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III

Routledge Handbook of International Organization

Edited by Bob Reinalda

Routledge Handbook of International Organization

This *Handbook* brings together scholars whose essays discuss significant issues with regard to *international organization* as a process and *international organizations* as institutions. Although the focus is on intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations are discussed where relevant. The handbook is divided into six parts:

- Documentation, data sets and sources
- International secretariats as bureaucracies
- Actors within international bureaucracies
- Processes within international bureaucracies
- Challenges to international organizations, and
- Expanding international architectures.

The state-of-the-art articles are meant for current and future generations of scholars to enjoy, working in and further exploring the field, and are also of great interest to practitioners of international organization and global governance.

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Abbreviations

3G	Global Governance Group
AANFTA	ASEAN–ANZCERTA Free Trade Agreement
ACMECS	Ayeyawady–Chao Phraya–Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ACTA	Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
ACUNS	Academic Council of the United Nations System
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEMM	ASEAN–EEC Ministerial Meeting
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AI	Amnesty International
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
ALLBUS	Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AMF	Asian Monetary Fund
ANES	American National Election Studies
ANZCERTA	Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
APC	Asia–Pacific Consultations
APEC	Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSR	*American Political Science Review*
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia–Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
BASIC Forum	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BCBS	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BSE	Mad cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy)
C20	Committee of Twenty
C2C	College-to-College

CACM	Central American Common Market
CAN	Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones)
CAQDAS	Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis
CARICOM	Caribbean Community CARIFORUM Caribbeab Forum
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum
CBHA	Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies
CCS	Comparative Candidates Survey
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDD	Ghana Center for Democratic Development (Ghana)
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEPEA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CER	Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement
CES	Central European state
ChinCom	China Committee
CIREFCA	International Conference on Central American Refugees
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CMI	Chiang Mai Initiative
CMW	Commission on Migrant Workers
CNEP	Comparative National Elections Project
CoCom	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CoE	Council of Europe
COMECON	see CMEA
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONCORD	Confédération européenne des ONG pour l'aide d'urgence et le développement
CoNGO	Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations Economic and Social Council
Coreper	Committee of Permanent Representatives (Comité des représentents permanents)
COW	Correlates of War
CPA	Comprehensive Action Plan on Indochinese Refugees
CPD	Country Programme Document
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDI	Comparative Survey Design and Implementation
CSDS	Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (New Delhi)
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
CSO	Civil society organization
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DARIO	*Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations*
DEU	Decision making in the European Union Data
DG	Directorate-General

DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
DHL	The Dag Hammarskjöld Library
DIDP	Development-Induced Displacement
DODIS	Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
DP	for UNDP
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSU	Dispute Settlement Understanding
E Europe	Eastern European Group
EAC	East African Community
EAS	East Asia Summit
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community/Communities
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECB	European Central Bank
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECR	European Court (of Justice) Reports
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EES	European Election Studies
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMAS	Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
EMIFCA	Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESS	European Social Survey
ETS	European Treaty Series
EU	European Union
EVS	European Values Study
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FSB	Financial Stability Board

FSF	Financial Stability Forum
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
FTT	Financial Transaction Tax
GAB	General Arrangements to Borrow
GAOR	General Assembly Official Record
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBS	Globalbarometer Surveys
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GCLN	Global Compact Local Network
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GMG	Global Migration Group
GOARN	Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
GONGO	Government–sponsored NGO
GRULAC	Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
GSS	General Social Survey
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HCR	for UNHCR
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAIS	International Association of Insurance Supervisors
IAMM	International Agenda for Migration Management
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IASC	International Accounting Standards Committee
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBSA	India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICA	International Commodity Agreement
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICARA	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICEF	for UNICEF
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
ICOW	Issue Correlates of War
ICPSR	Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies

IDA	International Development Association
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDD	Internal Displacement Division
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGAD–RCP	Intergovernmental Authority on Development – Regional Consultative Process
IGC	Intergovernmental Consultation
IGCR	Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IHR	International Health Regulations
ILC	International Law Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFC	International Monetary and Financial Committee
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IO BIO	*Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations*
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOR–ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IOSCO	International Organization of Securities Commissions
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPE	International Political Economy
IPR	Institute of Pacific Relations
IR	International Relations
IRO	International Refugee Organization
ISIPR	International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISR	Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITLOS	International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
ITO	International Trade Organization
ITU	International Telegraph Union/International Telecommunication Union
ITU–R	ITU Radiocommunication Sector
ITU–T	ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
LDC	Least-Developed Country
LMU	Latin Monetary Union
LONSEA	League of Nations Search Engine
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science
MAP	Mutual Assessment Process

MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Cono Sur)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MID	Militarized Interstate Dispute
MIDSA	Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa
MIDWA	Migration Dialogue for West Africa
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MSF	Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières)
MTM	Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration
MTOPS	Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement
MZES	Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung
NAASP	New Asian–African Strategic Partnership
NAB	New Arrangements to Borrow
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Movement of Non-Aligned Countries/Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NSF	National Science Foundation
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
ODS	Official Document System of the United Nations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OEOA	Office of Emergency Operations in Africa
OFFP	Oil-for-Food Programme
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OIHP	International Office of Public Health (Office International d'Hygiène Publique)
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLAF	Anti-Fraud Office (EU)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Public Administration
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PACO	Programme d'appui au cofinancement
PAFTAD	Pacific Trade and Development Conference
PBEC	Pacific Basin Economic Council
PCIJ	Permanent Court of International Justice
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PICMME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
PID	Project Information Document

PIPA	Program on International Policy Attitudes
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMC	Permanent Mandates Commission
PPVI	Public–Private Voluntary Initiative
PRSP	*Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (IMF)
PSC	Pan-Pacific Science Congress
PSM	Public Service Motivation
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
PV	Procès Verbal
PWC	Pan-Pacific Women's Conference
Quad	Canada, the Commission of the EEC/EU, Japan, the US
Quartet	EU, Russia, the UN and the US
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCP	Regional Consultative Process
RIA	Regional Integration Agreement
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RSP/RIP	Regional Strategy Paper/Regional Indicative Programme
RTA	Regional Trade Agreement
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACM	South American Conference on Migration
SACN	South American Community of Nations
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SAPTA	South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SG	Secretary-General
SICA	Central American Integration System
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNE	Seconded National Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOPE	Status of Projects in Execution
SR	Summary Record
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSDS	Social Science Data Service
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Network
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UFC	Uniting for Consensus
UIA	Union of International Associations
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UN-Habitat	UN Human Settlements Programme
UNAIDS	Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCED	UN Conference on Environment and Development
UNCLOS	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDG	UN Development Group
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	UN Fund for Population Activities/UN Population Fund
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNHCR	(Office of the) UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN International Children's Emergency Fund/UN Children's Fund
UNIHP	United Nations Intellectual History Project
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNPBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSCOP	UN Special Committee on Palestine
URD	Urgence Réhabilitation Développement (Groupe URD)
US	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USD	US dollar
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (Soviet Union)
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations for Cooperation in Emergencies
WEOG	Western European and Others Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WVS	World Values Survey
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association
ZA	Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
ZUMA	Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, Mannheim

This volume

The *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* gives an overview of international organization as a dynamic field of research that adds to our understanding of global and regional relations and related domestic politics. It brings together scholars whose essays discuss significant issues with regard to *international organization* as a process and *international organizations* (IOs) as institutions. Although the focus is on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are discussed where relevant. The state-of-the-art articles are meant for current and future generations of scholars to enjoy, working in and further exploring the field.

The handbook is divided into six parts:

I   Documentation, data sets and sources
II   International secretariats as bureaucracies
III   Actors within international bureaucracies
IV   Processes within international bureaucracies
V   Challenges to international organizations
VI   Expanding international architectures

It begins with a history of international organization as a field of research since 1910, with sections on the early years, functionalism, less and more nuanced realism, opening up the black box, regimes and institutions (rather than organizations), the English School, constructivism, multilaterism, NGOs, neo-institutionalism and the internal functioning of organizations (Chapter 1).

The *first part* of the volume draws attention to relevant documentation, data sets, sources and ideas. James Church and Michael McCaffrey provide an overview of available information and documentation on IGOs, which is crucial with regard to primary sources on the official workings of the most important global and regional IGOs. Even if these are increasingly available on the Internet, one needs to understand the specific directives of these information resources in order to find one's way through (Chapter 2). Erik Gartzke and Christina Schneider give a summary of the insights that have been gained from analyzing the famous Correlates of War database (on the effects of IGOs on peace) and some other organization-specific data sets (Chapter 3). Erik Voeten reviews 60 years of analyses that use the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voting data, both to discover voting patterns and (an entirely different purpose) construct indicators of similarity in state preferences (Chapter 4). Elizabeth Bloodgood and Hans Peter Schmitz present an overview of the main challenges of advancing a multidisciplinary research agenda on international NGOs (INGOs) and discuss methodological innovations recently introduced to INGO scholarship, such as agent-based modelling,

social network analysis and computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (Chapter 5). Since the 1990s, systematic cross-national public opinion surveys to observe social and political changes have expanded. Marta Lagos and Yun-han Chu offer a comprehensive view of the major data sets, which include international comparative surveys such as the World Values Survey and regional 'barometers' such as the Eurobarometer, Latinobarómetro and Asian Barometer (Chapter 6).

Davide Rodogno, Shaloma Gauthier and Francesca Piana discuss the historians' point of view by reviewing the *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (2009) and the League of Nations Search Engine (LONSEA), available since 2010, two tools that will help future historical studies of IGOs and NGOs (Chapter 7). Andrew Hurrell and Nicholas Lees discuss international organizations and the notion of equality. As part of the history of ideas, they examine the interplay of ideas and practices of equality (and inequality) within IOs. During the twentieth century the focus of the debate shifted from inter-state equality to questions of global and inter-personal equality. They argue that although much changed, older hierarchical conceptions of order remained extraordinarily influential in that period (Chapter 8). Richard Collins and Nigel White explore the legal autonomy of IGOs and illustrate the complexities of this recognition by international law by reflecting on the need to balance institutional autonomy with the demands of accountability and responsibility, an area in which legal doctrine is still in its infancy (Chapter 9).

The volume's *second part* examines the international secretariats of IGOs. Jörn Ege and Michael Bauer look at what could be called international bureaucracy research at the intersection of public administration and international relations (IR) theory. In their theoretical overview they argue that the more IR research becomes an analysis of international policy making, the more important it is to systematically consider the bureaucratic dimension of governance (Chapter 10). Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner do this in the field of international environmental governance. They have identified major manifestations of how international bureaucracies influence the behaviour of other actors (as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators and capacity builders) and explain the variation in degree and type of their influence. They argue that it is the bureaucracies within IGOs, their staff and leaders and the way they structure their work that matter with regard to IGO influence (Chapter 11). Jarle Trondal assesses the relationship between bureaucratic structure and the administrative behaviour of international civil servants by comparing two enduring behavioural patterns: a logic of hierarchy (steering signals from above) and a logic of portfolio (informed decisions). He provides an organizational theory approach to account for variation in administrative behaviour, which he applies to three seemingly different IGOs (Chapter 12).

Alexandru Grigorescu explains democratic deficit, accountability and transparency as the concepts that describe developments related to bureaucratic oversight in IGOs. He discusses why such oversight mechanisms recently emerged in so many IGOs and clarifies the variance in their application across organizations (Chapter 13). Felicity Vabulas examines why IGOs grant consultative status to NGOs and develops an argument that leverages an original data set of consultative status across the 300 or so IGOs in the Correlates of War IGO database. She argues that NGOs can provide information on whether states are adhering to or breaching the IGO agreement and then present this information in formal IGO meetings (Chapter 14).

The *third part* of the volume discusses actors within international bureaucracies. Yolanda Kemp Spies recognizes that in the early twenty-first century multilateral diplomacy is a growth industry, which is more institutionalized, codified, taught and practised than ever before, and analyzes the mandates, roles, functions and challenges of modern multilateral

diplomats (Chapter 15). Kent Kille reviews the somewhat scattered literature on Secretaries-General of IGOs by focusing on their leadership capacity and qualities, and argues that research on them should use carefully constructed analytical frameworks in order to allow for proper testing and cumulation of knowledge (Chapter 16). Manuel Fröhlich discusses another group of well-known but barely researched IGO actors, the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General, based on his database of these diplomats. He examines their origin, the legal and political basis of their work, some data on their development and offers perspectives for the evaluation of their work (Chapter 17).

What do we know about multilateral diplomats from former communist countries? Jacek Czaputowicz investigates the roles played by multilateral diplomats of Central European states in the League of Nations, which strengthened the statehood of the new nation-states during the Cold War, when the foreign policies were subordinated to those of the Soviet Union, and after 1989, when multilateral diplomats once again needed to gain experience in working within the framework of universal and regional IGOs (Chapter 18). Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Sabine Saurugger discuss the professionalization process that has taken place within international NGOs in the humanitarian sector as part of bureaucratization. The process is closely related to the international governance structure in the humanitarian sector that has emerged during the last 20 years, with the UN system and the European Union (EU) as its two core components, resulting in a growth of complexity (Chapter 19). Based on their own data set, Simon Anderfuhren-Biget, Ursula Häfliger and Simon Hug consider the values and motivations of international employees, a neglected issue in the literature on IGOs. They examine whether IGO staff hold a particular set of values, as is suggested by the literature. Their empirical analysis does not support value socialization of IGO staff, but rather confirms the existence of a particular type of cosmopolitan elite, with a specific set of values and motivations (Chapter 20).

The volume's *fourth part* deals with processes occurring within international bureaucracies. Didier Georgakakis examines the transformations that are taking place in the homogeneity, common culture and *esprit de corps* of the EU's civil service. This is not only a matter of values and culture, but also of change in terms of power and centre of attraction, i.e. a devaluation to the advantage of more casual international bureaucrats (Chapter 21). Analyzing the overwhelming UN bureaucracy, Thomas Weiss argues that the reinvigoration of its international civil service should be a priority, in particular from the perspective that 'people matter' and that the quality and impact of the staff members can be improved (Chapter 22).

Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis discuss the role and power of those who are given a certain amount of authority to chair negotiations and ensure their smooth and effective conduct. Analyses of the office revolve around tasks and functions, effectiveness and the chair's autonomy vis-à-vis the constituent principals. The authors stress the need for further research into how autonomy-prone chairs bypass the IGO's control mechanisms to expand the boundaries of autonomous action (Chapter 23). Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek consider the role IGOs play when they are called on for help in emergency situations. The literature barely pays attention to this matter or to the extensive literature on crisis decision making in foreign policy, while the latter pays hardly any attention to IGOs. They advocate the combination of the two fields of study in order to grasp the role of IGOs during today's globalized crises (Chapter 24). Heidi Hardt focuses on the informal level of international negotiations, arguing that scholars have largely overlooked the impact of informal rules and norms in IGOs, while much negotiating happens behind closed doors and in other informal settings. She traces the origins, influence and application of informal norms in the context of international negotiations (Chapter 25).

Jean-Frédéric Morin and María Martín-de-Almagro re-discuss the various stages of the issue life cycle. Their approach, which differs from the more common norms, discourses and policy approaches, looks closely at the last stages of the cycle. The most influential actors at the agenda-setting stage may end up being the least satisfied once the policy decision is being implemented. Rhetorically entrapped actors therefore may break with path dependency processes in order to regain greater discursive autonomy. The authors call this strategic retreat forward 'issucide' (Chapter 26). Thorsten Benner, Steffen Eckhard and Philipp Rotmann outline the state of research into organizational learning in international bureaucracies. They recognize conditions under which IGOs learn that are more complicated than external shocks or moments of crisis alone and identify a number of factors that influence learning outcomes. However, a comprehensive framework to explain the process and outcomes of the interplay still needs to be developed (Chapter 27).

The *fifth part* of the volume considers various challenges to IGOs. Thomas Dörfler and Madeleine Hosli explain the difficulties of reforming the UN Security Council, using path dependency approaches and veto player theory. They show member-state preferences and possible compositions if current power indicators guided representation. Their analysis highlights reasons for institutional 'stickiness', but also possible avenues for change (Chapter 28). John Trent discusses the need to rethink the UN from another perspective, by arguing that civil society is likely to be the best source of leadership to modernize the institution. He advocates a critical dialogue on global governance from this perspective (Chapter 29).

As IGOs have become one of the most frequent sanctioning actors, Dursun Peksen assesses the body of scholarship that examines the use, effectiveness and possible unintended consequences of multilateral economic sanctions under the auspices of IGOs. The balance between economic coercion and unintended damage to civilians' well-being and political freedoms remains delicate, and our understanding of the efficacy of coercion combined with incentives is still incomplete (Chapter 30). Patrick Bernhagen and Kelly Kollman deal with the encouragement and orchestration of voluntary codes by IGOs (such as the UN Global Compact) in order to share the task of global governance with private actors. They examine the conditions that encourage corporations to participate in public–private voluntary initiatives and conclude that the extent to which voluntary codes actually improve corporate performance is still open to debate (Chapter 31).

Anna van der Vleuten and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann look at inter-regionalism as the process and outcome of political and economic interactions between regional IGOs. Their stocktaking exercise refutes the EU's centrality in inter-regionalism, because it also has developed between and within other world regions, often with the intention of balancing EU influence (Chapter 32). How did IGOs develop in what is now called Asia and the Pacific? Tomoko Akami and Jiro Okamoto discuss the history and character of IGOs in this region and see a multilayered structure of forum-driven international institutions that may look disorderly, but serves as a pragmatic mechanism to ease potential contentions (Chapter 33).

The *sixth part* of the volume reviews some expanding international architectures. Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke provide a sketch of the genealogy and growth of international judicial institutions. They hint at an understanding of international courts and tribunals as organs of the international community, rather than as instruments in the hands of state parties, and discuss the authority they exercise as institutions of global governance (Chapter 34). Raquel Freitas explores the evolution in the closely interrelated refugee and migration regimes and concludes that the regulation of human mobility is fragmented, with differences in the degree of normative and institutional centralization of hierarchy (Chapter 35).

Dries Lesage provides an overview of the architecture of international monetary and financial governance, with three basic logics propelling the architecture's permanent expansion, which he terms functional, geopolitical and managerial. Moments of crisis often pave the way for substantial institutional reform and the general direction of these reforms is towards the strengthening and increased sophistication of the architecture (Chapter 36). Montserrat González Garibay stresses the coherence of the global trade architecture, although such coherence may not be distinguished at first sight, given the plurality of trade arrangements. The struggle with fragmentation takes place in negotiation structures, issues and the relationship between multilateral and preferential trade liberalization (Chapter 37).

Finally, Mélanie Albaret discusses the transformation of multilaterism as the result of 'club practices' (in the form of the G7, G20 or G77) and their interactions with IGOs. She argues that these indicate both a search for new forms of governance and the will to perpetuate a status quo, yet also raises the broader question of the socio-historical changes at play in multilaterism (Chapter 38).

1

International organization as a field of research since 1910

Bob Reinalda

The international relations' (IR) subfield of 'international organization' (IO) is quite old and still widening. Although 'international regime' and 'international institution' became broader terms, no one has suggested using these to indicate the subfield. International organization is a set term used by political scientists, as well as scholars from other disciplines such as international law, economics and anthropology. When political scientist Paul Reinsch published his *Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization* in 1911, he argued that traditional ideas of international law were in need of revision: 'the realm of international organization is an accomplished fact' (Reinsch 1911: 4).

Within the restrictions of an article and aware that reality is far more detailed and nuanced, this chapter attempts to sketch the emergence and evolution of the field as an invitation to current and future generations of scholars to enjoy working in it. International organization is a dynamic field of research that adds to our understanding of international relations and related domestic politics.

The early years of the field

When Reinsch published his book various institutions had begun to document international relations and international organizations, among them the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the United States (US), set up in 1910 to hasten the abolition of international war. It published the somewhat older journal *International Conciliation* as the first professional journal in the field of IR. Andrew Carnegie, who had helped to establish numerous public and university libraries, also contributed to the Peace Palace Library, opened in The Hague in 1913, which specialized in international law and diplomacy to service the various international courts in the same building. The first listings of IOs were published by the Institut international de la paix in the first series of *L'Annuaire de la vie internationale* (Monaco, 1905–7). The volumes of the second series (1908–9) were coproduced with the Union of International Associations (set up 1908 in Brussels under the patronage of the Belgian government) and the 1910 and 1911 editions were published with the support of the Carnegie Endowment. The League of Nations continued these series by publishing similar sourcebooks in French and English as *Répertoire des organisations internationales / Handbook*

of International Organizations (1921, 1923), *Répertoire des organisations internationales* (1925, 1936) and *Handbook of International Organizations* (1926, 1929, 1938).

British and American delegates at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference conceived the idea of an Anglo-American institute of international affairs, but it resulted in two separate independent think tanks, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (also known as Chatham House), founded in London in 1921, and the Council on Foreign Relations, set up in Washington, DC in 1922. Rather than being public opinion-focused, the Graduate Institute of International Relations in Geneva was established in 1927 as an academic institution awarding degrees. Other philanthropic organizations supporting scholarship in IR were the Rockefeller Foundation, established in 1913, and the Ford Foundation of 1936. Olson and Groom (1991) believe that the field barely could have progressed in this formative era without such philanthropic assistance, but also refer to the negative effect that scholars sometimes were tempted to trim their proposals according to the whims of foundation officers. An incentive to study world affairs objectively came from the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, which began its work in Paris in 1926 under League of Nations auspices. One of its activities was to encourage joint research by scientists from different states into, among other topics, IR. Thus, during the 1930s, subjects such as collective security, peaceful change and the use of economic policy as a means to peace were placed on the agenda. The subject of IOs was agreed upon in 1939, just before the outbreak of the war. Olson and Groom (1991: 74–6) showed that the study of IR could develop only in a few democratic countries, where it enjoyed indirect government support without being subject to official control, whereas in authoritarian states the study existed as an explanation and justification of state policy.

With regard to international organization the young study of IR inclined towards what may be called 'global social engineering' based on 'grand design'. Both the social-liberal economist John Hobson (1915) and the publisher and publicist Leonard Woolf (1916) used the term 'international government' when they published detailed plans for an international peace organization. These plans were based on the idea that peace as a condition had to be actively and jointly promoted. The experiences of nineteenth-century IOs, called public international unions (see Reinsch's book title and Reinalda 2009), were manifested in their encompassing plans. With regard to fundamental ideas, Hobson and Woolf built upon those individuals who had much earlier put forward so-called peace plans, such as the Abbé de Saint Pierre (see Ter Meulen 1917), and the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant (*Perpetual Peace*, 1795), in which these philosophers had advanced proposals for the creation of IOs through the designing of structures and the assignment of functions to these structures.

Based upon 14 IR textbooks published between 1919 and 1931, Olson and Groom (1991: 69) showed the various topics the textbook authors discuss, listed in order of frequency. Of the nine topics, 'international organization' holds second place, after 'diplomatic history' (first place) and before 'economic aspects of world affairs' (third) and 'international law' (fifth). Between 1931, the year in which the League of Nations failed to stem Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and 1941, when the US entered the Second World War, the mainstream IR texts continued to cover IOs designed to prevent war, consistent with the literature of the previous period. Olson and Groom (1991: 69) asked the question as to what extent this literature was 'idealist internationalist'. They concluded that the literature of the 1920s did not particularly reflect this paradigm.

> All of the authors possessed an international, as contrasted to a narrowly nationalistic, outlook. None of them thought for a moment that war as a human institution was over for good. To be sure, public opinion was now more important than ever before, but it served only to extend the political process, not to replace it.

They believed it was 'not an exaggeration to say that the new IR literature was designed to overcome some of the dubious assumptions and hopeful expectations of the idealists, widespread as their influence may seem to have been'. They discovered neither internationalist nor idealist predominance in the approximately 40 textbooks published in the entire period between 1916 and 1941. 'Even if by "idealist" we mean no more than stressing the efficacy of law and organization, only about half of these can be said to be even primarily idealistic in tone' (Olson and Groom 1991: 81).

A new way of thinking about cooperation between states

David Mitrany's (1948) liberal-utilitarian or functional-sociological approach can be seen to be in the global social engineering tradition, as he tried to look beyond the fighting during the Second World War. Using experience in wartime cooperation in shipping and the work of the League of Nations, he developed his ideas about functionalism 'as the basis for postwar planning' (Olson and Groom 1991: 98). Given the League's weaknesses his approach of a 'working peace system' was opposed to the political-constitutional approach dominant during the interwar period. Rather than beginning with the design of federal arrangements, such as the grand design of the League, with all their attendant legal and constitutional difficulties, Mitrany suggested that international cooperation should begin 'by dealing with specific transnational issues (such as disease control) where there was some prospect of applying specialised technical knowledge and where the success of such "functional" arrangements would lead to further efforts to replicate the experience in an ever-widening process' (Griffiths 1999: 191). Although his theoretical approach has been subject to grave criticisms, Mitrany attempted to introduce a new way of thinking about cooperation between states and as such has contributed to the development of the subfield of international organization.

Among those who built upon Mitrany's work was Ernest Haas, who recognized the difficulty of separating 'technical' from 'political' issues and attempted to understand the process whereby governmental elites are persuaded to shift their loyalties towards facilitating cooperation between their states, even if the gains from cooperation are unequally distributed. The formal institutions needed for this have to enjoy some autonomy from national governments in order to be effective and the whole process cannot work unless states accept the rule of law and majoritarian decision making. Progress on more technical and economic issues, with 'spill over' from one policy field to another, will lead to greater political cooperation and a decline of state sovereignty. In the early 1970s this neo-functionalism influenced the study of regional (Western European) integration. Its theoretical foundation was criticized and Haas (1975) himself was disenchanted with it. However, his approach clarified the ability of 'political entrepreneurs to apply consensual knowledge to the solution of common problems' (Griffiths 1999: 182).

Another student of closer relations between governments was Karl Deutsch, who in 1945 was a member of the international secretariat of the San Francisco Conference that established the United Nations (UN). In his work with other scholars (Deutsch et al. 1957) he pointed out that sovereign states can relate to each other in the form of 'pluralistic security communities'. With regard to the emergence of such a community in the North Atlantic area Deutsch did not accept a strong dichotomy between domestic politics and IR, nor did he see states as unified rational actors, since he regarded domestic politics and transnational relations as influences on relations between states. Both transactions between populations and the growth of integrative practices and institutions matter in generating diplomatic techniques that can diffuse problems and crises peacefully, the mutual willingness of governments to resolve their

differences at an organizational level and a common perception of threat regarding external actors (Griffiths 1999: 179).

Deutsch and the so-called English School of Hedley Bull and others (see later) can be positioned in the political thought that goes back to Hugo Grotius, by recognizing that an 'international society' exists when a group of states recognize certain common interests and values, regard themselves as bound by certain rules and share in the working of common institutions, such as customs and conventions of war, procedures of international law and the machinery of diplomacy and general international organization (Bull 1977: 13). This vision was not dominant in IR (realism was), but students of integration such as Haas and Deutsch 'undermined realism by first selecting developments in international relations that fitted realist predictions poorly and then explaining those developments by processes and actors outside the state' (Kahler 1997: 33).

Realism: less and more nuanced

The process of international organization also promoted the development of public international law as an academic discipline. During the nineteenth century the concept of the 'law of nations', as deriving from the law of nature, was steadily being abandoned and was moving towards positivism. But although international law developed as a system of rules governing the relations between sovereign states, and as such influenced thinking about IR, it has grown beyond that, with an open mind on the process of international organization and multilateral legal rule making.

The introduction of the concept of 'power politics' in IR theory as it was breaking away from international law caused the first great debate between different schools, with 'realists' on the one hand, armed with a theory grounded in human nature and state action and therefore prescient in its reading of IR, and liberal institutionalists on the other, often referred to as 'idealists', 'wedded to legal and institutional analysis and blind to the requirements of power politics' (Kahler 1997: 21). German emigrant Hans Morgenthau introduced the Continental European emphasis on power politics in American political science, which was professionalizing, and through the 'Chicago School' adopting the model of natural science for its research. However, when Morgenthau arrived in Chicago in 1943 his vision was not particularly welcomed, as the scientific movement of the 1920s and 1930s shared more goals and personnel with liberal institutionalism than it did with realism. 'Power politics was a dirty and forbidden word in the Chicago of his time' (ibid.: 26).

Nonetheless, realism ultimately established itself as the dominant IR paradigm with Edward Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1940) and Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* (1948). A caveat applies with regard to the term 'idealistic'. Cecelia Lynch (1994: 594) argued that Carr's labelling of peace actors as 'utopian', as opposed to 'realist', has created a stigma around attempts by social forces to influence the course of IR. 'This stigma has endured in both popular and theoretical parlance over the past fifty years and should be re-examined', as it prevents research into what actually happened. Portraying world federalists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as clumsy and insignificant obscured both their often very practical contributions to the functioning of IOs and the implementation of their policies, and the goodwill they created by their distribution of knowledge about the purposes and activities of IOs among citizens: qualities stressed by Mitrany and Deutsch. During the 1950s, IOs and international law were 'hardly regarded as the most exciting frontiers of research in the field', according to Kahler (1997: 29), as they had been 'tarred with the idealist brush'.

Realists recognize the existence of international law and IOs, but are 'careful not to overstate their importance in the search for power and peace' (Archer 2001: 122). Morgenthau in fact did pay attention to international law and organizations, which is to be appreciated, but he saw their contribution as 'modest' and as part of the general intercourse between states and governments. Functional IOs, even the UN, were not given any particular role in solving the problem of peace and transnational and international NGOs were not given real consideration. Morgenthau (1993: 255) characterized international law as 'primitive'. Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz (1979: 88) followed suit, neglecting IOs by arguing that they 'reveal their inability to act in important ways except with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the principal states concerned with the matters at hand'.

Inis Claude, Jr in his *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (1956, third edition 1964) provided a far more balanced approach, with his discussion of historical backgrounds, constitutional problems and approaches to peace through international organization. Like other realists, he saw international organization as a product of international politics between states, but his open mind allowed him to also see 'a mutuality of interaction, with international organization becoming a factor influencing the course of international politics' between states (Claude 1966: 7). He predicted that international organization might prove to be 'the most significant dynamic element in the developing reality of international relations' (Claude 1966: 4).

Claude's focus on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to a large extent excluded the realm of NGOs from his scope. F.S.L. Lyons, who, supported by the Council of Europe, published his *Internationalism in Europe 1815–1914* in 1963, included both IGOs and international NGOs. He found it curious that historians had largely neglected the nineteenth-century experiments in international government and organization, while international lawyers and political scientists had long studied them (Lyons 1963: 4). However, the historians' lack of attention is linked to the same dominant suggestion of IOs as not-really-important instruments of nation-states (see Rodogno et al. in this volume).

The field of international organization became well informed about IGOs after the trustees of the World Peace Foundation had decided in the spring of 1946 'to take definite action toward the dissemination of accurate information and informed comment on the manifold problems of international organization', a field that was becoming 'an increasingly important part of the study and understanding of international relations'. The requirement of 'a comparative knowledge of international organizations and why they have or have not worked in varying circumstances' resulted in the journal *International Organization* (Bundy 1947: 1–2), which in 1947 began to publish articles on and summaries of the activities of a wide variety of IGOs. These issues are still a rich source of empirical information and trends in the field. The *Annuaire des organisations internationales / Yearbook of International Organizations* was published in 1948, 1949 and 1950 and, based on an agreement with the UN, continued as the *Yearbook of International Organizations* from 1951–2 (Bloodgood 2011).

A new research programme: opening up the black box

The book Ernest Haas published in 1964, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*, is not always mentioned in overviews of his work, but he concurred with Claude's vision of international organization being a factor that influences the course of international politics. Haas developed an analytical framework that combines 'dynamic functionalism' with organization theory, leaving plenty of room for realist factors. He called it a rather 'eclectic' analysis (Haas 1964: vii, ix), but his framework revealed some interesting

elements of IO autonomy resulting from an interaction of organizational dynamics and environmental inputs. This helped to map the ways in which an IO may play a role of its own and make nation-states comply with its rules. By applying Philip Selznick's theories of bureaucracy and organizational growth – Selznick (1957) had published a book about leadership in administration – Haas was able to explain how an IO, in his case the International Labour Organization (ILO), acquires independence from its environment of states. He opened up the 'black box' to see what was going on inside. While Waltz (1979: 111) argues that leaders of IOs are 'not masters of the matters their organizations deal with' and are only concerned 'to secure the continuity and health of the organization', Haas pointed out that leadership of the bureaucracy may produce instruments which enable the organization to be politically active in IR and take measures which effectively intrude into the national domains of the member-states. Once leadership and motivated machinery have been built up internally, a process of choosing external clients and supporters and identifying competitors and enemies begins, followed by participation in the international game with regard to the matters concerning the IO. Hence, both internally directed management and externally oriented political pursuit are crucial for an executive's leadership. Applying organizational theory to IOs allowed Haas (1964: 111) to trace the possible patterns of outcomes: a minimum common denominator, splitting the difference, or upgrading the common interests of the parties. The third outcome resembles most what Deutsch (1966: 7) called the unpredictability of the organizations' responses to their environment and Arnold Wolfers' (1962: 22) recognition in the early 1960s that non-state actors affect the course of world events as well.

For his ILO study Haas had gone to Geneva, Switzerland, which at the time was the centre of IO studies; there he had discussions with Robert Cox, who was established at the ILO. In those days the Carnegie Endowment was located in Geneva and oriented towards studies of international organization, with Claude participating in research sessions sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment. In 1966 Claude introduced Cox to Harold Jacobson, who had come to Geneva on sabbatical leave to continue his study of international organization. Jacobson joined Cox, who directed a seminar at the Graduate Institute, and introduced the ideas developed by Robert Dahl in *Who Governs?* (1961). Pierre Gerbet from Paris put forward the idea of a comparative study of decision making in IOs, which resulted in a collaboration and the publication of Cox and Jacobson's *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (1973) (Cox 2004: 3).

Working with Jacobson introduced Cox to the American political science of the 1960s in the behavioural mode. He was fascinated by it then, but later developed his own methodological ideas (Cox 1997). Essential to understanding how the process of international organization worked in the late 1960s was the recognition that one has to start with an assessment of the real forces (the realist basis for this), but also that 'the process itself adds something over and above an inventory of the material capabilities of those forces' (Cox 2004: 5). Eight IOs were scrutinized in the *Anatomy* book, based on the common framework developed by Cox and Jacobson, which Jacobson also applied in his *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System* (1979). They discerned several types of decisions and, following the ideas of David Easton (1965) on political systems, saw IOs as political systems with linkages to member-states, rather than as independent islands of activity. The political system of an IO consists of two subsystems, a 'representative' one consisting of states and a 'participant' one consisting of all actors involved. While representative subsystems are 'oligarchic', participant subsystems can be either 'monarchic' (administered by the executive head and his or her confidants) or 'pluralistic-bargaining' (with many actors fighting for the microphone). The framework also takes environmental impacts into account. The most

important actors, according to their anatomic lesson, are the representatives of national governments, members of the bureaucracy, the executive heads, and also representatives of NGOs. Although Cox and Jacobson arrived at a realist conclusion (the more salient the decisions and areas of an organization under concern, the less autonomy it achieves), their analysis also showed that IOs can be fairly autonomous, depending on region, issue area and type of decision, and that an executive's internal and external leadership can be important (Reinalda 1998). Hadewych Hazelzet (1998), who 'revisited' Cox and Jacobson's *Anatomy* 25 years later, concluded that their analysis framework still holds true.

However, the promising research programme of Haas and Cox and Jacobson was interrupted by the arrival of a new generation of editors at the journal *International Organization* with different views on IOs and another, more general, IR research programme.

Regimes and institutions, rather than organizations

While the initial great debate between liberalism and realism continued, the second great debate between 'science' (American behaviouralism) and 'tradition' (the British emphasis on law, diplomatic history and Bull's idea of an international society) in the 1960s resulted in two different points of departure, even if many Americans believed that the British proponents of tradition 'went down in defeat' (Kahler 1997: 22).

During the 1960s the inter-state paradigm was questioned as a result of ongoing European integration, the increasing weight of transnational corporations and the dependence theory. Stanley Hoffmann (1966) argued that member-states of the European Communities did lose policy autonomy, but were strengthened by integration rather than weakened. Latin American dependence theory added a new dimension to the debate by arguing that transnational corporations and IOs were actors siding with the rich Northern states. The scientist who began an ongoing debate with realism was Robert Keohane, who in 1969 became an editor of *International Organization* and argued that studies of the UN and its agencies suffered from the 'Mount Everest syndrome'. International organizations were studied 'because they were there', rather than on the basis of relevant theoretical questions (Keohane 1969).

Various special issues of *International Organization* stimulated widely followed and influential debates, such as those on transnational relations (1971, edited with Joseph Nye), power and interdependence (1977, also with Nye) and international regimes (1982, edited by the realist Stephen Krasner). For the time being, the editors' interest in IOs was restricted, because their emphasis was on theory and they first wanted to understand world politics. Leaving aside the attempt to portray complex interdependence as a rival model to realism (referred to as the third great debate), the most important new category employed by the editors was 'international regime'. John Ruggie (1975: 570) was the first to use this term from international law in IR theory. Keohane and Nye, who recognized that in a situation of interdependence foreign policy and domestic politics were becoming increasingly difficult to disentangle, used the term regime to capture the clusters of rules, institutions and conventions that go beyond the formal definition of international organization. 'By creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations' (Keohane and Nye 1989: 5). Krasner's (1982: 186) regime definition ('sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations') became generally accepted and 'international institution' became a term wider than the classic IO, to include IGOs, international NGOs, and less formal regimes and conventions (Keohane 1996: 466–7). During the 1990s the term institution began to replace the term regime, allowing for the

analysis of both formal and informal 'sets of rules' and having a normative character, as these rules specify what states should do (Martin and Simmons 1998: 194).

When *International Organization* was 50 years old in 1998 and some former editors looked back, they called the period 1968–78 an 'intellectual opening for the study of international political economy', during which political and scientific developments resulted in new issues and approaches, among them the introduction of rational choice models of state behaviour. These models helped to explain how states may overcome problems of collective action, high transaction costs and information asymmetries. The journal's focus had moved from concrete IOs (the period 1948–68) to IR theory and 'political and economic affairs', as the journal's subtitle has mentioned since 1983 (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 650). International political economy became the term for what the journal has focused on since the 1970s. It promoted research into the interactions between domestic politics and international political economy, and with regard to the level of the international system (the importance of the distribution of power among states), it contributed to a renewed debate between liberalism and realism in the 1980s.

While Keohane and Nye's interdependence approach emphasized the potential for inter-state cooperation under anarchy, it was challenged by a hegemonic stability theory that stressed the importance of state power and explained regimes in realist terms. This is not the place to review the third great debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, except to mention that realists such as Robert Gilpin, Krasner and Waltz 'fought back' and succeeded in preserving a neorealist interpretation of the regime theory and in maintaining the argument that IGOs are 'second-order phenomena, simply tools of states', lacking power and 'any moral agency' (Oestreich 2011: 164). Although Keohane's *After Hegemony* (1984) in reaction to this argued that regimes change governments' calculations of advantages and that international institutions make the international system less anarchical and facilitate coopera-tion among states, his book was also an abandonment of the portrayal of an alternative to realism (Griffiths 1999: 187–9).

Ruggie (1998: 3) saw no difference any longer and qualified both perspectives as 'neo-utilitarian', because they were alike in depicting institutions in strictly instrumental terms, 'useful (or not) in the pursuit of individual and typically material interests'. While realists regarded institutions at best as 'intervening' variables or 'sticky arrangements' (that continue to function along their original paths even after power relations shift), neoliberals focused on the correction of political market failures, with information, enforcement and monitoring as the institutions' central concerns (Ruggie 1998: 10). The theoretical modernization of the liberal approach thus remained restricted, and in their 1986 state-of-the-art article on inter-national organization, Friedrich Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 771–2) warned that interna-tional institutions of a formal kind had been 'left behind' and that it was necessary 'to link up regimes in some fashion with the formal mechanisms through which real-world actors operate'. Twelve years later Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998) addressed the question of why states use formal organizations. They investigated the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform these functions, and identified 'centralization' of collective activities and 'independence' (operating as a neutral in managing problems) as key properties of formal organizations.

The English School on institutions

British IR, which goes back to Philip Noel-Baker's 1924 chair at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), began as state-centric and focused on power politics,

but saw these axioms challenged during the 1960s. European integration however did not excite a great degree of theorizing, while UN studies remained descriptive and evolutionary in tone (Groom and Powell 1994: 83). In 1971 the LSE's Frederick Northedge initiated *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* in a time of debates on the sociology of knowledge, on political theory (the work of John Rawls) and on the crisis of modernity. He regarded American journals as too narrow in focus: 'read, too US-oriented, too much concerned with current affairs at the expense of viewing contemporary problems and issues in a broader, historically informed context'. By the end of its second decade *Millennium*, which engaged in discussions on interdependence, transnationalism and claims regarding an evolving world society, would be associated with the post-positivist, critical turn in IR theory, with Cox's 1981 article on 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory' as a touchstone in 'the counter-discourse to the ontological and epistemological hegemony of the "neo-neo consensus"' (Mark Hoffman in Bauer and Brighi 2003: 141, 151). The LSE's Susan Strange played a role in international political economy debates. She criticized IR scholars' ignorance of the way in which economic forces were altering traditional power politics and criticized economists for relying too heavily on abstract calculations in determining politico-economic action. She developed the idea of 'structural power' as a concept that can bring politics and economics together (Griffiths 1999: 42–3). As an *International Organization* editorial board member (1977–82) she focused attention on markets and how states interact with them.

The English School (which as known is not made up of English scholars, but is related to British IR) assumes the existence of a society of states in the Grotian tradition, with ideas, norms and institutions guiding state behaviour. States share a common interest in their fear of unrestricted violence, which leads to the development of certain rules that states follow and that are maintained by institutions. The definition of institution by the English School is much broader than the one that originated from the American regime debate, given its focus on the issue of international order and the relevance of institutions such as international law, the balance of power, diplomacy and also international organization. Compared to American IR the English School is less interested in economic issues and less taken with the dilemmas of interdependence. Rather it analyses the social and political processes that underlie international society, de-emphasizing formal organizations, since these are regarded as important only to the extent that they strengthen the basic institutions of diplomacy, international law and the balance of power (Evans and Wilson 1992: 341). Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000: 266–7, 290) in their encompassing *International Systems in World History* regard companies and international NGOs as non-state units but not IGOs, because they do not have sufficient autonomous actor quality to count as such. However, the existence of IGOs raises the political interaction capacity of the international system by providing pre-set pathways for diplomacy, agreed rules and practices and obligations to participate.

The English School influenced American IR in two ways: by its connection with international law, which was introduced in a special *International Organization* issue on legalization and world politics (Goldstein et al. 2000); and by the efforts of Ruggie and Kratochwil to advance the central insights of the English School by focusing on the intersubjective meanings that explain the role that institutions play in international life. Ruggie (1982) had demonstrated the value of a sociological orientation by discussing the postwar international economic regime as 'embedded liberalism' with a shared intersubjective understanding, by criticizing Waltz's theory for its lack of sociological content and for failing to explain systemic change, and by observing, together with Kratochwil, that regime theorists failed to investigate the shared understanding that should lead to the convergence of actor expectations in IR

(Katzenstein *et al.* 1998: 674). These criticisms contributed to the turn towards constructivism in American IR (Martin and Simmons 1998: 197–8).

Constructivism and international organizations

The new tendency that arose in the late 1980s in the neoliberal context rejected the individual state-centric premises of neorealism and neoliberalism and instead argued that institutions constitute states and their practices. This sociological or constructivist trend has a different ontology and assumes that the social world, including IR, is a human construction and an intersubjective domain that is meaningful to those engaged in it. Intersubjectivity refers to shared understandings, expectations and social knowledge embedded in international institutions. Institutions in the constructivist context are stable sets of identities and interests and 'fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works' (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002: 51). Alexander Wendt (1992) disagreed with realism by saying that anarchy is not an external given, but 'what states make of it'. States construct one another in their interrelations and in doing so may construct an international anarchy, but it matters whether this anarchy is cooperative (as in a security community in which states trust each other and cooperate) or conflictual (as in a security dilemma in which states are distrustful and define their interests in self-help terms).

Martha Finnemore spoke out against IR assumptions that preferences of states are unproblematic and have their sources located within the state. Finnemore's (1996: 11) book *National Interests in International Society* suggested that state preferences are malleable. 'States may not always know what they want and are receptive to teaching about what are appropriate and useful actions to take.' Both problems and solutions may be provided by outside actors such as IOs. Finnemore (1996: 5) claimed that 'states are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest by international organizations'. States and institutions thus are mutually constituting entities, with institutions embodying the constitutive and regulative norms and rules of international interaction. They 'shape, constrain, and give meaning to state action and in part define what it is to be a state' and continue to exist because states produce and reproduce them through practice (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002: 52).

For constructivists IGOs and regimes exist 'not just as bureaucracies (although that can be an important sense also) but as social networks and patterned sets of interactions that take on a life of their own' (Oestreich 2011: 168). While neoliberalists assume that states are motivated by rational and enlightened self-interest, with IGOs allowing them to focus on shared goals and to put aside short-term power maximization, constructivists see interest formation as 'more complex, changeable and contingent': there is 'no assumption of progress or of the inherent value of IGOs, as Kant and others had posited' (Oestreich 2011: 169). Early constructivists such as Wendt and Peter Haas focused on the building of institutions to channel state cooperation, e.g. Haas (1989) on epistemic communities with formal and informal networks of experts shaping state behaviour. Networks of knowledge-based experts articulate the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems that states are confronted with, help states identify their interests, frame issues for collective debate and propose specific policies, while identifying salient points for negotiation in the context of regimes and IOs.

Later constructivists focused more on formal organizations, including their internal operations, and their ability to shape state behaviour through their role in networks of social interactions, e.g. Jeffrey Checkel (2005) on how the European Union (EU) is socializing its member-states and changing their identity. A special issue of *International Organization* edited by Checkel tried to better specify the mechanisms of socialization within international

institutions (strategic calculation, role playing and normative suasion) and the conditions under which they are expected to lead to the internalization of new roles or interests. Drawing on debates within the German IR community, Thomas Risse (2000) elaborated 'communicative action' with actors who are uncertain about their interests being open to persuasion, challenges and counterchallenges geared towards reaching a reasoned consensus. He claimed that arguing was likely to increase the influence of materially less powerful actors, such as small states and international NGOs. Frank Schimmelfennig (2003: 5) used 'rhetoric action', rather than material conditions, to explain the Eastern enlargement of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the new states used arguments based on the collective identity, norms and values of the EU and NATO, opponents of the enlargement found themselves rhetorically trapped. 'They could neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without publicly reneging on prior commitments and damaging their credibility as community members in good standing.'

Multilaterism and global governance

In addition to this constructivist turn, various other developments took place during the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War had an impact on IR. It revived interest in IOs, while regime theory was further elaborated. Oran Young (1989: 352) believed that the models of the power realists and the neoliberal institutionalists were seriously flawed when it came to accounting for the actual record of success and failure in efforts to form international regimes. He combined a perceptive conceptual analysis with empirical research on the roles environmental and resource regimes play in governing human–environment relations. Young concluded that regimes not only carry out regulation, but also procedural, programmatic and generative functions. He also showed that individuals play important roles both in the formation of regimes and in efforts to maximize their effectiveness once in place, and distinguished between structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership as a critical determinant in institutional bargaining (Young 1991).

Keohane applied his neoliberal vision to analyses of decision making in the European Community (EC), after Andrew Moravcsik had been in Europe scouting out PhD topics and had shown him the opportunities for research in the ongoing and intensifying European integration. It resulted in the book *The New European Community*, edited by Keohane and Hoffmann (1991), and in Moravcsik's interpretation of the EC as a unique, multilevelled, transnational political system, with major turning points in the form of treaty-amending sets of agreements that propelled integration forward. In *The Choice for Europe* Moravcsik (1998) explained these developments through theories of state preferences, institutional choice and inter-state bargaining. Moravcsik's 'liberal intergovernmentalism' and reactions from other scholars created debate and in the rivalry between older debates on European integration (neofunctionalism and policy processes) it became a matter of disciplinary 'catch-up'. Since intergovernmentalists had 'formidable disciplinary weight' behind them, for instance in the journal *International Organization*, it was 'not surprising that their appearance in the study of European integration created a sense of theoretical crisis' (Rosamund 2000: 81). The theoretically informed study of European integration began to flourish, with at least four viewpoints for understanding the EC/EU: 1) as an IO dominated by state preferences but peculiarly institutionalized, 2) as an instance of regionalism, given the tendency of groups of territorially adjacent states to cluster into blocs, 3) as a study of the interaction of interested actors and policy-making dynamics, and 4) as a *sui generis* phenomenon (Rosamund 2000: 14–16). The debates were accompanied by empirical research. For instance, economic historian Alan

Milward (1992) in his *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* also reached intergovernmentalist conclusions, with the EC an integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state after 1945. Moravcsik too did extensive empirical research for his book (for a critique of his empirical findings see Lieshout et al. 2004).

Among the new concepts discussed after the unpredicted and peaceful end of the Cold War and with regard to the issue of a new world order were 'multilaterism' and 'global governance'. James Caporaso (1992) observed in a special issue of *International Organization* that multilaterism had not been extensively employed as a theoretical category and had rarely been used as an explanatory concept, because the terms cooperation and institutions usually covered the theoretical work. Elsewhere Cox (1992) discussed multilaterism in order to understand its potential for change. He avoided the link with IR, because that assumed the Westphalian state system, and instead related it to 'world order' as consisting of a state system, a capitalist world economy and a global society. Since a world government capable of controlling nation-states had never evolved, James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992) in *Governance Without Government* wondered how a decentralized system of political authority, one in which governments reside in the constituent units, can actually govern the relations between them. The somewhat vague but soon widely used term 'governance' dealt with the fact that states had been managing to solve common problems to a considerable extent in spite of the lack of an international hierarchy. While 'government' refers to institutions and the personnel (agents) who occupy key institutional roles and positions, 'governance' refers to collective problem solving in the public realm by directing attention to 'the problems to be solved and to the processes associated with solving them, rather than to the relevant agents or to the nature of the political institutions associated with these processes' (Caporaso 1996: 32). Governance hence is a social function centred on steering human groups towards desired outcomes and away from undesirable outcomes (Young 2011: 3). Frank Biermann and Philipp Pattberg (2012: 3–4) in their *Global Environmental Governance Reconsidered* distinguish between a normative understanding of global governance, starting from a perceived inadequacy of political responses to globalization, and an analytical one that highlights non-hierarchical steering modes and the inclusion of for-profit and non-profit private actors as distinct qualities. Thomas Weiss (2009: 263–4), who raised the question of what happened to the idea of world government, called global governance a good heuristic way to understand what is happening, but one that lacks prescriptive power.

The new journal *Global Governance*, which has been published since 1995, had governance in its title and both multilaterism and IOs in its subtitle: *A Review of Multilaterism and International Organizations*. The change in relations in the world had allowed many scholars of IR and IO 'to imagine revitalized multilateral institutions forging cooperative responses to global problems', while the reality of the UN system, 'straining under so many new demands', made them question whether 'such a renaissance was possible'. The editors, Roger Coate and Craig Murphy (1995: 1) regarded the journal as 'a new forum for reflection on these tensions and for debate about their consequences' that should 'not be dominated by the political problems and intellectual concerns of any single discipline or part of the world alone'. The Academic Council of the United Nations System (ACUNS) and the United Nations University have sponsored it.

The observation that with the end of the Cold War and ongoing economic globalization gradually more trust was being placed in IOs to solve pressing problems encouraged Bertjan Verbeek and me to start a research project that resulted in three books, respectively on autonomous policy making by IOs (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998), decision making within IOs (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004) and implementation by them (Joachim et al. 2008), with a

wide range of organizations providing empirical evidence. The growing interest in IOs was also reflected in the number of panels on IOs during the International Studies Association's annual conventions and in articles in its journal *International Studies Quarterly*.

NGOs, social movements and transnational advocacy networks

Although transnational and international NGOs are an old phenomenon dating back to the nineteenth century (Charnovitz 1997; Reinalda 2011), they remained in the shadow of IR theory either because they were considered uninteresting actors in a state-dominated international system or because the lure of parsimony did not allow their inclusion. In the early 1970s Nye and Keohane's (1971: 337) transnational perspective recognized the emergence of 'autonomous actors with private foreign policies that may deliberately oppose or impinge on state policies', but these were not included in their research programme. Samuel Huntington (1973: 368) argued that transnational organizations had emerged 'apart from the existing structure' of IR and developed 'alongside but outside that system'. Others similarly thought of NGOs as 'intersocietal organizations' that help to promote agreements among nation-states on issues of international public policy, but they found it important 'not to exaggerate the impact of nonstate actors on world politics', because 'the nation-state still molds the activities of nonstate actors more than its behavior is molded by them' (Kegley and Wittkopf 1995: 153, 196).

Peter Willetts and others successfully argued against these ideas of NGOs working in a separate sphere and being irrelevant. Willetts (1982) interpreted NGOs as pressure groups with actual power capabilities and Thomas Princen (1994: 41–2) showed that NGOs should be viewed as actors 'with their own imperatives, their own frailties, and, most importantly, their own bargaining assets'. Non-governmental organizations were mostly considered agents of change and transformation, performing valuable functions within the UN system. 'Despite their many shortcomings and many disappointments, the NGOs have established a role for themselves as sources of organised criticism of the imperfections of international society, as a stimulant to progress, as promoters of new ideas and programmes, as sources of additional voluntary funds for development, and as channels of publicity' for the UN and its special agencies (Williams 1990: 268–9).

Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss (1995: 357) edited a special issue of *Third World Quarterly* on NGOs, the UN and global governance, which showed both theoretically and empirically that NGOs are prominent enough to be part of IR research programmes. Referring to global governance, they drew attention to the UN system 'as a central and reasonably transparent point of observation that has legal and historical underpinnings, and branching activities that reach to the social grass roots'. In this context NGOs were not *ad hoc* entities, but formal organizations intended to continue to be in existence. They had joined with governments in common undertakings and had become an integral part of the process of setting agendas for cooperation; in carrying the results to governments, other NGOs and citizens; and in bringing local experience to bear on international decision making. Gordenker and Weiss's puzzle was what specific roles NGOs may play in transnational networks as intermediary organizations that provide links between the state and market and between local and global levels (Gordenker and Weiss 1995: 358–60).

Millennium published a special issue on social movements and world politics in 1994 in order to explore to what extent social movements, such as the women's movement and environmentalists, forced scholars to rethink what constituted politics in general and the nature of social agency within the international realm in particular. It revealed the difficulty

of talking about social movements in a discipline which had been primarily concerned with questions of inter-state relations, which separated domestic and international politics and which relegated non-state actors to the discipline's margins. Recognizing social movements as embedded within the wider complex of relationships and institutions in civil society could solve this, although this should be done critically. Martin Shaw (1994: 655), who defines civil society in a similar Gramscian way to Cox, emphasized that social movements arise within a civil society which is 'still largely nationally framed'. These movements are formed 'mostly within national societies'. 'Even movements with universal or globalist goals and strong worldwide networks tend to be largely nationally based and mostly preoccupied with national and sub-national issues.' Jan Aart Scholte (1993), who favoured an alternative IR research agenda focusing on social change in a world perspective, and others studied the response of three economic IOs to social movement pressure and argued that the increasing engagement between sectors of civil society and IOs produced a new form of global governance. They called it 'complex multilaterism', as it was a movement away from a multilaterism based primarily on the activities of states, with IOs needing to accommodate the demands of social movements (O'Brien et al. 2000: 207).

In the constructivist mode, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 2), in their book *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, focused on networks of activists that coalesce and operate across national frontiers, targeting the policies of IOs and particular states. Their 'transnational advocacy networks' approach argued that the members of these networks are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services. They are able to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Activists in networks are thus relevant players in policy debates, because they try not only to influence policy debates, but also 'to transform the terms and nature of the debate'. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 36, 37) claim that transnational networks and their campaigns undermine absolute claims to sovereignty, because IOs and other states interfere in the domestic affairs of nation-states and because information provided by the networks may supplement the information of IOs and contradict information provided by states: 'networks imply that states sometimes lie'. And if sovereignty is a 'shared set of understandings and expectations about state authority that is reinforced by practices, then changes in these practices and understandings should in turn transform sovereignty'.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) complemented the advocacy networks approach by generating a coherent set of propositions about the emergence of international norms, the mechanisms through which they exercise influence and the conditions under which norms will be influential in world politics. Their approach included a focus on IOs, with NGOs and IGOs as organizational platforms. They argued that norms evolve in a patterned 'life cycle' with three stages: norm emergence, acceptance and internalization and a threshold or 'tipping point' between the first two stages at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm. The characteristic mechanism of the first stage is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs, who need to persuade a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms. These entrepreneurs call attention to issues and 'frame' them by using language that names, interprets and dramatizes these issues. The characteristic mechanism for promoting the norm cascades of the second stage is an active process of international socialization, intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers. Eventually the new norms may become so widely accepted that actors have internalized them and take them for granted.

International organizations as organizations: neo-institutionalism

International organizations can also be analysed as organizations, but given IR's road away from the 'Mount Everest syndrome' in the 1970s, the interest in an organizational analysis of IOs remained marginal, with Cox and Jacobson's *Anatomy of Influence* and Ruggie's socio-logical imagination as major exceptions. The gap between the study of IOs and the sociology of organizations was deep and persistent, with each running its own course and being largely uninformed by the other, as Gayl Ness and Steven Brechin (1988) wrote in their article 'Bridging the Gap' in *International Organization*. These sociologists mentioned organizational performance (effectiveness, efficiency) and the recognition of an interrelated set of conditions (organizational environments, technology, structure and goals) that affect performance as major advances in organizational sociology. In their article they applied these insights to what they knew about IOs and suggested a comparative analysis of IO performance. They argued that the absence of such comparisons in IR had left the field with 'an essentially naive view of organizations as simple mechanical tools that act directly and precisely at the bidding of their creators', whereas the sociological focus on organizations as 'significant units of action' had brought a 'more critical, even cynical, view of them'. 'They are seen as tools of action, to be sure, but as recalcitrant tools that come to have a life of their own, serving interests other than the rational and altruistic ends for which they were originally, at least publicly, created' (Ness and Brechin 1988: 269–70). They also favoured parallel comparative analysis in different issue areas and comparisons between IGOs and international NGOs to learn about their relative performance. Ness and Brechin's invitation to bridge the gap between IR and sociology is still to be accepted, according to Yves Schemeil (2012), although considerable progress has been made in the study of IOs as 'organizations'.

One year after Ness and Brechin's article James March and Johan Olsen (1989: 16–17) published their book on the organizational basis of politics: *Rediscovering Institutions*. They argued that the concept of institution in political science had been weak, whereas political processes strongly depend on institutional structures. They explored the ways in which the institutions of politics, particularly administrative institutions, provide order and influence change in politics, and regarded bureaucratic agencies as arenas for contending social forces and as collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, identities and beliefs. Following their argument a variety of neo-institutionalist theories revived the study of institutions in political science in general and in IR, by adding new perspectives such as the various logics (of appropriateness or consequentiality) that guide decision making within organizations, the concept of path dependency (in historical institutionalism) and the principal–agent relationship (in rational choice institutionalism).

March and Olsen (1989: 160) believed that politics is organized by a logic of appropriate-ness, with institutions defining 'appropriate' actions in terms of relations between roles that are being fulfilled and the obligations of those roles in particular situations, whereas behaviour in a logic of consequentiality is driven by preferences and expectations about consequences. In their article about the institutional dynamics of international political orders in *International Organization*, March and Olsen (1998: 954–5) showed that realist-dominated IR had paid more attention to the logic of consequentiality and related 'efficient' histories (focusing on competition for survival) than to the logic of appropriateness and related 'inef-ficient' histories, emphasizing the slow pace of historical adaptation and portraying the match between political institutions and their environments as 'less automatic, less continuous, and less precise than [is shown by] a view of history as efficient'. Their organizational decision-making typology of consequential and appropriate decision making, which is quite

structured in nature, as well as 'garbage can' decision making, in which problems, alternatives for action, decision makers and choice opportunities co-exist, slowly entered the field of international organization. Liesbet Heyse (2011) opened up the black box of international NGOs by applying these three tools to analyse NGO decision-making processes, also taking into account the various levels of explanation: micro (individual), meso (intra-organizational) and macro (environmental). She concluded that in NGO research, micro- and especially macro-level explanations for NGO internal operations are dominant and that scarcely any analytical elaborations of meso-level explanations exist.

Path dependency became a tool to understand long-term processes and critical junctures in what IOs do. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics has a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependency and, in comparison to the logic of consequentiality, unintended consequences. History matters in the sense that once an organization has chosen a path (a way of solving a problem), it tends to stick to this path both formally (relying on its rules) and informally (relying on its practice). Path dependency thus refers to the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system. 'Outcomes at a critical juncture trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future.' This implies that once actors have ventured far down a particular path, 'they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course'. Political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become 'irretrievably lost'. However, it also means that events and processes occurring during and immediately following critical junctures emerge as crucial (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 699–700). The path-dependent logic can also help in looking for such critical junctures. John Ikenberry (2001: 72), in his book *After Victory* on the setting up of IOs after major wars, as in 1815, 1919 and 1945, chose postwar institution-building moments because they are so rare. To explain the junctures when states were aware of high costs but willing to perform, he combined realism and liberal institutionalism, because realism neglected the role of these institutions, whereas liberal theories neglected the role of leading states in restraining themselves by using a strategy of institutional self-restraint at these junctures.

Kathleen Thelen (2003: 228) discussed from a historical institutionalist perspective how institutions evolve and change by distinguishing two processes: institutional layering and conversion. Institutional 'layering' refers to the process where new arrangements are layered on top of pre-existing structures, or where new institutions are added. This adapting of inherited institutions and practices to emerging new circumstances is reflected in an evolution that preserves much of the core of the original institutions. Institutional 'conversion', on the other hand, happens if institutions designed with one set of goals in mind are redirected to other ends. Set in motion by a shift in the environment, actors are confronted with new problems which they address by using existing institutions in new ways or in the service of new goals. Ernst Haas (1990: 3–4) had discussed similar changes in IOs in his book *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, by distinguishing between 'adaptation' (adding new activities without examining the implicit theories underlying their programmes and values) and 'learning' (redefining both means and ends by questioning these underlying programmes and values). Adaptation takes place as 'incremental growth' (augmentation of the organization's programme) or 'turbulent nongrowth' (ends no longer cohere and internal consensus on means and ends disintegrates), while learning is associated with 'managed interdependence', in which the re-examination of purposes is brought about by knowledge-mediated decision-making dynamics. Efforts to change IOs usually begin as adaptive practices, with, in many cases, IOs adapting and surviving without fully satisfying most of their members. Self-reflection and learning are possible when expert-generated knowledge about new problems can be made to mesh with the interest of the dominant members.

In the early 1990s, rational choice theory was used to explain the creation of international institutions in order to reduce the transaction costs of collective action, which would be higher without institutions. Institutions continued to exist because they reduced uncertainty. Rational choice institutionalism in the 2000s focused on delegation and agency in IOs. The relationship between member-states and the bureaucracy of an IO can be described as a principal–agent relationship, in which the principal delegates, but does not surrender, authority to the agent. Although formally a principal can withdraw the delegated authority, this may be a costly measure and is a complicated one, because IOs have not one but many principals (which an agent can set against each other). An agent's freedom of manoeuvre stems mainly from an asymmetrical distribution of information favouring the agent. This asymmetry then produces 'shirking': agents pursuing interests of their own, with the principal's problem being how to control the agent and limit shirking. This can be done by oversight procedures, which however involve additional costs for principals. The project on delegation and agency in IOs set up by Darren Hawkins and others (2006: 8) argued that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their 'masters'. They call independent action by an agent 'agency slack', occurring in two forms: 'shirking' (when an agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal's behalf) and 'slippage' (when an agent shifts policy away from its principal's preferred outcome and towards its own preferences). 'Autonomy' is the extent of manoeuvring available to agents after the principal has established control mechanisms. Hawkins et al. (2006: 342–3) found that some measure of agent autonomy is a prerequisite for enabling states to enhance their credibility, lock in favoured policies, overcome collective decision-making problems, or resolve disputes through delegation. They also found that IOs possess varying autonomy and potential for agency slack. Autonomy was relatively low in multilateral development banks, but higher in international courts and dispute resolution bodies. When IOs slack, member-states periodically attempt to improve oversight of and performance by their agents. In his book *Controlling Institutions* Randall Stone (2011: 224) combined formal and informal rules to explain the characteristic of IOs' dysfunctions. He claimed that powerful states delegate authority to IOs in ways that allow them to retain substantial degrees of control. 'Influential states manipulate the rules, insist on privileged treatment for their own interests, and exploit their control of the agenda, and these strategies undermine the ability of institutions to provide effective international governance.'

The internal functioning of international organizations

The internal functioning of IOs, both IGOs and international NGOs, was examined from the perspective of management studies in the book *Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise*, edited by Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder (2003: 1). They drew attention to pathologies that are inherent in the concept of IO. While IOs operate worldwide on almost any issue imaginable, they face profound management problems, with some shortcomings persisting to such an extent that the authors spoke of pathologies, such as 'excessive bureaucracy, slow action, humanitarian aid that reignites war, failure to protect refugees, and dependency as a byproduct of development cooperation'. Pathologies were also discussed by Constructivists Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, first in an article (1999) and then in their 2004 book *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Using the sociology of organizations, they observed that scholars were beginning to treat the internal workings of IOs seriously and started from the premise that an IO is a bureaucracy, which is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioural proclivities.

International organizations enjoy rational–legal authority, but also draw authority from other sources, such as moral standing (being the representative of the international community), expertise and delegated tasks. Their authority creates a basis for autonomous action vis-à-vis states. Bureaucracies exercise power in the world through their ability to change their environment, given their ability to make impersonal rules. They use these rules to regulate and to constitute and construct the social world. However, the same impersonal rules can also cause problems, when bureaucracies become obsessed with their own rules at the expense of their primary missions in ways that produce inefficient and self-defeating outcomes. International organizations, just like other bureaucracies, are prone to dysfunctional behaviour. Their emphasis on rules, specialization and compartmentalization can combine into five types of 'pathology' elaborated in the book. Although IOs almost always justify their reforms on the grounds that these changes will make them more efficient and effective, the bureaucratic tendencies towards pathology and the empirical evidence of the three case studies suggest that organizational expansion may increase the likelihood of pathological behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 3, 27, 163). This combination of IR theory and the sociology of organizations (Ness and Brechin's bridge) demonstrates that international policy outcomes cannot be fully understood without opening up the black box (Cox and Jacobson's *Anatomy*).

Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner in their *Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies* (2009) use a narrower definition of international bureaucracies than Barnett and Finnemore (who use the terms bureaucracy and organization interchangeably); these authors do not regard the entire organization as a bureaucracy, but only its secretariat. They keep the collectivities of member-states as IOs and international bureaucracies as actors apart and are less concerned with pathologies of bureaucracies than with their potential to contribute to problem solving. While both the principal–agent theory and sociological institutionalism assume a self-centred interest of bureaucracies that leads to pathological behaviour, they reject the assumption that international bureaucracies strive predominantly to maximize their mandate, funding, staff and power. Instead, Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009: 8) found that international bureaucracies are more interested in resolving political problems than in increasing their power as such. Drawing on organizational theory and its empirical notions of organizational cultures and internal procedures, they analysed international bureaucracies as social processes and collective entities constituted by their distinct organizational cultures, structures and behaviours. They argued that much variation in the autonomous influence of these bureaucracies can be traced back to differences in organizational cultures; that is, 'the "software" within bureaucracies that are otherwise similar in their legal mandate, resources, and general function'. Their nine case studies revealed that bureaucracies have a sizeable autonomous influence as actors in global environmental policy. They act as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators and capacity builders. This autonomous influence varies considerably, which the authors explained by pointing out factors at the macro level (the problem structure) and at the micro level (the peoples and procedures of a given bureaucracy). Institutional arrangements and designs mattered less than they expected. The core outcome of their project was that 'the macro level and the micro level are more relevant for explaining variation in autonomous influence than the level of the polity, that is, the legal, institutional, and organizational framework' (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009: 345).

Conclusion

International organization as a field of research has developed since 1910 and is progressing and flourishing. As a topic it once attracted more attention than international law, while at

other times IR interest in IOs seriously flagged. Efforts to understand the process of international organization have varied, as the sections on functionalism, less and more nuanced realism, opening up the black box, regimes, the English School, constructivism, multilaterism, NGOs, neo-institutionalism and internal functioning show. However, the debates show progress, with IOs being analysed both in a wider context (regimes, governance, world order) and as entities. Inter-organizational relations – that is, relations between IOs – is an emerging research programme (Biermann 2011). International relations theory and its understanding of international organization as a process have grown, also in combination with theories from other disciplines such as management studies and sociology, while anthropology is beginning to investigate IOs (Muller *et al.* 2012). International organization as a field of research has available to it theoretical tools and debates, a variety of journals, introductions such as those by Clive Archer (2001), Robert Jordan *et al.* (2001), Volker Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl (2006), Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst (2010) and Guillaume Devin and Marie-Claude Smouts (2012), to mention but a few, and its own book series, Global Institutions, edited by Thomas Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, with nearly 70 volumes in 2012 informing readers about the history, structure and activities of key IOs.

Recommended for further reading

Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Olson and Groom (1991), Kahler (1997), Martin and Simmons (1998) and Griffiths (1999).

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Part I

Documentation, data sets and sources

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2

International organizations
Available information and documentation

James Church and Michael McCaffrey

International governmental organizations (IGOs) are defined in the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (UIA 1992–3: 1649) as bodies that are "based on a formal instrument or agreement between the governments of nation states, include three or more nation states as parties to the agreement, and have a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks." Few would dispute the essentials of this definition, but what constitutes an "IGO document" may be less well acknowledged. Most users consider "government information" or a "government document" to mean any publication produced at government expense. But with IGOs, an important distinction exists between the information IGOs publish for public consumption (*publications*) and information created for internal use in the exercise of their function (*documentation*).

This dichotomy is less important today than years ago because most IGO information is on the Internet. But in the past, the distinction was crucial. While most IGOs historically produced publications in abundance, documentation was limited to a small number of depository libraries, if it was available at all. The League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), with their global system of depositories, were the first IGOs to embrace a model of greater public access, but in practice this was still limited. In 1950, there were 184 UN depositories worldwide; in 1966, there were 278 (United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library 1968). Other IGOs, such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) had even fewer depositories, typically at national libraries, while other IGOs had none.

International governmental organization documentation can be difficult to find and to use. Many of the documents in libraries remain un-cataloged, requiring the use of specialized indexes and finding aids. On the Internet, IGOs may host multiple databases with intricate interfaces. Some IGOs use complex symbols that can be difficult to learn. They also produce copious amounts of documentation, making it problematic to determine which ones are of interest.

These are the issues this chapter will attempt to address. In spite of these obstacles, IGO documentation is crucial. It records the official workings of national delegations striving to resolve the most serious problems facing the global community. It addresses issues such as peace and security, human rights, humanitarian aid, economic and social cooperation, and

international law. When international documents contain speeches, voting records, and statements of heads of state, they constitute primary sources comprising an essential part of the human record. With a little perseverance, researchers can obtain a working knowledge of these IGO information resources, enhancing and enriching scholarship.

League of Nations documentation

The League of Nations occupies a special place in the history of IGOs. As the first universal membership and purpose organization, the global extent of its activities and reach marked a departure from previous experience, and its documentation and publications are of use to a wide audience. The League's approaches to the organization and dissemination of its information also served as the model for UN policies and practices.

League material is of interest to historians studying the interwar period. It is also useful for studying organizations whose origins may be found in the League. In the field of public health, for instance, the work of the World Health Organization (WHO) is best seen in the light of its predecessor, the Health Organization of the League. The *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* and the *Weekly Epidemiological Record* are, in essence, League publications taken over and continued by the WHO. The publications of the League are valuable sources for those seeking statistical information predating modern IGO sources. While statistical time series found in UN publications generally start in the 1940s, many are continuations of League publications. The UN's *World Economic and Social Survey*, published from 1948 to the present, is patterned after the League's *World Economic Survey*, published from 1932 to 1945. Users of these publications are thus able to extend statistical resources back to the interwar period.

The standard source for the history of the League remains *A History of the League of Nations* (Walters 1952), which takes an organizational approach focusing on the League's organization and operations. Guides to League documentation are numerous, but the most comprehensive is the *Guide to League of Nations Publications* (Aufricht 1951) and a chapter on the documentation of the League (McCaffrey-Noviss 1997). Aufricht's work is an overview of the principal documentation of the League by topic or activity, enabling users to locate references in the context in which they were produced. McCaffrey-Noviss's work provides an overview of document and publication numbering schemes, along with detailed descriptions of bibliographic tools. Most users will be able to meet their needs using Aufricht. Those requiring further material can consult McCaffrey-Noviss to determine which sources best meet their needs. The League's archives have been cataloged to the *Sub-Fond* level; the catalog is accessible electronically (http://biblio-archive.unog.ch) but the actual archive remains on paper.

Although the League's publications received wide distribution, today their use is hindered by their condition and the manner in which libraries processed them. Many collections remain un-cataloged and require the use of print sources for discovery. The League distinguished between "documents" and "publications," and though many of the former were issued as publications, only the latter were distributed. A microfilm set of League documents was produced in the 1970s; the *Key* that accompanies it allows users to locate references to scarce material, but few libraries possess the set (Reno 1973–5: 14). Digitization of League documents and publications would increase their use, but such projects have been sporadic. Northwestern University Library has digitized a collection of statistical and disarmament documents (available at: http://www.library.northwestern.edu) but otherwise there has been no concerted effort to make the organization's output available.

Purpose and structure of United Nations documentation

Documentation from the UN principal organs

Like League documentation, UN documents are classified according to a system of symbols, which reference the agencies that produce them and the type of document issued. Guides to UN documents' symbols are published by the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library (DHL), but to use this documentation, it is helpful to understand the structure and function of the UN's principal organs: the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Secretariat, and International Court of Justice. The Trusteeship Council suspended operations after the last official UN non-self-governing territory achieved independence in 1994.

The United Nations' main deliberative body is the General Assembly, which comprises delegates from all member-states. It holds its opening session every September, starting with a general debate in which heads of state make speeches concerning national policy. This is followed by a plenary session, during which the General Assembly debates and passes resolutions. The Security Council, with its five permanent and ten non-permanent members, is the UN body for international peace and security. It remains in session throughout the year and meets as required. The ECOSOC is the body responsible for social, economic, and environmental cooperation. It comprises 54 members elected by the General Assembly. The Secretariat is the UN's executive organ, and provides administrative support to the other bodies. The secretary-general, the chief administrative officer of the UN, heads it. The International Court of Justice adjudicates cases brought to it by nation-states, and provides opinions to UN bodies upon the General Assembly's request.

Patterns of documentation: official records, speeches, and voting

In the course of this work, much documentation is produced, of which the UN *official records* are of primary interest. These are marked "official record" on the title page, and may be referred to by an acronym, e.g., *GAOR* for "General Assembly Official Record." They include meeting records, voting information, resolutions and decisions, reports of major organs, budgets, and other documentation. Meeting records include verbatim speeches made in the General Assembly and Security Council, which are denoted with the document symbol *PV* (from French, "procès verbal"). Other meeting records, such as those from General Assembly main committees, are issued in summary format, denoted by *SR* for "summary record."

Other types of official records, entitled *supplements*, include reports from subsidiary bodies, budgetary documents, and final resolutions. Resolutions go through several drafts before final passage, so it is important to identify the final, official form. Official records of resolutions for the deliberative bodies are called *annual cumulations*. General Assembly and Security Council voting records are included with resolutions, and are represented in tabular format in the annual print *Index to Proceedings*. Before the digital era, official record *annexes* were issued at the conclusion of each session. These organized documents by a unifying agenda number (for the General Assembly) or document symbol (for the Security Council), allowing researchers to comprehensively identify related items. They ceased publication in 1993.

The majority of UN documents are referred to as *masthead* documents. A masthead is any working document submitted to a UN body for consideration. Mastheads may present research obstacles due to their scale of production (thousands per year) and the difficulty in determining subject matter from ambiguous titles (Griffiths 2008: 136). While many are

ephemeral, others are quite substantial, including *Reports of the Secretary-General* written by staff at the Secretariat on global issues, human rights reports submitted to UN treaty bodies, and reports submitted to the UN from non-governmental organizations.

United Nations documentation is thus both voluminous and complex, and given these challenges, general information needs may be met by consulting reference tools, of which the *Yearbook of the United Nations* is a primary example. Issued since 1946 and now online (http://unyearbook.un.org) the *Yearbook* presents over a thousand pages of text summarizing key UN topics, ranging from international security questions to public health and refugees. It contains the full text of important resolutions, and citations for hundreds of additional documents, which are retrievable using freely available UN Internet databases. The most important of these are UNBISNet, the catalog of the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library (http://unbisnet.un.org) and the Official Document System of the United Nations (ODS) (http://documents.un.org). UNBISNet allows users to search for information by "type," for example, speeches, voting records, resolutions, state party reports to treaties, etc. The Official Document System functions as a general UN documents search engine, allowing users to locate full-text documents from 1993 to the present. Older documents are being added continuously, including an increasing number of speeches.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Library

Librarians at the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library (DHL) in New York provide service to UN delegates and staff, but they also assist the UN Depository Libraries, and hence the clientele that depositories serve. The DHL website produces authoritative guides to UN documents and reference sources, including UN-I-QUE (http://lib-unique.un.org), a database useful for retrieving documents of a recurrent nature, including speeches in the General Assembly, human rights documents, and reports of peacekeeping missions. Researchers needing historical documents may consult the DHL's print *Index to Proceedings*, issued for all UN deliberative bodies. Other historical indexes, such as the *United Nations Documents Index* and *UNDOC* may be consulted as needed. These and other historical documents are undergoing digitization, and are still housed primarily at UN Depository libraries.

Global issues on the UN agenda

The scope and breadth of UN operations are extraordinarily diverse. The following categories encapsulate the essentials of the UN's work in some of these areas and documentation which accompanies it but do not comprehensively address the agency's activities.

Peace and security, and disarmament

The Security Council is the body responsible for international peace and security, including peacekeeping forces, which are administered by the Secretariat's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Peacekeeping documentation includes Security Council resolutions, *Reports of the Secretary-General*, and reports of Security Council missions. Documentation can be retrieved using UNBISNet and ODS, the Official Document System, and especially from UN-I-QUE, by typing the country name and the word "mission." United Nations agencies working in disarmament include the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the General Assembly, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, and the UN Disarmament Commission, a deliberative body of the General Assembly. Documents for General Assembly

disarmament bodies are all included in the UN official records. The UN Office in Geneva holds an annual Conference on Disarmament, which has drafted several significant multilateral disarmament treaties. Its documentation is numbered sequentially, bearing the UN document symbol *CD*.

Human rights and humanitarian affairs

United Nations work in human rights is overseen by the Secretariat's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which acts as the UN's coordinating body in this area. In the past the ECOSOC's Human Rights Commission and its subsidiary bodies created much human rights documentation, but in 2006 the agency was replaced by the General Assembly Human Rights Council. Additional human rights documentation is created by the UN's independent Treaty Bodies, such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which monitor the implementation of international human rights instruments requiring state parties to submit periodic reports. This documentation may be found on the United Nations Treaty Body Database and other sources on the OHCHR website (http://www.unhchr.ch) which address human rights issues by country and by theme, along with reports from the agency's Special Procedures and Special Rapporteurs.

Work in humanitarian affairs is undertaken by agencies of the UN Development Group (see later), including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). These are autonomous agencies that function with a great deal of independence, and produce some of the UN's best-known titles, including UNICEF's *The State of the World's Children* and the UNDP *Human Development Report*. Agency documentation may be found on their websites, but may be buried within organizational hierarchies. Documents can also be found on UNBISNet by searching for the agency document symbol, for example, HCR for the UNHCR, ICEF for UNICEF, and DP for the UNDP.

Social and economic cooperation

The ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies address global social, economic, and environmental concerns. Much of the work is undertaken by ECOSOC's Regional Commissions (see later), which publish reports and statistical studies concerning their regions. The ECOSOC also accomplishes its mission through the work of its Functional Commissions, including the Commission on the Status of Women and the Commission on Sustainable Development. This documentation often takes the form of *Implementation Reports* on UN Declarations and/or Plans of Action resulting from UN conferences. Additional work is undertaken through autonomous UN agencies working in global development (see later).

Documentation of the UN specialized agencies

The specialized agencies are intergovernmental agencies related to the UN via bilateral agreements (Goodrich et al. 1969: 421). They function as independent bodies, each with their own founding documents, rules, and systems of documentation. Each was created to address specialized global issues, or to further international technical cooperation. Some produce documentation on a scale comparable to the UN and have their own document databases. Examples include UNESCO, the FAO, and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

UNESCO publishes documents online via its UNESDOC database (http://unesdoc.
unesco.org), which includes records of its General Conference, resolutions and decisions, a
Programme and Budget, and a *Report of the Director-General*. The FAO now hosts documents back
to the first FAO conference in 1945 on its FAO Corporate Document Repository (http://
www.fao.org/documents). Documents include conference proceedings, records from its
Executive Council, and reports on all aspects of food and agriculture. Complete documenta-
tion from the ILO was historically available at few libraries. Now this documentation is avail-
able electronically on the Labordoc database (http://labordoc.ilo.org) dating back to the first
ILO session in 1919, including reports from the ILO Governing Body, the ILO *Official Bulletin*,
and documents from the International Labour Conference. Documentation from additional
specialized agencies is addressed in other sections of this chapter, under "International
Financial Institutions" and "International Technical and Standards Setting Agencies" such as
the International Telecommunication Union and International Civil Aviation Organization.

Intergovernmental organizations in a broader context

International financial institutions: the World Bank, IMF, and WTO

Although they function with almost complete autonomy, international financial institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are also "specialized agencies"
of the UN. They trace their origins to the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, which envi-
sioned a tripartite of international institutions promoting economic development, global finan-
cial stability, and international trade, respectively. Historically, these institutions exhibited a less
open culture than UN bodies (Ross 2001: 45), with widespread access to documentation only
recently available on the Internet. The current issue for users is not so much access as it is knowl-
edge of the terminology necessary to retrieve helpful information. For example, the World
Bank site features an online portal (http://www.worldbank.org/reference) with over 120 cate-
gories of World Bank documents. Identification of appropriate content may be difficult without
knowledge of the steps in the World Bank project cycle, outlined in Figure 2.1. The categories
are limited to samples of major documentation types. World Bank documentation thus informs
users about the planning, financing, completion, and assessment of development projects at
various stages of the cycle. The information portal also includes meeting records of the Bank's
executive directors, country focus documents, and economic sector reports. Other sections
offer information on World Bank project financing, searchable by geography, sector, and theme.

Like the World Bank, the IMF has only posted documentation on the Internet in recent
years. The IMF's basic mission is to foster international monetary cooperation and global

Project Stage	Sample Document Type
Identification and strategy	Country Assistance Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Project Information Documents
Preparation	Environmental Assessments, Resettlement Plans, Indigenous Peoples Plans
Appraisal	Project Appraisal and Program Documents, Staff Appraisal Reports
Approval	Loan, Grant, Financing and Credit Agreements
Implementation	Status of Projects in Execution (SOPE)
Completion	Implementation Completion Reports
Evaluation	Project Performance Assessment Reports, Impact Evaluations

Figure 2.1 World Bank project stage and accompanying document types

Source: World Bank Projects and Operations: How the Project Cycle Works, available at http://web.worldbank.org

financial stability via surveillance of member economies and lending to countries with balance of payments difficulties. The IMF surveillance documents include *Article IV Staff Reports* and *Mission Concluding Statements*, based on periodic visits of IMF staff to member countries. Lending documents include *Letters of Intent*, which delineate economic reforms made as a condition for receiving IMF loans, and *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSPs), which provide analyses of country macroeconomic policies, plans to reduce poverty, and proposed sources of financing. This information is now available on the IMF website from the 1990s to the present.

The predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the International Trade Organization (ITO), the third organization envisioned at Bretton Woods. The United States and the United Kingdom failed to ratify the ITO charter, and in its place the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was set up as an interim multilateral agreement. It was succeeded in 1995 by the WTO, whose mission is to foster international trade by lowering trade barriers and resolving member trade disputes. Most documentation is available online (http://docsonline.wto.org) including legal texts, dispute settlements, and tariff commitments. Documents from the GATT are also available online at Stanford University from 1947 to 1994, via the Stanford GATT Digital Library (http://gatt.stanford.edu).

United Nations programs, funds, and other bodies

United Nations programs and funds represent the humanitarian and development arm of the UN, and include the UNDP, UNICEF, the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). These agencies produce some of the most widely used publications in the UN system, but their documentation is less well known. It may be broadly classified into: 1) parliamentary documents, 2) project documents, and 3) technical reports and studies. Parliamentary documents of these agencies are included in the standard UN databases. Project documents and technical reports have only recently become available on agency websites.

The UNDP, the UN's development organization, operates in 177 countries and produces project documentation on topics from poverty reduction and governance to gender empowerment and human rights. Project documents include fairly explanatory titles such as *Country Programme Documents*, *Cooperation Frameworks*, and *Outcome Evaluations*. UN–Habitat, an organization devoted to shelter and environmentally sustainable towns and cities, publishes documentation for its Governing Council, including resolutions, speeches, and reports on trade issues, notably foreign direct investment. UNCTAD, the UN agency for developing country trade issues, provides records from its Quadrennial Conference as well as proceedings of "expert meetings" which include academic papers. The World Food Program, the food aid agency of the UN, publishes project documents detailing the agency's responses to food and humanitarian crises. UNICEF offers access to sessional documents and *Country Programme Documents* (CPDs) which provide information on the development situation for women and children by country.

Joint agencies: UNAIDS and the UN Development Group

In the past decade, joint UN agencies have been created in recognition that global development issues require expertise from multiple stakeholders. The Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is an example, and includes representatives from 22 governments, ten UN agencies, and five international non–governmental organizations. Meeting documents are published by the UNAIDS governing program coordinating board. The UN Development Group (UNDG), an agency created to facilitate UN development activities,

functions as a partnership of UN funds, programs and agencies working in development. The UNDG website (http://www.undg.org) is among the most comprehensive among the agencies in the UN development system, and includes *United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks* and *Common Country Assessments* which offer collective development strategies.

Documentation from UN funds and programs may be overshadowed by their more visible publications. This is regrettable, as this documentation often contains local needs assessments and development analysis not available elsewhere and provides a wealth of development and humanitarian information inconceivable before the digital era.

Regional and multiregional organizations

Regional organizations are a newer phenomenon than international organizations, with many originating in the 1950s and 1960s based on regional political and economic interests and shared cultures. In the 1980s and 1990s, these organizations began to implement free trade agreements in response to globalization and the power of international financial institutions (Reinalda 2009: 697). The following sections attempt to illuminate this documentation and shed light on their processes.

UN regional commissions and country offices

United Nations regional commissions were created with the understanding that selected UN issues were better addressed at more local levels. These five commissions comprise the Economic Commissions for Europe, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific, and Western Asia. Reporting to ECOSOC, their primary focus is on economic and social development. Documentation for the most part is accessible via system–wide UN databases. Generally, their document symbols follow a predictable pattern: E/ECA for the Economic Commission for Africa; E/ECE for the Economic Commission for Europe, etc. Annual reports are included in UN official records, with selected meeting records indexed in UNBISNet. Historically, these documents were distributed solely to UN Depository Libraries in their respective regions. Today, most regional documentation is online, including meeting records, resolutions, and conference documents.

Regional and country offices of the UN differ from the regional commissions in that the country and regional offices carry out objectives of the organizations in the UN family to which they belong. Their documentation is frequently published via a UN Country Team on a shared website. Before the Internet the work of these offices was relatively obscure, and one of the most significant IGO technological achievements was publishing this information online. Several of these agencies maintain hundreds of country offices, including the UNDP, UNFPA, and UNICEF. UNDP country offices host project documents on their own databases, and all the agencies publish documents on a wide variety of topics, ranging from demography and public health to poverty, gender, and climate change.

Regional development banks and free trade associations

Multilateral regional development banks, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) raise capital globally but pursue development projects regionally. Like the World Bank, their objective is poverty alleviation, and examples of their documentation include their project documents, technical reports, conference proceedings, and meeting records. The ADB

project cycle is similar to the World Bank's, with assessment and preparation work recorded in documents such as the ADB *Country Partnership Strategies* and *Country Operations Business Plans*. Documents may be retrieved online via the ADB Project Database (http://www2.adb.org/Projects) by country, project type, and sector. Other development banks, such as the IADB, have similar databases, along with online conference proceedings and official records. The AfDB provides fewer project documents, but publishes social and environmental project evaluations and selected official records.

Free trade associations are based upon multilateral agreements seeking to eliminate restrictions on traded goods and services. Examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area. Economic integration schemes include customs and monetary unions and common or single markets. Customs unions, or trade blocs with a common external tariff, include organizations such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Others, such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), an organization of 15 Caribbean nations, is developing a single market with proposed free movement of goods and labor. With the exception of NAFTA, whose secretariat concerns itself almost exclusively with trade, most regional economic integration is conducted by organizations that address other issues. The following section lists these associations per region and discusses their documentation.

Africa and the Middle East

In Africa and the Middle East, selected regional organizations include the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the League of Arab States. The AU comprises every African nation except Morocco. Its focus is on political and economic cooperation and the common interests of the African people, from peace and security to gender and development. The AU documentation includes decisions and declarations by its Assembly and Executive Council, treaties and conventions, and speeches by commissioners (http://www.au.int).

SADC is a socioeconomic integration and political organization that comprises southern African states. Documentation includes a Tribunal with texts of decisions, and an online Research and Documentation Centre (http://www.sadc.int). ECOWAS is an economic organization of West African nations that famously undertook peacekeeping operations through its Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS documentation consists of statutes and treaties, presidential speeches, poverty studies, and other documents (http://www.ecowas.int). The agency also has specialized agencies devoted to health, monetary policy, gender, and youth. On the other side of the continent, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) site includes a comparably limited number of documents (http://www.comesa.int), which brings up an important issue. Researchers should not assume that all African government information is digital: book vendors still continue to supply African regional documents to libraries. Finally, the League of Arab States (also known as the Arab League) is a regional organization comprising 22 nations in North Africa and the Middle East. It publishes selected online historical documentation and treaties via its documents repository (www.arableagueonline.org).

East Asia

Major East Asian regional organizations include ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). ASEAN emerged in 1967 to promote regional security and

cooperation within the region. Its main body is an annual summit with a Coordinating Council, three community 'pillars', a Standing Committee, functional committees, and a Secretariat. ASEAN documentation includes the *ASEAN Documents Series*, a compilation of key documents. Also available are the *ASEAN Plus Three Document Series* (for meetings of ASEAN with China, Japan, and South Korea) and documentation from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an annual meeting of ministers including non-ASEAN members—Australia, the European Union and the United States. ARF statements, reports, and an *Annual Security Outlook* are available online (in English) (http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library.html).

The other major Asian regional organization is APEC, an organization of Pacific Rim countries working to foster economic cooperation and trade. Since its founding in 1989, APEC has grown from a modest organization to an information powerhouse. It includes an Economic Committee, a Committee on Trade and Investment, a Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) Steering Committee, working groups, and forums. APEC documentation is available from its APEC Information Management Portal (http://aimp.apec.org). Like ASEAN, APEC prepares a compilation of key documents entitled *Key APEC Documents*.

Latin America

Examples of regional organizations in Latin America include the Organization of American States (OAS), the Andean Community, and MERCOSUR. The most significant is the OAS, which comprises all independent American nations. It includes a General Assembly, a Permanent Council, a Juridical Committee, specialized organizations, an Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, and a Secretariat. Like the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York, the OAS has its Columbus Memorial Library (http://www.oas.org/columbus) and an online official documents system. Documentation includes resolutions and declarations, treaties and agreements, and legal opinions.

The Andean Community (Comunidad Andina) and MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Sur) are sub-regional Latin American organizations. MERCOSUR is an economic and political organization and customs union mandated to promote the free movement of goods, labor, and currency in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The Andean Community, also a customs union, includes the countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Although the organizations are forging alliances and may eventually merge, at present the two organizations publish separate documentation. The governing structure of MERCOSUR includes a Common Market Council, a Common Market Group, a Trade Commission, a Parliament, and a Secretariat. The website (http://www.mercosur.int) is in Spanish and Portuguese and includes an *Official Bulletin* (*Boletín Oficial*), as well as resolutions, directives, treaties and dispute settlements, available in separate documents and jurisprudence databases. Documentation from the Andean Community includes treaties, resolutions, meeting records, and seminars. The Andean Parliament publishes an *Official Gazette* and its Court of Justice provides judicial interpretations and rulings. Official documents (*Documentos Officiales*) are in Spanish with some in English (http://www.comunidadandina.org/endex.htm).

Europe and North America

The European Union (EU) is not an IGO per se, but rather a partly supranational government institution with power to create policy for member-states within the scope of its treaties. Its origins date back to the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, which evolved into the European Economic Community, the European Community (EC), and after the entry

into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU. Historical EU documentation is available via a system of depositories and documentation centers. The EU website, Europa, (http://www.europa.eu) is arguably the greatest government translation feat in history, with documentation available in all 23 EU official languages. Most documents are available via the "official documents" section and the Europa portal to EU law, Eurlex, a database of EU regulations, directives, decisions, and treaties (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). It includes the EU *Official Journal*, European Commission documents, cases from the European Court of Justice, *Reports and Debates of the European Parliament*, and more.

The Council of Europe is not an agency of the EU: It is a separate body of 47 countries founded in 1949 to promote European cooperation in the areas of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Its signature treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, empowers Europeans to file cases against member governments for human rights violations, through the European Court of Human Rights. Court documentation includes judgments and decisions from its HUDOC database (http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc). Main bodies, including the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and the Committee of Ministers, publish documents and reports online, including the *Official Reports of Debates* and *Adopted Texts* of the Parliamentary Assembly, and the *European Treaty Series* (ETS).

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which includes states from North America and Central Asia, functions as a conflict prevention, human rights, and elections monitoring body, although it also addresses minority rights, gender equality, and other topics. Between summits, its main decision-making bodies include the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Council; the latter authorizes field operations such as peace-keeping missions or election monitoring. Others producing documentation include its institutions, especially the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The OSCE has a system of depository libraries, and an online Documents Library (http://www.osce.org/library). Familiarity with OCSE agency acronyms is helpful when searching the database.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a multilateral economic organization with member countries in Europe, North America, Asia, and Latin America. It is a formidable knowledge-creation body, producing surveys, statistics, and reports on subjects ranging from education and health to taxation and energy. Most of these publications are available in its subscription-based OECD iLibrary. The OECD, like the IMF and World Bank, did not make documentation widely available until recently. Now documents are posted on the Official OECD Documents Search database (http://www.oecd.org/officialdocumentsearch), which permits users to search for declassified OECD documentation.

International law, technical agencies, and the environment

Legal and standard setting work

Intergovernmental organizations are rich sources of information on international law. While bodies whose principal function is to address matters of international law are well known, many other organizations work in the field, in the realm of negotiation and management of treaties, the adjudication of disputes, or the drafting of normative laws and technical standards.

Many treaties and international agreements are negotiated under the auspices of the UN or one of its bodies. Generally, their texts may be found as the Final Acts of conferences

convened to draft the agreement, or as resolutions of the General Assembly. In the case of the former, the texts of agreements normally appear as resolutions of the conference and are published in its report to the General Assembly. Often the reports will include a summary record of the conference proceedings. The full proceedings and the *travaux preparatoires* are not always freely available from the organizations, though the latter are often edited and published commercially with commentary (e.g., Detrick 1992). Where international agreements are opened for signature, background information on their drafting is found in the documentation of the committee where it was considered. Draft agreements may be addressed at one of the General Assembly main committees or at an *ad hoc* committee. While the extent of the information available will vary, it is readily available online via UNBISNet.

Other IGOs function as forums for the negotiation of international agreements. For the most part, the records of the proceedings leading up to their draftings are accessible, although the full record of the negotiations may be difficult to acquire. Certain treaties are negotiated entirely on camera, and the public record is only a reflection of the outcome. Normally, the parent body approves agreements before being opened for signature. UNESCO treaties, for instance, are approved by the General Conference, and ILO conventions by the International Labour Conference. Most specialized agencies of the UN follow this pattern, and many have built robust gateways to their treaties. The World Intellectual Property Organization's WIPO Lex (http://www.wipo.int/wipolex) and the ILO's ILOLEX (http://www.ilo.org/ilolex) are two of many examples. Unfortunately, not all IGOs follow this policy. It may be challenging to research the history of an international agreement, particularly if the agreement is relatively old and the organization's documentation was not widely distributed at the time.

Intergovernmental organizations normally serve as depositories of treaties negotiated under their auspices and will provide the researcher with information regarding status, signatories and other matters, as described in articles 76–8 of the 1969 *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (UN, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 1155: 350–52). Many multilateral treaties designate the UN secretary-general as the depository. The UN Office of Legal Affairs maintains a comprehensive gateway to the texts of treaties deposited with the UN, and to the status of treaties for which the organization carries out the duties of a depository. Formerly, notifications were collected and published annually, but the UN Treaty Collection website is now updated with virtually no delay. Other IGOs provide a similar service. WIPO Lex and ILOLEX make the determination of status a simple matter, as does UNESCO's Legal Instruments gateway (http://www.unesco.org).

In certain cases, mechanisms have been established to address breaches of states' obligations under the terms of an international agreement. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body is an example of one established to settle disputes between states which are parties to the WTO agreements, as is, to a lesser extent, the Human Rights Committee, established by the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to hear individual complaints over ICCPR violations. For the most part, this documentation is easily found and access is restricted only for purposes of confidentiality.

International technical and standards setting bodies

Many IGOs work to establish technical and other standards that, though they are not legally binding agreements, are subsequently adopted with or without modification. For the most part, these standards are issued by international technical organizations and their location is a matter of determining which IGO possesses the appropriate expertise. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization has established a number of standards as *Annexes to*

the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Annex 4, for instance, contains a set of standards and recommended practices for the production of aeronautical charts.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is especially active in this area. The organization's Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU–T) and its Radiocommunication Sector (ITU–R) produce a series of standards covering information and communication technologies infrastructure and the management of the radio–frequency spectrum and satellite orbits (*ITU-T Recommendations* are available at: http://www.itu.int/itu-t/ recommendations/index.aspx). For the most part these are freely available electronically, but not all IGOs adopt this policy. Access to the Universal Postal Union's technical documentation is restricted to its member–states' postal authorities, and thus while one can purchase some UPU general publications, the documentation issued by the agency's deliberative bodies and Secretariat are largely unavailable.

Environment and climate change: UNEP and IPCC

Since 1972, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has been instrumental in working toward the formation of international environmental agreements and policy, such as the establishment, with the World Meteorological Organization, of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is a scientific intergovernmental body charged with assessing the global effects of climate change. It is noted for its scientific *Assessment Reports*; the first one led to the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This framework treaty was completed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, and led to the eventual ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the first international agreement to set binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases for developed countries.

The IPCC publishes modest amounts of documentation, including records of plenary and working group sessions and expert meetings (http://www.ipcc.ch). But the UNFCC, as a UN Treaty Body, produces significant quantities of documentation. These are included in the UN documents system, and bear the UN "FCCC" symbol. Researchers interested in the compliance of countries signatory to the treaty may consult *National Communications* covering all aspects of country implementation, and *National Adaptation Programmes of Action*, or planning documents for developing countries. UNEP documentation is best located by consulting sections on the UNEP website for its governing bodies, including its Executive Office and Governing Council. Its documentation is included within the UN documents system and may be found on the Official Document System and UNBISNet. Official documentation bears the UNEP document symbol; for example, UNEP/GC.26 indicates a document issued at the 26th session of its Governing Council. UNEP also collaborates with other IGOs on databases like ECOLEX (http://www.ecolex.org), an international gateway to environmental law in partnership with the FAO and the International Union for Conservation of Nature.

International documentation in the digital era

While the Internet has largely overcome the former physical obstacles facing users of IGO information, two significant barriers remain. First, IGO documentation still remains information created for internal use by organizations in the exercise of their functions. A search for information in the context of the IGO's structure and activities will thus be much more successful. Second, the breadth of IGO activities and the sheer numbers of documents they

produce pose challenges; notably, determining which agency to consult for information. It is therefore important that the user first asks "Who cares about the topic at hand?" The answer will frequently involve an identification of an organization's area of competence, its interests, and the composition of its membership. Once these matters have been resolved, and despite the peculiarities of the organization's informational structure, the user will be able to make fuller use of IGO information.

Recommended for further reading

Fetzer (1978), Griffiths (2008), Hajnal (1997–2001), and Louis-Jacques and Korman (1996).

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Data sets and quantitative research in the study of intergovernmental organizations

Erik Gartzke and Christina Schneider

The past half-century has seen a dramatic rise in both the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and participation levels by states and other actors. This exponential growth has been tracked increasingly through the collection and analysis of quantitative data. Some data collections can be divided according to the major subfields of international relations (security, international political economy), while others focus on key institutions: the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Much less attention has been devoted to collecting data on minor IGOs, or to specialty organizations, which are no doubt worthy of additional scrutiny. In addition, very few large data collection efforts exist for regional organizations (with the notable exception of the EU), or for international non-governmental organizations.

The most integrated database on IGOs is the Correlates of War (COW) IGO data set (http://www.correlatesofwar.org). This chapter focuses on a description of this database as well as a discussion of applications of this database in the academic literature. Our main goal is to provide a summary of the insights that have been gained from analyzing the COW IGO data set. We then briefly summarize other data sets that are specific to important individual IGOs such as the UN, IMF, WTO, and World Bank. Based on these insights, we outline areas of possible data collection or where data sets could be exploited for further analysis. We conclude by noting both the successes of this literature and challenges to growth.

Correlates of War international governmental organization data set

The broadest data on IGOs come from the Correlates of War project (Pevehouse et al. 2004).

Wallace and Singer (1970) provide a description of an early version of these data. Due to the two-phase collection effort, these data are available in five-year intervals from 1815 to 1965 and annually from 1965 to 2000. There are three versions of these data, corresponding to different units of analysis (the IGO, the IGO-state, and the IGO-dyad). The IGO data list each IGO that existed for every year in the data set. In the second version of these data, an

observation represents a country year, with a count of the number of IGOs in which the state was a member in a given year. The final version, dyad years, consists of a count of IGOs in which dyad members share joint membership.

A number of studies have applied these data to various questions both within and beyond the scope of international institutions.

Inter-state peace and conflict

The core use of the COW IGO data is in studying international security. Singer and Wallace (1970) offer a series of bivariate statistical tests to analyze the effect of IGOs on war onset. This first foray into quantification of the effects of IGOs ended in disappointment, as IGOs did not appear to reduce war, though the authors admit that the measures involved are crude.

Evidence of a statistical relationship between IGOs and peace has been slow to materialize. Jacobson et al. (1986) evaluate a functionalist perspective on international cooperation, asserting a general relationship between the number of IGOs and the absence of war in the international system. As the authors state: "Functionalist predictions are upheld." While optimistic in broad strokes, the study's methodology is unable to demonstrate that it is the members of IGOs that are responsible for (or experiencing) a reduced propensity of war. Similarly, Domke (1988) finds that there is no significant relationship between IGO membership and inter-state war, though his decision to break down the analysis to individual years biases against finding such a relationship.

Interest in the pacific consequences of IGOs was revitalized by the democratic peace theory (Doyle 1986; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Theories and evidence that initially concentrated on liberal domestic politics eventually expanded to encompass the effects of deliberative institutions on the international level (Russett et al. 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999). Russett and Oneal (2001), along with co-authors, compiled a series of studies crediting a liberal "triad" of democracy, cross-border trade, and IGOs with promoting international peace. Despite repeated tests, the association between IGOs and peace is certainly the shakiest of the three relationships in Oneal and Russett's Kantian triad. As Gartzke et al. (2001) point out, under certain conditions, joint IGO memberships are associated with *increased* conflict. This is at least partly due to over-aggregation. Studies using the COW IGO data have generally relied on the count of joint IGO memberships, assuming in effect that all IGOs are the same. Boehmer et al. (2004) relax this assumption, testing a theory that only institutionalized IGOs are likely to affect conflict behavior. It is easy to conflate variation in the diplomatic activity of states with the effects of IGOs. Major power disagreement also makes these organizations less effective at promoting peace.

Given the controversy, researchers have sought new ways to evaluate the relationship between IGOs and conflict. Chan (2005) analyzes whether the number of IGO memberships affects the conflict behavior of the great powers. Using general dispute initiation instead of bilateral Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), he finds that increased IGO membership promotes increased great power MID initiation, with France being the only exception. States are also more likely to join more IGOs in the wake of an intense period of conflict. Crescenzi et al. (2008) review the effect of cooperation on conflict onset between states. Decisions by both members of the dyad to join the same IGOs in the same year are treated as a cooperative shock. The authors find that this cooperative shock in politically relevant dyads decreases the likelihood of conflict, but that joint joining has no effect on conflict in the sample as a whole.

Kalbhenn (2011) explores the effects of interactions between liberal domestic politics and international institutions using shared river basins as an issue of cross-border governance. The greater the number of joint IGO memberships, the lower the conflict in border-crossing basins. However, IGO membership does not affect water quantity very much. On the back end of conflict processes, Shannon et al. (2010) find that joint IGO membership reduces the duration of conflict, but *not* the likelihood of conflict onset (even in fatal disputes). IGO effectiveness also varies depending on the organization's informational or commitment role. Hansen et al. (2009) use the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data to measure conflict in the western hemisphere. The authors find that IGOs are more likely to facilitate agreements if they are institutionalized, when they have more democratic members, and if they use binding conflict management techniques.

Pevehouse and Russett (2006) argue that the effect of IGOs on peace is less equivocal when democracies are involved. The more IGOs are composed of democracies, the less likely it is that states in a dyad will engage in fatal MIDs. Joint IGO membership does not have an effect once joint membership in democratic institutions is controlled for (EU membership status is also controlled for in the analysis). Shannon (2009) uses the Boehmer et al. (2004) data to identify IGOs with a charter that is primarily security-oriented and the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data to update the list of these institutions. She finds joint membership in peace-brokering IGOs increases attempts to settle disputes peacefully. However, joint membership in security IGOs does not have an effect on bilateral attempts when controlling for shared interests, regime type, and the history of such claims. On the other hand, joint membership encourages settlement through third parties.

Researchers have increasingly shifted from asking "whether IGOs matter" for peace, to "which IGOs matter." Haftel (2007) develops a new data set on institutional design of regional integration agreements (RIAs). He finds that more diverse and intense economic activity and regularly scheduled meetings are associated with a decline in member conflict behavior. McLaughlin Mitchell and Hensel (2007) look for contexts where IGOs are particularly challenged with keeping the peace. The authors identify contentious issues using the ICOW database, and then assess the effect of IGOs, both as active conflict mediators and as passive membership organizations, in defusing and resolving contentious issues.

Given the growing evidence of indirect effects of IGOs, researchers have also been drawn to the methodology of networks to try to unravel causal mechanisms.[1] Dorussen and Ward (2008) attempt to demonstrate that the effect of IGOs on international stability is not necessarily a direct effect of individual memberships. Using network analysis, they show that indirect linkages through IGOs are an important substitute for direct diplomatic ties. Ingram et al. (2005) use network analysis and the COW IGO data to show that trade flows between states increase with the strength of IGO ties between countries. Interestingly, the apparent effect of IGOs on trade is not limited to organizations with an economic mandate, though IGOs with strong institutional structures have a larger effect in promoting trade than minimally institutionalized IGOs. The authors attribute this effect to identity formation.

Global governance

Whereas the bulk of research utilizing the COW IGO data set focuses on conflict behavior, a variety of studies have used the COW IGO data to examine the relationship between IGO membership and global governance. Bernauer et al. (2010) assess both domestic and international determinants of the ratification of global environmental treaties. They find that

countries that are more involved in IGOs tend to join more international environmental agreements. Generally, international factors (IGO membership, treaty ratification) have a stronger effect than domestic factors (income, democracy). Looking at a large number of variables, Neumayer (2002) finds evidence that democracies take more actions associated with environmental commitment. However, democratic performance is no better in terms of environmental outcomes. Similarly, Spilker (2011) shows that whereas democracies do not exhibit better environmental behavior, IGO membership can often lead to reduced pollution.

Greenhill (2010) analyzes the effect of IGO membership on socialization toward human rights. He finds that the human rights standards of IGO partners influence a country's human rights performance. The specific make up of IGOs (in terms of human rights records of their member-states) is actually more important than the nature of the IGOs themselves. Bearce and Bondanella (2007) take the notion of socialization one step further, arguing that countries with common IGO memberships tend to converge toward similar worldviews. Using data on voting patterns in the UN, they find that states with more joint IGO memberships tend to vote more similarly in the UN General Assembly over time, suggesting that nations with many international ties are being socialized by their memberships.

Intergovernmental organizations and democratization

Given modern trends, organizational mandates, and the normative context, it seems obvious that IGOs would serve as an important force motivating democratization in the international system. Pevehouse (2002a) seeks to identify the effect of IGO membership on democratization. He argues that IGOs with higher democratic density are more likely to be associated with liberal transition. His measure uses the average POLITY democracy score (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) of the most democratic IGO in which a given state is a member. Membership in democratic IGOs is shown to increase the likelihood of a transition to democracy. Interestingly, this does not appear to be the case for regional IGOs. As Pevehouse (2002b) shows, regional IGOs are not associated with an increase in democracy, but they are associated with the durability of national efforts to liberalize. Pevehouse (2005) echoes and expands on this premise, arguing that regional IGOs serve as a major commitment mechanism, allowing domestic leaders to make more credible claims to liberalize.

Torfason and Ingram (2010) argue that the network of IGOs diffuses democratic norms and transmits information among democratic members. They find that democracies have more influence in the IGO network than autocracies. Their evidence also supports the claim that networks diffuse democracy, accelerating the shift to democracy among those states heavily engaged in the IGO network. Donno (2010) explores the issue of reinforcement of existing democratic norms. Examining reports of election violations in the sample of COW IGOs, she finds that enforcement varies with importance, but that observers and the content of their reports influence IGO sections and enforcement.

The determinants of IGO membership

Scholars have devoted increasing attention to explaining IGO membership. Rey and Barkdull (2005) use the Singer/Jacobson version of the COW data to evaluate the effect of democracy on joining IGOs. They find that states with more competitive party systems and multiple legislative chambers tend to join a greater number of IGOs. Less competitive party systems with unicameral legislatures and low per capita gross domestic product tend to decrease IGO

memberships. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) also seek to identify why states accede to IGO membership. States that experience a democratic transition over the past five years tend to have about 20 percent more IGO memberships than states that did not undergo regime change. Autocratizing states are less likely to join IGOs than states with stable regimes, while democracies are more likely to join IGOs. Major powers and former communist countries are also more likely to join IGOs, while states involved in MIDs display a lower propensity to become IGO members. Eroding hegemony seems to stimulate more IGO joining.

Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) explore additional determinants of IGO accession. They argue that democratizing states have more reason to join standards-based and economic IGOs than political organizations, given the value of these organizations as commitment devices for domestic democratic politicians. They find that democratizing countries are more likely to enter economic, political, and standards-based organizations than stable autocracies. The influence of democratization on IGO joining also appears to be independent of stability. These effects are declining: As a state joins more IGOs of a given type, it enters fewer IGOs of the same type, but more IGOs of different types. Finally, Mansfield et al. (2008) look at the effect of domestic factors on membership in regional international agreements. While democracies are generally more likely to join RIAs than non-democracies, those with more veto players are relatively less likely to become members. The level of integration serves to magnify the effect of veto players: more integrated RIAs have fewer democratic members.

Boehmer and Nordstrom (2008) ask why countries become joint members in certain IGOs but not in others. They differentiate between levels of institutionalization, and between economic and security organizations, finding that dyads that are economically dependent or democratic and at peace are more likely to join highly institutionalized IGOs. MIDs have a modest effect in reducing the likelihood of joint IGO memberships. Economic development and alliances increase joint IGO memberships. Trade ties are the most important determinant of joint IGO membership. At the same time, IGO joining by non-democracies remains something of a mystery (Rodgers and Volgy 2009), particularly given pressures to conform.

Where most research addresses IGO joining, some studies have branched beyond this. Shanks et al. (1996) explore both the growth and demise of IGOs along five dimensions. While aggregate IGO counts have grown, many are also "set aside." As Shanks et al. (1996: 594) state, "only two-thirds of the IGOs that existed in 1981 were still active in 1992." Second, emanations (where existing IGOs create new organizations) are an important source of IGO formation. Third, evolution has resulted in the population of IGOs shifting over time. Newer organizations allocate membership differently. Fourth, membership patterns vary both across countries and over time. In some cases, states belonged to fewer IGOs in the 1990s than previously. Finally, the end of the Cold War led to new IGO formation that reflected reduced international competition. Surprisingly, Shanks et al. (1996) find that countries that are autocratizing (i.e., becoming *less* democratic) tend to have *more* IGO memberships. The age of a country and its development are associated with an increase in IGO memberships. Ingram and Torfason (2010) also address the determinants of IGO termination. They show that IGOs that are dependent on major powers suffer a much higher rate of organizational demise than IGOs which are not. Interestingly, IGOs that help to promote trade, democracy, and peace do not survive longer than those serving other functions.

Examples of organization-specific data sets

Whereas this chapter focuses on the COW IGO data set, other data collection efforts are worth mentioning, particularly because they provide important ideas about potential

future avenues for the data collection and analysis efforts within the COW IGO framework.[2]

United Nations

The most widely used database within the realm of the UN records roll-call votes from the UN General Assembly (UNGA) from 1945 to the present.[3] One arm of quantitative research involves the effect of UNGA voting on the level of international cooperation. Gartzke (1998, 2000, 2007) uses the similarity of UNGA vote patterns to argue that it is interests, and not institutions, that are primarily responsible for democratic peace. UNGA votes are widely used as a measure of variation in inter-state interests. As Voeten (2012: 12) notes, "indicators based on UN votes have now become an almost obligatory ingredient in models that explain bilateral and multilateral lending, international conflict, and a host of other outcomes." Other measures of international interests use alliance data (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992) or counts of IGO portfolios (Maoz et al. 2006).

Another arm of quantitative research involves the effects of major IGOs (in particular the UN) on domestic public opinion. Chapman and Reiter (2004) and Chapman (2009) show that the US president can demonstrate international support by obtaining approval from the UN Security Council (UNSC). Tingley and Tomz (2012) use an experiment to assess the causal pathways between UNSC resolutions and popular support. In contrast to the claim that UN resolutions signal quality or reflect international material support, the authors find that resolutions serve as commitments, causing publics to back military uses of force abroad.

Important questions remain about the origins of national interests, and how they are translated into voting in the UNGA or UNSC. Alker (1964) and Alker and Russett (1965) were among the first to apply UNGA roll-call vote data to study international politics. They used factor analysis to identify coalitions and cleavages among voting members. Kim and Russett (1996) use an updated version of the UNGA roll-call data to argue that the Cold War, in which an East–West divide was dominant, had been re-shaped by a North–South split. Voeten (2000) applies the NOMINATE scaling technique to evaluate UNGA roll-call vote data. He finds that the post-Cold War world actually remained uni-dimensional, with the US and its partners standing against all other states. Regime type and wealth are also determinants of UN vote patterns. Hagan (1989) goes further, using data on regime change in 87 developing countries to show that realignments in the UNGA are often tied to domestic transitions.

Studies of UN voting have been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to the manipulation of votes. In particular, powerful nations may be able to "purchase" roll-call outcomes. Early studies produced contradictory evidence of vote buying in the UNGA (Rai 1972, 1980; Kegley and Hook 1991; Sexton and Decker 1992). Wang (1999) finds that US foreign aid influenced politically important UNGA votes in a sample of 65 developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) estimate the value to a state of obtaining one of the ten temporary seats on the UNSC. Dreher et al. (2008) examine the benefits of UNSC membership in terms of World Bank loans. Temporary UNSC membership does increase the probability of success in obtaining funding from the World Bank, though UNSC influence of this kind does not seem to increase the size of the loans obtained.

World Trade Organization

The WTO, and its dispute settlement procedure, provides an ideal laboratory to empirically analyze questions of compliance and enforcement of cooperation in international institutions.

Over time, scholars have collected a database of several hundred General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO disputes, starting with the initial data collection efforts by Hudec (1993). This initial database was substantively revised and reformatted by Reinhardt (1996) and subsequently supplemented by Reinhardt (2000), Busch (2000), and Busch and Reinhardt (2003, 2006).[4] The database incorporates information on over 600 bilateral disputes from 1948 to 2000. In addition, the database includes information on the dispute escalation, policy outcomes, compliance with the rulings, and other factors of interest for analyzing enforcement of cooperation within the WTO. In a recent data collection effort, Busch et al. (2009) collected data on the legal capacity of WTO members using a 48-question survey. Many scholars have used these data to analyze important questions such as who initiates disputes, and why are some disputes never resolved whereas others never reach the formal stage. Busch and Reinhardt (2002) and Davis (2012) provide excellent overviews of the insights that have been drawn from these data.

International Monetary Fund

Data collection efforts in IMF research have focused primarily on the determinants of IMF lending, conditionality choices, and borrower performance. Vreeland (2003) provides data on the number of years a country is in an IMF program and the time a country negotiates a program.[5] Gould (2003, 2006), Dreher and Jensen (2007), and Copelovitch (2010a, 2010b) provide measurements of IMF conditionality operationalized as the number of conditions imposed for each IMF loan. For example, Copelovitch (2010a) collects data of 197 non-concessional IMF loans to 47 countries from 1984 to 2003 using IMF archival documents to measure loan size as well as the number of conditions for each loan. He distinguishes "hard" and "binding" conditions from "soft conditions." Stone (2008, 2011) proposes a different way of measuring the scope of IMF conditionality, using quantitative macroeconomic performance criteria and structural benchmarks as reported in the IMF's Monitoring of Agreements Database. The database codes conditionality in 19 categories, ranging from fiscal and monetary policy to exchange rate restrictions and structural reforms. Stone's measure of scope is operationalized as the number of categories of conditions subject to test in a particular review. With these data, Stone demonstrates how the US is able to continue to wield disproportionate power in the IMF, despite waning contributions, by combining formal and informal mechanisms. Finally, some effort has gone into providing adequate measures for borrowers' compliance. Dreher (2003) measures performance as a binary variable that takes one if in a particular year at least 25 percent of the amount which would be available for that year under equal phasing remains undrawn. He uses these data to analyze the effect of elections on IMF program interruptions. Using these data, scholars have addressed various questions, such as the influence of powerful states, preference heterogeneity, and agency behavior on IMF lending and conditionality. Copelovitch (2010a, 2010b) provides a detailed summary on the quantitative literature on this question, and Vreeland (2007) conducts a meta-analysis of data-based studies of the IMF, offering a criticism of some IMF lending practices and the influence of major powers.

World Bank and other multilateral aid institutions

Research on the World Bank and other multilateral aid institutions has long relied on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's International Development Statistics to analyze aid commitments and disbursements from various regional and multilateral

development banks, including the World Bank. In a recent effort, Tierney et al. (2011) provide a more comprehensive data set on bilateral and multilateral aid flows. Both data sets have been used to address a variety of interesting questions related to economic development, and provided important insights for our understanding of multilateral aid allocation decisions (see, for example, Milner 2006; Hicks et al. 2008; Lyne et al. 2009; Schneider and Tobin 2012a). In addition, in an attempt to enable the comparison of various multilateral aid institutions, McLean (2012) and Schneider and Tobin (2012b) collect data on contributions to and allocation of a number of multilateral aid institutions in order to understand why governments delegate resources to a variety of IGOs with often overlapping goals.

Future applications of quantitative data on IGOs

While much has been achieved in the initial exploitation of the COW IGO data, some important questions remain. Perhaps the greatest question of all remains the effects of IGOs on peace. A major source of ambiguity is the over-aggregation of the indicator itself. Counts of these data pose the risk of an ecological fallacy: Identifying relationships in populations does not mean that one can infer efficaciousness for individual organizations or memberships (Robinson 1950). Research using these data has generally not disaggregated these data.[6] Inferences meant to reflect the effects of IGOs in conflict are actually demonstrating the effect of accumulating memberships. Given the high variation in membership levels among countries, it is very likely that the factors that lead states to join more IGOs may themselves be responsible for variation in conflict behavior. This has already been shown in the case of countries that are more active in the international system. Future research should seek to disaggregate the effects of IGOs on various dependent variables. The data collected on individual IGOs, as summarized here, provide a useful starting point for this.

The existing efforts in data collection for specific IGOs provide further ideas for the development and application of the COW IGO database. Whereas much effort has been spent on analyzing the effectiveness of IGOs on promoting peace, there is less understanding about the effectiveness of IGOs in their own fields. Based on the ongoing efforts to provide more fine-grained codings in respect of IGO characteristics and policy fields, future research could gain insights about IGO effectiveness using comparative methods.

Scholars of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO often focus on the effects of bargaining power on policy outcomes. Most of this work relies on either the influence of the most powerful member-states, such as the US (Stone 2008), or on the influence of a group of powerful states (Copelovitch 2010b). More fine-grained analysis requires the collection of data about the informal and formal bargaining power of individual member-states. Much of this work has already been completed in EU research, and scholars have used these measures of power to analyze various questions related to formal and informal bargaining inputs and outputs in the EU (Carrubba 1997; Rodden 2002; Thomson et al. 2006; Slapin 2008; Aksoy 2010; Schneider 2011, 2012; Schneider and Tobin 2012a). This research could serve as a guide for future data collection efforts that result in a comparable data set of bargaining power in IGOs.

Another interesting question that has only been explored partially is the development and existence of IGOs in various issue fields that often have overlapping or even similar goals (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009). Some research discusses the beneficial effects of such regime complexes. For example, Schneider and Tobin (2012b) argue that it gives governments the ability to diversify the risks of delegation. Whereas these

studies provide explanations that are specific to particular issue fields, the COW IGO data set could provide the foundation for future data collection that makes it possible to answer such questions.

While much has been accomplished in terms of methodological sophistication, there remains room to refine analysis of key relationships through better theory and estimation techniques. In particular, little has been done to date to mate formal theoretical models with tests of hypotheses about international cooperation using COW IGO data and other sources. Given the compatibility of these data with other data sets, and the extensive use of formal modeling in the general conflict literature, this would seem to be an obvious course for future research. A related but more general challenge involves endogeneity. Studies to date explore the effects of IGOs on democracy, peace, and global governance, and of democracy and other variables on the tendency for states to join IGOs. Estimating these relationships separately is likely to bias apparent effects: Democracy both influences and is influenced by international institutions. Future research must tackle these challenges in order to provide more conclusive statements about the relationship between IGOs and international cooperation and conflict.

Recommended for further reading

Bearce and Bondanella (2007), Kuziemko and Werker (2006), Stone (2011), Torfason and Ingram (2010), and Voeten (2000).

Notes

1 Beckfield (2008) applies network analysis to the COW IGO data, finding that the structure of ties among organizations implies important challenges to major sociological theories of the organization of international affairs. Previous theoretical work on IGOs and even data-driven research underestimated the extent to which IGOs exhibit structural inequality.
2 European Union research has provided particularly important insights into the possibilities for data collection on IGOs more broadly. For example, the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) data set (https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:31896) measures the policy positions of member-states, the Commission, and the European Parliament on 70 legislative proposals adopted between 1999 and 2001 (Thomson et al. 2006). Similarly, Warntjen et al. (2008) collected data on the ideological composition of governmental coalitions in the Council of Ministers. We do not attempt to summarize data on regional organizations here.
3 See Strezhnev and Voeten (2012) for the codebook.
4 Note that there does not exist one integrated data set as the different efforts focus on different time periods.
5 Abouharb and Cingranelli (2009) updated the dataset.
6 For an exception, see Gartzke et al. (2009).

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4

Data and analyses of voting in the United Nations General Assembly

Erik Voeten

Voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has attracted scholarly attention right from the United Nations' (UN) inception. Renowned scholars such as Hayward Alker, Robert Keohane, Arend Lijphart, John Mueller, and Bruce Russett made their early marks with analyses of UN voting. These early studies viewed the UNGA as an arena in which broader patterns of behavior in world politics could be observed. Inspired by the behavioral revolution and methodological advances in the study of roll-call voting, these studies sought to identify voting blocs and dimensions of contestation in world politics.

In the 1970s this research program came under fire from scholars who argued that it was methodologically rather than conceptually driven and that it provided little justification for focusing on the UNGA as a microcosm for world politics (Keohane 1969; Alger 1970; Riggs et al. 1970; Dixon 1981). Robert Keohane (1969) accused studies of UN politics of suffering from the "Mount Everest syndrome," arguing that the UN is studied because it is there, without asking relevant and important theoretical questions. Arguably, the UN also had become a less significant venue by the 1970s and suffered from what Ernst Haas (1983) called "regime decay."

Consequentially, the study of the UN was put on the backburner. A good indicator is the number of articles published in the primary sub-disciplinary journal, *International Organization (IO)*, as well as the primary journal for the entire discipline, the *American Political Science Review (APSR)*. Riggs et al. (1970) counted 247 articles in *IO*, and 16 in *APSR* from 1950 to 1969 whose main topic was an investigation of some aspect of the UN. In the 1970s, 32 articles on the UN appeared in *IO* and four in the *APSR*. Between 1980 and 2000 only eight articles that explicitly investigated the UN were published in *IO*, whereas the *APSR* had not published an article with the UN as a main topic of investigation since 1976, until the Doyle and Sambanis (2000) study of the effect of peacekeeping operations.

The 2000s saw a return of interest in the UN, especially its peacekeeping functions and the Security Council. This did not lead to renewed attention for UNGA voting patterns, aside from a few exceptions (Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000). Yet UNGA voting data began to be used for an entirely different purpose: to construct indicators of similarity in

"state preferences." Since 1998, there have been over 50 published studies that use an indicator based on UN votes as a dependent variable and more commonly as an independent variable. Scholars have used these indicators to examine the impact of shared interests on the likelihood of inter-state disputes (e.g., Gartzke 1998), the distribution of foreign aid (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000), and the lending behavior of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Thacker 1999). Others used UN votes as dependent variables to answer research questions such as whether socialization through intergovernmental organizations leads to convergence in member-state interests (Bearce and Bondanella 2007), whether the European Union has started to form a cohesive foreign policy (Drieskens 2010), and whether the United States (US) is starting to get increasingly isolated on foreign policy issues on which it has lobbied (Voeten 2004).

This chapter reviews the usage of UN voting data for both purposes: analyses of voting blocs and the construction of indicators of the common interests of states. I argue that studies that use UN voting data to measure common interests pay insufficient attention to the content of UN votes and use inadequate methods to construct indicators of interest similarity. I show how ignoring (changes in) the UN's agenda and dimensions of contestation can lead to serious biases. Before delving into substantive applications, I briefly describe the existing data, which now range from 1946 to 2011.

Description of United Nations voting data

The most recent UN voting data set was assembled by Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten (2012) but it contains data collected by many scholars. The first source is the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research's *United Nations Roll Call Data, 1946–1985* data set (ICPSR 1982), which is itself a collection of various data gathering efforts. The Strezhnev–Voeten data set uses only non-unanimous plenary votes, although the ICPSR data also include information about Committee votes for the first 29 sessions of the General Assembly (but not thereafter). The Strezhnev–Voeten data include votes from emergency special sessions, such as on Hungary or the Suez Canal crisis.

The data after 1985 come from various updates from Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett (1996), Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo (2002), and Erik Voeten (2000) up to the latest release from Strezhnev and Voeten (2012). Unfortunately, these newer data do not include failed votes on resolutions nor do they include votes on paragraphs and amendments. Such votes have become somewhat rare in the modern UN era, but they do occur and can be quite important (with paragraph votes the most common).[1] Unfortunately, records of these votes are also more difficult to locate. An update is being prepared to include such votes, but these data are not yet available at the time of writing.

The Strezhnev–Voeten data include 5,140 votes in 65 UNGA sessions. States are recorded as either voting "yes," "abstain," or "no." The predominant view in the literature is that these choices should be treated as ordinal in that a "no" vote is a stronger signal of disapproval than an abstention. States can also be absent from the UNGA. Unfortunately, many studies confuse absences and abstentions, suggesting that absences are indications of disapproval of a resolution. A more realistic interpretation is that most absences have other causes, such as government turnovers that lead to states temporarily having no UN delegation. Indeed, in 68 percent of cases where a state is absent, it will also be absent on the next roll call on the agenda. This is inconsistent with a view that absences are generally protests against specific resolutions.[2] Confusing absences with abstentions could lead to serious biases given that absences are common (9 percent of observations, compared to 12 percent abstentions and 7 percent no

Figure 4.1   Issue areas of contested UN General Assembly votes, 1946–2011

votes) and correlated to structural factors such as civil wars or coups that could influence outcomes of interests.

The data also include information on the content of votes. First, the data identify those votes that the US lobbied on, as identified by the US State Department publication *Voting Practices in the United Nations*. Second, issue codes were assigned based on searches of the descriptions of resolutions.

Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of issue areas across time. Time is based on sessions, which usually run from September to December but occasionally stretch into the following year. The year 1964 was not accounted for because there were no votes over a dispute concerning the admission of Communist China.

There are a couple of striking patterns. First, Middle East issues have replaced colonialism issues as the most dominant agenda item (although human rights issues challenge this predominance in recent years). Often, about one-third of contentious UNGA votes concern the Middle East, which really means the Israel–Palestine conflict. The dominance of colonialism issues is even stronger in some years. This should be taken into consideration when evaluating indicators based on UN votes.

Second, especially in the first 30 years, there are large annual shifts in the content of the agenda. Thus voting coincidence between countries could rise or fall simply because the agenda changes, without any change in state interests. Ignoring this issue in time series applications could lead to biased inferences, as these changes in the agenda could be endogenous to outcomes. For example, violent conflicts tend to attract UN resolutions.

Voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly

The study of UN roll-call voting flourished in the 1950s and 1960s. The earliest study is Ball's (1951) study of bloc voting within pre-determined groups. Other influential studies are Lijphart (1963), Alker (1964), Alker and Russett (1965), Russett (1966), Mueller (1967), and Newcombe et al. (1970). Riggs et al. (1970) give an overview of this early literature.

Figure 4.2 plots ideal points derived from states' UNGA vote choices for 1946–69 and 1970–85 respectively. These ideal points are estimated using W-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; see also Voeten 2000). Each resolution (not plotted) can be represented by a cutting line, where the model expects countries on each side of the line to vote with each other. The plots assume that countries have static ideal points in a policy space that has a consistent meaning within the time period. This assumption is not always realistic. Yet the plots provide a useful vehicle to explain the historical evolution of contestation in the UNGA. I highlight points of departure from the static assumptions in the narrative.[3] Nevertheless, the static models accurately explain over 90 percent of actual vote choices in each period.

In Figure 4.2(a), the dominant dimension of UN voting separates the Soviet Bloc from the US and the Western European states. This conflict had already taken shape in the first UN sessions. The Soviet Bloc was isolated in the early days and almost always lost on Cold War issues (Rowe 1969). Colonialism issues and South Africa occasionally caused rifts between the US and its Western allies. Consequentially, the colonial powers rather than the US occupy the most extreme Western position during this period.

During the first five years there was an important orthogonal dimension of contestation concerning the issue of Palestine. Arab and most Asian countries opposed partition while the West and East stood united in favor of partition, although this unity proved to be short-lived. After Joseph Stalin's death, the Soviet Union started courting non-aligned states and generally voted with the Arab states. The Middle East issue thus became part of the first dimension. Nevertheless, the superpowers were still united on some North–South issues, such as their opposition to making the UN a more supranationalist institution over which the superpowers would have less control.

The early 1950s constituted a period in which the US actively and successfully used the UN for its foreign policy purposes. The multilateral authorization of the Korea intervention force and the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution that temporarily caused the UNGA to surpass the deadlocked Security Council as the most important political institution in the UN led even realists like Hans Morgenthau (1954) to hail the "new" UN as a useful mechanism through which the US could achieve its national objectives by multilateral means. Initially the Americans did not expect the end of the impasse over the admission of new members to change this. After all, the US sponsored the admission of 11 of the new members admitted in 1955, whereas the Soviet Union sponsored only four.

Yet, the introduction of new member states increased demands to deal with the issue of colonialism. The Soviet Union started to aggressively pursue the allegiance of the former colonies. This challenged the US to choose between these newer states and their most important allies, the "Old Europeans," against whom the many anti-colonialism resolutions were targeted. In the mid-1950s the US position was further removed from its European allies than in any other period. Following the Western divisions during the Suez crisis and the failure of the UN to act against the Soviet invasion of Hungary (despite a resolution condemning it), many realists believed the compromises required for acting through the UN had become too costly in comparison to the benefits of multilateralism (e.g., Morgenthau 1956; Hoffmann

1946–1969

(a)

1970–1985

(b)

Africa	Asia
E. Europe	WEOG
GRULAC	

E. Europe = Eastern European Group
GRULAC = Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries
WEOG = Western European and Others Group

Figure 4.2 Contestation in the UN General Assembly during the Cold War

1957). Consequently, the US increasingly voted with the Europeans on colonial issues from 1957 until President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961.

