

Northeastern Political Science Association

The International Relations of Regions

Author(s): Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Polity*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Summer, 1970), pp. 397-425

Published by: [Palgrave Macmillan Journals](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3233994>

Accessed: 27/02/2012 15:12

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The International Relations of Regions*

LOUIS J. CANTORI &
STEVEN L. SPIEGEL
University of California, Los Angeles

Here is an attempt to advance the study of international relations by developing a model of the subordinate regional system. It illustrates the extent to which political science is allied to political geography. As with most such attempts, its usefulness can only be assessed by those scholars who try to apply it to the real world in the process of investigating their own interests.

Louis J. Cantori did his graduate work at Chicago, held Fulbright, SSRC and Ford awards for research in the United Arab Republic (1963–65) and Morocco (1967–69) and has taught at UCLA since 1966. His interests are in comparative political systems. His colleague at UCLA, Steven L. Spiegel, has also held his present post since 1966 and is presently on leave as a research associate with the Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. His graduate work was done at Harvard and his field is international relations.

*Research support for this study was provided by a grant from the Research Committee of the Academic Senate, University of California, Los Angeles.

IT IS THE PURPOSE of this article to suggest a comparative approach for analyzing the role of the region in present-day international politics. We will consider regions to be areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units. We will attempt here to provide a framework for studying the region in terms of the shared features of all regions. As a result of these shared features, comparisons become feasible and generalizations are facilitated.

Recently, there has been a good deal of concentration on the region as a subordinate system.¹ This interest has developed simultaneously with studies of integration and international organization, both of which have also been largely region-centered.² In this article we are concerned primarily with the subordinate system approach, which provides us with a unit of analysis that facilitates comparison and allows us to concentrate on the international politics of a region rather than on particular processes (for example, integration, organization). Since the dawn of the modern era, the present period is the first in which all regions of the world maintain a measure of independence. The present is also a time in which communications and technology permit scholars

¹ See, for example, Leonard Binder, "The Middle East Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, x (April, 1958), 408-29; Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, xii (September, 1968), pp. 231-62; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Asia," *World Politics*, xv (January, 1963), 213-35, and Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), Chapters III and VI; George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies," *International Relations* (London), II (April, 1961), 143-55; William I. Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," *International Organization*, xxi (Summer, 1967), 545-64. From another perspective, Bruce M. Russett has attempted to examine the possible criteria for regions, using a variety of quantitative methods, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967). For an attempt at a "systems approach" to the study of regions, see Oran R. Young, "Political Discontinuities in the International System," *World Politics*, xx (April, 1968), 369-92.

² See, for example, Karl Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v (June, 1967), 315-43; Ernst B. Haas and Philippe Schmitter, *The Politics of Economics in Latin*

to become knowledgeable about events that occur simultaneously around the world. The gaining of independence and the increase of communications allow for an unprecedented capacity to compare regions to each other. But we are not interested in comparison for its own sake. Rather, we aim to develop a means of judging the causal factors which are responsible for the particular mixture of cooperation and conflict present among the nations within a particular region. We are interested in the relationship between such factors as culture and stability, power and order, communications and cohesion.

In this article we will attempt to explicate a framework for the delineation of subordinate systems in order to establish a basis for the study of regional international politics.³ We will begin with a discussion of some of the problems inherent in the identification of subordinate systems and then proceed to propose a method for subdividing them into analytic sectors. We will then provide four categories in the form of pattern variables which are helpful in delineating subordinate systems and in explaining regional politics within them. We will attempt to show the relationships between the pattern variables and sectors, and conclude with a brief discussion of intersubordinate system relations.

American Regionalism: The Latin American Free Trade Association After Four Years of Operation (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver Monograph, 1965); Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers," *World Politics*, xxi (October, 1968), 84-104; Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration Concept and Measurement," *International Organization*, xxxii (Autumn, 1968), 85-80; *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1965). In addition, see the excellent collections of articles in *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Anchor Books, 1966) and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *International Regionalism: Readings* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968). Finally, for a criticism of this integrationist approach to regional international relations which calls for an "empirical systems-analysis" approach, a fair label for the present study, see Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts," *World Politics*, xxi (January, 1969) 242-71.

³ For further elaboration see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), and "Regional International Politics: The Comparison of Five Subordinate Systems," *International Studies Quarterly* (December, 1969).

I. The Identification of Subordinate Systems

Nation-states are delineated by events, political practice, and (at least in part) membership in the United Nations. The dominant system, composed of the most powerful of states in any period of history, is more difficult to discern and its precise membership is a matter of constant conjecture, but there are at least a minimum of contenders for predominant status and therefore a minimum of potential configurations. There is also a degree of consensus among most observers: some form of bipolarity is present. Regional or subordinate systems, on the other hand, do not easily lend themselves to clear-cut identification: there are many alternatives, potential definitions, and groupings. Consequently, the determination of subordinate systems is difficult and complex.⁴

Given the complications of identifying subordinate systems, the authors have attempted nonetheless to identify fifteen subordinate systems (see Table 1).⁵ They have done so on the following bases:

Every nation-state (no matter how strong or how weak) is a member of one subordinate system. There are two exceptions to this generalization: the most powerful states are also active in other subordinate systems besides their own, and there are a few states which exist on the borderline between two subordinate systems and may be considered to coexist in some degree in both (for example, Finland, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Burma).

All subordinate systems are delineated—at least in part—by reference to geographical considerations, but social, economic, political, and organizational factors are also relevant. Consequently, members of subordinate systems are proximate, but they need not be contiguous.

⁴ It is adequate for our purposes to define a system as the total interaction of relations among the autonomous units within a particular arena of international politics (for example globe, region, nation-state). The authors, while aware of the suggestiveness of what they have to say for systems theory in political science, have deliberately sought to avoid using the complicated technical vocabulary of systems theory as it appears, for example, in David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957); and O. R. Young, "A Survey of General Systems Theory," *General Systems*, ix (1964), 61–80.

⁵ For a virtually identical breakdown, independently arrived at, see G. Etzel Percy, "Geopolitics and Foreign Relations," *Department of State Bulletin*, 1 (March 2, 1964), 318–30. We wish to thank Professor John Sigler for calling this to our attention.

