova. In addition, the EU has endorsed the NATO mission in Afghanistan and is behind the effort of Germany, Britain, and France to dissuade Iran from enriching nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear weapons.

Since expansion, the EU, with a population that exceeds that of the United States by almost 200 million and with a larger gross domestic product, has become a force to reckon with in global politics. However, despite advances toward integrating Europe, Monnet's goal of a "United States of Europe" remains elusive. In some respects, the EU has become greater than the sum of its parts, an institution that represents the interests of Europeans rather than those of states. However, states still retain considerable sovereign independence, a fact that became evident during the financial crisis that threatened first Greece and then other members including Spain and Portugal with **sovereign default**. Only after intense debate and disagreement and with the crisis spreading to global markets did eurozone members agree to establish several funds of up to \$950 billion to be loaned or guaranteed by them and the IMF in the event of a threatened default. At German insistence, such aid will only be extended if countries receiving the assistance agree to strict **austerity** that would dramatically reduce its deficits.⁵¹ Thus, Greece vowed to cut its budget deficit by cutting public-sector pay and pensions, raising the coun-

try's retirement age, increasing taxes, and cutting public investment.⁵²

In an effort to form a more perfect union, the EU began the process of drawing up a constitution for Europe as a whole. The next section examines this effort and its results.

A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION? The EU embarked on its most ambitious project to date when, at a December 2001 summit in Laeken, Belgium, European leaders adopted a declaration of principles as the basis for a continental constitution. As a result of the Laeken Declaration, the European Council established a Convention on the Future of Europe to draft a constitution that was completed by July 2003. Although the treaty establishing a constitution was signed in October 2004, its rejection the following year by French and Dutch voters halted the process. Instead, in order to avoid additional referendum, the key features of the abortive constitution were adopted by the Lisbon Treaty that was signed in December 2007, amending earlier treaties. It came into force two years later after being ratified by all 27 EU members.

The Lisbon Treaty is a complex compromise. The treaty added federalist principles to the EU while preserving state sovereignty. Among those features adopted from the failed constitution were a president of the European Council, which represents the governments of member states, and a new post of High Representative which united the jobs of the existing foreign affairs and the external affairs commissioners. It was also agreed that a commissioner from each of the 27 member states would serve on the European Commission, that a redistribution of voting weights among the member states would be phased in after 2014, that new powers be granted to the European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice, especially in the spheres of justice and home affairs, and that *both* the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers approve most legislation ("co-decision"). Finally, national vetoes were eliminated in several areas such as

energy security. Unanimity will still be required in the areas of tax, foreign policy, defense and social security.⁵³

In 2009, British Baroness Catherine Ashton was chosen as the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Belgium's Herman Van Rompuy as the new President of the European Council. The president will chair EU summits, while most ministerial meetings will still be chaired by the country holding the rotating six-month EU presidency. These two new EU leaders will still have to work with the President of the European Commission, which has been the executive branch of the EU since its establishment. This powerful position will be held by Spain's José Manuel Barroso until 2014.⁵⁴

In sum, the EU is a novel regional organization in which all members have surrendered some sovereignty. However, Europe's unique history creates doubts as to whether the EU is a model for regional integration elsewhere. To date, no other regional IGO has come close to achieving the EU's level of integration. Nevertheless, as we shall see, significant IGOs have been established on every continent.

Other regional organizations

Regional IGOs exist on all continents, and virtually every country is a member of at least one such organization. The first prominent African regional organization was the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, but it was so ineffective that in 2002, it was succeeded by the African Union (AU). With a pan-African parliament, a commission, a court of justice, and a development bank, the AU seeks to emulate the EU. The AU's first peacekeeping mission was to Burundi in 2003 to supervise a ceasefire agreement between warring Hutus and Tutsis. In 2004, it sent peacekeepers to protect civilians in the conflict in Darfur. In recent years, the AU has been partly eclipsed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), consisting of 15 West

African countries and dominated by its largest member, Nigeria. Founded in 1975 to promote economic development, ECOWAS has also become involved in peacekeeping, sending peacekeepers to Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Burundi, and Darfur.

The regional organization for the Middle East is the League of Arab States (LAS). This IGO is made up of 22 mainly Arabic-speaking countries and includes Palestine, which most Arab states recognize as an independent state. The Arab League was founded in 1945 to advance Arab unity, but it has become better known for its disunity. During the Cold War, members divided over superpower allegiances, and in 1976 Egypt's membership was suspended for over a decade following its peace agreement with Israel. Often, the Arab League has been unsuccessful in defining common positions on a range of issues, including an Israeli–Palestinian peace process and the 2003 Iraq War, although it was LAS members that asked for intervention in 2011 to stop Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi from attacking his own people. It remains unclear how the political transformations underway across the region will affect this organization.

Politically, the most important IGO in the Americas is the Organization of American States (OAS). Founded in 1948, the OAS includes all 35 countries in the western hemisphere, although communist Cuba has been excluded since 1962. Occasionally, the OAS has tried to balance the influence of the “Colossus of the North,” while at other times it has supported US policy – for example, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. However, the most important regional economic group in the Americas is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which created the world's largest free trade area (see Figure 10.7). The project began with the 1989 US–Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which became NAFTA when Mexico joined in 1992. NAFTA, which went into effect in 1994, created a free-trade area and a mechanism for deciding trade disputes among members. By 2008, virtually all duties and quan-



"It stands for 'North American Free Lunch Agreement'"

Figure 10.7 North American Free Trade Agreement

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

titative restrictions among the three countries had been eliminated. Hailed by business sectors for stimulating trade, generating jobs, and reducing prices, it was opposed by US labor unions that feared the loss of jobs to poorly paid Mexicans and by environmentalists who believed that firms would move to Mexico to avoid US environmental requirements. Both groups remain suspicious of NAFTA.

NAFTA has benefited all three members. Mexico's northern region along the US border has become a manufacturing and assembly center for all of North America. Canada and Mexico were the top two purchasers of US exports in 2009, and the value of US goods and services traded in NAFTA was \$1.1 trillion in 2008.⁵⁵ Prices of goods from Canada and Mexico have tumbled in the United States, and jobs have been created as well as lost. Politically, NAFTA reflects North American interdependence and has encouraged Mexico to pursue greater democratization and confront the

troubling issues of narcotics and illegal immigration. But NAFTA's effects have not all been beneficial. Employment has increased, but primarily in the low-wage *maquiladora* industries and workers have been displaced from the agricultural sector. Southern regions of Mexico were especially hard hit by growing economic inequality, a factor that fueled the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. The Zapatistas called NAFTA a "death sentence" for eliminating constitutionally guaranteed collective property rights and heralding the collapse of the local market for maize.⁵⁶

The most ambitious, but as yet unrealized, free-trade project in the Americas is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The idea was first broached at a summit of 34 regional leaders in Miami in late 1994. There, states agreed to launch a continental free-trade area with authority to resolve regional trade disputes. At a 1998 meeting in Costa Rica, participants agreed to general principles for the free-trade area. Since then, the project has lost much of its momentum owing to differences over the scope and speed of negotiations between the United States and several Latin American states, especially Brazil and Venezuela under its flamboyant anti-American president, Hugo Chávez. Dissatisfaction with the process led Venezuela and Cuba to establish in 2006 the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, a socialist regional grouping that in addition to cutting tariffs among member states encourages regional cooperation to eliminate illiteracy, reduce unemployment, and provide support to prop up poor countries. Today, this group has eight members.

Asia also hosts several ambitious regional IGOs. The most successful is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967. ASEAN conducts regular meetings to discuss regional issues and has proposed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with other states in the region that has been signed by China, India, Japan, and Pakistan. ASEAN members have agreed to speed up economic integration, with a free-trade area in place by 2020.

A more ambitious but less successful effort is the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. With US backing, the leaders of 15 Pacific Rim countries gathered in Seattle in 1993 and called for the elimination of impediments to trade and investment among them. Since then six additional countries have joined, including China and Russia. Recent meetings have called for action to limit climate change (2007) and reduce the gap between developed and developing members (2008).⁵⁷ Were APEC to become a free-trade area, it would be the largest in the world.

The EU is not Europe’s only important regional organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the world’s most powerful military alliance. Established in 1949 to provide security for Western Europe, NATO became an unprecedented peacetime alliance with a permanent secretariat and a military headquarters that represented the US commitment to deter Soviet aggression. The alliance’s core was Article 5 of the treaty by which each member affirmed that it would regard an attack on its allies as an attack on itself. Because the USSR never invaded Western Europe, Article 5 was first invoked on September 12, 2001, to provide assistance to the US the day after terrorists attacked New York and Washington.

Since the Cold War’s end, NATO has grappled with how to remain relevant. One way it has done so is by expanding eastward to Russia’s borders to spread stability and democracy across Central and Eastern Europe. In 1990, the former East Germany became part of NATO, and in 1999 the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary were admitted. Five years later Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were added. To ease Russian fears of NATO expansion a NATO–Russia Council was created for joint decision making on issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, crisis management, and arms control.

Today, NATO’s main role is assuring stability along Europe’s frontiers, a role it played during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. In fact, the Kosovo conflict

was the first in which alliance forces were deeply engaged. More controversial are US efforts to persuade NATO to meet crises beyond Europe. In August 2003, in its first mission outside the European–Atlantic region, NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force to pacify Afghanistan and remains involved in the Afghan war.⁵⁸

Another important European organization is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE, originally called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), evolved as a forum for reducing East–West tensions during the Cold War. It is recalled for the discussions it hosted in Helsinki, Finland between 1973 and 1975 that led to a US–Soviet agreement to recognize Europe’s frontiers, including the boundary between West and East Germany. In 1990, the CSCE’s members signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe that officially recognized the Cold War’s end, and in 1994 the organization changed its name to the OSCE. The OSCE is the world’s largest regional security group with tasks including promoting confidence-building measures among adversaries, pressing for human rights, managing potential crises, and encouraging democratization.

International organizations and peace

So, do international organizations contribute to peace? The answer seems to be that they do, a finding to cheer liberals. One pioneering analysis identified six ways in which IGOs help maintain peace: (1) coercing aggressive states, (2) mediating among those in conflict, (3) providing information to reduce uncertainty and avoid misunderstandings, (4) solving problems in ways that help states see their interests in new ways, (5) promoting shared norms, and (6) “building a shared sense of values and identity among peoples.”⁵⁹ IGOs, it seems, were most beneficial before World War One and less so in the period between

the two world wars, “but have been an important force for peace in the years after 1945.”⁶⁰

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the evolution of international law and organization in global politics and has considered how developments in both areas reflect the theme of change and continuity. In the absence of a central authority, international law manages violence, as in the just war tradition, and regulates interactions both to protect sovereignty and ensure a stable and orderly global system is maintained. The chapter has also shown that the League of Nations, the UN, and various regional IGOS similarly mitigate conflict and facilitate cooperation among participating states.

Today, international law has evolved beyond being a “law of nations” and is becoming a law of “persons” as well. As we shall see in the next chapter, in no area is this more evident than in human rights in which new protections for individuals are challenging the prerogatives of sovereignty, especially the prohibition against external non-interference in domestic affairs and the absolute authority of the state over its citizens.

Student activities

Map analysis

What does Map 10.1 tell you about which countries and regions are currently the leading trouble spots in global politics?

Cultural materials

Art can be used to make political statements. The UN exhibits many such works. For example, in 1964, Marc Chagall presented a stained-glass window memorializing former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and those who died with him in a plane crash in 1961. The window contains many symbols of peace and love, including motherhood and people struggling for peace. Try drawing a picture that you think would symbolize the UN and describe the symbolic elements in the picture.

Further reading

- Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Analysis of how international organizations as bureaucracies can make rules, exercise power, and act independently of members.
- Goldsmith, Jack A. and Eric Posner, *The Limits of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Controversial work that argues states only follow international law when it suits their national interest.
- Staab, Andreas, *The European Union Explained* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008). A concise examination of EU history, institutions, and policies.
- Weiss, Thomas G. and Sam Daws, eds, *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). An excellent and comprehensive collection of essays on UN's organs, issues, and relations with other actors.

1215

Magna Carta

1689

English Bill of Rights

1776

US Declaration of
Independence

1789

French Declaration
of the Rights of Man

1945–46

Nuremberg trials

1948

Universal Declaration
of Human Rights

11

Human rights: The individual in global politics

The human rights group Amnesty International tells how, in response to the eruption of mass protests following Iran's presidential election on June 12, 2009, Iranian officials resorted to widespread human rights abuses by limiting freedom of speech, association, and assembly. At least 4000 protesters were arrested, often by the Basij (pro-government vigilantes) and Revolutionary Guards (see Figure 11.1). Most were held incommunicado without charge or access to legal defense. Torture was common. One student "is said to have been beaten so badly by security forces that he needed treatment before being taken to Evin Prison," and he was beaten so badly "on his head" that he "had started to lose his sight." "Beatings on his ribs were thought to have initiated internal bleeding, including to his lungs. When moved from the Kahrizak detention facility to Evin prison, he was unable to breathe and began to convulse. His breathing then became shallower until it stopped."¹ As in Iran, **human rights** are routinely violated around the world, and torture remains a common way to terrorize dissenters.

This chapter focuses on normative theory, on what is right and wrong, and on how we "ought"

to behave in global politics. Are states required to treat citizens humanely? After all, states are sovereign and, therefore, enjoy unlimited legal power over those living on their territory. Also, being sovereign, they have no legal superiors. Under traditional international law, only sovereign states enjoyed rights, and only states were "juridical persons" with legal standing in one another's courts. The traditional view was that if a sovereign ruler or his representatives wished to exploit or abuse subjects, it was no one else's business, and no one had a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of another country.

When the American Revolution began in 1776, most governments still treated individuals as subjects from whom rulers had to extract resources and obedience. Except for a small number of enlightened philosophers in England and France, few thinkers thought that people had rights apart from those granted them by their sovereigns. Even the US Constitution regarded enslaved African-Americans as less than complete human beings, being counted as three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportionment of the members of the House of Representatives.

1948	1993	1995	1997	2002
Genocide Convention enacted	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established	Fourth World Conference on Women meeting in Beijing	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda established	International Criminal Court established



Figure 11.1 Iran's Basij Militia

Source: AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Historically, governments have limited or violated individual rights for many reasons – for example, to promote their ideology and induce fear. Dictators often force citizens to accept official ideological, religious, or political views and persecute those who refuse to do so. As in Iran, many rulers still jail opponents arbitrarily, use torture to extract information, deny justice and equality to racial and ethnic groups, treat women as chattel, and kill opponents to still dissent.

Although Americans and Britons do not like to think they violate human rights, abuses committed by US and British soldiers in Iraq have come to light. According to Amnesty International, the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad in 2004 was part of an “iconography of torture, cruelty and degradation” that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and reflected a “well-trodden path of violating

basic rights in the name of national security or ‘military necessity.’”² And British soldiers were told that they were not bound by the Human Rights Act when detaining and interrogating Iraqi prisoners.³

As in the past, some regimes are led by pathological leaders who commit incomprehensible atrocities. China’s Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union’s Josef Stalin ordered millions of their citizens to be killed in order to achieve rapid economic growth, ensure ideological purity, and eliminate dissent. Adolf Hitler ordered the genocide⁴ of over six million Jews and the deaths of countless others – gypsies, gays, socialists, and Slavs – whom he regarded as inferior. Stalin oversaw the deaths of millions by starvation, slave labor, and execution. Idi Amin (1928–2003) ordered the murder of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans, especially those of the Acholi and Lango ethnic groups, during his brutal dictatorship from 1971 until 1979. According to an eyewitness: “By 1974 his regime was murdering hundreds of thousands of its own people and Amin fed the heads of opponents to crocodiles and boasted of eating human flesh, keeping human heads in the freezer as his nation starved.”⁴ And Pol Pot (1925–98), leader of the communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, ordered the genocidal deaths of as many as two million – more than one in five – in his effort to remake Cambodian society.

Nevertheless, as democracy spread during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in the West, and with it the belief that law requires the consent of the governed, the ideas that governments should not treat subjects arbitrarily and that people had rights apart from those granted by rulers also spread. Among scholars, critical theorists most fully embrace the concept of “do not harm.” Liberals generally advocate greater reliance on international law to maintain peace and advance human rights. By contrast, realists declare that international law need only be obeyed when it serves states’ interests, and that human rights must take a back seat to the

demands of power and national interest. For their part, constructivists regard rights as social constructs that evolve when people regard them as legitimate and morally justified. They emphasize that, even though states may routinely violate international law and human rights, legal and normative precedents are being set and norms are evolving that, over time, may constrain the arbitrary behavior of states and limit their sovereign independence.

Human rights are a special category of “rights.” But what are “rights”? Most theorists agree that **rights** are moral entitlements possessed by people by virtue of who they are or what they have done.⁶ Rights are claims that others are duty bound to respect and entail corresponding duties.⁷ They establish a relationship between those who possess those rights and others such as governments against whom those rights are asserted. As such, rights can only exist in social groups.

Norms against human rights violations are growing, and global politics has witnessed a proliferation of legal protections for individuals since World War Two. Although international law has for much of the past three centuries jealously protected the prerogatives of rulers and the sovereignty of states, this is changing. The savagery of war, especially the Holocaust in World War Two, persuaded people that those responsible for atrocities should be held accountable. Beginning with the trials of German and Japanese individuals for **war crimes** in the postwar Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and continuing with the elaboration of human rights law by the UN and other international organizations, individuals – both perpetrators of abuses and their victims – are acquiring increasing status in international law. And the growing willingness of such organizations to authorize **humanitarian intervention** where there are gross abuses, and hold national leaders accountable for what they do to their own people, threatens to erode an essential core of state sovereignty. Today, the “responsibility to protect” (“RtoP” or “R2P”) is an emerging human rights norm that declares that the global com-

munity is obliged to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Despite the guarantee of state sovereignty in the UN Charter, former Secretary General Kofi Annan, declared that: “As long as I am Secretary General,” the UN “will always place human beings at the center of everything we do.” Although “fundamental sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of states” continue to be a “cornerstone of the international system,” Annan continued, sovereignty cannot provide “excuses for the inexcusable.”⁸ Annan’s view places a higher value on the rights of individuals in global politics than on state sovereignty. As we shall see in the next section, this has not been the case during most of the history of global politics. International law evolved as the law of nations, not the law of individuals.

We begin our discussion of human rights by describing the Holocaust, an event so terrible that it provided an impetus to holding states and leaders responsible for what they did to their citizens, as well as citizens of other countries. We then examine the sources, scope, and codification of such rights since World War Two, and the protections they provide. Some of the controversy

over human rights involves the status of women. Are women’s rights also human rights? In what ways are women treated unequally? Among the most important concerns involving women are the various forms of violence practiced against them and the question of whether women should enjoy reproductive independence. Finally, should we respect the role of women as defined by different cultures, or should women everywhere enjoy equality with men?

The Holocaust and the genocide convention

During World War Two, civilians were victims of unprecedented atrocities and in recent decades new types of warfare have emerged in which innocent civilians have become the principal victims. Despite the growing effort to hold perpetrators accountable for war crimes and **crimes against humanity** in the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, **genocide** and **politicide** have become increasingly common in global politics in recent decades. As Table 11.1 shows, since 1945 the mass killing of civilians has occurred on almost every continent.

Table 11.1 Genocides and politicides since 1945*

AFRICA				
<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
Sudan – South, Nuba Region	1956–72 1983–2005	2,000,000	Nuer, Dinka, Christians, Nuba, southerners	Khartoum government, NIF government, Militias, Rebels
Sudan – Darfur	2001 – present	250,000+	Zaghawa, Fur, Massaleit, and black Africans	Janjaweed Arab militias, Sudan government
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1945–60	1,000s	Africans	Colonial Forces
	1960–65	1,000s	Civil war	Rebels, army
	1977–79, 1984	1,000s	Civil war	Rebels, army
	1994–97	80,000	Hutus, Banyamulenge,	Kabila/Rwandan army,
		2 million	(civil war)	Ugandan, Rwandan armies, rebels, DRCongo, allied armies
	1994 – present	40,000	Hema, Lendu	Ethnic militias
	1997 – present	1 million	(civil war)	War-lord led militias, DRC army

Table 11.1 continued

AFRICA				
<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
	1994 – present	500,000+	Women (mass rape)	Rwandan <i>interhamwe</i> militias, Congolese militias, army
Somalia	1988 – present 2006 – present	100,000 40,000	Somalis, Isaaq clan Islamists, gov't supporters	Warlord/clan militias Ethiopian army; Al-Shabaab Terrorists
Ethiopia	1945–74 1974–85 1994–2000	150,000 750,000 125,000	Oromo, Eritreans, Somali Class enemies, Oromo Eritrea war	Selassie monarchy Derg communists Army (Ethiopian Defence Forces)
	2001 – present 2001 – present	25,000+ 1,000s 1,500 20,000	Ethnic minorities Oromo Anuak in Gambella Ogadeni (Somalis)	Army (EDF) Army (EDF) Army (EDF) Army (EDF)
Guinea	1958–84 1984–2008 2000–03 2008 – present 28 Sept 2009	1,000s 1,000s 1,000s 100s 160+	Political enemies Political enemies Guinean civilians Political enemies Democratic opposition	Toure Marxist government Conte military Charles Taylor forces Military Military
Equatorial Guinea	1975–79 2001 – present	50,000	Bubi, Nguema foes	Macias Nguema regime, successor
Uganda	1972–79 1980–86 1994 – present	300,000 250,000 10,000s	Acholi, Lango, Karamoja Baganda, Banyarwanda LRA foes	Amin gov't army, police Obote gov't army, police Lord's Resistance Army
Chad	1965–96 2005 – present	10,000s 1,000s	Southern Saras, civil war Zaghawas, Fur	Government army, Libyan army, rebels Sudan-backed militias
Kenya	1952–60 1991–93 2007–08	1,500 1,000s 1,300+	Kikuyu, 100s colonials Nilotics Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, other ethnic groups	Colonial forces, MauMau Kikuyu Ethnic militias Ethnic youth gangs
Zimbabwe	1982–84 1998 – present	20,000 1,000+	Matabele MDC supporters, Matabele, urban poor, white farmers	Government army 5 th brigade, militias government police, army, ZANU-PF militias
Côte d'Ivoire	2000–07 2000–07	3,000+ 1,000+	Dioulas, immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali Southerners	Government, bete & other militias, death squads Northern rebels
Eritrea	1961–91 1998–2000	570,000 125,000	Eritreans (independence war with Ethiopia) Border war with Ethiopia	Ethiopian armies, police
Burundi	1959–62	50,000	Hutus	Tutsi government

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
	1972	150,000	Hutus	Tutsi army
	1988	25,000	Hutus	Tutsi army
	1993–95	50,000	Tutsis	Hutu rebels
		100,000	Hutus	Tutsi army
	1996–2006	100,000	Tutsi, Hutu	Rebels, army
Togo	2004 – present	1,000s	Eyadema opponents	Government police, army
Nigeria	1966–70	1,000,000	Ibos	Nigerian army
	1972–2000 sporadic	1,000s	Tiv, Hausa, Yoruba, Ogoni, Others	Ethnic mobs
	2001 – present	500+	Niger delta groups	Nigerian army
Algeria	1954–63	160,000	OAS, Harkis, settlers	French Legion, OAS, Rebels
	1991–2005	200,000	Gov't officials, Berber	Islamic Armed Group (GIA)
Sierra Leone	1991–2003	200,000	Sierra Leone civilians	Revolutionary united front, other militias
Rwanda	1959–63, 1993	10,000s	Tutsi	Hutu government
	1994	800,000	Tutsi	Hutu power government, Interhamwe
	1995 – present	1,000s	Hutus	Rwandan government
Congo-Brazzaville	1959–68	5,000	Gov't foes	Government army, police, rebels
	1997–2000	1,000s	Political militias	Gov't army, rebels, Angola
Angola	1961–62	40,000	Kongo	Colonial army
	1975–2003	500,000	Umbundu, Ovimbundu	Government, UNITA armies, allies
Central African Republic	1966–79	2,000	Bokassa foes	Government army, police
	2001			
Liberia	1990–2003	200,000	Krahn, Gio, Mano, etc.	Doe government army, Taylor rebels, government, rebels
Botswana	1990 – present	100s	Küing Bushmen, Caprivi Namibians	Government police
Senegal – Casamance	1990–2001	1,000	Diola (civil war)	Senegalese army, rebels
Guinea Bissau	1960s – present	1,000s	Opponents of gov't	Army
Morocco-Western Sahara	1976 – present	1,000s	Sahrawis	Moroccan army, Polisario rebels
Mali	1990–93	1,000	Touaregs	Malian army, Touareg rebels
Mozambique	1975–94	1,000,000	MPLA, Renamo	Renamo, MPLA
Madagascar	1947–48	50,000	Malagasy nationalists	French colonial forces
South Africa	1987–96	1,000s	Zulus, Xhosa, ANC	Government police, ethnic militias
	1994 – present	3,000	Boer farmers	Hate crimes
Egypt	Sporadic	100s	Copts	Muslim fundamentalists

Table 11.1 continued

AMERICAS				
<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
Colombia	1948–58	180,000	Liberals vs. Conservatives	Political parties
	1975 – present	10,000s	Gov't officials, leftists, police, drug wars	Marxists, rightist death squads, drug cartels
Venezuela	1945–70s	1,000s	Yanomami	Settlers, miners
	2004 – present	100s	Isolated Chavez opponents	Chavez neo-Marxists
Brazil	1945–64	300,000	Vargas foes, Indians	Gov't police, settler militias
	1964 – present sporadic massacres	1,000s	Kayapo, Yanomami, etc.	Settlers, miners
Guatemala	1950s–80s	200,000	Mayans	Gov't army, death squads
Cuba	1945–59	100s	Rebels	Rightist gov'ts
	1959 – present	1,000s	“Counter-revolutionaries”	Castro gov't
Argentina	1976–80	20,000	Leftists	Army, police
Chilé	1973–76	10,000s	Leftists	Army, police
Nicaragua	1970–79	30,000	Sandinistas	Gov't army
	1980–89	30,000	Contras	Sandinista army
El Salvador	1980–92	75,000	Leftists	Army, militias
Peru	1980–92	69,000	State authorities	Shining Path Maoists
Paraguay	1945–62	1,000s	Indians	Army, settlers
	1962–74	1,000	Aché Indians	Settlers
Mexico	1945–2001	10,000s	Indians, gov't foes	Army, police
Chiapas	1945–2001	10,000s	Mayans	Army, police
ASIA				
North Korea	1949–53	2,000,000+	Korean civilians, Korean & UN troops	North Korean invasion of South, war to drive North back
Afghanistan	1995–97	1,000,000+	North Korean civilians	State created famine
	1978–93	700,000	Anti-communist forces	Soviet invaders
		50,000+	Pro-Soviet Afgfhans	Mujahadin
	1993–96	30,000	(civil war)	Warlords
	1996–2001	50,000+	Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara	Taliban, Al Qaeda
	1996–2001	10,000+	Pashtuns	Northern Alliance
	2001 – present	1,000s	Gov't supporters	Taliban, Al Qaeda
		1,000s	Taliban	NATO, gov't
Pakistan	1947 (partition)	61,000	Hindus	Muslim mobs
East Pakistan: (now Bangladesh)	1971	1,500,000	Bengalis & Hindus	West Pakistani army

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
West Pakistan	1973–77	1,000s	Shiites, Christians	Sunnis
Baluchistan, Sind	1978 – present	1,000s	Baluchis, Sindis	Army
Frontier provinces	2003 – present	10,000s	Government supporters, non-Pashtuns	Islamists, Al-Qaeda
Burma (Myanmar)	1945–48	1,000s	Rebels	Burma Ind Move
	1948–62	15,000	Rebels, govt	U Nu govt, rebels
	1962–2007	100,000	Shan, Karen, NDU	SLORC, SPDC (Burmese gov't)
	2007 – present	1,000s	Monks, anti-gov't democrats	SPDC (Burmese gov't)
Uzbekistan Fergana Valley	1991 – present	1,000s	Muslim fundamentalists, government opponents	Ex-Communist (Karimov) government
	2005 – present	100s	Opposition	Gov't police
Peoples Republic of China	1949–77	35,000,000+	“Class enemies”, religious minorities, Uighurs Muslims, Christians	Maoist communist gov't, PRC army, Red Guards, police
	1977 – present	10,000s	Falun Gong, Uighurs, Tibetans	Chinese Communist Army, police
Nepal	1996 – present	20,000 10,000s	Anti-Maoists Rebels	Maoist rebels Nepal army
Indonesia	1965	500,000	Communists	Suharto gov't & successors
	1984 – present	100,000+	West Papua/ Irian Jayans	Indonesian army
	1966–2005	10,000s 1,000s 1,000s	Acehnese Moluccas Sulewesi	Indonesian army Laskar Jihad Laskar Jihad
India	1947 (partition)	100,000s	Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs	Hindu, Muslim, Sikh mobs
Gujarat	1949–2003	1,000s 100s	Muslims Hindus	Hindu mobs Muslim mobs
Other states	1992–2003	1,000s	Muslims, Hindus	Rebels, police
Kashmir	1989 – present	40,000+	Kashmiri Muslims	Indian police
Philippines	1972 – present	1,000s	Pro-gov't officials Separatists Communists	Marxists, gov't Army, Moros Abu Sayyef
Sri Lanka	1983–2009	60,000	Tamil Sinhalese civilians	Anti-Tamil mobs Tamil Tiger rebels
Tibet	1959–90s	1,200,000	Tibetan Buddhists	PRC communist Chinese gov't
Azerbaijan	1988–94	10,000s 1,000s	Armenians Azeris	Azeris Armenian armies
Tajikistan	1992–97	50,000+	Tajik & Uzbek opposition	Ex-Communists
Cambodia	1945–66	5,000	King's foes	Royal gov't
	1966–75	15,000	Vietnamese	Lon Nol gov't
	1968–75	360,000	Pro-gov't	Khmer Rouge
	1975–79	1,700,000	Class enemies, Cham	

Table 11.1 continued

ASIA				
<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
		2,200,000	Muslims, city people, Vietnamese, Eastern Zone	Khmer Rouge
	1979–93	230,000	(civil war)	Samrin gov't, KR
	1993–99	1,000s	Gov't foes	Hun Sen gov't
French Vietnam	1945–53	10,000s	Leftists	French colonials
South Vietnam	1954–75	90,000	Leftists	South Viet gov't
North Vietnam	1954–75	1 million	Class enemies, minorities	North Viet gov't
Peoples Democratic Republic Vietnam	1975 – present	10,000s	Boat people, reeducated	Vietnamese gov't
Laos	1945–60	10,000s	Leftists	Royalists, French
	1960–75	100,000	Anti-communists	Pathet Lao
	1975 – present	1,000s	Hmong	Peoples' Democratic Republic
East Timor	1965–2000	200,000	Timorese	Indonesian army, militias
	2007–2008	100s	Political leaders	Military rebels
EUROPE				
Russia	1994–96	50,000	Chechens	Russian army
Chechnya, Ingushetia	1999 – present	25,000	Chechens	Russian army
	1994 – present	1,000s	Ingushi	Russian army
Russia	1990s – present	100	Isolated deaths	Neo-fascists
Yugoslavia: Kosovo	1998–2001	10,000	Albanian Kosovars	Yugoslav army
		100s	Serbs	Kosovo lib army
Yugoslavia: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia	1941–45	650,000	Serbs	Croatian fascists (Ustashi)
	1941–45	100,000	Croats, Muslims	Serb partisans (Chetniks)
	1945–87	1,000,000	Tito foes	Tito gov't
	1993–2001	1,000s	Dissidents	Milosevic gov't
Macedonia	1999–2001	100s	Albanians Macedonians	Macedonia gov't Albanian rebels
Bosnia	1992–98	100,000	Muslims, Croats Serbs	Bosnian Serbs Croats, Muslims
Georgia: Abkhazia, South Ossetia	1993 – present	100s	Abkhasians	Georgian army, separatist rebels
	2008	100s	Georgians	Russian army
Northern Ireland	1964–2001	3,000	Catholics, Protestants	Irish Republic Army, Protestant extremists

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Years of episodes since 1945</i>	<i>Cumulative civilian death toll</i>	<i>Group affected</i>	<i>Major killers</i>
Croatia	1991–95	50,000	Bosnian Muslims Serbs, Croats	Croat army, militias, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims
USSR (State no longer exists)	1945–53	15,000,000+	“Class enemies”	Soviet police, army, NKVD
USSR national minorities, esp. in Crimea, Dagestan, Ingushetia	1945–47 1945–91	1,000,000 6,000,000+ 400,000	Repatriated Soviet Nationals, dissidents Karachai, Meshketians, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Ingushi	NKVD, KGB secret police Red Army, secret police
MIDDLE EAST				
Iraq	1961–2003	190,000	Kurds, Shiites, Kuwaitis	Iraqi army, presidential guard, Baathists
	2003 – present	100,000	Shiites, Sunni “collaborators”, Kurds, Insurgents	Fedayeen, Al Queda, insurgent terrorists, Mahdi army, Iraqi and coalition forces
Yemen	1962–70	150,000	North Yemen Saudi-backed royalists vs. Marxist republicans	Egyptian and Yemeni republican troops, backed by USSR
Israel – Palestine	1948–55, 1956, 1967, 1973	1,000s	Israelis	Irgun, Arab terrorists, Israeli army, police, Fatah
	1987–93	1,162	Palestinians	Israeli army
		100s	Israelis	Hamas, Islamic Jihad, other terrorist groups
	2000 – present	1000s	Palestinians	Israeli army, police
		100s	Israelis	Hamas, Hizbollah
Lebanon	1974–91	55,000	Christians, Muslims, Druze	Religious militias, Hezbollah, Phalangists
	1991–2005	100s	Lebanese nationalists	Syrian secret police
	2006	100s	Hezbollah, civilians	Israeli army
Iran	1953–78	26,000	Shah foes	Secret police
	1978–92	60,000	Kurds, monarchists, Bahai	Iranian army, revolution guards
	1993 – present	100s	Gov’t opponents	Secret police
	2005 – present		(potentially: Israeli nation)	President, nuclear program
Turkey	1984–2000	10,000s	Kurds	Turkish army
	2001 – present	100s	Kurds	Turkish army
		100s	Turks	PKK
Syria	1981–82	21,000	Kurds, Sunni Muslims	Syrian army, police
Cyprus	1963–67	2,000	Turks Greek Cypriots	Greek Cypriots Turks

* Adapted from Genocide Watch, <http://genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocidespoliticides.htm>

DID YOU KNOW?

The term Holocaust, as used in the New Testament (Mark 12:33) meant “burnt offerings and sacrifices,” and it came to mean “complete destruction by fire.”

The concept of genocide – the eradication of an entire people – dates back to World War Two and the Nazi effort to exterminate Europe’s Jewish people. Six million Jews died in the Holocaust. Before that, however, **anti-Semitism** had existed in Europe for centuries. Massacres and **pogroms** of Jews were common in medieval Europe, especially during the Crusades, and Jewish believers were frequently forced to live in ghettos and wear identifying marks. They were also widely forbidden to own land or enter into many professions and businesses. However, the term anti-Semitism was only coined in the late nineteenth century, an era characterized by the spread of racist theories and myths in Europe and the US. Even in democratic France, anti-Semitism was widespread in the army, as reflected in the trumped up charge of treason and 1894 conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfuss (1859–1935) of spying for Germany.⁹ The French writer Joseph Arthur, Count of Gobineau (1816–82) was especially influential in spreading the ideas of Nordic supremacy and anti-Semitism with his treatise *On the Inequality of the Human Races*, and influential individuals such as the German opera composer Richard Wagner (1813–83) and US industrialist Henry Ford (1863–1947) were virulently anti-Semitic.

During the late nineteenth century, Austria, the country in which Hitler was born and raised, was a hotbed of racist thinking, and Hitler made anti-Semitism the core of his brutal ideology. Following World War One, Hitler became active in Germany’s right-wing anti-democratic movement. In *Mein Kampf (My Struggle)*, he clearly revealed his hatred of the Jews as well as other

“non-Aryans,” whom he held responsible for all of Germany’s woes, especially the rise of communism and what he believed to be the “degeneracy” of modern society (see Key document, opposite).

No sooner did Hitler come to power in 1933 than the Nazis began to institute policies against the Jews that would culminate in the murder of millions of innocent people. Initially, Jews were dismissed from government and from schools. Then, by the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, German Jews were stripped of their citizenship, and Jews were forbidden to marry non-Jews.¹⁰ In 1938, additional laws were passed that made it illegal for Jews to become lawyers or for Jewish doctors to treat non-Jewish patients. The government also transferred Jewish businesses to non-Jewish Germans at prices well below their value. Some of Germany’s Jews emigrated, but most could not or did not, unable to comprehend what lay in store for them. Among the best known of Jewish émigrés were Albert Einstein (1879–1955), the greatest physicist of his time, who left Germany in 1933, and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), the founder of modern psychology, who fled Vienna in 1938.

Nazi violence against the Jews began in earnest on the night of November 9, 1938, called *Kristallnacht* (Crystal Night), when the windows of Jewish-owned shops were shattered and many Jewish citizens were beaten or interned in concentration camps. With the onset of World War Two and Germany’s conquest of much of Europe, the Nazis began to contemplate a “final solution to the Jewish question.” Accompanying the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 were mobile groups called “action squads” that were organized specifically to kill Jews.

On January 20, 1942, at a secret conference convened by Reinhard Heydrich (1904–42), second in command of the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) (an elite unit that ran the network of German concentration camps) in Wannsee, a Berlin suburb, it was decided that the extermination of the Jews would begin. Gas chambers were built at several concentration camps in Poland including

KEY DOCUMENT

EXCERPTS FROM CHAPTER 11, “NATION AND RACE,” OF HITLER’S *MEIN KAMPF*

No more than Nature desires the mating of weaker with stronger individuals, even less does she desire the blending of a higher with a lower race, since, if she did, her whole work of higher breeding, over perhaps hundreds of thousands of years, might be ruined with one blow . . .

If the Jews were alone in this world, they would stifle in filth and offal; they would try to get ahead of one another in hate-filled struggle and exterminate one another, in so far as the absolute absence of all sense of self-sacrifice, expressing itself in their cowardice, did not turn battle into comedy here too . . .

With satanic joy in his face, the black-haired Jewish youth lurks in wait for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood, thus stealing her from her people. With every means he tries to destroy the racial foundations of the people he has set out to subjugate. Just as he himself systematically ruins women and girls, he does not shrink back from pulling down the blood barriers for others, even on a large scale. It was and it is Jews who bring the Negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same secret thought and clear aim of ruining the hated white race by the necessarily resulting bastardization, throwing it down from its cultural and political height, and himself rising to be its master . . .

The defeats on the battlefield in August, 1918, would have been child’s play to bear. They stood in no proportion to the victories of our people. It was not they that caused our downfall; no, it was brought about by that power which prepared these defeats by systematically over many decades robbing our people of the political and moral instincts and forces which alone make nations capable and hence worthy of existence . . .

KEY DOCUMENT

EXCERPTS FROM “BABI YAR”¹¹ BY YEVGENI YEVTUSHENKO

In only two days, 33,000 Ukrainian Jews were shot and buried in a ravine by the name of Babi Yar. That event is recalled in a moving poem by the Russian poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko:

No monument stands over Babi Yar.
 A steep cliff only, like the rudest headstone.
 I am afraid.
 Today, I am as old
 As the entire Jewish race itself.
 I see myself an ancient Israelite.
 I wander o’er the roads of ancient Egypt

And here, upon the cross, I perish, tortured
 And even now, I bear the marks of nails . . .
 I see myself a boy in Belostok . . .
 Blood spills, and runs upon the floors,
 The chiefs of bar and pub rage unimpeded
 And reek of vodka and of onion, half and half.
 I'm thrown back by a boot, I have no strength left,
 In vain I beg the rabble of pogrom,
 To jeers of "Kill the Jews, and save our Russia!"
 My mother's being beaten by a clerk . . .
 It seems to me that I am Anna Frank,
 Transparent, as the thinnest branch in April,
 And I'm in love, and have no need of phrases,
 But only that we gaze into each other's eyes.
 How little one can see, or even sense!
 Leaves are forbidden, so is sky,
 But much is still allowed – very gently
 In darkened rooms each other to embrace.
 – "They come!"
 – "No, fear not – those are sounds
 Of spring itself. She's coming soon.
 Quickly, your lips!"
 – "They break the door!" . . .
 Wild grasses rustle over Babi Yar,
 The trees look sternly, as if passing judgment.
 Here, silently, all screams, and, hat in hand,
 I feel my hair changing shade to gray.
 And I myself, like one long soundless scream
 Above the thousands of thousands interred,
 I'm every old man executed here,
 As I am every child murdered here . . .

Sobibór, near Lublin; Treblinka, northeast of Warsaw; and Auschwitz in Upper Silesia (see Figure 11.2). From all over Europe, Jews were shipped to these camps, where they were systematically murdered according to a program supervised by Adolf Eichmann (1906–62). In 1960, long after the war had ended, Israeli agents kidnapped Eichmann from Argentina and brought him to trial, where he was sentenced to death and executed for his crimes.

The Holocaust not only produced the term genocide but forced the world to confront the phenomenon. Although evidence had come to light of what the Nazis were doing, and tales of the death camps were widely circulated in the US, the USSR, and Britain during the war, the discovery of the death camps, as well as Japanese war crimes, produced shock and horror. Thus, in 1948 the UN General Assembly passed the Genocide Convention, which made genocide a



Figure 11.2 Dachau concentration camp

Source: Roger Violette/Getty Images

crime. Article 2 of the convention defined genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” by the following means:

- killing members of the group
- causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
- forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹²

President Truman submitted the Genocide Convention for ratification, but the Senate delayed approval until February 1986 owing to concern about its implications for US sovereignty.

The allies were determined to bring those responsible before the bar of justice. Although some have called the trials of German and Japanese war criminals “victors’ justice” – punishment imposed by the war’s winners on its losers – the trials marked a major step in holding individuals responsible for their acts and not permitting them to hide behind the protection of state sovereignty.

The Nuremberg precedent and the evolution of international criminal tribunals

The idea for bringing individuals to trial for war crimes dates to the end of World War One. A provision of the Versailles Treaty called for the trial of Germany's Kaiser, but Wilhelm fled to Holland at the war's end, where he received political asylum and lived long enough to witness the German conquest of that country in World War Two. The trials of other Germans for alleged crimes were prosecuted with little energy or success in German courts. Indeed, until 1945, only national courts could deal with alleged war criminals.

The Nuremberg and Japanese trials

The trials of the Germans at Nuremberg after World War Two were unprecedented because they were conducted by international tribunals. A special war crimes court was established with jurists from the US, the USSR, Britain, and France. The accused were not permitted to use the traditional defense of "superior orders"; that is, they could not claim that they had been given orders by superiors to act as they did. Neither could they use a defense based on "reason of state" – that is, that their actions, however regrettable, were in their country's national interests. The defendants were accused of three categories of crime as defined by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and **crimes against peace** (see Key document).

These charges include two especially controversial aspects. First, the fact that the accused could be held accountable for crimes against humanity "whether or not in violation of the law of the country where perpetrated" meant that

KEY DOCUMENT ARTICLE 6 OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG¹³

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

- (a) **CRIMES AGAINST PEACE:** namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
- (b) **WAR CRIMES:** namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
- (c) **CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:** namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

they could be prosecuted even where the Nazis had passed laws that permitted their acts. To some, this provision seemed to violate domestic sovereignty. The accused could also be tried for crimes against humanity that had been committed *before* the war began.

Even more controversial was the category of crimes against peace. Because going to war was regarded as a legitimate right of sovereign states, no such crime had existed before World War Two. Although Germany had signed the Kellogg–Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) whose signatories renounced war “as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another,”¹⁴ most countries did not take it seriously, and it had not been enforced against countries that had waged war after it had been signed. Therefore, the law prohibiting crimes against peace and conspiracy to wage an aggressive war has an *ex post facto* (after the fact) flavor to it. In fact, no one was charged with crimes against peace without being charged with other crimes as well. The Nuremberg trials lasted almost a year. Of the 21 defendants, 11 were sentenced to death by hanging, three were acquitted, and seven went to prison. Of those sentenced to death, one, Hermann Göring (1893–1946), committed suicide just hours before he was to be executed.

Accused Japanese war criminals were also made to stand trial between 1946 and 1948. Twenty-seven Japanese leaders were brought before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo. The court included justices from 11 allied nations that had fought Japan. According to the indictment, the defendants had promoted a scheme of conquest that “contemplated and carried out . . . murdering, maiming and ill-treating prisoners of war (and) civilian internees . . . forcing them to labor under inhumane conditions . . . plundering public and private property, wantonly destroying cities, towns and villages beyond any justification of military necessity; (perpetrating) mass murder, rape, pillage, brigandage, torture and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population of the over-run countries.”¹⁵

DID YOU KNOW?

Scientists in Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army used human subjects, including allied prisoners of war, to test the value of diseases such as anthrax, cholera, typhoid, and plague for biological warfare, killing thousands in the process. When the war ended, the unit’s commanders burned their records and destroyed their facilities. Later, at the recommendation of General Douglas MacArthur, a deal was reached with American authorities under which the scientists provided the results of their research in return for immunity from war crimes prosecution. Some of the scientists involved in Unit 731 went on to successful careers in politics, academia, and business after the war.

Seven of the accused were sentenced to death, including former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and General Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885–1946), who was in charge of Japan’s occupation of British Malaya and Singapore. The Yamashita case was controversial because Yamashita was convicted of crimes committed by troops in the Philippines over whom he had little control. Japan’s Emperor Hirohito (1901–89) was never brought to trial because the US believed that his cooperation was critical to America’s postwar occupation of Japan and efforts to democratize and reform Japanese society.

The postwar trials established the principle that individuals are responsible for their acts in time of war. In this, the trials departed from the tradition of treating states as responsible for the actions of leaders. Recent decades have witnessed additional efforts to reassert this principle.

DID YOU KNOW?

Iva Toguri D'Aquino (1916–2006), better known as “Tokyo Rose,” was tried and convicted for her acts in World War Two. A first-generation Japanese-American who was raised in Los Angeles, she was visiting Japan when war broke out and was unable to return to the US. Under Japanese pressure, she renounced her American citizenship and broadcast radio propaganda to American troops in the Pacific. Convicted of treason, Mrs. D'Aquino was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In 1977, she was pardoned by President Gerald Ford.

Cold War politics precluded the use of international criminal tribunals for several decades because the superpowers repeatedly clashed over the meaning of human rights. Yet, the precedent was revived, albeit employing national courts, during the Vietnam War, a brutal guerrilla conflict in which atrocities were committed by both sides. In 1969, US Lt. William Calley was tried for the murder of Vietnamese civilians in the hamlet of My Lai. According to witnesses, Calley had ordered his company of soldiers to shoot everyone in the village. Calley was convicted and sentenced to life in prison in 1971, but President Richard Nixon ordered him to be placed under house arrest, where he served fewer than four years until his 1974 release. The Calley case created an uproar. Some observers argued that Calley was being used to cover up the acts of more senior officers and that, although US forces had committed atrocities, he was being unfairly selected as a scapegoat.

Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia

An additional step toward anchoring the principle of individual responsibility for war crimes was

taken with establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, the Netherlands, by a May 1993 resolution of the UN Security Council. The ICTY was intended to deal with atrocities that had been committed in the former Yugoslavia after 1991 and was the *first genuinely international tribunal* of its kind, the first to hold such trials since Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the first to invoke the Genocide Convention. The court was mandated to prosecute crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of war, and genocide committed in the several Yugoslav wars (Chapter 13, pp. 428–9). The court, which is still operating, consists of 16 permanent judges selected by the UN General Assembly and an independent prosecutor.

Among those indicted by the ICTY, the most prominent was Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006), former head of state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Milošević was charged with crimes committed in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia that included **ethnic cleansing** and genocide. Regarding Kosovo, it is alleged that “forces of the FRY and Serbia acting at the direction, with the encouragement or with the support of the Accused, executed a campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian citizens.” As regards Croatia, Milošević was said to have “participated in a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ between at least August 1 1991 and June 1992. The purpose of this enterprise was the forcible removal of the majority of the Croat and other non-Serb population from about one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia, an area he planned to become part of a new Serb-dominated state.” Finally, in the case of Bosnia, Milošević was charged with:

- Two counts of genocide and complicity in genocide.
- Ten counts of crimes against humanity involving persecution, extermination, murder, imprisonment, torture, deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfers).
- Eight counts of grave breaches of the Geneva

Conventions of 1949 involving wilful killing, unlawful confinement, torture, wilfully causing great suffering, unlawful deportation or transfer, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property.

- Nine counts of violations of the laws or customs of war involving attacks on civilians, unlawful destruction, plunder of property and cruel treatment under Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁶

Milošević's trial began on February 12, 2002, with the prosecution completing its presentation two years later and the defense beginning to present its case at the end of August 2004. The court had made the point, clearly and forcefully, that individuals, including heads of state, must assume responsibility for acts committed by them and their subordinates that violate international law. The proceedings were cut short by Milošević's death in 2006.

Also on trial is former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić who was captured after a lengthy search,¹⁷ as well as others including Croatian Bosnians and Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić, who is accused of directing the killing of more than 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in a UN "safe area" in Srebrenica in July 1995 – the largest massacre in Europe since World War Two – was captured in 2011 and extradited to The Hague.¹⁸

The Rwandan genocide and civil war in Sierra Leone

The UN authorized a second international tribunal following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda which had led to the murder of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsis. In the early 1990s, Hutu militants in Rwanda accused the Tutsi minority of intensifying the country's economic and social woes and of aiding a Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and Hutu extremists put into effect a plan to annihilate

the country's Tutsis. As many as one million Tutsi men, women, and children were murdered between April and July 1994, as were many Hutu who refused to participate in the genocide.

In response to the Rwandan genocide, a new tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was established in Arusha, Tanzania, and held its first trial in January 1997. Although the Arusha tribunal confronted a host of difficulties in getting underway, it managed to indict a number of the Hutu leaders of the genocide and by 2010 had completed 51 cases, with another 23 in progress, and three awaiting trial.¹⁹

In 2002, under agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, a Special Court for Sierra Leone was established. In that country's 10-year civil war, rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front supported by Liberia's President Charles Taylor used amputations and rape to gain control of Sierra Leone's diamond mines. Taylor, who fled Liberia to Nigeria, was turned over to the Special Court in 2006 where he was charged with 11 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international law committed in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2002. These include acts of terrorism, murder, rape, use of child soldiers, forced labor, and looting.²⁰ The court, which began hearing cases in 2004, is an unusual hybrid of domestic and international law.

Cambodia's "killing fields" ²¹

After winning power in Cambodia (then renamed Kampuchea), the communist Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot (1928–98) in 1975 emptied the country's cities, trying to create a peasant utopia. The result was the death of some 1.7 million people by execution, starvation and forced labor until the brutal regime was overthrown by invading Vietnamese troops in 1978. Thus ended what one scholar describes as "the purest genocide of the Cold War era."²² In 2003, three decades after the Cambodian genocide, agreement was reached

between the UN and Cambodia to bring to trial Cambodia's surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge. The hybrid national–international Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) began its work in August 2006. By this time, many of the Khmer Rouge's leaders were elderly or dead, but the senior living leader, Nuon Chea, was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity.²³ The first judgment was handed down on July 26, 2010, against Kaing Guek Eav, alias “Duch,” who ran a Khmer Rouge prison in Phnom Penh, the country's capital city.²⁴

The International Criminal Court

UN-backed tribunals have been controversial, particularly in regards to their efficiency, funding, and limitation to crimes committed in a specific timeframe and specific conflict. It took over two years to begin trying cases in the ICTY and ICTR, and many trials last for months, even years. Furthermore, these ad hoc tribunals have operated at great expense, accounting for over 10 percent of the UN's regular budget in 2000.

In response to such concerns about the ad hoc tribunals, representatives of 160 countries and 250 NGOs met in Rome, Italy, in 1998 to take a first step toward establishing a *permanent* international court not affiliated with the UN to try individuals for war crimes, genocide, crimes of aggression,²⁵ and crimes against humanity. The meeting overwhelmingly approved establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC), consisting of 18 judges elected by secret ballot and located in The Hague. The ICC began functioning in 2002 after ratification by 60 states, and the Court's jurisdiction is currently recognized by 111 countries. The Court's first trial began in 2009 against Thomas Lubanga, a Congolese warlord, for atrocities committed in 2002–2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Another Congolese warlord, former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested in 2008 in Belgium for crimes allegedly committed in the Central African Republic in

2002–03 and was brought to trial in November 2010.²⁶

Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is a permanent institution with global jurisdiction. Its establishment was a giant step in making individuals, including heads of state and other government officials, subject to international law. In fact, one difference between the ICC and the International Court of Justice is the former's focus on individuals. The ICC is not designed to replace national courts, but to exercise jurisdiction where states are unwilling or unable to prosecute individuals accused of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”²⁷ The ICC prosecutor can undertake independent investigations as well as accept cases put forward by member states or by the UN Security Council. Each case is tried by three judges, of whom two must agree for the accused to be convicted.

The United States has opposed the ICC. Although President Bill Clinton signed the treaty establishing the ICC shortly before leaving office, he did not submit it to the Senate for ratification, and in May 2002 President George W. Bush announced that the US would not ratify the agreement. US opposition to the ICC was based on fear that politically motivated charges might be brought against American soldiers serving overseas, including those on UN peacekeeping missions. American opponents of the ICC demanded that the US, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, be able to veto ICC prosecutions of its citizens. With China, the US also opposed the court's authority to try citizens of countries that did not sign the agreement. With some success, the US has pressured governments to sign bilateral agreements under which they agree to exempt American soldiers from such prosecution. Supporters of the ICC fear that US position will ultimately produce a tiered system of international law, in which only some countries can be held accountable for engaging in the activities defined as crimes by the ICC.

In April 2005, the ICC was handed its first major case by the UN Security Council when

it was asked to investigate the massacre of black African Muslim Sudanese by Muslim Arab Sudanese militias allied with the government in Khartoum called the *janjaweed* in the Darfur region of western Sudan. The Court was sent the names of 51 suspects by a UN commission of inquiry, along with voluminous evidence of atrocities.²⁸ The US abstained from voting on the resolution asking the ICC to investigate the Darfur case. Acting US Ambassador to the UN, Anne W. Patterson, explained that the US remained opposed to the ICC but did not block the resolution because the resolution had explicitly granted Americans immunity from prosecution. Shortly thereafter, the ICC issued arrest warrants, its first, against five leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army, a group that has terrorized northern Uganda for two decades and kidnapped more than 20,000 children.²⁹ In 2010, the ICC's chief prosecutor, Argentina's Luis Moreno-Ocampo, initiated an investigation of the involvement of unnamed Kenyan politicians following the 2007 elections in Kenya that led to the deaths of 1100 Kenyan in ethnic violence.³⁰ In 2011, Moreno-Ocampo requested an arrest warrant for Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi for crimes against his citizens.

The prospect that heads of state could be brought before a court for their role in human rights abuses was pioneered by Spain's effort in 1998 to bring General Augusto Pinochet to justice for human rights abuses committed when he was Chile's dictator (1973–90). When Pinochet surrendered power, he received assurance that he would not be prosecuted in Chile for alleged crimes. However, in 1998, a Spanish judge sought Pinochet's extradition from Britain, where he was visiting for medical treatment. In 2000, the British government decided that Pinochet could legally be extradited to Spain but released him, claiming that his health was too poor to stand trial. The Pinochet precedent bodes ill for leaders who violate international law, suggesting that in the future they could be arrested and indicted for their actions when visiting other countries.

The Pinochet precedent was reinforced, as we have seen, with the arrest of Milošević in Belgrade, Serbia in 2001. Then, in 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for crimes against humanity, specifically "directing attacks against the civilian population" of Darfur³¹ where an estimated 300,000 people had died and millions more had been forced to migrate. The charge of genocide against the Fur, Masalit, and Zakhawa peoples of Darfur was added in a second warrant issued for al-Bashir the following year.³²

One problem evident in cases such as those of Darfur and the Lord's Resistance Army is that once the ICC or any other international court initiates efforts to bring the perpetrators of crimes to justice, there is no longer an incentive for perpetrators and their followers to cease their violence. For this reason, diplomats from the UN, the African Union, and the Arab League opposed the effort to arrest Sudan's al-Bashir because they believed it would complicate efforts to achieve a settlement in Darfur.³³ In effect, peace becomes a hostage to justice. Should peace be sacrificed for

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In 1993, Belgium adopted a universal jurisdiction law that allowed victims of human rights abuses anywhere in the world to file complaints in that country. Under the law an unsuccessful effort was made to prosecute Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2002 for alleged crimes against humanity arising from the 1982 massacre of Palestinians by Lebanese Christian militias in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The US, in particular, objected to the law for the same reason that it opposed the ICC, concern that its citizens might be prosecuted for frivolous reasons. Under intense US pressure, Belgium rescinded the law in 2003.

justice, or should perpetrators be forgiven in order to facilitate a negotiated compromise that would bring peace?

The doctrine of universal jurisdiction

Spain's effort to arrest General Pinochet was based on the *doctrine of universal jurisdiction*, by which any court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Just as national courts like Spain's are available for holding leaders responsible for criminal acts, so US courts are used by those seeking justice from leaders who have abused human rights. Using an obscure eighteenth-century statute, individuals have found that they can seek civil damages against visiting leaders who have violated their civil rights. The 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act allows federal courts to try "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,"³⁴ and in 1980 a Paraguayan citizen invoked the law successfully against a Paraguayan official who had killed his son (*Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*). Since then, several cases have been brought against visiting foreign officials. Among those who have been sued under this law are former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos (1917–89), Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, and two Salvadoran generals, as well as officials from Haiti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Indonesia. In 2000, five Chinese democracy advocates even tried to sue former Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng for his role in the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of student demonstrators in Beijing. And a suit was brought against Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe during his visit to the UN in 2000. In recent years, US firms doing business in such countries as Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Sudan have been sued for actions in those countries.³⁵ In 2004, the US Supreme Court upheld the Alien Torts Act (*José*

Francisco Sosa v. Humberto Alvaréz-Machain, et al.) but warned courts not to use the law to impede the ability of Congress and the president to conduct foreign policy.

In sum, the agreement of national courts to adjudicate cases of human rights violations committed against foreigners in other countries is a development that reflects the shift in international law from a law of nations to a law of people. We now turn our attention to the growing emphasis in international law on individuals and the evolution of human rights in global politics, an issue that challenges the prerogatives of sovereign states. In what follows, we examine the sources, content, and impact of human rights on global politics in recent decades. Few topics more vividly portray the speed and degree of change in global politics that is a theme of this book.

Individual rights under international law

Interest in human rights reflects growing recognition that individuals, as well as states, are subjects of international law. But what rights do individuals have, and what are the sources of these rights? Do states determine citizens' rights? Do individuals have intrinsic rights, even if states do not recognize them? When states and international organizations try to end other states' human rights abuses, does this violate sovereignty? In this section, we will examine each of these questions.

Sources of human rights

The idea of human rights is derived from the belief that God and nature confer dignity on all human beings. This tradition of **natural law** dates back to Greek Stoicism and Roman law, as well as to efforts during Europe's Middle Ages and Renaissance to limit rulers' arbitrary behavior. Natural law theorists like St. Thomas Aquinas

argue that actual law should reflect law as it *ought* to be. Their approach was, therefore, normative rather than empirical.

In practice, states, as we have seen, do not always subscribe to human rights. Thus, the belief that such rights are universal cannot be based in **legal positivism**, which provides that states are only subject to rules they freely accept by signing a treaty or habitually acting in conformity with them. However, those who favor universal human rights claim that there are higher rules of international morality known as *jus cogens* (“compelling law”). According to what is called *normative hierarchy theory*, states must observe human rights that are international norms derived from *jus cogens*. Thus, by Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, drawn up by the UN’s International Law Commission: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”³⁶ This convention, which has been ratified by most of the global community, would seem to accept the existence of those higher norms that constitute *jus cogens*.

There is an historical basis in custom for universal human rights. One of the most important was the Magna Carta (Great Charter), issued by England’s King John on June 15, 1215, under pressure from England’s barons. The barons were in rebellion against the growing tax burden imposed by the king without their consent to support his wars in France and against the harsh methods he employed to collect those taxes.³⁷ In the Magna Carta, the king agreed to limit his arbitrary powers and follow existing customs. In this, he admitted that no one in England, including himself, was above the law that he, too, had to follow.³⁸

Although the Magna Carta was issued in response to specific grievances of England’s barons, several of its liberties have evolved into general principles of British and US law and justice that today are regarded as fundamental rights in most liberal democracies. For example, clause 20 of the Magna Carta that guaranteed that “a free

man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offense” is the basis of the Bill of Rights’ guarantee that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Clauses 28, 30, and 31 of the Magna Carta are the bases of the US Fourth Amendment guarantee against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” And the provision that “no official shall place a man on trial upon his own unsupported statement,” is the basis of the Fifth Amendment right “to not commit self-incrimination.”

Magna Carta’s clause 39 stipulates that no one would be imprisoned “except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land” and so is the basis for trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, as is the right of prisoners to know what offenses they are charged with, what evidence exists, and the right to confront and cross-examine the accuser. The same clause is the basis for the concept of **due process** by which the law must be enforced according to established legal procedures, including safeguards for the protection of individual rights. Accused criminals are thus guaranteed procedural fairness. Integral to due process is the right of habeas corpus – the right of a prisoner to be brought to court to determine whether imprisonment is legal as determined by the facts and the law. Thus, the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that no one “shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” by the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment requires that US states apply the same principle. In addition, by clause 40, King John promised not to “sell” or “deny or delay right or justice,” thereby allowing his subjects equal access to courts of law, another basic right enjoyed in democratic societies.