The year 1960 was a milestone year for the UN. Seventeen new nations joined the organization, the UN embarked on a major peacekeeping mission to suppress the civil strife after the independence of the Congo, and the UNGA adopted the landmark Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev thought the 1960 UNGA plenary meeting so important that he and all Soviet Bloc leaders traveled by boat across the Atlantic to attend the meetings themselves (they stayed for four weeks). The big prize was the allegiance of former colonies. Most African states initially adopted a centrist position on the East–West conflict. Their internal divisions were along lines of colonial heritage. The former French colonies, assembled in the "Brazzaville caucus," were clearly distinct from the former British and other colonies (the countries on the bottom of Figure 4.2A). Most of the divisions between these groups were on issues that pertained to African affairs, in particular the conflicts in the Congo and the partitioning of Rwanda and Burundi.

Many of the conflicts that divided countries in the 1960s had by now become familiar. The issue of the representation of Communist China, for instance, continued to divide states along East–West lines, with majorities against Beijing ranging from as large as 16 in 1963 to an evenly split vote in 1965 (Boyd 1971). The issue would not be resolved until 1971 when Beijing finally replaced Taipei as the official representation of China. The conflict in the Middle East now separated states primarily along East–West lines. The Six-Day War in 1967 and the resulting controversies made it the principal source of conflict in the late 1960s. There was still discord over the Congo, Korea, and other Cold War issues. Non-aligned countries were divided on these issues (Van Staden and Stokman 1970). The Soviet Bloc and the West persisted to vote together against the South on issues related to UN supranationalism, budget issues, and certain questions of self-determination.

By 1970 a majority of UN members were not independent states at the UN's inception. States with only 10 percent of the world's population and contributing only 5 percent of the assessed UN budget could theoretically muster a two-thirds majority in the UNGA. These developments made the UNGA a more difficult instrument for statecraft for both super-powers. Neither superpower could count on reliable majorities, let alone the kind of super-majorities necessary to authorize peacekeeping missions through the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Consequently, there was virtually no UN involvement in Vietnam, Afghanistan and other major conflicts in the 1970s and early 1980s.

The 1970s was also the period when developing countries increasingly perceived that to use the UN to their advantage they should emphasize common causes and put more divisive issues to the background. At a conference in Algiers in September 1973, they followed a call by Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez to strive for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The goals were to get more favorable terms of trade with developed countries, to receive more aid, to regulate investments of transnational companies, to reschedule debt, and to change international organization such that organizations with equal voting power, such as the UNGA, would have more authority. This essentially created a 'third party', commonly referred to as the Group of 77 (G77) or the Non-Aligned Movement (see Iida 1988). Indeed, Figure 4.2(b) shows three fairly cohesive voting blocs with a largely empty space between them. In the literature on the US Congress such empty channels are seen as indicative of polarization, in the sense that they are indicative of voting behavior where few cross party lines. The same can be said for this period in the UNGA, which was heavily dominated by "partisan" attempts to set the agenda and maintain cohesion. This may make votes in this period less useful indicators for preferences than in other periods.

To maintain internal unity, the countries belonging to the non-aligned voting bloc successfully ignored a number of divisive issues. For example, although the future of Burundi had divided African nations in the 1960s, when the leading Tutsi minority slaughtered more than 100,000 Hutus in 1973, the issue was mostly ignored in the UN. Nor did Asian countries put much pressure on the UN to address the situation in Uganda where Idi Amin deported virtually everyone of Asian descent in 1975. Moreover, it led to logrolls that probably undermined the effectiveness of the UN, most importantly the resolution that equated Zionism with racism in 1975. Originally introduced as an amendment to the first UN Declaration on the equality of women, it infuriated the Europeans and especially the Americans who, led by Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, began a fierce battle to get the resolution rescinded. They did not succeed until the Cold War had ended (1991). Most of the successes of the South in achieving its goals, in particular regarding terms of trade and debt rescheduling, were achieved outside of the framework of the UN (Mingst and Karns 1995). Within the UN, the North–South conflict soon resulted in a stalemate (Doyle 1983).

In 1987, *Pravda* published an article in which Mikhail Gorbachev made a strong commitment to the UN, a pledge he repeated in a speech to the UNGA. This unlocked opportunities for a number of smaller peacekeeping missions and UN-instigated negotiations in contentious conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Angola and Namibia, and El Salvador, and the Iran–Iraq war. In the UNGA, the disintegration of the Soviet voting bloc started in 1989 when some Eastern European states, led by Czechoslovakia, shifted toward the West. The Soviet Union followed in 1991 as Russia. Yet, subtle changes occurred before then (see also Figure 4.4 in the next section). By 1987 the Soviet Bloc was no longer furthest removed from the US. Instead, this distinction belonged to Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Figure 4.3 shows the post-Cold War ideological structure in the UNGA. A model that assumes that states hold static ideal points along a single dimension explains 94 percent of vote choices on non-consensus UNGA resolutions in both the 1991–2000 and 2001–11 periods. This ideological structure contains new elements but also resembles patterns of the Cold War structure. The main exceptions to the stability are the Eastern European states, which switched sides. Russia and the newly independent former Soviet republics now take a position in between the West and the rest of the world. Their position resembles that of states such as Turkey and South Korea. These are all states with strong ties to both the West and the non-Western part of the world (but for different reasons).

Yet, the position of developing countries before the end of the Cold War is a very good predictor of their position since the end of the Cold War (Voeten 2000). The Latin American countries are still closest to the West, followed by a group of African and Asian countries. On the 'non-Western' pole are the remaining communist states: Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, China, and Cuba. But we also find states such as Afghanistan, Burma, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria close to the extreme side of the first dimension of conflict. These are not necessarily prototypical representatives of the countries that were seeking to establish the NIEO in the 1970s and 1980s. They are states that challenge principles of political liberalism and the dominance of the US. This finding lends support for the thesis that a counter-hegemonic bloc is forming among states that do not necessarily share many common interests other than a common aversion to Western hegemony and the principles associated with that. It is this common antipathy that determines vote choices over many global issues.

The liberal–non-liberal divide becomes more prominent in the 2000s (Figure 4.3(b)) when human rights issues become an increasingly prominent feature on the UN's agenda (see Figure 4.1). Whereas the right side of the policy space contained some liberal democracies in the 1990s (e.g., India), it is now completely occupied by repressive dictatorships.

Figure 4.3   Contestation in the UN General Assembly in the post-Cold War period

The second dimension mostly consists of conflict over issues that separate the US (and Israel) from its allies. This does not only involve issues directly related to Palestine but also resolutions on which the US has lost support from its European allies and has only Israel and some Pacific islands left in support (e.g., the Cuban boycott).

In short, the first dimension of contestation has been quite consistent and has mostly separated the US and its allies from those who oppose them. Nevertheless, there have been

important shifts in the UNGA's agenda that occasionally make a second dimension relevant and that alter the content of UN resolutions. Moreover, the UN has been more representative of conflicts elsewhere in some periods than in others, although even in the 1970–88 period the main dimension of contestation accurately reflects the Cold War conflict.

United Nations votes as indicators for state preferences

As highlighted in the introduction, current scholarship is not primarily interested in the UNGA *per se* but uses UNGA votes to calculate the degree to which states have common foreign policy "interests" or "preferences." Preferences and interests play an important role in many International Relations theories but are difficult to operationalize. The use of UN votes for this purpose is not entirely new. For example, Vengroff (1976), Moon (1985), and Hagan (1989) used UN voting data to test Rosenau's (1966) hypothesis that domestic instability in developing countries leads to shifts in foreign policy preferences. Yet indicators based on UN votes have now become an almost obligatory ingredient in models that explain bilateral and multilateral lending, international conflict, and a host of other outcomes.

There is some justification for this. United Nations votes have many advantages over alternative sources of data that can serve to construct indicators for state interests. Alliance choices are sticky and reflect the strategic security environment as much as (or more than) state preferences. Two geographically distant states with highly similar policy preferences may never close an alliance. Some formal alliances survive even if states become rivals. Other informal alliances are never formalized (e.g., Israel and the US). There is no obvious other source of data where so many states over such a long time period have revealed policy positions on such a wide set of issues. Moreover, as the previous section illustrates, the main dimensions of contestation in the UN are reflective of contestation over global policy issues. This is even true for the 1970–85 period when issues that were somewhat peripheral to the interests of great powers dominated the UNGA's agenda.

On the other hand, scholars have by and large failed to motivate why an indicator based on UN votes is an appropriate operationalization for their theoretical concept of interest. Most obviously, one should consider what UN votes are about. For example, some of the conflict literature uses UN votes to test the implications of bilateral bargaining models where states have conflicting interests over territory (e.g., Reed et al. 2008). Yet, UN votes concern *global* issues on which many states with territorial disputes have similar preferences. Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, Peru and Ecuador, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and other states with fierce border disputes are quite alike when it comes to UN voting. Thus, the use of UN votes is appropriate only if the relevant theoretical concept of interest concerns global political issues. Unfortunately, most of the literature fails to specify what is meant theoretically with "common foreign policy interests," let alone justify UN votes as the appropriate source of data.

Another crucial issue is the method by which indicators of interests or preferences are computed. The canonical approach is to compute a dyadic measure of similarity of voting patterns. This can be an ordinal measure such as Kendall's τ_b (Bueno de Mesquita 1975) or a Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient (Gartzke 1998, 2000). Others treat UN votes as interval measures, with abstentions halfway between a yes and a no vote. Such measures include Lijphart's (1963) index of agreement and Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S-score, which in its most common form is identical to Lijphart's index of agreement.

These measures suffer from various deficiencies. Dyadic indicators cannot capture the multiple underlying dimensions of UN voting. Votes in the UN are not choices on how much state A likes state B but whether a state approves of a resolution. Conceptually, estimates of

preferences should be based on a theory of how states translate preferences into vote choices. The spatial voting model offers such a theory and has been the basis for empirical estimates of preferences in legislatures all over the world for almost three decades. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 were created using such a method (NOMINATE in this case). There is no good reason why the UNGA should be the only assembly for which the analysis of roll calls resorts to dyadic similarity indicators popular in the 1960s. Yet, with few exceptions (Voeten 2000, 2004; Reed et al. 2008), that is the state of affairs.

The most important deficiency, however, is the lack of attention for dynamics. Indicators of preference similarity are almost always used in time series cross-sectional analyses (panels). This means that often it is changes in preferences that matter, especially in fixed effects models. Current methods are unable to disentangle the effects of agenda changes from preference changes (see Voeten 2004). While the UNGA's agenda is quite stable with many resolutions repeated each year, multiple votes tend to take place whenever major crises occur. Given that there are only about 80 resolutions a year, multiple resolutions on a specific crisis can strongly bias annual dyadic similarity measures if left unaccounted for. This is obviously problematic if the goal is to explain participation in conflicts, but it may also be important for the aid literature, as we know that aid responds to the outbreak of (civil) wars. More generally, the agenda shifts identified in the previous section could decrease or increase observed voting similarities between a pair of states even if neither state actually changes its interest.

Figure 4.4 illustrates this point using the US–Soviet Union (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, USSR)/Russia dyad. The dotted line offers the S-score, which is the most widely used indicator of voting similarity. It varies between −1 (no similarity) and 1 (identical voting patterns). There are several reasons why these are implausible estimates for common interests. First, according to S-scores, two countries had more similar interests during several periods

Figure 4.4 Similarity in vote choices, USSR and US, S-scores and dynamic ideal points

of the Cold War (mid-1950s and mid-1970s) than during most of the post-Cold War period with the exception of a few years in the early 1990s. It is somewhat absurd to imply that in the 2000s, the US and Russia, however acrimonious their relationship can sometimes be, are further apart than the Soviet Union and the US were during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Second, S-scores fluctuate considerably from one year to the next. It is questionable whether these reflect real changes in preferences rather than agenda changes. For example, the 6th Plenary Session (1951) held about half the votes of sessions before and after. This was mostly due to the dearth of colonialism resolutions, on which the Soviet Union and the US often voted alike in that period. The increased S-scores in the early 1970s were surely due to many NIEO resolutions (discussed in the previous section) on which the Soviet Union and the US often agreed rather than a true change in preferences.

Figure 4.4 also plots dynamic ideal points estimated by Bailey et al. (2013). They use a model that separates agenda change from preference change by fixing identical resolutions that are repeated (see Voeten 2004). Using this methodology yields estimates with greater face validity. The gap between the ideal points does not fluctuate erratically. The model accurately keeps the two countries much further apart during the Cold War than at any point during the Cold War's aftermath. Yet the ideal points do capture real interest shifts, not just the early 1990s but also Gorbachev's efforts to reconcile with the West in the mid-1980s. An added bonus is that estimates of ideal points allow us to detect whether it is the US or the Soviet Union that changes positions.

A more detailed discussion of methodology is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, Figure 4.4 is by no means a cherry-picked example of what goes wrong in conventional calculations of the common interests of states. Changes in the UN's agenda must be modeled in order to adequately model changes in state preferences.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed 60 years of analyses that use UN General Assembly voting data. Initially, these analyses were motivated by a desire to understand politics in the UN. The current literature shows little interest in the UN but uses voting data to construct indicators of "common state interests." I have argued that scholars who do this would be wise to think more carefully what these votes are about before choosing to rely on these data. The brief overview of UN voting patterns offered in this chapter may help in this regard. Second, the methodology used to construct indicators of state interests matters greatly. In particular, it is unwise to rely on dyadic indicators of voting similarity, especially for dynamic applications.

Recommended for further reading

Alker and Russett (1965), Gartzke (1998), Thacker (1999), and Voeten (2000).

Notes

1   For example, the last session for which we have these data included zero amendments, zero failed votes, and one paragraph vote.
2   By comparison, 23 percent of abstentions are followed by another abstention.
3   The narrative draws on much more detailed analysis in Voeten (2001).

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The INGO research agenda

A community approach to challenges in method and theory

Elizabeth A. Bloodgood and Hans Peter Schmitz

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are today widely acknowledged actors in global affairs and their influence has gained increasing attention in scholarly and policy circles. The Union of International Associations (UIA) reports a rise in the number of international NGOs from under 200 in 1909 to several tens of thousands by the 1990s. The number of international non-profits registered in the United States (US) almost doubled from 3,548 in 1998 to 6,790 in 2008 (Kerlin and Thanasombat 2006; Wing et al. 2010). Revenue more than tripled during the same time period, from 9.7 billion (1998) to 31.9 billion USD (2008), with much of the gains concentrated among the largest organizations. With the rise of middle-income nations, growth in this sector will shift to non-Western regions and greatly increase the diversity of INGO activism.

The growth of INGOs has outpaced other non-profit sectors, where the number of organizations less than doubled over the same time period (Lecy 2012). The revenue of this sector also increased more sharply. The revenue of this sector also increased more sharply. While only 1.9 percent of all non-profits in the US fell into the international category, they collectively received 2.9 percent of all charitable contributions in 2009 (Wing et al. 2010: 6). This increasing prominence has led some observers to call INGO activism 'America's most consequential export' (Eberly 2008: ix).

International NGOs have not only grown in number and capacity, but also with regard to their global presence. The World Bank reports that projects with some degree of "civil society" involvement increased from 6 percent in the late 1980s to over 70 percent in 2006 (Werker and Ahmed 2008). The number of NGOs with consultative status at the United Nations (UN) increased from 41 in 1946 to about 700 in 1992. After the end of the Cold War, this growth pattern increased tenfold and by September 2011 3,536 NGOs were granted accreditation, adding an average of 150 organizations annually (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2011).

International Relations (IR) scholars have demonstrated the significance of INGOs to international relations, but have yet to establish more generalizable explanations and theories of why, and under what conditions, INGOs affect the interests and behavior of other actors or create institutional change. Both the initial scholarship claiming transnational NGOs as key agents of social change (Price 1998; Glasius 2006) and their subsequent challengers

(Cooley and Ron 2002; Hertel 2006; Heins 2008) have typically focused on a narrow selection of cases. The increasing acceptance of researching INGOs and their transnational activities has yet to be matched by the development of effective approaches to the considerable challenges in accumulating knowledge about INGOs. These challenges include: 1) the absence of a commonly shared definition of INGOs; 2) the difficulties of identifying and tracking INGOs and their activities; and 3) challenges related to developing and applying appropriate methodologies in capturing INGO activities.

This chapter first presents an overview of the main challenges of advancing a multidisciplinary research agenda on international NGOs. It argues that individual scholarship has contributed in many ways to progress on each of these issues, but it also holds that creating a community among INGO scholars is a necessary next step. Dialog among INGO scholars can facilitate broader debate on best practices and the innovation of new techniques as well as diffuse those practices among scholars and students interested in the role of INGOs in global affairs. The second part of the chapter showcases new research on INGOs to highlight some of the opportunities and challenges for advancing a collective agenda focused on INGOs. The section discusses different methodological innovations recently introduced to INGO scholarship, including agent-based modeling, social network analysis, and computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software.

Challenges of researching INGOs

Challenges to establishing a sustained and progressive research agenda on the role of NGOs in global affairs include: 1) defining and delimiting the universe of INGOs; 2) disciplinary boundaries; and 3) challenges associated with accessing data. Challenges regarding the definition of INGOs are regularly explored in the academic literature (Martens 2002; Willetts 2002), while major international bodies rely on open-ended and ambiguous definitions when dealing with NGOs. These ambiguities go back to the introduction of the term 'nongovernmental organization' in Article 71 of the UN Charter and they reflect the limited recognition of NGOs in international law. The term NGO is a residual category, offering an open space for anyone to read into it whatever they prefer. As a result, there is no common standard used by international agencies that do or could track INGOs. Various international organizations with an interest in this sector, e.g., the UN, the European Union (EU), or UIA, use very broad and different definitions and depend on self-identification and self-reporting to collect important data on the budgets, missions, structure, networking, and activities of NGOs. These sources provide little more than the sense that the sector has been growing at a significant rate in the past two decades.

In the following pages, we first review how states and intergovernmental organizations have approached the question mostly in efforts to define access for NGOs. Second, we compare and contrast scholarly definitions which are driven by efforts to delimit an object of study. We conclude that a consensus about what (I)NGOs are is unlikely to emerge and may be unproductive, but that scholars researching and writing in this area should be more explicit about their specific definition and selection of INGOs studied.

In defining the role of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Charter provides that it "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence" (UN Charter, Article 71). Much of the definitional efforts of the UN reflected "the defensive position of states toward NGOs and their insistence that the status of an NGO is peripheral to that of a state" (Otto 1996: 110). ECOSOC Resolution 1296 adopted in May 1968 required the

existence of an established headquarters and a democratically adopted constitution, along with "recognized international standing" and competencies furthering the objectives of ECOSOC. National NGOs could only attain consultative status "after consultation with the Member State concerned" and should normally express their views through other INGOs. Resolution 1996/31 revised the criteria for awarding consultative status, primarily by explicitly opening membership to national NGOs and by adding specific language about required transparency concerning funding from sources other than individual members and national sections.

The African Union based its criteria for NGO observer status on the precedent set by the UN, but established more detailed criteria, including "management with a majority of African citizens or Africans in the Diaspora," and at least two-thirds of resources derived from membership contributions (African Union 2005). This restrictive approach contrasts with efforts in the European context to advance the international legal recognition of INGOs through treaties. The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations, adopted in 1986, provides for the mutual recognition of NGOs already registered in one of the member-states to the convention (Kamminga 2007). While the treaty came into force in 1991, only ten out of 47 member-states of the Council of Europe (CoE) have signed this agreement, showing strong state resistance based on national sovereignty concerns. In contrast, the CoE itself has moved ahead in establishing a Conference of INGOs which elevates their participation in relation to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. Both the CoE and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have adopted recommendations based on human rights law that are designed to limit arbitrary state actions against NGOs and establish predictable criteria of recognition.

The most positive development in the evolution of government-sponsored NGO definitions is the abandonment of a strict distinction between international and national NGOs and the acceptance that domestic NGOs can have a legitimate international presence. INGOs are becoming *de facto* partners in many issue areas of global and regional governance. Nonetheless, the definitions reviewed here remain highly problematic, either because they are driven by efforts to restrict NGO influence or because they perpetuate questionable visions of independence, altruism, and accountability. Even in the European context, efforts to advance the formal international recognition of NGOs and their activities have made little progress. This lack of recognition negatively impacts research on INGOs because what is not defined remains less visible and is more difficult to count.

Academic research has not been particularly successful in creating a common understanding of INGOs either. The plethora of terms used often blurs the boundaries between individual organizations, networks, and other forms of collective action. Terms which have risen to prominence during the past two decades include 'global civil society' (Anheier et al. 2001), 'transnational social movement organizations' (Smith et al. 1994), 'transnational advocacy networks' (Keck and Sikkink 1998), and 'transnational civil society' (Price 2003; Batliwala and Brown 2006). Focusing on different components of these labels helps highlight some important ways in which more clarity about definitional issues can advance debates about the role of INGOs in global affairs.

The voluntary–professional divide

A key distinction exists between definitions highlighting the voluntary character of non-profits and others emphasizing professionalism. Willetts (2002: 3) stands for the former by

defining an NGO as "an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities." Martens (2002: 282) represents the latter, defining NGOs as "formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level." Very few NGOs, most prominently Amnesty International (AI), integrate both aspects into their governance and organizational structure. In contrast, AI's main competitor, Human Rights Watch (HRW), is exemplary for its professionalized structure that avoids getting slowed down by membership tensions. Apart from the exception of AI, what this distinction highlights is the immense gap between the few large INGOs which are increasingly adopting professional corporate practices to manage rapidly growing organizations and the vast majority of mid-sized and smaller groups that do not get much attention among scholars. This is not to say that larger NGOs do not use volunteers, but to suggest that trade-offs between different governance strategies associated with a professionalized and/or grassroots orientation (Hopgood 2006) should be investigated rather than assumed away by definitions.

A better understanding of the internal characteristics of INGOs also leads to important insights into the sector overall, although reliable information only exists for certain home countries, including the US. While the overall growth rate may be impressive, it is important to recognize the inherent instability experienced by organizations in this sector, especially newcomers. Between 1989 and 2007, 4,688 new organizations were created in the US while 2,380 organizations ceased operations (Lecy 2012). Studies of international non-profits have shown widespread financial difficulties (Kerlin and Thanasombat 2006) and decreasing grant sizes force organizations to spend more time on fundraising. In the development sector, "the increase in total ODA [Official Development Assistance] has come about by adding many small new projects rather than by scaling up what works" (Kharas 2009: 8). Furthermore, the international non-profit sector in the US is characterized by extreme inequality: "80 per cent of the funds that pass through the international subsector are controlled by three percent of the organizations, with the top one per cent garnering 60 per cent of total funds" (Lecy 2012: 2). Understanding the dynamics of the INGO sector, and how individual organizations respond, offers an important empirical avenue through seemingly intractable definitional questions.

Are NGOs operating across borders transnational, international, or global actors?

During the 1970s, IR scholars interested in the rise of transnationalism rejected the term NGO and argued for the use of "transnational associations" to signify the networked character of these new forms of collaboration, but also to distinguish them from truly "international" organizations with representation in a significant number of nations (Judge and Skjelsbæk 1975). This scholarly push affected the terminologies used by UIA, but was rejected by UN bodies which began in the 1970s to adopt the term "transnational corporations" in their dealings with cross-border businesses' operations. Little of this debate was remembered when claims about a "global civil society" emerged in the 1990s. While some authors in the IR field revived the term "transnational relations," defined as "regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent" (Risse-Kappen 1995: 3), many others proclaimed the rise of an entirely new set of global actors largely removed from national restrictions. Most of these INGOs were based in the US or Europe, lacked credible representation elsewhere, and could not claim to be international or global, even if their goals were to improve livelihoods abroad.

Many have concluded from the sharp rise in the number and activities of INGOs that these organizations are becoming more powerful and have a significant impact on global affairs. Most of the organizations studied are not particularly representative of the overall population but tend to highlight large, advocacy-oriented, Northern-based, secular INGOs. This choice may be defensible based on relevance and scholarly interests, but often the labels used are at odds with the diversity of the actual sector. This leads scholars to underestimate potential conflict among INGOs and stalls methodological developments for capturing the individual and collective impact of the large majority of small and mid-sized organizations. Understanding INGO diversity also matters greatly for contextualizing the increasing number of studies quantifying INGOs across countries (Hughes et al. 2009) and the generalizability of such research.

While the terms "transnational non-governmental organization/advocacy network/social movement" continue to be used among scholars, the sector itself rejects the "transnational" label due to its perceived association with the corporate sector. Efforts to truly internationalize NGOs have only begun and their success is far from assured. Important examples include ActionAid's 2003 decision to move its headquarters to South Africa and efforts in many organizations to federalize and turn country offices into more independent national sections (Jayawickrama 2012). For scholars, these differences in governance structures can turn another definitional question into a compelling area of research (Brown et al. 2012).

What role do principles and formal independence play?

International NGOs are supposed to advance the well-being of others. They are formally distinguished from other organizations by their non-distribution constraint, although an increasing number of critics have argued that legal non-profit status is preventing these organizations from making a real difference in the world (Pallotta 2008). Assumptions about the principled character of INGOs have pervaded the literature as justifications for the legitimacy and power of these organizations. But questioning assumptions about INGOs' principled character and non-profit status can be useful in generating research programs advancing knowledge about INGOs.

The "world polity" literature uses one of the most expansive definitions of INGOs by including trade and industry lobby groups along with standard-setting agencies and groups focused on tourism and the like (Boli and Thomas 1999). At UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), this same issue arises when scientists, NGOs, and industry groups seek "a seat at the table" in shaping the global health agenda. In some negotiations, non-profits representing industry and other NGOs are treated as equal participants, while in others (e.g., tobacco) industry representatives are not given the same level of access as victim groups or public health organizations. Each of these organizations is legally a non-profit and operates across borders, but the definition of the "common good" is shifting over time, creating dangers of arbitrarily excluding specific INGOs from analysis.

Much of the literature on the power of INGOs in global affairs has focused less on individual organizations and more on the networks they build (Lecy et al. 2011). Selecting "the network" as the level of analysis creates additional challenges for tracking activities and contributions by individual organizations, and reinforces the difficulty and necessity of clearly distinguishing different types of actors in a network. First, networks differ dramatically in terms of formalization, and members may not agree on which organizations are in or out. There are also an increasing number of NGO associations whose collaboration and influence remain poorly understood (Gugerty and Buffardi 2009). Second, research on domestic

service delivery traces the emergence of "hybrid organizational structures with mixed public, nonprofit, and for-profit characteristics" (Smith 2010: 219). This may be less common for transnational NGOs than domestic organizations, but public–private partnerships certainly challenge the traditional boundaries between commercial, governmental, and not-for-profit sectors. Having a sense of what defines and distinguishes INGOs entering into such arrangements is crucial to future research, particularly, when trying to assess the risks of weaker partners being co-opted (Baur and Schmitz 2012).

Independence from states is one key formal aspect shared by all definitions of NGOs. This generates definitional clarity in identifying what is an NGO, but it provides little help with regard to practical research. Understanding INGOs' funding matters as much as their legal identity. The relative independence of an organization typically depends on its ability to balance different streams of funding from donors, grants, contracts, and members. Most NGOs have developed individual financial solutions for survival and growth which reflect the trade-off between independence and solvency. Some dependence on government funding is the norm in the development and humanitarian sectors where INGOs are the preferred means for dealing with natural and man-made disasters, while government funding is a major liability for human rights NGOs. Human Rights Watch draws heavily on foundation support to underwrite its growth. In contrast, AI prefers avoiding such exposure by relying mainly on membership donations. While AI has chosen a restrictive funding policy voluntarily, African Union requirements that INGOs receive a minimum of two-thirds of their funding from members are designed to exclude groups with significant external funding rather than guarantee INGO independence. The assumption of independence is useful only as a point of departure for research and not as a means to define INGOs. Legal non-profit status tells us little about the kinds of political and social contributions INGOs make.

While definitional efforts by international governmental and non-governmental bodies reflect an emphasis on formal rules and state sovereignty, scholars have put forward alternative terms reflecting disciplinary preferences and descriptive and/or normative understandings. Concept definitions have important ramifications for research because they directly affect comparability of studies. Based on this discussion, it is neither desirable nor feasible to establish a common definition for INGOs. First, "closed categories tend to control rather than encourage participation" (Otto 1996: 112) and states have consistently used such attempts to limit the influence of NGOs. Second, any criteria, if applied strictly, exclude a significant number of organizations that common sense would include in the category. Labels such as "principled," "international," "professional," or "voluntary" are best used as a starting point for research, rather than as criteria to establish a defined universe of INGOs. International NGO scholars should be precise and clear about what specific parts of this sector they are investigating, why they made that choice, and how this choice affects the significance of their results, rather than attempt to impose counterproductive universal labels on INGOs as a whole.

Moving research forward

Many individual scholars are wrestling with similar questions and theoretical challenges regarding INGOs, but lack dedicated venues to pursue such issues. In order to advance research on INGOs, creating and maintaining a community of scholarship can facilitate collaboration focused on the creation of new data sets and establish mechanisms for sharing existing information. Such a community will also accelerate the dissemination of cutting-edge methodological approaches, including different forms of quantitative analysis,

computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS), and social network analysis. Such a community is particularly needed to carry out the kind of large-scale data collection efforts needed to assess the broader impact of INGOs as a collective actor. More data and diversity in methods are crucial in order to develop a more accurate understanding of INGO structures, resources, behaviors, and impacts across countries, issues, and time. Different literatures studying the role of NGOs have tended to highlight particular sub-sections of the sector and particular methods of studying these organizations. The bias in the field of IR is visible in the emphasis on advocacy organizations, while in development studies, scholars have challenged the lack of methodological innovation (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006). Establishing a broader community of scholars interested in INGOs will allow its members to more easily recognize and overcome disciplinary boundaries limiting research progress.

Data collections and data sets

The Union of International Associations is the most common source for quantitative data on INGOs, drawing on its extensive and lengthy past collecting information on INGO structures, activities, locations, and networks from INGOs themselves (Bloodgood 2011a). Keck and Sikkink (1998) use these data to demonstrate the frequency of transnational activist networks by issue area, while Boli and Thomas (1999: 23) not only trace the expansion of the INGO sector over time, but also provide more detailed analysis of regional distributions and national participation. Smith and Wiest (2012) move from descriptive to analytic use of UIA data as they explain the global spread and density of transnational social movement organizations as a result of a country's economic and political integration into the world system. Kim (2012) has constructed a comprehensive data set comparing citizen membership in human rights INGOs with country membership in human rights IGOs from 1948 until 2009. Murdie and others examine the effects of having human rights INGOs in the neighborhood on domestic protest movements (Murdie and Bhasin 2011) and national human rights practices (Clay et al. 2012). The UIA is now a well-financed institution, providing consistency in data across time, countries, and organizations, with potentially detailed data on financing and networks. The definition of INGOs remains problematic, which affects the conceptual assumptions shaping the data set and the number of INGOs reported. The data are also expensive to access and labor-intensive coding is required if researchers want to benefit from the full depth of data. Finally, a large part of the more detailed information is plagued by missing values, as UIA relies on self-reporting.

Non-governmental organization scholars have also begun to build more specialized data sets tailored to their individual needs. Some of these data sets could be further developed to allow future scholars to address new and interesting research questions. Ron et al. (2005) and Hendrix and Wong (2012) have created and analyzed data on the reporting activities of human rights groups, including AI and HRW. Büthe et al. (2012) have gathered information on private international aid channeled through INGOs. These data collection efforts differ from the UIA's institutional approach because particular questions drive the research inquiry. These data sets also typically avoid problems of relying on proxy variables or instrumental indicators which may be easier to measure, but can be a poor match for the actual key factor of interest. The limitations of such data sets are typically a result of the much more complex and time-consuming data collection process, which ends with the completion of the research. As a result, such data sets are difficult to combine and often hard to share and reuse. Unlike other actors, INGOs are not yet used to providing the kind of sustained access needed to collect data on their operations, and many do not even systematically collect data that might

be relevant to researchers today and in the future. Quantitative data can be shared by using institutions, such as the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), but a similar effort focused on qualitative data sharing and quality control has yet to be established.

The Johns Hopkins University Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project and the CIVICUS Civil Society Index project both have provided extensive national data on civil society or the third sector, which includes both NGOs and INGOs. These datasets, while providing useful country comparisons and controls, are aggregated across individual organizations and are generally only available for a limited number of years per country. The Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project provides data taken from national accounting statements as provided to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 45 countries (http://ccss.jhu.edu/research-projects/comparative-nonprofit-sector). The use of national accounting reduces subjectivity, but such sources typically fail to include small organizations not required to report. These data are organized by sector and not individual organizations, and replicate government definitions of what counts as an INGO. Not many countries report data in sufficient detail to gather international non-profit data, despite a joint Johns Hopkins University–UN project to increase data availability.

CIVICUS turns to its NGO membership for their views of civil society participation, institutions, and perceived effects as well as the legal and political environments in which they (civil society organizations) work (http://socs.civicus.org). There is a presumption of increased participation and more accurate reporting with CIVICUS data, because member organizations anticipate benefits from CIVICUS and the association provides a means of shaming for intentional misreporting. Conceptual categories are necessarily fluid across countries, however, given the diversity of membership and interest in gathering data from as many countries and organizations as possible. Bloodgood et al. (forthcoming) have built a data set on national NGO regulations, in combination with UIA data, in order to assess the extent to which national regulations on NGOs diverge and affect INGO behavior. In addition to the overall limits of non-institutional data sets described earlier, data sets concerning legal codes and regulations also face problems with subjectivity innate to any project which codes text into numerical indicators, particularly as de jure regulations and de facto practice vary.

Data sets based on interviews are becoming increasingly available. The Transnational NGO Initiative at Syracuse University has conducted an interview study of 152 leaders of US-based INGOs focused on questions of governance, effectiveness, accountability, and networking (www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan_tngo.aspx). James Ron and a team of researchers at Carleton University have interviewed NGO workers from 60 countries to explore the credibility and efficacy of rights-based organizations in the developing world (Kindornay et al. 2012). Such data sets provide a means to directly address key questions straight from the source, reducing the need to intuit or read into INGO actions, intentions, motives, or beliefs. Such data are hard to share in raw form, however, due to the anonymity promised to interviewees and ethical concerns if the source could be determined and compromised. Yet without a source or context, the data are less useful. Furthermore, aggregated numerical codings of the raw text of interviews, which can be shared, add subjectivity and conceptual categories to the data which may not fit the needs or interest of future researchers.

International NGOs, their donors, and watchdog groups have recently embarked on more systematic efforts to measure their impact as organizations, providing scholars with unique opportunities to obtain data and also contribute research at the intersection of academic and practitioner worlds (Ogden et al. 2009). The newly created EU Transparency Register provides a wealth of data on all NGOs which seek to access EU institutions

and grant competitions, including financial and networking data (http://europa.eu/transparency-register/index_en.htm). The EU Transparency Register data have the benefit of being mandatory, thus providing badly needed consistency in the reporting of sensitive data that other data sets often miss, particularly regarding governance and financial resources, but this source is new and so time series data are not yet available. These data are also limited to organizations which want to work within or with EU institutions. In the US, Charity Navigator, GuideStar, or the Urban Institute provide detailed data on non-profits, including INGOs, taken from surveys and tax statements (IRS Form 990, which many NGOs must file). Lecy et al. (2009) use Form 990 data, available in one data set from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (http://nccsdataweb.urban.org), to examine INGO population ecology globally, and Balboa and Welton (2012) use GuideStar data to examine NGO population ecology in New York City. While these data offer important insights, they typically exclude smaller groups not required to file tax forms (if annual income is lower than 25,000 USD). More importantly, "charity watchdogs" have yet to collect data on the actual program activities of INGOs, which represent a key interest for many scholars (Mitchell 2010).

Many scholars have taken the route of collecting data directly from INGOs at headquarters and field offices (Büthe et al. 2012; Stroup 2012). This approach is cumbersome and faces the challenges of creating sufficient trust with an organization's staff, ensuring timely feedback to these organizations honoring their cooperation, and avoiding overburdening a few INGOs with constant requests from academics. Although many scholars regularly work with INGOs in various capacities, experiences about such collaborations have yet to become more widely shared. Once again, a scholarly community established around the subject of INGOs can aid in addressing some of these challenges by offering legitimacy to researchers and facilitating interactions with practitioners.

New technologies to collect data from the Internet or media sources available online, using largely open source user-generated computer codes have provided INGO scholars (among others) with the opportunity to easily harvest large quantities of targeted data. IssueCrawler (https://www.issuecrawler.net) allows scholars to examine network characteristics of NGOs by issue area or location, by tracking Internet links between NGO websites as indicators of network connections. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) provides a means to collect event data on what INGOs do (or what is done to them) according to a set of preexisting activity codes over both time and countries (Murdie and Davis 2012). Internet scrapping provides a means to gather and then search through data collected over months or years in order to establish patterns over time based on traced network connections or other kinds of data (Hannan et al. 2012). Bibliometric methods also provide a means to track the diffusion of ideas and norms via personal contacts as evidenced in online documents, such as CVs, and citation patterns in journal articles and academic papers (Lecy et al. 2013).

Technologies for data analysis

Beyond the challenge of access to relevant data, the scholarly community still lacks in many areas the adequate means to analyze the data that it has in a more relevant and nuanced (or systematic and rigorous) manner. Three major developments in recent INGO scholarship offer directions for the future. First, the use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, such as NVivo or ATLAS.ti, allows analysis of complex patterns of usage to define and analyze concepts within the context in which users use and understand them. Research on INGO accountability as understood by top managers demonstrates a significant gap between how such leaders define their *aspirations* for, and actually *practice*, accountability (Schmitz et al. 2012).

Social network analysis is a second technological tool that has helped advanced INGO scholarship. While not new in sociology, social network analysis is a relatively recent addition to political science. By enabling more precise means to count and describe attributes of networks as well as the position of individual nodes within a network, social network analysis enables the exploration of political, normative, and economic implications of INGO networks (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Lake and Wong 2009; Ward et al. 2011). The development of computer programs such as UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) and IssueCrawler (Carpenter 2007) makes this technology increasingly accessible.

Agent-based modeling of aspects of interactions between INGOs (and with states, citizens, and international organizations) within and outside of networks provides another method to develop hypotheses to explain how and why INGOs do what they do. While computer simulations of agent-based models developed via programs such as NetLogo, Repast, Swarm, or Python cannot provide empirical tests of NGO behavior, these technologies do provide a means to develop more general theoretical explanations for INGOs which can then be tested empirically (Johnson 1999; Clough 2001). The particular strength of this tool is the ability to incorporate complexity, in which small changes in one part of a system can have unexpectedly large effects in another, as well as uncertainty, typical in real-world politics, into theoretical models (Miller and Page 2007). Agent-based modeling also enables researchers to incorporate both the macro level (institutions and networks in domestic politics and the international system) and micro level (information and interests within INGOs) into a shared model of INGO activity and interactions. More accurate and useful models of INGO interactions and effects depend on better theories of INGO behavior, and effective hypothesis testing still requires more empirical data.

Conclusion

Bringing together scholars working on INGOs from different disciplines and perspectives not only enhances their individual work, but legitimizes and strengthens the efforts of others in this area. While we have seen some modest efforts to organize a nascent interdisciplinary community of INGO scholars, there is a lot of room for potential research collaborations and common future research programs. Increased exchange of data, methods, and technological innovations will strengthen INGO scholarship and enable cumulative knowledge production. Such progress will also enhance student training and provide benefits for INGOs themselves.

Increasingly deliberate efforts at the accumulation of knowledge regarding INGOs can provide theoretical and practical benefits to both INGO scholars and practitioners in the future. Community building among INGO scholars might produce formal mechanisms for data sharing in order to avoid duplication of efforts. Community building among INGO scholars can establish formal mechanisms for data sharing in order to avoid duplication of efforts and enable larger cross-national studies and potentially more time series research. In the past, new graduate students studying NGOs were severely limited by resource and time constraints in the potential expanse of their projects. Even informal sharing of data and research technology can save graduate students large amounts of time and effort (and frustration). With the development of a community of INGO scholarship, researchers can build on existing work in a cumulative fashion, enabling work that is increasingly analytic rather than the descriptive work that is customary at the start of a research program.

Community building among INGO scholars can also help to streamline scholarly requests to NGOs for their time and data, avoiding repetitive questioning and associated practitioner

frustration and burnout. Deliberate attention to NGO needs within an emerging scholarly community could also help to improve NGO–scholar relations. A progressive INGO research program which moves from description to mid-level theoretical analysis and empirically supported policy prescriptions may deliver greater returns to INGOs, encouraging a rich and mutually beneficial relationship between INGOs and scholars.

Recommended for further reading

Bloodgood (2011a, 2011b), Carpenter (2007), and Schmitz et al. (2012).

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Globalized public opinion data

International comparative surveys and regional barometers

Marta Lagos and Yun-han Chu

In the last two decades the expansion of systematic cross–national public opinion surveys to observe social and political changes around the globe has been a new development in the international social sciences community. This chapter identifies the historical background that gave rise to this, offers an introduction to the major survey data sets now available, and examines the evolution of the partnership between comparative multinational surveys and international organizations (IOs).

Public opinion data in a globalized world

The expansion of democracy since the mid–1970s brought about higher degrees of liberty, which allowed the development of public opinion surveys. This was driven by multiple actors: research centres studying voting behaviour in democratic elections, public opinion research companies and universities, as well as think tanks. Its expansion in emerging democracies was boosted by the financial support of IOs and cooperation agencies from developed countries, interested in helping transition processes. Due to increasing transnational interactions in the social sciences community, especially in the East–West and South–South exchanges, growth has been exponential, enhanced even further by the Internet.

The fathers of the social sciences could not have dreamt of the current riches of information. Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, for example, never interacted, despite living only 500 km apart. Sociology and political science are sciences based on comparisons, on similarities and differences. Comparative surveys have become a substantive part of this. Public opinion surveys have also spilled over into other areas of the social sciences, such as economics, as well as being used by IOs to learn about incredibly varied areas of society. This is a major change from a decade ago, when opinion surveys were considered to be subjective and volatile, producing only second-rate information. Nowadays they are increasingly used in public policy design and political decision making in emerging democracies, especially by IOs.

The development of international comparative survey research originated principally in Europe and the Anglo–Saxon countries. In 1959 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba pioneered the field in *The Civic Culture* (1963), covering five countries. Then, in 1973, the Eurobarometer initiated comparative survey work on an ongoing basis. The European Election Study, looking

at participation and voting behaviour in elections for the European Parliament, began in 1979. Most scholars participating in the new initiative built upon the expertise of the national election surveys in the member countries of the (now) European Union (EU). International barometer initiatives also developed by using expertise in national elections studies. Most salient is the role of the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research (ISR), the home of the American National Election Studies (ANES), the World Values Survey and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and the original home of the Arab Barometer.

It was principally after 1990 that ongoing comparative survey research projects grew in number and expanded their coverage beyond the EU. The so-called third wave of democratization (in the late twentieth century) pushed this work into different regions of the world, in response to the growing need for information on the impact and consequences of political and economic reform, the functioning of new institutions and the larger process of consolidation of democracy. Apart from single *ad hoc* international comparative surveys, ongoing international comparative survey research programmes can be classified into four main types:

1   Academic studies that develop and test social science theory: the World Values Survey (WVS), European Values Study (EVS), Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP), European Social Survey (ESS), European Election Studies (EES), International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the newly established Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS).
2   Opinion barometers that have developed as an applied branch of academic surveys to monitor the evolution and transformation of societies, researching democracy and oriented towards public policy. Their targeted audiences are social and political actors, national and international organizations and development agencies as well as the academy.
3   Commercial surveys on specific subjects, for example, the Corporate Social Responsibility Monitor (CSR) undertaken between 1999 and 2010 by Globescan Canada.
4   Other surveys. The Pew Research Center, a think tank based in the United States (US), has carried out the Pew Global Attitudes survey, monitoring public opinion with regard to the role of the US and US-related policy issues in selected countries.

During the last two decades comparative survey research has expanded. A so-called third generation of scholars has risen and large sets of data have been produced, but the last step of merging the results with social science theory is yet to happen. Partial explanatory models are easy to produce with the enhanced capacity of scholars newly trained in sophisticated statistical methods. Yet the challenge of incorporating these into theory is accompanied by the risk of using 'selected results' to prove particular hypotheses that are not equally proven when considering the overall available data across nations and cultures. New challenges are added as literature is produced in innumerable languages. Surveys that are subject to greater scrutiny are likely to produce better analysis. Projects conducted with governmental or international funding generally achieve higher levels of transparency and produce higher quality results than academic studies. A good example of this is the EU-funded European Social Survey, regarded as the Rolls Royce of survey research for its large scale and scientific rigour. It is the most expensive comparative survey ever conducted.

Equivalence of different realities – comparative methodology

Comparative methodology is a new dimension of applied empirical survey research. New initiatives have increased in this area, such as the Comparative Survey Design and

Implementation (CSDI) group that grew out of the Mannheim–based Zentrum für Umfragen Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) in 2002. It promotes internationally recognized guidelines that highlight best practices for the conduct of comparative survey research across cultures and countries.

Efforts to expand surveys face the challenge of imperfect information. The most significant reason for imperfect information lies in the level of knowledge of researchers, who should be capable of understanding the cultures and languages in order to comprehend the context in which social phenomena take place. Building networks of regional experts is essential in producing most of the data. An important part of the contribution of comparative survey research, especially in Africa, has been the development of the capacity to conduct such research and to provide the necessary training. In the 1990s, comparative public opinion surveys suffered from gaps in the information necessary for sampling design. Underdeveloped societies necessarily have a lower quality of survey because of these deficiencies in information. Emerging democracies, on the other hand, have been successful in closing the gap in terms of imperfect information systems over the last decade, especially through new and better census data. Full knowledge of the imperfections and heterogeneity of methods is necessary. Quality standards are provided through which researchers are able to identify imperfections and heterogeneity and build them adequately into their analysis. A list of ten rules helps to address these problems (Jowell 1998: 168–77).

Cultural differences have to be taken into account when establishing the interviewer protocol and sample design. Cultural factors that must be considered include barriers to free speech, caste status in India and traditional practices surrounding female social interaction in Africa (which make a gender quota necessary in sampling design). Challenges faced in international survey design include knowledge of topics acceptable to diverse cultures and finding terms that can be translated into all languages. Universal concepts do not necessarily have universal words. Democracy, for instance, is a difficult concept that does not have a translation in all languages. Language also matters for samples in multilingual countries, especially when not all sampled languages are considered in the survey design (Lagos 2003a).

Translation and back-translation is a major challenge when dealing with dozens of languages. Comparative survey research questionnaires are usually formulated in English, with Latinobarómetro the only barometer that produces a master questionnaire in Spanish. This is an important consideration, since English is a 'softer' language than others. Building scales with modifiers can be relatively soft in one language but hard in another, and can have an impact on the responses. Differences in response may be due to differences in language (Lagos 2003b), something that currently receives little attention.

World opinion?

No issue can be addressed in an opinion survey unless it is in the domain of public opinion. Finding subjects that are in the domain of all societies surveyed is at the core of comparability. However, there is no such thing as 'world public opinion' until one can identify subjects that affect or touch upon the world population as a whole. The 9/11 attacks of 2001 come close to an issue that could be addressed globally from a public opinion perspective. Nonetheless, we can find global issues such as wars, terrorism, natural disasters and world powers that can be dealt with through surveys. Finally, there is a world elite opinion shared by an enlightened international elite, but this should not be confused with 'world public opinion'.

The existence of a given public opinion beyond national borders is a function of the level of interaction between societies. The most developed societies with the highest levels of

interaction are more likely to develop new dimensions of public opinion, which then can become the object of comparative research (Rusciano 2004: 504–8). There is therefore a limit to comparative public opinion research. The scope of the research determines the scope of comparability, and comparison decreases with increasing specificity.

The empirical study of democracy through comparative survey results struggles with the heterogeneity in the ways people understand 'democracy' around the world. Clearly, liberal understandings of democracy reflected in public opinion surveys are restricted to a small number of mostly Western and developed societies. This is a major obstacle to making generalizations applicable across all regions of the world.

Development of international comparative surveys

The opinion barometers

With Almond, Verba and Paul Lazarsfeld being the pioneers of comparative survey research, the group of scholars involved in the Eurobarometer, the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey is the second generation, overlapping with the third generation that is currently producing regional barometers and other comparative surveys.

A comparative public opinion barometer can be defined as a 'comparative survey research program that periodically monitors the evolution of public opinion in a given number of countries representing a region or subregion of the world with identical questions in a defined universe at a given point in time' (Lagos 2008: 584). Principal differences lie in the quality of the comparability. The Eurobarometer was designed to field identical questionnaires simultaneously in a given number of countries. This design became a further source of heterogeneity as not all regional barometers are simultaneous in their application, because of the varying levels of capacity and funding conditions of individual surveys. Periodicity and regularity add to the equivalence and power of the data in explaining the phenomena they research. The standard Eurobarometer is carried out in spring and autumn. The only similar survey in this respect is the Latinobarómetro, which has run annually for 17 years. A major expansion is taking place in Africa, where the initial 12 surveyed countries have grown to 35 in 2012, showing at the same time the power of the data and the success of the surveys.

The regional barometers in Asia (Asian Barometer), Africa (Afrobarometer), Latin America (Latinobarómetro), the Arab world (Arab Barometer) and Eurasia (Eurasia Barometer) have joined in a federation called Globalbarometer Surveys. There are two other regional barometers outside that group: the Japanese AsiaBarometer and the Barometer of the Americas.

The Eurobarometer www.ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm

The process of European integration led to recognition of the need to survey the member countries of the European Community in the 1972 Schuijt Report (Schuijt 1972). Jean-Jacques Rabier, who had conducted comparative surveys in 1970 and 1971 and had close links with the academic world, was appointed to develop the European instrument. In 1974 he launched the Eurobarometer, a biannual survey in all nine member countries that had been pre-tested in 1973. Rabier, Jean Stoetzel and Ronald Inglehart had prepared questionnaires in French and English. From these beginnings, the EU has produced, as an academically based project, a series of approximately 60 surveys, known as the Standard Eurobarometer and the Flash Eurobarometer, serving both public policy and political information purposes.

The Eurobarometer is located at the European Commission's Directorate of General Press and Communication (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm). It has become a benchmark in public opinion research, engendering many sister initiatives within Europe, of which the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (1990–97), the New Europe Barometer (1991–2004, carried out in non-EU member countries), the Russian Barometer, the Baltic Barometer and the New Democracies Barometer are the most salient. Most of these now discontinued barometers do not provide web access to their data. Currently the new Eurasia Barometer, part of the Globalbarometro Surveys (see later), rescues some of these partial trends.

Thirty years of European history are visible in the trend file from the 1970–2002 Eurobarometer, currently the longest and largest in existence. Eurobarometer data are freely accessible, available in addition to the direct EU channel through different sources such as the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) and the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSDS). Some important differences with other surveys will be explained later.

The Latinobarómetro www.latinobarometro.org

The Latinobarómetro was conceived as a replica of the Eurobarometer and its origins go back to a group of private research centres in the southern cone of Latin America in 1989. Designed to understand the democratization processes in the region, considering the singularities of Latin America, it was launched in 1995 in eight countries, with funding for four countries from the European Commission and for another four from various national sources. It expanded to 17 countries in 1996 and to 18 in 2004. Initially the project was not designed to be regional, only modestly sub-regional. Its existence therefore is a demand-driven development.

Latinobarómetro is a regional public good available through a data bank managed by JD Systems, a Spanish company that has developed the most user-friendly online data retrieval system. In 2006 it launched the first comparative survey research data bank in Spanish, the first in both the southern hemisphere and the emerging democracies, which broke the monopoly of the English language for public opinion data banks. It has the second most visited data bank in the world after the World Values Survey.

The expansion of the use of comparative research is already visible in Spanish-language publications. This also increases the existing division in social sciences, since Spanish-language publications are not acknowledged in the English literature. However, with the third generation of scholars in comparative research this is beginning to change, not only in Latin America but also in Asia and Africa. In a globalized world, regional experts are produced in their region and not as before in the so-called first world.

Latinobarómetro is not an academic project, but one oriented towards social and political actors as well as governments in Latin America, providing standardized information on the evolution of their societies. Its data have changed the way in which both its own people and those outside the region evaluate the continent. Not only has it produced 'Latin America' insofar as it has highlighted similarities among countries, but it has also dismantled many myths and stereotypes, showing the diversity of the region. However, in an unprecedented – in the history of comparative public opinion – (and unsuccessful) action, a group of US academics concerned with democratization processes and Latin America, led by Mitchell Seligson, wrote to Latinobarómetro's donors denigrating this Latin American–based research and its researchers and urging them not to support them further.

The Latinobarómetro project is carried out by Corporación Latinobarómetro, a non-governmental organization based in Santiago de Chile, with Marta Lagos as its founding director. As the barometer most similar to the Eurobarometer, it publishes a regular annual report two months after the fieldwork. This largest and oldest comparative survey programme outside the developed world has had multiple funding sources over the years. European cooperation agencies, namely the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA (which led to other donors), and the Spanish development cooperation agency, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID), have been crucial in building this regional public good. Norway and Denmark also have donated to Latinobarómetro. Currently major regional IOs, including the Inter-American Development Bank, Organization of American States and Latin American Development Bank, are part of the donor group, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The Afrobarometer www.afrobarometer.org

This project was initially launched in 1999 by Robert Mattes of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Michael Bratton, the first founding director of Michigan State University. Both had conducted partial comparative research projects in different parts of Africa. These surveys merged into what became the Afrobarometer. In 1999 the directors of the Latinobarómetro and the New Europe Barometer were invited to advise the joint venture of Mattes and Bratton in Cape Town. The initial goal was not to develop it into an Afrobarometer, but the first results in 12 countries quickly showed the way to do so. As it expanded to larger parts of the region a third independent institute joined the project, the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) led by Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. The first three waves (rounds) of the survey were directed by Bratton based in the US and Cape Town, from the fourth onwards it has been based at CDD in Accra and directed by Gyimah-Boadi.

The second wave in 2002–4 expanded to 16 countries, the third in 2005–6 to 18 countries, the fourth in 2008–9 to 20 countries and the fifth (in progress) during 2011–13 will include 35 countries. The Afrobarometer benefits from multiple sources of funding, including Denmark, the Netherlands, the Swedish SIDA, the British Department for International Development, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. Funding is oriented towards helping the development of societies, with the results disseminated and used accordingly. Afrobarometer started as an academic survey and a public policy tool and is developing into a powerful tool for social and political actors in the region.

Nationally representative samples from between 85 and 100 per cent of the population are employed depending on the number of languages used in the survey, with 1,200 face-to-face interviews carried out in each country, except for Nigeria and South Africa which have 2,400 each. The first book to include results from the Afrobarometer is *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa* by Bratton et al. (2005b). Data are available online through JD Systems.

The Asian Barometer www.asianbarometer.org

The Asian Barometer was launched in 2000 at a meeting with existing barometer directors, including the newly founded Afrobarometer, under the co-directorship of Yun-han Chu and Fu Hu of the National Taiwan University together with Larry Diamond of Stanford University, Andrew Nathan of Columbia University and Doh Chull Shin of the University

of Missouri. The project's aim was to address an overriding concern over the future of democracy in the region, underscoring the importance of the growth of mass belief in democratic legitimacy for the process of democratization. During its formative years the project was known as the East Asia Barometer. Currently the survey is directed by Yun-han Chu and co-hosted by the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and the Institute for the Advanced Studies of Humanities and Social Sciences of the National Taiwan University in Taipei. Funding has come principally from the two co-hosting institutions, with supplementary funding from the World Bank, the Henry Luce Foundation and other national funding agencies.

A first wave was undertaken in eight East Asian countries and territories in 2002: Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the People's Republic of China and the Philippines. The second wave in 2006–7 expanded the East Asian initiative into an Asian project, covering 13 countries through the addition of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. The East Asia Barometer formed the Asian Barometer by combining with the South Asia Barometer, launched in 2004 (see later). The third wave covering 13 countries was completed in 2012.

Nationally representative samples of 1,200 or more individuals have been selected for face-to-face interviews in each country. Data from the first wave are also available through JD Systems and results were published by Chu et al. (2008a) in *How East Asians View Democracy*, the first in a series of publications.

South Asia Barometer http://www.democracy-asia.org

Under the leadership of Yogendra Yadav, Suhas Palshikar and Peter de Souza from Lokniti, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in New Delhi, the South Asia Barometer was launched in 2003, to cover Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The first wave was done in 2004. The second, in progress in 2012, has added the Maldives to make a total of six countries. During its formative years the survey was known as The State of Democracy in South Asia Project and was funded by IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), the Ford Foundation and the EU. Since its founding the South Asia Barometer has been a partner in the Asian Barometer, engaging in concerted efforts to develop common modules and standard research protocols across Asia. A subset of first-wave South Asia Barometer data, which became part of the first-wave Globalbarometer Surveys merged data, are available online through JD Systems.

Nationally representative face-to-face samples are used in each country. In India the number of interviews is 6,000, the largest sample size in any of the Globalbarometer countries. Sethi (2008) has published the results of the first survey in *State of Democracy in South Asia*. This barometer added a significant part of the world, including the largest democracy, to the analysis of the democratic behaviour of nations.

The Eurasia Barometer

This project, launched by Christian Haerpfer of the University of Aberdeen, is designed to monitor both normative and practical support for democracy to generate a comprehensive, balanced and dynamic account of political transformations taking place in Russia and eight other Commonwealth of Independent States (IS) countries. The resulting data will assist democratic reformers and policy makers in developing effective strategies to orient the masses towards democracy.

In the past, a part of the New Europe Barometer had completed seven waves of the New Baltic Barometer and the New Russia Barometer. After 1990 a number of limited initiatives produced longitudinal data covering short periods of time for this part of the world that can be gathered in a synergetic way to continue monitoring these societies. A series of scattered surveys carried out from 1990 to 2001 in eight countries, called New Democracies Barometer, with two full waves in 2002 and 2010, is now being transformed into the Eurasia Barometer in a synergy surveying nine countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine. The first data will be available in 2013.

The Arab Barometer www.arabbarometer.org

This project was launched by a group of scholars from the participating countries under the leadership of Mark Tessler of the University of Michigan. The first wave was done in 2006–7 in seven countries, with an eighth country added in 2009. The eight countries were Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Yemen. Egypt could not be surveyed in the first wave because no authorization could be obtained. The Middle East Partnership Initiative funded the first wave.

Nationally representative samples with face-to-face interviews are used in each country. Since 2009, data have been made available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, the world's largest deposit of publicly available social science data, as well as through the Arab Barometer website. The second wave was carried out in 11 countries in 2010–11 with multiple funding from the Ayn Rand Institute (ARI), the UNDP, Canada and the US. Although it was impossible to conduct the second wave in Bahrain and Kuwait, five new countries were added. The countries involved were: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. Egypt and Tunisia were included due to the political events that had opened up the possibility of surveying, which was previously prohibited. These were the very first surveys of this type carried out in these countries. The second wave used the Globalbarometer Surveys module as well as questions related to the Arab Spring, which was happening at the time. Currently the project is governed by a steering committee, consisting of Tessler, Bassman Kodmani (ARI), Amaney Jamal (Princeton University), Mohammed al-Masri (Centre for Strategic Studies, Jordan) and Kahli Shikaki (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research).

The Globalbarometer Surveys www.globalbarometers.org

Globalbarometer Surveys (GBS) is a federation of six regional barometers, namely the Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, Asian Barometer, Eurasia Barometer, Latinobarómetro and South Asia Barometer. It does not yet include the Eurobarometer, but efforts to coordinate with it have been made. The federation represents the first comprehensive effort to measure, at mass level, democracies and the current social, political and economic atmosphere around the globe. The member regional barometers have coordinated their efforts, designing a common GBS module and a set of identical questions used in 90 countries representing circa 70 per cent of the world population, merging data and launching joint publications. A first wave of GBS merged data that includes 49 countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America is available online through JD Systems.

The first publication which included Globalbarometer's data on trust in institutions was published by Bratton et al. (2005b). Globalbarometer data also make a visible contribution to the recent volume edited by Diamond and Plattner (2008) on *How People View Democracy*.

A second-wave GBS data set is being constructed using the new identical module for all regions. The new data will cover approximately 90 countries across the world, making it the largest comparative survey research currently in existence.

Japan's AsiaBarometer www.asiabarometer.org

In Japan, Takashi Inoguchi of Tokyo University conducted the first wave of the AsiaBarometer in ten countries in 2003. It focused on values and lifestyles of the urban population and was published in *A Cross-Cultural Analysis and Sourcebook Based on the AsiaBarometer Survey of 2003* edited by Inoguchi et al. (2005). Japanese corporate donors initially funded the project.

The second wave was carried out in 2004 in 13 countries, focusing on Southeast Asia, but also including China, Japan and South Korea. It was funded by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the University of Tokyo. Multi-stage random sampling with nationwide coverage, apart from that in China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia, produced 800 face-to-face interviews in each country (except for Japan). From 2005 to 2008 AsiaBarometer conducted polls with different themes each year in a few selected Asian countries. Data from 2003 to 2007 are available through the project's website.

The Barometer of the Americas www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop

The Barometer of the Americas is based in the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbildt University in Nashville, Tennessee, US. Its founding director Mitchel Selingson launched the study in 2004 in 11 countries in the Americas to look at democratic values and behaviour. It is financed primarily by the US Agency for International Development, with some supplementary funding from other donors.

Since 2004 it has been a biennial survey, with the number of countries studied increasing each time. The second wave in 2006 covered 22 countries, the third in 2008 covered 24 countries, and the fourth in 2010 covered 26 countries. LAPOP produces a report on every wave for each country, the only barometer to do so. The reports are published by USAID in Spanish and English and are completely standardized and centrally designed. This barometer is different, in that it is a study originating in the first world of an emerging region and covers countries in the Caribbean region not surveyed by other barometers.

International comparative surveys

International Social Survey Program www.issp.org

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a cross-national collaboration, adding a cross-national perspective to existing national studies. It is a joint venture of two research institutes in Germany (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfragen der Sozialwissenschaften, ALLBUS and Zentrum für Umfrage Methoden und Analysen, ZUMA) and the General Social Survey (GSS) in the US. It started with a module on job values, abortion and feminism that was produced in 1982 by ALLBUS and GSS. The results led to an interest in establishing institutes in all regions, so for expanding to 48 nations. They use 15-minute modules on specific topics to supplement regular national surveys. The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research has data from 1985 to 2009. Funding is individual and local, and merged data sets are produced by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung in Germany. The annual plenary meeting decides on the topics. Membership is by invitation.

The European Values Study and the World Values Survey
www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu and www.worldvaluessurvey.org

It is not surprising that European integration brought with it increasing levels of interaction among scholars and the formation of a social science community across the Atlantic where multinational projects flourished. This explains why the same group of scholars who participated in the design of the Eurobarometer started the European Values Study (EVS) and later the World Values Survey (WVS). The rapid growth of cross-national survey research took place against the backdrop of postwar stability in Europe, with the EVS, WVS and Eurobarometer as symbols of the period.

Gordon Heald, Jan Kerkhofs, Juan Linz, Ruud de Moor, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Jean-Jacques Rabier and Helene Riffault were the founders of the European Values Study. Currently the EVS Foundation carries out the survey. In 1981 the EVS surveyed ten West European societies, later expanding to 26 countries. The first three waves were done in 1981, 1990 and 1999–2000, covering countries both within and beyond the EU. Samples are representative of the adult population, with 1,000 face-to-face interviews in each country. Results showed that cultural and social changes are dependent on the historic and economic development of each country.

The World Values Survey is derived from the EVS. In fact, in the second wave of EVS surveys, Ronald Inglehart, as a member of the EVS steering committee, expanded application beyond Europe, thus launching the WVS. Currently the WVS is managed by a Sweden-based non-governmental organization, with a steering committee led by Inglehart. The data are available online through JD Systems. Initially the WVS was very heterogeneous in terms of the implementation of the fieldwork. However, since 2005, standardized quality requirements have been put in place. A fully standardized instrument together with a package of instructions have been given to principal investigators around the world who are participating in the sixth wave (which took place in 2011–12). Nationally representative samples with face-to-face interviews lasting approximately one hour have been used in over 50 countries around the world. Altogether about 80 countries have been covered in at least one wave. The WVS is the single most used study and the one that has had the largest impact on the development of survey research as a tool to understand the evolution of societies.

The WVS has focused on the link between economic development and value change. Results show how value orientations have shifted in almost all industrial societies. The 2005 wave also showed differences in that shift for an entire region, namely the Spanish-speaking world. The 2012 wave's single-country results already show how that initial difference has strengthened. These differences in changes in value orientation have consequences for the way in which economic development impacts the consolidation of democracies.

Comparative Study of Electoral Systems www.cses.org

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) emerged out of the collaboration between the European Election Studies and the American National Election Studies and was founded in 1995 under the joint leadership of Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Steven Rosenstone, who served as its founding director, and Jacques Thomassen. The CSES produces election surveys around the world with the participation of the second and third generation of scholars. It aims at a systematic analysis of electoral behaviour under globally varying institutional conditions. The project is based in Ann Arbor, Michigan, US, and has the support of the American National Science Foundation (NSF). It is coordinated through its Planning

Committee, which develops the agenda and designs the modules to be applied network-wide. Currently CSES coordinates the operation of more than 50 national election studies across the world. Two sets of data are gathered for each country. One module consists of information on the institutional arrangements of elections, while the other is a post-election survey module regarding the main election process in each society, generally included in a wider survey in each participant country designed to last no longer than 10 to 15 minutes. The CSES designs, receives, standardizes, cleans and merges these data, and then makes them available to the public. Three modules have been applied to date on three different topics surrounding the electoral process and a fourth module is currently being implemented. Data are available online through JD Systems.

Comparative National Elections Project www.cnep.ics.ul.pt/index1.asp

In the late 1980s Richard Gunther (Ohio State University) began the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP), initially in four countries. Since then it has evolved in three distinct phases (CNEP I, II and III), with a steady expansion into Africa and Asia. The CNEP's emphasis is on the processes of intermediation through which citizens receive information about policies, parties, candidates and politics in general during the course of election campaigns. Data from selected countries participating in the three phases are available on the project's website.

The CNEP applies a mixed methodology, with face-to-face interviews supplemented by a number of telephone surveys and one Internet survey. Nationally representative samples of the adult population consisting of 1,000 to 2,500 interviews are used in each country.

The European Social Survey www.europeansocialsurvey.org

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an EU-financed project that monitors public opinion in European societies; it was founded in 2002 by Max Kaase under the executive direction of Roger Jowell. The ESS covers the richest and most developed democratic region in the world, and is also the most expensive and best comparative survey research ever carried out. A strict orthodox methodology marks a significant difference from the unorthodox methodology of comparative research programmes in emergent societies. Samples in its societies are based on the best census data currently in existence and are without cultural restrictions on freedom of speech. Academically driven and European policy-oriented, it measures the evolution and differences in citizens' social values, cultural norms and behaviour patterns. A short module of supplementary questions follows the 60-minute interviews. Strict and fully documented random probability samples at every stage, consisting of 1,500 face-to-face interviews representing the total population of all persons aged 15 years and older, are applied in each country every two years. There is debate between those who favour the production of this level of high-quality data and those who value the production of data dependent on the level of development of the countries in which surveys are used.

The ESS central funding arrangements are the exception rather than the rule. While the ESS is funded by EU member-states, most other surveys rely on *ad hoc* funding, with the exception of the Barometer of the Americas which is funded by the US government.

Comparative Candidate Survey www.comparativecandidates.org

The Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) is an internationally coordinated effort to respond to the growing number of candidate surveys in the Anglo-Saxon world and beyond. It

includes a module to harmonize the dispersed efforts in local post-election surveys and give them a cross-nationally comparable core. Hermann Schmitt of the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) directs the study. It surveys parliamentary candidates in some 30 countries that vary systematically regarding their regime type (presidential versus parliamentary), the electoral system used (candidate- versus party-centred) and the degree of consolidation of the democratic order. Data will be available through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research in 2015, when they will have been gathered.

Commercial survey

Corporate Social Responsibility Monitor www.globescan.com

The Corporate Social Responsibility Monitor (CSR) is a comparative survey research project carried out by GlobeScan, a commercial Canadian company. It was first conducted in 2000 in over 25 countries from all continents, with nationally representative samples of 1,000 respondents from the adult population in each country. GlobeScan has also conducted other international comparative surveys, in association with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), the BBC and other organizations. Data have been partially released to the general public.

Other comparative international surveys

Pew Global Attitudes Survey www.pewglobal.org

The Pew Global Attitudes Project started in 2002 and is carried out by the Pew Research Center under the direction of Andrew Kohut, with data from 44 countries on people's image of the US and other great powers. It also includes questions about their views on current affairs. The second wave was released in 2003 with data from 49 countries on globalization and democratization in countries with a significant Muslim population. It is funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts with supplemental grants from the Hewlett Foundation (www.people-press.org). This is the only comparative survey research that aims at sampling the world through a set of countries in order to address global issues on an ongoing basis.

Conclusion

Comparative multinational survey research has mostly developed since the 1990s, following pioneering work in 1959 in the US and in the 1970s in Europe. Between 1990 and 2006, groups of scholars from all regions (Africa, the Arab world, Central and Eastern Europe, East and South Asia and Latin America) launched public opinion barometers. The Globalbarometer Surveys, which unite six of these barometers covering all regions of the world (with the exception of the EU and the US) under a common module for all countries involved, is currently based in Chile and is seeking collaboration with China and India to further develop its network.

Although some of the barometers originated in the US, currently most groups are based in their own regions and have developed into a major source of information for political and social actors. While some barometers were principally founded out of academic interest, they have subsequently developed into major regional sources of information on public policy and democratic development. However, academic comparative surveys such as the Comparative

Study of Electoral Systems and the Comparative National Elections Project reveal the dominance of Western academic practices in the comparative study of elections. At the same time, the International Social Survey Program and Pew Research show the diverse ways in which surveys can develop. Furthermore, issue-oriented commercial comparative surveys on single topics are also produced on an ongoing basis for multinational companies and IOs.

Two decades of development have shown how greatly new international comparative surveys have changed the way social phenomena are analysed, and at the same time have left researchers with data that have no theoretical framework to hold them together. Survey research precedes the development of democratic theory. While some social scientists may enjoy the use of the newly gained statistical tools, they are by definition restricted by the comprehension of the universe they observe. Others might be willing to look out of the window in order to produce a more holistic understanding of social change. Parallel to this paradox, comparative data are also impacting public policy, inasmuch as they show how few genuinely 'exceptional' problems exist and how much homogeneity there is across different populations around the globe. Although culture as well as context matters, social phenomena may be much more global than initially expected.

Most comparative multinational surveys entered into a complex partnership with IOs from the very beginning; for instance, through financial backing by international donor organizations such as the EU, UNDP, regional development banks, the World Bank and cooperation agencies such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA. These donors place growing emphasis on citizen empowerment, good governance, gender equality and human security. However, most of the comparative surveys have been able to maintain their intellectual autonomy, so that they are able to provide an independent and irreplaceable source of public opinion information that IOs can draw upon to evaluate the popularity and effectiveness of ongoing development assistance and/or democracy-promotion programmes, and to identify the areas of weakness and deficiency in any given recipient country.

The availability of globalized comparative survey data also allow IOs to supplement their existing objective indicators or expert-based evaluations, such as the World Bank's governance indicators and the UNDP's Human Development Index, with comparable subjective indicators based on the use of common modules and standardized methodology to survey ordinary people in different parts of the world. Barometers are also being used to produce the new Wellbeing/Happiness Index. Comparative survey research has only been warming up in this first period of its world expansion.

Recommended for further reading

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What does transnational history tell us about a world with international organizations?

The historians' point of view

Davide Rodogno, Shaloma Gauthier and Francesca Piana

What does the transnational perspective bring to the study of international organizations (IOs)? What are the benefits and the shortcomings of adopting such an approach? This chapter answers these questions through the assessment of *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (2009) and the League of Nations Online Search Engine (LONSEA). They represent two of the newest and most interesting academic endeavours for the study of the history of IOs, which adopt an overtly transnational perspective.

A transnational history perspective

The transnational lens is one of many ways through which historians and other social scientists can examine the past. The Latin etymology of perspective refers to the idea of seeing through something. In this context, IOs become meaningful spaces where individuals transit and connect, and where ideas, practices and policies emerge, crystallize or are implemented. A sound transnational perspective does not deny the importance of nation-states or power-related processes. Rather, the emphasis is on processes or movements that cut across, transit through and go beyond the nation-state.

In order to understand how the transnational perspective contributes to the analysis of IOs, it is necessary to provide preliminary definitions. Within IOs, there are two discernible categories: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Intergovernmental organizations are the result of treaties that are enacted by governments, as was the case for the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN). Conversely, international NGOs act independently of any government. It is possible to distinguish between international non-profit organizations, a term that usually refers to 'voluntary and open (non secret) associations of individuals outside the formal state apparatus . . . that are neither for profit nor engage in political activities as their primary object' and international corporations, which are also referred to as transnational corporations (Iriye 1999: 422). Contrary to what scholars claim, both Americans and Europeans have used the term 'non-governmental organization' since the early 1920s, long before the approval of the UN Charter.[1]

In spite of the fact that IOs have contributed in a variety of ways to the shaping of world politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, diplomatic historians and scholars of international relations have overlooked them as a unit of analysis. With few exceptions, these scholars did not deem IOs as objects worthy of inquiry. Even when they were taken into consideration, there was a lack of attention to understanding how IOs emerge and operate. Scholars embracing a realist perspective contested IOs' agency and autonomy. They conceived them as instruments through which nation-states attempt to achieve their national interests. Conversely, functionalists and liberal institutionalists granted IOs more autonomy in world politics than the realists. However, they tended to overlook the processes taking place within and beyond the nation-state and did not necessarily shed light on the interconnected dynamics that take place beyond the organizations themselves.

A further research field is the institutional history of IOs. Since the inception of IOs, civil servants who were organizational insiders became amateur historians and wrote volumes on the history of 'their' IOs. This has mainly been the case for IGOs, such as the League of Nations, International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank, but also for NGOs; for instance, the multi-volume history of the International Committee of the Red Cross by Pierre Boissier (1963) and André Durand (1978). These accounts by organizational insiders hastily gained the status of the official history of a given organization even when they lacked impartiality, a critical regard and did not quote their sources according to conventional scholarly standards. These success stories or, worse, hagiographical accounts, gave the history of IOs a bad reputation among historians and others. Regrettably, civil servant-historians rarely used their insider's vantage point to describe the dynamics taking place within a single organization, the rivalries and tensions within and among organizations. Two meaningful exceptions are Edward Phelan's (n.d.) ILO memoirs and Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer's *The International Secretariat* (1945). Organizational insiders did not cross-reference their sources or connect their accounts to the broader context of the interwar and the Cold War periods. Nonetheless, the importance of institutional history should not be altogether dismissed as it provides insight into the inner workings of IOs. Tools fostering a transnational perspective, such as the *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA, have revitalized the institutional history of IOs in different ways. They contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the internal mechanics and dynamics of IOs and shed light on the way these institutions act locally, nationally, regionally and internationally.

Since the 1960s, scholars from various disciplines have drawn attention to transnational relations. Raymond Aron (1967) referred to the vast set of interactions that could not be categorized under the label of interstate relations. Political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972) highlighted the multi-faceted relationships, exchanges and interactions that transcended state boundaries. In doing so, they encouraged scholars to look at transnational organizations and movements as crucial actors in global affairs. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1973) added to the debate and sought to limit the applicability of transnational relations to the study of IOs and their operations. As far as historians are concerned, Ian Tyrell's 1991 article 'American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History' broke new ground, for it used a transnational approach to suggest a reconceptualization of the history of the United States (US). Tyrell (1991: 1034) pointed out the weaknesses of adopting an exclusively national perspective to the study of a country's foreign policy. Patricia Clavin (2005: 425) maintained that transnational configurations, including those thriving within IOs, are dynamic and have an impact in the local, national and international domain. Madeleine Herren (2009) provided interesting insights into transnational network analyses and launched the LONSEA. The latter's initial focus is on transnational networks that

developed and eventually shaped the politics and practices of the League of Nations. Kiran Patel (2009) argued that the research falling under the purview of 'transnational' has embraced different strategies and methods. In this vein, Pierre-Yves Saunier (2008: 11) wrote that historians should use the foundations that have already been laid to their advantage and continue to explore new terrains.

Within the past few decades, an understanding of the potential of the transnational perspective as well as the methodological limits of such an approach has grown. This is reflected in the *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* and the League of Nations Online Search Engine. A new generation of historians now embraces a methodology based on the use of multiple-archival sources. They have proved creative and innovative in the way they make use of IOs' archival sources. These historians have made laudable efforts to become familiar with several archival systems and with a large set of historiographical traditions and questions. They have cross-referenced documents coming from the archives of IOs with other sources found in a multiplicity of archives, located in different countries and written in different languages. In a rather optimistic tone, Saunier (2008: 170) contends that historians are on the cusp of the 'ultimate transnational move'.

International organizations in transnational perspective

The transnational perspective adopted by the *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA highlights various mechanics and dynamics within and across IOs, including the role and circulation of individuals, the connections these individuals forge, their multiple roles within an organization and the processes through which ideas circulate. In their respective attempts to better understand the politics and policies of IOs, whilst embracing a transnational perspective, neither the *Palgrave Dictionary* nor the LONSEA overlook the importance of the nation-state. They encourage scholars to distinguish between international civil servants, permanent national representatives, national representatives sent to the organization in case of specific events, and *ad hoc* experts whose services are seconded by the organization to deal with a particular topic. Moreover, the *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA draw attention to the individuals' previous work experiences, their system of beliefs, and as in the case of an IGO, their national affiliation. They shed light on the moment of 'contact' between the individual and the organization and facilitate the analysis of networks of experts, if applicable to the research in question.

Sandrine Kott was among the first historians who examined the role of experts within IOs. She built upon Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas's (1992) pioneering work on epistemic communities: clusters of individuals who are bound together by the same beliefs and have common views on a specific issue. Epistemic communities further their cause through scientific knowledge, as they can both raise an issue for debate within an IO or contribute to an ongoing debate. They circulate their ideas through other channels such as formal venues, permanent structures of an IO, informal meetings and unofficial connections. Kott (2008) analysed how various labour experts, bound together by common knowledge and cause, interacted and exchanged information, and how their actions matter for decision making and implementation. Echoes of Kott's intuitions and analyses are to be found both in the *Palgrave Dictionary* entries and in the LONSEA digital project.

The way historians have written and students have read the history of IOs has changed dramatically in the last decades. Take for instance, the classic League of Nations' account by Francis Walters (1952): *A History of the League of Nations* leads the reader through the organization's official activities according to a thematic and chronological order. Walters tried

to be as exhaustive as possible, recounting the major events within the organization. However, he did not shed sufficient light on the role of individuals within it. On the contrary, historians who approach the League of Nations using a transnational perspective tend to expand on the influence of individuals. They investigate how and whether these individuals managed to shape the politics of the organization on certain issues.[2] The example of the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) is a good case in point. Grounded in Article 22 of the League's Covenant, it was comprised of individuals who were to oversee 14 territories that were being administered by various mandatory powers and to ensure the 'material and moral welfare' of the local inhabitants. Chosen for their merit and former work-experience, the experts on the PMC examined documents submitted both by the mandatory power and by the local inhabitants. When focusing on the background of these experts, it becomes evident that the apple did not fall far from the tree. Many of these individuals were in fact former colonial administrators and their nationality played into their selection. Such was the case of Lord Frederick Lugard, British PMC member, who had previously worked as British colonial administrator in Hong Kong and then Nigeria. This kind of information, which seems to be relevant to understanding the nature of the politics and practices of the PMC, is not to be found in Walters' book and in many other classic accounts of the League. On the contrary, various historians working on the mandate system today elaborate and emphasize these kinds of connections.

This example could also be applied to the UN. With the exception of some ongoing projects,[3] no extensive research has been conducted on the personnel of various UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the UN Children's Fund and the World Bank. How many of these civil servants in charge of enforcing development programmes, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, in the 'underdeveloped' and newly independent countries, were in fact former colonial officers or individuals who worked for one or the other predecessors of the UN, from the League of Nations to the UNRRA, or other prominent interwar period NGOs such as the American Relief Administration or the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee?

As evidenced in these examples, a transnational perspective should open the door for connections that help scholars contextualize the ideas, politics and practices of IOs. By emphasizing dynamics that transcend IOs, researchers using this approach are inclined to integrate meaningful complementary perspectives, as is the case for biographical and prosopographical details. Lawrence Stone (1971: 46) discussed the prosopographical approach to the study of individuals and defined it as being the 'investigation of the common background characteristic of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives'. A transnational perspective stresses formal and informal relationships, pointing to their often unequal nature. It decodes the forms that these relationships take and the way in which power materializes within them. A transnational analysis of IOs is supposed to offer any researcher adequate tools to narrow down and go in-depth in individuals' lives as well as to broaden the range of actors included in their analysis in order to understand cooperative efforts that bring governments, organizations and individuals together. This perspective looks at the spaces where ideas are generated, spaces through which ideas move, are exchanged, and eventually change. However, as in any scholarly research field, the transnational approach needs a sound critical distance from the object of study. This was not the case for a recent volume, *UN Ideas that Changed the World*, which took an uncritical and unnecessarily glorifying view of the role of the UN (Jolly et al. 2009; for an assessment, see Baert 2009). It would have been far more interesting to show the various channels through which ideas reached the UN and how they were transformed and contaminated, changed and appropriated.

Assessing the *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*

This section assesses how the *Palgrave Dictionary*, edited by Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, contributes to the study of IOs. The dictionary is a vast compendium which offers insight into a multiplicity of topics, ranging from concepts, ideas, continents, countries, movements and objects. In fact, its opening pages reveal a series of diagrams that encapsulate how the transnational perspective has influenced the study of international relations. The dictionary presents central themes such as flows of people, world order and disorder, world sound and images, production and trade, body and soul concepts and processes, groups and causes as well as knowledge.

The *Palgrave Dictionary* was not necessarily meant to be an attempt that would bolster the study of IOs. Nonetheless, it was symbolic of the fact that historians broke free from their 'cages', when they realized that scholars from other fields were studying IOs from various angles. Therefore, this volume engages with multiple disciplines, as it includes scholars from varied fields, such as anthropology, economics, theology, linguistics, geography, sociology and interdisciplinary studies. The dictionary was largely born out of the awareness of a specific deficit. Iriye and Saunier (2009: xix) grasped that 'there was room and need for a reference volume that would document the history of connections and circulations in the modern age, from about 1850 to the present'. Their purpose was not to add another 'historical dictionary' to the pile.

Coordinating and managing the compilation of over 300 entries must have been an onerous undertaking. Reviewers of the *Palgrave Dictionary* did not hesitate to refer to it as an 'authoritative, accessible and highly readable' work (Farquhar 2011: 155). This dictionary seems to conform to Patel's (2009) view that 'if used properly, the transnational scalpel cuts across all boundaries and dissects transnational connections just about everywhere'. In assessing the usefulness of the dictionary, the questions we ask are straightforward: is the dictionary a valuable tool for studying IOs? At what, if any, stage of one's research on IOs would the dictionary be most useful? What words of caution should be kept in mind by the scholar wishing to use this tool 'properly'?

The first aspect to note is that unlike traditional dictionaries that generally proceed in a more linear manner, the research journey through the *Palgrave Dictionary* involves a degree of jumping back and forth. Reviewers have noted that the volume is *ad hoc* in nature. Although not necessarily a 'traditional volume', the dictionary 'summarizes an outstanding amount of material that covers an equally vast number of themes' (Forest 2010). Although the editors maintain that there are no 'obvious' entries, one must be aware that certain aspects, including those that might be relevant for the study of IOs, have been left aside. For instance, there are entries on some UN specialized agencies, such as UNESCO, but not on the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).

One of the fairly typical criticisms raised against this, as any dictionary, is the risk of becoming outdated quickly (Guha 2009). A further criticism is that some entries are deemed to be 'slightly less satisfying than others' (Farquhar 2011: 155). Perhaps these reviewers tend to forget that this is a pioneer work whose prodromic value should not be underestimated. Hence, the disparity of themes dealt with is probably a reflection of the uneven state of research in various sub-disciplinary realms. Some scholars view unevenness as weakness, forgetting that the lack of homogeneity illustrates the attempt and the effort of the editors to broaden the scope of the historical dictionary. As Iriye and Saunier (2009: xix) write in the introduction, the volume is replete with various 'flaws'. These flaws do not necessarily indicate weaknesses, but areas where further research is needed. Furthermore, by including

the research of anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists, to list just a few, the editors remind historians of the pertinence of the work undertaken by other social scientists in topics of common interest.

Here, we conduct a simple test of the *Palgrave Dictionary*. We selected a topic (IOs and climate change) and proceeded to verify to what extent the dictionary is a helpful tool. Since the 1970s, climate change brought to the fore a number of actors that engaged with IGOs, epistemic communities and NGOs. It was at this juncture that new 'global movements' surfaced with heightened concern over the environment. For instance, NGOs have been intensely involved in environmental negotiations and treaty making. Before starting the test we were aware that IOs as well as epistemic communities operating within them had been significant actors in the move to raise awareness regarding environmental issues, as they had been proactive in amassing, disseminating information and lobbying for change. Does the dictionary sufficiently delve into these aspects? Does it indicate a single route (a kind of *via maestra*) or does it suggest alternatives for research?

The first stop in the thick book was at the tree diagrams. Laid out for the perusal of the researcher, they provide a road map for the seemingly random entries of the dictionary. An entire tree under the heading of 'planet earth', with a further heading of 'environment, resources and infrastructure' is laid out for the researcher, thereby drawing attention to some of the inter-connected aspects which fall under this field of study. These issues then appear again under a further tree labelled 'groups and causes', under the more general heading of 'international NGOs', and are then narrowed down under various environmental issues. With a loosely constructed navigational system in hand, the research process could be launched. Without adhering to the alphabetical order, the first 'obvious stop' was the entry on climate change.

This entry proceeds chronologically, first identifying some of the major scientific innovations. Then it focuses on some of the developments in environmental issues, such as the various conferences that have been convened and organizations that have been established to deal with this topic. In tracing how climate change has been elevated as an issue of international concern, the entry highlights the extent to which a number of transnational exchanges have transpired. It certainly pays particular attention to the importance of 'expertise' and the pivotal role that scientists from around the world have played in the compilation and provision of reports. It emphasizes the diversity of disciplines that have been involved in the process of studying the climate system. For instance, the cooperation and expertise of atmospheric scientists, oceanographers, terrestrial ecologists, as well as meteorologists, solar physicists and other scientists from the physical and biological, as well as social, sciences, are elucidated.

At times, the information is a bit staccato as some of the key experts are identified in the various countries without necessarily identifying whether and how they are connected with IOs. Although the transnational perspective is specifically intended to draw attention to various flows and circulations, it sometimes appears as though only some of the 'nodes' of the networks are highlighted. Moreover, there is no explanation or information on the reasons as to why other 'nodes' are left aside. For instance, the entry describes how, in the early 1980s, a number of climate and biological scientists from American and European universities and research centres released reports on the fact that climate change could indeed become a grave issue. It then shifts its gaze to developments in 1988 when NASA scientist James Hansen presented his findings at a US Senate Committee, emphasizing that he was 99 per cent certain that climate change was an imminent reality. The dictionary arbitrarily jumps in the delivery of information, as there is no link between the findings of European and American scientists. The reader is left wondering about the connections between these two key moments. It

would also have been interesting to know if these reports were similarly issued to organizations such as the UNEP, established in 1972, and the degree of collaboration between scientists and the latter. As to Hansen, he appears out of the blue and then disappears again into the abyss.

At first glance, this entry appears to be missing information on various aspects related to the link between climate change and IOs, particularly the links played by international conferences and the impact that the latter had on IGOs such as the UN. However, certain gaps can be filled when cross-referencing with some of the other entries. For instance, 'environmental diplomacy' complements the entry on 'climate change' and addresses some questions that were outstanding when consulting the former. More specifically, the information on 'environmental diplomacy' elaborates upon the governmental and non-governmental interactions that have transpired, resulting in the conclusion of trans-boundary agreements, as well as a host of other 'transnational efforts' that have taken place. This entry also provides insight into how IGOs such as UNEP represent central platforms upon which some environmental agreements have been based. The unevenness we referred to earlier is visible here, for the trajectories of influential UNEP experts and individuals are entirely overlooked. Overall, in spite of the cross-referencing, some information is disjointed and, in fact, there is no dedicated entry for the UNEP. Although one understands that it would evidently exceed the scope of the entries to provide a detailed account of all of the aspects mentioned, certain elements could benefit from enhanced connections.

We proceeded like any scholar would have done. From the *Palgrave Dictionary*, we moved to our library (virtual and real) and identified some of the major actors that have been at the core of climate change issues. We were instantly drawn to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The dictionary does not contain a dedicated entry on the IPCC, although information on this institution is scattered throughout various entries. This is surprising given that, according to Iriye and Saunier (2009: 173), the latter is much more than a network of experts whose 'critical review and assessment of climate change is unprecedented'. Information on the IPPC can be found within a number of entries: climate change, environmental diplomacy and environmentalism. The very basic information we gathered on the IPCC shows that it rapidly became the site of relevant transnational connections and discussions on the risks of climate change. The *Palgrave Dictionary* mentions the 'transnational' composition of the IPCC, which comprises over 2,000 scientists from around the world (Iriye and Saunier 2009: 173). Among the experts, there are also researchers from academic circles, governments, NGOs and other institutes. Moreover, the input provided by the dictionary instigated a questioning of the role of various epistemic communities and advocacy network groups that were comprehensively involved in the creation of the IPCC through the World Meteorological Organization and UNEP. The IPCC's reports are deemed to have wielded considerable sway on governments as far as the negotiation and eventual adoption of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change is concerned (Iriye and Saunier 2009: 174). We do not necessarily deem the lack of an entry in this regard to be a weakness. Starting from scattered information we found in the dictionary, we were able to formulate potential research questions on the nature of the IPCC's 'influence', on the role of various environmental pressure groups in directing and steering policies and practices through an IO, on issues related to knowledge and power. In that respect the alleged 'flaws' of the dictionary enhanced and stimulated our questioning.

Moreover, the dictionary's entry on 'environmental diplomacy' drew our attention to the measures and efforts undertaken by various groups, in particular NGOs. Despite an imbalance in some of the information, this entry highlights the inherent merits of a transnational

perspective when applied to the study of IOs. The role of non-state actors is particularly relevant when dealing with topics such as climate change. Does the entry engage with the methods NGOs utilize to persuade UN bodies or governments to consider or adopt principles or programmes that they uphold? The entry delineates the wide range of strategies, from radical measures undertaken by Greenpeace, to the World Resources Institute, which conducts research and disseminates information in the hope that it will sway decision makers and public opinion. Therefore, the dictionary has accomplished its task in this regard. Any outstanding questions will be left for the scholars to uncover in their individual work.

Last but not least, we must assess whether the dictionary, deliberately or not, imposes a specific agenda favouring transnational relations over other kind of relations on the scholar reading the dictionary. We can take the following example concerning two entries which the dictionary indicates as being strictly related to 'climate change', i.e. our test's starting point: 'environmentalism' and 'environmental diplomacy'. Reading 'environmentalism', one learns that key conferences and symposiums have taken place since the 1960s. The Biosphere Conference of 1968 intentionally steered clear of potentially provocative topics of policy and advocacy and instead emphasized the role of scientific knowledge in addressing environmental problems. In this vein, the *Palgrave Dictionary* highlights expertise and more specifically, the political role of 'science'. The editors and authors of the dictionary appear to maintain a critical look on networks of experts and transnational advocacy networks. As to 'environmental diplomacy', the last part of the entry brings the 'nation-state' back into the discussion. It maintains that governments are often reluctant to apply stringent environmental rules, especially if these rules impose restraints on economic growth. This might appear as a trivial or obvious statement, though given the intended readership of the dictionary this is an opportune reminder of the importance of nation-states even when non-state actors are the research objects.

The League of Nations Search Engine (LONSEA)

The LONSEA, founded at the University of Heidelberg, is part of a broader project entitled 'Asia and Europe in a Global Context, Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows'. Officially launched by historian Madeleine Herren-Oesch in October 2010, it is presented as a tool that encourages the investigation of 'global history' from below (Sibille 2011).[4] In the intention of its creators, the LONSEA is meant to overcome the limits of institutional history by highlighting the institutional and personal relationships that develop within, across and beyond IOs. For instance, it aims to trace the trajectories of international civil servants and examine how personal connections have shaped international politics. The LONSEA is built to make the researcher 'follow' the development of the career of an international civil servant who might change positions within the organization, move from one organization to another, or enter the national administration of her/his country of origin. Moreover, this database is designed to provide elements through which a researcher might determine the extent to which IOs and their staff were effective in the actions they carried out. This is made possible by varying search combinations and moving the focus from IOs to people, places, topics and connections.

According to the editors of the database, the scope of the LONSEA is not intended to be a comprehensive biographical reference work or an institutional reference. Rather, it should help the user examine the changing character of the mandate and activities of some of the organizations, and in particular the League of Nations, operating in the interwar period. Indeed, contrary to the classic historiography portraying the League as static and a failure, a

research tool such as LONSEA highlights the extent to which the organization was a dynamic institution. This also applies to the connections that the League had with internal bodies and external organizations, as well as with international civil servants. In providing insight into the individuals and institutions connected with the League of Nations, the LONSEA aims at reassessing its history and the connections that arose around the Geneva-based organization. Furthermore, data are visualized through a diagram structure, where tables and colours draw attention to the development, expansion or regression of networks over time and place. Therefore, the LONSEA facilitates the investigation of networks crossing national borders and sheds light on how these networks shape international relations.

As is reflected in its name, the LONSEA is deeply connected to the history of the League and to the interwar period. The documents upon which the database is compiled are based on the assumption that the League's Secretariat was at the centre of networks composed of international bureaux and commissions designed to regulate 'matters of international interest'. Therefore, from 1921 to 1938, the Secretariat collected and distributed relevant information on IOs and individuals and published them in eight volumes, called *A Handbooks of International Organizations*. The LONSEA not only contains every organization and individual mentioned in the *Handbooks* but has also been enriched by the League's personnel files for the period extending from 1919 to 1946. The database also contains entries from *A Handbook of International Cultural Organizations in Japan* (Tokyo 1936) and, in the near future, it will include entries from its German counterpart. Indeed, as both governments withdrew from the League in the 1930s, they set up their own departments dealing with IOs and conferences.

The LONSEA is an innovative project, as it relies on the collaboration between historians and information technology specialists. It binds the humanities and technology together with the goal of building a new system through which data are organized and contextualized. Contrary to classic projects of digitalization or databases of quantitative research, the pioneering character consists in offering a platform where heterogeneous and diversified entries find a suitable place. Despite its technological dimension, 'man/woman-power' was and is still behind the project's implementation, as data need to be inserted manually.

Contrary to traditional paper contributions, so far (through June 2012) no reviews in English exist. This can be justified by the fact that the historical community has not yet embraced the potential of digital humanities. One of the most obvious strengths of the LONSEA is precisely its digital nature: anyone within reach of a computer can easily access the information in a cost-effective way. From the neophyte of the interwar period to more experienced scholars, the LONSEA offers information on a multiplicity of different topics. It allows an individual researcher to collect information and elucidate networking relationships that traditional archival-based research would have done with more resources and time at her/his disposition. Moreover, due to its online nature, it is a permanently ongoing project and is easily expanded. This is what differentiates the LONSEA from a traditional paper publication that can only be updated with succeeding editions. Since October 2010, the number of the entries has continuously increased. When it was first launched, the database contained approximately 5,000 entries of individuals. Eighteen months later, 1,102 individuals have been added. Moreover, due to its interactive and open access structure, several scholars worldwide have contacted the editors, pointing out inaccuracies or providing them with additional information. As an example of its expansive nature, we can mention the setting up of a cooperation project aimed at exchanging information with the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis, www.dodis.ch). For instance, within this context, Dodis provides access to a variety of sources on Gustave Ador, a politician who was involved with the League while pursuing a career in Swiss politics and serving as the president of the

International Committee of the Red Cross. The LONSEA database also provides links to a list of digitized documents, to the Swiss historical dictionary, and to WorldCat, to name but a few. It offers the perfect example of the fruitful effects of inter-archival collaboration in our digital era. Due to the openness of the editors in this regard, it is certain that the entries will continue to develop and be enriched, while being accessible for free all over the world.

As for the weaknesses of the LONSEA, the most evident one pertains to a general lack of information on the website for its potential users. It is not yet user friendly and some work needs to be done in this respect. For the time being, there are only scant references to the *Handbooks of International Organizations*, which represent the bulk of the information the research engine is based upon. The editors should explain the rationale behind their choice in the use of them, as well as the logic behind the *Handbooks* themselves. The *Handbooks* list some of the organizations, activities, connections, relations and transnational movements. However, these volumes are certainly not exhaustive. Moreover, the LONSEA could have 'landing pages' helping users to identify the criteria according to which some of the interwar organizations and individuals were dealt with and why others were left out. For instance, it does not contain the list of the International Committee of the Red Cross's delegates working on behalf of the League of Nations and charged with the refugee work in the 1920s. Regarding Fridtjof Nansen, the high commissioner for refugees at the League, he is only listed as a member of the International Near East Association and of the International Society for the Exploration of the Arctic Regions by Means of Aircraft. Moreover, the LONSEA does not yet mention the reasons for the inclusion of documents coming from *A Handbook of International Cultural Organizations in Japan*. Without this information, the user cannot understand why among the list of topics, Japan is the only country with a separate heading. Finally, the database should include an explanation regarding the project's ongoing character, as well as inform users when information on the website has been altered.

Although there is a page called 'search LONSEA', the latter only offers basic information on how to use the website, and thus how to optimize time. For instance, there is little explanation on the reasons why the website is organized into three main sub-headings, namely 'search', 'visualize' and 'bibliography'. In particular, the user is left 'alone' for the part called 'visualize', as there is no explanation on how to use it. This is meant to provide an alternative possibility of approaching topics relating to international relations in the interwar period. For instance, in the 'organisation arc', connections are represented with ever-moving nodes of different colours. One can only presume that each of these colours stands for a different degree of institutional or personal connection. Despite the undeniable and visionary value of this technical approach, its outcome is diminished if it is not supported with guidance from the editors.

In spite of some of these difficulties, the sub-heading 'search' is more useful. A simple example shows how the LONSEA can be used. For instance, browsing by IOs and writing down the term 'minorities' presents the list of organizations that were interested in minority questions. In selecting one of these, one can access the names and careers of its officers and can trace their relationships within their organization and beyond. Searching further and clicking on the name of Pablo de Azcárate, a Spanish diplomat who worked in the Minorities Section, the researcher is familiarized with information on his position before joining the League of Nations and during his tenure for that organization, the geographical spaces where he carried out his activities, and the individuals with whom he was in contact.

As compared to the *Palgrave Dictionary*, the LONSEA is perhaps more focused and helpful for the study of individuals connected in one way or another with the League of Nations during the interwar period. Although this is not yet fully systematized, the LONSEA provides

insights into the organizations and activities with which the individual was affiliated. Let us take the example of Philip John Noel-Baker, one of the British members of the League of Nations' Secretariat. Using the LONSEA, we get to know his roles in the different organizations for which he was working, his residences and his networks. The LONSEA permits the researcher to click on the names of the persons with whom Noel-Baker was connected and to get information on the organizations for which he worked. For instance, clicking on the International Peace Campaign opens a new field of research: the database provides references to the mandate of the organization, its finances, the congresses which were organized, the names of the country representatives who belonged to it, as well as the names of its officers. More interestingly, it highlights the connections that the organization had with other organizations working on related topics. Hence, the database spurs new research questions and allows for further transnational excursions.

Browsing by topics, with a few clicks, it is possible to filter six organizations dealing with politics, international relations and pacifism, whose seats were in Geneva. Another function of the LONSEA is the so-called 'connection research', through which the researcher can verify the links through which two persons or institutions are connected. One has to click on 'mark the connection' on the top right of the pages of two individuals or organizations, before selecting 'connections' in the left column. This will show through whom and which organization these two individuals were connected.

Conclusion

This chapter has distinguished two related but different questions: the usefulness of the transnational perspective for understanding IOs, and the usefulness of the *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA in understanding IOs through transnational lenses. The *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA provide a firm foundation upon which future studies on IOs will be able to base themselves. An absolute beginner would potentially not be aware of all the connections that s/he has to forge and would need a proactive stance to make the best possible use of both of them. Perhaps the *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA are better used as tools for flagging and highlighting the most relevant network nodes and connections that will then require further and more comprehensive study. The transnational perspective is not intended to be a 'one size fits all' solution. In fact, both the *Palgrave Dictionary* and the LONSEA are excellent starting points, though they might well become obsolete. Hence, neither should be seen as the gospel for a new 'transnational history' chapel but, rather, as an open invitation to multiply the way international relations are addressed.

Recommended for further reading

Iriye and Saunier (2009) and LONSEA (2010).

Notes

1   Based on the findings of our research project From Relief to Rehabilitation: The History of Humanitarian Organizations' Programs, On Behalf of Civilian Populations in the Aftermath of the First World War, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. We thank Jaci Eisenberg for her contribution.
2   See http://graduateinstitute.ch/international-history/News_and_Events/New_History_LoN. html for the conference Towards a New History of the League of Nations at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, August 2011.

3   See http://www.ru.nl/fm/iobio (IO BIO project), http://www.unhistory.org (UN Intellectual History Project), and http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/modpol/uncrp.htm (UN Career Records Project at the Bodleian Library).

4   This article contains plenty of valuable information on the LONSEA. It should be translated into English and integrated as a central reference for the website.

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International organizations and the idea of equality

Andrew Hurrell and Nicholas Lees

Ideas about equality have long been central to the creation, functioning and influence of international organizations. On the one hand, international organizations have been crucial sites for the elaboration and diffusion of extraordinarily powerful sets of ideas connected, directly or indirectly, with notions of equality. Ideas about national self-determination, racial equality, democracy and human rights have, quite literally, changed the face of global politics. International organizations have played a central role in that process and are of crucial importance to weaker actors. They can provide important platforms for influence to the degree that they constrain the powerful through established rules and procedures, and they open up 'voice opportunities' that allow relatively weak states to make known their interests and to bid for political support in the broader marketplace of ideas. They also provide weaker states with political space to build new coalitions in order to try and affect emerging norms in ways that are congruent with their interests and to counter-balance or at least deflect the preferences and policies of the most powerful.

On the other hand, however, international organizations both reflect and reinforce inequality. Organizations are very rarely simply concerned with liberal purposes of solving common problems or promoting shared values. They are also sites of power and reflect and entrench power hierarchies and the interests of both powerful states and economic actors. The vast majority of weaker actors are increasingly 'rule takers' over a whole range of issues that affect all aspects of social, economic and political life. Because power is an essentially social quality, international organizations (and institutions more broadly) are central to the stabilization and effectiveness of power in general and hegemonic power in particular. They provide ample illustration of the various faces or facets of social power, in particular the power to set agendas and to shape what gets decided, but also ideational power and the capacity to shape both explicit sets of causal ideas (for example, on the nature of economic development) and the broader ideological framing within which all politics takes place. Finally, they illustrate discursive power and the capacity not simply to shape the process of interaction but to constitute the actors who are interacting (Barnett and Duvall 2004).

This chapter examines the interplay of ideas and practices of (in)equality within international organizations. It begins by exploring the hierarchical aspects of classical European international society and their on-going importance for more recent forms of international

organizations, before detailing the challenges to this order that emerged in and around the process of decolonization. It then examines how, as a result of the exhaustion of the early Third World challenge and the globalization of neoliberalism, the focus of debate within and between international organizations shifted from issues of interstate equality to questions of global and inter-personal equality. The conclusion traces ways in which the picture has been complicated by both the rise of emerging powers and the more general diffusion of power to non-state actors and networks, and how this double diffusion is likely to shape future debates on equality and inequality.

Inequality, the classical state system and its legacies

Modern international organizations grew out of an originally European state system. This system was both marked by, and structured around, inequality. The combination of rapid industrial development, the emergence of more efficient administrative and organizational state structures, the consolidation of national states, and changes in military technology and organization led to the emergence of a small number of major powers that dominated the international political landscape. Moreover, if inequality marked the core of the state system, the relations between the European core and the periphery were still more unequal. The industrial revolution and technological innovations in armaments provided the base for unparalleled dominance of the European powers over the rest of the world. The European colonial order was built around various elements, such as 1) formally subordinate territories which played no role in international relations, 2) institutionalized controls over colonies and semi-colonies involving unequal treaties, imposed export regimes, enforced concessions and 'temporary occupations', 3) an economic system marked by the enforced opening of peripheral economies and by demographic openness, 4) a series of cultural assumptions that stressed the superiority of Western and white culture and a natural belief that progress entailed the replication of European models, and 5) European control over the criteria by which non-European political communities could be admitted to membership of international society.

In addition to these disparities in material power and resources, inequality was entrenched in the norms, institutions and shared understandings that shaped and gave meaning to the system. Of particular importance were the special role and status of Great Powers as the managers of international security and the dominant role of major states in establishing by their practice or agreement the rules of international law, as well as the extent to which that law reflected the interests of the powerful, imposing few restrictions on the use of force and resort to war, upholding the validity of treaties signed under duress, and providing no place for notions of self-determination or of human rights. International law deliberately 'excluded large chunks of power from its compass – forms of international power exercised through private law, property and contract – forms of international power often associated with informal empire or the "empire of civil society"' (Koskenniemi 2011: 23). Finally, Europe's self-perception of its role in the broader system fed on and into ideas about racial, cultural or civilizational hierarchy. Alongside the management of European diplomacy and discussion of the impact of the industrial revolution on the distribution of power, there ran a continuous preoccupation with moral, cultural and civilizational factors. These played a crucial role in determining the status of 'great nations' and who was to count in the international pecking order. Within Europe, philosophers such as Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Georg Hegel and many others all believed in a hierarchy of nations with only some possessing the necessary moral character and the historically progressive potential. But it was in relation to the

non-European world that differentiation and hierarchy were obviously clearest: hence the widely held belief in the concept of civilization and in a hierarchy of races; hence the elaborate debates as to the principles, criteria and 'standards of civilization' by which non-European states might be able to be accepted as sovereign members of the 'society of states' or the 'family of nations'; and hence the idea of Europe as the unique site of a universal and universalizing modernity.

As this chapter will argue, it is true that much changed during the course of the twentieth century. Nevertheless it needs to be stressed that older hierarchical conceptions of order remained extraordinarily powerful and influential throughout the twentieth century, including in the practices and structures of many formal international organizations. Thus, for example, the Cold War 'order' and the so-called 'long peace' of 1945–89 were constructed in very traditional fashion around attempts to regulate the balance of power between the superpowers (through arms control agreements, summits and mechanisms of crisis management) and through the exploitation of hierarchy (through the mutual, if tacit, recognition of spheres of influence and through the creation of an oligarchical non-proliferation system designed to limit access to the nuclear club). Moreover, even as international institutions expanded so dramatically in both number and scope, hierarchy and inequality have remained central to both their conception and their functioning. This was clearly the case during the period of the League of Nations, as the League did not represent a total departure from the previous international system. Symbolically, its Covenant was not a separate compact, but formed part of the Paris peace treaties, which in turn stemmed from a conference dominated by the five principal victors. Even after the signature of the peace treaties, many consequential problems continued to be settled by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or its deputy, the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, and its offshoot, the Reparations Commission (Dunbabin 1993: 421–2).

This continued to be the case in the post-1945 period. The United Nations (UN) did not represent a fundamental revision of previous thinking. Hierarchy and the primacy of political agreement between the major powers were to remain central, despite being balanced by a stronger inclusive component (with the originally four non-permanent members of the Security Council in addition to the five permanent members) and a much broader range of legal and normative ambitions, including the legal limitation on force, the goal of collective security and human rights. Membership reflected ideas of material power, but again not solely. France was to be there because, for British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, it would be central to the re-building of Europe and it was, as he put it, part of the 'natural order'. China was to be there because of the hopes of the United States (US) that it would be able to play a future regional policeman role in the Far East and because of the link to de-colonization.

Sometimes the ordering role of hierarchy and inequality within international organizations was formalized, as in the special rights and duties of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, or the weighted voting structures of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, or the dramatic expansion of the role of the G7 from the mid-1970s. Alternatively, hierarchy is implicit in the way in which international financial management is dominated by closed groups of the powerful (as in the Bank for International Settlements or Financial Stability Forum) or the *de facto* decision-making rules of the World Trade Organization. Another way of dealing with the tension between formal institutions and the continuing role of major power politics has been through the growing importance of informal groupings of states (contact groups, core groups, groups of friends) that act in and around formal institutions (see Albaret in this volume).

The United Nations, decolonization and the evolution of the idea of international equality

If inequality of power and of condition was for many simply a fact of international life, there had nonetheless always been a powerful and persistent counter-tradition in Western thought that had long stressed ideas of the unity of humankind and the centrality of different forms of equality. This counter-tradition finds its analogues in many other religious, cultural and cosmological belief systems. The sources and development of this counter-tradition are complex but were both reflected in and buttressed by the great revolutions of the modern era: in the Netherlands, England, the United States, France, Haiti and the Soviet Union. In turn, these ideas about equality fed directly into the challenge to the Western dominance of the international system that gathered pace during the twentieth century, especially in relation to decolonization and claims for national self-determination and national liberation, but also in terms of the struggle for equal sovereignty and the struggle for racial equality. Ideas about equality increasingly entered into many aspects of the normative structure of international society, as is clearly illustrated in the process of decolonization.

The tensions between the principle of formal equality of states and the reality of enduring global socio-economic equalities helped to generate significant controversy within the UN in the early years of the organization's existence. After 1945 it became increasingly difficult to maintain the argument that national determination was to be confined to Europe, still less the sorts of views of racial superiority that had underpinned the age of empire. The association with fascism deeply undermined ideas of biological racism. In reaction against such ideas, principles of non-discrimination on the basis of race were incorporated into Article 13 of the UN Charter. The newly formed UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) set up a commission of experts to analyse the issue of race. Its members came from Brazil, France, India, Mexico, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. It resulted in the UNESCO Statement on Race (1950) and an educational programme designed to educate the publics of nations worldwide about the falsity of racialist ideas. Recent literature has also stressed the role of developing countries in the creation and development of ideas about international human rights (see Bhagawan 2012).

Despite the trend towards anti-racism and belief in the equality of peoples, some European statespeople hoped that the UN would help preserve the institution of empire as the League had done through the mandate system. However, the first wave of post-colonial nations, particularly India, were able to use the platform of the UN General Assembly to draw attention to the racialist practices of states such as South Africa and to push for full decolonization (Mazower 2009).

The emerging Third World ideology of racial equality, national self-determination and sovereign equality of states was consolidated at the Bandung Conference in 1955. The diplomatic coalitions resulting from these efforts, the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, played an important role in socializing newly independent states into a common Third World perspective and in enabling the global South to achieve a modicum of unity within international organizations. The re-definition of colonialism as being outside the bounds of acceptability in international society is a testament to the success of this strategy in effecting normative change, conducted in significant part through international organizations. Key was the passage of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 [XV]) within the UN General Assembly, which classified concerns about 'preparedness' of colonies as a 'pretext' which should not delay decolonization.

The dissolution of the inter-imperial order was consistent with US ambitions to construct a global trading system stabilized via the framework of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1998). Important features of this agenda included efforts to rebuild the European and Japanese economies through regional banks for reconstruction and development: components of what became known as the World Bank Group. Reconstruction efforts generated early proposals by Latin American nations for a permanent system of redistribution for needy nations based on a principle of mutual aid (Murphy 1984: 30–34). Whilst this did not occur, the US made a strong commitment to modernize the newly christened 'developing' nations in its own image so as to pre-empt the spread of radical egalitarian ideas in the form of communism (Gilman 2003). Indeed the 'global Cold War' played a fundamental role in the diffusion and contestation of ideologies of modernization and development. From this perspective the Third World can be seen as a product of the Cold War (Westad 2005). The global projects of the two superpowers raised hopes of the possibility of international socio-economic 'convergence' between nations now categorized as either developed or developing.

However, concerns grew that closing the economic gap between the late-developing nations and the industrialized world would in fact be much more difficult. The arguments of Raúl Prebisch, an economist for the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America, were important in crystallizing worries on the part of commodity-exporting nations that their terms of trade were liable to decline and thus relative international inequality was likely to persist. Dependent on volatile commodity prices and facing the pressures of mobilized populations demanding the benefits of the industrial age, the late-developing Latin American and new post-colonial states utilized their numerical majority within international organizations to place questions of equality on the agenda. The result was the opportunistic demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis (Braillard and Djalili 1984: 166–7). The NIEO was an eclectic set of demands for the reorganization of 'embedded liberalism' to benefit commodity producers and late-developing nations. Central elements of the programme included the reassertion of the rights of states over multinational corporations, non-reciprocal access to the markets of the advanced industrialized nations, commodity price stabilization and a substantial expansion of official development aid.

An important feature of the ideology animating the NIEO campaign was its insistence that international inequalities created moral obligations on the part of the advanced industrialized world in combination with a strong defence of state sovereignty in domestic affairs (Krasner 1985). It was fundamentally a set of claims about *international* rather than global equality, according to which formally sovereign states had the right to claim support from the international system in order to enable them to exercise their substantive sovereignty and pursue their chosen path of development (Murphy 1984). Rhetorically, this was presented as a necessary and inevitable step towards moving beyond a Europe-dominated world order and was thus linked to the condemnation of Israel, Portugal and South Africa.

These ideas of international equality gained some traction in the industrialized North due to new concerns over the fragility of industrial civilization and the mutual vulnerability of rich and poor, as expressed in notions of 'spaceship Earth'. Ideas of international equality could also be presented as an extension of the domestic welfare state in an era of interdependence. For others such as US Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1978), however, the organization had become a 'dangerous place' governed according to the tyranny of an illiberal majority. The authoritarian nature of many of the states making up the coalition behind the NIEO undermined their moral authority to make normative claims regarding international inequality, weakening their legitimacy as representatives of the impoverished.

When the bargaining power granted to the NIEO coalition by post–Oil Crisis fears over resource security evaporated, demands for greater international equality could be safely ignored. The US and the UK responded to the call for a New International Information and Communication World Order in UNESCO, defended by its advocates as a measure to safeguard cultural diversity in an era of global mass-communication, by leaving the specialist organization in 1984 and 1985.

By the early 1980s, however, the apparent cohesion of the Third World coalition that had brought the Western countries to the negotiating table to talk about a New International Economic Order had weakened. It had been undermined by factors such as the increased differentiation across the developing world (especially the rise of the Asian Newly Industrializing Countries), strains within the coalition itself, the loss of sympathetic inter-locutors within the North open to Southern demands, the hard-line rejection of any notion of a North–South dialogue on the part of the US and its major allies, and the deteriorating economic and political position of much of the developing world that accompanied the devas-tating financial and economic crises of the 1980s. The reformist rhetoric of the NIEO had been both defeated and deflated. Power-centred accounts of North–South relations stressed the existence of a 'structural conflict' reducible to contending sets of power and interest, however encrusted within the empty rhetoric of justice. The powerful neoliberal critique of rent-seeking Southern elites cut deep into progressive Third-Worldism. On the left, post-colonial writers came ever more to view the post-colonial state with deep disdain and the progressivist narratives of both capitalism and communism with even greater scepticism. And critical political economists argued that, to the extent that developing countries 'emerged', it would be as the result of structural changes in patterns of capitalist global production and the spread of neoliberal ideologies.

The global South came to be defined in transnational social terms rather than as a grouping or category of nation-states (Slater 2004). Empirical accounts focused more and more on the social movements that were emerging within and across the global South in response to neoliberalism. Normative attention was also shifting away from Southern states and towards social movements and civil society groups within the global South such as the World Social Forum, anti-globalization groups and post-Seattle protest movements (see later). The idea that the World Social Forum represented the 'New Bandung' precisely captured this shift – away from states and towards different forms of social movements in which the idea of the South as both a focus of protest and a transformative project lived on, but in a radically different form.

Inequality globalizes: neoliberalism and global economic integration

The ability of coalitions of the global South to use international organizations to advance ideas of international equality had, to a substantial degree, been made possible by the political investment of the industrialized nations in those institutions as part of a commitment to 'embedded liberalism'. The campaign for the NIEO could not continue once the US and its allies had demonstrated that they were willing to both exit those organizations and renego-tiate the terms of 'embedded liberalism'. The campaign for international economic equality was exhausted. Rather than use international organizations in an attempt to re-write the rules of the world economy, many states in the global South found themselves undergoing balance of payments crises and subsequently acceded to structural adjustment packages administered by the international financial institutions as part of the global project of liberali-zation and economic integration.

'Two tales of world poverty' based around two clusters of international organizations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN specialist agencies, emerged in this period (Thérien 1999). The account of poverty and underdevelopment offered by the Bretton Woods institutions emphasized the market distortions caused by states and counselled export-oriented integration into the world economy based on comparative advantage. Absent was any concern with questions of distribution, until concerns about the impact of structural adjustment programmes on vulnerable groups in underdeveloped nations generated calls for 'adjustment with a human face' (UNICEF 1987). Poverty reduction, a much more minimalist goal than equality, thereafter became the public rationale for the efforts of the Bretton Woods institutions to promote macroeconomic stability and growth.

The account offered by the specialist agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), however, placed much greater emphasis on aspects of human well-being not captured by standard economic indicators. Important in shaping this perspective was Mahbub ul Haq, who, during his time at the World Bank, had previously pushed for the adoption of a Basic Needs approach focused on the welfare of the poorest. As Special Advisor to the UNDP, Haq worked with other scholars and practitioners to develop a person-centred account of development. These efforts resulted in the 1990 *Human Development Report*, which advanced a perspective on development that placed individual needs at the centre of its analysis. In contrast to the accounts offered by the Bretton Woods institutions, it emphasized the importance of equity alongside growth and acknowledged the international dimensions of issues of poverty. However, this perspective was consciously less statist than that associated with the NIEO, emphasizing the significance of inequalities *within* nations as well as between them (UNDP 1990: 12). Although not necessarily committed to the goal of global equality of material resources, the human development perspective emphasized the priority of the needs of the globally worst-off.

From the outset, the human development perspective had been formulated in consultation with local practitioners and activists in the global South (Murphy 2007: 130). The UNDP and other UN specialist agencies therefore acted as important nodes in spreading new ideas throughout the network of charities, campaign groups, government ministries, think tanks and academic departments composing the burgeoning 'development industry' of the 1990s. Within this network, concerns over the impact of structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalization in underdeveloped nations fed into growing anxiety over the distributional and social impact of globalization. The well-documented increase in domestic inequality within nearly every nation during this period convinced many that rising inequality within industrialized democracies was linked with the enduring problems of poverty and underdevelopment in the global South. The concept of global inequality took priority over notions of international inequality.

Simultaneously, the requirements for underdeveloped nations in the receipt of funds from donor nations and the Bretton Woods institutions to undergo economic liberalization were increasingly bundled together with 'conditionalities' regarding human rights. This highlighted the concern of the set of ideas dominant within the Bretton Woods institutions, termed neoliberalism by its critics, with equality amongst individuals conceived of in formal and legal rather than distributional terms.

Together, therefore, the 'two tales of world poverty' emanating from the distinct clusters of international organizations helped initiate a shift away from the concept of international inequality between and among states and towards concepts of global inter-personal inequality and individual human rights.

Ideas of global equality in a hierarchical international system: the role of international organizations

From one perspective, international organizations can be seen to have acted as norm entrepreneurs by promoting new concepts of equality more relevant to a period of global economic integration. Some critical scholars allege, however, that even those international organizations ostensibly promoting egalitarian goals have functioned to maintain a structurally unequal global system and to reinforce unequal power (as discussed at the beginning of this chapter). These critics allege that rather than mitigating the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions by inducing them to take questions of poverty more seriously, the UN specialist agencies and the networks of which they are a part have in fact perpetuated inegalitarian programmes of economic liberalization by ameliorating their worst consequences. Mark Duffield (2001, 2009) alleges that the very concept of 'development' serves a discursive function by enabling the control of potentially unruly populations. His interrogation of the ideas and practices comprising 'development' suggests that they are continuous with earlier practice and ideologies of colonial administration. Supposedly egalitarian ideas promoted by international organizations can serve to perpetuate structural inequality.

This perspective is perhaps too thoroughgoing in its cynicism. Nonetheless it is important to point out that international organizations are not wholly autonomous actors able to promote ideas and political programmes independent of the interests of dominant international actors. Ideas which threaten to challenge the basic coordinates of power can be deflected or rendered less threatening through co-option. As Donald Puchala (2005: 581) suggested, international organizations serve to 'validate the liberal world order' as well as to 'serve as a political-ideological sink for counter-hegemonic ideas'. In this context, some entrepreneurs of egalitarian ideas meet with resistance whilst others find that they are able to use international organizations as a platform to promote reformist programmes and policies (Murphy 2001: 274–6). Such small accommodations of egalitarian ideas help to stabilize international hierarchies.

The evolution of the concept of 'human security' illustrates this claim. The concept originated in the 1994 *Human Development Report*, building upon existing attempts by scholars and practitioners in Asia to address the link between violent conflict and underdevelopment (Acharya 2001: 3). The notion of human security was an attempt to both shift the focus of security to individual persons and to broaden the concept of security to include other threats to human well-being, such as poverty. It therefore encompassed both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. This holistic concept of security was advanced by Japan at the 1995 session of the UN General Assembly. However, as with Japan's attempt to promote the East Asian model of development as an alternative to the 'Washington Consensus' within the Bretton Woods institutions during the same period, this attempt at norm entrepreneurship did not achieve its aims. Instead, other industrialized nations including Canada sought to promote a conception of human security focusing primarily on the notion of 'freedom from fear' (Acharya 2001: 3). This conception of human security provided an important set of arguments in defence of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and contributed to the formulation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine (ICISS 2001: 15), affirmed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1674 in 2006.

War crimes and state-sanctioned violence are clearly major threats to human well-being. But it is salutary to compare the resources which the US and its allies have been willing to commit to the advancement of the principle of human security understood as 'freedom from fear' as opposed to human development and 'freedom from want'. Strenuous efforts have been

made to operationalize the former concept and to vindicate it through the use of force. By way of contrast, the notion that problems of human development give rise to binding international obligations has been consistently resisted by the industrialized nations. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 is not generally held to imply that wealthy states are obliged to provide development assistance under international law (Alston and Quinn 1987: 186–92). In any case, the US has not ratified the Covenant and has long insisted that development is an aspiration to be progressively realized rather than a right. Although the year 2000's Millennium Declaration by the UN General Assembly spoke of a 'collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity' and established a concrete set of benchmarks in the form of the Millennium Development Goals, achieving them remains a collective aspiration rather than obligation. Whereas the doctrine of humanitarian intervention leaves existing international power hierarchies intact, a global programme of redistribution would not.

More broadly, developments in the operation of post-Cold War international organizations were seen as 'bringing back in' practices and markers of structured inequality: the idea that democratic states had a special role and status, the expansion not just of intervention but of international protectorates and international administrations, and new categories of 'rogue states' and 'failed states' that were unable to satisfy the criteria for full membership of international society.

Nonetheless, in other areas actors have been able to utilize the platform provided by international organizations to promote new kinds of egalitarian claims. Particularly notable is the success on the part of transnational activist networks and sympathetic actors within international organizations in promoting ideas concerning gender equality and women's rights. The 'Platform for Action' agreed upon at the UN-organized World Conference on Women in 1995 is often credited an important step in bringing together activists from both the North and the global South to establish a common agenda (Bunch and Fried 1996). Activists and campaigners have not only been able to establish gender equality as a central goal of many international organizations – for example, in the explicit commitment to the promotion of gender equality in the Millennium Development Goals – but have also been able to establish issue linkages between gender equality and other egalitarian concerns such as human development, civil and political rights, indigenous rights and equality regarding sexual orientation.

This pluralistic set of concerns has been argued by sociologists of the Stanford School to comprise part of the culture of an emerging 'world polity' (Meyer 2007). It comprises part of a 'script' or cultural package that has gradually come to define standards of appropriateness worldwide. According to the Stanford School, international organizations play a key role in shaping and disseminating a cultural script based on the liberal norms dominant within industrialized democracies. Indeed, the shift from the politics of economic redistribution to a wider set of struggles for equality within world politics mirrors so-called 'post-material' changes within industrialized democracies. The values of individual equality and personal choice endorsed by elite social constituencies within the industrialized world have thus become increasingly globalized and universalized through a process of diffusion outside of the control of particular liberal democratic nation-states (Buhari-Gulmez 2010: 257).

International organizations may play an important role in the diffusion of egalitarian aspects of liberalism. Apart from actively promoting certain egalitarian norms such as gender equality, they provide opportunities for contact and communication between geographically distant intellectuals, activist networks and sympathetic constituencies. Of course, these ideas still emanate from the more economically developed nations the majority of the time,

mirroring wider patterns of global structural inequality (Beckfield 2003). They may nonetheless provide resources against local injustices and exclusions by offering an 'authorized discourse to the deprived, to legitimate their own struggles for their realization' (Beetham 1995: 60).

So whilst international organizations do not necessarily act as progenitors for ideas which directly challenge global structural inequalities, they have nonetheless played an important albeit more indirect role as nodes in networks of actors attempting to pioneer new egalitarian norms in a variety of issue areas.

Global and international inequality today

It might have been reasonable to expect the evolution of ideas of global equality to continue in this fashion, with the liberalization programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions provoking criticism and new global egalitarian claims emerging from UN specialist agencies, development professionals and wider activist networks. As networks of activists began to unite to campaign against global inequalities in the 1990s, they focused their claims on the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization due to the perceived role of these organizations in the global project of economic liberalization. Ministerial meetings of the WTO and summits of the G8 grouping became lightning rods for protestors making new claims about global inequalities. The difficulty of maintaining legitimacy for the project of global economic integration under the aegis of these institutions resulted in efforts to accommodate some of the claims of egalitarian critics, notably through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt-relief programme, which was expanded and accelerated in response to the Jubilee 2000 debt-cancellation campaign, and again following the Global Campaign Against Poverty/Make Poverty History. Whether this represented a co-option of egalitarian claims by the G7 industrialized nations and the Bretton Woods institutions or a genuine 'normative cascade' initiated by campaigners is difficult to judge (Yanacopulos 2004; Busby 2007; Payne 2006). These trends signalled major change within world politics, arising from the general diffusion of power that is underway, often linked to technological changes, the information revolution and the synchronicity of shared experiences, the upheavals and challenges of the global economy, and the emergence of new forms of social and political mobilization and self-organization.

This picture has, however, been complicated by the return of claims about *international* inequality, especially as pressed by a new wave of coalitional politics. Although the majority of states within the global South had embarked on programmes of economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, even the most enthusiastic liberalizers voiced their discontent about the operation of the Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, the dominance of the industrialized democracies during the Uruguay Round of trade talks leading towards the creation of the WTO frustrated many states. The climate of mistrust resulted in the collapse of negotiations at the Seattle Ministerial in 1999. The attempt to re-brand negotiations as the 'Doha Development Round' failed to diffuse tensions. New alliances of states of the global South emerged at Cancún in 2003, contributing to a deadlock in trade negotiations which remains unresolved (Narlikar and Tussie 2004; Wilkinson 2004).

The emergence of these issue-based alliances was linked to complaints about the violation of norms of reciprocity and the procedural unfairness of tactics employed by the industrialized nations during 'Green Room' negotiations. In addition, states such as Brazil, India and South Africa who occupied positions of leadership within such alliances publicly defended their claims on the basis of their status as representatives of the majority of the world's poor in the

global economy (G-20 2005). Leaders within these new alliances alleged that WTO agreements threatened to limit the policy space necessary to promote the goal of development. Thus, moral arguments about *global* equality were employed to buttress renewed demands for greater *international* equality amongst sovereign states within international organizations.

The demand for reform of international organizations such as the IMF, WTO and the UN Security Council has since become a central element in the foreign policy of the emerging powers. From this perspective it is important to underscore the Southern character of the foreign policies of today's emerging powers, the extraordinary growth in South–South trade and economic ties (radically different from the 1970s) and the formation and persistence of Southern coalitions such as the trade G20 within the WTO or groupings such as the BRICS (especially after South Africa joined Brazil, Russia, India and China in April 2011) or the IBSA Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil and South Africa created in 2003. The global financial crisis, which broke in 2008, provided a fillip to those who had long criticized the illegitimacy of an international order in which the industrialized democracies allied to the US continued to exert decisive influence within the apex international organizations. Nonetheless, despite positioning themselves as 'outsiders' within the international order and couching their claims in the language of international equality, the emerging powers have repeatedly sought to secure special status and recognition for their status as great powers, regional powers and/ or leaders within the global South. This has made their claims somewhat unstable and has led to new demands for international equality by what Anthony Payne (2010) called the 'marginal minority', the large number of minor states excluded from negotiations within international organizations and networks of influence such as the G20. At the same time, some activists making more radical demands concerning global inequality have been wary of the emerging powers, seeing their claims as being motivated by self-interest despite the attempt by states such as Brazil to court the support of such constituencies.

Conclusion

Both the international political system and the structures of global capitalism are in a state of flux and uncertainty. The financial crisis has sharply underlined the relative strengths of the newcomers who are recovering rapidly, and the new weaknesses of the established G7. Powerful arguments are being made that we are witnessing the most significant set of challenges yet to the global order that the US sought to construct within its own camp during the Cold War and to globalize in the post-Cold War period. Many of these challenges also raise questions about the longer-term position of the Anglo-American and European global order that rose to dominance in the middle of the nineteenth century and around which so many conceptions and practices of power-political order, international legal construction and global economic governance have since been constructed.

Both patterns of inequality and ideas about (in)equality are therefore highly unstable and contested. Are today's emerging powers the carriers of new ideas about equality, most notably in their calls for the 'democratization' of international relations in general and international organizations in particular? Or, by contrast, are we witnessing a return to a more great power-centred order, in which the seats around the most important tables are being re-arranged and re-allocated to include those with the power and the relevant interests, as well as in some cases expanding the size of the table, as in the move from the G7/8 to the G20? What do contemporary power shifts imply for the idea of North–South relations as a structuring feature of the international system and as the framework within which ideas and practices of equality within international organizations have so long been understood?

Recommended for further reading

Barnett and Duvall (2004), Hurrell and Woods (1999) and Murphy (1994).

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Between independence and accountability

Exploring the legal autonomy of international organizations

Richard Collins and Nigel D. White

One of the most significant developments in the evolution of the international legal order over the last hundred years or so has been the emergence of international organizations (IOs) as autonomous legal actors. Whilst this autonomy is expressed formally in the recognition of an organization's international legal personality, its 'separate will' manifests more concretely in its ability to exercise legal powers, in turn depending on the internal 'constitutional' dynamics at play in the organization, particularly between institution and member-states. Examining this relationship in relatively centralized institutions like the United Nations (UN), however, reveals complex layers of autonomy. Whilst this layering undoubtedly confirms that these institutions can possess a separate will, which is clearly more than the sum of their separate parts, these complex internal dynamics make it somewhat difficult to develop a coherent system of accountability or legal responsibility to control their activities: such responsibility being perhaps the most obvious corollary of legal autonomy.

This chapter aims to illustrate the complexities of international law's recognition of the autonomy of IOs. We consider: first, the foundation of legal autonomy in the idea of international legal personality; second, the more concrete expression of this autonomy through the development of institutional powers; and finally, how this expression of autonomy is itself dependent upon an understanding of the internal constitutional dynamic at play within organizations. We illustrate the complexity of this dynamic through the myriad layers of autonomy in operation within the UN system. Whilst this example illustrates a great degree of separate will, in some instances even surpassing the powers of states in international law, the unique constitutional layering within the UN also reveals a greater challenge in keeping this institutional autonomy in check. We conclude, therefore, with some reflections on the need to balance institutional autonomy with the demands of accountability and responsibility in international law, an area where legal doctrine is still in its infancy.

From contract to constitution: the emergence of a new legal actor

The story of the emergence of IOs from the mid- to late nineteenth century is well recounted. Out of the inter-state deliberation of conference diplomacy, the administrative bureaucracy of the public international unions, and the hegemonic inequality of nineteenth-century great-power alliances, scholars trace the peculiar identity of the modern IO (Nussbaum 1954: 200; Claude 1971: 38–9; Klabbers 2001a: 291–2; Brölmann 2007: 14–17). Frequently, these elements are combined together in a functionalist, teleological narrative which explains the emergence of IOs as a gradual transformation of multilateral diplomacy through a combination of organizational permanency and administrative centralization (Alvarez 2005: 17–29). Initially, however, this mixture of supra-state, non-state and inter-state elements made the process of coming to terms with the legal nature of IOs somewhat challenging (Collins 2011: 313–15).