TABLE I
Subordinate Systems of the World and Their Subdivisions

REGION	CORE	PERIPHERY	INTRUSIVE SYSTEM
1. <i>Middle East</i>	United Arab Republic Yemen Saudi Arabia Kuwait Iraq Lebanon Sudan Jordan Syria South Yemen †Persian Gulf States	Israel Turkey Iran §Afghanistan	US USSR France Gr. Britain W. Germany Peoples Republic of China
2. <i>Western Europe</i>	France W. Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg	Northern: *Gr. Britain *Ireland *Switzerland Iceland §Finland *Denmark *Sweden *Norway *Austria Southern: *Spain *Portugal §Turkey Greece Malta Cyprus	US USSR
3. <i>Eastern Europe</i>	Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary Rumania Bulgaria	*Albania *Yugoslavia Finland E. Germany	US France W. Germany USSR Peoples Republic of China
4. <i>Russia</i>	USSR		

REGION	CORE	PERIPHERY	INTRUSIVE SYSTEM
5. <i>North America</i>	US Canada	§Trinidad and Tobago §Jamaica §Barbados †§West Indies Associated States	
6. <i>Latin America</i>	Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras †British Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela	*Cuba Trinidad and Tobago Jamaica Barbados Guyana Haiti †Surinam †West Indies Associated States	US USSR Gr. Britain Netherlands France Peoples Republic of China
7. <i>East Asia</i>	Peoples Republic of China	*Taiwan North Korea South Korea *Mongolia Japan †Hong Kong †Macao	US Portugal Gr. Britain USSR
8. <i>Southwest Pacific</i>	Australia New Zealand	†Islands of South Pacific Western Samoa	US France Gr. Britain USSR Japan

REGION	CORE	PERIPHERY	INTRUSIVE SYSTEM
9. <i>Southeast Asia</i>	I. Maritime S.E. Asia	Singapore	Peoples Republic of China
		†Territory of Indonesia	Japan
		Malaysia	Portugal
		Philippines	Australia
	II. Mainland S.E. Asia	Timor	US
		Burma	France
		Laos	Gr. Britain
		North Vietnam	USSR
		South Vietnam	
		Cambodia Thailand	
10. <i>South Asia</i>	India	*Ceylon	US
		*Nepal	USSR
		*Bhutan	Gr. Britain
		*Sikkim	Peoples Republic of China
		Afghanistan	
		Maldiv Islands	
		Pakistan Burma	
11. <i>North Africa</i>	Morocco Tunisia Algeria	Mauritania	France
		Libya	USSR
		†Spanish Sahara	US
			Peoples Republic of China Spain
12. <i>West Africa</i>	Ivory Coast Dahomey Guinea Senegal Upper Volta Mali Niger Togo	Nigeria	US
		Liberia	USSR
		Sierra Leone	France
		Gambia	Gr. Britain
		Ghana	Portugal
		†Portuguese Guinea	
13. <i>Southern Africa</i>	South Africa Rhodesia †Angola †Mozambique	Malawi	US
		Malagasy Republic	Gr. Britain
		Lesotho	Portugal

REGION	CORE	PERIPHERY	INTRUSIVE SYSTEM
	†South-West Africa	Botswana Zambia Swaziland Mauritius	
14. <i>Central Africa</i>	The Congo (Kinshasa) Rwanda Burundi	Central African Rep. Chad Cameroon Gabon Congo (Brazzaville) Equatorial Guinea	US Belgium Peoples Republic of China USSR France Spain
15. <i>East Africa</i>	Uganda Kenya Tanzania	Ethiopia Somali Republic †French Somaliland	US USSR France Peoples Republic of China Gr. Britain

*Peripheral states with core potential.

†Angola = colony; only the most important colonies have been chosen for their effect upon the subordinate systems.

§Afghanistan = states which could possibly be members of a second periphery.

Size does not necessarily determine the existence of a subordinate system. It may consist of one nation and be relatively large (the USSR),⁶ or may consist of several nations and be relatively compact in area (the Middle East). Where only one nation is a member of a region we can say that the internal (or domestic) and subordinate systems are identical.

Within the boundaries of a subordinate system, there is a complex

⁶ The Soviet Union has been considered a region in and of itself because with reference to social, political, and geographic factors it resembles many of the other subordinate systems. While many of the states on the Soviet Union's borders might have been considered as part of its periphery, Soviet relations with these states resemble more closely intrusive relations elsewhere rather than core-periphery relations.

interaction between political, social, and geographic factors. It is this interaction which is most important in defining the limits of a subordinate system. For example, primarily political boundaries divide East and West Europe; social and political boundaries divide Latin America and North America; geographic boundaries help to identify the Middle East and divide North Africa from the rest of Africa.

Indigenous political relationships (antagonistic and cooperative), geographic factors, and social and historical backgrounds help to define a subordinate system. Thus, the authors believe that, despite the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the African continent is fragmented by a variety of local interactions, while in Latin America, despite great differences, the area has shown more frequent interrelated characteristics.⁷

Outside powers play a role in defining a subordinate system. This is particularly the case in East Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Although geographic boundaries do not easily change and social factors rarely do, political and ideological factors are fluid. Consequently, the identity of a subordinate system is both tenuous and dynamic. For example, the nineteenth-century writer would probably have suggested the significance of the Central European subordinate system, but he would not have found most of the nation-states which are presently located in the Middle East.

We can thus conclude that a subordinate system consists of one state, or of two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system. The seven foregoing basic generalizations, plus this definition, should be sufficient to enable us, at least tentatively, to identify a subordinate system. It will become

⁷ It is worth noting in this regard that Africa is almost twice as large as Latin America and that its population is also about twice as large. Some readers may be surprised that the authors have not defined such areas as Scandinavia and Central America as separate subordinate systems. It is our position that were political integration to occur among such nations (Benelux and the British West Indies may be added), they would have a similar position in their subordinate systems (for example, as part of the core or periphery) to their present one, even though their power within the system would be increased. For example, a United States of Central America would play a similar role to that played by Mexico or Venezuela as members of the Latin American core, and a United States of Scandinavia would relate to West Europe as Great Britain does at present. Our subsequent analysis of cores and peripheries should further clarify the rationale for these judgments.

clear as we proceed to elaborate the components of our approach that we are at the same time elaborating our definition.