Other precedents for universal human rights include the English Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), all of which list basic rights. Some political philosophers such as David Hume (1711–76) and

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) opposed basing individual rights on natural law and natural rights (calling them “nonsense on stilts”),³⁹ because such law lacked a factual basis. In addition, since ideas such as natural law and *jus cogens* have Western roots, they lack appeal in non-Western societies in Africa and Asia, and, as increasing numbers of non-Western states entered global society with the end of Europe’s colonial empires, some were unwilling to accept rules to which they had not consented.

Some non-Western leaders adopt a position called **cultural relativism**, the claim that ethical beliefs are different in different cultures and that there are few, if any, universal principles of human rights. Cultures, they argue, are unique and fundamentally different from one another. Behavior, therefore, can *only* be evaluated as “good” or “bad” in the context of the society in which it occurs and such evaluation must reflect the approval or disapproval of that society (see



" / won't advise it, but you do have the right to remain silent "

Figure 11.3 Humane interrogation

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

Figure 11.3). Those who hold this position conclude that values are not objective and that each society should be tolerant of the values of other societies.

Although the concept of universal human rights is of Western origin, other cultures have highly developed traditions requiring respect for the dignity of human beings. Sometimes, rulers are obligated to give such respect in return for the obedience of those they rule. In this case, individuals do not have a fundamental entitlement to human rights. Traditions of such reciprocity exist in civilizations such as Islam, Confucian China, Africa, and Hindu India. Confucian rulers are obliged to serve the general interest of the people, but the Chinese language did not have a word for “rights” until the nineteenth century. If China’s emperors did not abuse subjects, it was *not* because people had inherent rights but because that was how an enlightened Confucian ruler was expected to behave.

Does the absence of a “rights” tradition undermine the claim for universal human rights, or is cultural relativism merely an excuse for repression? These are controversial issues. Some non-Western leaders argue that human rights should be interpreted differently in non-Western settings. They contend that the need for economic development in their countries may require limiting individual liberties.

Despite the claim of cultural relativists that human rights vary depending on cultural norms, most countries have accepted as legal obligations the growing body of human rights law enacted since World War Two.

The elaboration of human rights

Human rights have been developed and expanded by international organizations and legal instruments. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) employs the principal UN human rights official – the High Commissioner. The OHCHR describes human

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Global terrorism poses knotty problems for human rights analysts. In Afghanistan, in 2001, some US citizens were captured while fighting for the Taliban *against* the United States. Such captives are not legitimate soldiers of sovereign states and therefore are not automatically protected by the laws of war. However, do Americans who have fought against the US and who were captured in a foreign country merit the constitutional protections of citizens in the United States?

During the Afghanistan war, an American citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, was captured while fighting for the Taliban. Hamdi was labeled an “enemy combatant” by his captors and, they argued, he could be held until the war was over. Hamdi was imprisoned initially at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba until he was transferred to a naval brig at Charleston, South Carolina. Held incommunicado, at no time did he have access to an attorney. Hamdi sued, claiming that as a US citizen he was entitled to habeas corpus and was being held in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The government argued that Hamdi was not entitled to habeas corpus because he was captured in a combat zone on foreign soil and posed a grave threat to national security. On June 28, 2004, the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hamdi.

Writing for the plurality (two justices wrote a separate opinion), Justice Sandra Day O’Connor admitted that there were “weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.” However, she continued, “it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear” and that it is “during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested.” “A state of war,” she concluded, “is not a blank check for the President.” In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas declared that Hamdi’s “detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers” and that the “plurality utterly fails to account for the Government’s compelling interests.”⁴⁰ Hamdi was released in October 2004, renounced his US citizenship, and was sent to Saudi Arabia, where he had agreed to remain for at least five years

rights in its mission statement as “universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.” Lacking enforcement powers, the OHCHR depends on persuasion and observation to improve governments’ human rights policies. In addition to the OHCHR, the UN has several committees to monitor compliance with human rights treaties.

There is also a UN Human Rights Council that is empowered to examine, monitor, and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries or territories. The Council replaced the cumbersome 53-member UN Human Rights Commission in 2006. The Commission had become an embarrassment because countries like

Cuba and Sudan that regularly violated human rights were members. The reformed Council was, however, a half-hearted compromise that fell short of the US aim of replacing the Commission with a much smaller body, and it has many of the same defects as its predecessor. Thus, Russia and China were able to get a resolution passed that declared that free speech could be limited out of “respect for religions and beliefs.”⁴¹

The most important human rights document is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a comprehensive listing of civil, political, social, and economic rights.⁴² The document is not a binding treaty, but a declaration of aspi-

rations adopted by the General Assembly that asserts “the inherent dignity” and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” In 1966, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was reinforced by two multilateral treaties: the international covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights. Collectively, the three documents are known as the International Bill of Human Rights.

One way to think about individual entitlements is to conceive of human rights as negative or positive in relation to state behavior.

Negative rights, which are listed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are rights that preclude a government from interfering with individual liberty and usually involve political and civil rights and liberties. Such rights as freedom from government regulation of speech, the press, or religion, so familiar in the US Bill of Rights, are negative rights. In the West, negative rights are part of a tradition that dates back to Magna Carta.

Positive rights, which are listed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, refer to a state’s obligations to provide for citizens’ economic and social welfare – for example, education, employment, and healthcare. Socialists emphasize positive rights as prerequisites for negative rights and, in general, argue that individual liberty is meaningless without economic and social equality and security. They claim that the absence of such equality and security in the developing world constitutes a form of structural violence (Chapter 5, p. 157).

Positive rights are a more recent development in the West than negative rights, dating back to efforts to ameliorate the negative effects of industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and to President Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s. Thus, negative and positive rights are often referred to as first- and second-generation rights, respectively. American society still gives relatively less weight to positive than

negative rights than do European societies, but global norms, as reflected in the UN’s Millennium Goals, are evolving toward giving both equal weight.

Other agreements supplement those we have described. In addition to the 1948 Genocide Convention, the four Geneva Conventions governing treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in wartime became law in 1949 (with additional protocols in 1977 and 2005).⁴³ In 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights was signed, and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women followed shortly afterwards. Thereafter, other conventions were adopted to deal with a variety of human rights issues: the status of stateless persons (1954), abolition of slavery (1956), abolition of forced labor (1957), consent to marriage (1962), elimination of racial discrimination (1965), suppression of apartheid (1973), discrimination against women (1979), torture (1984), the rights of the child (1989), the rights of indigenous peoples (2007), and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (2008).

Since reliable enforcement mechanisms are lacking, human rights observance relies on voluntary compliance by states or on emergence of a genuine global policy consensus, as happened in eliminating apartheid in South Africa. There exist several efforts to chart progress in human rights. For example, Freedom House, a US-based non-profit organization, publishes an annual country-by-country evaluation of political and civil rights. As of 2009, 89 countries (46 percent) with a population of 1.61 billion people were described as “free” (as based on a checklist of questions on political rights and civil liberties largely taken from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), 62 (32 percent) as “partly free,” and 42 (22 percent) countries with 1.91 billion people as “not free.”⁴⁴ Since 1973, the percentage of free countries has grown from 29 to 46 percent. However, Freedom House noted that 2009 witnessed declining liberty in 40 countries and improvements in only 16.⁴⁵ According to Freedom House, the

highest percentage of free countries was in Western Europe (96 percent) and the lowest in North Africa and the Middle East (6 percent). Between 1987 and 2007, the number of electoral democracies rose from 66 to 123 countries, but declined to 116 by 2010. Not surprisingly, freedom is related to wealth in global politics, and the absence of freedom and democracy is more common in poor countries. Moreover, democracy requires the existence of social and cultural conditions like the rule of law and cannot be achieved simply by adopting the right institutions. This is one reason why building democracy in Afghanistan or Iraq has proved so difficult.

Since 9/11, a debate has raged over whether Islam and freedom are compatible. Although the question remains unanswered, Freedom House found that only two Muslim-majority countries were free, and most remained not free. Few Muslim-majority countries had democratic electoral systems although Indonesia, which is the largest Muslim society in the world, is a democracy, and democratic aspirations are spreading across the Arab world.

Explanations of human rights abuses

What accounts for violations of human rights around the world? There is no simple answer, and several factors – economic, political, and social – probably explain why some states do not respect citizens' rights.

Among economic factors associated with human rights abuses is a declining standard of living. Human rights abuses occur when economic conditions deteriorate and people search for scapegoats. Political factors also play a role in explaining human rights abuses. As a rule, democratic governments show greater respect for human rights than do authoritarian regimes, though even democracies may violate citizens' rights, especially during wartime. Thus, the US violated the rights of Japanese-Americans during World War Two

and some Arab-Americans, as well as Iraqi and Afghan prisoners, during the War on Terrorism and the invasion of Iraq. Early in the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln (1809–65) authorized the suspension of habeas corpus out of concern for “public safety.” The Constitution does not give this power to a president, and since only Congress is authorized to declare martial law, Lincoln’s action was unconstitutional. Social factors, too, are related to human rights abuses. For example, abuses tend to occur in societies that are cleaved along ethnic, racial, religious, or ideological lines, where social cohesion is fragile. By contrast, human rights violations are less frequent in homogeneous societies.

Recent decades have seen the proliferation of NGOs seeking to protect human rights globally.⁴⁶ Perhaps the best known is Amnesty International.

Amnesty International

Amnesty International (AI) is among the most prominent of the NGOs concerned about human rights, especially the rights of political prisoners. Others include Human Rights Watch, the World Council of Churches, and the World Organization Against Torture. AI was the brainchild of Peter Benenson (1922–2005), a British lawyer, who was deeply disturbed by the 1961 imprisonment of two Portuguese students who, in a Lisbon restaurant, had publicly drunk a toast to liberty in their country. In a letter to a British newspaper, *The Observer*, Benenson called for an international campaign to help “the forgotten prisoners.” Forty years later, Benenson recalled what had inspired his idealistic action: “Open your newspaper – any day of the week – and you will find a report from somewhere in the world of someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed because his opinions or religion are unacceptable to his government. The newspaper reader feels a sickening sense of impotence. Yet if these feelings of disgust all over the world could be united into common action, something effective could be done.”⁴⁷

The Observer publicized Benenson's "Appeal for Amnesty 1961," in which he asked private citizens around the world to protest against imprisoning individuals for political or religious beliefs. AI's first mission was undertaken in 1962 to Ghana, followed by a mission to Czechoslovakia on behalf of imprisoned Catholic Archbishop Josef Beran (1888–1969). From 1969, the organization became increasingly involved in drafting human rights legislation such as the UN's 1975 Declaration against Torture, and it began to receive widespread recognition for its work. In 1974, Sean McBride (1904–88), chair of AI's International Executive Committee, was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, and AI was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 for "having contributed to securing the ground for freedom, for justice, and thereby also for peace in the world."

Today, AI has three million members in more than 150 countries⁴⁸ headed by an International Executive Committee, with its own research council, and an International Secretariat in London, all funded by voluntary contributions. For more than four decades, AI has sought to free political and religious prisoners, assure fair trials for those arrested, eliminate torture, execution, and other harsh punishment of political prisoners, and bring those who abuse human rights to justice.

AI's principal weapons are publicity, education, and political pressure. AI staff interview victims, "adopt" prisoners whose cases AI publicizes, investigate the facts surrounding individual cases, and publish detailed reports. The group presses governments to approve human rights treaties and live up to them. AI accomplishes many of these activities by making sophisticated use of the internet with its website at <http://web.amnesty.org/>. In addition, AI organizes public demonstrations, sponsors letter-writing campaigns, or uses email to inform others about human rights violations. The group also sponsors special entertainment events to publicize its activities and raise funds. Thus, it observed the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998 by collecting 13 million pledges to support

the declaration and sponsoring a concert in Paris on Human Rights Day with performances by entertainers such as Bruce Springsteen.

The power of publicity was illustrated by the case of Luis Basilio Rossi, a history professor at São Paulo University, Brazil, who was arrested by Brazil's military regime in February 1973. Rossi's wife managed to sneak a note to their neighbor's daughter describing what had happened, and her message was forwarded to London by one of AI's researchers in Brazil. AI quickly organized a letter-writing campaign to Brazilian officials. "I knew that my case had become public," declared Rossi, "I knew they could no longer kill me. Then the pressure on me decreased and conditions improved."⁴⁹ In October, Rossi was released from prison.

AI has campaigned for: the prosecution of Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006) for human rights abuses committed while he was Chile's military dictator (1973–90), establishment of the International Criminal Court, and abolition of the death penalty in the US, which, according to AI, reflects racial discrimination. In past years, AI has lobbied to end the illegal diamond trade in failed states like Sierra Leone (2001), the global arms trade (2002), police abuse in southern Africa (2002), and political killings by Guatemala's armed forces (2002). It has also pressed Colombia to observe citizens' human rights in the midst of civil war (2002) and sought to prevent human rights abuses against Muslims after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US (2002). More recently, AI campaigned to outlaw the use of child soldiers, end the use of torture, obtain justice for the victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing, and protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. In 2009, AI singled out Iran for its 346 executions in 2008, accused China of using the Olympic Games to intensify domestic repression, and scolded Britain for deporting people to places in which they might be tortured.⁵⁰ At present, AI is running global campaigns to end violence against women, eliminate the death penalty globally, counter terrorism with justice, and control the world arms trade.⁵¹

In recent decades human rights law has been extended to issues of gender. The status of women has become a central human rights concern, with movement toward equal rights for men and women in much of the West clashing with opposition in some Islamic and Catholic societies.

Women's rights as human rights

Historically, women have systematically been treated as inferior to men in most societies. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which afforded equal rights to newly freed African-American slaves explicitly limited the right to vote to “male inhabitants,” thereby excluding women – black and white – from that right. Shocked by the insertion of “male” into the Constitution, the suffragette, Susan B. Anthony (1820–1906) exclaimed: “The only tenable ground of representation is universal suffrage, as it is only through universal suffrage that the principle of ‘Equal Rights to All’ can be realized.”⁵²

But does such treatment violate women's human rights? In an eloquent presentation to the Fourth World Conference on Women meeting in Beijing, China in 1995, then First Lady Hillary Clinton declared that the time had come for the world to hear “that it is no longer acceptable to discuss women's rights as separate from human rights.” “It is a violation of human rights,” she continued “when babies are denied food, or drowned, or suffocated, or their spines broken, simply because they are born girls . . . It is a violation of human rights when women are doused with gasoline, set on fire and burned to death because their marriage dowries are deemed too small.”⁵³ In 2010, having become US Secretary of State, Mrs. Clinton in a speech to the UN Commission on the Status of Women recalled her earlier comments and declared that:

[T]here is still so much more to be done. We have to write the next chapter to fully realize

the dreams and potential that we set forth in Beijing. Because for too many millions and millions of girls and women, opportunity remains out of reach. Women are still the majority of the world's poor, the uneducated, the unhealthy, the unfed. In too many places, women are treated not as full and equal human beings with their own rights and aspirations, but as lesser creatures undeserving of the treatment and respect accorded to their husbands, their fathers, and their sons.⁵⁴

International law now provides explicit protection for women. In 1946, the UN established a Commission on the Status of Women. In 1952 the Convention on the Political Rights of Women was adopted, and in 1957 a Convention on the Nationality of Married Women was added. The most important of such conventions was the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which defined discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”⁵⁵ The Convention dealt with the legal status of women, guaranteeing them the right to vote, hold public office, and represent their countries internationally. It also outlawed discrimination against women in education, employment, and economic and social activities and addressed several sensitive issues, asserting that women should have rights equal to men in holding property, choice of spouse, and parenthood. Even more controversial was the attention paid by the Convention to women's reproductive rights.

In 1983, UNESCO asked the Commission on the Status of Women to set up a procedure to review complaints of sex discrimination, and the Commission did so. A decade later the World

Conference on Human Rights brought women's status into the mainstream of human rights concerns, and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action endorsed the appointment of a new Special Rapporteur on violence against women. Finally, after years of negotiation the UN General Assembly in 2010 established a UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women or "UN Women" to consolidate the four separate UN divisions that deal with gender issues.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, despite such advances, women are still not treated equally in much of the world. Violence toward women remains a major problem, and women's efforts to achieve equality are deeply enmeshed in questions of reproductive autonomy.

Gender (in)equality

Nowhere do women enjoy the same opportunities as do men. The UN has developed two measures of gender inequality. One, the gender empowerment measure (GEM), is based on economic participation and decision making, political participation and decision making, and power over economic resources. The other, the gender-related development index (GDI), combines lifespan, knowledge, and standard of living. As shown in Table 11.2, women fared best in the West, especially in Scandinavia. The United States ranks 12th worldwide on both and Britain 16th.

Of the 177 countries examined, inequality was most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, also the world's poorest region. Examining individual measures, we find that the education gap is especially pronounced in Africa and the Middle East. Women in Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman earn only about one-sixth of what men earn. Even in the US and the Britain, the wage gap between men and women in the same job did not significantly narrow until the 1990s and currently remains about five-eighths that of men.

The data suggest that women suffer the greatest inequality in traditional societies where men

control public life and women are relegated to the home and family. Women in such societies exercise little control over their own bodies, and the large numbers of women who remain pregnant throughout their fertile years become economically and politically dependent on men. In wealthier societies, by contrast, women have acquired greater autonomy and have assumed new roles as birth control became available.

Societies that remain largely rural and agricultural value male children more than females because males work the fields, serve in the military, and provide financial security for their elders. Such thinking led to customs such as leaving newborn female infants outside to die and *suttee*, in which a widow immolates herself on her husband's funeral pyre (a former Hindu practice in India). In such societies females are still considered burdensome dependants who must be fed and clothed until they are married. Thus, Indian

Table 11.2 Ranking of the ten best and worst countries in gender equality

Rank	Gender-related development index (GDI) country and Gender empowerment measure (GEM) country
1	Iceland
2	Norway
3	Australia
4	Canada
5	Ireland
6	Sweden
7	Switzerland
8	Japan
9	Netherlands
10	France
168	Democratic Republic of the Congo
169	Ethiopia
170	Chad
171	Central African Republic
172	Mozambique
173	Mali
174	Niger
175	Guinea-Bissau
176	Burkina Faso
177	Sierra Leone

UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008 (New York: UN Development Programme, 2008), Tables 28 and 29, 326–33, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_GEM.pdf and http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_GDI.pdf.

doctors advertised ultrasound scans with the motto: “Pay 5000 rupees (\$110) today and save 50,000 rupees tomorrow,”⁵⁷ a reference to the cost of providing a dowry.

Violence against women – termed by one group “hidden gendercide”⁵⁸ – perpetuates gender inequality and reflects unequal power relations. Let us examine some of the forms that such violence takes, including domestic violence, female genital mutilation, honor killings, and rape.

Violence against women

Like inequality, violence against women exists in all societies, traditional and modern,⁵⁹ and is a major contributing factor to women’s ill health:⁶⁰

- In Egypt, 35 percent of women reported being beaten by their husband at some point in their marriage (UNICEF, 2000).
- Up to 47 percent of women report that their first sexual intercourse was forced (WHO, 2002).
- In Canada, the costs of violence against the family amount to \$1.6 billion per year, including medical care and lost productivity (UNICEF, 2000).
- In the US, a woman is battered, usually by her husband/partner, every 15 seconds (UN Study on the World’s Women, 2000).

Vigorous efforts have been made to reduce violence against women. The statute of the International Criminal Court stipulates that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization are war crimes, but this does not address the issue of domestic violence described in these statistics.

Neither does it address the “gendercide” that occurs because of the widespread preference for male children. Although banned in India (1994) and China (1995), families in those countries use prenatal amniocentesis and ultrasound scanning to learn the gender of fetuses, thereafter aborting

females.⁶¹ Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh decried the practice: “No nation, no society, no community can hold its head high and claim to be part of the civilized world if it condones the practice of discriminating against one half of humanity represented by women.”⁶² “Of course,” declared an Indian physician, “the women want only a boy. If we tell them it is a girl, they will feel very sorry; there will be a sadness in their face . . . And the husband will be saying right away, ‘OK, you are going for an abortion.’”⁶³ Indeed, it is estimated that that 10 million female fetuses had been aborted in India in the two decades before 2006⁶⁴ and that as many as 86.5 million females were “missing” from Asia’s populations as a result of these practices. According to one study, when “one child is allowed to live while another is actively or passively killed,” the result may endanger domestic and international peace and security. In fact, the “young surplus males” are becoming a source of violence both at home and abroad.⁶⁵ In China, where “gendercide” is made worse by the country’s one-child birth control policy, the country has 32 million more boys than girls under the age of 20,⁶⁶ and it is expected that by 2015 one Chinese male in five – referred to as “bare branches” – will be unable to find a bride because of a shortage in women,⁶⁷ leading to rape, kidnapping, and trafficking of women. The desire for sons has led to the kidnapping of boys as well.⁶⁸

One custom that stubbornly resists elimination is genital mutilation, which is still practiced in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, where men demand that the women they marry be virgins who will not fall prey to sexual temptation afterwards. In its more extreme form, genital mutilation involves the partial or total removal of the external female genitalia. As many as 130 million women have undergone one or another version of genital mutilation, and some two million women become victims of the practice every year (see Map 11.1 (later in this chapter) and Key document, below).

Another source of violence against women are **honor killings**, in which women are murdered

KEY DOCUMENT

AN INSULT ON THE DIGNITY OF WOMEN, BY OKUMEPHUNA CHINWE CELESTINE, A NIGERIAN JOURNALIST⁶⁹

I got the first experience of this when I was as young as eight years. Just behind my father's house in the village I heard a voice of a young girl shouting desperately for help inside a closed door. Out of curiosity and desire to render help I dashed out of my father's house and stole into the building where the save-my-soul cry was coming from.

I peeped through the keyhole. To the greatest surprise and shock of my life I saw for the first time in my life one of the evils women inflict upon themselves. This is also the greatest and most barbarous of my people's culture . . .

It was later that I learnt that in my culture, Igbo culture of the South-Eastern Nigeria of West Africa, women are not supposed to enjoy sex as men. Sex is a prerogative that is supposed to be monopolized by men only . . . Reasons for that include custom and tradition, religious demand, protection of virginity, prevention of promiscuity, increasing sexual pleasure for the husband, family honor, aesthetic reasons, purification, enhancing fertility, giving a sense of belonging to a group and increasing matrimonial opportunities.

by members of their own family for an alleged offense that “dishonors” the family, such as sexual relationships outside marriage – even if they are victims of rape. In one case a 15-year-old Syrian girl was kidnapped and raped and later married to a cousin. Then a year later, she was murdered by her brother: “Zahra was most likely sleeping when her old brother, Fayyez, entered the apartment . . . using a stolen key and carrying a dagger. His sister lay on the carpeted floor . . . so Fayyez must have had to kneel next to Zahra as he raised the dagger and stabbed her five times in the head and back: brutal tearing thrusts that shattered the base of her skull and nearly severed her spinal column.”⁷⁰ Honor killings still occur in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza, with over 2700 female victims in Pakistan alone between 2001 and 2007.⁷¹ With the emigration of Muslims to the West, the practice of honor killings, as well as that of forced marriage, has emigrated Westward as well.

Islamic attitudes toward women's sexual rights are controversial. Under Muslim law, accusations of improper sexual behavior against women require four witnesses, but if found guilty penalties are severe. In recent years, for instance, several of Nigeria's largely Muslim northern states adopted strict Islamic law, or *sharia*, under which extramarital sex by women is punishable by death. However, international protest led Nigeria's courts to pardon or reverse the charges against those condemned to death under *sharia* because of the potential harm to Nigeria's reputation.

The following are among the decisions that have been handed down under *sharia*:

- *March 2002*: Amina Lawal Kurami was sentenced to death by stoning in Nigeria for bearing a child out of wedlock.⁷²
- *November 2007*: A Saudi court more than doubled the number of lashes to 200 that a rape victim was sentenced to after her lawyer appealed the original sentence.⁷³

- *October 2008*: A woman who had been raped was stoned to death in Somalia after being buried up to her neck.⁷⁴

Rape is among the most brutal manifestations of male hostility toward women in wartime. From the Roman conquest of the Sabines in 290 BC to the Japanese enslavement of Korean, Chinese, Filipino, and Dutch “comfort women” in military brothels during World War Two, rape has been used to affirm male domination of women. In recent decades, systematic rape was used to terrorize populations and produce ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. More recently, tens of thousands of women have been raped by rebels, government troops, and even UN peacekeepers during the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo,⁷⁵ and rape has been used as a weapon against black African Muslims in the Darfur region of Sudan.⁷⁶ Even UN peacekeepers have been accused of having raped women in Africa:⁷⁷

- In Rwanda, between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the 1994 genocide (International Red Cross report, 2002).⁷⁸
- In Sierra Leone, 94 percent of displaced households surveyed had experienced sexual assaults, including rape, torture, and sexual slavery (Physicians for Human Rights, 2002).
- In Iraq, at least 400 women and girls as young as 8 were reported to have been raped in Baghdad during or after the war, since April 2003 (Human Rights Watch Survey, 2003).
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20,000–50,000 women were raped during five months of conflict in 1992 (IWTC, Women’s GlobalNet #212, October 23, 2002).
- In some villages in Kosovo, 30–50 percent of women of child-bearing age were raped by Serbian forces (Amnesty International, 27 May 1999).
- One in six US women has been a victim of rape or attempted rape.⁷⁹

With the establishment of the ICC, the practice of rape in wartime was outlawed, and since then

individuals have been brought to trial for rape in several international criminal tribunals. Still, judging from the data, the crime of rape has clearly not been eliminated in either war or non-war settings.

Children, too, despite international guarantees, are frequently victims of human rights abuses. Not only, as we have seen, are they forcibly used as soldiers in some countries, they are exploited, like women, as cheap labor or for prostitution and are the victims of human trafficking, especially in Asia and in Europe.

Ultimately, women cannot achieve equality with men until they take control of when and how they become pregnant. Reproductive issues, the topic we turn to next, are central to women’s health and wellbeing and their possibility for economic advancement.

Reproductive independence

Women’s status, especially their autonomy, health, and economic potential, is tied to contentious issues of reproduction. In the West, many women believe that questions of reproductive rights and birth control, including abortion, are equivalent to the issue of women’s control over their own bodies and, therefore, their freedom. In the developing world, where maternal complications are among the leading causes of death among women aged between 15 and 44, the issue of reproductive rights is closely connected to health issues.⁸⁰

The 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, Egypt, took a major step toward recognizing women’s reproductive rights as a serious issue. Birth control and abortion rights featured prominently at the conference. Norway’s Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland declared: “Morality becomes hypocrisy if it means accepting mothers’ suffering or dying in connection with unwanted pregnancies and illegal abortions and unwanted children.”⁸¹ The conference’s final “Program of Action” proclaimed the right of

women to make their own decisions about their families and recommended controlling population growth by improving the status of women's rights worldwide, especially by providing access to education and birth control.

The conference's decisions were vigorously challenged by Catholic and Islamic religious leaders. Shortly before the conference opened, a majority of the world's Catholic cardinals decried "cultural imperialism" in which "abortion on demand, sexual promiscuity and distorted notions of the family are proclaimed as human rights."⁸² Muslim spokesmen also objected to some of the conference positions, even though many Muslims have long approved of birth spacing and contraceptive use.

Women's rights received even stronger backing the next year at the UN-sponsored Fourth World Conference on Women, in Beijing, China. Some 50,000 people from over 180 countries attended the official meeting of the enormous nongovernmental organization forum trying to influence the official delegates. The resulting Beijing Declaration affirmed the rights of women to be universal human rights, stating that the "explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment."⁸³ Nevertheless, this right is still ignored in many parts of the world.


In the United States, domestic politics greatly affects women's reproductive rights. The abortion issue, in particular, has been highly controversial for years, with social liberals supporting a woman's rights to control her reproductive system and social conservatives opposed to abortion. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan ended funding to international organizations that were alleged to promote abortion for birth control. The Clinton administration reversed this policy, which was again restored under President George W. Bush in 2001. Under this policy, foreign NGOs that receive funding for family planning services from the US Agency for International Development must withhold information from women about

the possibility of legal abortion. Called the "Global Gag Rule" by opponents, the policy is contrary to the rights enjoyed by American women under US law. In 2003, President Bush extended the policy to foreign NGOs that receive funding from the State Department. In addition, the president refused to release funds appropriated by Congress for the UN Population Fund, the world's largest provider of family planning. The US also froze funding to the World Health Organization Human Reproduction Program. In January 2009, the Obama administration again reversed the restrictive policy of its predecessor, overturning a ban on federal funds to foreign family planning organizations that offer abortions or provide counselling about abortion.

Respect for the rights of women varies globally as indicated in Map 11.1. Despite controversy surrounding reproductive rights, great strides have been made toward gender equality in Europe and the US in recent decades. Progress has been slower elsewhere, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Much of the reason for this difference is cultural and, as we shall see, opponents of gender equality argue that there should be greater respect for cultural differences.

Should women have equal rights . . . everywhere?

The relativist claim that human rights are culture-bound appears frequently in the context of women's equality. Thus, Muslims, whose practices toward women are criticized in the West, contend that they are victims of cultural bias. They argue that instead of perpetuating inequality and repression, traditional Muslim customs toward women encourage modesty and family stability. In addition, such practices, they contend, provide women with protection. Furthermore, they note, women are treated differently in different Muslim societies, and Westerners tend to focus on extreme cases like Afghanistan's Taliban rather than moderate Islamic regimes. Indeed, many



Map 11.1 Countries with significant gender inequality

Muslim women do not regard themselves as oppressed. A 2005 poll revealed that, although a majority of Muslim women want to be able to vote and serve in government, most regarded gender equality as an issue of Western women, while they saw other issues as more important.⁸⁴

Arguments based on cultural relativism fall on deaf ears among Western feminists. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women recognizes that cultural norms have an impact on human rights and are partly responsible for the inequalities that women face. Thus, in its preamble the convention declares the need for “a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family.” Furthermore, Article 5 of the convention stresses the importance of modifying “the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” The

1995 Beijing Declaration also dismissed cultural relativism as a justification for gender inequality: “The full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all women is essential for the empowerment of women. *While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.*”⁸⁵

Of course, it is one thing to legislate human rights protections and another to enforce them. For the most part, publicity (“name and shame”) has been effective against governments accused of human rights abuses. More robust approaches have had varying success and entail trade-offs. For example, President Jimmy Carter came to office in 1976 intent on raising the profile of human rights as a global issue. Although the Carter administration argued vigorously for human rights, its behavior reflected the practical necessity of compromising with unsavory reality. Thus, the

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

What do human rights mean in practice? What is their function in the modern world? UN declarations proclaiming the rights of women have had little real effect on their status in many countries. According to Michael Ignatieff, “rights are meaningful only if they confer entitlements and immunities on individuals; they are worth having only if they can be enforced against institutions such as the family, the state, and the church. . . This remains true even when the rights in question are collective or group rights.”⁸⁶ The authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights debated this very issue of the status of individuals versus collective groups like the state. In the first big argument over the content of the declaration, Charles Malik, a Lebanese diploma and advocate of individual rights, asked: “When we speak of human rights. . . we are raising the fundamental question, what is man? . . . Is man merely a social being? Is he merely an animal?” Yugoslavia’s delegate answered that “human liberty consists in ‘perfect harmony between the individual and the community’ and that the common interest, as embodied in the state, takes priority over individual claims.”⁸⁷

Afghan women are asking similar questions today. Sixty-eight women were elected to Afghanistan’s lower house of the National Assembly in 2005, yet one of those elected, 27-year-old Malalai Joya, declared: “Every day as I am leaving the Parliament building in Kabul, I wonder if someone is waiting outside to kill me.”⁸⁸ Should the Afghan constitution protect women’s rights, or should it protect traditional community values, like Islamic law and the family? Should the Afghan parliament adopt a law advocated by religious traditionalists that allows a husband to starve his wife if she refuses to have sex?⁸⁹

Carter White House was more willing to impose its human rights policy on small countries like Guatemala than on large ones like Argentina, and on enemies like the Soviet Union than friends like Indonesia. Subsequent administrations played down human rights, while using the issue to embarrass the USSR and China in public forums like the UN until the end of the Cold War. When, in June 1989, the administration of President George H. W. Bush faced a dilemma following China’s massacre of students demonstrating for democracy in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, it condemned China’s brutality while trying not to alienate China’s leaders or harm Sino-America’s trade relations.

Western efforts to influence China’s authoritarian government to improve its human rights performance have had only modest success. Why? The West must temper such efforts with its desire

to maintain strong economic ties with China and work with China’s leaders to persuade North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear weapons programs. During the 1990s, US efforts to threaten China by restricting trade grew less credible as America’s own exporters became more dependent on China’s market. The dilemma sharpened during the 1990s as widespread reports circulated in the US about China’s repression of ethnic Tibetans, export of goods made by prisoners, and organ transplants of executed prisoners. During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton charged President H. W. Bush with “coddling” China. However, following his election, President Clinton also tried to avoid any action that would endanger America’s burgeoning trade with China, and in May 1994 he announced that trade and human rights issues would no longer be linked. “China,” Clinton declared, “has an atomic

arsenal and a vote and a veto in the UN Security Council. It is a major factor in Asian and global security . . . China is also the world's fastest growing economy."⁹⁰ The outcome was one that realists approved and liberals deplored: in the case of China, economic and military power had trumped human rights idealism.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how international law is undergoing a transformation from being the “law of nations” to becoming the “law of people.” The transformation in law was sparked by the Holocaust in World War Two, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials confirmed individual responsibility for human rights violations in wartime. These precedents have been followed by the establishment of a series of international courts, climaxing with the International Criminal Court. The chapter has also traced the sources of human rights from natural to positivist law and how international institutions and nongovernmental organizations have emerged to advocate human rights, sponsor human rights legislation and end human rights abuses.

Among the most important issues in human rights today is the status of women. We have seen how violence plagues women in most societies and how cultures differ in the treatment of women. This took us to the knotty problem of whether human rights are universal or culture bound. Should all cultures apply the same norms and rules, or should we respect differences in the way different societies regard human rights and treat their citizens?

The next chapter examines the changing definition of security in global politics. Human rights abuses, as we have seen, are among the threats to individuals, and other threats to survival and well-being other than military attack include poverty, crimes, and disease.

Student activities

Map exercise

Using Table 11.1, locate on a world map the major genocides and politicides that have taken place in global politics. What inferences can you draw from the locations of such conflicts?

Cultural materials

Among the many books written about the Holocaust, perhaps the most touching remains the diary of a 13-year-old German Jewish girl in Holland named Anne Frank. Anne and her family fled Germany in 1933 and settled in Holland. In 1942, two years after the German invasion of that country, Anne began to write her diary. Between July and August 1944, the Franks remained in hiding until they were betrayed and sent to the death camp at Auschwitz in Poland. Anne and her older sister, Margot, were then sent to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, where Anne died in March 1945. *The Diary of Anne Frank*, first published in 1947 and translated into English in 1952, is still widely read around the world. “In spite of everything,” wrote Anne, “I still believe that people are really good at heart.”

Another moving artistic memorial to the Holocaust was the 1993 film *Schindler's List* directed by Steven Spielberg. This Academy Award winning film tells the true story of a German businessman named Oskar Schindler who saved Jewish refugees by disguising them as workers in a Polish factory.

Read *The Diary of Anne Frank* or view *Schindler's List* and reconsider the analysis questions. Has your answer to any of these questions changed?

Other films that deal with genocide include *The Killing Fields* (1984) and *Hotel Rwanda* (2004).

Further reading

- Brysk, Alison, *Global Good Samaritans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Examination of how some states promote global human rights and why they do so.
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- Hunt, Lynn, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007). Essential history of the development of human rights.
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- O'Byrne, Darren J., *Human Rights* (New York: Pearson, 2003). Case study approach to human rights that considers political prisoners, torture, slavery, genocide, and refugees.

Part V

Global issues



THE CHAPTERS

12. Human security
13. Identity politics: nationalism, religion, and ethnicity
14. International political economy
15. The environment: a global collective good

1348–50	1918–19	1941	1951	1961	1999
Europe ravaged by the Black Death	Spanish influenza pandemic	Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees	Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Military-industrial complex" speech	Establishment of IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

12 Human security

In July 2005, the leaders of the world's seven major industrial economies met at a resort in Scotland for their annual conference. On July 2, with hundreds of millions of people around the world watching on television, a series of rock concerts called "Live 8" took place in Philadelphia, Paris, Johannesburg, Rome, Berlin, Moscow, and Barrie, Canada to pressure world leaders to fight poverty in Africa (see Figure 12.1). The largest concert, bringing together 200,000 people, took place in London's Hyde Park, and featured Paul McCartney, Madonna, Elton John, and others. In Philadelphia, crowds gathered around the Museum of Art to hear Stevie Wonder. At Berlin's Brandenburg Gate, Rome's Circus Maximus, the Palais de Versailles outside Paris, and in Moscow's Red Square, crowds also gathered for concerts.¹

Poverty represents only one of many enduring challenges to **human security**, especially in the less-developed countries (LDCs). Until recently, however, observers, especially realists, conceived of security as involving only military protection of state interests, and, since the beginning of the Westphalian era, the problem of security in global politics was largely focused on the threat of foreign attack. Although that problem still looms large, the security agenda has grown dramatically in recent years. The survival and wellbeing of individuals require more than military protection, and the

concept of human security takes account of this. People's lives and welfare are also threatened by crime, disease, civil strife, hunger, poverty, human rights abuses, terrorism, and environmental harm. According to Canadian diplomat Rob McRae, the idea of human security "takes the individual as the nexus of its concern, the life *as lived*, as the true lens through which we should view the political, economic, and social environment. At its most basic level, human security means freedom from fear."²

This chapter examines several major challenges to human security. It begins by exploring the concept and then turns to the challenge of poverty that many observers regard as the most pervasive threat to human security. Among poverty-related issues are economic development, foreign investment, and foreign aid, access to global markets, and global debt. Impoverished countries are especially vulnerable to a variety of other ills, including transnational crime that threatens personal safety, the global arms trade that fosters violence, and the complex issue of refugees and migrants. As you read this chapter, keep in mind that the dimensions of human security are closely related. For instance, the spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS is both a cause *and* a consequence of poverty; poverty creates incentives for crime and corruption, while perpetuating the very poverty that contributes to them in the first place.

2000	2003	2004	2006
Adoption of UN Millennium Goals	Discovery of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear black market	Establishment of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation	Collapse of Doha Round trade talks



Figure 12.1 London's Hyde Park Live 8 concert

Source: Getty Images

Human rights are so important a dimension of human security that we dedicated the previous chapter to the issue. There, we emphasized how the normative and legal climate is shifting to emphasize a “law of people” and the protection of basic political, social, and economic rights. There are other trends, too, that also pose real challenges to the wellbeing and survival of individuals and communities. Among these are issues of environmental degradation, itself of such suffi-

cient critical interest that it, too, merits its own chapter – Chapter 15.

The idea of human security

In contrast to realists who remain focused on the security of states from other states, liberal theorists have long argued that famine, disease, crime, and natural disasters cost far more lives than do wars

but, until recently, few countries were concerned about the welfare of individuals other than their own citizens. The idea of human security, then, emphasizes the welfare of *individuals* rather than *states*.

Yet, even now, while securing human security has become a central foreign policy objective of countries like Canada, it attracts far less attention and funding than military security. The UN Economic and Social Council and the UN specialized agencies are responsible for improving human security. The UN has sponsored a variety of conferences dealing with human security issues, and some have been controversial. The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, or “Earth Summit,” in Rio de Janeiro, set out environmental goals that highlighted the trade-off between environmental degradation and economic development, and, as we saw in Chapter 11, two other conferences, the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 UN World Conference on Women in Beijing, produced heated debates on women’s rights. The UN also sponsors several programs through the General Assembly that deal with human security issues. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is responsible for improving children’s welfare worldwide. The World Food Program seeks to reduce the threat of famine.

Economist Jeffrey Sachs has proposed a detailed nine-step plan to eliminate global poverty by 2025. His plan requires relatively little additional foreign aid from wealthy countries, but the very poor, he argued, do need help in reaching the first rung on the “ladder of economic development” to start the process of development, an achievement that he sees as not simply morally right but critical to global stability and security more generally.³ Sachs emphasizes how poor countries can help themselves, especially with assistance from international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF. The problem of poverty, in his view, is multifaceted, involving several dimensions, including an absence of capital investment, crippling debt, disease and ill health, political

instability, lack of education, ecological degradation, and inappropriate technology.

Such ideas influenced the formulation of the UN’s Millennium Goals as well as the effort to reduce the debt burden of poor countries. Many of the issues that constitute human security can be found in the eight Millennium Goals that were endorsed at a UN-sponsored conference in 2000. These goals, to be met by 2015, are:⁴

- Reduce by half both the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day and who suffer from hunger.
- Achieve universal primary education.
- Promote gender equality by reducing gender disparity in education.
- Reduce mortality by two-thirds among children under 5.
- Improve maternal health.
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
- Reduce by half those without access to safe drinking water and improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
- Develop an open and non-discriminatory trading and financial system to provide developing states with access to markets of developed states, and reduction or cancellation of debts owed by poor states.

Realistically, it is unlikely that these goals will be met because major states are reluctant to provide sufficient resources.

In January 2006, Sachs visited the model Millennium Village in Bar-Sauri in Kenya. Sauri had suffered from high rates of malaria, AIDS, malnutrition, child mortality, and low crop yields. On his visit, Sachs showed how a multidimensional attack on poverty had succeeded, and used the village as a case to illustrate that making improvements in health, safe drinking water and sanitation, education, agricultural fertilizer, and infrastructure could eliminate poverty at a per capita cost of about \$75 a year for the village’s residents. For that sum, villagers were able to

acquire hybrid corn seeds, fertilizer, bed nets to prevent malarial mosquito bites, school meals, and a truck.

Human security issues are not new. One source of the concept was a speech given on January 6, 1941, during World War Two by President Franklin Roosevelt before Congress in which he spoke of “four freedoms” (see Key document, below). What *has* changed is that the threats that those issues pose are transnational, even global, rather than local or national. Echoing Roosevelt, UN Secretary General Annan declared: “Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of

future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security.”⁵ Figure 12.2 summarizes how such factors are linked.

Such issues demand a global response. On the one hand, common problems create common interests. On the other, they produce disputes about how to confront them and pay for their solution. The problem of global poverty to which we now turn our attention illustrates such disagreements.




Figure 12.2 Realms of human security

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

KEY DOCUMENT

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JANUARY 6, 1941⁶

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression – everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want – which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor – anywhere in the world.

Poverty and economic development

Poverty is among the greatest threats to human security. Although the total global economic pie is growing, now exceeding \$70 trillion a year, its distribution is uneven, with 2.54 billion of the world's 6.8 billion people subsisting on less than \$2 a day, and of these 1.37 billion survive on less than \$1.25 a day.⁷ In many of the LDCs, rapidly growing populations erase economic growth. The poorest 40 percent of the world's population account for 5 percent of global income, while the wealthiest 20 percent receive three-quarters of world income.⁸ And since 2007, the income gap between the top and bottom 10 percent has increased in many countries. The next sections examine some of the efforts to alleviate poverty and describe key issues of concern to the world's poor.

Global dimensions of poverty

What are the sources of poverty? Among the factors contributing to poverty in LDCs are inadequate health, education (especially of women and children), clean water, and other social services. The absence of birth control information and resulting large families, combined with small land holdings, make it impossible for many families to sustain themselves. Environmental factors such as rapid population growth, deforestation, and drought tend greatly to affect the poor. Rising food prices make it difficult for people to avoid malnutrition, and the unwillingness of wealthy countries to eliminate domestic agricultural subsidies makes it impossible for LDC farmers to export their products. Global trade practices that advantage rich countries deepen the gap between rich and poor, as does directing foreign aid to those other than the poorest of the poor. Corrupt leaders and authoritarian regimes misuse public funds and the presence of valuable natural resources like oil allows leaders to enrich them-

selves while ignoring citizens' needs (known as the "resource curse"). Civil wars and crime increasingly afflict civilians, especially those least able to protect themselves.

How many people remain impoverished; where do they live; and to what extent has the problem of global poverty eased in recent decades? These are difficult questions to answer, as definitions and estimates of poverty vary. Using the World Bank's definition of *extreme poverty* (income less than \$1.25 per day), there has been considerable progress in reducing the absolute number of impoverished people worldwide. Still, over 3 billion people live on less than \$2.50 a day. The record is, however, more uneven at the country level. Much of the reduction in poverty has taken place in one country – China – where some 400 million people emerged from poverty between 1990 and 2002. By contrast, some 41 percent of people in low- and middle-income countries are unlikely to see poverty reduction anytime soon. In some regions, notably sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, the number of poor has actually grown. The World Bank predicts that about 900 million people will remain impoverished by 2015, even as the world population nears 7 billion.

Income measures do not paint a complete picture. They ignore other dimensions (some would say causes; others, consequences) of poverty. For instance, every year more than 500,000 women, almost all in developing countries, die from complications of pregnancy or childbirth, and in sub-Saharan Africa, one child in seven dies before its fifth birthday.⁹ Many countries lack basic infrastructure: over 2.5 billion are in want of sanitation services, 1.5 billion have no electricity, and 1 billion have no access to all-weather roads.¹⁰ Thus, in addition to income, some measures also consider indicators of longevity (such as birth rates, infant mortality, life expectancy), standard of living (unemployment, sanitation, access to potable water), and knowledge (schooling and literacy).¹¹ Less-developed countries (LDCs) are also victims of a "brain drain." Over 80 percent of college-

educated citizens from Haiti and Jamaica live in rich countries, as do over a quarter of college-educated citizens from Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda, and El Salvador.¹²

Corruption is pervasive in the LDCs and impedes economic development because it siphons funds from productive uses, discourages investors, and adds costs for consumers and producers. Transparency International (TI), a non-government organization with chapters in over 90 countries, publishes a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to rank countries' corruption. By that measure, the world's most corrupt countries in 2010 were Somalia and Myanmar (Burma), also two of the world's poorest. Other countries that were perceived as among the most corrupt were Afghanistan, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and several impoverished sub-Saharan African states including Sudan, Chad, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹³ Not surprisingly, several of these, as noted in Chapter 5, are failed or failing states. As TI's chairman declared: "The world's people continue to suffer under the double yoke of extreme poverty and corrupt, unjust systems. But there will be no poverty alleviation, no political stability without the fight against corruption."¹⁴

The CPI was augmented by a Bribe Payers Index (BPI) to measure the extent to which leading exporting countries use bribes to attract overseas business. According to TI's 2008 BPI Index, of the 22 leading exporting states accounting for 75 percent of all exports, the countries

whose officials were most willing to engage in bribery were Russia, China, Mexico, India, and Brazil. By contrast, the "cleanest" countries were Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany.¹⁶

All the major international economic organizations are involved in efforts to alleviate global poverty.

International institutions and global poverty

The question of how to measure poverty is not simply academic, because the answer influences efforts to combat poverty. The more complex the poverty measure, the more complex must be strategies to overcome it. Thus, coordinated efforts are underway to attack global poverty with an eye to eradicating it by 2015. Article 55 of the UN Charter commits states to advance the economic and social wellbeing of peoples everywhere.

The World Bank (IBRD) and IMF lead the effort to achieve UN Millennium Goals, and they provide development assistance to poor countries. One IMF instrument is the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility established in 1999 to provide poor countries with low-interest loans at a nominal annual interest rate of 0.5 percent.¹⁷ The program works as follows: After consulting with domestic groups and foreign experts, governments prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers that describe economic and social programs designed to reduce poverty and stimulate growth. These plans become the bases for IMF and World Bank decisions about whether to provide loans and debt relief to those countries. Governments are encouraged to present plans that (1) engage civil society, (2) assist their poorest citizens, (3) recognize that poverty has many causes, (4) involve cooperation among government, civil society, and external donors, and (5) have a long-term perspective. As of 2004, 78 poor countries were eligible for low-interest IMF development loans.¹⁸

DID YOU KNOW?

As part of its effort to reduce corruption in countries that it helps, the World Bank has a Department of Institutional Integrity with a 24-hour Fraud and Corruption Hotline: 1-800-831-0463.¹⁵

In 2010, the World Bank (IBRD) committed a record \$44.2 billion in loans to LDCs for 164 projects to provide education, health, electricity, environmental protection, and clean water. Some clients – countries at higher levels of economic development – receive long-term loans for specific projects, usually over an extended time period before they begin to repay the loans' principal. Overall, the World Bank is financing over 1800 projects around the world, including providing **microcredit** in Bosnia, improving healthcare in Mexico, educating girls in Bangladesh, and encouraging paper making in Brazil.¹⁹

KEY DOCUMENT ARTICLE 55 OF THE UN CHARTER²⁰

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

- a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
- c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

As the results of providing microcredit show, small investments can have large effects. For example, mobile phones have a great impact in reducing poverty. "Phones let fishermen and

farmers check prices in different markets before selling produce, make it easier for people to find work, allow quick and easy transfers of funds and boost entrepreneurship."²¹ By 2009, three-quarters of the world's 4 billion cell phone subscriptions were in the developing world. Individual phones can be shared by a village, and, according to one report, "an extra ten mobile phones per 100 people in a typical developing country boosts growth in GDP per person by 0.8 percentage points."²²

The World Bank (IBRD) is only one of several institutions that collectively constitute the "World Bank Group." In addition to the IBRD, this group includes the International Development Agency (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). As the world's largest source of **concessional assistance** to poor countries, the IDA is the most important of these. In 2010, it committed \$14.5 billion, mostly in the form of credits and grants.²³ For its part, the IFC encourages private investment in poor countries. The MIGA encourages investment in poor countries by providing insurance to protect potential investors from loss in case their investments fail or LDCs default on their loans. Finally, the ICSID mediates disputes between poor countries and foreign investors.

Critics of these international institutions, however, argue that the efforts of these institutions make the LDCs adopt free market capitalism (see Chapter 14, p. 472) and open their economies to foreign investment, thereby allowing them to be exploited by wealthy countries. The institutions advocate economic globalization which, critics claim, expose poor countries to unfair terms of trade, increase their debts, encourage production of agriculture for export rather than sustainable agriculture to support domestic needs and encourage the entry of foreign corporations seeking to take advantage of low wages and weak environmental and safety regulations whose main interest is sending profits home.

International organizations are also involved in helping poor states cope with the mountains of debt that impede development efforts. Recognition of this problem has grown, and steps have been taken to ease the debt burden of the poor.

Debt relief

In recent years, the World Bank and IMF have sought to assist poor countries that spend their export earnings and hard currency repaying interest on their debts. The debt crisis dates back to the 1970s and 1980s. First, a global recession in the mid-1970s, a decline in commodity prices, and a spike in oil prices in the late 1970s buried poor countries under mountainous debt. Oil-producing LDCs like Mexico and Nigeria, counting on higher earnings from oil sales, borrowed heavily for domestic projects. When oil prices plummeted in the 1980s and 1990s, they, too, were left with huge debt burdens. Between 1955 and 1990, poor countries' debt rose from \$9.69 billion to more than \$1.3 trillion. By 1985, debt service ratios – the ratios of principal and interest due on debts to export earnings – were estimated at between 20 and 50 percent for non-oil-producing LDCs.²⁴

With export earnings unavailable for new projects, LDCs faced declining standards of living, and the prospect that they might default on debts owed to Western banks. As the debt issue festered, the United States took steps to foster debt rescheduling, notably the Baker (named for Treasury Secretary James Baker) and Brady (named for Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady) plans. Between 1978 and 1984, 29 countries negotiated debt rescheduling agreements that allowed them to postpone repayment of about \$27 billion in loans. Matters improved temporarily, but by 2007 total LDC debt reached \$3.3 trillion.²⁵ It was evident that a more coherent policy was needed.

In 1996, the World Bank, IMF, and the Paris Club (an informal group of creditor countries

formed in 1956) jointly put forward a plan to provide debt relief for the world's poorest countries called the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Its aim was to reward LDCs that pursued sound economic policies by reducing their debt burden. Only by easing the debt burden, it was argued, could LDCs free up resources to alleviate poverty at home and attract foreign investment.

The HIPC was revised in 1999 to assure that the resources made available would be used to reduce poverty.²⁶ LDCs confronting an “unsustainable debt situation” but with a good record of economic, political, and social reform, and a workable “poverty reduction strategy” were eligible for HIPC debt relief. Reforms had to include improving the quality of government and reducing official corruption. Countries with such records could obtain loans and grants to reduce debt for an interim period during which they could carry out their poverty reduction strategies and implement reforms. If they did so, they would receive additional debt relief that would not have to be repaid.

By 2010, 40 countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, were eligible for HIPC debt relief. Of these, four were receiving pre-decision assistance, four were receiving interim aid, and 32 had reached the completion point and were receiving irrevocable debt relief. To date, some \$72 billion in debt relief, involving a two-thirds reduction in the debt of these countries, has been committed under the HIPC initiative. By 2005, the costs of debt service had dropped from \$5 to \$2.3 billion in countries receiving HIPC assistance, freeing up funds to reduce poverty. In countries receiving HIPC assistance, poverty-reducing expenditures had risen from 7 percent of gross domestic product in 1999 to over 9 percent in 2005 (see Table 12.1).²⁷

Although the HIPC has been very valuable for some countries, overall progress is slow. When the HIPC was initiated, it was hoped that many poor countries would quickly qualify for relief, but the process proved complex, and some targeted

Table 12.1 Countries qualified for HIPC assistance, December 201**Post-Completion-Point Countries (32)**

Afghanistan	Ghana	Nicaragua
Benin	Guinea Bissau	Niger
Bolivia	Guyana	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Haiti	Haiti
Burundi	Honduras	Senegal
Cameroon	Liberia	Sierra Leone
Central African Republic	Madagascar	Tanzania
Republic of Congo	Malawi	Togo
Democratic Republic of Congo	Mali	Uganda
Ethiopia	Mauritania	Zambia
The Gambia	Mozambique	

Interim Countries (Between Decision and Completion Point) (4)

Chad	Côte d'Ivoire
Comoros	Guinea

Pre-Decision-Point Countries (4)

Eritrea	Kyrgyz Republic
Somalia	Sudan

Source: International Monetary Fund, "Factsheet, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative," December 16, 2010, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm>

countries still have difficulty qualifying for aid, especially those afflicted by civil war. Thus, it has proved necessary to bend the rules somewhat to enable countries like Zambia to qualify. Owing to the slow pace of debt relief, the G-8 members led by British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed at their 2005 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, to forgive some \$40 billion in debt owed them by 18 of the world's poorest countries. Among those campaigning for such action was rock star Bob Geldof, who declared, "Tomorrow 280 million Africans will wake up for the first time in their lives without owing you or me a penny from the burden of debt that has crippled them and their countries for so long."²⁸ As a result of the G-8 agreement, on July 1, 2006, the World Bank cancelled \$37 billion in debt owed by 19 developing countries in Africa and Latin America that had met the HIPC criteria, freeing up funds for education and health services. Thus, economic development is beginning to accelerate in sub-Saharan Africa owing to a combination of high demand for commodities, improving governance, and lower inflation.

Countries with large debt burdens are regarded as poor credit risks and find it difficult to borrow the additional sums from private banks or public institutions necessary to pay off existing debts or promote economic development. At best, they only can borrow at high interest rates that further mortgage their future. At worst, if they default, they will get no additional loans at all. However, if they gain control of their debt burdens, they become eligible for new loans at lower rates of interest.

Nongovernmental agencies are also involved in debt issues. For example, private credit-rating institutions play a quiet but critical role by determining the interest rates countries must pay on the bonds they issue or the loans they make. Firms such as Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's, Fitch Ratings, and Dominion Bond Rating Service assess the likelihood that countries will repay the interest and principal on their loans. If such agencies conclude that the prospect of repayment is declining, interest rates that a debtor must pay for additional loans rises, thereby worsening its debt burden. In 2010, for instance,

Moody's lowered the credit ratings of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, intensifying financial crises in those countries. By contrast, if these firms conclude that a country is growing more likely to pay its debts, interest rates decline thereby reducing its debt burden. Investors will then be more likely to purchase the country's securities, providing additional funding to fuel economic growth.

Developed countries also play a significant role in debt relief. For decades, rich states have provided LDCs with foreign aid. Such assistance faces its own challenges. Doubters may criticize donor governments for the amount of aid they provide or the conditions on which it is distributed. Thus, in recent years developed countries have increasingly emphasized the role of private investment as a way of stimulating economic growth.²⁹

Foreign aid and investment

Many Americans mistakenly believe that the United States is a generous source of foreign aid and that such aid eats up a substantial proportion of America's budget. In fact, in 2010 US foreign aid amounted to only 0.21 percent of GDP, far short of the 1992 target of 0.7 percent. However, in response to President George W. Bush's proposal to increase US foreign aid and establish a Millennium Challenge Account to assist countries that encourage democracy, fight corruption, and adopt liberal economic policies, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004. By 2009, its funding had grown to \$7 billion.³⁰

Overall, the United States ranks 11th among the 22 major developed countries in its "commitment to development" as measured by the 2010 Commitment to Development Index developed by the Center for Global Development.³¹ That index is based on an average of scores in seven categories: (1) trade (access to a country's markets), (2) technology (government support for research as a percentage of GDP), (3) security (participation in peacekeeping operations), (4) environment

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Do democratic systems and human freedom foster economic development? Does economic development foster democracy? Westerners since Aristotle (384–22 BC) have believed that a relationship exists between these factors, while some Asian and African leaders have denied such a link. Research by political scientists, however, suggests that, although greater wealth does not produce democracy, the transformation to democracy accelerates economic growth and that such growth strengthens democratic institutions.³² Moreover, the Index of Economic Freedom compiled by the conservative Heritage Foundation suggests that countries that provide the greatest economic freedom (as measured by factors like property rights and trade policy) are the most prosperous, while those that provide the least are the poorest.³³

(harm done to the global environment measured by low gas taxes, emission of greenhouse gases, use of ozone-depleting chemicals, and fishing subsidies), (5) migration (aid to refugees and asylum seekers and percentage of students from LDCs among total foreign students), (6) investment (policies aimed at promoting foreign investment in LDCs), and (7) aid (grants and low-interest loans to LDCs as a percentage of GDP).³⁴ By this index, Sweden is the most committed and South Korea the least to poor states' development.

Most foreign investment must come from private sources, especially the transnational corporations (TNCs) discussed in Chapter 14. TNCs bring capital, train local managers, provide jobs, develop new products (which can be substituted for imports), introduce new technology, foster exports, and are sources of hard currency for

purchasing foreign goods. TNCs also link relatively isolated societies to the global economy through worldwide networks of production and distribution. TNCs and the vast amounts of direct investment they control are vital to economic growth in the developing world, and LDCs compete for their investment and the jobs they bring. Nevertheless, problems of poverty and economic development remain complex.

One barrier to ending global poverty remains the difficulty faced by LDCs in exporting their products to developed countries. Despite rhetoric extolling free trade, rich countries have been reluctant to eliminate barriers to imports from LDCs.

Access to markets

One of the most promising paths to economic development is through export growth. Currently, the United States and the European Union (EU) account for 46 percent of the world's merchandise exports, while the least developed countries account for only about 1 percent of global trade.³⁵ Moreover, many poor countries had earlier tried to develop their economies by protecting home industries and limiting imports. In the main, these efforts failed, and in the 1990s the LDCs turned to free market economics to attract foreign investment.

Export industries provide employment and hard currency for investment in industry and infrastructure at home. Japan pioneered this path to prosperity after World War Two, and the "Asian Tigers" – Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and, more recently, China – copied it with great success. The poorest LDCs, however, have difficulty gaining access to rich states' markets. Enjoying plentiful cheap labor, their industries could undersell competing industries in the developed world, thereby attracting jobs from rich countries. However, this intensifies domestic political pressures for protection from LDCs' imports.

In some industries, for example, textile production, LDC exports have been limited by "voluntary" quotas. The 1974 Multi-Fiber Arrangement limited exports of cotton, wool, and textiles in order to protect home industries in rich countries. The 1995 WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing began to phase out these quotas. It was intended to aid textile exporters in poor countries, but China's huge reservoir of low-cost labor and its access to Hong Kong's expertise and financial resources helped it reap most of the benefit from the Multi-Fiber Arrangement's termination. Poor countries like Bangladesh gained little. In February 2005 alone, Chinese apparel exports to the West were over 100 percent higher than the previous year. Resulting complaints of US and European manufacturers, combined with the damage done to apparel exporters in poor countries, may lead to new protectionist measures to limit Chinese textiles exports.