Before the First World War, 'international organization' was often thought of in its broadest sense as a process of international integration, heading towards some form of world government or international union (Potter 1945: 803–4; Klabbers 2009: 31). This kind of reasoning was particularly prominent amongst international lawyers present at the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 (Holls 1900; Schücking 1918), and has since clearly influenced some interpretations of universal organizations such as the League of Nations (Lauterpacht 1936), and later the UN (Suganami 1989; Fassbender 2009). Whilst some of the more explicit domestic analogies applied to IOs may now seem quite utopian, this form of theorizing at least acknowledges the difficulties of divorcing the legal framework of universal organizations from the broader, constitutive rules of the international legal order (Collins and White 2011: 15).

Applied to the more administrative organizations of the late nineteenth century, however, this reasoning was anyway less persuasive. In an era of absolute state sovereignty there was little scope for seeing such technical organizations, e.g. the International Telegraph Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union or the various River Commissions, as anything other than functional structures serving member-state interests (Bederman 1996: 334). Even though some of these institutions exercised quite considerable powers vis-à-vis their member-states, this limited autonomy could still be explained as deriving from a contractual agreement between members (Kazansky 1902; Reinsch 1909; Brölmann 2007: 42–5).

It was not until the creation of the League and the International Labour Organization (ILO) that scholars really began to come to terms with the idea of IOs as legal actors in their own right. As Brölmann (2007: 55) noted, in the interwar period the idea of the 'international organ' took root as an expression of the 'separate will' possessed by the new institutions. Drawing upon Heinrich Triepel's theory of the *Gemeinwillen*, finding institutional expression in the *Vereinbarung*, or 'law-making' treaty (Triepel 1920: 27–61; see also Rapisardi-Mirabelli 1925; Anzilotti 1955: 1883–5), prominent jurists of this era such as L. Oppenheim (1919: 241), or A. D. McNair (1930: 101, 112) recognized the 'constitutional' character of the League Covenant, even if the League itself was seen as somewhat *sui generis* in international law (Zimmern 1936; Brölmann 2005: 384–5; White 2005: 14).

Although the League clearly failed in instigating an institutional constitutional order, it nonetheless functioned as an autonomous legal actor in some respects, interacting with non-member-states and becoming a party to a number of international agreements (Chiu 1966: 8–13, cited in Brölmann 2007: 52). Whilst this generated interest in the idea of the League's legal personality (Oppenheim 1919: 239; Corbett 1924), the idea that organizations generally could possess such personality was only rarely asserted (Bederman 1996: 343–4; though see

Fiore 1890 and Marchegiano 1931). Those that did justify the idea of legal personality for IOs did so most often on the basis of member-state consent, rarely explaining personality in objective terms and opposable also as against third states (Brölmann 2007: 56–8).

Whilst this issue escaped any judicial consideration at the time, the Permanent Court of International Justice's (PCIJ) caseload was taken up with a number of questions on the legal competencies of the ILO.[1] The Court came to recognize that the ILO's effective functioning depended on its ability to regulate certain areas not explicitly laid out in its constituent instrument. It justified this according to the principle of 'attribution' (Klabbers 2009: 55–9). As it put this somewhat later, even though an organization has only those powers necessary to fulfil the functions for which it was created, it will have '[the] power to exercise these functions to their full extent, in so far as the statute does not impose restrictions upon it' (*Jurisdiction of the European Danube Commission between Galatz and Braila*, Advisory Opinion of 8 December 1927, PCIJ, Series B, no. 14: 64). Whilst this went some way to acknowledge that institutions acquire a degree of autonomy in order to fulfil their functions, the Court's reasoning is firmly anchored in the realm of treaty interpretation and, in any event, it stopped short of drawing any conclusions from this as to the legal nature of organizations generally.

Much of the uncertainty which characterized the interwar period was finally brought to an end by the PCIJ's successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its *Reparations* Advisory Opinion (*Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949: 174). In considering whether the UN could require Israel, a non-member-state at that time, to pay compensation for the death of one of its agents stationed in Israeli territory, the ICJ, like the PCIJ before it, had to consider the possible existence of a power or competence not originally provided for in the organization's constituent instrument. However, bearing in mind the nature of the competence in question (the ability to bring an international legal claim), the Court saw it as necessary to determine whether the UN had international legal personality. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ICJ answered this question in the affirmative.

The significance of the Court's conclusion should not be underestimated. Whilst the case was concerned solely with the UN, it was soon embraced as recognition that IOs, and indeed other non-state actors, *may* possess rights and duties on the international stage. As Bederman (1996: 279) noted, in reaching this conclusion, the case put an end to much of the interwar debate and, in doing so, 'signalled the final days of the "law of nations" and ushered in the era of "international law"'.

Nevertheless, the way in which the Court reaches its conclusion perhaps raises more questions than it provides answers. Its stress both on the 'supreme' nature of the UN and the importance of its tasks on the one hand, and the intentions and explicit endowment of certain capacities by the member-states on the other (at 179), seems untidy from a theoretical point of view (Schermers and Blokker 2003: 990–1, §1568; Sands and Klein 2001: 472, §15–007). As Judge Badawi Pasha noted in his dissent (at 209), the combination of factors which the Court expounds 'gives rise to contradictions and inconsistency as regards the justification of the [right claimed by the UN]'. Not only is the Court's movement from subjective intent to objective personality somewhat controversial without outlining the rationale for this within the rules of international law, its claim that the UN possessed a 'large measure of' legal personality (at 179) seems to conflate the organization's autonomy vis-à-vis its member-states with its legal personality within the overall international legal system: a quality which international law determines to be either present or not, incapable of being measured in degrees (White 2004: 31; Gazzini 2011: 200). As such, its conclusion (at 185) that 'fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community' had the power

to create an institution possessing *objective* legal personality seems unsatisfactory without further elaboration of the international legal basis for this claim.

It is of little surprise, therefore, that the case has been taken as support for seemingly opposable views as to the foundation of international legal personality: either that it is dependent entirely upon the will of the member-states; or that it arises as a result of bestowing certain attributes on the organization, recognized by the international legal system as a whole (Klabbers 2009: 47). Most often, however, it seems to be the Court's pragmatic compromise itself which is taken as the most authoritative view, as commentators struggle to move away entirely from the necessity of an objective position (that legal personality can only be bestowed by rules of the international legal order itself), whilst recognizing the realities of the subjective will and subsequent practice of the contracting states (White 2005: 39; Klabbers 2009: 48–9).

Accordingly, the case remains far more significant for what it recognizes, rather than the way in which the Court reaches its result. To the extent that the ICJ's reasoning leaves certain theoretical issues unresolved, this is in part an affirmation that the recognition of personality can only be a presumptive starting point leading to more significant constitutional questions over the extent of the powers or range of competencies possessed by the organization in question.

Finding autonomy: legal powers and constitutional development

In reaching the conclusion that the UN possessed the right to bring an international claim, the ICJ drew authority from the PCIJ's earlier jurisprudence on the powers of the ILO. In particular, it claimed that 'the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties' (at 182). Whilst a similar rationale may have been *implicit* in the earlier cases, the ICJ's reasoning was in many respects an important advancement of the law, particularly bearing in mind that, on the facts, the ability to bring a claim in this way is difficult to construe as 'necessary' on a strict interpretation of the UN Charter (Blokker 2002: 304). In fact, in his dissent from the majority in the case, Judge G. H. Hackworth (at 198) was adamant that '[p]owers not expressed cannot freely be implied. Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those that are "necessary" to the exercise of powers expressly granted'.

Nevertheless, this strict reading of 'implied powers', as the doctrine has come to be known (White 2005: 83–7), seems not to have found favour in subsequent case law. In particular, despite expressly endorsing the strict wording of the doctrine as set out in *Reparations*, in the later *Certain Expenses* case (*Certain Expenses of the United Nations [Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter]*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962: 151), the ICJ approved the General Assembly's competence to authorize consensual peacekeeping operations (a power nowhere mentioned in the Charter itself) without actually considering the necessity of peacekeeping in terms of the UN's ability to fulfil the express terms of the Charter (Brölmann 2005: 80–81; White 2005: 87–9). Instead, the ICJ seemed to rely on the claim that authorizing such missions could not be explicitly excluded (at 167).

We can thus begin to see how this broad approach squares the otherwise circular reasoning of the majority in the *Reparations* case in relation to legal personality, at least if one makes an important distinction between *capacity* and *competence* (Bekker 1994: 75; Brölmann 2007: 90–94). In other words, the attribution of certain legal *capacities* provides evidence of objective legal personality, which then gives rise to specific *competences*, the content of which

is determinable through application of the implied powers doctrine (as broadly interpreted in the case), which defines the scope of such competences by reference to the organization's functional purpose and institutional structure (Sands and Klein 2001: 475, §15–014). Personality and powers are thus mutually supportive: the relevance of the attribution of legal personality is that it allows the organization an existence somewhat detached from its members, and it is this detachment (however conceptual as opposed to real) which allows the Court to infer implicit, functional powers, and thus further buttress the institution's autonomy.

It is for this reason that some scholars have interpreted these early cases as developing a theory of *inherent*, as opposed to implied powers, recognizing certain competences simply on the basis of a functional requirement of meeting the overall aims and purposes of the institution in question (Seyersted 1966: 133–4; White 2005: 87–9; see Bekker 1994: 68–70). Such an explanation seems to be reinforced by the ICJ's claim in *Certain Expenses* that actions taken in fulfilment of the organization's purposes must be presumed to be *intra vires* (at 168), as well as its finding that the UN's organs were competent to authorize a peacekeeping force without having to relate that to any specific provision of the Charter itself (at 172).[2]

Whether we talk in terms of *inherent* or just *implied* powers, however, it is clear that the willingness of judicial bodies like the ICJ to not follow too slavishly the text of constituent instruments has been instrumental in securing the legal autonomy of IOs. International judges have tended to see organizations as living, evolving entities, and have interpreted the scope of their powers accordingly. As Engström (2011: 217) puts this, 'it is the exercise of powers that serves to distinguish organizations from "ordinary" treaties through bestowing autonomy upon them'. Even before the *Reparations* opinion, Judge Alvarez had already foreshadowed the changing mood, claiming that '[a]n institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which have given birth to it, and must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life' (*Individual Opinion of Judge M. Alvarez, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1947–8: 67, at 68). This judicial approach is evident in the later *Effects of Awards* opinion, where the ICJ confirmed the competence of the UN General Assembly to create an administrative tribunal: a body having the power to make judgements binding upon the Assembly itself, despite no such power being evident from the terms of the Charter (*Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1954: 47). Similar activism can be seen in many of the judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ, now the General Court), which, though based on the more *sui generis* argument of securing the effectiveness, or 'effet utile', of the Community legal order, nonetheless secured the growth of Community law into areas of competence hitherto reserved to the member-states.[3]

At the same time, it is important to note that arguments based on institutional effectiveness and functional necessity clearly have limits. Applying the test of implied powers (whether in broad or restrictive terms) does not in itself mean that a court will recognize any power claimed by an IO's organ. In fact, more recent decisions have shown some caution in interpreting the scope of powers possessed by institutions like the UN or European Union (EU). In the *WHO Opinion* (*Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996: 66), the ICJ held that the World Health Organization (WHO) lacked the requisite competence to request an advisory opinion on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict situations. In so doing, the Court seemed to take a much more restrictive approach to powers than in its earlier cases, even if it took additional factors into account, including the systemic integrity of the UN system overall (White 2001, 2005: 98–102). Similarly, in the *Tobacco Directive* case (Case C–376/98, *Germany v European Parliament*

and Council [2000] ECR [European Court Reports] I-8419), the ECJ seemed to go against the grain of its more activist jurisprudence in denying any competence on behalf of the European Community (as was) to ban the advertising of tobacco products. Whilst it is doubtful that these cases alone, or in conjunction with others, amount to a kind of 'changing image' of IOs, as Klabbers (2001b: 238–40, 2009: 69–71) suggests, they nonetheless demonstrate that the functional limitations of institutions can act as real restraints, particularly depending on the political circumstances pertaining at any given time.

Nevertheless, it is important not to oversell the role of judicial bodies in the day-to-day functioning of most institutions. Much of the constitutional growth of IOs has occurred through ongoing institutional practice, which if uncontested often means that the functioning of organizations can be quite removed from the terms of the constituent instrument itself (Alvarez 2005: 74–81). This is particularly the case in organizations like the UN where the organs themselves are given primary responsibility for interpreting the extent of and limits to their own competences (Schermers and Blokker 2003: 839). This is not to say that law plays a secondary role. Where disputes do arise, what is perhaps surprising is the regularity with which even political decision makers in institutions like the World Trade Organization or International Monetary Fund refer to explicit legal principles (e.g. the interpretive principles listed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) or those in the UN make use of non-binding Advisory Opinions under Article 65 of the ICJ Statute (Alvarez 2005: 105).

Nevertheless, to recognize that common tools have been deployed in giving effect to the constitutional development of organizations is not to say that these tools will reveal any particular answers to any given problem or dispute. Much will depend on the legal nature of the organization (e.g. contrast primarily 'contractual' organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the more 'constitutional' organizations such as the UN (White 2005: 14–23), what the organization does (e.g. the distinction between more technical institutions like the WHO and more political bodies such as the UN General Assembly), but ultimately, much will come down to the particular constitutional dynamics that pertain within any organization, including the relations between the institution proper and its member-states, often expressed in decision-making powers (Gazzini 2011: 201–8), not to mention the division of competences between organs within certain institutions (White 2005: 75–80). To illustrate these complex layers of autonomy, we will describe the constitutional dynamics at work in the operation of the UN system.

The complex layers of autonomy within international organizations

Having established that the existence of autonomy or separate will is formally encapsulated in the concept of international legal personality, and expressed more concretely through the exercise of powers, to understand how this autonomy manifests itself, one is drawn to consider the potentially many layers of autonomy that exist within a number of institutions, which can be analysed broadly as executive, legislative and judicial powers (White 2011: 300–312). These are not arrayed in either the UN or EU system, for example, in a classical liberal form of a separation of powers. In fact they are unevenly spread, sometimes being found concentrated in one organ (on the EU see Curtin and Dekker 1999; Craig 2001). This is in large part due to the fact that organizations were established to perform certain functions, with founding states being primarily concerned with those organizations being able to fulfil these functions, rather than with achieving a system of checks and balances. In this respect, we focus on the example of the UN system in order to illustrate these functional powers.

To begin with, in terms of executive functions, these are normally embodied within political organs, though the importance of the Secretariats should not be overlooked. They are recognized in the constituent documents as separate organs, independent from states, embodying a form of international civil service, but with extra powers to take diplomatic initiatives including bringing threats to the attention of the Security Council in the case of the UN secretary-general (Article 99 UN Charter); to access health departments of member-states in the case of the WHO director-general (Article 33 WHO Constitution); and to direct the work of the organization in the case of the director-general of the Food and Agricultural Organization (Article 7(4) FAO Constitution). These examples not only show that such functions exist within the UN, separate from member-states, but are in the hands of individuals not representing any state (Schermers and Blokker 2003: 327; Reinalda and Verbeek 2011: 95–9).

Autonomy might not be so obvious in the 'executive' political organs of the UN, consisting as they do of a small group of member-states, where state interests seem so dominant when considering the threats represented, for example, by Iran (in the shape of the potential development of nuclear weapons), or by Syria (in the shape of brutal repression, civil war, refugee flows and a collapsing state). However, when member-states in the Security Council manage to agree on a resolution and a veto within the permanent membership is avoided, especially when they agree on a resolution containing measures, the decision is legally one made by the Security Council. Indeed, only the Security Council can impose certain forms of sanctions and authorize military enforcement actions against states (Articles 41–2 UN Charter). It may depend on states to carry out its will, but legally speaking the Security Council has greater powers than those possessed by states, which are restricted to non-forcible countermeasures (Crawford 2002: 281–305), and forcible action in self-defence (Article 51 UN Charter).

When the Security Council established post-conflict administrations, in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999, it was exercising powers that are independent from any states. As stated by Caplan (2009: 363), a 'characteristic feature of all transitional administration[s] is their international organizational nature'. He contrasts the League's mandates and former UN trusteeships with the fact that 'no single state would likely be entrusted with the responsibility for the transitional administration of a state or territory', a function which is 'performed most commonly by the UN'. Considering that transitional administrations and other peace operations consist not only of troops drawn from states (in the case of UN peace operations, under UN command), but a variety of professionals and experts (police, relief workers, human rights field officers, election monitors, development workers and civilian administrators), the practical as well as legal separation of the UN from its member-states is revealed.

The fact that the Security Council can take the initiative in the area of peace and security signifies that it has more than simply executive functions, which are generally confined to preparing the agenda for the plenary body and executing the decisions of that body. Indeed, Schermers and Blokker (2003: 302–4) describe the Security Council as a 'governing body', with its own decision-making and enforcement powers, and point out that other UN boards combine both executive and governing functions. For example, the ITU's Radio Regulations Board, which governs the assignment and use of radio frequencies, consists of 12 experts who shall serve as 'custodians of an international public trust' and not as representatives of member-states (Article 14 ITU Constitution). Even though this particular Board is different in composition to other UN Boards, which consist of representatives of member-states, such Boards normally only contain representatives of between one-fifth to one-third of the member-states (far less in the case of the Security Council), and they can adopt decisions by various forms of majorities. With this structure and with wide-ranging powers, the governing bodies

of UN organizations have considerable independence in decision making (Reinalda and Verbeek 2011: 96–7).

In terms of legislative functions within the UN system, they are mostly located within the plenary bodies, but as the above analysis has shown, governing bodies also have functionally confined law-making powers, so that the Security Council can bind states to certain actions (for example, to impose sanctions against target states), or require them to enact certain laws (for example, to combat transnational terrorists), in order to ensure the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security (see, for example, UNSC Resolution 1373 [2001] re terrorism; UNSC Resolution 1540 [2004] re weapons of mass destruction). Similarly, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has wide law-making powers, described as operating to regulate air navigation (Schermers and Blokker 2003: 305).

The plenary bodies of UN organizations produce vast amounts of UN law, most of it non-binding (though it may become customary or be seen as forming general principles of law), though some of it is immediately binding (as provided in the constituent treaty, for example, Article 25 of the UN Charter as regards the Security Council, and therefore being a treaty obligation), thus making it possible to reconcile UN outputs with the traditional sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ (e.g. treaties, custom, general principles, etc.). In many ways UN laws have moved beyond those traditional sources, given that they are a product of institutional and collective decision making, and are a reflection of the autonomy of the organizations: something that is not captured in traditional sources doctrine.

United Nations General Assembly resolutions have become central to most areas of international law, embodied in definitions and declarations on areas as diverse as human rights and self-determination to outer space and the environment; see, for example, the General Assembly's Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (Resolution 217A), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1960 (Resolution 1514), International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 1961 (Resolution 1721), Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962 (Resolution 1803), and more recently the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 (Resolution 61/295). Though not formally binding when adopted, such declarations are formulated in normative language as principles and rules which should govern relations between states, and increasingly, issues within states.

Other UN plenary organs adopt different types of output with, for example, the World Health Assembly having the authority to adopt treaties, which require ratification by member-states to come into force, regulations which are binding on all members unless individual states opt out, as well as non-binding recommendations (Articles 19–23 WHO Constitution). Although the Assembly has adopted enormously significant, both in terms of legitimacy and impact, International Health Regulations, it normally operates by way of non-binding (but still legitimate and effective) codes of conduct. Within UN organizations, law making takes the form of hard laws (in the shape of negotiating treaties which states sign up to or immediately binding regulations) interwoven with soft laws, which update and develop the hard obligations, thereby producing sophisticated legal orders. These orders govern the activities of states, and increasingly, of actors and individuals within states. Moreover, UN law applies to all areas of human activity (from regulating of orbital slots in outer space to combating communicable diseases in doctors' surgeries). These laws work because they are a product of a legitimate collective process of debate and decision making and are embodied in a normative form as UN law. Though traditional international legal doctrine confines sources of law to law made by states for states, UN legislation is made by autonomous UN organizations and

bodies many of which, but by no means all, are composed of states, and which regulate states and non-state actors.

Some of the governing and plenary organs already discussed have quasi-judicial functions, most evident when the Security Council has declared annexations of territory as 'null and void' (e.g. UNSC Resolution 662 [1990] re Iraq's purported annexation of Kuwait). One might also mention the ICAO Council's dispute resolution function, its decisions on this being appealable to the ICJ (Article 84 Chicago Convention). However, pure judicial organs are much less prevalent in the UN system, though their number is increasing (Buergenthal 2001). Nonetheless, this limited development shows that the judicial layer of autonomy is thinner than the rest. Indeed, the development of a significant dispute resolution element to the UN system may be the last layer to develop, embodying as it does the rule of law, which is arguably the most difficult form of legal autonomy to achieve in any international system. Judges and courts, at least in their idealized state, are fully impartial and independent from states, and thereby the ultimate representation of autonomy (Merrills 2011: 166–9), especially in that courts could potentially not only scrutinize and strike down decisions and acts of states but also decisions and measures taken by the political organs of the UN (consisting of states). Judicial bodies within the UN system fall a long way short of this.

Despite its limitations (embodied in the fact that it is very much modelled on its predecessor, the PCIJ), the ICJ is not only the UN's 'principal judicial organ' (Article 92 UN Charter), but is also considered in the main body of literature as 'the general court of the whole international community' (Abi-Saab 1996: 7). It has contributed more significantly to the development of international law than is recognized in traditional sources doctrine, which sees judicial decisions as a subsidiary source. It remains hampered by its reticence to fully embrace the impact of community norms, especially when faced with traditional arguments of sovereignty and consent (see *Case Concerning East Timor*, 1995 ICJ Reports: 90), and the difficulties it has in developing powers of judicial review (White 2005: 205–16). Having said that, it has produced a number of judgments of collective significance, especially in its advisory opinions in the area of self-determination of territories and peoples (most recently in *Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Reports: 136).

Whilst legal personality may be the most basic layer of autonomy within the UN system, the above analysis thus shows that beyond this veneer of legal autonomy, there is a well-developed and recognized layer of executive autonomy (often extending into governing functions), a significant but under-recognized (at least in orthodox legal doctrine) layer of legislative autonomy, and an underdeveloped and relatively weak layer of judicial autonomy. However, the growing presence of judicial and quasi-judicial organs within the UN system, having competence not only over states but also over individuals and the organization itself, represents a development in the rule of law in the UN system. The 'rule of law could be said to embody the ultimate layer of autonomy within any system, and although the UN's own rule of law is underdeveloped, it is present and has strengthened over time' (White 2011: 311). Indeed, it is essential that the judicial elements are further strengthened to enable them to challenge the exponential growth in legislative and executive decision making.

The imperative of developing internal checks and balances within institutions, where some measure of accountability can be secured, is heightened as soon as one considers the problems of holding IOs to account as separate legal actors within the international legal order. Given that the natural corollary of legal personality should be the capacity to be held legally responsible for breaches of the law, a number of factors (not least of which being the internal complexities of organizations and the ambiguous role of states therein) seem to

hamper the process of legal responsibility. In the concluding section we briefly consider some of these difficulties and in so doing demonstrate how the formal legal autonomy of IOs, expressed through legal personality, may actually offer a shield to states to escape responsibility for unlawful acts.

Balancing autonomy and responsibility

If IOs are to be regarded as legal persons under international law then an obvious consequence of that personality is that organizations will be bound by applicable rules of international law and, therefore, should be held legally responsible for breaching those rules. Whilst for a long time the possible legal responsibility of IOs may have been a more abstract than real concern, the proliferation and increasing autonomy of IOs since the Second World War has heightened concerns over the potential for the abuse of this autonomy (Blokker and Schermers 2001; Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001). As noted in the previous section, this has been particularly the case in relation to the growth in presence of UN peace operations, operating in territories where governance structures have broken down, or in relation to the UN Security Council, which exercises quite considerable powers beyond those enjoyed by any state acting unilaterally. As revealed, these concerns are particularly alarming bearing in mind the lack of any final judicial oversight within the UN system. Additionally, however, the lack of jurisdiction of most international courts to hold IOs directly responsible in international law only intensifies the perception of an accountability or legitimacy gap.

As such, it is hardly surprising that by the turn of the new millennium there was increasing pressure to address the topic of the accountability of IOs (e.g. International Law Association 2004), and, in particular, that the International Law Commission (ILC) (2011) turned its attention to codifying legal principles on the responsibility of IOs. Nevertheless, the product of the ILC's study, the 2011 *Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations* (DARIO) is illustrative of the complexities involved in holding organizations responsible for breaches of international law.

Though a detailed analysis of DARIO is not appropriate here, it is worth pointing out that by treating organizations as homogeneous actors on a par with states and by modeling DARIO on the ILC's 2001 articles on state responsibility, DARIO fails to transpose the various layers of autonomy into forms of responsibility and, more fundamentally, does not capture the essence of institutional autonomy as described in this chapter. This has led to confusion as to when responsibility lies with the organization and when that falls to member-states, a problem reflected in an increasing number of unsatisfactory decisions concerning UN peace operations, where the military component is made up of contingents from a number of member-states (e.g. the case of *Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway* (2007) 45 EHRR SE10, before the European Court of Human Rights).

The problem is that states remain in a driving position in many of these situations, but the autonomy of the organization *may* shield states from responsibility. Where it does not, however, and we seek to impose responsibility on member-states instead, the autonomy of the organization is potentially undermined. One solution would be for institutional responsibility to be developed to reflect the layers of autonomy that exist within IOs. Moreover, that final layer of autonomy (the rule of law) needs to be enhanced to provide avenues of legal accountability that will enable organizations to deepen their autonomy and meet their legal responsibilities.

Recommended for further reading

Coicaud and Heiskanen (2001), Schermers and Blokker (2003), White (2005) and Collins and White (2011).

Notes

1 See, e.g. *Competence of the ILO to Regulate the Conditions of Labour of Persons in Agriculture*, Advisory Opinion of 12 August 1922, PCIJ, Series B, nos. 2 and 3, at 21–3; *Competence of the ILO to Examine Proposals for the Organisation and Development of Methods of Agricultural Production*, Advisory Opinion of 12 August 1922, PCIJ, Series B, nos. 2 and 3: 53–5; and *Competence of the International Labour Organisation to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer*, Advisory Opinion of 23 July 1926, PCIJ, Series B, no. 13: 6.
2 Though specific provisions such as Articles 11 and 14 were discussed at length; see, e.g. 163–5, 171–2.
3 See most obviously, Case 8/55, *Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority* [1954–56] ECR 292 (the recognition of a price fixing power in the context of market regulation function), and later, Case 22/70, *Commission v Council (European Road Transport Agreement)* [1971] ECR 273 (recognition of a power to regulate external road transport policy as a necessary corollary to regulation of the internal policy).

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Part II

International secretariats as bureaucracies

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International bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations perspective

Jörn Ege and Michael W. Bauer

International organizations (IOs), defined as intergovernmental entities based on a multilateral treaty and possessing a permanent secretariat, have always been of concern to scholars of International Relations (IR). Students of IR used to focus on the international system by analytically separating the international level from national domestic politics. International organizations were viewed as an outcome of a struggle between national governments; from this perspective, IOs were expected to change according to the changing national interests that were responsible for creating them. With the spread of institutionalist thinking in IR (fuelled by the end of the Cold War and efforts to strengthen regional integration), IOs are increasingly considered to be more than the mere instruments of their members. International Relations scholars have, for example, started to identify differential state preferences in order to permanently delegate certain competences to IOs (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Yet the consequences of intra-organizational variation in formal administrative structures or the informal behaviour of international civil servants, especially when it comes to the explanation of organizational policies, are largely still outside the focus of 'standard' IR.

Public Administration (PA) scholars have recently taken up such questions. Their starting point is the increasing domestic importance of collective decisions in which IOs are involved. This perspective focuses on the role of the growing international bureaucratic bodies that actually prepare international policy decisions and programmes as well as supervise the domestic implementation of international agreements (Bauer and Weinlich 2011). Thus, PA scholars conceive of IOs as an additional level of policy making in an already highly differentiated system. For them, the interaction of politics and administration within and across the different levels (regional, national and international) is the key to a proper analysis of what has been termed 'multi-level governance' (Hooghe and Marks 2003). For IR scholars, politics at the international level continues to be seen by and large as a function of interactions between states, whereas PA is better equipped to conceptualize the 'actorness' and 'exogenous' role of entities emerging at the international level. Simply put, IR usually is better in explaining why IOs are created, whereas PA is better suited to analyzing the policy-making role of IOs and their bureaucracies in day-to-day politics.

In view of these tendencies, this chapter looks to what could be called 'international bureaucracy research' at the intersection of the disciplines of PA and IR. We structure this

contribution as follows: first, we review the literature on international bureaucracies within PA and IR; then we identify topics that make up common ground and that should be examined more closely in order to broaden our understanding of international bureaucracies. Our central proposition is that the more IR becomes an analysis of international policy making, the more important it becomes to systematically consider the bureaucratic dimension of governance, in particular the role of the international bureaucracies themselves. Bureaucracy, not anarchy, is likely to be the defining feature of the international system in the twenty-first century.

Public Administration as the basis for studying international bureaucracies

An understanding of PA as a sub-discipline of Political Science is driven by the assumption that the process of public policy making is always characterized by hierarchical information processing (Hammond 1993) and the interaction not only between elected politicians but also, and crucially, between administrative actors. Thus, international bureaucracies have to be taken into account if we wish to study global governance and the behaviour of IOs. What, then, have PA scholars contributed to this discussion thus far?

Starting from the observation that political authority has been reallocated 'upward, downward, and sideways from central states' (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 233), we note that *upward* reallocation is probably most visible in regional integration arrangements (Börzel et al. 2012). Of these organizations, the European Union (EU) is the most authoritative and independent (Haftel and Thompson 2006). Hence, it comes as no surprise that interest in international bureaucracies is most pronounced in the field of European Public Administration, where the European Commission, as the administration of the EU, is by far the most intensively studied institution. In these studies the Commission is first and foremost viewed as a public administration in its own right (Michelmann 1978; Hooghe 2005; Egeberg 2006). Despite the pronounced focus on the EU system in internationally oriented PA (for an overview of the distinct features of this discipline, see Heady 1998), other organizations have also received scholarly attention. We distinguish three topics that PA scholars have found particularly puzzling: 1) the functioning of the international civil service, 2) management reforms and organizational change, and 3) the influence of bureaucrats on international policy making.

The international civil service

The staff of international secretariats has been on the research agenda of PA scholars since the foundation of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the establishment of its independent international civil service (Phelan 1932). Since the founding of the League of Nations and other IOs, countless PA scholars, who often enough had been employees of these organizations, have written extensively about the role of the international civil service over the last 80 years (for exemplary works, see Ranshofen-Wertheimer 1943; Beigbeder 1988). In 1970, a special issue of *Public Administration Review* entitled 'Towards an International Civil Service' (Mailick 1970) reflected the pronounced interest of PA scholars in research on international bureaucracies and international civil servants in particular. Right from the beginning, scholars recognized that international bureaucracies are subject to multinational staffing procedures, which creates problematic repercussions in the cooperation of people from different countries and cultures within the administration (Langrod 1963). Whereas early efforts have been criticized as largely descriptive and insufficiently backed by general theory

(Weiss 1975: xv), more recent projects have studied the supranational norms of international civil servants (Hooghe 2005; Ellinas and Suleiman 2011). In the same vein, the personality of the top civil servants of these organizations, such as Dag Hammarskjöld (United Nations) and Jacques Delors (EU), proved to be crucial elements of direction and leadership that helped keep these heterogeneous administrations together and facilitated efficient functioning of the organization (Langrod 1963: 201). These case studies have contributed to the under-standing of processes within individual organizations and have pointed to the need for national governments to promote more independence for international civil servants. However, it was not until the spread of ideas from 'new public management' from national to international administrations (Geri 2001) that an opportunity opened for more systematic research on international bureaucracies.

Management reforms and organizational change

In contrast to studies on international civil servants, research on institutional reforms and change focuses heavily on formal rules. Such research is often inspired by a wish to counter the increasingly popular criticisms of organizational pathologies and mismanagement with academically grounded knowledge from management studies (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). Not least owing to its severe organizational crisis and the subsequent reform efforts, the European Commission continues to attract a great deal of academic attention (Kassim 2008). In this context, researchers have investigated the perception of reform within organizations and found that civil servants are quite tolerant towards administrative reform on the condi-tion that the personal goals of international officials remain unharmed (Bauer 2012). On the other hand, management reforms have also been studied with regard to their effects on the working capacities of middle managers. These studies suggest that stronger output orienta-tion and increased administrative steering in fact weaken the capacity for policy innovation within the Commission's administration (Bauer 2008). Some authors have reversed the ques-tion and inquired not into the consequences but rather into the drivers of management reform. In accordance with Bauer's (2012) conclusion regarding administrators' perception of Commission reform, Nay (2011) found that the poorly equipped UNAIDS secretariat became an important entrepreneur of reform which, together with its political principals, promoted organizational change in order to expand its coordinating role.

   In recent years, the study of organizational change has become more comparative: scholars have discovered both national administrations (Balint et al. 2008; Bauer and Ege 2012) and other international bureaucracies (Bauer and Knill 2007) as cases for fruitful comparison with the Commission administration. As a consequence, nowadays one hears less and less that old *sui generis* verdict declaring any effort to compare the Commission to other administrations a project of limited value (Pollack 1997: 102). Furthermore, students of PA have started to explore behavioural dynamics within other international (compound) bureaucracies, such as the secretariats of the World Trade Organization and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Trondal et al. 2010), and the classic PA topic of the role of bureaucrats in public policy making (Suleiman 1984) has appeared on the 'internationalized' research agenda as well.

The influence of international bureaucracies on policy output

This third strand of research clearly remains in the tradition of the older literature on inter-national civil servants but increasingly examines their influence and power in international

governance (Mathiason 2007; Weller and Xu 2010). Identifying the 'administrative footprint' in IO policy making is, on the one hand, driven by the desire to limit the influence of illegitimate international 'mandarins' and to increase the steering capacities of political leaders (Eppink 2007). From such a perspective, the study of international policy making adheres to the basic assumptions of public choice theory, whose emphasis on the pathological effects of unconstrained self-interested bureaucrats may be even more troubling at the international level (Haas 1964: 98). On the other hand, scholars have highlighted the benefits of output-oriented legitimacy by emphasizing that powerful bureaucracies do not necessarily constitute a crisis of democracy, as a lack of input legitimacy by means of direct election may be justified if the solutions provided are more effective in achieving the public interest (Scharpf 1999).

Irrespective of one's trust in international institutions, several characteristics seem to put these international bodies in a particularly advantageous position to develop autonomous preferences and act according to them: even though international bureaucracies have, in comparison with national administrations, rather limited policy competences and weaker implementation powers, the existence of multiple political principals, the high volatility of their external environment, and the existence of accountability gaps – in particular, the lack of parliamentary scrutiny – may actually strengthen their autonomy. Thus, political control of highly educated expert bureaucrats by heterogeneous member-states in the absence of a strong public sphere seems difficult. Although the academic community repeatedly assumes that factors like high levels of attributed moral or expert authority, the technical complexity of the policy field, or the salience of a decision form specific conditions for bureaucratic influence, these conditions are rarely subject to systematic empirical scrutiny. One of the few exceptions is the 'Managers of Global Change' project (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009), which uses nine case studies to determine the conditions for autonomous bureaucratic influence. Mainly by altering the knowledge and belief systems of different actors, the environmental bureaucracies under scrutiny are found to be particularly influential if there are low costs for public action and regulation and if there is low salience for national decision makers. In addition to these problem-specific factors, organizational variables such as the mandate and material resources turn out to be less important conditions for bureaucratic influence. Most surprisingly, however, the project identified intra-organizational factors related to staff and procedures as crucial conditions that have been largely overlooked in previous studies. Bureaucratic expertise (often in combination with organizational neutrality), flexible hierarchies, and strong administrative leadership (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009: 337–44) explain a large degree of variation in bureaucratic influence.

In sum, PA as a Political Science sub-discipline has made some advances in studying international bureaucracies. It is, however, just beginning to explore the bureaucratic dimension of governance *above* the state. Much will depend upon whether the sub-discipline is able to adjust (or even innovate upon) its traditional assumptions and concepts to the less stable and vastly more heterogeneous context of internationalized policy making.

The conception of international bureaucracies in the field of International Relations

The conception of IOs has changed over the last five decades. Whereas nation-states were long considered the only relevant actor in the anarchic international system, IOs are now being recognized as autonomous actors in global governance. Quite obviously, this debate is embedded in the broader controversy over the influence of institutions in the international

system more generally. It seems to be broadly recognized today (though not unchallenged, see Moravcsik 1999) that IOs do indeed matter independently and autonomously of their national governments' principals (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). Hence, our focus here is on how such independence, particularly with a view to the bureaucratic bodies involved, has been conceived in recent decades. In so doing, we follow David Lake (2007: 221) and employ the common distinction between principal–agent approaches rooted in rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, which takes a more constructivist point of view.

Principal–agent approaches

The principal–agent theory is applied to various political and economic phenomena that are based on contractual relationships. In IR, such an approach is typically applied in order to model a delegation relationship between IOs and their member-states (Hawkins et al. 2006). Although the research agenda was initially driven by the question of why IOs are created in the first place and how member-states are able to control IOs in the face of information asymmetries (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Stone 2011), scholars gradually have become more interested in the internal mechanisms of IOs. When we look at how the research questions of principal–agent studies are currently being framed, we see more and more studies taking into account bureaucratic characteristics. These studies increasingly narrow down the agent role to the international secretariat (Elsig 2010: 351) and include administrative features such as independent staffing and the secretariat's ability to initiate or recommend policies as indicators of higher IO independence (Haftel and Thompson 2006).

Studies by Grigorescu (2010) and Brown (2010) illustrate the paths that IR scholars increasingly pursue. Whereas most studies focus on whether and how IOs are able to act autonomously, Grigorescu (2010) approaches the puzzle of delegation from the opposite direction and inquires into the determinants of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms that constrain the autonomy of international bureaucracies. The author collects information on oversight mechanisms (such as inspections, personnel evaluations, investigations and transparency requirements) in order to construct an additive index of bureaucratic oversight. His data on 73 IOs indicate that three groups of explanatory factors can account for the variation in oversight functions. First, there are the preferences of democratic member-states to symbolically erect this kind of control over international bureaucracies in order to signal to their domestic constituencies that democratic values are being pursued in the international realm as well. Second, some states try to maintain control over organizational policies and resources and substitute for a loss in *ex ante* control over policy making (i.e. through majority voting) by means of increased bureaucratic oversight. Finally, the author has detected a learning process in which an IO is found to implement a certain oversight mechanism if a partner organization has previously adopted the same mechanism.

The mainly conceptual work of Brown (2010) aims to construct an empirical yardstick for comparing delegation across time and organizations. Even though the author does not provide data for a larger sample of IOs, the study provides a generally applicable indicator-based measurement framework. By distinguishing between three sub-dimensions of delegation and various indicators, Brown's study is probably the most detailed administration-centred application of the principal–agent approach to IOs. Member-states' characteristics play hardly any role in his study. At the same time and in line with most other principal–agent approaches in IR, however, Brown is reluctant to explicitly attribute agency (which is largely measured by means of bureaucratic attributes) to the bureaucracy itself and instead refers to the organization as an agent without further explicating what the organization actually is.

Sociological institutionalism

In addition to principal–agent approaches, advocates of sociological institutionalism became increasingly unsatisfied with the instrumental conception of IOs and shifted attention to the inevitable autonomy inherent in bureaucratic organizations. For the pioneers of organizational theory, such as Robert K. Merton (1936), Herbert Simon (1947) and Philip Selznick (1949), an instrumental or epiphenomenal understanding of organizations as applied by IR scholars after the Second World War was completely unrealistic:

> As organizations become infused with value, they are no longer regarded as expendable tools; they develop a concern for self-maintenance. By taking on a distinct set of values, the organization acquires a character structure, an identity. Maintaining the organization is no longer simply a matter of survival but becomes a struggle to preserve a set of unique values.
>
> *(Scott 1995: 18–19)*

On the basis of this basic understanding of organizations as systems of value and meaning, sociological institutionalism makes use of a broad definition of *institutions*. For these scholars, institutions are not necessarily formal and written rules, but can be

> viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them.
>
> *(March and Olsen 1998: 948)*

Often motivated by increasing dissatisfaction with the rationalist conception of IOs, scholars started to use this understanding of institutions to continue where regime theory has struggled to provide an approach that can be operationalized and that is suitable to the study of international bureaucracies. Taking the sociological concept of bureaucracy (Weber 1978) as a theoretical starting point, institutionalist scholars managed to correct conceptual flaws rooted in the 'wooliness' and 'imprecision' of regime analyses (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 763) by drawing on a more explicit conceptual framework. The studies of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (Finnemore 1993; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004) are probably the most influential works in this field. In their book *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (2004), the authors use a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy to create a common analytical framework for evaluating different kinds of authority in international bureaucracies. The authors aim to show how different kinds of authority enable the bureaucracy to influence organizational policy making and, at the same time, highlight the organizational potential for dysfunctional processes and pathological outcomes. In their view, it is less important what international bureaucracies (by which in fact they mean the entire organization) are formally allowed to do, and more important what kind of authority they possess and how they can use this authority to give meaning to problems and ultimately influence the way in which their member-states perceive and interpret reality.

An impressive number of studies (most of them case studies) have been conducted in which scholars apply similar sociologically inspired institutionalist thinking to international bureaucracies. Without attempting to be exhaustive, one can identify four broad topics

around which sociological studies cluster: organizational change, the interaction of IOs with the environment, pathologies and power, and administrative leadership. We now turn to each of them separately.

In addition to PA scholars who study the development of domestic and international agencies over time, organizational sociologists have also shown an interest in the analysis of change in IOs (Barnett and Carroll 1995). Whereas standard rationalist explanations for timing, content and direction of change are often found to be rooted in the organizational environment – that is, in member-states and other stakeholders – organizational sociologists emphasize that organizations themselves may be strategic agents of change depending on their level of organizational security and the congruity of internal culture with external pressure (Barnett and Coleman 2005). The finding that processes of organizational change are determined by both internal factors (often bottom-up) and external factors (often top-down) is also supported by studies of organizational reform (Nielson et al. 2006) and research on organizational learning in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions (Benner et al. 2009; Junk et al. 2013).

Second, the literature on change (and the systemic approach of IR in general) suggests that intra-organizational phenomena can frequently be explained by looking at the organization's relationship to external actors. Within this strand of research the lion's share of studies has concluded that it is less the formal competences of organizations that allow them to exert influence (for an exception, see Batory and Lindstrom 2011) and more the authority and legitimacy that stakeholders attribute to them (Hurd 1999).

Third, research on (the sources of) the pathologies and dysfunctional behaviour of IOs has also attracted considerable attention in the IR discourse (see Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Whereas some authors claim that organizational failure is sometimes a desired coping strategy for public bureaucracies (Seibel 1996), others highlight that the same characteristics that lend power to organizations also render them 'unresponsive to their environments, obsessed with their own rules at the expense of primary missions, and ultimately lead to inefficient, self-defeating behavior' (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 700; Barnett and Finnemore 2004: Chapter 5).

Finally, building upon functionalist studies on the power of knowledge (Haas 1990), some scholars have come to view both technocratic expertise and particular norms shared among the members of epistemic communities as decisive non-material resources in the hands of international bureaucracies, enabling them to become powerful supranational entrepreneurs (Kamradt-Scott 2010). When it comes to bureaucratic entrepreneurship, the most important individuals within the organization, however, are the administrative leaders (Cox 1969: 205) at the top of the bureaucracy who fulfil both administrative and political tasks. In the tradition of Robert W. Cox's seminal study on leadership, the power of persuasion and deliberation is often attributed to the executive head of the respective IO, such as the UN secretary-general (Johnstone 2003) and the executive of the UN's HIV programme (Harman 2011).

If we consider the topics that feature prominently within the sociologist school of thought in IR, we see that the phenomena under scrutiny are quite similar to that examined in PA. Hence, it is not always easy to determine to which disciplinary tradition a study may best be attributed. Despite some important improvements over the last decade, sociological institutionalist studies in the tradition of Barnett and Finnemore (2004) often share some of the conceptual flaws usually associated with principal–agent approaches, such as the tendency not to conceptually differentiate between the administrative and the political part of the organization (Bauer et al. 2009: 27). Whereas principal–agent studies usually view the IO as being

made up solely of political institutions, sociological institutionalists refer to the bureaucracy when they speak about IOs, but neglect its interaction with the political arm within the organization.

Perspectives in studying international bureaucracies

Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder (2003: 15–16) identified four main shortcomings in the classic literature on IOs. Table 10.1 applies the four fields of criticism that Dijkzeul and Beigbeder expressed a decade ago (in rows) to the current state of the art of international bureaucracy research in each of the three (sub–)disciplines presented earlier in this contribution (in columns). As we see in Table 10.1, certain aspects seem to have changed; yet some observations of Dijkzeul and Beigbeder still appear to be highly relevant. The gathering of empirical information (see row 1) is probably best viewed as a gradually achievable long–term endeavour. Over the last decade, however, we have seen an increasing number of empirical studies on the internal mechanisms of IOs across disciplines. Has this development increased our systematic knowledge of how and when international bureaucracies matter? We believe

Table 10.1 Developments in the study of international bureaucracies

| Sub-discipline | | International Relations | |
Crucial aspects	Public Administration*	Rational-choice institutionalism	Sociological institutionalism
1 Empirical information on the actual functioning of IOs	Interest of European PA in international bureaucracies has spread to other IOs and sparked empirical research	Increasing availability of comparative data and evident tendencies to include administrative variables	Increasing number of single case studies that often explore the impact of values and norms
2 Theory about the inner functioning of IOs	Views IO as additional level in the multilevel system of joint decision-making	Views IO as (largely unitary) agent; focuses on issues of control and IO independence	Views IO as bureaucratic organization that necessarily develops a life of its own; focuses on value, culture and perception
3 Dialogue among scholars	Minor tendencies towards mutual recognition of the different approaches, especially between PA and sociological institutionalism in IR, but the major cleavages are still clearly visible		
4 Research design	Comparative case studies (often sector-specific) and process-oriented explanation	Highly diverse research designs ranging from single case studies to large-N comparison	Single case studies with a focus on longitudinal research design; lack of systematic conceptual frameworks

* The discipline of PA might also be split up into a rational-choice and a sociologically oriented strand of research. Owing to the scarcity of empirical studies in the international context, we do not further distinguish here.

so only to a limited extent because we still lack *comparative* studies that allow for reasonable generalizations. This lack of comparative empirical information is, of course, related to the different conceptualizations of international bureaucracies in the different disciplines. Considering the second row, we see a minor trend of conceptual convergence in the recognition of administrative characteristics in principal–agent studies (Brown 2010; Grigorescu 2010; Elsig 2011). In broader terms, however, we agree with previous evaluations (Xu and Weller 2008: 35; Bauer et al. 2009: 27) that the major shortcoming in the literature is the failure to properly define the bearer of agency within IOs. This criticism, however, holds not only for principal–agent approaches but also for sociological studies in the tradition of Barnett and Finnemore (2004). Even though these authors highlight the importance of the international bureaucracy as the central unit of analysis and the bearer of agency, bureaucratic characteristics (be they formal or informal) and the interaction with the worlds of politics remain conceptually blurry.

As regards academic dialogue across fields (row 3), traditional sub-disciplinary boundaries remain strong. The fact that international bureaucracies lie at the intersection of PA and IR, with the different epistemological traditions of these disciplines, and that IR itself is divided over the question of how to treat international bureaucracies, obviously limits the potential for dialogue between the sub-disciplines. As long as the research questions in the disciplines differ, this may not be much of a problem. Ever since the heyday of the analysis of international regimes in IR, some scholars have observed an increasing convergence of research questions towards a common interest in the explanation of public policies and global governance (Martin and Simmons 1998: 737; Ellis 2010: 15). Considering the similarity of topics studied in (sociologically oriented) IR and PA, our review supports this argument. Much as in the study of public policies in a national context (Egeberg 1995: 157), these developments will naturally shift the attention to international bureaucracies. The level (or the unit) of analysis and the research design, however, vary considerably between the disciplines (row 4; also row 2). Whereas PA's process-oriented approaches seem to have adopted a perspective that allows one to distinguish between different 'forces' within the IO, IR scholars from both the sociological and the rationalist schools of thought have rarely made use of the differentiation between different organizational branches or 'subsystems' as advocated by Cox and Jacobson (1973).

Thus, the time is indeed ripe for a 'third generation of [IO] study' (Trondal et al. 2010: 10) that not only is able to distinguish different behavioural dynamics of international bureaucracies but also takes into account the potential impact of structural characteristics such as decision-making rules and bureaucratic hierarchies (see Egeberg 1999) on organizational behaviour and policy making. In order to overcome the still evident problems in present international bureaucracy research as summarized in Table 10.1, we present by way of conclusion a perspective on IOs that is less driven by disciplinary peculiarities and that covers intra-organizational relationships, processes and the role of international public servants in its attempt to explain IO behaviour.

First of all, we argue for a more explicit distinction between the political and the administrative in the study of IOs. Whereas the political branch of the organization includes the collective of member-state representatives meeting in the assembly, the administrative branch refers to the more or less hierarchically organized bureaucracy that is less active during the actual decision-making process but prepares and implements political decisions. Some scholars have recently distinguished the two intra-organizational branches by using principal–agent theory (Elsig 2010). As Comparative Politics and Policy Analysis in national contexts have taught us, this must not come at the cost of neglecting the institutional milieu and the

embeddedness of the administration within it. We see particular analytical potential in an approach that views IOs as a political system (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Rittberger et al. 2012) which produces particular policy outcomes in the form of organizational decisions (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 8ff).

In order to summarize different topics of analysis and present a compass for future research endeavours, it seems useful to also distinguish between an actor-focused and a structure-focused perspective for each of the two organizational branches. Table 10.2 provides an overview of how different research topics could be allocated within such a two-dimensional perspective.[1] Following the argument that the logics of appropriateness and expected consequences are non-exclusive categories of individual behaviour (March and Olsen 1998: 952), we subsume not only the preferences but also the norm-oriented values of actors (what is often referred to as institutions in a broader sense) under the actor-focused perspective. Whereas IR research in particular, in both its sociological and its rationalist tradition, has focused on the actors in the political and administrative branches of the IO, PA adds a rather structure-centred perspective to complement the picture. Formal rules and organizational characteristics within and between the two branches of IOs are found to constrain individual behaviour and ultimately the policy outcome of an organization (Scharpf 1997).

The factors displayed in Table 10.2 may be studied as both dependent and independent variables, but considering the shift towards the study of governance and policy making in current research on IOs, we see particular potential if these factors and their interactions are studied as independent variables that shed light on the explanation of policy outcomes. We see two important advantages of such a conception of IOs. In consideration of the lack of systematic empirical information in the current study of international bureaucracies, a political system approach would first foster a comparative analysis of different features of IOs (both actor- and structure-related), much as is practised successfully in the disciplines of Comparative Politics and Comparative Government. Second, it would improve the analysis of policy outcomes and the intra-organizational mechanisms during different phases of the

Table 10.2 Summary of different agendas of IO research from a political system perspective

	Focus on actors	*Focus on structures*
Political branch of IO Member-state representatives and institutions	Preferences and behaviour of political principals (i.e. member-states) Socialization dynamics of member-state representatives Resources of political principals	Rules of decision making in political bodies of the IO Formal control mechanisms available to political principals (e.g. bureaucratic oversight)
Administrative branch of IO The bureaucracy	Preferences and behaviour of international personnel Socialization dynamics of international civil servants Administrative styles, identities and cultures Leadership Organizational learning	Hierarchical steering and politicization Budgetary constraints Specialization/division of labour between departments Design and trajectories of international civil service system Formal competences of the secretariat vis-à-vis the political institutions

policy-making process, such as the agenda setting (Pollack 1997) and the implementation phase (Joachim et al. 2008). The second argument is particularly important because our literature review indicates that IR research is indeed undergoing a shift in focus away from the question of whether or not IOs matter and towards more fine-grained questions about internal processes. The more IR studies in general and IO studies in particular continue to focus on governance mechanisms and the outcome of international policy making, the more important it becomes to systematically include the bureaucracy in the analysis. If we do so, however, it is essential to differentiate more explicitly between an actor-centred and a structure-centred perspective.

What we have in mind comes close to what Jarle Trondal and his colleagues propose when they promote 'normalization' in the study of IOs and the necessity that a 'public administrative turn comes to characterize IO studies' (Trondal et al. 2010: 3). In this regard, we see a particularly promising approach in organizational theory, which works equally well for different kinds of organizations and has already proven to be a possible bridge builder between PA and IR visions of IOs. One should not forget that organizational theory is open to both rationalist and sociological considerations (Scott 1995). The study of the effects of organizational design (Hammond 1993; Egeberg 1999) seems particularly fruitful to complement a purely behavioural perspective on individual motives or socialization processes (see also Scharpf 1997). Overall, the crucial issue in international bureaucracy research seems to be the ability to combine research efforts from within these two perspectives and to look at the interaction of structure and personnel in order to finally overcome the rather artificial disciplinary divide between international Public Administration and International Relations.

Recommended for further reading

Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009), Haas (1990) and Kassim et al. (2013).

Note

1   For the purpose of this contribution, we focus on factors within the IO. To be sure, that is not to say that environmental factors (e.g. external shocks, other IOs, non-governmental organizations, or powerful countries that are not IO members) do not play a role in the study of organizational behaviour or policy making.

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11

Problem solving by international bureaucracies

The influence of international secretariats on world politics

Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner

International bureaucracies play an increasing role in world politics in several policy fields. One type of international bureaucracy that is often overlooked is the secretariat related to international treaty regimes. While many international regimes rely for their secretarial functions on full-fledged international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), other treaty regimes maintain merely weak links to specialized United Nations (UN) agencies. Instead, such treaties have set up their own independent bureaucracies, the so-called secretariats.

These secretariats are particularly prevalent in issue areas where a strong international agency is missing, notably the area of global environmental governance. This policy domain is regulated by almost 900 international treaties, many of which are administered by independent secretariats, which are answerable to the conference of the parties of the respective international treaty. These secretariats are not necessarily small. While some have only a few staff members, others employ hundreds of international civil servants. The secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, for instance, has grown into a major international organization in its own right, even though it still functions with the formal mandate of a "treaty secretariat." In addition, many existing specialized UN agencies have become important players in environmental policy, setting up specialized environmental departments and joining the large group of international environmental bureaucracies.

Our research over the last decade has shown that these international bureaucracies have developed into autonomous actors in world politics. They create and disseminate knowledge, and shape powerful discourses and narratives on how problems are to be structured and understood. They also influence negotiations through ideas and expertise, and implement the standards that have been agreed in day-to-day practices in many countries. This chapter lays out in more detail our research approach and our core findings. We draw heavily on the findings of the Managers of Global Change research project (see Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009 in more detail), which focuses on international bureaucracies in the area of environmental policy.

The influence of international bureaucracies in world politics

In this project, we define international bureaucracies as agencies created by governments or other public actors, with some degree of permanence and coherence and beyond formal direct control of single national governments, notwithstanding control by multilateral mechanisms through the collective of governments. Empirically, international bureaucracies are characterized through a hierarchically organized group of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules and procedures within the context of a policy area. International bureaucracies can be (but are not always) part of international organizations.

In assessing the influence of international bureaucracies, we focused on assessing changes in the behavior of other actors, such as governments, non-governmental lobbyist groups, scientists, the mass media or individual actors, generally known as 'outcome' in policy studies, as opposed to the impact on target indicators, such as improvement of environmental parameters. This follows a line of reasoning in recent works on international institutions that have generally focused on changes of actor behavior instead of environmental improvement. By applying this perspective to a set of cases in international environmental governance, we identified three major forms of how international bureaucracies influence the behavior of other actors: as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators, and capacity builders.

Bureaucracies as knowledge brokers: setting the global agenda

International environmental bureaucracies influence the behavior of political actors by altering their knowledge and belief systems. Most international bureaucracies exert influence through synthesizing scientific findings and distributing knowledge to stakeholders, from national governments to scientific audiences and individual citizens. The environment secretariat of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), for example, participates in the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection, which is responsible for a large number of reports that have been cited 1,436 times in scholarly publications since 1967 (Campe 2009). Some international bureaucracies are also directly involved in the funding and administration of original research, such as the World Bank, with a strong emphasis on quantitative economic research. Quite often, bureaucracies are active in all three stages of knowledge generation, knowledge synthesizing, and knowledge dissemination at the same time.

Mostly, this type of activity has a sizeable autonomous influence on discourses and debates in environmental policy that goes beyond the initial positions and policies of governments. The international response to global warming is an example. In the late 1980s, uncertainty about the reality of global warming prevented governments from acting. Knowledge was either non-existent, or it was disputed among experts and lay people alike. In this situation, it was the bureaucrats of the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) that initiated and organized the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a network of 1,500 leading climate experts, to offer a series of consensus documents on the state of knowledge and on possible political response strategies (Agrawala 1998; Siebenhüner 2002a; Bauer 2009a). This panel did not generate new knowledge but helped to make existing knowledge accessible for policy makers and external stakeholders. Through its system of peer review and later of geographic balancing in this peer review, the necessary credibility and legitimacy for the existing knowledge were maintained: a task that was beyond the scope of individual governments that would inevitably have been seen as partisan in their

assessment. It was again international bureaucracies (UNEP and the climate secretariat) that took the lead in disseminating this knowledge through websites, brochures, information packages and workshops, especially in developing countries (Bauer 2009a; Busch 2009b).

Other examples are the many reporting and monitoring schemes that international bureaucracies have implemented, or the outreach activities of their staff via commissioned studies and continuous conference diplomacy. All treaty secretariats require members to report on environmental data and implementation efforts. The desertification secretariat, for instance, monitors worldwide desertification by collecting and documenting the reports submitted by parties. By integrating these data in its publications, the secretariat shaped a particular interpretation of desertification that gained currency among many stakeholders in a way that would not have been likely to emerge without the autonomous activity of the secretariat (Bauer 2006a).

Interestingly, the types of such cognitive influence vary among different perspectives, which we describe as technocratic, activist, and environmentalist. A typical example of technocratic cognitive influence is the environment department of the IMO, which restricts itself to informing governments and private actors on the technical details of safe and less polluting shipping. A similar case is the climate secretariat, which tries to cleanse its information input of any political or policy-sensitive implications. Quite different, however, is the desertification secretariat, which has a mandate comparable to the climate secretariat and even shares the same building, but has evolved into the prototype of what we term an activist bureaucracy with an explicit political agenda. The secretariats of the UNEP or of the biodiversity convention, on their part, have developed a more environmentalist type of cognitive influence, going beyond the technocratic restriction of the climate secretariat but also avoiding the more activist type of influence that the desertification secretariat revealed.

Bureaucracies as negotiation facilitators: shaping global cooperation

In addition, we found that international bureaucracies have an autonomous influence in global environmental governance through the creation, support, and shaping of rule-building processes for issue-specific international cooperation. Bureaucracies influence international rule setting both in its early stages; for example, through the initiation of diplomatic conferences at which international regimes are negotiated, and in the later phase of regime implementation and revision (e.g., Beach 2004; see also Young 1994; Sandford 1996). In the 1980s, it was, for example, UNEP that initiated the first conferences on negotiating a treaty to phase out ozone-depleting chemicals at a time when most governments had not recognized the issue (Downie 1995).

International bureaucracies have also been crucial in the later phase of dynamic implementation and revision of regimes. It is the staff of treaty secretariats that organize meetings, set agendas, and write reports to the conferences of the parties. Secretariats remain accountable to governments, which are the final masters of treaty evolution. However, by various forms of informal influence, international bureaucracies are hardly passive to governmental initiative, but are autonomous in their influence. Through their initiative, policy issues have entered or remained on the agenda of multilateral negotiations. In several instances negotiators relied heavily on the information provided by treaty secretariats, and many suggestions for treaty language have been taken over by negotiators from the bureaucracies in negotiations under the biodiversity convention, the ozone treaties and, to a much lesser degree, the climate convention (see Bauer 2006a; Busch 2009b; Siebenhüner 2009).

However, our work revealed substantial variation in the normative influence of international bureaucracies. The most striking difference is among the four treaty secretariats studied. While all four secretariats are similar in mandate and setup, they vary considerably in the degree in which they are able to have autonomous influence on negotiations. The climate secretariat limits itself strictly to mere neutral support of international negotiations, which makes it a more technocratic executor of what governments intend (see Busch 2009b). The biodiversity secretariat, on its part, follows an environmentalist approach and shows a sizeable autonomous influence on negotiations through drafting decisions and promoting compromises (see Siebenhüner 2009). The desertification secretariat, however, has pushed discourses and decision making in a direction that went against the intentions of a number of governments, notably within the donor community of the rich industrialized countries. While the climate secretariat can thus be seen as the prototype of a technocratic bureaucracy that tries to stay away from any autonomous political influence, the desertification secretariat, with its legally and politically almost identical mandate, evolved into the prototype of an "activist bureaucracy" that promoted its own agenda, in this case the support of the poorer developing countries, especially in Africa (Bauer 2006a).

Bureaucracies as capacity builders: making international cooperation work

Finally, international bureaucracies show a sizeable autonomous influence on global environmental governance through the direct assistance to countries in their effort to implement international agreements. Countries with stronger administrative capacities are in a better position to implement international environmental policies. Here again, it is particularly international bureaucracies that help raise the administrative capacity in many countries, especially in the developing world.

In the ozone regime, for example, three international bureaucracies (the World Bank, the UN Development Programme and UNEP, later joined by the UN Industrial Development Organization) organized an international campaign to install in each capital in the developing world a so-called "ozone unit" (see Biermann 1997 and Bauer 2009b on details). These were small administrative offices linked to the national environment ministry with staff trained and financed by these international bureaucracies to draft and implement national programs on the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances. Even though states paid for these programs, it was the staff of the international bureaucracies that developed and shaped the programs, setting the stage for the emission-control programs in more than 100 countries. Without the substantive input of these bureaucracies, the overall effectiveness of the ozone regime in the developing countries would hardly be conceivable.

Capacity building is more than a technical endeavor, but part of largely autonomous policy development by the international bureaucracies involved. We found repeatedly that international bureaucracies through their outreach programs in the capitals of member-states shape the policies of their host countries; for example, through training programs for mid-level civil servants that are influenced by ideas, concepts and policies that international bureaucracies propagate. Bureaucracies are also agents of diffusion for national policies or technologies that are identified by their staff as particularly promising or useful and are then spread to other countries through targeted programs of the bureaucracy (see Busch and Jörgens 2005).

How can the variation in influence be explained?

How can one explain this variation in the influence of international bureaucracies? In our work (mainly Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009), we developed an empirically based

theoretical model that can to a large extent account for the difference in influence between the bureaucracies we studied. The model includes explanatory factors at three levels of analysis: the macro level, where the structure of the *problem* addressed by a bureaucracy predetermines its overall autonomy vis-à-vis states; the meso level, with factors such as the competences, resources, and institutional embedding, what we describe as the *polity* of an international bureaucracy; and the micro level, that is, the *people* working in a bureaucracy and the *procedures*, cultures, and leadership styles that they develop over time. We found that these four Ps (problems, polity, people, and procedures) can explain a substantial degree of the variation that we observed in the autonomous influence of international bureaucracies.

Problem structure

We found that the type of problem international bureaucracies are mandated to address and the type of policy domain in which they operate considerably shape the degree and type of their autonomous influence. This problem structure emerged as a key factor to explain when and why international bureaucracies could manage to gain some degree of autonomy from governments. The case studies reveal that similar bureaucracies with similar design features and policies show different degrees and types of influence when faced with different problem structures. The relevance of problem structures is a robust finding of the literature on international regimes (on problem structures in regime analysis, see e.g., Miles et al. 2002 and Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998: 6–7). It can be confirmed also for the study of international bureaucracies. We analyzed variation of problem structures, both within different issue domains of environmental policy and over time. We found that two determinants make a problem less conducive for the autonomous influence of an international bureaucracy: the cost of public action and regulation, and the international and national salience of a problem.

First, the higher the costs of international regulation, the more governments try to retain control over the political process and to prevent autonomous influence of international bureaucracies. The cost of regulation is determined by a wide range of factors that include both the political, economic, and social costs of addressing and solving the problem and the political, economic, and social costs of inaction. In view of all these factors, for example, the regulation of the emission of ozone-depleting substances turned out to be less costly than regulating the emission of greenhouse gases, and the autonomous influence of international bureaucracies was significantly larger when comparatively easier problems were at stake. The costs also change over time. Scientific discourse and technological innovation, for example, can dramatically increase options and mould actor strategies, as was the case with the technological breakthrough in substituting chlorofluorocarbons, which altered the political context in the negotiation of amendments of the treaty for the protection of the ozone layer by lowering the costs of regulation (see Parson 2003). We therefore found that the lesser the costs are that governments anticipate for the effective regulation of the problem at stake, the more the international bureaucracies have an independent influence in the making and implementation of policies.

Second, the higher the international and national salience of an environmental problem, the more governments try to retain control and to withhold autonomous authority from international bureaucracies. A range of factors determines salience. These include, among other things, the time span between the cause and effect of a problem. If there is a significant delay between cause and effect, as for instance, between the gradual loss of biodiversity and the breakdown of an affected ecosystem, the problem is unlikely to receive high priority from national decision makers. Clearly visible impacts of global environmental problems, such as

extreme weather events in the case of climate change, increase political salience. Overall, we found that the less urgent the problem is perceived to be by most or by the most powerful governments at the national level, the more likely it is for international bureaucracies to develop their own independent influence in the making and implementation of policies.

The most costly and salient issue in this study has been climate change. This environmental problem knows no substitutes for the pollutants and no easy technical fix, and it affects core areas of economic activity, notably the energy and transportation sector. It pits against each other the largest countries, with the industrialized nations divided between Australia and the United States versus the rest; and the developing countries divided between the large growing economies such as China and India, the critically affected countries such as the low-lying island nations, and finally the oil-producing countries. Such a politically loaded environment did not leave the climate secretariat, created to assist governments in implementing the 1992 climate convention, unaffected (see Busch 2009b). The climate secretariat clearly differs from the other, otherwise quite similar, secretariats in its overly technocratic, politically overly neutral approach to almost all its activities. Consequently, the climate secretariat was of assistance to governments and thus a source of support in this issue area; yet all this influence was reactive and driven by the wishes and aspirations of governments represented in the conference of the parties and the various committees and commissions. The climate secretariat has truly been first and foremost the servant of governments.

The desertification secretariat, on the other hand, has evolved over time in a completely different direction (see Bauer 2006b). We believe that one key factor to explain this, in line with additional factors that we will elaborate further later, is the specific problem structure in this area: Desertification is a key concern for only few countries and of peripheral relevance for almost all industrialized countries and most major developing countries. The potential regulatory impact of the desertification regime on these countries is low and related only to the financial mechanism under the desertification convention, which remains controlled by consensus procedures. Therefore, in this policy area of minor relevance for most (industrialized) countries, a treaty secretariat could emerge that played a substantially autonomous role and became essentially what could be referred to as an "activist bureaucracy," with more characteristics of a non-governmental lobbyist organization than of a traditional intergovernmental bureaucracy.

The secretariats under the ozone and biodiversity conventions are largely in the middle between the extremes of the technocratic climate secretariat and the activist desertification secretariat. Biodiversity loss and ozone depletion are less prominent than climate change, but still more salient and potentially also more costly than desertification. Ozone depletion was a salient issue in the 1980s and early 1990s, but lost this relevance later when the secretariat became operative. Biodiversity depletion is a problem hardly visible or salient. At the same time, it is highly complex and costly to regulate, since it is difficult to define interests and many problems are regulated elsewhere; for example, under the International Whaling Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, or even the World Trade Organization.

A special case is the environmental division of the secretariat of the International Maritime Organization (see Campe 2009). While the regulation of shipping through standards for safety and environmental protection is not one of the most salient and most costly political controversies in world politics, the specific structure of shipping governance of the IMO creates a political context in which governments and other political actors most active in shipping have the strongest formal and informal influence on decision making. This includes both the major shipping nations and representatives from all shipping and trading nations that are

more favorable to shipping as opposed to environmental interests, notably representatives from transport and trade ministries, from national maritime agencies, from industry, and from semi-public shipping agencies. For these actors, the protection of low-cost free maritime transport and the threat of costly environmental regulation have high priority, and consequently, the room for maneuver of the environmental department within the IMO secretariat was small.

Polity

In addition to the structure of the particular policy area in which they operate, we have analyzed the extent to which the autonomous influence of international bureaucracies is shaped by their legal, institutional, and financial framework. We describe this framework as the "polity" within which the staff of bureaucracies is forced to act. In the domestic context, this framework is defined by the government of a country, often the legislative bodies that enact new laws, policies, and programs and that allocate resources, both of which determine the degree of freedom of bureaucratic actors. For international bureaucracies, the principals are usually governments. Governments keep some control in different forms. In the case of full-fledged international organizations such as the World Bank, governments are formally members of the organization and set the polity through their participation in the general assembly of the organization or in its governing council, executive boards, or commissions. In the case of treaty secretariats, governments shape the polity framework through negotiating the constituting legal agreement and establishing the related legal, institutional, and organizational frameworks for their implementation through the conference of the parties to the treaty.

With our research team we have analyzed in nine case studies in what ways this polity affected the autonomous influence of international bureaucracies. The focus was on 1) legal and institutional frameworks, including the mandate of the bureaucracy, 2) financial and material resources, and 3) the organizational embedding of the bureaucracy in larger settings.

Most strikingly, our work revealed several instances in which the formal legal and institutional setting of international bureaucracies was quite similar, yet with no noteworthy explanatory power regarding the autonomous influence of the bureaucracy. The comparison of the four secretariats with their comparable legal, institutional, and financial framework, in particular between the climate and the desertification secretariats, illustrates this best. However, the formal competences of the environmental departments of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the IMO are also comparable, yet with surprisingly different degrees and types of influence.

The finding is similar to the limited relevance of financial and material resources of international bureaucracies. Public discourse often maintains that organizational influence increases, maybe even proportionally, with an increase in available resources. However, several analyses within management studies have shown that a more generous allocation of resources does not necessarily correlate with increases in organizational influence (see Goodman and Pennings 1977; Cameron and Whetten 1983; Rojas 2000). Our work supports this claim: More or less financial and material resources are not necessarily a strong predictor for the degree and type of autonomous influence of an international bureaucracy in global environmental governance except for extreme varying cases.

Material and personnel resources of three of the four treaty secretariats studied here, for example, are comparable, but the kind and degree of their influence seem unrelated to this fact. The observed variation among the secretariats thus requires other explanatory factors.

Also, in the other comparable cases analyzed in this study, where the difference in financial and material resources was sizeable yet not overwhelming, money has not been a strong predictor of influence. An unsurprising exception is the World Bank with its enormous financial resources and staff that includes academic research divisions and a wide global dissemination network (see Marschinski and Behrle 2009). The World Bank has thus a much larger autonomous influence than all other bureaucracies studied here, and in a sense, its autonomy even stems from its size that makes interference from governments more difficult. Overall, however, we concluded that there is no clear link between the availability of funds and the autonomous influence of bureaucracies.

Interestingly, the polity of an international bureaucracy seems to shape the type of its influence with respect to the overall embedding in larger organizational structures. Single-issue bureaucracies are in this respect less problematic, such as the climate or ozone secretariats, which operate exclusively in a more or less clear-cut political arena. Yet the problem of fit becomes more important for multi-issue organizations and their secretariats. A striking example in this study has been the environmental department of the IMO secretariat (Campe 2009). For a variety of historical and functional reasons, the regulation of environmental pollution from maritime transport falls under the IMO, which was originally set up for the negotiation and implementation of maritime safety standards. Historically and institutionally, environmental regulation has been a late add-on in the IMO secretariat, which remains dominated by a staff with technical backgrounds in shipping. This institutional embedding of marine environmental policy in a larger technical, non-environmental bureaucracy has resulted in a domination of environmental interests through non-environmental interests or, in other words, in a framing of environmental concerns and problems in a technical, industry-oriented way. Environmental policy in the IMO secretariat thus remains an uphill struggle, and even the civil servants working in the environment department usually have backgrounds in non-environmental fields, such as engineering and maritime law. One could speak here of a problem of fit between environmental concern and organizational setting, or, conversely, of a form of organizational "policy capture" of the smaller environmental concern in the larger technically focused IMO secretariat and organization.

The case of the environmental department of the World Bank is similar to the IMO case, with environmental concerns here being integrated within, and dominated by, the overarching organizational and discourse context of development economics and the Bank's core function of project financing (see Marschinski and Behrle 2009). The environmental directorate of the OECD secretariat in this respect likens the environmental department of the World Bank (see Busch 2009a). The biodiversity secretariat is a counterexample. Here the environmental problem is not clear-cut, but also covers core concerns of other actors, notably the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, or, as a crosscutting concern, the overarching UN organization. Linking the biodiversity secretariat to the UNEP has in this case guaranteed that the secretariat evolved into an essentially environmental actor with an organizational paradigm and staff that place central emphasis on environmental protection as its core business (see Rosendal and Andresen 2003; Siebenhüner 2009). This is similar to the situation of the ozone secretariat, which has been closely integrated into the UNEP, which made it essentially an environmentally oriented small bureaucracy. Here, one counterfactual is that the issue of phasing out industrially manufactured ozone-depleting substances could have been integrated into the work program of the UN Organization for Industrial Development. It is most likely that the type of bureaucracy would have evolved differently than through integration in the UNEP. Likewise, we found

that the particular organizational embedding of the Global Environment Facility between significantly larger and more influential agencies gave its secretariat little room for maneuver and for the development of autonomous policies and positions (Andler 2009).

People and procedures

In addition to the factors of our theoretical model described here, we found that a large part of variation in the degree and type of influence of international bureaucracies can be explained by internal factors of bureaucracies, the "people" and "procedures." The relevance of these internal factors has been overlooked or neglected by much previous research that in fact often treated international bureaucracies as black boxes. A focus on the peoples and procedures (and, at the theoretical level, on organizational theories of management studies) allows an explanation of variation in the influence of bureaucracies that are otherwise largely comparable in their mandate, function, and membership. With the overall problem structure and the institutional polity of a bureaucracy, it is its leadership and staff that shape its policies, programs, and activities, and eventually its autonomous influence. We distinguish three factors: organizational expertise, organizational culture, and leadership.

First, the function of international bureaucracies as knowledge brokers requires a knowledge base within the bureaucracy itself. All bureaucracies that we studied have effective systems of generating, collecting, selecting, processing, and distributing knowledge. In most cases, this included analytical expertise in the scientific fields related to the bureaucracy's policy problems; for example, on scientific questions of biodiversity loss, technical expertise to understand existing technologies that cause or might solve the problems, institutional expertise on how to combat the problem effectively, including knowledge on processes and suitable institutional arrangements, and often also legal expertise—for example, on options for designing international treaties or domestic regulation that often go beyond the expertise of government representatives. Overall, the comparison of all nine bureaucracies studied reveals that the more expertise a bureaucracy could build up over time, the larger its cognitive influence eventually became.

While the general relation between expertise and cognitive influence holds for all cases, our work also reveals additional conditions for the bureaucratic expertise to influence and shape discourses and debates. Technocratic and environmentalist bureaucracies of our sample predominantly excel through the neutrality of their expertise. When they accomplish an integration of almost all relevant opinions and pieces of knowledge, governments and other stakeholders are more willing to draw on the work of the international bureaucracy. This is ensured in most cases through a broad representation of stakeholders. In the case of the UNEP-co-initiated Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the inclusion of numerous researchers from the South helped many of them to accept its results (see Agrawala 1998; Biermann 2002). Likewise, the World Bank-initiated World Commission on Dams ensured the representation of most relevant stakeholder groups. Its results influenced World Bank decisions on dam projects and its capacity-building efforts in this field (see Dingwerth 2005). By contrast, the desertification secretariat acted more as a partisan actor than as a neutral facilitator. Through communication that was often perceived as partisan by Northern governments, and through the organization of a controversial high-level segment of a conference of the parties in Cuba, this bureaucracy lost significant support, in particular with rich donor countries (Bauer 2006b).

Second, the case studies revealed that organizational culture, quite often rather neglected in political science and international relations research, plays a powerful role in determining

the type, but also to some extent the degree of autonomous influence of international bureaucracies. We defined organizational culture as the set of commonly shared basic assumptions in an international bureaucracy that result from previous learning and that include professional cultures and backgrounds of staff. We found that while some bureaucracies have a high diversity of staff and professional cultures, others were more homogeneous. This situation has partially shaped the particular direction of the cognitive and normative influence of the respective bureaucracies.

For instance, the World Bank is the prototype of a rather homogeneous staff and professional culture that is dominated by neoclassically trained economists. This has given the World Bank a high influence in those communities that draw on neoclassical economics, yet might also have limited the overall cognitive and normative influence of the Bank since it became so closely associated with one perspective on problems and solutions (see Marschinski and Behrle 2009). The OECD environment directorate resembles the World Bank in the respect of a strong emphasis on environmental economics in hiring policies, yet to a lesser degree because it also has many former members of national agencies and ministries with backgrounds in law, science, or public policy in its ranks (see Busch 2009a). The secretariat of the IMO is also dominated by one particular culture and staff composition, in this case a culture of professionals with a seafaring and naval background. This has led to a perspective of problems and solutions that focus on technical measures in shipbuilding rather than on the human impacts on marine ecosystems. Even the environment department of the IMO secretariat is dominated not by staff with an environmental background, but by shipping experts and engineers. Again, this has heavily determined the direction of the influence of the IMO environment department as a technocratic servant of shipping nations.

By contrast, the UNEP secretariat and most treaty secretariats are marked by high diversity of their workforce with natural scientists, lawyers, social scientists, and administrators combined. This has prevented these bureaucracies from developing a particular professional culture associated with a particular discipline or perspective. However, it is notable that both the UNEP secretariat and the treaty secretariats are essentially staffed with experts on, and interest in, *environmental* issues, which makes environmental protection one key common theme in the overall professional cultures of these bureaucracies. The desertification secretariat is different because here, the autonomy granted by principals, given the low priority of the issue, allowed for the autonomous development of a particular *political* professional culture that made this secretariat evolve into an activist bureaucracy with a clear South-oriented political agenda, quite different from the more technocratic, restrained climate secretariat.

Third and finally, our work revealed that the particular type of leadership of a bureaucracy leaves its marks on its autonomous influence. Even though governments as principals eventually select the chief civil servant at the helm of most bureaucracies studied, this person can evolve, if charisma, vision, and leadership skills allow for it, into a powerful autonomous factor in the governance of the issue area. This is more so since the leader at the helm of a bureaucracy shapes the other internal factors that have been discussed earlier, namely organizational expertise, procedures, and cultures. The commitment and work ethics of the rank and file, indeed a bureaucracy's corporate identity, generally correlate with leadership. The key distinction that we make, based on management theory, is between a "strong" and "weak" leader of international bureaucracies. We define strong leadership as a style that is charismatic, visionary, and popular, as well as flexible and reflexive. This distinction refers to the intellectual means to influence negotiations as well as the skills to use negotiations for one's own interest. Our empirical data show that such a form of strong leadership matters and correlates with the stronger autonomous external influence of the bureaucracy. For instance,

both UNEP and the World Bank have been led by rather strong leaders in the past five to ten years. Both leaders initiated structural reforms in their bureaucracies and at the same time gained an international reputation in pursuing environmental policies.

Conclusion

What can be concluded from this research toward other policy fields? First, our studies have shown that international bureaucracies with similar mandates, resources, and functions vary in both the degree and type of their influence. Our second key contribution to the theory of international relations is thus that institutional arrangements and designs matter less than was to be expected. We explain this through proposing a theoretical model that combines explanatory factors at the macro level (the problem structure) and at the micro level (the peoples and procedures of a given bureaucracy). The core outcome of this project is that the macro level (the structure of the problem) and the micro level (the people and procedures) are more relevant for the explanation of variation in autonomous influence than the meso level of the polity; that is, the legal, institutional, and financial framework.

This proposition does not go so far as to argue that the institutional context at the meso level is completely irrelevant. Once bureaucracies differ in their institutional and financial framework in fundamental aspects, institutional frameworks might well be a core explanatory factor in explaining variation in influence. Extremely large bureaucracies with a very far-reaching mandate will in absolute terms always be more influential than small bureaucracies such as treaty secretariats.

Second, the examples studied in this chapter reflect the dynamics of international environmental governance with its decentralized actor structure. There is no single anchor organization that dominates the entire policy field as in the case of international health issues or trade policies, but a diversity of small and larger secretariats for the individual treaties. Even though our research has shown that size and resources are not the only determinants of influence, it is likely that a more centralized international body could be more influential than myriad small bureaucracies. However, even small and innovative bureaucracies with strong leadership and expertise can have significant effects in international governance processes in general.

Third, we conclude that it is not only the 'international organizations' that have autonomous influence, as many recent international relations studies propose (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 2004). It is the *bureaucracies* within these international organizations, their staff and leaders and the way they structure their work that matter. On a theoretical level, therefore, further progress in understanding the role of international bureaucracies in world politics requires a stronger focus on those academic disciplines that analyze organizational behavior, namely management studies and organizational theory, but also anthropology and cultural studies.

Recommended for further reading

Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009), and Biermann and Pattberg (2012).

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12

International bureaucracy

Organizational structure and behavioural implications[1]

Jarle Trondal

International bureaucracies consist of the permanent secretariats of international organizations (IOs). They are organizationally separate from the general assemblies (councils of ministers) of IOs and have formal autonomy vis-à-vis the member-states, often codified in staff regulations. International bureaucracies typically have fixed locations, have a formalized division of labour vis-à-vis the general assembly, hold regular meetings, and are staffed mostly with permanent personnel recruited on the principle of merit, sometimes supplemented with a more flexible set of contracted temporary staff. One essential element is that the staff have taken an oath of undivided and primary loyalty towards the international bureaucracy. With respect to formal organization, they are vertically specialized bureaucracies, often with an administrative leader at the top. The European Commission (Commission) differs from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) secretariats by having its political leadership organized outside the Council of Ministers, thus being formally independent of member-state preferences and the inherited intergovernmental order.

Studies suggest that international bureaucracies change world politics (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009), affect power distributions across levels of government (Egeberg and Trondal 2009) and transform domestic democratic governance (Keohane et al. 2009). There is a growing body of comparative studies of the internal dynamics of international bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Checkel 2007; Gould and Kelman 1970; Mouritzen 1990; Rochester 1986). Nevertheless, existing research is inconclusive regarding the extent to which and how the bureaucratic structure of international bureaucracies shape the basic behavioural logics of the staff. One reason for this may be the gulf that exists between social science sub-disciplines, such as public administration and organization sciences (March 2009), and comparative public administration scholarship and IO literature (Heady 1998: 33; Jörgens et al. 2009; Trondal et al. 2010). This chapter contributes to the growing international bureaucracy literature by assessing the relationship between bureaucratic structure and administrative behaviour. It addresses two research questions: 1) To what extent do international civil servants abide by a logic of hierarchy within international bureaucracies, thus challenging an inherent logic of portfolio? and 2) Does a logic of hierarchy profoundly

penetrate international bureaucracies, or does it merely occur at the executive centre (within the presidential offices and general secretariats) of these bureaucracies?

The chapter compares two enduring behavioural patterns within bureaucratic organizations: a logic of hierarchy and a logic of portfolio. A *behavioural logic of hierarchy* suggests that international civil servants upgrade common agendas, coordinate actions of sub-units, abide by steering signals from 'above', downplay inter-service conflicts and turf wars, reduce sub-unit allegiances and emphasize the concerns and considerations of the executive centre. By contrast, a *behavioural logic of portfolio* envisages informed decisions and due administrative practices, emphasizes divergent agendas, coordinates action within sub-units rather than across them, and emphasizes sub-unit signals, concerns and considerations and staff loyalty towards sub-units. These behavioural logics highlight competing understandings of bureaucratic organization, administrative behaviour and bureaucratic change (Aberbach et al. 1981; Wilson 1989). Balancing these logics confronts a classical dilemma in bureaucratic organizations between instrumental design and executive centre formation on the one hand, and bureaucratic differentiation and sub-unit autonomy on the other. Governance inside international bureaucracies is ultimately influenced by how trade-offs between these behavioural logics are balanced by individual officials.

Building on a very different systems design, the chapter compares the two behavioural logics within three seemingly different IOs. It explores the extent to which international bureaucracies combine the two behavioural logics, and suggests that four conventional wisdoms or claims in existing research should be modified. The unit of analysis is individual civil servants: the actors that ultimately make international bureaucracies act. Officials in three selected international bureaucracies – the Commission administration, the WTO Secretariat and the OECD Secretariat – are chosen for study.

Four conventional claims in existing research

The first conventional claim in current literature is that the legal mandates of IOs, codified in their founding treaties, profoundly shape the administrative behaviour of staff within international bureaucracies (Curtin 2009). The *modus operandi* of international bureaucracies is causally explained by their legal status, which represents binding instructions and mandates (Yataganas 2001). International bureaucracies with a wide range of legal responsibilities are assumed to act more independently of member-states than international bureaucracies with few delegated provisions (Rittberger and Zangl 2006: 11). The data presented here, however, suggest that legal mandates have little explanatory potential with respect to administrative behaviour among international civil servants. Despite massive differences in the range of legal responsibilities delegated to the three bureaucracies studied, they act on the basis of fairly similar behavioural logics. Whereas the Commission has been delegated large proportions of exclusive legal competences in a wide area of policies, the OECD and WTO secretariats have been delegated fairly few provisions in few policy sectors. The behavioural logics observed here are thus not associated with variation in the legal competences and the ranges of responsibilities delegated to international bureaucracies.

A second claim in the literature suggests that the organizational capacities of IOs may explain the administrative behaviour of bureaucratic staff. Small international bureaucracies are assumed to be less able to act independently of member-states than large ones which have more administrative staff at their disposal (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009). However, contrary to this claim, our data illuminate that the size of international bureaucracies is not a key explanation of variation in the behavioural logics of international civil servants. Despite

the Commission being 12 times larger than the WTO Secretariat with respect to the number of A-grade staff, both show a portfolio logic to the same extent.

A third conventional claim is that the administrative behaviour of staff is profoundly shaped by the IOs in which they are embedded (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). International bureaucracies embedded in intergovernmental IOs are assumed to be less likely to act independently of member-states than those within supranational IOs. This claim rests on the assumption that there is no clear-cut distinction between IOs and their bureaucratic apparatus. Focus is placed on the interplay of states within IO general assemblies rather than on the back-stage activities of the secretariats (Rochester 1986). In some research, attention is directed at studying why states delegate power to IOs, the voting behaviour of states in general assemblies, the role of great leaders of international bureaucracies (Chesterman 2007; Cox 1969: 202; Rochester 1986) and the reform and change of IOs (Bauer and Knill 2007; Mathiason 2007; Xu and Weller 2008: 35). The data presented here, however, suggest that international bureaucracies seem to act fairly independently of the IO in which they are embedded. Three international bureaucracies embedded in three different IOs are shown to be equally driven by a portfolio logic. A larger variation in administrative behaviour is observed within, rather than between, international bureaucracies. What is surprising is not the observation of a portfolio logic, but the fact that the same behavioural logic is observed to the same extent within three bureaucracies embedded in seemingly different IOs.

A final claim is that bureaucratic staff are profoundly re-socialized by their international bureaucracy (Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007). Recent research has made a 'constructivist turn' and rediscovered processes of actor socialization, complex learning and cognitive framing of norms and rules (Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007; Trondal 2007). International bureaucracies are seen as having the potential for socialization of actors. This potential is assumed to be positively related to the duration and intensity of interaction amongst organizational members. Intensive in-group contact and interaction are assumed to be conducive to the emergence of relatively stable networks that shape the behavioural logics of international civil servants. The data presented here, however, suggest that administrative behaviour among international civil servants is profoundly conditioned by the bureaucratic structures of international bureaucracies and not by socialization processes. Two aspects of bureaucratic structure condition the variation in the two behavioural logics introduced earlier: the accumulation of relevant organizational capacities at the executive centre of international bureaucracies; and the vertical and horizontal specializations of these bureaucracies.

An organizational theory approach

This section offers an organizational theory approach to account for variation in administrative behaviour. Formal organizations offer codified and normative structures for incumbents. In order to understand the process whereby actors adopt particular behaviours and roles, one has to unpack the normative structures embedded in these organizational principles and the underlying logic of action. The mechanism supporting an organizational approach is based on the bounded rationality and computational limitations of actors (March 2008). Formal organizations provide cognitive and normative shortcuts and categories that simplify and guide actors' choices of behaviour and roles (Simon 1957). Organizations provide frames for storing experiences, cognitive maps categorizing complex information, procedures for reducing transaction costs, regulative norms that add cues for appropriate behaviour, and physical boundaries and temporal rhythms that guide actors' perceptions of relevance with respect to administrative behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; March 2010; March and

Olsen 1998). Organizations also discriminate between conflicts that should be attended to and conflicts that should be de-emphasized (Egeberg 2006). By organizing civil servants into permanent bureaucracies within IOs, a system of 'rule followers and role players' is established relatively independently of the domestic branch of the executive government (March and Olsen 1998: 952). From an organizational theory approach, three hypotheses are derived on the relationship between bureaucratic structure and administrative behaviour:

H1 Behavioural logics are likely to vary systematically according to the *vertical* specialization of international bureaucracies. In particular, administrative capacity building within executive centres is positively associated with a logic of hierarchy among staff members.

H2 Behavioural logics are likely to vary systematically according to the *horizontal* specialization (by purpose and process) of international bureaucracies. In particular, whereas the principle of process may encourage a logic of hierarchy, the principle of purpose is conducive to a logic of portfolio among staff members.

H3 *Organizational compatibility* across bureaucratic sub-units is positively associated with a logic of hierarchy among staff members.

The first two hypotheses suggest that the organizational structure of international bureaucracies profoundly mediates the behavioural logics of international civil servants. One proxy of the *vertical specialization* of bureaucratic organizations is the formal rank of personnel. Officials within different formal ranks are likely to employ different behaviour and have different role perceptions. Arguably, officials in top rank positions are more likely to evoke a logic of hierarchy than officials in bottom rank positions. The latter group is more likely to enact a logic of portfolio (Mayntz 1999: 84).

The Commission administration, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat are all vertically specialized bureaucratic organizations. Vertical specialization fosters the potential for disciplining and controlling civil servants by administrative command and individual incentive systems like salary, promotion and rotation (Egeberg 2003), and are likely to have a stronger impact on incumbents' behavioural and role perceptions than less vertically specialized international bureaucracies (Bennett and Oliver 2002: 425; Egeberg 2003: 137; Knight 1970). The relative administrative capacity existing within executive centres may account for variation in the extent to which a logic of hierarchy guides civil servants. As shown later, the administrative capacity at the helm of the Commission is significantly larger than those of the OECD Secretariat and particularly the WTO Secretariat. There are some key mechanisms through which the Commission may coordinate the services by hierarchy. Most notable are the principle of collegiality as expressed by the College of Commissioners, the coordinating role of the Secretariat-General, and the weekly meetings of directors-general, chefs de cabinets and deputy chefs de cabinets (Christiansen 2008: 75–6). Furthermore, the Commission has introduced new management techniques including a more linear career structure, promotion linked to merit and obligatory mobility among the staff. A second key element in recent management reforms in the Commission has been the creation of a new appraisal system: the Career Development Reviews (Trondal et al. 2010). In summary, the Commission has arguably accumulated an administrative capacity imposing a logic of hierarchy on the staff to a far greater extent than other international bureaucracies (Bennett and Oliver 2002: 425; Knight 1970) (Hypothesis 1).

Within the *horizontal specialization* of bureaucratic organizations, the department and unit structures are typically specialized according to two conventional principles: purpose and process (Gulick 1937). Cox and Jacobson (1973) saw organizational similarities between the

domestic branch of executive government and international bureaucracies. Similarly, Wagenen (1971: 5, original emphasis) has argued that the '*similarities* overwhelm the differences between national and international administration'. Formal organizations may be specialized by the major *purpose* served, such as research, health or food safety. This principle of organization tends to activate patterns of cooperation and conflict among incumbents along sectoral (portfolio) divisions. Arguably, organization by major purpose served is likely to bias behavioural logics towards a portfolio logic. This mode of horizontal specialization results in a less than adequate horizontal coordination across organizational units and a better coordination within them (Ansell 2004: 237). The Commission's Directorate-General (DG) and unit structure is a prominent example of this horizontal principle of specialization. The Commission is a horizontally pillarized system of government specialized by purpose where DGs enjoy relative autonomy vis-à-vis other sub-units and the executive helm (Trondal 2008). A similar horizontal specialization is prevalent in the OECD and WTO secretariats (Trondal et al. 2010). Because officials spend most of their time and energy in organizational sub-units, they are expected to make affective ties primarily towards their sub-unit (Ashford and Johnson 2001: 36). Subsequently, international bureaucrats embedded in trade departments (e.g. the Commission's DG Trade) are most likely to activate a portfolio logic (Hypothesis 2).

A second principle of horizontal specialization present within most bureaucratic organizations is the principle of the major *process* utilized, such as translation, general secretariat, administration, legal services or personnel services (Gulick 1937). This principle encourages the horizontal integration of functional departments and the disintegration of the major purposes served. General secretariats typically have horizontal tasks of coordinating bureaucratic sub-units and vertically integrating the executive centre and subordinated units. These organizational functions are likely to foster horizontally oriented behavioural perceptions among incumbents because their portfolios cover larger terrains of the bureaucracy. Thus, organization by major process is conducive to a logic of hierarchy vis-à-vis 'subordinated' units (e.g. the Commission's DG Trade). Officials in general secretariats are expected to develop inter-unit preferences, roles and loyalties by activating a 'helicopter view' of the international bureaucracy. Within the Commission, the Secretariat-General illustrates the process principle, as it aims to integrate the policy DGs into one coherent political secretariat for the College. Equivalent units exist in the OECD and WTO secretariats, although with far fewer organizational capacities available (Hypothesis 2).

Whereas organizational duplication is often regarded as costly and redundant (e.g. Commission 1999: 52), it may also be viewed as an organizational device against decisional errors within organizational sub-units (Landau 1969). It is argued here that *organizational compatibility* may strengthen the capacity for executive centres to penetrate bureaucratic sub-units. Reflecting the vertical specialization of bureaucratic organizations, studies demonstrate that agency officials exercise their discretion relatively insulated from ongoing political processes at cabinet level (Egeberg 2003; Wood and Waterman 1991). Agency officials tend to have relatively little contact with the political leadership of their respective ministries, ministerial departments other than their parent department, and parliament. Most typically they tend to prioritize professional considerations over political concerns, and they also usually assign more weight to user and clientele concerns than to signals from executive politicians. This loss of political control over organizational sub-units can be partly compensated for by strengthening relevant organizational units in the respective ministerial departments (Egeberg and Trondal 2009). Similarly, within international bureaucracies, organizational compatibility, if established, between the executive centre (e.g. the Commission's Secretariat-General) and bureaucratic sub-units (the Commission's policy

DGs) would augment the potential for a logic of hierarchy to be evoked among staff in the sub-units, thus offering the executive centre privileged access to, and influence over, bureaucratic sub-units (Hypothesis 3).

Empirical observations

The empirical observations benefit from synchronized comparative studies of permanent and temporary officials in the Commission and the WTO and OECD secretariats. The study is synchronized in the sense that the same interview guide applies to all three bureaucracies and with respect to the selection of administrative sub-units within each bureaucracy. The interviews were semi-directed, using a standardized interview guide that was applied flexibly during interviews. The questions posed in the interviews were directed at measuring the logics of hierarchy and portfolio. The proxies applied were contact patterns, coordination behaviour, conflict patterns, and role and identity perceptions. The key questions were: 'With whom do you regularly interact at work?'; 'Does your nationality or the nationality of your colleagues "matter" with respect to your daily work?'; 'Has an *esprit de corps* developed within your unit/division?'; 'To what extent do you identify with or feel a personal attachment towards the following institutions?'; and 'What kind of roles do you regularly emphasize at work?'. The interviews were carried out in Brussels, Geneva and Paris in 2006 and 2007. All interviews were taped and fully transcribed.

Interviewees were selected in order to maximize variation in the independent variables. First, two administrative sub-units were selected to measure the effect of *horizontal specialization*: trade units were selected as bureaucratic sub-units specialized horizontally by *purpose*, while general secretariats were chosen as a bureaucratic structure horizontally specialized according to the principle of *process*. These bureaucratic units, however, also offer variation in *vertical specialization*, with the general secretariat representing the bureaucratic centre of international bureaucracies and the trade units representing policy portfolios. To further measure the effect of hierarchy, interviewees were carefully selected from different levels of rank, although only among officials at the A-level who are primarily involved in policy-making activities. Finally, trade units and general secretariats were also used to gauge the impact of *organizational compatibility* across bureaucratic sub-units. Note that the chapter merely uses the selected cases as illustrative devices to illuminate tensions between the two behavioural logics within international bureaucracies.

In addition to interviews with permanent officials (see Table 12.1), interviews with temporary officials were also included. Having an ambiguous affiliation to the organization,

Table 12.1 List of interviewees among permanent officials by formal rank

	Top Managers	Middle Managers	Desk Officials	Total
	(directors-general, deputy directors-general or equivalent)	(directors, heads of unit, deputies or equivalent)	(advisors, counsellors, case handlers, analysts, officers or equivalent)	
Commission	1	9	14	24
OECD Secretariat	0	10	18	28
WTO Secretariat	2	4	13	19
Total	3	23	45	71

Table 12.2 Number of Interviewees by Administrative Unit

	Trade Units	General Secretariats	Other Units	Total
Commission:				
Permanent officials	18	6	0	24
Temporary officials	0	0	50	50
OECD Secretariat	16	12	0	28
WTO Secretariat	19	0	0	19
Total	53	18	50	121

temporary officials represent a crucial case example of the effects of bureaucratic structure on administrative behaviour. This study benefits from three separate but highly coordinated studies of Commission secondees. The first study consists mainly of Swedish, Danish and Norwegian secondees (Trondal 2006). Based on similar methodology, this study was replicated twice on secondees from the Netherlands (see Trondal et al. 2008 for the original data). These data include three in–depth qualitative interview studies (N = 50) on secondees. Despite covering only a minor selection of Commission secondees, the organizational approach outlined here does not predict significant variation in behavioural logics between secondees of different national origin (Trondal et al. 2008). Table 12.2 offers the total overview of interviews.

The logic of hierarchy in the Commission and the OECD and WTO Secretariats

The Commission

Within the Commission a logic of hierarchy has been observed at several points in its history, notably during the presidencies of Jean Monnet and Jaques Delors. 'At the end of Delors' ten-year tenure at the helm of the commission its potential for political leadership . . . had been demonstrated conclusively' (Christiansen 2008: 63). Essentially, however, the power base of these presidents and their policy initiatives were not safeguarded through organizational capacity building within the Commission. Decades earlier a relative downgrading of bureaucratic organization was also observed throughout the Monnet presidency. Monnet had the vision of great leadership from the top of the EU executive, with assistance from a small and flexible expert administration consisting of seconded national officials (Duchêne 1994), but he did not envision a permanent bureaucracy as inherent in Western democracies. By contrast, Commission President Walter Hallstein (1958–67) designed the Commission into a bureaucratic organization (Loth and Bitsch 2007: 58). Most of the powers were left to the policy DGs and fairly little to the command centre of the College and the Secretariat-General. This section substantiates that the Commission administration has recently experienced substantial capacity building around the president and the Secretariat-General, accompanying a relative strengthened logic of hierarchy among Secretariat-General officials.

During the last decade, the Commission has aimed to 'presidentialize' itself, notably making the Secretariat-General into an administrative command centre for the president. Presidentialization contains two ingredients: increased steering and coordination ambitions, and a concentration of power resources around the president. Ambitions to presidentialize the

Commission are documented by all our interviewees in the Secretariat-General and by President José Manuel Barroso himself (2009: 37). Regarding executive capacity building, the power base of previous Commission presidents Monnet and Delors was largely based on their *personal* capacities, convictions and successes, and on a dedicated inner circle of directors-general, cabinet members and commissioners (Duchêne 1994; Ross 1995). Similarly, the Secretariat-General has been considered the powerhouse of the Commission throughout its history, largely due to Emile Noël, the man who held the post of secretary-general from 1958 to 1987 (Kassim 2006). By contrast, the increased presidentialization of the Barroso Commission is perhaps primarily associated with organizational capacity building inside the Commission, aimed at making the Secretariat-General a steering and coordinating centre of the Commission services. In 2012, it employed 466 officials, of whom 208 were at the A-level (Statistical Bulletin of Commission Staff 2012).

One interesting organizational remedy that has been launched is to install organizational compatibility between the Secretariat-General and the policy DGs. While the Commission (1999) previously considered organizational compatibility as costly and redundant, it is increasingly viewed as a solution to portfolio autonomy. Organizational compatibility across the Secretariat-General and policy DGs is claimed to ease mutual communication and understanding between the Secretariat-General and the respective policy DGs. In an effort to get policy DGs to comply with certain parts of the 'Kinnock reform' package, specialized units ('cells') were installed within the policy DGs to deal specifically with the reform contents offered by the Secretariat-General (Barzelay and Jacobsen 2009: 326). In effect, organizational compatibility between the Secretariat-General and policy DGs ensures that the logic of hierarchy more easily penetrates the policy DGs. As a consequence, Barroso was reported as being 'determined to provide "political guidance" to the institution' (Kurpas et al. 2008: 32). Concomitantly, comparing the number of proposals prepared under the direct responsibility of Prodi and Barroso, Kurpas et al. (2008: 33) report that Barroso has been overwhelmingly more active. Essential to my argument is that this activism is associated with organizational capacity building at the centre of the Commission administration.

The presidentialization of the Commission administration, however, only supplements the horizontal specialization and 'siloization' of the services, which are increasingly echoed in the College, where Commissioners have become less collegial and more portfolio-oriented over time (Joana and Smith 2004; Kurpas et al. 2008). The non-portfolio logic observed in previous studies seems increasingly weakened in the College. This is reflected in College meetings, the relationship between Commissioners and their DGs, and the development of direct links between Commissioners and 'their' agencies (Groenleer 2009: 130). One implication is an increased presidential role in the horizontal coordination of Commission portfolios. Several respondents describe the coordinating role of the Secretariat-General as increasingly presidential. The vast majority of Secretariat-General interviewees report that the Secretariat-General is an emergent executive power base of the president. The increased presidentialization seems to be caused partly by the increased *organizational capacities* of the Secretariat-General, partly by the personal ambitions of Barroso, and partly by the *horizontal specialization* of the Secretariat-General.

The OECD Secretariat

The General Secretariat of the Office of the OECD Secretary-General consists of approximately 40 A-level officials. Due to the relatively weak administrative capacities at the executive centre of the Secretariat, a logic of hierarchy is largely absent among Secretariat

staff. The organization of the Secretariat into directorates, teams and individual dossiers is reflected in the perceptions reported by most interviewees. The Secretariat, however, combines horizontal specialization into separate 'silos' with organizational structures that safeguard coordination and cooperation across directorates. In order to safeguard inter-service cooperation, the Secretariat is largely organized into horizontal teams that build bridges across directorates. However, the main organizational principle inside the Secretariat is that of individual dossiers (purpose). The horizontal portfolio organization also accompanies contact patterns that go across directorates and teams with compatible dossiers.

In addition to the horizontal purpose specialization, and similar to the Commission, the OECD Secretariat also includes horizontal process-organized units. Such units have a horizontal coordination function within the Secretariat by providing services of different kinds, such as computer and legal services. OECD officials embedded in units specialized by process tend to evoke a 'helicopter view' of the Secretariat.

The horizontal specialization of the Secretariat mobilizes biases within the contact patterns of the staff. However, the vertical hierarchy in the Secretariat receives most attention among a majority of the interviewees. Contacts within the Secretariat tend to follow the vertical hierarchy. Most OECD officials consider the 'middle managers' (see Table 12.1) as key actors in the hierarchy. At the executive centre of the OECD Secretariat, however, the secretary-general and deputy secretaries-general seem to be less important in the everyday running of the directorates and teams.

The WTO Secretariat

In the WTO Secretariat a logic of hierarchy is largely absent. The WTO has virtually no general secretariat, but the director-general has a cabinet of handpicked civil servants. This Secretariat is a fairly small international bureaucracy with comparatively weak capacities at its administrative centre. One implication is that the behavioural perceptions of WTO officials are less strongly guided by a logic of hierarchy. Interviewees report that the director-general clearly is powerful and that the deputy directors-general do have formal powers but are only modestly involved in the Secretariat's everyday activities. The director level is also described as having fairly weak hierarchical control mechanisms and giving few direct instructions to WTO officials who, in effect, have a fairly large room for manoeuvre. Weak administrative capacities at the top of the WTO administration render informal communication across organizational bureaucratic sub-units fairly easy.

The horizontal and vertical specialization of the Secretariat accompanies mainly portfolio contact patterns, coordination behaviour and divisions of conflict among the personnel. As a reflection of the Secretariat's horizontal specialization, most of the interviewees report being primarily oriented towards their unit and portfolio. Although the Secretariat is mainly specialized according to purpose, some divisions are also organized by process. The interviewees report that horizontal specialization by process accompanies inter-service contacts across units, whereas organization by purpose accompanies a portfolio logic. Even at the level of deputy director-general, portfolios seldom cross-cut the sub-units of the organization.

The data suggest that the portfolio logic among WTO officials is associated with the Secretariat's horizontal specialization, which allows more *intra*-unit contact and coordination than *inter*-unit patterns of collaboration. Moreover, the purpose specialization of the WTO Secretariat fosters a 'silo logic' among the personnel. In addition to the horizontal specialization of the WTO into divisions, the organizational structure is supplemented with teams and projects.

The logic of portfolio in the Commission and the OECD and WTO Secretariats

The Commission

Reflecting the horizontal specialization of the Commission administration, predicted variation with regard to a logic of portfolio is observed between the Secretariat-General and DG Trade officials. Whereas most officials in the Secretariat-General agree that they adopt a 'helicopter view' of the Commission's work, officials in DG Trade mostly emphasize 'silo thinking' and focus on trade issues. This variation reflects the specialization of the Secretariat-General as a process–organized DG on 'top' of the Commission apparatus, while DG Trade represents a purpose–organized DG with a strong sector focus. The steering ambitions of the Secretariat-General sometimes exceed its steering capacities. Its horizontal interlocking role tends to collide with the organizational structure of policy DGs. DG Trade officials confirm the ambitions within the Secretariat-General to coordinate the Commission services. However, officials in DG Trade report focusing primarily on intra-DG coordination. One effect of the horizontal specialization of the services is the emergence of an individualization of policy formulation within separate portfolios (Bauer 2009: 68).

A logic of hierarchy in the Commission seems largely prevented by the horizontal specialization of the DGs. 'Silo thinking' is organizationally vested within the Commission services. The contact patterns among DG Trade officials are strongly driven by their portfolios. A recent study also shows that informal networks within the Commission are indeed guided by the horizontal specialization of the services, and are largely clustered within DGs (Suvarierol 2007: 118). Moreover, patterns of cooperation and conflict inside the Commission are also largely associated with the formal organizational boundaries of the services. The formal DG structure also profoundly activates perceptions of a portfolio role and identity among staff. Moreover, this effect is sustained and strengthened by a compulsory staff rotation system. The data suggest that staff mobility mainly occurs across units within DGs, accompanying sub-unit DG loyalties, identities and roles. The vast majority of interviewees report that their Commission identity is mainly directed towards the DGs and only secondarily towards the unit level and the Commission as a whole. One explanation for the DG identification is that the personnel rotation system accompanies fairly short tenure for most officials at unit level and complementary longer tenures within the DG.

A crucial test of the first two hypotheses is the extent to which Seconded National Experts (SNEs) adopt a portfolio logic. Being hired by the Commission for a maximum of six years and having an ambiguous organizational affiliation to the Commission during the contract period, the emergence of a portfolio logic among SNEs is less likely than among permanent officials. Nevertheless, the data suggest that SNEs seem to be embedded in the Commission organization quickly upon arrival in Brussels, viewing themselves as 'ordinary' Commission officials. Interviews with both current and former SNEs suggest that these officials direct their primary allegiances towards Commission DGs, sub-units and portfolios, and only secondary allegiances towards their parent ministries and agencies at home (Trondal et al. 2008). Portfolio loyalties among SNEs thus reflect the horizontal specialization of the Commission services.

The OECD Secretariat

OECD Secretariat staff tend to attach their primary identities towards bureaucratic sub-units rather than the executive centre. A vast majority of the interviewees report their primary

OECD identity to be directed towards sub-units and their secondary identification towards the organization as a whole. Similar to the Commission, the portfolio role and identity perceptions among OECD personnel reflect the vertical and horizontal specializations of the administration. The data demonstrate role and identity perceptions attached to different levels of the Secretariat. Fairly strong OECD-level identities are observed among OECD officials. These identities are clearly multiple, being directed towards both the OECD Secretariat as a whole and sub-units within the Secretariat. Officials tend to attach their primary identity towards the directorate level, reflecting the horizontal division of labour inside the Secretariat. However, some officials also report a lack of portfolio identification in the Secretariat. This absence of a logic of portfolio seems associated with the time-limited contracts of the officials inside separate units, accompanying fairly short tenures among OECD officials. As with the Commission, the rotation of officials inside the OECD Secretariat is reported to hamper the development of portfolio identities at unit level.

The WTO Secretariat

The horizontal specialization of the WTO Secretariat accompanies a portfolio logic among WTO staff. Most officials maintain a portfolio allegiance towards units and teams, the Secretariat as a whole, and the WTO administration writ large. Similar to the Commission and the OECD Secretariat, most WTO officials evoke multiple portfolio allegiances. To some extent, these identities may be seen as concentric circles where identification towards the Secretariat as a whole requires some degree of prior identification with the unit level. Consequently, sub-unit identities may be seen as foundational for the subsequent emergence of higher-level identifications towards the Secretariat as a whole.

The Secretariat is a strongly horizontally specialized bureaucracy. The interviewees confirm that this horizontal specialization of the Secretariat leads to strong portfolio identities. Reflecting the horizontal specialization of the services, WTO officials adopt primary identities towards their portfolios. In addition, WTO officials develop identities towards the Secretariat as a whole and also towards the idea of being an autonomous international civil servant.

Conclusion

This chapter illuminates that a logic of hierarchy is mainly evident in the Commission administration, and only marginally in the OECD and WTO secretariats. Moreover, within the Commission, a logic of hierarchy is primarily observed at the executive centre (inside the Secretariat-General) and only marginally in administrative sub-units such as DG Trade. Concomitantly, a logic of hierarchy, when observed, does not seem to profoundly penetrate international bureaucracies writ large. Within the Commission, two behavioural logics tend to coexist, albeit embedded within different organizational sub-units. A portfolio logic seems to be overwhelmingly present within policy DGs. The portfolio logic serves as the foundational behavioural logic at the heart of DG Trade and seems to be activated fairly independently of behavioural logics present within the Secretariat-General. A previous study of top Commission officials supports this finding, reporting that the Commission is caught between a call for managerialism and upholding Weberian bureaucratic principles (Ellinas and Suleiman 2009: 83). This balancing act seems less noticeable in the OECD and WTO secretariats, which are overwhelmingly dominated by a portfolio logic.

Variation in the administrative behaviour of international civil servants, both across and within international bureaucracies, is associated with the accumulation of relevant

organizational capacities at the executive centre (Hypothesis 3), and the vertical and horizontal specialization of international bureaucracies (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Administrative behaviour among international civil servants is patterned by the horizontal specialization of bureaucratic organizations. This effect is most clearly seen between the Secretariat-General and DG Trade in the Commission and in the directorates of the OECD Secretariat. Thus, different principles of horizontal specialization accompany predicted behavioural logics among the staff of international bureaucracies. The principle of purpose seems primarily to foster a 'silo logic' among the personnel. The purpose principle accompanies officials who are strongly geared towards their portfolios and the units they are embedded within. The principle of process seems to accompany a 'helicopter view', where civil servants mobilize inter-unit contacts, coordination patterns and feelings of allegiance. This latter observation is most clearly reported in the Commission's Secretariat-General.

Contrary to the four conventional claims in IO literature (see earlier), the data presented here suggest that administrative size, legal capacities, socialization processes and the IOs in which these officials are embedded do not pattern administrative behaviour among international civil servants. Despite being embedded in seemingly different IOs, a logic of portfolio is observed to the same extent within the Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. Variation in the logic of hierarchy among international civil servants seems largely to reflect variation in administrative capacity at the executive centre of international bureaucracies. The administrative capacity at the helm of the Commission administration is significantly larger than those within the OECD Secretariat and particularly the WTO Secretariat. Concomitantly, the vertical hierarchy of the Commission administration makes these officials more sensitive to a steer from above (a logic of hierarchy) than are officials in the OECD and WTO secretariats.

Recommended for further reading

Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009), Checkel (2007) and Trondal et al. (2010).

Note

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International organizations and their bureaucratic oversight mechanisms

The democratic deficit, accountability, and transparency

Alexandru Grigorescu

International organizations (IOs) have long had multiple types of mechanisms intended to improve control over their bureaucracies. Yet, in the post-Cold War era, there has been a noticeable increase in the number and scope of their oversight policies and offices. Starting in the mid-1990s, IOs as diverse as the European Union (EU), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) adopted policies allowing for increased public access to information. The Organization of American States (OAS), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) established internal oversight offices for evaluation, investigation, inspections, and audits. Starting in 2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) have ethics offices. Organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank implemented whistleblower policies. Within the UN system also there has been a surge in requirements for top officials to file financial disclosure statements.

These are important developments for several reasons. First, they improve the perceived legitimacy of IOs after a series of visible embarrassing scandals involving both low-level and high-level staff and, implicitly, they raise public trust in them. Second, the oversight mechanisms are intended to improve their efficiency. This is especially important in the post–Cold War era when the budgets and expectations for IOs increased substantially. Third, these developments are of great interest from an analytical perspective because they reflect a trend toward increased application of domestic institutional models to the work of IOs. While the dominant realist approach to international relations saw a clear distinction between the international and domestic realms (Waltz 1979: 79–101) and avoided any real comparisons between them, recent developments remind us that IOs may gain by seeking solutions based on the successes and failures of analogous domestic institutions and policies. Last, the policy initiatives related to the strengthening of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms appear to coincide with increased scholarly interest in the relationships between "principals" (member-states) and "agents" (IO bureaucracies) (Hawkins et al. 2006). The attention this topic

simultaneously draws from communities of academics and practitioners speaks to its significance.

This chapter will first explain three concepts that have been used to describe important developments related to bureaucratic oversight in IOs: democratic deficit, accountability, and transparency. Although such concepts *can* refer to mechanisms and institutions that do not deal directly with bureaucratic oversight, recently they have been used primarily in this context. The chapter then discusses various types of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. It offers several explanations as to why oversight mechanisms emerged recently in so many IOs as well as explanations of the variance in their application across such organizations. The concluding section evaluates the challenges that lie ahead in implementing these mechanisms.

The concepts: democratic deficit, accountability, and transparency

A number of terms have been used to describe the problems that bureaucratic oversight brings as well as the solutions to such problems. I will discuss three of the most important concepts here: the "democratic deficit" of IOs, their lack of "accountability" to those whose lives they affect, and the need for "transparency." There is a strong connection between these three terms. The first is generally viewed as the broadest one while the third is seen as the narrowest. The main problem (but not the only one) of the democratic deficit is generally understood to be the relative lack of accountability of IOs to the individuals whose lives they directly affect (Caporaso 2003: 365–6). One of the best solutions for the lack of IO accountability is to promote increased access to information—that is, greater transparency (Nye et al. 2003: 84–8). The emergence of these three concepts in time and the apparent frequency with which they are used also follow the trend from general to particular.

The term "democratic deficit" is generally attributed to David Marquand (1979) who emphasized European institutions' lack of democratic character, especially the problems of having an Assembly (the precursor of the European Parliament) that was not directly elected. Since then, the concept has been applied in fairly different ways, becoming a catchword used by those who believe that the actions of the European institutions do not reflect the will of the European public (Mény 2003: 8). Yet central to all uses is the idea that the functioning of European institutions should better incorporate democratic mechanisms analogous to those of domestic systems.

In time, the concept of democratic deficit has come to be applied to other IOs, beyond the European Union (Zürn 2000; Nye 2001; Woods and Narlikar 2001; Woods 2003a; Zweifel 2006). Yet, as it came to be used with greater frequency and applied to more IOs, concept stretching made it increasingly difficult to determine the exact components of democracy that one was applying to IOs. Moreover, it led to counterarguments suggesting either that we should not even consider applying the same democratic principles to the international realm (as there is no global or even regional "demos") (Dahl 1999; Nye et al. 2003: 24–32), that many of the mechanisms from the state level (such as the protection of individual rights) were not applicable to the international realm and that international institutions should not be held to domestic democratic standards (Caporaso 2003: 367; Keohane and Nye 2003: 388), or simply that the problems were exaggerated and, in fact, IOs are fairly democratic in nature (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2008).

Despite the differences in the use of the term, most of the academic literature appears to agree that of all democratic principles, the one of accountability is the most important and/or the most applicable to the international realm (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Grant and Keohane 2005; Koenig-Archibugi 2010). Of course, like all general concepts, there is also some difficulty in pinpointing the exact meaning of accountability (Gregory 2003). This

is especially true as some of the best-known definitions of the concept emphasize its 'relational' character (Shedler 1999); that is, the importance of identifying 1) *who* is expected to be held accountable and 2) *by whom*. In IOs these questions are especially important because there are multiple actors and levels of decision making involved. Figure 13.1 captures the main relations of accountability relevant for an IO.

The simple answer to the first question, regarding who should be held accountable, is "whoever makes decisions for IOs." While the traditional view of IOs considered states (especially powerful ones) as the sole relevant decision makers in such organizations (Mearsheimer 1994), the more recent literature has emphasized the increasing role and power of specialized bureaucracies in adopting and implementing IO decisions (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Mathiason 2007; Xu and Weller 2008). This emphasis on the role of officials has shifted the understanding of IOs from simply a set of forums for intergovernmental bargaining to one of actual organizations, where both "principals" and "agents" shape such decisions (Hawkins et al. 2006). This broader view of IOs leads one to consider that governments and IO officials alike (both working inside IOs and therefore above the dotted line in Figure 13.1) are part of the decision-making process in such organizations and therefore both need to be held accountable.

Key

1   Accountability of IO bureaucracy to member-states
2   Accountability of member-governments to the public
3   Accountability of IO bureaucracy to transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
4   Accountability of NGOs to the public
5   Accountability of IO bureaucracy to IO parliamentary assemblies
6   Accountability of IO parliamentary assemblies to the public
7   Accountability of IO bureaucracy to internal oversight units
8   Accountability of IO oversight units to IO chief administrator
8' Accountability of IO oversight units to member-governments
9   Accountability of IO chief administrator to member-governments
10 Direct accountability of IO bureaucracy to the public

Figure 13.1   Accountability of intergovernmental organizations

Because of the recent developing interest in the role of IO officials shaping policies, much of the literature on the democratic deficit and IO accountability has come to refer to the process through which such "faceless bureaucrats," working in headquarters hundreds or thousands of miles away from those whose lives they affect, can be held accountable by the general public. Thus, while accountability of IOs can refer to other types of relationships, most of the recent literature focuses on "arrows" 1, 3, 5, and 7 from Figure 13.1, all originating from the box representing IO bureaucracies.

The answer to the second question ("who should hold IOs accountable?") is more complex than the first. The simple answer, as suggested here, is the general public, i.e., the people whose lives are impacted need to hold IOs accountable. Such individuals and groups can be either direct or indirect contributors to the funding of the organization or the direct and indirect recipients of the organization's services. More broadly, the literature has referred to such actors as "the stakeholders" of the organizations (Lloyd et al. 2008).

Yet, as in all large organizations, direct control of the general public over bureaucracies is difficult to achieve. Therefore, most of the channels of accountability are indirect ones such as the ones through member-state governments (arrow 1), through transnational non-governmental organizations (arrow 3), or, in a handful of organizations such as the EU, through parliamentary assemblies (arrow 5). For these channels of accountability to work, the assumption is that these actors, in turn, are accountable to the public (arrows 2, 4 and 6, respectively). Yet there are often problems with such long "chains of accountability" (Nye 2001). Many governments are not democratically elected and accountable to those whom they are intended to represent. Transnational NGOs (or even the regional ones) have sometimes been accused of not truly representing the "global civil society" (Jonsson and Tallberg 2010: 8). With the notable exception of the European Parliament (and only since 1979) IO parliamentary assemblies such as those in the Andean Community, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or Black Sea Economic Cooperation, are also seen to be unrepresentative and ineffective channels of accountability (Nye et al. 2003: 33–46).

In order to compensate for such ineffective chains of accountability, IOs have recently emphasized other channels through which officials can be held accountable for their actions. First, "internal" specialized mechanisms of oversight have been developed to control such bureaucracies (represented by arrow 7 in Figure 13.1). Such units can be accountable directly to member-states (through arrow 8') or to IO chief administrators who in turn are accountable to member-states (through arrows 8 and 9). The UN Joint Inspection Unit is an example of the former, more direct, chain of oversight, while the UN Office for Internal Oversight is an example of the latter. While there are important differences between the two types of oversight bodies (United States General Accounting Office 1997), this chapter emphasizes their common traits. That is because, for the purpose of this study, both are oversight mechanisms internal to the IOs; they are (directly or indirectly) accountable to member governments.

While direct accountability to the public (arrow 10 in Figure 13.1) is indeed difficult to achieve, the literature has noted that the least IOs can do is to keep the public informed of their actions and intentions (Florini 2003: 85–8; Grigorescu 2007; Nye et al. 2003: 76–88). International organization "transparency" allows stakeholders to establish whether such organizations are indeed acting in their interests and, if not, to use the available accountability channels mentioned earlier to alter existing policies. One should note though that we should not consider *public* access to information a characteristic of only one form of accountability (i.e., one arrow from Figure 13.1). Once an IO makes information available to the public, it also implicitly allows for greater transparency toward all other actors shown in the figure.

Conversely, transparency toward specific actors such as member-states or parliamentary assemblies does not necessarily imply that information flows freely to the public.

Transparency is considered especially relevant for controlling IO officials because, traditionally, the power of bureaucracies has been seen as deriving from their ability to control information (Weber 1958). The assumption in the literature focusing on transparency is that, when officials are obligated to make their intentions and actions visible to the public, they are more likely to act in the public's interest (Stiglitz 1999: 11).

This chapter will focus only on the two latter forms of IO accountability: public access to IO information and internal oversight offices. The focus on these two particular channels of accountability is primarily due to the recent interest that they have generated both among practitioners and academics.

Access to information policies and practices of international organizations

Transparency of IOs is a basic and essential condition for their oversight. The emphasis on access to information regarding the work of IOs can be traced to the first major organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Office. Woodrow Wilson and the others who designed these IOs emphasized the positive role of public opinion (Zimmern 1939: 27–9). Essential to the public's ability to influence debates and decisions was open access to information on international affairs. The principle of "publicity" therefore occupied an important role in the postwar plans for international relations. Some of the prominent texts of that time, such as Wilson's "Fourteen Points" Speech and the League's Covenant, emphasized the need for diplomacy to be "open" and "proceed always frankly and in the public view."

The principle of publicity was seriously eroded in the IOs that emerged in the post–Second World War era. Due to the posturing of major powers that accompanied their Cold War ideological clashes, most of the "frank" discussions in IOs could not take place "in the public view." International organization information policies up to the late 1980s were generally based on a presumption that information was to be kept secret and that public access to information was the exception. The present movement toward greater IO transparency began in the 1990s. This trend mirrored a similar one at the domestic level, where the number of states adopting "freedom of information laws" doubled in the last decade of the twentieth century (Florini 2002).

In 1993 the World Bank was the first major IO to adopt a comprehensive public information policy. The push for transparency at the Bank was the result of a broad grassroots movement, begun in the late 1980s, that protested the lack of information regarding the environmental impact of its dam projects, particularly the one of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India. Transnational and local NGOs, from developed and developing countries alike, came together as probably never before to pressure the World Bank to change its policies including (or especially) the one on public information. In the early 1990s the NGO community benefitted from a window of opportunity offered by the tenth replenishment of the International Development Association's funds. They successfully lobbied the major donor governments (most notably the United States) to help overhaul the IO's public information policy.

This coalition of governments and NGOs was in part possible due to the opaque practices of Bank staff, felt both by the non-governmental and governmental actors. Even the Bank executive directors (who represent governments) had complained for some time that they had been denied access to information about such projects (Udall 1998: 392). Since the adoption

of the new information policy, the Bank has made many of its existing documents accessible to the public. More importantly, it established a new type of document, the Project Information Document (PID), offering the public basic information about the intentions of the Bank at a very early stage of the project. This allows stakeholders to voice their concerns before projects become *faits accomplis*. Soon PIDs became more complete and developed into useful tools for NGOs that monitor the organization's work (Udall 1998).

As in other policy initiatives, the information policy change at the World Bank was quickly imitated by the regional development banks (Nelson 2001). In the late 1990s the IMF also followed the example of its "sister organization." The pressure for greater IMF transparency was, in part, a product of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Fund began promoting transparency of governments and then felt it needed to practice what it preached. Around that time it began publishing "Public Information Notices" summarizing its consultations with governments, "Letters of Intent" spelling out countries' requests for the use of Fund resources, as well as other documents (Saul 2002). The organization also began posting on its website detailed national economic and financial statistics in its newly established "Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board."

Not surprisingly, the UN Development Programme was the first major agency from the United Nations system to follow the lead of the development banks by adopting a comprehensive Information Disclosure Policy in 1997. Other UN agencies soon followed. A particularly sudden policy change took place in the World Meteorological Organization after an official from the WMO stole 3 million USD (representing a sizeable portion of the small organization's total budget) in 2003. Even the UN Security Council, the most secretive forum in the UN system, is now generally considered more open than during the Cold War (Bourantonis 2006: 52).

In the case of the European Union the push for a public information policy began soon after the 1999 corruption scandal that led its entire Commission to resign. Yet, many believe that even such an important scandal would not have been sufficient to bring about change to the traditionally secretive culture of the EU, had not Sweden and Finland, the oldest and strongest proponents of open government, pushed for such policies after they joined the EU, particularly when Sweden held the presidency of the EU, in the first half of 2001 (Bengtsson et al. 2004: 319).

The increased transparency of IOs has not only manifested itself through the adoption of information policies. It is also reflected in organizations' *practices* of offering information. Virtually all IOs have established fairly large-scale public information offices. Where such offices were already in place, staffing and budgets were substantially increased. In addition, many IOs have allowed for greater public access to their archives and libraries and established internal and external online search systems for accessing official documents. Perhaps just as important, they developed comprehensive websites that allow them to be proactive in terms of offering information, even beyond the official documents mentioned earlier (Grigorescu 2007). In fact, IOs such as the International Labour Organization, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF have emerged as the premier online sources for labor, economic and financial statistics.

The new and/or improved IO information policies and offices have allowed for public access to information that in the past was only available to IO officials and, sometimes, to government representatives working in the organizations. While IO officials are still not working in the very visible proverbial "fishbowl" (Peters 1989: 182), like some bureaucrats in the most transparent countries, the "culture of secrecy" in IOs nevertheless appears to have been eroded.

Oversight offices and policies

The four main types of tasks oversight units focus on are audit, inspection, evaluation, and investigation (UN Joint Inspection Unit 2006). International organizations have dealt with some of these tasks almost since their inception. In 1946 the UN established its Board of Auditors, composed of three auditor-generals from its member-states. The task of inspection became institutionalized in 1966, when the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) was established. Since then, the JIU has generated several hundred reports intended to improve management in the UN system. In the World Bank, Robert McNamara first established an Evaluation Unit in 1970 (Grasso et al. 2003). Many other IOs also adopted mechanisms for audit, inspection, and evaluation throughout the Cold War.

The 1990s saw a great increase in the number and scope of such IO oversight tasks. This trend has been signaled by some of the academic literature (Woods 2003b; Mathiason 2007: 247–55; Grigorescu 2010). Most importantly, IOs also incorporated inspection within their array of oversight tasks. Once more, the UN led the way in establishing the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in 1993. A year later the World Food Programme and the Organization of American States established similar offices.

In all three IOs, the United States led the efforts to establish the offices of oversight and to include an investigation component to the oversight tasks with which the organizations already dealt. In the UN, the United States had promoted better oversight almost from the inception of the organization (United States Institute for Peace 2005: 43). Yet in 1992, the pressures for oversight became particularly strong under President George H. W. Bush, who had come to know the organization well in the early 1970s as United States Permanent Representative to the UN. Bush filled the position of UN under-secretary general for administration and management with former United States Attorney General Dick Thornburgh. In 1993, Thornburgh wrote a scathing report discussing the ineffective UN system of oversight and called for the establishment of an inspector general at the UN (United States House of Representatives 1993: 102–3). By the end of that year the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services was already established.

Many other IOs soon adopted the OIOS model, emphasizing the new task of investigation above others. The World Bank Department of Institutional Integrity was established in 1996. The EU's Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) was created in 1999. At times when IOs froze most of their hiring and cut their budgets the new oversight offices in the UN, World Bank, and EU increased their staff and budgets at a very rapid pace. The investigations division of OIOS alone almost doubled its staff and budget between 1997 and 2006. It has more than 70 investigators and a budget of more than 7 million USD. OLAF has an overall operational staff of about 250 and a budget of about 80 million USD (UN Joint Inspection Unit 2006: 39; Volcker et al. 2007: A1).

International organizations have recently adopted other policies intended to improve oversight of their bureaucracies. As inside information is directly relevant for the functioning of internal investigative units, the aforementioned IOs that first established investigative units were also among the first to adopt whistleblower protection policies. The UN developed protection of whistleblowers in 1993, soon after OIOS was created. The OAS adopted such a policy in 2000. Regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also established whistleblower protection policies around the same time. The World Bank only followed suit in 2008. Some organizations, such as the UNDP, even allowed for confidential whistleblower telephone and e-mail hotlines. By 2008, more than half of the IOs had adopted some form of whistleblower protection (Edwards 2008).

In the late 1990s and early 2000s many IOs also adopted new "ethics codes" to set clear conduct standards for their staff. In some cases such codes replaced outdated ones, while in others, they represented a completely new type of policy. Most notably, in 2001 the UN replaced its Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service that had been in place since 1954. To emphasize and enforce such codes of conduct, some IOs also established new ethics offices. In 2000 the IMF was among the first IOs to launch a fully functional Ethics Office. The UN created one in 2006. Since then several dozen other IOs have established similar offices. The offices deal with cases of malfeasance but also advise IO officials with regard to the actions that are deemed acceptable and which ones are not.

In the early 2000s, IOs also began encouraging their staff to file financial disclosure statements. In the UN, starting in 2005, all staff at the assistant secretary-general level and above, procurement officers and those whose duties involve investments of UN assets, as well as their dependants, are obligated to file financial disclosure statements. In some organizations, such as the World Bank, although there is no formal obligation to offer financial statements, voluntary disclosure has become the norm for top officials.

Factors explaining the emergence of oversight mechanisms in international organizations

There are multiple explanations for the emergence and strengthening of oversight offices and policies in IOs. One can group the arguments as those that operate at the systemic level (and therefore explain the spread of institutions and polices across many IOs around the same time) and those that operate at the specific IO level (and explain why some organizations are more prone to adopting such mechanisms than others).

A first systemic-level argument for the rapid emergence of such offices and policies is based on the increased visibility of such organizations in the post-Cold War era. They became more newsworthy as their tasks and budgets increased. Yet their increased visibility also came with a price. A handful of cases of corruption and mismanagement within such organizations remained top stories in the press for long periods of time (Beigbeder 2003). The most visible of such scandals involved the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. The mismanagement of the program led to hefty profits for Saddam Hussein's regime, hundreds of foreign companies, and even several UN officials.

Many IOs faced with such embarrassing publicity quickly adopted oversight policies and institutions to regain their lost legitimacy. Moreover, civil society representatives, who had been lobbying member-state governments and the IOs themselves for such institutional changes, learned to use the windows of opportunity immediately following scandals to push for meaningful change. For example, in the wake of the 2007 scandal at the World Bank that ended with the resignation of then president Paul Wolfowitz, the Government Accountability Project was able to pressure the new Bank leadership to revamp the Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity and to adopt a whistleblower policy.

The advent of the Internet also directly influenced the adoption of the new public information policies and indirectly the emergence of other oversight policies and institutions. The low cost of electronic communication has allowed international and not just domestic institutions to disseminate more information at a lower cost and faster than they did through traditional methods (Florini 2003; Nye et al. 2003: 85). The increased amount of information available electronically has also spurred the aforementioned visibility of IOs and led to the great pressures for accountability responsible for the new oversight mechanisms.