Although the general identification of a given subordinate system is relatively easily established, the specific membership of certain states poses some difficulty. In Table I, the authors have divided the globe into fifteen subordinate systems, each of which has been determined with reference to the considerations already discussed. (It is, of course, possible that other researchers—even using a similar framework—could come to slightly different conclusions.) Nevertheless, by accepting these delineations for the remainder of this article, the reader will be able to participate in an attempt to provide a methodology for comparing the international politics of diverse subordinate systems.

II. Four Pattern Variables

Granted the identification of a subordinate system in which the preceding generalizations are operative, it is possible to differentiate it further into three subdivisions: the core sector, the peripheral sector and the intrusive system. Before turning to a discussion of these three subdivisions of the subordinate system, we shall first proceed to a discussion of four pattern variables which we believe to be crucial to the demarcation of these subdivisions. These are: (1) nature and level of cohesion, (2) nature of communications, (3) level of power, and (4) structure of relations. These variables are crucial to the comparison of subordinate systems with diverse qualities.

Nature and Level of Cohesion: By cohesion we mean the degree of similarity or complementarity in the properties of the political entities being considered and the degree of interaction between these units. The concept of cohesion plays a similar role in the consideration of regions to that which the concept of integration has played in the analysis of nation-states. In the study of comparative national politics, integration has been used to mean, "The problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows—or eliminates—subordinate parochial loyalties."⁸ When applied to the study of international relations the concept of integration can thus represent an assumption that the states being compared will lose their independence as they become more interlocked. Cohesion involves no such assumption. As

⁸ Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in *Political Modernization*, ed., C. Welch (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967), 150–51. Reprinted from *The Annals*, ccclviii (March, 1965), 52–64.

states become more similar and more interactive, there is no guarantee that they will unite or federate; on the contrary, cohesiveness may as likely lead to disunity as to unity. When the term "integration" is applied to regions it is usually assumed at a minimum that warfare does not exist among the members or that a more encompassing political institution results from the process. "Integration and security community . . . imply stable expectations of peace among the participating units or groups, whether or not there has been a merger of their political institutions," or "Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."⁹ There is, on the other hand, no direct correlation between cohesion and absence of warfare or between cohesion and a shift of political loyalty.

The concept of cohesion as discussed here can be further differentiated into its social, economic, political, and organizational elements. Under the rubric of social cohesiveness, attention is focused upon the contributive factors of ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, and consciousness of a common heritage. The contrasts that these factors may present can be seen in the extremes of the Middle East subordinate system's high degree of social cohesion and Southeast Asia's extremely low degree of social cohesion. Under the rubric of economic cohesiveness, the focus is upon the distribution and complementarity of economic resources as well as on the character of trade patterns. The extremes of this factor can be seen in the West European system's high degree of economic cohesiveness and the West African and Middle Eastern systems' low degree. Under the rubric of political cohesiveness we are concerned with the manner in which the pattern and degree of complementarity of types of regime contribute or detract from the cohesion of a subordinate system. In this respect one could compare West Europe, with its multitude of reconciliation or parliamentary-type regimes, and the Middle East, with its contrasting mobilizational and modernizing autocracies.¹⁰

Finally, under the rubric of organizational cohesion we should note

⁹ The first quotation is from Karl Deutsch, "Security Communities," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed., J. Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press, 1961), 98. The second is from Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16.

¹⁰ For this classification of political systems, see David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 28-38, Chapters 9, 11.

the possible effects upon cohesion of membership in the United Nations and in regional organizations. The analysis of voting behavior in the United Nations has revealed the existence of groupings of states identifiable as Afro-Asian, Latin American, and so forth, all of which contribute in some degree to regional consciousness.¹¹ As for regional organization, we should note to what extent a regional organization is coterminus with the region's boundaries, contrasting, for example, the European Common Market and the Arab League. If all members of a subordinate system or a sector of a subordinate system belong to a regional international organization, this tends to reinforce cohesion, particularly if the boundaries of the membership coincide with the system's or sector's boundaries.

Nature of Communications: The second pattern variable, the nature of communications, is divisible into four aspects: personal communications (mail, telephone, telegraph); mass media (newspapers, radio, television); exchange among the elite (intraregional education, tourism, diplomatic visits within the region); and transportation (road, water, rail, air). It is evident that literacy rates and differences in language will affect the first three and that geography and technological development will affect all four. Regions will differ from each other with the degree to which these four factors are present and applicable. Southeast Asia is weak in all four, for example, as is West Africa, while West Europe has been able to outweigh linguistic differences by the sheer profusion of channels of communications and other pattern variables.

Level of Power. "Power," the third pattern variable, is defined here as the present and potential ability and the willingness of one nation to alter the internal decision-making processes of other countries in accordance with its own policies. We can isolate three broad aspects of a nation's power: material, military, and motivational. The material elements of power comprise the basis of a nation's capacity: these include its location and resources; the size, quality, and structure of its population; its economy and industrial capacity (particularly to be measured by gross national product (GNP), per capita GNP, and production and consumption of energy) and the relative efficiency of its administration and government. The military elements of power comprise a nation's ability to wage war: its military techniques, weaponry,

¹¹ For an analysis along these lines, see Bruce Russett, *International Regions and the International System* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), Chapters 4, 5.

manpower, and efficiency. They also include the effect which scientific and technological developments have on the ability of stronger nations to increase their margin of superiority over weaker nations or of weaker countries to overtake the leaders. Finally, the motivational elements of power center on a nation's will to seek prestige and status in international affairs, and on its readiness to sacrifice consumer satisfaction to build its material and military power. Motivation is influenced by such elements as ideology, national character and morale, nationalism, history, the personalities and abilities of particular statesmen, and diplomatic skill.

Because existing and potential¹² national strengths and weaknesses are frequently contradictory, it is difficult to produce a "power calculation" in order to compare states. Given the complexity of the process, the attempt to estimate the power of nations nevertheless produces valuable information about the distribution or balance of power among nations in a subordinate system. This analytical process also facilitates the comparison of the character of various subordinate systems.

It is possible to detect seven types of nation-states in the current period: primary powers, secondary powers, middle powers, minor powers, regional states, micro-states, and colonies. Which category a nation-state belongs in depends on its degree of power, as suggested by the three factors discussed above and its range of influence, as indicated by the number or location of states with which a particular nation is able to exercise its power.