Moreover, poor countries still depend on agriculture, and their ability to export agricultural commodities to the developed world has been limited, thereby posing an additional impediment to economic development. In a genuinely free market, LDCs would enjoy a comparative advantage in agriculture over rich countries, but there is no free market in agriculture. Japan, for example, which depends on exporting manufactured products, imposes a 778 percent tariff on imported rice.³⁶ Overall, rich countries spent \$253 billion on subsidizing farmers in 2009, thereby making enabling relatively inefficient farmers in rich countries to undersell competitors in poor countries. The EU is a major offender. Its subsidies accounted for more than three-quarters of its farmers' incomes between 2007 and 2009.³⁷

Historically, agricultural trade has been a thorny issue because of powerful farm lobbies in the US, Europe, Canada, and Australia. No issue divides the US and the EU more than competition for agricultural markets, and their disagreement makes it difficult for them to cooperate in reaching an agreement with the LDCs. In the US, congressional representatives from the South and

Midwest annually push for subsidies that go mainly to their largest farmers, while the EU keeps its farm sector afloat with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

The CAP provides subsidies to farmers that absorb much of the EU's budget. Farmers are assured a minimum price for their produce, thereby providing them with predictable earnings. At the time the CAP was established in 1958, Europe suffered food shortages, but since then, the CAP, like American subsidies, has led to agricultural overproduction and the dumping of commodities on global markets at prices so low that farmers in LDCs cannot compete. As a result of these subsidies and of US and European trade barriers, LDCs cannot export their produce and their farmers cannot even compete at home with agricultural imports from rich countries. This perpetuates poverty among peasants in poor countries and, sometimes, famine amidst global plenty.

Both Europe and the United States have incentives to reduce agricultural subsidies. US budget deficits will require major cuts in programs like agriculture, and the CAP, despite reform in 1992, costs Europeans \$82 billion a year (40 percent of the EU budget).³⁸ Moreover, EU enlargement doubled its number of farmers and added countries like Poland with large and inefficient agricultural sectors that will dramatically raise EU costs. Thus, direct subsidy payments to new EU members will be phased out by 2014. Some reform took place in 2003 when the EU decided to place a budget ceiling on the CAP and provide farmers with a single payment that does *not* increase with higher production. Farmers can produce what they want, but the market, not the EU, determines the price they get.³⁹ Negotiations are underway for the next CAP, to be implemented in 2014, but some EU members, notably France and Germany, oppose any overhaul of the program.

Special arrangements that grant some LDCs **preferential access** for their products to rich countries' markets notwithstanding, protectionist walls still exclude many LDC exports of agricul-


DID YOU KNOW?

In Europe, cows received more government aid than did people in 2000. The EU's annual dairy subsidy was \$913 per cow, while its annual aid to sub-Saharan Africa was \$8 per person. In Japan, the corresponding figure were \$2700 and \$1.47.⁴⁰

tural commodities from rich countries' markets. Declared Javier González Fraga, formerly head of Argentina's central bank: "The virtuous circle – we were to import capital goods from the industrialized nations and they were to buy our agricultural produce – never happened."⁴¹

The 2003 and 2005, WTO meetings in Cancún, Mexico and Hong Kong, which were held to reach consensus on global trade issues in the Doha Round, failed dismally, largely owing to disagreement over trade in agriculture. This failure blocked efforts to reduce trade barriers. At Cancún, the US, Europe, and Japan offered less than the LDCs had hoped in opening their markets to agricultural imports. Thus, a group of LDC commodity exporters led by Brazil and India, representing 60 percent of the world's population, 70 percent of the world's rural population, and 26 percent of global agricultural exports, joined ranks as the G-20 (see Chapter 5, p. 165; see also Map 12.1). The G-20 threatened to torpedo the entire Doha Round unless the developed countries reduced subsidies and tariffs that protect crops like US cotton and Japanese rice. In the end, amid mutual recriminations, negotiations collapsed in July 2006 and no real progress has been made since.

In sum, economic development entails complex interactions among states and markets. In the past, most economic activity took place within national boundaries and was congruent with those boundaries. This is no longer the case, and the spread of transnational activity is also evident



Map 12.1 G-20 members

in the globalization of crime, the topic to which we now turn.

Transnational crime

Transnational crime has thrived with globalization, generating well over \$1 trillion a year in income. Figure 12.3 shows how crime poses a major obstacle to **human development**. High crime rates have a variety of causes including weak governments, poorly paid and easily corruptible government officials, poverty and unemployment, demand in wealthy states for illicit drugs, and poorly paid illegal migrants.

Transnational gangs such as Mara 18 and Mara Salvatrucha in Central America cost El Salvador roughly 11.5 percent of GDP in 2003 and gave that country the distinction of having the world's highest murder rate in 2009.⁴² The same processes that globalize corporations fuel transnational crime. Like corporations, crime has profited

from the technological advances accompanying globalization. Thus, Colombian kidnappers use computers to check bank accounts of drivers they stop at roadblocks. Today's transnational criminals are also involved in a range of interconnected activities from drugs, bank and credit card fraud, and human trafficking to arms smuggling, counterfeiting of money and goods, intellectual piracy, and illegal smuggling of natural resources like rare hardwoods. Finally, new technologies allow criminal groups such as Russian and American mafias, Chinese triads, and Japanese *yakuzas* to enter alliances as the Sicilian and Colombian drug cartels did in the 1980s in bringing cocaine to Europe.

Drug trafficking

One of the world's largest transnational criminal enterprises is the global drug trade that by UN estimates is worth about \$400 billion with some




Figure 12.3 The impact of organized crime on human development

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

DID YOU KNOW?

The combined total heroin/opium market was worth about \$65 billion a year in 2009,⁴³ an amount higher than the GDPs of many countries, and in 2003 alone the illicit drug trade was valued as greater than the GDP of 88 percent of the world's countries.⁴⁴

200 million “customers.”⁴⁵ The global drug trade is especially hard to control, because eliminating one source frequently leads to greater production elsewhere. Thus, curbing cocaine production in Peru and Bolivia led to its spread in Colombia, and efforts to fight the Colombian cocaine cartels

caused the transfer of cocaine operations to Brazil and Ecuador, as well as an explosion in the manufacture and smuggling of illicit drugs in Mexico, where the Arellano-Félix Organization became the most violent drug-trafficking cartel in North America. Similarly, when Iran and Turkey cracked down on opium production (the basis of heroin) in the 1950s and 1970s respectively, Afghanis and Pakistanis took over the business. Along with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan form the “Golden Crescent,” which, after 1991, surpassed the “Golden Triangle” (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) as the world's main source of opium.⁴⁶

The rewards from the drug trade are so high that drug barons are prepared to take great risks. So much money is involved that they easily corrupt poorly paid police, judicial officials, and politicians in the LDCs. Moreover, in countries

like Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru, there are few crops as profitable for impoverished farmers as poppies and coca. Here, drug dealers make themselves indispensable to local communities. One observer explains how dealers, pretending to be businessmen, integrated themselves into a Peruvian community before beginning illegal operations:

They enlisted local labor and revitalized the local airport that had been closed for lack of government repairs. They also brought in satellite television, and provided monies to repair local roads, docking facilities, the school and medical clinic. They also supplied supplemental income payments to police, politicians and other notables. Only after being in the community for close to a year, did they reveal their true identity and purposes. They then asked for and received a public community vote of support to use the town as a major drug collection and transshipment site.⁴⁷

So pervasive is the drug trade that some countries have become “narco-states.” One is Afghanistan where the Taliban supports itself by drug sales. In Colombia, the Medellín and Cali drug cartels led by the Ochoa brothers and Pablo Escobar and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers respectively used violence and bribery to subvert governments and amass political influence in the 1970s and 1980s, until they were crushed in the 1990s. This did not end the problem, however, as smaller, more agile gangs succeeded the cartels, and there remain between 4000 and 10,000 members in 24 of Colombia’s 32 provinces.⁴⁸ Some fear Mexico is heading in the same direction. Recently, Mexican gangs passed Colombia’s in terms of resources and manpower, and they have effectively taken control of some cities and towns (Map 12.2). Their impact does not end at Mexico’s border. According to the US Justice Department, these gangs pose the “biggest organized crime threat to the United States.” They have a presence in at

least 230 cities and towns and are responsible for growing crime. Phoenix (Arizona) alone had more than 370 drug-related kidnappings in 2008.⁴⁹

One dangerous aspect of the drug trade is its link to terrorism.⁵⁰ Terrorists turn to crime to fund their operations. In Peru during the 1990s, the Maoist guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Marxist Leninist Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement protected drug traffickers who in return helped fund these groups. Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), a leftist guerrilla group, provides security for cocaine growers, refiners, and smugglers, who in return fund the insurgents who buy arms on the global market. Currently, American military officials believe that the Taliban and Al Qaeda receive up to 40 percent of their funding from the drug trade, and the UN estimates that it is closer to 60 percent of their funding.⁵¹

Responses to drug trafficking

Drug producers and traffickers in different countries cooperate. To meet this challenge, the UN General Assembly held a Special Session on the World Drug Problem in New York in June 1998 that agreed on the need for effective international cooperation to fight drug production and smuggling. Greater cooperation is also needed to provide alternative trade opportunities to developing countries that produce drugs and to finance crop-substitution programs.

For its part, the United States places agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency in its embassies and provides assistance to governments that are struggling against drug trafficking. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have provided large-scale aid for the Colombia’s anti-narcotics campaign. Under “Plan Colombia,” US funding provides military equipment and training for local troops to interdict drug smuggling and destroy the country’s coca fields and assists Colombian farmers to plant cash crops other than coca. Nevertheless, at a cost of \$7 billion since



Map 12.2 Drug cartel areas in Mexico

Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/0113/Mexico-drug-war-death-toll-up-60-percent-in-2010.-Why>

2000, the availability of cocaine in the US remains unchanged, with roughly 90 percent coming from Colombia.⁵²

The American war on drugs has been repeatedly compromised because some US allies have been involved – willingly or unwillingly – with illicit drugs. During the Vietnam War, the Hmong in Laos that assisted the CIA were also opium producers, and the CIA may have used drug profits to finance covert operations in Southeast Asia.⁵³ In 1989, US forces even invaded Panama, seized Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, and imprisoned him for drug trafficking. Nowhere is the issue more complex than in Afghanistan. Previously a leading source of opium, Afghan opium production was halted by the Islamic mili-

tants of the Taliban in 2000, but with America's overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, opium production resumed, and by 2005 Afghanistan had become the world largest heroin producer and exporter.

Money laundering

Globalization facilitates **money laundering**, an essential component of transnational criminal activity. Utilizing advanced technologies to transfer funds internationally, as well as encryption of email and cell phones, money laundering, involving sums equivalent to an estimated 2–5 percent of the world's GDP, enabling criminals

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American policies aimed at curbing the global drug trade have focused on cutting supplies to the US, and less effort has gone into reducing the demand for drugs either by decriminalizing drug use or rehabilitating drug users. Critics of US policy argue that, as long as demand for drugs and profits from their sale remain high, drug smuggling will continue to flourish. According to a World Drug Report wholesale cocaine prices in the largest market for that drug per kilogram averaged \$80,400 (United States, 2006–2009), and heroin prices averaged \$44,3000 (West and Central Europe, 2008).⁵⁴ “The most effective approach towards the drug problem,” declared the 1998 UN Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction, “consists of a comprehensive, balanced and coordinated approach, encompassing supply control and demand reduction reinforcing each other . . . There is now a need to intensify our efforts in demand reduction and to provide adequate resources towards that end.”⁵⁵

and terrorists to hide evidence of their illegal profits. According to the UN International Money Laundering Information Network, “‘Megabyte money’ (in the form of symbols on a computer screen) operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and may be shifted dozens of times to prevent law enforcement officials from tracking it down.”⁵⁶

There are three steps to the “laundry cycle.” In the first, criminals disassociate funds from criminal activity. Restaurants, hotels, and casinos are used as fronts to convert small-denomination bills into larger denominations or cashier’s checks. In the second, criminals mask the movement of those funds from law enforcement officials, often by sending them electronically to other countries with strong bank secrecy laws or lax enforcement of money laundering laws such as the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Finally, once criminals are sufficiently distanced from the funds, they place them where they are again readily available, often in legitimate businesses.⁵⁷

Programs to eliminate money laundering can prevent terrorists from buying arms and reduce the profitability of transnational crime. IGOs like the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention promote national laws to combat the problem, and the US State Department’s Bureau

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement develops programs to fight transnational crime and terrorism, for instance, training police in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. In 2007, the US launched the Merida Initiative, a \$1.4 billion effort to provide equipment, training, and technical assistance to Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti to combat drug trafficking, halt arms flows, and combat gangs and criminal organizations. Efforts in 2011 were to expand in order to emphasize effective border patrol efforts and building stronger community institutions.⁵⁸

Another dimension of globalization is the global arms trade that fuels arms races and conflicts around the world, abets militias and terrorists, and creates dependence of arms purchasers on those who are sources of arms sales.

The arms trade

Spending on armaments entails a vast diversion of resources from productive uses and places a burden on taxpayers everywhere. In 2009, global expenditure on armaments soared to \$1.53 trillion or roughly \$224 per capita and 2.7 percent of world GDP. The US accounted for 43 percent

of this spending with China a distant second at 6.6 percent. This is an area in which the global financial crisis had little impact, and 14 of the 15 leading arms purchasers actually increased their military spending in 2009 even as world output fell by 1.1 percent.⁵⁹ The US also leads in terms of arms sales to the developing world, where the leading purchasers are Brazil, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia.⁶⁰

In addition, arms are routinely smuggled illegally into many countries, especially LDCs, where they feed civil wars and ethnic conflicts, reinforce abusive regimes, empower criminals and private militias, and, overall, constitute a major human security threat to individual citizens.

The global arms market

The global arms trade has long been a source of controversy. Some have argued that those who sell weapons try to encourage war and are “merchants of death.” After World War One, it was suspected that a small group of profit-minded industrialists associated with giant munitions firms like Germany’s Krupp, France’s Schneider-Creusot and Britain’s Vickers had encouraged the outbreak of war. In 1936, a special committee of the US Congress concluded that war profiteering had indeed been a factor. “The committee finds,” declared its report “that some of the munitions companies have occasionally had opportunities to intensify the fears of people for their neighbors and have used them to their own profit” and that it is “against the peace of the world for selfishly interested organizations to be left free to goad and frighten nations into military activity.”⁶¹

The growth of US defense budgets and the proliferation of interest groups profiting from defense spending during the Cold War fueled suspicions that defense industries enjoyed a chummy relationship with the Pentagon and members of Congress whose districts benefited from defense spending and military bases by getting defense-related jobs and federal grants

for local school districts with large numbers of soldiers’ children. This relationship was dubbed the **military–industrial complex** by President Eisenhower in 1961. “This conjunction of an immense military establishment,” he declared, “and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government . . . In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence . . . by the military-industrial complex.”⁶²

Sales of conventional arms contribute to countries’ exports and help sustain defense industries at home but also promote violence around the world. Initial sales not only provide funds at the time arms are delivered but lock in purchasers to future sales of replacements and spare parts. Arms purchases reduce funding for economic development, and some countries, including Oman, Syria, Burma, Pakistan, Eritrea, and Burundi, spend more on arms than on health and education combined. It is estimated that the amount spent on arms by the developing world would enable such countries to educate every child and reduce child mortality by two-thirds by 2015.⁶³

Following the Cold War, there was a steady decline in the volume of international arms transfers, which had peaked in 1982, but this trend did not last. Transfers dipped to their lowest point in 2002 and have been rising since, excepting a drop in 2008 and 2009 attributable to the global financial crisis.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the United States, the world’s leading arms exporter, signed agreements worth \$22.6 billion in 2009, accounting for 39 percent of all sales. Between 2004 and 2008, the five largest conventional weapons suppliers were the US, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain, accounting for 78 percent of world exports. During this period, most US arms sales were to the Middle East, whereas most Russian weapons were to the Asia-Pacific region.⁶⁵

The black market in weapons of mass destruction

Some countries, including North Korea, have earned hard currency by illicitly selling WMD and missile technology. One way in which North Korea and Iran managed to circumvent the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and evade scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was by dealing with a **black market** in nuclear technology. This market also heightened the prospect of terrorists acquiring WMD. The black market involved Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program, who admitted that he had sold nuclear technology, components, and equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.⁶⁶ Although some Pakistani officials probably knew what was happening, Dr. Khan was essentially running a private enterprise.⁶⁷

The black market was discovered when IAEA inspectors in Iran in 2003 learned that Pakistani scientists had provided nuclear information and technology that enabled the Iranian government to embark on a secret program to build a gas centrifuge plant to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In addition, US intelligence operatives were able to seize equipment for making centrifuges⁶⁸ from a German ship heading to Libya in October 2003. Additional information became available after Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi announced that his country had secretly tried to build a gas centrifuge plant in the 1990s, and he provided the West with information about Libya's WMD program in December 2003, as well as surrendering the plans and equipment that his country had acquired from Khan's black market. Khan had planned to provide Libya with some 10,000 centrifuges as well as the information and equipment for a large gas centrifuge plant. The plant could have been completed in a few years after which Libya could have manufactured nuclear weapons.

The discovery of Dr. Khan's activities provided information about how the black market operated

and what companies and individuals were involved. As part of Pakistan's effort to build nuclear weapons, Khan's network had obtained nuclear secrets from China in the early 1980s, including the design for a small missile warhead. Although the network was managed from Pakistan, it involved others in Europe, the Middle East, South Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Libyan project, for example, had been organized by a Sri Lankan based in Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates.

Dr. Khan had established a genuinely transnational illegal enterprise to manufacture and distribute the sophisticated components needed to make gas centrifuges. This work was subcontracted to manufacturers in Malaysia, Turkey, Spain, and Italy. According to Mohamed ElBaradei, the former IAEA Director General (1997–2009):⁶⁹ "Nuclear components designed in one country could be manufactured in another, shipped through a third (which may have appeared to be a legitimate user), assembled in a fourth, and designated for eventual turnkey use in a fifth."⁷⁰ "What we are seeing," he declared, "is a very sophisticated and complex underground network of black market operators not that much different from organized crime cartels."⁷¹

Responses to the global arms trade

As a result of revelations about Khan's network the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which declared that the "proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to peace and security."⁷² The resolution reflected the Security Council's concern about the threat of terrorists acquiring WMD, a contingency not covered in the NPT, and declared that "all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery."⁷³

Although much has been written about WMD exports, less attention has been paid to the illicit movement of small arms – rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, and mortars – that play a key role in contemporary violence. Such weapons fuel much of the violence in the developing world and in civil wars that cost the lives of countless civilians in countries like Sudan and Congo. And when such violence subsides, former combatants sell their weapons to others who reuse them in new bloody arenas. Thus, the Pentagon cannot account for large numbers of Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles it sold overseas, and US commercial and military aircraft are threatened by terrorists using Stingers that were originally provided to Islamic militants fighting the USSR in Afghanistan after 1979.⁷⁴ The danger posed by such missiles was revealed in November 2002, when terrorists launched a missile that almost downed an Israeli plane with holiday travelers leaving Mombasa, Kenya.

Between 10 and 20 percent of the global trade in small arms involves black market sales or government-approved covert arms transfers to insurgents, terrorists, and criminals, often in violation of UN arms embargoes of which there were 15 between 1965 and 2001.⁷⁵ In general, sales of conventional weapons are concentrated in conflict-prone regions like the Middle East and West Africa. Few governments have strong laws regulating the production of and trade in small arms, and arms that were initially sold legally are often diverted to the black market. With the best will in the world, it would be difficult for governments to track the sales of the 385 arms manufacturers in 64 countries that were making guns in the 1990s, many of which were doing so under license, and which oppose any regulation of their business.⁷⁶ The problem is made worse by the porosity of many national borders and the vast number of surplus weapons left over from the Cold War. By some estimates, in 2001 there were about 500 million small arms in circulation worldwide. According to Oxfam:

- In north-eastern Kenya, the barter rate for an AK-47 has dropped from ten cows in 1986 to its present level of two cows.
- In Sudan, an AK-47 can be purchased for the same price as a chicken.
- In Central America, automatic weapons sell for around \$400.
- In the Philippines, local manufacturers sell machine guns on the black market for around \$375 and revolvers for as little as \$15.⁷⁷

Several of the states most affected by domestic violence, including the Ivory Coast, Guatemala, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, have sought a global agreement to manage arms sales. In October 2009, 153 governments agreed on a timetable to draft an Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the global trade in conventional arms. Declared the director of the International Action Network on Small Arms: “All countries participate in the conventional arms trade and share responsibility for the ‘collateral damage’ it produces – widespread death, injuries, and human rights abuses . . . Now finally governments have agreed to negotiate legally binding global controls on this deadly trade.”⁷⁸

In addition, a coalition of humanitarian NGOs, buoyed by success in advocating a ban on the use, production, and trade of anti-personnel mines that became law in 1999, is lobbying to regulate the small arms trade. Following a convention adopted by the countries of the Americas against illicit trading in small arms, the UN sponsored a global conference on the issue in 2001 from which emerged a proposed action program. Although significant limits on the arms trade are unlikely to be enacted in the near future, the issue is on the global agenda, and in time global norms may grow strong enough – as they did in the case of anti-personnel mines – to end the deadly traffic in small arms.

Still another salient aspect of globalization is the movement of refugees and migrants, whether the massive flight of refugees in the face of violence in Congo or the tide of Mexicans

flowing across the Rio Grande into the United States.

The global movement of persons

One of the characteristics of globalization is the movement of persons across increasingly porous national borders. Although people have always fled their homes from fear of violence and political persecution, their numbers have increased in recent decades owing to civil wars, criminal violence, and human rights abuses. Such individuals have a legal right to request asylum and constitute many of those we term “refugees.”

Larger numbers of persons leave their homes, however, to escape poverty and in search of a better life for themselves and their families. Many legally documented immigrants are allowed entry for family reunification. Between 1968 and 1993, over 16.7 million immigrants entered the United States legally, most from LDCs in Latin America and Asia. The US admits an annual quota of legal immigrants selected by lottery which is currently 226,000.⁷⁹ Owing to growing unemployment during the 2007–09 recession, however, many immigrants have returned home.

A minority of legal migrants are admitted in response to the demand for skilled workers in wealthy countries. Thus, the US admits those with special skills on H1B work visas but has imposed a quota of 85,000 new H1B visas annually. This is below the demand of American corporations for skilled workers and leads such workers to emigrate elsewhere. Canada, by contrast, has developed systematic immigration criteria to recruit economic-class immigrants, including skilled workers, and business-class immigrants. The Canadian Immigration and Citizenship department plays a key role in this effort. Among the skilled workers Canada seeks are biologists, architects, physicians, electricians, plumbers, dentists, nurses, and pharmacists.⁸⁰ Overall, Canada admits a significantly larger number of legal

immigrants in proportion to its population than does the United States. Finally, large numbers of students study abroad under temporary visas, an important feature of globalizing education.

The bulk of economic immigrants, however, move illegally from poor to wealthy countries, often paying exorbitant sums to human traffickers and risking their lives in crossing deserts from Mexico into the United States or drowning in their effort to reach the US from Haiti or Cuba or Europe from North Africa. These are individuals who lack entry visas and whom we describe as “undocumented aliens.” During the 1980s and 1990s some undocumented aliens have benefited from US policies that have granted amnesty and increased quotas for the number of legal immigrants.

Refugees

In December 1950, the UN established the office of High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), responsible for implementing the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, reaffirmed in 2001. Since its establishment, UNHCR has aided over 50 million refugees by providing humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, and medical aid, and the agency was awarded Nobel Peace prizes in 1954 and 1981. Today, UNHCR has offices in over 110 countries and a budget of about \$3 billion, based largely on voluntary contributions. In recent years, its resources have been stretched to cope with refugee populations around the world.

By the 1951 convention, countries are obliged to give asylum to refugees, defined as those who are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or unwilling to return home “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”⁸¹ According to the principle of **non-refoulement**, a country cannot expel or forcibly return a refugee. When the convention was enacted, it

applied mainly to World War Two refugees and those escaping communism. In recent years, however, the refugee issue has come to encompass millions of people fleeing from violence in their homelands. Additional legal instruments dealing with refugees and migrants include the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, refugees are becoming victims of “asylum fatigue,” being denied their rights by countries that confuse them with illegal economic immigrants.⁸²

Between 1984 and 2004, the number of refugees almost doubled, peaking in 1994 following the Rwanda genocide. By the end of 2009, UNHCR was responsible for over 36 million “persons of concern,” including 10.4 million refugees, a record 15.6 million **internally displaced persons (IDPs)**, almost a million asylum seekers, and millions more stateless persons.⁸³ IDPs, including the millions of people displaced in Pakistan owing to conflict and natural disaster, pose a growing problem, with hundreds of thousands of new displacements in Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Yemen in 2009 alone.

The number of refugees globally has stabilized in recent years. Today, the major sources of refugees are Afghanistan (2.8 million), Iraq (1.7 million), Somalia (678,000), Democratic Republic of Congo (455,900), and Myanmar (406,700).⁸⁴ Most refugees flee to neighboring countries. As a result, Pakistan, Afghanistan’s neighbor, is the foremost host country for refugees. Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Germany, and Jordan account for almost half of all refugees under the UNHCR mandate. Massive refugee flows can place economic, social, and political strains on host countries, many of which, like Pakistan and Kenya, already suffer from state weakness and conflicts of their own. Thus, many refugees remain in exile for years. The

UNHCR estimates that some 5.5 million of the world’s refugees, in 21 host countries, are in protracted refugee situations in which “25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in any given asylum country.”⁸⁵ The most controversial protracted refugee issue involves the 4.8 million Palestinians not included in the UNHCR data who live in camps in the Middle East and are sustained by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Table 12.2 shows the concentration of refugees in different continents. Such protracted situations occur in the poorest, most unstable regions of the world and refugees there are often forgotten or ignored.⁸⁶

At first, UNHCR tried to settle refugees in new countries but, in recent years, as the burden has grown, countries have become less willing to accept refugees on a permanent basis, and in some countries there has been a backlash against them. The sagas of Vietnamese boat people victimized by pirates and then refused entry into other Asian countries or of Albanians and Haitians fleeing hardship and tyranny turned away by Italy and the US respectively are well known. Having lost special refugee status in 1994, many of the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees who fled their country after 1975 languished in crowded Asian detention camps. Because of demands from host countries, the UN High Commission agreed to repatriate these refugees to Vietnam, forcibly if necessary, and close the camps. Today, as many as 40 percent of the world’s countries have implemented policies to limit numbers of refugees.⁸⁷

National policies toward refugees are often dictated more by political than humanitarian

Table 12.2 Refugee population by UNHCR region, December 2009

Africa (excluding North Africa)	2,074,800
Americas	812,300
Europe	1,647,500
Asia and Pacific	258,400
Middle East and North Africa	2,005,900

motives. Thus, during the Cold War the United States readily accepted Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union, as well as Eastern Europeans, Cubans, and Vietnamese fleeing communism. By contrast, in 1992 the US detained the flood of Haitian refugees trying to escape poverty and violence at home at the US base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba.

UNHCR now encourages the voluntary return of refugees to their home countries and provides them with the basic requirements to restart their lives. In assisting refugees, UNHCR draws assistance from other international agencies such as the World Food Program, the UN Children's Fund, the WHO, the UN Development Program, and the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as NGOs like the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Undocumented aliens

Illegal immigration is different than the refugee issue. Countries are not legally obligated to accept migrants who leave poor countries as "economic refugees." Between 1990 and 2005, the number of migrants globally jumped from 155 to 191 million.⁸⁸ The UN projects that between 2000 and 2050, those countries that will receive the most undocumented aliens will be the US, Germany, Canada, and Britain. By contrast, most these migrants are expected to come from China, Mexico, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.⁸⁹


Those who migrate often take poorly paid jobs and remit part of their earnings to relatives back home, estimated at \$414 billion in 2009 of which \$316 billion went to LDCs. Remittances exceeded 10 percent of gross domestic product in 22 recipient countries and 20 percent of GDP in another 11.⁹⁰ In 2008, Mexican migrants in the United States remitted about \$25 billion back home, accounting for 2 percent of Mexico's GDP and greatly exceeding official development assistance to Mexico.⁹¹ Host states benefit from the influx of low-wage labor and the taxes they

pay. Mexican workers, for example, earn about one-tenth of what Americans earn in similar jobs. For these reasons, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that "migration is not a zero-sum game" and that in "the best cases it benefits the receiving country, the country of origin and migrants themselves."⁹²

There are an estimated 214 million people living outside the countries in which they were born, an increase of 37 percent in 20 years, with most living in Europe (69 million), Asia (61 million), and North America (50 million).⁹³ The money that such migrants remit home is a vital resource for poor countries, in 2000, adding more than 10 percent to the GDP of such countries as El Salvador, Eritrea, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Yemen.

The United States is a nation of immigrants, and successive immigrant waves have enriched American culture. Some observers are, however, uneasy about the high level of Hispanic immigration. They are concerned about the pressures that immigrants place on local services like schools and welfare, ignoring the taxes that immigrants pay. Labor unions fear that illegal immigrants will work for low wages and compete with American workers for jobs though immigrants frequently take jobs that other Americans avoid and their relatively low wages limit inflation. By 2008, some 12 million undocumented aliens of whom 75 percent are Hispanic lived in the US. Map 12.3 shows illegal immigrants in the US are concentrated in California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida where they constitute large proportions of their states' populations.

The roughly 500,000 illegal immigrants entering Europe each year come from diverse locations – North Africa, Central Europe, and South Asia. Their presence has created resentment and political support for right-wing political parties. Owing to the end of border controls in much of the EU, once illegal aliens enter Europe, they enjoy considerable freedom of movement. And, despite efforts to harmonize policies, EU members still pursue different policies toward



Map 12.3 Distribution of illegal aliens in the US, 2008

Source: Jeffrey S. Passell and D'Vera Cohn, "A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States," Pew Research Center Publications, April 5, 2011.

asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. Problems of assimilating culturally exotic groups are greater in Europe than the US because European societies are more homogeneous and have less experience with large-scale immigration.

View of immigration must take account of significant demographic and economic trends. Although attention has been paid to the threat that population growth in LDCs poses to the global environment, in recent decades observers have thought seriously about the *absence* of population growth in rich countries and the growing burden posed by aging populations. The growing number of elderly relative to younger people means that fewer people are available to pay the taxes needed to provide social security and

medical services for growing populations of senior citizens. In addition, the dearth of young people threatens future labor shortages, especially in poorly paid jobs.

Immigration and demography

Although the proportion of elderly relative to the rest of the population is increasing globally, these trends are sharpest in the world's economically advanced regions. In Europe, the percentage of those over 60 years of age is expected to rise from 20 percent in 2000 to 37 percent in 2050. In Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Japan, Slovenia, and Spain, the percentage of those over

60 is expected to exceed 40 percent by 2050. By 2000, the median age of Europeans was 38 years, over twice that of Africans, and was projected to rise to 49 by 2050 (when most Africans will still be under 25 years of age).⁹⁴ These data translate into larger numbers of dependents and a growing financial burden on a progressively smaller proportion of working adults. Thus, between 2000 and 2050, the ratio of people over 65 to those of working age is likely to jump from 22 to 51 in Europe and 19 to 35 in North America with Spanish, Japanese, and Italian workers bearing the largest burdens.⁹⁵

Other than higher **birth rates** and employing larger numbers of women and the elderly, immigration is the only solution to easing the negative consequences of aging populations. High rates of immigration – legal and illegal – mean that the United States is better prepared to deal with the social and economic burdens of aging populations than Japan or Europe where resistance to absorbing culturally different aliens remains intense. The alternative is the export of more jobs overseas. The other side of the coin is that immigration from poor to wealthy regions is a safety valve for poor countries that affords opportunities for young people who would at best earn less and at worst be unemployed if they stayed at home where they would contribute to political unrest.

Growing numbers of undocumented aliens has produced networks of criminals who help smuggle migrants from LDCs into developed countries. Smuggling migrants to Europe and the United States has become a \$7-billion-a-year racket;⁹⁶ and, as the US tightens its borders, illegal immigration from Mexico has become extremely dangerous. Since 2001 more than 1800 bodies have been discovered in Arizona alone.⁹⁷

Human trafficking

Globalization has produced a demand for low-wage workers to occupy low-status jobs that can be filled only by illegal migrants, especially

women who are frequently hidden in an “informal” underground economy. That labor market is unregulated and affords little legal protection for those involved in it.

Globalization has thus fostered human trafficking in which illegal migrants are transported, sometimes by force, from LDCs to developed countries. Many work as gardeners, maids or caregivers in the homes of wealthy professional couples, sometimes finding themselves as virtual slaves, viewed as commodities to be bought at the lowest cost possible. Illegal migrants who work as domestic servants are poorly paid, and their own children at home are deprived of their parents. Globalization has also increased sex tourism and the import of brides, especially from Asia to the West. Sex tourism entails abuse by public officials and even the captivity of women by foreigners.

Although the United States ranks high in terms of efforts to reduce human trafficking, it was ranked for the first time in the 2010 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report documenting human trafficking and modern slavery. The report found that in America men, women, and children were subject to trafficking for “forced labor, debt bondage, and forced prostitution.”⁹⁸ Among those countries cited as doing the least to combat human trafficking were the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Kuwait, Laos, and Thailand. Women and even children brought to such countries are frequently victims of kidnapping and are employed as prostitutes and virtual sexual slaves.

We now turn to the issue of disease, often associated with the increasing mobility of populations. Health and disease are linked to poverty. Poverty produces weakened populations, refugee flows, famine, and disease, and illness contributes to poverty.

Globalized diseases

Globalized diseases are not new. Bubonic and pneumonic plague, carried by fleas that live on rodents, especially rats that hitched rides

aboard ships, repeatedly ravaged Europe. Plague epidemics, probably originating in China and Mongolia, followed the trade routes westward and reached Europe in the fourteenth century. By 1345, plague reached the lower Volga River and from there continued to the Caucasus, the Crimea, and Constantinople. In 1347, Genoese merchants carried the disease to Sicily from the Black Sea port of Kaffa. Within two months, half Messina's population was dead. The Black Death, as it was known, spread through Italy reaching France the following year, and then Germany and England. In under three years, Europe's population declined by one-third, and about 25 million people perished. Western Europe's population did not again reach its pre-1348 level until the sixteenth century. Whole areas were depopulated and abandoned, and agriculture declined.⁹⁹

Contemporary epidemics and pandemics

The large-scale movement of people associated with globalization has produced conditions for similar epidemics and pandemics (an epidemic that affects people in many countries). In 2004 and early 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) dealt with a variety of potential epidemics, most importantly, avian influenza, cholera in Africa, yellow fever in Africa and Latin America, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Africa, which causes death in 50 to 90 percent of all cases.¹⁰⁰ According to WHO, there are some 247 million serious cases of malaria annually, and over 800,000 people die from the disease each year, mainly children in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰¹ In addition, 1.7 million die from tuberculosis, with rapid increases in sub-Saharan Africa among populations weakened by HIV/AIDS.¹⁰² Malaria alone is estimated to cost Africa over \$12 billion annually. Other killing diseases that could be prevented if vaccines were readily available include diphtheria, measles, and polio.

High birth rates in poor countries among people living in crowded conditions with inadequate sanitary and medical facilities provide fertile soil for spreading diseases such as AIDS, malaria, and cholera, a disease arising from contaminated food and water. African sleeping sickness, river blindness, and the parasitic disease schistosomiasis also afflict many people in tropical regions.

Although heart disease and stroke are the chief causes of death worldwide, AIDS is today's deadliest pandemic and one of the major global killers and causes of disability in survivors.¹⁰³ By destroying lymphocytes necessary for the immune system to function, HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) causes AIDS, leaving victims vulnerable to a variety of deadly infections. The virus is transmitted through exposure to body fluids in the course of sexual relations, sharing hypodermic needles, and breastfeeding infants.

AIDS infected almost nine million people between 1980 and 1994, of whom 90 percent died. By the end of 2004, when annual AIDS deaths peaked, AIDS had cost over 20 million lives worldwide, and by 2009 about 33.3 million people were estimated to have contracted the HIV virus with three-quarters of the estimated 2.6 million new cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.¹⁰⁴ In China, too, the disease is spreading rapidly, with the number of estimated cases having risen 8 percent to 700,000 cases between 2005 and 2008, largely owing to growing drug use.¹⁰⁵ In some regions, the death toll has reversed previous gains in life expectancy and is revising future population estimates downward.


As shown in Map 12.4 HIV/AIDS has become a disease of the LDCs, while deaths in high-income countries have substantially dropped owing to the availability of antiretroviral drugs. LDCs account for over 90 percent of HIV infections since 1980, and the disease is spreading in densely populated areas of Asia, which had 352,000 new cases of HIV in 2009. China, where the disease has appeared in all that country's provinces (although five provinces account for 53 percent of all cases), is especially at risk, and Russia and Ukraine, where

social and political transformations have led to the opening of borders and widespread drug trafficking since the Cold War, have witnessed major increases in HIV/AIDS. Overall, sub-Saharan Africa has been hardest hit with 22.5 million people suffering from HIV (over two-thirds of all cases). Not all of Africa has been equally affected. In West and Central Africa, 12 countries have an HIV rate of 2 percent or less. The story is much different in southern Africa, where over a third of the world's population living with HIV can be found. Indeed, South Africa remains the country with the largest infected population, 5.6 million cases.¹⁰⁶ Owing to AIDS, life expectancy in South Africa plummeted between 1991 and 2006 from 63 years to under 50 years.¹⁰⁷ While life expectancy in developed countries like Japan is approaching 80, in the most afflicted African countries it declined at the peak of the pandemic to nearly 40 years or below, dropping to 34 for women and 37 for men in Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, even in those countries that have been most affected infection rates are gradually

declining, especially among young people who are adopting safer sex practices.¹⁰⁹

Poverty, inadequate healthcare, male dominance, and migrant workers living apart from families are among the sources of Africa's catastrophe. As in Europe during the Black Death, whole villages and regions have been depopulated. The consequences of HIV/AIDS illustrate how the various aspects of human security are linked. The disease takes a heavy toll among teachers, doctors, and other professionals, thereby blighting education, health, and economic progress in afflicted communities. Among its consequences are vast numbers of orphans, industries without workers, and fields that are left untended.

AIDS has been attacked globally by research, treatment, publicity, and education, but too little of this has taken place in the most severely affected regions. Global spending on HIV/AIDS reached \$6.1 billion in 2004. Increasingly, efforts are being made to provide antiretroviral drugs to the LDCs at affordable cost. Cooperation among major pharmaceutical companies, the UN, and



Map 12.4 HIV by region, 2009

the LDCs made it possible for 700,000 AIDS patients in the developing world to receive these drugs by the end of 2004. Nevertheless, too few countries recognize how massive the problem is, and national efforts have been poorly coordinated. As recently as 2001, South Africa's President Mbeki refused to declare AIDS a national emergency¹¹⁰ even though 290,000 South Africans would die of AIDS in 2003, 5.3 million aged 15 and over would suffer from HIV in 2005 (18.8 percent of adults), and about 1.2 million children would be orphaned as a result of the epidemic.¹¹¹ Mbeki's successor, Jacob Zuma has, fortunately, acted more vigorously to cope with the epidemic. Overall, global efforts to curb AIDS are beginning to succeed. UNAIDS reports that the incidence of HIV infection declined by over 25 percent in 33 countries between 2001 and 2009.¹¹²

DID YOU KNOW?

In 2002, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation committed \$100 million to slow the spread of HIV/AIDS in India. In 2005, it committed \$750 million to underwrite vaccinations for children around the world¹¹³ and \$258 million to research on malaria.¹¹⁴

SARS, polio, and avian influenza

One disease that has taken advantage of globalization is severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Between November 2002 and July 2003, over 8000 people contracted SARS, and of these 774 died. The disease involves a high fever, sometimes accompanied by chills, headache, coughing, and body aches as well as difficulties breathing. SARS was a challenge to WHO's Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response that limits epidemics by using early warning systems, coordinating international responses, and sharing information. To this end, WHO has

developed an Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR).¹¹⁵ In the case of SARS, WHO personnel, like good detectives, traced the outbreak of the epidemic from its first appearance in November 2002 and coordinated an international response.¹¹⁶

The story began with the appearance of a case of atypical pneumonia in Foshan City in China's Guangdong Province on November 16, 2002. Then, on February 10, 2003, the WHO office in Beijing received an email that described a "strange contagious disease" that in a week had "already left more than 100 people dead" in Guangdong Province. Two days later, Chinese health officials admitted that there had been hundreds of cases including five deaths in Guangdong between November and February but claimed that it had brought the epidemic under control.

On February 21, a doctor from Guangdong, who had experienced respiratory problems some days earlier, arrived in Hong Kong for a wedding. After checking in the Metropole Hotel, he went sightseeing. The next day he was admitted to hospital suffering from respiratory failure, where he died. A day later an elderly woman who had also stayed at the Metropole returned home to Toronto, Canada. On February 24, a Hong Kong resident, who had spent time in the Metropole, developed a respiratory infection but did not seek help. On the same day, the Global Public Health Intelligence Network learned of a "mysterious pneumonia" in the city of Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, that had infected 50 hospital workers.

The epidemic soon spread beyond China. On February 26, a businessman who had stayed at the Metropole across the hall from the Guangdong doctor was admitted to hospital in Hanoi, Vietnam, with respiratory distress. Some days later, seven Vietnamese health workers in Hanoi showed similar symptoms. On March 1, another former guest of the Metropole was hospitalized in Singapore with respiratory symptoms, and there followed other cases in Singapore involving young women who had traveled to Hong Kong

and had stayed at the Metropole. The following week, the elderly woman in Toronto died, and five members of her family were admitted to hospital with the infection. In addition, health workers in Hong Kong's Prince of Wales Hospital who had been in Ward A where the doctor from Guangdong had been treated began to show respiratory symptoms. Within days, the infection appeared in Taiwan.

Only on March 10 did China officially ask WHO for assistance in determining the disease's cause, and the organization issued a global alert about the disease following its spread among health workers in Hong Kong and Hanoi. On March 14, Canadian authorities alerted doctors and hospitals in Ontario of the outbreak of atypical pneumonia in Toronto. Early the next morning, Singaporean authorities sent an urgent warning to WHO that a doctor who had treated the country's first two cases of atypical pneumonia and who had himself complained of symptoms had embarked on a flight from New York to Singapore. On arriving in Frankfurt, Germany, the doctor and his family were quarantined. At this point, WHO issued a warning that the infection was spreading by air travel and gave the infection its name – severe acute respiratory syndrome.

New cases appeared in Canada, Singapore, Germany, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand, Britain, and, on March 20, the US. Only on March 17 did China finally provide WHO with a report of the original SARS outbreak in Guangdong. Working rapidly, WHO set up a network of laboratories in nine countries to identify SARS's cause and develop a test for the infection. Within a month, WHO identified the cause as a new coronavirus.

On April 11, South Africa became the 14th country to report the appearance of SARS. As the epidemic spread, China, Hong Kong, and Canada quarantined SARS victims, and, on April 2, WHO issued a travel advisory, recommending that travelers avoid Hong Kong and Guangdong Province, later adding Beijing and Shanxi Province, Tianjin, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan to the list.

Not until late June were travel restrictions to Beijing lifted, and only in July were Toronto and Taiwan described as free of new infection. Initial Chinese efforts to hide the epidemic's seriousness had delayed an effective global response. Only on March 26 did Chinese officials admit the seriousness of the epidemic that had swept Guangdong, and only on April 19 did the country's leaders order officials to tell the truth about SARS. In addition to lives lost, the economic consequences of the epidemic were steep. Tourism in Hong Kong came to a standstill for months, and a decline in travel was reported by all major airlines.

Another disease that has survived owing to globalization is polio. The disease, endemic to 125 countries in 1988, had been virtually wiped out by 2003 as a result of widespread immunization. In that year, however, vaccination was halted in northern Nigeria after local Islamic leaders alleged that the vaccine could make women sterile, transmit AIDS, and even that it was manufactured from pork. Travelers then spread the disease westward as far as Mali and southward as far as Botswana. Prospects for controlling the disease worsened when it arrived in Saudi Arabia (which had been polio free since 1995) with a Sudanese girl and a Nigerian boy who were among the vast crowds of Muslim pilgrims crowding into Mecca on the annual *hadj* or pilgrimage in January 2005 and returned to their homelands afterwards.¹¹⁷ Some months later, polio appeared in Indonesia, Yemen, Somalia, and then Angola. In the end, some 22 polio-free countries in Africa and Asia were reinfected after 2003.¹¹⁸ Immunization began again in 2004, and more than 80 million children were vaccinated. Nevertheless, roughly seven million Nigerian children under the age of 5 have not been immunized, and polio cases appeared in 15 countries in 2009.¹¹⁹

Finally, the prospect of avian influenza mutating into an epidemic in which people can directly transmit the disease to one another is a frightening one that evokes memories of the 1918–19 Spanish influenza pandemic that infected one-fifth of the world's population and killed between 20 and 40

million worldwide. The Spanish influenza first appeared at Camp Funston (now Fort Riley) in Kansas in March 1918, and it was carried by American troops going to fight in Europe. Thereafter, it spread like wildfire to China and Japan and then to Africa and South America. In September 1918, the pandemic reappeared in the United States, via war shipments to Boston, where it took a deadly toll. Some 200,000 Americans died of influenza in October alone, and military conscription was suspended. By the time the influenza had run its course, some 650,000 Americans had died as well as 450,000 Russians, 375,000 Italians, 228,000 Britons, 500,000 Mexicans, and millions of Asians.¹²⁰ Americans' lifespan dropped by ten years, and children skipped rope to the rhyme:

I had a little bird,
Its name was Enza.
I opened the window,
And in-flu-enza.¹²¹

Medical experts believe that the world may be closer to another influenza pandemic than at any time since 1968. In 2005, WHO, which uses a series of six levels of pandemic alert to inform the world of the seriousness of the threat, raised its alert to level 3 (“a new influenza virus subtype is causing disease in humans, but is not yet spreading efficiently and sustainably among humans”) in the case of avian influenza (H5N1 virus).¹²² In May 2006, WHO, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the giant computer company IBM, and several other groups formed the Global Pandemic Initiative in order to develop “the use of advanced analytical and computer technology as part of a global preparedness program for responding to potential disease outbreaks,”¹²³ especially predicting the spread of such diseases.

The avian influenza spread rapidly, and global response was hampered by the failure of some countries to provide timely information about cases within their borders. A lethal strain of the virus struck Hong Kong in 1997, and the city

responded by destroying large numbers of chickens and ducks. Additional outbreaks in Hong Kong were accompanied by outbreaks in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Failure to eradicate the virus, and the death of 44 victims in Thailand and Vietnam between December 2004 and January 2005 intensified fears that avian influenza might become a new pandemic. Migratory birds have been responsible for spreading the disease to China, Russia, Central Europe, and Turkey. Although the number of report cases death toll fell from 115 in 2006 to 48 in 2010,¹²⁴ a risk of pandemic remains.

Doctors Without Borders

Although globalization has created the conditions for the spread of pathogens and exotic diseases, it has also fostered innovative responses to health issues. In addition to international organizations like WHO, various humanitarian NGOs that specialize in alleviating illness in the developing world have emerged. The best known is Doctors Without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières* or MSF) that was founded in 1971 by a group of French doctors seeking to provide medical assistance to victims of armed conflict, epidemics, and natural and manmade disasters. In emergencies, MSF sends medical teams, armed with pre-packaged medical kits. In addition to its humanitarian activities, Doctors Without Borders is politically active in trying to eliminate the causes of the medical problems it treats, and its members publicize the actions of governments and other groups that imperil the health and wellbeing of people in countries in which it operates. Its many activities worldwide have gained global admiration, including the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize

Doctors Without Borders has become a transnational group with over 2700 doctors, nurses, other medical professionals, and local staff in over 60 countries in some of the most remote and impoverished regions of the world. Its medical volunteers provide services ranging from

primary healthcare and sanitation programs to surgery and the training of local doctors and nurses. It also runs programs to treat and eliminate diseases such as tuberculosis, AIDS, sleeping sickness, and malaria that take a heavy toll in poor countries, especially in Africa where MSF spends much of its funding. One of MSF's most spectacular successes was in West Africa where its teams vaccinated some 7.5 million people during a 2009 outbreak of meningitis.

MSF has gained considerable publicity for its activities on behalf of civilians caught in war zones, especially the floods of refugees fleeing civil wars in Africa in recent decades. The group's first wartime mission took place during Lebanon's 1976 civil war where its doctors and nurses aided Muslim casualties of Christian militias. Among its most dangerous missions were those sent to help Afghans fighting Soviet occupation of their country in 1979, relieve famine during Somalia's 1992 civil war, aid Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein's army in 1991, and provide medical assistance to Bosnian Muslim casualties during the 1992–96 siege of Sarajevo and the 1995 atrocities at Šrebreniça.

MSF's largest, most controversial, and complex mission was its effort to aid Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda to refugee camps in Congo after the 1994 genocide against Rwanda's Tutsis. On that occasion, the group was accused of unwittingly aiding members of Hutu militias who had been involved in the genocidal killings and who had accompanied the refugees. At present, Doctors Without Borders is involved in meeting the humanitarian crises posed by civil war in the Ivory Coast and the genocide in Darfur.

Medical tourism

Another innovative consequence of the globalization of medicine has been a growing global private market in medical treatment. As in global trade, countries specialize in treating and thereby profiting from particular illnesses. This has

produced the phenomenon of "medical tourism." Countries like India have established high-quality medical centers to serve citizens from wealthy countries like the US who seek medical treatment at lower cost than at home or from countries like Canada and Britain where government-run medical systems sometimes force people to wait long periods of time before receiving treatment. Bumrungrad International Hospital in Thailand advertises a coronary angiogram for \$3000, including two nights in a single room, a Caesarean section for \$1000, including four nights in a single room, and breast augmentation for about \$2000.¹²⁵ Medical tourism is so lucrative that the Philippines has introduced medical visas that will allow foreigners to stay in the country for up to six months for medical care.¹²⁶

Using the internet to advertise and send prescriptions and medical records anywhere on earth, some countries offers "package deals" in which patients are flown to a medical center, treated, and then enjoy a holiday at a local resort. The website MalaysiaHealthcare.com offers a variety of healthcare packages described as "the effective combination of a particular treatment requirement and a suitable holiday. The packages offered . . . have been planned keeping in mind the patient's state of health and the amount of post-operative recuperation required." The company offers a range of treatments, including cardio angiography (to determine the size of artery openings), gastrointestinal endoscopy, and a variety of dental and plastic surgery procedures.¹²⁷ Why Malaysia? Malaysia's Minister of Health provides 10 persuasive reasons: affordable procedures, modern facilities, professionals with internationally recognized credentials, short waiting time, social and political stability, ease of entry (travel visas), low cost of living, a variety of accommodation choices, ease of travel in the country, and "lots to see and do."¹²⁸ Someone wishing a root canal, for instance, might schedule a three-day, two-night package at the Holiday Inn Resort Damai Beach, an "idyllic resort" that "offers an abundance of land and sea-sports

activities for complete fun and relaxation.”¹²⁹ Of course, medical tourism does not benefit everyone. Some Nigerian health practitioners, for example, fear that at the rate Nigerians are seeking foreign medical care, Nigeria’s own health sector may collapse.¹³⁰

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced another major feature of the transformation of global politics now underway: the changing meaning of “security” and the emergence of new issues on the global security agenda. Today’s security agenda reflects a growing range of border-spanning threats to human life and wellbeing and the growing difficulties that states face in dealing with them.

The chapter has reviewed several issues associated with human security, including poverty, transnational crime, the global arms trade, refugees and migrants, human trafficking and disease. What these issues have in common is that they reflect the increasing interconnectedness of people around the world and the proliferation of collective problems that threaten everyone. Such issues defy easy resolution in a politically fragmented world, and encourage (but do not ensure) new forms of interstate and transnational cooperation. Resolving these problems will not only mean an expanding role for international and nongovernmental organizations but will also demand an increased and increasingly complex network of cooperation among states.

In the next chapter, we examine an additional source of insecurity. Since the end of the Cold War and the virtual disappearance of ideological conflicts between capitalists and communists, identities associated with nation, religion, and ethnicity increasingly occupy center stage. As we shall see, under some circumstances identity can be used to unify diverse peoples, but frequently it can become a source of conflict.

Student activities

Map exercise

Using Map 12.1, identify five non-European or North American countries in the G-20. What political and/or economic, features make these countries influential in global forums today?

Cultural materials

The great nineteenth-century British novelist Charles Dickens (1812–70) was personally acquainted with poverty, and several of his novels including *Oliver Twist*, *Bleak House*, and *Hard Times* depict poverty in England during the industrial revolution. Read one of these novels and report on the challenges to human security faced by Dickens’s characters.

Further reading

- Clawson, Patrick and Rensselaer W. Lee III., *The Andean Cocaine Industry* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). Analysis of the cocaine industry in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and of how American efforts to curb drug trafficking are hostage to local politics.
- MacFarlane, S. Neil and Yuen Foong, *Human Security and the UN* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006). Evolution of the idea of security for individuals, focusing on UN efforts to promote human security in the 1990s in regard to issues such as economic development and environmental deterioration.
- Newman, Edward and Joanne Van Selm, eds, *Refugees and Forced Displacement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003). How refugee movements are both a cause and a consequence of conflict within and among states, and why the issue should be treated as a problem of security.
- Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Random House, 1999). A systematic argument that freedoms and political liberty are necessary for sustainable economic development.
- Walters, Mark Jerome, *Six Modern Plagues and How We Are Causing Them* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003). Everything you wanted to know about six diseases from salmonella to SARS.

1389

Ottomans defeat Serbs in the Battle of Kosovo (Blackbirds Field)

1463

Ottoman conquest of Bosnia

1690

Battle of the Boyne

1848

Liberal and national revolutions sweep Europe

1859

Chechnya absorbed into Russian Empire

1943–57

Deportation of Chechens to Kazakhstan and Siberia

13

Identity politics: Nationalism, religion, and ethnicity

In 1976, a young Turk named Mihdat Güler moved to France, where he lived quietly as a legal immigrant with a wife and five children. Güler became one of France's 1500 *imams* – Islamic scholars and prayer leaders – and, according to French authorities, began to incite hatred of the West in his sermons, allowing the distribution of newsletters in his prayer room that encouraged violence against non-Muslims. In May 2004, French authorities arrested Güler and sent him back to Turkey in accordance with a 1945 law that permits the government to deport any foreigner believed to be a threat “to the security of the state or public safety.”¹ The French decision, authorities declared, was in the country's national interest.

The story of Mihdat Güler highlights the importance of **identity** in global politics. Identities reflect who people think they are and the group in which they belong. Changing identities have always been a feature of global politics. Thus, from Europe's Middle Ages to the twentieth century, a reshuffling of identities took place, so that citizenship and nationality, anchored in territory, took precedence over identities arising

from religion, class, **ethnicity**, and locality. States have used various methods to alter citizens' identities. One is through colonization (for example, China's settlement of Han Chinese in Tibet to outnumber ethnic Tibetans); a second is forced assimilation (for example, Syrian repression of Kurdish language and customs); and a third is “ethnic cleansing” (for example, Serbia's effort to expel Croats and Bosnian Muslims from Bosnia). For generations, states provided the psychological satisfaction of a broad group identity and a heightened measure of physical security and material satisfaction. As we shall see, identities are again undergoing significant reshuffling.

Identities highlight the role of **culture**, by which we mean the shared beliefs and values of a group as reflected in customs, practices, and social behaviour (see Figure 13.1). Constructivism is helpful in shedding light on how identities are critical for understanding interests. As political scientist Alexander Wendt explains it: “To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation,” and such ideas shape what we regard as in our interest. “Politicians,”

June 28, 1989	1991	1992–95	1994	1999
Slobodan Milošević publicly rouses Serb nationalism	Chechnya declares independence of Russia	Bosnian civil war	Russia intervenes in Chechnya	Kosovo war



Figure 13.1 Muslim women in France protesting a ban on wearing head scarves in schools

Source: 15.1/690

Wendt continues, “have an interest in getting re-elected because they see themselves as ‘politicians’; professors have an interest in getting tenure because they see themselves as ‘professors’.”²

The chapter opens by defining identities and how identities shape political behavior. While identities have always affected global politics, nonstate identities have become more important in recent decades. Individuals have multiple identities that, from time to time, come into

conflict, and we will examine suspicions that arise from the presence of multiple identities.

The chapter then describes how politicians can manipulate group identities to increase their political power and achieve political objectives. Often they do so by promoting political myths and symbols that intensify in-group feelings and demonize “others.”

Thereafter, we discuss the impact of several political identities. Nationalism is the best known

of these and has frequently been manipulated by leaders for political ends. We review the origins and bases of nationalism, including the role of common history and national myths, and contrast liberal with malignant nationalism. We then examine the relationship between nation and state, how the two ideas were merged, and how in recent years they are splitting apart.

Other identities are becoming more potent. Among the most important are religious identities, many of which have a long history, but which are of renewed importance owing to the spread of **religious fundamentalism**. Almost as important are ethnic identities that have triggered repeated spasms of violence in recent decades. Among the most deadly were conflicts in Yugoslavia in the 1990s that led to the break-up of that country. These conflicts influenced political scientist Samuel Huntington's belief that global politics is entering an era in which civilizations will collide and clash, the topic that closes the chapter.

Multiple identities

Identities are features that one recognizes as defining him- or herself and that, when shared with others, define a group. Each of us has multiple identities. A person may be a US citizen, an Asian-American, a Protestant, a student, a woman, a Democrat, and a capitalist all at the same time. Each identity implies a set of interests. Those who identify themselves as "working people" may support such goals as increasing the minimum wage and enforcing safety in factories. Women may lobby to assure equal pay with men, and women's groups may sue companies that fail to do so.

In this section, we examine how multiple identities may produce conflict and how, both in the past and present, class, religious, and other nonstate identities may conflict with citizens' loyalties to their countries. Especially in wartime, people's fears and prejudices may lead them to

conclude falsely that ethnic or religious minorities are disloyal. As we shall see, the growing population of Muslims in Europe in recent years has produced concern and unease in several European countries.

Conflicting identities as th eats to national unity

Individuals who share identities have a **collective identity**. This means they have interests in common and, sometimes, common enemies as well. American citizens, for example, have a national identity that produced a common interest in ensuring the survival and security of the US; during the Cold War, they perceived the USSR as a common foe. As a group, Latinos have an interest in immigration reform and may vote against those who oppose such reform. Whatever the common interest, it provides a psychological bond that is essential for political groups, including sovereign states, to remain cohesive for any length of time.

Although people have always had multiple identities, in recent centuries, most viewed citizenship as their principal political identity, and reserved their strongest loyalties for their nation-state. Those who identified strongly and publicly with other groups, for example an ethnic community, might be branded as traitors or **fifth columnists** and, if they openly opposed the state or rose up against it, would be brutally repressed. In the past, the question "what is your principal identity?" would likely have elicited the answer "American," "French," "Russian" or the name of some other country. It was not that people lacked other identities, but the dominance of the state in political life tended to marginalize those identities. Furthermore, by socializing citizens through education, indoctrinating the young by using symbols like a pledge of allegiance, and applying coercion if necessary, governments have tried, with differing degrees of success, to assure that their population identifies with and is loyal to the

state first and foremost. Enjoying legally recognized boundaries and sovereignty and capable of controlling their frontiers, states provided a reliable territorial basis within which they could fix and enforce boundaries of identity.

From time to time, the dominance of national identities in global politics has been challenged. In the decades before World War One, when industrialization and urbanization in Europe dramatically increased the size of the working class, or proletariat, **socialism**, an ideology that emphasized **class** rather than national or religious identities, grew in importance. In this case, being a worker or “prole” was a primary identity, and socialist ideology typically demanded an end to private property and the exploitation of workers. Socialism trumped religious identity, and Karl Marx referred to religion “as the opiate of the masses.” In their most famous political slogan, Marx and Friedrich Engels closed their *Communist Manifesto* by urging all those with proletarian identities to unite against the capitalists: “Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!”

DID YOU KNOW?

The term “fifth column” was coined during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) by fascist General Emilio Mola (1887–1937), who claimed in a radio broadcast that the city of Madrid, then under attack by his four advancing army columns, would fall into his hands because of a “fifth column” of sympathizers who were already in the city ready to rise up against the defenders. The term was popularized by Ernest Hemingway in a one-act play entitled *Fifth Column* and later extended to any unknown subversives.

As World War One approached, socialists argued that workers should refuse to fight for their countries because the coming conflict was really among capitalists seeking colonies and larger market shares for their exports. Russia’s Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Lenin, urged workers to remain loyal to their more fundamental identity, their class, “propagating the socialist revolution, and the necessity of using weapons *not against one’s own brothers*, the hired slaves of other countries, *but against the reactionary and bourgeois governments and parties of all nations.*”³ However, when the war did erupt, workers across Europe forgot their class identity, put down their shovels, picked up their rifles, and eagerly marched off to war, arm in arm with their fellow citizens.

In recent decades, as states’ dominance of global politics ebbs, other identities – old and new – are coming to the fore. Among the factors that account for the upsurge in nonstate identities are the declining importance of territory as a source of power and prosperity and the proliferation of globalized communication networks that allow people, however remote geographically, to communicate almost instantaneously. Global politics is witnessing a revival of ancient ethnic and religious identities as well as the invention of powerful new identities based on race, gender, and profession. Today, some of the answers one might get to the question “what is your principal identity?” are “I am a woman,” “an African American,” “a Christian,” “a Palestinian,” “a Tutsi,” “a poor person,” and so forth. And, as in the past, conflicting identities can produce intense passions.