As the adoption of IO bureaucratic oversight mechanisms is based on a domestic analogy, their spread also is associated with the spread of democratic institutions across states in the post-Cold War era. The increasingly powerful democratic norms have spurred the calls for IO accountability and the adoption of such mechanisms (Keohane and Nye 2000).

The norms argument has been especially powerful with regard to public information policies. The literature has pointed out that a new "transparency norm" at the domestic level later impacted developments in IOs through the work of NGOs such as the Bank Information Center and One World Trust that dealt with access to information issues at both national and international levels (Florini 2002; Nelson 2001).

The spread of the "anti-corruption norm" also contributed to the pressures leading IOs to adopt mechanisms of accountability and transparency. In fact, some of the founders of Transparency International, the most prominent NGO dealing with issues of corruption, had previously worked in major organizations such as the World Bank or the Commonwealth Secretariat (Wang and Rosenau 2001). Not surprisingly, many anti-corruption activists sought to find common solutions for both domestic and international institutions.

Yet another recent global development that led to the emergence of bureaucratic oversight institutions and policies in IOs is the increased interconnectedness of such organizations and the ensuing processes of institutional diffusion. It has been argued that, as IOs have taken on more tasks, there has inevitably been greater overlap in their work (Gehring and Oberthur 2006). As a result, there are also multiple formal and informal mechanisms allowing for exchanges of information among such organizations. For example, almost 20 IOs consult regularly in the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination to discuss common investigations, whistleblower policies, and, broadly, their experiences with oversight mechanisms. As IOs are exchanging more information and learning from each other, they are also more likely to adopt institutions and policies that seem to work in other organizations (Grigorescu 2010). Overall, the increasingly relevant processes of diffusion, as well as the increased role and visibility of IOs, their ability to offer information quickly and directly through their websites, and the empowerment of democratic and anti-corruption norms have all been considered to be conducive to the broad trend of increased bureaucratic accountability in IOs.

These arguments also suggest several reasons why not all IOs adopted such mechanisms. International organizations with small budgets and less democratic members are less likely to apply bureaucratic oversight. In addition, those that necessitate unanimous decisions (rather than majority ones) are less likely to adopt any type of institutional changes, including those dealing with bureaucratic oversight. Also, in IOs where members contribute approximately equal shares of the budget, it is less likely to see one state or a small group of states take a leading role in bringing about institutional changes (Cortell and Peterson 2006). Conversely, in organizations where one state controls a large proportion of the budget (as is the case of the United States, discussed earlier), there is a greater impetus for adoption of oversight mechanisms.

Oversight effectivenes and the way ahead

The very rapid spread of oversight mechanisms begs questions related to their effectiveness. Do they reduce mismanagement and waste in IOs? Do they increase accountability and reduce the democratic deficit of such organizations? Do they really change the way IOs function?

On the one hand, the heads of oversight offices argue that their institutions are indeed effective. For instance, OIOS reported that its financial recommendations issued in 2010

saved the UN approximately 20 million USD. It also recovered a little more than 2.5 million USD from fraud cases (OIOS 2011). The European Anti-Fraud Office boasts even higher figures as its investigations are often in collaboration with those of national authorities. According to its 2011 report, OLAF generated more than €2 billion through financial penalties and recovered funds (European Anti-Fraud Office 2011). One can argue that much more was saved through the additional deterrent effect of the new offices and policies.

On the other hand, critics point to multiple flaws that have made such oversight bodies and policies less effective than they could be. Perhaps the most oft-cited one is the relative lack of independence of the oversight offices from the top leadership of the IOs. In the aftermath of the Oil-for-Food scandal, an inquiry committee found that the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services investigations into the program had been unsuccessful because they were conducted by "insiders rather than qualified independent members" (Volcker et al. 2005: 56). The EU's OLAF (House of Lords 2004: 23) and the World Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity (Edwards 2007) have also been criticized for their lack of independence and, implicitly, for their ineffectiveness. In the World Bank, this lack of independence indirectly contributed to the scandal that led to the resignation of Paul Wolfowitz as president. Yet, as mentioned earlier, scholars and practitioners alike are aware that the "internal" character of such offices inherently leads to a tradeoff of their independence for increased expertise.

An additional problem that the new oversight mechanisms face in IOs is that they were applied to systems with a long-standing tradition of valuing "expertise" over "accountability" (Beigbeder 2003). The rapid change of oversight policies and institutions were not followed as quickly by changes in organizational culture. For example, well after OIOS was established and the whistleblower protection was adopted in the UN, a 2004 survey found that more than half of the UN staff either did not know enough about the institutions and policies or did not trust them to function properly (Deloitte Consulting 2004).

The new public information policies also face problems. First, in some IOs, the initial impetus for transparency has been rolled back. This has been especially true in the EU, where an ongoing battle for increased transparency has simultaneously involved the EU Council, the Parliament, the European Court of Justice, member-states, and NGOs (Phillips 2011). Moreover, even in cases where the new information rules are not being challenged, officials have found ways of circumventing them (Dobson 2009). This reminds us that, in the absence of a culture of transparency, even the most progressive rules on access to information have not been effective in achieving transparency in IOs in the past (Oliviero 2005). Both in the League of Nations and the UN, the usefulness of public information rules was often eroded when these organizations adopted most of their crucial decisions in secret informal meetings to avoid the stipulations of the formal information policies (Feuerle 1985).

Overall, the recent changes in bureaucratic oversight appear to have left room both for future advances and drawbacks. As in the domestic realm, the struggle for transparency and bureaucratic oversight in IOs is an ongoing one. Nevertheless, while the implementation of the new oversight rules still appears to face problems, the overall trend is one toward improving IO accountability and transparency. For instance, soon after the aforementioned survey signaled that UN staff still feared to report cases of corruption and mismanagement, the global organization adopted a more comprehensive whistleblower protection policy. The fairly progressive World Bank public information policy of 1993 has been improved several times since then, most recently in 2010.

The tug of war between IO bureaucracies, government officials, and global and regional civil society groups continues. Yet, what does appear to have changed is that domestic analogies with regard to bureaucratic oversight, access to information, and accountability have

come to be generally accepted (Grant and Keohane 2005). International organizations are likely to continue searching and applying domestic models for solving their actual or perceived democratic deficits.

Recommended for further reading

Nye et al. (2003), Florini (2003), Held and Koenig-Archibugi (2004), Grant and Keohane (2005), and Grigorescu (2010).

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Consultative and observer status of NGOs in intergovernmental organizations

Felicity A. Vabulas

International Relations (IR) scholars and the public have come to understand intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as cooperative endeavors between member-states (Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Pevehouse et al. 2004).[1] In other words, when we study IGOs, we usually focus on the bargaining, negotiation, and enforcement activities between states, the key actors in IR. However, this narrow concept of who comprises IGOs misses the rise in importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their increased participation in these international entities.[2]

Intergovernmental organizations are no longer just forums for inter-state collective action but instead, a large number of IGOs now formalize some sort of consultative or observer status with NGOs, giving them varying degrees of access to IGO meetings, policy research, negotiations, project implementation, and enforcement efforts. This chapter addresses when and why IGOs grant consultative and observer status to NGOs. It will first highlight why this phenomenon is important to IR scholarship, then overview the growing trend of IGOs granting consultative or observer status to NGOs. It will then evaluate how these partnerships vary across entities and issue areas, both by looking at a few small case studies and summarizing an original data set, and last, discuss some of the theoretical explanations for how IGO member-states and NGOs both benefit from the relationships.

Importance to International Relations scholarship

When and why do IGO member-states grant consultative status to NGOs? This is a crucial question for IR scholars to investigate, for several reasons. First, the understanding of IGOs has heretofore focused on the ebbs and flows of cooperation between states because IGOs are by definition forums of collective action between governments. But because of this definition, IR scholars have thus far missed a full understanding of some of the institutional arrangements that affect how IGOs operate, including consultative arrangements with NGOs. However, NGOs primarily exist because they aim to do something that states cannot or will not do (Karns and Mingst 2004), and we can therefore infer that when NGOs gain

consultative status with an IGO, the IGO becomes somehow different from an entity that just includes interactions between states. In other words, IGOs that have consultative status for NGOs may operate differently from those that do not grant formal access, in terms of key institutional characteristics such as transparency, legitimacy, and effectiveness, and this is therefore worthy of our focused attention.

Second, a more detailed investigation of consultative and observer status is warranted because the decision calculus of states in including these non-state actors is not obvious. By granting consultative status to NGOs, states potentially subject themselves to increased sovereignty costs, IGO agenda manipulation, increased bargaining constraints, and the loss of secrecy. Under what conditions would IGO member-states choose to hand over some of their control of IGOs, and what benefits do they receive in return? Furthermore, how do NGOs gain from establishing formal ties to IGOs when they are usually required to submit to costly bureaucratic rules in the process?

Third, a better understanding of the conditions under which member-states in IGOs will grant consultative status to NGOs is necessary in order to evaluate the outcome of these relationships. For example, some of the biggest challenges that face IGOs today include questions about compliance, dispute resolution, delegation, and institutional change (Downs et al. 1998; Hathaway 2001; Guzman 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; von Stein 2005). How does the phenomenon of NGO consultative status intersect with these important questions about how IGOs work (if at all)? We are likely to get a more complete understanding of how states uphold and enforce their international agreements by first better understanding the roles that all actors play in the institutional bargain.

Last, this topic tackles a larger theoretical debate in IR: Does the increasing role that we see for NGOs in world politics generally, and for IGOs in particular, signal the waning power of nation-states or do these relationships with non-state actors in fact bolster the ability of states to carry out their own interests (Sikkink 1993; Strange 1996; Raustiala 1997; Hall and Biersteker 2002)? Even more important, this topic can help us address whether NGOs are simply epiphenomenal in world politics or if these actors sometimes have the ability to shape IR outcomes.

Key concepts

Before proceeding, it is necessary to define some key concepts. The exact criteria for establishing "consultative status" or "observer status" with NGOs varies between IGOs, so this chapter looks at a broad definition of consultative status which incorporates many of the subtleties across (and within) organizations. Consultative status is defined as the formal recognition by an IGO that an NGO can regularly participate in (some) IGO activities. It is worth noting that consultative status is often not a binary decision within an IGO but instead, many levels of status may exist. In other words, consultative status follows a continuum from no access to observation, information sharing, consultation, collaboration, and at the deepest level, partnership.

At the lowest level of status, NGOs are not allowed to participate in any manner in IGO activities. While this was certainly the norm in the postwar years, this "ideal type" of no access has become much less prevalent in recent years. Many IGOs now at least allow a select group of NGOs to have "observation" rights, where they might be able to attend conferences or sit in (silently) to observe annual meetings. At higher levels of access, NGOs might be able to actually submit information or points of view prior to an IGO meeting (information

Figure 14.1   IGO–NGO consultative status can vary in depth among and between intergovernmental organizations

sharing), speak and voice opinions at official IGO functions (consultation), assist in implementing projects or carrying out tactical "on the ground'" enforcement of IGO activities (collaboration), or even vote alongside member-states (partnership). It should be noted, however, that no IGO currently garners this highest level of status to NGOs, and thus no IGO has put NGOs on a complete level playing field with member-states.[3] This chapter therefore looks at consultative status both as a binary decision (does an IGO grant consultative status to NGOs?) and also as a continuum (how deep is the access that an IGO grants to NGOs?). Figure 14.1 shows the spectrum of access that NGOs might have in different IGOs.

It is worth noting that NGOs have many other access points to IGOs beyond the formal consultative status discussed here. For example, NGOs can sometimes attend one-off IGO conferences or participate in IGO negotiations as official members of state delegations (Clark 1995; Mathews 1997; Clark et al. 1998; Albin 1999; Steffek and Nanz 2007). While these access points are also worthy of study, and probably have overlapping motivations from the actors involved, they are conceptually different to IGO consultative status because they are often established as *ad hoc* relationships rather than regular, formal interactions. Consultative status is therefore costlier for IGO member-states to maintain, and comes with more bureaucratic burdens for NGOs.

Non-governmental organizations have also increasingly found ways to establish informal access points to IGOs and interact with member-state delegations, even when the relationships are not formally sanctioned. However, these informal relationships also remain outside the scope of this study because their fluidity and the lack of an official title make these relationships difficult to define, track, and study. Furthermore, the plethora of informal relationships is not as puzzling as formal consultative status because neither IGO member-states nor NGOs are constrained in a contract. This IGO study is therefore limited to formal consultative status for NGOs in order to constrain scope, achieve analytic clarity, and focus on the most puzzling interactions between IGOs and NGOs. Future research should not only investigate the other access points mentioned here, but also whether and how each of the different access points are linked: Can informal NGO access act as a stepping stone to formal consultative status? And how does NGO participation in conferences or negotiations differ from consultative status?

Observable trends

Over the past 40 years, there has been a noticeable rise in formal access points and consultative arrangements between IGOs and NGOs (Risse-Kappen 1994, 1995; Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Charnovitz 1997; Clark et al. 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Dryzek 2012; see also

Raustiala 1997, 2001; Newell 2000; Arts 2005; Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Betsill and Corell 2001, 2008). For example, the Council of Europe has granted participatory status to a conference of 366 international NGOs including Amnesty International, the Russian Peace Foundation, and Transparency International. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has granted consultative status to 19 NGOs including the International Chamber of Commerce, and 11 NGOs are invited to send observers to the regular session of the Agency's General Conference. The Organization of American States (OAS), an IGO focused on democracy, human rights, security, and development, has granted formal access to 272 NGOs ranging from Acción Ciudadana to the World Youth Alliance.

Non-governmental organizations have in fact been at the heart of some IGO functions for a long time. For example, the League of Nations (1920–46) invited NGOs to participate in meetings other than those of the Assembly and Council (Karns and Mingst 2004; Grigorescu 2007; Woodward 2010). Following this League of Nations legacy, the United Nations (UN) also declared a formal access point for NGOs: On 21 June 1946, member-states adopted a provision in Article 71 of the Charter that allowed economic and social NGOs to gain consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and participate in formal UN proceedings (Cromwell White 1968; Gordenker and Weiss 1995; Otto 1996; Clark et al. 1998; Willets 2000; Alger 2002; Grigorescu 2007). Consultative arrangements for NGOs at IGOs have proliferated since then, including updates to the ECOSOC consultative arrangements.

After détente in the 1970s, NGOs became real protagonists in other IGOs besides ECOSOC. United Nations specialized agencies and programs, especially those associated with social and human rights issues such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, began to admit NGOs as consultants and implementers of projects (Tussie and Riggirozzi 2001). The 1972 Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm is often noted as a historical turning point for NGOs. During this conference, NGOs argued for observer status at future UN meetings, and they also used the opportunity to begin networking among themselves. While the Stockholm conference certainly increased access points for NGOs in UN conferences, it did not provide NGOs with the same level of consultative status at the UN General Assembly or Security Council as NGOs had achieved in ECOSOC and some UN specialized agencies.

The "Fifty Years Is Enough" campaign in the early 1990s marked another historical moment for formal NGO involvement in IGOs. After this campaign, both the World Bank and the regional banks began to establish consultative status for NGOs. The World Bank, and then particularly the Inter-American Development Bank, set up liaison relationships with NGOs which could serve as intermediaries, deliverers of services, and consultants in the joint implementation of projects at the national level (Tussie and Riggirozzi 2001). The World Bank–NGO Committee, for example, is now a forum for joint dialogue on World Bank policy. Non-governmental organizations on the committee can engage in critical dialogue and lobby stakeholders about projects and procedures.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a shallower opportunity for NGO participation vis-à-vis the multilateral development banks. It is not tied by operational directives calling for civil society participation, and its market-based approach favors relationships with business associations rather than civil society. However, the IMF appears to be continuously opening up access to NGOs (Tussie and Riggirozzi 2001). The World Trade Organization (WTO) has even shallower status for NGOs, limiting most of the formal NGO opportunities to observation only. The great majority of opportunities for NGOs in the

WTO remain informal or in unofficial meetings. This may be due to the different nature of the WTO. It is largely a "forum" organization that is tightly controlled by states (Cox and Jacobsen 1973; Tussie and Riggirozzi 2001), not a "service" organization that provides both funds and project opportunities with which NGOs can collaborate.

These examples show how some of the largest IGOs grant consultative status to NGOs. Importantly, these anecdotal cases also show that there is a great degree of variation in the depth of access that IGOs and their member-states permit for NGOs. While these qualitative analyses have provided a better description of the phenomenon, unfortunately, IGO scholars to date have a limited view of what consultative status is like across the wide set of some 300 IGOs. Furthermore, most of the one-off examples in the literature focus on particular issue areas, such as economic and environmental institutions, and the largest IGOs, so it is difficult to draw wider conclusions about which IGOs establish formal relations with NGOs, which NGOs get consultative status, and what implications this has for IGO outcomes across the set of IGOs.

Existing explanations for consultative status at IGOs

Through important case studies, previous scholarship has laid initial foundations that have helped build the start of a comprehensive theory of when and why IGOs grant consultative status to NGOs. First, Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide a compelling explanation for why NGOs have increasingly leveraged IGOs over time.[4] They argue that transnational advocacy networks (TANs), which are collections of NGOs and other actors with principled causes, leverage IGOs as focal point organizations where they can use the power of information, ideas, and strategies to change the preferences of domestic political actors. Their model is a powerful explanation of what motivates NGOs to engage in international politics, but because it privileges the agency of NGOs, it reveals little about the circumstances under which IGOs would open themselves up to NGO "influence." Non-governmental organizations can lobby or aggravate on the world stage as long as they want, which the Boomerang Model would explain, but it does not explain the opposite pathway; that is, why IGOs would sometimes formalize consultative status with NGOs or initiate the relationships. In other words, an important question still remains: Why would states (as the principals in IGOs) purposefully permit some NGOs to have easier access to their international negotiation arena which might give them the ability to come in and change both state preferences and inter-state interactions?

To date, IR scholars have proposed five loosely bound explanations for why states might choose to grant consultative status to NGOs in IGOs.

1   *Technical expertise theories* posit that states leverage NGO relationships in order to gain low-cost advice/information from networks of knowledge-based experts or implementation assistance from local providers (Raustiala 1997; Betsill and Corell 2008).
2   *Power-based theories* do not think that IGOs or NGOs impact fundamental questions in world politics. These theories explain that states grant consultative status to NGOs to extend their entrenched distributions of power and will only allow friendly NGOs to sit in on IGO meetings, but not to change the outcome of proceedings (Raustiala 1997; Willets 2000; Drezner 2007).
3   *Global governance theories* argue that in an ever-globalizing world, it has become increasingly difficult to govern the global commons. States grant consultative status to NGOs to incorporate emerging actors in collective decision making and fill voids in state-led international governance (Tussie and Riggirozzi 2001; Reimann 2006).

4 *Norm diffusion theories* argue that IGOs have increasingly granted consultative status to NGOs because civil society participation has become a norm for an IGO to be perceived as credible. The IGO–NGO relations are similar in the same region and issue area (March and Olsen 1989; Donini 1995; Charnovitz 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Staisch 2004).

5 *Democratic deficit theories* argue that states grant consultative status to NGOs to give a greater voice to developing communities (and states) and counteract the distorted power distribution in many IGOs, where powerful states maintain control. Non-governmental organizations can democratize IGOs by expanding participation and increasing accountability (Risse 2002; Scholte 2002; Moravcsik 2005; Steffek 2008; Bexell et al. 2010).

These explanations get us part of the way to understanding when and why IGOs might grant consultative status to NGOs, but because scholars have heretofore only evaluated stand-alone cases, these theories do not address the fact that there is both variation in the degrees of openness across IGOs and also across time (O'Brien et al. 2000). Furthermore, existing theories do not address the fact that consultative status probably comes with costs to both states and NGOs. We have not seen evidence that those IGOs without formal NGO consultative status do not need additional policy expertise or implementation assistance, nor that they escape the transparency, legitimacy, or democratic deficit crises that are prevalent explanations in existing theories. And we cannot explain a variable with a constant. Further, even if a lack of legitimacy or transparency could be shown in IGOs that grant consultative status to NGOs, scholars have not taken the next step of showing that NGOs will actually alleviate these situations. Many NGOs, for example, are not "democratic" in their organization and activities, and therefore do not automatically create inclusive participation or enhance accountability.

Furthermore, previous cases have focused on principled groups in areas such as the environment, healthcare and development, and consumers' rights rather than also addressing the potential role of NGOs in IGOs that focus on issues such as security and economic affairs. This has potentially led to an underestimation of the importance of these relationships in IR (Lipschultz 1992; Mathews 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Simmons 1998). Ignoring material issues in studies of non-state actors biases current findings and underplays the importance of IGO–NGO relations in international policy. We therefore need a comprehensive theory about consultative status for NGOs in IGOs which should be quantitatively tested across time, issue area, and entity.

Unifying argument: states grant NGOs consultative status to benefit monitoring efforts

The empirical reality that only some IGOs choose to extend consultative status to NGOs suggests that NGO consultative status is not costless to states and that states probably care about which NGOs are granted access. A unifying theory which applies across the entire set of some 300 IGOs rather than individual cases is that IGO member-states grant consultative status to NGOs to assist in monitoring and enforcing the IGO agreement. Non-governmental organizations, particularly those with niche skill sets or local-level access, can provide information about whether states are adhering to or abrogating the IGO agreement and then present this information in formal IGO meetings. Intergovernmental organization member-states can then use this monitoring information to assist in their efforts to enforce the IGO agreements, either through binding or non-binding mechanisms. Intergovernmental

organization member-states will therefore be more likely to create consultative arrangements for NGOs when monitoring and enforcement issues are central to the IGO's mandate, and furthermore, when the IGO has already created an internal body focused on monitoring the agreement.

When IGO member-states have a monitoring and enforcement body within the IGO, either as part of the original IGO charter or as an institutional adaptation along the way, they have revealed that they not only need additional monitoring and enforcement to maintain a collectively beneficial equilibrium (perhaps due to the nature of the cooperation challenge), but also that they are willing to take on the sovereignty costs of giving third parties more control in helping to enforce the agreement. If IGO member-states have set up an internal monitoring or enforcement body to aid states in adhering to the international agreement, it is likely that they not only 1) recognize the complexity of the enforcement challenge in the particular circumstance, but are 2) also willing to grant some autonomy to outside actors to help make monitoring and enforcement efforts more successful. In other words, when states have not already set up a monitoring and enforcement body, it is also less likely that they will grant access to NGOs.

This unifying theory does not mean to imply that the five previously mentioned theories are never at work in explaining when and why IGOs establish consultative status with NGOs. To be sure, policy expertise, implementation assistance, and increased legitimacy might play a role in some IGO–NGO relations, but this unifying argument provides a comprehensive theory that can be applied across the entire set of IGOs and also addresses some of the most puzzling cases.

It also presents an interesting conundrum: Why do IGOs that already have internal monitoring and enforcement bodies also need NGOs to assist in monitoring and enforcement efforts? First, even when an individual state has good evidence that another state has violated the IGO agreement, the observer state might be apprehensive about bringing that information to the IGO monitoring body when geostrategic concerns outweigh the benefits they might incur by shining the light on the violator. Second, IGO bureaucrats and member-states alone may have difficulty determining when an international agreement has actually been broken because information about state adherence to IGO agreements is often difficult for states and IGO bureaucrats to obtain. If a state wants to cheat or renege on an agreement, it will probably do so in a way that is covert or has observational equivalence with some approved action. Third, even if member-states or IGO bureaucrats can expose information about cheating states, the adhering states may have collective action problems in enforcing IGO agreements. Punishment, or reputational sanctioning, is therefore likely to be undersupplied by member-states alone (Martin 1992; Guzman 2002; Dai 2007; Donno 2010).

In the end, the presence of NGOs in official IGO forums and the information that they can supply can increase the ability of an IGO to serve as an information provider to states (which is the very reason that states turn to IGOs in the first place). The certification of consultative status gives a select group of NGOs the opportunity to publicize this information in an official forum and added credibility when presenting their claims. States can hardly ignore information that is presented at their own IGO meetings, while they can conveniently sidestep NGO claims that are simply made in the mass media. Non-governmental organizations can help member-states use the publicity from their monitoring efforts to pressure reluctant member-states into upholding a sanction or coordinate an otherwise appropriate collective response to defaults on international policy.

Because states maintain control of the IGO–NGO relationship, states will choose NGOs carefully. States that desire to genuinely adhere to the IGO agreement, "genuine adherers,"

will primarily endorse NGOs whose preferences align with their own. The main role of NGOs for "genuine adherer" states is to monitor and enforce compliance on states that might violate the IGO agreement because they have invested costly domestic resources in the IGO and also because their own credibility rests on the legitimacy of the agreements they sign.

"Genuine adherer" states will be careful, however, to not just endorse NGOs that are mirror images because this would diminish the credibility of the NGO and its monitoring information. "Genuine adherer" states will therefore sometimes grant consultative status to NGOs even when it might present a risk to their own reputations because they will have an increased opportunity to name and shame worse violator states.

"Superficial adherers," states that sign treaties but then break them, will also support consultative status for NGOs whose preferences align with their own. Unlike the NGOs which the "genuine adherers" support, however, these NGOs' preferences may not align with the mission of the IGO. Instead, these NGOs specifically stand up against powerful states or challenge the image of large-scale intergovernmental bodies. They do not provide monitoring and enforcement information about the IGO agreement itself, but instead they provide information that calls into question the credibility of hegemonic or leading states in the IGO (who might be ready to criticize them). Non-governmental organizations supported by "superficial adherers" still work as state-level allies, but their preferences are rarely in alignment with the letter of the treaty. Instead they aim to call into question the presumed leadership role of Western governments or powerful states in the IGO and are often government-sponsored NGOs (GONGOs) in authoritarian states.

The discussion thus far has emphasized the preferences of individual IGO member-states, but in the end, the decision about consultative status at an IGO is the vote of a committee of states or the entire set of IGO member-states. This means that the voting rules of the committee or IGO will be the deciding factor in determining the overall outcome of NGO consultative status, but state-level decisions or votes may reflect the strategic calculus above.

Consultative status can also benefit NGOs. First, because IGO member-states and bureaucrats often spend a significant amount of time up front in the NGO selection process, it can act as a signal that the NGOs' monitoring and evaluation information is credible. This formal "seal of approval" can give NGOs a leg up as they compete for such things as influence and donors. Non-governmental organizations with formal accreditation often publicize these credentials on their websites, probably to reap increases in fundraising, more focused attention to their cause, and a seal of approval on their group's image. Non-governmental organizations do not gain status easily. They must often provide some deference toward IGO requirements and oversight at the risk of their formal access being revoked. These politics between IGO member-states, bureaucrats, and NGOs reveal that there is an important bargain in the "game" of granting consultative status. Intergovernmental organizations can "capture" NGOs and make them adhere to certain IGO policies, but NGOs will do so in order to maintain their coveted consultative status which can reap them credibility and financial gains.

Descriptive statistics

An original data set across the full set of IGOs in the Correlates of War (COW) International Governmental Organizations Data Set v2.3 helps one to better understand the wider patterns

of consultative status for NGOs. A large-N data set helps avoid some of the selection problems that have plagued previous studies and case study analyses of IGO−NGO relations (Staisch 2004; Joachim and Locher 2009; Steffek 2008).[5]

Annex 14.1 shows several patterns that emerge from the data. First, about 34 percent of IGOs in the COW data set grant consultative status to NGOs. While this trend is certainly noteworthy, by no means do all IGOs reserve a role for NGOs. Some recognizable IGOs that do not grant consultative status to NGOs include the Andean Parliament, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the League of Arab States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Second, IGOs that focus on issues where monitoring and enforcement are paramount appear to be more likely to grant consultative status to NGOs. For example, IGOs in the democracy/human rights issue area, where monitoring and enforcement are central challenges, make up only 3 percent of the total set of IGOs, but all of these seven institutions grant consultative status to NGOs. On the other hand, only one of the six IGOs whose work is focused on health/disease, an issue area where enforcement issues are not endemic, grants consultative status to NGOs. These data therefore provide preliminary evidence that IGO member-states may choose to grant in a potentially costly consultative status to NGOs when they can help solve collaboration issues rather than coordination challenges.

Third, this initial probe confirms the unifying theory that IGOs with a monitoring or enforcement body are more likely to grant access to NGOs: about 21 percent of IGOs have a monitoring or enforcement body, and of these IGOs, 86 percent grant formal access to NGOs. On the other hand, only 52 percent of IGOs with high sovereignty costs, 43 percent of IGOs that have a high need for policy implementation assistance, and only 28 percent of IGOs with a high need for policy expertise grant consultative status to NGOs.[6]

It is unclear from these high-level statistics whether a regional focus of the IGO matters for NGO consultative status. Forty-two percent of strictly European entities grant formal access to NGOs (on the high side) whereas 21 percent of strictly African entities grant formal access to NGOs (on the low side). The descriptive statistics also show preliminary evidence that "big" IGOs (those with a membership of more than 75 member-states) are more likely to grant consultative status to NGOs (55 percent of big IGOs grant access) than "small" IGOs (those with a membership of fewer than 25 member-states), where only 21 percent of the IGOs grant access.

Last, the democratic density of the IGO and the percentage of developing states in the IGO do not seem to create recognizable patterns in the types of IGOs that grant consultative status to NGOs. In looking at the depth of access that various IGOs grant to NGOs, it is worth noting that in almost half the cases, NGOs are given the deepest level of access: collaboration, rather than just cursory observational rights.

Conclusion

International Relations scholars are increasingly aware of the existence of formal access points that allow NGOs to participate in IGOs, but existing studies focus on one–off case studies. This chapter highlights a nascent unifying argument that leverages an original data set of consultative status across the 300 or so IGOs in the COW data set.

Non-governmental organizations are proliferating across the globe, and thus debates abound as to the role that NGOs play in world politics and how these non-state actors are changing the way that policy makers need to view international affairs. While other scholars have indicated that the inclusion of NGOs in IGOs is beginning to "convert the world of interstate diplomacy to one of pluralist global governance" (Willets 2000: 192), the unifying theory in this chapter emphasizes that by endorsing consultative status for NGOs in certain IGOs, states are probably enhancing their own protected world of inter-*state* diplomacy. States may indeed be enhancing their own preferences when they grant consultative status to NGOs by leveraging these non-state actors to aid in monitoring and enforcing the IGO agreement.

Future research should build on these foundations and 1) systematically evaluate whether NGOs are able to change IGO outcomes when they have consultative status (versus when they do not), 2) unpack some of the subtle differences that exist in the set of NGOs which advocate for roles in IGOs, 3) analyze the composition of international secretariats to determine whether and how the bureaucratic culture of an IGO might affect relations with NGOs, and 4) look at consultative arrangements in a wider array of international agreements, including treaties.

Recommended for further reading

Gordenker and Weiss (1995), Charnovitz (1997), Tussie and Riggirozzi (2001), Woodward (2010), and Dryzek (2012).

Notes

1   I follow Pevehouse et al. (2004) in their definition of an IGO in the Correlates of War dataset. An IGO meets the following three criteria: 1) a formal entity, formed by an internationally recognized treaty, that 2) has states as members, and 3) possesses a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or permanent staff.
2   There is no universally acceptable definition of a 'non-governmental organization' either amongst scholars, or, more importantly, amongst IGOs. Some IGOs define NGOs interchangeably with civil society organizations (CSOs); some IGOs mean to only include international groups when they refer to NGOs; some IGOs consider NGOs to include a wide range of research institutions whereas others define a separate status for academic experts; still other IGOs do not recognize NGOs at all. My definition of an NGO is: any non-profit organization that is not established by governmental or intergovernmental agreement.
3   Five NGOs were invited to take part in the work of the Programme Coordinating Board of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDs (UNAIDS). These NGOs are on the board not as observers, but as members with voting rights alongside representatives of 22 governments. UNAIDS is an emanation though, so this IO is not included in my definition of an IGO, because it is created by an IGO rather than by states. I have provided this example to show that the highest form of NGO access is, however, a viable possibility. Furthermore, the International Labour Organization (ILO) is a tripartite UN agency with government, employer, and worker representatives, making it a unique forum in which governments and social partners of the economy can work together. The ILO is thus the only IGO where a particular kind of non-state actor (e.g., trade unions) holds equal status to states.
4   This relationship works in the reverse direction to the research question at hand.
5   Since time-series data are rarely available, the data set exists at the IGO level in the year 2011. Further information about the data set and the coding of variables can be obtained by contacting the author, who will defend her Ph.D. dissertation "Catch and Release: When and Why Do IGOs Grant Consultative Status to NGOs?" at the University of Chicago (2013).
6   It should be noted that each category is not mutually exclusive, so an IGO may have both a monitoring body and cover an issue area with high sovereignty costs, for example.

Annex 14.1 Descriptive statistics: IGOs with NGO consultative status

	Number	Total	Percent
IGOs that Grant Consultative Status to NGOs	93	277	34%
IGO Characteristics			
Has a semi-autonomous monitoring body	50	58	86%
Covers high sovereignty cost issues	28	54	52%
Covers issues with high need for implementation assistance	48	112	43%
Covers issues with high need for policy expertise	43	152	28%
Issue Area of IGO			
Democracy/Human rights	7	7	100%
Labor	3	4	75%
Arts/Culture/Language	5	11	45%
Trade/Development	20	49	41%
Environmental/Geographic	17	46	37%
Communications	4	12	33%
Banking/Finance/Insurance	9	29	31%
Energy/Oil/Gas	1	4	25%
Science/Research/Education	7	33	21%
Security/Nuclear weapons	2	10	20%
Farming/Food/Minerals	5	27	19%
Transportation	2	11	18%
Political/Governance/Law	5	28	18%
Health/Disease	1	6	17%
Regional Focus of IGO			
African	6	28	21%
Asian	5	13	38%
European	10	24	42%
Oceanic	1	3	33%
Size of IGO			
Big	22	40	55%
Medium	26	62	42%
Small	45	175	26%
Democratic Density of IGO			
Highly democratic	40	112	36%
Mixed democratic	12	35	34%
Not democratic	41	130	32%
Percent of Developing States in IGO			
Developed	78	231	34%
Mixed development	11	28	39%
Developing	4	18	22%
Depth of Access			
Not clear	8		9%
Observation (attend conferences)	7		8%
Information sharing (submit written documents)	13		14%
Consultation (right to speak at meetings)	23		25%
Collaboration (implementation, monitoring, enforcement)	42		45%
Partnership (voting rights)	0		0%

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Part III

Actors within international bureaucracies

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15

Multilateral diplomats in the early twenty-first century

Yolanda Kemp Spies

Individual agency has always been crucial in the bedrock institution of international society. Not surprisingly, classical diplomatic literature displays a preoccupation with profiling of the 'ideal diplomat' (Berridge et al. 2001: 2; Sofer 1988: 207). Profiling presupposes that specific characteristics, skills and knowledge are sought in candidates for the profession, but until well into the twentieth century, formal diplomatic training was the exception rather than the rule. Diplomacy was historically an elitist endeavour, premised on the assumption that ideal diplomats were a breed apart, rather than a professionally trained corps. This changed when the vast socio-political changes that transformed the international system of the twentieth century made diplomacy more diversified, less Eurocentric and more representative of a heterogeneous international society. In the process, merit-based recruitment and career-specific training became a necessity. Taking into account the prevalence of multilateral diplomacy at the start of the twenty-first century, profiling of multilateral diplomats *per se* is important because it sheds light on the contemporary evolution of diplomacy. From a practical perspective, it assists with recruitment and curriculum design for the continuous training of these specialized diplomats.

In order to analyse the mandates, roles and functions of multilateral diplomats, the conceptual framework of diplomatic theory is required – even if the latter has a lingering reputation as an underdeveloped part of International Relations theory (Cooper et al. 2008: 1; Sharp 1999: 34, 37; Sofer 1988: 196). As in the case of diplomatic law (the least controversial area within international law) there has not been much impulse to contest the theoretical assumptions underpinning this ancient 'civilizing as well as . . . civilized activity', as Berridge et al. (2001: 5) refer to it. But scholarly indolence in this regard is waning, as a surge of writing on diplomacy has attended the advent of the current century. One reason may be the more flexible career paths of diplomatic practitioners, many of whom now leave active diplomatic service and enter academe during their most productive years. The contributions of former practitioners such as Ronald Barston, Jovan Kurbalija, Shaun Riordan and Geoffrey Wiseman, among others, have facilitated a more integrated combination of practical and theoretical reflection on the profession.[1]

The growing academic attention to its practitioners mirrors the fact that diplomacy is a growth industry (Cohen 1999: 14; Reychler 1996: 1; Spies 2006: 294). At the beginning of

the twenty-first century diplomacy is more institutionalized, more codified, more taught and above all more practiced than ever before in the history of mankind. Much of this growth can be attributed to the sheer volume of multilateral diplomacy, which has gained currency (in practice, if not always in reputation), and exponentially so, over the past half a century. Multilateral diplomacy – the simultaneous interaction of three or more diplomatic actors – can be distinguished from various other modes of diplomacy, depending on the number and identity of parties that are involved. The other modes include bilateral diplomacy (the most traditional method); third-party diplomacy (mostly manifesting as mediation, and in recent times also as post-conflict reconstruction and development); and polylateral diplomacy (a collaborative diplomatic venture between state and non-state actors) (Barston 2006: 11; Hocking 1999: 24; Wiseman 2010: 24). If multilateral diplomacy has bloomed in quantity, however, it has not supplanted any of the other modes. Rather, its institutions facilitate and perpetuate the practice of diplomacy in general. This accommodating quality has added to its ubiquity within contemporary international relations.

Multilateral diplomacy's permanent institutional manifestation – intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – are full-fledged subjects of international law and generate their own distinct culture, practices and rules (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 221; Pigman 2010: 49; Van Langenhove 2010: 8). As international actors,[2] just like sovereign states, they have the ability to accredit diplomatic representatives to individual states and even to other IGOs. The actors *within* IGOs, namely the thousands of professionals who work within the multilateral environment of international bureaucracies, will be the focus of this chapter. The various manifestations of multilateral diplomats will be identified, after which the unique challenges associated with their functions will be considered, in the light of the international legal parameters of diplomatic functions.[3] As codified by Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, these include representation of a sending state, protection of state interests, negotiation, information gathering and reporting thereon, and promotion of friendly inter-state relations. First, however, the global 'arena' in which multilateral diplomats operate will be examined.

The multilateral diplomatic arena

Globalization has affected diplomacy as sweepingly as it has any other domain of international relations. The two main variables of the diplomatic arena, actors and issues, have both been multiplied in quantity and in turn fuelled the groundswell in multilateral diplomacy.

During the latter half of the twentieth century (in a process that has slowed down but not stopped yet), the sovereign actors of the diplomatic arena underwent quantum changes, predominantly as a result of state formation through decolonization. For new states with nascent national identities, membership of multilateral organizations offers symbolic legitimization of their acceptance into international society. Within the diplomatic (albeit nominal) 'democracy' offered by IGOs, even the weakest states can be seen and heard on the global stage. Moreover, decision making though majority voting in universal forums such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) facilitates collective action, and allows the developing world to advocate for change in the architecture of global political and economic governance (Barston 2006: 39; Langhorne 2005: 331; Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 222; Van Langenhove 2010: 7). The opportunity to express political solidarity against historical marginalization has rendered multilateral diplomacy a 'chosen means of struggle', in Sasson Sofer's (1988: 201) words, for the vast majority of the world's states. It has allowed states in general to place even obscure issues on the global diplomatic agenda and to obtain attention from states that would otherwise not have prioritized such concerns in bilateral forums.

Apart from its political attractions, multilateral diplomacy has also been of economic advantage to countries with insufficient resources and diplomatic infrastructure: the bulk of a state's diplomatic business, including all other modes of diplomacy, can be conducted via a small number of strategically placed representative missions at IGOs. This consideration has prompted even rich industrialized countries, under tax-payers' scrutiny, to reduce the operational costs of their foreign services by rationalizing bilateral diplomatic representation abroad (Barston 2006: 28). Multilateral forums have thus proliferated in response not just to the growth of multilateral diplomacy, but indeed to the practice of diplomacy more generally.

Democratization of diplomatic engagement beyond the state-centric environment has made diplomatic interaction in the 'global village' even more voluminous. More and more civil society, sub-national and transnational entities demand – and are granted – participation in diplomatic processes. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in particular network widely and galvanize international solidarity to demand accountability and transparency from states and IGOs. To an increasing degree (and as pioneered by the Nordic countries), representatives of civil society are included in national delegations to international conferences. Their inclusion has been prompted by a practical imperative: the technical nature of many issues that are discussed within diplomatic assemblies (Berridge 2010: 154; Langhorne 2005: 332; Pigman 2010: 64, 65; Saner and Yiu 2003: 4, 10; Wiseman 2010: 32).

One of the most dynamic intruders into the diplomatic arena has been the mass media. The speed, range and omnipresence of media coverage have caused public opinion to be a much greater consideration in the conduct of diplomacy (Berridge 2010: 144; Pigman 2010: 68; Riordan 2003: 5). Inevitably, it has encouraged political posturing in the 'transparent' milieu of multilateral forums, as diplomats and their political principals play to a global audience. The volume and diversity of state as well as non-state stakeholders in diplomacy have made diplomacy within the multilateral arena particularly complex (Saner and Yiu 2003: 10; Van Langenhove 2010: 7).

The demographic explosion in the multilateral arena has coincided with normative changes in global rules of engagement and expansion of the substantive scope of diplomacy. Enabled by unprecedented advances in information, communications and transport technology, and rendered imperative by porous, globalization-eroded borders, a host of state concerns transcends the traditional boundaries between domestic and international politics. In addition to the high political concerns about international security (considerations that induced the founding of the United Nations [UN], its predecessor, the League of Nations, and most regional IGOs), low political issues that diplomats historically considered infra dig (such as environmental degradation, communicable diseases and migration) have become fixtures on the global diplomatic agenda.[4]

Multilateral diplomacy is thus a response to a crowded agenda of issues that cannot be solved by individual states, however powerful they may be vis-à-vis other states. The transparent processes, continuity and multi-stakeholder involvement associated with this mode of diplomacy bestow legitimacy on the collective management, or 'global governance', of human concerns. The implications for states are that their domestic policies are increasingly subjected to international trends, standards and obligations that are organized through the international regimes negotiated within IGOs (Berridge 2010: 146; Saner and Yiu 2003: 3).

Leadership in addressing global concerns in multilateral forums has become a form of niche diplomacy, associated with 'middle power' status. The 'good citizens' of the multilateral arena – states such as Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden – exhibit a normative predilection for multilateralism in their foreign policy.[5] They are stabilizers of global order, network with like-minded states and non-state actors alike and seek to legitimize

global public policy. Since the end of the Cold War, the ranks of middle powers in the multilateral arena have been swelled by emerging economies from the developing world: countries like Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. Eduard Jordaan (2003: 167) calls these states 'emerging middle powers' and points out that, as semi-peripheral states who face acute developmental challenges themselves, they are able to act as intermediaries between industrialized states and the resource-rich periphery of the global economy. They display peculiar multilateral diplomatic behaviour, specializing in high-profile multilateral diplomacy and taking on a broader, activist role as representatives of the global South. Whereas traditional middle powers have a concessionary attitude to global reform, emerging middle powers have a much more assertive and reformist approach, hence their prominence, for example, in the debate about UN Security Council reform.

The shared multilateral umbrella offered by IGOs thus by no means prevents diplomatic fragmentation based on states' ideological, regional, linguistic or other affiliation (Barston 2006: 6; Langhorne 2005: 335; Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 218–19). To be sure, IGOs with a universal character, such as the UN, tend to be microcosms of global structural power: states and associations of states compete for diplomatic clout, with diplomacy taking place within and among and often straddling the various groups. In some cases, blocs become institution-alized – the 1964 formation of the Group of 77 (G77) within the UN is an example of bloc diplomacy obtaining permanence within a multilateral forum.

Diplomats operating in the multilateral arena

Both *de jure* and *de facto* diplomats operate within the multilateral arena: *de jure* when they have diplomatic status (immunities, privileges and obligations) under international law; *de facto* when they have no legal status as diplomats, but function in that capacity. At a very practical level, one can distinguish between persons who are entitled to carry diplomatic passports, vis–à–vis those who are not. All of them are multilateral diplomatic actors because they engage in one or more of the core functions of diplomacy.

Career diplomats

The most traditional of diplomatic actors are the official representatives of sovereign states. They are employed by ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) that preside over networks of resident diplomatic missions. Some of these missions have a multilateral mandate and are accredited to IGOs, but even at the head offices of MFAs, it is increasingly common to find specialized divisions dedicated to multilateral work. The responsible MFA officials are thus not only based at permanent missions to IGOs, but also conduct multilateral diplomacy in their own capitals and elsewhere on *ad hoc* assignment. Based at head office, they advise political principals and other sectors of government on multilateral relations, and network within the local foreign policy community, in tandem with colleagues who do the same in multilateral missions abroad. They also travel to IGOs to boost mission staff capacity during plenary sessions, and attend the meetings and summits of diplomatic organizations that do not have permanent secretariats; for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or Group of Twenty (G20).

Multilateral diplomats based at MFA headquarters are instrumental when a country hosts a major international conference, such as the various UN Framework on Climate Change Conferences, or the series of UN 'Earth Summits' on sustainable development. Presidency of an *ad hoc* conference is automatically allocated to the host state, affording it the opportunity

to impact proceedings substantively (Berridge 2010: 149). It also allows a host country to showcase national attributes to the world, and the instant publicity and prestige thereof makes it a very attractive foreign policy instrument. The complexity of managing an international conference has the advantage of 'socializing' a state's diplomats into the multilateral arena, as it necessarily involves a large number of diplomats from the host state, ranging from the most junior through to political principals.

Nevertheless, the notion of multilateral diplomats conjures up primarily those career diplomats posted to permanent representative missions at IGO headquarters, where they represent their states. These diplomats enjoy the same privileges, immunities and obligations in terms of their operational environment as diplomats serving in bilateral missions, despite the fact that there is no single convention on the status of multilateral diplomats under international law. During 1975, the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character sought to codify the legal status of multilateral diplomats. However, the Convention was subsequently not ratified by the required minimum of member-states and therefore did not enter into force (UN 2012c). Under customary international law, the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations apply to multilateral diplomats as well, and IGO secretariats typically negotiate with host state governments to ensure that these rights are incorporated into municipal law (Berridge 2010: 146, 147). Multilateral diplomats accredited to the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa therefore enjoy the same legal status as their counterparts in bilateral missions who are also based in Addis Ababa but accredited to the government of Ethiopia.[6]

Other state representatives

Thus far in the discussion, reference to representatives from sovereign states has denoted career diplomats as employed and deployed by MFAs. But within the domain of global governance, as indeed within diplomacy more generally, foreign ministries no longer operate exclusively: increasingly, other government ministries have dedicated divisions or specialized agencies tasked with policy dialogue at the international and transnational levels. Representatives from these government departments can be seconded to diplomatic missions, in which case they are accorded diplomatic rank and serve alongside their MFA counterparts (Barston 2006: 23). A non-member-state mission to the European Union (EU) in Brussels may, for example, have as part of its staff component attachés (as they are usually called) from ministries such as science and technology, health, or whatever technical areas feature prominently in that state's relations with the EU.

International civil servants

Most IGOs are designed in such a way that professionally staffed permanent secretariats manage their day-to-day business (Pigman 2010: 65). To a certain extent, secretariats replicate the foreign services of member-states, in the sense that staff serve at headquarters, participate in *ad hoc* international events or are posted to resident missions that are accredited to other states or IGOs. As in the case of MFAs, IGO employees can serve in a range of non-diplomatic capacities including administrative, technical, legal and other positions. Notwithstanding these support functions, a large portion of secretariat staff assumes full-fledged diplomatic roles, either formally or informally (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 229; Pigman 2010: 66–9).

Intergovernmental organization representatives sent on resident diplomatic postings to states or other IGOs enjoy diplomatic immunities and privileges similar to those accorded to diplomats from individual states (Pigman 2010: 55). When accredited to other IGOs, various forms of participation (short of the voting rights of member-state diplomats) can be granted to these representatives. At the UN, for example, many IGOs have applied for or received invitations to engage with the organization in a continuous, structured manner (UN 2012a). Most regional IGOs and others that are active in global governance maintain permanent diplomatic missions at UN headquarters and their representatives participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the various main organs. They receive copies of all official documentation, and in some instances are allowed to address the meetings they attend (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 229).

Geoff Pigman (2010: 55) explains that IGOs 'from the outset took seriously the need to construct their own professional, and hence diplomatic, identities and cultures'. This included the setting of nationality quota systems and enforcing employment standards that exceeded, in many cases, those of member-states. The cosmopolitan workforces of IGOs, it follows, display in every case a distinct sense of mission, *esprit de corps* and institutional identity. As in the case of traditional diplomats who engage consistently with their foreign counterparts within the diplomatic corps of a specific host country, IGO staff members over time develop a sense of kinship with one another and find that they 'have more in common with one another than with fellow nationals of their home countries' (Pigman 2010: 55).

Multilateral 'paradiplomats'

From the previous discussion it is clear that IGOs, even though they per definition comprise state members, increasingly allow participation by non-state actors. The UN Charter does not make provision for this type of engagement, but it has become accepted practice to grant, via UNGA resolution, observer status to important diplomatic actors even if they are not states or IGOs. As in the case of IGO observers, this allows the representatives of NGOs to network among, and negotiate with, the official representatives of member-states (Langhorne 2005: 338; UN 2012a; Wiseman 2010: 31, 34). The delegates of entities such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and liberation movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)[7] can therefore operate as *de facto* diplomats. This hybrid diplomatic mode of poly-multilateral diplomacy confirms that the expertise and coop-eration of NGOs are essential for the operationalization of multilateral diplomatic objectives, especially projects with a developmental or humanitarian mission (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 230; Meerts 1999: 89; Pigman 2010: 60; Riordan 2003: 82).

Functions and challenges of multilateral diplomats

As referred to earlier, the basic functions of (bilateral) diplomats are enshrined in Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. When the mandate of multilateral diplomats is considered, it transpires that all five of these functions apply, but each involves superimposed challenges generated by the dynamics of the multilateral arena.

Representation

The most salient of diplomatic functions, that of representation, takes on a compound nature when exercised in a multilateral context. All diplomats who work for individual governments

primarily represent one specific sovereign state, but for those officials who are accredited to an IGO, the reality is that they are an integral part of the entity to which they represent their states. This means that, to a certain extent, they also represent the collective mission of the IGO itself, as bestowed on it by its member-states (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 217).

Moreover, most diplomats working within the multilateral domain by implication also represent various other multilateral entities of which their sending states form part. A diplomat from Namibia, for example, would have to heed his/her government's membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the AU; and by the same token, a diplomat from Turkey would implicitly also represent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

'Pooled' representation becomes more complex when an IGO assumes a supranational identity, as does the EU. The EU, which now has its own European External Action Service (EEAS) is widely represented to states and other IGOs. Pigman (2010: 61) explains that this representation, which in most instances takes place in parallel with the bilateral diplomatic missions of EU member-states, can yield 'diplomatic synergies' when the bilateral (EU member-state) and multilateral (EEAS) diplomats pursue common objectives. However, as he cautions, 'this system of parallel representation can also lead to conflicts of emphases and priorities, if not policies, between the EU and its member states'.

An additional layer of representational duty within IGOs is conferred on state representatives when individuals are designated temporary multilateral leadership positions; for example, when they are required to act as bloc representatives in conducting liaison with an IGO's secretariat (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 219). An individual diplomat could be required to do so because s/he is the dean of an intra-IGO regional group, or has the personal integrity, reputation and diplomatic skills to aggregate and communicate a communal bloc position. Other than bloc leadership, state representatives also assume rotational presidency of various organs within an IGO, such as the UNGA or the UN's Economic and Social Council.[8]

Paul Sharp (1999: 53) adds yet another dimension of representation to the work of diplomats, in the sense that, as he explains, they do not just represent their states to the world, but 'represent that world back to their respective states'. Multilateral diplomats, in particular, project back to their MFAs standards, trends and norms of global governance – a role that arguably makes them potential norm 'importers'. Conversely, the receptive milieu of multilateral forums accounts for the active norm entrepreneurship by diplomats from middle powers.

International civil servants can also be norm entrepreneurs at the intergovernmental level, as Geoffrey Wiseman (2010: 30) points out. He gives the example of pioneering diplomacy associated with senior UN officials such as Lakhdar Brahimi and Sergio Vieira de Mello. Arguably, the diplomatic role of international civil servants is strengthened by the fact that it transcends the representational authority granted by individual states. At the UN, Secretariat personnel are required to take an oath of allegiance to the UN and 'not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or outside authority' (UN 2012b). And, under the UN Charter (Article 100), member-states undertake 'to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties'. This allows them to cultivate an autonomous institutional ethos.

Protection of state interests

As representatives of sovereign entities, diplomats are historically entrusted with the protection and promotion of their sending states' national interest. This role demands

comprehensive knowledge of a state's vulnerabilities as well as its comparative advantages. In multilateral forums, however, sub-regional, regional and other multilateral foreign policy interests widen the parameters of a state's interests. Diplomats need to be *au fait* with the amalgamated multilateral interests of their sending states, because global interconnectivity induces spillover of both threats and opportunities in the foreign policy domain.

This is where smaller, less developed states face daunting challenges. The larger the IGO, the more complicated is its organizational structure. In the case of the UN, deliberation on the agenda items of the General Assembly is delegated to six main committees. Each of these replicates the UNGA in the sense that all member-states are entitled to attend their meetings. Less developed states have limited diplomatic capacity and often they do not have enough staff to populate a range of committees that operate simultaneously – in addition to the UNGA plenary work. The result is disproportionate pressure on their diplomats, who are left exhausted and without opportunity for specialization to the degree that peers from more amply staffed missions can manage (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 226). On a more positive note, the committee system offers opportunities for junior diplomats to interact with senior diplomats from other missions, as various states attach various levels of importance to the mandate of committees, and thus allocate staff accordingly. This departs from the (bilateral) tradition that diplomats interact at a level commensurate with their professional hierarchy.

Regardless of other challenges, multilateral diplomats can only pursue their sending states' interests effectively when they have thorough knowledge of the institutional ethics, working methods and bureaucracy of the IGO itself (Barston 2006: 28, 30; Saner and Yiu 2003: 5; Sofer 1988: 200–201). A diplomat who can 'navigate' this specialized terrain is far more likely to use opportunities to full advantage, and by the same token, to avoid pitfalls. A matter as seemingly simple as a deadline for submission of policy papers can be pivotal. With so many participants and inputs to coordinate, large IGOs necessarily have strict deadlines for member-state submissions. This is not nearly as important in bilateral diplomacy, where time frames hinge on mutual agreement (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 227).

Negotiation

The concepts of diplomacy and negotiation are often used interchangeably in diplomatic theory. When diplomacy enters the multilateral mode, the nexus between the two becomes conspicuous. Massive and multi-layered volumes of continuous diplomacy take place within the multilateral arena, as multiple stakeholders consult on agenda matters. This is not restricted to the official assemblies of IGOs. In the margins of multilateral forums, informal diplomacy becomes as important as anything happening 'on the record' (Cohen 1999: 2; Berridge 2010: 25; Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 219).

As discussed, for diplomats from individual states part of the challenge lies in the multidimensional nature of their representational role. The foreign policy objectives of a national government, its relevant regional IGO and other minilateral groupings it may be aligned with, can be mutually exclusive (Saner and Yiu 2003: 10). Diplomats therefore negotiate continuously within their own blocs to harmonize strategy, often engaging in bilateral negotiations with key partners. The critical mass of negotiation outcomes depends in part on the nature of the multilateral forum. In parliamentary-style assemblies such as the UNGA, majority voting holds sway and quantitative support for resolutions is of the essence. On the other hand, in *ad hoc* conferences it is more important to determine a minimum common denominator so that general consensus can be reached.

A subtler but equally vital need for negotiation relates to intra-governmental liaison. When civil servants other than MFA staff interact directly with their foreign counterparts, it is inevitable that erosion occurs in the traditional international leadership monopoly of MFAs. This is most prevalent within economic affairs. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, ministries responsible for international trade and industry take the lead, as do finance ministries and central banks which represent their governments on issues of global financial management at organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Barston 2006: 10; Pigman 2010: 63; Saner and Yiu 2003: 5). Pigman (2010: 64) observes that ministries of agriculture have become key diplomatic actors in the 'perennially difficult' WTO negotiations about farm subsidies and in the conduct of diplomacy within the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. And Leguey-Feilleux (2009: 221) gives the example of the International Labour Organization where government officials in the labour sector have been accorded the right to participate and vote independently of their foreign ministry counterparts.

In response, MFAs have had to adopt a greater managerial role vis-à-vis the rest of government, and it is reflected in much more inter-ministerial policy strategizing at headquarters. Paul Meerts (1999: 90) describes this process as 'inter-civil-servant negotiations'. The same applies to the increasingly important role of civil society groups. Apart from actually being included in official delegations, NGO representatives also participate in the drafting of position papers and conference documents. One of the most striking examples of successful polylateral diplomacy during the preparatory strategizing prior to a major multilateral conference was the conclusion of the 1998 Ottawa Treaty, which banned anti-personnel land mines (Wiseman 2010: 27). *De facto* diplomats are thus granted a consultative position in the formulation of negotiation strategy while *de jure* diplomats remain formally in charge of national delegations at multilateral meetings (Saner and Yiu 2003: 5).

In addition to the myriad competing national, regional and other agendas within an IGO, and despite agreed-upon institutional procedures within IGOs, negotiation becomes enormously complicated and unpredictable by the sheer diversity in the culture, style and professional habits of individual diplomats. It is therefore much more difficult than in bilateral forums for multilateral diplomats to negotiate successfully (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 218; Sofer 1988: 200–201). As in so many other respects, the multilateral negotiation playing field is hardly level for the delegations of developing nations. Their governments can seldom spare the requisite technocrats from domestic ministries to strengthen multilateral negotiation teams, and this leaves their diplomats ill equipped to deal with the technical aspects of negotiations (Barston 2006: 21). The 'digital divide' exacerbates their dilemma, as their missions lack sufficient ICT-enabled link-ups to technical experts, or political principals, in sending states. John Hemery (2002: 142) argues that these disadvantages turn delegations from poorer states into 'a mere object of negotiation' and prevent them from participating as equal partners. In the same vein, Pigman (2010: 65) gives the example of the WTO's biennial ministerial meetings that are held away from its Geneva headquarters, to which powerful states dispatch large delegations with huge technical backup expertise at their disposal. Less powerful states are represented at the same meetings, but are thinly stretched and therefore operate 'at the relative disadvantage that smaller numbers and depth of expertise confer'.

Negotiation is also a routine part of the diplomatic functions of international civil servants. As mentioned, many engage in full-fledged diplomatic work both at IGO headquarters and when posted to permanent missions. An additional practice has become common, namely the deployment of IGO negotiators on *ad hoc* field assignments. A very visible example within the UN community is the appointment of a special representative of the secretary-general

(SRSG). According to Langhorne (2005: 336), the deployment of SRSGs was initially a rare occurrence but nowadays characterizes almost every diplomatic intervention by the UN in a conflict situation. He notes that the practice has also spread to thematic areas other than conflict resolution, and is being replicated increasingly by other IGOs within and beyond the UN system.

Information gathering and reporting

The diplomatic function of information gathering and reporting has become infinitely more difficult in a world where, ironically, information is in abundance and accessible to more people than ever before. Rather than diminish the need for diplomatic reporting, this has played up the need for more critical analysis of information and succinct reporting by state representatives, who have a holistic understanding of a given foreign policy context (Kurbalija 1999: 183).

Within a multilateral context, opportunities to gather information are multiplied by the proximity of so many potential sources: the representatives of states and non-state actors, and the institutional memory of the IGO itself. Networking skills are crucial in this regard, and increasingly also the ability to access available technology (including social media) to full advantage.

Since the codification of the 1961 Vienna Convention, the information-gathering function of diplomacy has assumed an equally important, parallel dimension, that of communicating information as part of public diplomacy. Bilateral diplomats actively engage with the civil society of their host states, whereas multilateral diplomats do not have this mandate. However, the media-accessible nature of multilateral forums means that they have opportunity to engage with a global audience.

Intergovernmental organization staff also actively engage in public diplomacy. An example is the UN's maintenance of a network of Information Centres (UNICs) across the world. There were 63 such UNIC offices during 2012 (Pigman 2010: 67; UN 2012b). Much as diplomats from individual states do, UNIC officials disseminate information about the organization they represent, promote its image and interests, and interact with host government officials as well as with civil society, the media and other entities in the foreign policy community.

Promotion of friendly inter-state relations

Raymond Cohen (1999: 16), in defence of the enduring need for professional diplomats, contends that the role of diplomacy is 'to work on the boundary between cultures as an interpretative and conjunctive mechanism'. Within the rich tapestry of cultures and interests that are multilateral forums, multilateral diplomats are the spokes of the wheels that propel international relations forward: they manage the growing network of agreements that allow people, goods and services to cross sovereign jurisdictions (Cohen 1999: 14; Hocking 1999: 32; Spies 2006: 294). This is why middle powers see multilateralism as a normative choice: IGOs are not just microcosms of international society, but offer unrivalled opportunities for international cooperation. Within multilateral forums diplomats can strengthen bilateral relations, conduct polylateral relations, practise third-party diplomacy and promote every manifestation of multilateral relations: intra-region cohesion building, minilateral 'club' diplomacy, inter-bloc synergy and even inter-IGO relations. Intergovernmental organizations also famously offer occasion for states that do not have diplomatic relations to use the

proximity of adversaries and the organization's facilities for discreet diplomatic encounters (Barston 2006: 41; Berridge 2010: 144–5, 152).

In the case of international civil servants who have diplomatic roles, the very *raison d'être* of their intergovernmental organization is to foster friendly inter-state relations. The secretaries-general of IGOs typically have prominent diplomatic profiles in this regard, but many other secretariat members, on a routine basis, assist with negotiation and consensus building to foster closer inter-state and inter-bloc relations within the organization (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 229; Pigman 2010: 66–9).

Conclusion

The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, drafted for the reality of the international system half a century ago, understandably focused exclusively on bilateral diplomacy between sovereign states. Had it been formulated at the start of the twenty-first century, it is quite possible that it would have paid particular attention to multilateral diplomacy, which has in the interim irrevocably impacted the form and substance of international relations. At the start of the twenty-first century, its arena offers a snapshot of global politics in terms of the number and variety of stakeholders and the range of issues that are dealt with. This consideration in itself has made participation in its processes an imperative for international actors, regardless of their relative structural power. Multilateralism is also a normative choice for some actors, notably middle powers, which emphasize the legitimacy bestowed by global governance of human concerns. As an umbrella mode that facilitates and accommodates all the other modes of diplomacy, it has fuelled a massive growth in diplomatic practice, yielding a particularly voluminous output within the context of IGOs.

The individuals who are tasked with the conduct of multilateral diplomacy are both *de jure* and *de facto* diplomats. They include the traditional, official representatives of states, officials from government departments and agencies other than MFAs, international civil servants and individuals who act on behalf of NGOs. Of these, official state representatives experience the greatest challenges in the execution of their traditional diplomatic functions: negotiating on behalf of and promoting the interests not only of their sending states, but implicitly also of various, often overlapping, other multilateral associations of which their governments form a part. To this complex mandate is added the pressure of media scrutiny and the huge variety of diplomatic styles and cultures that are superimposed on the distinct institutional culture of a given IGO. With an ever-increasing number of non-MFA officials involved in the negotiation of issues on the agenda, the role of official state representatives is therefore becoming managerial in nature. As 'specialist-generalists', with holistic knowledge of their countries' foreign policy agendas and the broader nuances of international relations, they are well placed to fulfil this function.

The benefits of the multilateral system are, however, asymmetrical. Less developed states, as a result of their peripheral position in the international system, are enthusiastic about the practical and symbolic opportunities of multilateral diplomacy. They are however also most vulnerable to the outcomes of global governance, yet struggle to match the levels of representation of their rich counterparts in the myriad forums of multilateral diplomacy.

The compounded challenges encountered by diplomats from these states, and indeed diplomats in general, make a case for strategic recruitment and customized training of multilateral diplomats. As Cooper et al. (2008: 1) note, diplomats are not traditionally trained for a role in global governance, because diplomacy is considered an exclusive activity whereas 'global governance, by contrast, is an open-ended way of looking at and navigating in the

world, with a high degree of inclusiveness about whom and what is included in its machinery and agenda'. One can argue that even experienced diplomats need to be 'rehatted' to navigate the multilateral diplomatic arena. The work of these 'governors' of our interdependent and interconnected world is of critical importance.

Recommended for further reading

Berridge (2010), Leguey-Feilleux (2009) and Pigman (2010).

Notes

1 Their contributions have also become important in the context of 'privatized' diplomacy. An example is the International Crisis Group (ICG), founded in 1995 as an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization that provides diplomatic reporting and analysis on areas of potential or actual crisis to supplement the work of ministries of foreign affairs and intergovernmental organizations. The ICG employs teams of political analysts – many of them former diplomats – from countries across the globe (International Crisis Group 2012). One of the advantages of a private diplomatic actor like the ICG is its pro-active research, which contrasts with the often re-active work done by individual ministries of foreign affairs, and its ability to select and focus on a small range of issues. This is something the foreign services of sovereign states cannot do, having to contend with the full spectrum of foreign policy priorities.
2 According to Clive Archer (1992: 68) international organizations have assumed three distinct roles within the international environment: they serve variously as arenas for interaction among global actors, are wielded as instruments by such actors, and act proactively and independently as actors in their own right.
3 From a professional procedural perspective, the term diplomat is applied to those officials who are accorded legal diplomatic status when working abroad and who, in hierarchical professional ascent in their ministries of foreign affairs, are in line to attain the eventual rank of ambassador. The term excludes, therefore, other categories of transferred personnel who are employed in diplomatic missions, such as administrative, technical and service staff.
4 The term 'infra dig' means 'beneath one's dignity' (from Latin phrase *infrā dignitātem*).
5 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand has since 1949, published an annual *United Nations Handbook*. It is widely distributed within the UN community in an attempt to foster greater understanding of, and effective operation of, the multilateral UN system. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said of this handbook that it is 'yet another sign of New Zealand's dynamic presence in the world Organisation' (United Nations 2011: back cover).
6 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) spells out, in Article 24(1), that the 'Headquarters of the Union shall be in Addis Ababa in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia'. The legal provisions pertaining to diplomats' immunities and privileges are further elaborated on, in an 'Agreement between the African Union and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on the Headquarters of the African Union' signed on 25 April 2008 (African Union 2008).
7 The United Nations General Assembly voted on 28 November 2012 (UNGA. Resolution A/RES/67/19) to enhance the participation of Palestine at the UN, by granting it the status of 'Observer State'.
8 With the exception of the UN Security Council, where presidency is rotated among the full Council, it is customary for these positions to be allocated to smaller or medium-sized states.

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16

Secretaries-General of international organizations

Leadership capacity and qualities

Kent J. Kille

In the study of international organization actors, a key area of focus has been the leaders of these organizations. While the executive heads of international organizations are labeled with a variety of titles, including Chairman, Director-General, Executive Director, General Secretary, and President, Secretary-General is both the most common and, given the particular emphasis that has been placed on the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, highest-profile title used to capture this position. However, despite the important role a Secretary-General can play in international affairs, research has to date provided an incomplete understanding of leadership provided by office-holders. To begin with, the great majority of studies have been carried out on the UN Secretary-General. While such an emphasis has led to a solid gathering of knowledge in certain areas regarding this office, the work on the UN Secretary-General has also tended to be limited in scope due to the primary focus on peace and security and greater analysis of certain office-holders compared to others.

More broadly, the focus on the UN significantly limits our understanding of Secretary-General leadership as the office-holders of other international organizations have been largely ignored or understudied. There are a few exceptions to this rule, but by and large there is a paucity of information on Secretary-General leadership across different organizational contexts. The research that is in place most often focuses on one organization, which does not provide for cross-organizational comparison or consideration of cross-office collaboration. The literature on the Secretary-General has also largely been descriptive, thereby lacking strong analytical frameworks or theoretical grounding.

This chapter explores these core themes, starting with the existing literature on the UN Secretary-General before moving on to present studies that tackle executive head leadership in other institutional settings, including work comparing international Secretariats or embedding Secretary-General leadership within the Secretariat that can shed light on approaches to the study of the Secretary-General. The analytical frameworks employed to specifically study the Secretary-General are then detailed, before moving onto a discussion of the growing effort to connect the understanding of Secretary-General leadership to developments in international organization theorizing. Each section provides an overview of the related material, and explains the main issues and research developments. The chapter concludes with linked suggestions for ways forward in the study of the Secretary-General

position that will bolster our understanding of the leadership capacity of the position and qualities of the individuals holding the office.

Research emphasis on the United Nations Secretary-General

The literature on Secretary-General leadership has been dominated by a focus on the UN Secretary-General. There has been a long-standing, and continuing, interest in carrying out extended analyses of the UN Secretary-General (Schwebel 1952; Gordenker 1967, 2010; Rivlin and Gordenker 1993; Chesterman 2007). However, there has been wide variation within the study of the UN Secretary-General in terms of the issues, activities, and individuals examined, and thereby the knowledge accumulated in these areas.

The primary emphasis on the study of the UN Secretary-General has been in the realm of international peace and security (Boudreau 1991; Newman 1998). In part this has been due to the Secretary-General's attention and activities often being drawn to this issue area, but there are analyses of other global problems such as engagement with human rights that seek to expand understanding of the role capability of an office-holder (see the work by Ramcharan, including that of 2002; Van Boven 1991; Forsythe 1993). However, this level of focus has helped to establish a strong understanding of the UN Secretary-General's role in relation to particular methods used to maintain peace. This includes fact finding (Bourloyannis 1990; Dorn 1995), good offices (Franck and Nolte 1993; Brehio 1998), diplomatic engagement in peacefully resolving disputes (Cordovez 1987; Skjelsbaek 1991), prevention of civil war (Pasternack 1994), and the use of "groups of friends" (Krasno 2003; Whitfield 2007). Useful details of how different Secretaries-General have handled certain security issue areas are also presented; for example, in relation to nuclear disarmament (Rydell 2009) and terrorism (Comras 2010).

More generally, the political role of the UN Secretary-General has been explored in detail (for instance, Goodrich 1962; Elarby 1987; Murthy 1995). In total, the potential authority of a Secretary-General leads one analysis of the political role to conclude, "All these avenues allow the SG to shape the institutional context and normative milieu within which personal influence must be wielded" (Thakur 2006: 324). While there are many different emphases on the study of the UN Secretary-General, other areas that have gained attention include selection of the office-holder (Urquhart and Childers 1996; Keating 2007), the Charter basis of the office (Goodrich et al. 1969; Simma 1994), with particular focus on Article 99 since this grants the Secretary-General the ability to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security" (Schwebel 1951; Dorn 2004), the international legal position of the Secretary-General (Lavalle 1990; Szasz 1991), the role connected to staffing of the Secretariat (Meron 1982; Ameri 1996), and the organizational structure (Ramcharan 1990; Williams 2010) and reform (Beigbeder 2000; Franda 2006).

There has clearly been more in-depth exploration of some UN Secretaries-General over others. This has led to some concern that the roles of certain Secretaries-General are not fully understood (Dorn and Pauk 2009). However, there is in-depth work focused on each Secretary-General who has left office thus far, including Trygve Lie (Barros 1989; Gaglione 2001), U Thant (Bingham 1966; Nassif 1988), Kurt Waldheim (Finger and Saltzman 1990; Ryan 2001), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Kanninen 1995; Lankevich 2001), and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Rivlin 1996; Burgess 2001), which is much more than can be said for most office-holders in other international organizations.

At the same time, this level of coverage is limited compared to the burst of interest over Kofi Annan that emerged during his tenure (for example, Rieff 1999; Ramo 2000; Maniatis

2001; Gourevitch 2003), with a particular analytical emphasis on his UN reform efforts (such as Bhatta 2000; Prins 2005; Zifcak 2009), as well as later full-length book treatments (Traub 2006; Meisler 2007). In addition, the study of the second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, has developed into a virtual cottage industry, which has established a deep understanding of the leadership he provided and exploration of the person behind the office (highlights include Lash 1961; Zacher 1970; Urquhart 1972). The interest in Hammarskjöld has been consistent across time, with his tenure being "revisited" (Jordan 1983), then returned to on the 100th anniversary of his birth (Ask and Mark-Jungvist 2005), and renewed yet again recently on the 50th anniversary of his death (Melber 2011; Hanley and Melber 2011).

Secretaries-General across international organizations

Those studying the UN Secretary-General have often made claims such as, "The Secretary-General of the United Nations is a unique figure in world politics" (Chesterman et al. 2008: 132), which has helped to bolster the analytical emphasis on this office. However, this approach also undermines the ability to build understanding of Secretary-General leadership by examining the role being played by heads of different organizations, and precludes the carrying out of long-called-for comparative work (Zacher 1969). Yet, there has been some important work on international organization leadership beyond the UN Secretary-General. As the precursor to the UN, the League of Nations Secretary-General has received attention. At times this is as part of anthologies looking across the League and the UN (Rovine 1970; Fosdick 1972) or in comparison to the transition to the UN, but the office (Ranshofen-Wertheimer 1945) and individual office-holders have also been specifically chronicled (Barros 1969, 1979; Gageby 1999).

A few studies have examined leaders in different parts of the UN system, including the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Bhattacharya 1976), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Finkelstein 1988), the World Bank (Schechter 1988; Kraske 1996), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Loescher 2001), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Blackhurst 2012). Yves Beigbeder's (1997) examination of the "leadership issue" in UN management considers different forms and roles, as well as the appointment process across the UN system, while other research has focused solely on the selection process across organizations, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and WTO (Kahler 2001), and analysis across a wide range of UN system heads during the time period 1945–70 (Hoole 1976).

There has been good progress in the study of the Secretaries-General of certain intercontinental and regional organizations. Illustrative of this is the Commonwealth Secretary-General, whose leadership has been analyzed (Doxey 1979, 1989; Chan, especially 2005; Mole 2010) as well as examined in conjunction with the Secretariat (in particular Leach 1971; Akinrade 1992). Due in great part to the earlier work carried out by Robert Jordan (especially 1979) and the recent extensive research by Ryan Hendrickson (most comprehensively 2006, 2010a) there is also a much clearer view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-Generalship (see also Hoogenboezem 2009).

The limited research examining the UN Secretary-General relative to regional organization executive heads indicates the feasibility and importance of such work. The relative powers of the UN and Organization of American States (OAS) Secretaries-General has been explored (Caminos and Lavalle 1989); and looking across the NATO and UN Secretaries-General in relation to the handling of Kosovo establishes not only the relative leadership provided by each organization's Secretary-General, but also the cross-office interaction that

can occur (Kille and Hendrickson 2010). In a different UN–European cross-office study, it is demonstrated that the same expansionist leadership-style analytical approach can be used to study executive head positions in both the UN and the European Union (EU) (Kille and Scully 2003). The potential for detailing the lives of a great number of Secretaries-General, and providing the basis for considering their social and professional connections, led to the launching of the IO BIO Project. This project is designed to produce an extensive *Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations* with entries designed to allow for exploring cross-Secretary-General linkage, as well as the capability to undertake broader Secretary-General comparative analysis (Reinalda and Kille 2012).

Such vital cross-organizational analysis has also been present in the comparative study of international organisation Secretariats. For example, Jarle Trondal et al. (2010) stress the need for such comparative research and carry out an in-depth study of international organization bureaucracies across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), EU, and WTO, while Alexandru Grigorescu (2010) takes a larger-N approach by examining bureaucratic oversight mechanisms as applied to 73 international organizations. An extended examination of the administration of international organizations includes a specific analysis of senior management, which looks across different executive heads and related management issues (Davies 2002).

International organization Secretariats and the Secretary-General

As Michael Davies' research has shown, there is value in examining the administrative place that a Secretary-General holds in the Secretariat when observing across organizations. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the range of work on international secretariats, it is important to acknowledge and illustrate how some of this work provides assistance for understanding Secretary-General leadership as head of the Secretariat. In other words, the insights from broader analyses across Secretariats can be used for analytical leverage where the Secretary-General is presented as a component of this work. In addition, recent work in this area also demonstrates the importance of and capability for carrying out comparative research using detailed analytical frameworks and theoretical principles that carries important implications for the specific study of the Secretary-General.

As James Jonah (2007: 170) succinctly states: "Key to the success of the Secretariat is its leadership . . . the competence, capability, and general character of any Secretary-General have an impact on the effectiveness of the Secretariat." Thus, analyses of the UN Secretariat have often placed an emphasis on the relative place and role of the Secretary-General (Bailey 1964; Myint-U and Scott 2007). In his key analysis of international organization, Inis Claude (1971) notes the issues facing the international secretariat and the place of the Secretary-General, where office-holders have had different approaches in addressing these. The wide-ranging UN Intellectual History Project was developed around the idea that "people matter" in the development of global ideas and activities, which of course includes the Secretary-General (for example, Weiss et al. 2005); and, building upon Claude's (1996) distinction of the "First UN" (member-states) and "Second UN" (Secretariat), such an approach extends to considering how to bolster the capability of those working in international organizations (for example Weiss 2010).

In examining the use of force across Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo, Ralph Zacklin (2010) emphasizes the intentional analytical focus on the Secretariat as an actor, instead of just the Secretary-General, but does present the Secretary-General's role in the context of Secretariat engagement and legal position and acknowledges the importance of the Secretary-General's

"voice" in representing the Secretariat. A study of the World Health Organization (WHO) Secretariat's norm entrepreneurship capability in the area of global disease regulations includes mention of the appointment and engagement of a new Director-General as an advantageous factor in helping to promote progress (Kamradt-Scott 2010). The extensive study *Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies* (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009) demonstrates the importance of employing strong analytical frameworks and theoretical grounding for comparative analysis, and includes the dimension of "organizational leadership" which is found to be significant across their case analysis of nine different organizations. In an earlier related piece, Steffen Bauer (2006: 23, 45; see also Bauer 2008) emphasizes such a "need for a substantive and systematic research effort that analyses the activities of international organizations" since, in this case, "systematically addressing the contributions international governmental secretariats can make to effective environmental governance is thus essential for a comprehensive analysis of global environmental politics."

Analyzing Secretary-General leadership

Such systematic analysis has often been lacking in the study of the Secretary-General, which has been critiqued from early on for this limitation present in the literature (Knight 1970). The classic basic analytical distinction is the simple duality of Secretary versus General, which has focused discussion from early on and has generally continued to dominate the discourse on the office. This debate often reflects back to the founding of the League of Nations Secretary-Generalship, including contrasting the administrative "Secretary" approach of League Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond with the active "General" emphasis of his contemporary, Albert Thomas, in the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Alexandrowicz 1962). The dual distinction remains "a crucial recurring theme regarding the secretary-general . . . to what extent do their activities involve independent political roles beyond managerial and administrative functions?" (Smith 2006: 84), although other analytical divisions have been put forth, such as the Secretary-General as prophet, pope, and pharaoh (Adebajo 2009).

There have been other deeper analytical efforts to address international organization leadership. In a widely cited article, Oran Young (1991: 281) argues that leadership "is a critical determinant of success or failure in the process of institutional bargaining," and therefore in need of closer and better defined understanding, and distinguishes between structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership accordingly. Robert Cox's analytical contributions to studying international organization leadership (Cox 1969) and decision making (Cox and Jacobson 1973) continue to resonate in current analysis, as indicated by the revisiting of Cox and Jacobson (Hazelzet 1998; see also Reinalda and Verbeek 2004) and the adaptation of Cox's framework for studying leadership at the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (Harman 2011; see also Nay 2011). Such analytical repetition, and therefore testing and cumulation of knowledge, is relatively rare in the study of the Secretary-General. However, such an effort can be seen in the direct application of a framework developed to study the OAU Secretary-General across legal-institutional, resource, systemic, and personal factors (Meyers 1976) to the Commonwealth Secretary-General (Doxey 1979). Similarly, Michael Schechter's (1987) study of systemic conditions, organizational characteristics, and personal characteristics across the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO, and the World Bank has been adapted to the Commonwealth setting as well by organizing the analysis along a similar variable structure (Doxey 1989).

More recent efforts tied to UN Secretary-General leadership include the research of Jeong-Tae Kim (2006) and Kent Kille (2006). Both review the existing efforts to study the

office-holders and seek to develop more systematic analysis that builds upon and beyond this work. Kim's "analytic approach" is structured around the range of activity available to an office-holder, based in particular on role-scope and tolerance-scope dimensions, and applied to brief case studies of Lie, Hammarskjöld, Pérez de Cuellar, and Boutros-Ghali. Kille (2006) derives three key leadership styles (manager, strategist, and visionary) and a connected framework for analyzing the avenues of influence available to a UN Secretary-General. The leadership styles for the first seven office-holders are presented, along with detailed case chapters covering Hammarskjöld (visionary), Waldheim (manager), and Annan (strategist) which show how these office-holders' tenures matched well with the behavioral expectations for each style.

International organization theory and the Secretary-General

Kille's leadership style studies (Kille and Scully 2003; Kille 2006) demonstrate how advances from the field of foreign policy analysis can be extended to the study of the Secretary-General, but Secretary-General research has also been making recent strides in drawing upon relevant international organization theory. As scholars have sought to better understand the agency of international organizations, and the potential of international organizations to carve out their own independent capability in international relations, there are clear implications for considering Secretary-General leadership. A principal–agent approach applied to international organization points to member-states as the principals delegating to the institutions that they established (Hawkins et al. 2006). Within such a framework, the Secretary-General can be analyzed as an agent, who may carry out the tasks as instructed or seek to pursue more independent interests, and the opportunities and implications of the office's actions can be examined within the context of the principal–agent structure that exists for a particular international organization.

The work of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999, 2004), emphasizing the need to move beyond a state-centered framework to address the capability of international organizations to exercise authority via their bureaucratic nature, has been particularly influential and inspirational for research related to the Secretary-General. As noted in a report from the workshop "Rediscovering Global Bureaucracies: From Weber to Where?," Barnett and Finnemore's framework "today presents the most elaborate framework for understanding the behavior, pathologies, and powers of IOs" (Bueger and Heßelmann 2011: 90), and this perceived relevance to the study of international organization bureaucracy is reflected in the continual reference to their work in other work on international secretariats. Even when the specific research is not explicitly grounded in related international organization theory, it can be argued that the work can still be usefully drawn upon and connected to the theoretical exploration (Auth 2012).

The particular emphasis in the study of the Secretary-General, which again has been focused on the UN Secretary-General, has been on norms. Simon Rushton (2008), grounding his argument primarily in the work of Barnett and Finnemore as well as Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), details the norm entrepreneurship role of Boutros-Ghali in promoting a norm of democratic governance. Kirsten Haack and Kille (2012) extend the understanding of the UN Secretary-General in the realm of democracy, demonstrating the possibility of self-directed leadership by tracing the development of the UN democracy agenda across Boutros-Ghali and Annan. The analysis highlights the relevance of Secretary-General engagement in shaping the understanding of and approach to democracy as this agenda became increasingly institutionalized and more broadly applied in practice as part of

the organizational discourse. Ian Johnstone (2007) also tracks the UN Secretary-General as a norm entrepreneur, with a particular emphasis on the three-stage process of norm creation, norm institutionalization, and norm interpretation connected to an analysis of Annan, who he describes as "more conscious" (Johnstone 2007: 123) than preceding office-holders of this potential influential path despite their own norm entrepreneurship engagement. This builds upon his earlier work, in which he argues that the "persuasive powers" of the Secretary-General connect to the office-holder's role as an interpretive participant in the international legal discourse (Johnstone 2003).

One dimension of international organization authority, and by extension that of the Secretary-General, is "moral authority" where the institution can "claim to be the representative of the community's interests or the defender of the values of the international community" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23). The importance of moral authority to Secretary-General leadership has particularly been stressed in relation to the UN Secretary-General, with questions raised over the relevance to other offices: "Unlike the UN Secretary-General, who is expected at times to exercise his 'moral authority' . . . these same expectations have not existed for NATO's secretary general" (Hendrickson 2010b: 26). However, office-holders outside of the military realm—in particular in relation to human rights and humanitarian issues—could still be connected to moral authority dimensions. One study, which is also grounded in the related literature on religion and international relations and ethics and international affairs, demonstrates the relevance of the UN Secretary-General and moral authority to office-holder decision-making across case studies of the first seven Secretaries-General. It uses a common analytical approach that encompasses an "ethical framework" based on personal religious and moral values in connection to related external contextual cues as well as formative environmental and experiential factors (Kille 2007). In addition, Manuel Fröhlich's research on Hammarskjöld (in particular 2008) has demonstrated the importance of political ethics in the handling of the office.

Conclusion

From this review of the literature on the Secretary-General, it is clear that progress has been made on researching the office and its holders, but that important work remains to be tackled. First, the research emphasis on the study of the UN Secretary-General has led to useful insights into the functioning of this office, particularly in the realm of international peace and security, and the qualities of those who have served in this position. This work should continue in order to build upon these achievements to provide a closer understanding of all of the Secretaries-General and their engagement across a range of issue areas. The eighth, and current, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon illustrates this need. Although he has already entered his second term in office, there is relatively limited detailed analysis of his time as Secretary-General (Schlesinger 2010; Williams 2010; Gowan 2011; Jonah 2011; on Ban's selection and implications see Urquhart 2006; Benner 2007; Traub 2007). Ban's emphasis on environmental issues (see Kanninen and Kostakos 2011) also demonstrates an understudied area of UN Secretary-General engagement, despite the strong study of environmental secretariats that does exist.

However, as stressed across the chapter, there is an even greater need to undertake detailed study of the Secretaries-General of other international organizations in order to overcome this clear gap in the literature. Such research will improve comprehension of Secretary-General leadership in international relations and allow for comparison across international organizations. Analysis can also be further extended to build understanding of

Secretary–General interactions, as well as the differing organizational contexts within which they are operating and the impact that this has on their role. Finally, research on Secretaries-General should be carried out using carefully constructed analytical frameworks, and theoretically grounded in the relevant work, in order to allow for proper testing and cumulation of knowledge.

Recommended for further reading

Gordenker (1967), Cox (1969), Johnstone (2003), Kille (2006), and Hendrickson (2006).

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The Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General

Manuel Fröhlich

Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) of the United Nations (UN) are persons appointed by the UN Secretary-General to fulfil roles in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They work in specific conflict situations or are engaged in transregional and transnational issues, with activities ranging from discreet mediation efforts to conducting a peace operation and virtually running a country. Since 1990 their number and their entrusted tasks have increased dramatically, making them a prime instrument of UN functions in the realm of international peace and security. The acronym SRSG is also used for a broader category comprising a wide variety of high-level appointments (Peck 2004: 337–8). Mirroring different tasks, contexts and mandates, it includes Special Envoys, Heads of Mission, Special Advisors, Personal Representatives and Transitional Administrators as well. Although SRSGs are present on all continents and work on a variety of transregional challenges, their work has not received much public or scholarly attention. According to Puchala (1993: 82) 'even some very elementary questions' regarding their origin, development, functions and performance 'remain unanswered'. Some 20 years later Puchala's assessment still holds true, although a few articles and reports explicitly dealing with SRSGs have been published (Vance and Hamburg 1997; Fafo 1999; Peck 2004; Fröhlich 2006; Peck 2008; Fröhlich 2012). Building on these efforts and the ongoing work of assembling a comprehensive database of SRSG appointments, activities and personalities, some elementary questions will be discussed in this chapter that will also illustrate their relevance for the study of international organizations (IOs). The chapter examines the origin of SRSGs in the UN context, discusses the legal and political basis of their work, provides some data on their evolution and offers perspectives for the evaluation of their work.[1]

The origin of the Special Representatives

The use of envoys, representatives and mediators has been a constant feature of diplomatic activity and interaction throughout history (Black 2010). While the rank of ambassador is usually bestowed on the national representative of one country in a different country, new methods of diplomatic interaction, such as the emergence of IOs, have led to new diplomatic titles. Among these are permanent representatives, who do not work on behalf of a particular

country but are part of a multilateral framework with a thematic focus and specific procedural rights and obligations. The use of representatives of IOs is remarkable, as it underscores the fact or the ambition that, at times, IOs act in their own right. These representatives can also be seen as a manifestation of the international civil service, albeit with some major differences regarding their recruitment, remuneration and responsibilities. Among the first people given mandates to represent the UN, and more specifically its Secretary-General, was Moderow Wlodzimierz of Poland, who in 1946 was designated Representative of the Secretary-General in Geneva to negotiate and organize with the League of Nations' last Secretary-General, Sean Lester, the transfer of assets from the League.[2] The reasoning behind his appointment was simple and plausible, as the UN Secretary-General needed someone who could speak for him and negotiate and arrange matters on an equal footing with the League's Secretary-General. Since the UN Secretary-General could not spend a long time away from headquarters to deal with technical problems in the context of the League's dissolution, Wlodzimierz's task was to 'represent' him in the legal procedure. The appointment of the Chinese Victor Hoo as Personal Representative of the Secretary-General on the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1946 introduced a more political role for the representative and indicated a pattern that has remained common until today: the use of SRSGs as members and leaders of UN entities away from headquarters. This also applied to the 1947 appointment of the Norwegian Erik Colban as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). While Hoo's task signalled the subsequent use of SRSGs in peacemaking, Colban foreshadowed their use in the context of peacekeeping efforts. Two prominent names complete the list of the first SRSGs: the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, who worked as UN mediator in the Middle East until his assassination in 1948, and the American Ralph Bunche, whose position as Chief Representative of the Secretary-General in Palestine changed to that of Acting Mediator as successor to Bernadotte. Although working under different titles, Bunche in 1950 was the first SRSG to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work.[3]

After the initial, rather improvised, use of representatives, a more specific use can be traced back to the tenure of Dag Hammarskjöld and his efforts to alleviate Cold War tensions through his style of private diplomacy and an enlarged concept of technical assistance for the benefit of newly independent countries (Miller 1961; Urquhart 1972; Fröhlich 2008a). The overarching framework for these activities can be found in Hammarskjöld's concept of 'UN presence', according to which UN deployment may take many forms, varying from a strong peacekeeping force of several thousand soldiers to a single diplomat working confidentially on sensitive issues. While the first 'big' deployments of UN peacekeepers after the Suez Crisis (1956) and in the Congo (1960) illustrate the former, the dispatch of the Head of the UN Geneva Office, Piero Spinelli, to Jordan in 1958 to deal with the volatile situation there is an example of the latter (Urquhart 1972: 294–6; Fröhlich 2008b: 21–2). Going beyond peace-keeping and peacemaking, Hammarskjöld's early use of SRSGs also points towards other, peacebuilding, functions entrusted to them. In 1959 he sent Adrian Pelt, a former UN staffer and then Secretary-General of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, to Guinea as his Special Representative, to appraise the need and options for UN technical assistance (Urquhart 1972: 378–9). Pelt was an interesting choice for that mission because, following a mandate from the UN General Assembly, from 1950 to 1951 he had administered the independence of Libya as UN Commissioner. This quite unique assignment paved the way for the future use of SRSGs in similar circumstances and is echoed in the more recent roles that SRSGs have played in the transitional administrations of East Timor and Kosovo. Hammarskjöld consciously used SRSGs for political missions (Miller 1961) when he sent the

Colombian Francisco Urrutia to Israel and Jordan in order to negotiate the Mount Scopus Agreement of 1957 and dispatched the Swedish diplomats Johan Beck-Friis (border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia) and Herbert de Ribbing (the future of the disputed Bureimi oasis in Oman). The SRSGs thus emerged as part of the constitutional shift in the UN at the time. With the Security Council deadlocked by Cold War tensions, it fell to the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to take responsibility for actively working for international peace and security.[4] The General Assembly, however, can only recommend that certain actions are taken. As a plenary organ of decision making, and not of executive action, it placed more and more responsibilities on the Secretary-General's shoulders. This was the background to the common quote 'Leave it to Dag', implying the one venue of UN action in the face of 'Big Power inaction' (Fröhlich 2008a).

The emergence of the SRSGs thus largely coincided with the establishment of the Secretary-General as a political actor on behalf of the organization's interests (Puchala 1993; Vance and Hamburg 1997; Peck 2004). Much like the Assembly's resolutions, however, the Secretary-General's actions, if not mandated by the Security Council, rely on his (so far, only men) communication skills and sometimes on relatively extraordinary procedures to establish himself as a relevant actor in crisis diplomacy. This was done partly by entrusting selected diplomats with a rather personal mandate, which raises the question of the legal and political basis of the SRSGs' work.

The legal and political basis of the Special Representatives' work

There is no direct reference to SRSGs in the UN Charter. The same is true for, and partly coincides with, the 'Blue Helmets', whose role developed over the years as the UN tried to adjust to the demands of varying challenges in the maintenance of peace and security around the world. Although the tasks and mandates of SRSGs may vary, the Charter provisions give some basic orientation for their role and scope of action. Their role is tied closely to the office of the Secretary-General, as they 'represent' or, in the case of envoys, are 'sent by' him. Hence, the Articles of Chapter XV on the Secretariat also have relevance for the SRSGs (Fröhlich 2008a: 15–48). Article 97 identifies the Secretary-General as the 'chief administrative officer of the organization' with the concurrent power to lead and appoint an administration of international staff working around the globe. The prerogative of selecting individuals working for the UN, stipulated in Article 101, thus ultimately lies with the Secretary-General and also applies to the selection of SRSGs. As international civil servants, they have to observe the strict standards of international loyalty laid down in Article 100, which aims to protect the staff from pressure and undue influence by member-states but also commands them to work for the fulfilment of the aims and principles of the organization. Chapter XV contains two further provisions, which deal with the political competences of the Secretary-General and, by analogy, apply to the work of the SRSGs representing him. Article 98 states that the Secretary-General 'shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him' by the other main UN organs. This provision opens the door for every major organ of the UN to give specific mandates to the Secretary-General, which may reach (as they have done) well beyond purely administrative services. Among the most specific tasks entrusted to the Secretary-General in the past was the management of peace missions. As he cannot personally engage in the coordination and supervision of many or all missions around the globe, he typically works with someone who represents him in the field. The wording of Security Council Resolution 1590, relating to the situation in Sudan, illustrated this particular mechanism when the Council asked the Secretary-General to coordinate all UN activities in a given

country 'through his Special Representative' (UN Doc. S/Res/1590, 24 March 2005). The Secretary-General's political activities are, however, not limited to tasks directly entrusted to him by the major organs. Article 99 states that he 'may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'. The potential of this provision is remarkable, as it explicitly gives the Secretary-General an area of personal discretion in deciding what kind of situation or event may threaten peace and security.

Against this background, the Secretaries-General have engaged in 'fact-finding-missions' (Partsch 1981: 61–2; Bourloyannis 1990; Boudreau 1991: 17–19) and have provided 'good offices' (Pechota 1972; Franck and Nolte 1995). In these endeavours they can either participate personally or send a representative. The sheer number of assignments and conflicts on the agenda of the UN and its chief executive has made it inevitable that much of this work is delegated. The SRSGs are a practical necessity and seen as 'surrogates for the Secretary-General, essentially as extensions of his person who do what the Secretary-General would and could do if he were personally present' (Puchala 1993: 82). In addition to (often) imprecise resolutions of the major UN organs, they rarely have more guidance for their work than a short letter of appointment.[5] But this lack of detail can also be regarded as giving them flexibility and an invitation for a personal role and indeed leadership in peace missions. As a rule the Secretary-General appoints all SRSGs, who, depending on the nature of the conflict and the UN engagement, report to either the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

With various tasks in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, three sub-groups of SRSGs emerge from the titles used: Representatives, Envoys and Advisors (Fafo 1999). Although the labels are not the result of strict procedure and originate from such diverse rationales as tradition, preference of the office holder and, last but not least, preference of the country to which they are deployed, a rough distinction can be made. Representatives usually have peacekeeping tasks, Envoys are more or less focused on peacemaking duties and Advisors normally work on cross-cutting and transnational issues out of Headquarters.[6] This observation ties in with the attempt to define SRSGs by Marrack Goulding (2002: 16), the former head of the DPA, who differentiates between Special Representatives, Personal Representatives or Representatives tout court ('in that order of seniority'), Special Envoys and Personal Envoys, and Special Advisors and Senior Advisors.

The SRSGs usually hold the rank of Under-Secretary-General for the duration of their mission, which gives them further standing. With the aim of building more coherent and integrated peace missions, SRSGs in the field were also given special status, as Kofi Annan's (2006: para. 5; Ortiz 2009) 'Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions' stated. The SRSG is

> the senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the UN. He/She represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the UN in a given country. The SRSG establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach.

However, in most cases SRSGs are heads of a team (Schori 2009). In addition to Representatives in the narrow sense of leaders of peacekeeping operations, Deputy SRSGs, often working simultaneously as Residents, Humanitarian Coordinators or Chiefs of Staff, emerge as relevant actors (Clement and Smith 2009), which points to the fact that SRSGs

have to set up a useful division of labour within their mission (NMFA 2008: 38; Power 2008: 268; Ortiz 2009; Schori 2009; De Coning 2010).

Therefore SRSGs have to play various roles at the same time. Attractive and challenging though the entailed scope of action may look, the various contexts of conflicts, scarce resources and other requirements limit and impede the SRSGs' role, or at least call for 'multi-tasking' on their part. The most basic distinction with regard to their functions and tasks would be to label them 'part diplomat and part manager' (Fafo 1999: 13). The multitude of possible roles can be understood as an extension of the basic roles of the Secretary-General himself (Fröhlich 2007), who by virtue of the Charter provisions and the will of the member-states is asked to work simultaneously as manager of an administration (acting as leader of a bureaucracy), manager of conflict (acting as mediator) and manager of ideas (upholding, adopting and defending the core values and principles of the Charter). Interviews with former SRSGs seem to support this view (Peck 2008; for illustrations Fröhlich 2013) and are stressed in the Fafo (1999: 30) study that builds on the experience of SRSGs and argues that SRSGs must be effective diplomats, practical but also visionary managers, and effective communicators, and must speak for the highest ideals of the international community.

Focusing on SRSGs engaged in peacekeeping contexts, the 2003 *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* distinguishes three roles of SRSGs, namely facilitator of the political process, head of the UN presence/mission and transitional administrator (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2003: 13). Kofi Annan, whose tenure saw the biggest increase in SRSG deployments, listed four roles: personification of the UN, leader of a peace process, head of a peacekeeping/political or peacebuilding mission and unifying force for all UN activities in the field (UN Doc. SG/SM/7760, 2 April 2001).

Although SRSGs may be working even before the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement, their tasks stem both from the UN Charter in general and from the texts relating to peace agreements in specific terms. A few examples can illustrate the ensuing broad range of activities: preparing an international conference and helping to restore national institutions, as in the 1997 mandate for the SRSG for the Great Lakes Region (UN Doc. S/RES/1097, 18 February 1997); assisting in the implementation of explicit Security Council Resolutions, as in Lebanon (UN Doc. S/RES/1559, 9 May 2007); and leading a transitional administration, as in Kosovo (UN Doc. S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999). The range of SRSG activities in implementing comprehensive mandates and in complex peace operations is indeed sometimes congruent with the whole range of what conceptual efforts in peace and conflict research have identified as the constitutive elements of peace-promoting endeavours (Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Wallensteen 2012; see also the spectrum of peacemaking, peace-keeping and peacebuilding in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992). Thus SRSGs in Haiti and Sudan or the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi lead missions whose mandates include: 1) peace consolidation and governance, 2) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector, 3) promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity and, 4) donor and UN agency coordination (UN Doc. S/RES/1719, 25 October 2006).

To sum up, the legal and political basis of the work of SRSGs parallels that of the UN Secretary-General. Insufficient specific guidance from the Charter and ambiguous mandates call for improvisation. Successful incumbents of the respective offices may be able to establish themselves as important actors, furthering the cause of peace in various ways and through diverse missions. Regardless of their individual tasks as 'good officers' in negotiations or heads of peace operations, the basis of their work remains fragile and lends itself to easy

criticism and blame. Here, another parallel between the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives emerges. Robert Cox (1969: 205 and 207) argued that the 'quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization' and concluded: 'The executive head, in this vision, is cast in a role comparable to that of the proletariat in a better-known dialectical proposition – a heavy load of historical expectations for a rather lonely figure to bear.' Notwithstanding all the manifest problems that stem from such an overburdening with tasks and expectations, the weakness of the Secretary-General and the SRSGs can also be their strength, since the lack of hidden agendas and biased interest implies a mandate and an obligation for action on behalf of the UN. The SRSG tasks and roles are multifaceted and over time have developed from early experiments in the 1950s to become a standard tool of the UN.

The development of Special Representatives

Following Hammarskjöld's early practice, his successors in office all employed the instrument of SRSGs. This use, however, increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War. Boutros-Ghali 'developed the personal envoy and special representative function into one of the most intriguing and promising aspects of UN diplomacy of the post–Cold War era' (Vance and Hamburg 1997: 2). His successor Annan carried on with this practice amidst frequent calls for an intensification of the mediatory and 'good office' functions of the Secretary-General, as in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document (UN Doc. A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, para. 76), which led to 'the coming-of-age of UN mediation as it emerges from the gentlemanly and frequently last-minute practice of the Secretary-General's "good offices" into a more rigorous and finely tuned part of UN core business' (Griffiths 2005: 3). The quantitative development corroborates this finding. While the skilled mediators and interlocutors of early days transformed themselves into the heads and managers of multidimensional peace operations, their number increased significantly in the 1990s. The Jena Database shows a number of trends.[7]

First, the use and presence of SRSGs have risen sharply over the last few decades. Taking the year 1980 as a starting point, the number of SRSGs working on different assignments (understood in the broad sense introduced earlier) more than doubled every ten years. In 1980 there were about a dozen SRSGs, while in 1990 their number had already passed 25. Ten years later the figure was nearly 70 assignments. Although the speed at which SRSG appointments were rising seems to have slowed down, in 2010 there was still an upward trend over time, with about 90 SRSGs operating worldwide.

Second, employing a rough distinction by looking at the titles, another trend emerges. Representatives, who are increasingly engaged in the leadership of complex peace operations containing both peacekeeping and peacebuilding components, nearly quadrupled between 1980 and 2010, when over 50 assignments were identified. At the same time, the number of Envoys, who did not appear in the 1980 count, rose to 18 in 2010, which represents a slight decrease compared with the 2000s, when their number had risen above 20. On a somewhat lower level the same holds true for Advisors, who did not appear in the 1980 and 1990 counts, but rose to 15 in 2010. Again, the distinction is rather blunt, as some Advisors, for example, also work on peacemaking tasks and cannot be confined to thematic work from headquarters. The trend of an increase over time can, however, be observed for all subcategories.

Third, SRSGs come from all over the world and work all over the world. Disregarding titles but looking rather at regional aspects, the following picture emerges from an in-depth study of

SRSGs in 2006 on the basis of the UN's list at the time (Fröhlich 2006). Roughly a third of the 66 appointments worked on 'transregional issues' (such as child soldiers and gender issues), with another third working in Africa and the remainder in Asia and the Pacific (13.6 per cent), Europe (10.6 per cent), the Middle East (9 per cent) and the Americas (6.1 per cent). Concerning the origin of the SRSGs, a similarly diverse picture emerges: about forty per cent came from Europe, followed by the Americas (24.2 per cent), Africa (15.1 per cent) and Asia (13.6 per cent). There were four vacancies at the time. While this is just a small glimpse at the regional aspects of the SRSGs' work, it shows their very international character.

Finally, SRSGs constitute a distinct group of diplomats with specific qualifications. A closer look at the 2006 study provides more information. Ignoring the SRSGs working on 'transregional issues', those 31 SRSGs working in specific conflict situations show the following characteristics. About 65 per cent had made their career in the foreign service of their home country, while about 25 per cent had represented their country at the UN and 25 per cent had worked as an ambassador in one of the countries that were permanent members of the Security Council (multiple classifications being possible). Those who had experience with other, regional, multilateral bodies numbered 38.7 per cent and the same share had worked at the UN before their appointment as SRSG. One of the most striking findings from the sample is that 55 per cent of the SRSGs working in December 2006 had been employed on a different SRSG assignment previously. The average age of the SRSGs was 63, with only a small margin of deviation. Last but not least, all of the selected SRSGs in December 2006 were men. The last few years have seen a number of calls to break this predominance of men among SRSGs (see the demand in a presidential statement of the Security Council: UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/39, 29 October 2008). During the years of Ban Ki-moon's tenure the number of female SRSGs has risen to 15 in 2010.

These observations indicate a number of factors that determine the selection and appointment of SRSGs. The Secretary-General obviously has an important say in the selection of SRSGs, who seem to come out of 'interpersonal networks of people whose international careers have intersected' (Puchala 1993: 83). Apart from the Secretary-General, the consent of the Security Council, the host country, large troop contributors and further stakeholders or parties to the conflict is important (Peck 2004: 326; Fafo 1999: 39). Notwithstanding the need for intensive consultations, Secretaries-General 'have resisted formalizing, institutionalizing, or in any sense routinizing the appointing and dispatching of special representatives'. 'Each mission is considered sui generis; each is instructed ad hoc, staffed as fully or meagrely as resources allow and executed as ambitiously or cautiously as the Secretary-General thinks appropriate' (Puchala 1993: 84). The rationale for choosing a specific SRSG therefore has to take various aspects into account. Former SRSG Pierre Schori (2009: 28) recalls:

> When UN Secretary-General (SG) Kofi Annan asked me to be his Special Representative (SRSG) for Cote d'Ivoire, he argued that the situation called for a person who had executive and legislative experience in government and parliament, insider experience dealing with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), one who came from a country with no colonial past and a tradition of supporting the liberation struggle in Africa, who spoke French and personally knew African leaders.

These qualifications also raise the question of what a SRSG has to bring to the job in order to succeed, how success can be measured and what part of success or failure is attributable to SRSGs. Impressive as the increase in their sheer numbers is, it does not signify that each and every appointment is a suitable and effective way to address a particular challenge or problem.

On the occasion of the deployment of Spinelli as SRSG to Jordan, George Ivan Smith, press officer to Hammarskjöld who had coined the term 'UN presence', regretted his invention of the term because it 'began to be used [as] an ointment suggested for every wound' (Fröhlich 2008b: 22). Hence there may be an element of unnecessary proliferation and pretence in the increased number of SRSGs – this could be used as a procedural move by the UN 'to do something', without actually being able to have an effect on the challenge concerned.

The evaluation of Special Representatives

Although more information could be gathered on the 'elementary questions' that Puchala (1993: 82) raised, the analysis and evaluation of SRSGs still face some obstacles. Pending the elaboration of a detailed database on their origin, background and performance, the very basis of evaluating their efforts beyond the discussion of individual cases is difficult. Three avenues of research underpin the relevance of SRSGs for the study of international organizations.

First, there is a need to work on correlations between SRSG deployment and global conflict occurrence. The increase in SRSGs coincides with a remarkable decrease in intrastate conflict since the 1990s (Fröhlich et al. 2006), as highlighted by the 2005 *Human Security Report*.[8] Although the report discusses factors that could account for this development (the end of colonialism, the spread of democratic governance, increased state capacity and international accountability for domestic conduct, see Marshall and Gurr [2005]), the 'upsurge of international activism' is specified as 'the single best explanation for the extraordinary decrease' (Human Security Center 2005: 150 and 155). The evidence for this thesis is presented in various parameters that experienced a significant increase in the years since 1990 (preventive diplomacy missions, Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General, peacekeeping operations). The SRSGs seem to be yet another measure of 'international activism'. Looking at the sheer numbers of UN presence and narrowing the view to countries that, according to the Uppsala Dataset, experienced conflict between 1992 and 2004, the number of peacekeeping operations employed in this constructed world of conflict-ridden countries remains between five and ten missions.[9] The presence of SRSGs does, however, grow from five to more than 20 deployments and thus graphically coincides with the steep decline in the number of intrastate conflicts in that period. While not establishing a direct causality between SRSG presence and decline of intrastate war, this ties in with the findings of Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 791; also 2006), who declare 'multidimensional peace operations' to be 'extremely significant and positively associated with strict [peacebuilding]', since these missions are routinely headed by a SRSG. Referring to the findings of the Jena Database, the authors of the *Human Security Report* argue that if 'a single indicator is used, SRSGs are . . . the most appropriate indicator of UN activism on the global security front' (Mack and Nicholls 2007: 117) and the Human Security Report Project (2007: 30) identified SRSGs as 'a good proxy measure for the UN's overall efforts to enhance security in a region'.

Second, there is a need to have a closer look at the role of personality when studying IOs. Various studies argue that personality clearly matters in international relations (Hermann and Hagan 1998; Byman and Pollack 2001; Dyson 2006). The connection has also been emphasized by the findings of the UN Intellectual History Project (Jolly et al. 2009). The case of SRSGs provides a rewarding field of research in that context. In his classic study on the relevance of personality in politics, Fred Greenstein (1967) listed three conditions that determine the extent of the personality factor in politics. These are clearly present for SRSGs: 1) personal impact increases when the environment admits restructuring: (post-)conflict situations call for restructuring, but at the same time show formidable obstacles to it; 2) personal impact increases

when the actor is 'strategically placed' in the environment: there should be no doubt that this is the case for SRSGs (Annan 2006); and 3) personal impact depends on the strengths and weaknesses of the individual actor. Illustrative examples such as that of Martti Ahtissaari in Namibia, Lakhdar Brahimi in Afghanistan, Alvaro de Soto in El Salvador and the more contested role of Yasushi Akashi during the Yugoslavia conflict underline this point (for an overview see Howard 2008; Bellamy and Williams 2010). The SRSGs working to maintain international peace and security act in difficult circumstances and 'almost always have to navigate by sight' (Fafo 1999: 12). In these situations, 'cognitive maps' and 'operational codes' of actors are highly relevant, as Axelrod (1967) and George (1971) found. This gives credibility to Annan's emphatic words during a workshop with former SRSGs: 'you personally have the power to make an enormous difference' (UN Doc. SG/SM/7760, 2 April 2001; Fafo 1999: 29), a statement that recalls the relevance of 'differences of leadership and strategy at the tactical level' (Doyle 2007: 2–3) that were rated prominently in the studies by Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006). The concept of leadership (Burns 1978; Hermann 1986; Young 1991; Helms 2000; Grint 2010; Cottam et al. 2010: 101–30; Hochschild 2010), which is also at the heart of the Jena research project, does indeed offer a promising category for evaluating the performance of SRSGs. The distinction of different dimensions (e.g. manager of administration, manager of conflict, or manager of ideas) and arenas of SRSG leadership (vis-à-vis the Security Council, conflict parties or the mission components) seems necessary in order to address the simultaneous roles SRSGs can play. In a broader picture, such an approach could tie in with concurrent work on the role of executive heads of IOs (Kille 2006; Kille and Hendrickson 2010).

Third, given its institutional and situational context, SRSG leadership can be characterized as 'transformational' leadership (Bass and Riggio 2006), relying mainly on the communication tools of arguing, bargaining and persuasion in pursuit of the maintenance of international peace and security (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The basic ingredients of the transformational leadership concept – i.e. the emphasis on the personal, even charismatic influence of individuals, the need to reframe problems, inspiring through motivation and intellectual stimulation, as well as the ethical values of a leader's vision and that of his/her potential followers – all can be related to the situation and work of SRSGs (Bass and Riggio 2006; Hochschild 2010: 28). Leadership by SRSGs does imply the individual creation, interpretation and realization of a mandate for action understood as an administrative, political and normative task. Much like the Secretary-General in his efforts for peace and security, SRSGs regularly have to 'invent themselves' (Franck 1985: 117–33). They have to create a space for the UN and its mission by activating norms and values in a situation that is regularly defined by their absence. This aspect of SRSG leadership can be seen as an example of the imperative that Vance and Hamburg (1997: 4) distilled from practical experiences in the field, that 'international interests and norms are [to be] injected into . . . negotiations by the special representative'. The handbook compiled by the DPKO's Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (2003: 15) also highlights this context, stating that the SRSG 'personifies the will of the international community'. Such statements tie in with the more theoretical considerations that Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 914) stress in their description of 'norm entrepreneurship' by individuals in promoting and diffusing norms in the international system. Norm entrepreneurship is a variation of Young's (1991) 'intellectual leadership' and can be linked to recent studies of the role of individuals in promoting and diffusing norms in the international system (Park 2006: 342).[10] In this context the role of Advisors should be highlighted. With their work on cross-cutting global challenges, they epitomize the struggle of the international community to create certain standards of behaviour and commonalities in interpretation, and attempt to organize a globalized world. The Responsibility to Protect seems to be a fitting

example here (Luck 2010, Fröhlich 2011). Once again, the degree to which these individual actors determine and are determined by the structure of the international system has to be analysed while considering the specific conditions of each case.[11] In that effort, not only the successes but also the failures of SRSGs in their work are indicative of the 'problems and progress of international organization' (Claude 1988).

Recommended for further reading

Puchala (1993), Vance and Hamburg (1997), Fafo (1999), Peck (2004) and Fröhlich (2013).

Notes

1 This chapter draws on the ongoing research project 'Individual and International Leadership: The Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security', funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research, at the University of Jena. Parts of the chapter utilize, and update, sections of previous publications (Fröhlich 2006; Fröhlich et al. 2006; Fröhlich 2013).
2 These and other data are collected in the Jena database, on the basis of official UN reports and documents.
3 Martti Ahtisaari can be regarded as the second SRSG to be awarded this honour, since the Nobel Committee singled out his work for the UN as SRSG in Namibia, stating that 'No single diplomat did more than he did to deliver Namibia's independence' (Mjøs 2008). Ahtisaari also worked as Special Envoy in Kosovo, thus making him one of the 'multiple' SRSGs who were used in a number of different situations.
4 Most notably in the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution that legitimized UN action in Korea.
5 There may be other, usually not public, guidelines and instructions that define the parameters of what is and what is not in line with the general UN policy (cf. De Soto 2002: 88).
6 'These SRSGs are assigned to raise awareness of . . . major problems, to develop relevant policy, and to work with member states and the UN system to ensure that the problems receive appropriate attention and action' (Peck 2004: 328–9). Examples of an incoherent use of titles include the current Special Envoys on Climate Change and the Special Representative for Migration. See the list at http://www.un.org/sg/srsg/other.shtml.
7 Numbers refer to the SRSG Database 1946–2008 v1.0 with additions to 2010. Over the course of a year there may be overlapping, double and sometimes difficult to categorize appointments, which is why some of the trend numbers presented here are not detailed in one definitive single number per year but are given as a reference quantity.
8 There have been several arguments about the nature and scope of that decrease, see Hegre (2004) and the other articles in that special issue on conflict duration; for a discussion of the report see Gießmann (2006), Mayer (2006), the rejoinder by Mack and Nicholls (2007), Human Security Report Project (2007; 2011).
9 The Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset traces the worldwide occurrence of different forms of conflict (inter-state and intra-state), defined by the number of 25 battle-related deaths per year, in which at least one party is the government of a state. See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset
10 Not to be equated with Young's (1991) 'entrepreneurial leadership'.
11 On agent and structure, see Wendt (1987).

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18

Multilateral diplomats of Central European states before and after 1989

Jacek Czaputowicz

This chapter discusses the roles played by multilateral diplomats of the Central European states (CESs) in international organizations (IOs). Central Europe in the narrower sense comprises the states that were independent in the interwar period and retained statehood throughout the Cold War, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, Poland and Romania. In turn, Central Europe in the broader sense also includes the states between today's Germany and the Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. the Baltic States formerly incorporated within the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR): Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the Balkan countries emerging from the break-up of the old Yugoslavia, i.e. Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, along with Albania. This chapter employs the narrower of the two definitions.

It is claimed here that the role of IOs, and accordingly the role of multilateral diplomats, has changed following historical developments. The first section discusses multilateral diplomats in the period of the League of Nations, when new nation-states had to put multilateral diplomacy in place. The second section discusses the era in which the CESs were part of the Soviet sphere of influence, multilateral diplomacy became restricted and diplomats were also active in some communist IOs. It will be questioned whether, and to what extent, these IOs can be considered 'real'. The third section discusses the changes affecting the work of multilateral diplomats in the United Nations (UN) system and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which promoted détente in Europe from 1975 onwards. The fourth section deals with developments after 1989, i.e. the end of the Cold War and a return to independence for the CESs, whose foreign policy and multilateral diplomacy changed dramatically.

Central European multilateral diplomats in the League of Nations

When the first IOs emerged in the nineteenth century, the countries of Central Europe were not even present on the political map, because they were parts of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and German (Prussian) empires, until their independence obtained them recognition at the 1919 Peace Conference in Versailles. Among the early objectives of these new

countries' foreign policies was accession to already active IOs, such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union, the Central Office for International Carriage by Rail and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, as well as to the newly established League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Membership of these organizations ensured the incorporation of these new states into the system of international legal norms, and provided access to information in various policy fields, and fuller participation in global trade.

Central European multilateral diplomats had to be trained and learn how to function in a system of nation-states which also cooperated in the fields of security and economic and social relations. They regarded the League and other IOs as tools to strengthen their statehood and to solve some of the problems their states faced at the time. Diplomats were involved in the resolution of a Polish–Lithuanian dispute over Vilnius, a Lithuanian–German dispute concerning Klajpeda, a Polish–German dispute over Upper Silesia, and the conflict regarding the rights Poland enjoyed in the Free City of Danzig. They took part in the successful resolution of a Bulgarian–Greek conflict associated with the 1925 border incident at Demir-Kapù. The main issues the Central European diplomats had to deal with were the problems of national minorities. The shifts of territory after the war had resulted in large ethnic minorities, such as Germans in various countries, Poles in Lithuania, and Hungarians in all neighbouring states. By virtue of several treaties on minorities, each member-state enjoyed the right to alert the League to violations of minority rights. Central European diplomats regarded these treaties as discriminatory, because they were not binding upon the Great Powers and later served Nazi Germany's propaganda interests. However, they perceived the League's role as crucial for their security during the entire period.

According to Foreign Minister Eduard Beneš, Czechoslovakia could only safeguard its security and possibilities for development by playing an active role in the League and accepting conferment upon it of a right to intervene in states' internal affairs. In his diplomacy, Beneš preferred personal contacts. He was fluent in French and English and also able to hold talks in German. His contemporaries saw him as a creative and inventive master of activity beyond the conference hall, as well as a competent negotiator and achiever of working compromises (Taborsky 1958: 669). Beneš strove for disarmament and arbitration and was a proponent of the idea that European security was indivisible. Diplomats like Štefan Osuský and Ferdinand Veverka supported him at the League, which observers said had become a virtual second seat for the Czechoslovakian Foreign Ministry (Zinner 1994: 107, 110).

Former Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski initially represented Poland in the League. Polish diplomats launched an initiative that resulted in the Assembly's adoption, on 24 September 1927, of a declaration recognizing that 'a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes', and was in consequence 'an international crime'. In 1931 they proposed the 'moral disarmament' concept, understood as action to eliminate the spirit of hate and violence from international relations. When Germany was allowed to join and was assured a permanent Council seat, Poland's diplomats demanded a similar position and managed to guarantee a 'semi-permanent' place (i.e. re-election after a three-year term). Romania's permanent representative to the League, Nicolae Titulescu, who was twice his country's minister of foreign affairs, presided over the General Assembly in 1930 and 1931. He spoke up for enhanced cooperation and accord between states, and subordinated Romania's security to the collective security system. He also advocated the principles of indivisibility of peace, the uniting of all states against a potential aggressor, regional and bilateral treaties, and mutual assistance.

However, Central European diplomats were unsuccessful in guaranteeing peace for their countries, because the political and military developments in Europe were beyond both their

reach and that of the League. At the Munich Conference of September 1938, the Great Powers permitted the annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland by Germany. The invasion of Poland in September 1939 then marked the beginning of the Second World War, during which both Czechoslovakia and Poland were members of the coalition of Allies standing up to Hitler and the Axis states. The authorities of these two countries also signed the Atlantic Charter of September 1941. However, the agreement reached at Yalta in February 1945 left the Central European states within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Diplomats in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact

For the CESs, the Soviet sphere of influence meant a Comintern-type of order entailing political subordination and a centrally planned economy under state control. The system was non-democratic, with opposing voices and movements repressed and governments that did not represent their countries' societies in place. The foreign policies of the CESs were subordinated to that of the Soviet Union. Continuity in multilateral diplomacy was broken, although some countries became early members of the UN and (some of) its special agencies (see later). Diplomats were, however, recruited from within the ranks of the communist apparatus, thus guaranteeing loyalty to the Soviet Union; they acted in the interests of the communist world. The era brought the establishment of two IOs of an appropriate profile in which the multilateral diplomats of the CESs were of secondary importance, i.e. the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact.

Known to the West as Comecon, the CMEA was set up in 1949 with the statutory aim of 'developing a socialist division of labour in the interests of the building of socialism and communism'. Deputy prime ministers served on its Executive Committee. The Council was a retort to the Marshall Plan, although its activities were effectively frozen throughout the Stalinist period. In the early 1960s the principle of a socialist division of labour was adopted officially, meaning specialization of output in line with a country's level of development. For example, a specialization in agriculture, especially the production of animal fodder, was imposed upon Romania, which ultimately acted to resist the idea, adhering instead to its plan for industrialization (Popa 2006: 648–50). Poland was also dissatisfied with the role assigned to it as provider of raw materials, whereas new technologies' development was attributed to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. However, protests against this Moscow-controlled division of labour were the exception rather than the rule. The CMEA enjoyed observer status at the UN.

The Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955 as the Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. For the purposes of the UN Charter, it defined itself as a regional collective security organization, with Article 4 providing for immediate (if necessary, military) assistance in the event of an armed attack. In practice it served to legitimize the stationing of large Soviet military contingents on the territory of each CES. The decision-making body was the Political Consultative Committee, made up of the parties' first secretaries and the countries' prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs and defence. Sessions took place in each state in turn. Russian was the official language, with translations provided. The key players were party apparatchiks, rather than multilateral diplomats. Diplomats representing the state that organized the session prepared the Committee's draft resolutions. However, a delegation took the first versions to Moscow. At this stage those in the USSR made their corrections, sometimes toughening up particular provisions to give the impression of making concessions and compromise during actual sessions. The host-state would present the draft as

if it were its own. After formal acceptance, the document would make its way to the relevant departments of the foreign ministries, from where it would pass to other party and governmental institutions (Nowak 2011: 51–3).

When Warsaw Pact bodies met, the floor was always given first to the representative of the USSR. Addresses by heads of delegations would then underline the leading role of the Soviet Union in the defence of socialist unity against Western imperialism. The meeting adopted ideological and political stances of a principled nature that were to be pushed forward at multilateral fora such as the UN, the CSCE and the Geneva talks on disarmament. Other decisions were taken when the parties' first secretaries took their obligatory annual holidays in Crimea. These decisions would receive the necessary formalizing rubber stamp at an official Warsaw Pact gathering later on. In this way, Moscow prevented direct contacts between CESs, though the latter nonetheless competed for their position within the Pact. In the 1970s, for example, Poland made an effort to raise its profile by having the Permanent Secretariat actually located in its capital, but without success (Nowak 2011: 51–3).

The decision-making process over military matters was even more centralized. The bodies involved were the Military Council (operating from 1957) and the Committee of Defence Ministers (from 1969). Moscow enjoyed the opportunity to hand down 'recommendations' directly, thus assigning tasks to the military in the member-states. In the name of socialist internationalism, all opposition was precluded, military doctrine thus being wholly subordinated to that of the USSR. Efforts to achieve any kind of autonomy were punished by the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Were these communist IOs real multilateral organizations? They definitely met formal criteria, since they had statutes, seats, institutional structures and a membership of at least three states. In line with the letter of international law, the Warsaw Pact was a collective self-defence pact, registered with the UN and having a clear *casus foederis*, which generated alliance-like activity and political and military bodies (Skubiszewski 1959). But were they really multilateral? Multilateralism denotes a group of states coordinating policies in line with principles such as indivisibility (no discriminatory barriers for members), diffused reciprocity (the benefits accruing from cooperation are spread proportionally) and such generalized principles of conduct as sovereign equality and inviolability of borders (Caporaso 1992: 601–2). However, as the degree of adherence to these principles was low in both cases under consideration, the Warsaw Pact and CMEA can be considered IOs in formal terms only, the qualitative dimension characterizing most other IOs being absent. The principles of indivisibility, diffused reciprocity and generalized principles of conduct were not applied.

The level of security that Warsaw Pact member-states enjoyed differed from one to another. Resort to force was the last word in any dispute, as was made evident by the armed interventions. The organization was first of all a tool of Soviet interests underpinned by enforced unity. It was a military bloc, rather than a military alliance of the Western type. Its legitimacy was bogus and any apparent similarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was entirely superficial. Within the CMEA, the benefits from the imposed economic cooperation were highly asymmetrical. The organizational principles were antithetical to the norm of sovereign equality: the USSR was in a position to impose diktats, while the other states lacked the capacity to articulate their own interests.

In communist IOs, the roles of foreign ministries and multilateral diplomats were of secondary importance. They pursued policies dictated by Moscow to the parties' first secretaries. Furthermore, multilateral diplomats were recruited from groups that were loyal to the communist party. Their leeway in setting and implementing policies was very limited, so they were mostly involved in technical issues, while Party bodies took the real decisions.

Central European diplomats in the UN system and the CSCE

Central European states were also members of universal and regional IOs, among them the UN and the CSCE. When the UN was established in 1945, the communist states operated as an informal group of Slav countries that normally cast their votes together. These included three Soviet delegations (since Byelorussia and the Ukraine had their own separate votes) plus Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. In 1955 Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were accepted into the UN at the same time as other former Axis countries, i.e. Finland and Italy. Consultations between diplomats of communist states on site in New York or Geneva were not organized, as the Heads of Missions to the UN received their instructions directly from their countries' capitals, the provisions they included having been set previously at CMEA or Warsaw Pact level.

A few Poles left their mark on the UN. The jurist Raphael Lemkin was a member of the Polish delegation to the sixth conference of the International Bureau for the Unification of Penal Law, held in Copenhagen in 1935. In 1939 he left for the United States, where five years later he published a book that used the concept of 'genocide' for the first time. He started lobbying for a law that would make it a punishable offence. In 1948 his perseverance at Nuremberg and within the UN resulted in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. While Lemkin acted independently, two initiatives by Polish politicians were actually pushed for by the Soviet Union and had as their aim the securing of an advantageous strategic position for the communist bloc. In 1957, the plan of Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki envisaged the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the territories of Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and Poland (Wandycz 1994; Ozinga 1989), and in 1963 the leader of the Polish United Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka, proposed a similar plan for a nuclear armaments freeze in Central Europe.

An example of Central European diplomats pursuing policies in the context of specialized agencies involves the ILO, at which they refused to back labour standards that did not bear in mind the 'political realities' and did not contribute to 'social progress', in their idiosyncratic understanding of those terms. Thus, in 1976, they refused to extend their support to ILO Convention No. 144 concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote the Implementation of International Labour Standards, considering it an attempt to impose the tripartite principle of governments, workers and employers. The communist countries considered standards that were highly detailed and precise (i.e. those normally regarded as essential if there is to be any effective action) to be superfluous in the case of their states. Instead, they wanted ILO Conventions to ensure appropriate levels of income and regulate the activities of transnational corporations, which were perceived as instances of neocolonialism. However, Polish multilateral diplomats did not prevent Poland from being criticized by the ILO for making the independent trade union Solidarity illegal after the imposition of martial law in December 1981.

The idea to convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe came from Poland's search for confirmation of its western borders along the Oder–Neisse rivers. The USSR, looking for an improvement in its tarnished image after the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, supported the initiative. Afraid that the USSR would use the Conference for bilateral talks with the West, and to strengthen its hegemony over Central Europe, Poland stressed the importance of broader consultations with other CESs. The preparations for the CSCE meeting in Geneva in September 1973 show how communist multilateral diplomacy at that time functioned. During the consultations within the Warsaw Pact framework the day before the meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko handed the Central European representatives their assigned tasks, as well as the authorships of prepared proposals to be

tabled at Working Groups. Bulgaria and Poland had to address the issue of human rights, for example. Poland had counted on receiving a different portfolio, but Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski voiced no reservations out loud, presenting the material the following day as if it were a joint Polish–Bulgarian proposal (Nowak 2011: 49–50).

The CESs regarded the Final Act of the CSCE, adopted in 1976 in Helsinki, as a success, because it confirmed the borders in Europe and reinforced the territorial status quo. For Poland, it substituted a peace conference after the Second World War, while Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania saw possibilities of opening up to the West and closer cooperation in the Danube region. However, the CESs accused the Western states of propagating their model of democracy and of reducing the Helsinki process to humanitarian issues. The so-called 'Third Basket' of human rights was treated as the West's 'Trojan Horse', because the CSCE genuinely encouraged the crystallization of a democratic opposition in the CESs, with the emergence of such groupings as Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the Workers' Defence Committee and Solidarity in Poland.

The CSCE's regular meetings soon became battlefields for multilateral diplomats from East and West. The diplomats of the latter accused the CESs of violating the Final Act, and used the forum to highlight specific cases of the repression and imprisonment of dissidents. The communist states defined this as interference in their internal affairs. During the 1977 CSCE meeting in Belgrade, the Western states enhanced their position, after the head of the American delegation Arthur Goldberg had introduced the tactic of naming political prisoners. This limited the room for manoeuvre of Central European diplomats. The head of the Polish delegation informed his ministry that the Western states had attempted 'to turn Belgrade into a kind of tribunal, judging the socialist countries on human rights' (Jarząbek 2008: 49). Another diplomat complained of the Western states' 'effort to legitimise on an international plane the minority opposition and dissidence in socialist countries, and to put forward a whole catalogue of unrealistic postulates concerning contacts between people and the flow of information' (Nowak 1980: 41–2).

Poland's international standing deteriorated even more after its imposition of martial law and suppression of Solidarity in 1981–2. Demonstrations at Polish embassies in Western states were numerous. A report on human rights violations in Poland, prepared by a Helsinki Committee, was delivered to the Madrid CSCE Conference (1980–3), the UN and the ILO. Polish diplomats involved in the CSCE negotiations argued that the Helsinki Final Act was not legally binding and, to defend their case, cited the CSCE principle of non-intervention. They used procedural means to prevent discussion and later the more offensive strategy of accusing Western states of abusing human rights. An example is the 1985 Ottawa Expert Conference on Human Rights, at which Polish delegate Andrzej Towpik argued that Poland was among the societies in which social justice had been a primary value, as opposed to societies in which individual freedoms had dominated. The CESs were particularly afraid that control mechanisms for human rights proposed by Western states might actually be introduced (Jarząbek 2008: 55–7).

The diplomats of the CESs did not act independently of Moscow, but their Western counterparts saw Hungarian and Polish diplomats as less dogmatic and more flexible (Thomas 2001: 74). They discerned two currents among these diplomats in the CSCE: a conservative current that was servile towards Moscow and afraid that the human rights issue would undermine the communist system; and a liberal one, which comprised younger diplomats expecting the CSCE to foster greater openness towards the West and to weaken the USSR's stranglehold on Poland (Nowak 1997: 111–12). However, this 'liberalism' was seriously limited by the predominance of conservatives. Furthermore, the diplomatic network was infiltrated by the

Secret Service, whose main goal was to fight opposition supporters abroad. Multilateral diplomats had to follow party lines strictly if they wanted to continue in the Foreign Service. In the second half of the 1980s, most Central European regimes were more conservative than the Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev. Contacts of diplomats with opposition leaders were not allowed until the breakthrough of 1989.

Opposition activists were the ones to put communist foreign policy under pressure. In the mid–1980s, they had joined Western peace campaigners in declaring that the Helsinki Final Act might offer a good basis for uniting the societies of East and West, and in counteracting the division of Europe by showing respect for the right of self-determination (Giving 1986, Czaputowicz 2009: 42–53). Multilateral diplomats were not independent in their foreign policy initiatives, however. With just a few possible exceptions, they were isolated and restricted in their room for manoeuvre as a result of their countries' subordination to Moscow. This situation changed in 1989.

The CSCE thus played an important role in relaxing Cold War tensions and in enhancing cooperation between East and West. It prepared the CESs for democratic change and facilitated the transition towards liberal democracy.

Central European multilateral diplomats after the end of the Cold War

The political changes and fall of communism in Central Europe in 1989 took a largely peaceful course, other than in Romania, and the regaining of independence by the CESs had a serious impact on their diplomacy. Newly elected governments broke with the communist legacy and referred symbolically to the sovereignty they had briefly enjoyed in the interwar period. Symbols of statehood kept by their governments-in-exile were solemnly handed over to democratically elected parliaments. Diplomats received new inputs, with some room to initiate new policies. There were internal disputes over how to strip the Diplomatic Service of its communist character and a real regaining of credibility was needed. Should communist diplomats and those who had collaborated with a Secret Service abusing human rights be allowed to continue their careers? Countries answered this question differently. While 'old' diplomats in Poland mostly remained in the Service, and even played their part in the new multilateral diplomacy, their counterparts in Czechoslovakia who had worked for their Secret Service were not considered legitimate representatives of the country. In September 1990, foreign minister and former Charta 77 activist, Jiri Dienstbier, ordered a vetting procedure for all diplomats.