PRIMARY POWERS: The primary powers (the us and ussr), together with the secondary powers constitute the great powers, that is nations which influence domestic politics and foreign policies of other countries in several areas of the world and are individually superior to other nations materially, militarily, and in motivation. Primary powers are superior to secondary powers on the basis of these three factors, but both types compose the dominant system in international politics.

SECONDARY POWERS: Compared to primary powers, secondary powers (the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan, and China) have a limited capacity to participate in selected subordinate systems of the world.

MIDDLE POWERS: Middle powers (for example, Italy, Canada, Australia, East Germany) are those states whose level of power permits

¹² "Potential" applies to each factor of power (material, military, and motivational). An advanced state may be capable of growing further or may change in motivation as a result of altered international conditions or a new domestic regime. A developing state's potentiality may be long or short-term, depending upon its possible development and rate of growth.

them to play only decidedly limited and selected roles in subordinate systems other than their own.

MINOR POWERS: Minor powers (for example, Cuba, Algeria, United Arab Republic) are those states which play leading roles in the international relations of their own systems.

REGIONAL STATES: Regional states (for example, Greece, Hungary, Syria) are those states which are able on occasion to play a limited but not leading role in their own subordinate systems. They also tend to have greater flexibility with reference to stronger powers than do micro-states and colonies.

MICRO-STATES: Micro-states (for example, Jamaica, Togo, Laos) are states which have little or no influence in regional international relations because their power calculation leaves them almost totally within the orbit of one or more large powers.

COLONIES: Colonies (for example, Spanish Sahara, Angola, Hong Kong) are the few remaining political entities which have little or no independent motivational power.

This categorization allows us to make an estimate of both the distribution and hierarchy of power within a subordinate system. West Europe is distinctive for its prevalence of secondary and middle powers. In Latin America there are only one middle power (Brazil), a few minor powers and a few regional powers, and many micro-states. In the Arab sector of the Middle East congeries of regional and micro-states are all minor powers. The categories also facilitate the comparison of subordinate systems: the predominance of secondary and middle powers in West Europe indicates that its level of power is greater than that of either Latin America or the Middle East.


Structure of Relations: The fourth pattern variable, the structure of relations, refers to the character of the relationships which exist among the nation-states that compose a subordinate system. It is important here to determine: (1) which states are cooperating and which are in conflict (the spectrum of relations); (2) the bases for their amity or antagonism (the causes of relations); and (3) the instruments which they use to effect their relations—for example, types of weapons, ways of ameliorating conflict, methods of cooperation (the means of relations).

THE SPECTRUM OF RELATIONS:¹³ The structure of a system's interrelations can be described by reference to the conditions depicted in Table II, which shows a spectrum extending from the close coopera-

¹³ The concept of power, the seven types of nations, and the spectrum of relations are discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming book by Steven L. Spiegel to be published by Little, Brown and Company.

tion of a bloc to the exacerbated conflict of direct military confrontation.

TABLE II
Spectrum of Relations



Conditions of amity include: a bloc, in which two or more nations act in international politics as if they were one political entity; an alliance, in which they agree to aid each other in specified ways—usually including military means; and tentative cooperation, in which they coordinate their actions for specific purposes and over a very short period of time (days rather than weeks, weeks rather than months). From the opposite direction, conditions of antagonism include: direct military conflict, in which combat occurs between the troops of two opposing sides; sustained crisis, in which contending parties make persistent attempts, short of direct military conflict, to alter the balance of power between them; and stalemate, in which contention continues while neither side is prepared or able to alter the existing relationship. In direct conflict, the means used to change the status quo are forceful and deliberate, but in sustained crisis the primary means of contention are more subtle: they include political maneuvering among neutral and independent states, arms races, limited local warfare between parties aligned on either side, vituperative exchanges, crises, and in general a chaotic atmosphere filled with tension. In stalemates, contention is at a lower level because both sides decide that, given existing conditions, they would prefer to live with the situation than face the consequences of attempting to upset the prevailing balance of forces.

Only when we arrive at equilibrium do we find a standoff in competitive power between two sides that is mutually acceptable. Whether or not an equality of power exists, the effect is the same: the states-

men of both sides not only accept the situation but prefer it to any foreseeable alternative. The status quo becomes a standard of the foreseeable balance of power, and so long as neither side moves to alter it or perceives that it is being altered the equilibrium will continue. The difference between stalemate and equilibrium is that in a stalemate one or both sides would change conditions if they could and are seeking means of doing so; in equilibrium neither side believes that it would alter the balance of power even if it had the means to do so. Equilibrium is a prerequisite to most stages of amity—except the lowest forms of limited cooperation.¹⁴

THE CAUSES OF RELATIONS: States are, of course, not always consistent in their relations. In any relationship between two or more states there may be elements of conflict on one level and of cooperation on others. Many Latin American states (for example, Peru, Chile, Bolivia) are in a stalemate with reference to border issues while they are allied in economic and diplomatic international organization. Saudi Arabia and the UAR have been in a sustained crisis in regard to Yemen but in an alliance in regard to Israel. It is therefore necessary to consider the relative significance of major issues which cause conflict or cooperation between particular states in a subordinate system. In Latin America, the effect of American influence has been to subordinate local issues to regional pursuits. Similarly, in the Middle East, intra-Arab disputes are muted by the confrontation with Israel.

When there is conflict, the nature of the disputed issues reveals the intensity of the contention. For example, border and economic disputes are usually less damaging to peaceful international relations in the region than racial, religious, ideological, and historical rivalries. Similarly, when there is cooperation the reasons for collaboration indicate the strength of the cross-national ties. A common enemy is likely to be a stronger tie than mutual economic interest; under present conditions, economics is likely to be a stronger incentive to cooperation than are religious ties.