Potentially conflicting identities and loyalties is a growing problem for Europe. For much of its history, Europe was overwhelmingly Christian, but large numbers of Muslims arrived after World War Two as a result of guest-worker programs, filling poorly paid jobs that Europeans refused. Although initially they were only supposed to be temporary residents, many remained. Europe’s Muslim population was enlarged by family reunification programs and additional immigrants,

reaching an estimated 15 to 20 million by 2005 or between 4 and 5 percent of total population, far more than the estimated percentage of Muslims in the United States.⁴ In Spain, only 3.2 percent of the population was foreign born in 1998, yet by 2007, 13.4 percent were Muslim. Europe's Muslim population doubled during the past three decades and is expected to double again by 2015.⁵ Today, many children and grandchildren of the first generation of Muslim migrants in Europe are alienated both from their parents' home countries and from Western culture and define themselves according to their religious roots. As shown in Figure 13.2, large majorities of Muslims think of themselves as Muslims first and only then as citizens of their country.




Figure 13.2 What do you consider yourself first

Source: "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religions and Cultural Attitudes", July 6, 2006, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, a project of the Pew Research Center

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Europeans have grown uneasy about the increasing numbers of Muslims in their midst, although majorities of Europeans still regard immigration from the Middle East and North Africa as positive.⁶ Large numbers of Muslims from Pakistan, Turkey, and North Africa live in British, German, and French cities, and many consider Europeans to be hostile toward them.⁷ France has Western Europe's largest proportion of Muslims (6 percent of its population), followed by the Netherlands (5.7 percent), Germany (5 percent), and Britain (2.7 percent).⁸ As a result, Islam is now the second largest religion in Europe, and European concern has been translated into increased votes for right-wing political parties. By contrast, only 0.8 percent of America's population is Muslim.⁹

European concern is reflected in controversy facing the EU about whether or not to admit Turkey as a member. Turkey is governed as a secular democracy by moderate Islamic political leaders and seeks to be a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, but is overwhelmingly Muslim. Those opposed to Turkish admission cite historical clashes between the Ottoman Turks and Christianity. Former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing declared that Turkey's admission to the EU "would mean the end of Europe."¹⁰ Inasmuch as only 20 percent of Europeans polled in 2009 thought that Turkey's admission to the EU would be a good thing and only 32 percent of Turks still had a favorable opinion of the EU,¹¹ the admissions process, for which formal negotiations began in 2005, is likely to be a thorny one.

France, long regarded as the epitome of a nation-state with a single, distinctive secular and national culture, is confronting challenges to its homogeneity. More than Americans or British, French citizens believe that "outsiders" in their country should assimilate, speaking French and adopting French secularism. This belief has been challenged in recent years by growing numbers of Muslims, many of whom live in isolated slums. France is now home to about 3.5 million Muslims,

largely North Africans who emigrated over the years from France's former colonies of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. In recent years, controversy has swirled over French efforts to foster their secular national culture by banning the wearing of "conspicuous" religious symbols such as Muslim headscarves (*hijabs*) in French schools. With public opinion indicating that some 70 percent of its population favors such a ban, the French passed a law to that effect in 2004. Then, in November 2005, French cities were swept by violent unrest in their predominantly Muslim neighborhoods or *banlieues*. In 2010, with the support of 80 percent of the public, France (following Belgium) banned wearing the *niqab* (a full body veil which leaves the eyes uncovered) and the *burqa* (a full body veil that covers the eyes) in public.¹²

Unlike French Muslims, British Muslims or their parents are largely from Pakistan and India, former British colonies. On July 7, 2005, a series of suicide bombings carried out in London's transport system by Muslims with British citizenship resulted in 52 deaths and hundreds injured and created concern about public safety in the country. As a result, the British government passed the Terrorism Act 2006 that made it illegal to plan terrorism, "directly or indirectly incite or encourage others to commit acts of terrorism," including "the glorification of terrorism," disseminate terrorist publications, or provide training in terrorist techniques.¹³ A year later British authorities disrupted a plot to blow up 10 US-bound passenger jets in flight with liquid explosives that would have caused what British authorities called "mass murder on an unimaginable scale."¹⁴

As a consequence of such incidents, some observers argue that London has become a dangerous locus for Islamist militants and their sympathizers. Referring to the city as "Londonistan," they argue that its mosques have become centers of recruitment for Islamic causes and a source of danger to US security.¹⁵ In a 2006 poll, 81 percent of British Muslims declared that they considered themselves as Muslims first

and British second. Majorities of 69 percent of Muslims in Spain and 66 percent of Muslims in Germany gave similar answers.¹⁶ Many feel like outsiders in Europe's secular communities, especially while British and American troops are fighting Muslims in Afghanistan and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists.

The ambiguous position of Muslims in countries like France and Britain highlights the fact that multiple identities may produce divided loyalties. Sometimes such concerns are well founded, but often, as in the case of Japanese-Americans during World War Two, they may lead to grave injustices.

Divided loyalties?

America's multicultural tradition permits students greater latitude in expressing their identities than in France, but even in the US there have been incidents in which Muslim girls who wore headscarves have been sent home, including one that occurred at the Benjamin Franklin Academy in Muskogee, Oklahoma, in 2003.¹⁷

Opponents of such bans argue that they discriminate against observant Muslims who believe that women should dress modestly. *Burqas*, however, have been worn to disguise suicide bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, some observers contend that headscarves and other Islamic dress reflect the unwillingness of those who wear them to integrate into non-Muslim societies and symbolize women's subservience to men in Islam. Thus, French President Nicolas Sarkozy described the *burqa* as "a sign of subjugation" that is "not welcome on French territory."¹⁸ In some Muslim societies, the failure of women to dress as militant Muslim men believe they should has had fatal consequences. For example, according to a Western newsman who was held hostage, women who were not wearing Islamic dress were killed in Basra, Iraq, after the British withdrawal from that city in summer 2007.¹⁹

Although most people have multiple identities, few of these are politically salient at any moment. Identity is contextual, and it is only when an issue affects the welfare of those in a particular group that identity assumes importance. When issues arise that touch on women's rights, women start to think of *gender* as their principal identity. Whether such women are American or Iranian or are Catholic or Protestant matters less than the fact that they are women. Similarly, when famine and civil war threaten people in sub-Saharan Africa, African-Americans may be reminded of their kinship with the continent from which their ancestors came centuries earlier and may lobby US leaders to provide humanitarian relief. Every issue calls forth somewhat different identities that help explain the political preferences people have regarding those issues.

Sometimes, issues arise that force individuals to choose between competing identities. When America's Civil War erupted, Southerners had to choose whether to fight for the United States (the Union) or join the Confederacy. Among those who confronted this fateful choice was General Robert E. Lee (1807–70), who had to decide between his identities as a Virginian and an American. When the war loomed, Lee was regarded as among the most talented generals in the US Army. Although Lee was opposed to slavery, he felt a deeper tie to his native Virginia than to the United States. He explained his decision in a letter to his sister:

With all my devotion to the Union and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I have therefore resigned my commission in the Army, and save in defense of my native State, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my sword.²⁰

Since the September 11 attacks by Al Qaeda terrorists and the subsequent War on Terrorism,

American Muslims have been torn between their identities as Americans and as Muslims. In a few cases, American Muslims have turned against their country. Nidal Malik Hasan, an American-born Muslim of Palestinian descent and a US Army psychiatrist killed 13 people at Fort Hood in November 2009; Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani with American citizenship, tried to set off a bomb in New York's Time Square in May 2010; and five American Muslims from Virginia were convicted in Pakistan in June 2010 for conspiring to attack Americans in Afghanistan.²¹ And some Americans have come to view Muslims living in the US with suspicion even though virtually all American Muslims are loyal citizens.

The concern that US Muslims might put their religious identity before their national identity recalls the fear that swept the United States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. At that time, the US government feared that American-Japanese citizens might be fifth columnists who would place their Japanese identity ahead of their loyalty to the United States (see Key document, below). Thus, in February 1942, President Roosevelt ordered the internment of about 120,000 Japanese-Americans (two-thirds of whom were native-born citizens) living on the West Coast. In the 1944 case of *Korematsu v. United States*, the US Supreme Court ruled that the internments were constitutional even though those interned had been forced to sell their homes and had committed no crime. This episode in American history was finally brought to a close in 1988 when the Congress apologized for the internments and agreed to pay compensation to the 60,000 surviving internees.

In sum, those with similar salient identities can differentiate themselves from others, and as we shall see, they create boundaries that separate them from "others" outside their group. The process in which identities create in-groups and out-groups is a recurrent feature of global politics and a source of potential conflict. Such groups are separated by psychological distance even when they reside in close proximity. By contrast, modern technology makes it possible for people living

KEY DOCUMENT

LETTER TO MISS CLARA ESTELLE BREED, THE CHILDREN'S LIBRARIAN AT THE SAN DIEGO PUBLIC LIBRARY FROM 1929 TO 1945, FROM A JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNED IN POSTON, ARIZONA²²

November 30, 1942

Dear Miss Breed,

Since I did not do any house moving in Santa Anita, I'm doing double duty here . . .

After 6 weeks of school life in camp has become similar to the life in San Diego. We now have a school paper. At the present there is a contest going on in submitting names for the school . . .

A friend who returned from Colorado related the following incident to me. He said, while in town a few boys entered a restaurant to have a bite to eat. The first thing the waitress asked was "Are you Japs?" When they replied "yes" she turned her back on them and said they don't serve Japs. So they had to go to another restaurant to eat. Here is another incident which disgusted the boys. When the boys asked a policeman where a certain store was he replied - "I don't serve Japs." One of the boys became angry and remarked - "Alright be that way - what do you think we came out here for? We didn't come to be made fun of - we came to help out in this labor shortage." Then the policeman apologized and showed them to the store. This boy said he certainly was glad to return to camp where there is no unfriendliness. Of course, he knows and we all know that there are people all over the world who hate certain races and they just can't help it. But I am sure when this war is over there will be no radical discrimination and we won't have to doubt for a minute the great principles of democracy.

One discouraging thing which occurred here is the building of the fence. Now there is a fence all around this camp. I hope very soon this fence will be torn down. I always seem to rattle on and on about myself . . .

Most sincerely,

Louise Ogawa

Please do write during your leisure time.

even at great distances to feel a close kinship to one another.

"We" versus "them" in global politics

Common identities foster group formation (in-groups), while those with other identities remain

"outsiders" or "aliens" (out-groups). As a result, a basic fact in global politics is a world divided into groups that often mistrust one another. Hostility among territorial states reflects such intergroup mistrust, as do conflicts among such diverse actors as the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups in Kenya, and Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq. Such conflicts reflect age-old divisions between peoples with conflicting identities. Members of each

group believe they have something in common with one another that distinguishes “them” from “others” who are different. People tend to like those who are like themselves and are members of the same identity group, and they come to depend on one another. As a result, people’s loyalties follow their identities.

By contrast, people feel less loyalty to members of groups in which they are not members or from which they are excluded. “We” may dislike “them” or even regard “them” as inferior. Such identity-based feelings strengthen bonds within groups but also cause or exacerbate conflicts and violence in global politics. Sometimes, one group blames another unjustly – a **scapegoat** – for its own failings, thereby avoiding the need to acknowledge its own responsibilities.

When those in one group feel superior to those in another, they may persecute their “inferiors.” In extreme cases, such as the Nazi belief that Jews were a cause of Germany’s woes after 1919 and were inferior to German “Aryans,” the result may be a genocide in which one side seeks to exterminate the other.

Many of today’s most intractable conflicts pit identity groups against one another, as in the violence between ethnic Africans and Arabs in Sudan. For over 20 years, violence raged between the largely Christian black Africans in Sudan’s south and the forces of Sudan’s Islamic Arabs in the north. No sooner was this conflict settled in 2003 than Islamic black Africans living in the Darfur region of western Sudan rose in revolt against the country’s Arab-dominated government. Both conflicts were identity wars. When asked about the possibility of coexistence between Africans and Arabs in Darfur, a leader of the African rebels answered: “Impossible! Arabs and Africans living in one village? Impossible!”²³ In his view, too vast a psychological gulf separated Arabs and Africans in Sudan for them to live in peace. Thus, in 2011 South Sudan became an independent state.

The degree to which groups see the world differently reflects **psychological distance**, and the

DID YOU KNOW?

The real Aryans were not Germans, but a nomadic people from Central Asia who settled in northern India in about 1500 BC.

greater that distance, the more that people will have different values and interests. When groups are separated by great psychological distance, they view the world through different lenses, and the probability is high that they will misperceive or misunderstand one another and find themselves in conflict. Today, psychological distance is largely unrelated to geographic distance. New technologies and the advent of globalized economic and cultural systems make it possible to maintain relative intimacy even at great physical distance. By contrast, even people who live near one another may psychologically be worlds apart.

In the world’s urban centers, such as New York, Johannesburg, and Rio de Janeiro, the very rich and very poor live next to one another even while existing in different worlds. Despite physical proximity, they have little in common. Many of the rich are members of a global business elite that is psychologically distant from the poor whom they pass on the street every day. Members of this elite may work for giant transnational corporations like Microsoft or Siemens. Regardless of nationality, most speak English as their common language, dress the same, have similar customs, holiday together, share the same views on economics and politics, and send their children to the same universities. They travel widely and stay in touch with one another by means of email, fax machines, BlackBerries, and mobile phones. And, they have more in common with and feel a greater kinship toward one another than toward their impoverished countrymen.

This new commercial elite resembles Europe’s aristocracy in the eighteenth century, whose

members had more in common with one another than with commoners in their own country. Most spoke French rather than their local language and were linked by bonds of marriage, personal friendship, and common interests in maintaining their status and privileges. Like those who constitute today's globalized elite, eighteenth-century aristocrats wore the same clothes, dressed the same way, and in general, enjoyed a shared culture that helped them empathize with and understand one another.

Identity groups tend to be **moral communities**, in which members feel that they are obliged to treat one another according to shared norms and standards that do *not* apply to "outsiders." Sameness provides the **legitimacy** for such communities and is a reason why members respect their laws and customs. By contrast, those outside a moral community may be viewed as *not* meriting equal treatment simply by virtue of being outsiders.

Europeans in the seventeenth century saw themselves as united in a community of Christians who should treat one another as brothers and who were subject to the limitations of international law. However, when the Spaniards and Portuguese collided with indigenous "pagan" Indians during their conquest of South and Central America, they regarded the Indians as beyond such legal protection. European lawyers and theologians argued that a war conducted in order to Christianize a pagan people constituted a "just war." Only when Spanish missionaries and theologians like the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria (c.1486–1546), backed eventually by the Spanish monarchy, declared that the indigenous people of the Americas had rights, did their situation improve. Vitoria argued that under natural law Indians were free people who had owned their land before the Spaniards arrived and denied that they lacked the power of reason and were, therefore, naturally slaves: "There is a certain method in their affairs," he wrote, "for they have polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and

a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason: they also have a kind of religion. Further, they make no error in matters which are self-evident to others; this is witness to their use of reason."²⁴

Today, identities are in flux, and states are hard pressed to maintain national identity as primary. One reason that state identities are weakening is the emergence of new globalized communications technologies that governments have difficulty controlling.

Identities and technological change

In past centuries, governments fostered nation-state identities by controlling the channels of social communication, making it difficult for "alien" identities to compete effectively. States influenced citizens' perceptions and beliefs by filtering the information available to them. Their capacity to influence the printed word, radio, film, and television allowed them to promote patriotism and domestic unity, and to encourage amity or enmity toward "others."

But, technological change is relentless. Today, microelectronic technologies decentralize information production, and networking dramatically empowers social groups like Mexico's Zapatistas and China's Falun Gong. In short, technology fosters new identities, and weakens old ones. The accelerating pace of technological change in recent decades complicates states' ability to control the flow of information and ideas to citizens. Nowhere is this more evident than in China, which wants to retain central communist party control over ideology while using new technologies for economic development. As long as television, radio, and the press were the sole sources of news, it was relatively easy for the regime to control information dissemination. Today, however, as we saw in Chapter 6 (p. 196), the internet poses special problems in countries like China and Iran.

The same technologies threaten states' ability to promote a unifying national tradition that differentiates "us" from "them" and anchors people's loyalties. Such traditions – built on religion, language, mythology, literature and poetry, historical events, and ways of dress – promote political legitimacy and define the moral community. People can learn from satellite television, the internet, and films that there are others not only "unlike them" but – equally important – also "like themselves," about whom they had known little before and with whom they can communicate. New categories of "us" and "them" are made available for political mobilization. Thus, traditional leaders fear that women and young people are susceptible to the lure of Western materialism, secularism, and individualism and that the conservative and stabilizing doctrines of piety and party may be swept aside. Islamic fundamentalism is in part a backlash against Western materialism.

Multiple identities, then, can produce conflict that threatens the integrity and unity of states. Divided loyalties – real or imagined – produce social fissures. Common identities are the bases of group loyalties, just as different identities separate groups, and new technologies make it easier for transnational identities and loyalties to arise.

The next section examines how political leaders can manipulate identities for their own purposes. The cases of Yugoslavia and Chechnya in Russia illustrate how charismatic politicians can cleverly manage the identities of followers to foster their personal power and pursue their own interests. And, as we shall see in the case of Northern Ireland, myths and symbols are critical to sustaining identities.


Manipulating identities

When violence erupts between identity groups, newspapers often report the "appearance of ancient rivalries" or "the resurgence of old hatreds." Such reports are deceptive. What often

happens is that an event occurs that either sharpens an existing identity or reawakens consciousness of old rivalries. Thus, perceived British injustice in the decades before the Revolutionary War helped forge a common American identity where previously there had been 13 separate identities. Political leaders take advantage of such events to achieve their own goals. They may manipulate identities for their own benefit and intensify the passions of followers by adroitly using symbols and historical myths, which they tailor to reinforce their political power. Mythmaking, then, entails a struggle over how history is written and the memories it evokes.

Several cases help illustrate how events can reawaken and reshape identities and how political leaders can manipulate symbols of identity for their own ends. In Bosnia, for example, people had adopted Islam following the area's conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1463. However, Bosnian Muslims were relaxed about their religion. More important was their ethnic identity as Slavs. The central political cause animating Bosnians in the decades prior to World War One was a desire for independence of Slavic peoples like themselves who had been absorbed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (see Map 13.1). Until civil war erupted in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, Bosnian Muslims had rarely identified themselves in terms of religion. "We never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims," declared a school teacher. "We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered, because we were Muslims, things changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers."²⁵

Conflicting identities in Yugoslavia were encouraged and manipulated by the ambitious leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. Milošević, who had been a communist all of his political career, transformed himself into a popular Serb nationalist as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. Increasingly, he spoke of old wrongs done to Serbs by Croats and other national groups in Yugoslavia, and so frightened these other groups that they, too, chose rabid nationalists as leaders.



Map 13.1 The Former Yugoslavia

In an effort to foster his nationalist credentials and rouse nationalist fervor among Serbs, Milošević focused on an ancient battle at Kosovo Polje (Plain of the Blackbirds) of June 15, 1389, in which a Muslim Ottoman army had crushed a Christian Serbian army under King Lazar (1329–89) (see Key document, below). Milošević repeatedly posed as the successor to Lazar, defending Christian Serbs against Muslim “Turks,” thereby focusing Serbian hatred against Muslims in Yugoslavia, especially Bosnian Muslims and Muslim Albanians living in Kosovo. In this way, Milošević increased his popularity among Serbs, deepened Serb nationalism, and unleashed the bloodiest wars that Europe had seen since 1945.

Chechnya provides another example of an identity war (see Map 13.2). The Chechen republic is located in a rugged and inaccessible mountainous area of the Caucasus. In addition to Chechnya, the area includes another six Russian republics, all of which are ethnically diverse. Among them, Dagestan alone is inhabited by

about 30 nationalities, each with its own language and customs. Like Bosnia, much of the Caucasus adopted Islam while ruled by the Ottoman Empire, which retreated from the region in the face of Russian pressure in 1785. Yet, despite repeated efforts to “Russify” them, the mountain peoples of the Caucasus retained their identity, and Chechnya did not become part of the Russian Empire until 1859. In 1943, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin deported some half-million Chechens to Kazakhstan and Siberia, turning over their lands to non-Chechens. Only in 1957 were the Chechens allowed to return.

Taking advantage of the turmoil engulfing Russia during the final days of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev (1944–96) seized power in Chechnya in 1991 and declared Chechen independence. After three years of nominal independence, Russia intervened in August 1994 to put an end to Chechnya’s secession. After another two years of bloody but inconclusive warfare, the Russians withdrew, but, following a series of

KEY DOCUMENT

SPEECH BY SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ ON THE 600TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF KOSOVO, JUNE 28, 1989²⁶

By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity . . . Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future . . .

Today, it is difficult to say what the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo is and what legend is. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. Therefore it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we survived in this slavery . . . What has been certain through all the centuries until our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom.

The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression.

Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others . . .

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way, but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity. In this spirit we now endeavor to build a society, rich and democratic, and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country, this unjustly suffering country, but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age that they make for a better and happier world.

Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!

Long live Serbia!

Long live Yugoslavia!

Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples!



Map 13.2 The Chechen Republic in Russia and the neighboring Republics of Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Dagestan

terrorist explosions in Moscow and other Russian cities in 1999 and a Chechen incursion into neighboring Dagestan, President Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops back into Chechnya. Despite Russian claims that Chechen resistance had ended, violence continued, climaxing in a series of terrorist incidents in Russia in 2004 including destruction of two Russian civilian airliners and

the deaths of more than 350 hostages, mainly children, after the seizure of a Russian school in Northern Ossetia in September. So complex is the ethnic mix in the Caucasus that Ossetian anger was directed not only towards Chechnya but also toward ethnic Ingush – some of whom may have been involved in the hostage crisis – who are related to Chechens and live in neighboring

Ingushetia. Since then, Russia has crippled the Chechen rebel movement, imposed a pro-Moscow regime and officially ended its military campaign in April 2009.²⁷ Nevertheless, the North Caucasus remains the scene of frequent violence, and Moscow continues to be a target for terrorist bombings by militant Muslims.

Like Bosnians, Chechens, although Muslim, rarely identified themselves in terms of their religion until after the Russian invasion. Prior to that, according to one Chechen: “Nobody talked about religion. But these days it seems that nobody can stop talking about it. Nearly every Chechen soldier swears allegiance to Allah, taking *gazavat*, the holy oath to die fighting the invaders.”²⁸

Like Serbia, Chechnya had a leader who manipulated his people’s identities and tailored his own identity to increase political support. Shamil Basayev (1965–2006) was the leader of Chechnya’s independence movement. Basayev was responsible for terrorist atrocities that shook Russia in the autumn of 2004 and was finally killed by Russian authorities in July 2006. He began his armed struggle against Russia as a Chechen nationalist and revolutionary romantic who idolized Ché Guevara but later adopted the new identity of fervent Islamic militant. Basayev (who took the name Abdullah Shamil Abu Idris) and others who adopt the ideology of radical Islam, whether from true conversion or not, can secure funding from wealthy Arab governments and rally zealous Muslims from around the world to their cause.

Both Milošević and Basayev could provide their followers with victories, Milošević in seizing the city of Vukovar from Croatia in 1991 and Basayev in successful raids into Russia, including Moscow. They are only a few of many leaders throughout history who have understood the power of myths and symbols, especially those that include some type of divine sanction, in manipulating people’s identities and attracting their loyalties. Chinese dynasties routinely depicted themselves as heirs to China’s mythical sage kings who were divinely

DID YOU KNOW?

The Emperor Augustus of Rome commissioned Virgil to write the epic poem *The Aeneid* in order to legitimize imperial Rome (and Augustus as emperor) and to proclaim Rome’s descent from Troy. After fleeing from the burning city of Troy, the hero Aeneas arrives in Italy, where he marries Lavinia, the daughter of the king of Latium, and becomes the ancestor of Romulus and the Romans.

mandated to rule the empire. Shinto, which proclaimed Japanese emperors to be divine, depicted an unbroken imperial line of over two millennia from the founding sun goddess.

Leaders realize that, if they can (re)write history to show that they symbolize an epic struggle by an identity group to gain independence and respect, they can rally members of that group behind them. In highlighting ancient grievances and triumphs, these leaders create “memories” for their followers. To anchor those memories, they encourage parades, ethnic ceremonies and rituals, monuments, and pageants that remind people of who they are and what their ancestors accomplished.

Symbols and symbolic acts are highly valued in Ireland that has for centuries witnessed conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Such acts allow political actors to construct reality and complicate efforts to ascertain objective historical “truth” since each generation writes history for its own purposes. Thus, every year on July 12, the city of Belfast in Northern Ireland, which for years witnessed violence between Catholics and Protestants, is the scene of rival parades in which Catholics wear green and Protestants orange. The most provocative of these parades is the “Orange Walk,” in which militant Irish Protestants memorialize the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 in which England’s Protestant King William III defeated the



Figure 13.3 An Irish approach to peace

Source: Martyn Turner

former King James II, a Catholic who had lost his throne in England's "Glorious Revolution" of 1688. The color orange became a Protestant symbol because the Dutch-born William had been Prince of the House of Orange. The night before the parade, at the stroke of midnight, Protestants light huge bonfires throughout Northern Ireland to the singing of patriotic songs (see Figure 13.3). The whole affair, however, is a distortion of historical reality intended to deepen the sense of identity among Irish Protestants. The battle itself was actually relatively minor. It was fought by mercenaries of diverse religions from all over Europe, and William's victory, far from being regarded as a Catholic defeat, was actually celebrated by the pope in Rome as a victory of the "European Alliance" over the pope's enemies in France and Britain. "It is," declares one historian, "unfortunately beyond all question that the Irish Catholics shed their blood like water and wasted their wealth like dirt in an effort to retain King James upon the throne."

But it is equally beyond all question that the whole struggle was no earthly concern of theirs; that King James was one of the most worthless representatives of a race that ever sat upon the throne; that . . . William was a mere adventurer fighting for his own hand . . . ; and that neither army had the slightest claim to be considered as a patriot army combating for the freedom of the Irish race.²⁹

Historical memories and myths, then, sustain old identities and loyalties so that they may flicker for generations, even centuries. Religion, literature, dialect, poetry, painting, music, and ritual are only a few of the ways in which such identities are nourished and sustained. "[W]hat better way," asks historian Anthony Smith, "of suggesting and inducing that sense of belonging than by 'rediscovering' submerged or lost ethnic roots in the mists of immemorial time?"³⁰ Such rediscovered roots also play an important role in creating and sustaining political communities and in providing such communities with legitimacy in the eyes of their members. However, the best known and most widely discussed of identities in global politics is nationalism.

Nationalism

Nationalism assumes the world is divided into distinctive "peoples." These peoples form nations whose members are loyal to one another and united in their desire to protect the nation and maintain its distinctiveness. Nationalism has been both hailed as a source of liberty and cultural flowering and denounced as a cause of war and hatred. In the next section, we shall discuss these views of nationalism and compare competing definitions of "nation" and "nationalism." We will then examine how ambitious leaders manipulate nationalism to acquire power and achieve their goals. Let us first consider what a nation is.

The bases of nationalism

Recognizing a nation is not easy. When asked what defines a nation, some point to a common language; others see common ethnicity or religion as the basis of nations; still others believe that nations consist of people who have a common history. Frequently, nations are defined by some mix of these characteristics. As a result, there is no consensual meaning of nation or national origin. All that everyone can agree on is that “nationals” share a sense of ownership in the “nation” as a whole and a sense of common destiny. As Walker Connor observes, “the essence of a nation is intangible. The essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it.”³¹ The “psychological bond” to which Connor refers is critical to understanding nationalism. Nations exist in people’s minds and become objective features of global politics only after people believe they exist. Unlike mountains or oceans, nations are invented by people who *believe* that they share a common destiny with others “like themselves.” Nations, then, are “imagined communities” that reflect the reality of shared features such as language, race, religion, or kinship.

Sometimes those shared features assume special importance because an enemy points to them as the reason for persecuting or attacking those who have them. In this way, what begins in people’s minds becomes real: Over time, people act in ways that deepen and anchor the bonds of nationhood, develop cooperative habits, and are threatened or persecuted by others as a group. Thus, when dominant nationalities try to force minority groups to give up their own language, as Turks did to Kurds living in Turkey or as Russians did to Latvians in the USSR, those efforts are likely to deepen national feelings. In response, victimized minorities resist as best they can the efforts to destroy their cultural inheritance. Such shared experiences then provide heroic myths and tales of resistance that deepen national feelings and pride and provide the members of a nation with a common history that “proves” their national identity.

As described in Chapter 2, after the French Revolution, nationalism in Europe provided states and rulers with greater political authority and military power. The creation of the nation-state convinced citizens that putting their lives on the line for “the fatherland” was a noble expression of self and a means of defending home and loved ones. Popular sovereignty – the idea that “the people,” now citizens, owned the states in which they lived – replaced dynastic sovereignty – the idea that kings owned the territory of states and the subjects who lived in that territory. In nation-states, the identity of rulers and ruled was fused, and states acquired “national interests.”

Was the spread of nationalism a positive or negative development? During the first half of the nineteenth century, many Europeans regarded nationalism as a benevolent ideology that went hand in hand with liberalism and democracy. Among the leading advocates of **liberal nationalism** was the Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72). Mazzini was a leading advocate of Italian unification and independence and fought Austrian domination of his countrymen. He believed that nationalism meant the liberation of people from foreign rule and that, when people were liberated and took control of their own affairs, they would naturally adopt democratic institutions. Europe in 1848 seemed on the verge of realizing Mazzini’s aspirations as revolutionary currents swept the continent, including Italy. In the end, however, liberal nationalism was crushed in Italy and elsewhere in Europe by conservative rulers. Over a half a century later, another great liberal, President Woodrow Wilson, followed in Mazzini’s footsteps in advocating national self-determination as the path to peace and democracy in global politics.

Even as Mazzini was extolling the liberal virtues of nationalism, others were exploring its darker side. Conservative politicians recognized that they could exploit national passions for their own ends. By manipulating such passions, they could reinforce both their own personal power and the power of the states they controlled.

Making use of crude analogies with Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, they argued that some nations were superior to others and that such superiority became apparent by "the survival of the fittest" in fighting and winning wars. Such **malignant nationalism** contrasted vividly with Mazzini's liberal variant.

As Mazzini had been an eloquent spokesperson for liberal nationalism, Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96) became a leading exponent of this darker version of nationalism. As a young man, Treitschke had been disappointed by the failure of the liberal 1848 revolution and became a supporter of Bismarck's realist policies of "blood and iron." Influenced by the philosopher Georg Hegel (1770–1831) and the jurist Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861), Treitschke, along with other Germans of his generation, regarded the nation (*Volk*) as a unique living and evolving cultural and historical insti-

tution with a collective will whose survival was guaranteed only by military strength. States, he argued, exist to foster nations, not individuals, from generation to generation. War, in his view, created nations and showed whether or not they were worthy of survival. "Brave peoples alone," he declared, "have an existence, an evolution or a future; the weak and cowardly perish, and perish justly. The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations."³²

Influenced by Treitschke's view of nations, German General Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849–1930), an ultranationalist military thinker, advocated German expansionism and contributed to the bellicose atmosphere in Germany in the years before World War One. In a widely read book entitled *Germany and the Next War* (1912), Bernhardi argued the virtues of war, contending that the desire for peace "has rendered most civilized nations anemic".

KEY DOCUMENT EXCERPTS FROM VON BERNHARDI'S *GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR*³³

War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization.

The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the result of contesting forces . . . The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favorable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb . . .

[I]n war, the nation will conquer which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend itself. War will furnish such a nation with favorable vital conditions, enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow . . .

We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the Powers of Europe; we now must decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a *World Empire*, and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been hitherto withheld from them . . .

We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonorably beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future.

The virulent nationalism of Treitschke, Bernhardt, and others in the late nineteenth century not only produced the militarist and racist atmosphere that fed the fires of war in the years before 1914 but also had more lasting effects. Fascism, with its emphasis on national myths and renewal, drew on their ideas and became the ideology of ultranationalists throughout Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Fascist dictators seized power in Italy and Spain and prospered in Eastern Europe, and Hitler and his Nazis assumed power in Germany. In each case, historical memories of national greatness (for example, the Roman Empire in Italy) that was allegedly undermined by factors like racial mixing were combined with promises of national revival and conquest. According to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who coined the term, fascism “conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State,” and “the growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality, and its opposite a sign of decadence.”³⁴ Fascists viewed the relationship between state and nation as close, but nations and states are not the same and, as we shall shortly see, their relationship has evolved over time.

Nations, states, and nation-states

Nationalism reinforced state power by providing an emotional and psychological element that made people feel as though they controlled their own destinies. The nation-state was a more cohesive and stronger political unit than any before it. Simultaneously, nationalism made the boundaries between states increasingly rigid, promoted interstate rivalry and conflict, and increased the size and intensity of wars. In a word, nationalism promoted unity within states and disunity among them.

In Western Europe, the boundaries of states and nations became largely compatible over time, and states’ populations became relatively homogeneous. But these processes were often bloody. Greece and Turkey became homogeneous nation-states by the forcible exchange of populations in 1923 – over one million Greeks from Asia Minor and 400,000 Turks from Greece, and the expulsion and massacre of some 800,000 Armenians by the Turks during World War One. The French, English, Dutch, and German nations also are largely located within the boundaries of a single sovereign state, but here too, in each case the process was lengthy and sometimes violent.

The nation-state is only one of many forms of political community. Like other polities, it was the


product of a particular time and place, and its triumph over rival identities in Europe and, later, elsewhere was always partial and contingent. So, for example, today, many perceive the sense of nationhood and national homogeneity of Europe's states to be threatened by the influx of outsiders who are "different" because they worship different gods or have different tastes. The fear that national cohesion is endangered is reflected in the story of Mihdat Güler with which we began this chapter. Nationality in Europe is also challenged by another, broader identity, the identity reflected by the European Union of being "European" rather than British, French, or German.

The incompatibility of national and state boundaries is greater outside Western Europe. Thus, the boundaries of some states enclose several nations and divide others, as did the ramshackle Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires before their demise and as do many postcolonial states in Africa and the Middle East today. Kurds and Palestinians are among the most prominent nations that as yet have no state of their own.

The Kurds are an Indo-European people who number between 25 and 30 million and live mainly in mountainous areas of Turkey (15

million), Syria (1.5 million), Iraq (3.5–4 million), and Iran (6 million), which they call "Kurdistan," as well as in communities in Europe and the US. The Kurds are a Sunni Muslim ethnic group with their own language and customs who trace their history back thousands of years. There are as many as 800 separate Kurdish tribes in Kurdistan that are reflected in an individual's last name.

Kurdish history is a story of failed efforts to achieve independence (see Map 13.3). In the seventh century, the Kurds were conquered by the Arabs, in the eleventh century by the Seljuk Turks, and 200 years later, by the Mongols. Prior to World War One, the area they inhabited was part of the Ottoman Empire. After the war, they rose against the Turks and were crushed; but, attracted by President Wilson's advocacy of national self-determination, they sent representatives to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which carved up the Ottoman Empire, provided for the creation of an autonomous Kurdish state, but Kurdish aspirations were again thwarted when the Ottomans were overthrown by Kemal Atatürk, Turkey's modernizing national hero, who refused to ratify the treaty. Further Kurdish rebellions in Turkey in 1925, 1930, and 1937 resulted in additional misery and death.



Map 13.3
Kurdistan

Without a state of their own, the Kurds have had a difficult time, especially in recent decades. Since 1984, the Kurds in Turkey have sought greater autonomy, including the right to use their own language, and their efforts have repeatedly been met by Turkish military repression. Again and again, the Kurds have been used as pawns by the states in which they live to destabilize neighboring states. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, for example, Iran funded Kurdish resistance against Iraq, only to leave Iraqi Kurds in the lurch when relations between Iraq and Iran improved in 1975. Renewed resistance in Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War brought about terrible vengeance from Saddam Hussein who, in 1988, used poison gas against Kurdish villages and rounded up and executed some 200,000 Kurdish men.

In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq's Kurds again rose up against Saddam but were crushed by the Iraqi army, forcing hundreds of thousands of them to flee to Turkey. Between 1992 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as well as after the invasion, the Kurds in Iraq received US military protection and enjoyed considerable autonomy. For the most part, Iraqi Kurds supported the overthrow of Saddam, but they are unlikely achieve an independent Kurdistan. An important obstacle is the resistance of Turkey, Syria, and Iran, which fear that "their" Kurds may also try to secede, thereby threatening the territorial integrity of those countries.

Today, as the Kurdish case shows, nationalism no longer cements state unity as it did in France after 1789. Instead, in some cases, it subverts state unity, especially in regions of the world where states were artificially imposed by colonial conquerors. In those regions, nations and states diverge, and states have remained weak and subject to civil strife. And where civil strife is endemic, state institutions have collapsed, threatening the spread of violence and larger regional wars as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Everywhere, it seems, national movements have proliferated, with leaders demanding their own independent state, often accompanied

by large-scale violence. As former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1925–2011) put it, if matters continue as they have: "[W]e'll have 5000 countries rather than the hundred plus we now have."³⁵

Nationalism is sometimes built at least in part on common religion, and religion has again become an important identity in global politics. In the next section, we shall look at the role that religious identities have played in the past and how conflicting religious identities have become a source of conflict in the present.

Religious identities

Religion has played a formidable role in global politics throughout history. The ancient Romans, like other ancient peoples, recognized that religion, when harnessed to secular authority, was a powerful asset. In Chapter XI of *The Prince*, Machiavelli declared that "ecclesiastical principalities" can survive without ability or fortune because "they are sustained by ancient religious customs, which are so powerful and are of such quality, that they keep their princes in power in whatever manner they proceed and live."³⁶ And, in *The Discourses*, he praised Rome's official religion and described religion as "the most necessary and assured support of any civil society . . . for where religion exists it is easy to introduce armies and discipline."³⁷

Contemporary states, too, routinely harness religion to promote legitimacy or at least to co-opt religious identities that might undermine the loyalty of citizens. Russia's post-communist leaders are reinventing themselves as defenders of Eastern Orthodoxy like the tsars of old. And Muslim leaders in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere have made Islamic law, called *sharia*, the law of their countries. Judaism is the basis for the founding of Israel; India is the home of Hinduism; and Buddhist identities keep alive memories of independent statehood in Tibet. During the Cold War, Catholicism fostered nationalism and anti-

communism in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic republics.

In some countries, religious identity competes with citizenship for people's loyalties. Identity conflicts, especially those involving religion, are especially sharp in the Middle East. Nationalism associated with territorial states, as in Europe, did not take root in Arab lands, due in part to their traditional nomadic tribal culture, so the idea of sovereignty means little to many Arabs. The territorial states in the region – Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan – were imposed by Europe's colonial powers after World War One, and nationality has had a hard time competing with local clan-based identities and the transnational attractions of pan-Arabism and Islam that ignore existing state boundaries. These ideologies constantly threaten the stability of Arab states. And, in the region, Islamic identity is often more salient than Arab identity.

History reveals how religious sentiment and identity can challenge a citizen's state for primacy. Prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, European princes competed with the Church for popular support. To achieve sovereign independence, they had to throw off papal claims to govern them, gain the loyalties of national clergy, and take over church resources within their realm, as did Henry VIII (1491–1547) in England in 1530. For its part, the Catholic Church provided legitimacy for monarchs – variously titled “Catholic sovereigns,” “most Catholic,” and “most Christian” – who were prepared to accept the authority of the cross over the scepter.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a bitter contest raged in Europe – the investiture controversy – over whether secular princes, especially the Holy Roman Emperor, could install bishops in office without Church approval. The conflict climaxed in a trial of strength between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV. When the emperor appointed the bishop of Milan in spite of papal prohibition, Gregory excommunicated Henry. In 1077, Henry journeyed to Canossa, in

the Italian Alps, where he knelt in the snow to beg forgiveness from the Pope.

The struggle between church and state in Europe continued for centuries and included the Protestant Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, and the Counterreformation. Just as Islamic zealots seek to establish **theocracies** – states governed by religious leaders – so Protestant zealots in sixteenth-century Europe established several theocracies. The Reformation brought with it various forms of Christian fundamentalism, efforts to establish theocratic rule, and a host of willing martyrs – also features of contemporary Islamic movements. The Reformation also featured terrorism and counterterrorism, warfare unrestrained by legal conventions, and transnational proselytizing of fundamentalist principles. Thus, historical theocracies predated by centuries contemporary theocracies such as Iran's under its Shia ayatollahs.

The leading Reformation fundamentalists were Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531) and John Calvin (1509–64), both of whom were active in Switzerland. In Zurich, Zwingli required that law and policy be based solely on a literal rendition of scripture and argued that scripture could only have a single meaning. Biblical rules demanded absolute obedience; other laws could demand none. Calvin was the most influential of the Protestant reformers who advocated religious government, insisting that, since God was sovereign, bishops, kings, and other political leaders could not demand obedience. As virtual ruler of Geneva, he imposed his theocratic views, integrating the church with the civic government, assuring that the clergy would play a leading role in politics, and employing the law to impose an austere morality on the city's citizens. Calvinism also deeply influenced early American settlers. God and the state were enshrined together in Puritan Plymouth and its Congregational Church.

Today, religious fundamentalism – belief in governance in accordance with religious dogma – informs Islam, some Christian movements in the United States, Orthodox Judaism in Israel, and

Hindu nationalism in India. Religious fundamentalists of all stripes demand that government reflect a literal reading of God's word as revealed in holy texts. Hindu nationalists have for some time enjoyed great influence in various heavily populated Indian states and were instrumental in the 1992 destruction of an ancient mosque in the city of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh and the ensuing violence that swept Bombay. India's Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Janata, became the leading party in a coalition government in New Delhi after elections in spring 1996.

Today, the transnational challenge posed by religious identities is most evident in the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Events in Islamic history, some dating back 14 centuries, have been revived to undermine existing state practices. Islam is in the throes of a contest between militant and mainstream elements, and a key issue that defines the contestants is the relationship between religion and state, with militants seeking to revive the medieval Islamic Caliphate and the establishment of theocratic authority over the global Islamic community, the *umma*.

One of the earliest political movements that emerged to promote transnational Islamic identities was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928. More recently, militant Islamists from Indonesia to Nigeria have emerged and become active on behalf of a universal Islamic community. Their cause gained global attention with the overthrow of Iran's monarchy by Shia supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini claimed to act not as an official of the Iranian state but as a spiritual leader of Shia Muslims everywhere, a claim still made by Iran's current supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These movements are also growing in secular Europe, where, for example, in 2010 Norwegian police arrested a Chinese Uigher, an Uzbek, and an Iraqi Kurd for a plot to build a peroxide bomb. This particular case highlights a transformation within these groups to deemphasize old national identities to forge a truly transnational Islamic group. Thus, as we saw in Chapter 7, Western-Muslim

conflicts threaten the stability of societies around the world.

Although religious identities have been headline news in global politics, there has also been a resurgence of ethnic identities. Like religion, ethnicity has historically been a major factor in shaping nationalism but was largely repressed or ignored by governments that sought to foster patriotism and national unity. During the Cold War, the superpowers made a special effort to dampen ethnic consciousness at home and abroad in order to focus attention on the ideological divide between East and West. With the end of the Cold War, almost every continent has been gripped by examples of impassioned ethnic conflict and separatist yearnings, the topic to which we now turn.

Ethnic identities

Ethnic identities are based on a belief that members are linked by blood ties related to family and kinship, some of which are real and some invented. Ethnic consciousness is especially strong in areas of the world that were formerly ruled by European colonizers who imposed state boundaries with little consideration of whether these made sense in ethnic terms.

In Africa, following decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, governments sought to build national loyalties and create states like those in Europe. For the most part, they failed because governments rarely represented all the ethnic elements in society. Instead, governments became extensions of *particular* ethnic groups that were then able to give public jobs and contracts to members of their immediate families and kinship group. In turn, armies and police were not impartial protectors of public order and national defense but rather became the armed representatives of the groups and individuals in power. These conditions, along with the failure of authorities to cope with socioeconomic problems, impaired nation building and weakened loyalties

to the state. At the same time, they intensified and deepened older ethnic identities that colonial and postcolonial leaders had sought to dampen.

For example, in the years immediately following Nigerian independence in 1960, the country was the scene of coups and unrest owing to tension between the Hausas of the northern region and the Yorubas and Ibos in the south and west. In Kenya, the period just before independence in 1963 featured intense jockeying for power between the country's leading political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which enjoyed the support of the country's two largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and Luo, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which was supported by several smaller ethnic groups. The late 1960s and 1970s saw a split in the KANU owing to increasing animosity between the Luo and Kikuyu.

In a few cases, such as those of the Kurds or the Druse, religious and ethnic identities reinforce each other and foster transnational communities. The Druse are a fiercely independent ethnic people of some 200–300,000 adherents who live mainly in Lebanon near Mount Hermon and in the mountains behind Beirut and Sidon. A few villages are also located on the Golan Heights, in Syria, and just inside Israel's northern border. The Druse sense of uniqueness is fostered by the form of Islam they practice. Their variant of Islam emerged in the tenth century and contends that God had appeared in the form of a Muslim leader in Egypt whom most Muslims regard as a blasphemer. The Druse keep their religion secret, and do not accept converts or marry outsiders. As a result, their identity as a distinct people is deeply anchored and clearly bounded.

Ethnic identities threaten the integrity of countries in the developed as well as the developing world. Across Europe and North America, "ethno-national" groups claim that their culture has been submerged or swallowed up by majorities within nation-states – Spanish Basques and Catalans, Belgian Flemish and Walloons, French Corsicans, and others. Increasingly in recent years, the

familiar ideas of "nation" and "nationalism" have taken on a distinctly subversive, anti-state connotation, even in the West.

Québec is an instructive case of just how complex such issues can be. When the secession movement of former Parti Québécois premier, Jacques Parizeau, lost a 1995 referendum, he blamed it on "money and the ethnic vote," highlighting the presence of a large number of non-French-speaking English and other minorities. To complicate matters further, Cree and other indigenous groups who claim half the territory of Québec were so alarmed by referendum that might subject them to Québécois control rather than the more generous federal government in Ottawa that they, in turn, threatened to secede from Québec, claiming the same right to national self-determination as the Québécois. Were Québec to secede, others might follow, as the country is made up of numerous regional/provincial identities as well as ethnic ones: the Maritime Provinces, British Columbia, and so on.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was an extreme example of ethnic passions and violence. There, violence raged for much of the 1990s, and unspeakable atrocities were carried out by ethnic groups against one another.

The brutal break-up of Yugoslavia

As we saw in Chapter 3, Serbia, later the heartland of the Yugoslav state, played a key role in starting World War One; and Bosnia, also part of the future Yugoslavia, was the site of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Yugoslavia (meaning Union of the South Slavs) emerged from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in December 1918. Serbia united with Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina in the new state. However, both the birth and early years of the country were difficult, as non-Serbs eyed with suspicion Serb efforts to predominate. In the 1920s, the Croatians demanded

autonomy, but Yugoslavia's king thwarted their national aspirations.

In 1941, Yugoslavia was invaded and conquered by Nazi Germany. Two Yugoslav resistance movements coalesced to fight the occupation. One led by Draža Mihailović (1893–1946) consisted largely of Serb officers and soldiers of the Royal Army who were called *Četniks*. The second consisted of communists, called *Partisans*, led by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). By 1943, the two movements were fighting one another as much as they were fighting their common enemy. Further complicating matters, the Nazis set up a fascist puppet regime in Croatia led by Ante Pavelić (1889–1959), known as the “butcher of the Balkans,” and his followers called *Ustase* (Insurrection), who carried out brutal atrocities against the Serbs in which as many as 750,000 died. In the end, Tito and the communists triumphed and governed Yugoslavia with an iron hand for four decades.

Tito became a popular figure in the country after he defied Stalin and the Soviet Union in 1948 and pioneered an ideology of **national communism**. Tito managed to repress conflicting ethnic identities in the country by maintaining strict political control and including in the governing politburo representatives of all nationalities. With Tito's death in 1980, however, ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia began to resurface.

In 1987, Milošević succeeded Tito as head of the communist party and two years later was elected president of Serbia. Milošević, as we saw, concluded that communism was obsolete and decided that his political future depended on his becoming a Serb nationalist. As a result, he began to advocate a greater Serbia that would include parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Frightened by Serb ambitions, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on June 25, 1991. In September, Macedonia declared its independence, and in February 1992, the predominantly Muslim republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit. The Serbs used force to try to prevent the country's break-up or, if that

failed, to gain as much territory as possible for themselves. Initially, this led to warfare in the Krajina region of Croatia along the Serb border, home to many ethnic Serbs. When Croatia finally regained the region in the summer of 1995, its forces drove some 200,000 ethnic Serbs from their homes and across the border.

Violence spread as the struggle shifted to Bosnia, the most ethnically mixed of Yugoslavia's regions. Bosnia's Muslim and Croatian populations both feared Serbian ambition and demanded independence for their republic. In the autumn of 1990, Bosnia held elections in which the major political parties, each representing one of the region's ethnic groups, fielded candidates. Although the Muslim Slavs' Party of Democratic Action won a plurality of seats (34 percent), Bosnia's parliament was almost equally divided: the Serb Democratic Party led by Radovan Karadžić and linked to Milošević's ruling party in Serbia won 30 percent of the seats, and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian branch of the ruling party in Croatia, won 18 percent. A Bosnian Muslim was named president of the country, heading a fragile coalition government. In the following year, Serb deputies walked out of parliament because of Muslim and Croatian support for Bosnian independence, and Bosnian Serbs and Croats began partitioning the country into ethnic subunits. Bosnian Serbs set up a separate parliament, trained armed militias, and in November 1991 held referendum in which they voted to remain part of Yugoslavia. In another referendum held in February 1992 at the behest of the European Union, Bosnia's Muslims and Croats voted overwhelmingly for independence, which was recognized by the US and the EU in April. Bosnia's Serbs boycotted the second referendum and proclaimed their own state.

War erupted almost immediately among the three groups, with Serbs and Croats aided by Serbia and Croatia. Initially, the Croatians allied with Bosnia's Muslims against their common foe, the Serbs. With Belgrade's assistance, Bosnia's Serbs engaged in “ethnic cleansing” – killing and

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Nationalism, especially when combined with feelings of national superiority, is believed to be a cause of war. Indeed, the role of nationalism in triggering violence and human rights abuses is one reason why theorists believe it is necessary to include the unit level of analysis in explaining war. The belief that nationalism can produce intense conflict was evident as Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1990s. The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo featured extensive ethnic cleansing against civilians. As described in the *New York Times*: “Željko Ražnatović, the gangster turned paramilitary leader known as Arkan, stormed into the largely Muslim town with his Tigers militia, and the carnage began. “They were going house to house, looking for fighters and things to take, Mr. Haviv [a photographer] remembered. ‘Inside a mosque, they had taken down the Islamic flag and were holding it like a trophy. They had a guy, they said he was a fundamentalist from Kosovo. He was begging for his life. There was shouting outside. They had taken the town butcher and his wife, and they were screaming. They shot him, and he was lying there. There was a truck that had crashed nearby. I got between the cab and the body and turned my back so the soldiers couldn’t see me. They shot the woman, then they brought out her sister and shot her. There were the two soldiers. Another came from my left, he had a cigarette in one hand and sunglasses on top of his head. When he kicked her, it was like the ultimate disrespect for everything.’”³⁸

terrorizing Muslims and Croats, forcing them from their homes, and placing many in concentration camps. In addition, Serbs systematically raped Muslim women to produce fear and destroy families. By mid-1992, most of Bosnia was in Serbian hands, and Sarajevo, its capital, was surrounded and under continuous artillery shelling. In spring 1993, the Croats, too, turned on Bosnia’s Muslims, seizing large areas in the country’s center around the city of Mostar, which endured months of artillery bombardment.

As we saw in Chapter 10, the UN became involved in the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts in February 1992 with the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR was given the virtually impossible task of separating the protagonists and, in the spring of 1993, shielding civilians in six “protection zones” in Muslim areas: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Goražde, Srebreniça, and Zepa. At a conference in London in 1992, former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (1917–2002) and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen proposed ambitious terms to end the conflict:

- The withdrawal of Serbian forces from Croatia.
- Demilitarization of UN Protected Areas and enforcement of no-fly zones over Bosnia.
- UNPROFOR supervision of local authorities and police until the achievement of an overall political solution.
- Support for humanitarian organizations and the safe return of displaced persons to their homes in UN protected areas.

Finding itself in the midst of civil war, UNPROFOR was unable to maintain the security of the protected areas or enforce no-fly zones over Bosnia. Thus, NATO was empowered to carry out the job despite objections from Russia, which had close ties with the Serbian government. In May 1995, continued Serbian artillery attacks on civilians in Sarajevo triggered NATO air strikes on Serb military targets. Following Serb hostage taking of UNPROFOR soldiers and massacres of Muslim civilians in Zepa and Srebreniça in the summer of 1995, NATO began a sustained air and artillery campaign, called Operation Deliberate

Force, against the offending Bosnian Serb forces. Simultaneously, Croatia launched a major offensive to drive Serbs out of the Krajina region, and then, with Bosnian Muslim forces (with whom they allied after a February 2004 truce), seized control of large Serb-inhabited areas in western Bosnia.

In October 1995, a ceasefire agreement was reached, and the enemy leaders agreed to attend a peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, the following month. The Dayton Peace Accord was reached three weeks later. By its terms, Bosnia was given a constitution that established a Serb Republic and a largely fictitious Muslim–Croat federation in the country. Bosnia would be run by an official selected by the EU and the UN. In addition, a NATO force would replace UNPROFOR. The agreement also authorized elections and the return of the roughly 2.3 million Bosnian refugees (of a total population of 4.4 million) to their homes. Bosnia remained under the authority of NATO, the EU, the UN, and their (reduced) military forces until the EU formally took over NATO's Bosnian peacekeeping operations in December 2004.

The Dayton Accord did not bring peace to the Balkans. In 1999, another deadly war exploded that, like the Bosnian war, was ignited by Milošević. In this instance, the site was the Serb province of Kosovo, an icon for Serb nationalists because of its historical association with Serb culture and religion and their age-old conflict with the Ottoman Turks. Serb nationalism in Kosovo was challenged, however, by Albanian nationalism. The majority Muslim Albanian population had agitated for independence or union with their Albanian homeland across the border ever since Serbia had annexed the province during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Following mass demonstrations by Albanian Kosovars for better living conditions and greater political freedom during the 1980s, Milošević sent the Serb Army into Kosovo in 1989, cancelled the autonomy that the province had been granted two decades earlier by Tito, and forbade the use of the Albanian language in schools. In taking this action, Milošević

burnished his credentials as a Serb nationalist but triggered a growing underground independence movement among Albania's Muslims. That movement elected its own president in 1992, set up its own schools and parliament, and began to pursue a policy of passive resistance.

Under repressive conditions, militant Albanian Kosovars took to the hills in the early 1990s to form the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and began to attack Serb policemen. Assaults against Serb authorities escalated through the 1990s. In March 1998, Serb military units and security police began a major campaign against the KLA, in which many Albanian Muslims were killed, and hundreds of thousands were driven from their homes. This served only to increase the popularity of the KLA and provided it with additional recruits.

As the international community became concerned about events in Kosovo, diplomatic pressure on Milošević intensified, and threats were uttered about renewed NATO air attacks against the Serbs. Nevertheless, both sides continued the violence, and efforts to negotiate its end proved fruitless. In early 1999, Milošević initiated a major military offensive against Albanian villages in Kosovo, which augured a new campaign of ethnic cleansing. Under international pressure, new peace talks were held in France in early 1999, but neither side showed any willingness to compromise. Thus, Milošević refused a plan to insert a NATO force in Kosovo and permit NATO troops to enter Serbia.

War exploded in March as NATO forces began air and cruise missile attacks against targets throughout Serbia, including the capital city of Belgrade. NATO expectations that the air campaign would lead to a rapid Serb capitulation were disappointed, as Serb army units poured into Kosovo and began systematic ethnic cleansing in an effort to drive the Albanian population from the province. Two wars appeared to be taking place at the same time – one involving NATO air attacks on Serb targets outside Kosovo and the second, a Serb ground assault in Kosovo that forced about 640,000 people to flee.

In June 1999, Milošević was compelled to

turn over Kosovo to NATO control, although the province legally remained part of Serbia. The UN Security Council, which had *not* authorized NATO's bombing campaign, authorized an international occupation by military units from NATO and Russia. This force, called the Kosovo Force or KFOR, was to maintain security, monitor the withdrawal of Serb forces, and ensure the safe return of the almost one million refugees who had fled the province during the violence. KFOR, whose mission continues to the present day, has resettled as many as 800,000 refugees (but relatively few Serbs), prevented acts of revenge (Albanian violence against Serbs), demilitarized the KLA, collected thousands of weapons from former combatants, removed most of the estimated 40,000 mines that had been laid, and reconstructed roads, bridges, and other elements of the province's infrastructure.

Although fighting has ceased in the former Yugoslavia, and six new states have emerged – Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, the Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina – scars have not healed. The trials of alleged war criminals by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that had been authorized in 1993 by the UN Security Council are still underway. And many fear that when peacekeeping forces leave Bosnia, ethnic strife will recommence. In addition, the future of Kosovo remains unclear (see Table 13.1). Although Serbs still regard it as an integral part of Serbia, Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, and NATO-led troops remain.³⁹ Although Kosovo's sovereignty has been recognized by 69 countries and the International Court of Justice rendered an advisory opinion in 2010 that Kosovo's "declaration of independence of February 17, 2008, did not violate general international law,"⁴⁰ Serbia has vowed never to recognize Kosovo's independence.⁴¹

In sum, the ethnic hatreds that led to the destruction of Yugoslavia reflect the consequences of conflicting identities in global politics. Far from the universal triumph of liberal democracy described by political scientist Francis Fukuyama

as "the end of history,"⁴² recent decades have witnessed an ugly upsurge in ethnic and religious violence. A variety of forces, including the proliferation of nonstate identities have conspired to erode the capacity of many states, threatening their autonomy and their ability to satisfy citizens and thereby retain legitimacy. This does *not* mean that a "global citizenship" or "a global identity" has emerged with a set of universal norms. Instead, in the words of one observer, "our psychic and even our material rewards seem to rest on fragmented and compounded self-identification."⁴³

The Yugoslav case is also a reminder of the problem posed by human rights abuses. "Ethnic cleansing," a euphemism for genocide, was first heard during the Bosnian conflict. In addition, the Kosovo conflict involved external humanitarian intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country in violation of traditional international law.

In sum, ethnic identities continue to have important consequences for global politics. The United States itself, once thought of as a "melting pot" in which different ethnic groups lost their older identities to become American, has become a country of numerous hyphenated Americans who are conscious of and take pride in their ethnic origins. The growing role of identities in global politics combined with the perceived erosion of states have produced the startling idea that we may be entering an era of conflict among whole **civilizations**.

Approaches to culture

Yugoslavia's collapse piqued an interest in clashing civilizations and the idea that Yugoslavia was at the "fault line" of three civilizations – the Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim. The Serbs are a Slavic people, with close cultural ties to other Slavic peoples like the Russians. With the Slavs, most Serbs share a common religion, Eastern Orthodoxy that evolved in Byzantium

Table 13.1 Key events in the history of Yugoslavia

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1389	Serbian defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in their “ancestral home” of Kosovo.
1918	With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires at the end of World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is established.
1929	The country becomes an absolute and centralized monarchy under King Alexander, its regions divided without regard to ethnic composition and its name is changed to Yugoslavia (Kingdom of the South Slavs).
1941	Yugoslavia is invaded by the Nazis. Germans occupy Serbia; Germany and Italy divide Slovenia; Italy controls Kosovo and Montenegro. A pro-German puppet state is set up in Croatia and Bosnia under Ante Pavelić sets out to exterminate the Serbs. Two resistance movements are formed. One, led by Colonel (later General) Draža Mihailović and other Serb officers and soldiers of the Royal Army called <i>četniks</i> , and the second communists led by Josip Broz Tito, called the Partisans. Between 1941 and 1945 Yugoslavia is the scene of three armed conflicts: (1) Between the anti-Nazi resistance movements and the Axis occupiers and their allies; (2) between the Partisans and the <i>Č</i> <i>h</i> <i>e</i> <i>t</i> <i>n</i> <i>i</i> <i>k</i> <i>s</i> ; (3) among Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Slavs on both sides of the other two conflicts.
1945	At the end of World War Two, Yugoslavia becomes a federated pro-Soviet communist republic under Tito.
1948	Tito breaks with the Soviet Union and institutes “national communism” in Yugoslavia.
1974	A new Yugoslav constitution grants autonomy to Kosovo, a Serbian province largely occupied by ethnic Muslim Albanians. Yugoslavia became a confederation with the central government retaining only limited powers.
1980	Death of Josip Broz Tito.
1987	Aided by Serbian President Ivan Stambolić, Milošević becomes leader of the Serbian Communist Party, then turns against Stambolić, denouncing his allies as being “soft” on Albanian nationalists in Kosovo.
1988	Slobodan Milošević the president of the Serbian Communist Party and president of Serbia (after 1989) begins a campaign to reassert Serb and communist control over Yugoslavia.
1988	Mass pro-Serbian demonstrations orchestrated by Milošević in Vojvodina forces resignation of the Vojvodina provincial party presidium.
1989	Milošević ends Kosovo’s autonomy.
1990	Disintegration of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
1991	Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declare independence, triggering ethnic fighting among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.
1992	Serb forces massacre thousands of Bosnian Muslims and carry out “ethnic cleansing” by expelling Muslims from areas under Bosnian Serb control. Kosovo’s Albanian majority votes to secede from Serbia. Serbia and Montenegro declare themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
1995	Leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia reach the Dayton Peace Accord to end the Bosnian War.
1997	Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) begins killing Serb policemen and establishing areas from which the Serbs are driven entirely.
1998–99	Kosovo War between Serbia and NATO forces. Agreement to end NATO bombing of Serbia and withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo reached in June.
2000	Resignation of Milošević as Serbia’s president.
2001	Trial of Milošević by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, the Netherlands, for alleged atrocities in Kosovo in 1999 and in Croatia between 1991 and 1992 and for genocide in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 begins.
2006	Sudden death of Milošević in March before the conclusion of his trial.
2006	In June following a referendum, Montenegro declares its independence, bringing an end to the rump Yugoslav Federation.
2008	Kosovo declares independence.
2008	Radovan Karadžić arrested and delivered for trial to the ICTY in The Hague.
2009	Serbia applies for membership in the European Union.
2010	ICJ recognizes the legality of Kosovo’s independence.