As a result of the new independence, CESs started to train a new generation of diplomats in Western institutions such as the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, or else established their own diplomatic academies as in Poland and the Czech Republic (Digol 2007). This ended a Cold War situation whereby the Moscow State Institute of International Relations had prepared the diplomatic cadre for all Soviet Bloc countries. Years of this kind of Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact had fixed bad habits, such as an entrenched political culture founded upon the elimination of different viewpoints. Ultimately, both the Warsaw Pact and CMEA were dissolved in 1991, as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union that had created them. Horizontal relations between CESs replaced relations radiating out from Moscow to its 'satellites'.

In the late 1980s, communist authorities and opposition activists alike viewed the CSCE (in 1995 transformed into the OSCE, or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) as the main institution that would underpin any future pan-European security architecture. A key exponent of this approach was Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel. But, once

Table 18.1 Accessions of Central European states to international organizations

IO	Poland	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Council of Europe	1991	1993	1993	1990	1993	1992
Visegrad Group	1991	1991*	1991*	1991	–	–
CEFTA	1992	1992	1992	1992	1997	1999
IMF and World Bank	1986	1990*	1990*	1982	1972	1990
OECD	1996	1995	2000	1996	–	–
NATO	1999	1999	2004	1999	2004	2004
European Union	2004	2004	2004	2004	2007	2007

*As Czechoslovakia

the states of Central Europe acquired the capability to pursue independent foreign policies, they founded regional institutions of their own, such as the Visegrad Group and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), as well as acceding to existing ones, such as the Council of Europe, financial IOs such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), NATO and the European Union (EU) (see Table 18.1).

The Council of Europe

Membership of the Council of Europe represented a symbolic closing with the past, and was followed by accessions to a whole series of conventions concerning human rights, the prevention of torture and the fight against terrorism, but also issues such as broadcasting, common cultural heritage and nature conservation. Standards regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities were introduced and heeded (Tesser 2003). The CESs were genuinely incorporated into Europe's legal space through this web of commitments. The conventions required domestic legal orders to be adjusted, which also prepared the CESs for EU accession. On 16 and 17 May 2005, Polish diplomats organized the Council of Europe Summit in Warsaw under the slogan of a 'Europe Without Dividing Lines'. The declaration from that summit stressed the need for European unity upon the foundation of common values, with divisions between EU member-states and the rest combated and new synergies between the Council and the OSCE sought out. The 2007–8 Slovak presidency of the Council focused on strengthening civil society, support for multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies and reinforced cooperation with other players such as the EU, OSCE and UN.

The CESs signed multilateral treaties more often than other states, a fact that may reflect their desire to build confidence. The top 20 countries in the world being party to the greatest number of multilateral treaties concluded after 1989 include Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Elsig et al. 2011). By acceding to multilateral treaties, states were signalling their attachment to democratic values, effectively closing off certain political options, consolidating their democratic institutions and enhancing their stability and credibility internationally (Moravcsik 2000: 220). This ratification of multilateral treaties was intended to convey to key fora how determined the CESs were to meet all criteria necessary for both NATO and EU membership.

Visegrad cooperation

In February 1991, the Hungarian town of Visegrad hosted a meeting at which Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland began to cooperate more closely. The primary aim was to coordinate efforts at integration with Western institutions through consultations in various fields and coordinated stances at international fora. The Central European Free Trade Agreement, established in 1992, was extended to Slovenia. Good regional relations between countries augured well for future cooperation within the EU framework. Established in 2000, the International Visegrad Fund promoted closer cooperation between member-states and the countries of Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the Southern Caucasus. There have been regular meetings of Visegrad officials and diplomats at different levels. The CESs share interests when it comes to the EU being of an open character, the Eastern dimension enhanced via the Neighbourhood Policy and a common policy on energy security developed.

The financial and economic organizations

Membership of the IMF and World Bank gave the CESs the chance to participate in international financial markets and to take advantage of credit. It facilitated post-1989 discussions with the Paris Club on the restructuring of foreign debts. The World Bank helped the CESs to restore macroeconomic stability, extend support to the private sector and promote reform of public finances. In the mid-1990s, the CESs became members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which entailed enhanced efficiency of the economy and adaptation of domestic law, especially with regard to customs duties. The WTO offered access to markets that encouraged growth and trade and released the pressure for protectionist measures being imposed by interest groups. Membership of the OECD for some CESs further strengthened the latter's image as democratic states with free-market economies.

Within the framework of the OECD, different ministries have been engaged in multilateral diplomacy. The Polish Ministry of Economy coordinates cooperation with the OECD, which exercises its influence through reports and conferences. In March 2004, the translation of the OECD *Economic Review of the Slovak Republic* was presented at a conference under the auspices of the Slovakian prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda entitled 'Economic Reforms for Europe' (Dacho 2005: 97–8).

The capacity of IOs to set conditions lies in their making conferment of aid dependent on, for example, the introduction of a democratic system, economic reform or the heeding of minority rights (Schmitter 1990: 30). Nevertheless, enthusiasm for democracy and reform may also have endogenous roots as a result of domestic convictions. Under this scenario, the external setting of conditions is a factor of secondary importance.

NATO

At the outset, the CESs perceived NATO as a Cold War organization. However, the failed putsch in Russia in the summer of 1991 and the outbreak of war in the Balkans promoted the conviction that the CSCE was unable to ensure the continent's security. NATO thus came to be seen as an indispensable element for the European security system (Hyde-Price 1995: 242–4; Czaputowicz 1997; Kupiecki 2001). The CESs drew on arguments concerning historical justice, and invoked the need for democracy and the multilateral norms binding the alliance to be maintained, not least equality and indivisibility of security (Schimmelfennig 2003: 229–36). In practice, NATO memberships granted in 1999 and 2004 did indeed confer a

feeling of security, favour the modernization of armed forces and enhance the image of the CESs as stable and responsible participants in international relations.

The departments of international security of foreign ministries coordinated the multilateral diplomacy in NATO. Diplomats were recruited from among those who had gained experience in multilateral disarmament negotiations at the end of the Cold War within the framework of the CSCE, as well as from younger generations that had started their diplomatic careers after 1989. In Poland, however, it was persons engaged in the CSCE process in communist times who played the key roles. For example, Adam Rotfeld, who had become director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in the 1990s, became advisor to President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and later deputy foreign minister with a portfolio of international security and multilateral cooperation, before he became minister of foreign affairs. Andrzej Towpik was director of the Security Policy Department at the Foreign Ministry, ambassador to NATO, deputy minister of foreign affairs and defence and ambassador to the UN in New York. Jan Nowak was ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna, director of the Security Policy Department at the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to NATO based in Brussels.

The European Union

The CESs anticipated political, economic and social benefits from EU membership. The political benefits were in turn concerned with counteracting the inheritance of a divided continent and stabilizing its political system. Economic pluses were expected to accrue from participation in the single market and access to assistance funding and modern technologies. The social benefits would reflect approximation with European standards on safety, working conditions, health, education, the environment, science and the modernization of administrative structures.

Set in 1993, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria on conditions for EU membership encompassed the establishment of institutions capable of securing democracy, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights (including the rights of ethnic minorities), a functioning market economy, an ability to compete within the EU and an overall ability to assume obligations resulting from membership. The CESs justified their aspirations to seek EU membership in terms of the sharing of relevant standards and values. Their rhetoric was sufficiently powerful to bring into focus the inconsistency between certain states' reluctance to support EU enlargement and a much-vaunted adherence to the principles of membership and ideas regarding a pan-European community of democracy (Schimmelfennig 2003: 5). The road to membership was nonetheless a lengthy one. Diplomats from foreign ministries and civil servants from newly established institutions like the Office of the Committee on European Integration in Poland conducted intensive multilateral negotiations. European Union membership exerted a significant influence on foreign policy with regard to third countries. Bulgaria, for instance, retained a wide-ranging relationship with Russia, but under Community law was required to introduce visas for Russian citizens, and to erect barriers to trade. As a result, traditionally friendly relations rather cooled.

United Nations

Structural changes with regard to post-1989 multilateral diplomacy took place in the foreign ministries. In Poland the Department for International Organizations was renamed Department for the United Nations System, which included the UN Missions in New York,

Table 18.2 Central European states elected as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council

Bulgaria in 1966–7, 1986–7 and 2002–3
Czechoslovakia in 1964 and 1978–9; as the Czech Republic in 1994–5 and as Slovakia in 2006–7
Hungary in 1968–9 and 1992–3
Poland in 1946–7, 1960, 1970–71, 1982–3 and 1996–7
Romania in 1962, 1976–7, 1990–91 and 2004–5

Geneva and Vienna. Organizational inertia explains why the number of diplomatic staff dealing with the UN was for a long time much larger than the number occupied with priority areas such as NATO and the EU. The foreign policies that the CESs pursued at the UN were in line with the values most of their people recognized. Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and multilateral diplomats in the UN were in favour of raising the rank of human rights, through the establishment of a Human Rights Council (instead of Commission), a Committee for Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues to the General Assembly and a Human Rights Department to deal with peacekeeping (Kuźniar 2009: 196). In 2000, a Polish initiative brought the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the conference 'Towards a Community of Democracies', hosted by Warsaw, was the venue for the adoption by over 100 states of a declaration that voiced support for democratic principles, practices and institutions – in particular, for the election of governments in the context of multiparty systems (Toward 2000). A democratic caucus in turn supported the Resolution on Promoting and Consolidating Democracy at the Millennium Session of the UN General Assembly.

The existing Eastern European Group within the UN ceased to be a platform for political consultation and became little more than procedural in character. Initially the CESs considered a transfer to the Western European Group, but pragmatic considerations concerning election rules won the day, and changed their minds for them. The Group consists of 23 states, including Russia and the countries that arose out of the former USSR and Yugoslavia.

The CESs perceive the UN as a most valuable instrument for stabilizing the international situation and counteracting non-military security threats. The CESs were elected for membership of the UN Security Council 18 times, 11 times before and seven times after 1989 (see Table 18.2). They have supplied significant military contingents for UN peacekeeping operations. Their representatives have been nominated as special envoys: e.g. Miroslav Jenča of Slovakia as the secretary-general's representative and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Asghabad, Ján Kubiš of Slovakia as the secretary-general's special representative for Afghanistan, Edward Kukan of Slovakia as the secretary-general's special envoy in the Balkans, Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland as special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia (stepping down following the spring 1995 Srebrenica Massacre), and Ivo Petrow of Bulgaria as the secretary-general's representative and head of the UN Mission in Tajikistan.

Conclusion

The multilateral diplomats from the CESs evolved from essential agents of newly independent states in the interwar period 1919–39, via a role as instruments of Soviet diplomacy during the Cold War (1945–89), to being subjects of independent states acting in their national interests.

Since the 1990s, multilateral diplomats from the CESs have gained experience in working within the framework of universal and regional IOs. They were not treated as equals with Western diplomats from the beginning, as they had to gain credibility and experience, but their historical experiences, geographical locations and relative strengths have ensured their countries' status as advocates of multilateralism in foreign policy.

The multilateral diplomacy of the CESs may be characterized by reference to the twin trends of Europeanization and specialization. European Union membership has ensured that the CESs appear at international fora, not as individual actors, but as members of a larger whole. This gives them new opportunities to act since they may count on the support of other member-states. However, this compels them to reach compromises, denoting at times 'lowest common denominator' stances. In contrast, specialization allows them to focus on particular priority issues, such as respect for human rights and regional advancement of democracy to the east of the EU (Bilikovà and Matějkovà 2010: 319). The EU position has influenced their decisions on, for example, the ratification of the statute of the International Criminal Court and the recognition of Kosovo's independence. European Union membership has also changed their *modus operandi* within the UN framework. Stances are consulted and agreed upon with other member-states before being presented by EU delegates, unless it has proved impossible to arrive at a common position. Drawing up a common position is frequently time-consuming for multilateral diplomats; however, the status of such a position is incomparably greater.

Recommended for further reading

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The professionalization of international non-governmental organizations

Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Sabine Saurugger

The national, transnational and international non–profit sector has virtually exploded in size over the last four to five decades. In contrast to the non-governmental non–profit organizations (NGOs) active at the national level operating under the respective national legislation, the transnational and international non–governmental non–profit organizations (INGOs) derive their legitimacy from three postulates. First of all, they are presumed to contribute to the creation of global governance and thereby to the democratization of the international system. Second, they have a role to play in terms of both the input and output legitimacy of politics internationally. This means that, on the one hand, they participate in the policy-making processes through the representation of specific preferences and their expertise (input legitimacy), and on the other, that these organizations contribute to the provision of goods and services that states do not provide or only provide to a limited extent (output legitimacy). International NGOs advocate and provide public goods but, unlike trade unions or business organizations, do not act in the name of, or for, their specific constituency, in other words their members. They define their specific target group as the poor, women and children, as the victims of natural disasters and armed conflicts or as endangered species.

The list of public goods is infinite. Only a limited number of these are taken care of by NGOs which select them on the basis of their own preferences in order to improve a situation. In attempting to change the existing international governance structure, redefine the priorities on the political agendas (input) and contribute to the implementation of particular decisions (output), NGOs have to adapt to the international environment: they have to professionalize in order to successfully achieve their objectives. This chapter aims to explain this professionalization process of INGOs both theoretically and empirically. In a first step the concept of professionalization will be clarified, followed by a clarification of the problems this implies for the INGOs. The challenges will then be illustrated with reference to the humanitarian sector. The similarities and differences to other sectors of INGO involvement will ultimately be discussed.

INGOs and democracy: the international level

The idea of associating transnational non–state actors in global governance stems from the first half of the twentieth century (Reinalda 2009). At that time, NGOs were mainly

considered as instrumental for better regulation. It was only at the beginning of the 1990s and with the end of the Cold War that their participation in global affairs was acknowledged as an important element to foster the democratic legitimacy of both intergovernmental organizations and the states (for an overview see Omelicheva 2009).

In contrast to the domestic level, transnational or international non-governmental actors operate in a legally diffuse and normatively challenged space. At the domestic level, participation is usually determined by specific legal and therefore legitimate rules. This, however, is not the case at the international level. Participation in policy making, from which NGOs derive input legitimacy, must be understood as the result of informal opportunity structures. Participation is increasingly accepted and regulated through accreditation procedures. In addition, donors use NGOs as implementing agencies for the provision of goods and services the states cannot or do not want to provide. This may include development projects, emergency relief or even the support of democratic (opposition) movements (output legitimacy).

At the international level, the various transnational non-state actors are thought, at least by a group of scholars, to play a role as transnational representatives of diverse demoi (Scholte 2004). In this sense, their participation at the global level is to be understood as more than promoting new norms or raising issues. They are conceptualized as agents of resistance (Kaldor 2000) or of systematic transformation (Florini 2003). The proponents of a normative approach therefore put emphasis 'less on causal pathways of influence, or scope conditions of political success, but on the emancipatory role of NGOs' (Steffek and Nanz 2008: 8). The participation of non-governmental members of various societies at the international level is therefore considered to further the advancement of democratic governance at the global level.

These different reasons for INGO participation in politics can be subsumed under three arguments (see also Steffek and Nanz 2008). First, INGOs possess non-conventional expertise and knowledge that neither state authorities nor intergovernmental organizations have (Mansbridge 1992: 35). Therefore the states as well as intergovernmental organizations need the input of INGOs in the policy-making process. Second, these non-state actors represent citizens' interests and values directly in the international policy-making process, thus creating an international 'public sphere' (Steffek and Nanz 2004). Third, non-state actors also act as 'reverse channels': they inform citizens directly about decisions taken in the international realm. But INGOs do not pretend to contribute to policy making through information only, but also to the efficient management of international public policies. And this, again, brings us back to the question of INGO professionalization.

The professionalization puzzle

While the research on political parties at the beginning of the twentieth century can be considered to be the starting point for the systematic study of the professionalization of political representation, the social movement literature of the 1980s provides us with the elements to understand the professionalization of transnational non-state actors. The literature insists that this transformation could help social movements represent their claims in a more forceful way, become full-fledged members of political systems and shift from being 'outsiders' to 'insiders'. This idea was further developed in research on associations and interest groups, contributing to opening up the black box of groups and attempting to link internal logics of membership to external logics of influence.

McCarthy and Zald (1994: 375) defined professionalized non-state actors as entities characterized by: 1) a leadership that devotes full time to the association with a large proportion

of resources originating outside the constituency the group claims to represent, 2) a very small or non-existent membership base or chapter membership where membership implies little more than allowing the use of one's name upon membership rolls, 3) an attempt to represent or to speak in the name of a potential constituency and 4) attempts to influence policy towards that same constituency. A number of studies on 'new social movements', associations and interest groups have addressed the question of non-state actors' professionalization (for an overview see Saurugger 2012). Meyer and Tarrow (1998) underlined in their study of social movements that professionalization and institutionalization may be transforming the major vehicle of contentious claims (the social movements) into an instrument within the realm of conventional politics. The professionalized social movements have to become less interested in changing the fundamental rules of institutional politics and more interested in exercising greater influence within existing institutions. These phenomena lead to the adaptation and reorganization of their organizational structures. Professionalization in this context is also about drawing boundaries between accredited persons and others (Moore 1996). One could call this professionalization shift one where marketing and fundraising, as well as advertising and communicating, became core requirements for the individuals in such organizations.

The professionalization is part of a broader phenomenon: bureaucratization. This is certainly one important dimension with the establishment of hierarchically organized institutional structures with clear functional boundaries between services. Equally relevant are the ways and means with which these organizations develop strategies to intervene successfully in the process of decision making influencing the decision-making process itself. This has led to the extension of the professionalization process by building different networks at different times and different levels. Networks have greater discretionary resources, enjoy easier access to the media and greater geographic mobility and cultural interaction. These features seemed to have complemented permanent, centralized and bureaucratic organizations in attempts to effectively challenge the elites or authorities (Kriesi et al. 1995). These network structures are managed by professionals who have a long experience in organizing events and demonstrations and have connections to the media which give them access to the highest positions.

Networks are but one illustration of adapting to a changing environment. The realm of the European Union (EU) is another illustration of the pressure exercised by the environment on non-state actors. In the literature, the hypothesis that European associations model their behaviour around the techniques of interest representation that are fostered by European officials seems to have gained large acceptance (Marks and McAdam 1996). Thus, associations and lobby institutions, instead of engaging in more contentious behaviour, use their action repertoires in order to gain greater influence. They organize conferences and carry out expert studies for the European Commission, while country-based groups engage in more contentious forms of politics (Guiraudon 2001).

Studying INGOs in the development policy domain, Warleigh (2001: 623) found that the secretariats of these organizations dominate the agenda-setting processes. They make 'little or no efforts to educate their supporters about the need for engagement with EU decision makers'. In the British context, Maloney (2007: 80) underlined the fact that the professionalization of representations led to biased participation (see also Jordan and Maloney 1997, 2007). In more general terms these professionalized and bureaucratized interest groups are staffed by communications experts, lawyers and lobbyists increasingly supported by sophisticated fundraising departments and management structures. Grassroots members in public interest groups, or the so-called 'civil society organizations' have become chequebook participants.

Notwithstanding this trend of excluding grassroots members from the organizations' activities, their membership numbers have increased dramatically over the last 20 years. These numbers are used by professional groups in their argumentation legitimizing their right to participate. One should not forget, though, that quite a number of NGOs are not membership organizations in the traditional sense, though they are confronted with identical problems in terms of survival.

Finally, the many similarities between public and private interest organizations make an analogy between public and private interest groups, business interest organizations and NGOs, these two types of private organizations have a number of points in common at the international level. An interesting aspect, which indicates the increasing relevance of norms, is the partial convergence between for-profit organizations and non-profit organizations. Quite a number of business organizations have subscribed to corporate social responsibility including environmental responsibility. This indicates a trend where explicit norms and principles are included in the policies of major economic players. Whether this will really have visible consequences over time remains to be seen.

Adaptation and professionalization: conceptual considerations

We have seen from the preceding discussion that professionalization is a necessary condition for adapting successfully to the increasing complexity and interdependence in the international system. This chapter argues that professionalization of INGOs is based on three constitutive elements: education, knowledge and experience. Knowledge is produced, to simplify matters, by research transmitted through education. Experience is the process of adapting knowledge in a concrete context. The report by the NGO Impact Initiative (2006: 91) suggests three constitutive components of NGO professionalism:[1]

1 the professional competencies of individual staff, particularly those whose work benefits from specialized knowledge and experience;
2 the institutional capacity to deliver services effectively including the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the local actors; and
3 governance and management structures, systems and policies that ensure that it operates professionally, transparently and effectively.

Conceptually, the individual level (the professional) and the collective level (the organization) are central. A third level needs to be added: the whole system of actors interacting, or refraining from interacting, with each other. This system with its dynamics will determine, in the end, the impact of the collective efforts invested.

The analysis of the professionalization of international non-profit non-governmental organizations relates not only to *what* they do, but also to *how* they produce their output. On top of purely technical skills, these types of INGOs rely on a set of specific norms, which are constitutive for their mission. One can distinguish two basic functions: on the one hand, advocacy, and on the other, the delivery of goods and services. Advocacy means speaking in the name of those groups that cannot make themselves heard. Organizations engaged in advocacy can be exclusively expert organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, as opposed to more militant advocacy organizations, such as Amnesty International, engaged in both advocacy and service delivery by providing support to people in need of legal advice, for instance, asylum seekers. The delivery of goods and services is legitimized by reference to specific principles or norms. These principles or norms are the link between advocacy and

action. The relative weight of these two functions varies across the sectors in which the INGOs are engaged.

The preliminary conclusion is that both advocacy as well as the provision of goods and services relate to all three dimensions referred to: governance, input legitimacy and output legitimacy. With respect to governance, advocacy is the core function. With respect to input and output legitimacy, knowledge and experience are to a varying degree complemented by advocacy. Knowledge and experience are the necessary conditions for optimally providing goods and services. Therefore professionalization relates, first, at the intra-organizational level to the recruitment and proper coordination of the various professionals in order to guarantee the overall performance of a given agency. This includes management of the various departments, coordination between the strategic arena and the implementing arena (Dijkzeul and Gordenker 2003; Martens 2005), resource allocation, increasing external (public as well as private) funding to guarantee optimal service, and product delivery. Second, increasing professionalization, where applicable, refers to the transformation of power relations between elected members and grassroots activists and the secretariat. It means, third, that both the input and the output provided are relevant. And fourth, at the level of the particular issue areas, the development of a common understanding of how to define clear professional requirements – including both the normative dimension and the qualification criteria (education among others) – is necessary. Professionalization is, in the end, the counter-movement to amateurism combined with political activism. The humanitarian sector will be used as the empirical case to discuss a number of related issues.

Professionalization: empirical illustrations

The professionalization of non-profit agencies certainly varies across the different sectors of their involvement. At the same time, these organizations are more or less confronted with a number of similar problems. We will take the humanitarian sector as an example for several reasons. First of all, it is probably the oldest non-profit sector, having started with the creation of the Red Cross and the First Geneva Convention of 1864. Second, this international treaty legitimized the role of civil society in the case of war. Third, humanitarian action is no longer a reserved domain of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, since a non-governmental humanitarian sector has evolved as well, in particular with the *Sans Frontièrisme* or Without Borders Movement of 1971, originating in France in the wake of the Biafra war of secession. Fourth, the states, the intergovernmental organizations and the humanitarian NGOs all had to adapt to the fundamental changes in the international system starting in the 1980s, with the breakdown of the Soviet empire as its core event, best illustrated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the 1970s only about 300 million USD were spent on humanitarian actions (emergency relief). In 2010 the global figure was 16 billion USD, not including so-called new donors (ALNAP 2012: 35). On an average the long-term trend in spending is an increase of 1 per cent annually. At present around 44,000 humanitarian NGOs are active worldwide, including 274,000 humanitarian aid workers. But the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and the so-called five 'mega NGOs' dominate the field (ALNAP 2012: 9).

We argue that professionalization cannot be reduced to the internal adaptation process of the individual organizations. Conceptually the whole system of actors involved needs to be taken into account as well. This section briefly describes the major trends in the professionalization of the humanitarian sector. In the concluding section we will confront these trends with the role of INGOs and professionalization with respect to governance and democratization, and the relationship to input and output legitimacy of NGOs in the humanitarian sector.

International humanitarian law can be interpreted as a major step towards the democratization of the international system, albeit in a very limited way. International humanitarian law attempts to humanize war by guaranteeing the protection of wounded soldiers and prisoners of war. In addition, with the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the civilian population is protected from armed attacks, a late consequence resulting from the Second World War. The obligation to respect these principles embedded in international humanitarian law is foremost an obligation of the states and the parties in armed conflicts. But the humanitarian organizations are also mentioned (or more precisely 'organizations such as the ICRC'); they can provide assistance as long as it is impartial. This implies a division of labour between governmental and non-governmental actors. One could even go a step further by arguing that international humanitarian law legitimizes the activities of the humanitarian INGOs.

In more general terms, we can identify more precisely the core objectives of professionalization of NGOs and INGOs. One element is the so-called technical dimension of an INGO's chosen domain of activity. The second element is the normative referent of its action from which an organization can derive its legitimacy, and the third element is the link with the decision-making institutions, which may promote the organization's input legitimacy and its contribution to the overall governance. The objectives of professionalization in the humanitarian domain in particular are, on the one hand, the provision of services (assistance) according to the state of the art of knowledge in combination with experience, and, on the other, the provision of assistance according to the humanitarian principles (humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence).

The combination of these two dimensions, as well as the quality of service provision according to particular norms, is therefore the reference for evaluating the sector's level of professionalization, which relates to the third element, namely the relationship with the other actors – in particular, political actors in the decision-making processes and global governance structures. The relevant question is: what are or have been both the intended and unintended consequences of the adaptation processes both with respect to the individual INGOs on the one hand, and the overall humanitarian system on the other? More precisely: to what extent has the normative dimension become an integral part of humanitarian action?

At the level of symbolic politics, humanitarian principles and a principled humanitarian policy are well established. All the major INGOs have signed the 1994 Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct. At the EU level, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid of June 2007 declares those principles as the cornerstones of humanitarian action. Additional documents such as the Oslo Guidelines (released in 1992) and the Guidelines on the Use of foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Release (2006) explicitly specify the different roles of the military and civil protection units and the humanitarian actors. The reality is unfortunately different. One of the consequences of the diversity of the INGOs has been the corresponding diversity with which the principles are defined and practised. This is even more true when we analyse the behaviour of governments and donors. Humanitarian aid tends to be considered as an instrument of foreign and security policy, especially since the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001. Conflict parties continuously violate international humanitarian law. From a normative point of view, the professionalization of humanitarian aid is still in its infancy as the INGOs have shown that they are incapable of developing systematic policies based on the humanitarian principles. The question though is whether there will ever be a consensus on the principles and whether the principles are also implemented in the activities.

In contrast, professionalization in terms of the delivery of services has greatly improved. Both the organizations and the individual humanitarian workers have successfully adapted to

the rising demands and have also taken into account the increasing diversity of issues they are confronted with in emergencies. This process has been facilitated by learning and training, by the work of networks specialized in the various functional activities (fundraising, evaluation, project management, logistics, nutrition), by the assistance of research institutions and by the creation of academic programmes in the domain of humanitarian aid. The functional or managerial dimension of humanitarian aid has reached relatively high quality standards.

The humanitarian system is a donor-driven system. The donors, with their financial power, define to a considerable degree who can do what, when, where and even how. This can be summarized with the slogan 'value for money'. This means that results, best expressed in quantitative terms, count for the donors, which tends to ignore the normative aspect. This tendency of instrumentalization by politics will probably increase with the perceived importance of the size and status of the humanitarian sector. The progress made in terms of managerial and technical skills, encouraged by the donors, paradoxically reinforces their instrumentalization ambitions.

There is a follow-up effect with equally undesired consequences: the increasing competition among humanitarian organizations for the scarce resources and the desire to survive. Some organizations are more successful in this competitive struggle, leading to a process of concentration: fewer big organizations and many smaller ones where some of the latter will be unable to stay in this 'struggle for survival'. As Cooley and Ron (2002: 6) argue: 'the growing number of IOs and INGOs within a given transnational sector, increases uncertainty, competition and insecurity'. But not only may survival primarily lead to emphasizing the technical and managerial performance, it will also highlight the absence of consensus within the humanitarian community on what principled action means in practice. A corollary to this structural condition is the concentration process in this particular field. Today there are six organizations spending a total of 1.7 billion USD, as opposed to 179 organizations spending a total of 523 million USD (Harvey et al. 2010: 22).[2] The former employ a total of 90,400 people including 4,000 expatriates, the latter employ 13,900 people including only 800 expatriates. It seems that donors are in favour of this concentration process: they seem to believe that 'the bigger the organization, the better the result'. A final unintended effect is the competition for qualified personnel. There is always a greater demand for qualified personnel in the case of major humanitarian crises. Again, bigger organizations buy up qualified people because they offer better working conditions (salaries and perks) than smaller ones ever could.

Professionalization has also incited humanitarian organizations to enlarge the scope of their activities. This relates to pre-crisis activities such as prevention or disaster preparedness, but equally to post-crisis activities such as recovery and rehabilitation alongside activities related to the process of assistance such as downward accountability (to the so-called beneficiaries), transparency, partnerships and capacity building. Thus, as the range of issues and activities grows larger and larger, the original core humanitarian activity becomes more and more diluted. This indicates a lack of capacity to distinguish conceptual issues from practical ones. Preparedness and prevention are relevant as they may have consequences once a crisis has occurred. But this implies the potential danger of humanitarian organizations overstretching and getting involved in areas for which other organizations may be better equipped. At the core is the problem of transversal coordination of different issues. One could call this the trap of professionalization where the complex conceptualization of a domain of activity is translated into an increasingly complex structure of the individual organizations. The management of the organizations becomes more and more complex, therefore favouring the process of bureaucratization. Paradoxically, this could certainly weaken the humanitarian values without making the organizations more efficient.

Output legitimacy is primarily a factor related to the donors, but also to the organizations they finance. If the latter perform badly the donors will hardly challenge them. This would mean trouble with their parliaments and the media. Thus, to a certain extent, the real problem is not output legitimacy as the organizations try to demonstrate this continuously. Input legitimacy seems to be more relevant. International NGOs contribute to it because the donors need these organizations' advice and support. The potential drawback is that the individual organizations or the corresponding networks tend to be converted to the role of specialized consultants, while their role as humanitarian advocacy organizations is becoming less and less relevant. Finally, the governance structure, as argued earlier, is fragmented for the simple reason that the states as donors will not transfer all their competencies to international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the EU. Money is the instrument allowing them to retain control in humanitarian affairs.

Does participation more or less automatically lead to democratization? Professionalization might indeed favour participation, but the rules of the game are primarily determined by the donors, less so by the INGOs. Participation seems to have an integrative effect in the sense that INGOs are turned into technical advisors, rather than advocates for a norms-based approach. Ironically, therefore, greater participation is no guarantee whatsoever for the democratization process at the international system level. This will be the case as long as neither the governments nor the intergovernmental organizations, in particular from the UN family, have much interest in sharing their prerogatives with NGOs.

Professionalization: input and output legitimacy in the humanitarian sector

In this section we focus more specifically on the link between professionalization and global governance, for both input and output legitimacy. Undoubtedly, an international governance structure in the humanitarian sector has emerged. Yet this governance structure is not global but rather fragmented as at least three major pillars can be identified. Over the past 20 years, an international humanitarian governance system has emerged where the individual governments (the major donors) and the 'derived' donors (the intergovernmental organizations) retain the decision-making power. The two core components today are, on the one hand, the UN system, and on the other, the EU. How these institutions adapted is part of the adaptation process of the humanitarian domain in general. The UN system reacted at the same time as the EU after the Kurdish disasters in the early 1990s with the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the creation of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) including all the so-called UN humanitarian agencies. The IASC operates on the basis of the consensus principle. A few INGOs also have access to this Committee as observers, again restructured as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998.[3] Its head is the emergency relief coordinator who is also under-secretary-general of the UN. This particular agency's role was and still is coordination. In order to strengthen this coordinating role to remedy the many deficiencies identified in the *Humanitarian Response Review* in 2005, a new structure was put in place, the cluster system. It consists of a global cluster system and a field cluster system, the latter being the operational part. This still does not work out as it should, partly due to the humanitarian coordinator's lack of competencies. Right after the publication of the *Humanitarian Response Review*, the Global Humanitarian Platform was created in 2006 in order for this coordination system to be more inclusive and therefore more efficient. This was the result of massive criticism expressed by the representatives of the other two pillars of the humanitarian system that the Red Cross/Red Crescent

Movement and the INGOs had simply been ignored in the review. Yet the Global Humanitarian Platform only managed to formulate the principles of partnership. It no longer exists due to most UN agencies' lack of interest.

Professionalization also includes the capacity to develop efficient strategies of influence. This presupposes the development of collective strategies by INGOs. One way to do so is by creating networks. At the national level, platforms have been created which have access to both the government and the parliament such as InterAction in the US, Coordination SUD in France and VENRO (the umbrella organization of development NGOs) in Germany. In many countries, and even in the EU member-states, such formalized channels of interaction do not exist.

At the regional level, the network VOICE (Voluntary Organisations for Cooperation in Emergencies) was created in 1992 in Brussels. This network of humanitarian INGOs from the EU member-states is the core interlocutor of the EU institutions, primarily the Commission's European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), but also the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. At the international level, ICVA, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, based in Geneva, primarily focuses on the UN system. A relatively small network including only big INGOs, the Geneva-based SCHR (the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response), also including the International Committee of the Red Cross, focuses on the UN system as well. These different networks show that the humanitarian agencies have succeeded in making themselves heard, as collective entities or individually. They have access to the international decision-making process. Whether this access has translated into influence is a different matter. Networks can advocate specific issues if their members agree. However, networks do not guarantee a consensus on ideas, principles, actions and, even more so, strategies. This is a potentially limiting factor for the INGOs' degree of influence. Only recently has advocacy as a general approach become part of the professionalization discussions. The greater the diversity of the members of a network, the less effective its influence will be.

Output legitimacy is generally uncontested as the non-governmental humanitarian agencies provide an estimated 80 per cent of the delivery of emergency relief aid. Professionalization initiatives from within probably stem from the chaotic involvement of INGOs during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. The first one was the initiative taken by the Red Cross Red/Crescent Movement to clarify the principles of humanitarian intervention with the Code of Conduct that every humanitarian organization was free to sign in 1994. In conjunction with the Code of Conduct's diffusion, the Rwanda genocide of that year raised the issues of humanitarian assistance in practice. The Danish Development Agency DANIDA sponsored evaluation, following the disaster in Rwanda, which led to a number of initiatives. The first one worth mentioning is the SPHERE Project, set up by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement in 1997, which in 2000 developed a set of minimal standards in the various domains of humanitarian intervention such as health, nutrition and sanitation. These standards were criticized by some organizations as purely technical and too constraining. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), also established in 1997, followed shortly afterwards with tools and analyses on learning and accountability issues. It initially specialized in the evaluation of humanitarian action, but later expanded its area of competence to other topics such as impact research. The French response to SPHERE was the *COMPAS Qualité* as an alternative approach developed by the research, evaluation and training institute URD (Urgence Réhabilitation Développement). Finally, the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework, launched in 2010 (http://www.contextproject.org/index.html), includes

15 leading humanitarian agencies under the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) and provides a solid basis for staff development for improved humanitarian response.

The networks discussed here were created by the INGO community itself and have focused on issues such as the appropriate management of projects according to humanitarian principles. Three other initiatives must be mentioned that focus both on the individual professionals and the humanitarian organizations themselves. These initiatives are People in Aid's certification approach, the EU's Framework Partnership Agreement and instructions to organize as bigger entities.

At the organizational level, People in Aid developed standards for appropriate organizational structures. Any organization could be accredited after a rigorous process of evaluation if it wished. The objective is to make humanitarian INGOs accountable to their beneficiaries, as opposed to the accountability they are subject to by their donors. But in terms of output legitimacy, the donors have themselves imposed criteria on what they consider as professional action. This certification approach was chosen by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP International, founded 2003 in Geneva), albeit with only limited success.

The EU with its so-called Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) has set up the most rigorous criteria. All INGOs that want to submit proposals need the FPA. Eligibility criteria are, among others, audited financial statements for the two previous financial years, demonstration of sufficient and verifiable administrative capacity, endorsement of a voluntary code of conduct showing adhesion to the principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. Once the FPA is signed, the INGO can apply for grants. Generally speaking, the donors more or less rigorously enforce administrative criteria and bureaucratic procedures, which in fact contribute to the bureaucratization of the INGOs without necessarily improving their efficiency. Sanchez-Salgado (2007) has analysed this influence of European funding on NGOs' accounting structures, in particular after the 1999 step-down of the European Commission led by Jacques Santer due to internal fraud. Specific managerial and organizational abilities are now required for groups funded by the EU. This has not necessarily improved the quality of humanitarian action in the field but has certainly increased the administrative workload.

The donors did not stop at imposing heavier bureaucratic or administrative criteria. More recently, due in part to budgetary constraints, a number of major donors such as the British Department for International Development and the European Community Humanitarian Office 'recommend' how the broader internal governance structure of INGOs should look. More specifically, they recommend that NGOs organize themselves in consortia. The other alternative, also recent, is that big organizations will be given priority in funding. 'The bigger the better' is the general assumption. Even more critical are donors' requests that their partners also take into account additional issues in their projects, such as capacity building, by explicitly discussing elements like disaster preparedness, partnerships, accountability to the beneficiaries and transparency. Interestingly, many INGOs themselves also contribute to this accumulation of new functions. All of these output requirements demand greater resources for coordination and assistance provision.

The spread of management techniques usually takes place through training seminars, set up either by international or national organizations, or by partnerships with existing university training schemes established by concerned non-state actors themselves. Thus the European Commission has financed a number of programmes such as PACO (Programme d'appui au cofinancement) with the aim of improving the quality of proposals submitted by NGOs to the Commission. The CONCORD network (Confédération européenne des ONG pour l'aide d'urgence et le développement) has developed very similar training schemes and capacity-building working groups with EU and non-EU funding (Sanchez-Salgado 2007).

What can be inferred here is that the humanitarian INGOs have made a considerable effort to professionalize. They have developed relevant criteria of professionalism, both individually and collectively. One of the problems is that the donors restrict the individual organizations' freedom of action by imposing additional requirements. At the same time, the humanitarian organizations, in an attempt to be comprehensive in their approach, tend to enlarge the scope of their activities, as we have underlined before: pre-crisis activities such as conflict prevention or disaster preparedness; as well as post-crisis activities such as recovery and rehabilitation alongside activities related to the assistance process such as downward accountability (to the so-called beneficiaries), transparency, partnerships and capacity building. By expanding the range of issues and activities, the humanitarian core activity becomes more and more diluted. This indicates a lack of capacity to distinguish conceptual issues from practical ones, which in turn implies the potential danger of humanitarian organizations overstretching and getting involved in areas where other organizations may be better equipped.

Conclusion

A few concluding remarks are in order to identify those problems which are specific to the humanitarian sector and those which may be applicable to the analysis of the non-governmental non-profit sector in general. Looking at the specificity of the humanitarian sector first, what makes it distinct from all the other actual, and imaginable, sectors of non-governmental activities is that a basic set of norms or principles binding states, conflict parties and humanitarian organizations exists, enshrined in international humanitarian law. This in principle establishes the output legitimacy of non-governmental non-profit actors. One could also infer that this implicitly provides them with input legitimacy and inclusion within the existing international governance structures, as fragmented as they may be. What also distinguishes the humanitarian sector from all the other sectors is the transmission of profession, knowledge, education and research. Only relatively recently did humanitarian action find its way into universities, primarily in the United Kingdom, the US, France and Switzerland. The resulting insight from experience has, to a great degree, gone hand in hand with the creation of specialized policy research institutes such as the Overseas Development Institute in London with its Humanitarian Policy Network and the Feinstein International Center in Boston. But there is no officially recognized status for the professional humanitarian worker. Professional organizations have only recently been created. Whether this will lead to establishing humanitarian work as a recognized profession, barring access to amateurs as is still the case, remains to be seen. A last difference with regard to all the other sectors is that in their case, the normative criteria or principles (for example, guiding development policies or conflict prevention) are subject to the prerogative of the state. Furthermore, most of the other sectors are based on well-established research fields and recognized university degrees.

Among the similarities with the professionalization of NGOs in general is first of all the competition among INGOs, enabling the donors or the governments to control to some extent what INGOs do and how they should do it. And there is no indication that states will lose that control as long as they provide the major portion of the funding. In the future it will be interesting to observe to what extent big private foundations such as the Bill and Linda Gates Foundation can impose their policies and thereby avoid governmental prerogatives.

Second, INGOs' input legitimacy seems to be desired or considered unavoidable by states. This is equally the case for output legitimacy. International NGOs may even be included in the existing global governance structures. This is plausible given the level of control the states

still retain and to which the INGOs comply, preferring to act from within rather than from outside, but with a resulting limitation of their influence.

Though participation in governance, and the recognition of INGOs' input legitimacy as well as their output legitimacy can be considered as a given, this in no way implies democratization. It is above all an indication of the growth of complexity in structural terms and in terms of the ongoing policy processes. This in turn is counterproductive to greater transparency and accountability. But it may still be that the grip states still have on non-governmental actors may lead to unintended knock-on effects that actually bring about a substantial gain in democracy at the global level.

Recommended for further reading

McCarthy and Zald (1994), Cooley and Ron (2002), Skocpol (2003) and Martens (2005).

Notes

1 Source: http://www.dochas.ie/Pages/Resources/documents/NGO_Impact_Initiative.pdf; we have changed the order of the list.
2 Source: http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-sohs-final.pdf. The list includes a total of six groups; we only mention the top and bottom tiers 1 and 5.
3 These are the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and three others.

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The values of staff in international organizations[1]

Simon Anderfuhren-Biget, Ursula Häfliger and Simon Hug

In much of the academic literature, international organizations (IOs) appear as monolithic actors, rather than complex organizations (e.g. Ness and Brechin 1988). Reviews of the IO literature (for instance, Martin and Simmons 1998; Simmons and Martin 2002) barely touch on the issue of how IOs function internally. One work even states that the literature addressing this question is 'increasingly removed from the central problems of world politics' (Simmons and Martin 2002: 193). Admittedly, some authors have studied particular types of IO employees in order to answer specific questions. They have focused on negotiators (Jacobson et al. 1983), top bureaucrats in the European Commission (e.g. Hooghe 2001), relief and humanitarian workers (Atlani-Duault and Vidal 2009), and high-level or elected officials at the head of IOs (e.g. Volgy and Quistgard 1974). To comprehensively assess the values and motivations of IO staff, the focus of these studies must be broadened. As the literature increasingly considers IOs as agents of various principals, understanding what motivates staff is of considerable importance. This chapter examines whether IO staff hold a particular set of values, and if these values affect principal–agent relationships involving IO staff. Moreover, in dialogue with IO scholarship (e.g. Hooghe 2001; Checkel 2003), we investigate whether these values exist prior to IO staff recruitment, and are therefore dependent on some form of selection, or are the result of socialization.

Although IO employees have not often been linked to values in international relations (IR) research, organizations in general are thought to have values or guiding principles (Deal and Kennedy 1982). It has long been observed that IOs do not depart from this constant (Ness and Brechin 1988). As different IR traditions have acknowledged, IOs were established for the projection and institutionalization of values or international normative principles to frame the international system of states. From a functionalist perspective, the growth of IOs serves altruistic ends, creating an enmeshed and homogeneous international community (Ness and Brechin 1988: 247). However, even if built upon the broad principles stated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, relative heterogeneity in terms of values and purposes characterizes the environment in which IOs operate. Not all IOs are alike, and heterogeneity can be found both within and among these organizations (Coicaud 2001). These arguments suggest a *first question*: do all IO employees hold the same values and motivational patterns, despite working for different organizations? To answer this, the empirical analysis compares employees in

humanitarian and technical IOs. We also consider the motivations of volunteers working within these organizations.

Value systems are fundamental and enduring beliefs, and can be described as grammars of actions (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991) that legitimate or justify behaviour. It is therefore useful for both academics and practitioners to understand what sustains employees' commitment and involvement. While values and motivations are clearly linked to individuals' attitudes towards their job or organization, they may also influence professional identities or work outcomes (Vaughan 1997). More precisely, theories of motivation presuppose that employees or volunteers are driven by the fulfilment of higher-order needs, such as values (e.g. Schwartz 2006). These values are linked to an individual's cultural background: 'National culture does make a difference in determining how we think and how we behave' (Steers and Sanchez-Runde 2002: 190). While research on for-profit companies has been interested in cross-cultural issues (Hofstede 1980), academic scholars have neglected the multinational non-profit sector (Merlot et al. 2006). These arguments suggest a *second question*: do IO employees hold the same values and motivational patterns despite their different cultural backgrounds? To address this question, the empirical analysis systematically assesses whether employees from different cultural backgrounds have distinct values and motivational patterns.

Answering these questions raises the issue of whether the values among IO staff come from organizational socialization, self-selection and recruitment, or cultural background. We offer some preliminary evidence suggesting that a cosmopolitan elite populates IOs through self-selection and recruitment.

The literature review which follows covers: 1) the general literature on IOs, 2) what is known about international civil servants, and 3) what can be learned from studies carried out in national bureaucracies and the voluntary sector. The empirical section of the chapter is based on our own original data set.

Studies on international organizations

A brief look at survey articles and textbooks on IOs (e.g. Martin and Simmons 1998; Jacobson 2000; Simmons and Martin 2002; Rittberger et al. 2012; Hurd 2011) suggests that values, particularly those of IO employees, rarely occupy centre stage. This is unsurprising given that IOs have mainly been studied by IR scholars. In the broad paradigms dominating IR for some considerable time (for instance, Carlsnaes et al. 2002; Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008), the internal life of IOs appears to be of little relevance. From a realist perspective, IOs are considered epiphenomenal, simply doing what major powers would have done in their absence. Similarly, liberal perspectives drawing on game theory to explain cooperation (most notably Axelrod and Keohane 1985) consider IOs largely as slaves to member-states' interests.

A pointed critique, mostly of this latter approach, appeared in the 1980s from scholars drawing on a public choice perspective (Frey 1997; Vaubel 1986; Vaubel and Willet 1991). This approach emphasizes that understanding international institutions requires focusing on the motivations of those who created them, i.e. heads of state and government, and those operating within these institutions: the bureaucrats in IOs.[2] Economists developed this public choice or 'political economy' view of IOs (Vaubel 1986; Frey 1997). It is therefore hardly surprising that these scholars focused mainly on self-interest and viewed bureaucrats in the manner proposed by Niskanen (1971). Although public choice theorizing opened up discussion relating to IO staff, this discussion was restricted by the assumptions used to explain employee motivations. A related approach, known as the principal–agent framework (Bendor

et al. 2001) also drew on work in economics, yet went one step further. In this perspective, as applied to IOs (e.g. Fratianni and Pattison 1982; Kindleberger 1986; Pollack 1997; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006), governments create institutions and delegate particular tasks to the organizations that operate within these institutions. These IOs and their employees are thus agents to their principals (member-state governments), with the latter also involved in staff appointments. The principal–agent framework emphasizes that the interests of agents may diverge from those of their principals. This focused many scholars' minds on what determines the agents' interests.

Sociological approaches to international institutions and organizations (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 1999) place greater emphasis on the norms and values linked to the international realm. In this tradition, IOs have set forth their bureaucratic culture or character as an institution. This institution shapes the values of staff members and defines the power and legitimacy of the IO in the international realm. International organizations act impersonally in the name of the values they claim to embody: 'It is the values and the people they serve that make bureaucracies, including IOs, respected and authoritative' (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 22). Even though notions like socialization (Checkel 2003) figure prominently in this approach, very few studies have explicitly dealt with individuals in general, and IO employees in particular (see Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). Functionalism, as applied mostly to European integration (Haas 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), has led to some consideration of the contributions of supranational actors. Spillover effects are one example.

International organizations and their employees: cosmopolitanism

Values and motivations have been studied in detail in work on national bureaucracies and voluntary organizations. However, analyses focusing on the motivations and values of IO employees have been rare. Some of the earliest studies in this area dealt with those working for the Commission of (now) the European Union (EU). By adopting an anthropological approach (Abélès and Bellier 1996) to understand 'organizational culture', or a neofunctional perspective (Hooghe 2001), scholars wished to understand the orientations and values prevalent in this particular international public administration. Hooghe finds that Commission officials do not completely lose their national political orientation, even after an extended period of time working for the EU. She thus questions whether organizational socialization is of much importance. When public administration scholars report that although 'the organizational mission differs somewhat from that of a national government, staff are inspired by the European ideal or deeply committed to creating policy in a specific field' (Vandenabeele and Ban 2009: 20).

Staff characteristics in the UN system have been scrutinized along two main lines of inquiry. The first relates to the recruitment of staff members, the second to workforce management in an international environment. With regard to the former, scholars have addressed strategies for national representation in the directorates of IOs (Cogan 2009) and in all other strategic positions within them (Johns 2007). Multinational staffing with regard to conflicting loyalties, recruitment restrictions based on representation concerns (Michelmann 1978), and the specific managerial issues of intercultural communication and the building of a common organizational culture (for Annan's 1988 UN experience: 'Human resources management in an intercultural environment' see McLaren 1997: 57) have been long-standing issues in IO research. Scholars proposed that IO employees, because of their high level of education, especially at top levels, can be categorized as cosmopolitans, or 'people with a worldview, a world-wide perspective, an orientation to the global as opposed to the national'

(McLaren 1997: 61). Thus, international civil servants can be portrayed as transnational cosmopolitan elites who first and foremost are loyal to the principles of the UN and not to their native cultures (McLaren 1997).

The idea of transnational allegiance is closely related to issues concerning value conflicts and the development of particular work cultures. For instance, dysfunctional behaviours (corruption, overspending, nepotism or fraud) in times of managerial failure or internal crisis have been associated with questions surrounding the integrity and loyalty of IO staff members (Harrell-Bond 2002; Beigbeder 2004; Salomons 2004). Moreover, the interconnections and recognized tensions between individual values and work motives (i.e. dedication to the needs of others while expecting power, social status or esteem in return, see Vaux 2001; De Jong 2011) have been identified as dominant identity traits of humanitarian workers (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 12). Moreover, social psychologists have described the building of a professional culture or identity in the humanitarian field and the crystallization of international epistemic communities sustaining the diffusion of norms, knowledge and practices (Fresia 2009). Thus, the rather eclectic research on IO staff to date has identified certain characteristics, linked to an international or cosmopolitan ideal, as common to IO staff.

Motivations and values in the public and voluntary domains

Several studies point to motivational differences between private and public sector employees, with the latter being more intrinsically motivated and less dependent on monetary incentives (Jurkiewicz et al. 1998). Public management scholars have also acknowledged that motivation at work is not only a matter of self-interest. They assert that furthering the public interest or well-being of others is an important driving motive. This commitment to public service values was conceptualized around the construct of Public Service Motivation (PSM) (Perry and Wise 1990), or 'the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interests of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate' (Vandenabeele 2007: 20). The type of motivation implied by PSM is conceptually close to altruism and to the concept of pro-social motivation (Grant and Berg 2011: 29). Public Service Motivation is also particularly preeminent among volunteers (Perry et al. 2008) and non-profit workers (Mann 2006; Steen 2008; Taylor 2010).

Empirical research on this subject has clearly shown that public-service-motivated employees are better motivated (Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2010), more committed (Crewson 1997), more satisfied (Moynihan and Pandey 2007), and perform better (Brewer 2010). Drawing upon a principal–agent framework, Gailmard (2010) proposes that PSM is valuable for organizations as it means they can staff themselves with dedicated employees. Public-service-motivated employees may also bring, however, their own standards and values into the organizational setting, which may not be completely aligned with those of the organization.

While the recruitment of motivated employees is clearly important for any organization, it is particularly important for the non-profit sector to recruit pro-socially motivated individuals. This is because volunteers are not remunerated, or are paid only insubstantially for their work. Norms and values are a key factor explaining the motivations of voluntary workers as they are considered to be a link between motives and pro-social action (see Musick and Wilson 2008 for an overview).

The norms linked to pro-social behaviour are those involving social responsibility (Batson 1998), and are closely linked to certain types of personal values such as benevolence and

universalism (e.g. Clary et al. 1998; Bardi and Schwartz 2003). These values may be culturally contingent to some extent (Welzel et al. 2005) but are nevertheless thought to guide social behaviour. Values shape attitudes, norms and interests, and are distinct from these three concepts (Rokeach 1973). Values can be considered as antecedents of attitudes, which in turn influence behaviour through intentions (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) or affective responses (Fazio et al. 1989). An example of the latter is the functional attitude explanation of the pro-social behaviour model that has been used to explain volunteering (Clary et al. 1992).

Clary et al. (1998) developed a widely used Volunteer Function Inventory (VFI), which measures the functions behind volunteers' attitudes towards their work. Several authors have established the effect of volunteer motives on specific work outcomes and volunteer recruitment (e.g. Greenslade and White 2005; Finkelstein 2008). Thus, similar to PSM, volunteer functions play an important role in work outcomes. Moreover, the two constructs are closely conceptually related (Coursey et al. 2008).

The benefit of recruiting individuals who identify with organizational values or missions has been confirmed in a number of studies concerning volunteers (e.g. Puffer and Meindl 1992; Hitlin 2003) and paid employees (e.g. Finegan 2000; Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). However, these kinds of selection effects are not the only aspect of interest in the relationship between volunteers and organizations. Considerable socialization effects may also arise from organizational membership. First, extended volunteering may lead to the formation of a volunteer role identity (Penner 2002), which, in turn, aids organizational attachment and commitment (Oesterle et al. 2004). Second, there is ample evidence of the socialization effect of volunteering in terms of organizational values (e.g. Penner 2002). Thus for IOs, we expect individuals with strong humanitarian motivations to be drawn to organizations with a humanitarian mission. Furthermore, if the socialization hypothesis is correct, identification with the values of the UN system or perceived organizational values should be stronger with longer-serving employees.

Values of paid and unpaid employees in international organizations

While the studies discussed earlier offer partial glimpses of the values and motivations of particular IO employees, a more comprehensive view is still missing. An original data set collected in the context of a research project entitled 'Motivating Employees and Volunteers of International Organizations: Do Values Matter?', allows for a broader view. This data set covers several IOs and staff categories, and focuses on various dimensions of values and motivations. After contacting several IOs, a web-based survey was made available to all staff members from those organizations willing to participate.[3] Table 20.1 recapitulates the socio-demographic characteristics of the surveyed population.

We will now focus on four central aspects related to the values and motivations of IO employees. First, drawing on recent empirical studies of values, we rely on Schwartz's (1996) conception of human values. Second, as our interviewees work in the international public sector, we measure and assess levels of PSM. Third, as compared to employees in domestic administrations, our interviewees might well be attracted by the values of the UN system. We study this question by relying on a specific measure of UN values. Finally, since IOs depend on a considerable volunteer workforce (either interns or UN volunteers), we compare regular employees to voluntary workers. For each of these measures we assess whether the type of IO (humanitarian or technical) and the origins of employees and volunteers make a difference. We further assess whether we find evidence of differences which are attributable to organizational socialization versus recruitment and self-selection.

Table 20.1 Description of the sample

Sex*	*Type of IO*
Men: 497 (46.8%)	Humanitarian: 1459 (83.1%)
Women: 564 (53.2%)	Technical: 296 (16.9%)
Age Categories**	*Origin****
19–29: 78 (8.6%)	Africa: 167 (17.4%)
30–39: 295 (32.4%)	Asia-Pacific: 210 (21.9 %)
40–49: 309 (33.9%)	Eastern Europe: 93 (9.7%)
50–59: 215 (23.6%)	Latin America and Caribbean: 65 (6.8%)
60–62: 12 (1.3%)	Western Europe and Others: 424 (44.2%)
63–65: 2 (0.2%)	
Average Organizational Tenure	*Employment Categories*
9.5 years	Paid employees: 1728 (97.7%)
	Interns/volunteers: 41 (2.3%)

N = 1769
* 60%, respectively ** 51.5%, *** 54.2% answered the question

For human values, we rely on 21 items covering ten sub-dimensions and assume, following one of Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987) models, that these sub-dimensions form four main dimensions. The dimensions openness to change and conservation assess independence and readiness for new experiences against self-restriction and resistance to change. The self-enhancement and self-transcendence dimensions describe values that express self-interest and concern for others (Schwartz 2006). For simplicity's sake, we construct these dimensions by calculating the mean response values based on the sub-dimensions of each main dimension. Table 20.2 shows the mean values on the four value dimensions (simple averages of the additive scales), where higher values indicate 'likeness' and lower values 'unlikeness' to persons pursuing these goals. The table shows that IO employees from different organizations tend to be quite similar with regard to the four value dimensions. The only slight exception is the self-enhancement dimension, where employees of technical IOs score lower than those of humanitarian IOs.

Similarly, the average values per UN regional group (not shown) provide little indication of systematic differences across countries of citizenship. Some evidence to the contrary

Table 20.2 Values in four international organizations

	Openness to Change	Conservation	Self-enhancement	Self-transcendence
Humanitarian	2.64	2.59	2.27	3.50
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Technical	2.68	2.72	2.03	3.62
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.18)
N	261	174	280	227
F	0.10	0.46	2.80	0.35
p(F)	0.75	0.50	0.05	0.86

For Tables 20.2–20.5:
Standard errors in parentheses
F = F-statistic
p(F) = value of significance test

appears for the conservation dimension, where employees from Africa and Asia score higher than those of other regional groups. We find no difference on any of the four value dimensions according to paid or unpaid status. This may be partly due to the fact that most of the volunteers surveyed work in humanitarian organizations. Most of the paid staff interviewed also work in this type of IO.

Turning to the empirical assessment of the PSM of IO employees, a precision should be made. Since its conceptualization, PSM has been considered an aggregate construct (Kim 2011) comprising four dimensional facets or public service orientations. Employees can fulfil their need to contribute to the greater good of humanity by engaging in the policy-making process (attraction to politics and policy making), by dedicating themselves towards the realization of the common good (commitment to the public interest), by developing compassionate feelings for particular targeted groups (compassion), and by risking personal loss to pursue a goal considered as essential (self-sacrifice) (Perry 1996). Table 20.3 reports the average level of these four PSM dimensions for both categories of IO. It shows that IO employees value the four facets of PSM differently. The figures provide evidence that IO employees working in the humanitarian domain are more likely to be disinterestedly motivated than those working in technical IOs.

With regard to differences across regional groups (not shown), we find that these are slightly statistically significant for two of the four dimensions of PSM. Asians, and to a lesser extent, Africans, are more likely to have higher compassion PSM than IO employees coming from other parts of the world. Regarding the self-sacrifice dimension, Eastern Europeans, and to a lesser extent Asians, are more driven by selflessness. The distinction between paid and unpaid employees is relevant for only one dimension of PSM: unpaid employees score significantly higher on the political dimension of PSM. Moreover, as a point of comparison, one must stress that the mean levels for each of the PSM dimensions are higher for the studied population than for the national employees surveyed in most PSM studies (for state-of-the-art PSM research, Perry and Hondeghem 2008; for a comparison with Swiss public agents, Anderfuhren-Biget 2012). Accordingly, the PSM levels and dimensional configurations of international civil servants show greater similarity to the staff of non-governmental organizations (Taylor 2010) or to European Commission officials (Vandenabeele and Ban 2009) than to national bureaucrats.

As stated earlier, one of the major issues when studying the values of IO employees is whether or not a common referential in terms of values constitutes their identity. To assess this, we constructed a variable reflecting adherence to the values of the UN system, with seven

Table 20.3 Four PSM dimensions in international organizations

	Attraction to Politics and Policy Making	Commitment to the Public Interest	Compassion	Self-sacrifice
Humanitarian	4.21	3.98	3.87	3.72
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Technical	3.82	3.66	3.58	3.30
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
N	1217	1191	1208	1203
F	40.41	22.76	21.19	31.24
p(F)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

items reflecting the primary UN goals: maintaining peace and international security, working towards achieving international cooperation, improving social justice, promoting human dignity, promoting human rights, promoting freedom of speech and promoting freedom of religious beliefs. Not surprisingly, we find that these values are more strongly present in humanitarian IOs (4.46, standard error 0.01) than in technical IOs (4.24, standard error 0.05), a statistically significant difference. Conversely, the valuation of these common system principles is not influenced significantly by different origins in terms of regional groups.[4]

Finally, we compare work functions for the different categories of IO employees. According to studies of voluntary workers, unpaid staff appear to be most strongly motivated by values (concern for others), learning (wanting to acquire new skills) and enhancement (improving personal or social aspects of one's life). The differences between the different types of organization are, however, significant for all work functions (see Table 20.4).[5] Employees of humanitarian organizations have, on average, higher levels of work motivations.

When comparing different regions of origin (not shown), there are some differences regarding protection and enhancement functions. Employees from Eastern Europe are less likely to choose IO work because they wish to improve on or distract from negative aspects of their life. These differences remain statistically significant when controlling for other organizational variables and socio-demographic factors.

As we are using an (adapted) instrument developed specifically for volunteer work, we also check for differences between types of employee. We find significant differences between interns/volunteers and regular employees in terms of career and learning functions (see Table 20.5).

Table 20.4 Work functions and type of international organization

	Values	Career	Protection	Social	Learning	Enhancement
Humanitarian	4.50	(3.05)	2.30	3.00	3.98	3.30
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.33)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Technical	3.76	2.65	1.88	2.47	3.44	2.90
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
N	1311	1249	1240	1198	1304	1276
F	215.57	23.05	31.21	41.27	78.51	30.20
(p)F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 20.5 Work functions and type of employee

	Values	Career	Protection	Social	Learning	Enhancement
Regular Employees	4.38	2.98	2.23	2.91	3.90	3.23
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Interns/Volunteers	4.44	3.85	2.07	2.78	4.23	3.48
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.18)
N	1321	1248	1250	1206	1312	1285
F	0.16	19.32	0.72	0.45	4.79	1.75
(p)F	0.70	0.00	0.39	0.50	0.03	0.19

We may assume that these differences are due to age, as UN volunteers and interns are younger than average employees. When controlling for age, organizational tenure and other organizational variables, however, the effect of the type of employee loses statistical significance altogether. Organizational tenure (not age), however, does have significant effects on the type of work function, with values, career, learning and enhancement functions diminishing with increasing tenure. This latter finding indicates a weakening of work motivation over time. International organization employees are, by and large, more strongly motivated at the beginning of their assignments, which points towards a confirmation of the selection hypothesis. It does not necessarily, however, provide direct support for the socialization hypothesis, as work functions do not need to be related to organizational socialization.

This finding suggests that we need to look more closely at the effect of organizational tenure on human values, PSM and UN system values. Similar to work motivation, we do not expect human values to change with organizational tenure. Public Service Motivation, and to a greater extent UN system values may, however, be affected by tenure.

When comparing the human values of IO employees and volunteers with their compatriots, Häfliger and Hug (2012) show that these two groups differ considerably, even when controlling for socio-demographic factors. This suggests that two processes may be operating. First, it may be that careers in IOs attract individuals with a certain set of values, which cannot be explained by socio-demographic characteristics. Second, employees and volunteers working in IOs might, after having been recruited, have been socialized in their new working environment. For this second explanation to be true, we would need to find some evidence that the values of IO employees and volunteers systematically differ as a function of tenure in the IO and/or age. We find, however, no systematic and statistically significant effect for either of these variables on the four dimensions. This seems to suggest that individuals working in IOs have, already at the time of their recruitment, a different set of values from their compatriots. If these values are, at least in part, at the core of some of the actions undertaken by IO employees, the principal–agent problem discussed earlier may be considerable.

Turning to PSM, we find that its general level decreases with tenure. In addition, once we control for this latter variable, the effect of the type of organization and UN region both lose statistical significance. The only exception is the compassion motivation, as employees of humanitarian organizations continue to have slightly increased levels of compassion. As for the work functions discussed earlier, we find no evidence for socialization effects, but possible effects due to resignation and cynicism developing over time (Andersson 1996; Giauque et al. 2012).

Finally, tenure also appears not to influence adherence to UN system values (indicative of the existence of a cosmopolitan elite), again questioning socialization effects. As we also find that once we control for tenure the effect reported for the type of IO on UN system values loses statistical significance, we suspect that attraction and selection effects may dominate and thus lead to a certain homogeneity in terms of shared values. This is in line with the 'cosmopolitan' hypothesis.

Conclusion

The literature on IOs has largely neglected the study of employee values and motivations. While some work, particularly in the European integration context, has supported the socialization hypothesis (e.g. Checkel 2003), empirical evidence has started to point the other way (e.g. Hooghe 2001). Work concerned with top-level IO staff has suggested the existence of a particular type of cosmopolitan elite, with a specific set of values and motivations

(McLaren 1997). Our empirical analysis tends to confirm this hypothesis. We find little indication of value socialization in IO staff. Conversely, there is clear evidence of the selection hypothesis. Individuals with a particular set of values and motivations are drawn to work in IOs. Furthermore, we find small regional differences in work motivation (work functions) but not in terms of values. This, again, does not support the (cultural) socialization hypothesis, but rather shows a certain homogeneity concerning selection processes which attract applicants with similar configurations of values.

While these results are of interest as such, further research has to assess whether these value differences matter. As we have discussed in this chapter, IO employees and volunteers are clearly not a simple representative sample drawn from the citizens of their home country. International organization staff work for the citizens of IO member countries, either directly and/or indirectly. We might therefore be worried about possible agency losses, if staff were to make decisions not in their ultimate principal's interest. In the absence of studies linking the values of IO staff to their decisions, we can neither disconfirm such agency losses, nor assume that these values do not matter. Starting from our study of values in IOs, future research should assess these possibilities and thus lead to a fuller understanding of IOs.

Recommended for further reading

Hooghe (2001), Perry and Hondeghem (2008), Reinalda and Verbeek (2004) and Musick and Wilson (2008).

Notes

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2 Here we draw on North's (1990: 3–7) distinction between institutions (rules) and organizations (created to operate in these institutions).
3 International organizationss insisted on proceeding in this way. Thus, depending on the IO's capacity to involve their employees in the research, as well as their decentralized character, response rates ranged from 14 to 44 per cent.
4 If age and gender differences have no effect on the valuation of UN system values, unpaid employees (interns and UN volunteers) score significantly higher. Accordingly, the more motivated employees (unpaid, in this case) are also those who identify themselves more with the constituting values of the UN system.
5 The career function encapsulates career improvement motivation, the social function relates to the social desirability of work and the protection function to distracting from negative aspects of life (Clary et al. 1998).

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Part IV

Processes within international bureaucracies

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What is happening to the staff of the European institutions?
A cross-disciplinary view

Didier Georgakakis

Worried by the revision of the staff regulations, the trade unions representing the staff of the institutions of the European Union (EU) at the end of 2011 adopted 'Stop dismantling the EU staff!' as their slogan. Sweeping aside the argument by stressing its provocative nature could be a first reaction. Even if member-state pressure for revising the regulations is high, no one really believes the EU staff will disappear in the short term. However, the slogan's existence and success in mobilizing numerous people should prevent too-rapid judgements, especially in the context of a huge crisis and previous important administrative changes.

Disregarding the familiar polemics for or against these 'Eurocrats', what do scholars say about this issue? Does dismantlement make sense, and if so to what extent? More broadly, what is happening to the staff of the European institutions? In spite of academic analyses from the last 15 years, one has to admit that the question is challenging. Many scholars do not take for granted the simple idea that a European civil service exists as an entity. Its degree of homogeneity (or diversity), common culture and *esprit de corps* (or not) are still a cause of division and (often) misunderstandings.

This chapter aims to construct a more inclusive view. Borrowing from multiple disciplines, it will question the 'reality' of this group and its transformations by taking into account a variety of approaches and paradigms. After having shown (and hopefully broken away from) some implicit structures and traps in the scholarly debate on EU civil servants, it benefits from the history and sociology of social groups and proposes a definition that allows discussing the structure of this civil service with the inclusion of differences between its members. Using empirical data, it points out the transformations in question, in particular in terms of a crisis of reproduction.

How to assess the Eurocrats

The lenses through which one grasps reality are both a substantial part of this reality and an issue of power in a political and academic battlefield such as the EU institutions. Understanding through which lenses EU officials are perceived and constructed is therefore important when attempting to integrate different perspectives. Scholars in disciplines such as law, public administration, political science, anthropology, history and sociology study EU officials. All

use their own indicators, methodology and sources: archives, text analyses, interviews, observations and questionnaires. But the diversity of perspectives is not only due to these varied disciplines, it also changes according to four divisional types (political, cultural, epistemological and personal), with each having consequences for how the EU civil service as a group is perceived.

The first division is the one most difficult to deal with. It relies on the political lenses through which the European construct itself is seen, hoped for or feared, celebrated or ridiculed. A dispute underlying the origins of EU studies about seeing the EU institutions as either a secretariat of an international organization (Siotis 1964) or as a federal government in progress (Sidjanski 1964) affects the construction of this object and the interpretations of observed phenomena. The more authors share the first view, the more the international nature of the corps is seen as a major obstacle to a common identity. That EU officials have different nationalities (also discussed as a cultural divide, see later) implies that the idea of a corps is seen at best as 'wishful thinking' (Coombes 1968), as many Anglo-American and Nordic scholars believe – in particular, in public administration and management studies. In the opposite view, when EU institutions are understood as something other than classic international organizations, EU officials are regarded as being closer to a nation-state's civil service while part of an ongoing supranational process. In this case EU officials may have obvious internal divisions and struggles, but they share enough common rules and attitudes to be considered the equivalent of national bureaucracies, with multiculturalism seen as an asset rather than a weakness. Most continental public law scholars as well as many anthropologists and sociologists share this view.

The second, cultural, division relies on different visions of public administration and civil service and of the roles they (have to) play. In the first view, public administrations are considered 'organizations' with an, compared to private organizations, undifferentiated status. Entering a civil service is not seen as finding the Holy Grail, but rather as a job just like any other. Differences between people based on their status or hierarchical position have no particular sociological meaning. The idea that an elite administrative corps exists is perceived as a legacy from the past. Those who identify closely with the European Commission reform proposals of Finnish Commissioner Erkki Liikanen in 1995 and British former Vice-President of the Commission Neil Kinnock in 2000 share this view. Despite the important role played by the Germans and Dutch in founding the European administration, they see its evolution as leading from a 'French' model to a modern one, breaking with the fraud and corruption which in 1999 led to the resignation of the Commission headed by Jacques Santer. Others have a more continental view of administration and underline the difference in the symbolic as well as the material nature of public *institutions* and their staff compared to that of generic organizations. Civil servants have special status in terms of social position and staff regulations, which is a guarantee for their neutrality and provides them with special skills to accomplish their 'mission' and to embody and represent the general interest. Obviously this division is not only a matter of scholarly interpretation, but is also a huge power issue within the EU institutions.

An epistemological division that refers to the scientific models used to analyse reality should be added to these political and cultural categories. Chris Shore (2007: 183) contrasts positivist scholars with others. In the one case, the starting point is a rather abstract model, in which concepts and assumptions are weakly related to empirical fieldwork with a system of formal evidence typically gathered from polls, questionnaires and semi-direct interviews. In the other, interactions and symbolic relationships between actors, norms and historical circumstances matter. In the first context, attitudes and perceptions are seen as individual

rather than collective qualities, with holism being downgraded by international mainstream literature. In the second, scholars are more likely to search for the construction process of a common identity, including by studying concrete interactions between people and processes (rather than through interaction between variables). If political notions of man and society are likely to structure epistemological conceptions, they are also eased by methodological 'choices'. Starting from attitudes implies the building of groups of preferences through surveys mainly based on questionnaires, whereas starting from the process of group or class making implies more qualitative evidence. A clear link between the two is still missing.

Finally, the personal and to some extent social experiences in which scholars are embedded have consequences for their points of view on EU civil servants. This problem is known with regard to the history and sociology of social groups. The closer one is to a group, the more one sees human diversity; the further away, the more one sees a group as homogeneous. Here experiences with and feelings towards the staff of the EU institutions are important, as many scholars studying the institutions have had special links with them. They themselves had been trainees or interns, had relatives working in them, were used as experts, had studies paid for by the institutions, or sometimes mobilized against them. Emotions and to some extent unconscious feelings resulting from these experiences influence their visions. Sociological homologies and distances between scholars and members of the institutions (e.g. in terms of diplomas and cultural and social position) are also consequential.

The image of the group and its degree of density change according to these different filters. For instance, a picture of the EU as a classic intergovernmental system, perverted by 'old' continental administrative habits, in the framework of a positivist model and in a relationship of total distance from European affairs or even Europeans, makes it unlikely one will see an elite corps defending the common interest of a new European polity. However, making these filters explicit helps to provide some distance from spontaneous and existing views and to propose a more inclusive picture.

EU civil servants: a social group relative to others

The sociology of social groups and fields offers a tool for parting from the series of divisions. Theoretical input comes from authors such as Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu, who attempt to break with classical dichotomies separating the social sciences (individualism/holism, structure/agency) by promoting integrating perspectives and a sense of reflexivity from a point of view at the geometrical centre of various perspectives. This horizon, which includes American and European traditions in a wide range of social sciences and humanities, is beneficial to the understanding of groups beyond the classical antagonism between groups and individuals and homogeneity and diversity. According to historians and sociologists of the same disposition, a social group is a collection of individuals who are more or less close in terms of economic or social position and whose original homology of positions is transformed into a social group through a process of social and political construction (Thompson 1963; Boltanski 1987). This process includes trade unions, political prophets and mobilization, as well as modelling by academics. Institutionalization by law contributed to a process of identification and embodiment, which finally resulted in the understanding that an individual is quite singular but also more or less immersed in the group, which is studied through its main hard core in a sense close to the physical sciences' point of attraction.

This way of thinking of groups is relevant for studying the staff of the EU institutions, which comes both from different backgrounds and has been constructed during 60 years of history (including mobilization for or against, staff regulations and sociological processes) as

something other than a simple aggregate of individuals. Whatever their social and professional status, important numbers of those who work in the EU institutions are immersed in them for a substantial part of their life. Moreover, compared to other groups working with the institutions, they as a whole look much more integrated, their social trajectory and life being directly dependent on the evolution of the institutions.

The people working in or around EU institutions (what many call the 'Brussels bubble') are numerous and diverse: EU officials (themselves also quite diverse as we will see), EU politicians, European politicians, representatives of interests, permanent representatives and their staff, accredited and permanent journalists, experts, and also those from various backgrounds who negotiate in Brussels (national administrations and businesses) (Spinelli 1966; Haller 2008). Just like other social fields, the field of Eurocracy is nevertheless a collection of relatively stable and competitive structures (Georgakakis 2012), rather than totally entropic. The different positions and trajectories of all these individuals can be ranked in a diagram according to the degree of authority they have (on one axis) and their degree of permanency in this social field (on the other axis), with a third dimension measuring experience between the private and the public sector.

Despite nationality and institutional divisions, the staff of the EU institutions represents a section within the field of Eurocracy, combining deep differences in terms of hierarchy and authority in the field with closer positions in terms of permanency. Moreover, relative to others, the staff is in a situation of dominance, if not monopoly, with regard to permanent positions warranted, for most of them, by the staff regulations mentioned earlier. Whatever their specific position, this can be considered a key aspect of their common initial resource as a group, with implications for their competences in the field and their social skills and positions as members of the unique group institutionalized by Europe. This also makes them think about themselves as a group. By comparison, the permanent representatives, who are first and foremost diplomats for their countries, think of themselves as a club but never as a group (Chatzistavrou 2012).

Given these elements, the European staff can be defined as a collection of individuals from diverse backgrounds, who as a result of several socio-historical processes are collectively placed in the quite unique position of permanents, which provides them with the individual and collective resources to occupy a central position that enables them to administer European policies and interests and be the brokers for all others in the field. Stressing the location of individuals within the field, this definition helps both to bring together the diversity and the common part of the group and to question where its centre of gravity is located at various moments, a major issue in understanding how the group is changing.

Different members . . .

Although all Eurocrats seem similar from the outside, the group is far from monolithic in a wide range of aspects. Institutionally, the staff belongs to very different institutions. Of the more than 40,000 people who are on the statutory staff (see later for the differences in status) 25,000 are appointed by the European Commission, 6,500 by the Parliament, around 2,000 by the Court of Justice, less than 1,000 by the Court of Auditors, respectively more than 800 and 700 by the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, some 50 by the European Ombudsman and the European Data Protection Supervisor and 1,600 by the new External Action Service (European Commission 2011). These differences matter with regard to different goals, interests, practices and institutional cultures, including those related to human resources policies and management.

The institutions are not all located in the same cities. If Brussels, and to a lesser extent Luxembourg, are highly dominant (with more than 17,500 and somewhat less than 3,500 of the 25,000 Commission staff members respectively), the circle widens when one includes the research centres that belong to the Commission which are located in five European cities (1,700 people, of whom 1,000 are in Ispra, Italy), autonomous agencies (in various cities) and other European institutions such as the European Central Bank (in Frankfurt). Since the 1990s, regulatory and executive agencies have taken on a more prominent position in the administrative tasks of the EU institutions. These statutory staff members (about 8,500, 92 per cent of whom work on a temporary basis, often however on mid- or long-term contracts) are claimed to represent the 'new Eurocrats' (Geuijen et al. 2008).

Staff members in these various organizations have different *status*. In the case of the Commission, including executive agencies, one has to distinguish between officials, 23,500 (66 per cent); temporary staff hired mainly for their technical skills or for the Cabinets, 1,687 (4.8 per cent); contract staff, 5,977 (16.9 per cent); and local staff (2010 figures). Furthermore, there are seconded national experts, trainees, service providers and interim staff members. Status is important, because permanent positions are guaranteed only to officials, whereas contract staff members have short-term contracts, although often doing a similar task and sometimes having worked in the field for a long time. The gap between official and contractual staff did not exist previously and has tended to increase, with consequences for the social and economic status of the individuals as well as their collective ability to embody the role of Europe's servants.

It is difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture of the social background of staff before they enter the institutions, even if several studies show strong homologies beyond nationality. The number who have diplomas or PhDs, or who studied abroad is high for middle- and high-level administrators, which is an indicator of homologies within these groups. But the differences are huge when looking at the hierarchical levels when they join the institutions. Between someone on a contract (group 1, from the first stage) and an administrator AD16, scale 3 (which is the top grade), the salary varies from 1,847 to 18,370 Euros per month (with taxes paid at the source). A similar difference can be seen between a young parliamentary assistant and an old civil servant at the European Parliament. These differences also impact upon the quality of housing and the ability to amass a long-term family inheritance. Sociologists and anthropologists show that this dimension matters in a city such as Brussels, where some sectors in the east and south are considered to be 'ghettos for Eurocrats' (Shore 2000; Caillez 2004).

What staff members do within the institutions also varies. From the outset, scholars have identified dissimilar functions (Michelmann 1978). There is indeed a difference between being a legal advisor, auditor, assistant secretary, translator, manager or policy maker. More recently, institutions such as the Commission have promoted reflection on job types in the Sysper database. As a result, 30 job families have been distinguished, showing the significance of pure administrative and secretariat tasks compared to policy tasks or tasks related to programmes. One should add that Directorates have diverse cultures, resulting from history and influenced by the sector's structure and specificities (Abélès et al. 1993; Cini 1996, 2007), with consequences in terms of thinking about EU policies and identification (Egeberg 1996; Hooghe 2011).

This first set of internal differences is close to that known about national or local administrations, although the number of administrators is higher. However, as in other organizations with an international staff, the questions of nationality and cultural diversity remain. The issue of nationalities is real and is placed under scrutiny, as the geographical balance is considered a key aspect of the representative nature of the administration, which is of concern with regard to symbols and powers between member-states.

These differences imply varieties of an administrative culture, at least in terms of a 'grand' model of European administration (Stevens and Stevens 2000), and of networking and information inside and outside the institutions. But this is not necessarily so. Carolyn Ban (2013) shows that those who joined after the 2004 enlargement did not bring their own administrative cultures, probably because many of them had gained experience abroad, often in the private sector. With an average hiring age of 35, there are also differences between those who arrive after finishing their studies, including graduate studies, and those who come after having worked in the public or private sector. The more serious analyses of networking within the Commission show that differences between nationality and culture, including the so-called 'North–South divide', are weak arguments. Semin Suvarieriol (2008: 111) refreshes the earlier assumption that 'the ideal of civil servants "whose nationality is supranationality" seems to be the everyday life reality'. In terms of progress in careers, belonging to one nationality rather than another still has an impact, given the need to preserve a general balance and sometimes because some countries consider the sector as touching upon their national interests, but 'flag positions' do not exist any longer as official distribution keys.

. . . embedded in a common historical and social construction

One could argue that beyond the diversity discussed here a model was born, as well as a class of European civil servants directly related to the development of the institutions. A combination of factors contributed to making the EU civil service more than a collection of individuals.

These factors are first of all historical. From the start, a hard-core group of civil servants managed to build, beyond diversity, a real *esprit de corps*. Katja Seidel (2010) show that the idea of the early civil servants being 'European idealists' is a myth, because several types of people, including very pragmatic ones, were already present at the time. It is also wrong to see them as 'stateless' persons, given that national resources and identities, including linguistic skills and previous networks, were crucial to interpreting the political and national feasibility of European policies. Their advocacy for implementing these policies in and by the member-states was important. Seidel (2010: 150) shows that various factors played a role in building a common spirit: shared generational experience and socialization during the Second World War and long-term exposure to institutional structures, combined with career opportunities and a high degree of job satisfaction, the emergence of an expert culture focusing on the shared task of shaping Europe through common policies, the particular living and working conditions in Brussels, and the presence of European role model figures such as Walter Hallstein, Hans von der Groeben and Sicco Mansholt, who inspired motivation and enthusiasm and introduced participatory working methods. Most factors converge with observations by other historians who studied the beginning of the institutions and their members, in particular the role of working and living conditions and the inputs of 'heroic' figures (Dumoulin 2007). Because the Commission formed the hard core for a long time (few officials belonged to the other institutions at the outset), one may add the role played by Emile Noël, the Commission's secretary-general who held a key position in terms of the Commission's structure and the habits of its civil servants (Bossuat 2011). Historians also recall that outside critics, threats of diminishing relevance and successive crises and reforms impacted the day-to-day life of European officials. Going through all of this contributed to the strengthening of the group and to giving its members the feeling that focusing on long-term issues in Europe offered the best chances.

Law was crucial in this construction period. Between 1952 and 1968, i.e. from the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the merger of the executive bodies of various Communities, the debate on staff regulations was central and determined the group in many respects, for instance in the choice to build up a permanent corps. This option was not Jean Monnet's first intention, but was promoted by some members of the High Authority and its lawyers (Conrad 1992; Mangenot 2012). As formulated by the lawyers, the first ECSC staff regulations proclaimed the idea of building up a corps that was equivalent to a state's civil service (in the making), with some conditions in terms of rights and duties, separation from other public and private sectors, recruitment by open competition and good working conditions (salary, protections, special conditions), as being attractive to and enabling retainment of high-level staff (Rogalla 1981). The idea of a civil service based on vocation, rather than employing a corps of mercenaries, was institutionalized and reproduced through further staff regulations until 2005 (Gravier 2008). Principles such as permanency, independence and competency were also identified through this juridical process of constructing an administrative body (Andréone 2008).

From a sociological point of view, the staff regulations institutionalized the group as a new 'Stand', to use the Weberian expression which Talcott Parsons translated as 'group of status' (Weber 1947): a new transnational elite warranted by law (Georgakakis 2010a, 2010b). A set of social processes contributed to the construction of the model of a differentiated corps of European civil servants and permitted some of its members to embody their roles and gain the related authority. The significance of central personalities in building and embodying the model has been perpetuated by the legend of some charismatic commissioners and directors-general. Although staff policy was relatively weak (Stevens and Stevens 2000), symbols of the group and transmission of its memory and future were also spread through the *Courrier du personnel*, replaced by the *Commission en direct*. This internal journal has formulated and spread portraits of exemplariness. European Union officials' trade unions defended the interests of the group as a whole, designing the values of the European civil service beyond categories of staff and institutions in their discourses, journals and leaflets and mobilizing the group in strikes when, on several occasions between the 1970s and the 2000s, staff regulations or salaries were threatened (Georgakakis 2012).

Individual processes also contributed to the embodiment of the role and status of EU officials. Until the mid-2000s the quasi-exclusive part of the group joined and served EU institutions as permanent staff. This transformed the social position of individuals through various types of capital (economic, cultural, social) that define such a position (Bourdieu 1979). Having a permanent position provides secure economic capital, which can have patrimonial effects. If most officials at administrator level already had prestigious degrees, higher than legally required (for the large number of PhD holders see Page 1997; Kassim et al. 2012), their experience also often added technical expertise as well as multilinguistic skills and practical experience in working within a multicultural European environment, which gave them a comparative advantage over others. Beyond hierarchy and previous social positions, becoming a group member also changed their standing in terms of social capital, networks and relational power, since entering the 'community of elected people' also reversed their position vis-à-vis former national colleagues; in particular, former superiors.

Throughout their careers, officials go through various social filters that create a distance from other people within and outside the field. Among these filters, the open competition to join EU institutions (the *concours* in Eurospeak) used to be a major prerequisite for (re-)producing the group in these forms, particularly in a context where it is difficult to control the social institutions (family, school) which traditionally partake in elite formation.

Exceptions to the latter are the European schools in Brussels and some Masters and PhD programmes in Bruges and Florence. Whatever differences in specialization exist in the *concours*, European officials are the only civil servants who owe their position to a particular European open competition. The *concours* also represents a 'rite of institution' (Bourdieu 1996), with major effects on the definition of the group and its members, especially in selecting people with a set of academic and social skills related to specific European aspects and what the candidacy invitations describe as 'the capacity to work in a multicultural environment'. Without it being made explicit, a candidate who was too obviously showing his/her national flag stood a poor chance of passing the oral test in front of a jury composed of officials of other nationalities. The oral test also ensured that the future 'elected' had cardinal traits, such as distance from the position of their own member-state, listening capability, ability to verbalize knowledge when analyzing problems and ability to evolve sustainably among European institutions and to represent them elsewhere.

These sociological processes differentiate EU officials from their national counterparts and other expatriates, to whom they are socially akin, but with most of them affirming their commitment to public service and common interests as against specific national or economic interests. More or less reproduced all through their career, they also increase EU officials' chances of embodying the institutions they represent, at least until they reach the 'glass ceiling', the moment when further promotion requires political and in, particular, national support. This differentiation also has an effect on their trajectory, as is shown by the case of directors-general, positioned at the apex of the Commission's hierarchy. The analysis of 200 career trajectories of directors-general demonstrates that the proportion of in-house careers has increased over time. They held positions in the commissioners' cabinets rather than ministers' offices, were members of the cabinet of a commissioner of a different nationality and obtained international degrees or were recognized for their European dimension (Georgakakis and De Lassalle 2010). In other words, having a specific European capital of authority with its related behaviour and mental maps has had a strong effect on careers, trajectories and the capacity to embody institutions, even if it has also caused frustration and feelings of exclusion in those at the margins of this model. Despite this common model different inclinations still exist, as shown by historians (Seidel 2010) and by Liesbeth Hooghe (2011) in a survey of the preferences of EU Commission high-level officials, in particular between those who support federalist ideas and those whose priority is the effectiveness of policies formulated at European level. However, both groups (which together represent 83 per cent of expressed preferences) relate strongly to their position as high-level European civil servants, while only a small number (17 per cent of expressed preferences) have an intergovernmentalist view (Dehousse and Thompson 2012).

In the end, the anthropologist's observation of the existence of a common culture and the capacity to embody the model may be nuanced according to different positions, social and national commitments and origins, and jobs. But eventually, the construction of a hard core of typical European civil servants – with proper meta-values in terms of an ethos of builders focusing on the future, multiculturalism and pragmatic skills to enable Europe to continue (Abélès et al. 1987) – was real. Structured like an advance guard symbolized by the policy makers, the relatively closed nature of the group and the need for discriminant social skills such as culture and multilingualism (Shore 2000, 2007) are also relevant observations. However, the idea of transformation of European civil servants into a constituted nobility of state has to be amended and put into a more continental context. It would be better to talk about a nobility of state *in the making* or of a *bourgeoisie de robe*, terms which show the differences between this 'bourgeoisie of law and state' and 'the economic and industrialist

bourgeoisie', as well as the difficulties of its social reproduction in this specific social field. One can also wonder if their kind of arrogance, also criticized by Shore (2007), is related to this collective position and its closed nature, or is the product of a golden age that was still present in the mid-1990s, but that appears quite challenged in the current context.

Changes and challenges for the model

Since 2000 many changes have occurred. On the institutional level, the role of the Commission, which has most of the staff, decreased politically to the point that some analysts talk about its decline (Kassim and Menon 2010). Following the 1999 Santer Commission's resignation, an unprecedented wave of internal reforms in many respects has brought about a 'change in culture' (Cini 2007), including in daily tasks and human resources. The staff regulations were revised in 2005, producing a first wave of austerity for newcomers. Following the economic crisis, and under member-state pressure, this revision itself was revised in 2011–12 (and is still under revision), again favouring austerity. If the European project of the period of Commission President Jacques Delors was considered a great success (Ross 1995), the enlargement's concretization into a project with a 'European constitution' and the Euro, two fetish objects in the field, has been badly jeopardized. All conditions, including an increase in staff of 31 per cent, have challenged the group, if not directly its existence as a group, then at least the condition for reproduction of the thus far dominant model.

First of all the group was challenged by a *cycle of demoralization*. If the feeling of being part of a movement in history and having a successful job mattered during the group's construction (also for motivation and a sense of action, which have become issues in current human resources policies), one must admit that since the late 1990s, the morale of the staff has been closer to depression than euphoria, particularly given the 'change in culture' introduced by the last administrative reform. Although officials admit that changes were needed, various authors (Bauer 2008; Ellinas and Suleiman 2008) observe a general feeling that the Commission's spirit as the EU's engine has diminished after the reform. It is difficult to say whether it is a profound change or just part of a cycle. Seidel (2010: 177) argues that the lowered morale and the impression of an administrative turn, with even reinforcement of intergovernmentalism, is comparable to the 1970s, when the Commission was 'increasingly confined to administering rather than initiating policies'. But other converging symptoms can be noticed. Although the dynamic of the group used to be supported by a relative cohesion between the hierarchical levels, particularly between the political part of the 'college' of the Commissioners and the administration, the relationship tensed (Wille 2009; Georgakakis 2010b). While the directors-general previously were the key leaders for the staff, and also central in reproducing the group's values, they now are seen on the one hand as relatively discarded by an empowered general secretariat with direct links to the president of the Commission, and on the other as in a condition of fear (of frauds, responsibilities and initiatives). This feeling of decline needs to be put in perspective on the administrative level, with the capacity of the Commission at the centre of a wider administrative European network (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010) growing in inverse ratio to that of its political leadership.

Whatever this is worth, these feelings are embedded in broader objective changes.

The *level of fragmentation* of the corps has never been so high. This is most apparent in the enlargement by ten new countries in 2004, which was a (potentially positive) challenge for the group. Indicators show that newly recruited people were far from strangers in the field, developing the same solid international experience as previous generations. But compared to former smaller enlargements, this one took place at a time when other fragmentation was

already in process. While previously the Commission was the incarnation and engine of the group spirit, the depressed atmosphere and competition with other institutions became more widespread and powerfully raised the issue in terms of staff cohesion. Within the group, the divide resulting from the new 2005 regulations also seems to be important, as well as some resentment from the newcomers (Ban 2013). In a context in which more than 30 per cent of the people joined after the new staff regulations were introduced, the objective division within the corps reached new highs. The larger numbers of people working on contract changed the group's core, whereas permanent and official status used to be ultra-dominant. In the last proposal to revise the regulations, secretaries were not included as official staff, although after staff objections a compromise was found preserving the *status quo*. The process of externalization, allotting more executive tasks to external agencies, is also challenging the unity. The same applies to the creation of separate bodies such as the External Action Service, with 1,600 employees. Although the pro- and anti-reform debate divided the staff unions, two new trade unions managed to achieve surprising results in the elections for their staff committees in 2009 and 2012. The first (Union for Unity) wants to restore the values of a strong EU public service; the second (Generation 2004) supports staff who joined the institutions after the introduction of the new staff regulations in 2004.

Challenged in its ambition and cohesion, the group of EU civil servants is also challenged in its specificity. One wonders whether the differentiation process through which the group was shaped into a group of typical EU civil servants still exists, when a *de-differentiation process* is at work. Although the reforms had different effects depending on the institutions and services in the Commission (Bauer 2008; Schon-Quinlivan 2011), the promoted new culture looks closer to the global public management spirit, which meant a break with the construction of competences based on expertise, European culture and multicultural and linguistic skills. The related new mottos and policies, such as recruitment at basic level and nomination at middle and top level, are now framed by conceptions and indicators which are far from neutral. They are inspired by Anglo-Saxon management standards based on private organization issues and promoting a model of a global manager class, which is supposed to consist of 'talent' independent of the context in which they work. Key skills are redefined, dispensing with the capital of authority based on expertise (including European law, economics and politics) and a sense of European diversity and commitment. Similarly, the slogan, a 'culture of service', with all the topics that go with it (anti-knowledge, anti-elite, anti-state bureaucracy), raises paradoxes for a civil service whose two essential functions are to be brokers for different interests supported by national and economic elites in the field of European cooperation, and to invent innovative solutions for building EU compromises, something which currently seems to be more and more difficult to achieve.

In this context, the relevant change for the group is basically not only a matter of values and culture, but also of change in terms of power and centre of attraction. The process in question is the devaluation of the hard core of European policy makers and brokers, their status as role models and their relative strength in the field of Eurocracy, to the advantage of more casual international bureaucrats. According to the possible points of view discussed in the first part of this chapter, one can rejoice or deplore it. However, apart from normative positions, one has to stress the process, which is for now not a full dismantlement, but rather an issue to be discussed in terms of reproduction of the corps' capacity to be at the forefront of the dynamics within the field of Eurocracy. For the group, this wider battle may lead to two different types of outcome in the medium term. Depending on the movement of the pendulum the group may still exist as such and restore a relative balance, if it is mobilized and unified enough. But it could also split into two parts across the institutions, with on the one

hand a small elite of highly placed international managers inherited from the former class of civil servants, driving the policy makers, and on the other a mass of disparate 'agents' working on contract in the agencies. Only history and the cross-disciplinary study of what is going to be enacted will tell the eventual outcome.

Recommended for further reading

Ban (2013), Kassim et al. (2012), Georgakakis (2012) and Le Theule and Lepretre (2012).

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22

Reinvigorating the "Second" United Nations

People matter

Thomas G. Weiss

Critical and creative contributions by individual staff members who work at the United Nations (UN) are typically overlooked or cavalierly dismissed by analysts who stress that the real red meat of international organization consists of the national interest politics of 193 member-states and the supposedly iron-clad constraints on the so-called bloated bureaucracy that slavishly serves these masters. My proposition is different: people matter and the world organization should rediscover the idealistic roots of the international civil service, to make more room for creative idea-mongers as well as establish more mobile personnel and career development paths for a twenty-first century secretariat.

This chapter briefly explores the origins of the concept, problems with its evolution, the logic behind reform, and specific improvements. Examples of both problems and solutions are drawn from the three main areas of UN activity (international peace and security, human rights, and sustainable development) that serve as the clearest substantive framework for understanding the work of the world organization.[1]

Overwhelming bureaucracy and underwhelming leadership

Inis Claude (1956, 1996) long ago distinguished between "two United Nations": The Second UN consists of heads of secretariats and staff members who are paid from assessed and voluntary budgets, while the First UN is the arena for state decision making. The Third UN of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), experts, commissions, business, and academics is a more recent addition to analytical perspectives (Weiss et al. 2009).

A group organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during the Second World War termed the creation of an independent international civil service "a great experiment" of the League of Nations (Ranshofen-Wertheimer 1945), which was then carried over in UN Charter Article 101 calling for "securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity." The Second UN's most visible champion was Dag Hammarskjöld, whose widely cited speech at Oxford in May 1961 spelled out the critical importance of an autonomous and qualified staff. He asserted that any erosion or abandonment of "the international civil service . . . might, if accepted by the Member nations, well prove to be the

Munich of international cooperation" (Hammarskjöld 1961: 349). He fervently believed that UN officials could and should pledge allegiance to a larger collective good symbolized by the organization's light-blue-covered *laissez-passer* rather than the narrowly conceived national interests of the countries that issue their multi-hued national passports.

Setting aside senior UN positions for officials approved by their home countries belies that integrity. They operate that way in the European Union because in it and the UN system, governments seek to ensure that their interests are defended inside secretariats. In fact, many have even relied on officials for intelligence, an especially debilitating development during the Cold War. From the outset, for example, the Security Council's permanent members have reserved the right to "nominate" (essentially select) nationals to fill the main posts in the secretary-general's cabinet, and secretaries-general (SGs) have done too little to combat such interference.

The rapid influx in the 1950s and 1960s of former colonies as new member-states led them to clamor for "their" quotas, their share of the spoils. The result was downplaying competence and exaggerating national origins as the main criterion for recruitment and promotion. Over the years, efforts to improve gender balance and the age profile of secretariats have resulted in new claims. Virtually all positions above the director level, and often many below as well, are similarly vetted and the object of campaigns by governments.

How many people are we discussing? Today's professional and support staff number approximately 55,000 in the UN proper and in agencies created by the General Assembly, and another 20,000 in the specialized agencies. This number includes neither temporary military and police staff in peace operations (a total of about 120,000 in 2012) nor the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank group (another 15,000). These figures represent substantial growth from the 500 employees in the UN's first year and the peak total of 700 staff employed by the League (Myint-U and Scott 2007: 126–8).

Neglected personnel issues are worth emphasizing because individuals matter, for good and for ill. The Second UN does more than simply carry out marching orders from governments. I disagree categorically with the vast majority of analysts, even those sympathetic to multilateral cooperation, who tend to dismiss "the curious notion that the United Nations is an autonomous actor in world affairs" (Puchala et al. 2007: x).

United Nations officials present ideas to tackle problems, debate them formally and informally with governments, take initiatives, advocate for change, turn general decisions into specific programs, and implement experiments in the field. They monitor progress and report to national officials and politicians gathering at intergovernmental conferences and in countries in which the UN is operating. There is considerably more room for creativity and independence than is commonly thought.

None of this should surprise. It would be a strange and impotent national civil service that took no initiatives or showed no leadership, simply awaiting detailed instructions from the government in power. United Nations officials are no different. Decision making and responsibility for implementation in most parts of the UN system, especially the development funds and specialized agencies, depend in large part on staff members.

Problems in international secretariats

The recruitment, composition, rewards, retention, and performance of international civil servants are a substantial part of what ails the UN. Sir Brian Urquhart and others have for years called for a dramatic change in the selection process for the SG and agency heads, but the problems go far deeper (Urquhart and Childers 1990). The quality and impact of the staff

members of international secretariats is a variable that can be altered far more easily and swiftly than such problems as state sovereignty and the counter-productive North–South theater that plague the UN.

International peace and security

Nothing that follows should in any way make us forget the fact that many persons have served the UN with distinction and heroism since 1945, including Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 other colleagues who lost their lives in Baghdad in August 2003, and the 17 UN staff who were killed in Algiers in December 2007. Indeed, the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize recognized the 300 civilian staff members and 2,600 soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in UN service.

Such valor should not, however, blind us to such serious problems as arose in the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) and efforts to secure gender balance within secretariats and field operations. The OFFP "scandal" reflected as much American domestic politics as the situation. After all, member-states were responsible for approving the bulk of the monies that found their way into Saddam Hussein's coffers and consciously overlooked "leakage" to such key allies as Jordan and Turkey.

Nonetheless, the sloppy management of this politically visible and crucial assignment tarnished the organization's reputation and exposed deeper-seeded and longer-standing problems. The report of the Independent Inquiry Committee headed by Paul Volcker pointed to "ethically improper" activities, including some by Annan's son Kojo (Meyer and Califano 2006). The main disconcerting details, however, related to the Second UN that was not technologically or managerially up to the job.

Another example arises from the realization about the status of gender equality because one might reasonably have expected the UN to lead in integrating women into work compared with other national and international secretariats. Yet the pace has been glacial. In 2012, women continued to be excluded in important ways from the trenches and bureaucratic corridors. At the end of this century's first decade, participation by women in UN peace operations was not even 3 percent. The representation of women in the professional and higher categories in the UN system was slightly over a third. Only at the entry (P-1 and P-2) professional levels was something like gender balance achieved. In the higher categories (D-1 and above), women were only a quarter of UN staff (UN Women 2009). Moreover, the appointments of special representatives of the SG (SRSGs) are completely open, but the results are appalling: "Two female SRSGs and one female Deputy SRSG in 26 peacekeeping missions is indefensible."[2]

Human rights

The international civil service should be held to the highest standards of competence and consistency because the UN has played an essential role in establishing human rights norms. The standard bearer should lead the way in implementing the standards set for others. The Second UN's performance in this arena is especially disconcerting.

Following widespread allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct by UN troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005, including trading money and food for sex and engaging in sex with minors, the UN instituted a number of system-wide reforms. When similar allegations surfaced later in Burundi, Haiti, and Liberia, the UN acknowledged widespread abuse after downplaying problems. The command and control of UN troops and their discipline are almost entirely in the hands of national commanders, and reports of sexual

misconduct by peacekeepers regularly surface in spite of Annan's having adopted a "zero tolerance" policy.

Moreover, two cases of unacceptable administrative reactions indicate a related lack of vigilance and appropriate support for personnel from the UN's highest levels when visible senior personnel are caught in a vortex of sovereignty and human rights. Perhaps the most searing example was when the force commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire, made repeated and totally unsuccessful requests for assistance and authorization to try, even symbolically, to halt the fast-paced genocide (Dallaire 2004).

Even more illustrative are the deaf ears that also greeted calls by the SRSG to Sudan, Jan Pronk, to halt slow-motion genocide in Darfur. In 2004–6, as now, governments and the Security Council were dragging their feet, but also there was no outrage from UN headquarters when Khartoum expelled Pronk. This *persona non grata* had unflinchingly reported on the violence against civilians throughout his tenure and was accused of displaying "enmity to the Sudanese government and the armed forces" on his personal blog. What was his reward? Annan recalled Pronk ahead of an expulsion deadline and ended his UN career (Hoge 2006).

Again the previous examples do not imply that there have not been numerous instances of outstanding and exemplary behavior. But worth noting here is the weight of the shackles of political correctness, measured by what major and even minor powers consider acceptable behavior by UN officials. Such subservience reflects an outmoded definition of sovereignty and builds a substantial structural flaw into the international civil service. Any reinvigoration will require more courage in confronting member-states than has been customary for some time.

Sustainable development

The UN's reputation and performance in economic and social development are continually degraded when political machinations take obvious precedence over competence. But here too politics trumps competence. For instance, Ban Ki-moon selected Sha Zukeng as under-SG to head the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs in his first administration. The choice of a career Chinese diplomat who began as a translator without exposure to development thinking and practice was not atypical for SGs. He chose his first deputy primarily because she was a Tanzanian Muslim woman, just as the United States (US) and United Kingdom under-SGs for political and humanitarian affairs were chosen because their politics were close to George W. Bush's and Tony Blair's.

But for sustainable development, two of the most painful historical cases involved the incompetence of two sons of the Third World, UNESCO's director-general (1974–87), Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, and director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization (1976–93), Edouard Saouma. Some institutions are headed always by a national of the same country or continent (for instance, the World Bank by a US citizen, and the IMF by a European), whereas others have positions that are rotated among regions. M'Bow and Saouma were elected because it was Africa's and the Middle East's "turn" at the helm of their organizations. Both served multiple terms and almost bankrupted their institutions (Hancock 1989).

Again, while not gainsaying sterling contributions to development by such intellectual stalwarts as Raúl Prebisch and Helvi Siipila, and operational ones as Jim Grant and Sadako Ogata, the selection criterion for senior appointments has increasingly become nationality rather than experience and ability to do the job. Students of international relations and organization can hardly expect appointments to be "above politics," but senior slots should not provide on-the-job training.

The logic of reforming the Second United Nations

Ninety percent of the UN's expenditures are for its employees. These individuals are its main strength and can be reformed and reinvigorated. While some argue that intergovernmental secretariats only sustain the status quo, I have a different view. The international civil service, properly constituted, can make a difference in field operations as well as in intellectual and policy pursuits at headquarters (Thakur and Weiss 2009).

Knowing when to ignore standard bureaucratic operating procedures (SOPs) is an essential part of leadership that can break down the UN system's bureaucratic barriers. For instance, former US Congressman and later administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Bradford Morse and Canadian businessman Maurice Strong broke the back of the feudal system when they headed the temporary Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) in the mid-1970s. Their own experience, reputations, and independence permitted them to override SOPs just as Sir Robert Jackson had done in the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in postwar Europe, parts of Africa, and the Far East, and then in the Bangladesh emergency in 1971 (Gibson 2006).

In preparation for the UN's sixtieth anniversary, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) hatched a mouse, which the SG (Annan 2005) supported and the World Summit agreed to consider, namely a one-time buy-out to cut "deadwood." This familiar proposal probably would not improve matters because enterprising and competent staff could take a severance payment and seek alternative employment while the real deadwood would remain. The more pertinent challenge is how to gather new wood and ensure that the best and brightest are not only hired but also retained and promoted.

Recruitment should return to the idealistic origins of the League and early UN secretariats; competence should be the highest consideration rather than geographical origins, gender, and age: the various rationales for cronyism (Weiss 1975). The onus must be placed on governments to nominate only their most professionally qualified and experienced candidates. And in contrast to the take-it-or-leave-it approach of the posts "reserved" for particular nationalities, several (at least two or three) candidates should be nominated and the choice left to the SG and heads of UN organizations.

As in domestic circumstances, it is a fallacy to argue that quality must suffer while moving toward more diversity. Special recruitment efforts can be focused on under-represented nationalities, including the expanded use of standardized examinations and evaluations for junior entrants. The requirement is to limit outside influence and patronage which come from donors, friends, and family members of candidates from developed and Third World countries alike for cushy positions at every level. If language and culture are concerns, then regional as opposed to national quotas would be preferable.

The beginning of a term for a SG, as for any new head of any organization, is often a good one for shaking up the Second UN. Annan instituted significant managerial and technical improvements shortly after assuming the mantle in 1997, and again at the beginning of his second term in 2002, just as Boutros Boutros-Ghali had in 1992. Ban Ki-moon made no such effort to jump-start his administrations, either in 2007 or 2012.

The clash between South and North at the end of Annan's term, as it had on many previous occasions, stalled the consideration of sensible proposals to place more authority in the SG's hands, rather than those of member-states. A relatively small number of countries in the global South are reluctant to move power away from the General Assembly, where by virtue of their numbers they call the shots. Mark Malloch Brown (2008: 10) noted after he no longer was deputy-SG: "Taking a demotion to come over from UNDP to be Kofi Annan's chief of staff

was a much bigger step down than I anticipated . . . I found when it came to management and budgetary matters, he was less influential than I had been."

If the UN is to meet new and old challenges and be more accountable, additional authority and responsibility at the top is a minimum requirement.

Improving the Second United Nations

Human agency is crucial. Moreover, change is possible. What follow are some specific illustrations of what has and could happen more widely within the Second UN.

International peace and security

Two examples illustrate how the UN could and should improve within the field of international peace and security: disciplining personnel and better representation of women in peace operations, the problems discussed earlier.

In response to allegations that emerged in 2004 of sexual misconduct among peacekeepers in the DRC, the SG invited Jordan's Prince Zeid to act as his advisor on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel. Zeid's (2005) hard-hitting report made a number of recommendations, and the General Assembly adopted a "comprehensive strategy." The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) established conduct and discipline units to prevent, track, and punish gender-based crimes.

Given the symbolic and actual importance of UN peacekeepers—in 2012, approximately 100,000 soldiers and another 20,000 police and civilians, costing some 8 billion USD (UN Peacekeeping 2012a)—the measures outlined in this report represent essential steps toward a heightened professionalism and accountability to replace the "boys will be boys" attitude of the past. United Nations, not national, discipline is required.

The UN continues to struggle with under-representation of women at senior levels. Despite reforms, very slow progress has been registered. The creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women as well as Security Council Resolution 1325 marked symbolic turning points in the commitment to gender mainstreaming. Nonetheless, the rate of progress has been glacial (Peacewomen 2006). Indeed, from the outset, women have had to challenge patriarchal norms and institutions, and much of the work on peace and security issues was separated from the UN's mainstream activities.

Eleanor Roosevelt, first chair of the Commission on Human Rights, made a direct appeal for women to be involved in peace efforts, asserting that the UN provided a window of opportunity (Jain 2005: 40). Some three decades later, at the first UN-sponsored World Conference on Women (Mexico City, 1975), governments signed the Declaration of Mexico, which proclaimed: "Women must participate equally with men in the decision making processes which help to promote peace at all levels" (Jain 2005: 72). That same year, the General Assembly called upon women to participate in the process of strengthening international peace and security in Resolution 3519 (XXX).

Today, however, women continue to be excluded from UN peace operations at all levels (DPKO 2011). Over the last two decades, there has been an overall increased female participation: from 1 percent of uniformed personnel in 1993 to 3 percent of military and 9 percent of police in 2011. These figures remain absurdly low, accounting for a mere 3.33 percent of peacekeeping personnel worldwide. While women constitute about 30 percent of civilian staff for missions, this level was attained about two decades ago (UN Peacekeeping 2012b).

The current condition of women in the UN administration overall is better but also disappointing. The representation of women in the professional and higher categories in the UN system is about 40 percent. Only at the entry professional levels (P-1 and P-2) has gender balance been achieved. In the higher categories (D-1 and above), women make up between 23 and 29 percent of UN staff (UN Women 2009). The appointment (SRSGs) remains poor although statistics are not broken down by gender (DPKO 2012).

Cost-cutting measures designed to enhance efficiency may lead to hiring freezes in upper-level positions, thus decreasing opportunities for women's advancement. However, structural problems alone cannot account for the inadequate progress in achieving gender balance. As Devaki Jain (2005: 168) asserts: "The world body has much work to do before women assume their proper place there – sixty years is a long time to wait."

One might have expected the UN to be taking the lead at integrating women into its various workforces compared with other institutions, and doing so faster than many of its member-states. Ironically, certain countries, such as Liberia, have done better. Led by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa and a former international civil servant who shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, Liberia has appointed women ministers of defense, finance, sports and youth, justice, and commerce, as well as chief of police and president of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The UN might well follow her lead.

Human rights

The human rights arena provides encouraging examples. Here, three steps are desirable and plausible: using more outsiders, insisting upon field rotation, and issuing fewer permanent contracts (UN 2004). As UN employees are subject to close scrutiny by member-states, officials often avoid not only robust public confrontation but even a more gentle variety.

One solution is based on work on internally displaced persons, essentially a special representative with a UN title and privileges, but outside the UN and without a salary (Weiss and Korn 2006: Chapter 8). Francis Deng's mandate (1992–2004) as the representative of the SG was intertwined with the Project on Internal Displacement directed by him and Roberta Cohen at the Brookings Institution. A similar arrangement continues with his successors. The conceptualization of internal displacement was a notable contribution to contemporary thinking about international relations, in particular by reframing state sovereignty as responsibility.

Deng had a foot in two camps: taking advantage of being within the UN *and* outside it. Indeed, the paltry results from his recent job, officially within the UN system as the special representative for the prevention of genocide, suggest that he was more effective at his earlier base at a public policy think tank, where he worked in tandem with universities, kept a respectable distance from governments and from predictable multilateral diplomatic pressure, processes, and procedures. Moreover, soft money from private and public donors meant that the project's activities were expected to extend the outer limits of what passes for conventional wisdom in mainstream diplomatic circles.

The role of outside-insider or inside-outsider offers advantages that should be replicated for other controversial issues when independent research is required, institutional protective barriers are high, normative gaps exist, and political hostility is widespread.

The bulk of UN activities are in developing countries. A problem for staff morale and competence has been that promotions are mainly the result of work and contacts in pleasant headquarters settings, whereas the real challenges lie on the frontlines.

A specific task for the future thus is to reward better fieldwork and have a flexible personnel policy to meet the unforeseen but predictable demands of new crises. In 1982 the UN high

commissioner for refugees implemented the first formal rotation policy in order to promote burden sharing among staff members. All international professional staff recruited on indefinite appointments are subject to rotation, which the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has cited as a model. UNICEF and UNDP also have mandatory staff rotation. Similar rotation systems should be a requirement across the UN system.

This policy creates a sense of equity among staff members (along with high divorce rates) and ensures an exposure to the field and training in the kinds of management skills that are likely to be necessary in future emergencies. The SG's 2006 *Investing in the United Nations* identified promotion and mobility among staff as key strategies for investing in people. Annan (2006) also noted that this wrenching effort would be "a radical overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat – its rules, its structure, and its systems and culture." Indeed.

The League of Nations instituted permanent contracts, a practice continued by the UN, applying the logic of protecting staff from government pressure and arbitrary dismissal. However, permanent contracts have the same justification as university tenure, and both have critics who argue that removing the possibility of being fired can also lead to coasting rather than productivity.

Beginning in the late 1990s, permanent contracts have been progressively reduced. While veteran officials may serve institutional memory, the number of persons with "continuing" contracts (basically the equivalent of "permanent") should be kept to a minimum and avoided for substantive jobs. Within the human rights field, in particular, an argument could be made that virtually no one should have a long-term contract, so that they make a mark quickly. If a staff member, especially a senior one, were doing a job correctly, many member-states should be irritated and be asking for his or her head.

Sustainable development

The bulk of the UN system's staff and resources are devoted to activities to foster sustainable development. Two possible solutions suggest themselves for what ails the Second UN: better ideas and younger staff.

Ideas, like people, matter, for good and for ill. So it is useful to cite John Maynard Keynes's quote about so-called practical men and women who have no time to read but often are acting on the basis of theories from dead "scribblers." He (1936: 383) wrote that "the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood."

Powerful minds are essential to the UN's performance. Intellectual contributions by the likes of Hans Singer, Prebisch, and W. Arthur Lewis (and eight other Nobel laureates in economics) are part of UN history. A more recent example is the *Human Development Report*. Mahbub ul Haq, the Pakistani UN economist whose vision animated the innovation, died in 1998 but his controversial approach continues. A powerful idea was to create indicators for ranking countries for their performance on the Human Development Index. In 2012, Norway was number one, the US was in fourth place, and the DRC brought up the rear (UNDP 2011: Table 1).

The *Human Development Report* is a prime example of intellectual bite (Murphy 2006). Calling a spade a shovel in numerical terms does not always make friends and fans among governments. As an outsider becoming a temporary UN insider (whose future was not tied to a lifelong tenure but rather to performance), ul Haq and others associated with the effort take political flack from irritated governments, which resented the fact that poorer neighbors got higher ratings because they made more sensible decisions about priorities, e.g., devoting

limited resources to education and health instead of weapons. Indeed, many governments disputed the very appropriateness of UNDP's using official contributions to commission finger-pointing research. Some rudely talked about "biting the hands that feed."

At all UN levels, there should be persons capable of such intellectual leadership. This is far more likely to come from the minds of fixed-term officials, specialized consultants, and academics on leave rather than permanent civil servants whose careers are dependent upon reactions from superiors and governments, and moreover who may not stay abreast of the literature and other scholarly developments.

It is necessary to strengthen the institutional capacity to generate and disseminate original ideas, to fortify mechanisms that ensure creative thinking. In the myriad proposals for UN reform over the years, none has emphasized the vital need to invest in analytical capabilities, nor in the quality of the minds who do the work. This is such an ignored possibility that it is developed further later.

It is essential to attract young qualified staff. A 2000 Joint Inspection Unit report, for instance, identified the need to address "work–life" or "work–family" issues as well as rotation (Mezzalama 2000: v–vi). In the 1960s, UNDP launched the junior professional officer (JPO) program that provides some 13 percent of UNDP's international staff (see www.jposc.org). Junior professional officers are selected and sponsored (i.e., fully funded) by their governments to work for a fixed period of time (usually two to three years). The program has become the key entry point for an international career and has been adopted by numerous other UN agencies, including UNICEF, UNHCR and the World Food Programme. Other agencies have adopted similar programs under different titles, e.g., the IMF's Economist Program and the Asia Development Bank's Young Professionals Program.

There are no silver bullets. What is essential, however, is to find the means to lower the average age at the professional entry level (currently 37) and the average age of the secretariat as a whole (currently 46) over the next decade when 15–20 percent of the staff reach retirement age.

Adlai Stevenson once joked that the work of the UN involves "protocol, Geritol and alcohol" (quoted in *Forbes* 2003: 120). Little can be done to reduce diplomatic procedures and the consumption of fermented beverages, but sclerosis is a guarantee of mediocrity. And the UN should find ways to continually infuse new blood.

Improving the intellectual capacity

The importance of reinvigorating the international civil service is obvious, with more illustrations about the potential impact of such changes. An oft-ignored reality for the UN system, which is applicable across sectors and depends on the quality of people, is the quality of policy ideas. Independent research by the United Nations Intellectual History Project (Weiss et al. 2005; UNIHP 2007; Jolly et al. 2009) demonstrates that having people and leadership capable of influencing deliberations and priority setting is essential because ideas and concepts are a main driving force in human progress and arguably the most important UN contribution over seven decades.

The staff members across the UN system should provide more intellectual leadership about the fundamentally changed nature of contemporary problems and their solutions. They should seek to bridge the deepening gap between scientific knowledge and political decision making. The UN should enhance its ability to produce or nurture world-class public intellectuals, scholars, thinkers, planners, and practitioners. United Nations officials are typically considered second-class citizens in comparison with counterparts from the

Washington-based international financial institutions. This notion partially reflects the resources devoted to research by the World Bank and the IMF, as well as their respective cultures, media attention, dissemination outlets, and the application of research.

But there is much more to the story. Nine persons with substantial experience within the UN and its policy deliberations have won the Nobel Prize in economic sciences: Jan Tinbergen, Wassily Leontief, Gunnar Myrdal, James Meade, W. Arthur Lewis, Theodore W. Schultz, Lawrence R. Klein, Richard Stone, and Amartya Sen, whereas only one from the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has done so. But he resigned from his post in protest and is now deeply associated with UN policy work. And this list is in addition to individual Nobel Peace Prize winners who worked for years as UN staff members: Ralph Bunche, Hammarskjöld, Annan, Mohamed ElBaradei, and Martti Ahtisaari. In total, some 15 organizations, diplomats, or statesmen associated with the UN have also won a Nobel Peace Prize. No other organization comes even close to being such a center of excellence, a fact missed by many politicians, the media, and a global public looking for answers to global predicaments.

Taking ideas and the people who produce them more seriously points toward steps to improve research, analysis, and policy work: facilitate staff exchanges from the secretariat to universities and think tanks for original and synthetic research; create space within the UN system for truly independent research and analysis; increase interaction and exchanges between the analytical staff of the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN economic and social departments and offices; ensure more effective outreach and media promotion activities so that the economic and social research produced reaches more audiences and has more impact on the decisions of economic and finance ministers around the world; and transform recruitment, appointment, retention, promotion, and organization of responsibilities as an integral part of a human resources strategy to exert intellectual leadership.

Despite a history of contributions from UN institutions, the system's full potential for policy research and analysis has scarcely been tapped. Cross-agency collaboration is too rare. Research staff in different parts of the UN reporting to the Economic and Social Council seldom venture beyond the walls of their departmental silos. Regular, mandatory gatherings for sharing research and ideas could reduce parochialism. A system-wide research council, for instance, could expand opportunities for information sharing and collaboration, and reduce the chances of redundancy and the pursuit of different projects at cross-purposes.

The UN should seek as many alliances as possible with centers of expertise and excellence: in academia, think tanks, government policy units, and corporate research centers. Human resources policy should do more to foster an atmosphere that encourages creative thinking, penetrating analysis, and policy-focused research of a high intellectual and critical caliber. The model of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change could well be replicated for other issues. The 2007 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to this group because mobilizing the talents of world-class public intellectuals under UN auspices (in this case, the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme) established the reality of human contribution to climate change.

The intellectual firepower of staff members is essential and will depend on better professionals. These nuts-and-bolts issues of operational alliances and staffing directly affect the quality of policy outputs from across the UN system. However, such a reorientation would require courage and autonomy by senior UN officials. It is a fool's errand to try and please all 193 member-states all of the time if a bold and forward-looking policy agenda is desired. Calling into question conventional or politically correct wisdom requires longer-term funding. Encouraging freethinking and exploration of ideas and approaches is vital but not cheap.

Without first-rate people and adequate funding, messages are typically watered down to satisfy the lowest common intergovernmental denominator. It is worth recalling what should have been learned from the howls greeting the annual *Human Development Report*, namely that even hypersensitive government representatives can tolerate intellectual independence. As might be imagined, honesty does not always gain fans among governments that fare less well than they thought they should have. Predictably government officials ask how the US could not be first, how Russia could rate so poorly on so many indicators, and how 15 African countries could always bring up the rear.

But UNDP's experience suggests that researchers can be liberated from the need to check analyses before publication with boards or donors. The widespread use of this practice will require "islands" or "safety zones," within which serious and independent analyses can take place away from daily tasks and without fearing the loss of income or publication because governments are irked. Academic freedom should not be an alien concept for researchers working within UN secretariats on twenty-first-century intellectual and policy challenges.

All parts of the UN system should acknowledge straightforwardly that contributions to ideas, thinking, analysis, and monitoring in their areas of international action should be *the* major emphasis of their work. The mobilization of more financial support for research, analysis, and policy exploration should be a top priority. Not only are longer-term availability and flexibility necessary, but, more importantly, no strings should be attached by donors in order to guarantee autonomy. Ideally, multiyear funding for research and analysis should come from assessed contributions, but voluntary funding is more likely.

Conclusion

The quality of the international civil service is not the UN's worst ailment (the lack of political will and the myopia of member-states win that award). But because the health of the Second UN can be improved and has consequences, the reinvigoration of the international civil service should be a priority. Moreover, strengthening the Second UN is not pie-in-the-sky. Neither constitutional changes nor even additional resources are necessary, but vision and courage by SGs and other heads of agencies. Examples cited earlier indicate that we are not starting from scratch.

The UN's residual legitimacy and the ideal of international cooperation keep a surprisingly large number of competent people committed to its work. The likes of Annan and Margaret Joan Anstee indicate that autonomy and integrity are not unrealistic expectations of international civil servants who are recruited as junior officials without government approval and have distinguished careers within international secretariats. The fact that both Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart joined the UN on loan from their national civil services also suggests that government clearance need not entail subservience to national perspectives.

In a series of follow-up reports to *Investing in the United Nations*, Annan (2006: 3) lamented the "silos" that characterize staff appointments and promotions and spelled out his "vision of an independent international civil service with the highest standards of performance and accountability." The so-called Four Nations (Chile, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand) Initiative (2007: 32–3) sought to come up with consensus proposals for improved governance and management. Predictably they expressed support for "geographical representation," but after moving beyond this mantra, the main thrust of their 2007 recommendations pointed to "merit-based" recruitment and the use of "expert hearings" for the most senior positions that "should not be monopolized by nationals of any state or group of states." Ban Ki-moon has not moved this agenda forward.

The stereotype of a bloated and lumbering administration is inaccurate in many ways (it overlooks many talented and dedicated individuals), but the nature of recruitment, retention, and promotion within the Second UN is a fundamental and fixable part of what ails the world body. After over four decades of working within or analyzing international secretariats, my conviction is that too often, success reflects more personalities and serendipity rather than recruitment of the best persons for the right reasons within appropriate institutional structures.

Why bother? People matter and are the UN's principal cost item. A reinvigorated international civil service is a potential resource whose composition, productivity, and culture could change, and change quickly.

Recommended for further reading

Gordenker (2010), Jolly et al. (2009), Jonah (2007), Myint-U and Scott (2007), and Weiss et al. (2013).

Notes

1   These pillars provide the framework for many analyses of UN activities: see Weiss (2012) and Weiss et al. (2013).
2   Available at www.huntalternatives.org/download/253_10_25_05_hunt_haf_statement_to_un_security_council_on_resolution_1325.pdf.

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The role and power of the chairs in international organizations

Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis

Uncertainty, high issue complexity and a wide range of actors and interests most often characterize multilateral negotiations. In that respect, international organizations (IOs) have emerged as institutionalized forums that are appropriately structured to facilitate such multidimensional and complicated processes. One of their distinctive organizational features is the chairmanship office. In IO parlance, the terms 'president', 'chairman' or 'presiding officer' have been used interchangeably to denote the holder of the office, namely an individual who is given a certain amount of authority to chair negotiations and ensure their smooth and effective conduct. This person can be a supranational officer, a third party not directly involved in the negotiations, a permanent representative or diplomat of a state elected or appointed to this position, a foreign minister of a country and even a head of state or government.

Taking into consideration the idiosyncratic institutional and political features of the IO in question as well as its *modus operandi*, any analysis of the chairmanship office is IO-specific. In more general terms, however, the office does emanate from the common need to address collective action impediments in multilateral negotiations, tackling agenda, negotiation and representation failures (Tallberg 2006a: 19–29; 2010: 243–5). According to this functional understanding of the office, the constituent states-principals set the chair-agent in place to ensure procedural order, overcome information asymmetries in political and technical areas of governance and enhance rule-making efficiency (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 4). In that respect, analyses of the office usually revolve around three recurring issues: tasks and functions, effectiveness and the chair's autonomy vis-à-vis the constituent principals. After a brief literature review, these three issues constitute the backbone of this chapter. We conclude by highlighting some main questions that are open to further research.

The chairmanship office in perspective: insights from literature

The main bulk of research on the chairmanship office focuses basically on two organizations, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), with only a handful of scholarly works looking at other IOs, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU).

Within this general grouping there are three types of studies with regard to the UN. The first type consists of writings with an explicit focus on the role and power of the chairmanship office either in a specific body or in a wide range of UN bodies. In the former category, one can list indicatively the works on chairs in the UN Security Council by Khan (1964), Jaipal (1978), and particularly a volume edited by Nicol (1981) with contributions by 18 former Security Council presidents that advances more than any other UN study the empirical literature on the Security Council chair. In the latter category, the book by Werners (1967) has focused on the powers, duties and responsibilities of the chairs of the UN General Assembly and its main committees, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2011a, 2011b) conceptualize and analyse chairs in various UN bodies as policy entrepreneurs and examine their effectiveness in different multilateral negotiating settings.

The second type of studies comprises works on 'around-the-table' UN negotiations, in which the chairmanship office is actively involved. These negotiations have taken place mainly in UN-sponsored conferences such as the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (for instance, Buzan 1981; Koh and Jayakumar 1985; Antrim and Sebenius 1992: 97–130) and successive environmental conferences (for instance, Grubb and Yamin 2001; Ott 2001; Depledge 2005, 2007). Relying on records of formal debates and interviews, these writings provide very useful insights into the chairs' role in these negotiations.

Finally, the third type includes studies, focusing mainly on either the decision-making processes in the UN in general or the functioning of particular UN bodies, that also make extensive references to the chairmanship office. The theory-informed empirical works by Smith (1999, 2002, 2006) are representative of the former, while the descriptive accounts by Bailey (1960: 49–70), Nicol (1982), Pogany (1982), Peterson (1986) and Bailey and Daws (1998: 124–37) about the Security Council and the General Assembly are representatives of the latter.

Very much as in the UN case, EU scholars have paid little attention to the rotating presidency of the Council/European Council for a long time, with few exceptions (for instance, Wallace and Edwards 1976; De Bassompierre 1988; Kirchner 1992). Additional input has come from more general works on the Council of Ministers (Westlake 1995; Sherrington 2000; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Descriptive case studies dwelled on the general record of particular presidencies, their performance in specific fields or their role in negotiations at intergovernmental conferences. In this group, indicative works are the presidencies' assessment in the *Journal of Common Market Studies*' *Annual Review of the European Union* and the works by Wurzel (1996), individual contributions in the edited volumes by Elgström (2003) and O'Nuallain (1985), as well as Crum (2007) and the relevant chapters in the edited volumes by Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992) and Laursen (2002, 2006) on the negotiations of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties.

Departing from the earlier descriptive focus, recent work has attempted to ground the analysis of the rotating EU Presidency on a solid theoretical and comparative basis (Metcalfe 1998; Elgström 2003, 2006; Tallberg 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). Adopting mostly a rational institutionalist approach, these works have provided a typology of the presidential functions with due emphasis on its agenda-shaping and brokerage capacity, and have elaborated on the parameters that condition its effectiveness and efficiency in the inter-state negotiations within the EU. This literature strand is comparative in nature, drawing its conclusions on across-country research. In that respect, it is useful because in addition to the analysis of the office *per se*, it identifies country-specific structural features that impinge on the presidential office and affect its performance. In the post–Lisbon Treaty institutional environment, the

permanent tier of the EU Presidency attracts increasing attention (Blavoukos et al. 2007; Fernández 2008; Crum 2009).

The relevant literature on other organizations is rather limited, once again with very few works targeting explicitly the chairmanship office. In the case of the African Union, the chair's role and influence have been adequately studied (Kufuor 2007) as well as the prospects of its further institutionalization (Lecoutre 2010). A much more theoretically rich discussion has taken place in the WTO contours. Pfetsch (2009) discusses the role of chairs in this setting as mediators who facilitate communication among negotiating parties but may also become influential agents of bargaining breakthroughs. Odell (2005) identifies three types of mediation tactics used by chairs in the WTO, ranging from a passive attitude of observation, problem diagnosis and information channelling to a more active engagement through actual (re-)formulation and even manipulation of the negotiating process. Odell (2009: 278–79) reinstates elsewhere the significance of chairs as mediators and attributes to them a decisive role in breaking deadlocks in international institutionalized negotiations. Testing his theory of formal leadership in a comparative venture, Tallberg's studies (2006a, 2010) explain why, when and how the chair matters in settings such as the EU, OSCE, UN and WTO.

On functions and autonomy: what chairs do and at what cost

In response to the failures that are inherent to multilateral negotiations, the functions of the chair comprise agenda management, brokerage and representation services (Tallberg 2003: 6–13; 2010). *Agenda management* has both an administrative-procedural and an agenda-shaping component. The former entails administrative activities from the pre-negotiation stage to the conclusion of an agreement, related to the sequence, frequency and method of negotiation, as well as to the structure of the meetings, the format of the meeting agenda and the voting procedure. The latter component comprises agenda setting, structuring and exclusion. It captures the chair's potential to shape the negotiation agenda in the first place or alter the existing policy prioritization. It becomes more important in bargaining milieus in which a temporal lag exists between the moment an issue emerges and the moment actual policy-making decisions are finally taken. Agenda exclusion can occur either by stalling deliberation on a particular agenda item through instrumental use of the privileged control of decision-making procedures or by presenting impossible compromise proposals.

The *brokerage* services of the chair address the common practice of states in multilateral negotiations of withholding information about true preferences, thus limiting chances of concluding an agreement. Tactical information concealment is a common practice of states; negotiating parties try to reveal as little as possible of their actual preferences in an attempt to make the minimum of concessions and maximize their gains (Raiffa 1982; Young 1991). However, this strategy may backfire, preventing the negotiating parties from reaching an agreement despite the existence of a 'contract zone' that includes at least one potential Pareto-improving outcome. Hence, negotiators are continuously in a state of dilemma about how much information they can disclose without jeopardizing the successful conclusion of negotiations. The chair comes into play as a third party who controls information flows facilitating agreement among the parties (Schelling 1960: 144; Lax and Sebenius 1986: 172).

Finally, *representation* addresses the phenomenon of interdependent bargaining in multiple, nested games. Thus, a case- or issue-specific bargaining process is hardly ever insulated from developments in other – simultaneously and in parallel – ongoing negotiations. In that case, outcomes of one negotiating forum need to be transferred to another, a task that the

constituent principals entrust to the agent–chair, representing them in their collective external interactions (Tallberg 2006a: 27–9).

As mentioned earlier, chairs are set in place to meet the principals' demand for solutions to inherent problems of multilateral negotiations. The assignment of this role is based on the core assumption of the chair's neutrality and impartiality. The agentic nature of the chair suggests that the conduct of these functions and any further assigned tasks should be pursued with a view to promote collective gains, managing the agenda without prejudice, acting as an 'honest broker' in the bargaining stage, and representing the negotiating parties externally without taking sides. However, chairs may evolve into self-interested figures motivated to exercise their functions to further their own preferences and values, closer to one or the other negotiating party (Schelling 1960: 144; Young 1991: 296). Along these lines, holding the chairmanship office constitutes a 'window of opportunity' for the occupant to influence the course of negotiations, directing negotiations to the chair's preferred outcome along the Pareto optimal frontier or inducing a sub-optimal solution. In the first case, the effect is mainly distributional, skewed to the chair's benefit; whereas in the second case, the chair's activities may impede overall bargaining efficiency. The negotiating parties try to minimize the cost of the chair's autonomy by setting *ex ante* or *ex post* control mechanisms that may take the form of appointment, administrative and oversight procedures (Tallberg 2002).