THE MEANS OF RELATIONS: The spectrum of relations within a subordinate system is further elucidated by reference to the means which are used in such relations. The type of warfare (for example, guerilla versus conventional) being carried on helps to explain the relations which exist. Moreover, the manner in which conflicts are ameliorated

¹⁴ The spectrum we have presented does not include nations which are "neutral" toward each other in the sense of noninvolvement in hostile relations. In current subordinate systems, equilibrium or stalemate in respect to two conflicting sides is frequently either the cause or the effect of neutral policies of individual states.

and terminated indicates the strength of particular conditions in the spectrum of relations. For example, conditions in Latin America, where an elaborate set of diplomatic devices exists for the settlement of many types of conflict, are very different from conditions in the Middle East, where cease-fires are arranged by intermediaries and there is little or no contact between the Arabs and Israelis. West Europe, where states are also likely in the current period to resort to established means of amelioration, is different from Southeast Asia, where guerrillas either emerge victorious or fade into the interior and where rare agreements are broken freely. Finally, the extent of established consultative devices and the range of ties between cooperating governments not only help to indicate whether a bloc, alliance, or limited cooperation is in progress; they also hint at the durability of these relationships.

These three elements, then, provide a frame of reference for examining the prevailing nature of relationships within a subordinate system. They enable us to make comparisons with other subordinate systems, both with respect to the influence of what we shall call the "intrusive system" and the effect of levels of cohesion, power, and communication. As we shall see, these four pattern variables, when applied to a given subordinate system, unveil the existence of what we term "core" and "peripheral" sectors.

III. The Core and the Periphery

The Core Sector: The core sector consists of a state or group of states which form a central focus of the international politics within a given region. It usually consists of more than one state, and when it does the constituent units possess a shared social, political, and/or organizational background or activity. There may be more than one core sector within a given subordinate system.¹⁵

We can make our definition more specific and useful by examining

¹⁵ Generally, the identification of a core sector is assisted by the existence of an easily identifiable culturally heterogeneous peripheral sector. When the peripheral sector is not so heterogeneous, as, for example, in the West African Anglophonic peripheral sector, such factors as degree of cohesion, size or geographical area, population, and economic wealth have to be considered in order to determine the political center of gravity of the subordinate system. In West Africa, the high level of cohesion relative to the periphery and the vastness of the Francophonic area are the decisive factors.

a hypothetical core sector in terms of our four pattern variables: the level of cohesion, the nature of communications, the level of power, and the structure of relations. The minimal conditions for the existence of a core sector can be determined by its level of cohesion which requires a consideration of the degree of social, economic, and political similarity, complementarity, and interaction within the particular group of states. In addition, the factor of organizational cohesion would have to be considered. Thus, an analysis of the similarity or complementarity of social cohesiveness would take into account ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and historical similarities, while economic cohesiveness would depend upon the complementarity of natural resources as well as the patterns and the degree of trade within the core and within the periphery. Political cohesiveness would be determined by the similarities among regimes and the manner in which these might contribute to or detract from the cohesiveness of the core sector. For example, in West Europe the regimes of the core sector are relatively similar, while in the Middle East they are not. Organizational cohesion would be revealed by the extent to which an organization (for example, the European common market and the West European core sector) coincides with a core sector. The degree of common membership in international organizations, moreover, would be an indication of the extent of interaction within the core sector. It is evident that a knowledge of the degree of similarity or complementarity of these factors of cohesion will assist us to delineate a core sector. It is also evident that one type of cohesion may be more pronounced than others in a given core sector (for example, the organizational in West Europe and the social in the Middle East), while still other core sectors may be significantly united by all four elements of cohesion (for example, North America, Southwest Pacific). Most often, however, one or more of the elements of cohesion, but not all of them, are significantly present in a core.

The second pattern variable, the nature of communications, should further inform us about the nature of a core sector in terms of personal communications, mass media, interchange among the elite, and transportation facilities. Striking, for example, is the extent to which the flow of communication within a subordinate system can be restricted to a core sector and fail to penetrate the peripheral sector (for example, the Francophonic core sector of West Africa and the Anglo-phonetic peripheral sector).

An analysis of the core sector in terms of levels of power, our third pattern variable, should inform us of the political capabilities contained within it. As in a region as a whole, the distribution of power within the core reveals the political processes at work. The primacy

of France and West Germany in the Common Market, of Australia in the Southwest Pacific, of Algeria in North Africa, and of the Union of South Africa in Southern Africa may be contrasted with the rough equality among the participants in the cores of maritime Southeast Asia and East Africa. The degree of supremacy of the pre-eminent states of a core (for example, United States in North America versus the UAR in the Middle East), can be contrasted with the position of weaker states (for example, Canada in North America versus Jordan, Yemen, and South Yemen in the Middle East), the relative gap between strongest and weakest must also be assessed. Finally, in distinguishing the core from the peripheral sector it is important to note the relative power of each. The Middle East and West Africa are distinctive for the strength of their peripheral states *vis-à-vis* the core, while in Latin America and Southeast Asia the peripheries are particularly weak. In West Europe, the core and periphery come closer to approximating equality than in any of the cases just cited.

The fourth pattern variable, the structure of relations, completes the profile of a core sector. It is closely connected to the third variable, for it informs us of the dynamics of the exercise of power. Differing levels of power within a core sector will have profound consequences on its internal relations. The conflicts between the UAR and Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Argentina, North Vietnam and Thailand, Guinea and the Ivory Coast, among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and between Algeria and her two neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, are related to power conditions within the core. The means of both conflict and cooperation are, moreover, directly connected to the level of power of the core—except where outside powers intervene and provide their own instruments of contention (for example, jet fighters) or collaboration (for example, international organization). The causes of relations, however, often involve wider issues than mere level of power. Cohesion and communications are especially significant in explaining the reasons for the particular structure of relations within the core. For example, the factor of political cohesion helps to explain the split within the Arab core; improved communications and political and organizational cohesion help to explain Franco-German reconciliation.

It can thus be seen that while the initial delineation of the subordinate system may itself be considered somewhat subjective, the application of the four pattern variables soon reveals the identity of the subordinate system and of the more well-defined core sector as well. In fact, our ability to delineate the core sector so sharply in turn assists us to define the subordinate system itself.

The Peripheral Sector: The peripheral sector includes all those states

within a given subordinate system which are alienated from the core sector in some degree by social, political, economic, or organizational factors, but which nevertheless play a role in the politics of the subordinate system. While the core sector tends towards cultural, social, and political homogeneity, the peripheral sector is characteristically heterogeneous, and there is usually little interaction among periphery members. The minimal factor accounting for the inclusion of the member states of the peripheral sector in the subordinate system appears to be primarily geographical, although additional social, cultural, political, and historical factors exist. It follows, then, that the peripheral sector, as compared with the core sector, is characterized by less cohesion, less communication, relatively unrelated levels of power, and much more fluid relations.