(Constantinople) after the split of Rome into Eastern and Western empires. The Serbs also share an alphabet with other Slavs, derived from Greek letters, known as Cyrillic that was developed in the ninth century for the use of Eastern Orthodox Slavs. The Cyrillic alphabet is also used in Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian.

By contrast, Croatians, although speaking a language virtually the same as Serbian, use the Latin alphabet, and most are Roman Catholics. Whereas Serbia historically enjoyed close ties with Russia, Croatia was part of the Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Croatians regard themselves as Western, rather than Eastern, European. Finally, Bosnia's Muslims are Slavs who converted to Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries after the Ottoman Empire conquered the region. Overall, Bosnia has a complex mix of religious traditions, which helps explain why it became a battleground in 1992. Of its 4.6 million people, 40 percent are Muslim, 31 percent are Eastern Orthodox, 15 percent are Roman Catholics, and 14 percent are "other."⁴⁴

The idea that fault lines between clashing civilizations, such as those within the former Yugoslavia, might be "the battle lines of the future" has passionate advocates and detractors, and it forces us to think seriously about some of the identities we have been discussing. In the next section, we examine the provocative claim that a looming clash of cultures will bring the world's great civilizations into conflict with one another.

A clash of civilizations?

In 1993, Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?"⁴⁵ The article began with a provocative claim that the European epoch of global politics is ending and, with it, interstate conflicts such as the world wars and the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, Huntington asserted,

the world was changing. "World politics," he declared, "is entering a new phase" in which "the fundamental source of conflict" will "occur between nations and groups of different civilizations."

A civilization, Huntington argued, is "a cultural entity,"⁴⁶ and he identified eight such civilizations – Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African. Civilizations differ in terms of "history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion."⁴⁷ Each civilization, Huntington argued, had a core state – for example, India in Hindu civilization, Russia in Slavic-Orthodox, and China in Confucian – but nation-states were, he claimed, becoming less important sources of identity for people. The future, then, would be one of widening collisions among groups and countries from different civilizations, such as the war in Chechnya that pits "Slavic-Orthodox" Russians against "Islamic" Chechens, or the "Hindu"–"Islamic" (India–Pakistan) clash over Kashmir. Empirical research to discover whether Huntington's different civilizations were "real" led political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel to the cautious conclusion that "societies with a common cultural heritage generally *do* fall into common clusters" but that their positions also reflect other facts like economic development.⁴⁸

Osama bin Laden's declaration of war "between the Islamic world and the Americans and their allies" to combat a "new crusade led by America against the Islamic nations" echoes Huntington's argument regarding the clash of civilizations.⁴⁹ The United States, bin Laden argued, had made "a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims," and he urged Muslims everywhere to take up arms against America.⁵⁰

Civilizational conflicts, Huntington declared, would feature a "kin-country syndrome" in which members of a civilization would help others from the same civilization against their common foe. Thus, Muslim militants from other countries who joined the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation after Moscow's 1979 invasion have reappeared

in a variety of settings pitting Muslims against non-Muslims including Chechnya, Kosovo, and Iraq. In Iraq, the militant Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), deceased leader of the group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, frequently used non-Iraqi volunteers, “holy warriors” he called them, as suicide bombers against US forces and Shia civilians. Most of these volunteers were non-Iraqi Arabs, many of whom came from Saudi Arabia; others came from Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen, and elsewhere, including Europe.⁵¹

To buttress his case Huntington pointed to a number of events in global politics in 1993 that reflected growing tensions between countries in different civilizations, assistance among people within the same civilization, or potential alliances between certain civilizations against others, especially the West. They included:⁵²

- Fighting among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs in Bosnia, Western failure to help Bosnian Muslims in an appreciable way, and Russian support for Slavic Serbia in the Bosnian conflict.
- Muslim and Chinese rejection of the West’s version of universal human rights, suggesting a Confucian–Islamic alliance against the West.
- The voting along civilization lines to hold the 2000 Olympics in Australia rather than China.
- China’s sale of missile components to Pakistan; China’s testing a nuclear weapon; and North Korea’s effort to obtain nuclear weapons, suggesting a growing Confucian threat to the West.
- America’s “dual containment” policy toward Iran and Iraq, and America’s military preparations for two major regional conflicts against North Korea and Iran or Iraq.
- German limitations on admission of refugees.
- US bombing of Baghdad.

Huntington argued that the West’s influence had begun to decline and that it increasingly had to

face challenger civilizations that “have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”⁵³ Asian civilizations were enlarging their economic, military, and political power, and Islamic countries had rapidly growing populations and an expansive religious ideology. Western primacy, Huntington feared, was threatened by the rapidly growing power of China and the possibility of an emerging “Confucian–Islamic military connection.”⁵⁴ Under these conditions, global politics would become “the West versus the rest.”

Despite the emphasis Huntington placed on the threat from China, the best remembered phrase from his article was his assertion that the “crescent-shaped Islamic bloc, from the bulge of Africa to central Asia, has bloody borders.”⁵⁵ This phrase was widely recalled after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Observers invoked Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations thesis as they asserted that the attacks marked the beginning of a war between the Western and Islamic worlds, not a conflict with a relatively small minority of fanatic Muslim fundamentalists.

Huntington’s concern that Muslim and Western values were in conflict seemed to be reinforced by the storm of anger that swept Muslim communities around the world after a Danish newspaper in September 2005 published 12 cartoons satirizing Muhammad and ridiculing the activities of Muslim militants that were then reproduced in other newspapers across Europe.⁵⁶ Their publication aroused Muslims because Islam forbids depictions of the Prophet and many Muslims regarded the cartoons as provocative. By contrast, many Westerners regarded the issue as one of freedom of speech and contended that Muslim protests and intimidation threatened individual freedom and secular values. Twelve writers, most of whom were Muslims living in the West, declared that the furor showed that: “After overcoming fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism, the world now faces a new global totalitarian threat: Islamism.”⁵⁷ The growing gap between Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions of the world were

reflected in a poll in which majorities or near majorities of non-Muslims in the West viewed Muslims as “fanatical” and not respectful of women, while Muslims viewed Westerners as “immoral” and “selfish.”⁵⁸

Thereafter, Huntington again produced heated reactions when he expressed concern at the large-scale immigration of Hispanics to the United States who, he argued, were not assimilating into American society. Americans, he declared, define their national identity and culture to include “the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to create a heaven on earth, a ‘city on a hill.’”⁵⁹ In his view, Hispanics were establishing insulated cultural islands in areas such as Southern California and South Florida, and the sheer number of Hispanics in the United States – up from almost 9 percent of the population in 1990 to over 48 million in 2009 (not counting four million citizens of Puerto Rico), of whom as many as a quarter are illegal – threaten to undermine America’s culture.

According to Huntington, the “Mexican/Hispanic Challenge” posed by Mexican immigration is unlike previous waves of immigration into the US. Mexican immigrants, he argues, unlike their predecessors, do not assimilate. The result, he fears, will be “a culturally bifurcated Anglo-Hispanic society with two national languages.”⁶⁰ A number of factors, he believes, make Mexican immigration to the US unique, including the fact that Mexico is America’s neighbor, thereby permitting continuous movement back and forth across the border, the high concentration of Mexicans in particular localities like Los Angeles, the high proportion who enter the United States illegally, the persistence of the immigration northward, and Mexico’s historical claim to American territory. In addition, the Mexican government supports the flow north-

ward as an economic and political safety valve, advocates an open border, and is prepared to let Mexicans living in the US vote in Mexico’s elections. Mexico even published a pamphlet entitled “Guide to the Mexican Migrant” that is filled with practical hints to help migrants enter the United States illegally and safely. The publication infuriated US opponents of illegal immigration.⁶¹

Huntington argues that factors limiting the assimilation of Mexican migrants are failure to learn English, poor education levels, low income, low naturalization and intermarriage rates, and, most importantly, failure to acquire American identity. The density of links across the US–Mexican border and the mixing of cultures has produced a unique region in southwestern US and northern Mexico “variously called ‘MexAmerica,’ ‘Amexica,’ and ‘Mexifornia’” which, Huntington believes, “could produce a consolidation of the Mexican-dominant areas into an autonomous, culturally and linguistically distinct, economically self-reliant bloc within the United States.”⁶²

Huntington’s analysis is an extension of his view that we are entering an era of clashing civilizations. He is a nationalist whose views are those of one who fears that relentless globalization will undermine existing national cultures and perhaps even national independence. To his critics, Huntington is a **xenophobe**, whose belief that American culture is rooted in Anglo-Protestant tradition is false and whose fears are overheated. To his supporters, he summarizes the resentment against a global tidal wave that threatens national identities, boundaries, and traditional values. Some of his critics contend that Hispanics do, in fact, assimilate in the same way that their predecessors did. Others argue that his version of American culture, while suitable for the Pilgrim Fathers, had already been made obsolete by earlier generations of immigrants. Finally, many of his critics argue that Huntington simply does not understand how the US has repeatedly integrated waves of immigrants into a culture that reflects them all.

Huntington’s overall clash-of-civilizations thesis is flawed in several respects. First, despite

his denial the concept of the state is still central to his framework; indeed one of his civilizations consists of a single country, Japan, and three others are virtually coterminous with a single state: Confucian and China, Hindu and India, and Slavic-Orthodox and Russia. Second, it remains unclear precisely what a civilization is. In some cases, the definition seems to rest on a common religion, whereas in others ethnicity or other factors play a major role. Third, even in recent years, major conflicts have arisen between countries from within the same civilizations that Huntington identifies, for example, the 1980–88 war between Islamic Iran and Iraq. Fourth, each of the civilizations Huntington identifies also has *internal* fault lines. Muslims, for example, are engaged in conflict among themselves in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. China and Vietnam eye one another with suspicion as do Venezuela and Colombia. Moreover, strong alliances exist between countries from different civilizations, like that between the United States and Japan. Finally, to some extent, Western culture is less about religion and language and more about modernity, and modernity is spreading globally, toppling traditional institutions and ways of life that stand in its way. Nevertheless, Huntington's argument highlights the growing importance of identity in global politics and the growing resentment of non-Western societies toward cultural and economic globalization, which some non-Westerners view as a kind of Western cultural and economic hegemony over them.

Civilizations have, of course, come in contact on many occasions in the past. As we saw in Chapter 2, Christian–Islamic conflict dates back over a millennium. Other cultural collisions include the arrival of Europeans in the New World and their meeting with indigenous peoples ranging from the Aztecs in Mexico, the Incas in Peru, and the Native Americans in Virginia. Today, we still debate the meaning of these cultural encounters. Did Christopher Columbus's "discovery" of the New World mark a first step

in Europe's "civilizing" mission? Was it the beginning of Europe's extermination of vibrant indigenous cultures? Or was it a morally neutral "clash" or "encounter" of "civilizations"?

Perhaps the most controversial of Huntington's claims about civilization is that when they come into contact, they "clash." In fact, encounters among those from different civilizations rarely result in conflict. Instead, they often bring cultural enrichment for the civilizations involved, especially for those who encounter a more advanced civilization, like the nomadic Mongols and Jurchens (Manchus) who conquered China in the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. Empirical analysis tends to refute Huntington's conclusion. For example, political scientists Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and Michaelene Cox argue that "traditional realist influences as contiguity, alliances, and relative power, and liberal influences of joint democracy and interdependence, provide a much better account of interstate conflict" and that pairs of countries "split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states."⁶³ Even disputes between the West and the rest of the world, or with Islam, were no more common than those between or within most other groups.

In addition, according to data collected by the World Values Survey, Huntington is correct in identifying a clash of civilizations but is wrong in concluding that the clash between the West and Islam concerns political values, particularly over the desirability of democracy. Democracy is, in fact, popular in both civilizations. "Instead, the real fault line between the West and Islam, which Huntington's theory completely overlooks, concerns gender equality and sexual liberalization."⁶⁴

Alternative cultural models

Huntington's view of culture as clashing civilizations is, however, not the only theoretical perspective. Sociologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse regards Huntington's thesis as one of three

cultural paradigms, the others of which he terms “McDonaldization” and “hybridization.”⁶⁵ Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” is a romantic vision that assumes that cultures are pure and closed and reflect permanent differences, and its “fallacy is the reification of the local, sidelining the interplay between the local and the global.”⁶⁶ It represents the “paradigm of differentialism following the principle of *purity*”⁶⁷ as reflected in the burning of churches by militant Muslims in Malaysia⁶⁸ or the banning of Christian bells in Somalia.⁶⁹ By contrast, “McDonaldization” assumes cultural homogenization owing to diffusion from a hegemonic cultural core via transnational corporations. Finally, “hybridization” assumes a mixing of cultural traits “that resolves the tension . . . between the local and the global.” “Each paradigm involves a different take on globalization.” Huntington’s view is that globalization is only superficial and that what is most important is the formation of hostile regional blocs. “McDonaldization” sees globalization as the spread of American culture globally, and “hybridization” sees globalization as the mixing of cultures.⁷⁰

Conclusion

In sum, identity is a crucial factor in global politics. As constructivists suggest, the answer to the question “who are we?” informs us of our interests and shapes our behavior. Historically, nationalism was the most important identity in global politics, but always had to share pride of place with other identities such as class and religion. Today, a host of identities based on religion, ethnicity, race, and gender, to name a few, challenge nationality; and, where there are conflicting identities as in contemporary Europe, the unity of states may be profoundly challenged by divided loyalties.

Identity groups that form the basis of “we”–“they” divisions may violently collide, as is the case in a host of wrenching ethnic, tribal, and national conflicts that have taken place mainly in

the global south since the end of the Cold War, though also in Europe in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Extreme cases may lead to “ethnic cleansing,” even genocide. The declining capacity of states to control activities within their frontiers, partly a result of technological change and the willingness of unscrupulous leaders to manipulate identities for their own ends, complicates the problem of identity divisions. Identity groups such as Chechens and Kurds clamor for independence and endanger the countries in which they reside. Even more pessimistic is the controversial claim that the world is entering a period of clashes among civilizations.

The next chapter moves us from culture to economics as we examine the relationship of global politics and economics. If there ever had been any doubt about the intimate relationship between global politics and economics, the global financial and economic crisis that began in the United States in late 2007 and spread rapidly around the world should have dispelled it.

Student activities

Map exercise

Using a world map, locate and label the eight civilizations that Samuel Huntington identifies in his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” Is each truly a distinct civilization?

Cultural materials

Few works of literature reveal the profound impact of identity better than the novel *Roots* by Alex Haley. The 1977 mini-series based on the novel was among the most widely viewed and celebrated television events of the decade. The plot was based on the author’s family history. It tells of how Kunta Kinte was kidnapped from his village in Africa and sold into slavery in America. It also tells of his marriage and the birth of his

daughter, Kizzy, who was sold to another plantation owner, where she had a son. Great events such as the American Revolutionary War and the Civil War form the backdrop before which the epic unfolds. Read the book and describe the key elements in Kunta Kinte's identity.

Further reading

- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). Insightful analysis of nationalism as an imagined construction.
- Christie, Kenneth, ed., *Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: A Global Perspective* (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1999). Collection of essays on ethnic conflicts around the world.
- Esposito, John L., *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Balanced, informed, and thoughtful analysis of militant Islam.
- Gellner, Ernest, *Nationalism* (New York: NYU Press, 1998). Short and accessible analysis of how nationalism is linked to modernity.
- Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). Provocative argument that we should view the world as a set of seven or eight cultural "civilizations" in which conflict will pit civilizations against one another.
- Laitin, David, *Nations, States, and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). A riveting analysis of how national identities are created to serve politics ends, the relative virtues of cultural homogeneity, and the growing obsolescence of nation-states.

1356–1862	1651	1776	1816	1846	1867
Hanseatic League	England passes the Navigation Act	Adam Smith's, <i>The Wealth of Nations</i> published	David Ricardo discovers the law of comparative advantage	Repeal of the British Corn Laws	Publication of first volume of <i>Das Kapital</i> by Marx and Engels

14 International political economy

Newmont Mining is the world's largest gold producer. Its Minahasa mine on Sulawesi Island dumped arsenic, mercury, and lead – the dross of gold mining – into Buyat Bay, contaminating the bay's fish and causing illness (see Figure 14.1). Indonesia's environmental standards are lower than America's, and the company's system for disposing of tailings at Minahasa was banned in the United States by the Clean Water Act. The company denied charges that villagers' health problems were due to arsenic poisoning, claiming that their symptoms were due to poor nutrition and inadequate sanitation. In August 2004, a legal aid group brought suit against Newmont for millions in damages. Although the Minahasa mine ceased production, the company feared that local pressure could end production at its lucrative Sumbawa mine, and officials were concerned that Indonesia would then lose significant foreign investment. In 2006, the company agreed to pay Indonesia \$30 million in a "good-will agreement" to settle the lawsuit.¹ In 2007, an Indonesian court acquitted the company of criminal charges partly so as not to lose Newmont's foreign investment elsewhere in the country, and Newmont undertook reclamation activities near the former mine



Figure 14.1 Security tape surrounds the Newmont Mining site in Sulawesi

Source: AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim

October 1929	1930	1944	1995	2007–09
Stock market crash and onset of the Great Depression	Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act	Bretton Woods Conference	The WTO officially replaced the GATT	The Great Recession

area and improved coral reef habitat in Buyat Bay.

Transnational corporations (TNCs) like Newmont are major actors in the global economy, and, as we shall see, the question of whether or not they are a positive force elicits heated debate. **International political economy** (IPE) examines how economic and political forces influence each other. Its focus is relationships among states, international organizations, TNCs, and the global market.

Interdependence and market globalization have had a profound impact on both political and economic affairs. Although economic interdependence was as high or higher before World War One, what is different is the emergence of a single, integrated global market in which TNCs from many countries vigorously compete with one another, and capital is highly mobile. Corporations design transnational and global strategies, and production and management structures are integrated among enterprises around the world. Globalization has brought about an unprecedented interdependence of national economies, complicating countries' efforts to control their own economic fate. World trade in goods and services has soared, increasing from \$6.45 trillion in 2000 to \$19.5 trillion in 2008,² and economic competition has grown intense as greater effort is expended in increasing productivity and efficiency. One example of this change, as we saw in Chapter 5, is the economic competition flowing from China's rise as an export superpower, a destination for jobs and industries formerly located in Europe and North America, and a magnet for **foreign direct investment** (FDI).

Economic globalization reflects a revolution in economic practice caused by the proliferation of TNCs and massive flows of foreign direct investment for which they are responsible. FDI consists of corporate investments from overseas, including *greenfield investments* (investment in new production facilities or expansion of existing facilities) that create new production capacity, jobs and new technology, and *mergers and acquisitions* that involve buying, selling, and uniting different existing companies. By contrast, **portfolio (indirect) investment** involves the purchase of stocks and bonds.

Corporate investment provides capital for countries' economic growth and jobs, and its impact grew dramatically starting in the 1980s with growing acceptance of free market capitalism. Global outward FDI grew from \$14 billion in 1970, and peaked at \$1.5 trillion in 2007. It declined to \$1.2 trillion in 2010 owing to global recession but is expected to reach \$1.6–\$2 trillion by 2012.³ Mergers and acquisitions, worth \$150 billion in the early 1990s, were valued at \$1.2 billion in 2000, declining to \$880 billion by 2006.⁴ FDI from the United States to other countries reached an all-time high of \$394 billion in 2007 (declining to \$248 billion in 2009), reflecting a desire of US-based TNCs to relocate operations overseas. The US remains the single largest recipient of FDI, attracting \$325 billion in 2008 (\$130 billion in 2009), and China received \$108 billion in FDI in 2008 (\$95 billion in 2009), leading all developing countries.⁵ Sovereign wealth funds (government investment funds of developing countries intended to acquire foreign assets mainly in developed countries) have

become important sources of FDI, and by 2008 were managing assets valued at \$ 5 trillion.⁶

Most FDI flows into the developed regions of North America, Europe, and East Asia where corporate sales and interstate trade are greatest and where corporations meet less resistance than in LDCs that fear corporate exploitation. China, the US, and India are the preferred targets for FDI of leading corporations (see Figure 14.2).

Although slowed by global recession in 2008–09, trade barriers have fallen since World War Two, and economic policies including privatization and deregulation of public industries and the free movement of capital have spread. Other changes in recent decades involve technologies

that have increased financial flows geometrically. Thus, in the 1970s the value of foreign exchange transactions – the world’s largest financial market – was about \$18 billion a day, and by 2010 it had reached \$4 trillion per day.⁷ Such transactions involve exchanging different currencies, an essential requirement for global trade and investment, but huge flows involve **speculation**, making financial markets volatile and permitting crises to unfold overnight.

The chapter begins by looking at the historical emergence of international political economy (IPE). It then examines three principal theoretical approaches to IPE – **mercantilism**, **economic liberalism**, and **Marxism**. Thereafter, it turns to

Top 20




Figure 14.2 Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, 2010

Source: www.business.nsw.gov.au/aboutnsw/Trade+and+Investment/B6_foreign_dir_inv_conf_index.htm.

the major international institutions of the global economic system: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (also known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) along with its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO). The chapter then examines the enormous role of TNCs in the global economy and the evolving relationship between states and markets. It concludes by discussing the sources and consequences of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and the Great Recession that began in 2007.

The beginnings of a global economy

For much of history, there was no global economic system. Trade was mainly local and based on barter – the direct exchange of goods without money. When barter became inadequate owing to distance or the bulk of goods for trade, precious metals like gold and silver were used to make payment. Rome established a monetary system throughout its empire, and long after that empire collapsed its gold coins remained in use and were accepted everywhere.

Europe’s medieval world evolved slowly under the influence of social and economic change. In Flanders, Belgium, and northern Italy, self-governing city-states emerged as commerce flourished. Growing trade required money, and banks appeared. By the end of the thirteenth century, Florence had become Europe’s banking center with 80 banks, and, as money replaced barter, trade within Europe and between Europe and other lands expanded. Florentine bankers such as the Bardi and Peruzzi families established branches around Europe and became immensely rich, involved in trading grain, wool, and silk, as well as making loans and exchanging currency. The most important Florentine banking family were the Medicis, later to become the city’s rulers. It was to Lorenzo de’ Medici the

Magnificent (1449–92) that Machiavelli dedicated *The Prince*. At its height, the Medici’s banking empire had nine branches outside Florence at which it made loans, kept deposits, and invested in commerce and industry. Its most important client was the pope for whom it collected tithes (10 percent of earnings) from across Europe and, under Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464), it actually managed papal finances. The Medicis also loaned money at high interest rates to Europe’s rulers, especially when those rulers waged war. This was a risky proposition as the Peruzzi and Bardi families discovered when England’s King Edward III (1327–77) could not repay his loans during the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453), and they were bankrupted.

As commerce spread northward, merchant groups from commercial cities along the Baltic Sea such as Hamburg and Lübeck formed the Hanseatic League in the twelfth century (see Map 14.1). The league provided security for merchants, standardized weights and measures, and fostered trade among Russians, Scandinavians, Germans, Poles, and English. By the fourteenth century, some 60 cities were members of the league. Thereafter, Europe’s voyages of discovery created new economic links with distant peoples and places in the course of establishing empires and planting European colonies on distant shores.

As territorial states emerged as principal global actors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they assumed the role of providing money and regulating trade. Along with the state, the first international monetary system developed – the **gold standard** under which gold and money were equivalent. Under this system, national currencies were linked to gold that was kept in national treasuries. Gold was used to pay for imports from countries that imported more than they exported.

As the global economy grew, several theoretical approaches evolved concerning the relationship between economics and politics.



Map 14.1 The Hanseatic League, major cities, 1367

Theories of political economy

There are three dominant theoretical traditions in IPE – mercantilism, liberalism, and Marxism – each with distinctive analytic and normative elements. Mercantilism dominated economic thinking between the sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries. Although it was eclipsed by liberalism in the nineteenth century, a version of mercantilism still influences many countries where it takes the form of **protectionism** for home industries. The second perspective, economic liberalism or free market **capitalism**, arose in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, spread by British and American advocates. Marxism developed in the nineteenth century as an alternative to liberalism, with socialists and communists advocating various Marxist approaches as alternatives to capitalism (a term coined by Karl Marx). Three factors – the Cold War’s end, the influence of free market capitalists, and globalization – have made economic liberalism, now called neoliberalism, today’s dominant perspective.

Mercantilism

The Scottish political economist Adam Smith (1723–90) coined the term “mercantile system,” which he defined as “the encouragement of exportation and the discouragement of importation.”⁸ Mercantilism’s normative premise was that economic policy should advance state power. In this, mercantilists were political realists. Mercantilists believed that accumulating gold and silver (“bullionism”) was beneficial and that there was little to gain from trade because the precious metals used to pay for imports balanced the value of the goods exported. Since every country accepted precious metals as payment, such metals were the bases of wealth. In reality, accumulation of precious metals by not producing goods while increasing a country’s money supply proved highly inflationary.

The mercantilist era was one of intense colonial rivalry among Europe’s powers. Spain’s conquest of South and Central America in the sixteenth century and its access to precious metals made it the leading power of its age, and its New World colonies became part of a great imperial trade bloc. By 1600, Spain’s American empire consisted of New Spain (the mainland north of the Isthmus of Panama, the West Indies, and

Venezuela) and Peru (South America south of New Spain except for Brazil). Spanish mercantilism prohibited non-Spanish vessels from visiting Spanish colonies, banned foreign exports from its colonies, and required that exports to its colonies be re-exported through Spain. Spain's colonies were not permitted to manufacture a range of products, and until 1720 all colonial trade had to be re-exported through the city of Seville. England's imperial ambitions brought it into conflict with Spain whose treasure ships were attacked by English privateers like Sir Francis Drake (1540–96), who in 1578 brought back Spanish treasure that earned investors a profit of over 4000 percent. England's naval primacy dates from its defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588.

Mercantilism thrived in an era during which European states were centralizing their authority by building specialized bureaucracies and hiring mercenaries for their armies and navies. Like realists, mercantilists believed that the success of a state's economic policies could be judged, not by the increase in *absolute* wealth, but by the increase in wealth *relative* to rivals. States, according to mercantilists, should be self-sufficient in industries, especially those needed to wage war. To this end, leaders did not allow skilled labor to emigrate or capital goods (goods used to produce other goods) to be exported.

Mercantilists argued that **infant industries**, even if inefficient, should be nurtured and protected behind a protectionist wall even though this meant that prices for consumers would be higher and their choices fewer. Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), America's first Secretary of the Treasury, delivered to Congress a "Report on Manufactures" (1791) in which he defended the need for such policies in the young republic: "It is well known," he argued, "that certain nations" help their manufacturers to export "particular commodities" and help "their own workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors, in the countries to which those commodities are sent." Hamilton concluded: "To be enabled to contend with success, it is evident, that the

interference and aid of their own government are indispensable."⁹ Hamilton, like other mercantilists, also encouraged exports to acquire precious metals and favored manufacturing over agriculture because its products could be more readily exported.

Under mercantilism, economics and politics were entwined in several ways. Mercantilists regarded **tariffs** on imports as a vital source of government income to pay for armies. To this end, Europe's monarchs constantly interfered in their countries' economies, regulating production of goods associated with security and establishing state monopolies, corporations, and trading companies. Mercantilists also supported imperial expansion and establishment of overseas colonies to obtain larger exclusive markets for their products and access to raw materials. In addition, new manufacturing industries were granted overseas monopolies, while potential competitors were shut out of home and colonial markets by quotas, tariffs, and outright import bans.

Mercantilists also encouraged population growth to provide colonies with laborers. They encouraged the building of merchant ships and navies, a policy beneficial to England's North American colonies because it facilitated the movement of settlers to the New World and aided trade between England and North America. During the late seventeenth century, King Louis XIV encouraged the growth of French shipping by providing **subsidies** to shipbuilders and placing heavy duties on foreign ships entering French ports. The king's comptroller general of finance, Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619–83), placed high tariffs on foreign goods, rewarded French families for having large numbers of children, and extended France's empire by colonizing Canada, Louisiana, and Haiti.

England's mercantilist policies played a key role in relations between the American colonies and the mother country. The 1651 Navigation Act required that goods shipped to and from English colonies or imported by England from its colonies use only English vessels manned by

English crews. This law was directed principally against England's arch rival, Holland, and, later, also against France. Since England's North American colonists were regarded as English, the act benefited them initially. Colonial unrest grew, however, when in 1663 the Navigation Act was amended to require that colonial exports to Europe be sent to an English port before being re-exported elsewhere. The colonists also chafed under England's prohibition on the export of colonial products like tobacco and rice to countries other than England, as well as subsequent laws that prevented colonists from manufacturing products such as woolens, hats, and iron that might compete with English manufacturers.

Mercantilism began to give way to economic liberalism during the Industrial Revolution and Britain's conversion to free trade. The Industrial Revolution (c.1760–1830) transformed Britain from an agrarian to an industrial society. Industrialization and accompanying urbanization empowered a commercial middle class, greatly enlarged the numbers of urban workers, and advanced the spread of democracy, evidenced by Britain's 1832 Reform Act, which expanded the number of eligible British voters.

To provide cheap food for a growing urban population, Britain stepped away from mercantilism by revoking its Corn Laws. These had prevented importing grain in order to protect the profits of large landowners who feared that imports would reduce prices. The laws had kept the price of bread high to the detriment of workers in Britain's expanding towns and cities, and industrialists feared that high bread prices would force them to pay higher wages. Poor harvests in 1816 and 1839 pushed bread prices sky high, creating urban unrest, and producing opposition to the Corn Laws. In 1838, the liberal economist Richard Cobden (1806–65), along with the reformer John Bright (1811–89) and other advocates of laissez-faire economic principles, founded the Anti-Corn Law League. Economic depression between 1840 and 1842, followed by the 1845 failure of the Irish potato crop and the

Irish famine, aided the cause of opponents of the Corn Laws, and the laws were repealed in 1846.

By 1860 Britain had become an advocate of free trade, and, for another half-century, Britain's hegemonic power was instrumental in maintaining an open trading system. Mercantilism, however, did not disappear. The US, for example, maintained high tariff walls behind which its industries could flourish. Also, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the European powers maintained tariff walls around their overseas empires.

Today, a modern form of mercantilism – called neomercantilism – persists, even in the face of globalization. Few countries wish to remain self-sufficient under conditions of globalization, an exception being “the hermit kingdom” of North Korea whose leaders propounded a variant of self-sufficiency called *juche* (self-reliance). Today, economic nationalism often takes the form of **nontariff barriers** to trade, for example, campaigns that urge citizens to buy home products, rules that require governments to purchase goods made by home industries or impose technical standards on imported products. Subsidies, tax breaks, and import quotas are other ways governments protect home industries without imposing tariffs.

Occasionally, governments pressure each other to accept “voluntary” export restraints. In the 1980s, the United States pressured Japan to limit the number of automobiles it exported to the US. Sometimes, countries impose complex regulations on foreign imports that require cumbersome and expensive inspection processes, justified for safety or health reasons. As a result of a single case of mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) in the US in 2003 Japan required that every American cow slaughtered for export to Japan be individually inspected.

Pockets of mercantilism exist in most countries. Fears that jobs will be lost through **outsourcing** to other countries where labor costs are lower produce resistance to free trade, especially among labor unions. While protectionism

may save the jobs of those in *inefficient* industries, other countries may retaliate with their own protectionist measures, thereby reducing exports and jobs in *efficient* industries. Mercantilism's opponents argue that, while protectionism aids particular groups, it harms society as a whole by increasing prices and reducing the range of goods available to consumers. Thus, French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1801–50) published a satirical pamphlet entitled “The Petition,” ridiculing an imaginary group of candle makers who seek protection from “the ruinous competition of a rival who apparently works under conditions so far superior to our own for the production of light that he is *flooding the domestic market* with it at an incredibly low price; for the moment he appears, our sales cease, all the consumers turn to him, and a branch of French industry whose ramifications are innumerable is all at once reduced to complete stagnation.” Their “rival” is the sun! And the candle makers want the government “to pass a law requiring the closing of all windows, dormers, skylights, inside and outside shutters, curtains, casements, bull’s-eyes, deadlights, and blinds – in short, all openings, holes, chinks, and fissures through which the light of the sun is wont to enter houses, to the detriment of the fair industries with which, we are proud to say, we have endowed the country, a country that cannot, without betraying ingratitude, abandon us today to so unequal a combat.”¹⁰

Recent decades have witnessed the spread of economic liberalism, and the next section examines the origins and features of this perspective.

Economic liberalism

Unlike mercantilism, the underlying norm of economic liberalism is that economic policies should improve citizens’ standard of living, not increase state power. In this, it is akin to political liberalism, much as mercantilism is related to realism.

As a coherent perspective, economic liberalism was pioneered by Adam Smith and the English

economist David Ricardo (1772–1823). In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Smith argued that trade impediments impoverish rather than enrich. Precious metals, he believed, were less important than manufactures. Countries could achieve **economies of scale** by specializing in goods that they could produce most efficiently. Smith described how markets produce general welfare, arguing that competition among numerous self-interested individuals benefits society as a whole because competition results in a wide choice of goods at low prices. An “invisible hand” transforms individual greed into social prosperity. Individuals would only act this way, however, if private property and the rights to buy and sell were assured. State interference in economic life, Smith contended, should be limited to providing national defense and public goods such as roads and schools. Beyond this, government interference distorted markets, thereby reducing social welfare.

To Smith’s ideas, Ricardo added that free trade was beneficial because in specializing, countries achieved a **comparative advantage**. Ricardo showed that, even if one country could produce *all* its goods more inexpensively than other countries, it would still be better off specializing in whichever good it could produce *most* efficiently relative to its trading partners and trading for whatever else it needed, thereby minimizing its **opportunity costs**. A country might have a comparative advantage in producing a product even if it were absolutely less efficient than other countries in producing that product. Comparative advantage results from the cost of factors of production – capital, land, technology, energy, and labor

To illustrate comparative advantage, imagine a lawyer who opens an office. To save money, the lawyer types all her own letters, but, as new clients come, she realizes that to spend time with them requires a secretary. The secretary she hires actually types more slowly and makes more mistakes than the lawyer did. She is better at *both* jobs than the secretary and, therefore, has an *absolute*

KEY DOCUMENT

THE “INVISIBLE HAND” FROM ADAM SMITH’S *THE WEALTH OF NATIONS*

As every individual . . . endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . [H]e intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.¹¹

advantage over him in both law and typing. Nevertheless, it would be foolish for her to do all the work herself or split both jobs with her secretary. By letting the secretary type, the lawyer can see more clients, thereby focusing on her professional specialty. The secretary, an inferior typist, still has a comparative advantage in typing over the lawyer. Thus, comparative advantage does *not* mean being able to do something better than anyone else. By doing her own typing, the lawyer would forego the *opportunity* to earn a higher income by accepting more clients. This is an opportunity cost, and, by comparing opportunity costs, one can determine in what one should specialize. In this instance, the lawyer saves money by doing her own typing but would sacrifice the opportunity of earning more money.

Now consider two countries: China and Brazil can both produce oranges and rice. If each devotes all available resources to oranges, Brazil could grow 100 tons of oranges and China 200 tons. If both allocate all their resources to rice, each can produce 100 tons. Thus, China can grow oranges less expensively than Brazil, and both can produce rice at the same price. China enjoys an *absolute* advantage in producing oranges, and both can grow rice equally efficiently.

Why should they trade with each other? The answer lies in opportunity costs. For Brazil, the

opportunity cost of producing one ton of oranges is one ton of rice and vice versa. But for China, the opportunity cost of producing one ton of rice is $\frac{1}{2}$ ton of oranges, and the opportunity cost of one ton of oranges is two tons of rice. Since China has a lower opportunity cost of producing oranges, its *comparative advantage* lies in specializing in oranges and letting Brazil grow rice. Were China to use its resources to grow both, it would sacrifice the larger advantage it enjoys in growing oranges. In other words, China would incur opportunity costs of forgoing the benefits that would accrue from growing oranges. For its part, Brazil has a comparative advantage in growing rice. If both countries produce and consume their own oranges and rice, they will jointly produce a total of 150 tons of oranges and 100 tons of rice. But, if they trade oranges for rice at the price of one ton of oranges for $\frac{2}{3}$ tons of rice, together they can produce 200 tons of oranges and 100 tons of rice, thereby providing more oranges at no increase in cost.

Economic liberals recognize that production cost is only one of many factors determining why people buy one company’s goods rather than another’s. Corporations can also improve sales by selling goods at lower prices than competitors, appealing to customers’ tastes and preferences, and providing high-quality products. As a result,

KEY DOCUMENT

EXCERPT FROM DAVID RICARDO'S *ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION* (1817) CONCERNING "COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE"

Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, by regarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labor most effectively and most economically: while, by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world. It is this principle which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal, that corn shall be grown in America and Poland, and that hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in England.¹²

artificial barriers to free enterprise limit the range and quality of goods available to consumers.

Economic liberalism has evolved since Smith and Ricardo. Today's giant corporations are rivals in markets that often have too few competitors to assure genuine competition based on comparative advantage. Global trade increasingly occurs among or within these corporations and their subsidiaries. Success is measured by a corporation's share of the global market – as well as the profits it earns. Also, unlike manufacturers in previous centuries, corporations can improve their comparative advantage by moving to countries with low labor costs or few regulations.

Today's neoliberal economists still favor free markets, elimination of trade barriers, and minimal government interference in markets, but they see a greater role for international economic institutions than did classical economic liberals. They argue that free movement of investment capital and labor produces greater wealth for the world as a whole even though inefficient countries and industries may suffer. Economic *efficiency*, they believe, matters more than economic *equality*. With free markets, there may be

inequality, but even the poor become absolutely better off because of the overall growth in wealth. Moreover, concentrations of wealth provide needed capital investment for further economic growth. Unfettered competition may, however, trigger speculation that drives up the price of assets above their value, and, when such "bubbles" burst, economic distress may result. This took place in the United States after housing prices peaked in mid-2006 and began to decline. Thereafter, many borrowers, especially those with subprime mortgages (risky loans made at high and frequently variable interest rates), were unable to repay their loans and lost their homes. As a result, banks and other financial institutions in the US, Britain, and elsewhere that owned those mortgages saw the value of their assets drop precipitously, and a global financial crisis followed. Critics of economic liberalism or "casino capitalism"¹³ view unregulated capitalism as a source of economic inequality. Out of this critique emerged a third competing economic perspective: Marxism.

Marxism

Angered by the injustices of the industrial revolution, Karl Marx and his associate, Friedrich Engels, offered a revolutionary alternative to capitalism that conceived of global history as a struggle between economic classes rather than among states. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels warned that a “specter is haunting Europe – the specter of communism” and called on the world’s workers to rise up against their capitalist oppressors.

THE EVOLUTION OF MARXISM Marx and Engels were driven by humanitarian motives, and Europe’s socialist parties later adopted many of their ideas as the bases for social reform. Marxist ideas also influenced the LDCs in the 1960s and 1970s, and, although the Cold War’s end made Marxism seem less relevant, influential theorists continue to view problems of international political economy through Marxist lenses.

Marx and Engels believed that history evolved owing to changing modes of production that

allowed some economic classes to dominate and exploit others. The historical process, they argued, was inevitable, evolving through a clash of opposing forces in a process called **dialectical materialism**. Economic conditions, Marx argued, determine politics, not the other way around. Each historical period featured a struggle between classes that climaxed in violent revolution, overthrowing the dominant class. In Europe’s Middle Ages, a feudal class dominated economic and political life and was overthrown by a new capitalist class, which, in turn, would be overthrown by the working class as industrialization changed the way goods were produced.

Under capitalism, capitalists owned the means of production, and workers, Marx argued, owned nothing but their own labor which they sold to capitalists. Capitalists dominated the state and its coercive bureaucracies, enabling them to preserve their privileges. “Capital,” Marx declared, “is dead labor, which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks.”¹⁴ Capitalists paid workers less than the value of their labor, profiting from the difference

KEY DOCUMENT EXCERPT FROM FRIEDRICH ENGELS, *THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND* (1845)

A pretty list of diseases engendered purely by the hateful greed of the manufacturers! Women made unfit for childbearing, children deformed, men enfeebled, limbs crushed, whole generations wrecked, afflicted with disease and infirmity, purely to fill the purses of the **bourgeoisie**. And when one reads of the barbarism of single cases, how children are seized naked in bed by the overseers, and driven with 39 blows and kicks to the factory, their clothing over their arms, how their sleepiness is driven off with blows, how they fall asleep over their work nevertheless, how one poor child sprang up, still asleep, at the call of the overseer, and mechanically went through the operations of its work after its machine was stopped; when one reads how children, too tired to go home, hid away in the wool in the drying-room to sleep there, and could only be driven out of the factory with straps; how many hundreds came home so tired every night, that they could eat no supper for weariness and want of appetite, that their parents found them kneeling by the bedside, where they had fallen asleep during their prayers.¹⁴

between the cost of labor and the income derived from selling their products. Capitalists, Marx believed, would increase production but reduce wages and employment to increase profits, thereby impoverishing ever more workers. As capitalist greed “pauperized” more workers, economic crises would grow more frequent. In the end, the **proletariat** would rise up to destroy capitalism.

Following revolution, a new system, **socialism**, would emerge in which workers would own the means of production and exchange and would be compensated according to their contribution rather than according to the capitalist law of supply and demand. The wealth of society would be distributed “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.” After socialism, the world would enter the stage of **communism**, a classless society that distributed wealth “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”¹⁶

Let us now examine two examples of recent neo-Marxist approaches: world system and *dépendencia* theory.

WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY Influenced by Marxism, political scientist Immanuel Wallerstein developed world systems theory to explain the gap between rich and poor. According to Wallerstein, the modern “capitalist world system” emerged from a feudal world and led to the rise of Western Europe between 1450 and 1670. After a period of stagnation that began about 1300, capitalism grew, accompanied by the formation of strong states in Europe. Capitalism then expanded beyond Europe, creating a world economic system that transcended national boundaries.¹⁷

Wallerstein argued that the capitalist world system involved a global division of labor in which some regions prospered and others languished. He identified three main regional types: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Core states in Europe and North America, he contended, were the main beneficiaries of the world economic system at the expense of countries on the periphery. The periphery included regions that

exported raw materials and were linked to the core by unequal trade relations. Initially, much of Latin America and Eastern Europe constituted the periphery, and these were later joined by colonized areas in Africa and Asia. Eastern Europe, governed by aristocratic landowners, exported grain to the core, using poorly paid rural laborers as workers. Latin America exported precious metals and raw materials to Europe, and the Spanish and Portuguese elites exploited the peoples they conquered, as well as African slaves, as cheap labor.

Wallerstein examined the evolution of the world economy during which some countries moved from core to periphery and vice versa. From the eighteenth century, industrialization fostered imperialism in a search for new markets and raw materials, and Asia and Africa joined the world economy as part of the periphery, while Germany and the US became core countries. In this way, world system theory, like classical Marxism, theorizes that economic change underlies historical evolution.

DÉPENDENCIA THEORY The influence of Marxism was also apparent in the popularity of *dépendencia* (dependency) theory in Latin America between the 1960s and the 1980s. Like Wallerstein, *dépendencia* theorists such as Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, Brazilian economist Theotonio dos Santos, and German sociologist André Gunder Frank argued that underdevelopment was due to the inferior position of LDCs in a world capitalist system. The world trading system, these theorists argued, benefited only advanced capitalist countries. **Terms of trade** – the ratio of export prices to import prices – were stacked against the LDCs, especially those that exported raw materials and agricultural commodities, because the prices of imported manufactured goods rise faster than that of commodity exports. Terms of trade for LDCs would deteriorate unless prices of their exports rose faster than prices of imports. Worse, since much of world trade is among corporate

subsidiaries and not exposed to the market conditions, corporations can use accounting devices to avoid paying taxes. By overpricing products sent to subsidiaries in high-tax countries and underpricing products sent to low-tax countries, TNCs can artificially reduce profits where tax rates are high, thereby lowering their tax burden. According to *dépendencia* theorists, the key to breaking the cycle in which the rich got richer and the poor got poorer lay in reducing imports (import substitution), becoming as self-sufficient as possible, and establishing state control of the economy. Many LDCs depended on exports of a single primary commodity like cocoa from the Ivory Coast and therefore were vulnerable to price fluctuations owing to rising or falling demand for their product. A rapid decline in commodity prices would leave them awash in debt and unable to develop their own industries. The LDCs, argued *dépendencia* theorists, should cease importing goods from the developed world, thereby ending their dependence on the capitalist core and, instead, adopt protectionist policies to reduce imports. Only by encouraging infant industries, nationalizing foreign enterprises, and regulating domestic prices, the argument went, could LDCs achieve economic independence.

Initially, policies advocated by *dépendencia* theorists enjoyed some success, but by the 1980s the limits of these policies were apparent. Industries fostered by *dépendencia* policies were inefficient, and failure to invest in agriculture harmed the LDCs' most important economic sector. Government budget deficits ballooned, and hyperinflation had become a staple of economic life owing to deficit spending and artificially low interest rates. Moreover, subsidizing domestic industry required large-scale capital that was only available through foreign loans. Thus, Latin American debt almost quadrupled between 1975 and 1982, until an acute debt crisis confronted the region. The effort to come to grips with the debt crisis produced a "lost decade" in Latin America that reduced per capita income.

The failure of policies urged by *dépendencia*

theorists and growing pressure on LDCs from the developed world to abandon import-substitution policies and adopt export-led policies to attract foreign investment largely discredited Marxian economic analysis and led to growing interest in free market economics, notably attraction of foreign investment and growth in exports. Nevertheless, Marxist analysis did not disappear. The persistence of economic inequality within and between countries and the cycles of recession and prosperity that still characterize global economics help Marxism to survive as an analytic tool and critique of capitalism.

During the early twentieth century, the three IPE approaches continued to compete, but liberalism became dominant. Although all countries retained some mercantilist practices and Marxism took root in the USSR after 1917, free market capitalism dominated the global economy until the disaster of the Great Depression. This event scarred a generation, threatened the survival of global capitalism, and led to the birth of a group of international economic institutions following World War Two.

The Great Depression

The Great Depression traumatized an entire generation, and, as we saw in Chapter 3, contributed to the rise of Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan. Beginning with the collapse of stock prices on Wall Street, the Depression spread across the US and then across the oceans to Europe and Asia, destroying the global economic system and encouraging people to seek extreme political solutions. In this section, we will examine the causes, course, and consequences of the Depression.

The 1920s witnessed widespread prosperity, stock speculation, and an optimistic belief in ever higher living standards. "We in America today," declared President Herbert Hoover (1874–1964) on taking office in 1928, are "nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land."¹⁸

The Depression begins

Fueled by low interest rates, growing stock dividends and personal savings, speculation pushed stock prices above their true value. People borrowed money to buy stocks and then put up these stocks as collateral to buy additional stocks (a practice called “buying on margin”). Thus, stockbrokers’ loans jumped from about \$5 million in 1928 to \$850 million by September 1929. Fearing the “bubble” might burst, the US Federal Reserve tried to curb stock speculation by raising interest rates, thereby making it more expensive to borrow money. Rising interest rates, however, led businesses to reduce spending, production, and employment. Despite a decline in stock prices in September, few Americans thought the prosperity of the 1920s would end. Then, on October 24, “Black Thursday,” a record number of shares changed hands, and many investors were in a panic to sell stock before prices fell further.

Several leading bankers gathered at J. P. Morgan and Company to try and end the panic selling, and Thomas Lamont, a senior partner at Morgan, announced that: “There has been a little distress selling on the Stock Exchange . . . due to a technical condition of the market.”¹⁹ The panic subsided, and stock prices stabilized on Friday and Saturday. The worst seemed over until, on Monday October 28, selling resumed and then, the following day, recalled as “Black Tuesday,” the Dow Jones stock average dropped 13 percent. By 1932, US stocks were worth one-tenth of their 1929 value; manufacturing had declined by over half; and unemployment had soared to one-quarter of the workforce.

The stock market crash was followed by the collapse of agricultural prices. Following World War One, America’s agricultural sector largely missed out on the country’s prosperity, suffering from overproduction, low prices, and high debt. The Depression exacerbated these problems. As global agricultural markets contracted, grain prices fell, and a combination of overproduction and declining demand made it impossible for

many farmers to pay their debts. When farmers could not repay debts, rural banks were forced to close their doors. Drought on the Great Plains added to farmers’ woes, and many were forced to sell their farms and head westward to California as migrant workers. So many migrants left Oklahoma, the center of the “Dust Bowl,” that migrants in general were labeled “Okies.”

By balancing budgets at a time of declining tax revenues, governments cut spending, further reducing the demand for goods and causing economic contraction. Furthermore, countries were still on the gold standard, forcing governments to maintain fixed exchange rates that made international trade easier by permitting currencies to be exchanged for gold. To prevent the outflow of gold that would result if banks sold their currency in anticipation of its losing value, governments kept interest rates high. This made it difficult for businesses or consumers to borrow, and, by raising interest rates and trying to stop the outflow of gold, America’s Federal Reserve reduced the amount of money available to buy goods, creating a **liquidity crisis**. Economic contraction reduced taxes further, thereby forcing governments to cut budgets still more, and individuals curbed personal spending. As the value of their assets – stocks and property – declined, panic-stricken people tried to take their money out of banks which ran out of cash, had to close their doors, and went under. In two days in June 1931 alone, 18 banks in Chicago collapsed.²⁰ By 1933, 11,000 of America’s 25,000 banks had failed, and a general decline in economic confidence led firms and individuals to hold the money they still had.

Governments and economists at the time believed that the Depression would be self-correcting and opposed government intervention. According to widely held beliefs, weak businesses and banks deserved to go bankrupt and, when they did, resources would be freed up for successful enterprises. What instead took place was a vicious cycle of higher unemployment and declining production and consumption, leading to **deflation**. Falling prices led investors to delay

investing until prices fell further, and consumers who had money to spend did not do so in anticipation of further price declines. Businesses let workers go because no one could buy their products, and, as unemployment grew, fewer people had money to spend.

The Depression spreads

High levels of interdependence globalized the Depression, quickly bringing down the financial system that had yoked the economies of the US and Europe after World War One. The United States had emerged from the war as the world's chief financier and the source of loans to Europe. When the US economy crashed, American investment and loans to Europe ceased, causing economic chaos across the Atlantic. There followed the collapse of the giant Austrian bank Creditanstalt in June 1930 in what was the largest bank failure in history. Creditanstalt had grown rapidly in previous years by taking over smaller institutions, but it had been weakened by holding several bankrupt Austrian industries and was surviving by virtue of short-term US, French, and British loans. When rumors circulated that French creditors were demanding immediate repayment of their loans, panic seized Europe's financial markets.


The world economic system was a house of cards. By the Versailles Treaty, Germany was obligated to pay war reparations to France and Britain. Reparations were used by France and Britain to repay US loans made during the war to purchase American arms. Americans then loaned the funds sent by France and Britain to Germany to enable that country to pay its reparations bill. With the crash, US loans to Germany dried up; German payments to Britain and France ended; and Britain and France could no longer repay their debts to the US. German efforts in 1931 to obtain a moratorium on reparations payments were supported by President Hoover, who was also willing to cancel much of France's war debt to the US.

European delay, however, doomed the effort to forgive German debts, and the effort to get Congress to declare a moratorium on Anglo-French debt repayment was defeated.

The countries most deeply in debt to the US – Germany and Britain – also suffered most from the Great Depression. On September 20, 1931, Britain abandoned the gold standard, triggering panic in Europe as banks sought to sell British pounds because of the expected drop in their value. No longer would the Bank of England peg the value of the pound to gold and exchange gold for pounds at a set rate because doing so had kept the pound's value relatively high. This increased British imports of relatively inexpensive foreign products while reducing British exports. The subsequent drop in the pound's value was costly to countries that owned British securities, especially the US and France.

In Germany, the unemployed swelled the ranks of the Nazis and communists. Civil servants and the elderly saw their savings wiped out, and the middle class abandoned the Weimar Republic and endorse “extreme” solutions. Japan saw its export markets dry up, and unemployment grew in industries like silk making. Without markets for its goods, the prospect of obtaining an Asian empire for raw materials and protected markets became popular, and support for militarism grew.

With no dominant **hegemon** to make governments coordinate policy in the 1930s, countries tried to save themselves at one another's expense. Britain had played the role of hegemon before World War One and the US would do so after 1945, but in the 1930s, no single country could or tried to impose economic order. Governments tried to stabilize their economies by unilaterally boosting tariffs and devaluing currencies. These policies made imports more expensive and exports less expensive and more competitive. By boosting foreign demand for its products, a country could increase production and employ more workers, but higher tariffs and currency devaluation by one country also meant that the exports of other countries became less competitive



Map 14.2 The effect of the Depression in Europe

and that production in those countries declined and unemployment rose. Thus, unilateral tariff increases and currency devaluations were called *beggar-thy-neighbor policies*. Such policies triggered retaliation by other countries, producing a downward spiral in trade that left all worse off than before.

In June 1930, the United States passed the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act. Its purpose was to protect ailing US farmers from the competition of cheap agricultural imports and stem the decline in agricultural prices, but for political reasons Congress added tariffs on industrial goods. Other

countries retaliated, resulting in a contraction of global trade, and between 1929 and 1932, world trade plummeted by two-thirds. The Depression's impact was felt all across Europe (Map 14.2), and between 1929 and July 1932 global industrial production dropped by 38 percent.

Elected US president in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt, tried to end the Depression at home with an avalanche of economic and social reforms collectively called the New Deal. Although the New Deal advanced the cause of social and economic justice, the Depression persisted until World War Two when military conscription and

wartime spending reduced unemployment and raised US industrial production. The experience of the Great Depression persuaded world leaders to establish economic institutions at the end of the war to foster cooperation and discourage beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The next section examines the origins of these institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT – and their evolving economic roles.

The Bretton Woods institutions

The first steps in building a new economic order were taken at the July 1944 UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. At Bretton Woods, the representatives of 44 governments agreed to establish the IMF to help states with short-term **balance-of-payments** problems and the World Bank to provide long-term capital for poor states. This arrangement represented a compromise between the ideas of British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), who led his country's delegation to Bretton Woods, and Harry Dexter White (1892–1948), the chief international economist at the US Treasury in 1942–44. Keynes sought a powerful independent institution to balance American economic power, whereas White sought an organization that would be an adjunct to US economic power.

The conference also encouraged tariff reduction to stimulate world trade, and the 1947 Havana Conference adopted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the charter for a proposed International Trade Organization (ITO). Fearing that the ITO would undermine US sovereignty, however, Congress refused to approve its establishment. The GATT remained as an international forum to promote tariff reduction and resolve trade disputes. The key GATT norm was the **most-favored-nation (MFN) rule** that requires countries to treat one another equally in trade relations by according the same (lowest) tariff rates on imports from all countries. If one

country reduces tariffs on imports of another country, it has to extend the same reductions to other countries.

The IMF, World Bank, and the GATT became pillars of the global economic system, and, as that system evolved, so did their role. Today, they reflect the economic interdependence of actors in a globalizing world, play a major role in reinforcing neoliberal norms, and provide global economic governance.

The International Monetary Fund

The IMF was designed to promote economic stability by regulating monetary policy and currency exchange rates – the price of a country's currency in terms of other countries' currencies. It is an intergovernmental organization managed by a board of governors. Day-to-day work is handled by a managing director – customarily nominated by the European Union, an arrangement that is balanced by America's leading role in selecting the World Bank president.

Stable exchange rates are vital because trade and investment require payment in money. Countries have different currencies, and the currency of one country cannot be used to buy goods from another. Thus, importers need to convert money into the currency of the countries from which they are purchasing goods. Currency is a commodity like wheat or iron, and its value varies depending on supply and demand. If more people want dollars because they believe the dollar's value will rise, the demand for dollars will increase, and the dollar's value relative to other currencies like the euro or yen goes up. The result is a "strong dollar." But, if the demand for dollars declines, the dollar's relative value also declines, resulting in a "weak dollar." When a country's currency is strong, it can purchase imported goods inexpensively, and imports rise. Since a country's products are priced in its currency, a strong currency also means that its exports are expensive for foreigners to buy, and exports decline. Thus,

countries that want to increase exports may devalue their currency relative to other currencies.

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, countries adhered to the gold standard, by which the value of all currencies were linked to fixed quantities of gold into which they could be converted. Since currency exchange rates were fixed, exchange rates were stable, thereby facilitating the settlement of trade transactions. After 1933, the US abandoned the gold standard in favor of a modified system in which gold coins were no longer used but gold still defined the value of the dollar at a fixed rate of \$35 an ounce.

The IMF's main task was to restore a monetary system based on convertible currencies and **fixed exchange rates** and prevent competitive devaluations. Fixed exchange rates, however, make the system rigid. With fixed exchange rates in which the value of other currencies was pegged to the US dollar, it was not possible for a country to devalue its currency to increase exports. The IMF was responsible for maintaining stable exchange rates by providing short-term loans to help states manage temporary balance-of-payments deficits.

The IMF's task grew more complicated and its role expanded with the collapse of part of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. To combat domestic inflation and a spiraling balance-of-payments deficit during the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration decided that the US could no longer afford to subsidize global trade by maintaining a strong dollar. On August 15, 1971, the US announced it would no longer maintain a system of fixed exchange rates and that dollars could no longer be converted to gold.

Several reasons account for this decision. First, as monetary interdependence deepened, it became difficult to coordinate so many states' policies. Transnational banks and corporations had learned how to take advantage of slight fluctuations in interest and currency rates, for example by buying "cheap" gold and selling dollars in the belief that the US dollar was overvalued, and these practices were beyond IMF control. Second, Europe and Japan had recovered

from wartime destruction and wished to reduce their political dependence on the US. Washington had previously accepted a trade deficit and an outflow of dollars to help allies recover by providing them with funds to purchase needed imports. By 1971, this was no longer necessary. Third, American spending to wage war in Vietnam and combat poverty at home had stimulated global inflation. US inflation meant that dollars were worth less, but, since adjustment was impossible with fixed exchange rates, that inflation was exported to US allies. Fourth, the Nixon administration wanted to stem the decline in the US trading position but could not do so as long as fixed exchange rates prevented the dollar's devaluation.

America's action heralded an era in which currencies were permitted to "float" in relation to one another, their value determined by supply and demand. With some exceptions, **floating exchange rates** remain the norm today. If exchange rates float freely, the currencies of strong economies will rise, while those of weak economies will fall. If a country refuses to let the value of its currency rise freely, however, it will artificially increase its exports and reduce imports, a practice that the US claims that China is following.²¹ Currency speculation is inevitable with huge amounts of money racing around the world every day, and maintaining monetary stability – vital for world trade – is a serious challenge.

IMF funds that are loaned to countries to bolster their currencies are provided by member states, each with a quota based on its economy's size that is reviewed every five years. In addition, the IMF has a large gold reserve that it can sell for additional funds. As of February 2010, the IMF had available \$591.7 billion.²² A country's quota determines its voting power in the organization. Thus, the world's richest countries dominate the IMF. The US has 16.74 percent of the votes in the IMF in contrast to tiny Tuvalu with 0.01 percent of a vote. The IMF's 10 richest members, mostly from North America and Western Europe plus China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, dominate

the organization with almost 54 percent of the votes.²³ A member's quota also determines how much it may borrow from the IMF in a financial crisis.

As guardian of the world's monetary system, the IMF monitors economic trends and advises members about monetary policies. It consults annually with members – “surveillance discussions” – about their policies. The IMF also establishes standards for good financial practices to help countries avoid economic crises. Such crises occur owing to large and persistent budget deficits, high external debt burdens, weak or corrupt banking systems, overvalued currency, natural disasters, and domestic violence and wars. Such factors reduce exports, thereby creating balance-of-payments deficits, loss of investor confidence, and panic selling of foreign-owned assets in the country (called “capital flight”). Speculators can undermine a country's economy overnight by massive sales of its currency, causing its value to collapse.

In a crisis, the value of a country's currency drops precipitously, and the country loses **hard currency**, as people sell local currency for US dollars, European euros, Japanese yen, or gold. The outflow of hard currency and gold make it impossible for the country to pay its debts, most of which require repayment in hard currency, or to import essentials because sellers refuse payment in local currency. As local currency depreciates, citizens' savings and pensions are wiped out. Economic activity comes to a standstill, causing massive unemployment and widespread hardship.