On effectiveness: a typology of parameters conditioning the chair's performance

This section discusses the main parameters that condition the chair's ability to perform effectively the assigned tasks and roles. Consciously, the typology is eclectic in nature, drawing on different theoretical strands and approaches. The proposed parameters derive mainly from realist and institutionalist accounts of intergovernmental negotiations, but we also acknowledge the need to consider personal-psychological, cognitive and persuasive aspects of deliberation and communicative action in various institutional settings. In that respect, we cluster these parameters in three broad categories related to: 1) the negotiating contour and the content and structure of the negotiations, 2) organization-specific features of the chairmanship office, and 3) personal skills and country-of-origin attributes of the chair (Blavoukos et al. 2006).

The negotiating contour and the content and structure of negotiations

The *negotiating contour* reflects the broader international environment in which the chair operates. General patterns of cooperation and conflict in world politics have a direct bearing on the activities of IOs (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 25–34). Thus, general political conditions of enmity or amity in the world and the systemic power configuration constitute important exogenous parameters affecting the resources available to the chair and/or the chair's tasks and functions *per se*. A polarized international environment curtails the chair's resources, limiting subsequently the chair's potential to deliver, and minimizes his/her role and scope of intervention to simple procedural tasks and formalities.

The *content* and structure of negotiations refer to special features of the negotiating issues and the bargaining process as well as the decision-making rules that apply to the negotiations. To begin with, the nature of the negotiating issue (for instance, military, economic, humanitarian, or environmental security) affects the capacity of the chair to successfully perform the required functions. Operationalizing this parameter, one should take into account the degree

of salience and controversy of an issue. Issue salience disassociates the importance of an issue from the 'high – low politics' dichotomy, linking it to the particular value it has for a negotiating party regardless of its thematic classification. The more salient an issue is for the constituent principal-states, the more difficult it becomes for the chair to perform the required functions, bouncing against the hard fought–for 'red lines' of the negotiating parties, especially in unanimous decision-making environments. In cases of non-salient issues, it is more likely for the disagreeing country or group in the minority to be cajoled by the chair (or the other negotiating partners), especially in institutionalized settings of repetitive negotiations. Issue controversy refers to the extent that an issue is amenable to compromise or not (Young 1989: 366–71). There are three criteria to identify whether an issue has reached this point in negotiations. First, negotiating sides should be able to see a clear need for departure from the current *status quo*, in which moving in the same direction becomes a corollary requirement. Second, it should be possible to derive arrangements perceived equitable to more, or even better, all sides involved. Third, there should exist identifiable salient solutions around which the debate can be focused (Smith 2002: 124–6). Obviously, the more controversial an issue, the greater the distance among the 'agreement zones' of the negotiating partners, and the smaller the 'contract zone', the more difficult it is for a chair to effectively perform the required functions.

Moving on to the *structure* of the negotiations, several issues come up. First, in terms of the size of the negotiating body, a small number of participants usually eases the life of the chair, reducing significantly the complexity of the negotiations and allowing an agreement to be reached (Smith 1999: 178–9). Second, it makes a big difference whether negotiations constitute a one-off venture or repetitive bargaining processes in successive rounds. In the latter case, both the shadow of the future and the past clearly affects the countries' negotiating stances to the benefit of the chair, decreasing informational uncertainties, increasing predictability, and introducing reputational considerations. Third, it also affects bargaining dynamics, whether negotiations revolve around one single issue and are therefore insulated from other bargaining processes, or whether they constitute one part of a multi-thematic bargaining agenda, often evolving in different negotiating forums. In the latter case, the chair's effectiveness is affected by ongoing developments elsewhere beyond the chair's control or even knowledge. Fourth, the duration of the negotiations also casts an ambiguous impact on the effectiveness of the chair. A short and intense negotiating period may help the chair to exercise pressure on the negotiating parties but it may also undermine the chair's capacity to perform the required functions in a very limited period of time. At the same time, extended and protracted negotiations may offer greater opportunities to the chair to establish a viable contract zone and broker an agreement, but may also lead to a negotiating quagmire with no bargaining breakthroughs due to negotiating inertia. Finally, decision-making rules also crucially affect the effectiveness of the chair. In multilateral bargaining settings whereby decisions are taken through simple majority voting, the chair can more easily garner the necessary support than in cases of special majority or unanimity. Thus, the more demanding the decision-making rule is, the more difficult it becomes for the chair to perform the required functions.

Organization-specific features of the chairmanship office

The second group of parameters that affect the chair's performance relates to the organization-specific, institutional and political features of the chairmanship office. The capacity of the chair to pursue the required functions depends primarily on the availability of resources and the formal institutional environment within which the chair is called to operate (Tallberg 2006a: 41–51).

Resources comprise primarily privileged information, the chair's legitimacy and authority, as well as the political support given to the chair by other parties within or outside the multilateral negotiating setting. In general, the more resources available, the greater the chair's potential to deliver with regard to the assigned tasks. The most important asset for the chair is the privileged and asymmetrical access to information that is either unavailable or extremely costly to the constituent states-principals (Moe and Howell 1999: 138). Through existing bureaucratic mechanisms (for instance, secretariats) and procedural arrangements (such as confidential bilateral meetings), the chair enjoys privileged access to undisclosed preference information, which can be instrumentally used for the exact demarcation of the existing contract zone, facilitating multilateral agreement.

Legitimacy and authority derive from the perceptions of the negotiating parties about the chair. They are related to the content expertise of the chair, mainly the chair's capacity to handle highly specialized and technical issues due to special skills, education and/or previous record of activities in the same field (Wall and Lynn 1993: 173). If negotiating parties consider the chair's intervention legitimate and the chair as an authoritative source of brokerage activities, the effectiveness potential rises. The chair may lose legitimacy and authority in cases of distributional bias in previous negotiation rounds, attempts to expand the mandate or bypass the principals' control, and/or changes in the bargaining structure that result in the chair's status degradation. Two additional points to bear in mind are: first, the legitimacy of the chair is often associated with, and reflects the legitimacy of, the international organization in which the office is embedded; second, the mode of selection affects the chair's authority. A consensual decision of the principals appointing the chair or an election with an overwhelming majority empowers the chair in the exercise of the assigned tasks.

The third category of resources consists of the political support given to the chair by other parties within or outside the multilateral negotiating setting. The political back-up to the chair can be implicit or explicit. It may take the form of additional contributions to the chair's resources (informational or other), exerting pressure to or influencing negotiating partners to accept a specific bargaining outcome, deter challenges to the chair's authority and ensure his/her institutional viability. Solid and consistent political support to the chair contributes substantially to the chair's effectiveness.

Moving on to the *institutional environment* of the chairmanship office, first and foremost, the format of the chairmanship office constitutes a critical parameter for the chair's effectiveness. Different institutional models comprise the rotation of the office among the negotiating parties (like in the UN Security Council and the rotational six-month Presidency of the Council in the EU), the election of the chair from one of the participating states (as in the UN General Assembly) and the appointment of a third-party or a supranational official (as in the WTO). A fourth model also exists, which assigns the chairmanship office to the country that acts as a host to the negotiations, as in the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Each of these institutional alternatives reflects different states' disposition and power configurations and shapes differently the negotiation manoeuvrability and intervention capacity of the chair. Rotation ensures equal burden sharing among negotiating partners at the cost of hampering negotiation dynamics due to frequent changes in the office. Appointment of a third-party or a supranational official may ensure greater efficiency, but at the possible cost of autonomous chairs, and this may be the case also with the option of a longer period in office for one of the negotiating parties.

The alternative models vary in the way they treat issues of process control, institutional continuity and duration of tenure (Elgström 2006). Process control refers to the privileged position of the chair over negotiation sequence, frequency, format and even intervention

methods, like being able to table single negotiating texts or alternative draft agreement proposals. Institutional continuity is hampered by frequent changes in the office, which is usually the case in the rotational institutional design and in appointment and election schemes with short periods in office for the chair. Institutional discontinuity impedes socialization effects, economies of scale and learning curves in the building up of the chair's interaction with constituent partners, developing skills and informational resources. In the same vein, longer duration in office enables repeated intensive interactions between the chair and the negotiating constituent states-principals, and facilitates familiarization with working methods, techniques and issues, leading to the emergence of a common policy perspective (Metcalfe 1998: 416–26). In general, greater process control, more institutional continuity and longer tenure have a positive impact on the effectiveness of the chair.

The second component of the formal institutional environment is the set of operational rules that delineate the chair's formal scope and modality of intervention. These rules are encapsulated in the chair's mandate and determine the extent of process control of the chair over the negotiations. Besides the operational rules explicitly stipulated in the mandate, the chair may draw on custom or established practice to broaden his/her scope and modality of intervention. In general, a broad and/or vague mandate that allows space for chair initiatives raises the potential of this agent's assertiveness and reinforces his/her effectiveness. In contrast, a very narrow and/or detailed mandate curtails the chair's capacity to perform the required functions. The mandate clarifies the formal institutional rules of agenda shaping, establishing, for example, whether the agenda-setting power is shared with the negotiating principals and/or secretariats or vested only in the chair. Furthermore, it outlines the intervention repertoire of the chair in the negotiations, namely the modality of the chair's intervention in the negotiation process and the available means at the chair's disposal. Indicatively, mandate provisions that allow the chair to table draft proposals in a negotiating forum constitute a significant institutional asset. The capacity to delegate decisions to other negotiating forums assists the chair to shape the agenda and either introduce proposals s/he wants to promote or discourage others s/he wants to keep away from collective consideration. Issuing rulings over disputed and contested items in the process of the negotiations may also have far-reaching consequences on the structure of the negotiations and their outcome. Finally, compiling and making public statements on behalf of the negotiating parties enables the chair to tackle representation failures but may also provide an opportunity to commit the principals on an agenda issue.

The third component of the institutional environment is the organization-specific set of formal and informal constraints. Formal institutional constraints derive from the control mechanisms set in place by states-principals to control the chair-agent for over-assertiveness. Greater efficiency of these control mechanisms curtails the chair's freedom of action and subsequently his/her effectiveness. In cases of elected and appointed chairs with a specific lifetime, the possibility for a renewal of tenure creates a favourable incentive structure for the chair to rise to the prescribed requirements of the office. However, by an inverse logic, if only a single renewal is possible, a second-term 'lame duck' chair may be set free from first-term constraints, adopting a more 'heroic' approach to the office with an eye on personal historical legacy (Blavoukos et al. 2007: 247). Allowing for the dismissal or impeachment of the chair in case of inaction, an impediment or serious misconduct weighs heavily on the mind of the chair in the conduct of the required functions. The important question to ask here is about the decision-making rule with which this oversight procedure will be activated, given the collective principal's difficulty in agreeing on acceptable levels of misconduct and agency losses.

Informal institutional constraints mainly refer to the most often implicit behavioural norms that inform all actions and initiatives of the chair, imposing *ex ante* constraints. In general, the more extensive the range of these norms, the more limited the role of the chair will be and the less his or her chances of performing the assigned functions effectively. For example, applying the norm of consensus even in decision-making frameworks where unanimity is not required makes the chair's life more difficult, undermining significantly the effectiveness potential of the chair since there emerges the need to accommodate the concerns of all negotiating parties.

Personal skills and country-of-origin attributes of the chair

The performance of the chair depends also on the physical presence and the country of origin of the person in the office. Personal skills, content expertise and the leadership potential of the chair substantially increase the effectiveness potential. Personality-specific features and social skills may advance bargaining and negotiation efficiency, as may the chair's temperament and working style, competence and experience as well as intellect and physical endurance. In addition to that, chairs often enjoy a unique expertise over the subject matter, due to special technical knowledge or wide-held experience in dealing with the issue in question. This content or issue expertise may have been acquired in a personal capacity or derive from the chairmanship institution more broadly, in which case it may be further strengthened by the particular auxiliary bodies set in place to assist the chair, like the secretariats (Wall and Lynn 1993; Metcalfe 1998; Beach 2004).

Furthermore, the leadership potential of the chair can assist negotiating parties to overcome bargaining impediments (Underdal 1991; Malnes 1995). Leadership reflects the asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor directs the behaviour of others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time (Underdal 1994: 178). Formal leadership refers to established positions of authority, like the chairmanship office, set in place by the principals to manage and control an otherwise anarchical process (Smith 2002: 121). Successful formal leadership does not follow a single pattern and is heavily dependent on context and personality. It is exercised in accordance with the particular rules of interaction in any given institutional milieu, the limitations deriving from the constituent agreement on the setting of the international organization, and the personal traits of the figure(s) assigned to such a position of authority (Burns 1978; Schechter 1987). It can be of short- or medium-term nature depending on the time frame and the kind of issues handled (Metcalfe 1998: 414).

Three analytically distinct forms of leadership come regularly into play in international interactions: structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership (Young 1991). Structural leadership largely connotes the translation of structural, resource-based power into the form of bargaining leverage in negotiations. Entrepreneurial leadership refers to the framing of an issue in such a way as to facilitate integrative bargaining and to strike deals that would otherwise elude negotiating partners. Finally, intellectual leadership relies on the power of ideas to shape perspectives and orient the involved actors in certain outcome directions. The chair can exercise all three forms. Through arm-twisting and side-payments (structural leadership), use of negotiation skills (entrepreneurial leadership), and/or framing appropriately the problem at hand by means of effective use of his/her ideational power (intellectual leadership), the chair may have a catalytic influence on the bargaining outcome.

The country-of-origin attributes refer to country features and reputational assets that enhance the performance and effectiveness of the chair. The international record of the country of origin can add to (or subtract from) the chair's resources, especially in terms of

legitimacy and authority. Negotiating partners usually show a more positive disposition towards chairs from countries with no stake in the negotiations and a pacifist and non-aggressive international profile, especially if this profile is accompanied by a good record of mediating activities in international conflicts. In contrast, a chair from one of the 'great powers' is treated with an *a priori* scepticism, if not distrust. Still, it should be acknowledged that such a chair has a greater capacity to provide structural leadership, being able to resort to the country's structural power to bring into line any recalcitrant negotiating parties. Thus, the impact direction of this parameter remains ambiguous and open to empirical insights.

The need for further research

Although chairs constitute an omnipresent feature of multilateral negotiations at all levels of analysis, they have remained for a long time at the sidelines of academic research. This was mainly due to the twin assumptions of neutrality and impartiality that were for a long time associated with the chair's performance in executing the assigned tasks and functions. Another important reason for this relative delay in capturing the chair's potential in affecting multilateral negotiations in IOs was the bipolarity of the Cold War environment that constituted a significant constraint on the chair in performing the required tasks and functions. Departing from this rather simplistic approach of the chair as an omni-subservient agent with little if any impact on the course and outcome of negotiations, recent empirical and theoretical research acknowledges the significant potential role and power of the chair. Furthermore, it begins to raise questions about the chair's boundaries of autonomy, the distributional effect of such agency slippage as well as the best ways for the negotiating principals to control and curtail it.

As far as the former is concerned, the main parameters that condition the chair's effectiveness have been identified, clustered in the three categories discussed earlier: 1) the negotiating contour and the content and structure of the negotiations, 2) organization-specific features of the chairmanship office and 3) personal skills and country-of-origin attributes of the chair. However, even setting aside the conscious choice of eclecticism that can attract some epistemological criticism, several issues emerge that require further research, issues that touch upon theoretical and methodological aspects of the proposed typology.

First, not all of these parameters are relevant to all institutional settings or cases. It may well be that in a particular case or setting, a parameter has an overwhelming effect on the performance of the chairmanship office, and in a different case or setting bears no influence at all. How parsimonious is this typology then? Does it need further refinement? Second, the identified parameters are interrelated: they constitute a coherent set, whereby each one has a varying relative weight of influence. In each case, the effect of one parameter is filtered through the others. For example, issue salience affects negatively the effectiveness of the chair, but not if the issue in question is not controversial and negotiating partners share the same perspective. Thus, although each of the parameters can trigger individual analytical propositions about the direction and magnitude of impact, they should not be disassociated from each other and treated independently. Again, this is detrimental for the generalizability of any conclusions reached for each parameter through the application and empirical corroboration of the typology. Third, in the real world, there is more often than not an overlap between the identified parameters and they cannot be easily disentangled for analytical reasons. This inevitably raises serious methodological problems about the appropriate research design that can spot, isolate and measure the relative weight of each relevant parameter.

To address these issues, serious empirical work is required to test and assess the identified typology. We especially need comparative research across international organizations to

overcome the *ad hoc* nature of several institutional and political features of international organizations that blur our analysis of the chairmanship office. One final word of caution vis-à-vis the chair's effectiveness: quite often, it is not possible to assess performance based on tangible outcomes. In that case, *perceptions* of the chair's performance by the office-holder and the other negotiating parties become the empirical point of reference for the researcher with all the deriving cognitive problems.

As far as autonomy is concerned, more emphasis should be laid on the scope and modality of the chair's autonomous action. Existing work suggests that the parameters that condition his/her autonomy resemble those that affect the chair's effectiveness (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011a: 31–4). However, further research is required to enhance our understanding of the institutional and political environments that are more conducive in that respect. In terms of modality, we should ask ourselves especially how autonomy-prone chairs bypass agents' control mechanisms to expand their boundaries of autonomous action.

Recommended for further reading

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24

International organizations and crisis management

Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek

In times of crisis, international organizations (IOs) are often called upon for help. Such crises may have both domestic and transnational features. In 2012 the domestic revolt in Syria, which had started the previous year, escalated and the United Nations (UN) was asked to help work towards a permanent solution. When in 2011 the situation in Somalia caused the population to flee across the border, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was instrumental in providing shelter and food for those in need. Another example is the involvement since 2008 of the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in trying to solve the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis. The involvement of IOs in times of crisis comes as no surprise, since IOs are usually founded to meet trans-border problems. Many governments, but also public opinion and civil society actors, therefore naturally turn to IOs for solutions, all the more so when a situation occurs for which no obvious intergovernmental, i.e. exclusively between states, solution seems within reach.

Three developments cause states and other global actors to turn to IOs in ever more policy areas: the end of the Cold War, globalization and increased regionalization. While Western and Eastern blocs used IOs for their own ends in their Cold War battles, rendering many IOs ineffective, after the end of the Cold War IOs increasingly came to be seen as a vehicle for solving global problems. Globalization, particularly salient since the mid-1980s, brought home the message that various policy issues have closely related domestic and global dimensions and that problems in one area can spill over into another. For instance, the growth of Asia's economic strength has set in motion a drive to obtain resources in Africa. Subsequently, the exploitation of natural resources entails consequences for the environment. Increased regional cooperation, itself often a response to globalization, has strengthened supranational institutions through the role of law, particularly in the EU, thereby creating a situation in which not only member-states but also citizens can apply for 'IO assistance'.

In this new global context, events frequently occur which are labelled a 'crisis', be they in the realms of traditional security (inter-state conflict), new security (intrastate conflict, refugees, internally displaced persons), the economy (financial crisis), the environment (natural disasters, man-made emergencies such as oil spills), health (spread of viruses) or sheer human survival (hunger, shelter). The impact of such crises and the expectations with regard to IOs

have increased because of the influence of (inter)national media and the development of new information technologies such as various kinds of social media. This raises the question of which role IOs actually play during such crises. Oddly, the literature scarcely pays systematic attention to this matter. Although many studies of IOs discuss the role IOs play in emergency situations, few focus on the extensive literature on crisis management and crisis decision making. Equally, the abundant collection of crisis studies barely takes notice of IOs. This chapter seeks to build a bridge between the two fields. It describes the essential concepts of IO and crisis, identifies the major developments in the IO and crisis literature and demonstrates the importance of combining these fields of study in order to grasp the role of IOs in today's globalized crises.

International organizations and international crisis defined

The term IO is often used for what properly should be called an intergovernmental organization. This refers to an international treaty between sovereign states establishing an organization with specific agreed-upon tasks to deal with a specific issue, usually of a transborder nature. It minimally comprises a collective mechanism for adopting decisions among the member-states and a secretariat assigned to implementing these decisions. An IO thus possesses a certain problem-solving capacity that may be relevant during international crises. In degrees that vary across IOs, member-states have delegated their sovereign powers to the secretariats, least so in intergovernmental bodies such as the G7/8 or G22 (Bayne and Putnam 1987) and most in the EU, where the Commission and the ECB exclusively decide upon and implement, respectively, competition and monetary policies. Because of their international legal status and the prominent role of states, IOs differ from non-governmental organizations, which may be important players when IOs are involved in crisis situations.

An IO's precise role, in fact the extent to which it possesses 'agency', varies a great deal (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 20–27). International organizations can act as platform, forum or agent. Conceived of as a platform, an IO provides the stage on which member-states display their positions to domestic or international audiences and continue their inter-state struggles. The UN during the Cold War comes close to this description. Looked upon as a forum, an IO is still dominated by its member-states, their preferences and their mutual power relations, but the secretariat might serve as a broker both in tabling certain issues and in helping member-states to find acceptable solutions. Member-states may subsequently delegate the implementation of these to the IO. Seen as an agent, the IO secretariat can be an effective power player itself, sometimes even promoting international policies that conflict with the preferences of powerful member-states (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). An IO may thus play different roles in anticipating, preventing or solving an international crisis. Even a leadership role seems possible.

Although frequently used, the term 'international crisis' is difficult to define. Three issues need to be addressed. First, objectivistic notions of crisis should be distinguished from subjectivistic ones. The former refer to a situation in which the researcher seeks to determine the extent to which a social system is on the verge of collapse (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000: 4–5). When applying a subjectivistic notion, the researcher starts from the perception of certain actors that a crisis is imminent or has occurred. This could involve a perceived threat to the actor's vital values and interests, a perceived uncertainty about events and their consequences or a perceived lack of time to take decisions (Hermann 1969).

Second, what constitutes a crisis may differ between actors and across time. The literature on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis mostly speaks of a threat to, and thus a crisis for, the United

States (US). In the Cuban perception of the crisis, however, it dates back to the 1961 US-instigated Bay of Pigs invasion and persistent rumours about a new invasion. To Cuba, persuading the Soviet Union to install missiles was a solution to the perceived US threat (Nathan 1992). Moreover, for some actors a perception of crisis may present an opportunity to further their interests. One should thus be open to the possibility that an IO contributes to the framing process which determines the dominant perspective on a crisis. Similarly, one should remain alert to the fact that an IO may perceive a situation as a threat to, or opportunity to further, its organizational interests.

Third, several terms are used interchangeably; in particular, crisis, disaster and emergency. Disaster often refers to crisis-like situations that have their origin in natural events, such as earthquakes and tsunamis. Emergency is often linked to a situation of human suffering that most of the time can be explained, at least partly, by human choices, such as famine in deforested or conflict-ridden areas or the quick spread of viral diseases. For the purpose of this chapter, all situations are relevant to the extent that various actors define the situation as a crisis, as described earlier.

Literature on international organizations: absence of crisis

The bulk of the literature on the role of IOs originates in international relations (IR) and international law. The management literature pays little attention to international bureaucracies. Until the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, most studies of IOs and crises concerned their role in inter-state conflicts. Since then the emphasis has shifted to issues of 'new security', in particular intrastate conflict and its transborder repercussions. In addition, increased attention is being paid to the role of IOs in the global political economy. The existing literature allows for some striking observations. First, the notion of crisis is hardly ever discussed. Rather, what the problematical situation looks like is taken for granted. The role IOs may play in defining and tabling a crisis is thus overlooked. This is remarkable, since the agenda-setting capabilities of IO secretariats, even of the UN Secretary-General, have long been recognized. Over the past decade studies of new security issues and the global political economy have bridged this gap, through their interest in early warning systems that IOs develop in order to anticipate major crises or monitor so-called creeping crises (e.g. Bussiere and Fratzscher 2006).

Second, most attention is paid to the effects of IO action. This is true for studies in most domains. Studies of IOs and inter-state crises tend to focus on an IO's contribution to four aspects of the relevant crisis: de-escalation and termination of the crisis, isolating the problem, reducing its intensity and advancing a definitive solution (Haas 1983). The results are mixed and difficult to interpret. The alleged success of the UN in contributing to a definitive solution to violent conflicts in Angola, Cambodia and Namibia in the 1980s seems more due to the stalemate and the poor prospect of quick gains for the warring parties than to UN actions. However, because the UN offered a face-saving opportunity to end hostilities, it contributed a key element in solving these conflicts that no other global agent could provide (Berridge 1990). International organization presence in conflict situations may help stop hostilities and prevent the conflict from spreading, but may thereby render a definitive solution more difficult when the conflict becomes 'frozen', as has been the case in Cyprus since 1974 (James 1989). This suggests that IOs may not always be the solution, but can also be part of the problem, an element that is often overlooked.

Studies of new security crises have a similar inclination to focus on IO effects. Because superficially the nature of a crisis often seems obvious, there is a tendency to

focus on practical effectiveness; for example, providing food and shelter and disseminating information on the risks of a pandemic. The danger of such a focus is that the problem is taken for granted, but its political dimensions are neglected. Successfully housing and feeding refugees may reinforce the status quo 'at home' which caused these people to seek refuge elsewhere in the first place. The role IOs may, or may not, play in identifying and addressing the root causes of the problem might thus remain in the background. This cannot be said of some of the literature on IOs and major problems in the global political economy. Here we find a scholarly debate on the extent to which IOs such as the World Bank and the IMF are themselves agents in a larger whole (the so-called 'embedded liberal political economy') and thus may be part of the cause of regular economic and financial crises, rather than the 'firefighters' who solve these crises. Such studies often take an objectivistic approach to crisis and speak of the crisis of the global economic system (e.g. Chorev and Babb 2009).

Third, IO studies barely pay attention to the internal dynamics during a crisis. Sometimes the memoirs of major international civil servants give an idea of an IO's internal policy-making process during a crisis, but these are rare. Exceptions include UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's (1999) account of UN decision making during the Yugoslavian civil war of the 1990s, and former IMF Executive Director De Beaufort Wijnholds' (2011) insider perspective on IMF policies during the monetary crises of the 1990s and 2000s. The best academic examples include Barnett's (2003) description of the UN's (lack of) response to the imminent Rwanda genocide in 1994. His analysis of the UN's cognitive biases and emphasis on routine procedures served as a stepping stone for Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) constructivist theory of dysfunctional IOs. Applying a 'small group' perspective in order to pinpoint cognitive biases, Woods (2004) explains how IMF and World Bank teams failed to tackle the 1994 Mexican peso crisis.

Fourth, what permeates through the literature is that an IO's authority during crises is a very precarious and feeble asset. In general, IOs derive their authority from their mandate, their technical expertise and observing the informal rule that they should avoid turning member-states into their enemies. The mandate of the UN on security issues has gradually expanded over the years. In the 1940s and 1950s the UN sometimes served as a forum for states to display their differences during a crisis. Major states used it to put pressure on smaller states (e.g. the US using the UN to force the Netherlands to give up the Dutch East Indies). Many states looked upon the UN as a nuisance. After the deployment of the UN Emergency Force to save the faces of the United Kingdom (UK) and France during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the UN mandate was extended to include peacekeeping. Despite fierce resistance, particularly from France and the Soviet Union (because of the UN intervention in the Congo, 1960–64), this has evolved into peace enforcement and eventually the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which allows the UN to interfere in the domestic realm of sovereign states (in 2011, put into practice in Libya).

Although the application of R2P still requires approval by the Security Council, the normative foundation of UN authority to act during crises has expanded widely since 1945. It has been accompanied by a gradual increase in the authority of regional organizations, notably the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Arab League and the EU, which now enjoy greater authority to propose, and engage in, crisis intervention. The expansion of the UN mandate to R2P has strengthened UN authority in another way too. An IO's authority is partly based on the principle that it is impartial or neutral. This is best embodied by the International Red Cross, which cares for all victims in a conflict, but the principle is valid for all IOs. When IOs went against their interests, member-states would persistently try to discredit them by accusing them of partiality. The acceptance of peace enforcement and R2P now makes it easier for an IO to side with

threatened civilians without losing authority. However, its authority may be reduced because of a dominant perception of IO failure, as happened during the Yugoslav civil war and the Rwanda genocide.

Finally, IOs continue to have to avoid turning important member-states into their enemies. From this perspective, a crisis may pose a threat to an IO's authority and therefore to its long-term viability, and thus may become a crisis for the IO itself. This was already obvious during the Cold War. Fighting the Korean War (1950–53) under the UN banner and inventing the idea of peacekeeping in 1956 incurred the wrath of the Soviet Union, provoked a major financial crisis for the UN and almost brought about its collapse. The so-called politicization of the UN system in the 1970s and 1980s discredited this system in the eyes of its major contributors, the US and the UK. From a principal–agent perspective, the principals (the member-states) monitor their agents (IOs) and may decide to take back the authority they had previously delegated to them.

Sometimes, however, the threat comes from unexpected sides, when IOs have to compete with other IOs to maintain their authority. In the 1970s the oil crisis triggered a Western response in the form of the Financial Support Fund, but this caused intense rivalry between the IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Cohen 1998). In the 2000s the IMF was increasingly considered to be obsolete and faced competition from new international credit facilities such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas. Here we come across an important general omission in the IO literature: the tendency to not see an IO as an agent with distinct interests and preferences. In this, the crisis literature, which focuses on 'existential threats', may prove relevant.

Literature on crises: absence of international organizations

Crisis management is an ill-defined research field. This reflects the heterogeneity of the field, with scholars scattered over a variety of different disciplines such as management studies, organizational theory, political science and psychology (Boin 2006). The reasons for studying crises vary accordingly. The most common perspective taken is that crisis (management) has a value in itself as a political and societal event. Others study crises because they are external shocks that pose challenges to established systems, and to help trigger policy reforms and organizational learning (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Finally, crises can be seen as more-intense and focused forms of everyday organizational processes (Stern 2001).

On the whole, however, research addressing the characteristics of new security crises and the role of IOs in their management is lacking. Despite an increasing interest in the trans-boundary nature of crises and crisis management (Rhinard et al. 2006; Boin 2009; Galaz et al. 2011), existing research mainly focuses on single crises which are managed in one nation, policy sector or organization (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The dominant time perspective applied by most crisis management studies has also hampered a linking up with the IO literature. The former describe crisis management as a sequential process taking place within a specific and confined organization, which is expected to perform five functions: early warning, sense making, decision making, meaning making, termination and accountability and learning (Boin et al. 2005). In contrast to the preoccupation with long-term effects in the IO literature, crisis management research has focused on management as such and, in doing so, has largely ignored more long-term and structural effects. Finally, the crisis management literature has been dominated by case studies of dramatic and single events, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1971), the Three Mile Island incident (Perrow 1984) and the Bhopal gas tragedy (Shrivastava 1992).

This prompts the question as to what extent findings from the crisis management literature can be applied to the organizational structure and environment of IOs. Four major insights from crisis management have a bearing on the role of IOs during crises: centralization, leadership, information management and learning.

The centralization hypothesis

One of the most debated issues has been the trade-off between centralized and decentralized responses. The commonly held position amongst scholars examining crisis management, especially in the field of security studies, has been that crises tend to centralize leadership at the highest organizational levels. Centralization has the benefit of shortening lines of authority and information, thus ensuring a swift response (Hermann 1963). Scholars stressing the surprise effects inherent in crises have contested the centralization hypothesis ('t Hart 1993): surprising events are better managed by those close to the event, who can ensure speed and flexibility. From this perspective, centralization risks creating bottlenecks in decision-making procedures and information flows. This juxtaposition of centralization and decentralization in current research simplifies the complex relations inherent in individual organizations in terms of leadership styles, mandates and structures. This is particularly true when it comes to IOs, which display very varied characteristics with regard to these issues.

Leadership

The popularity of the centralization thesis explains the predominant interest in leaders and their decision-making abilities during crises. The classical crisis management literature mainly focused on the US and explored the role of the president, his advisors and the bureaucracy (Allison and Zelikow 1999). This strand is also characterized by cognitive research on how stress and cognitive biases affect leaders' decision making (Janis and Mann 1977). Scholars who have studied the dynamics of small exclusive advisory groups have pointed to conditions under which the advantages of technical expertise and deliberative discussion could easily slide into dysfunctional 'groupthink' modes (Janis 1982). Studies focusing on the organizational environment of leadership point to bureau-political tendencies, which may result in dysfunctional interagency rivalry (Rosenthal et al. 1991).

Information management

One of the key tasks of crisis managers is information management, especially in environments with many different actors. Information management can be roughly divided into internal and external communication. The former refers to the information that actors need to appreciate early warnings, make decisions and engage in implementation and learning. Information flows depend on the institutional contexts, which range from centralized structures with controlled processes to decentralized organic responses that evolve as the crisis unfolds (Smith 2012). Coordination is rarely the result of a leader's deliberate attempt to create order, but rather emerges through a system characterized by informal channels, norms, behavioural patterns and agreements. However, in order to make such organically evolved structures function effectively actors need to be able to identify sources of information, to be willing to share information and to have developed a reasonable level of trust (Buzzanell 2010; Peterson and Besserman 2010). Regarding external communication, the classical crisis communication literature has focused on rhetorical strategies aimed at reducing blame

(Coombs 2011). Coordination of information, both internally and externally, are crucial for the ability of IOs to manage and sustain legitimacy in times of crisis. However, most studies of crisis communication have been conducted in single organizations, mostly corporations, rather than in multi–governance organizations such as IOs.

Learning

The crisis management literature has paid considerable attention to the lessons that may or may not be learnt in the aftermath of a crisis. Key discussions within this field have been related to who learns and what is learnt. An often referred to distinction is between single and double loop learning. The former relates to superficial changes in policies and routines, whereas the latter involves the profound alteration of previous beliefs and values (Argyris and Schön 1978). Learning further may take place before a crisis erupts, during it or after the crisis (Smith and Elliott 2007). Although acute crisis episodes often produce double-loop learning effects, crises happen only rarely. Organizations thus face the challenge of finding ways to institutionalize such learning effects. Behavioural learning takes place when the organization internalizes lessons through standard operating procedures and planning documents. Cognitive learning occurs when lessons are embedded in the minds of organization members (Deverell and Olsson 2009). Learning in multi-level governance environments, which consist of a multitude of actors with different institutional baggage and loyalties, may raise new issues that have remained untouched so far.

International organizations and crises in the twenty-first century

The meaning of security has been broadened to include many more interrelated transborder issues than violent conflict alone, such as climate change, transferable diseases, human rights and depletion of resources, as was recognized in the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration. As a result, many more events than previously can be framed as a crisis. Because globalization and regionalization have reduced the policy autonomy of governments, states increasingly look to IOs to solve problems. This is a double–edged sword: success may bring praise to IOs, but failure could put their reputation at risk. This development is reinforced by two additional factors. The first is the growing influence of (inter)national media, which contribute to framing events as crises and which, by monitoring the performance of IOs, affect their standing in the world. The second factor is the risk that IOs themselves, because of heightened expectations and their expanded mandates, become increasingly part of the process of framing events as crises, thus raising the stakes for themselves as organizations.

Despite this growing IO involvement, their problem-solving capacity and leadership potential have not always kept pace. Here the dilemma between centralization and decentralization may play a role. The agencies of IOs on the ground have developed clear emergency scenarios, as the UNHCR has in refugee crises, while at the same time, the crisis provides a push towards centralization of decision making, bringing IO leadership to the fore. At such moments the IO's reputation will be at stake. Its leadership will then walk a tightrope, as it needs to act effectively on the ground without alienating its major member-states. It is thus vital that an IO portrays itself as a neutral, impartial actor, better yet as a technical problem solver, rather than as an actor who through its choices can be accused of taking sides. However, this need to avoid partiality may hamper timely and effective operations on the ground.

In this chapter, we identify three potential trajectories for future research to merge the IO and crisis management literature: the symbolic dimension of crisis, power struggles during crises and learning processes.

The symbolic dimension of crisis

The rise of a new communication landscape characterized by an increase in non-state actors, global transparency and interconnectedness makes the symbolic aspects of crisis management more salient than ever before. Globalization has increased the proneness to crises of contemporary global politics: effects are felt more rapidly and stakeholders expect quick and effective responses from policy makers. These conditions contribute to a sense of urgency and time pressure. In such circumstances, turning to an IO can be an effective strategy for policy makers so as to convey the impression of decisiveness (Boin et al. 2005). However, it leaves IOs with the huge task of dealing with a crisis while facing high expectations. Thus, the engagement of IOs in crises is a double-edged sword, as it leaves them in a position where they will be either blamed or praised. For example, the European Commission, as a supranational regulative body, is particularly vulnerable to blame games from the member-states when things go wrong (Hood 2002). During the 1990s the Commission under Jacques Santer faced a series of scandals related to mismanagement, among other things for its management of the BSE (mad cow disease) crisis, eventually forced its resignation.

Crises do not only constitute a threat, but, when managed and framed successfully, they can also be an opportunity to gain political legitimacy and to push through pet policies (Boin et al. 2009). From an IO perspective, well-managed crises are likely to boost reputation, provide additional resources and strengthen mandates. For example, during the 2003 SARS crisis, the World Health Organization (WHO) managed to turn the challenge posed by a non-focal, multi-country outbreak of a hitherto unknown disease into an organizational success, by framing the crisis as a severe threat and pushing non-compliant member-states into releasing information and cooperating. Similarly, the European Commission eventually managed to turn the BSE debacle into an institutional achievement: three years after the BSE crisis, the common market caused a new food safety crisis, when inadequate controls in the animal feed industry exposed the food chain in Belgium to dioxin. This time, the Commission took all measures available to respond in a speedy and resolute manner, perceiving the crisis as an opportunity to prove that it could face up to the situation and take action. Afterwards, a Commission representative judged that the dioxin crisis 'was not a real health crisis [most of the contaminated food had already been consumed by that time] but a crisis of confidence and therefore the Commission had to react as if it was a real crisis' (Olsson 2005: 138). In doing so, the Commission managed to use the crisis as a way of promoting its institutional value as the defender of a properly functioning common market. Crises thus play an important role in understanding 'the ongoing processes of legitimization, de-legitimization and re-legitimization' ('t Hart 1993: 40). In an era of globalization and media-zation the framing abilities of IOs become essential in the processes of acquiring the legitimization needed to continue to be an actor who can be counted on. International organizations will then be crucial actors not only for managing crises, but also for defining events as crises.

However, IOs do not always exploit opportunities to promote their self-interest. For example, in the 1990s the UNHCR had a chance to expand its mandate, but chose not to. The organization was formally responsible for giving shelter to refugees, i.e. individuals who cross national borders. When so-called failed states, such as Sudan, suddenly had massive numbers of internally displaced persons, the UNHCR had the opportunity to obtain a formal expansion of its mandate and indeed was invited to do so by some of its major member-states. The organization was internally divided and in the end opted for a pragmatic solution, in deciding to help internally displaced people on a case-by-case basis (Freitas 2004). This example makes it clear that understanding an IO also requires looking into its internal power struggles.

The struggle for power

The crisis management literature suggests that, at heart, crises are political events dominated by power struggles and politicization (Boin et al. 2005). How such battles are played out depends on many factors, including organizational and leadership dynamics. When looking at the role IOs play in crises, their mandates provide the basic structure for their ability to operate in a crisis. However, for a fuller insight, the incorporation of informal practices embedded in their organizational culture is required.

In general, the crisis management literature highlights organizational aspects such as decision making and information processing, which can contribute to a better understanding of an IO's real capacity to act in times of crisis. Crises provide good opportunities to examine *ad hoc* responses, personal contacts and informal practices. International organizations are of particular interest here due to their complex structures, with secretariats, expert involvement and member-state influences. In the IO environment, we can expect bureau-political struggles to take place between IOs and member-states, between member-states themselves and between IOs, but also within the various departments of the IO. The character and outcome of these processes have important implications for how crises are framed and managed. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had developed a standard operating procedure with regard to peacekeeping that prevented it from appreciating the warning signals sent by UN peacekeepers in Rwanda in 1994 that genocide was about to take place. Instead, DPKO stuck to its idea of 'normal ethnic unrest' and its rule never to take sides but remain receptive to all parties involved (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 121–55).

There is limited knowledge on centralization and decentralization processes and how these impact on IOs' capacities to take action (for the EU see Boin and Rhinard 2008). Is power centralized by member-states tightening control and influence, leaving IOs to function merely as platforms, or is power decentralized, providing room for manoeuvre for IOs to take on an agent role? Further, which circumstances give rise to centralization versus decentralization and with what effects? For example, the European Commission has a well-developed system of committees consisting of national experts who provide expertise on technical issues. These committees serve as a link between the Council and the Commission and provide forums for negotiation, often characterized by technical rather than politicized approaches to various policy problems. There are three types of executive committee: consultative (which can only consult on issues), administrative (which can block decisions) and prescriptive (with the power to approve decisions). During the 1999 dioxin scandal the prescriptive Standing Veterinary Committee consisting of member-state experts played an important role, not foremost as experts, but rather as political member-state representatives in the crisis decision-making process.

Other examples show how IOs can take leadership roles in times of crisis. One of the reasons for the WHO's success during the SARS crisis was that it managed to put international political and economic pressure on non-compliant member-states such as China. The WHO's travel advice for Hong Kong and Guangdong forced China into action and resulted in cases being reported on a national basis. By independently issuing this travel advice, the WHO took a leadership role, which was a break with previous practices when such measures were taken in concert with affected countries. A large part of the WHO's success over the last decade can be attributed to new information technologies, used for early warning, thus establishing its independence from official governmental reports (Galaz 2009). Instead of passively waiting for governments to provide the organization with information, the new legally

binding International Health Regulations (IHR), launched in 2000, gave the WHO the mandate to work proactively and independently in collecting information. An important component of the proactive approach was the setting up of GOARN, the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (Van Baalen and Van Fenema 2009).

In order to manage crises effectively, IOs ultimately depend on their member-states' willingness and resources. For example, the European Commission can use its regulative power, but has no resources of its own and depends on member-states to act in accordance with its decisions. In the same way, the WHO depends on its member-states for implementation. Even though the management of SARS was considered a success, it also highlighted a system that ultimately depends on member-states' ability and willingness to respond to a public health threat. In this specific case, Canada lacked the capacity to do so and China lacked willingness. Thus the potential mismatch between member-states' local decision-making capacities and the IO level, which requires coherence, may constitute the largest challenge to an IO's effectiveness during a crisis.

Learning and reforming

Crises do not end abruptly, but most often are followed by lengthy processes during which responsibility is assigned and reforms are undertaken. However, which lessons to draw and which reforms to implement remains a strategic process. In line with the notion of crisis exploitation, crises can provide a powerful rationale for promoting certain reforms and refuting others (James et al. 2011). For example, SARS functioned as a trigger for speeding up the process of revising the IHR, which were finalized in 2005. Under the new IHR, WHO members have the responsibility to develop and maintain the capacity to detect, report and respond effectively. SARS was thus a milestone in the process leading from state-centric responses to a WHO-centred global health governance structure. Similarly, the UN's impotence in preventing genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s resulted in the development and adoption of the R2P principle in 2005. The international community now has, under certain conditions, an obligation to act to protect civilians (which has raised expectations regarding IOs).

Reforms and institutional change do not necessarily entail true learning. First, learning in multi-level structures is complicated due to the number of actors involved. Different actors are likely to draw different lessons from the same crisis. Second, learning puts high demands on organizational openness and trust, which hardly ever exist in highly politicized contexts dominated by prestige, high political stakes and blame games (Smith and Elliott 2007). For example, in the wake of the food crises during the 1990s the European Commission seized the opportunity to launch a proposal to set up a joint European supranational food agency. Eventually its proposal was watered down to establishing an advisory agency, with the main responsibility for food safety remaining at national level. Similarly, the R2P principle has introduced the possibility for the international community to intervene in strictly domestic situations. As a consequence it can be expected that IOs will be more involved in domestic issues in the future, risking a backlash from member-states seeking to reassert control. Indeed, when the UN Security Council in 2011 invoked R2P to condone a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect Libyan civilians, China and Russia were incensed when, much to their chagrin, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization interpreted the mandate as a licence to remove the Gaddafi regime from power. As a result China and Russia throughout 2012 persisted in their refusal to adopt a similar resolution with regard to the Syrian civil war.

Conclusion

One observation stands out: it is high time that the IO and the crisis management literature met. International organizations are often involved in global and local crises, and their involvement can only be expected to increase. Moreover, they are organizations that operate in politically highly sensitive settings, yet often have the capacity to deal with acute problems on the ground. The crisis management literature has long studied organizations similar to IOs, but only rarely investigated IOs themselves. They thus miss the unique aspects of organizations operating in an inter-state environment. Similarly, the IR literature has refrained from accessing the crisis management library, at the expense of ignoring interesting organizational inroads that could be made into explaining IOs' behaviour. Both disciplines can profit from each other's expertise. International relations studies can obtain a better grasp of IO crisis performance by investigating the centralization–decentralization paradox recognized in the crisis management literature. Similarly, they might come closer to a better understanding of the conditions of IO leadership: crises provide a window of opportunity to be decisive, show effectiveness and thus gain reputation. The IR literature also should be open to the possibility that IOs may not be mere agents responding to a crisis, or states' instruments to respond to a crisis, but may themselves contribute to the framing of an event as a crisis.

The crisis management literature might profit from IR studies, particularly by appreciating the specific implications of an inter-state environment. This context causes an IO to develop standard operating procedures and cognitive biases that are closely related to the notion of sovereign states. Future research should be directed at assessing to what extent these factors (centralization–decentralization, IO leadership, the context of the inter-state system) vary across crises in different issue areas (the spread of diseases may well provoke different outcomes to the occurrence of genocide). As IOs can be expected to be involved in ever more global and local crises, knowledge of such variation will be vital.

Recommended for further reading

Terry (2002), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Boin et al. (2005) and Boin et al. (2013).

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Informal norms

Shaping behavior in international negotiations

Heidi Hardt

A budding scholarship in the field of international negotiations has turned its attention to the informal level of decision making and the associated norms, communications, and interactions of diplomats and officials. In particular, the adoption of informal norms influences the course of negotiations. However, in the context of international organizations (IOs), the majority of previous literature on negotiations has privileged formality by primarily modeling formal decision making, observing and measuring votes and vetoes, and studying outcomes (Tollison and Willett 1979). As the study of norms is not new, Finnemore (1996: 325) observes that international law, history, anthropology, and sociology provide examples of fields that "have always known that social realities influence behavior." Yet political science scholarship has chosen to favor the study of *formalized* social norms. Only one of Odell's (2010) three "islands" or areas of knowledge in the international negotiations literature has incorporated informality. That is, unlike negotiation analysis and political economy, constructivism has embraced the notion of informality because informal norms comprise part of its broader focus on the normative framework surrounding negotiations.

Martin and Simmons (1998) cite the IO literature's historical emphasis on formal rules. In the 1950s, one early study on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade briefly noted that the organization "gained much strength from its informality" (Gorter 1954: 7), but comprehensive work on the subject of the informal level of international negotiations was lacking. By focusing on formal rules, scholars have largely overlooked the impact of the informal level at which critical decisions often transpire. Much negotiating happens behind closed doors, over dinner or on the tennis court and in other informal contexts, and a set of unspoken rules guides this behavior. Recent scholarship has started to identify and analyze these informal norms in spite of significant methodological constraints. This chapter is dedicated to reviewing past and ongoing developments in political science research in the arena of informal norms in IOs. It addresses three burgeoning areas of debate: the origins, influence and application of informal norms in the context of international negotiations.

International negotiations: informality in diplomacy

In decision making, agreements, and institutional learning, informality is omnipresent in international affairs (Lipson 1991: 495). For example, during the Cold War, the Soviets and Americans used very few formal treaty agreements but instead favored informal understandings (Lipson 1991: 496). Informal communications provide negotiators with the advantages of privacy, such as the ability to share ideas for creative and politically sensitive solutions without accountability. Private deliberations also lack formal structure so informal negotiations can take place in an infinite possibility of forums, from the hallway outside the meeting room to a local café. Neither the press nor negotiators from other member-states are present for these communications, so participants can fully disclose their bargaining points and preferences without retribution in the form of damage to the prestige of the institution that they represent. Feurle remarks how such informal consultations at the United Nations (UN) aid in preventing diplomats and UN officials from using the organization as an opportunity for them to pursue their personal interests. Rather, the relaxed atmosphere "is reflected in the flashes of humor which surface during informal consultation" (Feurle 1985: 271). Having established rules and norms, Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 33) argue that organizations diffuse them among members who "shape state action by establishing best practices and by articulating and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behavior." Alagappa (1997: 427) describes how this process of "norm-setting" entails altering collective expectations, which then in turn influence state behavior across the political, economic and security arenas. The *informal* norm is therefore an unwritten rule that follows a logic of "appropriateness" among its members but may or may not facilitate an organization's effectiveness in achieving its stated aims (March and Olsen 1996). From this perspective, March and Olsen (2004: 2) view such informal norms as being followed because they are seen as "natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate." For the purposes of this chapter, I adapt the definition of informal norms by Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 725) as rules "created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels." In other words, informal norms are uncodified rules deemed appropriate and employed by the majority of actors in a given institution. The informal level matters because it structures interpretation of formal rules and it affects formal outcomes.

As is the nature of diplomacy, informal and formal exchanges together constitute the interactions among ambassadors, diplomatic staff, and organization personnel. Yet the subject of informal communications and guidelines in these discussions remain largely understudied in the literature on the assumption that such deliberations matter *less* than their formal counterparts. Lipson (1991: 500) explains that informality is "best understood as a device for minimizing the impediments to cooperation at both the domestic and international levels." Personal politics at the informal level can equally be a source of dissension amongst participants in negotiations. The relevance of communications at the informal level is therefore paramount for understanding the factors that facilitate and block decision making. An analysis of votes, vetoes and rules can provide only a superficial look.

Different streams of thought in the International Relations scholarship make different assumptions about the ways in which diplomats come to agreements, but traditionally they have debated the role of the state and the relevance of state interests. Most prevalent, the realist doctrine subscribes to the notion that the search to state fulfill the national interest drives all bilateral and multilateral communications at the negotiating table. As Mearsheimer (1990: 11) writes, "states operating in a self-help world should always act according to their own self-interest, because it pays to be selfish in a self-help world." Given that realists make the

assumption that states are the only actors that matter, the institutional context of negotiations is devalued. Liberal and constructivist perspectives have repeatedly challenged this. For informal norms to stand alone, the latter scholars must make the case that informal norms have developed for reasons above and beyond official duties to maximize the respective state's interests. From the realist and neorealist perspectives, the distinction between informal and formal is not useful because they view every aspect of negotiations as state-centric—whether deliberations occur in the corridors or in the meeting room and whether rules are codified or informally agreed upon. Numerous constructivists such as Adler, Barnett and Wendt have countered that a social identity amongst individual actors can play a role in decision making and this shapes the norms that develop and their effectiveness in negotiations (Adler and Barnett 1998).

Even if realists were to agree that informal norms exist to facilitate cooperation, such cooperation would be viewed as a product of survival in a world defined by war and anarchy. As Tilly (2008: 76) writes, "preparation for war created the internal structures of the state within it." Could informal norms be the result of readiness for war? In the case of negotiating military interventions, states' cooperative actions in IOs could be interpreted as a reaction to a realist world of anarchy. Since 1956, the UN Security Council has overseen 53 civilian and/ or military peace operations with more than a dozen underway in response to conflicts.

In fact, traditional understandings of diplomacy perceive any relevant informal interaction as taking place purely for the purpose of serving the national interest. Informality is viewed as only another tool in the box for a diplomat to use to further the national agenda. The review of fields of study in the following pages will focus on unpacking scholarly assumptions about the role of norms and addressing them. Contemporary negotiations literature indicates and in some cases empirically demonstrates that decision making cannot be solely explained by national interest, and that such norms influence policy decision making with their survival over time, diplomatic rotations and changing environments.

Due to the challenges associated with measuring informal norms, scholars interested in studying them have opted for conducting large-N structured interviews with the negotiation participants themselves. Drawing on a constructivist worldview, Pouliot (2007: 367) outlines a "sobjective" methodology that uses interviews to "develop both subjective knowledge (from the meanings that social agents attribute to their own reality) and objectified knowledge (which derives from 'standing back' from a given situation by contextualizing and historicizing it)." Some recent examples of studies that also use qualitative research to, in part, examine informal norms include Odell's (2000) interviews with international negotiators at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement; Mérand's (2008) 40 interviews with European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee ambassadors and officials; Pouliot's (2010) interviews with 69 security officials on NATO; Cross's (2011) interviews with EU diplomats, junior diplomats and officials; Funabashi's (1989) interviews with more than 100 US and Japanese government and bank officials on monetary negotiations; and Hardt's (2011) interviews with 50 permanent representatives at regional organizations on conflict management negotiations.

Debates over development of informal norms

One venue of contemporary research on informal norms studies norms as the dependent variable to be explained. These include attempts to answer questions like "Where do informal norms come from?" and "What conditions facilitate the development of new norms?" For scholarship on decision making in IOs to move forward, a closer look at informal norms is not only warranted but necessary.

Realists have little to say on the birth of informal norms because they are not recognized as anything more than a means to an end in a broader power struggle amongst states in an anarchic system. In IOs, power determines agenda setting and therefore regional hegemons play a strong role. Because of balance-of-power politics, the support of a major regional power or hegemon is essential for mounting any operation at a regional organization, argues Bures (2006: 96). In the case of the EU, Hyde–Price (2006: 222) observes that "EU external policy cooperation constitutes a collective attempt at milieu shaping [seeking stability], driven primarily by the Union's largest powers." He provides a neorealist critique of the literature that has evolved the concept of a normative power Europe. In drawing up a theory for explaining coalitions in EU decision making, Janning (2005: 826) emphasizes the influence of networks among member-state ambassadors and officials but chooses to frame these in the framework of alliances and balance of power politics. Such networks, such as meetings of France, Germany, and Britain, may develop their own informal norms of behavior but only for the purpose of pursuing a national agenda.

In contrast, game theory instead points to repetition as the informal norm that guides consensus building but does not cite any other informal norms as motivating factors in international negotiations. Game theory assumes that players (in this case ambassadors and their respective capitals) are rational actors that make choices based on maximizing their utility. Certain situations of this strategic interaction result in benefits from cooperation. "Considerations of how to prevent cheating and how to resolve distributional conflict are central to theories of cooperation regardless of the specific goals of actors," write Martin and Simmons (1998: 743). Merging the institutionalist perspective with game theory, institutional bargaining games do take the institutional environment into account when explaining negotiations. Aggarwal (1998: 10), for example, examines the influence of specific institutional factors: "issue capabilities, overall capabilities and domestic coalitional stability" – on an actor's basic goals. In institutional bargaining games, scholars study how the three elements of goods, individual situations and institutions affect the outcomes of negotiations (see Aggarwal 1998). These environmental factors, however, could only be considered informal norms of behavior if combined with intentional and mutually agreed upon guidelines of interaction.

In his liberal realism theory, Moravcsik's (1993: 481) emphasis on national interest would likely dismiss the relevance of any informal norms, because they would be interpreted as a reflection of areas of agreement amongst individual states' interests. They would be seen as a result of the two-level game model: the compromise between domestic and state interactions. In contrast, the neoliberal explanation views informal norms as the natural consequence of formal norms rather than state interaction. In other words, the formal institutional environment shapes the unspoken rules that actors adopt. Therefore these formal sets of rules at IOs regarding the decision-making process lead to norm creation. The institutional framework constrains the behavior of individuals and the evolution of the organization. An example of a formal rule influencing informal norms relates to the formal requirement of the high frequency (minimum twice a week) and long duration of formal meetings at the EU Political and Security Committee. This has led to an informal norm at the committee limiting the amount of time a given ambassador can speak. This fits with Keohane's (1988: 383) theoretical approach to institutions, which he describes as "both involving persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations." In his seminal work *After Hegemony*, Keohane (1984) argues that international cooperation continues "after hegemony" because of the benefits that negotiated international agreements can provide. Diplomats and officials are responsible for finding ways, in spite of their formal constraints, to reach consensus.

The neoliberal approach equally complements functionalist literature that perceives institutions as evolving appropriately to meet demands on their efficacy. These new norms develop in response to a dynamic institutional environment and follow a path–dependent trajectory until an external shock changes that environment. Actors "deliberately choose softer forms of legalization as superior institutional arrangements" because informal normative frameworks offer functional advantages over legal or formal rules. Such informality offers a flexible means for facilitating compromise and responding to uncertainty (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 423). Yet traditional paradigms, namely realist and neorealist theories, have not been able to easily explain these norms that "produce organizational and behavioral similarities across the globe." Therefore as these sets of norms and rules are referred to as "institutions," the theoretical approach toward studying them has been named "institutionalist" by those working within the domain (e.g., Finnemore 1996: 326).

Institutionalists would argue that informal norms are a natural part of organizations going through the process of institutionalization. According to Kahler (1995: 83), the deepest stage of formal institutionalization involves the "pooling of sovereignty through an incremental process." While debate still exists on the most appropriate definition (Huntington 2006; Kahler 1995; Levitsky 1998; March and Olsen 1998), consensus on the term "institutionalization" can be summarized as the ongoing process of building rules, norms and structures that together reflect a blending (Levitsky 1998: 80) of members and organizations toward the evolution of a "social space" (Stone Sweet et al. 2001: 12).

Scholars have challenged the purely institutionalist framework as incompatible with all IOs, because it does not take into account the effects of socialization on changes in state behavior and multilateral negotiations. In contrast to institutionalists, scholars supporting sociological arguments, in the words of Finnemore (1996: 327), "do more than simply argue that social structure matters; they tell us what the social structure is." Acharya explains the progress of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, through its socialization process rather than through the influence of formal institutional constraints. Unlike some IOs (e.g., the WTO and International Monetary Fund), it has no enforcement mechanisms or formal legal framework. The result of repeated negotiations has been the development of strong informal norms of respect for sovereignty and conflict mediation. Acharya (2009: 9) blames ASEAN's successes and failures on "the nature and *quality* [sic] of its socialisation process and the norms that underpin it."

Sociological institutionalists view institutions as agents of socialization. As this process facilitates learning (Gheciu 2005), informal norms that reflect these lessons modify both behavior and outcome. Constructivists have described "social learning" as the changes in behavior of states to accommodate international norms. The notion of implicit learning appeared in the psychology literature following a compilation of empirical studies on cognitive processes, but Pouliot (2010: 25) applies this concept to the practices of IOs. Reber (1996: 5) defines it as "the acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely independently of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was acquired." Informal norms, then, figure into the constellation of emerging social representations. Contemporary scholars have recorded evidence of convergence of social representations toward a common model in conflict management, as at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Gheciu 2005) and the EU (Mérand 2008: 59–60). For example, Mérand applies the development of new trends and norms in European defense as evidence of the EU moving closer to Bourdieu's (1977) version of *habitus*. In contrast, Janning (2005: 827) argues that while social networks play a role, this is only thanks to the constraints of the organization's institutions. In the case of the EU, he writes that "while the deepening of the

network layers has occurred at the expense of the formal institutional layers of integration, the former can still be understood as enabling agents of EU policies and institutions."

In the sociological institutionalist paradigm, informal communication can be understood as a conduit for the development of new informal norms, which together move negotiations toward consensus. Informal communication represents socialization in its most literal form and underpins diplomacy. Through this mechanism, business and pleasure are blurred as diplomats use sports, shared language and cases of previous postings together as means to build both friendship and political alliances. Yet what begins as attempts to stay close to the national interest, with friendship and interpersonal relations, soon becomes a balancing act amongst meeting the demands of the interpersonal relationship with the fellow diplomat/s, responding to the organization's norm of seeking consensus and following the instructions from the capital. Hardt (2009a) puts forth the argument that informal communication leads to higher levels of trust. She argues that bonds of trust, often bonds of friendship, explain the convergence on norm creation seen across IOs engaged in conflict management. The argument that friendship can harmonize divergent views hinges on the notion that trust enables ambassadors and other bureaucrats to have increased access to information and an absence of negative emotional feelings, as George et al. (1998) found in their study of cross-cultural negotiations. Nevertheless, the scholarship in this arena has yet to fully identify the conditions under which such informal communication occurs.

Theorizing the impact of informal norms

Several streams of political science research have equally engaged the subject of *how* informal norms influence the efficacy of IOs. While they agree on the significance of informal communications in shaping norms, they vary with respect to their perspectives on their explanatory value for negotiated outcomes. Scholars pursuing this utilitarian approach respond to Martin and Simmons' (1998: 729) calls for research into *how* institutions matter, as this burgeoning scholarship views institutionalized informal norms as independent variables for explaining negotiation outcomes. Certain norms fit for certain issue areas, as they do in the literature on regimes. Less work has been carried out on the specific norms in multilateral negotiations themselves. As in the literature that subsumes the significance of institutions, these scholars have accepted as given that such institutionalized norms have an impact in international negotiations.

Constructivists offer different takes on the impact of the informal norms that they espouse. Though the label "constructivist" did not exist at the time of his writings, Deutsch (1968: 6) influenced the literature on IOs through his detailed descriptions of the security community as a collection of states which, through interaction and socialization, gained a common sentiment of unity. Subjective beliefs fit into Deutsch's rational framework of decision making. Adler and Barnett (1998: 119) later termed this unified sentiment a sense of "we-ness," which comes about from institutionalized forms of communication amongst negotiators. This sense of togetherness facilitates negotiations by internalizing the norm of consensus seeking. Their study of collective identity "informs socially appropriate behavior" (Pouliot 2010: 38). The result of such behavior is a higher likelihood that international negotiations will result in consensus. In his study of NATO, Pouliot (2007: 51) discusses how the norm of implicit learning leads to a community of minds. Individuals then feel compelled to acquiesce to the norms at hand. Using a "sobjective" methodology, he creates a theoretical framework called a practice of security communities where he sets out to incorporate a logic of practicality based on observations of socialized practices or norms of behavior amongst decision makers and other relevant officials.

Cross's (2011: 131) study of norms, socialization, and epistemic communities at the EU also emphasizes a sense of community amongst actors involved in crisis management. As observed at NATO, she identifies the community-oriented norm of a strong desire to reach consensus in the EU, at both the Political and Security Committee and Coreper, the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The extent of the influence of the norm of consensus remains disputed but the ambassadors themselves report a trend in this direction. Howorth's (2011: 101) extensive survey-based interviews with 24 of the 27 EU ambassador representatives to the Political and Security Committee show that 63 percent described the prevalent attitude within the committee as "cooperative and consensus-seeking," with the other 37 percent describing it as "rational bargaining." Howorth (2011: 110) concludes that his interviews reveal a "unanimous sense" that, above all, the committee seeks to achieve consensus. Cross presents evidence that communications through knowledge-based transnational networks— that is, epistemic communities—explain advances in security integration. Informal norms help dictate interactions amongst members of these networks. In discussing the EU Political and Security Committee, for example, she writes that certain procedural norms help make the committee take decisions more quickly. For example, "ambassadors who speak a second time must apologize to the presidency and explain why they need another turn" (Cross 2011: 131). They are also expected to speak for no longer than two minutes at a time.

Alagappa argues that the impact of informal norms in international negotiations depends more on the extent to which member-state representatives commit to the norms that they have developed than on commitment to one another. The more strongly that the participants to negotiations commit, the more "effective" the IO will prove to be. Alagappa (1997: 435) bases his findings on research on regional organizations but uses different nomenclature, referring to them as regional institutions. Nevertheless, there exist limits to convergence through socialization. Finnemore (1996: 331) points to the deep-rooted tensions in the norms of world culture, from Western norms that clash with non-Western norms. This can be seen within given regional organizations. At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), for example, several ambassadors reported that the Russian ambassador and fellow Russian officials to the OSCE preferred subscribing to the norm of strictly formal communications, whereas ambassadors from Westernized states relied more on a norm of informal communications for doing business. This echoes a long history of hierarchy and formality in Russian diplomacy.

Emphasizing the interactions amongst actors in the IO, scholars have applied sociological and interpersonal explanations to interpret the influence of informal norms in organization decision making. In an analysis of socialization, Checkel (2005: 59) perceives informal norms as guidelines that actors choose to follow after first moving through two sequential steps of strategic calculation and role playing. He refers to this initial process as Type I socialization. In Type II internalization, actors move beyond role playing to begin adopting the norms of the group. Howorth (2011: 108), for example, applies these processes to his study of decision making at the EU Political and Security Committee. Mérand analyzes communications in the broader context of the European (now "Common") Security and Defence Policy and argues that ambassadors and officials employed a norm which he terms *bricolage* (literally: "do-it-yourself") to seek out *ad-hoc* negotiated outcomes through a trial-and-error approach (Mérand 2008: 130). When a particular form of EU peace operation proved deficient in one way, the subsequent mission introduced was adjusted accordingly. In addition to helping find consensus, norms can also help affect the speed of decision making. Hardt (2009a) reveals how communications amongst regional organization permanent representatives, by means of bonds of interpersonal trust, lead to friendships and social networks that help expand the bargaining

range. Representatives are willing to share more sensitive information with those they trust, which leads to strategic information sharing that eases the path toward compromise.

Weber's rationality work on organizations suggests that informal norms or rules that develop can inadvertently be harmful to the efficacy of the organization. As bureaucrats act in their own self-interest, this can lead to the establishment of counterproductive norms. Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 707) summarize his observations as follows: "Bureaucracies are political creatures that can be autonomous from their creators and can come to dominate the societies they were created to serve." Although Weber never defined the term "bureaucracy," his writings on the subject laid the groundwork for debates on organizational effectiveness. Albrow (1970) interprets his conceptualization of bureaucracy as "an administrative body of appointed officials." Weber's concept of rational bureaucracy indicated that officials acted rationally based on the processes and principles governing social organization. This complements the rational actor view of public choice theory (Frey 1984) which, when applied to organizational theory, suggests that bureaucratic officials pursue rational agendas based on their personal interests. These interests do not always match those of the organization; therefore Weber warns that bureaucracies can risk becoming ends in themselves rather than the means to an end. The rules and procedures, which one could interpret as equally informal or formal, "become so embedded and powerful that they determine ends and the way the organization defines its goals" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 720).

Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 721) take this a step further to label informal norms gone wrong as one of the five pathologies of IOs. They refer to this as a "normalization of deviance," which means that bureaucracies make "small, calculated deviations from established rules," and, with time, allow these exceptions to the rule to become standardized procedure as there is little threat of accountability.

Principal–agent theory highlights the procedural distinctions in negotiations amongst ambassadors and other diplomats (agents) and amongst heads of state and national government administrations (principals). Waterman and Meier (1998: 173) reiterate the two central tenets of this theory: "that goal conflict exists between principals and agents, and that agents have more information than their principals, which results in an information asymmetry between them." Such asymmetry of information does reinforce differences in the informal norms by which the respective groups of individuals communicate. Yet, in this theory, more emphasis is on the nature of the information and less on the norms that guide the translation of this information. This leaves little to conclude about the impact of the informal norms themselves.

Informal norms in practice

The following overview offers summaries of findings on the nature and impact of informal norms in various IOs around the globe, from global to regional organizations. These provide a review of recent and ongoing scholarship in this narrow (Odell 2010: 628) field of research.

According to a compilation of empirical studies of negotiations, norms concerning the practice of arguing can have an impact on negotiation outcomes, write Ulbert and Risse (2005), and this can be felt through normative characteristics of the social context in which the arguing takes place. In her 1985 study of the UN, Feurle uncovers the strength of the informal mechanisms of decision making at the UN Security Council. For example, a senior member of the UN secretary-general's staff referred to informal consultation as "the *real* Security Council, the place where ideas are put to the test, and where compromise is applied in solving international conflicts" (Feurle 1985: 267). At the time, the norm at the Security Council was for the president to draw on his "privilege" to arrange informal consultations

(Feurle 1985: 278), and from time to time, the secretary-general or another official arranged these meetings as well. Another informal norm at the Security Council dictated that the secretary-general always attends these informal meetings, and although there is no formal agenda, the president typically brings up a number of key points to discuss.

As at many IOs, informal meetings intentionally never begin on time so that negotiators in bilateral conversations can start with the most honest and open discussions. On the subject of norms at the WTO, Cortell and Davis (2005) analyze the evolution of the norm of liberalization, but in the context of individual states without addressing how the norm affects the inter-state negotiations directly. Based on his interviews with negotiators, Odell (2010) outlines three distinct informal norms for mediation that WTO chairs employ and that affect negotiation outcomes differently. These then affect negotiations through the chair's leadership of meetings. Also focusing on the WTO, Ford's (2003) book draws on Wendt's (1999) theories of socialization to argue that states at the WTO in the Uruguay Round of negotiations pursued an informal "pro-trade" norm. She describes how trade ministers of developing countries changed their discourse to use the language of liberal economics to make their demands for incorporating labor and environmental standards.

Research on organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America represent a rapidly growing portion of the work done on multilateral negotiations and the decision making therein. Williams' (2009: 620) work on the African Union and particularly its Peace and Security Council provides insight into some of the norms in negotiations on peace operations and conflict management. Following an informal norm of seeking unanimity in negotiations, ambassadors to the Peace and Security Council have chosen to refrain from voting in favor of a consensus approach, even though the formal regulations allow them the option to vote. On ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, a report on conflict prevention details norms of mutual engagement and reciprocity by actors but does not devote much analytical weight to the development or utility of these norms (Aning and Bah 2009). In Asia, the member-states of ASEAN "remain focused on norms such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in domestic affairs" (Lewis and Books 1998: 113). Examples of ASEAN's informal institution building include member-states' strict reliance on *musyawarah* and *muafakat* (consultation and consensus) for conflict management, the much-emphasized and internalized norm of self-restraint, and confidence-building measures (Anthony 2005: 65). Haacke (2003: 4) describes this as a "normative framework" toward conflict management. With respect to research on the Organization of American States, Herz (2008) details how the norm of peaceful resolution to disputes has shaped negotiations on engagement and intervention throughout the organization's history.

European organizations have repeatedly been cited as the most institutionalized of the IOs (Buzan and Waever 2003: 352; Odell 2010: 628). Such a description has been used to refer to the bureaucratization and formal layers of decision making, but a culture of informality exists as well in different European organizations to different extents. Regarding the EU, the two previously cited studies by Mérand and Cross respectively have highlighted informal norms in negotiations through structured and semi-structured interviews with diplomats and officials. Mérand (2008: 134) describes how EU officials through informal norms of behavior and *ad hoc* discussions come to negotiated solutions. Cross (2011: 131) cites several of the norms recounted by EU officials. This includes how formal meetings of the Political and Security Committee are conducted in English 70 to 80 percent of the time and the rest of the time in French without translation. When the Committee added 12 new member-state ambassadors with the expansion of the Union in 2004 and 2007, this informal non-translation norm was maintained even though many lacked sufficient French language skills (Hardt 2009b). Heisenberg (2005: 68)

discusses at length the role of informal norms at the EU Council. She tracks the development and persistence of the informal norm of consensus, despite formal changes such as the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting and the Single European Act. In contrast, the OSCE is even more informal thanks to its status as a coalition of like-minded states rather than a treaty-based IO. Ghebali's work on the OSCE (e.g., Ghebali 2006; Ghebali and Lambert 2007) analyzes norms of decision making, particularly regarding conflict prevention. Finally, Pouliot's study of NATO–Russia diplomacy illustrates how informal norms of non-violent dispute settlement have been internalized into the relationship between Russian and Western officials in the context of the NATO–Russia Council. In 2006, Pouliot (2010: 96) writes, "diplomacy was a normal but not a self-evident way to solve disputes in Russian-Atlantic dealings" and, according to Cross (2011: 96), security practitioners came to embody this as "the way to go."

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to review contemporary debates on the role of informal norms in negotiations by highlighting challenges to the research, development, and sustainability of such norms, and by providing examples of practical observations by scholars. Different theoretical paradigms offer substantially different perspectives on informal norms depending on their assumptions about the nature of states and institutions. In a natural extension of scholarship on institutions and formal rules, the study of informal norms in negotiations conducted at IOs continues to expand as a field. Scholars seek insight and answers on questions regarding the birth, nature, and sustainability of these norms, yet equally struggle to find the best measure of their impact. A clear understanding of informal norms is nonetheless necessary for scholars to gain a holistic view of the decision-making process. Formal rules regarding who must meet with whom and with what frequency shape but do not define the informal norms of procedure and interaction among negotiators. By perpetuating the bias in the literature toward formality, scholarship undervalues the complex process of negotiations. Only through conducting research on and observing the application of these unspoken rules can scholarship come closer to accurately theorizing behavior in international negotiations.

Future areas of research on informal layers of decision making will require innovative methodological approaches to compensate for the lack of transparency in informal negotiations. Specifically, research is needed into the nature of the interplay between the informal and formal layers of decision making in IOs. How exactly do formal rules and structures influence the development of informal norms and how do informal norms of behavior shape negotiators' loyalty to those formal norms? How do informal norms function differently under different conditions? Whereas the field has many questions left to answer, the study of informal norms is growing rapidly and responding to a need for clarity and coherence on the international negotiations taking place behind closed doors.

Recommended for further reading

Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Hardt (2011), March and Olsen (2004), Odell (2000), and Stone Sweet et al. (2001).

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From internationalization to internalization

Spirals of contentions

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There are more problems in the world than any political actor can handle. A diversity of state and non-state actors competes for attention in the international arena by framing a problem, selecting an organized set of information that makes the problem intelligible and transforming it into an issue than can be debated and contested. This chapter aims to describe *spirals of contentions*, from the moment an issue emerges, passing by its institutionalization, to the point in time when it fades away and leaves space in the international arena for newcomers. The spiral metaphor is used to illustrate that the arguing process is transformative and that no issue ends up exactly where it began. Originating as the agent's construction, an issue can eventually become the same agent's constraint. The constant possibility for contestation results in cooptation, drift, gradual build up, reversal of an issue and even disputes over whether the problem is an issue at all (March and Olsen 1989). This approach facilitates a study of the iterative contestation and negotiation process, as state and non-state actors compete to identify, define and implement a policy (Krook and True 2010).

We focus our analysis on typical circles within this spiral process that we call the *issue life cycle*. Three issue cycles belonging to the same spiral of contentions are illustrated in Figure 26.1. As this chapter makes clear, different agents may have disparate levels of success at the various stages of the issue life cycle. The most influential actors at the agenda-setting stage may end up being the least satisfied once the policy decision is being implemented, only to come back under a new issue cycle.

We use an issue-based approach instead of the more common norms, discourses or policy approaches. This choice is meant to clearly distinguish our review from studies that focus on a limited segment of the cycle or overlook the agency of actors in the interactive process of arguing. Nevertheless, we largely build on these studies and equally draw from the parallel literatures on social movements and media.

Our concept of issue life cycle captures the journey of an issue from the target of framing efforts to the source of structural constraints. Like many other authors interested in the life cycle of social constructs, we distinguish three broad stages: expansionist, transformative and contractive. The first includes initial framing efforts and agenda setting; the second depicts the uptake or rejection of an issue by policy makers and the internalization of newly created norms; and the final stage, or the dissipation of the issue, follows its internalization and

Figure 26.1   Successive issue cycles in a spiral of contentions

localization. Although we understand that a three-stage scheme does not reflect all the complexity and dynamism of the issue life cycle, the fragmentation into typical stages allows for a clearer understanding of the different levels of analysis.

This chapter argues that issues, as they mobilize actors and generate social and legal norms, tend to follow a discourse-based path dependency process with positive feedback reinforcing earlier arguments. Therefore, issues do not have a built-in life expectancy and could hypothetically be supported indefinitely. To break with this path dependency and tranquilize the public debate, stakeholders facing high reputational costs can strategically capitulate to their rival's claims. By closing a debate, they might find themselves in a better position to introduce a new one.

This chapter is organized in three sections, covering the three broad stages of the issue life cycle. The evolution of these stages will be illustrated by the transnational debate over access to patented medicines that took place from 1998 to 2006. This case illustrates how some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) successfully introduced a new issue on the trade agenda, but later, confronted with a runaway version of their own conception, sought its demise.

Internationalization: from local problems to global debate

To understand the transnational issue life cycle, it is useful to first distinguish *issues* from *problems*. For a problem to become an issue, it has to leave the objectivity realm and pass to the world of inter-subjectivity. Some actors must realize that there is an existing problem affecting a community, organize a set of information in order to make it intelligible, and place it on the public agenda so that the issue can be debated.

The vast majority of problems exist in perpetuity or resolve themselves without the intervention of policy makers because they have not been targeted and transformed into issues. This pre-issue stage can, and often does, last indefinitely without engaging public attention. Importantly, the probability of a problem to become a socially constructed issue is not correlated with the objective severity of the situation. The situation of the victims of a problem could be much worse during the pre-issue stage compared to when the issue finally emerges from the problem (Downs 1972; Carpenter 2007).

For example, with respect to access to patented medicines, the pre-issue stage existed for a long time with only a handful of experts expressing concern. Even when the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was concluded in 1994 and made the patentability of pharmaceutical products mandatory for all WTO members, few trade negotiators, public health advocates or pharmaceutical companies saw any matter for dispute (Morin 2011).

While the objective severity of a problem is not a key determinant for the emergence of a transnational debate, three key elements appear as necessary conditions. The first is the

impulsion of some *issue entrepreneurs* to actively challenge the status quo. The concept of issue entrepreneur is similar to Rochon's (1998) 'critical thinker' and Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) 'norm entrepreneur'. Beyond being the central conduit for dissemination of information, issue entrepreneurs serve more practical roles such as absorbing the initial cost of mobilization and bringing organizational experience to the movement.

In regard to the problem of access to patented medicines, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was among the earliest and most influential issue entrepreneurs. It was ideally positioned, with extensive field expertise and political connections. It had long been aware that patented drugs were more expensive than their generic equivalents. However, it was not until MSF received its Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 that it decided to launch a worldwide campaign entitled 'Access to Essential Medicines' ('t Hoen 2002).

Issue entrepreneurs, like MSF, typically create a *transnational advocacy network* around them. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 200) define a transnational advocacy network as a social organization associating 'those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and who engage in a voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal exchange of information and services'. As with any network, transnational advocacy networks have a dual character. They function as agents acting on their own to influence policy making, while at the same time being structures following patterns of interaction among their constitutive elements.

Because MSF was strategically located at the core of the transnational advocacy network for access to patented medicines, its focus influenced the entire network. For instance, the technical notion of 'essential medicines', used for decades by the World Health Organization (WHO), entered through the intermediary of MSF into the lexicon of several trade-oriented NGOs and consumers' groups (Morin 2010).

Two common misconceptions regarding transnational advocacy networks must be clarified. First, although they champion transnational issues, they do not necessarily focus on transnational problems. A local problem can be transnationalized through a *boomerang effect* that occurs when domestic actors bypass obstructed channels of communication with their government and 'search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12; Risse-Kappen 1995). Second, transnational advocacy networks are not necessarily exclusively made up of NGOs. Businesses and scientists could equally act as issue entrepreneurs and constitute a transnational advocacy network.

Once again, the transnational advocacy network promoting the issue of access to patented medicines provides a good illustration. It involved the close collaboration between some local NGOs interested in pressuring their own government, generic drug producers and concerned academics (Morin 2010).

The second necessary condition for the emergence of a transnational debate is a *political opportunity structure* that issue entrepreneurs can seize to draw attention to the matter. Political opportunity structures are social and institutional filters that enable certain problems to enter policy makers' agendas. The wideness of an opportunity structure depends on a number of factors, such as the level of transparency, the stability of political alignments, the configuration of the coalition holding power, the obstruction of gatekeepers, the homogeneity and prevalence of the elite, the political tolerance of protest, and political crises (Kitschelt 1986; McAdam et al. 2001; Joachim 2003).

In the early 2000s, a unique alignment of opportunities was offered to the transnational advocacy network concerned with access to patented medicines, including the diffusion of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Western countries, the entry of the first antiretroviral drugs into the market, the end of transitional periods for TRIPs application, and the launch of a new round

of negotiations at the WTO. The main catalyst was probably a lawsuit brought by 39 transnational pharmaceutical companies against the South African government over its bill amending the Patent Act for public health motives. This lawsuit created a forum for the debate and broke the inertia, elevating patented drugs from problem to the initial expansive phase of the issue life cycle ('t Hoen 2002).

The third necessary condition for the emergence of a transnational debate is the articulation of a *collective action frame*, merging together common cultural references and the specificities of the problem to be socially constructed. To make a problem meaningful for others, issue entrepreneurs must insert it into a discursive frame that resonates with pre-existing discourses, often linked to parallel or earlier public policy issues. A frame that enables one to diagnose the problem and offers a prognostic to solve it is likely to attract attention, to expand the scope of participation, and to elevate the underlying problem to an issue (Benford and Snow 2000).

Framing patents as the main obstacle to access to medicines offered the strategic benefit of pointing to the appropriate international forum to discuss the issue (the WTO) and the legal instrument to be amended (the TRIPs agreement). Alternative frames seemed politically less attractive. Blaming insufficient development assistance or inadequate governance, for example, would have indirectly put the responsibility on the governments which act as gatekeepers for the inscription of a new issue on the intergovernmental agenda. Therefore, the issue was framed in a simple formula, equating patents with high prices, and thus with the narrative of premature death (Sell and Prakash 2004).

Frames aiming to raise awareness of an emerging issue, however, should avoid being too technical. Effective frames are often clear moral conflicts that resonate with values central to the prevailing cultural repertoire. Given the receptivity of the Western world to antagonist frames opposing good and evil forces, dramatic frames featuring victims clearly deprived of their basic human rights, as the result of the deliberate actions of identifiable individuals, remain highly persuasive. In such cases, media uptake is facilitated and media resonance expands the size of the audience. While the ultimate target of issue entrepreneurs might be a narrow circle of policy makers, framing a dramatic narrative through the mass media is an effective way to access their formal agenda.

The transnational advocacy network on access to patented medicines actively helped the media to translate their technical discourse into a dramatic narrative. Several leading newspapers cast pharmaceutical companies as greedy multinationals, juxtaposed against images of dying poor people. The South African litigation was portrayed as a battle between powerful transnational corporations on one side, defending excessive profit margins, and a weak state on the other side, defending human life. This frame proved to be highly persuasive and helped convince WTO members to launch negotiations to address this specific issue (Sell and Prakash 2004).

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 914; Payne 2004), *persuasion* occurs when 'agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes intersubjective'. Under this definition, a successful persuasion is not the end of the road but merely its beginning. As the next sections discuss, a persuasive frame selected by issue entrepreneurs during the initial stage of the issue cycle is determinative of the long-term direction of the issue. It establishes a dominant narrative of the problem, defines which actors should be considered relevant and what kinds of events will constitute future opportunities for collective action.

Institutionalization: from global debate to global norms

Setting a new issue on a governmental or intergovernmental agenda is a *tipping point*. Once set, issues become rapidly institutionalized; a defined group of conflicting stakeholders is

identified, a formal or informal forum for debate is selected, other organizations introduce the issue into their own agendas, studies are conducted, and decision makers are pressed to take positions (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

This institutionalization calls for an adaptation of the advocacy network's strategies. While agenda setting may need radical action to attract attention, upstream stages of policy formation, especially the legislative process, require 'more conventional protests with more instrumental goals' (Tarrow 1994: 53). Confrontation is often replaced by moderation, which is more desired by the political establishment. Mobilized lawyers, academics, consultants and bureaucrats join the original issue entrepreneur as the driving forces of the issue cycle.

This institutionalization does not necessarily cause a decline in attention. In fact, institutionalized issues punctually re-emerge as points of contentious public debate with greater ease than problems. Indeed, the institutionalization process creates new political opportunities, such as the anniversary of a decision, international conferences, legislative reviews, amendments and flawed implementation (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).

The case of access to patented medicines is illustrative. The global debate was punctuated by a series of institutionally linked events. First, in 2001, the WTO Ministerial Council called for international negotiations to address the need of some countries to import generic medicines. Then, in 2003, a WTO decision defined the conditions under which one country could authorize the export of generic drugs to another. A few months later, the global debate moved from Geneva to Ottawa as Canada became the first country to amend its Patent Act to authorize the export of generic drugs. In 2007, Canada used the WTO scheme to export 260,000 packs of generic antiretroviral drugs to Rwanda. This shipment remains, however, the only export to have been conducted under the WTO scheme in the first ten years of its existence. In view of these modest results, review processes were initiated to assess its impact and discuss how it could be improved.

As the issue progressively evolves, it becomes discursively *path dependent*. The notion of path dependency denotes the idea that once a certain option is selected, it becomes locked in and constantly reinforced through positive feedback loops (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). It is traditionally used within the paradigm of rational choice, where feedbacks are seen as a material gain that alters interest calculations. Yet, if one assumes that positive feedback could be found in the realm of discourse, path dependency can also be applied to issue life cycles (Schmidt 2008).

Once issue entrepreneurs have ventured down a particular path, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse their course. Certain arguments are automatically ruled out, while reputational gains are generated for those who address the issue. As a result, alternative diagnoses and prognostics, which were once quite plausible, are discarded before being carefully examined. The debate gradually transforms itself into a nascent *global master frame* that determines the discourse to be conveyed and the actions to be taken. In the majority of cases, refusing the constructed master frame can result in non-responsiveness, outlier status, or accusations of bad faith.

Such a path dependency process was apparent in the implementation phase of the access to patented medicines debate. Claims raised by stakeholders that were related to the initial framing received wider echoes by policy makers, such as references to Africa, HIV/AIDS and legal obstacles. Arguments that diverted from this global master frame, however, were marginalized. Pharmaceutical companies, for example, were unable to divert attention to poverty, corruption, inadequate health infrastructures and other obstacles to access to medicines, which would have redirected the blame onto governments. Similarly, NGOs found it difficult to expand their initial framing to include medicines that are not on the WHO essential medicines list and to expand the proposed export system to non-African emerging countries (Morin and Gold 2010).

One force that strengthens discursive path dependency and locks issue entrepreneurs into their initial rhetoric is the *contagion effect*. The contagion effect refers to a phenomenon pursuant to which the issue is spread out across both geographical and social boundaries. At the same time, spin–off movements grow and latecomers enter the fray, attracted by positive feedbacks such as media exposure, public visibility and donor funding. This process of social production, aggregation and transformation of political actors is sometimes called *brokerage* (McAdam et al. 2001; Bob 2005).

The idea that patent law should be amended to implement the 2003 WTO decision proved to be virally contagious. It received widespread support from gay rights groups, labour unions, churches, opposition parties and even rock stars. At one point, most of the active promoters of the idea had little technical knowledge on intellectual property and no experience in providing health products in developing countries (Bubela and Morin 2010).

Together, these latecomers socialized others groups and policy makers. *Socialization* is the process that is directed towards an actor's internalization of the ideas prevalent in a given community (Schimmelfennig 2000). Several reasons can explain why an actor lets him or herself be socialized, including a search for legitimization, a need for conformity or belonging to the group and a longing for esteem from the other actors. Generally, the more actors are socialized and adhere to the master frame, the easier it becomes to exert peer pressure and convince others to converge towards it. This is known as the *cascade* phase (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

One mechanism that favours this cascade is membership to an intergovernmental organization, whereby a certain organization links admission directly to behaviour or provides a forum where certain norms are promoted and deviant behaviours are criticized. This *embeddedness* – or the shared intergovernmental organizational memberships – is influential in diffusing norms among states. Issue entrepreneurs aware of this effect might partner with officials from an intergovernmental organization in order to promote their ideas (Meyer et al. 1997; Johnston 2007; Kelley 2004).

In the access to patented medicines case, embeddedness played a major role in the cascade process. Not without some diplomatic tensions, the South Center, the WHO, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development actively promoted a relaxed interpretation of the TRIPs agreement on the ground of the right to health.

Another socializing strategy used by the transnational advocacy network was *accountability politics*; that is, 'the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 16). The 2003 WTO decision stating that countries can legally implement the scheme for access to patented medicines was used as evidence by the transnational advocacy network that, on moral grounds, they must do it. Ultimately, several developed and developing countries answered the call for accountability and translated the international scheme in their domestic laws.

It is methodologically difficult to establish if policy makers implement a policy as a result of external pressure or a genuine belief in its virtues. Indeed, they can adopt the master frame strategically to make reputational gain without actually believing in its truth. Most of the time, however, cognitive dissonance caused by inconsistency between beliefs and discourse tends to lead people to change their beliefs to fit their actual discourse, rather than the other way around (Festinger 1957). Therefore, actors socialized to an issue might enter into a second stage, or *type II socialization*, in which they internalize not only the master frame but also its underlying beliefs. At one point, when these beliefs are fully internalized, they regard them as their own and change their behaviour independently from peer pressure (Checkel 2005).

Because the master frame discourse contains not only the substantive content of ideas, but also the interactive processes by which these ideas are socialized, it does not only commit agents to certain actions but can also constrain future ideas, discourses and actions. This prevents plausible alternatives from rising and convinces newcomers of the necessity to take a given course of action. Therefore, the probability of moving along the same path increases with each move and with each new agent joining the frame.

Localization: from global norms back to local problems

Despite the rich literature on issue creation, diffusion and socialization, most studies do not carefully pay attention to the last stages of the life cycle. Sophisticated theories on issue emergence often end the cycle with a poorly defined stage.

Those who look more carefully at this last stage often explain the fading out of issues by internal conflicts within the transnational advocacy network. It has been understood for some time that local actors often lose control over their issues in a transnational campaign. During the agenda-setting stage, transnational NGOs translate local testimonies to fit their own objectives. As a result, 'there is frequently a huge gap between the story's original telling and the retellings – in its socio-cultural context, its instrumental meaning, and even in its language' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 19). Researchers now realize that a similar loss in translation occurs during the implementation stage of the life cycle. Transnational actors can lose control over their story to the benefit of smaller local actors when their campaign is being translated domestically.

More precisely, at the internalization stage, original ideas of issue entrepreneurs are often transformed and reinterpreted as their frame is diffused and newcomers are being socialized. Governmental structures and latecomers in favour of implementation need to develop significant congruence between the international master frame and domestic beliefs and practices. This process is called *issue localization* and consists of conducting a cultural selection of international ideas in order to fit the newcomers' normative structure (Acharya 2004). However, the master frame does not always offer enough flexibility to adapt to the newcomers' circumstances, due to the tensions and contradictions within the transnational advocacy network.

Moreover, some latecomers within a transnational advocacy network can be more concerned with legitimacy gains, while others are concerned with the distribution of material gains. These two objectives are independent, as it is possible to achieve *pre-emption* (non-acceptance with new material advantages) or *co-optation* (acceptance without new material advantages). Partial outcomes are frequent, since the set of strategies required for acceptance and for material advantages are often conflicting. While serving as a credible source of information on a current issue requires predictability, moderation and compromise, attracting attention to a new issue requires novelty, polemic and confrontation (Gamson 1975; Florini 1996).

Such tension became apparent in the transnational advocacy network for greater access to patented medicines. Local NGOs in developed countries eventually became the most enthusiastic supporters of the 2003 WTO decision and the most satisfied with the evolution of the debate. Many of them measured their success in terms of gaining legitimacy and changing policy rather than by structural changes. As such, they perceived the policy diffusion as a political success and a revelation of their own influence. Setting a precedent for change had significant political value in itself: sustaining a global momentum, raising awareness and opening policy space at the local level of action. The narrow circle of NGOs that provide health services in developing countries, however, did not share this enthusiasm. The MSF was one of the least enthusiastic actors and quietly defected from its transnational advocacy network when Canada implemented the 2003 decision (Bubela and Morin 2010).

In the later stages of the issue, MSF was rhetorically entrapped. *Rhetorical entrapment* refers to the inability to pursue a preferred option that violates a prior rhetorical statement while refusing to comply with normative standards because it would undermine material interests (Schimmelfennig 2001). On the one hand, MSF could not criticize too harshly a scheme that, according to both policy makers and the media, was a result of their advocacy efforts. On the other hand, claiming a policy win may have long-term negative consequences in terms of a loss of momentum for more radical change. Consequently, MSF was left with a hollow victory, a legislative scheme mirroring their institutionalized influence but unlikely to have any practical effect on improving access to medicines in developing countries (Morin and Gold 2010).

Surprisingly, the earlier generation of authors, who recognized that an issue can arise as a result of strategic framing by agents, failed to consider the strategic ending of an issue by rhetorically entrapped actors. It is certainly true that social discourses have structuring properties, but actors do not lose their capacity as agents and can eventually break with path dependency processes. Actors feeling rhetorically trapped may, for instance, strategically retreat and agree to the first available definitive solution with the hope of closing the public debate as soon as possible, diverting the attention away, and regaining greater discursive autonomy. We call this strategic retreat forward an *issucide* (Morin 2011).

Being rhetorically entrapped, MSF and other issue entrepreneurs committed such an issucide. They actively participated in the last stages of the debate to prove that the suggested solution would be a failure. They thought that if they could successfully demonstrate its failure after having advocated its implementation, they would later have a strong case advocating for completely different models (Morin and Gold 2010).

A learning process takes place where issue entrepreneurs realize that the context and strategy they created themselves evolves, cascades and takes on a life on its own when newcomers enter the debate. It becomes impossible to turn back at this stage. The power of path dependency only leaves one option: to actively close the issue in order not to worsen the situation (Rico and Costa-Font 2005) while opening up enough space for a re-start with a new master frame. Indeed, issue entrepreneurs learn that activists have more power of influence at the pre-negotiation phase of a problem; that is, at the moment when they are able to transform a problem into an issue and determine a certain course of action using a collective action frame (Price 2003). Issucide allows stakeholders to radically cut the path and re-frame the issue in the future, applying the lessons learnt.

The issue entrepreneurs at the origin of the access to patented medicines debate have learned their lesson and reframed the problem. They now avoid a trade law approach to access to medicines and increasingly focus on business models. For example, they actively pushed UNITAID, an international facility for the purchase of drugs launched in 2006 and hosted by the WHO, to set up and implement a patent pool that is supposed to change business practices of pharmaceutical companies to foster the development of new drugs and drive prices down without requiring legal changes in domestic legislations.

The pharmaceutical companies have also learned from their experiences. They have recently regained some control over the public debate but carefully avoided any representation opposing profit with public health. Instead, they fight against counterfeit medicines in developing countries in the name of public health. Generic drugs manufactured in developing countries are currently presented as a threat to health security. This new frame is one of the underlying discourses of the 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).

Other explanations for how issues fade out are presented by a new generation of scholars who focus on intentional actions of latecomers in the transnational campaign, latecomers who challenge and redefine the issue during the implementation phase. If an issue was adopted

under pressure, contestation can take the form of either *issue contention* or *issue subsidiarity*. The degree of *contention* will depend on the degree to which the scope of an international frame stretches to adapt to the local practices and ideas. If the master frame allows for a high degree of stretching and adaptation, newcomers will develop *issue-consistent* strategies and tasks that complement the underlying purposes of the master frame. However, if the master frame does not allow for adaptation, newcomers will adopt *issue-inconsistent* strategies contradicting the underlying purpose of the master frame in order to make the issue fade out.

Weaker actors use *issue subsidiarity* to challenge their marginalization from international decision-making processes. It consists of deliberate attempts to develop new rules, timelines and meanings with a view to preserving the autonomy of local actors from dominance of the more powerful central actors of the campaign (Acharya 2011).

Once the issue has been adopted and the legislative process has produced a new norm, governmental actors are the only ones that can make an issue degenerate and disappear through *non-compliance cascades* (Panke and Petersohn 2012). If a government does not agree with a norm and feels it can bear the costs of non-compliance, it will start violating the norm. In the absence of sanctioning actors or enforcement authorities, other governments will decide it is less costly to violate the norm than to follow it. At other times the non-compliance cascades are not voluntary, they are simply the product of a misunderstanding and misuse of the new norm (Badescu and Weiss 2010). Nevertheless, they will still provoke the erosion of the new norm, which will result in either its complete disappearance or substitution by rival norms available. One thing is certain: a new spiral of contention will begin as soon as new agents find a new political opportunity to bring in a problem from the realm of subjectivity.

Conclusion

By exploiting a political opportunity and framing a problem, issue entrepreneurs constrain themselves to a narrow set of possibilities of argumentation and action. Other stakeholders progressively join the cause in a collective action in which every member has different priorities and diverse understandings of the issue. Although the process of stakeholder socialization in the transnational sphere is necessary in terms of material resources, media attention and reaching international agenda setters, it also contributes to the *petrification* of a master frame that issue entrepreneurs can no longer control.

Not everyone shares this sequentialist view of the policy debate. The garbage can model, for example, rejects the notion that problems are first framed and policy solutions follow suit. Under the garbage can model, policy is the association of latent and previously disconnected elements, taken from four different cans: 1) problems, looking for solutions, 2) solutions, looking for problems, 3) political opportunities, waiting for decisions and 4) and decision makers, aspiring to solve problems. Inflows and outflows from these four garbage cans are independent and scarcely coordinated (Cohen et al. 1972).

Nevertheless, the spiral metaphor (see Figure 26.1) enables us to understand that there is not a precise moment or a single unitary actor in the formulation of international issues. If a student of international relations conducts interviews to understand the origin of a successful international policy, it will not be a surprise that every interviewee claims to be the real issue entrepreneur: non-state actors have lobbied a certain civil servant, who in turn has made a recommendation to the minister, who defended it before the Council of Ministers, in which the head of the state passed it. To the contrary, if the public considers a certain policy unsuccessful, everybody can assign responsibility to a third party. It is indeed extremely difficult to identify the single actor responsible for a certain international policy since few political actors,

if any, have a sole, permanent, all-encompassing interest and power status. Rather, interests and power vary according to the socially constructed issue at hand. The issue constrains the agent by structuring whom and what are relevant to the debate, and it is precisely the nature of this contentious process that allows for the constant redefinition of problems, preventing a stagnation of the international system in which certain interests always dominate others.

Recommended for further reading

Baumgartner and Jones (1991), Benford and Snow (2000), Downs (1972) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).

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27

Learning in international organizations[1]

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Can international organizations (IOs) learn, and if so, under what conditions and how? Answers to these questions are critically relevant to many millions of people whose lives depend on aid from humanitarian organizations, on security provided and peace promoted by United Nations (UN) peace operations and political missions, and on economic decisions by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to name a few examples. Answers to these questions determine in part if the world can find feasible solutions to global problems. Many of these depend on IOs to learn. Scholarly inquiry into organizational learning in IOs is also a fascinating opportunity to combine insights from across the rich tradition of the social sciences on rules, knowledge and organizational culture as well as political bargaining based on interests and power. Indeed, to conceive of learning in any public and therefore political organization as anything but a deeply political process would be to ignore important layers of empirical reality. Therefore, one key argument in this chapter is that the analysis of learning requires stronger emphasis on the political and normative conflicts about who gets to draw 'lessons' and thereby define the 'truth'.

It is by no means self-evident that a handbook of international organization would include a chapter on learning. During the heyday of research on international regimes in the 1980s and early 1990s, the inner workings of IOs as bureaucracies created little excitement in academic circles. Over the past two decades, however, IOs themselves have begun to challenge the long-standing stereotype of rigid, slow and boring international bureaucracies. The World Bank, the UN Development Programme and many other IOs have started to import ideas from the private sector and present themselves as knowledge-based organizations. They use the language of 'best practices' and 'lessons learned', invest in knowledge management and strive to become 'learning organizations'.

A growing number of academics have chosen to analyse whether the new rhetoric of the learning organization is matched by organizational practice. As a result, the study of organizational learning has become both a driver and a beneficiary of the academic rediscovery of IOs as bureaucracies (Benner et al. 2009; Ege and Bauer in this volume), and a much-needed addition to the related work on 'policy learning' (Breslauer and Tetlock 1991; Levy 1994; Fosdick 1999). However, despite the recent focus in that field on IOs as forums and facilitators of learning (Duina and Nedergaard 2010; Heupel 2012), the policy learning literature is

not the subject of this chapter. Therefore, if we occasionally use the term 'international bureaucracy' interchangeably with 'international organization', it is to underline the focus on the bureaucratic organization, rather than the broader institution.

The emerging scholarship on organizational learning in IOs has yet to put forward comprehensive and reliable models. Scholars of learning in IOs do not share a common approach, or even clearly defined competing approaches, to the definition of learning, the learning process and factors that influence (non-)learning. At least in part, this reflects the patchwork nature of the concepts they employ, many of which are borrowed from related fields such as organizational theory and management studies without being applicable 'as is' to the reality of IOs. Not only that, the literature on organizational learning from which most of the borrowing takes place suffers from its own share of conceptual heterogeneity, which makes its concepts no easier to recombine in a different context.

The chapter outlines the state of research on organizational learning in IOs in three parts. The first part addresses the challenges of analyzing organizational learning in international bureaucracies. The second part discusses three key questions for the analysis of learning in IOs: 1) how to define learning, 2) how to conceptualize the process of learning and 3) how to move beyond organizing established causal influences on learning towards the next frontier of theory building. The concluding part proposes directions for advancing the research agenda on learning in international bureaucracies.

Challenges to the study of organizational learning in international organizations

With very few idiosyncratic exceptions, namely the pioneering work of Ernst Haas (Haas 1990; Haas and Haas 1995), the scholarship on learning in international bureaucracies makes a rather disparate and disjointed appearance. A growing collection of insightful case studies at the organizational level (Senghaas-Knobloch et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2006; Böhling 2007; Howard 2008; Siebenhüner 2008; Campbell 2011) is slowly being complemented by in-depth empirical investigations at the level of individual learning processes within individual organizations (Detzel 2008; Kopp-Malek et al. 2009; Benner et al. 2011; Hirschmann 2012). The mainstream focus on the organizational level holds not just among scholars of IOs. Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2011: 15) observe the same tendency among management researchers: 'We want to understand organizational learning, but lack research on actual learning processes and knowledge.'

Conceptually, one group of studies focuses on a single factor or analytical lens to account for (non-)learning; for example, boundary-spanning units as a structural feature (Böhling 2007), micro-level experience among staff (Brown et al. 2006), or maximum autonomy from headquarters and from the international politics among member-states (Howard 2008). Others attempt a comprehensive analysis of different influences on (non-)learning to explain particular empirical cases, but have yet to combine these various factors in a coherent, generalizable whole (Senghaas-Knobloch et al. 2003). This messy state of affairs reflects a similar situation in the organizational learning literature, which uneasily combines concepts developed in public administration, sociology, business management and organization theory to study mostly business organizations (for an overview see Berthoin Antal et al. 2001; Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2011). Even in this literature, organizational learning is often more akin to a widely applied metaphor than to the bedrock of a well-developed research paradigm.

In using only partially compatible concepts in a related, but significantly different context, researchers face four distinct challenges: 1) dealing with the lack of conceptual clarity, 2)

avoiding normative bias, 3) avoiding technocratic bias and 4) adapting concepts from different contexts to IOs.

With regard to the first challenge, there are no common answers to fundamental questions about what learning is, who may learn, and if and how to separate learning from change or reform. This conceptual heterogeneity stems directly from the management literature, where

> research in organizational learning has suffered from conceptions that were excessively broad, encompassing nearly all organizational change, from ontological complaints that organizations cannot learn, and from various other maladies that arise from insufficient agreement among those working in the area on key concepts and problems.
>
> *(Cohen and Sproull 1991: Editors' Introduction)*

As a result, even the most widely applied taxonomies of learning tend to remain at a metaphorical level. One of the most consequential examples is the distinction between 'single-loop', 'double-loop' and 'deutero' learning. 'Single-loop' learning takes place within a given set of rules and a given organizational structure, while 'double-loop' learning leads to the creation of entirely new approaches, and 'deutero-learning' refers to 'learning to learn' (Argyris and Schön 1978). Since every organization is defined by rules, can there be any learning without a change in rules? When are changing rules sufficiently different from the existing body of rules to count as 'entirely new'? This rigid distinction of qualities or orders of learning has proven hard to operationalize and has attracted considerable criticism (Nonaka 1994), as the empirical picture suggests more of a continuum than a sharp divide between such poles. Similar problems plague many other qualitative taxonomies of learning (for an overview see Pawlowsky 2001: 77).

The second challenge, as critics have pointed out, is to avoid a hidden normative bias. Researchers occasionally fall into this trap by presenting their own views under the neutral guise of 'learning'. If the organization is found to have changed its practice according to the scholar's preferences, it is found to have 'learned'. If not, the organization 'failed to learn'. This way of bringing in normative concerns through the back door is particularly convenient where explicitly normative research has gone out of fashion. To overcome such temptations, normative judgements on whether a particular 'lesson' is desirable or not should be made and examined separately from a solid analysis of learning processes.

A third, equally dangerous, challenge is the extent to which a technocratic bias informs scholarship on organizational learning in international bureaucracies. Going through the motions of 'lessons learned', 'best practices', knowledge management or evaluation cannot ensure that an organization actually learns. Neither is it sufficient for organizations and policy makers to look for consensual scientific 'truth' to adopt into their knowledge base and expect their staff to find the 'optimal' way of translating insight to action. While there are cases where such a broad scientific consensus on valid knowledge exists, for many of the most vexing problems in global governance there is no clear-cut scientific consensus within a solidly entrenched and respected 'epistemic community'. On conflict management, crisis diplomacy and peace building, for instance, there is no such science: only analytical findings mixed with normative propositions that jointly inform political decisions. In the absence of monolithic, authoritative 'truth', the analytical and the normative elements of a lesson are often not easy to distinguish. Often they are not even openly presented, since competing factions within an international bureaucracy have incentives to use analytical findings strategically for their own political ends.

Regarding the fourth challenge, for all the diversity of approaches, fields as different as business management, public administration and military studies are largely unified in their

reliance on a crude metaphor of the capitalist market to explain why any organization would be able to overcome the many obstacles to learning: to be successful and survive, organizations must adapt to the pressure of the market (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From its origin in business management, this basic mechanism travelled to parts of public administration through the so-called New Public Management wave as well as to the study of military learning where losing a major war quite literally threatens national survival (Posen 1986; Downie 1998).

Private-sector concepts can be useful for research on public (Finger and Bürgin Brand 1999) and international bureaucracies (Ege and Bauer in this volume), but some adjustments are necessary. Public organizations are founded to deliver public goods in a way that appears legitimate to the public and international bureaucracies are governed by political representatives of member-state governments. Even with increasing demands for greater efficiency and ever-present bureaucratic competition for budgets and political influence, the world of IOs is a far cry from a competitive marketplace in which actors fight for survival (LaPalombara 2001a). In addition to being largely inaccurate, the strong emphasis on competitive pressures neglects the role of knowledge and politics in how public organizations learn, confusing learning with other forms of organizational change and ignoring a major driver of both success and failure in organizational learning.

Key questions in the analysis of organizational learning in international organizations

To advance in a more coherent and accessible way, research on learning in international bureaucracies needs to achieve clarity on three questions. How do we define organizational learning? How do we conceive of the learning cycle? And, most importantly, how do different factors and the interactions between them influence learning?

Defining organizational learning: rules, knowledge and politics

Individuals can learn in a cognitive process that has no simple, accurate equivalent at the level of social groups and organizations. Therefore, while individual learning is a prerequisite for organizations to learn, learning at the organizational level requires its own definition and analysis if it is to go beyond a superficial and ultimately metaphorical analogy to the human mind.

In 1921, Max Weber (1978: 958) was the first to systematically analyse the traits of bureaucracies. He famously concluded that 'the reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in [bureaucracy's] very nature'. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004: 3) followed Weber's lead and translated it to the international level: 'Bureaucracies exercise power in the world through their ability to make impersonal rules. They then use rules not only to regulate but also to constitute and construct the social world.' Rules create organizational structures such as hierarchical reporting lines, the division of authority and responsibility between units, and standard operating procedures on how to deal with particular kinds of tasks (Balding and Wehrenfennig 2011). Rules, whether formally codified or informally communicated, are at the core of how bureaucracies act by shaping the behaviour of their individual members.

Therefore, for a bureaucratic organization to learn, a change in its rules is required. Individual learning among officials in relevant positions may produce a temporary change in organizational practice, but it cannot be sustainable as individuals move on. Learning is only institutionalized through rule change. That said, a change of rules is only necessary but not

sufficient for learning to take place since, contrary to what some of the military learning literature suggests (Nagl 2005), it should not be assumed that rules are always readily implemented (Rid 2007). Therefore, learning can only be considered successful or complete when changes in rules also lead to changes in organizational practice.

Learning is distinct from other forms of organizational change because the questioning and changing of rules are based on newly acquired or reinterpreted knowledge. In *When Knowledge Is Power* (1990) Ernst Haas was among the first to conceptualize the role of reflection and knowledge in IOs. In his model, an epistemic community of scientists develops 'consensual knowledge' on (re-)conceptualizing a problem and an adequate response, e.g. how chlorofluorocarbons damage the ozone layer and how we can mitigate this effect. An enlightened international bureaucracy adopts the (new) scientific wisdom through a political process and thereby 'learns'. Despite his requirement for scientific consensus, Haas argues that there is no such thing as value-free 'technical' knowledge. Instead, knowledge always comes with a normative claim to be valid or true, a claim that is necessarily subjective and often contested by the proponents of a different view. This element of contestation is all the more relevant where there is no clear-cut scientific consensus within a broadly representative, undisputed epistemic community. Arguably, this is the case with regard to many of the most important and vexing global policy problems IOs are confronted with, including international economic development and trade, transnational crime, climate change, war and violent conflict or nuclear non-proliferation.

A generally applicable concept of organizational learning in IOs therefore requires a broader notion of knowledge that goes beyond the elusive scientific consensus. Knowledge can have a variety of sources. In addition to scientific inquiry, it may be self-generated within the organization based on in-house research or practical experience (for this incremental learning see Wildavsky 1964; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), or it may be transmitted from governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It always reflects the particular perspectives of those from whom it emerges. For knowledge to become relevant enough to justify a change in organizational practice, it needs to be made explicit even if it may already have been around in the form of tacit knowledge (Nonaka 1994; Rid 2007).

In a political bureaucracy, particularly in a field as contested and heterogeneous as global politics, the questioning of prior knowledge and the debate about lessons is never an apolitical exercise. In a review of political science contributions to organizational learning, LaPalombara (2001b: 139) observes that 'organizational "lessons" are formulated through a process of negotiation or bargaining'. In other words, "lessons" are . . . the product of an organizational or political dynamic, rather than . . . of the application of logic and pure reason to the past' (Lovell 1984: 134). As such, the content and political nature of learning processes should not be simplified only to make them easier to analyse.

Rather than prematurely focusing on just one or two aspects, a generally applicable and analytically useful definition of organizational learning in IOs should therefore combine the reliance on rules, knowledge and politics. One way of doing so is to use the following definition for learning in IOs: organizational learning is a knowledge-based process of questioning and changing organizational rules to change organizational practice. We used this definition in a study of UN peace operations and it turned out to be analytically fruitful (Benner et al. 2011).

Conceptualizing the process of learning

Most scholars of organizational learning assume that bureaucracies, including international bureaucracies, are by nature unlikely to learn. 'The bureaucratic system of organization is not

only a system that does not correct its behavior in view of its errors; it is also too rigid to adjust, without crises, to the transformations that the accelerated evolution of the industrial society makes more and more imperative' (Crozier 1964: 287). In this view, bureaucracies are built on incentives to always make the smallest possible departure from established routines: what Lindblom (1959) famously described as 'muddling through'. This dynamic prevents any attempt to question established rules and thereby results in non-learning by default. Only major crises may provide opportunities to overcome this bureaucratic inertia and trigger learning processes.[2] Not only is this understanding far away from what the management literature describes as the ideal type of the 'learning organization': an organization that purposefully constructs 'structures and strategies so as to enhance and maximize organizational learning' (Dodgson 1993: 377), it is also far removed from the realities of learning in today's international bureaucracies.

Analyzing the impact of catastrophic failures alone is not enough to understand the reality of learning and non-learning in many IOs today. Instead, it has become increasingly common to analyse organizational learning as an open-ended process that may succeed or fail as a result of competing bureaucratic and political influences. This process is usually organized in a sequencing model similar to the policy cycle, a familiar heuristic tool for political scientists. Most of the literature (for example, March and Olsen 1976; Huber 1991; Crossan et al. 1999) employs some variant of a three-stage model, each stage being guided by a distinct logic. The three stages are:

1   A learning process begins when a group of individuals within the organization acquires new knowledge through active research or passive reception from outside sources, or by converting its own experience into new knowledge. Outside sources of knowledge could be academics, governments or other organizations. What its proponents regard as their new 'lesson' (be it a small technical proposal or a fundamental critique of core assumptions) only becomes relevant for the organization at the small-group level, where the lesson evolves beyond an individual's secret idea.
2   As the proponents of a new lesson advocate for it to be acted upon, they link new knowledge with proposals to change existing rules. Through a combination of arguing to recruit genuine converts to their ideas and building coalitions along overlapping interests, they seek to build momentum and convince key decision makers to accept their claim to new knowledge and the corresponding proposal to change rules. During this period of advocacy, policy proposals may change in order to broaden political support within the organization and among powerful external stakeholders, such as member-state governments or influential advocacy groups. At the end of this stage stands an authoritative decision on a rule change.
3   Once such a decision has been taken, it must be codified, disseminated and ultimately implemented by the relevant members of the wider organization, often far beyond the initial group of advocates or its winning coalition. However, implementation does not follow automatically. In a hierarchical bureaucracy, institutionalization works from the top down as the new rules are merged into the existing body of rules, disseminated among the relevant units, supported by training and outreach efforts and backed up with accountability mechanisms from individual sanctions and rewards to collective performance assessment and evaluation procedures. The learning process is only completed once the new rules are generally applied throughout the organization.

A learning process that clears these three stages could be called complete or successful in a single iteration. The analytical criterion of success is independent of the substance of the

lesson or some outsider's subjective view of whether the rule change appropriately reflects the new knowledge. It must be exclusively procedural rather than normative to avoid the normative bias outlined earlier. Ideally, in a learning organization, the process would be repeated with the new rules and practices subject to continuous review, for example, through default evaluation mechanisms and further learning.

Learning processes may be interrupted at any point. Stalled, incomplete or abandoned learning processes are empirically very common and can serve as rich sources of insight into the organizational and political dynamics of learning as well as the self-reflection that may be triggered by the realization of failure or dysfunction (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011).

From organizing causal factors to advancing theory

Almost two decades ago, Jack Levy (1994: 289) challenged students of learning in foreign policy to explicitly 'attempt to specify at what point in the cycle the learning process gets blocked' and why. Only rarely have researchers in any branch of the organizational learning literatures invested such substantial effort in disassembling processes of learning (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2011: 15). In addition to the empirical difficulties of data collection, the emerging field has yet to provide a consistent framework to systematically assess the influences that promote or obstruct learning processes.

The extensive conceptual and case study literature on organizational learning across the management, sociology, and emerging international relations and public administration fields provides plenty of suggested factors that need to be taken into account in building such a framework. In recent years, many scholars have paved the way for doing so by providing important accounts of how individual factors or analytical lenses help explain learning outcomes. Table 27.1 provides an overview of these contributions with regard to IOs.

Each of the factors in Table 27.1 was found in one or several studies to be causally relevant in the explanation of (non-)learning. The next frontier would be to put together a coherent causal framework that includes all of these influences, formal-organizational and political alike, and draw on the interactions among them to explain the success or failure of individual learning processes. This has proven a daunting challenge to many, probably because these factors are ontologically so different, and because they are neither independent nor easily combined without losing explanatory power. This complexity of interrelated causes of learning and non-learning goes a long way in explaining why scholars of learning in international bureaucracies have yet to surmount the choice between explaining individual cases and analyzing individual factors. Either choice allows only limited progress towards theory development and solidly grounded answers to policy-relevant questions.

To illustrate this conundrum, and perhaps as a very early step towards moving forward, an intermediate heuristic may be worthwhile. Such a heuristic would reduce complexity by carefully grouping some of these explanatory factors in order to study their interactions and how they affect learning outcomes. In a study of 12 learning processes in the UN peace operations apparatus, we combined commonly employed factors in two clusters, labelled 'infrastructure' and 'politics'. The *infrastructure cluster* covers structural properties of the organization. In our reading, they include the first five factors listed in Table 27.1: formal structure, resources, standard procedures, incentive systems and organizational culture. While these factors can and do change over time, they generally evolve slowly and in a path-dependent way. Over periods of up to several years, and outside moments of fundamental change, they are often static. In contrast, the *politics cluster* covers the dynamic and often volatile factors of leadership (individual leadership and efforts of leadership coalitions), political pressure and

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Table 27.1 Influences on learning in international organizations

Factors	Contributions with a specific IO focus
Formal structure: distribution of authority and autonomy within a formal hierarchy, the openness or rigidity of information and communication flows	*Open systems* (Ansell and Weber 1999) *Boundary-spanning units* (Böhling 2007) *Knowledge management systems* (Bolisani and Damiani 2010)
Resources: dedicated units, posts, funds, and knowledge repositories to support knowledge management and learning	*Development of consensual knowledge* (Senghaas-Knobloch et al. 2003) *Knowledge management systems* (Bolisani and Damiani 2010)
Standard procedures: for regular reporting and decision making as well as specifically for knowledge acquisition, doctrine development, training, implementation and evaluation, e.g. communities of practice, document repositories and regular reviews or lessons-learned studies	*Routines as impediments to learning* (Campbell 2011) *Doctrine development* (Ahmed et al. 2007) *Knowledge management procedures* (Howard 2009; Ringel-Bickelmaier and Ringel 2010) *Communities of practice* (Henderson 2005; Bicchi 2011) *Procedures for knowledge transfer* (Kopp-Malek et al. 2009) *Feedback mechanisms and evaluation* (Weaver 2010; CDA 2011)
Incentive systems: how individuals are motivated to contribute to collective knowledge, to question assumptions and promote learning	*Human resource policies* (Benner et al. 2011)
Organizational culture: interpretative frames and cultural norms	*Interpretive frames that obstruct learning* (Autesserre 2010) *Culture that obstructs learning* (Bauer and Weinlich 2011)
Leadership: how individuals, often in concert with others, promote a learning process beyond their formal positions of authority or lack thereof	*Change agents in positions of authority* (Siebenhüner 2008)
Political pressure: primarily from member-state governments as a deliberate policy supporting or obstructing not necessarily learning in general but often a particular lesson (Dekker and Hansén 2004)	*Government and NGO pressure for learning* (Siebenhüner 2008) *Learning at the political level* (Heupel 2012 as one example among many)
Bureaucratic politics: within the organization as a result of competitive behaviour between sub-units (Allison and Halperin 1972; Halperin and Clapp 2006)	*Institutional rivalries that obstruct learning* (Smith 2011)*

*The role of bureaucratic politics in organizational learning has been comparatively little studied, yet we found it important in explaining the success and failure of different learning processes in our own work (Benner et al. 2011).

bureaucratic politics within and beyond an IO in its interaction with outside actors and events. Table 27.2 summarizes the two clusters at a glance.

We cannot expect any single factor or cluster alone to be a necessary or sufficient condition for a learning process to be completed. What we found, however, were some potential regularities in how the clusters interacted to determine different stages of a learning process in

Table 27.2 Organizing causal influences in two clusters: infrastructure and politics

Cluster	Infrastructure	Politics
Items	Formal structure	Leadership
	Resources	Political pressure
	Standard procedures	Bureaucratic politics
	Incentive systems	
	Organizational culture	

relation to the lesson at hand. Therefore, focusing on these interactions and utilizing a cluster heuristic appears to be a way of generating hypotheses.

For example, a moderately developed learning infrastructure may comprise a small unit (formal structure, resources) dedicated to identifying lessons and facilitating advocacy about resulting changes (standard procedures). This basic level of infrastructure may be sufficient to support a straightforward, largely consensual learning process that sparks no political opposition inside or outside the organization. Carried by an enabling infrastructure, we found examples of such learning processes that we call 'infrastructure-driven'. A more contested or politicized lesson, in contrast, could not be learned purely because a solid knowledge management system is in place, because there is a learning-friendly organizational culture and because staff face positive incentives to question existing routines. To be successfully learned, such a lesson needs supportive political activity by leadership coalitions across different levels of hierarchy, bureaucratic champions who hope to gain politically if the lesson gets implemented or external political pressure from important stakeholders. We call this kind of learning process 'politically driven'. Conversely, obstructive politics can easily stall a learning process, or even cause it to fail, and the lack of an enabling learning infrastructure inhibits even those lessons that are uncontroversial and undemanding to learn.

For the key factor that determines which of these different types of interaction between infrastructural and political factors prevails, we need to look no further than the lesson itself, and its political nature and reception in the organization. In the UN peacekeeping system, we found that the effects of bureaucratic politics and political pressure were much stronger compared to infrastructure factors when a lesson's underlying claim to new knowledge was contested. Therefore, much as we found the cluster heuristic helpful, as others have noticed before (Senghaas-Knobloch et al. 2003), the missing link at the theoretical level may be a useful typology of knowledge to be learned. The substance of the lesson (the issue it seeks to address, the ambition of the proposed change and the way it is perceived or politicized) probably determines the infrastructural and political demands of successfully learning it.

Advancing research on organizational learning in international organizations

A decade into the rediscovery of learning in IOs as a worthwhile field of study, we can safely conclude that there are indeed conditions under which IOs learn, and that these conditions are more complicated than external shocks or moments of crisis alone. Inspired and informed by the insights of other disciplines, a number of factors have been identified that influence learning outcomes. A comprehensive framework to explain the process and outcomes from

their interplay, however, has remained a bridge too far. We outline three avenues for further research to advance towards building such a framework.

First, the foundations are now in place for further in-depth inquiry into the relationship between different properties of knowledge and the other factors that influence processes of learning. Developing analytically useful typologies of knowledge to explain how different kinds of lesson may require different factors to be learned would be most valuable to take this agenda forward, perhaps based on intermediate steps that reduce the complexity of interacting causal factors.

Second, such typologies and other conceptually ambitious contributions would benefit from systematically comparative research designs. Is there variation in the relative importance of factors across issue areas? We might expect such variation between, for example, highly politicized security issues versus more technocratic issue areas, or between areas where there is a consensus in an outside epistemic community, and areas where such a consensus is lacking. Do certain factors or clusters play a larger role at certain stages of the learning cycle? Has the relative importance of certain factors changed over time? These questions point to the need for larger studies comparing learning processes across different IOs, across different periods of time and across different issue areas. Based on the groundwork done in recent years, it is time to move from small-N to medium-N studies, even though key concepts are not yet as sharply defined and empirical measurement remains too context-dependent to allow meaningful large-N studies on learning processes.

Finally, most of the attention on learning, conceptually as well as empirically, has focused on knowledge management and doctrine development: the early stages of a learning cycle where existing knowledge is questioned, lessons are generated, negotiated and agreed, and where rule changes are implemented. What is missing even in the empirical literature is a solid understanding of the crucial feedback mechanisms. Did we learn the right thing? Do the changed rules actually lead to more effective implementation of an organization's mandate? As Kate Weaver (2010: 2) argues, 'despite a rich body of work on organizational evaluation in sociological theory, public administration and business management, there is simply a dearth of knowledge in international relations scholarship regarding the role of evaluation in bigger questions regarding IO learning and change'. What kinds of evaluation mechanisms are best suited to support learning? Or does evaluation, especially if it includes transparency mechanisms, lead to a culture of fear and passivity?

Learning in international bureaucracies is as much a political process as it is an organizational process, and it is fundamentally defined by knowledge. As scholars of organizational learning, our challenge is to fuse these concepts in a way that is analytically fruitful to allow increasingly general insights to be drawn on how international bureaucracies work, but also to help build better, more reflective organizations.

Recommended for further reading

Haas (1990), Haas and Haas (1995), Howard (2008) and Benner et al. (2011).

Notes

2   A well-known example supporting this claim is the UN's catastrophic failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s and its role in sparking a decade of organizational learning and change (Breul 2005; Benner and Rotmann 2008; Seibel 2009).

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Part V

Challenges to international organizations

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28

Reforming the United Nations Security Council

Proposals, strategies and preferences

Thomas Dörfler and Madeleine O. Hosli

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the only global institution with the right to legally adopt binding resolutions for the maintenance of international peace and security, and to authorize the use of force to that end. Since the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, there have been debates about who should be represented in this institution. Adapting the institutional structure and decision-making procedures of the UNSC appears to be one of the most difficult challenges of the last decades. Several attempts have been unsuccessful, in spite of a range of major and well-prepared proposals. A large majority of UN members prefers reform, but deciding on an option to carry this out is intricate, mainly due to concerns about regional equality, efficiency and representation by individual member-states.

This chapter aims to explain the difficulties of UNSC reform, basing the analysis on path dependency approaches and insights from veto player analysis. This empirically oriented analysis shows two aspects: 1) possible compositions of the UNSC if current power indicators guided representation in this institution, and 2) preferences of UN member-states, as expressed by their governments, on UNSC reform. The analysis shows reasons for 'institutional stickiness' and highlights possible avenues for change. We first review selected work on institutional change and UNSC reform and provide an introduction to our theoretical framework. We then apply this to the UNSC and assess the need for reform on the basis of power change indicators between 1945 and the present. Finally, we analyse preferences of pivotal actors and assess whether potentially, a winning coalition supporting one of the reform proposals exists.

The challenge of Security Council reform

United Nations reform constitutes a complex challenge and has sparked intensive academic debate. Beigbeder (2011) shows how UN member-states perceived UN effectiveness over time and provides an overview of UN reform proposals in recent decades. While these proposals have prompted deliberation and some reform decisions, a lack of consensus has inhibited substantial, generally acceptable change on issues such as adapting the UNSC institutional structure. International law scholars have discussed the legal basis of UNSC authority and reform (Fassbender 2003; Blum 2005). Other authors focus on the UNSC reform process from a historical perspective (Morris 2000; Franda 2006; Volger 2008; Kugel 2009),

highlighting important developments such as the 2005 World Summit (e.g. Zifcak 2009: 14–37). An alternative approach focuses on actor perspectives and preferences, especially for those interested in gaining permanent representation (such as Japan, see Akiyama 2009), members of the permanent five (P-5) (Bourantonis 1998; on the Chinese perspective see Malik 2005), or the Non-Aligned Movement and the South (Bourantonis 1998; Zifcak 2009: 163–87).

United Nations Security Council reform has especially stimulated work from a political science perspective, such as on the legitimacy and legitimation of the UNSC in view of possible changes in its composition (Hurd 2002, 2008). Similarly, Voeten (2008) focuses on the role of the UNSC and implications of current arguments for its institutional design. Alexopoulos and Bourantonis (2008) apply veto player analysis to assess possible effects of changed UNSC compositions, suggesting that increased representation does not necessarily imply decreased efficiency. More empirically informed work on UNSC reform focusing on feasibility encompasses work such as Weiss (2005) and Weiss and Young (2005), who based their analysis on expert surveys of diplomats involved in the reform process.

Explaining institutional inertia: path dependency and veto players

The concept of path dependency is often attributed to the economists Arthur (1994) and David (1985), who challenged the proposition of neoclassical market efficiency (Beyer 2006: 14–15), and to North (1990), who essentially introduced a path dependency argument into the social sciences. Early discussions on path dependency mostly centred on the argument that chosen equilibriums do not necessarily constitute the most efficient solutions to a given problem (North 1990). However, for political actors, efficiency may be of secondary importance, due to the impact of power, norms, values, traditions and bounded rationality (Beyer 2006: 21). Pierson (2000a: 252–3; 2004: 54–78) further adapted the path dependency approach to a social science framework by emphasizing the importance of 'sequencing': events at the beginning of the sequence of institutional development are more important than developments later in the chain. Different sequences produce different outcomes and the history of events crucially matters.

Compared to economics, on the 'market of political institutions', corrective mechanisms such as price are less effective (Pierson 2000b: 489–90). Even when actors identify an inefficient political institution, adapting it requires overcoming several obstacles. Two such obstacles are actors' short time horizons and the status quo bias of institutions. Because of re-election constraints, political actors may have short time horizons and are more interested in short-term than long-term benefits. Actors thus stay on the same path, because changing it is expensive in the short run and may only create pay-offs in the long run.

In addition, political institutions are generally hard to adapt or even resist change. Two possible factors determine this status quo bias (Pierson 2000a: 261–2). First, to bind successors, designers aim to establish stable institutions. In the political world, actors are uncertain about future developments and must reasonably assume that political opponents may gain control over governmental responsibility in the future. As a safeguard, actors equip institutional arrangements with high thresholds for change to prevent the institution from being used against the preferences of its creators. In barring political opponents from the power to change the institution, however, they also forgo this option for themselves (Moe 1990: 125). Second, political actors are often required to bind themselves. A key finding of the literature on credible commitments is that actors have an interest in removing given options from their

menu (Pierson 2000b). Once excluded from political choice, they are unlikely to be part of the menu of options in the future.

Designers purposely agree on these high thresholds for change to create stable institutions. Many constitutions forgo certain adaptations completely as they grant veto rights to actors in need of special protection or privileges. This 'institutional stickiness' has profound implications for institutional change. 'Confronting the twin problems of time inconsistency and political uncertainty, designers may reasonably decide to make political institutions change-resistant' (Pierson 2000b: 491). If there is a need for institutional change, the threshold might be too high to implement it. Conversely, an institution may be less functional than intended due to underlying path dependency (Mahoney 2000: 519).

In terms of a concrete 'stability mechanism' (Beyer 2006), however, Pierson does not specifically establish a link between status quo biases and the prospect for institutional change, besides advising to focus on the decision-making threshold. Accordingly, insights from veto player analysis offer a way to extend Pierson's concept. According to Tsebelis (2002: 2), decision-making procedures empower certain actors to become 'veto players', namely those required to alter the status quo. Without their consent, institutional change is not possible. The constitutional provisions determining an institution's structure define the configuration of veto players. The prospect of successfully changing the status quo depends on the number of veto players and their preferences (i.e. their position towards the new policy). Thus, when analyzing the stability of institutional arrangements, the first step should focus on the decision-making procedure, and the second on actors empowered as veto players by the decision rule.

United Nations Security Council reform requires a two-thirds majority of UN states, plus consent of the P-5. A large majority of UN members rejects the current UNSC set-up, but a group of states does not necessarily benefit from reform and holds a privileged position in the decision process on such reform. In principle, every additional seat in a reformed UNSC implies a loss of power for the P-5: more non-permanent members increases the number of affirmative votes needed to adopt a resolution and new permanent members would weaken the power position of the P-5. A similar mechanism exists for other possible veto players: nearly all regional UN groupings (almost) constitute a blocking minority. A veto player will not support solutions that are suboptimal to the status quo.

Security Council reform: power, preferences and obstacles

The Allies and victors of the Second World War created and shaped the UN. The seat allocation in the UNSC reflected the global power distribution of 1945 (Morris 2000: 266–8). The applied criteria of population and territory, economic and military power, and intellectual resources, decreased the number of potential candidates for permanent membership to just a few Great Powers, which are the current P-5 (Fassbender 1998: 164; Klabbers 2010: 80–81). Provisions of the UN Charter detail the UNSC seat distribution, constituting the status quo after the 1966 enlargement (e.g. Weiss and Young 2005: 140). There are 15 members, of which five are permanent: the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, China and the Russian Federation (as the successor of the Soviet Union). The UN General Assembly (UNGA) elects the non-permanent UNSC members for two-year terms; immediate re-election is prohibited (UN Charter, Article 23). By adopting Resolution 1991A of 17 December 1963, the UNGA introduced an official regional distribution for non-permanent UNSC positions: three seats for Africa, two for Latin America, two for Asia, two for Western Europe and one for Eastern Europe. The general threshold for UNSC decisions is nine affirmative votes (UN Charter, Article 27).

Compared to the 1945 situation, the prevailing argument holds that the UNSC set-up no longer reflects a global power distribution (Zifcak 2009: 14). However, it is probably more difficult today to provide reasons for countries to become new permanent or non-permanent UNSC members. As we intend to show, if the power distribution has profoundly changed, we have to ask on what objective basis countries should be allocated seats in a potentially reformed UNSC. To assess this, we use Dahl's concept of power (cited in O'Neill 1997: 60): '[P]ower is the probability that one party can change another's behavior; that is, the probability it can get the other to do what it might not have done otherwise.' We use three indicators to operationalize this concept of power: population size, economic power expressed by gross domestic product (GDP), and the number of UN Conventions to which member-states are party as a measure reflecting adherence to international rules. All three indicators we employ arguably constitute sources of power on a global scale and are quantifiable in fairly straightforward ways.

To obtain insights into changed power distributions over time, we measure the indicators as follows. All three indicators are transformed into an ordinal ranking (for all UN states). To determine an aggregate value for a country's power position, we take the average position of the three rankings. However, as we are interested in a more qualitative assessment of the world's power distribution than an exact quantitative measurement, we regard the loss of information due to ordinal ranking as acceptable for the needs of this analysis. Moreover, we assume that all three indicators carry similar importance, and we therefore weigh them equally. Through this methodology, as the results in Annex 28.1 show, we can observe that only three of the P-5 are still among the five most powerful countries of the world. If the UNSC were created today, other countries, such as Germany, Italy or India would possibly be considered as permanent members.

If the UN Security Council were created today

On the basis of Annex 28.1, we create a model of the UNSC that would reflect the new power distributions. For this purpose, the first 25 countries in Annex 28.1 are included, as this approximately corresponds to the size of the UNSC that most of the recent reform proposals suggest. If the UNSC were created today, in terms of regional affiliations, it would possibly look as shown in Table 28.1.