There are some exceptions, however, in areas where there tends to be some degree of homogeneity if not also cohesiveness (notably in the Anglophonic periphery of West Africa, groupings in the West European periphery, the Black states of the Southern African periphery, and the Francophonic area of Central Africa). In West Africa, for example, a common British colonial experience and knowledge of the English language among the elite contribute to this comparative homogeneity. Where both the core and periphery are cohesive, it is necessary to assess the relative degree of cohesiveness and the focus of political centrality within the subordinate system before assigning the label "core."

One of the outstanding characteristics of the periphery is that its diplomatic orientation is typically outside of the region; for example, peripheral states usually seek their diplomatic alignments outside of, rather than within, the subordinate system. This can be seen, for example, in the key role played by Nigeria, a member of the West African peripheral sector, in the founding of the OAU and in the membership of Iran and Turkey, members of the Middle Eastern peripheral sector, in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Another characteristic of the peripheral sector is that it often serves as a geographic and diplomatic buffer between external powers. This largely geopolitical circumstance can be seen in Libya and Mauritania, which are buffers for the North African core sector, and in Burma, which is a buffer for the mainland Southeast Asian core sector.

Aberrations in the Periphery: The fluid nature of the periphery occasionally makes it necessary to qualify its delineation. In this section we shall identify two groupings of peripheral states in West Europe and we shall also discuss the problem of borderline peripheral states. Both the large size and certain dichotomous features of the West European periphery suggest that it can be divided into Northern and Southern

groupings (see Table 1). The Northern peripheral states are more industrialized, more developed economically, and more democratically governed than the South; as a consequence, most of these states have a higher core potential. They are also distinguished from the South because they are more Protestant and linguistically more Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, and Germanic. This distinction does not, however, affect the method of core-periphery analysis already presented, because it is offset by the importance of intrasector organizational and economic cohesion.

A few of the states which we have described as peripheral are, by virtue of their activities, divided between the peripheries of two subordinate systems. In terms of our four pattern variables this generally appears to occur when certain states (notably Turkey, Finland, Afghanistan, and Burma) can be identified with one subordinate system in terms of cohesion and communications while they interact with another in terms of power and the structure of relations. In addition, the Anglophonic area of the Caribbean appears to lie astride both the North American and Latin American subordinate systems, as elements of the four pattern variables and geography pull these micro-states in both directions in this period of transition from colony to independence.¹⁶ Some degree of verification of the marginal character of borderline states is provided by the fact that our consideration of them reveals that they are always located in a periphery, and never a core. Thus, although borderline peripheral states are difficult to locate within a specific subordinate system, it is possible to examine their position by utilizing this comparative regional approach.

Relations Between the Sectors: As the definition of the peripheral sector indicated, the periphery is in part defined by its relationship to the core. In relations between the core and the periphery, alienation is a central factor, as was cohesion in our discussion of relations within a sector.

The core, as the center of political gravity in the subordinate system, relates individually to isolated states or to small groups of states in the periphery. Their alienation may arise for a variety of reasons. Geography is frequently a complement to other factors, but it is not ordinarily the only element leading to alienation from the core, and in

¹⁶ Further examples of states which may be placed in more than one subordinate system may readily occur to our readers (for example, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Mauritania). At this stage in our study, an examination of conditions in terms of the four pattern variables yielded only the borderline peripheral states which are listed in Table I, although the addition of others is possible as further research continues.

fact may not be an element at all, as the case of Israel shows. In West Europe, geography has contributed to Great Britain's alienation from the core, but political developments have also been crucial. Were Britain to be admitted to the Common Market, she would thereby become a member of the core, since organizational cohesion is the most important element in determining the West European core. In the Middle East, on the other hand, social cohesion is extremely important in delineating the periphery; therefore, the three non-Arab states, Iran, Turkey and Israel, form the periphery.

The degree of alienation between the two sectors can perhaps be seen in the distinction between states with, and states without, the potentiality of becoming part of the core (for example, Taiwan and Great Britain versus Jamaica and Israel). A high degree of political and organizational cohesion in the core tends to breed peripheral states which are potential members of the core sector, while a high degree of social cohesion in the core tends to preclude peripheral states from having such potentialities (see Table 1).

There is frequently disaffection between the core and the periphery. Among the fifteen subordinate systems of the world, some form of tension between the two sectors is especially severe in the Middle East, East Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and South Asia. Only in Southeast Asia and North Africa does tension within the core exceed the tension between the sectors. As for tension within the periphery, this hardly exists, because of the low level of interaction in the periphery. The major exceptions are Greece and Turkey (when Turkey is viewed as a member of the West European periphery); Albania and Yugoslavia in East Europe, the Koreas in East Asia, and Ethiopia and the Somali Republic in East Africa. States which are potentially part of the core and those which are not seem to be equally likely to find themselves in antagonistic relationships with their core. In some cases the differences which contribute to the difficulty of becoming part of the core create an antagonistic relationship with some or all of the core states (for example, Israel, Pakistan, Mauritania), although frequently the potentiality of joining the core itself seems to create alienation and conflict (for example, Taiwan, Albania, and Cuba).

IV. The Intrusive System

An intrusive system consists of the politically significant participation of external powers in the international relations of the subordinate system. While the core and peripheral sectors both involve the states located within the region, an analysis of almost every region reveals that these states are not the only ones which play a role in the activities

of the subordinate system. As one would expect in an international system with a hierarchy consisting of seven types of nations, external countries involve themselves in the international politics of subordinate systems other than their own. This pattern is only absent in the North American core and in the Soviet Union, where the level of power is extremely high. Additionally, in the core of North America, the level of cooperation between the two members, the United States and Canada, is extremely high.¹⁷

There are two types of externally based regional participation: **politically significant involvement and politically insignificant involvement.** Politically insignificant involvement comprises material aid, trade, economic investment, and cultural and educational efforts which do not usually produce participation in the balance of power of the region. Middle powers, and to some degree secondary powers, are most likely to undertake this type of involvement. Spanish involvement in the Middle East and Canadian aid to India are examples. Much of Japanese and West German aid (except West Germany's activity in East European politics and its Hallstein Doctrine) has not been politically motivated or accompanied by a desire to participate in local international relations. These conditions may change, however.