The IMF can play a key role in such crises by lending a beleaguered country hard currency, thereby reassuring investors, and arranging with foreign banks and other countries to reschedule its foreign debt. However, IMF aid has strings attached to it that entail a loss of national control over the economy. Loan recipients must usually agree to “conditions” that its government introduce economic reforms, liberal trade and investment policies, higher interest rates to attract

foreign investment, and budget **austerity** to reduce deficits, end inflation and restore confidence in its currency. These policies reflect the “Washington Consensus,” a set of neoliberal practices ranging from tax reform and lower public spending to free trade and privatization of public industries,²⁴ and they may increase poverty and political unrest in countries receiving aid. Economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that such policies are “based on the outworn presumption that markets, by themselves, lead to efficient outcomes, failed to allow for desirable government interventions in the market, measures that can guide economic growth and make *everyone* better off.”²⁵

The IMF is widely viewed as a surrogate for rich capitalist countries that dominate it and an advocate of those countries' free market ideology. IMF conditions are stated in a structural adjustment program that outlines the economic policies a country must follow to receive loans. Such programs reflect the IMF belief in economic liberalism and privatization. They often require currency devaluation to enhance exports and reduce imports, the balancing of government budgets (by raising taxes and reducing expenditures), lifting government restrictions on imports, exports, and private investment, and ending state subsidies.

Once the IMF approves a country's reform program, other countries and foreign banks are likely to reinvest in the country – a key step in restoring economic health. Most IMF assistance is made through agreements called stand-by arrangements in which loans are extended at market-based interest rates. However, poor countries can obtain low-interest **concessional loans**. Total IMF loans peaked at almost \$72 billion in 2004, declined to about \$9.9 billion in 2008, and rose again to almost \$52 billion in mid-2010 owing to the global recession.²⁶ The IMF also assumed the role of providing the newly energized G-20 (Chapter 5, p. 165) with staff support and evaluating how a global tax on financial institutions might be levied.

In 2010, the IMF joined the European Union in providing Greece with \$60 billion in loans. Greece confronted the prospect of defaulting on the debts (“sovereign default”) it had amassed in previous years by borrowing to finance annual budget deficits. By that time, debt-rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Fitch had downgraded Greek government bonds to virtual junk status, and there was a growing risk that a Greek default would cripple not only Greek banks, but foreign banks, especially in Germany and France, that had made earlier loans to Athens. An additional risk was that investors’ panic over Greece would spread to other indebted European countries – Portugal, Ireland, and Spain – that also were deeply in debt. Facing an economic and financial maelstrom that threatened to spread across Europe and cross the Atlantic, the IMF agreed to provide up to \$317 billion to supplement an EU stabilization fund that would be available to rescue other eurozone members (countries that use the euro as their currency) with serious debt problems. Thereafter, Ireland and Portugal also requested assistance. To provide amounts that, as in the Greek case, exceed such countries’ IMF quota, the IMF itself borrowed from other countries, notably, China, Brazil, Russia, and India.²⁷

Although the IMF has lessened the severity of the conditions it sets to make loans owing to its experience during the “Asian contagion” of the late 1990s (see pp. 488–9), conditionality – the conditions it attaches to loans – was much in evidence during the European crisis and in earlier IMF rescues of countries in financial crisis – Hungary, Ukraine, and Iceland. To obtain the EU–IMF loans, the Greek government had to pledge dramatic cuts in spending and increases in taxes to reduce its budget deficit from 13.6 percent of gross domestic product to below 3 percent by 2014. In order to cut its budget by \$37 billion within three years, Greece agreed to do away with bonus payments and freeze salaries and pensions for government workers for three years, increase sales tax from 19 to 23 percent, raise taxes on fuel, alcohol and tobacco by 10 percent, and raise the

average retirement age from 61.4 to 63.5. Greece also pledged to reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption among tax and customs officials.²⁸ Other eurozone members also adopted austerity plans to cut their budget deficits.

Austerity policies imposed as EU/IMF conditions produced resentment. Lower government spending and higher taxes meant an economic slowdown, accompanied by higher prices and spreading unemployment. Greek workers were furious at ending a system that had guaranteed them lifetime employment and early retirement. National boundaries afforded no protection against economic storms, and globalization had eroded the capacity of Athens to manage domestic economic policy. Angry Greeks, especially public service workers, reacted to these conditions by taking to the streets (see Figure 14.3).²⁹

As the Greek case indicates, IMF reform programs may produce social and political unrest. Declines in government spending may increase unemployment, and the end of subsidies for staples like bread, rising costs for basic goods, and reduced public services may trigger a popular backlash against a government and the IMF, strain social and political institutions, and threaten political stability. The IMF and lending banks advocate government nonintervention in the economy and reliance on the global market. They regard market stability as more important than a state’s economic autonomy. Countries in crisis have little choice but to accept IMF conditionality because private banks will no longer extend loans and, without IMF aid, default is the only (unpalatable) alternative.

Having examined the role of the IMF, we turn to the second institution conceived at Bretton Woods, the World Bank. The World Bank, which actually consists of several agencies, is a major source of development assistance for poor countries and increasingly has become an advocate of sustainable development.



Figure 14.3 Greeks riot against austerity plan

Source: AFP/Getty Images

The World Bank

The World Bank was originally established to fund post-World War Two reconstruction but soon turned to the task of economic development. Like the IMF, the World Bank is an intergovernmental grouping with a board of governors and executive board. The bank's president is by custom an American and is currently Robert B. Zoellick, formerly US Trade Representative and Undersecretary of State. Zoellick succeeded Paul Wolfowitz, a neo-conservative who as US Undersecretary of Defense had vigorously promoted the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Funded by members' contributions and borrowing on global capital markets, the bank makes lending decisions on market principles – loan rates and prospects for repayment. For years, the bank funded large, splashy infrastructure projects

such as dams that critics argued provided little help to the poor and ignored environmental consequences. In recent years, however, the bank has focused more on the problems of the poorest countries, has raised additional funds for this effort, and provides borrowers with low-interest loans to alleviate poverty and stimulate sustainable economic development. This “mission creep” has been controversial, with critics claiming that it has expanded the World Bank's agenda until it has become unachievable.³⁰

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the third institutional pillar of the economic system. Like the IMF and World Bank, the WTO is responsible for a specific aspect of global economics, in this case world trade. In this role, it, too, promotes a neoliberal economic agenda, and many view it as a leading institutional exponent of globalization.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization

Global prosperity depends on people's ability to sell their products to one another. At Bretton Woods, the GATT was negotiated to encourage a liberal trading order based on the most-favored-nation norm.³¹ The GATT was an agreement or treaty, but unlike the IMF or World Bank, it was not an international organization. Over the years, a series of highly successful "negotiating rounds" were conducted within the GATT framework to encourage free trade. In the five decades following the GATT's establishment, world trade quintupled and average industrial tariffs fell to one-tenth their 1948 level. The early Dillon (1960–61) and Kennedy (1964–67) rounds reduced trade and nontariff barriers in key industrial sectors, and the Tokyo Round (1973–79) achieved deep tariff cuts and launched efforts to confront controversial issues such as favorable trade treatment for poor countries.³²

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

The Bretton Woods institutions were established by economic liberals who believed that eliminating tariffs and other trade restrictions would enhance global trade and produce greater overall wealth. This belief has been borne out by the experience of the global economy since World War Two. Since the war, industrial tariffs have dropped to less than 5 percent in industrial countries, while global economic growth averaged 5 percent a year and world trade grew at an average of 8 percent a year between 1945 and 1980.

The Uruguay Round (1986–94) was more ambitious and complex than its predecessors, addressing vexing issues such as agricultural subsidies, trade in services (like insurance), rules for governing **intellectual property**, and establishment of the GATT's powerful successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the end, agricultural subsidies were cut (but not as much as originally hoped), protection for intellectual property was expanded, rules for investment and trade in services were set, and tariffs were slashed by an average of one-third. But the Uruguay Round's most important accomplishment was establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995. Since then, the WTO has become a symbol of economic globalization and a target for anti-globalization groups.

The WTO is intended to provide "the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members."³³ It is based on norms of non-discrimination in trade, reciprocity of access to markets, lower trade barriers, stability of trade relations, and elimination of unfair trade practices such as government export subsidies or "dumping" (selling below cost to capture a market). These norms and rules are codified in a series of treaties. The GATT regulates trade in goods. The other treaties, as their names suggest – General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and Dispute Settlement agreement – regulate trade in services, protect intellectual property, and create a dispute settlement mechanism to adjudicate trade conflicts that arise among WTO members.

Unlike the GATT, the WTO has teeth that help it enforce trade rules. It is empowered to resolve trade disputes promptly, and its decisions stand unless *all* members oppose them. GATT decisions, by contrast, could be blocked by *any* member. Under the WTO agreement, each member agrees that its laws and practices must measure up to WTO rules and, in doing so, surrenders some control over its economic sovereignty. Those rules limit states' unilateral efforts to protect their

industries. The United States, for example, tries to stop foreign firms from selling goods in the US at prices below the cost of production. Such dumping is described as an unfair trade practice under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. American firms frequently petition the government to use Section 301 against foreign competitors. Although WTO rules do not bar Section 301, they allow the WTO to determine whether it is being used as a genuine response to dumping or as a way to protect home industries.

Trade disputes are brought before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. The WTO first tries to settle disputes amicably. If consultations are held, they frequently produce efforts to have the dispute mediated. If consultations fail, the Dispute Settlement Body may establish a formal panel composed of independent experts, who must reach a decision within six months. Once a decision is reached, the panel indicates the steps a country must take to end its violation of WTO rules. The loser may appeal to a standing WTO Appellate Body whose decision is final. If a country fails to comply, the state that brought the complaint may ask for compensation or impose retaliatory trade sanctions.

American opponents of the WTO were concerned that this commitment would undermine US sovereignty and weaken US environmental and health regulations that by WTO regulations must be "least trade restrictive." The WTO can interpret such regulations as efforts to exclude exports of states with less stringent environmental or health standards. Environmentalists argue that LDCs have lax standards and that these should be raised by banning imports from countries that do not provide environmental protection or worker safety. Environmentalists are suspicious of the WTO's dedication to environmental protection because of its decisions, including one in which the WTO declared illegal the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, which banned tuna imports caught in nets that endanger dolphins (see Figure 14.4). LDCs, however, claim that environmental protests are ruses to keep out their imports

and that the costs involved in improving environmental and safety standards would raise the prices of their products, making them uncompetitive. For poor countries, poverty reduction and economic growth are more important than environmental and safety concerns.

The WTO has reviewed a variety of complaints, although trade in agriculture has generated the most disputes. Most have been brought by developed countries against one another or against LDCs, but LDCs also use the WTO to correct what they view as trade injustices by rich states. Not surprisingly, the number of complaints increased following the onset of the global recession. Between January 2008 and July 2010, 41 cases were brought to the WTO, whereas only 16 were initiated during the previous 18 months. The United States (11), the EU (11), and China (10) accounted for most of the complaints. Those brought against the US involved a range of trading partners and issues. China, Brazil, Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand brought complaints about antidumping duties on their products, and Canada and Mexico complained about US labelling requirements for their exports. For its part, the US initiated six complaints in the same period about such matters as Philippine taxes on US exports of distilled spirits, Chinese barriers to exports of raw materials, and Chinese limits on US financial information services. Complaints about the EU were brought by Brazil, India, China, Norway, Canada, the US, Taiwan, and Japan.³⁴

Let us now examine a few celebrated cases to see the kind of dispute that lead countries to ask the WTO for relief. The first involved a complaint against the United States.

THE STEEL CASE In March 2002, President George W. Bush imposed tariffs of 30 percent on a variety of imported steel products to protect the ailing US steel industry from cheap imports and provide political cover for Republican candidates in steel-producing states in upcoming congressional elections. The US tariff affected steel imports from the EU, Brazil, South Korea, and



Figure 14.4 Criticism of the WTO

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

Japan. During the first year of the tariffs, EU steel exports to the US plummeted by 37 percent.

In July 2003, the WTO ruled against the United States, declaring that Washington had failed to show that its steel industry was endangered by foreign imports,³⁵ and the EU announced it was ready to impose some \$2.2 billion in retaliatory duties on US exports – for example on Florida oranges – carefully selected to cause pain in states critical to President Bush’s 2004 re-election. Following a US appeal, the WTO Appellate Body upheld the ruling, and the Bush administration grudgingly agreed to abide by it.

GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS A second case illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing between efforts to maintain health and safety standards and policies designed to protect domestic industry. Since its inception, the WTO has grappled with the vexing issue of whether national environmental and safety regulations are imposed for legitimate ends or whether they serve as subtle but illegal barriers to trade. GATT Article XX allows countries to impose rules for safety and environmental protection as long as they “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”³⁶

In May 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina filed separate complaints to the WTO that a 1998 EU moratorium on the import of genetically modified (GM) food violated trade rules because there was no evidence that such foods were harmful. Under the moratorium, the EU refused to import GM foods until new regulations for labeling and tracing the origins of such foods were in place. Owing to pressures from American farmers and their congressional representatives, the US decided to pursue the matter in the WTO even though it threatened to worsen US–European relations, already strained by America’s war in Iraq.

Genetically modified food is common in the US and elsewhere because GM crops reduce the need for pesticides and herbicides while providing products with features that consumers find appealing. Most US soybeans and cotton and much of its corn are grown from genetically modified seeds. Many Europeans, however, denouncing what they call “Frankenfood” and claiming that GM food is potentially dangerous to health and biodiversity, have tried to keep it out of the market and have US food imports clearly labeled if they contain more than 1 percent GM food. American farmers and producers of GM seeds, like Monsanto, lobbied vigorously for action to pry open European markets, arguing that labeling is expensive and unfairly implies that there is something unsafe about a product. In 2006, a WTO panel declared that the EU had illegally banned some GM products. In December 2006, the EU announced that it intended to implement the WTO decision but that it needed additional time to do so owing to the complexity and sensitivity of the issue. Canada agreed to extend the time limit. On July 15, 2009, Canada and the EU announced a mutually agreed solution involving establishment of a dialogue on agricultural biotech market access. Argentina agreed to this in 2010,³⁷ and the three complainants agreed to delay imposing punitive tariffs on EU exports.

No global trade round has been completed since 1994. A new round was initiated at a WTO

CONTROVERSY

The introduction of genetically modified crops and animals has produced passionate debate over their relative merits and costs. Those who favor GM see it as a means of reducing the cost and enhancing the quality and quantity of food, thus increasing food security. Genetic modification, in their view improves the quality of crops and enhances their resistance to disease and pests. Moreover, GM animals are more productive and healthier, and the environment benefit from decreased use of herbicides and pesticides and from conservation of water and soil. GM opponents fear its impact on human health – for example, the possibility that GM products may trigger new allergies. They also fear that GM crops and animals may crowd out existing species, reducing biodiversity and increasing the possibility of disaster if disease aff icts surviving species.

conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001. There, it was agreed that negotiations would focus on freeing trade in agriculture and services, both contentious trade issues, with an eye toward reaching agreement by 2005. However, as we saw in Chapter 12 (pp. 396–7), agreement, which requires consensus in the WTO, has been elusive owing to conflict over reducing agricultural subsidies in the developed world to enable LDCs to sell their products overseas. Efforts to reach agreement collapsed after the US and the EU failed to agree over subsidies, and developing countries like Brazil refused to reduce tariffs further until Western markets were opened to agricultural goods. A renewed effort to reach agreement in 2008 failed when the US, India, and China could not agree about how to protect farmers in the LDCs from cheap agricultural imports if agricultural tariffs were reduced.³⁸

This examination of the GATT and the WTO completes our review of the three institutional pillars of the global economic system. Will these pillars remaining standing, however, if the US withdraws its support of them?

Hegemonic stability

According to **hegemonic stability theory**, the global economy and the institutions that sustain it require the support of a hegemon to prevent countries from pursuing selfish economic interests. By this theory, which is rooted in realism, only a great power can promote and enforce the rules of the global trade and monetary systems, and, in doing so, it benefits both itself and provides the world with a collective good. The economic order can survive only so long as a hegemon, like Britain in the nineteenth century or the United States today, finds that the system is in its interest and sustains it by providing leadership. When no hegemon is willing to provide financial resources during monetary crises or political support for international economic institutions, the rules that govern the economic order may be widely flouted. Then, as in the 1930s, states may follow their narrow economic self-interest by erecting trade barriers and carrying out unilateral currency devaluations.

Hegemonic stability theory became prominent in the 1980s when it appeared that America was entering a period of economic and political decline and that Japan might overtake the US as an economic superpower. However, the end of the Cold War, Japan's anemic economic growth, and the surging US economy in the 1990s silenced those who feared the end of US hegemony. More recently, the growth in protectionist sentiment in the US and the spate of trade disputes that have pitted the US against Europe and China have rekindled fears for the future of the liberal economic order.

Will the United States abandon the global economic order it helped construct or stay the

course and continue to support that order? Economic issues, more than other foreign policy questions, are embedded in domestic politics, and economic policies are routinely made in response to domestic interest groups rather than global needs. Were the US to surrender its leading role in fostering cooperation, international economic institutions would be hard pressed to maintain the open trading system erected after 1945. The possibility of US withdrawal does not mean that the existing system is in imminent danger. Most countries recognize that their prosperity depends on cooperation. However, the Great Depression showed that the stability and survival of the global economic system cannot be taken for granted. Bad times, as in the 1930s, place strains on global economic cooperation and encourage economic nationalism.

As important to the global economy as the major international economic organizations are the giant transnational corporations that have proliferated in recent decades.

Transnational corporations: engines of global capitalism

TNCs are engines of global capitalism, knitting peoples together in a vast system of economic exchange. Transnational economic enterprises have existed for centuries, and some enjoyed many of the perquisites of sovereignty. These companies were, as political scientist Janice Thomson puts it, "endowed with nearly all the powers of sovereignty."³⁹ The British East India or the "John Company" was, at its height, virtual ruler of India with an army of 150,000. By its charter, the company could acquire territory, exercise legal jurisdiction, wage war, make treaties, and issue its own currency. Founded to obtain for Britain a share of the East Indian spice trade, its ships first arrived in India in 1608, and its penetration of India began after its navy defeated a Portuguese fleet in 1612 off India's northwest coast.

Thereafter, the company established posts along India's east and west coasts to trade in cotton and silk goods, indigo, saltpeter, and spices from south India, and founded English settlements in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Its governing responsibilities grew after Robert Clive (1725–74) defeated the local ruler of Bengal in the 1757 Battle of Plassey, bringing an end to the independence of northern India's Mughal emperor.

The next section examines TNCs' role in the contemporary world, evaluating the extent and sources of their power and the nature of their goals.

The global reach of TNCs

The role of TNCs has expanded in recent decades. Their numbers grew from 7000 in 1970 to over 82,000 with some 810,000 foreign affiliates in 2009. By 2008, TNCs employed 77 million people, produced a quarter of the gross world product, and the 100 largest corporations alone accounted for 4 per cent of the gross world product, while the 1000 largest accounted for 80 percent of the world's industrial output. By 2007, the 100 largest TNCs had assets of \$10.7 trillion (declining slightly in 2008), had sales in 2008 worth over \$8.5 trillion, and employed over 15 million (see Table 14.1).⁴⁰

Table 14.1 The 100 largest global corporations (2010)

Rank	Company	Country	Industry	Sales (\$bil)	Profit (\$bil)	Assets (\$bil)	Market value (\$bil)
1	JPMorgan Chase	United States	Banking	115.63	11.65	2,031.99	166.19
2	General Electric	United States	Conglomerates	156.78	11.03	781.82	169.65
3	Bank of America	United States	Banking	150.45	6.28	2,223.30	167.63
4	ExxonMobil	United States	Oil & Gas Operations	275.56	19.28	233.32	308.77
5	ICBC	China	Banking	71.86	16.27	1,428.46	242.23
6	Banco Santander	Spain	Banking	109.57	12.34	1,438.68	107.12
7	Wells Fargo	United States	Banking	98.64	12.28	1,243.65	141.69
8	HSBC Holdings	United Kingdom	Banking	103.74	5.83	2,355.83	178.27
8	Royal Dutch Shell	Netherlands	Oil & Gas Operations	278.19	12.52	287.64	168.63
10	BP	United Kingdom	Oil & Gas Operations	239.27	16.58	235.45	167.13
11	BNP Paribas	France	Banking	101.06	8.37	2,952.22	86.67
12	PetroChina	China	Oil & Gas Operations	157.22	16.80	174.95	333.84
13	AT&T	United States	Telecommunications Services	123.02	12.54	268.75	147.55
14	Walmart Stores	United States	Retailing	408.21	14.34	170.71	205.37
15	Berkshire Hathaway	United States	Diversified Financials	112.49	8.06	297.12	190.86
16	Gazprom	Russia	Oil & Gas Operations	115.25	24.33	234.77	132.58
17	China Construction Bank	China	Banking	59.16	13.59	1,106.20	184.32
18	Petrobras-Petróleo Brasil	Brazil	Oil & Gas Operations	104.81	16.63	198.26	190.34
19	Total	France	Oil & Gas Operations	160.68	12.10	183.29	131.80
20	Chevron	United States	Oil & Gas Operations	159.29	10.48	164.62	146.23
21	Barclays	United Kingdom	Banking	65.91	15.17	2,223.04	56.15
22	Bank of China	China	Banking	52.20	9.45	1,016.31	147.00
23	Allianz	Germany	Insurance	130.06	6.16	834.04	52.74
24	GDF Suez	France	Utilities	114.65	6.42	245.95	83.36
25	E.ON	Germany	Utilities	117.38	12.05	214.58	68.26
25	Goldman Sachs Group	United States	Diversified Financials	51.67	13.39	849.00	84.95
27	EDF Group	France	Utilities	95.17	5.60	342.63	92.23
28	AXA Group	France	Insurance	145.86	5.17	1,016.70	46.02
29	Lloyds Banking Group	United Kingdom	Banking	106.67	4.57	1,650.78	50.25

Rank	Company	Country	Industry	Sales (\$bil)	Profit (\$bil)	Assets (\$bil)	Market value (\$bil)
29	Procter & Gamble	United States	Household & Personal Products	76.78	13.05	135.29	184.47
31	ENI	Italy	Oil & Gas Operations	121.01	6.27	163.52	82.22
32	Telefónica	Spain	Telecommunications Services	79.11	10.84	154.98	108.19
33	IBM	United States	Software & Services	95.76	13.43	109.02	167.01
34	UniCredit Group	Italy	Banking	92.17	5.59	1,438.91	43.95
35	Hewlett-Packard	United States	Technology Hardware & Equip	116.92	8.13	113.62	121.33
36	Nestlé	Switzerland	Food, Drink & Tobacco	97.08	10.07	105.16	173.67
37	Verizon Communications	United States	Telecommunications Services	107.81	3.65	227.25	82.21
38	China Mobile	Hong Kong/ China	Telecommunications Services	66.22	16.87	104.46	199.73
39	ConocoPhillips	United States	Oil & Gas Operations	136.02	4.86	152.59	72.72
40	Pfizer	United States	Drugs & Biotechnology	50.01	8.64	212.95	143.23
41	Nippon Telegraph & Tel	Japan	Telecommunications Services	106.98	5.53	181.48	68.68
42	ENEL	Italy	Utilities	91.87	7.74	221.26	50.92
43	Deutsche Bank	Germany	Banking	62.98	6.93	2,150.60	39.75
44	Credit Suisse Group	Switzerland	Diversified Financials	50.26	6.11	988.91	53.93
45	Sinopec-China Petroleum	China	Oil & Gas Operations	208.47	4.37	110.66	130.06
46	Vodafone	United Kingdom	Telecommunications Services	58.35	4.38	217.97	112.26
47	Johnson & Johnson	United States	Drugs & Biotechnology	61.90	12.27	94.68	174.90
48	BBVA-Banco Bilbao Vizcaya	Spain	Banking	49.27	6.03	760.39	48.20
49	Microsoft	United States	Software & Services	58.69	16.26	82.10	254.52
50	Siemens	Germany	Conglomerates	112.23	3.36	133.94	80.07
51	Banco Bradesco	Brazil	Banking	59.10	4.60	281.40	54.50
52	Banco do Brasil	Brazil	Banking	56.10	5.82	406.46	42.78
53	Royal Bank of Canada	Canada	Banking	35.41	3.58	608.05	78.17
54	Intesa Sanpaolo	Italy	Banking	50.71	3.56	877.66	44.67
55	Samsung Electronics	South Korea	Semiconductors	97.28	4.43	83.30	94.48
56	France Telecom	France	Telecommunications Services	65.92	4.30	132.06	62.39
57	Sanofi-aventis	France	Drugs & Biotechnology	41.99	7.54	114.85	98.07
58	Ford Motor	United States	Consumer Durables	118.31	2.72	194.85	41.80
59	Commonwealth Bank	Australia	Banking	31.84	3.81	500.20	75.10
60	RWE Group	Germany	Utilities	66.57	4.98	130.36	47.93
61	Novartis	Switzerland	Drugs & Biotechnology	44.27	8.40	90.89	126.22
62	BHP Billiton	Australia/ United Kingdom	Materials	50.21	5.88	74.86	192.45
63	Zurich Financial Services	Switzerland	Insurance	70.27	3.22	366.66	34.71
64	Statoil	Norway	Oil & Gas Operations	79.76	3.16	97.09	72.26
65	Generali Group	Italy	Insurance	123.14	1.83	607.37	35.19
66	Roche Holding	Switzerland	Drugs & Biotechnology	47.35	7.51	69.64	146.19
67	Westpac Banking Group	Australia	Banking	31.19	3.04	519.03	70.99
68	Rio Tinto	United Kingdom/ Australia	Materials	41.83	4.87	95.01	118.34
69	Lukoil	Russia	Oil & Gas Operations	86.34	9.14	70.94	45.18
70	Anheuser-Busch InBev	Belgium	Food, Drink & Tobacco	36.76	4.61	111.58	81.48

Table 14.1 continued

Rank	Company	Country	Industry	Sales (\$bil)	Profit (\$bil)	Assets (\$bil)	Market value (\$bil)
71	GlaxoSmithKline	United Kingdom	Drugs & Biotechnology	45.83	8.94	65.38	95.36
72	Merck & Co	United States	Drugs & Biotechnology	27.43	12.90	112.09	116.11
73	Crédit Agricole	France	Banking	91.96	1.61	2,227.22	34.42
74	Munich Re	Germany	Insurance	59.31	3.67	284.21	30.12
75	Apple	United States	Technology Hardware & Equip	46.71	9.36	53.93	189.51
75	Cisco Systems	United States	Technology Hardware & Equip	35.53	6.07	76.40	140.85
77	Rosneft	Russia	Oil & Gas Operations	34.70	6.51	83.11	83.19
78	Mitsubishi Corp	Japan	Trading Companies	63.12	3.80	109.74	42.64
79	National Australia Bank	Australia	Banking	32.50	2.29	574.41	48.80
80	Vale	Brazil	Materials	27.82	5.88	100.81	145.14
81	CVS Caremark	United States	Retailing	98.73	3.70	61.64	47.85
82	Itaúsa	Brazil	Conglomerates	66.36	2.25	342.63	28.74
83	ANZ Banking	Australia	Banking	26.91	2.60	420.52	53.72
84	Tesco	United Kingdom	Food Markets	77.94	3.10	65.61	51.43
85	Unilever	Netherlands/ United Kingdom	Food, Drink & Tobacco	57.05	4.83	52.05	91.33
86	Honda Motor	Japan	Consumer Durables	102.82	1.41	117.24	63.22
86	Toronto-Dominion Bank	Canada	Banking	23.60	2.90	517.28	55.43
88	Iberdrola	Spain	Utilities	35.15	3.94	125.21	42.16
89	Comcast	United States	Media	35.76	3.64	112.73	47.76
90	China Life Insurance	China	Insurance	24.01	3.12	153.13	118.75
91	Bank of Nova Scotia	Canada	Banking	23.27	3.29	460.93	47.26
92	UnitedHealth Group	United States	Health Care Equipment & Svcs	87.14	3.82	59.05	39.40
93	Sberbank	Russia	Banking	23.27	3.20	220.62	57.70
94	United Technologies	United States	Conglomerates	52.92	3.83	55.76	65.28
95	Nordea Bank	Sweden	Banking	22.81	3.41	729.06	39.42
96	Bank of Communications	China	Banking	19.05	4.17	392.83	57.34
97	BASF	Germany	Chemicals	72.63	2.02	72.06	52.12
98	Walt Disney	United States	Media	36.29	3.31	69.31	61.17
99	Standard Chartered Group	United Kingdom	Banking	20.94	3.38	435.56	46.16
100	AstraZeneca	United Kingdom	Drugs & Biotechnology	32.80	7.52	53.63	63.56

All figures are in U.S. dollars and are latest available. Market value is as of Mar. 1, 2010. Combined market value for BHP Billiton Ltd and BHP Billiton Plc (a dual listed company in Australia and the U.K.). Combined market value for Carnival Corp and Carnival Plc (a dual listed company in Panama and the U.K.). Combined market value for Investec Plc and Investec Ltd (a dual listed company with headquarters in South Africa and the U.K.). Combined market value for Mondi Ltd and Mondi Plc (a dual listed company in South Africa and the U.K.). Combined market value for Reed Elsevier Plc and Reed Elsevier NV (a dual listed company in the Netherlands and the U.K.). Combined market value for Rio Tinto Plc and Rio Tinto Ltd (a dual listed company in Australia and the U.K.). Combined market value for Unilever NV and Unilever Plc (a dual listed company the Netherlands and the U.K.). E: Estimate. NA: Not available. Sources: Capital IQ, a Standard & Poor's business; Interactive Data, LionShares, Thomson Reuters Fundamentals and Worldscope via FactSet Research Systems; Bloomberg; Forbes.

Source: "The Global 2000," *Forbes.com*, April 21, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/18/global-2000-10_The-Global-2000_Rank.html.

Although TNCs may have a national center, they are transnational because they engage in direct foreign investment and conduct business in more than one country. Some have many subsidiaries: Ford, for example, employs about 159,000 employees and has some 70 plants worldwide.⁴¹ TNCs are organized to pursue a coherent global strategy that permits units to pool knowledge, technology, and financial resources. Most TNCs are located in the developed world while many of their foreign affiliates are in LDCs, and they have immense economic clout. Among the 2000 largest companies, over 550 have American roots, but, at least one major TNC comes from each of 62 countries.⁴² Of the world's 50 largest corporations in 2010, 18 have American roots, six Chinese, five French, and five British, and four German.⁴³ The "nationality" of TNCs, however, is at best blurred. Thus, only 65 percent of the content of a Ford Mustang is from the US or Canada, while Toyota's Sienna is assembled in Indiana of almost entirely US-made parts; General Motors imports Korean-made cars sold as Chevrolets; and 67 percent of Japanese cars sold in North America are made in North America.⁴⁴

Overall, the leading 2000 companies in 2006 accounted for \$32 trillion in revenues, \$1.6 trillion in profits, \$125 trillion in assets and \$20 trillion in market value.⁴⁵ The combined sales of the world's 200 largest TNCs in 2006 accounted for over 30 percent of global gross domestic product, exceeding the combined gross national income of 187 of the world's countries.⁴⁶ Indeed, the value of Walmart's 2009 sales *alone* was more than the gross national income of all but 21 countries and more than Sweden or Saudi Arabia.

Size is only one measure of TNC impact. Others are foreign assets and number of employees. General Electric with *foreign* assets of over \$401 billion, ranks first among TNCs.⁴⁷ Walmart employs 2,100,000 people of whom 700,000 are non-American, making it the largest employer in Canada and Mexico, and it has 8300 stores and warehouses of which 4000 are outside the US in 14 countries other than the United States.⁴⁸ Some

companies are highly globalized such as the Canadian media giant Thomson, which employs 98 percent of its employees overseas.⁴⁹

TNCs enjoy other strengths. They can shift investments to escape government regulation, high taxes, or labor unrest. They can ally with one another and invest in countries that provide a hospitable atmosphere, while disinvesting elsewhere. They can establish subsidiaries in countries with low wages and lax environmental standards, outsourcing jobs from some countries to others. Factors such as labor skills and costs, proximity to markets, and quality of transportation and communication systems make some countries attractive to TNCs. By lowering taxes, improving roads and ports, educating citizens, eliminating environmental rules, reducing corruption, and capping labor costs, countries such as China and Ireland have been especially successful in attracting TNCs. Thereafter, as surplus labor diminishes and wages rise in those countries, corporations will outsource elsewhere. Thus, even China has begun to lose jobs to Bangladesh, while India has lost jobs to countries like Morocco.⁵⁰

Corporate mergers have created concentrations of economic power in key sectors of the global economy, leading to concern that some may become global monopolies able to control the supply and price of the goods and services they provide. Fear of such corporate power was reflected in the 2004 decision of a European court against Microsoft for using unfair tactics to maintain monopolistic control over computer software. The court decided that Microsoft, by preinstalling its Windows Media Player in its Windows operating system (used in 90 percent of the world's personal computers), was giving itself an unfair advantage over competitors. Documents written by Microsoft officials such as a 1997 memo written by the company's general manager to then CEO William Gates III suggested the corporation's intent was to shut out potential rivals.⁵¹ By its decision, the court upheld an earlier decision of the EU Commission requiring Microsoft to pay \$689 million in fines. The

Commission also demanded that Microsoft share information about its Windows operating system with rival software producers and sell its operating system without the preinstalled media player. Microsoft argues that its only sin is being too successful. Fines were increased to \$990 million in 2006 for Microsoft's failure to obey Europe's earlier antitrust ruling, and this decision was upheld by the European Court of First Instance in 2007.⁵²

TNCs seek to minimize national impediments to trade or investment and prevent politics from interrupting the smooth transaction of business. Their goals are profits for shareholders, sales growth, and security and autonomy. Although governments have weapons they can use against

TNCs, including taxation, capital controls, regulation, and, in extreme cases, nationalization, they rarely do so because they seek corporate investment, expertise, and technology, and, excepting companies that extract resources, TNCs can pick up and leave (Table 14.2).

DID YOU KNOW?

Had Walmart been a country, it would have been China's eighth largest trading partner in 2005.⁵³

Table 14.2 The world's sixty wealthiest entities (\$billion) 2009¹

1. United States	14,256	31. Argentina	309
2. Japan	5,068	32. South Africa	286
3. China	4,909	33. Royal Dutch Shell	278
4. Germany	3,347	34. ExxonMobil	276
5. France	2,649	35. Thailand	264
6. United Kingdom	2,175	36. United Arab Emirates	261
7. Italy	2,113	37. BP	239
8. Brazil	1,572	38. Finland	238
9. Spain	1,460	39. Colombia	231
10. Canada	1,336	40. Portugal	228
11. India	1,296	41. Ireland	227
12. Russian Federation	1,231	42. Hong Kong	215
13. Australia	925	43. Sinopec-China Petroleum	208
14. Mexico	875	44. Israel	195
15. South Korea	833	45. Malaysia	192
16. Netherlands	792	46. Czech Republic	190
17. Turkey	617	47. Egypt	188
18. Indonesia	540	48. Singapore	188
19. Switzerland	500	49. Nigeria	169
20. Belgium	468	50. Pakistan	167
21. Poland	430	51. Chile	164
22. Walmart Stores	408	52. Romania	161.2
23. Sweden	406	53. Total	160.7
24. Austria	385	54. Philippines	160.4
25. Norway	382	55. Chevron	159
26. Saudi Arabia	369	56. PetroChina	157.2
27. Iran	331	57. General Electric	156.8
28. Greece	330	58. Bank of America	150
29. Venezuela	327	59. Kuwait	148
30. Denmark	310	60. AXA Group	146

1 Countries' GDP, "World Development Indicators database," World Bank, July 1, 2010, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf>, and corporate sales, "The Global 2000," *Forbes.com*, April 21, 2010, www.forbes.com/lists/2010/18/global-2000-10_The-Global-2000_Rank.html.

Are these engines of capitalism benevolent or malevolent forces in global economics? Neoliberals see TNCs as wealth creators and sources of economic development. Others, notably Marxists, are suspicious because many corporations originate in wealthy states and enjoy the support of Western governments. Large developing countries such as China, Brazil, and Russia tend toward **state capitalism** by which they propagate government-owned TNCs. Those who applaud globalization also laud the role of TNCs in spreading wealth and modernity. Critics point out that there is also a down side. The following section examines some criticisms of corporate behavior.

Criticisms of TNCs

There are several criticisms of TNCs. One is that they expropriate local resources and export them for their own benefit so that poor countries lose control over their assets. By this argument, TNCs return a disproportionate share of profits to their home countries, plowing little back into host countries, and prefer to make products for export rather than products useful to the poor in host countries. Critics also argue that TNCs create little local employment and reward executives for employing the fewest possible number of workers. And when TNCs do create jobs, declare critics, they hire few locals for senior positions and create privileged urban elites with little stake in helping local development.

Another criticism is that TNCs increase local demand for useless, unhealthy, or dangerous products like cigarettes and, like Newmont Mining mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, act in ways that harm the environment. One case involved the chemical giant Union Carbide that was implicated in an industrial disaster in Bhopal, India, in which thousands died. The plant, built in a densely populated neighborhood, produced the pesticide carbaryl and the organic compound methyl isocyanate. On the night of December 2–3, 1984, water accidentally flowed

into the methyl isocyanate holding tank, causing a chain reaction in which heat combined with the chemicals to corrode the steel tank, allowing methyl isocyanate to escape as a toxic gas. Chemical scrubbers for treating the gas were shut off for maintenance; the refrigeration unit for maintaining the chemical at low temperatures was out of order; and the alarm system failed. With no warning, the gas settled over the shantytowns of Jaiprakesh and Chhola, killing sleeping residents and blinding and choking others who fled into the streets where they suffocated. Victims sued Union Carbide for damages, and in a 1989 settlement the company agreed to pay \$470 million. In addition, Union Carbide's CEO, Warren Anderson, was indicted in Bhopal for culpable homicide and was declared a fugitive from justice by a local magistrate in 1992 for failing to appear in court. In 2010, eight former plant employees were convicted of "death by negligence" and were sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a fine of \$2000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by law.⁵⁴

TNCs, then, must walk a fine line as regards the environment. They want to keep costs down but do not want unfavorable publicity or the costs of legal action. Their dilemma is highlighted by the problems faced by oil companies in Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer. Much Nigerian oil comes from the Niger Delta where ethnic Ogoni inhabitants get few benefits from oil that is pumped from their region and are frequently victims of oil spills. Ogoni protesters have repeatedly interrupted oil exports. Local hostility has led to sabotage of oil installations owned by Shell, ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, the kidnapping of company employees, and a decline in Nigerian oil exports.

A further criticism is that TNCs meddle in local politics in ways ranging from outright bribery to illicit campaign contributions. After the discovery that Lockheed Corporation had bribed Japanese officials, the US enacted the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, forbidding US companies from paying bribes to win foreign business. In 1997, the

world's developed countries agreed to ban bribery by companies seeking contracts, and several major corporations signed an agreement to show "zero tolerance" for paying bribes.⁵⁵ Despite such efforts, many TNCs use middlemen or make small "facilitation" payments that they claim are not bribes to win business. TNCs argue that corruption is so prevalent in some countries that they cannot do business otherwise and that, since other firms continue to pay bribes, they cannot compete unless they "play the game."

In some cases companies have even been involved in efforts to overthrow governments. "I spent most of my time as a high-class muscle-man for big business, for Wall Street, and the bankers," admitted US Marine General Smedley D. Butler (1881–1940):

Thus, I helped make Mexico . . . safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street . . . I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras "right" for American fruit companies in 1903.⁵⁶

The case of "big oil" illustrates the lengths to which governments have gone to help "their" companies. During the 1920s, the world's leading oil companies, known as the "seven sisters," formed an **oligopoly** in world oil production, refining, and distribution. Among the largest was the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later to become BP) which was established after oil was discovered in Iran in 1908. Shortly before World War One the company arranged a deal with the British government whereby Britain would receive a steady oil supply in return for government investment in the company.

In April 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh, a nationalist, became Iran's premier and set out to end the foreign presence in his country.

Negotiations had already begun between Iran and Anglo-Iranian over Iran's demand for higher royalties for oil. When these broke down, Iran's parliament moved to **nationalize** the company, then Britain's single largest overseas investment. London responded by banning Iranian oil and imposing a naval blockade. When Iran's titular ruler, the Shah, refused to grant Mossadegh emergency powers, he resigned but was reappointed after massive street protests. In October 1952, British and US intelligence officials began consultations about overthrowing Mossadegh. The operation climaxed in August 1953 as street battles swept Teheran, and Iranian soldiers arrested Mossadegh who was convicted of treason, spent three years in prison, and remained under house arrest until his death.⁵⁷ A year later Iran's new government and a consortium of oil companies agreed to restore the flow of Iranian oil. Iranians still cite Mossadegh's ouster as evidence of Western hostility, and the episode was used by militants to mobilize Iranians against the US after the 1979 Iranian revolution. In 2000, then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that the US had erred in acting as it did in 1953, admitting that "the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."⁵⁸

Finally, TNCs have been accused of human rights abuses. Some firms use "sweatshop" conditions in poor countries that would be illegal in rich countries. In November 1997, a leaked internal audit of Nike, the maker of sports equipment, revealed the company was using child labor in unsafe conditions at its Vietnam facility, and resulting publicity forced Nike to improve working conditions in its plants. In May 1998, Nike agreed to end its use of child labor and introduce US health safety standards in its Asian factories. Corporations defend such practices, arguing that if they adopt US labor standards in the LDCs, they will increase costs and might have to cease operating. The main casualties would be the LDCs that would lose investment and jobs.

Criticism has produced efforts to reform TNCs, and a number of reforms have been instituted to curb abuses.

Reforming TNCs

In 2003, UNESCO adopted a set of norms “on the responsibilities of transnational corporations . . . with regard to human rights.”⁵⁹ Former Secretary General Annan tried to forge a closer relationship between TNCs and the UN. In 1999 at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Annan proposed a “Global Compact” between the UN and TNCs consisting of nine (later 10) voluntary principles to which corporations agreed. With the cooperation of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Global Compact was launched at a meeting attended by executives from 50 major corporations, followed by a 2004 Global Compact Leaders Summit. The principles of the Global Compact deal with human rights, labor, the environment, and corruption:

Human rights

Principle 1: The support and respect of the protection of international human rights.

Principle 2: The refusal to participate or condone human rights abuses.

Labor

Principle 3: The support of freedom of association and the recognition of the right to collective bargaining.

Principle 4: The abolition of compulsory labor.

Principle 5: The abolition of child labor.

Principle 6: The elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation.

Environment

Principle 7: The implementation of a precautionary and effective program to environmental issues.

Principle 8: Initiatives that demonstrate environmental responsibility.

Principle 9: The promotion of the diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

Anti-corruption

Principle 10: The promotion and adoption of initiatives to counter all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery.⁶⁰

Overall, results have been disappointing. In 2009, a coalition of international investors urged major corporations to honor these principles. Of 130 companies contacted, 105 were described as “laggards.”⁶¹

DID YOU KNOW?

In 2010, William Gates III, the founder and former CEO of Microsoft, was worth more than the GDP (official exchange rate) of Syria or Belarus.⁶²

We have seen how global economic processes are being globalized. With this in mind, let us examine the changing relationship between states and economic markets that transcend national frontiers.

States and markets

Historically, the growth of European states helped create national markets. Today, markets have expanded beyond the frontiers of states, and for consumers, producers, and investors, national boundaries are inconveniences to be overcome. “On the one hand,” argues political scientist Robert Gilpin, “the state is based on the concepts of territoriality, loyalty, and exclusivity,” while “the market is based on the concepts of functional integration, contractual relationships, and expanding interdependence of buyers and sellers.” Gilpin continues: “For the state, territorial boundaries are a necessary basis of national autonomy and political unity. For the market, the elimination of all political and other obstacles to the operation of the price mechanism is imperative.”⁶³

Today's states are ceding authority in the economic realm to other institutions such as TNCs and the WTO, thereby diluting their economic autonomy. As domestic economies become more vulnerable to events beyond their borders, leaders enjoy diminished control over national economies and lose their ability to regulate the national economy in the public interest. Although states still control traditional means of coercion, these avail little when capital takes flight, currencies fluctuate, or trade deficits produce unemployment. Thus, for many people global markets have produced economic disadvantage and political turmoil. Globalized markets are a fact of modern economic life that individual governments can only ignore if they are prepared to pay a high price. It is impossible to insulate citizens from globalization's economic effects – good or bad – without their sacrificing its benefits. How can governments control economic policy on behalf of citizens if their economic fate is determined by currency speculators, banks, TNCs, investors, mutual funds, and buyers and sellers in other countries? This problem was revealed during Asia's 1997–98 economic crises and again during the global financial crisis that struck in 2007–08.

The Asian contagion

In the 1970s and 1980s, Southeast and East Asian countries made great economic strides. Emulating policies pioneered by Japan, governments encouraged exports and investment, helped corporations identify attractive economic niches, directed investment to selected industries, provided loans and subsidies, and protected national firms from foreign competition. The aggressive efforts of Asia's newly industrializing countries (NICs) to foster economic growth earned them the title "Asian tigers" and made them major players in global trade and finance.

Asia experienced low inflation and high employment owing to citizens' willingness to

work long hours, save their earnings, and forgo wage increases. Asia's governments worked closely with the private sector to select and aid industries with potential to compete successfully with foreign competitors. They financed a dramatic growth in their economies mainly by combining overseas investment and borrowing from foreign banks.

Since US interest rates were lower than Asian rates in the 1990s, Asian banks found it cheaper to borrow US dollars and convert them into local currency than to borrow at home. Banks then invested much of this borrowed money in high-risk bond markets overseas. Since they had to repay foreign loans in hard currency, they gambled that local currency would not decline in value relative to US dollars and Japanese yen. This gamble proved costly. Although borrowing forced Asian banks into debt to foreign banks, high Asian interest rates continued to attract foreign dollars that were invested in local stock markets, sending stock prices higher. Many investors purchased real estate that was used as collateral for the growing mountain of debt. Asia's financial crisis erupted in July 1997, when speculators began to dump Thailand's currency in expectation that its value would decline. As investors rushed to buy US dollars and get their money out of the country, the exchange value of the Thai baht went into free fall.

Foreign banks soon discovered that financial institutions throughout Asia were facing similar solvency problems. In days, speculators began to sell other Asian currencies, and investors dumped local stocks and bonds. Before it was over, local stock markets and currencies had collapsed, businesses had gone bankrupt, and unemployment had soared. In the autumn, the crisis spread beyond Southeast Asia. In October, the financial tidal wave struck Hong Kong whose stock market dropped 40 percent. A wave of competitive devaluations took place across Asia, and threatened to spread to other **emerging markets**. In South Korea, foreign investors began to sell local investments, and Korean enterprises desperately tried to

repay their foreign debts, leading to a growing demand for dollars and a drop in the value of Korean currency.

As investors lost confidence in Asian economies, their fears grew to encompass other emerging markets. Stock prices in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico fell precipitously. The contagion spread to Russia and then Brazil. Russia had accumulated enormous debt after 1995 to pay its budget deficits and, as its debt mounted, the world price for oil – a key source of Russia's income – dropped. With the Russian ruble in free fall and the government's debt default, Russia's stock market lost three-quarters of its value in a matter of months.

A number of factors account for the spread of the crisis. One was the high level of integration of financial markets. A second was economic interdependence among trading partners. Thus, the devaluation of one country's currency reduced imports from its trading partners, leading to speculative attacks on their currencies and forcing the devaluation of those currencies as well. A third factor was the dramatic increase in the size and speed of capital movements, financial transactions, and even rumors made possible by new communications technologies. A fourth was the propensity of investors to view all emerging economies in the same way and conclude that the problems confronting one also confronted others. A final factor lay in the weakness of local banking systems. Banks in much of the region were poorly supervised, subject to political pressure to make foolish loans, and hid information about the loans they made. With growing economic uncertainty, a raft of foreign debt, the prospect of collapsing banking systems, overproduction, and diminishing exports, markets took fright, and the crisis erupted as stock prices crashed and currency values collapsed.

Asia's economic crisis showed that, in a globalized world, when financial instability shakes one country it can spread out like ripples in a pond. Resulting turmoil may be contagious as speculators take advantage of currency fluctuations and

withdraw funds not only from the country at risk but from others facing similar problems. Thus, Moisés Naim described an economic world in which conventional geography plays no role and in which the concept of "neighborhood" assumes a new meaning. Financial markets, he argued, "tend to cluster those countries perceived to be in the same 'neighborhood' and to treat them roughly along the same lines. This time, however, the neighborhood is no longer defined solely in terms of geography. The main defining criterion is the potential volatility of the countries; the contagion spread inside risk clusters, or volatility neighborhoods."⁶⁴ And when a "volatility neighborhood" is extensive, as it was in 1997–98, the economic system as a whole may be at risk.

The "Asian contagion" was a harbinger of a larger financial crisis that erupted in late 2007 in the United States, rapidly became global in scope, and became the greatest global economic challenge since the Great Depression. Virtually all the factors that accounted for the spread of the earlier Asian crisis were at work once again.

The American contagion

The crisis had its roots in a dramatic rise in US real estate prices beginning in 2002. Spurred by low mortgage rates, the sale of subprime mortgages to questionable buyers, and the widespread belief that real estate prices would continue to soar, a housing "bubble" grew. The absence of regulations on banks and a willingness to lend money to almost anyone who wanted to borrow produced a mountain of debt that triggered unsustainable economic growth and could not be repaid when the bubble burst.⁶⁵ By December 2007, the "Great **Recession**" had begun.

Rather than holding risky mortgages, banks sold them to Wall Street investment firms such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch. These firms then bundled the subprime mortgages with other loans that they sold to investors. Owing to the liquidity provided by such assets,

investment banks and other investors had borrowed ever more to provide leverage that allowed them to create new investment products that also included subprime mortgages. Then, the bubble burst as real estate prices fell and increasing numbers of homeowners were unable to pay their mortgages. A rapid fall in house prices meant that many homes were worth less than the amount of homeowners' mortgages. Foreclosures soared as large numbers of people simply stopped paying their mortgages and other debts. In 2009 alone, US lenders wrote off as uncollectible \$11.1 billion in home equity loans and \$19.9 billion in home equity lines of credit.⁶⁶

Financial uncertainty spread as the value of securities that included real estate sank, and banks – fearful that their loans would not be repaid – ceased lending. Since the American economy depends on credit, with businesses borrowing to purchase goods and consumers borrowing for homes and cars, this produced a dramatic reduction in liquidity as loans dried up, making it increasingly difficult for businesses or financial institutions to obtain credit. Investment funds were forced by banks to sell assets such as stocks and bonds to raise cash and repay loans. The result was a rapid fall in stock prices globally only months after many stocks had hit an all-time high in July 2007. The crisis quickly became global as it became apparent that foreign banks and investors held large portfolios that included US subprime mortgages. To ease the liquidity crisis, central banks in several countries, including the US Federal Reserve, loaned banks billions of dollars.

In March 2008, the investment bank Bear Stearns was saved only by being purchased at a "fire sale" by JP Morgan Chase.⁶⁷ In September 2008, Lehman Brothers was forced into bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, American International Group (AIG) was saved from bankruptcy by the US Federal Reserve, and America's largest mortgage institutions – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – were effectively taken over by the US government.⁶⁸ As US stock markets continued to fall and consumer spending dropped

and unemployment climbed, the Bush administration proposed creating a fund to guarantee and/or purchase the assets of troubled firms – the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) – to aid financial institutions that was enacted into law by Congress in October 2008.⁶⁹ In February 2009, the Obama administration announced it would use TARP funds to reduce home foreclosures and help investors purchase "toxic assets" – assets that no one would buy because they had lost so much value – from banks. Shortly after, the administration added its Public-Private Investment Program to provide loan guarantees to help investors buy toxic assets from banks.

The US financial crisis and economic downturn rapidly spread to Europe and Asia, increasing global unemployment by 20 million,⁷⁰ and, as we saw earlier, threatening sovereign default in Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. With growing unemployment, public opposition to legal and illegal migrants grew. This opposition was reflected in a law passed in Arizona that made failure to carry immigration documents a crime and gave police authority to detain anyone suspected of entering the country illegally,⁷¹ and the US Senate's restriction on financial institutions that received taxpayer bailout money from hiring high-skilled immigrants on temporary work permits.⁷² By 2009, reverse migration had begun, much as had been the case during the Great Depression, a flow described by one observer as "deglobalization."⁷³ The governments of Spain and Japan began to provide cash incentives for migrants to return home.⁷⁴ In Russia and Asia, foreign workers returned or were sent home. Reverse immigration included Mexicans from the US⁷⁵, and the flow from Mexico dropped from about one million to 636,000 between February 2006 and February 2009.⁷⁶

One consequence of reverse and reduced migration was a reduction in the **remittances** sent home by migrants that are a major source of income for developing countries. The Philippines, for example, depends on its eight million citizens living abroad to provide some 10 percent of its

domestic output, and remittances account for about 46 percent of Tajikistan's gross domestic product, 38 percent of Moldova's, and 24 percent of Lebanon's. Remittances from Latin American workers in the US dropped 11 percent or about \$7 billion in 2009,⁷⁷ resulting in hardship for many families back home. In Haiti, where remittances accounted for over a quarter of the country's national income in 2008, a decline of 13 percent in the first few months of 2009 was disastrous.⁷⁸ This trend was not reversed until 2011.

Global trade also shrunk precipitously, by 9 percent – the first drop since 1982.⁷⁹ The decline was partly a result of reduced demand for imports. Thus, the drop in the purchase and construction of US homes dramatically reduced demand for Canadian lumber. The drop in trade was also partly a consequence of the global integration of production and distribution that has accompanied globalization. Thus, most products are made from “components and part-finished items” produced in different countries that must be traded back and forth among these countries, and any decline in sales of finished products reduces trade. Finally, part of the decline was due to spreading protectionism as countries resorted to tariffs, subsidies, and beggar-thy-neighbor policies to help their firms at the expense of those of other countries.⁸⁰ Political scientist Ian Bremmer summarized the protectionist wave:

China has reinstated tax relief for certain exporters. Russia has limited foreign investment in 42 “strategic sectors” and imposed new duties on imported cars, pork, and poultry. Indonesia has imposed import tariffs and licensing restrictions on over 500 types of foreign products. India has added a 20 percent levy on soybean oil imports. Argentina and Brazil are publicly considering new tariffs on imported textiles and wine. South Korea refuses to drop trade barriers against U.S. auto imports. France has announced the creation of a state fund to protect domestic companies from foreign takeover.⁸¹

Finally, the financial and economic crisis produced renewed state intervention in economic life. China's rapid recovery made its state capitalism a model for many observers. Governments elsewhere are establishing state-owned corporations or sovereign wealth funds to purchase foreign assets. Even in the US and Britain, bastions of free market capitalism, governments became deeply involved in managing or investing directly in banks, financial institutions, and even industrial corporations – for example, America's General Motors. They also imposed new regulations on banks and other financial institutions. It is unclear whether state intervention in economic life will persist after the recession ends. In all likelihood, greater government regulation will continue even as those, at least in the West, reduce their role in national economies. Elsewhere, especially in emerging markets like those of Brazil, China, India, and Russia, the state's role in economic life is likely to persist.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the evolution of the global economy. It reviewed competing economic perspectives and described the destructive consequences of the Great Depression and the creation and evolution of the principal international economic institutions that were intended to prevent a repetition of the errors made in the 1930s.

We saw how the world's leading economic powers, far from resisting economic globalization after World War Two, viewed the process as being in their interest and crafted policies to encourage and accelerate it. With US leadership, the world economic system expanded until, after the Cold War, it encompassed the former members of the Soviet bloc. With China's 2001 admission to the WTO and Russia's application to join that body, the system has become global. But will a global market governed by neoliberal principles persist, or might it erode as it did during the Depression? The Great Recession undermined free market

principles, and the future of the neoliberal system is at risk.

The next chapter focuses on what some regard as the single greatest threat to human security: our deteriorating global environment. Growing populations in poor countries represent a major obstacle to economic development and contribute to deteriorating environmental conditions globally. Environmental issues such as vanishing forests, declining water resources, and global climate change threaten our existence as a species.

Student activities

Map analysis

Pick a major TNC such as BP or General Electric. Using the company's annual report or an internet source, find out in which countries they own facilities and locate these facilities and the company's headquarters on a world map. What can you infer about the company's global presence and influence from this map?

Cultural materials

A 1993 film, based on Michael Crichton's *Rising Sun*, reflected fears among Americans at the time that, with Japanese investments in the US, Japanese political influence in the country was also growing. Indeed, Crichton paints a highly

unflattering picture of Japanese business practices and customs. He refers to the Japanese as "the most racist people on the planet" and refers to pro-Japanese Americans as "Chrysanthemum Kissers." Do you think foreign investment leads to foreign political influence, or does such investment provide the host country with greater influence? Do you think that foreign investment in China today is reducing that country's independence?

Further reading

- Bremmer, Ian, *The End of the Free Market* (New York: Viking, 2010). A provocative and timely analysis of the growing role of state capitalism and the decline of free market principles.
- Cohen, Stephen D., *Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). A careful and balanced analysis of the impact of multinational corporations on the global economy.
- Eichengreen, Barry J., *Globalizing Capital* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Brief, readable history of the development of the international monetary system over 150 years.
- Gilpin, Robert, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). A survey of key theories and issues in international political economy.
- Kolb, Robert W., ed., *Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2010). A balanced and comprehensive set of essays concerning the origins and consequences of the Great Recession.

1804	1960s, 1970s	1965	1972	1973, 1979	1992
World population reaches 1 billion	Green Revolution	United Nations Development Programme is founded	UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, Sweden)	Oil crises	UN Conference on Environment and Development

15

The environment: A global collective good

Environmental threats to human survival have always existed. One explanation for the Roman Empire's fall, for example, was the declining birth rate caused by using lead in water pipes. The absence of sanitation in medieval Europe contributed to the incidence of diseases like cholera. In the nineteenth century, entire species of animals including the passenger pigeon – once the most numerous bird on earth – were wiped out, and the mercury used to turn fur into felt in making hats was inhaled by hat makers, causing “mad hatters’ disease” – made famous in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland* – with symptoms such as trembling, slurring of speech, and anxiety (see Figure 15.1).¹

Today, however, environmental threats have become global in scope, a fact best reflected by **global warming**. During the twentieth century, the world warmed by 0.7°C (1.3°F) and, according to the International Energy Agency, global temperature is expected to rise an additional 3.5°C (6.3°F) by 2100. The global failure to impose stringent limits on carbon emissions has led some to conclude that the “fight to limit global warming to easily tolerated levels is thus over,”² and the world must start to adapt to resulting changes. Among the consequences will be warming of

permafrost thereby destabilizing whatever was built on it, melting of winter snow causing spring floods, rising sea level that will flood coastal areas and deltas, coral bleaching that will harm fish, increased rainfall in wet regions and extreme drought in arid regions, and more intense storms and extreme weather conditions.



Figure 15.1 Rest of world pull

Source: original artist @ cartoonstock

1997	1998	1999	2010	2012
Kyoto Protocol is negotiated	Warmest year on record (UN World Meteorological Organization)	World populations reaches 6 billion	Explosion of Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico	Kyoto Protocol expires

The chapter begins by examining the concept of **collective goods** originally elaborated by economist Mancur Olson that explains why it is difficult to get countries to cooperate in meeting environmental threats.³ The chapter then turns to a key source of environmental degradation, growing populations in the developing world. The question of energy, which follows, like other environmental concerns, reflects the trade-off between ecology and economics. How do we provide sufficient energy to power economic development and maintain our standard of living while coping with challenges like global warming? Thereafter, we examine additional environmental challenges – food shortages, disappearing forests and spreading deserts, polluted seas and inadequate fresh water, and efforts to cope with them.


Environmental challenges are more global today than ever before, yet the global record in dealing with these challenges has been dismal. According to Yale University's Center for Environmental Law and Policy and Columbia University's Center for International Earth Science Information Network, in 2010 only four countries (Iceland, Sweden, Costa Rica, and Sweden) exceeded 85 percent in meeting environmental goals including environmental health, air quality, water resources, biodiversity and habitat, productive natural resources, and sustainable energy (see Map 15.1).⁴ In some cases, countries that performed well – Iceland, Slovakia (13th), and Serbia (29th), for instance – owe their improved performance to economic recession that shut down or lowered production in polluting industries.⁵ The United States, by contrast, ranked 61st, significantly lower than other industrialized nations.

The most worrisome, however, were heavily populated China (121st) and India (123rd), both in the midst of rapid economic development. In 2008, China, which is *annually* adding almost as much energy as Britain's entire capacity, became the world's leading source of carbon emissions.⁶ Environmental threats do not respect national boundaries, and no single state or group of states can successfully cope with these threats. Cooperation, however, is elusive, partly because of the problem of collective goods.

Collective goods and collective fates

In an era of globalization, *issues increasingly place actors in situations in which they win or lose jointly*. A cleaner environment is universally beneficial, whereas environmental degradation is harmful to everyone. Such issues affect people around the world and cannot be effectively met by any single country or group of countries. Thus, however much Europe reduces its emissions of gases that cause global warming, *that phenomenon will not be curbed unless the US cooperates*. Even then, the effort would be doomed unless rapidly industrializing countries like China, India, and Brazil also curb their growing appetite for fossil fuels.

Unlike traditional interstate disputes over territory, it is difficult for actors to profit at one another's expense in the case of collective issues. There are winners and losers in territorial contests. The territory gained by one actor is lost to its opponent. By contrast, when environmental conditions worsen, humanity *as a whole* suffers,



Map 15.1 2010 Environmental performance index

although not equally, and when environmental conditions improve everyone benefits. Such issues defy conventional definitions of national security and national interest.