In this assessment, Africa would only be allocated one seat (for Nigeria) and thus be represented less than it is currently. However, if other indicators were chosen for the ranking, like 'territory', 'cultural and intellectual resources' or 'raw materials', this pattern might obviously change. Populous states (e.g. China, India) and economically significant states (e.g. Australia, Japan and Korea) in Asia, as well as the Americas and Western Europe, would gain seats. Eastern Europe would slightly increase its representation as well. Moreover, the Middle East (currently only represented with one seat alternating between the Asian and the African group based on informal practice) would obtain two seats. If we consider only the first 15 countries in Annex 28.1 (indicated in bold in Table 28.1), Africa would receive no seat at all, and the general pattern of representation would shift towards Western Europe. Interestingly, all candidates mentioned in the major proposals for UNSC reform are indeed included in this list.

Based on our three indicators, after observing that the power distribution in the world has changed rather profoundly, we now assess whether our argument of path dependence may support this finding. First, we can observe that there is a difference between the UNSC status quo and the seat distribution of a hypothetical UNSC: from the five most powerful countries in 1945, only three are still in this position now. Europe and Asia have significantly gained

Table 28.1 A hypothetical set-up for the United Nations Security Council

	Africa	Asia incl. Oceania	America	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Middle East
UNSC seats according to hypothetical model	1	6	5	8	3	2
UN member-states	Nigeria	**China** **India** **Japan** Australia Philippines Korea (Rep.)	**Mexico** **Brazil** **USA** Canada Argentina	**Germany** **France** **Italy** **UK** **Spain** **Netherlands** Belgium Sweden	**Russian** **Federation** **Poland** Romania	**Turkey** Egypt
UNSC seats according to the status quo	3	3	3	4	2	–

Note: For results based on earlier indicators, see Dörfler (2009). Countries indicated in **bold** are among the first 15 countries in a 'global power ranking' based on three indicators (given in Annex 28.1).

importance according to our three indicators. America has also become more powerful in general terms, whereas Africa seems to have lost power. All three of the former 'enemy states' (Germany, Italy and Japan) are now, in fact, among the 15 most powerful countries in the world, but are not permanently represented in the UNSC. Therefore, the institution has not adapted to the shift in the global power distribution. The persistence of the 1945/1966 UNSC set-up seems to show the importance of status quo bias.

Closing the power gap?

There is a significant gap between the UN Charter's institutional arrangement designed to reflect the power distribution of 1945 and the current situation. Both the present regional seat distribution and the veto privilege would probably have no chance for success if the institution were established now. Can the 'power gap' be closed with specific proposals for reform? Since the creation of the UN there have been a number of reform efforts, among them proposals on how to adapt the composition of the UNSC (Hosli et al. 2011). Among the most prominent are former president of the UNSC, Ismail Razali's proposal (A/S1/47/Annex 11, 20 March 1997), the two proposals by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565, 2 December 2004: 66–9), and elaborating on these the proposals by the Group of Four (G4) (A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005), Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (A/59/L.68, 21 July 2005) and the African Union (AU) (A/59/L.67, 14 July 2005).

The major reform proposals, in terms of the total number of seats and type of UNSC membership (permanent or non-permanent), are shown in Table 28.2. First, concerning the size of a potentially reformed UNSC, enlargement proposals range from 24 to 26 states. A decisive (and divisive) issue is the category of these new seats. Some reform proposals suggest new permanent seats (up to six in practice), whereas others seek to increase the number of non-permanent seats exclusively. The AU proposal suggests extending veto rights to new permanent members, whereas other proposals do not touch upon this politically delicate theme. In addition

Table 28.2 Overview of reform proposals (by region)

	Africa	Asia	America	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Total
Status quo	0 / 3	1 / 2	1 / 2	2 / 2	1 / 1	15
Hypothetical Set-up (15)	0	4	3	6	2	15
Hypothetical Set-up (25)	1	8	5	8	3	25
Razali Plan	1 / 4	3 / 3	2 / 3	3 / 2	1 / 2	24
High-level Panel Model A	2 / 4	3 / 3	2 / 4	4 / 2		24
Group of Four	2 / 4	3 / 3	2 / 3	3 / 2	1 / 2	25
High-level Panel Model B	0 / 4 / 2	1 / 3 / 2	1 / 3 / 2	3 / 1 / 2		24
Uniting for Consensus	0 / 6	1 / 5	1 / 4	2 / 3	1 / 2	25
African Union	2 / 5	3 / 3	2 / 3	3 / 2	1 / 2	26

Source: Adapted from Dörfler (2009). Note: The first figure in each cell represents permanent seats; the second shows non-permanent (in Model B, the four-year non-permanent seats), and the third figure the two-year non-permanent seats. The AU proposal includes the veto for new permanent members. Model B and the UFC proposals abolish the prohibition of immediate re-election.

to this, the UFC as well as the Model B reform proposal suggest abolishing the prohibition of immediate re-election for non-permanent members. With this possibility for re-election, a country could belong to the UNSC for a longer time span, creating quasi-permanent seats.

The introduction of 'rotating' or 'regional' seats such as one for the EU is not part of any of the major reform proposals. Likewise, no proposal contains the limitation or abolition of the veto privilege of the P-5, possibly due to pragmatic reasoning expecting P-5 resistance. Finally, the future majority threshold is to be determined. The proposals reflected in Table 28.2 aim for a qualified majority of about 60 per cent of UNSC membership, i.e. a threshold comparable to the current arrangement (on effects of the threshold, see O'Neill 1997; Hosli et al. 2011).

Do the reform proposals 'fill the gap' due to the shifting global power distribution? Or do they lie somewhere between the status quo and today's global power balance? If the reform proposals reflect the current global power distribution, the institution can be expected to adapt to changes in its environment. If they are found to be between the status quo and the current power distribution, however (and hence some 'gap' still exists), the institutional development appears to be path-dependent.

The discrepancy between the reform proposals and the current power distribution, as assessed on the basis of our three indicators, is shown in Table 28.2. Africa, in all reform proposals, is rather over-represented compared to the actual global power distribution. This may partially be due to the indicators we use, which may not focus as much on other factors defining the relative strength of some African countries. In comparison, this assessment shows that both Asia and Europe are under-represented. America, however, would maintain about the same number of seats. As noted, none of the reform proposals touches upon the veto privilege or the position of the P-5. As shown earlier, two of the P-5 would not receive a veto right if the institution were created today. Altogether, the gap between the status quo and today's power distribution does not appear to be closed; at least not on the basis of the indicators used in our analysis.

Why is UNSC reform so difficult to achieve? An important issue seems to be the level of the decision-making threshold for institutional change. The threshold defines which actors are necessary to change the institution and conversely, who can block the decision to reform. Finally, we examine if a winning coalition could exist favouring a specific path for reform, given the current distribution of preferences of UN states. In order to change the size, composition, veto privileges and majority threshold applicable to the UNSC, the UN Charter text of Articles 23 and 27 has to be amended. To achieve this, the UN Charter could be altered in two ways. First, through the main provisions of Article 108, which require a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and ratification (Putnam 1988) by two-thirds of the UNGA, including the P-5. To date, however, the UN Charter has been amended only three times according to Article 108 (Simma 2002). The second possibility is prescribed in Article 109 of the UN Charter, stipulating that in addition to nine of the 15 UNSC members, two-thirds of the UNGA membership can convene a conference of UN member-states. All amendments adopted at such a conference can enter into force when two-thirds of the UNGA, as well as the P-5, have ratified the amendment. However, so far, Article 109 of the UN Charter has never been applied in practice (ibid.).

In short, a Charter amendment requires a two-thirds majority in the UNGA, as well as the approval of the P-5, which hold a veto on any amendment. As there is a general tendency in the UN to work within the framework of regional groupings, it is important to focus on these entities to assess the decisive actors needed for a reform proposal to succeed. With 193 states, the two-thirds majority threshold in the UNGA amounts to 129 votes; accordingly, 65 UN member-states can form a blocking minority.

The distribution of shares in total UNGA votes for the five official UN regional groups is important for assessing the likelihood that specific proposals can be adopted (assuming the regional groups vote fairly cohesively in the UNGA). The African group currently constitutes about 28.2 per cent of total UNGA membership. Similarly, the Asian group holds about 27.6 per cent. Accordingly, both of these regional groupings are almost able to form a blocking minority by themselves within the UNGA. The other three regional groupings – Latin America and the Caribbean (17.2 per cent), Western Europe and Others (15.1 per cent), and Eastern Europe (12.0 per cent) – have a combined share of about 44 per cent of UNGA membership. Likewise, a coalition of the 'Latin American and Caribbean' and the 'Western Europe and Others' group has a combined share of almost 33 per cent in the UNGA. Even in the case that all other regional groupings in the UNGA are united in support of a proposal, however, the Asian group, the Western European and Others Group, and the Eastern European Group each have at least one of the P-5 members with veto power in their group.[1]

The analysis of potential obstacles to reform necessitates a focus on all potential veto players according to the provisions of the UN Charter. Clearly, the potential veto players are all of the P-5 and the large UN regional groups, but there are also informal groups spanning several regions. In practice, the sponsors of each of the reform proposals aim to gather a large number of supporting nations – partially across the boundaries of the existing regional groupings. For example, the supporters of the major reform proposals, the G4 and UFC respectively, encompass several countries from different continents. The contents of these proposals, and respective support in terms of shares in UN membership, are discussed in the following sections.

Preferences and prospects for reform

To systematically assess UN member-state preferences on UNSC reform, we first employ a data collection issued by the Center for UN Reform Education.[2] This document, from

8 December 2008, contains structured information on member-state preferences for UNSC reform, but data are missing for a large number of UNGA members. In order to get a more complete assessment of member-states' positions on UNSC reform, we studied a compilation of statements from member-state representatives in a UN context, as provided on the Reform the UN website (http://www.reformtheun.org). In addition, to obtain information on the preferences of particularly important states for the reform process on the three major dimensions of contestation concerning UNSC reform (e.g. the P-5), we have analysed the websites of their Permanent Missions to the UN. For countries for which data were still lacking, we substituted missing information with the preferences of closely affiliated groups. Accordingly, in the case of African countries for which we lacked information, for example, we substituted their preference profile with that of the official AU position (i.e. the AU proposal). The same procedure was used to substitute missing country preferences for the G4 and UFC supporters, as well as for smaller groups of states, such as those belonging to the Caribbean Community.

Generally, however, it was quite difficult to update and complete the information in the spreadsheet provided by the Center for UN Reform Education, partly due to the use of diplomatic language in official statements. Many UN members do not openly state which solution they actually prefer, partly due to negotiation dynamics, especially those attempts to prevent negotiations from turning away from their own preferred positions. In official statements, UN member-states often hide behind general claims, such as the need for a 'more equal geographical representation' or the demand for a 'consensus decision' instead of 'hasty majority decisions'. Finally, some UN states do not necessarily benefit from a reformed UNSC – e.g. because they are too small to be considered potentially legitimate members of the UNSC or do not participate in the discourse on UNSC reform at all – and it therefore remains unclear what coalition they would support if a vote on UNSC reform were to be taken.

Nonetheless, after a search for respective information (notably on the basis of official statements), a majority of positions was assembled for the three dimensions that we consider as major areas of contestation and on which major reform proposals vary (see also Dörfler 2009). These dimensions are: 1) the size of the enlarged UNSC, 2) the categories of (new) seats and 3) the veto issue. The actual data coverage for the different dimensions analysed here, with the second dimension split into two subcategories, is as follows: 55 per cent coverage in terms of UN member-state preferences for the future size of the UNSC, 79 per cent for the aspect of permanent seats and 77 per cent for non-permanent seats, and 56 per cent as regards UN member-state positions on veto power. In order to assess prospects for UNSC reform, it is important to evaluate this information in terms of the contents of member-state preferences. Subsequently, on the basis of our data set on UNSC reform, we will show the aggregate values in terms of membership support for specific UNSC reform proposals.

The size of a reformed UN Security Council

Regarding the size of the enlarged UNSC (see Figure 28.1), we can observe two major groups of countries supporting the option of either 25 or 26 seats. Interestingly, inbetween these two groups are other states that would accept either 25 or 26 seats. Clearly, a solution for a UNSC consisting of 25 or 26 members has strong global support. In fact, in our analysis, we find only three UN member-states that prefer the considerably smaller size of the current 15, or the option of 21 members. Similarly, we only have two countries in our data collection that publicly support the option of a UNSC consisting of more than 26 members. Hence, 26 is likely to constitute a *de facto* maximum for a reformed UNSC.

Figure 28.1 Preferred size of an enlarged UN Security Council

According to our data, in contrast to the majority of UN member-states, the P-5 tend to favour (if at all) an increase by only a few seats based on arguments related to UNSC efficiency. In general, from the perspective of the P-5, the UNSC works well and every reform would weaken their power position as enshrined in the UN Charter (Zifcak 2009: 25–6). Although the difference in terms of the number of seats compared to today's constellation might only be about five, such a change is quite important for the P-5; in the current system, they only need four more votes by non-permanent UNSC members to adopt a resolution. With a more significant UNSC enlargement to 25 members, an additional ten votes would be needed. Whether this is easy or more difficult to achieve, however, also depends on the preference constellation of (future) members of the UNSC (Alexopoulos and Bourantonis 2008).

New permanent and new non-permanent seats

As regards the categories of potential new UNSC seats, it is important to distinguish between support for new *permanent* and new *non-permanent* seats. Figure 28.2 shows the distribution of UN member-state preferences on this issue, in terms of cumulative figures.

Figure 28.2 Introduction of new permanent seats (cumulative values)

Figure 28.3   Introduction of new non-permanent seats

Our data show a collection of 133 states generally supporting the creation of new permanent seats, with the AU as the largest unified group demonstrating a clear preference on this issue. The second largest support group with a similar position to the AU is the G4. Together these groups combine a vote share of about 40 per cent of UNGA membership. Another, less unified group supporting the introduction of new permanent seats consists of states not affiliated with one of these two groups. If we provide a cumulative value for all states generally preferring the creation of new permanent seats in the UNSC (Figure 28.2), we see that a two-thirds majority is already in place. By comparison, the group of states rejecting the introduction of new permanent seats is quite small, encompassing only 20 states. Opposition to the introduction of new permanent seats stems largely from countries supporting the UFC proposal.

Concerning the introduction of new non-permanent seats, as Figure 28.3 demonstrates, there is clear support for UNSC enlargement. This result is unsurprising, as most states generally agree on the idea of a larger UNSC, and even states opposing new permanent seats tend to favour enlargement within the non-permanent category.

Nonetheless, we have to distinguish between states preferring a smaller increase in non-permanent seats (such as the proposals of the G4 or the AU) and those favouring a larger increase in the non-permanent membership category but no increase in permanent membership (this notably applies to the UFC group). On this dimension, we also find a small number of UN states favouring the creation of a new category of seats (either as 'semi-permanent' members for larger states, or another, special category for smaller UN members).

The veto privilege

Finally, in terms of the veto privilege, we find more variation in member-state preferences, as Figure 28.4 demonstrates. This is due to the many options for the role of a veto within a reformed UNSC, including limitation, abolition, or expansion of, veto privileges.

As Figure 28.4 shows, three groups can be discerned in terms of divisions on this issue. The supporters of the G4 propose no expansion of the veto privilege to new permanent members and do not challenge the privileged position of the P–5, probably to avoid P–5 opposition. In contrast, the African Union group aims to implement an extension of the veto right to new permanent members (which would, according to their own proposal, be countries

Figure 28.4 The veto issue

from the African continent). A third group, as Figure 28.4 shows, generally prefers to decrease the importance of the veto privilege, which, according to members of this group, constitutes an unjustified and anachronistic phenomenon. Members in this category propose to either limit the veto privilege to certain issues, such as Chapter VII resolutions, or abolish it entirely. Overall, rational motivations seem to drive UN member-states' positions, as many generally seek to marginalize the issue of the veto privilege, knowing that the P-5 would block suggestions to abolish the veto. Therefore, these states either scale down their position (as within the proposal of the G4), or argue, for example, that if the veto is not to be abolished or limited, it should at least not be extended to new permanent members. Overall, however, none of the groups is getting close to achieving a significant majority position on this dimension. Accordingly, this is the most divisive issue for UNSC reform.

Clearly, reform proposals for the UNSC face steep hurdles to acceptance. But on some dimensions of contestation, a necessary majority may already be in place. Notably, the murky issue of veto rights and their potential application in the future as well as the question of which countries should qualify to become new (permanent) UNSC members seem to divide UN membership. For various reasons, shown here and elsewhere, reform of the UNSC is very difficult to achieve, but by focusing attention on specific aspects of preference heterogeneity within the UNGA, a compromise solution could still be in reach.

Conclusion

This chapter aims to explain the difficulty of UNSC reform, by drawing on insights from path dependency approaches, complemented by veto player theory. The UNSC in its current composition is not based on power positions in the international system. However, institutional provisions for UN Charter reform specify a high hurdle for UN Charter amendments (O'Neill 1997; Sutterlin 1997: 163) and grant a veto player position to the P-5 and two of the largest UN regional groupings. Accordingly, the decision-making procedure for UN Charter amendment and the empowerment of veto players greatly influences prospects for UNSC reform, and poses a major obstacle to possible change.

In analyzing potential support for the size of an enlarged UNSC, we observe a large number of states preferring enlargement of the UNSC to 25 or 26 states. Concerning the seat categories, a majority of states supports the creation of new permanent seats, and a large majority an increase in non-permanent seats. Regarding the veto privilege, however, member-state preferences are more heterogeneous: some states favour an extension of the veto; some propose no change; and finally, some demand abolishing or at least limiting the veto privilege. Accordingly, this may be the most contentious and divisive issue that needs to be settled.

Altogether, UNSC reform still requires a draft text that would combine the preferences and positions mentioned here. The chair of the 'intergovernmental negotiations' on UNSC reform, Zahir Tanin, issued a basis for this on 10 May 2010. Since then, several text-based negotiations have taken place. The major challenge is to include the preferences of different majorities into one single draft text that meets the two-thirds majority requirement and has the support of the P-5, which excludes finding a compromise in a step-by-step fashion. It remains to be seen whether UN member-states will be able to consolidate their diverging preferences in favour of a compromise solution that would overcome the many obstacles for reform.

Recommended for further reading

Hurd (1997), O'Neill (1997) and Weiss and Young (2005).

Annex 28.1 The global distribution of power: ranking on the basis of three indicators

Rank	Member-state	Population	GDP	UN Conventions member-state is party to	Mean value of ranks	Years served on UNSC (in % of total eligibility)
1	Germany	15	4	14	11,00	25.0
2	France	21	5	10	12,00	PM
3	Russian Fed.	9	11	26	15,33	PM
4	Italy	23	8	16	15,67	20.7
5	UK	22	6	19	15,67	PM
6	China	1	2	49	17,33	PM
7	India	2	9	41	17,33	20.6
8	Spain	28	12	13	17,67	13.8
9	Mexico	11	14	32	19,00	10.3
10	Brazil	5	7	56	22,67	29.4
11	US	3	1	69	24,33	PM
12	Poland	34	20	20	24,67	13.2
13	Turkey	18	17	43	26,00	10.3
14	Japan	10	3	65	26,00	35.1
15	Netherlands	60	16	2	26,00	13.2
16	Canada	37	10	37	28,00	17.6
17	Australia	51	13	29	31,00	11.8
18	Nigeria	7	43	49	33,00	15.1
19	Argentina	33	27	42	34,00	23.5
20	Philippines	12	44	47	34,33	8.8
21	Belgium	75	21	8	34,67	14.7
22	Egypt	16	38	56	36,67	10.3

23	Sweden	86	22	7	38,33	9.0
24	Korea (Rep.)	25	15	76	38,67	9.1
25	Romania	52	48	18	39,33	12.1

Notes: For results based on earlier indicators, see Dörfler (2009).

Data sources:

Population as of 2010 and *GDP* (2010, in USD): World Bank data, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

Number of UN Conventions a member-state is party to (as of 2012): UN Treaty Series Database, UN Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org. This indicator includes all 'multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General' containing the word 'Convention' in its title.

Years served on the UNSC: UN and UNSC websites; the indicator gives the percentage of years served in relation to the number of years the state was eligible. PM = permanent member.

The values for *Population, GDP* and *UN Conventions* show member-state is party to the country ranks in the respective category; the average value is calculated as the mean of these rankings.

Notes

1   For respective data see the UN website http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups. shtml. The total number of UN member states is 193; Kiribati is currently not a member of any regional group. Africa includes South Sudan; Asia excludes Kiribati; the group Western Europe and Others includes the US (formally an observer), and includes Israel. Due to rounding, the percentages do not add up to exactly 100.
2   This data set is available at www.centerforunreform.org/node/377

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The need for rethinking the United Nations

Modernizing through civil society

John E. Trent

The opening line of the frontispiece of Scholte's *Building Global Democracy?* (2011) is: "The scale, effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance lag far behind the world's needs"; the closing plea: "Pressing global challenges are crying out for more global governance" (Scholte 2011: i, 342). Malloch-Brown (2011: 241) argues for strengthening international institutions "because the world needs to have rules in place that allow for peaceful adjustments between states . . . We all now live in an underregulated hell where deteriorating earth, rivers, oceans, and climate go unchecked . . . We share the impact globally, but the solutions remain blocked at the national level." These eloquent calls for the transformation of international institutions, especially the United Nations (UN), are two recent examples of recognition that the world cannot long continue the way it is without facing calamity. If one asks people what they consider to be the world's worst problems, almost everyone has some idea: global warming, fiscal crises, terrorism, inequality, international mafias, pollution, or pandemics. The list is endless. But the one thing they do not mention is the common denominator to all these global demons: the fact that humanity does not have the appropriate institutions for making authoritative decisions to resolve them. Hence, they—we—need to rethink the UN.

It is hypothesized here that humanity cannot afford a Third World War or some similar calamity before creating new world institutions. Therefore we have to find mechanisms and leaders for an institution-building process. Using a process of elimination, I eventually propose that civil society is likely to be the best source of leadership for modernizing the UN. Scholte's (2011: 311) research on civil society organizations (CSOs) concludes: "Since the late 1990s, a general consensus has prevailed that CSOs are rightly involved in transplanetary regulation." To know what we are talking about raises the problem of terminology. The first section shows that much of a practical nature hangs on our choice and definition of concepts. The second section briefly traces the historical developments of both international organizations (IOs) and international non–governmental organizations (INGOs). The third section considers the nature of the relationships between global civil society and international institutions to date. The final section strives to present a workable process for the creation of new global institutions.

Concepts signify more than words

The Civicus Civil Society Index Project defines civil society as "the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests" (Heinrich and Fioramonti 2008: xxx). The collective term "civil society" is used here in its general sense to cover associational life in national and international NGOs. At the international level, some NGOs (this term now includes INGOs) are organizations formed to *advocate* a particular cause such as human rights, peace, and environmental protection. Others are established to *provide services* such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and development assistance. Scholars distinguish between not-for-profit associations and for-profit corporations. It is also common to treat terrorist, criminal, and drug-trafficking groups separately, sometimes referred to as the "dark side" of civil society or un-civil society (ibid.: xiii).

The term is enjoying such extensive usage that we must be more definitive about its intended use. Two surveys (Keane 2003; Edwards 2004) have shown that it is being used in three different, sometimes overlapping ways: analytical-descriptive, strategic (or public policy), and normative. The "analytical" trend studies the composition of civil society which it sees as forms of associational life that are "a part of society distinct from states and markets" aimed at advancing common interests and facilitating collective action. It includes all associations and networks except firms and un-civil organizations. There is no assumption of a common political agenda or a normative consensus. The "strategic" or public sphere school of thought sees civil society as "an arena for public deliberation, rational dialogue, and the exercise of active citizenship in the pursuit of the common interest," especially in democracy and development. The third usage represents sets of theories that define civil society in "normative" terms as "the realm of service rather than self-interest and a breeding ground for attitudes and values like cooperation, trust, tolerance and non-violence," a different way of being that is identified as "civil" (Edwards 2004: vii–viii).

To get a real feel for the meaning of "civil society" it is worth going back to its East and West European origins in the 1980s. Kaldor (2003: 50–63) relates how, following the 1975 Helsinki Accords, Central European intellectuals brought together goals of peace and human rights as a basis for a new concept of civil society. This would include notions of autonomous public spaces within society, self-organization, solidarity, non-violence, individual dissidence, civic initiatives in a sea of apathy, a counter power that cannot take and does not want power, proud and responsible members of the *polis* making genuine contributions to the creation of its destiny, parliamentary democracy but also workplace democracy and local and global democracy, and especially reaction to the overbearing and paternalistic state. No formal definition can quite capture this real essence of what inspires civil society. In the UN, however, people often refer to civil society *and* NGOs. In part this is because the UN traditionally dealt with NGOs. Civil society has been an add-on to allow for the fact that the UN has come to include in civil society not only associational life but also other categories with similar autonomous, self-activated characteristics, such as scholars, faith-based groups, unions, the media, social movements, and other grassroots groupings.

"Globalization" and "global governance" very much form the context in which multilateralism is evolving and to which the reform of IOs must respond. Mukherjee and Krieckhaus's (2012: 150) survey of the literature shows that globalization

> refers to diverse processes, including greater mobility of capital, goods, and services as well as the diffusion of ideas, norms, and faster and easier modes of communication and

transport. Thus globalization is a multidimensional concept that has economic, social, cultural, political and environmental dimensions, among others.

Karns and Mingst (2010: 22–3) say the main question is how globalization will be governed. They point out that it increases integration and interdependence but also disintegrates through greater conflictual divisions. It has both beneficial and detrimental effects and not all countries are affected equally. Among its negative effects are growing inequality, environmental degradation, and child labor. Fuchs and Kratochwil (2002: 232) conclude that the reality of globalization and global governance is much more complicated than overly optimistic evaluations suggest.

Global governance includes "those procedures and practices that exist at the world or regional level for the management of political, economic and social affairs" (Knight 2005: 17). It is the cooperation of those with shared goals. This definition is in line with what might be considered the "original" one by the Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2):

> The sum of the ways individual and institution, public and private manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal and informal arrangements. Various international institutions can be responsible for organizing particular spheres of multilateral action. It can take place at different locales and as it evolves it can be understood to include non-state actors and to cover global issues by establishing authoritative rules and procedures to govern interaction among multiple forces.

Scholte (2011: 8) has shortened the definition to: "A complex of rules and regulatory institutions that apply to transplanetary jurisdictions and constituencies." It is not the same thing as government which is centralized, public and has the formal authority to enforce its decisions. For shorthand, it is governance without government. Compliance is the key to ascertaining its presence (Rosenau 2002).

The problem with global governance is that it is a slithery term. Because of its vapidness it is less offensive to some ears, but it is without essential meaning and does not set any goals for the world community. As Weiss (2009: 227–8) puts it:

> Although global governance may be a good heuristic devise for understanding today's world, I am beginning to feel uncomfortable about its lack of prescriptive power in pointing where we should be headed and what we should be doing. We require more creative thinking about the absolute necessity for more robust intergovernmental institutions.

A short history of international organizations and NGOs

Many studies of the UN assume that it, like the League of Nations, was founded in reaction to the crisis of a world war. Their founding responded only to that war and the experience immediately preceding it. There is some truth in this assumption, but it is far from being the whole truth. This "big bang" theory of the origins of IOs is being supplemented by an "evolutionary" theory that places the roots of international institutions at the beginning of the nineteenth century rather than the twentieth.

Studies by Reinsch (1911), Lyons (1963), Claude (1966), Charnovitz (1997), Archer (2001), Schemeil (2003), Reinalda (2009), and Karns and Mingst (2010) make it possible to

"tease out" the steps in the creation of international institutions; that is, multilateral processes (the holding of international conferences), public international unions (like the Universal Postal Union), NGOs (like Transparency International) and IOs (like the UN). Between 1840 and 1914 there were nearly 3,000 international gatherings. We learn of the anti-slavery movement in the beginning of the 1800s, the founding of the Red Cross in the 1860s, and that by 1900 there were 425 peace societies throughout the world (Charnovitz 1997). More than 450 private IOs were created between 1815 and 1915. The number of governmental IOs increased from seven in 1874 to 37 in 1909 (Lyons 1963: 12; *Yearbook of International Organizations* 1974, 15, Tables 1 and 2).

It all started with the Congress of Vienna and the founding of the Concert of Europe in 1815. This peace treaty ending the Napoleonic Wars included a major power alliance (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia) to which other states could adhere. It was the first ongoing multilateral rather than bilateral accord. As a "security regime," it held regular meetings on common interests. It developed preventative diplomacy, as well as consultations, common rules and monitoring. The Concert met more than 30 times up until the Berlin Conference in 1878. Still operating as separate states, they developed a framework of rules and consultations without a formal organization, but created a special status for the great powers which eventually ended up as the present Security Council with the "Permanent Five" and their veto at the UN.

Public international unions were developed in a series of conferences mainly in functional areas such as the post and telegraphy. They were called "unions" in the same sense as the "European Union" means the bringing together of states to cooperate within a number of concrete policy domains. It was the experience of these unions that created international functionaries, experimented with conferences, set standards, and empowered individual participants as well as governments. Evidence suggests that in IOs, innovation often results from debate originating in the conferences of scientific, technical, and humanistic communities. Philosophical ideals play a leading role in inspiring pragmatic policies. Discussing intellectual, universalistic propositions forces people to take sides in the debates; debating in turn leads to organizations; informal exchanges transform themselves into official preparatory meetings; and publicly made commitments tie the hands of those who make them (Schemeil 2003: 12, 17). The conferencing process creates a temporary equality among unequals, and encourages the sort of open discussion that often gives rise to innovation. Governments also learned that the tentative, experimental nature of exploratory international meetings helped to minimize the domestic costs to politicians of desirable international innovations (Murphy 1994: 61–2).

International private conferences and movements—for instance, in 1868 Mary Goegg founded an international women's organization that initiated an international movement—allowed inspired private citizens to take their new right of participation seriously on issues such as the abolition of slavery, promotion of peace, and improved labor conditions. Non-governmental organizations recognized their abilities to influence governments, and governments learned the benefits of their expertise and societal support (Charnovitz 1997: 212; Reinalda 2009).

The growth of international law and organizations in the nineteenth century, the great impetus given to them by private individuals and associations, and the intertwining of governmental and non-governmental actors were forerunners of things to come. In the present circumstances, where advances in technology and communications have run well ahead of the capacity of governments to cope with them, we must think once again how citizens and their NGOs can help transform the global system. In the 1800s, European

governments were torn between their desire for sovereign independence and the require-
ments of technological, economic, and social cooperation. They were becoming enmeshed in
the industrial revolution with all its new means of transport and communications. They could
not ignore each other. Demands of efficiency and effectiveness required the help of the exper-
tise that had grown up around public conferences in order to staff the new organizations
needed to structure the agreements reached at the meetings. The new industrialists pressured
their governments to provide continent-wide systems of stable security for their investments
(Trent 2007: 29). A prime illustration of the potential role of individuals and groups in
developing IOs was Leonard Woolf, founder of the Fabian Society. His Fabian Committee
plan called for an international high court, a council of states, and an international secretariat
and sanctions as tools to prevent war. All of these found their way into the League Covenant
(Archer 2001: 132).

Though environmental conditioning and evolutionary development are important
elements of international innovation, they alone cannot explain the creation and the nature
of the League and the UN. Archer (2001: 17) believes that the League was not fashioned by
the ideas of seventeenth-century writers, but by the immediate experience of wartime coop-
eration. "Whilst schemes abounded for innovations, the statesmen present at the Paris
Conference drew heavily on their own experience of co-operation in the war and of previous
institutional developments." Earlier, I alluded to the hypothesis that growth and innovation
in international institutions took their impetus both from the logic of evolution (the "evolu-
tionary" theory) and from the necessities and lessons inspired by world crises (the "big bang"
theory). The statesmen molding the new League found that the plans before them
relied heavily on the experience of the previous hundred years. But, they also had the
wartime experience on their minds. One side of the coin was the previous effort to prevent
the collapse of international relations into general war, the other side was the Allied coopera-
tion during the war (Archer 2001: 15). The League itself was certainly a seedbed for more
"centralized and systematic" world relationships. Archer (2001: 21–4) claims that in some
ways, the founding of the UN resembled the creation of the League in that "the wartime
cooperation was crucial in determining the institutions and aims". Thus, the great power
cooperation became a model for the Security Council dominated by the Permanent Five
(P5). The founders looked to recent experience for their models. The secretariats of the
International Labor Organization and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency provided
examples for a UN secretary-general and secretariat with executive prerogatives as well as
administrative ones.

But ideas also came from the outside. At the founding of the UN, 1,200 voluntary associa-
tions were largely responsible for the inclusion of education and human rights in the relevant
chapters of the Charter and for the specific provisions for NGO consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Schlesinger 2003: 122–6).

Changing civil societies' relations with international organizations

Since the 1990s there has been a plethora of studies on the growing role of NGOs and civil
society in global politics. Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kaldor (2003), Keane (2003), Edwards
(2004), Tarrow (2005), Heinrich and Fioramonti (2007), and Scholte (2011) look at the influ-
ence of their advocacy "beyond borders" in "restructuring" world politics. Citing numerous
studies between 2000 and 2002, Keane shows there were an estimated 5,000 world congresses
held annually and some 50,000 not-for-profit NGOs operating internationally. Nearly 90
percent of them had been formed since the 1970s. Worldwide, they employ several millions

of people and could count on the volunteer labor of as many more. Many have larger staffs and budgets than the UN agencies with which they deal (Keane 2003: 5). The take-off period started in the mid-1960s, even in developing countries. For instance, Africa's share of country memberships in INGOs doubled from 8 to 16 percent (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 32).

The debate over civil society has been waxing fast and furious. Some see it as an adjunct to international democratic and cosmopolitan life (Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998). Others are more critical, noting the lack of resources and access in large parts of the globe, the imbalance of resources between civil society and corporations and states, and a lack of democratic credentials, transparency, and accountability of many civil society actors. Although there has been considerable growth in civil society in the Global South, this has not overcome critics who maintain that NGO activism tends to strengthen the influence of developed countries to the point that "current governance efforts at the global level have a club quality" (Fuchs and Kratochwil 2002: 235). There is also recognition that in civil society there are dangers of cooptation, of "privatization by stealth," of exaggeration of political importance, of "loonies and paranoids," and of a narrowness of purpose and constituency that can lead to illegitimacy, corruption, lack of accountability and external dependence (Edwards 2004: 1–17). Given both this potential and its limits, Edwards (ibid.: 111) maintains that associational life is a handmaiden to much broader change. The essence of civil society is collective action: "The determination to do something because it is the right thing to do, not because we are told to do it by governments or enticed to do it by the market, is what makes associational life for good."

The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 32–5) pointed out that up until the last two decades, governments and intergovernmental institutions were the main actors in international relations. But NGOs, INGOs, citizens' movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass media have also taken their place on the international stage as part of an emerging global civil society. Civil society organizations fulfill many functions: channeling the interests and energies of many associations outside government, offering knowledge, skills, enthusiasm, a non-bureaucratic approach, expertise, a grassroots perspective, voluntary contributions, administrative efficiency, and flexibility: attributes not always found in governmental institutions. For these and other reasons, some 3,000 INGOs have consultative status in the ECOSOC and attend UN summits on an *ad hoc* basis, some having been accorded "major group" status. Even so, as an international partner, "it is seldom feasible for them to present a united front. Sometimes, the very number of small and often fragmented organizations inhibits agreement on common positions" (Strong 2000: 338).

The role of NGO advocates is a political one according to Karns and Mingst (2010: 236): to "exercise influence over government positions and IGO policies and programs, NGOs need access and recognition of their right to be consulted, lobby, participate, provide data, and even vote." This they gradually have won to differing degrees. Non-governmental organizations with the broadest access may consult with officers from the UN Secretariat, place items on agendas in ECOSOC and functional commissions, attend meetings, submit statements and make oral presentations with permission. Arrangements are made by the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Relationship with ECOSOC (CONGO) and by an NGO liaison office located in Geneva. After 1997 even the Security Council permitted consultations, so several NGOs created a Working Group on the Security Council which meets periodically, off the record, with the Council's president. One may account for the increased influence of NGOs not just because of their range and the utility of the multiple functions they perform for states and IGOs, but for several more profound reasons.

The first has been the increasing number of access points, not just within the sprawling institutions but also with the increasing number of UN-sponsored global conferences. "This open process, created thanks to friendly diplomats and helpful Secretariat officials enabled NGOs to participate actively in the shaping of conference results, by offering innovative ideas, coordinating joint advocacy, using media skillfully, and practicing savvy diplomacy" (Paul 2011: 3). The first Rio Conference on Environment and Development (1992) created a specialized forum, which attracted 1,400 NGOs. Three years later, 35,000 NGO representatives attended the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. They were better equipped than governments to deal with the issues and even got themselves invited to help with the implementation of conference outcomes.

Second, the communications revolution (fax, Internet, e-mails, social media) has allowed NGOs to be the first to communicate with partners, enhance services, and shape public perceptions. "What is inescapable now are the density, size and professionalism of NGO networks that have emerged as prime movers, framing issues and agendas, mobilizing constituencies in targeted campaigns, and monitoring compliance" (Karns and Mingst 2010: 235). As Keck and Sikkink (1998: x) put it, "transnational networks multiply the voices that are heard in international and domestic politics."

Civil society became particularly adept at using "coalition campaigns" to alter the course of international relations. In 1999, after six years of assiduous efforts by more than a thousand organizations in 60 countries which had managed to attract the support of a number of middle powers, the International Treaty to Ban Landmines was adopted at Ottawa. On the judicial front, supranationalism embedded itself in the legal details of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the first new international institution since the founding of the UN system. In 1995, Bill Pace of the World Federalists initiated the Coalition for an International Criminal Court of more than 800 associations spanning the world which "helped to midwife the birth of the new institution" (Paris 2008: 250).

All this started to change around 2000. During the 1990s, what with civil society's growing access to the UN, its ever-growing presence at global conferences, its mastery of the Internet and media, the personal effectiveness of its executives and the noise it made at street demonstrations, the traditional "authorities" began to be more and more alarmed by the space taken by it. While it was never an open campaign, states, business, IGOs, and churches started to move back to the status quo *ante* and exert their authority. "Those who predicted a steady path upward of civil society influence at the UN proved to be wrong . . . States have remained strong primary actors and they have become less tolerant of civil society and the 'democratic opening' in international affairs in the 1980s and 90s" (Paul 2011: 2).

Global South governments were suspicious that NGOs were becoming a growing, radical opposition and an aid to Northern governments with their incessant demands. Citing security threats, in 1999 the UN first impeded NGO passage through the perimeter security barrier and then took away NGO access to the second floor of their Conference Building where the entrances to the Security Council and ECOSOC are located and also the delegates' lounge: the most useful points for meeting and lobbying. Member-states were reacting more and more defensively against human rights critics, environmental advocates, and women's campaigners. Following sharp attacks by the United States against the "unproductive, expensive, pie-in-the-sky meetings" (Paul 2011: 7), the UN abandoned the high-level conferences. The last ones were held in 2002 and the shorter, smaller replacements and preparatory meetings were crafted to keep NGO participation at a minimum.

In 2000, Kofi Annan set up a Global Compact, a program to draw major corporations into relations with the UN. This was followed up by a wave of "partnerships" with private

companies and a series of meetings, so that corporate agenda setting continuously weakened NGO influence. Faith-based groups also began to appear more frequently and helped lead a conservative counter-attack against UN resolutions on reproductive health and women's rights. National delegates at the UN started to accuse NGOs of being unrepresentative, whereas their elected authorities represent citizens. Non-governmental organizations were accused of being self-interested, profligate, and acting just like any other actors. A handful of large INGOs tend to dominate most issue areas. On other issues, the all too numerous NGOs tend to cancel each other out with conflicting demands. When Annan set up the Cardoso Panel to report on UN–NGO relations, its 2004 report "showed scant understanding of the issues of most concern to civil society" (Paul 2011: 9). But it did manage to propose a new "multi-constituencies dialogue" which would drown NGOs in a sea of corporations, religions, local governments, and parliamentarians. The events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing "war on terror" led governments to set aside human rights protections, while the establishment of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre with its 75,000 participants drew NGO attention away from the UN. By 2009 there were reports that countries were placing prohibitions on NGO exchanges of knowledge, expertise, and finances across borders, and, as in Canada, attacking them as radical foreigners.

There is evidence that civil society is taking its critics and its limits to heart. The Civicus Civil Society Index undertook an in-depth, critical-constructive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of civil society in 54 countries between 2003 and 2006. It was an evidence-based and participatory assessment of the state of civil society in countries (Volume 1, 2007) and on a comparative basis (Volume 2, 2008). Civicus recognizes that civil society is a political phenomenon, engages in political terrain, and is highly dependent for its survival on a conducive political context (Heinrich and Fioramonti 2007, 2008). The editors then ask themselves how civil society might counteract the negative consequences of the greater influence and growing integration of large CSOs into governance processes. Experience has shown that they have been most successful when in wide coalitions of NGOs, faith-based organizations, progressive unions, and social movements. They also work well when they recognize the need to assert their legitimacy through transparent, self-critical, and accountable behavior. Most of all, civil society must concentrate on its core functions of giving voice to the marginalized and keeping watch on those in power (Heinrich and Fioramonti 2008: 381–7).

Scholte gave another detailed study of the extent to which civil society activities have made global regulatory institutions more answerable to the people. His general conclusions are that civil society activities over recent decades have made some contributions to greater transparency, consultation, and evaluation for more accountable global governance. Significantly, the best results have been achieved when associations have worked collectively in coalitions. However, improvements have remained modest and marginalized constituencies have not been served equally. The modest achievements are explained by a combination of weak personal qualities of activists; structural problems of resources, organization, and staffing; and by lingering statism and the forces of capitalism (Scholte 2011: 341–2).

Furthermore, CSOs have decided to take the bull by the horns in order to improve their coordination and accountability, especially to counter criticisms in the field of development. Following a worldwide series of country and sectoral meetings, a group of 29 widely representative CSO groupings came together in 2010 to create the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. Its objectives are the creation of an open process to bring together CSOs, preparation of a CSO vision of development effectiveness, agreement on common principles, documentation of good practices, and an accord on minimum standards. All this led to the adoption of the Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles at the Forum's

Global Assembly in 2010 (http://www.cso-effectiveness.org). These principles include the respect and promotion of human rights and social justice, gender equality, democracy, peoples' empowerment and participation, and environmental sustainability through practices that are transparent and accountable and work through equitable partnerships that promote knowledge sharing and lasting change.

Thus, civil society must choose its battles and rally its forces to have decisive influence in the UN. Nevertheless, Paul (2011) concludes that citizen movements of many kinds are rising to challenge official orthodoxies and search for real change. In a strange twist, the 2012 Rio+20 Conference perhaps proves Paul's conclusion correct. Reports on the conference are unanimous that the 50,000 NGO activists present were disgusted by the vapidity of the final document, stripped of vital specifics and clear goals. In reality, many NGOs now expect little from formal, top-down, multilateral agreements. Very few of the pledges by states at the first Rio Conference in 1992 have been fulfilled. In such circumstances, Pat Mooney of the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration said: "Delegates at the preliminary meetings in RIO+20 have been more focused on details such as figuring out how resources can be better deployed to make real progress" (*Globe & Mail*, 20 June 2012). It would seem that civil society is reinventing itself once again.

Civil Societies' role in seeking authoritative global institutions

As Paul Heinbecker, Canada's former ambassador to the UN has recently written (2010: 247), one of the reasons world problems persist is that "many are global in scope and require global solutions, sometimes of extraordinary complexity, for example climate change." Further there is

> no global authority with the power to deliberate, decide on, a solution, and compel its implementation. International institutions like the UN can bring the horses to water but the authority and resources to make them drink remain vested in individual states. There is no sheriff the UN can call if signatories violate agreements. International law depends on consent.

Based on the preceding sections, what has civil society already been doing to help international relations to evolve? To summarize:

1 Civil society is now a significant international player.
2 Citizens and NGOs can play major roles in promoting change in the international order.
3 The context is crucial: The communications revolution gave wings to citizens' voices.
4 Non-governmental organizations are needed because they perform multiple functions for governments and society.
5 International organizations can transform through evolution and in response to calamity.
6 Faced with crisis, politicians draw on their own experience and current political realities.
7 Conferencing oils the wheels of change with ideas, debates, examples, and visibility.
8 Epistemic communities of experts are the spark plug of institutional creation.
9 Civil society is a political phenomenon, dependent on the political context.
10 After all its efforts for global change, civil society's achievements have been modest.
11 State governments are still the dominant force in the international system and have learnt how to side-step civil society.

12 To be effective, civil society must coordinate its diversity and work in coalitions.

13 The attempts by other players to control civil society are a recognition of its strengths.

14 Civil society can self-regenerate when true to its democratic goals and grassroots.

To answer the question of how authoritative, decision-making global institutions might best be created, one may usefully consult the works of Ernest Haas (1990), Peter Haas (1992), Rosenau (2002), Keohane (1988, 2002), Luck (2003), Knight (2005), and Maxwell (2005). My basic proposal in this regard is to combine theory and practice by bringing academia and civil society to think together to create a critical dialogue on global governance. The question is how to put the tandem of scholars and advocates together to rethink the UN in order to equip the world with effective world institutions capable of making authoritative decisions dealing with the global challenges, and to investigate the creation of updated principles and processes required for global governance (which is akin to constitutional thinking in domestic politics). This knowledge mobilization and intellectual leadership must be used to analyze how to convince world public opinion and governments that global decision making is required.

The UN as legitimate, universal IO, has been relegated to the shadows of world politics. Worse still, the recently retiring UN under secretary-general of internal oversight services, Inga-Britt Ahlenius, wrote in her final report: "I am concerned that we are in a process of decline and reduced relevance of the organization . . . This inevitably risks weakening the United Nations' possibilities to fulfill its mandate" (*The New York Times*, 20 July 2010). Rather than working on reforms, the major states are fleeing the UN, seeking at every turn to find alternate institutions that are more attuned to their bidding. Only a major new effort can simultaneously start the process of refocusing interest on the UN and the UN system while studying its failures, proposing transformations and galvanizing public support.

Some ask, why start from the UN for international institutional reform? Why not start with the G8 or the G20? The major problem is that these groups have no constitutional foundations. "The G-20 can complement the UN not substitute for it. By definition, the G-20 lacks the legitimacy that universality of membership affords the UN. The G-20 ought not, moreover, to become a kind of 'concert of powers'. When the world last tried that, at the Congress of Vienna, it ended badly" (Heinbecker 2010: 254). Another reason for not starting elsewhere is the tradition of building IOs based on evolution rather than revolution. It took unique circumstances, great skill, diplomacy, and political leadership to bring some 50 countries and many NGOs together in 1945 in reaction to the Second World War. What would it take to unite five continents and 193 countries if the UN were set aside? The UN is a living laboratory. Despite what some might think, it still seems to attract all the states in the world. It is the world's one universal diplomatic forum and provides us with a starting point, a foundation for future deliberations.

What sort of institution would we be building? It is not at all certain it will be one organization. It may take a fairly long period of trial and error with different types of more limited agencies. After all, we already have two with strong world mandates. The World Health Organization and World Trade Organization are both fairly authoritative, each in their own manner. But most opponents of "world government" are worried about a tyrannical Leviathan. Wendt (2003) holds that a new sovereign political entity with constitutional authority over all states need not be centralized or hierarchical or threaten national identities or collectivize culture, economy, or local politics. Although it would require a procedure for making binding choices about threats, it need not require a unitary body and leader. Deudney (2006) is optimistic that global governance can avoid war and that it can be small,

decentralized, and liberal. He makes the case for establishing a world republic based upon the same premise of restraining and diffusing power that motivated the founders of the American republic in the late eighteenth century.

I hypothesize that a vision of global authorities need not be singular and centralized. On the contrary, the only form of global governance that would be acceptable to governments and citizens would be one that is partial, constitutional, plural/federal, decentralized, liberal, and promotes human rights and equality. There is historic support for this hypothesis. Historically, humanity has moved step-by-step from tribes to vast nation-states, discovering new governmental mechanisms to cover more and more people and territory. Politically, humans have continually developed new techniques, many of which have been considerable advances, in their capacity for governance (federalism, rule of law, democracy, human and minority rights, the European Union). There is no reason why they cannot move to the global level.

In concrete terms, the spark plug for such a process would be a partnership of worldwide associations of academics and also of NGOs. Such a partnership would oversee the long-term process of research, conferences, consultations, communications, and public mobilization required to put global decision making back on the political agenda. My proposal for a comprehensive, ongoing process starts with a series of academic conferences and then goes on to civil society conferences based in large part on the input of concerned and competent NGOs and former political leaders and international practitioners (former heads of international agencies and UN departments). These conferences would also be open to government representatives of "like-minded" countries. The academic meetings are intended to bring the issue of "Rethinking the UN" back into vogue, to give it legitimacy and to focus on a high-priority agenda. "There need to be regular international forum-conferences to provide a platform for competing ideas on global governance, to work toward the development of agreement on priorities for international reforms, and to mobilize public opinion and political will for their achievement" (Trent 2007: 250).

Recommended for further reading

Schwartzberg (2004), Trent (2007), Weiss (2009), Paul (2011), and Scholte (2011).

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30

The use, effectiveness, and unintended consequences of economic sanctions by intergovernmental organizations

Dursun Peksen

States, either unilaterally or collectively through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), often opt for economic sanctions to achieve a range of foreign policy objectives. Economic sanctions have frequently involved such ambitious goals as promoting human rights, punishing state sponsors of terrorism, ending civil wars, and resolving trade disputes. Sanctions take the form of trade restrictions (embargoes and boycotts), financial asset freezes, investment bans, suspension of economic and military aid, and travel bans on target countries' officials (Hufbauer et al. 2007).[1] Given the popular use of sanctions in foreign affairs, significant scholarly research and policy debate have been devoted to the utility of economic sanctions in international politics. A major strand of the literature has studied the value of multilateral cooperation in economic statecraft. Scholars and policy makers advocate international cooperation among major sanctioning countries with or without the involvement of IGOs for economic and normative reasons (Doxey 1987; Martin 1992; Haass 1998; Drezner 2000). From an economic standpoint, multilateral cooperation can be vital to impose significant economic costs on target countries. Greater economic damage caused by the sanctions through a coalition of sanctioning states would, in turn, increase the possibility of compliance by the target government. From a moral standpoint, the broad international support for a sanctioning effort could legitimize the use of coercive power since multilateral sanctions indicate that the international community does not approve the wrongdoing committed by the targeted regime.

This chapter offers a comprehensive assessment of the body of scholarship that examines the use, effectiveness, and the possible unintended consequences of multilateral sanctions under the auspices of IGOs. Specifically, it addresses the following four broad questions: How often are IGOs involved in the imposition of economic sanctions? Are IGO-led collective sanctions more effective than the efforts by *ad hoc* coalitions of countries or unilateral sanctions? What are the major inadvertent socio–economic and political costs of the collective sanctions on the targeted countries? What lessons can we learn from the record of multilateral sanctions initiated by IGOs to guide future policy making on the use of economic coercion during foreign policy crises?

How often do IGOs initiate economic sanctions?

Economic coercion has become an increasingly ubiquitous feature of international politics. According to the widely used sanctions data set gathered by Hufbauer et al. (2007), there were only 16 imposed sanction cases during the 1915–45 period. The number of sanction regimes during the Cold War (1945–90) increased considerably with 131 new cases. Since the end of the Cold War, economic sanctions have become even more popular with 70 new cases in only 15 years (1991–2005). How often did IGOs get involved in imposing sanctions during the same time span? Using the data from Hufbauer et al. (2007), Annex 30.1 provides the list of all multilateral sanctions imposed by IGOs and Figure 30.1 shows the change in the number of IGO-led sanctions over time. According to the numbers reported in Figure 30.1, multilateral sanctions account for only a small portion of the sanction cases before and during the Cold War. Specifically, there were only 22 sanctions (about 12 percent of all sanctions) initiated by IGOs before 1991. Seventeen of those cases occurred during the Cold War and the remaining five cases were imposed between 1915 and 1940. Given the small number of IGO sanctions until the 1990s, it is clear that sender countries used sanctions without seeking official support from IGOs.

However, we observe a remarkable proliferation of IGO-led sanction cases since the demise of the Cold War. Intergovernmental organizations initiated 34 new sanction cases between 1991 and 2005, which is about half of all imposed sanctions (70 cases) during this period. This suggests that multilateral cooperation via IGOs not only increased drastically, but also became more common than unilateral sanction efforts (28 cases) and those by *ad hoc* coalitions of states (eight cases). This suggests that global and regional IGOs have become increasingly influential actors in economic statecraft during the last two decades. Intergovernmental organizations have become more involved in economic statecraft in part because both major powers and small countries are increasingly opting for institutionalized coalitions to handle effectively important international issues such as nuclear proliferation, human rights, and civil wars. Further, especially in the case of the United Nations (UN) sanctions, with the end of the Cold War it appears that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are more willing to cooperate using multilateral sanctions to cope with major global problems.

According to the list of multilateral sanctions for the 1915–2005 period that appears in Annex 30.1, the UN and the European Union (EU) are the two most frequent sanctioning IGOs. There were 22 different UN sanction regimes, with 18 of those cases occurring after

Figure 30.1   Number of sanctions imposed by IGOs, 1915–2005

1991. Of the four cases that occurred during the Cold War, only the sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa were mandatory sanctions passed by the UN Security Council. The sanctions against North Korea and Portugal, on the other hand, were passed by the UN General Assembly but never received the full support of the Security Council. The EU (named as the European Community, EC, until 1993) is the second most active sender involved in 20 different sanction regimes. As in the case of the UN sanctions, the EU opted for economic coercion more often in the post-Cold War era, targeting only two countries (Turkey and the former Yugoslavia) before 1991.

There are also several other organizations involved in multilateral sanctions, including the League of Nations, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), the China Committee (ChinCom), and MERCOSUR (a trading bloc of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Excluding the League of Nations sanctions against Italy, and the Arab League sanctions against Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States (US), one common feature of the attempts at institutionalized coercion is that they target only "underdeveloped" countries. This is in part because most underdeveloped countries undergo various socio-economic and political crises such as military coups, civil wars, and genocide that trigger the external interventions. Underdeveloped countries are more frequent targets of economic pressure also because of their relatively high levels of trade with, and external economic and military aid dependence on, developed countries and international institutions.

Another notable finding from the list provided in Annex 30.1 is that the UN and the EU are the two most globally influential organizations that impose economic punishment against countries from different parts of the world. Regional organizations, excluding the EU and the Arab League, have used trade and financial sanctions only against their member countries and/or the countries that are located in the same region, such as the sanctions against Sierra Leone by ECOWAS and the AU sanctions against the Central African Republic. Regional IGOs impose sanctions on neighboring countries due to the close economic ties between the member countries of the organization and the targeted country. Further, regional organizations are frequently involved in such sanction regimes because the member countries are more likely to seek institutionalized cooperation against a neighboring target to effectively undermine any regional negative externalities of an ongoing crisis in the target country.

Intergovernmental organization-led sanctions were enacted with various goals in mind, such as ending civil wars, discouraging nuclear proliferation, impairing the military capabilities of the target, promoting human rights and democracy, and destabilizing a hostile regime. However, no issue has dominated the use of multilateral sanctions more than the promotion of democratic reforms and human rights, especially in the post-Cold War era (Hufbauer et al. 2007). Economic coercion by IGOs has become an oft-used policy tool to advance human rights and democracy mostly because of the growing support for basic human freedoms and rights in the international community. The world has witnessed the democratic transition of several former communist regimes and dictatorships in Eastern Europe, South America, and Southeast Asia during the last four decades. Hence, more than ever before, the global community widely considers the respect for democratic freedoms and basic human rights an international norm. Given the near universal popularity of democracy and human rights, Western democracies and major non-state international actors, especially the EU and the UN, have identified the promotion of democracy and human rights as a high priority on their foreign policy agenda. As a result, IGOs involve themselves in the sanction cases concerning such issues as human rights violations and political violence more than ever before.

Are IGO-led sanctions effective?

Despite the increasing use of economic coercion, conventional wisdom—based on both case studies and large-N empirical research—holds that sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing a target to change its behavior (e.g., Galtung 1967; Pape 1997; Hufbauer et al. 2007). Scholars estimate that sanctions fail 65 to 95 percent of the time (Pape 1997; Hufbauer et al. 2007).[2] Others have shifted the focus to the question of under what circumstances sanctions are likely to achieve their intended policy goals. Among other factors, economic coercion is more likely to work if target countries are economically dependent on the target (Drury 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2007), if sanctions inflict serious economic damage on the target country (Tsebelis 1990; Morgan and Schwebach 1997), if there is no future conflict expectations between target and sender countries (Drezner 1998), and if sender countries perceive the issue under dispute as highly salient (Ang and Peksen 2007).

A strand of the literature on the efficacy of sanctions has examined whether international cooperation increases the success of sanctions. Policy makers and some scholars assumed that multilateral sanctions with or without the involvement of an IGO are more likely to induce a behavioral change in the target than unilateral sanctions (Doxey 1987; Haass 1998). Sanctions by a single sender should fail more often than the attempts by a coalition of sender countries because of the greater likelihood of breaching sanctions ("sanctions busting"). With unilateral sanctions, third parties (governments and private actors) probably attempt to capture the economic opportunities created by the sender's decision to limit its economic ties with the target. One version of sanctions busting is identified as the "black knight" effect, which refers to third-party actions that aim to overturn the negative impact sanctions have on the target (Drury 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2007). That is, third-party countries with political motivations seek to spoil unilateral sanctions by opening their markets for the target's boycotted goods and/or by supplying the sanctioned goods, as in the case of Soviet Russia's increasing trade relations with Cuba during the Cold War. Another version of sanctions busting, which is more commonly observed, includes the economically motivated and opportunistic "third-party attempts." Specifically, most third-party actors might seek merely to capture new trade opportunities in target countries to make a profit as a sender country restricts its economic ties with the target.

Multilateral sanctions, on the other hand, might inflict significant economic damage due to the pressure exerted by multiple countries (Doxey 1987; Martin 1992; Haass 1998). They also reduce the target's ability to locate alternative markets to which to divert its trade and financial relations. Hence, multilateral sanctions could be costlier to the target, which should subsequently induce the target government to comply with the sender countries' demands. Furthermore, senders often attempt to obtain multilateral support for their sanctioning attempts to increase the legitimacy of sanctions in the international community (Drezner 2000). Sender countries can use the broad international support for a sanctioning effort to show that the international community does not approve of the wrongdoing committed by the targeted regime. Thus, because of the potentially greater economic and moral advantages of collective sanctioning efforts, multilateral sanctions are often assumed to be more effective than unilateral sanctions.

Most studies in the literature, however, find no support for the hypothesis that multilateral sanctions are more successful than the unilateral efforts. On the contrary, scholars show that unilateral sanctions are more likely to achieve their intended objectives than the multilateral attempts (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1998; Drezner 2000, 2003; Miers and Morgan 2002). One major exception to this counterintuitive finding is the multilateral attempts led by IGOs: Institutionalized multilateral sanctions are indeed more effective than the sanctions by *ad hoc*

coalitions of countries and unilateral sanctions (Martin 1992; Drezner 2000, 2003; Miers and Morgan 2002; Bapat and Morgan 2009).

Why do economic punishments by *ad hoc* coalitions of senders often fail while IGO-led multilateral attempts are likely to produce successful outcomes? There are two strong theoretical explanations as to the failure of multilateral sanctions. The first plausible explanation for the failure of the multilateral efforts concerns the possibility that multilateral cooperation is more likely to occur when the issue under dispute is highly salient for both senders and the target (Smith 1996; Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004). If the issue under dispute is viewed as having high salience, such as a serious threat to territorial integrity, national security, and regime stability, a potential sender country will be more willing to seek international cooperation to incur higher costs on the target, which might consequently increase the possibility of obtaining a successful outcome in the dispute (Ang and Peksen 2007).

Yet, the issue under dispute that leads to the creation of a coalition of sanctioning countries might also be perceived as highly salient by the target government. Hence, target countries in response to the sanctions imposed by a coalition of states will probably be more resolved not to comply with the demands of the senders (Smith 1996; Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Ang and Peksen 2007). This is because capitulating to the senders will result in high costs due to the importance attached to the issue under dispute. Consequently, because multilateral sanctions often involve a highly salient issue for both the target and senders, the targeted regime will opt for non-compliance with the senders' demands, which increases the probability that multilateral sanctions will fail.

The second plausible argument for the failure of the multilateral efforts concerns the possibility of free riding among sanctioning countries (Martin 1992; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1998; Drezner 2000). Multilateral sanctions create more incentives among sender countries to free ride off the efforts of the other sanctioning countries. Some sender countries might unilaterally defect in order to reap the benefits of economic rents. They might attempt to bust the sanctions either through illicit trade by private actors or through the official announcement of lifting sanctions to overtly trade with the target country. If most sender countries choose to free ride, multilateral sanctions will impose only very limited economic pressure on the target. This will consequently reduce the efficacy of multilateral sanctions given the established link between the high economic costs on the target and sanction success (Drury 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2007).

The suggested free-riding problem that multilateral sanctions suffer from might be less likely to occur in the sanction regimes led by IGOs (Martin 1992; Drezner 2000; Bapat and Morgan 2009). Sender countries are deterred from violating the institutionalized sanctions because IGOs often create mechanisms to monitor the enforcement of the imposed trade and financial restrictions. In the case of the UN sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, for instance, the UN placed customs inspectors in Macedonia and created a maritime exclusion zone in order to establish a stronger enforcement mechanism (Drezner 2000: 84). Intergovernmental organizations are also more likely to have established rules and procedures to punish the free-riding senders, which further reduces the incentive to free ride among the senders.

Even when IGOs fail to establish a strong sanctions enforcement mechanism they can make free-riding attempts more difficult by monitoring defections and exchanging information about free riders (Martin 1992; Drezner 2000). Furthermore, IGOs could undermine the violation of the sanction regimes by offering side payments and economic incentives to maintain the cooperation from sanctioning countries. The UN, for instance, provided side payments to Iraq's neighboring countries such as Turkey and Jordan during the comprehensive sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime from 1991 to 2003.

Intergovernmental organizations also reduce the incentives to defect among the senders by increasing information about all members of the coalition (Drezner 2000). Intergovernmental organizations serve as arenas for international bargaining and negotiation for the members. Because member countries effectively communicate and exchange information through IGOs, each sanctioning country is more likely to be reassured that all the senders are committed to the collective sanctioning effort. As a result, because sanctions initiated by IGOs suffer less from the defection problems, they are likely to produce more economic damage on the target country. Intergovernmental organization-initiated sanctions' ability to impose major economic pressure on the target consequently makes them more effective than the sanctions by *ad hoc* coalitions of countries and unilateral sanctions.

What are the major unintended consequences of economic sanctions for target countries?

A strand of the sanctions literature has examined the possible inadvertent consequences of sanctions. This body of scholarship has been instrumental in demonstrating that the impact of sanctions on the target country extends well beyond the initial intended goal(s) of their use. Scholars show that sanctions might result in significant humanitarian problems in the target society by increasing poverty, unemployment, and inflation; undermining the effective functioning of public health services; impeding the development of civil society; and affecting the level of educational attainment in the sanctioned countries (e.g., Galtung 1967; Cortright and Lopez 1995; Haass 1997; Weiss et al. 1997; Gibbons and Garfield 1999; Muller and Muller 1999; Weiss 1999; Barry 2000; Heine-Ellison 2001; Peksen 2011). According to this line of research, the humanitarian damage of sanctions is mostly conditional on the extent to which the external pressure is costly for the target society. Therefore, the sanctions led by IGOs can be very detrimental to civilians because of the potentially high economic costs that such collective sanctioning efforts exact on the targeted society. Indeed, the UN-involved sanctions against Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti during the 1990s are often referred to as the sanction cases where severe civilian sufferings overshadowed any potential political success (Haass 1997; Gibbons 1999; Muller and Muller 1999).

Economic sanctions by IGOs and other senders might increase civilian pain through deteriorating economic conditions and citizens' reduced ability to afford a healthy life and standard of living. Hufbauer et al. (2007) show that sanctions on average result in a 3 percent reduction in the target state's Gross National Product. Excluding those countries experiencing hyperinflation, the average inflation is about 37 percent following sanctions imposition. Higher inflation and economic downturn as a result of sanctions create greater unemployment and poverty. A decline in national economic and financial conditions subsequently reduces people's ability to afford necessary services such as education and health care.

External economic pressure might also cause various humanitarian problems in the target country by restricting adequate access to food, clean water, medical supplies, and other basic needs (Weiss et al. 1997; Gibbons and Garfield 1999; Barry 2000; Peksen 2011). For instance, trade embargoes on agricultural products and inputs such as fertilizer and seeds cause food shortages and inflate food prices. Similarly, trade limitations on the purchase of medical equipment and pharmaceutical products might severely damage the health infrastructure of the target country. Poorer nutrition caused by food shortages and lack of access to basic needs and medical services might threaten the physical quality of life in target countries. This includes an increase in the maternal and child mortality rates, and the outbreak or spread of epidemics and diseases, especially among the more disadvantaged segments of society.

Economic sanctions also cause humanitarian problems by weakening the target government's ability to provide public goods and welfare services such as public health, education, and the enforcement of security and the rule of law (Peksen 2011; Drury and Peksen 2012). Economic coercion reduces the government's tax revenues from domestic economic actors, and international trade and financial exchanges. A decline in state revenues will force the government to cut public services. The under-provision of public services will consequently contribute to the human misery and the deterioration of the overall socio–economic conditions in the targeted countries.

Other studies show that economic coercion led by IGOs and other senders inadvertently increases the level of political repression through contributing to the rise of human rights abuses, media repression, and the violation of democratic freedoms in the targeted country (Lopez and Cortright 1997; Drury and Li 2006; Wood 2008; Peksen 2009, 2010; Peksen and Drury 2010). More specifically, sanctions appear to further restrict basic human rights and political freedoms because external pressure generates conditions that help enhance the government's coercive capacity and create new incentives for the political elites to limit political freedoms.

Economic sanctions also inadvertently help the targeted regime consolidate authoritarian power by enabling the political leadership to enhance its ties with the key political supporters, while at the same time economically disrupting average citizens and anti–government groups' (e.g., an opposition party or an anti–regime social or political movement) ability to maintain their political relevance (Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2010). Once sanctions are imposed, the government is likely to find ways to undermine the cost of sanctions on its capacity to rule. Leaders might respond to foreign pressure by changing their public spending priorities, shifting resources from welfare policies to military equipment and personnel to undermine the cost of external pressure on their coercive capacity (Escribà-Folch 2012). Another possible way for the target regime to avoid the negative impact of sanctions is to generate revenues and secure supplies of scarce resources through illegal smuggling and other underground transnational economic channels using neighboring countries (Gibbons 1999; Andreas 2005).

The government might also attempt to mitigate the costs of sanctions by intervening in the market to redirect wealth toward its ruling coalition and away from its opponents (Weiss et al. 1997; Gibbons 1999; Weiss 1999). The state's intervention in the economy could occur through restricting the flows of certain goods and products made scarce by the sanctions, confiscating or redistributing private property outside the common law, imposing targeted taxes, and providing subsidies and tax reductions to the pro-regime groups. Consequently, this combination of shifting resources in the target regime's favor and the declining economic capacity of opposition groups makes it unlikely that the target regime will be coerced. On the contrary, as sanctions inadvertently allow leaders to augment the ties between powerful groups and themselves, while disproportionately hurting anti-regime groups, targeted regimes become more authoritarian and intransigent.

In addition to consolidating the regime's ability to retain power, sanctions also provide new incentives to restrict basic human rights, and press freedom, as well as the democratic freedoms of opposition groups (Drury and Li 2006; Peksen and Drury 2010). The targeted leadership usually perceives the external demands for political reforms as a threat to sovereignty and particularly to regime survival (Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Ang and Peksen 2007). The government might assume that conceding to foreign pressure will decrease its legitimacy and support in the country. Hence, the anticipated audience costs caused by conceding to external economic pressure (especially to the pressures demanding more domestic reforms) create an incentive for the government to be less conciliatory toward

foreign coercion and provide another excuse to employ repression against opposition groups to show the regime's determination to resist any external pressure.

Studies also show that foreign economic pressure instigates more protests against the government and might threaten the tenure of the leadership in some cases (Marinov 2005; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). As mentioned earlier, sanctions might create the unintended consequences of greater poverty, higher levels of unemployment, and poor health conditions for ordinary citizens (e.g., Cortright and Lopez 1995, 2000; Weiss et al. 1997; Weiss 1999). Deterioration of socioeconomic circumstances is suggested as a major source of economic grievance and political violence (Gurr 1968, 1970). As anti-government movements rise following sanctions, especially among the economically disadvantaged groups, the target regime is more likely to resort to repression to crack down on the opposition movements to maintain its authority and status quo (Henderson 1991; Poe et al. 1999; Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2010).

Others have examined the possible effects that sanctions by IGOs and other senders have on the well-being of less privileged groups, especially women and ethnic minority groups (Buck et al. 1998; Weiss 1999; Al-Ali 2005; Al-Jawaheri 2008; Drury and Peksen 2012). This line of research advocates the detailed study of the less-privileged groups for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the damage inflicted by sanctions on target countries. It is unlikely that every segment of society bears the socio-economic and political costs of the coercion equally. Groups with privileged access to political and economic resources might face minimum or no cost from external economic shocks by unevenly using the scarce resources in their favor. Vulnerable groups, on the other hand, might significantly suffer from major political and economic upheavals due to their disadvantaged socio-economic and political position in society.

For instance, studies show that economic and political hardship caused by the economic sanctions significantly hurt women's status and increase the level of gender inequality in the target society (Garfield 1997; Buck et al. 1998; Al-Ali 2005; Drury and Peksen 2012). Foreign economic coercion causes women's status to deteriorate by 1) worsening female labor participation and access to welfare services, 2) increasing gender-based economic and political discrimination, and 3) endangering women's physical security and human rights. As the target's economy shrinks from the economic sanctions, women will face more violations of their economic rights, such as more discrimination in hiring and promotion practices and more frequent arbitrary firing or layoffs as a result of their vulnerable status in society. Consequently, not only will there be fewer women in the workforce but their economic condition will also suffer. Moreover, the economic decline caused by the sanctions will reduce the welfare of the target's populace, leading to greater economic grievances that incite more social disorder and instability. This social disorder will probably result in more gender-based violence and the violation of women's social and political rights.

A study by Peksen (2012) shows that sanctions also increase the extent of official economic and political discrimination against ethnic minority groups. In multiethnic target countries, the contraction of the economy as a result of sanctions is likely to prompt official economic discrimination against ethnic groups outside the support base of the government. This will mostly occur through reducing minority groups' access to the public resources and services made scarce by the sanctions. Ethnic minority groups will have less access to public resources because the leadership will divert shrinking essential public resources to themselves and their supporters (e.g., Weiss et al. 1997; Gibbons 1999). Consequently, the uneven use of goods and services by the state and its close allies increases the extent of economic discrimination against ethnic minorities along with other disadvantaged groups in society.

Economic coercion also inadvertently contributes to the rise of political discrimination of ethnic minority groups. Because ethnic political parties and organizations are major political actors in heterogeneous societies, they will be among the groups who face state repression. The use of discriminatory policies such as banning ethnic political parties will deny minority groups a strong voice in the political arena and limit their access to government resources. Repressive measures against the political groups representing ethnic minority groups consequently allow the regime to consolidate its authority to maintain the status quo in the face of sanctions.

Policy implications and the future use of IGO-led sanctions

This chapter has offered a discussion of the use, effectiveness, and possible unintended negative consequences of institutionalized multilateral sanctions. According to the sanctions data discussed earlier (see Annex 30.1 and Figure 30.1), IGOs have become one of the most frequent sanctioning actors in the international arena. As such, they initiated about half of the imposed sanctions during the 1991–2005 period. The growing number of institutionalized sanctions suggests that potential sender countries are willing to seek international cooperation rather than acting alone when attempting to punish another country. There is also significant support in the literature for the idea that obtaining international cooperation through IGOs enhances the international legitimacy of the sanction regimes. Further, the research on multilateral sanctions shows that the institutionalized collective attempts are likely to be more effective than the sanctions imposed by an individual country or an *ad hoc* coalition of countries. Thus, if IGOs continue to frequently involve themselves in the international sanction cases, it is likely that the use of economic coercion might become more efficacious in the future in dealing with major foreign policy issues such as nuclear proliferation, political violence, and intrastate conflicts.

Although IGO-led sanctions appear to be more effective than the non-institutionalized sanctions in achieving their intended policy objectives, any assessment of the efficacy of IGO sanctions without accounting for the humanitarian and other costs of the coercion would be, at best, incomplete. Economic sanctions involving IGOs or other senders might diminish the economic and political well-being of innocent civilians, while failing to damage the coercive capacity of the target government. In some IGO-led sanctions, as in the cases of Iraq and Haiti, the collateral humanitarian damage produced by the coercion might outweigh or over-shadow the intended policy success. Therefore, individual countries and IGOs imposing sanctions should be aware of the delicate balance between using economic coercion to induce targets to change a policy and the possible unintended damage to civilians' socio-economic well-being and political freedoms.

If economic coercion inadvertently destabilizes the target country by increasing the level of political repression and violence, IGOs and major sanctioning countries might face new challenges. More unrest and instability in the targeted country following the imposition of sanctions would pose threats to the stability of neighboring countries, causing more inter-state and civil wars. Problems posed by growing domestic instability in the target country might subsequently result in greater involvement of sender countries and IGOs, which in turn might further undermine regional and international security. Therefore, policy makers should take into account the possible inadvertent consequences in weighing the costs and benefits of the decision to sanction, to make sure that the coercive power does not produce more harm than good for both the target and sender countries.

"Smart" or targeted sanctions in the forms of financial asset freezes, reduction or suspension of military arms sales and aid, and travel bans on country officials could be a way to

put the pressure directly on the political elites who are in charge of the wrongdoing (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Wallensteen et al. 2003). The significance of these smart sanctions is that the political leadership is more likely to suffer from them since they are specifically aimed at the elites. Subsequently, if the targeted elites face the cost of coercion more immediately through targeted sanctions, the expectation is that they would be more conciliatory toward the senders' demands. However, there is still very limited, if any, convincing evidence that smart sanctions 1) are able to directly hurt the political elites and 2) are more effective than the traditional sanctions. Targeted sanctions often fail because the political elites are likely to find ways to mitigate the cost of sanctions on themselves (Drezner 2011). For instance, in response to the targeted financial sanctions or arms embargoes, the government can alter its public spending priorities to use the public resources disproportionately in its favor.

Intergovernmental organizations and other major actors could also consider using economic sanctions prior to or simultaneously with the other external tools such as foreign aid and economic loans. It is possible that a mixed strategy—the carrot and stick of diplomatic tools—could be a more successful policy-making strategy than coercive diplomacy. Under most circumstances, it is unlikely that the target government will concede to foreign demands if sanctioning countries fail to offer some incentives in return for cooperation. Thus, rather than relying solely on coercion or incentives, a well-designed policy that combines immediate sanctions and future foreign aid might produce successful outcomes. More research on the sanction cases where sender countries also offer incentives could be a starting point to understand the role that economic coercion combined with the other policy tools plays in improving the efficacy of economic coercion.

Recommended for further reading

Baldwin (1985), Martin (1992), Weiss et al. (1997), Drezner (2000), and Cortright and Lopez (2002).

Annex 30.1 Economic sanctions imposed by IGOs, 1915–2005

First Year	Last Year	IO Senders	Other Senders	Target	Goal
1921	1921	League of Nations		Yugoslavia	Military disruption vs. Albania
1925	1925	League of Nations		Greece	Withdraw from Bulgaria
1932	1935	League of Nations		Bolivia	Settle the Chaco War
1932	1935	League of Nations		Paraguay	Settle the Chaco War
1935	1936	League of Nations	United Kingdom (UK)	Italy	Withdraw from Abyssinia
1946	–	Arab League		Israel	Create Palestinian homeland
1948	1994	CoCom	US	Soviet Union, CMEA*	Impair military potential
1949	1970	ChinCom	US	China	Impair military potential
1950	1953	ChinCom	US	China	Military disruption, Korea
1950	–	UN	US	North Korea	Regime change, military impairment
1962	1994	UN		South Africa	End apartheid; Namibia

Annex 30.1 Continued

1963	1974	OAU, UN		Portugal	Free African colonies
1965	1979	UN	UK	Rhodesia	Majority rule
1973	1974	Arab League		United States	Support for Israel
1973	1974	Arab League		Netherlands	Support for Israel
1978	1983	Arab League		Egypt	Camp David accords
1979	1979	Arab League		Canada	Planned Israeli embassy move
1981	1986	EC		Turkey	Restore democracy
1983	1983	OECS	US	Grenada	Destabilize Bishop–Austin regime
1988	–	EU	US, Japan	Burma	Human rights, elections
1988	–	UN	US, UK	Somalia	Human rights; civil war
1990	1991	UN	US	Iraq	Military disruption; restore Kuwaiti government
1991	2003	UN	US	Iraq	Destabilization; military impairment
1991	2001	UN, EC	US	Yugoslavia	Civil war in Bosnia
1991	1994	UN, OAS	US	Haiti	Democracy
1991	1991	EC	US	Soviet Union	Coup
1992	1998	ECOWAS, UN		Liberia	Civil war
1992	–	EU	France, Germany	Togo	Democracy, human rights
1992	2000	EU	Spain	Equatorial Guinea	Democracy, human rights
1992	1994	EU		Algeria	Democracy
1992	1997	UN	US, Germany	Cambodia, Khmer Rouge	Ban Khmer Rouge
1992	2003	UN		Libya	Extradite Pan Am suspects
1993	1994	UN	US	North Korea	Nuclear proliferation
1993	1993	EU	US	Guatemala	Coup
1993	2002	UN		Angola, Unita	Civil war, democracy
1993	1998	EU	US	Nigeria	Human rights, democracy, narcotics
1994	1995	UN	US	Rwanda	Civil violence
1994	1998	EU	US, Japan	The Gambia	Democracy
1995	1995	EU		Turkey	Human rights
1996	2000	EU	US	Niger	Democracy
1996	1996	MERCOSUR	US	Paraguay	Possible coup attempt
1997	–	UN	US, Germany	Cambodia, Khmer Rouge	Democracy
1997	2003	ECOWAS, UN		Sierra Leone	Democracy
1998	2001	EU	US	Yugoslavia, Serbia	Destabilize Milosevic
1998	1999	EU	US	Yugoslavia, Serbia	Kosovo
1999	2002	UN	US	Afghanistan	Extradite Osama bin Laden
1999	2002	EU	US	Ivory Coast	Coup, democracy

Annex 30.1 Continued

First Year	Last Year	IO Senders	Other Senders	Target	Goal
2000	2006	ECOWAS, UN		Liberia	Support for Revolutionary United Front
2002	2006	UN	US	North Korea	Nuclear proliferation
2002	2006	EU		Guinea	Democracy
2002	2005	EU	US	Haiti	Democratization
2002	–	EU	US	Zimbabwe	Democracy, human rights
2003	2005	AU, EU	US	Central African Republic	Coup
2003	–	UN		Dem. Rep. of Congo	Violence
2004	–	UN	France	Ivory Coast	Civil War
2005	–	EU	US, Switzerland	Uzbekistan	Human rights

* Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation, known to the West as COMECON

Notes

1 Throughout the chapter, "target countries" refers to the countries that are subjected to economic sanctions while "sender countries" refers to the countries that impose economic sanctions.
2 It is worth pointing out that some scholars have dissented from the conventional wisdom denigrating the utility of economic sanctions. They have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success–failure measure (see, for example, Baldwin 1985, 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains. These scholars argue that they should be deemed positive and significant contributions to sanctions outcomes.

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Public–private voluntary initiatives

Enlisting corporations for the provision of public goods

Patrick Bernhagen and Kelly Kollman

International organizations (IOs) have limited formal control over private actors such as business corporations. As corporate behaviour is increasingly consequential for the goals of IOs, there is a growing interest in alternative institutions of 'global governance'. Defined as 'systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the IO – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions' (Rosenau 1995: 13), global governance implies an active role for corporations (Ronit and Schneider 1999). Voluntary codes and other private initiatives are major vehicles to engage business corporations and their perceived social responsibilities. Over the past two decades, such initiatives have developed into central pillars of global governance, as IOs are increasingly encouraging and orchestrating such schemes in their efforts to share the task of global governance with private actors. While these schemes are intended to encourage ethical practices by participating corporations that go beyond compliance with existing rules and regulations, assessing their success depends on a thorough understanding of the extent to which corporations participate and why, as well as of the differences these programmes can be expected to make for goals such as sustainable development and the safeguarding of human and labour rights.

The following section briefly describes the development of voluntary codes by IOs. The third section examines the political, economic and social conditions that encourage corporations to participate in public–private voluntary initiatives (PPVIs). Finally, we assess the effectiveness of these initiatives in contributing to the goals of the sponsoring organization before concluding with an outlook on the future of and research on PPVIs.

Voluntary initiatives and international organizations

Voluntary initiatives and other 'non-state market driven' systems are important institutions of global governance (Cashore et al. 2004). Many scholars distinguish between two types of voluntary initiatives that govern the social and environmental behaviour of corporations (Kolk and Van Tulder 2005). Corporations or business associations develop the first type to serve as a means of 'self regulation'. These codes of conduct, which include high-profile schemes such as Responsible Care® and the Global Mining Initiative, are part of corporations'

strategies for dealing with their non-market environment (Baron 2010). As such, they complement corporations' more overtly political activities, such as lobbying policy makers, by creating guidelines or voluntary practices to address society's concerns about their activities, improve their reputations and perhaps even reduce the impact or likelihood of further public regulation (Sethi 2003; Baron 2010).

The second type of code is designed by public and/or non-profit organizations including governments and IOs, sometimes in conjunction with corporate actors, to guide or change corporate behaviour. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and IOs in particular have become very active and are playing an increasingly important role in governing the gaps that appear where local or national governance mechanisms are lacking or ineffective. In many respects these public–private voluntary initiatives have become more prominent in terms of publicity and membership than their corporate counterparts and include popular schemes such as ISO 14001, an environmental management system, and the United Nations' (UN) Global Compact.

The increase in number and scope of both types of corporate voluntary codes since the 1970s is at least in part a response to the governance gaps that have followed in the wake of international market integration and the inability of formal international law to keep pace with these developments. These gaps are perceived to be particularly prominent in developing economies where the need for foreign investment may lead governments to ease regulation in attempts to attract business. Such countries also frequently lack the capacity to enforce existing regulations. In other cases, social and environmental issues are simply not very salient for policy makers (Williams 2000; Sethi 2003). In these countries, corporations are often expected, either by local or global actors, to take more responsibility for social issues. For this, they need guidelines to encourage ethical behaviour and provide 'rules of the road' for markets to function correctly (Cutler et al. 1999: 8). As a result, IOs increasingly have enlisted corporations in the development and adaptation of voluntary codes of conduct, standards and guidelines.

The advent of voluntary standards, however, is not a mere reaction to globalization, nor is it entirely new. Historically corporations have often preceded the state in regulating their activities (Haufler 2001; Vogel 2010: 70). In many contexts, corporations have the resources and technology to proceed faster than governments. Therefore, rather than a shift from public to private regulation, the recent increase in codes of conduct and PPVIs describes a change to a 'more inclusive institutional arena' (Ruggie 2004: 503) in which different types of organizations with claims to moral authority and knowledge, including IOs, influence corporations to promote a better society and increased accountability. In this view, IOs and private interests are 'partners in public-private governance arrangements' (Flohr et al. 2010: 7).

The growth of PPVIs has largely occurred in two periods: in the 1970s; and since the mid-1990s. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed the first PPVI designed for globally active companies with the publication of its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 1976. The guidelines are 'voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct in areas such as employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation' (OECD 2011). Around the same time, the first private international code of conduct known as the Sullivan Principles was developed to help large United States (US) corporations operating in South Africa to address the apartheid regime (Sethi and Williams 2000). While many of the early codes developed by the OECD and UN agencies in the 1970s had little effect on corporate behaviour, they laid the groundwork for later guidelines (Haufler 2001; Kolk and Van Tulder 2005). The OECD Guidelines have been reviewed several times, and in 2011 were amended to include a chapter on

human rights, which is based on the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights implementing the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy framework proposed by UN Special Representative John Ruggie (OECD 2011). Presently, the OECD Guidelines are regarded as the 'world's most comprehensive international corporate responsibility instrument developed by governments' (Boucher 2010). Similarly, the Sullivan Principles had a second wind in the late 1990s when they formed the core to a more general code: the Global Sullivan Principles on Social Responsibility. Their goals are to ensure that companies 'respect the law' and are 'responsible member[s] of society' (Leon H. Sullivan Foundation 2012). By the early 2000s, IOs, both public and private, increasingly had come to see business as a 'critical partner' in their efforts to solve global problems.

As part of this second wave of PPVI creation, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), an international body made up of national standards organizations, began to expand its mandate beyond industrial standards to create management systems aimed at increasing the social performance of individual corporations and facilities. In 1996 it launched ISO 14001, an environmental management system that requires external but private certification of management practices. ISO 14001 is currently the largest voluntary environmental corporate code in terms of participation, with over 250,000 facilities gaining certification by 2010 (ISO 2010). The ISO has since developed a broader standard on social responsibility for individual firms (ISO 26000). Although governments often promote ISO standards, the latter are generated through the ISO membership bodies, some of which are private and others public, with direct involvement of the private sector (Clapp 1998; Prakash and Potoski 2006).

The UN also has sought to engage corporations in an effort to influence their policies and behaviour. During the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged business leaders to 'initiate a global compact of shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the global market' (United Nations 1999). This led to the establishment of the UN Global Compact the following year. The Global Compact consists of ten principles relating to human rights, labour rights, care for the environment and corruption. The two main objectives are to 'mainstream' these principles in business activities and 'to catalyze business actions in support of broader UN goals, including the Millennium Development Goals' (Latham & Watkins LLP 2009). Within half a decade, the Global Compact had developed into 'the world's largest corporate citizenship initiative' (United Nations 2006: 45). It currently has over 6,000 participating corporations from more than 130 countries, and provides a platform from which corporations can publicly express their commitment to business ethics. Because of its global reach and the scope of the issues covered, the Global Compact is one of the most significant PPVIs. However, it does not require participants to have their ethical, social or environmental commitments reviewed by an independent auditor. For this reason, many NGOs, including high-profile ones such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, have been critical of the scheme. In particular, NGOs have urged the UN to increase the stringency of the core requirements as well as the monitoring of participating corporations.

Since the 1990s, pressure has also been put on corporations from institutional investors through the creation of socially responsible investment funds. These investors emphasize environmental, social and corporate governance issues, which are perceived to have an effect on their investment portfolios. Negative externalities, such as environmental damage, can affect shareholder value and reduce returns to investors as accidents like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico vividly illustrate. As unethical behaviour may affect investment negatively and pressure from investors increases, corporations are becoming more

likely to take measures to address environmental or social risks. In this area too, IOs are driving the agenda. A prominent scheme is the Principles of Responsible Investment, a UN-backed network of international investors. Over 915 investment institutions had signed the Principles by October 2011 (Principles for Responsible Investment 2012).

Why do corporations engage in public–private voluntary initiatives?

Corporations engage in non-market activities in a variety of ways, often with the aim of influencing public policy and preventing adverse regulation (Stigler 1971; Grier et al. 1994). In addition, their public reputations and the trust of key external actors in the political arena and civil society are important corporate assets. Managing these assets is a key part of corporate political strategies. While research on corporate political activity has mainly focused on corporate lobbying of policy makers and financial contributions to electoral campaigns, there is growing recognition that corporations are expanding their repertoire of political activity as part of an integrated non-market strategy (Schuler et al. 2002; Baron 2010; Rehbein et al. 2011). In this context, the legitimacy that a corporation can gain by participating in public–private voluntary initiatives can reduce the threat of adverse consumer, public or political activity (Meznar and Nigh 1995). Consequently, scholars have begun to examine the political dimensions of what is generally referred to as corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Matten and Crane 2005; Waddock 2008), including the political and institutional factors that shape corporate decisions to participate in CSR-related activity and voluntary codes (Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Doh and Guay 2006). Of central concern is the considerable variation in PPVI participation across different countries, economic sectors and types of corporation (Kollman and Prakash 2001; Bennie et al. 2007; Perez-Batres et al. 2011). For example, while only 2.4 corporations per 100,000 inhabitants in Egypt have signed up to the Global Compact, 24 corporations from South Korea have: that is, ten times as many. Researchers have tried to explain this variation, referring to a variety of factors including corporations' individual characteristics, differences in the mobilization of normative biases within their home countries, the behaviour and strategies of countervailing interests, and the wider institutional environment in which corporations exist and operate.

Corporate characteristics

A corporation's *size* reflects its resources and market power as well as what it has at stake in economic and political conflict (Grier et al. 1994). As larger corporations have more to gain from political activity than smaller ones, at least in absolute terms, they will often ignore the free-rider incentives of others (Olson 1965). Larger corporations often also have increased reputational incentives for participating in political activity, as they have to protect publicly visible brand names. Indeed, individual firm size has consistently been an important determinant not only of political activity but also of CSR-related activities and voluntary disclosure (Meek et al. 1995; Hillman et al. 2004: 839). Similarly, large corporations are more likely to participate in global initiatives. Research on the non-market behaviour of the Forbes Global 2000 corporations, for example, shows that larger firms are significantly more likely to sign the UN Global Compact (Bennie et al. 2007).

    Differences in *corporate governance* systems might also affect the decisions that corporations make about participating in PPVIs. As Kolk and Van Tulder (2005) argue, the 'outsider' system of corporate governance dominant in the US combines diffuse shareholding with a prominent role of the chief executive officer (CEO). Together with its high propensity for

liability and class-action suits, this system, they reason, might encourage socially responsible investment. The European and Japanese systems of corporate governance, by contrast, are 'insider systems' whose two-tier board structure and less prominent CEO status might combine to use codes of conduct more as an 'internal control (rule-setting) instrument' (Kolk and Van Tulder 2005: 8). However, no empirical evidence exists to date to support this expectation. What is supported, however, is the view that a corporation's involvement in political activity can be shaped by the personal preferences and ideals of management (Ozer 2010).

Above all, corporations' involvement in PPVIs is shaped by the nature of their *sectoral activity*. Corporations in extractive sectors are exposed to a higher risk of conflict with external actors, especially in the areas of environment and human rights. Natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals are often fixed and located in politically as well as geographically difficult environments. The largest proven oil reserves are found in countries with autocratic regimes, poor human rights records, and weak and often inadequate environmental regulations. As established and easily accessible oil reserves mature, challenging regions such as the deep seas are increasingly explored and exploited under perilous and poorly regulated conditions. For global corporations active in these locations, reputation building, political communication and engagement to safeguard their investment become important political activities. Hence, these 'resource-cursed' corporations seek opportunities to enhance their reputation and take countermeasures to increase their public legitimacy. PPVIs provide such opportunities (Bennie et al. 2007).

Countervailing actors

As employers and producers, corporations exercise substantial power over people in their roles as workers and consumers (Hart 2010). Non-governmental organizations and organized labour can provide 'countervailing power' to corporations' economic and political clout (Galbraith 1954). A vital element of pluralist societies, these countervailing political actors are of particular importance in the transnational or global arena, where traditional governance structures are under-developed or non-existent. While labour unions have struggled with globalization, NGOs have become formidable countervailing powers to global corporations since the mid-1970s. International NGOs have become active in the development and implementation of environmental policies, and IOs are increasingly relying on their services (Rowlands 2001). Non-governmental organizations can confront global corporations directly using voluntary codes or certification systems in a carrots-and-sticks approach, where carrots include corporations' enhanced reputation and market access, while sticks can involve the 'naming and shaming' (Vogel 2010: 74) of corporations whose behaviour is found to be unethical or socially or environmentally irresponsible. The reputational leverage of NGOs can easily be underestimated, and in some instances global corporations have done so to their disadvantage. A prominent example is the case of Shell, which was successfully targeted by Greenpeace for planning to sink an oil loading facility, the Brent Spar, in the North Atlantic. The energy corporation had to bow to the public pressure generated by Greenpeace's media campaign and eventually decided to decommission the structure onshore. While this was feted as a victory of civil society over a powerful transnational corporation, commentators from the environmental as well as the industry side criticized Greenpeace for distorting the environmental threat represented by Brent Spar, and ultimately the rule of law, by its use of cunning media tactics (Jordan 2001).

Quantitative analyses of public–private voluntary initiatives support the expectation that global corporations react to the pressure of countervailing powers and adapt to the normative

context of their home countries. Corporations located in countries with strong environ-mental movements are more likely to participate in the UN Global Compact (Bennie et al. 2007). As countervailing actors shift their political strategies from the national to the transnational level, the incentives for corporations to participate in non-market activity at this level also increase. Thus, corporate involvement in PPVIs may be influenced by the level of participation of countervailing actors: the more countervailing groups sign up to PPVIs, the more corporations should do the same. However, the empirical evidence that exists to date does not always support the expectation that corporations respond to NGO pressure (Perez-Batres et al. 2011). In fact, UN Global Compact participation is discouraged by national embeddedness in international NGO networks, as many advocacy groups within these networks have been critical of the programme (Berliner and Prakash 2012). These results highlight the need for more research on the role that different non-corporate actors play in encouraging corporate participation in PPVIs.

The political economy of the home country

Institutions form 'the rules of the game' that structure and constrain actors' behaviour (North 1990: 97). These rules can be formal (legally binding rules and regulations) or informal (soft-law codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and conventions). Therefore, corporations' institutional environments condition their non-market strategies. Nation-states are the foun-dations of the most important institutions in the international system, and even globally active corporations operate on the basis of nationally distinct politico-economic systems. Among the formal institutions, the *political regime* plays a particularly important role in shaping corporations' strategic environment and their related decisions about participation in PPVIs. Liberal democracies provide opportunities for external pressure from autonomously organized interest groups representing diverse areas including environmental issues (Li and Reuveny 2006) and human rights concerns (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Together with relatively free media, these groups' activities ensure that citizens and consumers in democracies are generally better informed about the social and environmental externalities of corporations. Therefore, corporations from democratic countries are exposed to increased demands from a variety of actors. Furthermore, the same pluralist features and participatory opportunities that empower non-business interests in democratic countries also enable corporations to pursue a wider array of non-market strategies. In their efforts to engage or ally with non-business actors and improve their legitimacy and reputation, corporations headquartered in democratic countries face increased incentives, as well as a more conducive environment, to join PPVIs compared to corporations from non-democratic countries.

The empirical evidence concerning the role of the political regime of the corporation's home country again is mixed. Perkins and Neumayer (2010) find that democracy has a posi-tive, conditioning influence on the spread of Global Compact participation across borders: transnational connectivity increases participation in democratic countries more than in non-democratic ones. However, these authors find no similar conditioning effect of democracy on the uptake of ISO 14001, where national levels of wealth appear to be a more important conditioning factor. Berliner and Prakash's (2012) analysis suggests that any positive influence democratization may have on Global Compact adoption would take several years to take effect. However, Berliner and Prakash's data include up to a maximum of 89 countries, so that less than the full spectrum of political regimes that can be found in today's world is analysed.

Differences in *national styles of capitalism* might further help to explain variation in corporate engagement with PPVIs. Various attempts have been made to identify different types, or 'varieties', of capitalism, but Hall and Soskice's (2001) is arguably the most established one. These authors compare liberal market economies with coordinated market economies. These two forms of capitalism are distinguished from one another by the degree to which they depend on market or non-market forms of coordination. In liberal market economies, like the United Kingdom (UK) or US, 'firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements', while in coordinated market economies, such as Germany or Sweden, 'firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their relationships with other actors' (ibid.: 8). More accustomed to taking responsibility for their employees and the concerns of external actors, corporations from coordinated market economies in continental Europe might be expected to be more likely to agree to long-term commitments to the principles of human rights, and environmental sustainability (Janney et al. 2009). By contrast, corporations from liberal market economies are used to weaker trade unions and employment protection, and are more likely to put pressure on governments for deregulation with the aim of coordinating activities through contractual rather than non-market relations. This should make them less likely to participate in PPVIs. Empirically, this expectation points in the opposite direction of what Kolk and Van Tulder (2005) argued about the role of corporate governance. While these authors expect American corporations to participate in PPVIs at higher rates than their European counterparts, the broader mechanics of liberal market economies should make participation by US firms less likely. Like the argument about corporate governance, the role of nationally distinct types in capitalism has not yet been researched empirically in great depth.

Finally, the non-market behaviour of global corporations is shaped by *national regulatory regimes*. Countries have different requirements for corporate reporting in areas of social or environmental responsibility. Increasingly, such requirements are legally mandated, placing similar demands on corporations as PPVIs in these areas do. In Denmark, the Financial Statements Act was amended in 2009 to require reporting on corporate social responsibility. France has had a legal requirement since 1977 for corporations with more than 300 employees to publish a social review (KPMG et al. 2010). More recently in 2003, the *Nouvelles régulations économiques* came into force, requiring these corporations to report their social and environmental performance as well as their financial performance. More generally, research on the uptake of environmental management systems has shown that the regulatory environment affects participation, although researchers disagree on the nature of this effect. Prakash and Potoski (2006: 142–4) find that corporations operating in countries with more stringent environmental legislation are more likely to join ISO 14001. Neumayer and Perkins (2004), by contrast, find that participation rates in a similar management code, the EU's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), are suppressed in countries with greater levels of state environmental regulation. In a qualitative study of EMAS and ISO 14001 participation in Germany, the UK and the US, Kollman and Prakash (2001) find that the type, and not just the level, of regulation affects corporate take-up. This may partially explain the contradictory findings in the quantitative studies.

The role of the sponsoring international organization

International organizations can pursue a variety of strategies to increase participation in and implementation of PPVIs. The Global Compact uses a system of Local Networks that are organized at the country level. By providing assistance to corporations in fulfilling their

Global Compact commitments, these Local Networks can lower the cost of participation incurred by corporations. To retain their official status, networks have to stage a Global Compact–related activity at least once a year. Beyond this minimally required level of activity, however, there is wide variation in the levels of Local Network activity observed in different countries. Whelan (2010: 320) posits a correlation between the activity of Local Networks (GCLNs) and the corporate take-up rate: '[c]ountries with the largest number of GC participants also tend to have the largest GCLNs'. Similarly, Hamid and Johner (2010: 272) propose that the observed geographical variation in the percentage of reporting participants 'can mainly be explained by the strength of and efforts undertaken by Local Networks'. However, the relationship between corporate participation and Local Networks is more complicated. It takes participation to support a network, and then the network is expected to boost corporate participation further, so that any association between network strength and corporate take-up is in itself not evidence of the network's effectiveness for recruitment. However, the sponsoring IO can affect participation indirectly. Berliner and Prakash (2012) have found, for example, that the more embedded a country is in IO networks, the more corporations from this country participate in the Global Compact.

Do public–private voluntary initiatives make a difference to corporate conduct?

A major criticism of public–private voluntary initiatives is that they have no legal enforcement and only weak monitoring mechanisms. Some commentators see voluntary codes as insufficient and ultimately incapable of solving global problems. A number of critics fear that these programmes enable corporations to 'green wash', or in the case of the Global Compact, 'blue wash', their reputations (Laufer 2003; Thérien and Pouliot 2006: 67–8) while preventing more effective public regulations from being enacted (Haufler 2001). An additional criticism launched at PPVIs and similar initiatives is that they can exacerbate the North–South divide, with the countries of the North imposing standards on developing countries in the South (Clapp 1998). For corporations, this may exacerbate rather than overcome a dilemma associated with doing business in multiple jurisdictions and cultural contexts. Is appropriate behaviour determined by host countries' laws and customs or should corporations behave in host countries as they do in their home country (Baron 2010: 752)?

Supporters of self-regulation, however, see voluntary agreements as an important part of a learning process within and among corporations, supplementing or preceding regulation by states and IOs (Ruggie 2002). In this view, PPVIs help operationalize and implement standards, communicate a commitment to these standards to the outside world and produce common knowledge on compliance. In other words, they produce a platform where best practice can be exchanged and performance monitored. Some scholars have argued that these codes go beyond merely providing firms with information and rules and are helping to disseminate norms of appropriate behaviour that can lead firms to redefine their interests through processes of socialization (Conzelmann and Wolf 2008: 107–8; Kollman 2008).

But our understanding of how effective these codes are in bringing about more sustainable or socially responsible behaviour is still limited and existing research on the topic has yielded mixed results. The International Labour Organization (ILO) found that the footwear sector is comparatively advanced in the implementation of codes within its supply chains, while the apparel and retail sectors lag behind and appear to treat corporate social responsibility as a mainly symbolic exercise (Mamic 2003). However, the ILO points out that working conditions would probably be worse in all of these sectors if there had not been pressure from

external actors, facilitated by the existence of voluntary initiatives (Mamic 2003). Indeed, Kolk and Van Tulder (2002) found that codes of conduct are important, though not exclusive, tools for addressing child labour in the garment industry. More generally, corporations that participate in the Global Compact have been shown to be more likely than non-participants to have substantive human rights policies in place and to be regarded as sustainable corporations by external audiences (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2010). Similarly, while many scholars were initially quite sceptical of the effectiveness of environmental management codes such as ISO 14001 (Andrews et al. 2003; Dahlstrom et al. 2003), other research has shown that certification to these programmes improves firms' legal compliance and reduces their pollution levels (Potoski and Prakash 2005).

How do 'toothless' agreements such as voluntary codes and management systems affect corporate behaviour on the ground? Here, legitimacy and reputation are of central importance (Haufler 2001). In addition to the role they play in socializing firms, both are important assets for corporations, and many codes that have been developed in cooperation with IOs and NGOs achieve high levels of legitimacy among certain publics. But corporations cannot assume their audiences to be naïve (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2010). To render their commitments credible they must be willing to take on material burdens and communicate these. ISO 14001 certification is a good example of this, having been analysed as a 'club good' for which corporations are willing to incur costs beyond what is required by law in order to reap reputational benefits (Prakash and Potoski 2006). In addition, corporations' high-profile public commitments to social and environmental values provide policy makers and NGOs with information that can be used to pressure corporations into implementing the substance of the voluntary schemes they enter into.

External monitoring by third-party certifiers might well improve implementation, but, on the whole, research has shown that corporations tend to do what they claim to do (Kolk 2004). Thus, corporate participation in voluntary initiatives and public disclosures seems to induce implementation of new CSR policies and enhance the environmental and human rights performance of corporations. However, this conclusion partly depends on the level of development and dominant economic policies of the corporation's home country. According to Lim and Tsutsui (2012), more liberal economic policy traditions seem to encourage ceremonial commitment in developed countries, suggesting a pattern of 'organized hypocrisy' whereby corporations make symbolic commitments without subsequent action. By contrast, corporations in developing countries are encouraged to make more substantive commitment. Overall, however, research on the effects of corporate participation in PPVIs is just barely out of its infancy. A great deal of the research has focused on just one or two prominent schemes, namely ISO 14001 and the Global Compact. In general, we also know more about how PPVIs affect corporate environmental governance than companies' human rights or anti-corruption performance.

Conclusion

Owing to a lack of a central global political authority and a growing recognition of the need for effective governance at the global level, IOs have joined governments, business associations, NGOs and investors in the development and sponsorship of voluntary initiatives to address governance gaps in the areas of human rights, environmental, labour and social issues. For large corporations, public–private voluntary initiatives have become an important means to show commitment to social responsibility and reduce the trust gap between corporations and society.

Even in this era of globalization many of the factors shaping companies' engagement in PPVIs are located at the national level. Although companies operate in international markets, their origins and operational practices remain embedded in the political, economic and social systems of their home states. Democratic regimes and the locally specific mobilization of bias help explain why some corporations participate in PPVIs while others abstain. The counter-vailing power of national as well as international civil society is an increasingly important force shaping corporations' decisions to engage in PPVIs. A number of additional country-level factors such as regulatory regimes and different forms of capitalism also have been hypothesized to affect firms' participation in PPVIs, but presently very little is known about the role played by these factors.

The extent to which voluntary codes actually improve corporate environmental and social performance also is still open to debate. As many critics point out, PPVIs are soft law initia-tives that lack enforcement and often have only weak monitoring mechanisms. While there is tentative evidence to suggest that participating corporations tend to put their money where their mouth is, there has been little systematic research on the effectiveness of these standards, particularly when corporations operate across borders and in developing countries. Many of the host countries in which transnational corporations operate have weak regulatory regimes and poor enforcement capacity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many NGOs push for the norms elaborated in PPVIs to become legally binding so that corporations are forced to commit to corporate *accountability* instead of to a vaguer notion of corporate *responsibility* (Clapp 2005). Possibly the biggest question in this context concerns the question of the relationship between corporations' participation in PPVIs and their political activities regarding binding regulatory policies. If corporations really use PPVIs strategically to avert stricter regulation and real accountability, then any achievements of global governance goals resulting from PPVIs may be undone by the setbacks that result from anti-regulatory lobbying facilitated by the very same schemes. This question is yet to be addressed by systematic research.

Recommended for further reading

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The politics of inter-regionalism

Relations between international regional organizations

Anna van der Vleuten and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann

As the development of relations between international regional organizations, inter-regionalism denotes a relatively recent phenomenon. Largely due to systemic bipolarity, inter-regional relations remained limited to 'dialogue partnerships' between the European Community (EC) and other regional groupings until the end of the Cold War. Academic interest in the topic is even more recent, and until 2001 the terminology of inter-regionalism was rarely used.[1] Scholars have, moreover, mainly focused on inter-regionalism involving the European Union (EU). While acknowledging the key role of the EU, we also include other, less studied inter-regional relations. Views differ as to what is covered by the term 'inter-regionalism'. We distinguish between *regionalization*, which refers to the growth of socio-economic integration within a given region, and *regionalism*, which is the establishment of regional organizations resulting from the top-down political response of states to bottom-up processes of regionalization. Regional organizations are formal institutions, created by international treaties. Based on this distinction, inter-regionalism is the process and outcome of political and economic interactions between regional organizations. We distinguish between 'pure' inter-regionalism, involving two regional organizations, and 'hybrid' inter-regionalism, involving regional organizations and other regional actors as well. Our definition is not limited to 'inter-hemispheric cooperation'. It also includes relations between regional organizations on the same continent. In fact, a continent is composed of different regions, the relations between which constitute an inter-regional layer of governance. Pioneer of inter-regionalism Heiner Hänggi also includes so-called 'trans-regional' relations between groups of states, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), composed of 15 East Asian, two North American and two South American countries (Hänggi 2006). However, we agree with Julie Gilson that trans-regionalism and inter-regionalism are different phenomena.

> Trans-regionalism is a structural attempt to combine a range of states within a coherent unified framework. Inter-regionalism, by contrast, explicitly sets one region in a dialogue (or potentially a conflict) with an "other" . . . The region as a political actor is central to inter-regionalism in a way that it is not in transregionalism.
>
> *(Gilson 2002: 3)*

This brings us to the concept of region, which is crucial to our understanding of inter-regionalism. Regional organizations consist of states belonging to a 'region', a certain geographical area with borders which are not simply natural but also constructed and geopolitical, and which embodies a claim to a common identity, based on the shared history of this geographical entity and some combination of cultural, economic, linguistic and political ties (Van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2007).

A last conceptual issue to be addressed is the actorness of regional organizations. Some consider all regional organizations other than the EU as lacking the capacity to act in a coherent way because of the absence of supranational institutions and procedures. In order to enable us to discuss, their behaviour, we assume that regional organizations all have actorness, but to differing degrees, depending primarily on the supranational or intergovernmental character of regional institutions and the thickness of these institutions. These differences in actorness have to be taken into account by any theory which aims to explain the outcomes of inter-regionalism.

Theories

Why do regional organizations engage in inter-regionalism? A dominant theoretical framework has not emerged yet, as there seem to be different theories which are well placed to deal with the question raised. We briefly present four main strands.

Realist theories point to the dynamics of rival regionalism and explain the decisions of regional organizations to engage in inter-regionalism by the need to balance third parties, the need to balance (inter-)regionalism in other regions or the desire for bandwagoning with another regional organization. These patterns of soft balancing are a product of the growing recognition that pure military power is ineffective in tangibly affecting policy outcomes in non-military issue areas, thus shifting policy making to institutional arenas (Rüland 2010). In an international system where economic power is increasingly important, the fear of being excluded from beneficial arrangements pushes regional organizations to establish or intensify inter-regional cooperation in a way similar to that in which states balance military power by concluding alliances.

Liberal institutionalist approaches stress the impact of the parallel processes of globalization and regionalization on the need for states to regain political control over a situation of complex interdependence. They have framed the rise of inter-regionalism as a synthesis of market-driven globalism and politically driven regionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). In this view, inter-regional institution building is considered a strategy to increase trust and reduce uncertainty about the behaviour of others. Inter-regionalism may also contribute to regional institution building ('regionalism through inter-regionalism'), and it may strengthen the positions of regional organizations involved in negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or at the global level in general. Linked to these approaches is the pluralist interest group hypothesis, which expects inter-regionalism to be the outcome of political bargaining processes between regionally organized domestic business interests pushing for market-opening policies and their protectionist opponents. Strong support by interest groups would then be correlated with the rise of inter-regional regimes, and the decline of this support would be correlated with their stagnation.

Constructivist approaches focus on processes of collective identity formation through inter-regional interactions. Inter-regionalism helps in building the identity of a group of states as a regional actor. Gilson (2005) shows how inter-regional interactions between an amorphous Asian 'self' and a pre-defined European 'other' have shaped the concept of an East Asian region, without, however, leading to the institutionalization of the region. In her

explanation of EU–Latin American relations, Jean Grugel (2004: 621) argues that 'new regionalism appears to constitute a relatively safe space within which Europe can display identity and norm difference from the US' (United States). One volume even investigates the '"makability" of regions' as a result of EU support for regionalism (De Lombaerde and Schulz 2009). In fact, the EU assists other regional organizations in capacity building as part of an active exporting of the European model of regional integration. This constitutes the EU as an external federator and supports its claim of being a normative power, which consequently contributes to the EU's own identity building. Given the specific territorial and ideational character of regional organizations, inter-regional relations will reflect and reproduce these characteristics. They will be friendlier between regional organizations with an inclusive identity and less friendly between regional organizations that have conflicting identities, such as the former colonizer and the formerly colonized.

A critical international political economy approach considers inter-regionalism as a 'problem-solving institution' intended to resolve some of the tensions inherent in regional and global capitalism by smoothing contradictions between national and inter-regional capitalist interests. Paul Cammack (1999), for instance, argues that state leaders in the EU and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) exploit the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to reinforce the power of capital over labour. Inter-regionalism may also open up possibilities for the generation of transnational strategic counter-hegemonic projects, because they allow different emancipatory movements to join forces in their common resistance to capital (Briceño Ruiz 2010). Elements of these four perspectives return in our discussion of the emergence and development of inter-regionalism in different world regions.

Inter-regionalism and the European Union

Already during the Cold War, the EC developed so-called 'dialogue partnerships' with other regional groupings, creating a hub-and-spokes system gravitating around the EC. The EU has used inter-regionalism to promote regionalism, manage interdependence and secure market access, to balance US influence, to promote the interests of transnational capital, and to enhance its legitimacy and establish itself as a global actor. Promoting inter-regional relations not only enhances the EU's legitimacy but also 'promotes the legitimacy and status of other regions. This, in turn, promotes further crosscutting regionalism and inter-regionalism around the world' (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005: 251). Inter-regional relations involving the EU are mostly based on framework cooperation agreements, which include three pillars: political dialogue, development cooperation and trade liberalization. Table 32.1 shows the relations between the EU and other regional organizations, as well as the year in which formal cooperation started.[2]

Table 32.1 Inter-regional cooperation between the EU and other regional organizations

EU–Africa	EU–Americas	EU–Asia
EU–ECOWAS (2000)	EU–CAN (1996)	EU–ASEAN (1972)
EU–GCC (1988)	EU–CARICOM (1975)/	EU–SAARC (1994)
EU–IGAD (2003)	CARIFORUM (1992)	
EU–OAU/AU (2000)	EU–MERCOSUR (1992)	
EU–SADC (1994)	EU–CACM/SICA (1993)	

EU–Africa

Regional integration is a key word in EU–African relations at both the continental level and the level of the regional economic communities. The EU promotes it as an instrument to tackle poverty and instability.

Continental: EU–African Union (AU)

In 2000 the EU–Africa dialogue was launched with the historic EU–Africa Summit in Cairo. It has intensified after the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the AU in 2002. It features a series of meetings between officials, ministers and diplomats. The dialogue is focused on the main issues of AU policy making: peace and security, good governance and regional integration and trade. In 2007, relations were reframed from the 'EU Strategy for Africa' to a 'Joint Africa–EU Strategy', reflecting the intention to establish a genuine partnership of equals. The joint response to global challenges, rather than African concerns, would now be the chief focus. The main engines of the strategy are not the member-states, but the European Commission and the AU Commission. In yearly College-to-College (C2C) meetings, they discuss their institutional relations and the implementation of the eight thematic partnerships, including 'Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure', 'Energy' and 'Climate Change', and the concomitant Action Plans. Each partnership has a European and an African implementation team. The Joint Africa–EU Strategy suffers, however, from a lack of funding and a lack of awareness among key stakeholders, which raises serious doubts regarding its capacities to deliver.

EU–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The GCC was created in 1981. In 1988 the GCC and the EU signed a framework agreement, which contained a commitment from both sides to enter into negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The negotiations were initiated in 1990, but by 1995 they had slowed to a halt because the EU had lost interest. The negotiations resumed after the EU exhibited renewed interest in talks with the Gulf region in 2003. This was mainly due to geopolitical reasons in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion in Iraq and constituted 'a move to demonstrate solidarity with moderate Arab forces' against Islamic fundamentalism (Rüland 2010: 1275). The GCC's decision to create a customs union (which entered into force in January 2003) also motivated the EU's change of attitude, although not for commercial reasons, as trade with the GCC accounts for less than 3 per cent of total EU imports and less than 5 per cent of total EU exports. In addition, petroleum imports, which account for three-quarters of EU imports, are not included in the FTA negotiations (Antkiewicz and Momani 2009). Further strengthening EU–GCC relations is considered a contribution to regional security and stability, rather than an economic imperative.

EU–African regional groupings

Hybrid inter-regionalism between the EU and Africa began with the first Lomé Convention in 1975, when the EC negotiated with the former colonies of its member-states, the African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). However, cooperation has deepened to pure inter-regionalism under the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. 'Cotonou' mentions regional integration as an instrument for poverty reduction. Regional integration and

development are explicitly linked, and economic and political regional integration is financially supported by means of the European Development Fund (EDF). Under Cotonou, inter-regional partnerships are being developed in the negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and West Africa, with the aim to make EU–African trade policy WTO-consistent.

Paradoxically, the EU not only promotes regional integration through inter-regionalism, it also undermines it by negotiating different agreements with groups of states belonging to the same region. The first full-fledged EPA, for instance, applies to only four out of 15 SADC (Southern African Development Community) member-states. These separate agreements undermine the credibility of EU commitment to regional integration. It must be admitted that there are over 30 regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Africa, and that African countries average four RTA memberships each (Lynch 2010), which complicates coherence on both sides. The EU approach, however, exacerbates the fragmentation.

An EPA covers trade and regional integration. Further aspects of the relations between the EU and the regional groupings are covered by multiannual Regional Strategy Papers/ Regional Indicative Programmes (RSP/RIPs), which detail 'political dialogues' on region-specific issues. The RIP for Eastern Africa, for instance, covers EU relations with COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), the EAC (East African Community) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). It addresses cooperation on issues such as piracy, drought, desertification and famine. The RIP for West Africa supports ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in electoral assistance and migration policies. A special case can be made for the cooperation between the EU and SADC, which is both more intensive and more controversial than that with other regional organizations in Africa. In 1994, SADC made a new start when post-apartheid South Africa joined the grouping, which was previously dominated by the Frontline States. In the very same year, the EU and SADC issued a joint declaration (the Berlin Initiative) announcing the development of a comprehensive dialogue covering many domains, including the offer from the EU to share its experience in the field of regional integration with SADC. The region-specific issues are the fight against HIV/AIDS and the political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. The main chunk of EU funding is intended for regional economic integration and the promotion of export-led economic growth in order to reduce poverty. The remainder is earmarked for the reinforcement of the SADC Secretariat. The earlier involvement of some EU member-states as colonial powers in the region has made SADC a wary partner, which criticizes EU sanctions against the Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe as neocolonialism. The EU has also been accused of policy incoherence since it concluded a bilateral FTA with South Africa, which undermines regional cohesion.

In sum, EU–African inter-regionalism is characterized by processes of 'regionalism through inter-regionalism' through which the EU uses its predominance to promote a single model of economic liberalization across the African continent and secure for itself market access. The EU promotes (inter-)regionalism as an instrument to tackle poverty, but its African counterparts accuse it of policy incoherence and 'soft imperialism' because of its patronizing attitude and the perceived abuse of its superior economic strength.

EU–Americas

In all relationships with other regions, the EU is the stronger side, but this does not apply in the case of North America. The US is its major rival on the global scene. As a result, the EU

has developed bilateral rather than inter-regional relationships with North America. In contrast, inter-regional cooperation has been developed with Latin American and Caribbean regional organizations.

EU–MERCOSUR

MERCOSUR was created in 1991 as Common Market of the South and was seen as a receptive group to which the EU could export its model of integration. Despite remaining an intergovernmental organization, MERCOSUR's structure is largely inspired by the EU. EU–MERCOSUR relations were institutionalized in 1992 by the Inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement, and further deepened by the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA) from 1995. The agreement is built on three pillars: political dialogue, development cooperation and trade liberalization. Political dialogue has taken place via meetings at different political levels. Development cooperation has been put into practice by means of a Memorandum of Understanding (signed in 2001), and a number of projects have been implemented so far. Trade liberalization has been the most controversial part of the agreement. A free trade agreement has been under negotiation since 1999. The negotiations have suffered many interruptions and came to a complete halt in 2006. They resumed in 2011, but there are no concrete prospects of winding up because no agreement has been reached yet on the topics of services, public procurement and agriculture. From the beginning, MERCOSUR perceived cooperation with the EU as a strategy to balance US hegemony in South America, and as an opportunity to improve cooperation with their most important economic partner and major source of foreign direct investment (Doctor 2007). However, since Brazil and the EU concluded a Special Partnership in 2007, EU–MERCOSUR relations are under pressure. Although the EU claims that inter-regionalism and strategic partnerships with regional powers are complementary, the record so far has shown that this is not self-evident.

EU–Andean Community (CAN)

The Andean Pact was created in 1969 and renamed the Andean Community in 1997 in the context of the new wave of regionalism in the 1990s. EU–CAN relations were established first at the level of a political dialogue with the Declaration of Rome in 1996. In 2003 a framework agreement was signed which included development cooperation and liberalization of trade, but the latter was suspended in 2008 due to disagreements regarding biodiversity, among other things. Meanwhile, EU–CAN inter-regional relations have deteriorated, chiefly due to the internal problems of CAN. With the withdrawal of Venezuela in 2006 and the creation of broader encompassing organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), CAN has lost its coherence and *raison d'être*. The slow development of integration in the region has also been contributed to by the EU's loss of interest in promoting its model in the region. Furthermore, since the suspension of the framework agreement in 2008, the EU has concluded bilateral trade agreements with CAN member-states Peru (2010) and Colombia (2010). Similar negotiations were started with Ecuador, but were suspended in 2009. Given that trade relations constitute a major component of inter-regional relations, it is fair to say that bilateralism has replaced inter-regionalism in EU–CAN relations.

EU–CARICOM/CARIFORUM

Regional integration in the Caribbean was started in 1965 with the creation of CARIFTA, the Caribbean Free Trade Association. Integration was deepened and widened in 1973, when the Commonwealth Caribbean island states established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Regional integration is embraced by the small and vulnerable island states as their only defence in a globalized economy. Formal but hybrid inter-regional relations started with the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975 by the EC and the Caribbean members of the ACP Group of States. The CARICOM Secretariat coordinated and monitored the regional projects financed by the European Development Fund. However, three states joined the Lomé Convention without being members of CARICOM at the time: Suriname joined in 1979, Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1990. The need to institutionalize a new forum for consultation on (inter-)regional cooperation emerged. For that reason, CARIFORUM was created in 1992 with the task of managing and coordinating the policy dialogue between the Caribbean Region and the EU, and promoting regional integration. The institutions of CARICOM and CARIFORUM show considerable overlap, and the secretary-general of CARICOM also assumes the role of secretary-general of CARIFORUM. In 2008, the CARIFORUM–EU EPA was signed as the first EPA between the EU and a regional grouping. As in previous agreements, it encompasses trade and aid, but the main difference is the introduction of the principle of reciprocal grant of preferences, which is consistent with WTO principles. Unfortunately, WTO rulings have had detrimental consequences for Caribbean banana producers, despite EU defence of their interests. The EDF continues to financially support the deepening of regional integration in the Caribbean region.

EU–CACM/SICA

Central American countries participate in many regional groupings, the most important being the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Central American Integration System (SICA). Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua created the CACM in 1960. Relations between the EU and the CACM are built on the political cooperation during the Cold War, institutionalized by the San José Dialogue in 1984, and renewed in Florence in 1996 and in Madrid in 2002. The Central American countries welcomed the EU's inter-regional approach mainly as a way to balance US hegemony in the region, to seek market access, and to canalize development aid. However, inter-state and civil wars paralyzed the CACM until the 1990s. In 1993, the CACM, Panama and Belize created the SICA as a political body with the task of consolidating democracy in the region and coordinating economic and political integration. A Framework Cooperation Agreement was signed in the same year between the EU, CACM and Panama, which was renewed and deepened by the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement in 2003 (it has not entered into force yet). Its central themes are the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, environmental conservation and biodiversity, and integrated trade cooperation aimed at the progressive integration of Central American countries into the world economy. Similar to its Africa policies, the European Commission negotiates multiannual RSP/RIPs with Central America in parallel to trade agreements. Until 2010, strengthening the institutions of the SICA was one of three focal sectors of the RSP/RIP. Since 2011, support is focused on regional development and transborder crime. In 2004, the Dominican Republic, the CACM countries and the US concluded a Free Trade Agreement which has weakened the SICA and inter-regional relations with the EU.

In sum, the development of EU–American inter-regionalism was motivated by the desire on both sides to balance US influence. It is increasingly characterized by a double track: on the one hand, the promotion of regional integration and institutionalization following the EU neoliberal model which includes good governance; and on the other hand, the undermining of pure inter-regionalism by bilateral trade agreements. In addition, trans-regional forums such as the EU–CELAC and EU–UNASUR have developed, involving large groups of countries.

EU–Asia

Inter- and trans-regional relations between the EU and Asia have grown in significance since the 1990s, but pure inter-regionalism remains limited to EU relations with ASEAN and SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). In 1994 the European Commission launched the New Asia Strategy, which was to be more comprehensive, reflecting the awareness of Asia's increasing economic and political weight in the post-Cold War world. It resulted in the first Asia–Europe Meeting in 1996, with the aim of balancing the APEC as a platform for American influence in Asia. In spite of its progressive institution-alization, ASEM is first and foremost a case of trans-regionalism 'as an umbrella structure within which state-to-state and bilateral interregional structures [between EU-ASEAN] are nested' (Doidge 2011: 143).

EU–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

In 1972, the first informal relations were established between the EU and ASEAN, prompted by economic and security motives. The impending 1973 accession of the United Kingdom to the EC raised fears of trade and investment diversion and the loss of trade preferences. In addition, the United Kingdom had withdrawn its troops east of Suez and the US had weakened its security guarantees, moving ASEAN to look for new alliances. In September 1978 the first ASEAN–EEC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) took place. In 1980 the EC–ASEAN Cooperation Agreement was signed, aiming at commercial, economic and technical cooperation. A Joint Cooperation Committee was established as a mechanism to monitor cooperation. In the 1990s, cooperation broadened to include political and security matters. In parallel with the meetings of ministers and officials, ASEAN–EU private cooperation through business networking and joint ventures is promoted as well, bringing together small and medium enterprises from both regions. With an initial focus on agriculture, industry and trade, the scope of cooperation has widened to include issues such as poverty alleviation, health and family planning, and women's rights. The 16th AEMM resulted in the adoption of the Nuremberg Declaration and Action Plan, seeking closer cooperation on economic, development and security issues, including piracy and terrorism, and negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement were launched. The launching of the formal EC–ASEAN relationship in 1978 is often considered as the origin or archetype of pure inter-regionalism. Nevertheless, over the decades, cooperation has not deepened beyond a proliferation of non-binding dialogue processes. This can be explained by diverging interests within both organizations, neither of which have a mechanism to overcome internal disagreements on foreign and secu-rity issues, by disagreements between the EU and ASEAN on Myanmar's membership and human rights issues, and by the thinly institutionalized character of ASEAN. Under the ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support, the European Commission, keen on seeing its supranational institutional model copied, has given financial and technical support

to the ASEAN Secretariat. Doidge (2011: 174) terms it 'capacity-building interregionalism' as it might contribute to the creation of deeper inter-regional cooperation.

EU–South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

The SAARC is an economic and political regional organization set up in 1985 with the objective of building mutual trust and confidence into a conflict-ridden region. In 1995 economic objectives were incorporated into the agenda with the launching of the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), upgraded to a Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2005. SAPTA was also the start for inter-regional cooperation, when the European Commission and the SAARC Secretariat signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in 1996. It avoided sensitive political issues and focused on technical assistance in trade matters. In 1999, the EU and SAARC agreed to cooperate on improving market access for SAARC products. The development of concrete cooperation has been slow, reflecting the lack of progress within SAARC, which is plagued by conflicts, encounters policy divergence on all major issues, suffers large income differences and features India as a reluctant hegemon. The general consensus is that SAARC, as opposed to ASEAN, has not succeeded in integrating the region economically or politically. The EU continues to invest in inter-regional cooperation with SAARC because of the trade and investment opportunities in the region. In 2007, the European Commission obtained observer status, which offers opportunities to enhance EU technical assistance and promote business networking.

In sum, EU–Asian inter-regionalism is characterized by the aims of obtaining market access (for both regions) and avoiding marginalization (for Asia). Its institutionalization remains weak due to the reluctance of Asian states to pool sovereignty, but also because of the development of more encompassing trans-regional structures such as ASEM.

South–South inter-regionalism on the same continent

In the wake of the Cold War and spurred by the fear of marginalization in a globalized world dominated by 'the West', inter-regional cooperation has also developed in the 'global South', in spite of the thin institutionalization of regional integration and the limited resources available.

Africa

African inter-regionalism has mainly developed under the aegis of the African Union (see Table 32.2). The AU aims at establishing an African Economic Community by 2028. This overall objective was already envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and agreed upon in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, because economic integration was considered necessary to promote an endogenous and self-sustained economic development. The ideal of collective self-reliance has given way to the aim of eradicating poverty. The AU aims at coordinating and harmonizing the policies of African regional organizations because in spite of the serious capacity constraints which plague regional and inter-regional cooperation in Africa, a plethora of cooperation arrangements has developed with many overlapping memberships. These multiple memberships create duplication and sometimes competition in activities, while placing additional burdens on already over-stretched staff to attend all the various summits and other meetings. As these overlaps impede progress on economic integration, the 2006 AU Summit in Banjul called for a moratorium on the recognition of regional organizations, with the exception of eight

Table 32.2 Inter-regionalism on the same continent

Continent	Regional Organizations Involved in Inter-regional Cooperation
Africa	AU–CEN-SAD (2007)
	AU–COMESA (2007)
	AU–ECCAS (2007)
	AU–ECOWAS (2007)
	AU–IGAD (2007)
	AU–League of Arab States (2007)
	AU–AMU (2007)
	AU–SADC (2007)
	COMESA EAC SADC Tripartite (2008)
Americas	MERCOSUR–CAN (1993–2008)
Asia and Oceania	ASEAN–ANZCERTA Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) (1996)
	ASEAN–SCO (2005)

organizations: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The AU Summit in Accra (2007) adopted a protocol which regulates the relations between the AU and these regional organizations, including the recommendation to rationalize these regional organizations, meaning the elimination of double memberships, and to strengthen them so as to lead to the creation of an African Common Market. This top-down process of inter-regionalism also covers political integration and cooperation in the field of peace and security.

Spurred by the Banjul Summit, three regional organizations decided to move towards broader and deeper integration. The COMESA EAC SADC Tripartite (the Tripartite) started in 2008 with a joint summit. In 2011 the heads of state and government of the 26 member-states of the three organizations launched negotiations for the establishment of the grand Tripartite Free Trade Area as a first step towards an integrated market. Their cooperation is motivated by the hope that a wider market will bolster intra-regional trade, infrastructure development and investment flows. It might also strengthen their position in the EPA negotiations with the EU. As regards infrastructure, the Tripartite has also started collaboration with IGAD and the international donor community (including the private sector) on a series of projects to improve the key transport corridors and reduce the costs of cross-border trade in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Americas

MERCOSUR–CAN relations are the only case of pure American inter-regionalism. Despite the increase of inter-regional trade, attempts to formalize relations between CARICOM–CAN and CARICOM–CACM have failed. The Free Trade of the Americas project (FTAA), proposed by the US in 1994, would have subsumed all regional organizations under a hemispheric free trade area, but negotiations were suspended in 2005 and the project is considered dead. The MERCOSUR–CAN rapprochement dates from 1993, when former Brazilian President Itamar Franco proposed the creation of a South American Free Trade Area. His successor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso continued the process and upgraded the project into

the South American Community of Nations (SACN) in 2000. The SACN was finally created in 2004. Its main pillar was trade convergence between MERCOSUR and CAN, leading to a pattern of inter-regional relations between the two organizations. SACN was renamed Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008 under the influence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and changed its main characteristics, increasing the importance of political and social issues on the agenda to define post-neoliberal integration objectives (Briceño Ruiz 2010). With the creation of UNASUR, the only process which could be defined as American inter-regionalism evolved into regionalism.

Asia

ASEAN is the key player in Asian inter-regionalism. In the 1990s, it started to invest in inter-regional Asian relations, motivated by the fear of marginalization, the need to diversify ties and the desire to obtain standing in the global arena. Its activities have resulted in links with the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement (ANZCERTA, also referred to as CER) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

In the 1990s, negotiations started between ASEAN and ANZCERTA. These aimed to increase economic integration and were prompted by a shared economic interest in securing access to export markets and increase competitiveness. In 1996 a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation was signed. In the post-bipolar era, ASEAN wanted a higher level of cooperation. In 2004 it asked to reopen negotiations with the aim of establishing an FTA with ANZCERTA, in order to reap more benefits from economic integration and balance China and India, the rising powers on the Asian continent. An FTA also served Australia's (and to a lesser extent, New Zealand's) strategic interests in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN–ANZCERTA FTA (AANFTA) entered into force in 2010.

ASEAN has also sought cooperation with its northern neighbours, the member-states of the SCO. ASEAN and SCO concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005. It refers to cooperation in the domains of energy, tourism and the environment, but the priorities lie with cooperation in the field of terrorism and transnational crime. ASEAN–SCO relations have a non-binding and low-profile character, exemplified by the fact that the Memorandum has been concluded between the secretariats of the organizations and has been signed by their secretaries-general, without an explicit commitment on behalf of the member-states. They hold yearly consultations, mainly on terrorism, drugs, arms and human trafficking.

The extension of pure inter-regionalism in Asia is limited by the political and strategic rivalries between China and Japan, which impede the creation of an East Asian Community. In order to establish a counterweight to the regional fortresses emerging in Europe and North America, the ASEAN+3 (APT) framework was established in 1997. It 'formally' links ASEAN to the key Northeast Asian economies – China, Japan and the Republic of Korea – but it is a case of trans-regionalism in the absence of institutionalized East Asian regional integration. Asian inter-regionalism is motivated by the fear of marginalization and the need to balance American and Chinese power. It is constrained by the reluctance to institutionalize relations and the unwillingness of regional great powers to invest in cooperation.

South–South cross-continental interregionalism

Hindered by low levels of inter-regional trade and investment, South–South inter-regionalism is in several cases no more than the recognition of the potential benefits of further coopera-tion agreements. Table 32.3 summarizes South–South inter-regional cooperation.

Table 32.3 Inter-Regional cooperation by regional organizations from different continents

Continents	Inter-Regional Cooperation
Africa–Asia	ASEAN–GCC (1990)
	ASEAN–SADC (1996)
	IOR-ARC (1997)
Americas–Africa	MERCOSUR–GCC (2005)
	MERCOSUR–SACU (2004)
Americas–Asia	CAN–ASEAN (1997)
	MERCOSUR–ASEAN (1996)

Africa–Asia

Pure African–Asian inter-regionalism is found in the relations between ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council and between ASEAN and SADC, but it has remained very limited despite the fact that the regions have been bound together in an informal economic community for many centuries and share a history of colonialism. Cooperation between ASEAN and the GCC started in 1990, when the foreign minister of Oman in his capacity as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GCC expressed the desire to establish formal relations with ASEAN. In 2009, activities by the secretariats and the secretaries-general finally resulted in the first ASEAN–GCC Ministerial Meeting in Bahrain. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Secretariats. Cooperation seems to have eventually taken off since the first meeting, with proposals on exchange of information on counter-terrorism, plans for closer collaboration on trade and investment, and yearly meetings at ministerial level.