Politically significant involvement, on the other hand, produces participation in the balance of power of the subordinate system and may affect the dominant system's balance as well. This participation is expressed by the possession of a colony; economic or military aid producing an alteration in the balance of power in the region; formal alliance, troop commitment, or any agreement which causes the external power to act in ways which resemble the types of actions that would ordinarily be taken by a country indigenous to the region. This type of involvement is also determined by reference to the objectives, power, motivation, location, and international position of the intruding nation. Since only politically significant members can be defined as being members of the intrusive system, we will primarily be concerned here with these types of external powers. Even politically significant involvement by one state, once identified as such, has to be judged further in relation to other intrusive powers. Thus, for example, Australia and Portugal meet the minimum requirements for politically significant involvement in Southeast Asia, but their participation is nowhere near as significant as that of the United States, China, or the Soviet Union.

¹⁷ It might be suggested that French and British involvement in Canada is in form similar to intrusive action in other subordinate systems. The authors rejected this interpretation, however, because of both the indigenous power of Canada and its close relationship with the U.S.

We can isolate nine characteristic ways in which external powers participate in the politics of a given region. These are: multilateral arrangements; bilateral arrangements; trade and economic investment; possession of a colony; military intervention; subversion; use of the United Nations; cultural and educational activities; and propaganda. All of these are employed in one situation or another by politically significant external powers, while a few—particularly the economic and cultural avenues—are used occasionally by those which are politically insignificant.

These characteristic ways of participation in the intrusive system have both positive and negative effects upon the four pattern variables of the subordinate system: cohesion, communications, power, and the structure of relations.

Cohesion: The social, economic, political, and organizational aspects of the cohesion of a subordinate system are affected in a number of ways by the participation of an external power. Social cohesion can be enhanced by the educational efforts of an external power, if these efforts reinforce the pre-existing educational and linguistic patterns within the system. An example of this type of activity is the continued educational efforts of the French in their former colonies in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Another way an intrusive power may affect social cohesion is to assist in the transfer of populations (for example, the Russians, in moving the German and Polish populations westward after World War II). In general, however, external powers are less able to affect social cohesion as such. Economic cohesion can be increased if economic assistance programs have as their aim the enhancement of economic complementarity through the encouragement of industrialization, improved methods of agriculture, or economic integration. Examples of external attempts to influence economic cohesion include American efforts in Latin America and West Europe, Russian efforts in East Europe, and British efforts in East Africa. In each case the purpose of external pressure and effort has been at least in part the encouragement of a division of labor within the region. The effect of external participation upon political cohesion may be seen when the support of a given power serves to perpetuate a conservative, radical, or moderate regime in power, or to prevent a particular type of regime from coming to power, thereby reinforcing or reducing cleavages within the system. In addition, there are instances where the concern of an external power with regional security arrangements or economic arrangements has either contributed to or hindered the organizational cohesion of a subordinate system. Intrusive powers have been able to act whether or not they have actually been members

of these international organizations (for example, NATO, CENTO, COMECON).

Communications: External powers influence communications within subordinate systems in a variety of ways. Economic assistance programs have aided in mail delivery and telephone and telegraph facilities. In a variety of circumstances they have also led to improvements in transportation systems and have expedited the introduction of radio and television. The activities of an external power in a region can also encourage interchange of elite groups. Diplomatic visits and education within the region have been promoted by intrusive powers. Moreover, students and diplomats have found themselves in contact with members of other elite groups of their own region, on the territory of an intrusive power, at its universities, and at conferences sponsored by it.

Level of Power: It is upon the pattern variable of level of power that external powers have perhaps their greatest effect. External powers can promote the material power of members of subordinate systems by providing economic aid, food, technical assistance, favorable trade terms, birth control assistance, teachers, and administrative advice. Of more direct effect on the balance of power of a subordinate system is a change in military power. In ascending order of importance, the types of this kind of aid external powers can give members of the subordinate system are: economic aid which frees funds for arms purchases; grants or sales of arms and the training necessary for the use of these arms; transfer of the technology, know-how, and material necessary to permit indigenous manufacture of weaponry; and finally, the commitment of troops.

Of the three factors of power, the motivational factor is here the most significant. Through their participation in the region, external powers may affect the political, social, and ideological direction which particular nations in the subordinate system follow. Exterior powers will decide whether to support existing governments or whether to support opposition or rebellious groups, and they may either moderate or encourage the desire of indigenous countries for increased influence of their own. External powers may then play an essential role in determining which elite comes to power in a large number of states of the region and which kinds of political institutions will prevail. In extreme cases, they may even affect the number of states which exist in the subordinate system.

Structure of Relations: As this analysis of the risks attendant upon the involvement of intrusive powers suggests, external powers affect

and indeed at times determine the structure of relations within a subordinate system. The high degree of cooperation in both East Europe and Latin America is affected by the primacy of the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, in these intrusive systems. It is interesting to note that when either the United States or the Soviet Union loses power in either of these regions, regional conflict tends to be aggravated. On the other hand, the competition of intrusive powers exacerbates conflict in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, East Asia, North Africa, and West Africa. In the Middle East and Southeast Asia particularly, sustained crisis and direct military conflict have become prevalent as the conflicts of the dominant and subordinate systems have fused.

The type of military aid and involvement of intrusive powers affects the means of relations. Consultation and amelioration are facilitated by one or more of the intrusive powers in West Europe, Latin America, East Europe, North Africa, and South Asia. In Southeast Asia and the Middle East, on the other hand, massive military aid has raised the level of conflict and made it far more dangerous. In addition, China has contributed to the turmoil in Southeast Asia through its conceptual and practical assistance in guerrilla warfare. The great influence of the intrusive powers upon the means of relations in Southeast Asia is attested to by the fact that regional wars are frequently accompanied by peace conferences attended by several great powers.