A healthy environment is a collective good because it *offers benefits that must be shared and made available to everyone if they are to be enjoyed by anyone*. Challenges such as global warming and water depletion threaten everyone's wellbeing, and their solution promises benefits from which no one can be excluded. Paradoxically, because everyone benefits from clean air, no one has an incentive to pay for it voluntarily because it would be difficult to deprive particular actors of such benefits even if they refuse to pay. Each prefers that others pay and reasons that, because the group is so large, one less contribution will not matter and will not be missed. In the case of global warming, leaders may reason that reducing

the number of automobiles on their country's roads or buying expensive scrubbers for power plants will only affect the amount of global emissions marginally and that their country can benefit from ending global warming at no cost to itself.

The paradox is that, faced by collective challenges, it is in the rational interest of *each* actor to pay as little as possible, instead letting others pay while still reaping the benefits. To the extent that actors can get others to pay, they are **free riders**, enjoying benefits without having to pay for them. Such reluctance is strongest among those that do not expect to receive a share of the benefits commensurate with the costs they have to pay. As a leading source of carbon emissions, the United States would have to foot much of the economic bill to curb global warming and thus has failed to exercise leadership on the issue.

KEY DOCUMENT

GARRETT HARDIN, “THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS” (1968)⁷

The biologist and ecologist Garrett Hardin illustrated the problem posed by collective goods in a 1968 article entitled “The Tragedy of the Commons,” in which he illustrated how the interests of individuals and the interests of the group can collide. The following is an excerpt from his description of the problem:

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is the utility *to me* of adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility has one negative and one positive component:

- 1 The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
- 2 The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

There are two ways to prevent free riding – by coercion or by providing **private goods** (called “side payments”). The imposition of penalties by the World Trade Organization on states that violate trade regulations illustrates the use of coercion to prevent free riding. Private goods are

benefits that are available only to those who pay for them, and actors that do not contribute can be excluded from such benefits. Providing countries with financial rewards for reducing carbon emissions by planting trees that absorb carbon dioxide (“carbon sinks”) or providing low-cost

loans to countries that reduce emissions constitute private goods available only to actors that contribute to reducing pollution.

The collective goods problem is exacerbated if actors adopt a short time horizon. In the short term, they may *not* view these issues as ones in which they win or lose jointly and may place immediate national interests above long-term global interests (particularly when economic interests are at stake). In the case of climate change, countries most responsible for producing greenhouse gas emissions like the US and China are less likely to be severely harmed by the onset of global warming and so have little incentive to implement economically costly and politically unpopular reforms to manage the threat. Countries that anticipate the most severe environmental impacts often lack sufficient influence to produce change. Similarly, **deforestation** contributes to global climate change, but its most immediate environmental impacts – soil erosion, flooding, drought, and biodiversity loss – are experienced locally before they produce global consequences. Most countries experiencing deforestation like Haiti are also poor, and their forests are among their most productive resources in achieving economic development. Countries in the midst of economic development are loath to be pressured to implement “green” policies that might hinder that development, and they may lack the institutional capacity to do so without substantial financial and technical assistance.

There is, then, a tension between the general interests of a community and the particular interests of individual actors. This is why polls repeatedly show that citizens want *both* a stronger military establishment *and* lower taxes. All citizens benefit from a strong common defense, yet many prefer to let others pay for it. It is necessary to enforce tax laws (coercion) to fund national defense and provide side payments like defense contracts for local industries to selected areas of the country in order to increase political support for defense spending. Moreover, in a world of sovereign states with no higher authority to coerce

actors to contribute to the provision of collective goods, such dilemmas are difficult to resolve. Nowhere is this clearer than with the issue of population growth.

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Environmental issues reflect the dilemma posed by the theory of collective goods in several ways. First, environmental improvements such as cleaner air and water and an end to climate change benefit every country. Second, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deprive individuals of such benefits. Third, countries have an incentive to be free riders and avoid paying for such improvements because they cannot be deprived of the benefits and their contribution makes little difference. Fourth, countries can be persuaded to contribute by being given side payments such as foreign aid to fund environmental projects. Companies or countries that pollute can also be given credits that allow them to emit a specific amount of a pollutant. Those that emit more than they are allowed must purchase credits from other companies or countries that pollute less than their allowance. In other words, purchasers are fined for exceeding their pollution allowance, and sellers are rewarded for polluting less than allowed. There are even financial firms that specialize in “energy an emissions trading and environmental asset trading opportunities.”⁸

For decades, a debate has raged about the earth’s capacity to sustain continued growth. Central to this debate is population growth. In the next section, we will see how both rapid population growth and population decline can affect economic growth and environmental wellbeing.

Population and environment

Growing populations present a difficult collective goods problem, especially in traditional agricultural societies. In such societies, it makes sense for families to have many children who can help work the land and can care for parents as they grow old. However, what is rational for individual families is irrational for society as a whole because rapid population growth may outstrip economic development and place intolerable strains on a country's resources.

Historically, a large population was regarded as a key element of national power that made it possible to field large armies and support low-cost labor-intensive industries. Countries tried to encourage higher rates of population than rivals. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, for example, tried to encourage Italy's population growth in the 1930s to settle overseas colonies and recruit larger armies. He also banned abortion and information on contraception and provided incentives such as family allowances, tax breaks, and loans

to encourage large families of five children or more. On one occasion, he met with a group of 93 mothers who had collectively given birth to more than 1300 children.

For some countries, a large population provides emigrants for overseas colonization that adds to the power of the mother country. Surplus population in the city-states of ancient Greece allowed for settlements in Asia Minor, North Africa, and elsewhere that spread Greek culture to the corners of the Mediterranean world. The poor from Great Britain settled in North America and Australia, and surplus population from many countries emigrated to the United States.

Two centuries ago, the English political economist and clergyman Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) predicted a growing imbalance between population and food supply, arguing that world population would be kept in balance with resources only by natural disasters like famine, disease, and war (see Key document, below). Although Malthus's dire predictions have been averted by agricultural innovation, notably the

KEY DOCUMENT

THOMAS MALTHUS, *AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION* (1798)⁹

Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will shew the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.

By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.

The power of population is so superior to the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction; and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world.

“green revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s in which new strains of wheat dramatically increased yields, it remains to be seen whether a “neo-Malthusian” future lies ahead, at least for some countries. Indeed some communities have successfully transformed their environments to support growing populations. The Machakos district of Kenya suffered from deforestation, overgrazing, and severe soil erosion in the 1930s, raising concerns that its 240,000 inhabitants were “rapidly drifting to a state of hopelessness and miserable poverty and their land to a parching desert of rocks, stones, and sand.”¹⁰ Out of necessity, they adopted new farming, livestock, and water management practices that restored the land and increased productivity such that the district was able to sustain a population of nearly 1.4 million in 1989.

Population trends

After 250,000 years, world population reached one billion in 1804. It took another 123 years for it to reach two billion, and 33 more years to reach three billion. According to UN estimates, world population – increasing by 77 million annually or about 146 every minute – reached the 6 billion mark in October 1999, only 12 years after reaching 5 billion.¹¹ World population reached 7 billion some time in late 2011, and, by 2050, it may approach 9 billion. This growth is unequally distributed, and nine countries are expected to account for half the projected global population increase (India, Pakistan, Nigeria, China, the US, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Bangladesh).¹² In 1960, 70 percent or 2.1 billion of the world’s 3 billion people lived in LDCs; by late 1999, LDCs were home to 80 percent of the world’s population, and 98 percent of the projected growth of the world population by 2025 will take place in these countries.¹³ Thus, most population growth will occur in the world’s poor regions, which, per se, are least able to sustain more people.

Population growth in these regions threatens to outstrip economic development, reducing standards of living and fostering discontent especially among the young who constitute nearly half the world’s population and significant majorities in poor countries such as Rwanda and Bangladesh. Rapid population growth increases the proportion of young people in a society, while declining growth rates produce an aging or “graying” society. Each trend entails different problems with global consequences.

Almost nine out of 10 of those between ages 15 and 24 who are entering their peak childbearing years live in the developing world. Between 2010 and 2050, the total number of young people will decline from 18 to 13 per cent of the world’s population, but their numbers will remain at about 1.2 billion.¹⁴ Young people place special burdens on a society’s economic and social infrastructure. Children need supervision so that parents can work, and large numbers place heavy demands on education systems. Above all, young adults need land or jobs, and in much of the developing world these are scarce. If educated youth have no opportunity to realize their aspirations, they become disillusioned, often rejecting the political system that has failed them. Large numbers of young people, especially males, without employment may become open to political extremism, revolutionary or criminal groups, religious militancy, and extremist nationalism. The young were the backbone of Europe’s fascist and communist movements in the 1930s, just as they are found in militant Islamic groups today. As was the case in the 1930s, so today they are sources of potential political and social instability and upheaval.

Overall, global birth and **fertility rates** have dropped significantly in recent decades, forecasting an end to exponential population growth. Between 1965 and 2010, fertility rates dropped from 4.8 children per women to 2.6. Overall, population stability should be achieved by 2050. Even in LDCs, where fertility levels had been highest, they have been halved from six to three children born per woman so that the rate of

increase will slow. Elsewhere, the populations of Russia and Ukraine are expected to drop precipitously by mid-century, and China's population will start declining by the 2030s. Fertility levels in much of the developed world have fallen below replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, and immigration is a key source of labor to support aging populations. Populations in a number of developed countries, including Japan, Germany, and Italy, have begun or will begin to drop soon, and birth rates are also dropping Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic. As a result, the EU fears it may have a shortfall of 20 million workers by 2030.¹⁵

Rapidly growing populations produce environmental strains, especially in the developing world where countries feature slowly declining birth rates and rapidly declining death rates (from 20 to fewer than 10 deaths per thousand since 1950),¹⁶ resulting in population growth that threatens to overwhelm economic development. For example, the populations of Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Uganda – all but two in sub-Saharan Africa – are projected to triple by 2050.¹⁷ These data suggest a rapidly changing world with fewer Europeans and larger numbers of Asians and Africans. In 1950, of the 20 most populous countries, six were European. By 1999, only two were European, and by 2050 only one – Russia – is expected to remain among the top 20. This predicted population shift is expected to have serious implications for the management of environmental threats, human rights concerns, and economic development.

High birth rates in poor countries among people who live in crowded conditions with inadequate sanitary and medical facilities provide fertile soil for the spread of diseases such as AIDS and cholera. Economic development is a key source of **urbanization**, and the influx of peasants into urban areas is part of a demographic transition from higher to lower birth rates that accompanies economic development. As land-hungry peasants or those who can no longer make

a living from agriculture abandon the countryside and flood cities in search of jobs, they create urban nightmares, overtaking existing facilities and creating dense concentrations of poverty (see Chapter 12).

The proportion of people in LDCs living in cities has almost doubled since 1960 from less than 22 to over 40 percent.¹⁸ Indeed, over half the world's population now live in cities, and this percentage is expected to grow to 60 percent by 2030.¹⁹ In 1975, only five cities had populations of over 10 million. By 2001, there were 17 **megacities** of more than 10 million, and, by 2015, it is expected that there will be 21 such cities, including six (Tokyo, Dhaka, Bombay, São Paulo, New Delhi, and Mexico City) with more than 20 million (see Figure 15.2).²⁰ The urban poor often live in illegal shantytowns that lack safe water or indoor plumbing. Many homes lack electricity; garbage is burned in the open; and sewage flows through open ditches, creating the conditions for disease. Infrastructure in these cities is inadequate, crime is endemic, and police are often corrupt.

Increasing conflict?

Rapid population growth breeds violence in crowded cities like Bogotá, Karachi, and Rio de Janeiro, and growing populations translate into demands for resources, which, if unmet, may generate conflict as countries try to satisfy the need for space and resources at one another's expense. Some analysts believe that crowding, a result of population density, triggers violence. Anthropologist Desmond Morris describes crowded urban conditions as a "human zoo":

Only in the cramped quarters of zoo cages do we find anything approaching the human state . . . But even the least experienced zoo director would never contemplate crowding and cramping a group of animals to the extent that man has crowded and cramped himself in his modern cities and towns. *That*




Figure 15.2 The world's megacities, 2007–25

Source: Copyright Guardian News & Media Ltd 2008


level of abnormal grouping, the director would predict with confidence, would cause a complete fragmentation and collapse of the normal social pattern of the animal species concerned.²¹

From this perspective, urban crime and war have similar roots. We would expect violence and crime to be greater in densely populated cities with few amenities and high poverty rates such as Calcutta or São Paulo than elsewhere. In Karachi, Pakistan, a city with a population of some 12–18 million that is growing at 5 percent annually,²² “middle-class suburbs are virtually under siege from urban

guerrillas, armed with automatic rifles, bombs and rocket launchers.”²³

Japanese leaders in the 1930s claimed that the need for resources justified the country's aggressive imperialism, and Hitler invaded Russia in 1941 in search of *Lebensraum* (living space) for the German people. Today, there is growing concern over the possibility of resource wars, for example in the Middle East where demand for water is outstripping supply.

Population density, as shown in Map 15.2, on average is growing in less-developed regions, and, along with economic inequality, also produces land hunger. Small elites own disproportionate



Map 15.2 Global population density

amounts of arable land, leaving poor peasants with insufficient land to support themselves. Such conditions promote revolutionary violence as they did in El Salvador in the 1980s. More than half of El Salvador's population and three-quarters of those in rural areas lived in absolute poverty at the time, and the country's population was growing rapidly. The US-supported Salvadoran government resisted land reform, and Marxist guerrillas seized large estates and distributed them to landless peasants. Although a 1992 agreement ended the war in El Salvador, continuing population pressures and land hunger may rekindle social tension in the future and trigger massive waves of migrants northward toward the United States. Similar conditions exist in much of Central America.

A more complex view is that population pressure produces environmental degradation that in turn leads to declining agricultural production,

population movements, and disrupted institutions. According to political scientist Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, these conditions are associated with three types of war: scarcity conflicts that arise over limited resources like fresh water, group identity conflicts between ethnic and cultural communities, and relative deprivation conflicts connected to inequalities within societies.²⁴ Journalist Robert Kaplan concludes that:

It is time to understand “the environment” for what it is: *the* national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts – will

be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate.²⁵

Defusing the population bomb

Economic and social development is the key to slowing population growth. Poor countries with traditional societies tend to have high birth and death rates, in contrast to rich and modern societies, which have low birth and death rates.

Questions of population growth touch people's cultural and ethical beliefs. Infant mortality rates in poor countries are high owing to inadequate sanitation, nutrition, and medical care, and these contribute to high birth rates because parents assume many of their children will die. In addition, males desire large families for prestige, and the inferior status of women is perpetuated by the imperative of bearing and raising children. In sum, preference for large numbers of children has deep roots in poor agrarian societies where people want large numbers of male offspring to help in the fields, compensate for a high infant mortality rate, and provide parents with social insurance in old age. As noted earlier, from a family's perspective, numerous children make good sense, even though more mouths to feed are harmful to society as a whole.

Changes in customs and values are needed to control population growth. In the initial stages of economic development, medical advances cause a drop in death rates, especially in infant mortality, thereby accelerating population growth and life expectancy. Social and economic upheavals that increase wealth, education, and urbanization alter individual incentives and reduce birth rates. With prosperity, population growth rates decline and then stabilize. Economic development increases the demand for women in the workforce and provides new opportunities for educating both men and women. Wealth and education, especially of women, create new interests outside the home and provide knowledge about opportunities for personal growth that encourage later

marriages and that only exist with a small family. In urban settings, women marry later; divorce is more common; and more women remain single. In a word, empowering women is probably the most effective way to slow population growth in LDCs. Finally, urbanization and government social security reduce economic incentives to have large families and create practical constraints like insufficient housing.

Poor countries that emphasize the education of women as agents of change and offer family planning in community settings do best in reducing birth and fertility rates, yet as many as 350 million families still have no access to family-planning services. And it is estimated that only 9 percent of married women in West Africa use contraception, even though population growth is explosive.²⁶ Combining economic development and coercion can make a big difference as shown by China's experience. By combining a coercive policy limiting families to one child since 1979 with free contraceptives and birth-control information and legalized abortion, China almost halved its birth rate and reduced its fertility rate from 5.7 to 1.4 between 1970 and 1999.²⁷ Imposing birth control may, however, entail running roughshod over traditional beliefs or, as in China, creating social tensions as families abort female fetuses because of a traditional preference for boys and so produce a surplus of males for whom there are no brides. Political scientists Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer argue that this surplus of young males is a likely source of internal and international conflict.²⁸

As we saw in Chapter 11, China's coercive family-planning policies and especially its use of abortion and sterilization to control births became linked to the abortion debate in the United States. In announcing a cut-off of funds by the Bush administration to the UN Population Fund, a State Department spokesman declared that China's birth-control programs "have penalties that amount to coercion. Therefore we feel, by funding these programs, we would be indirectly helping the Chinese to improve their manage-

ment of programs that result in coercive abortion, and that's prohibited by our law."²⁹

In time, as birth rates decline, countries may discover that they have an insufficient number of young people as workers and taxpayers, and the burden on societies of providing healthcare and retirement benefits for growing populations of elderly people may become onerous. These problems are sharpened by the disappearance of extended families typical of traditional societies that provide care to the elderly. Increasingly, rich countries in North America, East Asia, and Western Europe are experiencing older populations, with smaller numbers of young people having to provide for and finance growing numbers of retired citizens. Even China has begun to experience "graying" and, despite its enormous population, will begin to experience a shortage of cheap labor.³⁰ In the US, Europe, and Japan, the prospect that government social security and medical insurance programs may go bankrupt has become a major political issue.

One solution for "graying" societies is encouraging more births, but this threatens to exacerbate environmental problems and touches on social issues such as women's independence. Another possibility is utilizing more women in the workforce, a route already exploited in Europe and North America but still available in Japan where the status of women has advanced only very slowly. Migration is another partial solution that has postponed the demographic crisis in the United States. Indeed, labor shortages in countries like Italy, the first country with more people over the age of 65 than under the age of 15, may help poor countries because they provide opportunities for them to "export" workers who then send money home. However, migration can produce social tension in homogenous societies, and in some cases like that of Japan violates a basic social consensus and is stubbornly resisted.

Nevertheless, continuing population growth in poor countries remains a source of environmental degradation. Concern about global population and the environment surfaced in the 1960s and

led to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden, and, then, two years later, to the UN World Population Conference in Bucharest, Rumania. The link between population and environment received considerable attention at the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City, which urged countries to bring population and resources into balance. At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development or "Earth Summit" held in Rio de Janeiro, representatives of 172 countries and 2400 NGOs gathered to discuss ways to reduce strains on the global environment while fostering **sustainable development** to lower the tension between the desire of poor countries to develop their economies quickly and the preference of wealthy countries to impose environmental limits on development. The conference produced an ambitious set of objectives called Agenda 21 in which participants committed themselves to a program of environmental preservation, with emphases on global warming, biodiversity and the linked problems of poverty, health, and population. These commitments proved ephemeral, and the US failed to fulfil its obligations under Agenda 21.

The Rio conference was followed by the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, where efforts were made to find a balance between economic growth and population, while endorsing slower population growth and pointing out the link among production, consumption, and environmental health. There followed the 1996 UN Conference on Human Settlements, called Habitat II, in Istanbul, Turkey, which focused on problems of rapid urbanization and population growth.

Population growth is a key source of environmental stress and ecological deterioration. The following section examines a number of growing environmental challenges and depicts the relationship among them.

Deteriorating global ecology

Population growth and rapid economic development diminish physical space and strain the earth's physical, social, and political environments. Already, wealthy countries are running out of space in which to dump solid waste – some of it violently toxic or radioactive – and, in some cases, have exported it to poor countries in need of hard currency. And as personal electronics become more ubiquitous, more electronic waste (**e-waste**) is being shipped to the developing world, where crude recycling methods release heavy metals and hazardous chemicals into the soil and atmosphere, poisoning human workers.

The links among environmental problems, as well as their relationship to economic growth, are characteristic of globalization. One recurring dilemma involves the trade-off between economic and environmental interests. Rapid economic development is not an unmitigated blessing. It brings with it mountains of waste and pollution.

Consider China. Despite slowing population growth, the country has such a large population (1.3 billion) that a growth rate of only 1 percent means an additional 12 million people annually, roughly the population of Tokyo. China, which is modernizing at breakneck speed, has some of the world's most polluted cities and rivers, and the situation is deteriorating. "The number of accidents fouling the air and water doubled during the first half of 2010, with an average of 10 each month . . . More than a quarter of the country's rivers, lakes and streams were too contaminated to be used for drinking water. **Acid rain** . . . has become a problem in nearly 200 of . . . 440 cities,"³¹ and it is eroding landmarks such as the Great Wall and the ancient Leshan Buddha statue in southern China.³² In November 2010, air pollution readings taken at the US Embassy in Beijing "soared past 500 – a level so astonishing it prompted the embassy's automated air pollution twitter feed to add a completely new rating: 'Crazy Bad'."³³ (The designation was later replaced with "Beyond Index.") Factories dump toxins into

rivers and the ground, producing widespread poisoning – in just one scandal in 2009, more than 2000 children were found to have been afflicted with lead poisoning produced by a manganese smelting plant in Hunan province.³⁴ Government-run lumber companies clear forests, stripping mountainsides and producing soil erosion that produces mudslides, like that which killed more than 1000 people in Northwest China in 2010.³⁵ China's reliance on coal to industrialize and its growing number of automobiles are making it a leading producer of climate-warming carbon dioxide, and global warming may inundate China's coastal plain, displacing millions around Shanghai and Guangzhou. China's Three Gorges Dam, the country's largest project since the Great Wall and the world's largest dam, built to end flooding along the Yangtze River, has created a vast reservoir 412 miles long that inundated numerous cities and villages, many industrial sites with toxic materials, factories, and fertile farmland, forcing the resettlement of some 1.2 million people.³⁶ The toxic materials could leach into the reservoir and the Yangtze. Authorities are now recognizing it also may be contributing to landslides, earthquakes, water-borne disease, and a decline in biodiversity.³⁷ Finally, the sources of the majestic Yellow River are drying up, and the river is almost entirely contaminated.³⁸

China's environmental challenges came into the global spotlight with the 2008 Beijing Olympic games, both for that country's poor environmental record and for its commitment to deliver a "Green Olympics."³⁹ In addition to constructing "green" Olympic venues, China spent \$15.7 billion cleaning up its environment, including shutting down factories, taking cars off the road, improving emissions standards, upgrading Beijing's mass transit system, and improving the city's air and water quality. However, recent efforts to stimulate economic growth have reversed many of these gains. Smog, traffic, and polluted water are once again a fact of life for Beijing and its environs.⁴⁰

The next section illustrates this trade-off between economic and environmental objectives in the context of growing energy demands for economic development and dangerous environmental side effects like global warming.

Global energy politics

Energy politics illustrate how environmental and economic imperatives collide and how actors have divergent views of trade-offs between them. Energy is essential for economic growth, and, although energy use has grown more efficient in recent decades, energy usage continues to rise.


FOSSIL FUELS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Harnessing new energy sources tells much about how human society has modernized. The industrial revolution was made possible by machinery that replaced human and animal labor and was built on mountains of cheap, plentiful fossil fuels like coal and coke. Transportation and distribution networks were based on the internal combustion engine – ships, trains, planes, and cars. However, the environmental and health toll of industrialization was enormous. Smog and toxic compounds inflicted disease and premature death. Air and water were poisoned; coal miners contracted tuberculosis and black lung; and the burning of coal in London made that city notorious for “pea-soupers.” Although progress has been made in limiting certain dangerous pollutants like heavy metals such as mercury, cadmium, and nickel, societies continue to wrestle with the trade-offs between economic development and pollution, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, the storage of dangerous materials like nuclear waste, air pollution and acid rain, and global warming.

One of the most vexing problems in global politics is how to generate sufficient energy for growth while coping with associated environmental effects. This is complicated by the fact that energy consumption trends are rapidly changing.

In 2003, the richest 20 percent of the world’s population accounted for 86 per cent of total private consumption expenditure, including 58 percent of the world’s energy and 87 percent of its automobiles.⁴¹ With less than 5 percent of the world’s population, the US has long used more of the world’s fossil fuels than any other country – until 2009, that is, when China surpassed the US as the world’s largest energy consumer and the largest auto market.⁴² Indeed, China’s rapid development, more than any single factor, accounted for the dramatic rise in global oil prices in 2004–06. Developing countries like China are willing to sacrifice the environment for economic growth, while rich countries demand more stringent environmental standards.

Today’s global community is more sensitive to the relationship between energy and environment and better understands how both are needed for prosperity and health. The economic and political sides of the equation have received more attention since the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at a conference in September 1960 attended by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. These five were later joined by eight other oil-exporting countries: Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973–92), and Gabon (1975–94). Although OPEC is not strictly a regional organization, seven of its members are located in the oil-rich Middle East (see Map 15.3). OPEC is an important institution because of its role in the production and distribution of oil. It is a commodity cartel whose members aim to reduce competition and maintain high prices for their product by controlling production. Together, they account for about 40 percent of the world’s oil output and over three-quarters of the world’s proven oil reserves. Inevitably, there is global concern about OPEC’s “oil power.”

In the 1970s, the OPEC cartel emerged as an oligopoly able to determine oil price, an ability that gave it great political clout. Twice a year OPEC oil ministers meet at their Vienna headquarters to



Map 15.3 OPEC countries

decide production levels and set production quotas for members. Oil-producing states seek to control their commodity and earn as much as possible while it lasts, and oil-consuming states want plentiful oil at stable prices.

Libya was the first oil producer to force foreign oil corporations to renegotiate earlier agreements. Threatening to seize their assets, in 1970, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi demanded that oil companies increase the price of Libyan crude. Companies' efforts to stand up to Libya collapsed when Occidental Petroleum broke ranks and raised prices. Libyan success led other oil-producing states to demand similar increases and, in an effort to stabilize prices, the oil companies tried to involve oil-producing states in multi-lateral negotiations to set a common price.

Several events triggered a new price spiral: growing global demand, devaluation of the US dollar, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent Arab oil embargo. During the same period, oil-producing states seized control of price and production levels from companies and assumed ownership of company concessions on their territory, while continuing to rely on the companies for technology, capital, and markets.

Declining domestic oil production and growing consumption made the United States increasingly dependent on foreign oil. Between 1970 and 1973, crude oil prices jumped, but dollar devaluations in 1971 and 1973 diluted OPEC profits because consumers paid for oil in dollars. Although OPEC countries had more dollars, these were worth less. After the 1973 war, Arab oil producers tried to use the oil weapon to make Israel's supporters change their policies while showing solidarity with fellow Arab states and the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. A selective oil embargo was imposed on the US, the Netherlands, and Portugal, but failed to have the desired effect because of the availability of non-Arab oil supplies. Nevertheless, between 1972 and 1980, supplies remained tight; OPEC discipline held; and prices soared.

In response to rising prices, the United States and other developed countries established the International Energy Agency in 1974. The agency was intended to coordinate the policies of major oil-consuming countries in the event of another crisis, help reduce the overall demand for oil, monitor the oil market, and develop a system to facilitate sharing oil supplies among consumers if

that became necessary. The agency, however, has been largely ineffective, a fact that became evident when it failed either to curb rising prices or facilitate sharing scarce oil supplies when the Iranian Revolution brought a halt to Iranian oil exports in 1979.

Oil prices jumped following the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war in September 1980, peaking in 1981 and then falling because of global recession, Western efforts to conserve energy, and the violation of quotas by some OPEC members and resulting overproduction. Non-OPEC countries – Norway, Mexico, Britain, Oman, and Russia – also began to account for a greater share of oil production. By 1998, oil prices had dropped to \$12 a barrel. Several factors in recent years, however, have produced a dramatic reversal in this trend: flagging US conservation, reduced production in old oilfields, increased demand for energy in China and India, the end of global economic recession in 2003, and a variety of specific events in oil-producing countries – for example, the Iraq war, anti-American rhetoric by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez and Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, civil strife in Nigeria, and uprisings across the Middle East. The last conspired to push crude oil prices to over \$115 a barrel in early 2011. As the global thirst for oil rises and the supply tightens, either owing to unrest in the Middle East and Gulf or to reductions in the production capacity of oil-producing states, the price of oil can be expected to rise, although its impact on the global economy remains uncertain.

Despite high prices, OPEC’s influence has waned for several reasons. First, OPEC no longer has the excess pumping capacity needed to control prices. Second, non-OPEC oil producers, notably Russia and the countries of Central Asia such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, are increasing their role in the oil market. Third, leading OPEC members repeatedly ignore their production quotas. Finally, there is widespread recognition that efforts to use oil prices as a political weapon can backfire because the resulting decline in the

value of the US dollar and inflation in the West harm oil producers themselves because they must pay higher prices for the goods they import with dollars that are worth less than before.

FOSSIL FUELS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The environmental side of the oil equation became evident on March 24, 1989, when the tanker *Exxon Valdez* broke up on Bligh Reef, spilling nearly 11 million gallons of crude oil that poisoned Alaska’s Prince William Sound. In January 1993, the tanker *Braer* spilled hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil on the Shetland Islands’ coastline, devastating its fragile ecology. In 1991, Saddam Hussein used environmental terrorism during his retreat from Kuwait, blowing up hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells. During the months that followed over a billion barrels of oil were burned, creating a poisonous smoke across the region, causing black rain, leaving deep lakes of oil, and producing an increase in cancer in the area.⁴³ More recently, world attention was riveted on the Gulf of Mexico when, on April 20, 2010, an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig killed 11 people and initiated the largest ever accidental oil spill into marine waters. After several failed attempts, BP, the owner of the rig, finally capped the leak on July 15, by which time an estimated five million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf. The well was finally declared “dead” in September, but hundreds of thousands of people and businesses were harmed and the long-term environmental consequences remain unknown.⁴⁴

An environmental threat to the earth as a whole is posed by gases released in burning fossil fuels that are responsible for heating the earth’s atmosphere. Although sunlight can pass through these gases, they also reflect it back to the earth’s surface as infrared radiation. According to the UN World Meteorological Organization, 1998 was the warmest year on record, closely followed by 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 (2008 was the 10th warmest year on record), and it is estimated that the average global surface temperature has risen just over 1°F in the past century.⁴⁵ According to US

scientists, 2010 actually tied the warmest year on record (2005, by their account).⁴⁶ Figure 15.3 illustrates how global warming works. Among fossil fuels, oil is not the only villain. The demand for coal, a dirty fuel that produces almost a third of global carbon emissions, has grown, especially in China and the United States, because oil prices have risen and oil supplies have grown tighter. Sixty percent of China's electricity comes from coal, and its consumption from 2000–08 accounted for three-quarters of the growth in the global demand for coal.⁴⁷

In 2005, atmospheric amounts of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and nitrous oxide (N₂O) – the two leading greenhouse gases – reached an all-time high.⁴⁸ Average concentrations continue to rise even as emissions fall (owing to economic downturn and *La Niña* climate patterns) because CO₂ is entering the atmosphere faster than natural processes can scrub it.⁴⁹ Among the signs of climate change are melting glaciers, shrinking Arctic ice, warming of Canadian and Alaskan permafrost, and changes in rainfall patterns. Even small temperature changes may have big effects. The earth 130,000 years ago was between 3.6° and

5.4°F (2° and 3°C) warmer than today. Tropical swamps thrived where London now stands. As global warming increases, the polar ice caps may melt and flood populated coasts and islands. Island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Nauru may disappear beneath the waves, and heavily populated low areas in countries like Egypt and Bangladesh may be inundated. Thus, in 2003, Tuvalu's prime minister declared in a speech to the UN: "We live in constant fear of the adverse impacts of climate change. For a coral atoll nation, sea level rise and more severe weather events loom as a growing threat to our entire population. The threat is real and serious, and is of no difference to a slow and insidious form of terrorism against us."⁵⁰

Among those hard hit by global warming will be Eskimos, or Inuits, who follow a traditional life hunting seals and polar bears near the Arctic Circle. In December 2004, their leaders announced that they would seek a ruling from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the US for contributing to global warming that threatens their existence and violates their human rights. Their case was strengthened when 300




Figure 15.3 The greenhouse effect

Source: US Environmental Protection Agency

scientists from the eight countries with territory in the Arctic, including the US, concluded that “human influences” are the major source of environmental change in the region. Yet even as indigenous Arctic dwellers see their livelihood disappear, countries near the Arctic Circle like Russia and Norway see opportunities to drill for oil as the icepack melts.

In 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, a protocol to the 1992 UN treaty on climate change was negotiated under which 35 industrialized countries were to cut back emissions of greenhouse gases by 2012 to 5 percent below 1990 levels. The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates that concentrations of the most important gases – nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, and methane – in the atmosphere have increased 18, 36, and 148 percent respectively since the beginning of the industrial revolution.⁵¹ The cutbacks mandated at Kyoto translated into a reduction in US emis-

sions by 24.3 percent, Japanese emissions by 21.4 percent, Canadian by 20.4 percent, and British by 6.6–7.3 percent. Russia, whose economic decline had reduced the country’s energy consumption, could increase its emissions by 4.4 percent and remain within the Kyoto limits.⁵²

The Kyoto Protocol was ratified by 140 countries, excluding the US, which in 2007 accounted for some 20 percent of the world’s carbon emissions.⁵³ Other leading emitters of carbon dioxide are China, India, Russia, and Japan. The US feared harm to its economy and demanded application of emission limits to developing countries like China and India that were excused from the protocol.⁵⁴ The Kyoto Protocol could only come into force once countries that account for 55 percent of emissions had ratified it. With America’s refusal to do so, Russia’s ratification in late 2004 proved the necessary last step, and, in February 2005, the treaty came into force.

CONTROVERSY

The question of whether the earth’s climate is growing warmer is controversial. Scientists agree that global warming is taking place and, overall, that “climate indeed shows signs of human-induced warming.”⁵⁵ Nevertheless, a 2009 poll surveying public attitudes toward global warming found that among the 19 countries surveyed, Americans were least likely to believe climate change is an urgent policy priority. The average American citizen rates the need to respond urgently to climate change at 4.71 on a scale of 1–10 (with 10 the highest priority), while Mexico rates it at about 9, and China, Turkey, Chile, and the UK all rate it above 8.⁵⁶

Assessing the present threat from climate change is complicated by several factors. Although global warming has been blamed for natural disasters like the wildfires that engulfed Russia or the floods that inundated Pakistan in 2010, it is not possible to determine accurately the relative significance of natural variability and climate change. Declares a climatologist at the US National Center for Atmospheric Research, “I believe the correct interpretation is that nowadays everything has a component of natural variability and also global warming. . . . The way to think of it, though, is that global warming exacerbates the other conditions that would be occurring anyway: The droughts are more intense, last longer and thus elevate wildfire risk. ⁵⁷ It is also difficult to distinguish the relative impact of a warming climate from that of population growth, land use patterns, and other human activities that produce deforestation and soil erosion, which also contribute to worsening flooding. ⁵⁸ So, how urgent is the problem and how ought it to be addressed?

Further meetings including one in Montreal in 2005 and one in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 produced modest progress toward curbing carbon emissions and began movement toward a post-Kyoto agreement with the “Bali Road Map,” a document that established a two-year negotiating process to culminate in a binding successor to Kyoto. As the deadline approached, a binding agreement seemed less and less likely, and at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference participants could only agree on a nonbinding compromise, negotiated among the US, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil, to decrease carbon emissions. In contrast to Kyoto, emissions reductions were not negotiated into the document, but member states submitted voluntary targets following the meeting. The key players at Copenhagen wrestled with concerns pertaining to sovereignty and differential responsibility. Climate change is viewed as largely a product of decades of greenhouse gas emissions from the global north, but today some of the largest emitters are industrializing countries in the global south. Developing countries contend that they should not be pressured to limit their growth in order to manage a problem they did not create. The US, in contrast, is unwilling to implement costly policies to reduce its current emissions while countries in the global south continue to increase emissions, thereby undermining efforts to achieve a coherent solution. These positions seem to have become even more entrenched since Copenhagen, making unlikely a legally binding, post-Kyoto agreement by 2012.

Although the US has not supported internationally binding emissions reductions, Europe has adopted an American idea that may produce global progress on the issue. The idea is an emissions trading system, under which governments allocate emissions quotas to industrial facilities. Those facilities that emit less gas than they are allowed can sell “carbon credits” to others that cannot meet their emissions quotas. In addition, owing to tighter oil supplies, higher energy prices, and growing awareness of environmental costs, interest has grown in energy conservation and

in clean and renewable energy sources such as solar, geothermal, wind, hydrogen, biomass, and nuclear power.⁵⁹ For the most part, however, these alternatives remain expensive and technologically difficult, or, in the case of nuclear energy, are seen by many people as dangerous.

By 2010, some 498 nuclear plants were operating or under construction worldwide,⁶⁰ but the nuclear alternative grew less attractive after three events made it appear that the solution might be worse than the problem. On March 28, 1979, a malfunctioning valve set in motion events at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, that uncovered the nuclear reactor core. Although little nuclear material escaped, fear of nuclear meltdown gripped Americans. Then, on April 26, 1986, Reactor No. 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, near Kiev in the USSR, blew up sending toxic nuclear debris across much of Western and Central Europe and forcing the evacuation of 134,000 people living near the plant. More recently, three reactors overheated in Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant following a powerful earthquake on March 11, 2011 and a subsequent tsunami that knocked out the backup generators powering the emergency cooling systems. The incident spewed radioactive steam over surrounding cities and leaked radioactive water in and around the reactor buildings and into the ocean. These incidents have fueled public fears about nuclear power, but some experts believe such disasters will slow, but not halt, efforts to develop nuclear power as an alternative energy source.

Another problem involves storing nuclear waste, some of which, like Plutonium-239, remain poisonous practically forever. Between 1947 and 1967, radioactive waste from uranium mining in Soviet Kyrgyzstan was dumped in 23 open sites; and, to avoid surface leaks of nuclear waste, the USSR secretly injected liquid nuclear material directly into the earth, a process described by a Nobel laureate in physics as the “most careless nuclear practice that the human race has ever suffered.”⁶¹ In the US, the problem of nuclear

waste is complicated by rusting tanks of toxic by-products from nuclear weapons' manufacture and from the dismantling of Russian and US weapons after the Cold War. America's nuclear production facilities are responsible for widespread contamination of soil and water, and no solution has yet been found for disposing of nuclear waste. After 1981, the US began moving toward storing such waste in salt caverns at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Nevada, however, opposes this, and the issue remains unresolved. In sum, as a result of public concern about nuclear power, fewer nuclear power plants were operating in 2009 than in 1996.⁶²

Without alternatives, the world will continue to rely on fossil fuels for energy. We will see more killer smogs in cities such as Mexico City, Athens, and Beijing where pollution is equivalent to smoking several packs of cigarettes a day. In rural societies, smog from wood and dung fires in poorly ventilated huts accounts for the death of countless children from respiratory distress. Another consequence of air pollution is acid rain and snow caused by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide – much of which is spewed from energy plants in America's Midwest – that have denuded forests in eastern Canada, New England, Germany, and Central Europe and killed off fish in innumerable lakes.

Growing populations require more food, and energy is required to grow food. In the next section, we examine the problems of famine and malnutrition.

Too little food

The mass famine that Malthus feared has been deferred by technology, including genetic engineering, new plant strains, improved fertilizers, and mechanized agriculture. Nevertheless, in some regions per capita food consumption is outstripping food production, while in some developing countries the problem of obesity exists alongside of widespread malnutrition.⁶³ In

2007–08, a dramatic spike in food prices produced an acute food crisis in which global food prices increased 43 percent. Wheat and soybean prices increased by 146 and 71 percent respectively.⁶⁴ Rising food prices reduced **food security**, especially among poor populations who spend 50–75 percent of their income on food, and they led to riots and political instability across the developing world, including the 2011 uprisings across the Middle East, although exactly how large a role food played in those events is unclear.

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) the most common forms of malnutrition are:

- Iron deficiency anemia that affects approximately 1.5 billion people, mostly women and children.
- Iodine deficiency disorders that affect about 740 million people.
- Vitamin A deficiency blindness that affects about 2.8 million children under 5 years of age.
- Calcium deficiency in pregnant and lactating women that can harm the development of their children, and appears as osteoporosis later in life.
- Vitamin C deficiency – scurvy – that is widespread among the poor and refugee populations.⁶⁵

Although food output has tripled during the past 50 years and hunger has been reduced globally, some 800 million people in the developing world remain victims of chronic malnutrition.⁶⁶ In Africa, food production in the early 1990s was actually 20 percent lower than two decades earlier.⁶⁷ In China, with population increasing by 15 million a year,⁶⁸ loss of 20 percent of cropland since the late 1950s to industrialization and urbanization, along with soil erosion, salting of irrigation systems, and global warming, led ecologist Lester Brown to foresee a decline of 20 percent in grain production between 1990 and 2030, leaving a shortfall of 216 million tonnes – “a level

that exceeds the world's entire 1993 grain exports of 200 million tons."⁶⁹

Despite drought, flooding, soil exhaustion, **desertification**, and other natural disasters, sufficient food is still available, but distributing it to those in need is inefficient. Moreover, poverty, the inevitable companion of famine and malnutrition, makes it impossible for those in need to purchase food when it is available. Both local and global political problems, including warfare and inadequate investment in agriculture, have shaped efforts to address that compelling problem. Somalia is a frightening illustration. A UN-authorized humanitarian intervention in late 1992 that tried to arrest famine in Somalia was an "abject failure"⁷⁰ and continued violence led to the withdrawal of American forces in March 1994. As in prior famines in Ethiopia and Sudan, the world community reacted too late, only after starvation was widespread. Part of the reason is that, in dealing with such hunger, knotty local political issues have to be addressed. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia all suffer intractable political problems – petty warlords, weak central government, and ethnic rivalry – that make foreign assistance ineffective.

In addition, food is used as a weapon in global politics, as it was by Somalia's rival warring clans. As more countries depend on a few food exporters, the latter may provide or withhold those exports to coerce political concessions, as did America's Carter administration when it halted grain shipments to the Soviet Union after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The United States contributes to UN relief agencies and provides inexpensive credits to countries it wishes to reward so that they can purchase surplus American grain. Domestic pressures from American farmers, however, prevent the US government from providing funds for countries to purchase grain locally which would be far more cost effective. In 2007, the Bush administration proposed a change to allow food purchases closer to where food is needed.

Various international efforts have been made to address problems of hunger and malnutrition

and realize US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's commitment to the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome that "within a decade, no child should go to bed hungry."⁷¹ These include the UN World Summit for Children (1990) in which states promised to halve child malnutrition by 2000, the International Conference on Nutrition (1992) that reaffirmed that goal, and the World Food Summit (1996) which set a goal of halving the number of the world's hungry by 2015, a pledge reaffirmed in the UN's 2000 Millennium Development Goals.⁷² In 2006, the UN established a Central Emergency Response Fund in its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to speed up its response in the event of famine.⁷³ In addition, a variety of humanitarian NGOs such as Oxfam actively seek to alleviate famine and malnutrition. Even if the global community wants to help, food assistance often fails to reach those who need it most. Long-term food assistance may also create local dependency, preventing the agricultural reforms needed to make a country self-sufficient in food, as recipients fail to make suitable policy reforms or invest what is needed in local agriculture.

The need for additional farmland, the growth of cities, and the need for wood for construction, heating, and cooking are among the reasons that forests are vanishing, the issue to which we now turn.

Vanishing forests and encroaching deserts

The growing need for food has important environmental consequences. Intensive farming contributes to soil erosion, **salinization**, deforestation, and desertification. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, some 61,000 square miles of forests were destroyed annually in the 1990s,⁷⁴ and about 50,193 square miles per year between 2000 and 2010. The rate of deforestation is actually decreasing since the 1990s owing to large-scale tree planting, but nonetheless

it is estimated that between 2000 and 2010 the net loss in forests was equivalent to an area the size of Costa Rica.⁷⁵ Among the most visible effects of deforestation is southward expansion of the Sahara in Africa and sandbars created in the Bay of Bengal by silt runoff from the Himalayas. Many Bengalis who try to live on these islands perish during annual cyclones. Another effect of deforestation in the developing world where “**slash and burn**” techniques are used to provide additional farmland is the emission into the atmosphere of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide in the burning of trees.⁷⁶ These gases contribute to global warming, and nitrous oxide also helps destroy the **ozone layer**, which affords protection from the sun’s dangerous ultraviolet rays. Another effect of deforestation is the loss of biodiversity. Tropical rain forests are home to between 50 and 90 percent of all living creatures, including most primates, and deforestation results in the loss of about 137 animal and plant species every day.⁷⁷

At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, a plan was adopted to halt desertification. The Convention on Desertification established a “global mechanism” to seek money for and coordinate projects to slow the spread of deserts. Little money, however, has been pledged for this task. An effort to limit logging was blocked by the United States, and international efforts to realize the promise of Rio have been unsuccessful.⁷⁸

A special problem is posed by disappearing jungles. Already vast jungle tracts in the developing world have been denuded to slake the world’s thirst for Southeast Asian, South Pacific, African, and Latin American hardwood and local demand for farmland, living space, and fuel. Such loss reduces the earth’s ability to produce oxygen, alters rainfall patterns and gives rise to droughts, and creates new deserts and enlarges old ones.

In Brazil’s Amazon basin, home to one-third of the world’s remaining rainforests, 30 percent of the world’s plant and animal species and source of as much as 20 percent of all fresh water flowing into oceans, economic pressures were colliding

head on with the imperatives of global survival until Brazil’s government began to act vigorously. That region, drained by the Amazon River, covers 800 million acres, an area almost as large as Australia. Although rain forests absorb huge amounts of carbon dioxide, since 1970 over 232,000 square miles of the Amazon jungle (an area about the size of Botswana) have been burned away.⁷⁹ These fires contributed more to global air pollution than did burning Kuwait’s oilfields by retreating Iraqi troops in 1991,⁸⁰ and Brazil, home to much of the basin, became a major source of carbon greenhouse gases. Although the Amazon basin was once known as the “lungs of the world,” an American ecologist declared: “It’s not the lungs of the world. It’s probably burning up more oxygen now than it’s producing.”⁸¹

In September 1993, the space shuttle *Discovery* reported clouds of smoke over the Amazon. Air pollution from slash and burn fires in Indonesia in 1994⁸² was so dense that two ships, unable to see each other, collided off Singapore, and in 1997 much of Southeast Asia was blanketed with smoke from Indonesia’s burning forests. In recent years, the Indonesian government has begun to limit such unrestrained destruction of forests. When jungle is destroyed, animal and plant life is lost. Among the plants pushed to extinction are those with high medicinal potential. Plants that might help cure or prevent cancer or AIDS tomorrow are being destroyed today.

The fight to reduce slashing and burning of the Amazon has been led by foreign and local ecologists and by those who harvest the jungle to tap rubber (a harvest that does not destroy trees). Resulting violence included the 1988 murder of Chico Mendes (1944–88), a leader in protecting the rain forest and helping rubber workers, and the murder of indigenous Yanomami Indians by gold prospectors in 1993. Mendes’s martyrdom turned Brazilian public opinion against the business interests that were exploiting the basin. In 1991, Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello took steps to save the Amazon – abolishing tax subsidies for farmers and ranchers, firing the

head of Brazil's Indian Protection Agency, establishing the Chico Mendes Extraction Reserve, and, most important, embarking on a policy of debts-for-nature swaps. In 2008, President Lula da Silva announced a plan to reduce deforestation rates in the Amazon by 70 percent over 10 years, and, in 2010, Brazil's government reported that deforestation had declined by 47.5 percent over the previous 12 months.⁸³ Nevertheless, as the global economy recovers from financial crisis and the price for agricultural commodities increases, deforestation rates may again increase.

However, even as forests disappear, some countries, notably Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Turkey, have undertaken reforestation campaigns and are limiting tree cutting for agriculture. Indeed, some of the world's wealthy countries like the United States have denser forests today than in 1990, and the introduction of efficient agricultural techniques combined with the movement of peasants into cities is helping to remedy the problem.⁸⁴

The debts-for-nature swap is an imaginative approach suggested by tropical biologist Thomas Lovejoy in 1984 to reduce friction with indebted developing countries that are asked to bear a large share of the costs of global environmental reform. Lovejoy's idea was that a government or an environmental group pay part of a debtor's obligation at reduced interest. In return, the debtor country would use the funds it would have paid in interest for environmental ends. The proposal attracted attention when it became apparent that some loans would never be repaid and banks became willing to accept partial repayment rather than confront a loan default.⁸⁵ The debts-for-nature tactic was first used in 1987 in Ecuador. In 1998, the United States enacted the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) to implement debt-for-nature swaps and, by 2006, had concluded agreements with 11 countries. In 2010, the US concluded a TFCA agreement with Brazil to cut that country's debt payments by \$21 million in return for greater protection of several endangered ecosystems, including its most endangered

rainforest, the Mata Atlântica, which covers less than 8 percent of its original range.⁸⁶ Another innovation involves the purchase by rich countries from poor ones of "carbon bonds" that allow the purchaser to continue emitting current levels of carbon while providing funds to poor countries to save forests and jungles.⁸⁷

Water is necessary for human survival, yet about 1.1 billion people have no access to clean drinking water.⁸⁸ Vanishing forests and desertification, growing populations, intensive agriculture that uses artificial fertilizers, and growing populations all strain existing water sources, the final environmental challenge we will discuss.

Water: dying seas and drying wells

Environmental stress is evident in the world's oceans, seas, lakes, and rivers, many of which are used as open sewers. For example, for 30 years the Soviet Navy dumped radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas in the Arctic.⁸⁹ Coral reefs, which support rich concentrations of life, have begun to die. Plastic debris and oil slicks have killed countless seabirds, and whales, seals, turtles, and fish are victims of deadly toxins and viruses caused by chemical discharges. And these problems will worsen as we acquire technology to harvest the wealth stored in ocean seabeds and rock chimneys – new microbes and precious metals such as zinc, copper, silver, and gold as well as potential oil reserves.

FISHING According to one estimate of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), more than 70 percent of the world's fish species have been either "fully exploited or depleted," while in the north Atlantic "commercial fish populations of cod, hake, haddock and flounder have fallen by as much as 95 percent."⁹⁰ Indeed, by mid-century there may be a global collapse of *all* species currently fished.⁹¹ And, as fish prices rise, incentives increase to use destructive technology that

destroys marine ecosystems increase, leading to efforts to impose drastic fishing quotas. Scarcity intensifies competition for what remains and deepens tension between the collective good of conservation and the individual incentive to catch as many as possible while they remain. Thus, American and Canadian fishermen heatedly argue about the distribution of declining stocks of Pacific salmon,⁹² and Canadians and Spaniards quarrel about depleted stocks of Greenland halibut. And, the issue of commercial whaling is highly divisive with Japan, Norway, and Iceland seeking to regain the right to hunt certain species of whales against the resistance of the United States, many Europeans, and most environmental NGOs.

“The depletion of fisheries,” declared the Secretary General of the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, “poses a major threat to the food supply of millions of people,”⁹³ over 2.9 billion of whom depend upon fish for “at least 15 percent of their average per capita animal protein intake.”⁹⁴ The conference proposed a plan to establish Marine Protected Areas to restore fish stocks. Currently, under 1 percent of the world’s oceans is protected in this way. And, although many governments have agreed to the UN’s Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, very few are implementing the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Nevertheless, as the extent of **overfishing** has become clear, progress has been made. According to the Ocean Conservancy, except in the North and Western Pacific, there has been significant progress toward rebuilding overfished stocks as mandated by the Clinton administration’s 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act (see Table 15.1).

FRESH WATER Supplies of fresh water are diminishing. Only 3 percent of the earth’s water is fresh, and current demand is roughly 35 times greater than it was 300 years ago, tripling within the last half of the twentieth century. Agriculture

Table 15.1 Ocean Conservancy Overfishing Scorecard recent trends for the most important fish stocks, relative to 2008¹

Council	2008 score (%)	% change since 1997
North Pacific	94	+29
Western Pacific	69	+3
Pacific	79	+27
Mid-Atlantic	87	+36
New England	62	+13
Gulf of Mexico	69	+16
South Atlantic	63	+13
Caribbean	31	-19

Note: The scores measure success at avoiding or ending overfishing and rebuilding depleted stocks.

1 Ocean Conservancy Scorecard, September 1, 2009, p. 6, <http://www.oceanconservancy.org/site/DocServer/OverfishingScoreCard2008.pdf?docID=5741>.

accounts for about 75 percent of the fresh water that is used, industry 20 percent, and human consumption only about 5 percent.⁹⁵ Between 1950 and 2003, the area under irrigation almost tripled despite greater efficiency in use as measured by irrigated area per person.⁹⁶ Growing demand threatens rivers, lakes, and underground aquifers.

Arid areas such as the Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa, South Asia, China, Australia, the western United States, and Mexico where population continues to grow, urbanization is producing “megacities,” agricultural production is expanding, and demand for hydroelectric power is growing are experiencing ever tighter supplies of fresh water. Demand for fresh water is outstripping supply, and a “tragedy of the commons” is overtaking the world’s fresh water resources. In India alone, some 700 million people lack adequate sanitation owing mainly to a lack of clean water, and about 2.1 million children under the age of 5 die each year for the same reason. “If we become rich or poor as a nation,” declared one Indian official bluntly, “it’s because of water.”⁹⁷

Table 15.2 shows how many of the world’s great rivers ranging from the Colorado in the United States and the Ganges and Indus in India to the Nile in Egypt are on the verge of drying up. The Colorado, for example, is increasingly stressed

Table 15.2 Major rivers running dry

<i>River</i>	<i>Situation</i>
Amu Darya	The Amu Darya is one of the two rivers that feed into the Aral Sea. Soaring demands on this river, largely to support irrigated agriculture, sometimes drain it dry before it reaches the sea. This, in combination with a reduced flow of the Syr Darya – the other river feeding into the sea – helps explain why the Aral Sea has shrunk by roughly 75 percent over the last 40 years and has split into two sections
Colorado	All the water in the Colorado, the major river in southwestern United States, is allocated. As a result, this river, fed by the rainfall and snowmelt from the mountains of Colorado, now rarely makes it to the Gulf of California
Fen	This river, which flows from the northern part of China's Shanxi Province and empties into the Yellow River at the province's southern end, has essentially disappeared as water withdrawals upstream in the watershed have lowered the water table, drying up springs that once fed the river
Ganges	The Gangetic basin is home to some 450 million people. Flowing through Bangladesh en route to the Bay of Bengal, the Ganges has little water left when it reaches the bay
Indus	The Indus, originating in the Himalayas and flowing southwest to the Arabian Sea, feeds Pakistan's irrigated agriculture. It now barely reaches the ocean during much of the year. Pakistan, with a population of 161 million projected to reach 305 million by 2050, is facing trouble
Nile	In Egypt, a country where it seldom rains, the Nile is vitally important. Already drastically reduced by the time it reaches the Mediterranean, it may go dry further upstream in the decades ahead if the populations of Sudan and Ethiopia double by 2050, as projected
Yellow	The cradle of Chinese civilization, the Yellow River has frequently run dry before reaching the sea over the past three decades. In 1997, the lower reaches saw no flow for 226 days. While better management practices have enabled the river to reach its mouth year-round during the past several years, flow levels are still extremely low during the dry season

by the booming demand of California's expanding population. The same tragedy is also afflicting many of the world's great lakes and seas (see Table 15.3). For example, in Central Asia so much water was diverted from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers that feed the Aral Sea to irrigate the region's cotton crop that the Aral virtually dried up, and its salinity tripled. In Russia and Kazakhstan, the Aral, Caspian, and Black Seas are becoming irretrievably polluted, mainly by chemical fertilizers. Lake Chad, which once covered an area of 23,000 square kilometers in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, has been reduced to 900 square kilometers, all in Chad, and, in China, Hebei Province has only 83 of the more than 1000 lakes it once had.⁹⁸

Underground aquifers are also being depleted owing to agricultural irrigation and industrial demand in a variety of regions, including the United States (from South Dakota to Texas), Mexico, China, Iran, Spain, and India.⁹⁹ Such

aquifers, many vital for areas that produce food, cannot be refilled and are becoming polluted by toxic chemicals that have leached into groundwater.

As concern for the global environment has grown, international organizations and NGOs have dedicated ever more resources to turning the tide. Key international organizations in global environmental governance include the UN Environmental Programme, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), while some of the major transnational NGOs dedicated to ending environmental degradation and fostering sustainable growth are Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the Nature Conservancy. We now examine several of these organizations.

Table 15.3 Disappearing lakes and shrinking seas

<i>Lake</i>	<i>Situation</i>
Aral Sea (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan)	Excessive diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, largely for irrigation, has shrunk the five-million-year-old lake to about 25 percent of its 1960s size of 66,000 square kilometers. It now holds less than one-fifth of its previous volume and has split into two sections. The larger South Aral Sea is unlikely to be restored, but the construction of a dam between the two sections, completed in September 2006, has already led to a rise in water level in the smaller North Aral Sea.
Lake Baikal (Russia)	Lake Baikal, the world's oldest and deepest lake, contains nearly one-fifth of the world's unfrozen fresh water. Over the past century the amount of soil flushed into the lake increase by two and half times due to regional agricultural and industrial development.
Lake Chad (Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon)	Lake Chad has shrunk from 23,000 to 900 square kilometers over the past 40 years, a result of increased irrigation and decades of depressed rainfall. The lake, which once covered part of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon, is now contained entirely within Chad's borders.
Lake Chapala (Mexico)	Mexico's largest lake is the main water source for Guadalajara's five million people. Its long-term decline began in the late 1970s corresponding with expanded agricultural development in the Rio Lerma watershed. Since then, the lake has lost more than 80 percent of its water. Between 1986 and 2001, Chapala shrank from 1,048 to 812 square kilometers and its level dropped by up to 4 meters.
Dal Lake (India)	The Dal Lake has shrunk from 75 square kilometers in AD 1200 to 25 square kilometers in the 1980s, to smaller than 12 square kilometers today. Over the last decade the lake has dropped 2.4 meters in height. All the untreated sewage of Srinagar city and some 1,400 houseboats is deposited directly into the lake. Other lakes in the Kashmir Valley are facing similar problems.
Dead Sea (Jordan, Israel, Palestine)	At 417 meters below sea level, the Dead Sea is the lowest place on earth, and is falling by up to one meter per year. The sea has shrunk in length since the early 1900s, from over 75 to 55 kilometers long, and has split in two, with the southern basin turned into evaporation ponds for potash extraction. The salty lake could disappear entirely by 2050, along with the 90 species of birds, 25 species of reptiles and amphibians, 24 species of mammals, and 400 plant species that live on its shores.
Dojran Lake (Macedonia, Greece)	More than 50 islands have appeared in the middle of the lake as overuse has dropped the water level by up to 3.48 meters below the minimal level established in a 1956 bilateral agreement between Greece and Macedonia. Now with an average depth of 1.5 meters, the lake is turning into a swamp to the detriment of local plants and animals, especially fish.
Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) (Israel)	The Sea of Galilee is Israel's largest freshwater lake, with a total area of 170 square kilometers and a maximum depth of approximately 43 meters. At 209 meters below sea level, it is the lowest freshwater lake on Earth and is expected to drop even lower as the lake shrinks and becomes saltier due to excessive water withdrawals, drought, and evaporation.
Lake Manchar (Pakistan)	Diversion of the Indus River, largely for irrigation schemes, has deprived Manchar, Pakistan's largest lake, of fresh water. Salt content has increased dramatically in recent years and the polluted water fosters diseases previously absent from the region. The lake had been a source of fish for at least 1,000 years, but due to its deterioration some 60,000 fishers have left the area.
Lake Nakuru (Kenya)	The lake has shrunk in area since the 1970s from 48 to less than 37 square kilometers today. Nearby forests are being cleared for farmland to feed a fast growing population, causing soils to erode and wash into the lake. Failed urban sewage systems and unregulated industrial effluent have polluted the lake.
Owens Lake (United States, California)	This perennial lake in southeastern California held water continuously for at least 800,000 years, spanning 518 square kilometers at its peak, but since the mid-1920s, after a decade of diverting water from the Owens River to Los Angeles, the lake has been completely drained. The dry lake bed, which contains carcinogens including nickel, cadmium, and

Table 15.3 continued

Lake	Situation
	arsenic, became the single largest source of particulate matter pollution in the United States, elevating air pollution in surrounding areas up to 25 times the acceptable level under national clean air standards. Since 1998, Los Angeles has tried to abate these toxic dust storms by shallowly flooding a portion of the lake, reclaiming saline soils, and cultivating fields of a tolerant grass.
Tonle Sap (Cambodia)	Tonle Sap performs the important function of holding excess water during flood season, yet siltation from eroding farmland and deforested areas has reduced the lake's capacity and has destroyed aquatic habitat.

http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2005/Update47_data.htm

Environmental IGOs

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was established following the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment as the lead UN body for environmental issues. As a programme, it is a small secretariat (department) within the UN that is designed to coordinate efforts among existing national and international agencies. In addition to coordinating environmental activities, its mandate includes monitoring the state of the global environment, sharing information with governments and NGOs, and raising awareness of environmental issues. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the UNEP initiated negotiations on matters such as ozone depletion, climate change, hazardous wastes, biodiversity, and persistent organic pollutants. But, in the 1990s, the UNEP lost influence as governments became divided over the organization's focus on climate change, ozone depletion, and biodiversity – problems that developing countries viewed as products of development and, hence, of greatest concern to the developed world. For the developing countries, which face very different ecological challenges as a consequence of being *underdeveloped*, including air and water pollution, sanitation, and deforestation and desertification, development and environmental policies had to be considered in tandem. They turned away from the UNEP and to other institutions that were better designed to take a more comprehensive

approach to the environment and development.¹⁰⁰

The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was one such institution. It was created following the Earth Summit in 1992 to monitor Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and to coordinate the activities of UN bodies involved in pursuing sustainable development. The CSD, comprising 53 member states, is the highest level forum in which governments, international organizations and NGOs can discuss environment and development issues and work through competing claims over matters including sovereignty, technology transfers, and financial mechanisms. While the CSD has successfully raised the issues of forests, freshwater resources, and energy on the global agenda, it has had proved more difficult to produce results. Delegates to the 1992 Earth Summit were deeply divided on the issue of forests, for example, and it was the CSD's efforts that kept the topic on the global agenda and ultimately lead to the UN Forum on Forests (2000) and the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (2007).¹⁰¹ However, as of 2011, there was still no binding agreement on forests.

NGOs are also important actors in managing environmental issues. They work with governments, international organizations, and other NGOs to advance environmental goals that often transcend borders. Their relations with these other political entities, however, are not always

harmonious. We now examine Greenpeace, one of the most controversial of environmental NGOs.

Greenpeace

“Greenpeace,” according to its mission statement, “is an independent, campaigning organization that acts to change attitudes and behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace.”¹⁰² Greenpeace International is headquartered in Amsterdam, in the Netherlands, from where it oversees offices in over 41 countries.

Greenpeace was born in 1971 in Vancouver, Canada, when a group of activists sailed their ship to an island off Alaska’s west coast to protest a US underground nuclear test.¹⁰³ Their protest stirred sufficient interest to help end testing on the island, which was later made into a bird sanctuary. The success of this venture led to the 1972 voyage of the Greenpeace ship *Vega* captained by David McTaggart to protest French nuclear testing at the Moruroa Atoll in the Cook Islands of the South Pacific. France had cordoned off much of the surrounding ocean in preparation for testing, but McTaggart sailed into the test area and delayed the test. The next year McTaggart returned, and he and his crew were assaulted by French commandos who boarded his vessel. McTaggart brought charges in a French court, and the publicity surrounding the case helped persuade France to end its above-ground nuclear testing program.

In 1976, Greenpeace launched another highly visible campaign, this time to protest the annual hunt of baby seals in Canada’s Newfoundland. Greenpeace activists used their bodies to protect seal pups, and resulting publicity produced widespread revulsion against the hunt and resistance against purchasing products made from seal fur. Greenpeace opposition to seal hunting expanded to include the hunting of whales, and, in 1981, partly as a result of the group’s highly public protests, the International Whaling Commission banned the hunting of sperm whales.

The following years saw additional Greenpeace environmental campaigns about issues as diverse as toxic dumping at sea (1982), offshore oil drilling (1983), prevention of mining in Antarctica (1991), global warming and the export of hazardous wastes to poor countries (1994), and genetically engineered foods (1998).¹⁰⁴ One memorable incident in Greenpeace history was the bombing of its ship *Rainbow Warrior* in the harbor of Auckland, New Zealand, by French secret service agents in which a Greenpeace photographer was killed. Another took place in 1989 when the *M/V Greenpeace* successfully halted a US test of a Trident II ICBM off Florida. Four years later the same Greenpeace ship exposed Russia’s practice of dumping radioactive materials into the Sea of Japan, an event that accelerated the permanent end of such practices in 1996.

Greenpeace’s strategy of highly visible publicity stunts to embarrass governments and corporations has irritated and enraged its victims. One such stunt took place in December 2009 when four Greenpeace activists crashed a state dinner at the Copenhagen climate summit and held up banners demanding action on climate change. In another stunt in 2011, activists dressed in shark costumes and played the theme to *Jaws* outside the headquarters of the tuna company Princess to protest its fishing practices. In sum, Greenpeace reflects the ways in which an activist NGO can forward its agenda by using imaginative forms of protest.

Conclusion

Environmental issues pose collective goods dilemmas that touch everyone, albeit not in the same way. These issues are interrelated, and they reveal an interdependent world. They have political, economic, health, ecological, and even military dimensions that frequently are at cross-purposes. Global warming reveals the tension between global needs and actors’ interests. Island states appeal for quick action, while oil producers fear a

decline in demand for their chief export. Poor countries argue that the burden of reducing greenhouse gases should be borne by the rich that emit most of these gases. The rich argue that rapid economic growth in poor countries will worsen the problem and that such growth must be limited to avoid ecological catastrophe. No single actor or group of actors can solve major environmental challenges alone, yet individual actors are tempted to behave as “free riders” and let others pay for solutions.

Such questions have no simple answers. Even prosperous societies meet resistance at home to trade-offs between the environment and the economy. Passionate conflicts pit Americans who exploit forests and wetlands for jobs and profit and those who wish to preserve them, those who want to drill for oil in pristine regions of Alaska and those who fear environmental disaster, and those who advocate nuclear power and those who fear another Chernobyl. Nevertheless, no country can wall itself off from threats to the environment. The problem, however, as with collective goods in general, is to find a formula that encourages countries at different levels of economic development to cooperate in meeting environmental challenges.

Student activities

Map exercise

Using Maps 15.1 and 15.2, in what regions and countries do you think environmental pressures are greatest? Explain why environmental pressures are so great there.

Cultural materials

Film and literature have been useful tools to portray the political and economic controversies surrounding global warming. The 2004 film, *The Day After Tomorrow*, concerns the effects that

global warming may have in creating climatic changes such as super hurricanes, tidal waves, coastal flooding, and, most important, a new killing Ice Age. Some Republicans believed that the film was intended as a criticism of President George W. Bush’s reluctance to accept the views of a majority of scientists regarding global warming or to support the Kyoto Protocol.

In his 2004 novel *State of Fear*, Michael Crichton tells the story of a group of ecoterrorists who keep the world in a state of anxiety by exaggerated claims about global warming. The plot involves an island nation in the Pacific that sues the United States for contributing to the greenhouse effect and how the ecoterrorists manufacture earthquakes and tidal waves to prove their claims about global warming. At the end of the novel, Crichton explains his personal skepticism about global warming.

Global warming does threaten the island nation of Tuvalu, motivating a poet from the island to write the following:

Tuvalu and global warming

Jane Resture

I hear the waves on our island shore
 They sound much louder than they did before
 A rising swell flecked with foam
 Threatens the existence of our island home.
 A strong wind blows in from a distant place
 The palm trees bend like never before
 Our crops are lost to the rising sea
 And water covers our humble floor.
 Our people are leaving for a distant shore
 And soon Tuvalu may be no more
 Holding on to the things they know are true
 Tuvalu my Tuvalu, I cry for you.
 And as our people are forced to roam
 To another land to call their home
 And as you go to that place so new
 Take a little piece of Tuvalu with you.
 Tuvalu culture is rare and unique
 And holds a message we all should seek
 Hold our culture way up high
 And our beloved Tuvalu will never die.¹⁰⁵

Find a film or novel that deals with global warming or another aspect of the environment. What message does the work try to convey? Using what methods and plot devices? How successfully does it accomplish its apparent goal?

Further reading

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Part VI

And tomorrow?



THE CHAPTERS

Epilogue: A future dimly seen

Epilogue: A future dimly seen

Although we can identify trends in global politics, the future remains contingent. Trends can accelerate, slow down, or even be reversed. The future is not determined, and we should be skeptical when told that such-and-such an event “made war (or anything else) inevitable.” Leaders’ choices and the actions of individuals, while conditioned by factors beyond their control, matter. In October 1962, American President John F. Kennedy or Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev *might* have made a fatal misstep in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis, and this misstep could have sparked a nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR. Historians would, then, not have been able to claim, as they do today, that the superpowers avoided “hot war” during the Cold War because both possessed nuclear weapons.

In what follows, we lay out several possible future scenarios. Forecasting is, however, a dangerous practice. To illustrate this, it is helpful to recall predictions that have been made in the past:¹

- “Atomic energy might be as good as our present-day explosives, but it is unlikely to produce anything very much more dangerous.” Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1939.
- “The idea that cavalry will be replaced by these iron coaches is absurd. It is little short of treasonous.” Aide-de-camp to Field Marshal Douglas Haig, at tank demonstration, 1916.
- “We will bury you.” Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, predicting Soviet communism would win over US capitalism, 1958.
- “There is not the slightest indication that nuclear energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will.” Albert Einstein, 1932.
- “I must confess that my imagination refuses to see any sort of submarine doing anything but suffocating its crew and floundering at sea.” British novelist H. G. Wells, 1901.
- “It will be years – not in my time – before a woman will become Prime Minister.” Margaret Thatcher, 1969.
- “The Americans are good about making fancy cars and refrigerators, but that doesn’t mean they are any good at making aircraft. They are bluffing. They are excellent at bluffing.” Hermann Göring, Commander of the Luftwaffe, 1942.
- “Stocks have reached what looks like a per-

manently high plateau.” Irving Fisher, Professor of Economics, Yale University, 1929.

- “The bomb will never go off. I speak as an expert in explosives.” Admiral William Leahy, US Atomic Bomb Project, 1944.
- “Airplanes are interesting toys but of no military value.” French Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, 1904.
- “There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. As this operation continues, those weapons will be identified, found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them.” General Tommy Franks, March 22, 2003.

Can we see the future any better today? Questions about global politics defy clear answers for two reasons. The first is that an observer’s view of change depends on how it affects her interests. Thus, we have seen how the world’s poor are prepared to endure environmental pollution in favor of rapid economic growth and how traditional leaders react against globalizing trends that undermine their authority. The second is that we do not know whether existing trends will be dominant. For example, will population rates continue to decline? Will we run out of oil before other energy sources become widely available? Will globalization be reversed, or is it irreversible? Several futures are possible, some of which we may prefer to others. And, as the predictions in the earlier list suggest, even the best informed observers often get it wrong.

Throughout this book, we have seen how contemporary global politics combines both the old and the new, and the result is a complex world that challenges our capacity to make sense of what is happening. At any moment, we cannot be certain whether change or continuity will dominate. Realists tell us that little has changed over the millennia and that military threats still overshadow other problems. Since, in their view, we can do little to improve our condition, we must remain vigilant, always trying to contain threats

to our security. Liberals, by contrast, see ceaseless change all around them. Democracy is on the march, they say, and with its triumph, war will end. In contrast, constructivists see change as possible, albeit not necessary, depending on the evolution of norms and beliefs. However, for constructivists, change is not unidirectional. Despite liberal optimism, the constructivist says, history indicates that change is as likely to reproduce past conditions as it is to introduce novel circumstances. Thus, even though interest is growing in new concepts such as human security, global civic society, and human rights at the expense of state sovereignty, events may again return our attention to security-business-as-usual, meaning intense and dangerous rivalry among states.

Alternative futures

Given the trends outlined earlier, some of which seem contradictory, what does the future portend? Several possibilities suggest themselves, depending on which trends prove more potent. Three of these possible worlds assume weaker territorial states; a fourth allows for the reinvigoration of states. The first involves the triumph of globalization and the dominance of free market forces and economic logic. The second involves a restructuring of the global system to provide a greater role for NGOs and IGOs. The third envisions a world of escalating chaos brought on by the collapse of existing state and interstate institutions and the incapacity of the present system to manage widespread violence. The fourth possibility allows for the return to a realist world of states. *In fact, the world will probably feature elements of some or all of these patterns, with different regions reflecting more of one or another of them.*

A globalized world

In the first scenario, major global outcomes are the result of market forces that governments may

try to soften but cannot resist. States remain, but they have been thoroughly penetrated by global economic forces over which they have little control. In this world, governments have grown less significant than global markets. Thus, global markets, along with giant transnational corporations, distribute and redistribute global resources and determine the wellbeing of individuals everywhere, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse.

This is the world foreseen and avidly desired by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century liberals and, more recently, political scientist Richard Rosecrance. In this world, economic interdependence has produced peace and prosperity. Rosecrance confidently asserts that, “despite retrogressions that capture our attention, the world is making steady progress toward peace and economic security” and “as factors of labor, capital, and information triumph over the old factor of land, nations no longer need and in time will not covet additional territory.”²

The world envisioned by Rosecrance has “virtual” rather than power-maximizing states. Virtual states, built on information processing and service production, have little in common with the territorial leviathans celebrated by realists. In addition, Rosecrance argues, a global division of labor exists “between ‘head’ countries like Singapore” that specialize in “research and development, product design, financing, marketing, transport, insurance, and legal services,”³ and “‘body’ nations like China that manufacture physical products.”⁴ Head and body states, therefore, enjoy a symbiotic relationship, helping to create a secure world based on open trade, uninterrupted production, and instantaneous communication.

In this world, sectarian identities based on tribe, ethnicity, religion, and nationality have softened. What it “means” to be American, Canadian, French, or Chinese becomes less important than the opportunities an individual is entitled to. The role of the state in this world (aided by the market) is to establish and protect these opportunities, as well as to maintain majoritarian democracy and

minority rights. In a globalized world such as this, sovereign states will evolve in a direction akin to that followed by the states within the United States: giving up their once important local authority and identity and, due to increased economic integration and mobility across their frontiers, eventually limiting themselves to more mundane tasks such as fostering education and citizens’ welfare.

Governments in this world are mainly democracies whose ability to manage external violence lies in:

1. the Kantian hope that all states can be restructured along liberal lines
2. the belief that growing wealth is producing an ever larger global middle class that favors democracy
3. the research noted earlier that suggests that democracies do not fight one another.

In sum, the liberal solution is, at best, a very long-term one and makes the dubious assumption that individuals will abandon subnational and transnational identities in favor of democratic citizenship. The model also makes the unlikely assumption that the liberal state can or will accommodate identity groups despite their irreconcilable differences regarding the values that underlie resource allocation.

This, then, is a world that rejects violence as destructive to economic wellbeing. War is viewed as a waste of resources that disrupts markets. The growing importance of knowledge industries, Rosecrance believes, makes war obsolete because of the decreasing importance of territory.⁵ “The rise of the virtual state,” he concludes, “inaugurates a new epoch of peaceful competition among nations.”⁶ Where the threat of violence remains high, for example in Palestine, the causes can be traced to the fact that societies have failed to satisfy the requirements of the liberal model, notably providing equal life chances for all.

How likely is such a benign future? The European Union suggests that such a world is

possible, and communications and transportation technologies make it feasible. The “obsolescence of war,” declares James Sheehan, is a European phenomenon, “the product of Europe’s distinctive history in the twentieth century,” and “the disappearance of war after 1945 created both a dramatically new international system within Europe and a new kind of European state.”⁷ However, although some countries in the developing world are being integrated into the global markets, the gap between rich and poor countries, the proliferation of failed states, and the impact of ethnic intolerance and religious militancy suggest that, at best, such a world would be limited to the developed world. Furthermore, the survival of that world would depend on its ability to ward off threats from outside like transnational terrorism and its capacity to assimilate the growing number of migrants from poor countries and persuade them to accept the values of their new countries. This is the world foreseen by Robert Wright who argues that “globalization makes relations among nations more and more non-zero-sum” in a process that is moving so rapidly that “we’re going to reach a system of institutionalized cooperation among nations that is so thorough it qualifies as world governance.”⁸ This argument, then, overlaps with a second possible future that features a growing role for international institutions.

A world of liberal institutions

A second possibility, also desired and predicted by many liberals, is a world in which international organizations like the UN, the EU, the IMF, and the WTO, aided by a variety of nongovernmental organizations and wealthy states, actively intervene to restore peace or provide for the welfare of citizens living in states that have collapsed or are in imminent danger of doing so. States play a more significant role in this model than in the first, but the impetus for restructuring global politics arises from the interstate system, from the

norms and institutions of interstate and transnational collaboration that have been evolving much as constructivists predict.

This is a world in which sovereignty has come to mean less and less and no longer poses a serious obstacle to humanitarian intervention or regime change. In this scenario, reminiscent of the League of Nations Mandate system and its successor, the UN Trusteeship system, international organizations, along with regional regimes or even former colonial powers restore order, promote reconciliation in post-conflict environments, and reconstruct state institutions in failed states. International and NGO efforts to help East Timor prepare for self-rule illustrate how humanitarian intervention works.

In a world dominated by liberal institutions, intervention like that in East Timor is legitimated by norms compelling states to cooperate with IGOs, construct democratic institutions, protect minority and human rights, and take responsibility for those unable to help themselves (Map E.1). However, because sovereignty still legally forbids interference in domestic politics, norms regarding global responses to civil strife still remain much less developed than those pertaining to interstate war. Nevertheless, beginning with UN and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in the 1990s and climaxing with intervention in Libya in 2011 to end Muammar Gaddafi’s murderous attacks on his citizens, norms and precedents have begun to evolve that may in this hypothetical future world be translated into practical guidelines for actions by outsiders in civil wars.

How likely is this scenario? First, the absence of institutional authority and enforcement capacity creates impediments to realizing this model. More serious obstacles are the absence of political will among major states to allow international institutions to manage the use of force during transnational or civil strife. Thus, Russia, China, Brazil, and Germany opposed international intervention in Libya. To date, human rights norms and the laws of war have not been consistently enforced. As a result, international responses to



Map Ep. 1 East Timor

tragedies like the Rwanda genocide or the Darfur genocide in Sudan have been woefully inadequate. Indeed, to date, humanitarian intervention has been haphazard, depending on the attitude of major powers like the United States (which opposed declaring Rwanda the victim of Hutu genocide against Tutsis) and China (which opposed large-scale intervention in Darfur, Sudan, where Muslim Arab militias carried out murderous attacks against Muslim Africans) (Map Ep. 2).

In a world dominated by liberal institutions, nongovernmental organizations would play a major role in managing violence and relieving human suffering. Already a variety of NGOs including Oxfam and CARE provide humanitarian relief and protection for civilian victims of

violence. In one proposal, the UN Trusteeship Council would be reformed as a Forum for Indigenous Peoples. In this forum, nongovernmental representatives of indigenous peoples could discuss their status and seek redress for their grievances against states without resort to violence. Such proposals aim to increase NGO participation as a way to prevent conflict or reduce its consequences. NGOs might also utilize strategies of conflict management and resolution, which are being developed in academic settings like the Carter Center, established in 1982 by former US President Jimmy Carter at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia (see Figure Ep. 1). According to the Center, its staff “wage peace, fight disease, and build hope by both engaging with those at the



Figure Ep. 1 The Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, Georgia

The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum



Map Ep. 2 Darfur, Sudan

highest levels of government and working side by side with poor and often forgotten people.”⁹ It cites as accomplishments strengthening democracies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; helping farmers increase grain production in African countries; working to prevent civil and international conflicts; and intervention to prevent diseases, such as Guinea worm disease, in Latin America and Africa. A liberal world such as this would feature democratic institutions, international and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to improving human welfare and assuring human security, and a widespread sense that the important human community is humanity as a whole.

A world in chaos

The first two prospective futures owe much to liberal and constructivist optimism. The third is of a very different stripe, an apocalyptic vision of a world run amok. This is a world described by the journalist Robert Kaplan as dominated by “poverty, the collapse of cities, porous borders, cultural and racial strife, growing economic

disparities, weakening nation states,” a world of “disease pandemics like AIDS, environmental catastrophes, organized crime.”¹⁰ “I believe,” argues Kaplan, “that, for a number of reasons, we’re going to see the weakening, dilution, and perhaps even crackup of larger, more complex, modern societies in the next 10 or 15 years in such places as Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Pakistan”¹¹ and that a combination of political upheavals, demographic factors, resource scarcity, and climate change will produce global chaos.

In this world of failed states and failed institutions, political authority has broken down, and local militias, criminal gangs, and religious fanatics and terrorists roam freely. It is a world of terrorists with nuclear weapons in suitcases, snipers on street corners, bioterror outbreaks, and resource scarcity. This despairing vision owes much to events like the apocalyptic terror attacks of Al Qaeda, waves of suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Fort Hood, Texas, shootings, the Bali nightclub bombing, and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and possibly even terrorist groups. Kaplan summarizes his fears in a non-territorial “last map” drawn from travel amid the ruins of “failed states” and “postmodern wars:”

Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of various group identities such as those of language and economic class, atop the two-dimensional color distinctions among city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadows overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies that guard the wealthy in failing states and hunt down terrorists. Instead of borders, there would be moving “centers” of power, as in the Middle Ages . . . To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as growing populations, refugee migrations, soil and water scarcities and . . . vectors of disease . . . On

this map, the rules by which diplomats and other policymaking élites have ordered the world these past few hundred years will apply less and less.¹²

Should a genuine and widespread political smash-up occur, it might usher in an extended period of unimaginable chaos and drastically raise popular anxiety and encourage authoritarian solutions that seem to offer some form of protection. This is the path that publics in Germany, Italy, and Japan chose after the Great Depression in their “escape from freedom.”¹³ But it is the path that produced fascism, Nazism, and militarism. It is the path followed by Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina in the 1970s, where military dictatorships took power as fear of leftist terrorism spread among the country’s middle classes.

How likely is this world? The kind of chaos described in this model is likely to afflict parts of the developing world in which a toxic combination of poverty, population growth, ecological disaster, and corruption foster state failure. It will be possible, however, although difficult, to limit the spread of disorder and turmoil, preventing its infecting more developed regions. Contemporary Russia illustrates how creeping authoritarianism can take place as a way of trying to prevent disorder. Other countries are likely to emulate this “solution,” and this brings us to a fourth possible future.

A realist world

A fourth possibility entails a revival of the state system resulting either from a breakdown of global authority as depicted earlier or a new era of old tensions among major powers such the United States, China, and Russia. Such tensions could arise from a variety of sources. One would be the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries such as North Korea and Iran, followed by an arms race involving additional countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia that felt threatened. Another would

be the continued expansion of China's military capability, and the concern that expansion may produce in China's neighbors and in the United States. Regional conflicts that are most likely to bring about a renewal of tensions include those between Russia and Georgia (that produced a war in 2008); North and South Korea; India and Pakistan over Kashmir; China, the United States, and Japan over Taiwan; China and Japan over potential oil deposits near the Senkaku Islands; China and Vietnam over potential oil and gas deposits near the Paracel or Spratly Islands (Map Ep. 3); and Israel and Iran over Iranian nuclear weapons, Gaza, or Lebanon. Were a new era of old tensions to begin, it would strengthen governments in some states vis-à-vis their own peoples, again highlight military preparations and

alliances, and encourage us to dust off realist and neorealist ideas.

The world would most likely retreat to a realist path if other states view US policies as dangerous. Recent years have witnessed American actions that other countries regard as superpower unilateralism and disregard for the sovereign rights of other states. This propensity reinforced itself after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. The most important unilateral action was America's 2003 invasion of Iraq in defiance of most UN members, including Russia and NATO allies France and Germany. Concern about US unilateralism has, however, dissipated under President Obama, especially his efforts to reduce nuclear arms¹⁴ and his willingness to work with America's allies in conflicts in Afghanistan



Map Ep. 3 Spratly Islands

THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

Shortly before the Bush administration took office in 2001, Condoleezza Rice, who was to become the president's National Security Advisor and, later, Secretary of State, outlined the administration's foreign policy. She argued for a policy based on realism and the pursuit of **national interest** over the pursuit of values. For this reason, she argued, relations with "the big powers, particularly Russia and China" would occupy most of the administration's time and energy, and a special effort would be made "to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies." She also noted that US military forces were "certainly not designed to build a civilian society."⁶ Events in the real world, notably the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, dramatically altered this realist agenda. The priorities outlined by Rice were largely abandoned in favor of America's War on Terrorism. Instead of renewing "strong and intimate relationships with allies," the United States found itself in a bitter quarrel with France and Germany over America's 2003 intervention in Iraq, where American soldiers remained "to build a civilian society" after the removal of Saddam Hussein.

and Libya and to prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the president's turn towards multilateralism earned him the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize.

The Bush administration justified unilateral actions on the basis of its reluctance to consent to any arrangement it believed could undermine American freedom of action. An assertion of realist principles, however, could produce a realist reaction in the form of efforts to balance US power. American military power remains so great that it is difficult to imagine any effective countervailing alliance or any country with the resources to match American military strength. Nevertheless, global nervousness about American unilateralism is widespread. One result has been closer Chinese–Russian relations.

How likely is this world? As long as states remain central players in global politics and globalization does not rob them of their autonomy and independence, many governments and leaders will view events through the prism of the national interest, especially as long as territorial issues like those that divide India and Pakistan and Israel and the Palestinians persist. An even more dangerous source of realist behavior would

DID YOU KNOW?

By July 2010, the war in Afghanistan ("Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan") had exceeded the duration of the Vietnam War to become America's longest war. Between 2001 and 2010, the military coalition of 25 foreign countries had suffered 1895 fatalities of whom 1150 were American, 310 were British, and 150 were Canadian. An additional 5725 American soldiers had been wounded of whom the largest number were from Texas.¹⁶

be a serious challenge to US hegemony in global politics posed by an ambitious, rising China. Such an event would challenge the global status quo and might trigger an American effort to increase its power or even a war between the United States and its challenger. According to what is called *power transition theory*, a condition of rough military equality between hegemon and challenger is likely to produce such a war.

Although the changing nature of security, deepening interdependence, and resulting shared fates induce leaders to think beyond the national interest, defined narrowly, there is no certainty that they will do so. After all, governments of states are responsible to their citizens, and the actions of those citizens, either at the ballot box or in the streets, are more likely to determine whether leaders remain in office than the actions of those outside the country. If that begins to change, the prospects for a realist future will diminish. Which of these possible futures is most likely? Evidence already exists for all of them, and they by no means exhaust all possibilities. No one vision is necessarily incompatible with any other. Thus, the state of current relations among Europe, the United States, Japan, Canada, and other highly developed countries resemble the globalized world depicted in the first model. By contrast, much of Africa resembles Robert Kaplan's chaotic world. And certainly the realist world vision appears in a variety of relationships, including those between India and Pakistan and between the United States and China.

Conclusion: an uncertain future

The transformation of global politics and changing patterns of authority, identities, and resource distribution in *any* era are likely to be accompanied by anxiety and instability. Whatever the precise form it assumes, tomorrow's world is likely to be more complex and probably more unpredictable than today's. All of this leads Kaplan to conclude that "*We are not in control. As societies grow more populous and complex, the idea that a global elite like the UN can engineer reality from above is just as absurd as the idea that political 'scientists' can reduce any of this to a science.*"¹⁷ *Complexity produces misunderstanding; misunderstanding creates unpredictability; unpredictability breeds instability; and instability threatens conflict.*

Global politics is a system of organized complexity in which the fate of billions of people depends on decisions of relatively few fallible leaders. History with its record of wars and mistaken decisions suggests how dangerous it is to place our faith in leaders whose understanding of their own behavior and of the consequences of that behavior is imperfect. As political scientist Karl Deutsch observed: "If one looks over the major decisions about initiating war . . . the probability of a major decision being realistic may well have been less than one-half, on the average. That is to say, *if in the last half-century statesmen made major decisions on matters of war and peace, the chances were better than even that the particular decision would be wrong.*"¹⁸

Yet what choice do we have? "There remains," as sociologist Peter Berger argues, "something in all of us of the childish belief that there is a world of grownups *who know.*" As a result, it "is very shocking then to suspect that the knowers do not exist at all. Everyone is groping around in the dark, just as we are."¹⁹ If we let others tell us what we ought to believe and allow them to formulate our ideas, we may find ourselves like passengers in a defective airplane, unable to bail out, even though a safe landing is highly improbable. Despite the dramatic changes in global politics in recent decades described in this book, decisions in global politics are made in much the same way as they were 50 or 100 years ago. Governments of major states acting in what they call the national interest make decisions on our behalf. At the same time, the changes that generate the need for decisions are outpacing leaders' capacity to anticipate them. In addition, the rapidity of change, especially in technology, gives them less time to prepare for its consequences, even while interdependence makes it inevitable that the results of mistakes will affect more and more people.

Toward the end of *The Prince*, Machiavelli exclaims that "fortune is the ruler of half our actions," like an "impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, casts down trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and

places it on the other; everyone flees before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it.” Our task is, in Machiavelli’s words, to “make provisions against it by dikes and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous.”²⁰ By now, you are in a position as future citizens and leaders to understand the complexities of global politics and to help “make provisions” against “fortune.”

Student activities

Cultural materials

One of the best known works in fiction that seeks to describe the global future is George Orwell’s *1984*, written in 1949. The story takes place in England, known as Airstrip One, in the year 1984. England is part of Oceania, one of three great states in the world along with Eastasia and Eurasia. The country, which resembles the Soviet Union under Stalin, is governed by a party led by “Big Brother.” The protagonist Winston Smith works for the Ministry of Truth rewriting history. The plot follows Smith’s disenchantment with the

Party, his effort to write a diary, which is illegal, his love affair with Julia, and his friendship with his boss O’Brien, who claims to be working against the Party. Smith is betrayed by O’Brien, who tortures him until he comes to believe all the lies he is told. Finally, Smith even betrays Julia when he is threatened with his worst nightmare, rats gnawing his face. And, in the end, he realizes that he loves Big Brother.

1. Can you identify any elements from *1984* in contemporary global politics?
2. If Orwell were writing today, what might *2084* look like? What aspects of global politics might be critiqued in this future world?

Further reading

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Notes

Prologue

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1 Theoretical approaches to global politics

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2 The evolution of the interstate system and alternative global political systems

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Epilogue: A future dimly seen

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Glossary of key terms

- absolute gains** efforts to ensure everyone gains something from cooperation.
- absolute war** one in which adversaries use every available means to defeat one another.
- acid rain** precipitation made acidic by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides that are produced by industry, automobiles, and power plants.
- actual power** the power an actor is able to realize in practice; actual power can only be measured by observing the changed behavior of others.
- agent–structure problem** a controversy about whether individuals and groups play the major role in explaining global politics or whether features of global structure determine the behavior of actors.
- aggression** the initiation of actions that violate the rights and interests of others.
- alliance** a formal agreement to cooperate to achieve joint security.
- anarchist** one who seeks to overturn all constituted forms and institutions of government.
- anarchy** absence of a higher authority above sovereign states.
- antiballistic missile (ABM)** missile designed to destroy incoming enemy missiles.
- anti-foundationalists** those who claim that there are no neutral, value-free tests to determine the truth of a proposition.
- anti-Semitism** irrational dislike, prejudice, or hatred of Jews.
- apartheid** a policy of systematic legal, political, economic, social, and cultural racial separation implemented by a white minority regime in South Africa which maintained the African majority at the bottom of society.
- appeasement** policy of concessions that aims to satisfy another actor's grievances and thereby keep the peace.
- arbitration** process of resolving disputes by referring them to a third party, either agreed on by them or provided by law, that is empowered to make a judgment.
- arms control** any approach designed to regulate levels and types of arms in a manner that enhances strategic stability.
- arms race** an action–reaction process in which increases in armaments by one state is reciprocated by an increase in armaments by the other.
- assimilate** to absorb a culturally distinct group into the dominant culture.
- attrition** gradual erosion of an enemy's army by constant attack.
- austerity** policies aimed at balancing the budget by reducing expenditures.
- authority** idea of legitimate power or the right to exercise influence over others.

- autonomy** capacity to behave independently.
- balance of payments** a tabulation of a country's debt and credit transactions with those of other countries.
- balance of power** policy aimed at preventing any state(s) from gaining a preponderance of power in relation to its rivals.
- Balkans** a peninsula in southeastern Europe that includes Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and European Turkey.
- bargaining** interactive process involving threats and promises between two or more parties with common and conflicting interests seeking to reach an agreement.
- behavioral revolution** shift in political science from the study of institutions, laws, history, and single case studies and toward the observation of human behavior or its artifacts with an eye toward uncovering general propositions.
- bipartisanship** effort to include and gain the approval of members of both political parties in the formation of foreign policy.
- bipolarity** political system with two centers of power.
- birth rate** annual number of births per thousand.
- black market** system of illegal buying and selling of goods in violation of price controls or rationing.
- blog** personal online journal updated and intended for general public consumption.
- Bolsheviks** (meaning majority) followers of Lenin who believed in violent revolution and who gained a majority at the 1903 second congress of Russian Social Democratic Labor party over their opponents who became known as the Mensheviks (meaning minority).
- bond** certificate promising to pay back borrowed money at a fixed-rate interest on a specified date.
- bourgeoisie** middle class in society that supports the capitalist economic system.
- Caliphate** Muslim empire from 661 to 1258.
- capabilities** resources available to actors that can be used to influence other actors.
- capitalism** economic system based on the private ownership of property and the means of production and a free market for exchanging goods and services that allows competition.
- caste** hereditary socio-professional group found in traditional Hindu and African societies.
- catharsis** relief of emotional tension.
- city-state** independent political entity consisting of a city and its outskirts that dominated global politics in ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy.
- civil disobedience** illegal acts designed to bring public attention to laws regarded as unjust.
- civil society** complex global network of non-governmental institutions that link individuals from the realm of social life with common values who regularly communicate ideas and coordinate activities.
- civilization** type of culture of a specific place, time, or group.
- coercive diplomacy/compellence** threat or use of force to make an adversary alter its behavior
- Cold War** period of hostility short of open warfare between the US and its allies and the USSR and its allies that erupted after World War Two and lasted until 1991.
- collective dilemmas** problems that require the cooperation of actors for solution and that no one actor can resolve on its own.
- collective goods** benefits such as military security or clean air from which individuals cannot be excluded and, as a result, for which beneficiaries have no incentive to pay.
- collective identity** shared set of characteristics that defines the boundaries of a group and distinguishes it from other groups.
- collective security** system of international security under which *all* states agree to take joint action against states that attack.
- colonialism** political domination, social control, and economic exploitation of a territory and its people by a foreign power.

- communism** social system without states or classes featuring common ownership of property in which individuals contribute according to capabilities and gain according to need.
- comparative advantage** ability to produce a good at lower cost, relative to other goods, compared to other countries.
- compellence** threat or use of force to make an adversary alter its behavior.
- complex interdependence** interdependent relationship among actors characterized by multiple channels of interaction, multiple issues, and the absence of military force.
- computer virus** program that reproduces itself by copying itself into the other programs stored in a computer.
- computer worm** destructive computer program that uses a computer network to spread itself.
- concessional assistance** economic assistance of which at least 35 percent consists of grants that do not need to be repaid.
- concessional loans** loans at interest rates below market rates.
- consociationalism** political system in which there is an explicit bargain that power be shared among distinct ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups.
- constructivism** approach to global politics that assumes that political structures and behavior are shaped by shared ideas and that actors' identities and interests are the result of those ideas.
- consumerism** norm that values the acquisition of material goods.
- containment** US foreign policy that sought to prevent the spread of communism by applying diplomatic and economic pressure on the USSR.
- crimes against humanity** ill treatment of civilians in wartime defined at the Nuremberg trials to include "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts against any civilian population."
- crimes against peace** planning, provoking, and waging an aggressive war.
- critical theory** Marxist-inspired normative theory with the goal of overcoming the sources of domination and oppression.
- cultural relativism** belief that ethical beliefs vary by culture and that there are few, if any, universal principles of human rights.
- culture** norms, customs, and ways of living of a group of human beings that is transmitted from one generation to another.
- current account** statistic registering all payments between a country and the rest of the world in goods and services, investment income and payments, unilateral transfers.
- customary law** traditional practice that has become an intrinsic part of expected conduct in global politics.
- cyberspace** electronic medium of computer networks in which online communication takes place.
- cyberwar (also, cyber attack)** use of information systems to exploit, disrupt, or destroy an enemy's military or civilian computer networks with the aim of disrupting those systems and the tasks they perform.
- Dalai Lama** traditional government ruler and highest priest of the dominant sect of Buddhism in Tibet and Mongolia.
- data** factual information.
- DDOS** preprogrammed flood of internet messages sent by a "botnet" – a network of computers that are under remote control – aimed at jamming other computer networks.
- decapitation attack** attack that aims to kill an enemy's leaders.
- decolonization** process by which a majority of less-developed countries (LDCs) gained their independence from the European colonial powers.
- defense** use of power to prevent an attack or minimize damage from an attack.
- deflation** persistent decrease in consumer prices.
- deforestation** massive loss of forests with environmental consequences such as reduced oxygen production and soil erosion.
- democracy** political system based on the right

- of all persons to participate in government, often by electing representatives of the people.
- democratic deficit** situation in which political institutions are unaccountable to people and lack democratic legitimacy.
- democratic peace theory** theory that democracies do not fight wars with one another.
- demography** study of the characteristics of human populations.
- desertification** spread of deserts as a result of soil erosion, overfarming, and deforestation.
- détente** periods of lessened tension between the US and USSR during the Cold War.
- deterrence** strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from acting in a certain way by threatening to retaliate with military force.
- dialectical materialism** Marxist belief that material factors constantly change owing to the tension between conflicting economic forces.
- diaspora** community of people living outside their original homeland.
- digital divide** gap between those who have access to new information and technologies such as the internet, and those who do not have such access.
- diplomacy** art of conducting negotiations and managing relations among actors.
- disarmament** any effort to reduce the number of weapons in actors' arsenals.
- discrimination** in warfare, distinguishing between legitimate and improper military targets.
- distribution of power** distribution among actors in global politics of the capacity to compel one another to carry out their preferences.
- divide and rule** retaining control by keeping the opposition divided.
- due process** in law, administration of justice according to established rules based on the principle that no one can be deprived of life, liberty or property without suitable legal procedures and safeguards.
- dynastic sovereignty** sovereignty that is vested in a monarch and the monarch's heirs.
- economic liberalism** belief in free trade and dominance of a free market.
- economies of scale** reductions in unit cost owing to increased production.
- egoism** view of moral behavior that views self-interest is source of moral conduct.
- emergent property** characteristic of a group that is the unforeseen consequence of interaction among its members.
- emerging market** financial market of a developing country.
- empire** political unit having an extensive territory or comprising a number of territories or nations and ruled by a single supreme authority.
- empirical theory (positivism)** theories built on knowledge derived from experiment and experience.
- epistemic communities** communities of experts and advocates who share information about an issue and maintain contact with one other.
- escalation** upward spiral in level of conflict or violence.
- espionage** crime of spying on a government and/or transferring state secrets on behalf of a foreign country.
- ethnic cleansing** euphemism for rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by murder or expulsion from a territory of people from a particular ethnic background.
- ethnicity** group, frequently based on common ancestry, whose members identify with one another owing to common racial, religious, linguistic and/or cultural traits.
- e-waste** discarded household and personal electronics, including mobile phones, televisions, computers, and refrigerators.
- expected utility theory** approach to decision making predicated on the belief that leaders are rational and seek to maximize gains.
- explanatory theory** theory that explains why things happen as they do.
- export controls** rules limiting the export of goods, technology, and data, especially that are considered to have a military purpose.

- export credits** financing arrangements that permit a foreign buyer of exported goods to defer payment over a period of time.
- external face of sovereignty** legal equality of sovereign states.
- extraterritorial** relating to persons exempt from the legal jurisdiction of the country in which they reside.
- failed state** state that has collapsed and cannot provide for its citizens' basic needs.
- fascism** anti-democratic political philosophy that advocates rule by a nationalist dictator aided by a mass party enforcing obedience by using violence.
- federalism** political system in which authority is divided between a central authority and constituent political units.
- fertility rate** number of children born to an average woman during her lifetime.
- feudal system** legal, political, and social system, in which vassals hold land from lords in exchange for military service.
- fifth columnists** subversives working on behalf of a foreign power.
- first-strike capability** ability to launch an attack and successfully destroy an enemy's capability to retaliate.
- fixed exchange rate** system in which the value of one currency against other currencies is not permitted to vary.
- floating exchange rate** system in which the value of a currency against other currencies is determined by supply and demand.
- food security** having access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets dietary needs and food preferences.
- foreign direct investment (FDI)** overseas investment in physical resources such as buildings, machinery, and equipment.
- foreign-exchange reserves** deposits of hard currencies such as dollars, pounds, euros, and yen held by national banks of different countries.
- foreign policy** sum of an actor's goals and purposive actions in global politics.
- foundationalists** those who believe truth can be determined through empirical testing.
- free riders** those who receive the benefits of a collective good without paying their fair share of the costs of producing that good.
- freebooting** pirating or looting.
- functionalism** theory that conflict can be reduced if actors cooperate in technical and non-political areas and that such cooperation will then become habitual and spread to other areas.
- G-7** world's leading industrialized democracies, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, whose leaders meet annually to coordinate economic policies and provide leadership in global economic policy.
- game** interaction among actors characterized by rules and strategies in which each actor's outcome depends partly on what other actors do and in which actors try to outwit one another.
- genocide** deliberate and systematic destruction of an ethnic, racial, or cultural group.
- glasnost** policy of openness and transparency initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
- global governance** existence of order and authoritative decision making in the absence of formal government.
- global political system** global universe of actors such as nation-states, international organizations, and transnational corporations and the sum of their relationships and interactions.
- global politics** political interactions among nonstate actors as well as sovereign states.
- global warming** warming of the earth's climate caused by the release of "greenhouse" gases trapping heat from the earth that would otherwise escape into space; see also *greenhouse effect*.
- globalization** those processes that knit people everywhere together, thereby producing worldwide interconnectedness and interdependence and featuring the elimination of borders and the rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders.

- global south** describes the less-developed countries (LDCs) that have not achieved a significant degree of industrialization relative to their populations, most of which have medium to low standard of living and frequently high population growth and density, many of which are located in the southern hemisphere.
- gold standard** monetary system in which the basic unit of currency is equal in value to and exchangeable for a specified amount of gold.
- governance** authoritative demands, goals, directives, and policies of any actor, whether a government or not.
- great power** in the eighteenth century, the name for a European state that could not be conquered even by the combined might of other European states. Today, the term is applied to a country that is regarded as among the most powerful in the global system.
- greenhouse effect** process in which the earth's atmosphere traps solar radiation, caused by the presence in the atmosphere of gases such as carbon dioxide and methane that allow incoming sunlight to pass through but absorb heat radiated back from the earth's surface.
- gross domestic product (GDP)** total value of all final goods and services produced in a country in a given year.
- gross national product (GNP)** total value of all goods and services produced by a country in a year, whether at home or abroad.
- guerrilla warfare** use of hit-and-run tactics including ambush and surprise raids.
- hard currency** currency that is generally accepted for payment of obligations.
- hard power** power based on the use of coercion and rewards.
- hard shell of impermeability** capacity, now largely gone, of states to defend their frontiers by military means.
- hegemon** actor that is able to dominate the global political system.
- hegemonic stability theory** theory that global order results from the domination of a single great power and that for order to be maintained this dominance must continue.
- honor killings** murder of women for dishonoring the family or clan.
- human development** quality of life and standard of living of individuals.
- human rights** basic rights that individuals enjoy by virtue of their humanness that can be neither created nor abrogated by governments.
- human security** protection against threats to the lives and wellbeing of individuals in areas of basic need including freedom from violence by terrorists, criminals, or police, availability of food and water, a clean environment, energy security, and freedom from poverty and economic exploitation.
- humanitarian intervention** intervention by states or by an IGO into the domestic politics of another state to protect people from human rights abuses or other threats to their survival.
- hyperglobalist** analyst who believes that the essence of globalization is the creation of a single global economic market.
- hypothesis** tentative prediction or explanation that a theorist seeks to test.
- idealism (or utopianism)** term coined by realists to deride other scholars of global politics who believe in the importance of international law, treaties, morality, and international institutions.
- identities** set of characteristics that individuals recognize as defining themselves and that, when shared, defines the group as a whole and its interests.
- ideology** doctrinaire body of ideas that reflects the beliefs of a political entity and underlies political action.
- imam** Islamic religious leader.
- imperialism** policy of extending a state's authority by territorial acquisition or by the establishment of economic and political hegemony.
- indirect rule** policy by which foreign powers administer their colonies using indigenous leaders as proxies.
- industrialization** process in which production

- and manufacturing are mechanized, bringing with it a complex of political, social, and economic changes including economic development, factory production, division of labor, and urbanization.
- infant industries** industries that have recently been established and are thought to have the potential to achieve comparative advantage if protected until they mature.
- influence** actor's ability to cause another actor to behave differently than it would otherwise have.
- intellectual property** property such as books or computer software that reflects intellectual achievement and is protected by patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
- intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)** ballistic missile with a range of 3000 to 8000 nautical miles.
- interdependence** relationship in which two or more actors are sensitive and vulnerable to one another's behavior and in which actions taken by one affect the other.
- internal face of sovereignty** complete legal authority that states enjoy over the subjects within their territorial boundaries.
- internally displaced persons (IDPs)** persons who have been forced to flee their homes and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
- international law** body of legally binding rules that governs relations among states and other groups, and which increasingly provides rights for individuals in relation to states.
- international nongovernmental organization (INGO)** organization whose members are individuals from several states, but who do not represent the government of any state.
- international organization (IGO)** organization established by and whose members are sovereign states.
- international political economy (IPE)** analysis of the relationship between economics and politics to understand the policies, both domestic and international, adopted by different actors.
- international politics** political interaction among sovereign states.
- international regime** set of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that govern actors' behavior in an international issue area.
- interventionist liberalism** version of classical liberalism that sees it as a duty to intervene overseas to bring freedom, democracy, and other liberal virtues to people everywhere.
- Iron Curtain** metaphor Churchill coined in 1946 to describe the line separating the area in Europe under Soviet control from the free countries in Western Europe.
- irredentism** claim to territory based on historical ties to the land or an ethnic or cultural affinity with its population.
- Islamism** also known as political Islam, a political ideology based on the Muslim religion that views Islam as both religion and the basis of political life and is opposed to capitalism and liberalism.
- isolationism** policy aimed at avoiding overseas political and military involvement.
- issue linkage** bargaining strategy in which an actor gains favorable concessions in one issue area, by making concessions in another.
- jihad** holy war undertaken as a sacred duty by Muslims, but also interpreted more broadly by some to be a struggle of any kind.
- justice** fairness, honesty, and impartiality in dealing with individual citizens including according them equal treatment, upholding their rights, affording them what is legally theirs or theirs on the basis of merit.
- Koran** book composed of sacred writings accepted by Muslims as revelations made to Muhammad by Allah through the angel Gabriel.
- La Niña** extreme phase of a naturally occurring climate cycle, characterized by cooler than normal ocean temperatures in the Equatorial Pacific.
- legal positivism** theory that international law is derived from voluntary agreements among states and that states are bound only by the rules that they freely accept.

- legitimacy** characteristic of a political or social institution that is perceived to have a right to make binding decisions for its members.
- levels of analysis** analytical tool that simplifies theorizing by categorizing key factors in global politics at the level of the whole global system or of some of its constituent parts (individual or units such as states and international organizations).
- liberal democracy** political system in which the authority of elected representatives to make decisions is governed by the rule of law under a constitution that protects individual and minority rights.
- liberal nationalism** variant of nationalism that links the independence of national groups with human rights and democratic ideals.
- liberalism** optimistic approach to global politics based on the perfectibility of humankind, free trade, and democracy; focuses on individuals rather than states.
- liquidity crisis** situation in which there is inadequate cash for the needs of consumers and businesses.
- logic bomb** delayed action computer virus using a programming code that is designed to execute (or “explode”) under specified circumstances.
- madrasa** Muslim religious school.
- malignant nationalism** strain of nationalism based on the superiority of some nations over others and that admires the use of violence in politics.
- managed democracy** authoritarian political system reinforced of an apparatus of repression that features democratic forms such as elections and political parties.
- Mandates of the League of Nations** colonial territories taken from the defeated states of World War One and entrusted by the League of Nations to the victors that were to prepare them for independence.
- maquiladora** foreign-owned export-assembly plants on the US–Mexican border.
- Marxism** revolutionary doctrine based on the belief that history proceeds through class struggle that will end when capitalism is replaced by a socialist and ultimately classless society in which economic “means of production” will be shared for the benefit of society as a whole.
- mediation** intervention by a third party in a dispute in order to help adversaries reach an agreement.
- megacities** cities with a population of over 10 million people.
- mercantilism** belief that economic policy should increase state power by protecting infant industries, increasing exports, and restricting imports.
- methodology** rules and procedures by which research is conducted.
- microcredit** small loans available to the poor to start small businesses.
- migrant** person who moves from one country to another in search of work or other economic opportunities.
- military–industrial complex** combination of defense corporations, Congress, and the Pentagon that cooperate to encourage higher US defense spending.
- mirror image** propensity of groups and individuals to hold views similar to each other; we see in others what they see in us.
- modernization** economic and political development in the LDCs.
- money laundering** disguising criminal profits to prevent their detection by law enforcement agencies.
- monotheism** belief in a single god.
- moral communities** groups in which members are obliged to treat one another according to shared norms, rules, and standards that need not be applied to “outsiders.”
- most-favored nation (MFN) rule** requirement for countries to treat one another equally in trade relations.
- multilateralism** policy of working with other states to achieve policy goals.
- multipolarity** political system having three or more dominant centers of power.

- mutual assured destruction (MAD)** condition of nuclear deterrence in which each state has the capacity to survive the attack of another state and retaliate with its own devastating second strike.
- nation** group of people united on the basis of some combination of shared history, religion, language, or ethnicity.
- nation building** effort to forge a nation out of an artificially created state.
- national communism** ideology of certain communists based on the claim that each communist party should follow its own distinctive national road and need not follow the same path as the Soviet Communist Party.
- national interest** idea that a state has a set of goals that will collectively benefit its citizens.
- national self-determination** doctrine that any people who consider themselves a nation should enjoy their own territorial state; the right of a nation to govern itself.
- national wars** those fought with enthusiasm by citizens with a strong national attachment to their state.
- nationalism** strong identification of a group of people with a polity defined in national terms, belief that the national group should be recognized as such, should enjoy equal rights with similar groups, and should have political autonomy or independence.
- nationalize** to convert from private to government ownership and control.
- natural law** principles of law derived from nature, right reason, or God.
- necessary cause** factor that must be present for a particular result to follow but whose presence does not necessitate that result.
- negative rights** rights of individuals not to suffer from undue government interference in political, economic, and social independence and autonomy.
- neocolonialism** policy whereby developed countries use economic and political means to perpetuate or extend its influence over LDCs.
- neoliberalism** school of liberals that believes in the critical role of international organizations in improving the prospects for order and peace.
- neorealism (structural realism)** school of realism that holds that structural properties of global politics, especially anarchy and distribution of power among states, cause conflict and war.
- neoliberalism** school of liberals that believes in the critical role of international organizations in improving the prospects for order and peace.
- neorealism (structural realism)** school of realism that holds that structural properties of global politics, especially anarchy and distribution of power among states, cause conflict and war.
- neutralism/neutrality** policy by which selected countries abstain from political and military involvement in world affairs.
- nonalignment** policy of equidistance between the Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War.
- noninterventionist liberalism** school of liberalism that holds that history will bring improvement in society without help from external actors.
- non-refoulement** legal principle that a state may not deport an alien to a territory where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.
- nonstate actors** actors whose members are individuals or groups other than sovereign states.
- nontariff barrier** measure other than tariffs such as exchange rate manipulation or lengthy customs procedures that impedes imports and intentionally makes it more difficult or expensive for foreign competitors to do business in a country.
- normative theory** theory concerning what is right and wrong.
- nuclear safeguards** measures to ensure the security of nuclear materials and technologies and prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.
- nuclear winter** period of cold and darkness following a nuclear war, caused by the blocking of the sun's rays by high-altitude dust clouds.
- oligopoly** market condition that exists when

- there are so few sellers that each can affect the price of a product being sold.
- opportunity cost** cost of something in terms of opportunity forgone.
- outsourcing** subcontracting the purchase of labor or parts by a company with a source outside the company's home country.
- overfishing** rate of fishing that exceeds a maximum fishing mortality rate.
- ozone layer** region in the upper atmosphere in which most atmospheric ozone is concentrated and that protects us from dangerous solar radiation.
- pacifist** one who refuses to support violence or war for any purpose.
- paradigm** example that serves as a pattern or model for something, especially one that forms the basis of research and theory.
- patterned behavior** repeated behavior seen to be orderly and predictable.
- peace enforcement** authorization under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter for member states to use military force to end aggression.
- peacekeeping** use of lightly armed military forces to separate warring parties, contain violence, and impose calm in situations of potential violence.
- people's war** Mao Zedong's strategy of long-term armed revolutionary/guerrilla warfare waged by a peasant population.
- perestroika** policy of political, economic, and social restructuring initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
- pogrom** organized campaign of persecution sanctioned by a government and directed against an ethnic group, especially against the Jewish population of tsarist Russia.
- polarity** number of power centers in a global system.
- political culture** attitudes, beliefs, and values which underpin a political system.
- political integration** voluntary process of joining together to create a new political community.
- politicide** mass killings in order to eradicate a group of people owing to their political or ideological beliefs.
- polytheism** worship of or belief in several gods.
- popular sovereignty** sovereignty invested in the entire people of a state.
- population density** number of individuals of a population per unit of living space.
- portfolio (indirect) investment** foreign investment in a country's stocks and bonds.
- positive rights** rights of individuals to have their essential needs such as food and health seen to by government.
- postpositivists** those who reject empiricism on the grounds that there are no objective facts and that reality is subject to interpretation.
- potential power** capabilities that an actor might use to create a power relationship.
- power** psychological relationship between actors in which one influences another to behave differently than it would have if left to its own devices.
- power vacuum** area not under the control of any strong country and that strong states may wish to control to prevent others from doing so.
- predictive theory** theory based on induction that predicts what will happen under specified conditions.
- preemptive war** war initiated to gain an advantage over an enemy that is itself about to attack.
- preferential access** more favorable than usual tariff treatment granted to another state or group of states.
- prescriptive theory** theory about correct policies to use to reach a desired objective.
- preventive war** war launched by one actor in order to prevent another actor from growing strong enough in the future to pose a threat.
- private goods** benefits that are enjoyed only by some and need not be shared.
- proletariat** class of industrial workers who lack their own means of production and hence sell their labor to live.

- proportionality** in international law, the norm that a response to a wrong should not exceed the harm caused by the wrong.
- protectionism** practice of shielding a country's domestic industries from foreign competition by taxing imports or otherwise impeding imports.
- protectorate** state or territory under the "protection" of a more powerful state.
- psychological distance** degree of dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to, and coping with the world.
- purchasing-power parity** measurement of purchasing power in different countries that takes account of lower prices in LDCs compared to rich countries for a given basket of goods.
- quantification** use of numbers and statistics to describe and explain political behavior.
- rationality** acting to promote one's interests by adopting means that are conducive to achieving desired and feasible ends.
- realism** approach to global politics derived from the tradition of power politics and belief that behavior is determined by the search for and distribution of power.
- realpolitik** policy aimed at advancing the national interest that is premised on material factors, especially power, rather than on ethical considerations.
- recession** reduction in a country's GDP for at least two consecutive quarters.
- reciprocity** strategy by which one actor behaves toward others as they have behaved toward it.
- reflexivism** contemplation of global politics based on one's own subjective ideas and reason.
- regime change** overthrow or ousting of a government.
- relative gains** efforts to gain more relative to others so as not to be exploited by others at some future point.
- relativists** those who believe that there are no clear truths and that what is right or wrong varies from person to person or from society to society.
- religious fundamentalism** belief that law and politics derive solely from the word of God as stated in the holy book(s) of the religion in question.
- remittance** money sent back to someone in one's home country.
- resolve** willingness to use force.
- revanchism** policy of taking revenge by seeking to reacquire lost territory.
- Riga axioms** belief that Soviet policy was driven by ideology rather than power.
- rights** privileges and prerogatives to which one has an established claim.
- rogue states** countries that are said to flout the norms, rules, and practices followed by most other states.
- salinization** causing infertile soil by adding excessive salt.
- scapegoat** someone selected to take the blame for someone else's problems.
- second-strike capability** ability to absorb an enemy's first strike and deliver a counterblow in retaliation.
- sectarian violence** violence between nonstate actors representing different ethnic or religious groups. Violence may be between members of different sects (Christian versus Muslim) or different groups in the same sect (Sunni versus Shia Muslims).
- secularism** attitude that religious considerations should be excluded from public affairs.
- security dilemma** inability of actors under conditions of anarchy to trust one another; fear of aggression created in one actor by growth of military power in another; a situation in which one actor's effort to increase its security makes other actors less secure with the unintended consequence of greater insecurity for all.
- self-determination** right of groups in global politics to choose their own fate and to govern themselves.
- skeptic** an analyst who believes that, despite growing international interactions, interdependence was greater in the nineteenth century,

- and that globalization is no more than intensified interstate interdependence.
- slash and burn** technique to create additional farmland in which an area of forest is cleared by cutting and burning and is then planted, usually for several seasons, before being left to return to forest.
- social class** social hierarchy in which individuals are ranked mainly on the bases of wealth and occupation.
- Social Darwinism** sociological theory that nations and races are subject to the same laws of natural selection as Charles Darwin had perceived in plants and animals in nature and that individuals or groups achieve advantage over others as the result of genetic or biological superiority.
- social movement** loosely organized grouping of people with a common ideology who seek to achieve social and political, goals.
- socialism** political system in which the state controls the means of production and provides for citizens' basic needs.
- socialization** process by which people acquire the habits, beliefs, and accumulated knowledge of society through education and training.
- soft power** power based on culture and reputation and that is used to set the global agenda and shape the preferences of others.
- sovereign default** situation in which a country cannot repay its debts.
- sovereignty** status of states as legal equals under international law, according to which they are supreme internally and subject to no higher external authority.
- specialized agencies** IGOs with responsibility limited to a single, often narrow, area of human behavior.
- speculation** engaging in risky business transactions on the chance of a quick profit.
- sphere of influence** geographic region dominated by a major power.
- standard operating procedures (SOPs)** established routines that bureaucracies follow to carry out recurring tasks.
- state** political entity that is sovereign and has a government that is said to enjoy exclusive control over a defined territory and population.
- state capitalism** economic system in which private capitalism is modified by varying degrees of government ownership and control.
- state centric** model of global politics in which nation-states are the source of important activities and the sole focus of scholars and practitioners.
- strategic stability** condition in which leaders have few incentives to launch a military first strike.
- structural power** power derived from control over resources, location in information networks, interpersonal connections with influential others, and reputation for being powerful; the power to determine how things will be done.
- structural violence** physical or psychological violence that is carried out, not by individuals, but by structures, for example, injustices of the worldwide trading system.
- structure** any set of relatively fixed constraints on global actors.
- subaltern** subordinate; someone who is lower in rank.
- subnational** taking place within the boundaries of a single state.
- subsidy** any government financial contribution that benefits home industries by reducing production costs.
- sufficient cause** factor that when present always assures that a particular result will follow.
- supranational** above the authority of national governments.
- sustainable development** development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to develop.
- swaggering** displays of military might aiming to enhancing national pride and prestige.
- tariff** duty levied by a government on imported goods.

- terms of trade** index of the price of a country's exports in terms of its imports.
- territorial state** political unit that originated in post-medieval Europe in which a government has exclusive authority within a defined territorial area
- terrorism** calculated use of violence against innocent civilians for political ends, especially to gain public attention.
- theocracy** system of government by religious leaders and based on religious dogma.
- theory** abstract, simplified, and general proposition that answers "why" and "how" questions.
- totalitarianism** political system in which rulers control all aspects of society.
- transaction costs** costs involved in any transaction other than the price paid such as time spent or information about others involved in the transaction.
- transformationalist** analyst who believes that globalization or human interconnectedness has no historical parallel and that it is producing a merger of foreign and domestic policy arenas, weakening states and the role of territory in global politics.
- transnational** crossing national frontiers and involving social groups and nongovernmental actors.
- transnational corporations (TNCs)** economic enterprises with operations in two or more countries that operate under a system of decision making that permits coherent policies, a common strategy, and sharing knowledge and resources.
- transnational relations** direct interactions or transactions between separate societies across national frontiers, involving nongovernmental groups.
- transnational war** large-scale violence involving state and nonstate groups across state frontiers.
- treasury note** interest-paying debt instrument issued by the US government, with an initial life of between one and 10 years.
- tribe** sociopolitical group consisting of a number of families or clans that share a common ancestry and culture.
- Triple Alliance** alliance between Germany, Austria–Hungary, and Italy (which declined to honor its commitment) that entered World War One.
- Triple Entente** alliance between France, Great Britain, and Russia that entered the war against Germany and Austria–Hungary in 1914.
- trojan horse** program in which a code is contained inside a program or data so that it can take control of a computer in order to damage it.
- ulema** community of Islamic legal scholars who interpret the *sharia*, the body of traditional Islamic law.
- unilateralism** practice of acting alone, without consulting friends and allies.
- unipolarity** international political system dominated by one center of power.
- unitary-actor approach** assumption that actors' internal attributes or differences among such attributes have little impact on foreign policy behavior.
- urbanization** social process during which cities grow and population becomes more concentrated in urban areas.
- variable-sum (non-zero-sum) game** situation in which the total gain for one party is *not* identical to the other's losses; both can gain, both can lose, or one can gain or lose more or less than the other.
- veto** legal power of any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to reject a Council resolution.
- virtual state** state that has outsourced much of its territorially based production capability.
- vulnerability** degree to which an actor's nuclear retaliatory force can be destroyed by an enemy attack.
- war crimes** abuse of enemy soldiers or prisoners of war during wartime.
- weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons that can kill large numbers of people indiscriminately.

xenophobia fear and hatred of foreigners.

xenophobe one who fears or dislikes foreigners.

Yalta axioms belief of US leaders before the Cold War that it was possible to bargain with the Soviet Union and that the USSR was much like other states that designed foreign policies based on power.

Zapatistas revolutionary movement that sought

democracy, justice, and freedom for indigenous peoples in Mexico's Chiapas province.

zero sum relationship of pure conflict in which a gain for one actor is equal to the loss for another.

zero-sum game situation of pure conflict in which the gain of one side is equal to the loss of the other.

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