Intrusive powers usually have less influence on the causes of relations than on the other elements of the structure of relations. They may not be responsible for local religious and racial rivalries, but as we have already suggested they are capable of fanning the flames of contention by introducing ideological rivalries, by imposing their own political competitions on the area, and by encouraging local adventurism. The division of Korea and of Vietnam may be cited as examples of external powers influencing local conflict. In like manner, although to a lesser extent, they can organize local blocs and alliances to support their policies (for example, NATO, Warsaw Pact) and thereby enforce cooperation among local parties. In general, the experience of intrusive powers has been that it is easier to impose conflict than cooperation upon the members of a subordinate system.

External powers can thus serve to intensify or reduce the level of conflict of subordinate systems. Their presence may encourage division or integration among the nation-states of these areas. Intrusive powers may promote regional associations as a means of extending their control or of aiding the economic development of the indigenous states. On the other hand, their presence may limit regional cohesiveness and produce fissiparous tendencies. Whatever their effect, the

external powers must be viewed as an integral part of the international politics of almost every region without which the form of each subordinate system would be considerably dissimilar.

V. Relations Between Subordinate Systems

The final subject to be considered here is the relationship between subordinate systems. We can distinguish two fundamental types of such relationships, that oriented toward cohesion and that oriented toward power. Relations which are oriented toward cohesion are based primarily (although not solely) on the effect of the first two pattern variables: cohesion and communications. They tend to occur among subordinate systems which are geographically proximate, have similar political and social backgrounds, and have a high degree of interaction. Examples of such relations between systems are the Middle East and North Africa, and Central Africa and West Africa. Power-oriented relations are influenced primarily by the pattern variables of level of power and the structure of relations, and are characterized by the presence of intrusive systems. The most powerful subordinate systems are the most highly interactive. In general, relations oriented toward cohesion exist between regions which are similar in power, and power-oriented relations exist between subordinate systems unequal in power. Of course, subordinate systems do not always relate to each other as a whole; in particular cases, one sector or even one country may be more important than others in determining the pattern of relations with another region. In individual cases, then, we must investigate the countries or group of countries which relate to another system, as well as the role of the periphery and the core in these relations.

Let us select a single subordinate system by way of illustration. In the Middle East, relations with North America, the Soviet Union, West Europe, East Europe, and, to a minor degree, East Asia are power-oriented. They are determined largely by the level of power and the spectrum of relations with geographic proximity also playing an important role in some cases. On the other hand, the factors of cohesion and communications are particularly—although not solely—significant in the cohesive relations of most Middle Eastern states with North Africa and, to a much lesser degree, with West, East, and Central Africa. Factors of cohesion and geographic proximity are most important in the region's cohesive relations with South Asia and, to a lesser extent, in its cohesive relations with Southeast Asia, where the Islamic solidarity between most of the Middle East and Malaysia and Indonesia is the most significant influence. Israel, unlike the other

states in the Middle East, conducts power-oriented relations with many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and parts of Latin America.

Besides identifying the factors which contribute to relations between two or more systems, it is necessary to form some estimate of the intensity of these relations between subordinate systems. In this regard, one of the most significant indices is the degree of shared participation in international organizations, which may operate either toward cohesion or power. For example, OECD and NATO represent the cohesive interconnectedness of West Europe and North America, but they also are significantly power-oriented. The Arab League is an indicator of the cohesive ties between the Middle East and North Africa, and the OAU links the various regions of Africa in a broader manner. To a lesser extent, power-oriented organizations encourage more cohesive relations between subordinate systems: the Colombo Plan has encouraged greater cohesive contacts between South and Southeast Asia; OCAM links Francophonic Africa; the British Commonwealth, in a much broader way, has served to increase incipient cohesive links between a variety of subordinate systems. In this way, international organizations like OECD, NATO, the OAU, OCAM, the Arab League, and the British Commonwealth can be viewed as supraregional in character; that is to say, they tend to function as aggregators of regions. By providing forums for greater interchange they enable particular subordinate systems to intensify their interactions toward either cohesion or power.

Thus, relations between subordinate systems, while largely unstructured and uneven, can have a significant effect upon the international politics of particular areas of the world. The relationships between diverse subordinate systems, between individual countries in different regions, and between cores or peripheries of different regions, can affect local balances, local intrusive systems, and the dominant system. Consequently, in any complete analysis of the international system it is insufficient to consider each subordinate system in isolation. Its relationship to other systems must also be explored.

VI. Conclusion

We have been engaged in the exploratory venture of attempting to characterize the nature of the international relations of a region. As our point of departure, we have endeavored to treat the region as a unit of analysis unto itself, a unit which possesses its own internal dynamic processes. We have attempted to do this by means of an

inductively arrived at classificatory system which can be used to specify how the subordinate system can be identified and what its component elements can be said to be: core sector, peripheral sector, and intrusive system. Our introduction of the four pattern variables—level of cohesion, nature of communications, level of power, and the structure of relations—was intended to establish that these matrical elements are of intrinsic importance to the delineation and understanding of the core and peripheral sectors and the intrusive system.

As part of the four pattern variables, we included a seven step ranking system to estimate the level of power of each member state of the international system, as well as a spectrum of international relations which encompasses conditions of cooperation and antagonism. We attempted to show, by means of these categories, that both antagonistic and cooperative relationships contribute to the delineation of a subordinate system and its sectors. Both antagonistic and cooperative relationships exist within the core and the peripheral sector and between the core and peripheral sectors, and these assist us in identifying a particular subordinate system.

We cannot fully understand the inner dynamics of a subordinate system, however, until the effects of politically significant participation by external powers in what we have called the "intrusive" system have been added. Only a consideration of the antagonism and cooperation inculcated within the subordinate system by external powers can provide a complete panorama of the full network of relations at work within any particular subordinate system. As we have seen, the support or withdrawal of support of an external power can radically alter the internal balance of a subordinate system.

Thus, our attempt here has been to provide a schema for the comparison of the international relations of regions. We have sought to produce a basis for analyzing units of international relations of diverse social and political backgrounds. Any such effort runs the risk of ignoring crucial factors or magnifying minor elements. We have entertained such a risk, being convinced of the significance of beginning to categorize and illustrate the patterns and processes at work in the intermediate arena of the international system—the subordinate system. For in this era of the collapse of European influence in international affairs and of the decolonization of formerly dependent peoples, the region has become one of the crucial units of international politics.