Since 1996, two years after South Africa entered SADC, consultations with ASEAN on inter-regional trade and industry have taken place on a regular basis at the level of ministers of trade and industry. The meetings are prepared by and take place in the presence of the secretaries-general of ASEAN and SADC. As financial and human resources are limited, the meetings are usually held on the margins of larger international meetings.

There are several larger, trans-regional initiatives, which include regional organizations from both regions as well as individual states, such as the New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). Even though the IOR-ARC has 'regional cooperation' in its name and includes four regional organizations (ASEAN, GCC, SAARC and SADC), it is not a case of pure inter-regionalism, but rather a forum for cooperation among the coastal states of the Indian Ocean with a tripartite structure involving officials, academics and business people.

Americas–Africa

Relations between American and African regional organizations have not evolved much beyond the signing of bi-regional agreements. MERCOSUR and the GCC signed a framework agreement in 2005 which never entered into force, and while free trade negotiations began, they stalled after the second round in January 2007. In 2004 and 2009, MERCOSUR and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) signed partial trade agreements, but they did not enter into force either. Free trade negotiations started and appear more promising, but there have so far been no announcements of concrete dates for the finalization and signing of an agreement. The concluded agreements suggest a logic of diplomatic recognition, rather than the pursuit of substantive inter-regional relations.

Americas–Asia

ASEAN has pushed for the establishment of inter-regional relations with Central and South America in a deliberate effort to diversify its network beyond Europe and North America. ASEAN and MERCOSUR started meeting informally in 1996, but it was not until 2008 that they convened their first Ministerial Meeting in Brasilia. On that occasion they expressed the desire to enhance linkages between the two organizations and agreed to convene a second meeting. In addition, a Senior Officials' Meeting would be established to coordinate a Roadmap and Action Plan. The second meeting, scheduled to take place in Thailand in 2010, was later moved to the Philippines and subsequently postponed. It has yet to take place. Meanwhile, the broader Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) has developed as a trans-regional vehicle for balancing US influence and EU economic power.

A dialogue between ASEAN and the Andean Community started in 1997, aiming to increase inter-regional trade, investments and tourism. In 2000 the first Symposium on ASEAN–Andean Cooperation took place, where they reaffirmed these interests, but so far the organizations have not concluded any formal inter-regional agreement.

Conclusion: the politics of inter-regionalism

According to David Camroux, concern with inter-regionalism is still a largely European enterprise. Camroux (2010: 58fn) adds that there are 'no studies of relations say between SAARC and ASEAN, or NAFTA and ASEAN that use the terminology of interregionalism'. He concludes that even the EU only preaches inter-regionalism, but practises bi- and multi-lateralism. Has this chapter proven him right? Can we say that inter-regionalism is more about rhetoric than practice? If so, why do regional organizations sign inter-regional agreements?

On the question of the centrality of the EU in inter-regionalism, the stocktaking exercise in this chapter shows that inter-regionalism has also developed between and within other world regions. Not only is the EU not involved in those cases, this type of inter-regionalism is often intended to balance EU influence and strengthen the asymmetrical bargaining position of 'Southern' regional organizations. However, the effective exercise of inter-regional power is in these cases hampered by the weak actorness of one or both organizations in terms of the lack of institutionalization (the absence of a strong and well-staffed secretariat) and the impossibility of speaking with one voice. The former often results from resource constraints, the latter from the reluctance to pool or delegate sovereignty. Accordingly, inter-regional relations and agreements suffer from a gap between rhetoric and practice that puts into question the relevance of inter-regionalism. Furthermore, the EU not only acts as the motor behind inter-regionalism, it is also a disruptive force when it prefers bilateral agreements with key players rather than inter-regional agreements.

On the question of why regional organizations sign agreements in spite of these financial and political obstacles, we agree with Jürgen Rüland (2010) that soft balancing has been a major driving force in all cases, both involving the EU as well as South–South inter-regionalism. In distinction from Rüland, however, our analysis suggests that managing interdependence figures higher than the creation and consolidation of a regional identity. The 'makability' of regions through the promotion of a set of norms connected to (inter-)regionalism seems to be primarily an EU concern. The central importance of economic concerns in a globalized world economy and the role of inter-regionalism as an instrument for the diffusion of the neoliberal script confirm the critical international political economy perspective.

In conclusion, the proliferation of inter-regional agreements in the last decades does not (yet) imply 'a shift from a world order based on nation-states towards one based on regions and interregional relations' (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005: 252). Instead, it is another strategy for nation-states to better defend their geopolitical and economic interests and provide a forum for the exchange of information in an insecure and interdependent world.

Recommended for further reading

Söderbaum and Van Langenhove (2005), Hänggi et al. (2006), Telò (2007) and Doidge (2011).

Notes

1   Searching Google Scholar for the key word 'inter-regionalism' shows a mere 60 hits between 1993 and 2001, but 195 hits in 2001 alone and a yearly average of 88 hits between 2001 and 2012.
2   We will not discuss Euro-Med, EU–LAC and EU–CELAC (formerly EU–Rio Group), because these are cases of trans-regionalism rather than inter-regionalism. Also, we have left out instances of inter-regionalism which were mentioned in secondary literature but of which we found no further evidence.

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33

International organizations in Asia and the Pacific

Tomoko Akami and Jiro Okamoto

International organizations (IOs) in Asia and the Pacific have often been characterized as 'informal' in comparison to more 'formal' IOs. The latter organization is understood as the 'proper' type of IO defined by the existence of a permanent secretariat and a binding set of rules and/or agreements between governments. The European Union (EU) represents such a 'formal' IO that is regionally based. In this context, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often contrasted with the EU as an 'informal' type, although scholars suggest it has become more formal in the past two decades. This chapter studies a long time span and examines the characteristics of IOs of the region, now called Asia and the Pacific.

International organizations in Asia and the Pacific

We suggest four points to keep in mind when discussing IOs in Asia and the Pacific. First, regionally based IOs in this region have been predominantly forum-driven institutions, or 'informal' IOs. They are different models of IOs, which are not in a transitional stage towards becoming more formal organizations.

Second, colonialism limited and defined the development of these region-based IOs in their formative period and beyond. Modern IOs began in Europe almost at the same time when the European, American and Japanese empires colonized most countries in this region, leaving only a handful of independent states that could be members of IOs. There was, therefore, little basis for region-based IOs during the colonial period. American-led non-governmental organizations (NGOs) nonetheless played a significant role in providing rare international forums for experts to discuss the problems that were specific to the region.

Third, decolonization and the Cold War were key factors in shaping the newly created, regionally based IOs in Asia and the Pacific after the Second World War. While this meant a further increase of influence by the United States (US) in some of these organizations, newly independent Asian states also created IOs among themselves. Until very recently, all these regional organizations were informal in the sense that they did not have a permanent secretariat or binding agreements and were predominantly forum-driven. These newly independent states in the region, which became the member-states of region-based IOs, prioritized national sovereignty, territorial integrity and policy autonomy. As a result, international

activities of these organizations were limited, and their core activities were functional (economic) cooperation. ASEAN is the exception with its recent move to a more formal secretariat, charter and greater governmental cooperation (Reinalda 2012).

Fourth, there were a few competing visions with regard to the regional order, on the basis of which each regional organization was founded. These visions were reflected in the terminologies for the region of a specific historical period, which also indicated the leadership and/ or membership of the envisaged regional order. There are two kinds of these terminologies. The first one encompasses non-Asian (and non-Pacific Islands) actors, especially the US and the British Commonwealth countries on the Pacific Rim, and assumes US leadership on its own or in cooperation with pro-US countries. In the 1920s, for example, the term 'Pacific region' meant the US-led region, which included independent countries and British Commonwealth countries on the Pacific Rim, but omitted the colonies in Asia and within the Pacific Ocean. Here, the term 'Pacific' was used to naturalize and legitimize the involvement and leadership of non-Asian actors, especially the US, in the region. By the early 1990s, a new term, the 'Asia-Pacific region', took over. While it stemmed from the US-led 'Pacific' of the 1920s, it reflected greater initiatives of a new economic power in Asia, Japan, and also a non-Asian actor, Australia. This new term served a similar purpose to 'Pacific' in the 1920s, but with a strong emphasis on the roles of Japan and Australia. Such use of the term 'Pacific' was also evident in the South Pacific Committee (1947), made up of former and current colonial powers, which became the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in 1998.

The second kind of terminology for the region is exclusive of non-Asian (and non-Pacific Island) actors. In the nineteenth century, Japanese imperialists used the term, 'East Asia' (*Tōa*), for what we now call Northeast Asia in order to assert Japan's hegemonic role in this region. This was slightly modified in 1938, and again in the early 1940s; a more resource driven notion of the 'Greater East Asia' (*Dai Tōa*) presented a new Japanese imperial design for the broader region. None of these Japanese imperial notions materialized in genuine IOs. Now a new notion of 'East Asia' emerged as a term to integrate Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, which is in general exclusive of non-Asian actors. 'Southeast Asia' of ASEAN is another term, which excluded non-Asian members. The 'Pacific' of the South Pacific Forum (established in 1971) probably comes inbetween with its use of the term 'Pacific'. Its member-states include Pacific Island independent states as well as Australia and New Zealand, and the semi-colonial role of the latter pair is undeniable. Yet the forum changed its name to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000, indicating not only more extensive membership, but also the greater voices of the Pacific Islands.

In this chapter, we use 'Asia and the Pacific' as a relatively value-free term for the region, and mainly focus on IOs in the Asian part.

US-led Pan-Pacific organizations in the period of colonialism

While most IOs were established in the mid-to-late nineteenth century in Europe and North America, regionally based IOs did not develop in Asia and the Pacific. This was because the very empires which were forming IOs in the North Atlantic, as well as the Japanese empire, colonized most countries in the region. Membership of IOs was usually limited to independent countries, many of which had colonies, and their metropolitan states represented not only their 'nations', but also their colonies at IOs. As only a few independent countries were left in the region, there was little basis for regionally based IOs. Pan-Asianism, which stressed the need for Asian solidarity against Euro-American imperialism, did exist, although it was soon subsumed by Japan's imperialism.

Independent countries in Asia were China, Japan, Korea and Siam (Thailand). Korea, however, became a formal colony of Japan in 1910. These countries were eager to join emerging IOs that were headquartered mostly in Europe. For these independent countries, membership of these organizations implied international recognition and prestige and showed that they were modern nations that had reached the 'standard of civilization' each organization had set. If these independent countries were empires and wanted to join these organizations, they had to meet their standards not only within their 'national' territories, but also in their colonial territories. This was the case for the Rome Sanitary Convention of 1903. Acceptance of this convention was the basis for membership of the Paris-based Office International d'Hygiène Publique (OIHP), which was set up in 1907 to gather information on epidemics. The Japanese empire, therefore, could enter OIHP only after the empire met the standard of sanitation in both its national territories and colonies.

The Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War created the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Among the League's original 42 members, only China, India (1920), Japan and Siam were from Asia, with Persia (Iran) and 16 countries from Central and South America as the other non-European countries. The establishment of the League stimulated international activities of the member-states in Asia and the Pacific. At the League, British dominions and a British colony, India, had a separate representation from the British imperial government. Australia and New Zealand in particular became the new powers to administer the League's mandates in the Pacific. Japan, which was one of the original members of the League's Council, was also a new great power in the region. They all became active members of the League. Japan and Australia, for example, were the two main actors to establish the League's first office outside Europe, in Singapore in 1925.

Furthermore, the League enhanced the formation of NGOs, and this was the case in Asia and the Pacific. It mobilized NGOs for its activities and increased their significance in international and regional relations. International cultural and educational cooperation is a good example of the League using non-governmental (as well as governmental) organizations (Iriye 2004). Other 'technical' sections and committees of the League also used experts and their organizations from Europe, North America and beyond in order to shape norms for global governance in the fields of public health, refugees, financial and economic management, trafficking of women and children and drug trafficking. As a result, White's (1933: 12) pioneering work on NGOs assessed that NGOs were exerting 'a greater influence [than IOs] on international affairs'. Many specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN) were to take over the activities of the League's technical committees after 1945.

While the League's member-states and their national experts in Asia and the Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand, contributed to the League's activities, their institutional base was mostly with IOs based in Europe and North America, not with regional organizations. Nevertheless, regionally based NGOs existed in Asia and the Pacific in the age of the League. In fact, in the absence of IOs, NGOs provided rare and significant opportunities for experts, and at times officials, of the region to discuss the problems specific to the region. Experts in policy-relevant fields (scientists, social scientists, lawyers and other experts in public health, medicine and education) in the US led these regionally based NGOs. Their counterparts in the Pacific Rim countries, especially Japan, China and the British dominions, supported them.

The parameters of these NGOs were defined by US foreign policy of the time. The US did not join the League in 1919, but expanded its regional leadership beyond the Americas (Pan-Americanism) to what they called the 'Pacific' (Pan-Pacific movement). This new

Pan–Pacific initiative culminated in the Washington Conference of 1921–2. Its resulting treaty framework checked Japan's aggression and secured the Anglo-American maritime supremacy and the strategic status quo in China and the Pacific Ocean.

In the 1920s, these Pan-Pacific advocates called the region the 'Pacific'. This construct did not focus on what was inside the Pacific Ocean, which was filled with colonies, but on the cooperation among independent countries on the Pacific Rim, namely the US, British dominions, China and Japan, but mostly not Latin American countries which came under Pan-American organizations. These 'organizations' were forum-driven and initiated various Pan-Pacific biannual or triennial conferences in order to solve urgent regional problems. To organize these forums, most of them had a temporary administration which was housed at the host organization of the next conference. The most important among these regional organizations were the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–60), the Pan-Pacific Science Congress (PSC, 1921–present) and the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference (PWC, 1928–59).

The Institute of Pacific Relations was understood to be one of the most important non-governmental organizations in the 1920s, and was the only organization among these NGOs that had its headquarters inside Asia and the Pacific, in Honolulu (White 1933: 13, 130–1). Its structure, which was based on national units, was the most popular model of the time. This model contrasted to the cosmopolitan model, whose members were not national units, but individuals. The IPR's member countries were largely from the Pacific Rim and included metropolitan Britain. The IPR's main concern was trans-Pacific problems, especially North American relations with Northeast Asia. Its conferences attracted prominent figures of the member countries. It emphasized the merit of providing a non-official forum, and argued that experts' analysis and discussions, free from national policy, would be the best way to solve regional problems. The national units of these organizations were also imperial units. Reflecting its origin in Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) networks in Asia, the IPR's initial members of 1925 included Korea and the Philippines (colonies). Hawai'i (territory) was central in the organization and had a separate representation from the US mainland. Korean and Hawai'ian groups were, however, soon absorbed into their respective imperial/national groups (Akami 2002). The Pan-Pacific Women's Conference was based on similar Christian organizational networks in the region. But unlike the IPR, whose members were predominantly male, the PWC was closely connected to global feminist networks. Despite its attempt to include classes other than the middle classes, and from diverse cultural backgrounds, Southeast Asia was not represented at the PWC until the period of decolonization; nor were indigenous groups from the Pacific Islands.

Unlike other forum-driven NGOs the Institute of Pacific Relations had permanent staff and a fixed location for its International Secretariat (ISIPR), largely due to its independent financial backer, the American Rockefeller Foundation. The ISIPR was located at Honolulu before it moved to New York in 1933. Although other Pan-Pacific forum–driven organizations, such as the Pan-Pacific Science Congress, had secretariats, their activities rotated among the organizations which would host the next conferences. When the location of the next conference was not set, as occurred with the PSC after the Great Depression, the secretariat floated over the Pacific Ocean, with no physical base and activities often stalled.

Although the IPR, the PSC and the PWC can be regarded as parts of Pan-Pacific movements, the PSC presented a distinct model of regional NGOs, in spite of some similarities. Like the IPR and the PWC, the PSC was an organization of experts, based on 'national' expert associations, with experts occupying the executive positions. It was based on national units. It was led by the Americans and supported by the Japanese and people from British

dominions on the Pacific Rim. Finally, the PSC, which became the most comprehensive forum for scientists in the region, had a similar objective to that of the IPR, namely to solve region-specific problems through experts' cooperation and discussion.

There were, however, notable differences. The Australasian groups played a greater role at the PSC than in the IPR. Unlike the IPR, which focused on social science and relations among Pacific Rim countries, the PSC was interested in scientific problems within the Pacific Ocean. It was concerned with the physical nature of the ocean and islands, minerals, plants and animals, as well as the population decline of the islands. Research on these issues required the cooperation and attracted the interests of a greater number of relevant metropolitan and colonial governments than the IPR did. Scientific organizations in the Dutch, French and other European metropolitan states and their colonies in the region became members along with the British, Japanese and US empires. Australia and New Zealand stressed their semi-imperial status in the Pacific as the administrative powers of the new League's mandates, formerly the German colonies in the Pacific south of the equator.

Furthermore, the PSC had official endorsement. Although it was an organization of experts, each member country's government endorsed it. As a result, conference invitations went through diplomatic channels (unless no diplomatic relationship existed), and relevant ministries funded conferences. Participating scientists were meant to act as governmental representatives. Scientists with government posts, including colonial officers, became participants at PSC forums. There were various reasons for the PSC to act as a semi-official organization. Governments most likely saw the PSC as dealing with less contentious issues than the IPR, whose initial agenda included the sensitive diplomatic issue of immigration disputes. Governments also had a great stake in scientific cooperation, in which governmental support was vital. The PSC members did not problematize this official endorsement and financial support until the very end of the 1930s, when PSC executives became critical of the reluctance of governments, especially the US government, to fund PSC conferences during financially difficult times.

Although US experts led these Pan-Pacific organizations, they did not totally dominate the organizations and their agendas. Supporters of the US-led regional vision in Pacific Rim countries, especially Japan and Australia, were crucial in making these forums possible, especially in the initial period. In the 1920s, Japanese experts joined the Pan-Pacific organizations and actively promoted the idea of the 'Pacific community', confirming the government policy of cooperative diplomacy that accepted US regional leadership. Experts from Australia, New Zealand and Canada were also PSC advocates. Meanwhile, newly integrated nationalist China increasingly used the League and other multilateral forums to promote its political legitimacy to the 'international public'. Before 1945, China, still grappling with internal divisions and semi-colonial status, however, did not play a great role at the earlier-mentioned regional NGOs, nor did the Soviet Union.

Although the Pan-Pacific NGOs were American-led, colonial and middle-class, they nonetheless created an early epistemic community in which experts of policy fields, with or without official endorsements, tried to solve urgent problems in the region. Regional conflicts caused by Japanese aggression in China and the global depression made their practical operations difficult. During the Second World War, the IPR became a think tank and discussion forum for experts in the Allied countries, who during the war debated postwar settlements and reconstruction processes in the region (Akami 2002). The war in the region reinforced the decolonization process and brought in new political and economic dynamics, although various characteristics persisted.

Postwar international organization in the context of decolonization and the Cold War

The end of the war brought epoch-making changes to Asia and the Pacific that could have positive outcomes for the emergence of regional intergovernmental organizations. Japan's military aggression ended and region-wide decolonization followed. The principles embodied in the UN Charter, such as the right of self-determination and the responsibility of colonial powers for guiding their colonies to political and economic independence, were applied in the region. For newly independent countries that had suffered a long history of colonial rule, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the equality of all races and nations were very important.

The Cold War, however, complicated the process of achieving independence and nation building, and the development of regional IOs. In Northeast Asia, the establishment of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in August 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) the following month and the People's Republic of China in 1949, as well as Japan's regaining independence in 1952, cemented unresolved issues during and after the war and firmly set a divisive structure. The outbreak of the Korean War (1950–3) made cooperative international institutions in this region almost impossible.

In Southeast Asia, the Cold War intricately divided the region when the withdrawal of the colonial powers gained momentum, and the circumstances did not help region-wide cooperative organizations to develop. In the 1950s, President Sukarno took control of the Indonesian government, with strong communist influence from China. Soon after the defeat of France in the First Indochina War in 1954, the Philippines and Thailand signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (South East Asian Treaty Organization: SEATO) along with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the UK and the US, bringing the two Southeast Asian states tightly into the US alliance network. The emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement was a by-product of the Cold War in which newly independent states in the region such as Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaya (Malaysia) were actively involved. This complicated the regional political structure.

Newly independent states intended to create intergovernmental frameworks in Asia soon after the war. The objectives of these institutions, however, were largely restricted to economic cooperation and development assistance. They had common interests in these areas, as they saw economic development and prosperity as the key to stabilizing their fragile polities.

While providing bilateral assistance, bigger powers such as the US, the UK and the Soviet Union wanted to establish multilateral institutions for economic assistance. This was because they regarded the economic development and political stability of the new states in the region as important for consolidating their influence in the Cold War context. The new states welcomed such initiatives. The UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) is one example in the early postwar period. It was established in 1947 and initiated the creation of the Asian Development Bank in 1966. ECAFE was reorganized in 1974 as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, which began in 1951, is another example. It started as a Commonwealth scheme and was later extended to non-Commonwealth countries, combining development aid and technical assistance.

The establishment of ASEAN

The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 marked a new era of IOs in Asia and the Pacific. It was the first substantive and exclusively Asian regional organization. ASEAN, however, was not

created for building an organizational structure that enabled regional cooperation activities in certain fields. Its original main aim was to promote peaceful relations among the member-states and to protect the security of Southeast Asia from the outside world. This was crucial for the leaders of the five original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in order to concentrate on their own national political and economic development. The basis of its formation was mutual assurance by members not to interfere in domestic affairs. Thus, the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 stated that ASEAN's aim was 'to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region', but it did not mention regional political/security cooperation, let alone 'integration'.

ASEAN member-states shared another agenda: their opposition to extra-regional actors' interference in, and influence on, their regional and domestic affairs. Member-states, which were the allies of the US, argued that they regarded all foreign military bases in the region as temporary. The other members of the Non-Aligned Movement accepted this rationale. In this way, the member-states were united in their opposition to extra-regional force, and managed to stay in the same organization. Communist penetration was the most immediate common threat, as ASEAN was formed in the midst of the Vietnam War. Even after the end of this war in the mid-1970s, communism remained a significant threat as was evident in crises such as the massive influx of refugees, the rise and fall of the Pol Pot regime and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia (the 'Cambodian problem'). Until the early 1990s, communist neighbours in Indo-China continued to be the main external threat to ASEAN. ASEAN, however, was not simply anti-communist. This was clearly shown in ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration in 1971. It stated that ASEAN states agreed 'that the *neutralization* of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and that [they] should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization' (italics added).

While ASEAN gradually institutionalized its organization, its distinctive features were informal but frequent consultations, consensus decision making and non-binding commitment. These features, which have been called the 'ASEAN way', ensured ASEAN's cooperation activities without alienating the most vulnerable or negative member(s). However, they also effectively restrained its cooperation activities at a low level. The 'ASEAN way' developed from the necessity to maintain the organization's internal cohesion and to display solidarity to the outside. They were essential to building ASEAN's credibility and confidence in the precarious political and economic environment.

Economic development in Asia: APEC and ASEAN's changing character

The economic development of countries in Asia since the 1960s prompted them to develop regional economic cooperation institutions. Japan was the first to start developing its economy rapidly, and, by the 1980s, its gross domestic product had become one of the world's largest. Resource-rich countries such as Australia and Indonesia enjoyed large growth in export earnings, while others like Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan followed the Japanese path by adopting trade-oriented industrial strategies. The economies of the Southeast Asian countries developed steadily throughout the 1970s and began to grow rapidly in the latter half of the 1980s.

In this context, the private sector and policy-oriented academics in developed countries (Australia, Japan and the US) initiated the move to create an institution for regional economic cooperation in the 1960s. As in the 1920s, they used the term 'the Pacific region' in order to legitimize and integrate non-Asian actors, although this time, leadership came mainly from Japan and Australia. In 1967, Japanese and Australian businesses led the creation of the Pacific

Basin Economic Council (PBEC), consisting of business representatives from five developed countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the US. Since then, PBEC has attracted the participation of various Asian and Latin American developing economies. In 1968, the first Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) was organized, bringing together a group of economists from the same five developed countries. Subsequently, academics from major developing countries in the region have participated in PAFTAD conferences, which have been organized every one to two years since.

At the end of the 1970s, another institution for economic cooperation developed, again by a joint Japan–Australia initiative. The first meeting of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (later Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, PECC) was held in September 1980 in Canberra. This time, both developed and developing countries in the region joined from the very beginning. The PECC process in the 1980s created the basis for the further development of economic cooperation institutions in the region in several ways. First, PECC introduced a 'tripartite' structure in which business leaders, policy-oriented academics and government officials could participate (the latter in a private capacity). While the process was not intergovernmental, participation of government officials contributed to an acknowledgement of the need for greater economic cooperation among politicians and senior bureaucrats in the respective governments. Second, along with PAFTAD and PBEC, the PECC process created strong policy networks among business leaders, academics and government officials in the region. Direct and frequent meetings enabled them to learn about each other's needs. Third, these close personal networks helped to facilitate the convergence of ideas on regional economic cooperation and foster broad-based support for open and outward-looking domestic economic regimes and gradual trade and investment liberalization.

After the worldwide recession in the early 1980s, most Asian economies recovered strongly through trade-oriented strategies that required a stable international trade regime as well as closer policy coordination in the region. Because of the rapid appreciation of their respective currencies against the US dollar, which aggravated already increasing costs of production (such as rises in wages and land prices), manufacturers in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan relocated many of their production and export bases to ASEAN countries. In other words, Asian economies started to create close production networks in the region.

The regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), nevertheless, was fragile in the late 1980s and early 1990s and major actors in world trade gravitated towards regional arrangements. When the Uruguay Round reached a deadlock, the US opted for the creation of a free trade agreement with Canada (which came into effect in 1989) and subsequently extended it to Mexico as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. The European Community advanced its programme of creating a single market through the Single European Act of 1987 and the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 led to the creation of the EU in the following year.

The states in Asia adapted their policies to the earlier-mentioned changes in the international environment in the 1980s and enhanced regional cooperation further. Members of PECC policy circles and political leaders mainly in Japan, Australia and the US judged that more governmental involvement was necessary for regional consensus building on economic policy issues such as trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. This was because these issues required administrative and/or legislative measures to change domestic economic regimes in individual countries. Australia and Japan led the initiative to secure more involvement of governments in economic policy coordination in the region, which culminated in the establishment of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Here one can see the

terminology for the region being no longer Pacific, but 'Asia–Pacific'. It was inclusive of non-Asian actors, but Asian economic powers were no longer implicit, and needed to be articulated. The inaugural APEC Ministerial Meeting was held in Canberra in November 1989, with ministers from 12 regional economies participating: all six ASEAN members (five original members and Brunei Darussalem), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the US. APEC's continual pressure to revitalize the global trade regime was an important factor leading to the successful completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations at the end of 1993. Subsequently, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (1991), Mexico and Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994), and Peru, Russia and Vietnam (1998) have all joined APEC.

APEC has developed several distinctive principles: gradual consensus building, voluntary but concerted actions and open regionalism. APEC, therefore, was another forum-driven, informal region-based organization. ASEAN indeed insisted on the 'ASEAN way' in APEC, in return for ASEAN states joining the forum. These principles have promoted the inclusiveness of APEC; for example, smaller actors could join without fearing bigger powers' domination of the agenda. At the same time, they also enhanced APEC's lack of effective implementation of cooperative actions in contentious issues. APEC members were unable to agree to liberalize certain economic sectors earlier than others (the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization initiative, 1997–9) (Okamoto 2004). Its failure to respond quickly and effectively to the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s also illustrates this point.

Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and the US mainly led APEC's early development. In a separate move, ASEAN decided to create its own free trade area, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), in order to counter North American and European moves to form preferential trade areas. The ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 declared that AFTA, under which effective intra-regional tariff rates would range from 0 to 5 per cent, would be established within 15 years, starting from January 1993.

AFTA represented a clear departure from ASEAN's previous economic cooperation schemes. It aimed for more comprehensive trade liberalization, both with regard to the extent of tariff reductions and in the range of products covered. Moreover, while the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme, the main mechanism for intra-regional tariff reduction, allowed members some discretion in selecting products that would not be covered by the scheme, the room for such flexibility was much less than in any other previous cooperation schemes. AFTA was also an important turning point for ASEAN because it articulated regional economic 'integration'. Through AFTA, ASEAN aimed to integrate its members' markets in order to enhance its member countries' attractiveness for foreign direct investment (FDI). This initiative showed that ASEAN's leaders realized that it was critical for small countries to join forces to enhance their collective position and benefit from regional integration.

The Cold War's end accentuated the move in Asia, which, in the early 1990s, led to an increase of economic competition for ASEAN members. Many former centrally planned economies accelerated their transition into market economies and became new competitors in the global economy. As a result, China and Vietnam as well as some East European economies emerged as attractive new FDI destinations for Japan, the US, the European Community/Union and others. ASEAN member countries' economic growth relied heavily on the inflow of FDI, which forced them to respond to this more competitive global environment.

The end of the Cold War also presented political challenges and opportunities to ASEAN. It significantly reduced the communist threat in the region. ASEAN now had a chance to resolve the lingering Cambodian problem. However, the disappearance of direct threat could also weaken ASEAN's unity. To respond to these post-Cold War challenges and

opportunities, ASEAN members moved to utilize the regional organization fully. By admitting and welcoming the membership of Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999), ASEAN became a truly Southeast Asian regional organization and brought former adversarial states under its norms and principles. Furthermore, ASEAN declared its willingness to play a more active role in inter-regional political and security issues. This move eventually led to the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.

The aftermath of the Asian financial crisis: the emergence of wider Asian institutions

The Asian financial crisis prompted the region to build its own regional economic cooperation frameworks. The crisis occurred first as a disastrous currency depreciation in Thailand in July 1997 and consequently plunged many Asian economies (Indonesia and South Korea in particular) into economic turmoil and political confusion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) arranged emergency loan packages for Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand with strict 'conditionalities' that did not take the individual recipients' economic and political circumstances into account. The US and the EU gave only modest financial aid. Asian countries, especially Japan, realized that a future crisis in any Asian economy had to be dealt with primarily within the region.

The crisis required a region-wide response. The states in Northeast Asia joined ASEAN member-states to act together as a region. The heads of governments of ASEAN members, China, Japan and South Korea held a meeting in November 1997 to discuss policy cooperation and coordination. While such consultation among them had already started in the previous year as a part of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), more substantive region-wide cooperation (often called ASEAN+3) evolved after this summit meeting. By the mid-2000s, this cooperation was extended to the areas of finance, economy in general, human resources and other forms of development initiatives, as well as political and security cooperation.

The ASEAN+3 process led to the emergence of the new concept of 'East Asia', which is now used by governments, media and scholars in Asia. The reports of the East Asia Vision Group and the East Asia Study Group, which were formed for a limited time as advisory groups for the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting, recommended the creation of an East Asian Community in the future. The term East Asia often refers to the geographical areas covered by the ASEAN+3 countries and is used to emphasize the exclusively Asian nature of ASEAN+3 activities. In some cases, however, East Asia includes Mongolia, North Korea, Taiwan and India, and also Australia and New Zealand. The definition of East Asia, therefore, is flexible in order to respond to various political and economic needs.

The Asian financial crisis and the economic rise of China induced the reorganization of production networks in Asia. Multinational companies from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and others aimed for the optimal intra-firm trade, which increased intra-regional trade and investment in Asia. Asian states strengthened their efforts to help the private sector, especially by furthering bilateral and/or sub-regional free trade agreements (FTAs). In addition to AFTA, most ASEAN members now have FTAs with Japan. China and South Korea prioritized FTA negotiations with ASEAN as a whole and Japan followed suit. By the end of the 2000s, ASEAN had successfully negotiated these 'ASEAN+1' FTAs with Australia/New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea. In the early 2010s, Japan had FTAs with Chile, India, Mexico and Switzerland; China did so with Chile, New Zealand and Peru; and South Korea with Chile, the EU, India and the US. Most Asian states,

therefore, have been willing to conclude FTAs not only with other Asian states, but also with extra-regional states, because their economic interests are not confined to Asia.

Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, new sub-regional, regional and cross-regional multilateral cooperation frameworks have emerged. For example, BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand) and ACMECS (Ayeyawady–Chao Phraya–Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) are sub-regional frameworks. The IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation) is a cross-regional framework co-initiated by Australia, India and South Africa, with members from Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Eastern and Southern Africa.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is one of these new organizations. Its members are China, Russia and the four Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. While it started as a security cooperation framework in 2001 and remains so primarily, it intends to expand its scope to economic cooperation. In recent years, the SCO has been critical of the US and European argument for armed intervention in Iranian and Syrian affairs. It also opposed economic sanctions against these two states. The SCO has the potential to become a balancing force against the regional political and economic order led by the US and supported by its allies.

The East Asia Summit (EAS), which started in 2005, is another forum-based regional institution. Under this framework the leaders of member-states from the wider 'East Asian' region (ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) meet annually to discuss a range of economic and political cooperation issues. Foreign ministers of EAS members also meet regularly. At the EAS in January 2007, Japan proposed to work on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), an FTA in which all 16 EAS members are expected to participate. The US and Russia joined the EAS.

Responding to the Asian financial crisis, proliferating FTAs and many new multilateral regional cooperation frameworks in Asia and the Pacific, ASEAN decided to consolidate its regional integration efforts in order not to be marginalized and overshadowed by these developments. Accordingly, the ASEAN Summit in 1997 adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020, which declared its intention to create an ASEAN community by 2020. The vision covered wide-ranging regional economic integration and cooperation activities in the areas of trade and investment, finance, small and medium enterprises, human resources development, technology and infrastructure, food and energy security, and the creation of a socially cohesive community with a common regional identity. The 1998 Summit approved the Hanoi Plan of Action, which set a mid-term (from 1999 to 2004) guideline for activities to realize the broad vision.

Since the turn of the century, ASEAN has further accelerated regional integration and is moving towards a more 'formal' IO. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in 2003 stated that ASEAN aimed to establish an ASEAN Community consisting of the Political-Security Community, the Economic Community and the Socio-Cultural Community. Until the early 1990s, ASEAN states believed that political and economic integration and community building was an exclusively European experience, inapplicable in Southeast Asia. Their shift to see ASEAN as a politically, economically and socially cohesive 'Community' was, therefore, a significant change. One can argue that ASEAN, like the EU, is attempting to strengthen its political and economic position in the world by demonstrating the coherence of an ASEAN Community.

This move was substantiated by the following actions. The Vientiane Action Programme of 2004 provided a list of activities to be implemented during the period between 2004 and 2010 in order to develop the three Communities. In 2007, the target year for realizing the ASEAN Community was brought forward five years to 2015. The Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, which focused on the economic cooperation part of the Vientiane Action Programme and proposed more concrete and targeted integration activities, was endorsed in November 2007. Furthermore, the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter) was drawn up to provide ASEAN with a legal framework for the first time since its establishment in 1967. It came into force in December 2008 and gave ASEAN greater potential than before to address the region's political, economic and social issues such as democracy, human rights, development gaps and the environment.

Conclusion

In Asia and the Pacific, regionally based organizations have been predominantly forum-driven. In the colonial period, when little basis for intergovernmental organizations existed, forum-driven non-governmental organizations provided rare and significant opportunity for experts to discuss urgent problems in the region. American experts led all these organizations with support from their counterparts in Japan, China and the British Commonwealth. Such characteristics survived as significant features when regionally based IOs were established after 1945, and almost all regional institutions have remained forum-driven. Only ASEAN has moved towards a more 'formal' IO. Meanwhile, cooperation initiatives in the region have created a multi-layered structure of IOs. Bilateral, sub-regional, regional and cross-regional organizations and institutions now coexist even in the same area of regional cooperation.

The new key factor in these organizations is the political and economic rise of China and how it affects the Japan–China relations. Japan uses regionally based organizations and global ones, such as the UN, World Trade Organization and G20, to check China's influence in the region. China also uses regional and global organizations to communicate its political and economic stance. China's rise also affects the involvement of the US in the region. Since 2009, the Barack Obama administration has been gradually renewing its involvement in Asian affairs, as seen in US participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and the East Asia Summit process, and the realignment of its armed forces in the region.

The multi-layered structure of IOs and institutions provides alternative channels of communication and activities when competition between China and Japan, and the US, becomes intense and their bilateral relations deteriorate. Although the current multi-layered structure of forum-driven international institutions in this region may look disorderly, it is serving as a pragmatic mechanism to ease potential contentions (Beeson 2009).

Recommended for further reading

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Part VI

Expanding international architectures

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International judicial institutions in international relations

Functions, authority and legitimacy

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The traditional perspective on international judicial institutions frames them as instruments for the settlement of disputes in a state-centred world order. It presents but one function for international courts and tribunals: settling disputes. This view alone can no longer, if it ever could, plausibly capture the practice and the breadth of international judicial institutions. It simply does not fit specifically with younger institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose prosecutor can act on his or her own initiative to prosecute individuals for international crimes. Having just celebrated its tenth anniversary, the ICC made prominent appearances by issuing arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir as well as former Liberian leader Muammar Gadaffi, and it sentenced Thomas Lubanga, a warlord of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to 14 years' imprisonment for recruiting child soldiers in his rebel army. A one-dimensional understanding of international judicial institutions as dispute settlers is deficient as it eclipses other important functions that many international courts do perform today. Little would be understood about the ICC's practice if it were viewed from the perspective of dispute settlement.

Reassessing the functions, authority and legitimacy of international judicial institutions is a pressing task in light of the creation of new institutions and in view of the increasing use of existing international courts and tribunals (Alter 2008; Romano 1999, 2011). The development has left some fields of international law untouched and hard questions of war usually still lie beyond the reach of any international judicial forum. The 'judicialization' of international relations has been uneven (Kingsbury 2012). But other fields are now marked by strong(er) international judicial institutions that often surpass their traditional role of settling disputes. They produce an ever-growing stream of decisions and exercise functions that reach beyond specific disputes placed before them.

The shift in quantity has gone hand-in-hand with a transformation in quality. Within the context of global governance, international courts and tribunals now more than ever before perform a number of different functions. Understanding the multifunctionality of international adjudication beyond concrete disputes opens up a view on the ways in which international judicial institutions themselves exercise authority in international relations. For one, they wield authority over the parties to any particular dispute. Beyond the confines of the concrete case, they exercise authority by way of lawmaking. For example, whoever wants

to make a legal argument in international trade law cannot escape the precedential force of decisions rendered by the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO). International courts and tribunals further exercise authority by way of reviewing the acts of others, both in a horizontal relationship with regard to international institutions, but even more so in a vertical relationship with regard to the domestic level. Subject to certain jurisdictional hurdles, foreign investors can, for example, challenge domestic regulations before international arbitral tribunals and claim damages. Nowadays 800 million citizens of the 47 member-states of the Council of Europe have direct access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to contest domestic acts and to possibly vindicate their rights.

Following a sketch of the genealogy and growth of international judicial institutions, the present chapter outlines the main functions of international courts and tribunals, elucidates their public authority in international relations, and ponders legitimatory problems in a concluding outlook.

The expanding institutional architecture

On a first glimpse, the genesis of international law supports the traditional one-dimensional view picturing international courts in their function of settling disputes. Sticking to this function might even be crucial for the success of courts in the rough environment of international relations. Such an understanding has a long pedigree. In a treaty of 445 BC, Athens and Sparta agreed not to go to war as long as one of the parties wished to bring the controversy before an arbitral tribunal. When a dispute erupted, Athens suggested bringing the case to arbitration in accordance with the treaty. Sparta instead attacked Athens and suffered a bitter defeat. Widespread opinion held that Sparta lost because it disregarded its obligation to resort to arbitration and thereby evoked the wrath of the gods. In another instance, the roles were reversed. Sparta then stood on the side of the law and defeated Athens, which was again seen as the just punishment. Against this background, even the historian Thucydides ([5th century BC] 1910) came to the conclusion that it is impossible to attack a party which has offered to submit the dispute to judicial settlement. The task of the tribunal was notably to settle the dispute and nothing else. The authority of its decision was supposed to calm controversy.

Modern international judicial institutions developed in a somehow similar context – the international legal system based on states' sovereign equality – when the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 established the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (Anand 1974). Most delegates embraced a state-centred conception of international order, which is rather hostile to autonomous international institutions with functions other than settling disputes. The same holds true after the First World War when state representatives established the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) within the new framework of the League of Nations in 1920; a rather weak institution without compulsory jurisdiction and with little bite.

The state-oriented understanding competed with the impetus arising from various peace movements and from progressive international lawyers pushing for a strong international judiciary. The Institut de droit international as well as the International Law Association, both founded in 1873, advocated international dispute settlement mechanisms in the interest of the 'civilized world'. Their voices critiqued the meagre outcomes of the peace conferences in The Hague and the weak features of the PCA. They strove to ensure peace and saw sporadic arbitration as unsuited to serve this goal. For Hans Wehberg (1912: 11), a German scholar linked with the peace movements, the programmatic formula was clear: 'More development of international law through international decisions!' In his argument, as in

others, generating and stabilizing normative expectations by way of adjudication was a key task for international courts, and justified by the aim of ensuring peace. Proponents like him thus hailed the establishment of the PCIJ as a milestone, even if they favoured a yet stronger institution.

While the PCIJ testified to the understanding of international judicial institutions as instruments for the settlement of disputes in a state-centred world order, it also emboldened voices that embraced it as an organ of the international community and tasked it with developing international law to the benefit of international society. Hersch Lauterpacht (1934) looked back at the practice of the Permanent Court and highlighted the lawmaking side of its judicial practice. But the Court was surely powerless against the unravelling political events finally leading to the Second World War. After the war and in the context of the United Nations (UN), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's principal judicial organ (UN Charter, Article 92), stands in continuity with the PCIJ. Together they are frequently dubbed the 'World Court' (Hudson 1934; Rosenne 2003).

For decades, the ICJ stood splendidly alone at the heart of the international legal order. However, after an upbeat start with a number of significant judgements and advisory opinions, the Court fell into a severe crisis in the 1970s when it decided, by the president's tiebreaking vote, not to have jurisdiction to hear cases relating to the presence of the apartheid-state South Africa in Namibia: a decision much to the dismay and disbelief of the new African states. The International Court only recovered with its 1986 judgement in a famous case brought by Nicaragua against the United States of America (US) in which the International Court *inter alia* found that the US had violated the prohibition of the use of force in international relations by providing covert support to the Contras, a rebel group active in Nicaragua. Since then, the International Court has recorded an increasing number of cases in its docket, now more than ever before. It vacillates in its practice between paying utmost deference to the positions of state parties, on the one hand, and cautiously positioning itself as an organ of the international community, on the other. Either way, a number of younger and yet more active institutions, frequently with more muscle, challenge its place as a 'World Court' at the centre of international law.

An innovation occurred within the broader context of the UN system when, in 1993, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, in 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The tribunals were tasked with the prosecution of international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) committed in the respective countries in the preceding years. The ICTY first challenged the ICJ's central position when it pronounced on the international law standard regarding the attribution of conduct to the state. Whereas the ICJ had found in the Nicaragua decision that 'effective control' was necessary to attribute conduct, the ICTY now held that more lenient 'overall control' was sufficient. This divergence sparked then ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume to speak bleakly before the UN General Assembly of a fragmentation of international law that would lead to a cacophony of judicial institutions (Oellers-Frahm 2001). Whereas institutional differentiation continued, the practical and normative consequences of fragmentation are much disputed (Benvenisti and Downs 2007).

Both ICTY and ICTR have been prolific institutions shaping key aspects of international humanitarian law by way of their decisions. They established that war crimes can be committed not only in international armed conflicts but also in internal conflicts, shaped the elements of the crime of genocide and formed the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. The ICTY is now drawing to a close after a total of 161 cases while the ICTR continues its work, having found 32 individuals guilty, six non-guilty, still conducting 25 cases and preparing

nine prosecutions. For the biennium of 2010–11, the UN General Assembly adopted a budget for the ICTR of 245,295,800 USD and authorized 693 employment positions at the Tribunal. The experience of both international criminal tribunals was crucial in the process of setting up the ICC in 2002.

In a different field, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered into force in 1994 and paved the way for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to commence its work. Within the ambit of inter-state dispute settlement, it engages more on the terrain of the ICJ; for instance, in matters of maritime delimitation. But specifically, and those have been the majority of its cases so far, it deals with cases of prompt release, cases in which foreign vessels and their crew are arrested by coastal states and then possibly released against the posting of a bond. ITLOS in effect interferes in domestic proceedings and can determine, for instance, whether a bond is reasonable.

Moving towards international economic law, in 1995 the Marrakesh Agreement created the WTO and with it established compulsory adjudication in international trade law. The dispute settlement mechanism has since advanced to be international trade law's flagship, fleshing out legal provisions and, in some cases, diving rather deep into the spheres of domestic regulatory autonomy. Panels and the WTO Appellate Body have decided high-profile cases relating to the import prohibition of hormone-treated beef, for example. Among other things they are likely to pronounce on the European Emissions Trading Scheme and Europe's seal-product ban in the future. Compared to the pre-1995 era of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the turn to compulsory adjudication has brought a boom of cases.

In the field of investment protection, arbitral procedures and frameworks such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have existed for longer, but their activities have increased immensely since the 1990s. Whereas ICSID arbitral tribunals decided only 24 cases in the time from its creation in 1966 until 1990, 305 decisions have been rendered since. On the basis of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or similar legal instruments, foreign investors can claim compensation directly before international arbitral tribunals when they see standards of investment protection, such as fair and equitable treatment, violated.

In the field of human rights, finally, a number of new institutions have entered the scene, such as the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, while existing institutions such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the ECtHR have received more business. In 1998 the European Commission of Human Rights was abolished and individual complaints now come directly before the ECtHR. As of 2010, 93 per cent of all its decisions have been rendered after 1998. It decides an average of 1,500 cases per year with 139,650 individual complaints pending in 2012, certainly putting the Court under stress but also pushing it to develop mechanisms that increase its authority to deal effectively with the flow of complaints yet further (Wolfrum and Deutsch 2009).

Functions

Having outgrown the early days of sporadic inter-state dispute settlement in a thinly regulated international legal order, many international judicial institutions now perform a variety of functions beyond dispute settlement. Functional analysis or researching how a practice contributes to orderly and peaceful social interaction has produced valuable insights with regard to domestic courts (e.g. Shapiro 1981). We employ this methodology in the following pages to refine the understanding of international judicial institutions, conceived broadly as institutions created under international law whose characteristic activity lies with making

binding decisions by applying legal yardsticks according to ordered procedures. To be sure, functions may be at odds with one another, institutions usually weigh them differently, and priorities may shift over time. We also stress that functional analysis is distinct from an evaluative assessment and should not be read as conveying a normative stance. In a condensed overview, we see that international judicial institutions perform four main functions in international relations: settling disputes, stabilizing normative expectations, making law, and controlling as well as legitimizing public authority.

Settling disputes

Settling disputes in individual cases is and remains the main function. It leans on the hope that the authority of judicial decisions leads to the end of a dispute, which in international relations might otherwise even unleash a looming potential for violent confrontation. International judicial institutions are mechanisms for the 'pacific settlement of disputes' (UN Charter, Chapter VI) and provide 'an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the parties' (ICJ 1969: para. 87). Article 38 of the ICJ Statute provides plainly that the Court's 'function is to decide . . . disputes as are submitted to it'. But the characteristic activity of the ICJ and other judicial institutions of deciding disputes by way of reasoned judicial decisions has a number of social consequences that go beyond the settlement of disputes. The well-known Nicaragua case clarifies this.

Stabilizing normative expectations

It may be asked whether the ICJ's Nicaragua judgement contributed to settling Nicaragua's dispute with the US and whether it served the function of dispute settlement more generally. Its decision maybe even had a negative effect because it prompted the US to withdraw its unilateral recognition of the International Court's jurisdiction. But if the decision is considered in light of the contribution it has made by stabilizing normative expectations (a second main function of international courts) then a different picture emerges. The judgement reasserted the validity of one of international law's cardinal norms, the prohibition of the use of force, in the face of the contravening practice of one of the two superpowers of the time. Feeding into the general legal discourse, the decision affirmed international law as an order that promotes peace and does not bow to the powerful.

The Nicaragua judgement thus supported international law's normativity and stabilized *normative* expectations when it comes to the use of force. The decision discouraged the opposite *cognitive* modus advocated famously by Thucydides, according to whom 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must' (Thucydides [5th century BC] 1910: Chapter 89). It is a widely shared position of otherwise conflicting strands of legal theory that stabilizing normative expectations, particularly in the case of their violation, is a key function of law and crucial for orderly social interactions (Habermas 1998: 427).

Making law

The Nicaragua decision contributed to stabilizing normative expectations, but also promoted the 'development' of international law. The decision has continuously supported legal arguments which endorse a wide interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force and a narrow reading of the right to self–defence. It 'thickened' international law by adding to its normative substance.

Some institutions are specifically mandated along the lines of Article 3(2) of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide 'security and predictability' in international law. The WTO Appellate Body leaned on this provision to argue that its earlier decisions need to be taken into account, where relevant, because they 'create legitimate expectations' among members and market participants. The development of normative expectations is another core function of international courts and tribunals. This dimension of judicial practice can best be understood as generating new legal normativity or simply as lawmaking (Alvarez 2005: Chapter 5; Treves 2005; von Bogdandy and Venzke 2012b).

The lawmaking effect of judicial decisions has two closely intertwined dimensions to it that should be distinguished. One concerns the making of law in the particular case between the parties and stems from applying pertinent norms in view of the concrete case. The other dimension, the one at stake here, reaches beyond the case at hand. Courts are adding to the law with the very decision, the justification that carries the decision (*ratio decidendi*) and with everything said on the side (*obiter dictum*). As a matter of fact, it seems that today a number of decisions candidly aim at influencing the general legal discourse by establishing abstract and categorical statements as authoritative reference points for later legal practice. Intended or not, judicial decisions work as precedents and redistribute argumentative burdens in legal discourse.

Controlling and legitimizing public authority

A fourth function comes into view if one compares international courts with other institutions of public authority that call for control and legitimation; that is, in a separation-of-powers or checks-and-balances perspective. In a *vertical* dimension, international courts control domestic authority against yardsticks of international law. International human rights courts provide the classic example, but other courts have joined them. International trade law, itself strongly shaped by judicial practice, contains detailed prescriptions for domestic regulators. Notably, domestic provisions that are deemed to contradict international trade law can be challenged by a WTO member before they have been applied and without a burden on the claimant to show an individual legal interest in the case. The function of controlling domestic public authority also applies to decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals, often assuming the role of administrative or constitutional adjudicators taken to be deficient in the host country (Kingsbury and Schill 2009).

In order to refine, but also to deepen their control function, many international courts have shaped doctrines such as proportionality analysis, which stems precisely from administrative and constitutional adjudication developed at domestic levels of governance (Venzke 2012: 180–95). With such doctrines, international judicial institutions can often closely control domestic regulatory activity. They move into the space of political decision making that has, at least traditionally, been reserved for domestic administrations or legislatures.

Controlling domestic authority in many constellations contributes to its legitimation. The review of public acts against general standards by an independent international judicial institution is one of the most powerful legitimating mechanisms. It is for this very reason that many domestic constitutions attribute a specific domestic role to international treaties and their courts, specifically in the field of human rights protection. Moreover, some courts develop procedural standards for fairer domestic administrative and regulatory processes and thus contribute to the legitimation of domestic public authority that impacts outsiders.

The *horizontal* control and legitimation of authority exercised at the international level are weaker. As of now, international courts hardly have a role within the institutional order of international law in terms of a system of checks and balances. While a possible check on the

Security Council by judicial review of the ICJ has been subject to much debate, the Court has so far refrained from embracing such a role. But there are some other instances that go in this direction. The Inspection Panel of the World Bank as well as other internal administrative tribunals show potential for control and legitimation. More fundamentally, international courts can contribute to the legitimacy of the legal order of which they are part (Shany 2012: 246–7). In this vein, finally, it is possible to see that the Nicaragua judgement contributed to vesting the international legal order in general with legitimacy, especially in the eyes of newer states (Abi-Saab 1987: 225–8).

Authority

On cognition and decision

Speaking of authority in the relevant sense of *political* or *public* authority of international judicial institutions in international relations, in contrast to *epistemic* authority, would be plainly pointless if the nature of right judicial decisions was that of cognition, if the scales handled by *Justitia* were a purely technical instrument that yields right answers. Granted, few would still advocate a traditional cognitivistic understanding of judicial interpretation as Montesquieu famously expressed it in his metaphor picturing a judge or a court as *bouche de la loi*. And yet, at least in parts of legal thinking, remnants of the view are still ubiquitous according to which the nature of legal decisions is one of deduction that does not involve moments of choice or will and does thus not amount to political authority. Courts certainly do not contradict such an 'a-political' view of their practice but are inclined to sustain and nourish it. What is more, such an understanding of their actions forms an intricate part of a prevailing and self-reinforcing judicial ethos. Judges apply the law; this is the source of their legitimacy, and whenever the impression gains currency that they are not applying the law that is given to them, then they are usually in trouble (Shklar 1964: 12–13).

But ever since the time of Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), it has no longer been possible to claim that decisions in concrete situations can be deduced from abstract concepts (Kant [1781] 1982: 59). Legal scholarship has struggled with the practical consequences of this theoretical insight ever since. Consider, for example, Hans Kelsen's famous argument that every act of law *application* is also one of law *making*, precisely because a norm cannot be determinative of its concrete interpretation. The meaning of a norm for a specific case cannot be *discovered* but only *created*. Kelsen (1934: 82–95) mocked theories of interpretation that want to make believe that a legal norm, applied to the concrete case, always provides a right decision, as if interpretation was an act of clarification or understanding that only required intellect but not the will of the interpreter. More recently, the linguistic turn has reinforced this strand of thinking, emboldening the idea that it is the practice of interpretation that makes international law. Participants in legal discourse make interpretative claims, struggle over meaning, and thereby contribute to the lawmaking process. What then matters in such semantic struggles is the actor's semantic authority (Venzke 2012: 62–4). In fact, making law by way of interpretation is a key modus of international judicial institutions' exercise of authority in international relations.

The exercise of public authority

Even if the practice of international judicial institutions involves choices and will, it would still not amount to public authority if it did not come with a minimal degree of force. *Justitia*

herself not only handles scales but also wields a sword. It is rather evident in the context of national democracies marked by the rule of law that coercive mechanisms are in place to effectively implement domestic court decisions. This is not the same when it comes to decisions of international courts. According to Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, the Security Council may take coercive measures if disregarding decisions of the ICJ threatened international peace and security. It has never done so and is unlikely to do so.

The *prima facie* lack of coercive enforcement mechanisms within reach of international judicial institutions could indicate that their authority is at best insignificant. Such a conclusion would indeed be warranted if public authority were confined to compulsory power, involving only modes of physical coercion. But such a traditional conception of public authority has become, if it has not always been, inadequate. Other modes of power should be considered, modes that all the same constrain actors in the exercise of their freedom. It is an empirical fact that many international institutions nowadays shape the legal and factual situation of others (constrain them in the exercise of their freedom) with similar significance and potential when compared to domestic institutions, even if they are usually not backed by coercive enforcement mechanisms (von Bogdandy et al. 2008).

Many international judicial institutions are embedded in contexts that do lend force to their decisions. The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers oversees the implementation of ECtHR decisions, WTO members are authorized to resort to countermeasures once their claims have succeeded in adjudication, and arbitration awards of ICSID tribunals are enforceable in domestic courts as if they were rendered by last instance of the domestic court system. These mechanisms support international judicial institutions' authority over the parties to a concrete dispute. But what about the other functions of international adjudication, specifically lawmaking by way of adjudication?

Precedents are formally not biding in international law. But that formality does certainly not exhaust discussing the authority which international judicial institutions exercise through lawmaking by way of adjudication (Ginsburg 2005; Jacob 2012). Earlier international judicial decisions typically enjoy an exceptional standing in semantic disputes about what international law means. Anyone making legal arguments in fields marked by judicial practice can hardly escape the force of precedents. Interpreters are expected, and as a matter of fact required, to relate their arguments to existing jurisprudence. Judicial precedents redistribute argumentative burdens and no participant in international legal discourse can easily withdraw from their spell. In many judgements, precedents work as arguments in support of decisions that in terms of authority are hardly inferior to provisions spelled out in an international treaty. Disputing parties are well aware of this and thus fight about the meaning of earlier judicial decisions as if they formed part of the sources of international law.

Three sources of authority

1. Consent and delegation. The most straightforward source of authority is voluntary submission by way of consent and explicit delegation. There are numerous plausible reasons why actors would create and submit themselves to international courts and tribunals exercising authority over them. Basically, decisions to delegate authority and even to tolerate a certain degree of unpredictability or leeway can rest on the expectation of instrumental gains; for instance, when another actor can perform a task more efficiently or effectively. Such delegation may even be implicit; for example, when state representatives conclude an international agreement with rather generic terms, silently grant international judicial institutions the authority to interpret those terms and expect them to shape the contents of their treaty

commitments. Reasons for such delegation further stem from incentives arising in domestic political processes where actors may want to undertake international commitments in order to outplay domestic competitors or to pursue political projects that would be more difficult to realize otherwise (Benvenisti and Downs 2007).

Delegation as a source of authority suggests that principals use international judicial institutions as agents to further their objectives. Should the agent act in undesired ways (should 'agency slack' persist), principals can learn from frustrated expectations, change the terms of delegation or dismantle the agent altogether. If that is easily possible, the authority of agents is limited as they lack independence. But some objectives require that the agent at least enjoys an air of independence. Such objectives would be frustrated if the authority of the agent was all too limited. A certain degree of independent authority is also necessary when it comes to one of the most salient reasons for creating international institutions generally: overcoming collective action problems. For such a purpose, actors need to credibly signal that they will live up to their commitments in the future. International judicial institutions are key in this regard as they strengthen commitments, increase the benefits of participating in an international regime, and lower the costs of participation (Carrubba 2005). Delegating authority to international judicial institutions may thus not only be thought of as a conditional grant to an agent to capture efficiency gains, but also as delegation to a trustee that is less responsive to the input of principals (Alter 2008).

2. Judges, procedures and justice. Authority can also emanate from the traits of judges, the qualities of procedures and the summoning of justice. The person of the judge does matter and judicial statutes typically provide in one of their first articles that the 'Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices' (ICJ Statute, Article 2). Directives on the conduct of their office may further add to the judges' appearance as independent and possessing integrity. Beyond appearance, empirical evidence of independence varies among institutions, but on the whole, judges are in fact independent. The influence of government does however straightforwardly determine the judges' nomination and election processes (Mackenzie et al. 2010). Independence in the exercise of their office adds to authority. The prestige of specific judges or of the overall bench matters and the authority of the institution can be seen to rise or wane with it.

Judicial procedures (their routine, symbolism and appearance of rationality) and the larger organizational and normative structure further support the authority of international judicial institutions (Luhmann 1983). Moreover, the juridical language itself sustains the image of the impersonality and objectivity of the judicial procedures. 'The ritual that is designed to intensify the authority of the act of interpretation . . . adds to the collective work of sublimation designed to attest that the decision expresses not the will or the world-view of the judge but the will of the law or the legislature (voluntas legis or legislatoris)' (Bourdieu 1987: 828). In this way, procedures as a source of authority are linked to moments of consent and delegation.

But the judicial process also offers a genuine source of authority to the extent that it features fairness and mechanisms of participation. Moreover, at times, international judicial institutions may further seek to increase their authority by imploring hortatory concepts such as justice. They may thrive on moral positions or, closer to the ground, on strongly teleological reasoning that hinges on shared or global goals. International courts and tribunals thus invoke functional necessities in support of their reasoning, sometimes even brushing aside rather clear manifestations of expressed consent in the treaties that found their authority.

3. Precedents and past practices. The exposition of international judicial institutions' exercise of authority by way of lawmaking has alluded to a third main source of authority: its discursive construction in legal discourse. Authority generally is based on 'culturally and historically conditioned expectations' (Lincoln 1991: 116). International judicial institutions themselves as well as legal counsels are expected to relate their arguments to earlier decisions on the same or similar matters. Earlier decisions thereby gain an exceptional standing in semantic disputes in international law. The force of past practices is a key source of authority. It boosts interpretation in the present as it can draw on the past, and it vests present judicial decisions with authority because they can be imposed on the future. This kind of authority rests on the dynamic construction within a larger discursive setting (Stone Sweet 2000: 18–20). Notably, where appeal mechanisms exist, they have increased the standing of precedents by arguing along the lines of the WTO Appellate Body that earlier decisions 'create legitimate expectations . . . and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute' (Appellate Body 1996: 14). Even in the field of investment arbitration, where tribunals are constituted *ad hoc* and are not subject to appeal, arbitrators increasingly relate their arguments to precedents and sometimes even suggest that they have a duty do so, thereby increasing the authority of past and present decisions.

International judicial institutions exercise authority in international relations not only over the immediate parties to a dispute, but also through their ability to establish content-full reference points in discourse that are difficult to avoid because participants are expected to relate to them and are well-advised to do so in a strategic modus. The authority of such reference points works independently of their content, within bounds, and rests on expectations and interests.

Conclusion

International judicial institutions should be studied in a multifunctional perspective. Not all institutions serve all functions equally at all times. The ICJ, given its weak jurisdictional basis, its broad focus and its global constituency, certainly differs from the ECtHR and the WTO Appellate Body. A multifunctional approach aids a better understanding of the differences between the institutions. A better understanding of the sources of their authority and the modes in which they exercise authority sharpens normative questions and assessments.

The traditional, one-dimensional view of international judicial institutions confines its outlook to moments of express consent and delegation. As instruments of dispute settlement in the hands of the parties, the parties' consent seems to provide a sufficient justification of their practice. But the self-sufficiency of this constellation may well be questioned in light of other functions and sources of authority, specifically in view of the international judicial institution's exercise of authority by way of lawmaking. This dimension of their practice reaches beyond the dispute and beyond the narrow legitimatory foundation of parties' consent.

The genealogy and growth of international judicial institutions have already hinted at another basic understanding of courts and tribunals that sees them less as instruments in the hand of state parties, and more as organs of the international community. Such a view is open to other functions and indeed embraces the fact that international adjudication develops international law and reviews authority exercised by other institutions, especially at the domestic level. From this perspective, international courts and tribunals develop and safe-guard core values of the international society such as peace and human rights. Such a view certainly has appeal, but the reference to fundamental communal interests is also too narrow

and too vague to fully justify the current practice of adjudication in a globalized world. It might capture large parts of the legitimatory foundations of adjudication in international human rights and criminal law, but it can only be extended to issues of economic governance at a tenuous stretch.

Adjudication in the field of international trade and investment law highlights the authority that international courts and tribunals exercise as institutions of global governance. They contribute to stilling the thirst for international regulation arising from increased global interaction (see Weiler 2004). An understanding international courts and tribunals as institutions of specific legal regimes is attuned to transformations in the structures of governance in the wake of economic globalization, and shows how they contribute to the stabilization and generation of normative expectations of many market actors. But the normative justification of international judicial institutions' exercise of authority in this constellation ultimately remains unsettled. It leans strongly on functionalist narratives that entreat the effective pursuit of shared or global goals. Such a normative basis can indeed go a long way in an imperfect international setting. But it struggles to account for normative choices and value conflicts.

Finally, none of these understandings of the practice and authority of international judicial institutions sees them as actors. They rather reduce the authority of international courts and tribunals to the will of the parties, the values of the community, or to the interests of specific legal regimes. A multifunctional analysis and a better understanding of the sources of international judicial institutions' authority ultimately bears out the thought that international courts and tribunals should be understood as actors in their own right which exercise public authority. The gold standard against which the exercise of public authority (authority that conditions others in the exercise of their freedom) remains to be judged is the principle of democratic legitimation (von Bogdandy and Venzke 2012a). The continuing task with regard to international judicial institutions' authority thus points to grander projects of further developing conceptual frameworks and institutional programmes with regard to the democratic justification of international public authority.

Recommended for further reading

Alter (2008), Kingsbury (2012), Romano (2011), Teitel and Howse (2009) and Shany (2012).

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The global human mobility architecture

Raquel Freitas

Human mobility has increased exponentially over the centuries. However, mobility is not synonymous with access to other territories. The state-centric international structure has imposed limits on human mobility, even as global means of communication shorten distances dramatically. At the same time, states are finding it more difficult to control their borders and to respond to security concerns while respecting individual rights. The increasing complexity of the flows and international responses to them introduces ambiguity among norms and interests, and generates conflict between the rights of refugees and migrants, on the one hand, and the interests of the states managing migration, on the other.

This chapter explores the evolution in the refugee and migration 'architecture' and current challenges in light of contributions from the regime theory. It focuses on changing normative and institutional frameworks, the roles of key actors, and the main opportunities and challenges posed by regime complexity in terms of effectiveness. During the twentieth century, regulatory frameworks emerged to address forced migration with the creation of a global refugee architecture, and to manage economic migration through a corresponding global migration architecture. These are becoming increasingly complex and generating inconsistencies. As is shown in the following discussion, the two sets of 'architecture' – for refugees and migrants – have overlapping concerns and share regulatory areas of focus, but they differ in focus and in institutional and normative terms. It is concluded that the regulation of human mobility is fragmented, with multiple instruments and actors accounting for a multiplicity of outcomes. As existing arrangements are clearly insufficient to address current challenges, it is necessary to search for solutions that are both able to incorporate the necessary flexibility of adjustment to reality, while retaining and reinforcing the consistency between existing and emerging norms and institutions.

Refugees and migrants: two different architectures

There is an increasing linkage between global responses to refugee and migration problems. However, while it is common to find references to the global refugee regime in the literature (Loescher 1994; Mertus 1998; Roberts 1998; Lippert 1999; Barnett 2002; Roversi 2003; Betts 2009c), there are fewer references to a global migration regime. Although the integrity of the

architecture of the global refugee regime has also been the subject of concern (Loescher 1994; Betts 2010a; Kunz et al. 2011), the literature on migration strongly emphasizes the absence of a regime in this area (Hollifield 2000; Aleinikoff 2002; Martin et al. 2007; Newland 2010).

This chapter focuses on existing debates about how to classify the two sets of architecture. These debates reflect the changing nature of regimes as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner 1983: 2), and the difficulties in establishing the boundaries of what constitutes a regime and what makes it effective in a rapidly changing international environment.

Both sets of architecture are changing, revealing the proliferation of norms and institutions. While the refugee architecture emerged earlier and had clear underlying norms and objectives that permitted what was intended to be a temporary arrangement to become permanent, the migration architecture is less structured, and its norms and institutions more dispersed. The refugee architecture is more ordered and centralized, but it has also tended to deteriorate, as reflected in moves to limit asylum-seekers' access to the territory of host countries. This means that regimes are moving targets. They are not fully finished and stable entities; nor are they necessarily coherent within and across issue areas.

The refugee architecture: responding to forced migration

The systematic erosion of refugee protection has been cause for concern among several observers (Chimni 2000; Loescher 2001) given the growing signals of lack of commitment to the spirit of the regime. States' contributions to refugee protection have been highly selective and are rarely motivated exclusively by humanitarian or altruistic concerns (Betts 2009a). States have also been increasingly reluctant to provide for local integration or to resettle refugees, and they have insisted on voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution for refugees. Initiatives designed to restrict access to host states, such as the deployment of the concept of 'regional protection' provide additional evidence of this tendency (Noll 2003).

The emergence and consolidation of the regime at the global level

The reconfiguration of the European balance of power in the aftermath of the First World War gave rise to the interwar refugee regime under the League of Nations between 1921 and 1939 (Betts and Loescher 2010). Although relatively informal and based on *ad hoc* coalitions (Gordenker 1987), this regime set out structured international rules for the protection of and material assistance to refugees under the aegis of the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period between 1924 and 1929.

The first international agency to deal with refugees was the High Commission for Refugees, which was created in 1921. It was later replaced by the Nansen International Office for Refugees (1931), which introduced the Nansen Certificate, an identity document that allowed stateless people and refugees to travel to a new country and integrate. The Nansen Office also promoted the adoption by 14 countries of the Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees of 1933. Nevertheless, governments were unwilling to agree on the definition of 'a refugee' due to diverging political perceptions and given the view that the refugee problem was a temporary one (Karatani 2005).

As a result, two institutions emerged during the Second World War to deal with the maintenance and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, respectively the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) and the United Nations Relief and

Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). However, neither was equipped to provide adequate international protection of refugees.

After the Second World War, the international community insisted on a temporary solution to the refugee problem, creating the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in 1946. The IRO was related to the framework of the United Nations (UN) but remained outside it, again because of divergences among UN member-states. However, it soon became apparent that a new organization was necessary and that states would have to agree to new commitments to resolve the persisting refugee problem. It was in this context that talks were initiated, in 1949, to establish a new organization to replace the IRO, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Freitas 2005).

Concurrently, negotiations were initiated for the drafting of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This has been the instrument governing refugee issues at the global level since the Second World War. Originally, the scope of the 1951 Convention was limited to Europe, the site of two world wars and massive human rights violations. During the Cold War, the regime also covered persons subjected to political persecution in the Soviet bloc, and it became an instrument of bipolar confrontation, dominated by United States (US) and European interests (Loescher 1993). The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which was created in 1949, also reflected specific political interests, and was intended to respond to the needs of Palestinian refugees emerging from the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The UNHCR is the main institution responsible for supervising the 1951 Convention. It was created in 1950 with a mandate to offer international protection for and seek durable solutions to the problems of refugees and other groups of concern.[1] The UNHCR is also responsible for distributing funds for material assistance through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Subsequent decisions by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the governing body of the UNHCR, the Executive Committee, permitted and legitimized the expansion of the High Commissioner's activities to new areas, increasing material assistance, expanding operational activities, and including new groups of concern such as stateless people, returnees or displaced persons.[2]

Other organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been engaged in the area of refugee assistance, either in cooperation with the UNHCR or as a service provider for states engaged in refugee return (Betts 2009b). From the 1990s onwards, the expanded operational role of the UN in all areas of activity, from emergency relief and peace building to development, led to the increased engagement of organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Peace Building Fund (UNPBF) among many others.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also played a fundamental role in the international response to refugee issues and in advocating for their rights. Many international and national NGOs are actively involved in refugee assistance in the field at the operational level. Others are actively engaged in protection activities through advocacy work, promoting the development and implementation of norms at the global, regional and national levels, or by providing direct legal advice to asylum seekers and refugees.

Differentiation at the regional level

The 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention formalized the temporal expansion of its scope beyond events occurring before 1 January 1951, and the expansion of its geographical coverage

beyond Europe, following processes of decolonization in Africa and elsewhere. Later, the regime was also used to respond to political instability in South Asia during the 1970s, to the effects of proxy wars in Africa, Asia and Central America in the 1980s, and to take humanitarian action and address the effects of internal displacement during the 1990s (UNHCR 2000).

Regional processes were also undertaken to respond to specific regional problems related to forced migration, namely the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference of 1969, the 1981 International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA), the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) of 1989, and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-chinese Refugees (CPA). These conferences led to the establishment of normative instruments adjusted to the specific problems of refugees in each region. Some were binding and others non-binding, but all remained under the aegis of the 1951 Convention.

Europe has developed a sub-regime with the passage of successive regulations (the Dublin regulations), a process that culminated in the creation in 2010 of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). EASO is designed to contribute to the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and to support national asylum systems, particularly in the states most burdened with asylum requests. While some observers view this development as a substantive institutional breakthrough in European law (Comte 2010), for others the system is permeable to divergences in interpretation. Further, the introduction of mechanisms of 'practical cooperation' places an additional burden on the institution that supervises the regime, the UNHCR, which should 'remain focused on raising the standards in key areas where the current norms do not ensure fair outcomes or the humane treatment of asylum seekers' (Hövell 2011: 75). These developments also emphasize strategies such as extraterritorial processing of asylum claims, which are viewed with concern (Levy 2010) in the context of increasingly restrictive migration and asylum policies.

Since the 1980s, and increasingly in the 1990s and beyond, states began to resort to 'alternative forms of protection'. In addition to temporary protection, other instruments have been applied broadly, particularly in the European context but also in the US and Canada. These include 'Class C' refugee status, provisional admission, toleration, *Duldung*, or temporary suspension of deportation, and extraordinary leave to remain. These measures challenge the refugee regime and have not been comprehensively codified (Fitzpatrick 2000); they are also effective excuses not to accord formal refugee status and grant refugees their rights (Gallagher et al. 1989).

The case of internally displaced persons: ambiguity and norm consolidation

The needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were only recognized after the end of the Cold War. This IDP sub-regime evolved from three other regimes: those for human rights, refugees and humanitarian law. There is no international binding instrument at the global level for IDP protection, although the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have penetrated the countries involved quite substantially as a result of the activity of a small institutional set-up, the Office of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs.[3] Later, an institutional framework was designed to establish the link between the field and operational activities of different organizations: the IDP unit of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), later renamed the Internal Displacement Division (IDD).

More recently, Africa has formalized IDP protection through the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (the Kampala Convention).[4]

The anchorage of the IDP sub-regime to the refugee regime has been plagued with ambiguity and inconsistencies caused by states and the UNHCR alike (Maley 2003; Freitas 2004; Phuong 2005; Duffield 2008). Alongside the normative framework on IDPs another norm has been taking shape, that of using the internal flight alternative as possible grounds for rejecting asylum applications outside the country of origin (Freitas 2004; Betts 2009b).

Hiding behind 'efficiency'

Betts (2006b) argues that the current emphasis on the 'efficiency' of the refugee regime works as a rhetorical device for states that want to limit access to their territory. One instance is the focus on the mechanism of regional protection; that is, the need for the region of origin to offer refugees protection. This amounts to another containment strategy, but it is justified on the grounds that regime effectiveness must be maintained, or that host states lack the capacity to process large numbers of often abusive asylum requests and to maintain their capacity to absorb applicants (Loescher 1993). In the context of global power shifts, the observed tendency in the West has been for the clash between individual rights and state interests to become increasingly acute (Ghosh 2010).

Thus, the original goals of the refugee regime have changed and it has been adjusting accordingly, but this means that it is now dominated by the priorities of migration management, which has a negative impact on the possibility of spontaneous arrivals seeking asylum. Given the tendency for the migration system to absorb the refugee regime, the latter is being diluted as old norms are overtaken by a proliferation of new norms, which are generated and implemented by structures other than the UNHCR that was originally mandated to supervise the regime.

Some of the problems with the refugee regime are a result of the erosion of capacity of the UNHCR to offer refugees protection (Barnett 2002). Internal dysfunctions undermine its leadership role in monitoring the regime (Walkup 1997). Further, Northern states have traditionally manipulated the UNHCR and increasingly contest its mandate and role (Stedman and Tanner 2003). Despite these challenges, the UNHCR has quite effectively linked the refugee problem with other global issues as a means to hold Northern states to their commitment to refugee protection in the South. It has linked the refugee problem to global governance issues such as migration, security, development and peace building (Loescher 2003; Betts 2006a, 2008).

The global migration architecture: responding to economic migration

The global migration architecture is characterized by the absence of a centralized institutional framework or a hierarchy of norms linking the international, regional and national levels. It is structured around *ad hoc* cooperation between states, international organizations (IOs) and NGOs, with an increasing emphasis on the notion of partnerships between these actors. The 'system' is institutionally and normatively fragmented. Migration is linked with other issues as a matter of course, and there is a proliferation of instruments covering different areas that refer to migration-related issues.

'Architectural volatility' and the absence of a regime

There is no international treaty that comprehensively covers migration issues. Global migration is covered by a multiplicity of soft law initiatives. The 1990 Convention on the Protection

of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families is the closest that the international community has come to a global response to migration. But most host countries have yet to ratify the convention, the implementation of which has been plagued by state divergences (Pécoud 2009). The Commission on Migrant Workers (CMW) has monitored the implementation of the 1990 Convention since 2004. The absence of a global normative framework is matched by the fact that there is no global institution with a comprehensive mandate to address migration issues. Existing global institutions working on migration issues either play an operational role that reflects the interests of host states, as in the case of the IOM (Betts 2011), or, like the ILO, they play a regulatory role in labour-related issues.

This decentralized migration system dates back to the conflict between the US and international institutions (notably the ILO and the UN) over how to deal with surplus populations in Europe since the interwar period. Since the 1930s there had been a plan to establish a migration authority under the auspices of the ILO to actively coordinate global labour migration (Maul 2010), but the US favoured an institution with specifically designed functions based on intergovernmental negotiations (Karatani 2005). It was in this context that the predecessor of the IOM, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), was created in 1951; this was originally intended to work for a limited period of time. After successive name changes, the IOM acquired its current title in 1989. At the same time, its role has evolved: it has shifted from being a logistical agency to playing an increasingly prominent role in global migration governance, even though it works outside formal UN structures (Betts 2009b).

Since the 1980s, several reports have called for a more cooperative global approach to the management of international migration (Marchi 2010), but substantive efforts only began to emerge after 2000 and their impact has been limited. One such effort was the Berne Initiative, which emerged from the 2001 Symposium on International Migration. One of its key outcomes was the establishment of the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM), a non-binding policy framework involving a significant number of states, which advocates the involvement of all stakeholders in migration management. The 2005 Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) subsequently identified six broad migration principles to guide the formulation of national, regional and global migration policies (GCIM 2005).

The UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006 was, surprisingly, the first ever plenary session of the UNGA to deal with migration issues. It focused on ways to maximize the development benefits of migration, and to minimize its negative impacts. The High Level Dialogue produced a broad consensus on the need for continued dialogue. However, it also became apparent that it was too early to move beyond this kind of framework and establish a norm-setting intergovernmental commission, as there were divergences between states regarding organizational details (Martin et al. 2007). In 2006, the Global Migration Group (GMG), an interagency group (involving the UN, the IOM, the ILO and the World Bank), was created to promote the application of international and regional instruments and norms regarding migration, but it is regarded as a disappointing underachiever (Marchi 2010).

The work of these UN-led initiatives later culminated in the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), a state-led mechanism that met for the first time in 2007. Its goal is to place development squarely at the centre of the international migration debate. The US was absent from the first meeting due to fears that the GFMD would become a forum for poor states to complain about how their citizens are treated in the rich countries (Martin and Abella 2009).

In 2009 the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) launched the Conversations on the Global Governance of Migration, involving representatives of different stakeholders in informal discussions (ICMC 2009). Cooperation on illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking has also intensified in the framework of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (Koslowsky 2006).

Fragmentation and issue linkage

Thus far, it has been impossible to agree on a new set-up based on formal UN-based multilateral action (Bhagwati 2003). Newland (2010) observes that there is no consensus on the full list of possible options for global governance on international migration, including the establishment of a new agency, or deploying a leading agency, bringing the IOM into the UN system, adopting a coordination or a leadership model, whether to use the World Trade Organization (WTO) model or whether to opt for an evolutionary model.

Existing arrangements have been described as providing a framework of substance without architecture (Aleinikoff 2007). The migration architecture is thin on global norms and thick in terms of fragmented cooperation at the bilateral, regional and trans-regional levels, rather than at the multilateral level. These forms of cooperation establish management mechanisms (governing access to territory, visa policy and entry quotas, among other issues) rather than creating normative instruments to guarantee the rights of migrants (Ghosh 2003).

Aleinikoff (2002) has identified a scale of norm consistency. He correlates established norms with areas of general international agreement, emerging and vague norms with areas where joint interpretive work may be productive, and 'gaps' with areas where further international consideration is necessary. Some of the gap areas include arrangements for skilled and unskilled labour flows, readmission agreements, coordination of anti-trafficking efforts, procedures regarding persons rescued at sea, the migration–development nexus, anti-discrimination norms covering non-citizens, family reunification, and the consideration of migration issues in multilateral trade negotiations.

In this context, there is plenty of room for ambiguity and forum shopping, and it becomes impossible to identify who is actually shopping. Kunz et al. (2011) have attempted to understand states' choice of venues for cooperation (be it bilateral, regional or multilateral). The strategic position of the elites governing international organizations can also generate ambiguities in the regime and undermine its effectiveness.

The increasing complexity of the international environment also makes room for greater issue linkage between adjacent regimes (Kunz et al. 2011) because of the multiplicity of actors, myriad agendas and boundary decisions that respond to a changing context. This has been the case with migration and asylum but also with labour rights, trade, security, climate change (Martin 2010) and development (Gamlen 2010; Bakewell 2008).

The World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO/GATS) is one of the few instruments to establish incentives for strongly codified mobility rules. It has promoted multilateral norms to liberalize the temporary flows of skilled labour (Kunz et al. 2011) and to restrict permanence by promoting the readmission of people to their countries of origin, or trade-related mobility (Jandl 2007).

Processes at the regional level

There has been a noticeable increase in regional processes that address migration issues, and in attempts to codify mobility as part of regional integration processes. The EU has not only

developed a normative framework governing internal mobility but has also created what has been called 'fortress Europe', with a domino effect of restrictive policies (Overbeek 1995). 'External governance' has also increased the extra-territorial expansion of EU rules beyond its borders (Jileva 2003; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Other regional integration frameworks have replicated the EU model and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) free movement regime, albeit with different degrees of mobility rights.[5] The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the most restrictive, limiting mobility to skilled workers (Kunz et al. 2011).

Another important instance of regional cooperation is the Regional Consultative Process (RCP). This shows the need to go beyond bilateral approaches and to address the close linkages of migration with a wide range of issues, such as development, labour migration, the social integration of migrants, the protection of migrant rights, smuggling and trafficking in persons, migration and health, and trade and migration. The first of the RCPs was the Inter-governmental Consultation (IGC) of 1985, which brought together representatives of states, IOs and NGOs for informal and non-binding dialogue and information exchange on migration-related issues of common interest and concern.

The Puebla Process, or the Regional Conference on Migration, is an example of a process designed to promote regional cooperation on migration in North and South America within the framework of the economic and social development of the region. Other RCPs include the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, the Asia–Pacific Consultations (APC), the Bali and the Budapest Processes, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Conference, the Colombo Process, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD-RCP), the Manila Process, the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM), the South American Conference on Migration (SACM), the Söderköping Process, and the 5+5 Dialogue.[6]

A preference for mobility partnerships

There has been a marked preference for tailored mobility partnerships despite the proliferation of global initiatives (Kunz et al. 2011) because the former provide mechanisms that are meant to address specific problems rather than establishing universal norms like multilateral normative regimes do. Mobility partnerships between Europe and countries of origin and transit are one example of this. They are designed to create a common transnational framework for cooperation on labour migration, including circular migration, and it is claimed that they allow a 'triple win' between the countries and the migrants involved. However, doubts have been raised about the extent to which these partnerships transcend a European and security-centred focus and actually address the broad spectrum of existing challenges (Carrera and Sagrera 2011).

Public policy theories justify this preference by reference to the concept of incentives to cooperate, whereby states that are able to exert power promote the establishment of partnerships that serve their interests (Drezner 2007; Betts 2011). Koslowsky (2006) points out that there are few incentives for global cooperation on migration because of divergent interests. Further, interests are increasingly ambivalent, as the complexity of global mobility gradually causes the traditional distinction between origin, transit and destination countries to fade (Newland 2012).

Given the unstructured emergence of these partnerships, the latter have been described as 'islands of migration governance' in a sea of multi-layered mechanisms (Kunz et al. 2011) or

even as examples of 'coherent plurilateralism', a middle ground between formal multilateralism and informal network–based governance (Betts 2011).

Effectiveness

The migration architecture remains fragmented because it aims to respond to contradictory national motivations and to address various issue areas, levels (the national, regional and global levels) and actors (states, IOs and migrants themselves).

The architecture is also marked by the disjuncture between the technical implementation of migration management activities, and the political dimensions of migration policy formulation, which requires compromise between different interests. As regards migration management, given the scale and magnitude of the current challenge, it has not been possible to attain the desired outcomes. Border controls are particularly ineffective, which often has a negative impact on everyone involved (Jandl 2007). The absence of meaningful cross–border cooperation also opens up opportunities for illegal migration and smuggling networks that benefit from existing 'gray areas' (Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute 2012). Given the ineffectiveness of border management, it is necessary for a reflection on global migration policy that begins by determining the purpose of cooperation before deliberating on its form (Newland 2012), and ascertains the right balance between the security, economic and other interests of states and the rights of migrants (Ghosh 2003; Pécoud 2009).

Bhabha (2011) has evaluated the effectiveness of the international legal framework in establishing a global migration system and enforcing migrant rights, and concludes that effectiveness could be enhanced through consensus building and norm creation. However, it is difficult to combine this dual dynamic with a global monitoring architecture in the absence of a hierarchical relation between the normative systems that are able to respond to initiatives that are currently fragmented.

Global human mobility: towards convergence?

Although the refugee and migration architecture are closely interrelated and even overlapping in some areas, there are differences in the degree of normative and institutional centralization or hierarchy. However, there seems to be a tendency towards convergence and contamination given the difficulty in distinguishing refugees from migrants (Overbeek 1995; Betts 2009b; Betts and Loescher 2010; Koser and Martin 2011).

The emergence of new categories such as *survival migration* (Betts 2010b), reflect the increasing challenges in distinguishing between forced and economic migration. The concept of *people on the move* (Crisp 2009) has been developed to describe situations where social and economic catastrophes lead to forced migration, as in Zimbabwe in 2009. Refugee issues are being redefined as migration issues, and the latter are being redefined as development or security issues as a result of issue linkage (Loescher et al. 2008; Koser and Martin 2011). The concept of *international mobility* proposed by Koslowsky (2006) is more inclusive as it also encompasses tourism flows and takes on board not only the incapacity to control borders but also security threats. Benz and Hasenclever (2010) go a step further and argue that there is a *forced migration regime* that is broader than the refugee and migration regimes and includes development–induced displacement (DIDP) and victims of trafficking, who fall between the cracks of all regimes, including internal security and international cooperation systems. Trafficking networks take the opportunities offered by insufficient regulation and restrictive, but not always effective, border controls, and put undocumented migrants at greater risk.

The UNHCR has become gradually involved in the broader migration debate, adding extreme deprivation, environmental degradation and climate change to the traditional grounds for flight such as conflict and persecution (Crisp 2008). Given the complexity of displacement today, the UNHCR has introduced the notion of 'refugee protection and durable solutions in the context of international migration' (UNHCR 2007). It has done so in an effort to respond to a policy agenda dominated by the interests of the industrialized countries while still retaining the distinction between refugees and migrants.

In a context of regime complexity, effectiveness is not merely a technical issue of border control and processing of flows, but a political one that highlights ambiguities and contradictions in two key dimensions. The first reflects traditional cleavages between the interests of states in the North and South, and between origin, destination and transit countries; the second, tensions between human rights and state interests, is affected by the first. The proliferation of human mobility norms and institutions constitutes an attempt to respond to these inconsistencies, but it has generated more inconsistencies. This is making it increasingly difficult to assess effectiveness and is aggravating power imbalances (Drezner 2009).

If, as suggested by Drezner (2009) and Betts (2009b), we are witnessing a shift from simple to complex regimes, then key concepts should be identified and distinguished. It is useful to retain the concept of density (the number of norms and institutions in a regime), viscosity (resistance to change) and integrity (the degree to which regimes coherently reflect universal transversal norms such as those of human rights). It follows that the current complex regimes are characterized by high density in norms and institutions, as well as high levels of adjustment (low viscosity) at the cost of integrity (creating inconsistencies between emerging and existing norms and institutions). The nature of current international concerns, including those in the human mobility arena, requires an adequate balance between consistency and flexibility. An effective global human mobility architecture would involve a planned system of linked issue areas, bound together by a set of universal principles with a high level of integrity, regardless of the levels of density and viscosity. Managing human mobility through an architecture-like structure would then be guided by a global rights framework taking hierarchical precedence over existing responses to address the specific nature of mobility situations, thus incorporating the necessary flexibility.

Recommended for further reading

Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute (2012), Betts (2011), Betts and Loescher (2010), Koser and Martin (2011) and Kunz et al. (2011).

Notes

1 Statute of the UNHCR at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html
2 For the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness see http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html
3 See Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement at http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html
4 See African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) at http://www.unhcr.org/4ae9bede9.html
5 This is the case, for example, for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).
6 See Regional Consultative Processes at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/regional-consultative-processes/rcps-by-region

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The architecture of international monetary and financial governance

Dries Lesage

Over the course of about 150 years the architecture of international monetary and financial governance has become quite complex and crowded. It was not until 1930 that the first official international financial institution was created: the Bank for International Settlements. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 complemented the groundwork for today's architecture. In the following decades it underwent a fascinating evolution, marked by both path dependency and discontinuity, in response to changes in the external environment. Three basic logics can be distinguished that propelled the architecture's permanent expansion, deepening and reform. They can respectively be termed functional, geopolitical and managerial.

First, functional institutions have been created and are continually reformed to address the destabilizing effects of financial internationalization, in the form of disequilibriums and crises. The agenda consists of appropriate exchange rate regimes, international monetary solidarity and international rules to reduce risk in banking and investment. Another functional necessity is the provision of credit for postwar reconstruction and development when private financial markets fail. Second, geopolitical shifts constantly put the architecture under pressure. To ensure that the institutional framework remained legitimate and effective, from time to time the circle of decision making was widened so as to give the 'emerging powers' of each respective epoch a greater say. Third, in response to the architecture's ever-growing complexity, the major powers set up new mechanisms to improve the management of the system as a whole. These new bodies had to provide leadership and oversight of coordination and coherence. They took the form of high-level political steering groups and inter-agency network organizations. Closely related to this management-driven trend is the path-dependent clustering of international institutions in established hubs, notably Washington DC and Basel. Interestingly, the three logics continue to be at work until this very day. Certainly these basic trends are not the only driving forces for the architecture. Regionalism, in particular, has always been present and often has developed in response to changes and threats in the global environment. This is not the focus of this chapter, however.

International financial institutions before the Second World War

The Latin Monetary Union

Before the Second World War the world of finance was rarely institutionalized through multilateral organizations. Yet the expansion of world trade in the second half of the nineteenth century did create demand for international monetary cooperation. One formal attempt to achieve this was the 1865 treaty which created the so-called Latin Monetary Union (LMU) between Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland, later joined by Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Venezuela and others. The LMU was intended to facilitate trade through the fixing of exchange rates for coins and by rendering them interchangeable. It also had to address the problems of the bimetallic monetary system of that time, more precisely massive cross-border arbitrage because of differing gold–silver ratios in the respective coins. The ratios were standardized across the LMU zone. Underlying the creation of the LMU were French dreams of European integration and a single European currency. It proved not to be successful, however. It was undermined by a lack of macro-economic cohesion and deviations from the agreed standards. Greece, for example, was temporarily expelled between 1908 and 1910. Although it was not officially dissolved until 1927, the LMU actually perished at the outbreak of the First World War (Einaudi 2000).

The gold standard

From the 1870s onwards the European industrialized countries and several nations in the Americas and the Far East abandoned silver or bimetallism. They entered into a regime of fixed exchange rates based on the permanent convertibility of their currencies into gold. This 'gold standard' was not launched by a conference or treaty, but gradually emerged as a result of path dependency. When the United Kingdom (UK), which domestically had opted for gold-based money, achieved commercial, industrial and financial primacy, one country after another decided to join this standard in order to improve its trade and credit opportunities. In particular, Germany's adoption of the gold standard in 1871 set off a positive chain reaction based on this kind of network externality. The central banks showed strong commitment to the standard. They applied sophisticated tools to defend the pegs and monetary stability, a practice which John Maynard Keynes later dubbed 'playing by the rules of the game'. The Bank of England acted as the *primus inter pares* and set the reference interest rate. The central banks also showed solidarity if there were banking crises. In 1890, for example, the French and Russian central banks came to the rescue of the Bank of England, following the collapse of the British Barings Bank due to bad loans in Argentina. The gold standard was maintained without the presence of an international organization. It came to an end in 1914. After a failed British attempt to restore it, the interwar years were marked by severe monetary and financial instability, culminating in the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen 2008).

The Bank for International Settlements

Just before all hell broke loose, a window of opportunity opened for relatively constructive international relations within the financial establishment, which, combined with mounting international financial and economic stress, was seized to create a key international financial institution. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) more concretely resulted from the

debates, commissions and conferences in the 1920s on the pressing financial and monetary issues of that time. These forums addressed questions such as the settlement of war debts owed to the United States (US) and the UK, German reparations, the restoration of international monetary stability and the return to the gold standard. The idea of building an institution for central bank cooperation already had been circulating for some decades. Deepening financial integration and growing complexity called for technical collaboration and the pooling of research and statistical activities. What is more, central bankers were longing for a 'safe haven' in which to exchange sensitive information, build up mutual understanding and reaffirm their political independence vis-à-vis governments of variable composition. Notwithstanding their differences and disputes, the central bankers identified themselves as a transnational network, sharing certain views which could be fine-tuned into a common monetary doctrine.

With this aim, the BIS was founded in 1930 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the UK, with US representatives participating in a private capacity. It was located in the Swiss town of Basel. The immediate cause was the 1929 Young Plan to settle the German reparation issue. Part of that arrangement was the commercialization (and thus depoliticization) of German debt through bonds available to the financial markets, so that the Allied powers could receive huge sums in advance instead of payments spread over several decades. It also included a provision to multilateralize risk, in case Germany could no longer service its debts. Among other functions connected to reparations, the BIS had to sell these bonds to private investors, transfer the collected capital to the former Allies and follow up on Germany's repayment. Right from the start the BIS also served as a venue for central bank cooperation in general, which continued after Hitler stopped reparation payments in 1933 (Simmons 1993; Toniolo and Clement 2005).

The Bretton Woods system (1944–73)

A new choice in the monetary trilemma

During the interwar period a return to the classic gold standard had become impossible. A strong commitment to fixed exchange rates in a context of open trade and free capital mobility could only be maintained through central bank actions such as contractive monetary policies, regardless of the socio-economic consequences. But due to a stronger labour movement and the expansion of universal suffrage, objectives such as full employment, fiscal redistribution and extensive social provisions had become greater priorities. Hence, monetary policy was no longer insulated from society and democracy. Policy makers had to make a new choice in the so-called monetary trilemma, which implies that out of three desired objectives, one always needs to be sacrificed. Under the gold standard, fixed exchange rates were combined with unrestricted capital mobility, with national monetary and macro-economic autonomy relinquished. In the post-Second World War context, in contrast, national autonomy had become the first priority, while a return to the interwar jungle of exchange rate instability was out of the question. As a consequence, the US government and others set out to design a new regime which combined exchange rate stability and national autonomy. The victim was free capital mobility, given its inherent potential to derail stable exchange rates and punish national policy choices through international arbitrage and capital flight. Moreover, due to traumatic experiences before the war, its economic predominance and new strategic thinking, the US strongly favoured an open, liberal, rules-based trading system. Building a new institutional framework to fulfil these objectives was the agenda of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference (Eichengreen 2008).

The conference gave birth to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now part of the World Bank Group (see later), the so-called Bretton Woods institutions. The IMF was mandated to supervise international monetary stability, while the IBRD had to provide credit for reconstruction. Both are based in Washington DC, at walking distance of the White House and the US Treasury Department. The US is the only member with veto power in the two institutions, where important decisions require an 85 per cent majority. Due to an informal deal among the US and Western European members, the IMF managing director is always a European, while the president of the World Bank Group is a US citizen. This arrangement, which is seen as illegitimate by both the rest of the world and civil society, is coming under pressure, but thus far the developing countries have failed to draft a joint and effective counterstrategy. The Soviet Union did not participate in these institutions until after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.

The International Monetary Fund

The IMF's statutes, the Articles of Agreement, stipulated the tasks of the Fund and laid the foundation for the so-called Bretton Woods system, the new regime for international monetary cooperation in the Western world. This was based on fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates centred around the so-called gold–dollar standard. Exchange rate stability was regarded as a precondition for the expansion of world trade. Each currency was pegged to the dollar, while the latter was convertible into gold at a fixed rate. On principle, exchange rate adjustment was only allowed in case of a 'fundamental disequilibrium' and required prior discussion at the IMF. The Fund was also tasked with monitoring national policies regarding restoring currency convertibility, an important barrier to free trade at that time. These two functions highlight the strong link between the IMF and the liberal trade agenda of the US.

The IMF also had a role to play in the preservation of national macro-economic autonomy. With regard to non-trade-related and often speculative capital flows, the IMF and most of its members favoured restrictions, or capital controls, for the sake of stability and autonomy. Member-states also provided the Fund with equity capital (the so-called quotas), from which governments facing a balance of payments crisis can borrow. In this way they can avoid devaluation or extreme austerity measures, while retaining some autonomy. In the early years, though, monetary solidarity through the IMF was limited, as the US Congress was reluctant to commit large sums to this multilateral body. Much more money was involved, for example, in the unilateral Marshall Plan (James 1996; Eichengreen 2008). But with the growth of the world economy and economic interdependence, the capital of the IMF had been expanded regularly.

The highest decision-making body is the Board of Governors. Representatives from each member-state meet once a year to decide on general matters, such as quota reform and amendments to the Articles of Agreement. Voting power is linked to member-states' quotas. Quotas are determined on the basis of a complex formula that takes into account countries' economic weight, and to a lesser extent factors such as openness and monetary reserves. The Executive Board deals with the IMF's day-to-day business, which includes crucial decisions on lending, conditionality and surveillance. It currently has 24 members and in practice is the most powerful body in the IMF. The largest shareholders (the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, France) appoint five executive directors. The others are elected by groups of countries, or constituencies, and their voting power equals the combined votes of their constituency. A reform is under way to move to an all-elected Board (see later). The managing director leads the more than 2,400 staff and is another influential party at the IMF.

The multilateral development banks

The IBRD, the core of the later World Bank Group, gradually shifted its focus from postwar reconstruction in Europe towards development and poverty eradication in the global South. It provides finance to middle-income and credit-worthy poorer countries in the form of loans and guarantees, as well as analytical and advisory services. Unlike the IMF, the IBRD raises most of its money from bonds it sells in the global financial markets. In 2011 the Bank had about 200 billion USD outstanding in loans. In 1960, in response to the particular financing needs of the poorest countries, the US and other member-states set up the International Development Association (IDA), which provides grants to low-income countries as well as loans at zero or very low interest rates. Since its foundation, the IDA's total credits and grants have amounted to 238 billion USD. The IBRD and IDA together constitute the so-called World Bank. A third component of the Group was created in 1956: the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which offers advice and finance to the private sector in developing and transition countries, through loans and equity among other instruments. In 1988 the World Bank Group spawned yet another institution: the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which basically insures private investments in vulnerable countries against non-commercial risks. A final offspring of the Group is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 1966, which is a forum for arbitration and conciliation in state–investor disputes around the world. A Board of Governors on which all members have a seat runs the World Bank Group. A powerful Executive Board of 25 members, more or less based on the same constituencies as those of the IMF, oversees the daily work of the IBRD, IDA, IFC and MIGA (Kapur et al. 1997).

The increasing international focus on development from the 1950s onwards led to the creation of regional development banks. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was established in 1959, the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 1963 and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966. All three are in fact 'groups' modelled on the World Bank Group, in terms of both governance and activities. They are run by regional and non-regional member-states on a basis of quotas and votes, with the advanced industrialized countries having an important say. These banks were founded to complement the World Bank and to respond to specific policy preferences and regional circumstances; for example, to counter the success of left-wing and communist movements in Latin America (Kapur et al. 1997: 137–8, 163). The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established after the end of the Cold War. It concentrates on the post-communist transition economies and North Africa. In addition to these four, there are several other multilateral banks with a narrower membership or scope, such as the Caribbean, Islamic, West African and East African Development Banks.

Survival of the Basel club

Interestingly, despite US hegemony and the creation of the IMF, the BIS survived American attempts to abolish it. The Federal Reserve had never fully engaged with the BIS, and after the Second World War, Washington saw no need for this Basel-based institution alongside the US-led IMF. Yet abolishing the BIS required a special majority. More importantly, the BIS was a centre for exchange of information and for coordination, with proven expertise, to which the European central bankers, the so-called Basel club, were very attached. The BIS even became the manager of the European Payments Union, which was to prepare the continent for current account convertibility by 1959. As an important hub of international

financial and monetary cooperation, 'Basel' would remain a European counterweight to US supremacy in the decades to follow (Bernholz 2009).

In the same vein, the BIS hosted the meetings of the Group of Ten (G10), which was formed in the early 1960s as an informal body of the central bankers of the major industrialized countries at that time. After Swiss accession, the group consisted of 11 countries, namely Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. With deepening financial integration and mounting pressure on the Bretton Woods system, the G10 and BIS became central to international crisis management. In those years the US saw its trade balance deteriorate, while the increasing dollar glut jeopardized the gold–dollar standard. Efforts to turn the tide included, among other transatlantic initiatives, the G10-run General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) at the IMF, which increased the Fund's lending capacity (Borio and Toniolo 2006; Eichengreen 2008). These institutional developments illustrated America's growing need to bring on board the economic capacity, monetary reserves and political clout of Western Europe, Canada and Japan for the sake of global monetary stability.

Neoliberal globalization and instability (1973–2007)

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system

The Belgian economist Robert Triffin had already pointed out in 1947 that the Bretton Woods system was inherently unstable. On the one hand, the world economy was in constant need of liquidity backed by the US dollar, the main reserve and trade currency. On the other, too much dollar liquidity spurred inflation and in the long run rendered the dollar's convertibility into gold at a fixed rate implausible. In other words, the dollar became dangerously overvalued. United States deflationary policies seemed the only solution to restore confidence in the dollar and maintain the system. The choice between flooding the world with dollars and maintaining the gold–dollar standard is referred to as the Triffin dilemma. United States authorities actually took the inflationary path, so that foreign central banks continued to accumulate dollar reserves. Growing US deficits, ensuing from President Johnson's social spending and the Vietnam war, together with the rise of the uncontrollable 'Eurodollar market' in London and other European financial centres, greatly added to the dollar glut. In the meantime liberalization of trade-related cross-border financial transactions, the Eurodollar market and technological innovations had enabled a massive growth in capital flows. Hence the situation became very unstable. In 1971 President Nixon finally closed the 'gold window', when he announced that the US would no longer guarantee the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned in 1973 (James 1996; Eichengreen 2008).

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system marked the beginning of a new era, characterized by the deregulation and liberalization of capital markets, deepening financial integration and chronic systemic instability with consecutive crises. Technological innovations, the evolution of markets, and neoliberal policies pushed financial globalization to unprecedented levels. Not surprisingly, these developments also generated a strong demand for enhanced multilateral management and re-regulation.

With the demise of the regime of fixed exchange rates, the IMF lost one of its key mandates. This did not mean, however, that the international community wanted a return to monetary chaos. Countries were supposed to refrain from unilateral monetary policies that could harm others. For that purpose, the IMF's mandate regarding the monitoring of individual countries' policies was readjusted. National exchange rate and macro-economic policies would be

subject to what, from then onwards, was called 'bilateral surveillance'. This practice still exists today through the so-called 'Article IV consultations' of the IMF. It has also invested in multilateral surveillance, through its periodic *World Economic Outlook* and *Global Financial Stability Report* (Pauly 2008).

The need for political steering and the G7

In the first half of the 1970s the monetary turmoil became too politicized to leave coordination entirely to the IMF's executive directors and other technocratic officials. Governments felt the need for political oversight and steering of the international monetary architecture as a whole. The US was interested in establishing a new high-level political body, in order to dilute the European dominance of the G10. It first pushed for the creation of the ministerial Committee of Twenty (C20) at the IMF, which mirrored the composition of the Executive Board and operated from 1972 to 1974. One of the C20's recommendations was the founding of a permanent and political council at the IMF. In anticipation, the membership set up the 'Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System', which had an advisory role (Keohane and Nye 2001: 73; Shakow 2008). The envisaged council, however, was never to come into being.

Driven by similar motivations, the US was also looking for a more informal and smaller group to provide political guidance during the international monetary disorder. In 1973 Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz invited his counterparts from France, Germany and the UK to meet in the library of the White House. This Library Group was quickly complemented by the finance ministers of Japan and Italy to form the G6. The group reflected the US wish to compensate for its relative decline and loss of hegemony by including like-minded allies in a new instrument of 'group hegemony'. In 1975 France and Germany took the initiative in upgrading the group to the level of heads of state and government and introducing an annual leaders' summit. The G6 was soon enlarged by the inclusion of Canada and the European Community, to form the Group of Seven (G7). In 1998 Russia joined the group, which became the G8, although it did not become a member of the ongoing G7 process at the level of finance ministers. Today the financial G7 still exists, alongside the G8 summit. The latter has taken on a wider political role, with the global economy as just one of the topics of interest (Bailin 2005; Hajnal 2007).

New tasks for Basel

The end of the Bretton Woods system entailed a new choice in the monetary trilemma. Fixed exchange rates were abandoned, while national macro-economic and monetary autonomy, now including the right to freely adjust exchange rates, was to remain in place. Partly under US competitive pressure, free capital mobility was restored in one country after another. This new environment not only fostered deep financial integration, it also was accompanied by turbulence and the accumulation of risk, to which new institutional answers had to be found. In 1974 the German private Bankhaus Herstatt and the US Franklin National Bank collapsed due to imprudent international banking activities. These events threatened international financial stability and induced the G10 to set up the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), based at the BIS. The Committee's objective is 'to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide'. In order to reduce risk in the banking sector, the BCBS developed standards for capital adequacy ratios, i.e. the ratio of the bank's own capital to its risks (Kapstein 1994; Seabrooke 2006). These

non-binding but authoritative standards are known as the Basel I, II and III norms. Interestingly, other international regulatory bodies also found a home at the BIS; for example, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS, created in 1994) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF, created in 1999, see later).

The crises of the 1990s

Ongoing financial globalization appeared to produce a sequence of international financial crises in the 1990s. In 1992–3 speculative attacks destabilized the European Monetary System. Mexico encountered stormy weather in 1994–5. The instability culminated in the 1997–8 Asian crisis, which spilled over into Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey. As early as their 1995 summit in Halifax, Canada, the G7 leaders announced the building of a 'new international financial architecture'. The group basically contended that the international system's weak spot was the poor quality of financial regulation and banking supervision in the newly industrializing countries. Those countries were indeed most seriously affected by the crises. The G7 wanted local financial systems to be strengthened, in order to render them more compatible with the globally integrated financial system and to reduce systemic risk. The norm of free capital mobility was not called into question by the Western political elites.

This crisis period unleashed a new wave of institutional innovation, in which the G7 took the lead. In 1999, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the Canadian and US finance ministers, supported by the G7, took the initiative of convening the Group of Twenty (G20). The G20 consists of the G7 member countries plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey, as well as the EU Presidency. The idea was to bring together the 'systemically important' economies to deliberate on better regulatory practices. The launch of the G20 indicated that the G7 could no longer handle financial globalization on its own. The composition of the group has always been controversial, as important economies and/or significant regional players such as Belgium, Egypt, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Singapore, Spain and Switzerland were excluded. It also lacks representation of the Least Developed Countries. Like the G7, the G20 is an informal and political steering group, without treaty or secretariat. The new G20 was to hold annual meetings at the level of ministers of finance and central bankers (Hajnal 2007).

Also in 1999 the G7 set up the Financial Stability Forum, with the task of addressing weaknesses in financial regulation and supervision worldwide and monitoring trends in financial markets. It also provided a precious platform for exchange of information and best practices. The FSF comprised the G7 membership and Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland. In addition, the FSF included international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), BIS, BCBS, IAIS, the Madrid-based International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO, created in 1983 as successor to an inter-American institution) and the London-based International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, created in 1973, now the International Accounting Standards Board) (Baker 2005: 216–17). Therefore, the FSF should be regarded as a 'network institution'. Both the G20 and the FSF were meant as devices to strengthen oversight and manage complexity: the G20 by convening finance ministers with the political mandate to oversee the financial system and deal with connections between issues; and the Basel-based FSF by bringing together, for the first time, a range of functional institutions which otherwise operated separately.

In addition to improving national financial systems, policy makers found that the IMF resources were no longer commensurate with actual and potential financial emergencies in the globalized world. In 1997 the IMF created the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), which is a set of credit arrangements between the IMF and 25 member-states, on which the Fund can draw in case its quota resources are insufficient. The NAB added about 50 billion USD to the IMF's lending capacity. Participants included the G10 and other advanced economies, but also a few Asian and Arabian Gulf nations (IMF 1997). In addition to the NAB, the Fund's quota resources were increased by 45 per cent, from 199 to 288 billion USD (IMF 1998). Furthermore, in 1999, the IMF's high-level advisory group, the Interim Committee, was transformed into the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC). Its 24-member composition corresponds to the constituencies of the Executive Board. The Committee meets biannually at ministerial level. The 1999 move did not change much, as the IMFC was not granted decision-making powers. Moreover, politically the select G7 continued to prevail over the broader IMFC (Woods 2006: 191).

Regional monetary and financial cooperation

With the demise of the Bretton Woods regime and ensuing instability, regional monetary cooperation gained ground in Europe. From the 1970s onwards the (now) European Union (EU), notwithstanding ups and downs, operated a system of relatively fixed exchange rates. A group of EU countries ultimately opted for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In 1999 the euro, the single currency issued by the European Central Bank (ECB), was finally launched (Eichengreen 2008: 134–84). But what started as a historic achievement to secure monetary stability for the participating countries in a globalizing and turbulent world has now been plunged into unprecedented crisis. This crisis in turn has sparked new initiatives for financial regulation and supervision at EU level.

Regional monetary and financial initiatives were not confined to Europe. Discomfort with the neoliberal and uniform outlook of the Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions and the intrusive conditionality attached to their loans fostered the search for regional alternatives. The 1997–8 Asian crisis in particular caused a serious legitimacy crisis for the IMF. Many policy circles in the emerging economies evaluated both its pre-crisis advice and its crisis responses as misguided. The Japanese idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) did not take off, but China, Japan, South Korea and a group of Southeast Asian countries were able to agree on the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). This is a regional arrangement of monetary solidarity, at first based on bilateral swap arrangements, now on regionally pooled resources totalling 240 billion USD. The CMI does not constitute a breach with the IMF, however. Countries subject to an IMF programme and conditionality can draw more resources from the CMI than countries without such a programme (Grimes 2011).

A promising South American initiative, the Banco del Sur, appears to be less successful so far. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela only committed to 7 billion USD as start-up capital (Salmerón 2012), hence the Banco del Sur can still not be seen as a meaningful alternative to the World Bank or IADB. The IMF's legitimacy crisis also led to unilateral responses, in particular whenever emerging economies recovered from their crises. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia repaid their debts to the IMF ahead of schedule. Brazil, China, India, Russia and others also built up their own foreign exchange reserves, as a form of self-insurance (Chin 2010). As a result the IMF's lending activity and affiliated revenues plummeted, leading many observers to question the Fund's relevance.

Global financial crisis (2007–12)

After some years of relative stability, few people expected the outbreak of a new global financial crisis. What started in 2007 as the subprime mortgage crisis in the US culminated in the collapse of Lehman Brothers bank in 2008. These events unleashed an international banking crisis, which eventually led to the devastating European sovereign debt crisis. The global financial crisis rocked the foundations of the international governance architecture, again sparking a series of institutional reforms. Their general direction was towards a strengthening of multilateralism, albeit within the confines of the politically possible. It is important to note that these changes did not constitute a break with the functional, geopolitical and managerial trends that had already been under way for some decades.

The G20 as the premier forum

With the crisis getting out of hand, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown succeeded in convincing US President George W. Bush to convene the heads of state and government of the G20 in Washington DC in November 2008. In the midst of the crisis, leaders just drew upon the existing G20 membership, rather than contemplating a new composition. The April 2009 London summit produced meaningful decisions on multiplying the IMF resources (see later) and a more robust international coordination of financial regulation, so sending a strong signal of confidence to the financial markets and the international community. Although this was not planned at the outset of G20 summitry, the September 2009 Pittsburgh summit proclaimed the G20 as the members' 'premier forum of international economic cooperation' and introduced an annual summit under a rotating presidency. Spain was given the status of 'permanent guest'. In this way, the G20 took the political lead in crisis response at a global level. Still an informal body without treaty or secretariat, it had the political clout to give impetus to the Bretton Woods institutions, the OECD and regional development banks, as well as a series of technical bodies (Kirton 2013). Whilst the G20 summits proved quite successful in showing leadership and calming down the financial markets in 2009, consensus was growing that, in 2012, the process was losing steam. The group had failed to break the major gridlocks in global financial and monetary governance. It is becoming clear that in key economies such as China, Germany and the US the pace of international cooperation is largely determined by domestic politics. It is not the G20 that will induce restructuring of the US consumption-driven and Chinese export-led growth models to arrive at global macro-economic rebalancing, or persuade Germany of the benefits of expansive monetary policies at the Eurozone level. Similarly, the G20 meets huge difficulties when trying to implement a global level playing field for financial regulation and is unable to agree on a proposed financial transaction tax (FTT) to finance global public goods.

The IMF is back

Nevertheless, the G20 was instrumental in revamping the IMF, which surprisingly moved to centre stage after some years of marginalization. The 2009 London summit agreed to treble the Fund's resources to about 750 billion USD. In the short term, both advanced industrialized countries and emerging economies contributed to the IMF through bilateral loans or purchases of IMF 'notes'. These efforts folded into a longer-term solution: the expansion of the New Arrangements to Borrow from about 50 to 565 billion USD. The expanded NAB welcomed new participants, such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Russia (IMF 2011).

Thus for the first time, the large emerging economies contributed significant amounts of money to the IMF's war chest. Since being part of the NAB does not as such enhance the participant's voice in regular IMF decision making, the emerging economies insisted on a quota increase and reshuffle with a concomitant roll-back of the NAB. The IMF Board of Governors agreed to this in late 2010.

In addition to a doubling of the Fund's general quota, the agreement included a rather modest realignment in favour of emerging economies such as Brazil, China and India, building upon earlier such quota shifts decided in 2006 and 2008. Whereas the US retains its veto, Canada, European countries, Saudi Arabia and, ironically, some developing countries lost voting power. Emerging and developing countries saw a 2.6 percentage point increase in votes, up to 44.7 per cent. Late in 2011 IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde started yet another pledging round to increase the IMF's firepower, for an amount of more than 400 billion USD, through short-term measures.

A key part of the 2010 reform package pertains to the Executive Board. Two full-time equivalent seats of advanced European countries will move to the emerging economies and developing countries. Moreover, the Board will become all-elected, which means that the five largest shareholders are no longer entitled to an appointed seat (which in practice is not likely to change much) (IMF 2010). At the time of writing, the 2010 reform package has not yet come into force. There is still no agreement on the tricky details of the Board reshuffle, while the quota reform waits for ratification by some member-states, in particular the US. The World Bank Group is going through a process of governance reform as well, also to enhance the voice and participation of developing and transition countries. Apart from a general capital increase, developing and transition economies received a 4.6 percentage point increase in votes. This now stands at 47.2 per cent in the IBRD. In contrast to the IMF, a 25th executive director was introduced, which implies a third seat for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2009).

The crisis not only left its mark on the IMF's resources and governance, but also on its mandate. The IMF now provides institutional backing for the G20's Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), a peer review process aimed at the coordination of domestic policies in the context of the group's Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth (IMF 2012). Yet the advent of G20 summitry added to the ongoing marginalization of the IMFC. Some IMFC members not represented in the G20 hoped that their Committee would become the world's premier body for global financial governance, but the informal and differently composed G20 prevailed. One of the advantages of the G20 is that it is not a formal part of the IMF, but is a freestanding major power club that can also give political instructions to other institutions, such as the World Bank, the OECD (for example, on taxation) and the Basel network.

Basel adjusts to the new world

The crisis also accelerated reform in Basel. The G20's April 2009 London summit decided to transform the FSF into the Financial Stability Board (FSB). It also received a wider mandate. The FSB is to pay more attention to systemic risks in the global financial system; in other words, macro-prudential regulation. Its membership was spectacularly enlarged, to include all G20 members. In the same vein, in 2009 the still G10-centred BCBS widened its membership to include the rest of the G20, along with Hong Kong and Singapore (Helleiner 2010). The BIS itself had already embarked upon enlargement to encompass the emerging economies. This occurred in three waves, in 1996 (with the accession of the central banks of Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia, among others), 1999 and 2003 (BIS 2003).

Conclusion

Functional, geopolitical and managerial logics explain the evolution of the international monetary and financial architecture. The almost continuous internationalization of finance has proved one of the main drivers of the functional expansion and deepening of the architecture. Even if the Bretton Woods regime (1944–73) attempted to roll back financial integration for the sake of national macro-economic autonomy, it did itself form an answer to the drawbacks of financial globalization. Moments of crisis often paved the way for substantial institutional reform. The general direction of these reforms has almost always been towards the strengthening and sophistication of the architecture, regardless of the critical evaluations that can be made about the wisdom of the choices and their justice and effectiveness. With the emergence of new problems, new institutional responses were designed. Meanwhile the IMF saw constant increase in its firepower. In this sense, the continuity of trends at the institutional level of global financial governance since Bretton Woods is striking.

Throughout this period there has always been a power struggle between the US and Western Europe. Shortly after the Second World War, when the US had obtained the status of hegemonic power in the West, Europe reasserted itself. Examples are the continuing vitality of the Basel club and the relevance of the G10. The US had no alternative but to share power with the Europeans in bodies such as the G7, not least because it also needed European resources to sustain its open liberal world order. By the same token, from the 1990s onwards the emerging economies had to be brought on board, at the newly created G20, at the IMF and World Bank and in the Basel institutions. Finally, the architecture's increasing complexity gave way to mechanisms for political oversight and steering. The G7 and G20 are cases in point. Similar attempts were made at the IMF, notably with the IMFC. However, the latter has always been subordinate to the G7 and G20, which puts non-members of these informal groupings at a disadvantage. Bringing together existing institutions, in particular through the Financial Stability Board, also fostered coherence.

Recommended for further reading

Helleiner (2000), Pauly (1997), Phillips (2009) and Van Dormael (1978).

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The global trade architecture

An expanding agenda in times of fragmentation

Montserrat González Garibay

This chapter provides an overview of the global trade architecture by stressing its coherence, while noting that at first sight such coherence may not be distinguished, given the plurality of trade arrangements. The overview is structured along three main axes: a theoretical background, the trade regime's main institutional configuration and the evolution of the substantive trade agenda. Regime theory, the theoretical perspective adopted in this chapter, is instrumental in highlighting the global trade architecture's *leitmotiv* (the tension between coherence and fragmentation), to which that architecture has been subject since its inception. On the one hand, actors' expectations have converged around a multilateral trade order governed by the principles of non-discrimination, most-favoured nation and national treatment, especially during the second half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the proliferation of regional negotiation forums with disparate thematic agendas and the ascent of new actors such as the emerging countries and non-governmental actors reflect a pervasive tendency towards fragmentation.

The chapter traces the roots of the trade regime's organizational architecture back to the post–Second World War framework, which was shaped by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and its evolution towards the World Trade Organization. It assesses the proliferation of regional forums and agreements as well. It sheds light on the changing set of actors shaping that architecture and the trade regime's subject matter, which expanded its initial focus on the liberalization of trade in goods by reducing tariffs and quotas to cover items such as public procurement, technical barriers to trade, and labour rights. Finally, it highlights the challenges that the trade regime faces.

Trade at the crossroads of economics, law and political science

Trade is a multidisciplinary domain, with ramifications mainly in economics, law and international political economy (IPE). Economic and legal analyses are often guided by normative principles and lead to prescriptions about what the global architecture should look like in terms of exogenous criteria such as efficiency and legality. The IPE agenda, however, focuses on explaining existing governance structures in terms of political actors' behaviour. Traditionally, it focuses on the question of why countries liberalize, given certain factors that

push domestic policies towards protectionism (Milner 1999), but later approaches also address the distribution of power across trading partners, the relationship between trade and other policy areas, the political economy of regional integration and the incorporation of non-state actors into trade dynamics. Within IPE, the study of trade policy confronts *top-down* structural (realist or critical) explanations where trade governance is clarified in terms of the characteristics of the international system of states, with *bottom-up* explanations, which explain trade architecture through the behaviour of individual countries or groups of actors within countries.

Top-down explanations look at the trade architecture in terms of the characteristics of the international system of states. For instance, according to hegemonic stability theory (McKeown 1983), the anarchic nature of the international system creates the need for a hegemonic power to provide public goods. Under the lens of IPE, this specific public good is trade liberalization. In turn, the regime created by the hegemonic power changes the behaviour and expectations of individual countries. Other top-down theories, especially from the critical tradition, focus on the way trade organizations consolidate global patterns of dominance (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Within bottom-up explanations, authors look at trade policy in terms of domestic interests' rational preferences at the level of factors (labour and capital), sectors, firms, voters or government officials. Domestic institutions are integrated in those models as a buffer between the international system and national policies (Milner 1999). Those elements are often inserted into two-level-game theoretical frameworks (Putnam 1988), in which a trade negotiator's strategic behaviour is influenced by both interactions with counterparts and the pressure exerted by domestic actors. In addition, the level of the negotiator him/herself has been incorporated into bottom-up models in two ways. First, negotiation theory has introduced psychological factors, such as the character of the negotiator or the features of the interactions at the micro level (e.g. trust), as new explanatory variables of trade dynamics (Odell 2009). Second, other studies have incorporated constructivist insights, which deal with the way norms are produced at the micro level (Niemann 2006).

The division between bottom-up and top-down studies is a stylized one. In practice, several theories incorporate elements from both approaches or use frameworks that may alternate focus on bottom-up or top-down dynamics. Regime theory is one such case. Developed during the 1980s by international relations (IR) scholars (Krasner 1983), it is widely used to study the international trade architecture (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). Krasner (1982: 186) defines a regime as 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area'. The lack of assumptions or hypotheses regarding the way norms are produced makes the conceptual framework a particularly versatile one, allowing focus on both bottom-up and top-down dynamics.

Some authors look at how and why the trade regime is constructed and the ways in which regimes change (regimes as the dependent variable), often drawing from hegemonic stability theory. From this point of view, the trade architecture is the product of the United States' (US) economic and military predominance after the Second World War and the advent of a new, presumably Asian, world order which may bring about a new trade order. The regime may alternatively be constructed by interactions of state and (possibly) non-state actors. Here, cognitive components such as ideologies, the historical context and institutional constraints are taken into account (Haggard and Simmons 1987). From this point of view, the emergence of the trade regime can be assessed as a product of the free trade paradigm that gained strength after 1945. Other authors study regimes as a factor explaining political actors' behaviour (that is, as an independent variable). They may, in other words, affect the behaviour of concrete actors. For instance, the identity of developing countries as a specific group within the

international trade regime may be regarded as the product of the trade regime (Ford 2003). A few studies combine different approaches in which both power and ideas play a role. This is the case of Ruggie (1982), who states that the financial and trade regimes that emerged after the Second World War were the product of power, 'social purpose' and normative action.

Looking at the international trade architecture in terms of a regime makes it possible to emphasize its continuity and systemic nature, in spite of giving the initial impression of a fragmented whole. Moreover, the concept allows for comprehensiveness by accommodating norms, actors and the characteristics of the issue area.

Main institutional patterns of the trade regime

The regime governing international trade encompasses a complex intertwined network of organizations and treaties, involving an equally intricate web of policy actors. This section provides a brief historical overview of the organizational structure's development, the main actors within that structure and the principles governing it.

The organizational structure of the trade regime

The global trade regime has featured, since its inception, a strong struggle between fragmentation and attempts to streamline trading patterns into a single, all-encompassing multilateral structure. This duality was already present in the nineteenth century. Advocates for the removal of trade barriers brought the trade liberalization paradigm into the European political scene (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 90), but protectionism persisted. On the one hand, some liberalization took place, with the 1846 repeal of the United Kingdom's (UK) Corn Laws, the 1860 Cobden–Chevalier Agreement (which eliminated trade restrictions between France and the UK) and other liberalization treaties. On the other hand, surges of protectionism (that is, tariff increases) accompanied economic crises, and colonial powers (mainly the UK and France) instituted a preference system for products originating in their colonies. The rise in the number of export and import duties during the 1880s created an obstacle to international trade, as only a few states published them. A Belgian initiative prompted 25 countries to sign the 1890 convention establishing the Bureau of the International Union for the Publication of Custom Tariffs, which collected, translated and published tariffs from around the world. Over more than 20 years, it published roughly 100 volumes with details of 464 tariff systems and 1,813 supplements and revisions (Reinalda 2009: 122–3). The volatility of nineteenth-century trade patterns was 'normalized' during the interwar period (Kindleberger 1990: 131–5), only to debouch into the trade wars that characterized the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this sense, we cannot speak of an established regime for the governance of international trade before the 1940s.

The postwar multilateral trade architecture was discussed in 1946 at the United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, Cuba. This conference, along with the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, established the main institutions governing economic life along three pillars: financial stability (International Monetary Fund), economic reconstruction and development (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and trade. The negotiations in the framework of the Havana Conference had two main outcomes: the 1947 Havana Charter, which established an International Trade Organization (ITO), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Charter envisaged the ITO as an international organization designed to deal with trade matters. Several domains of action

were included: the imperial preferences were abolished; a link was established between trade, employment and labour standards; economic development and reconstruction were set as policy priorities; monopolistic practices were discouraged; and a basis was set for the removal of quantitative barriers (quotas). In addition, it created a binding system of dispute resolution. The GATT, centred on liberalization of trade in goods, was meant to serve as a temporary instrument during the ratification process of the Havana Charter. However, the heavy opposition in the US Congress to the Charter made it clear by 1950 that ratification would be impossible. As a result, a slightly amended version of the GATT (not an international organization but only a schedule for tariff reduction) emerged as the main cornerstone of the postwar trade regime.

During the following decades, the GATT was converted *de facto* into a full-fledged multilateral organization. This was done thanks to the efforts of Eric Wyndham White, GATT executive secretary from 1965 to 1968. It served as the forum for eight 'trade rounds': the Annecy Round (1949), Torquay Round (1950–1), Geneva Round (1956), Dillon Round (1960–2), Kennedy Round (1964–7), Tokyo Round (1973–9), and the Uruguay Round (1986–94). Though the GATT acquired the infrastructure, mandate and legitimacy of an international organization throughout the years, it was not until 1994 that it was recognized as a permanent (as opposed to an accidental) institution. The Uruguay Round triggered a process that culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the main institution charged with further liberalizing international trade. The Doha Development Round, aimed at completing and extending liberalization to other fields, is the first set of negotiations to be conducted in the WTO forum.

In spite of the fact that the GATT's creation and consolidation pulled the trade regime towards unity, the organization did not fully succeed in mainstreaming trade patterns, and the tension between coherence and fragmentation remained present in two ways. First, regional and bilateral cooperation structures (preferential trade agreements or PTAs) emerged throughout the post–Second World War period. Those structures can adopt the form of trade-liberalizing areas (better known as free trade areas) or customs unions, wherein several countries liberalize their mutual trade and at the same time apply a common tariff to imports from third parties. The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in March 1957 initiated these cooperation patterns, and as a customs union, the EEC has participated as a single actor in multilateral trade negotiations since the 1956 Geneva Round.[1] Regional integration gained further momentum in the 1990s with the formation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). MERCOSUR is a customs union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and since 2006, Venezuela, whereas NAFTA established a free trade area covering Canada, Mexico and the US. In addition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a free trade agreement in 1992, and numerous other regional agreements have followed. The most visible among these agreements involve either the US or the EEC and third parties.[2] Countries such as Australia, Japan and New Zealand, however, have also pursued an active free trade strategy.

The second source of tension was the evolution of former colonial preference systems into organizations and schemes focused specifically on reinforcing the role of the developing countries within the trade system. In 1964, in the midst of the post-colonial period, the UN General Assembly created the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), whose mission was essentially to provide a voice to the developing countries in the multilateral trade regime, and to provide an alternative to the Western-dominated GATT (see later). Officially, its role was to promote international trade and to help coordinate trade and

development policies. In 1964 a GATT initiative established the International Trade Centre (ITC), which provides trade and development assistance to both (large) exporters and policy makers in developing countries. Since 1968, the GATT and UNCTAD have been running it jointly.

In addition to multilateral cooperation systems, some developed countries (the US, European countries through the EEC and later on, Japan) established a generalized system of Preferences (GSP), reducing tariffs to which the 'Least Developed Countries' (LDCs) were subject. The colonial preferences as such survived the end of colonialism thanks to a series of EEC treaties (the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, the Lomé Conventions of 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 and the Cotonou Agreement of 2000) granting unilateral trade preferences to their former dependents.

The main actors

The trade regime's organizational fragmentation has been accompanied by fragmenting participation of the various trade actors in the various trade forums. The regime has experienced two evolutions throughout time, their common denominator being the breakdown of the developed countries' trade monopoly: a change in the set of nation-states shaping the regime and the addition of non-state actors at the negotiating table.

During the first years of the regime, trade took place mainly among industrialized countries and consequentially Western powers dominated the GATT. They constituted the majority among the 23 countries that participated in the GATT negotiations of 1947. During the postwar period, the US led trade negotiations, though this role gradually expanded to the Quad group (Canada, the EEC, Japan and the US). Decision making was achieved at so-called Green Room meetings, where the Quad was ubiquitous (Barton et al. 2006: 64–5, 154). However, the Uruguay Round, with no less than 123 countries participating, was marked by the emergence of the larger developing countries (Brazil, India, Mexico) as important drivers of trade liberalization, and by the formation of a complex web of coalitions that cut across the lines of economic development (Narlikar 2003). Moreover, the accession of China to the WTO in 2001 has made it a central player in world trade dynamics. Russia joined the organization in 2012. The increased participation of emerging and developing countries in the world trade regime is not limited to the WTO. Increased flows of South–South trade (between developing countries) have led some of the main actors to pursue an active leadership in other settings. For instance, Brazil (through MERCOSUR) and India have behaved assertively during bilateral and bi-regional negotiations with the EEC, and several former European colonies have successfully opposed economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EEC. Although no direct trade negotiations take place, some regional and bilateral forums, such as the G20, the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) trilateral cooperation, and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), address trade liberalization by providing developing countries with additional platforms to defend their agendas.

The second evolution with regard to actors is the expansion of agency from nation-states towards non-state actors. Nation-states remain the only actors with an international legal personality but as the trade agenda has expanded to include beyond-the-border policies such as intellectual property (Barton et al. 2006: 125–52) and the environment, they have become increasingly subject to pressure from interest groups, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Domestic interest groups such as European farmers and American steel producers have traditionally played an important role in deterring trade liberalization. This has been the case both for the multilateral setting and in a bilateral context.

For instance, one of the most contentious issues in the EEC–South Korea FTA negotiation proved to be the automobile sector, in which automotive interest groups actively lobbied. In addition, the US generalized system of preferences was stalled at the beginning of 2011 due to a local industry's pressure against Bangladeshi imports. Pressure by NGOs has also become ubiquitous at the WTO and elsewhere. During the 1990s, several NGOs denounced the WTO on the basis of environmental and labour concerns (Wilkinson 2006). This led to the opening of WTO and GATT documents to the public and the submission of letters ('*amicus curiae* briefs') by NGOs during the dispute resolution procedures (WTO 2007: 338–40). Public opinion has also been mobilized in regional settings, such as NAFTA, where protests and lobbying induced the signature of parallel agreements on labour and the environment. Sometimes coalitions of NGOs and developing countries arise. The failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998 can be attributed to joint public mobilization and developing country opposition. The Oxfam campaign against economic partnership agreements in the late 2000s was instrumental in stalling the negotiations.

Coherence across structures: the principles governing the trade regime

Even though the modern multilateral trade regime displays some formal coherence, characterized by the GATT/WTO's principles, actual adherence to those principles is far from uncontested. This section highlights each of the four principles that formally govern the trade regime as well as the exceptions that lead to fragmentation.

The most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, reciprocity and national treatment, all enshrined in the GATT, are regarded as the cornerstones of the trade regime. Most-favoured-nation treatment (GATT Article I) implies that every WTO member is to grant the same trade preferences (e.g. tariffs) to the other members as it does to its most favoured partner, regardless of the latter's membership. In other words, discrimination is prohibited among members of the regime and between regime members and external actors. The reciprocity principle (WTO 2007: 130–31), though not officially defined, essentially implies that trade liberalization should be mutual. Countries should not liberalize less (or more) than their counterparts. National treatment (GATT Article III) refers to the obligation of parties to the regime to treat imported products in the same way as domestic products in their internal markets, thus avoiding unfavourable protection of the latter. Two observations are pertinent with regard to these principles. First, they do not impose trade liberalization as much as non-discrimination in liberalization processes. Second, although two of the three principles are clearly defined in international legal texts, their practical application is often fraught with obscurity and is defined in multiple ways (WTO 2007: xxvii).

The fourth principle governing the international trade regime is dispute resolution, an alternative to immediate retaliation via trade sanctions if agreements are breached. The rationale of the principle boils down to the avoidance of the trade wars that led to widespread impoverishment during the Great Depression. It should be noted, however, that the dispute resolution procedures have changed considerably throughout the years. In the Havana Charter's dispute resolution system, states did not dispose of a veto right for those decisions adopted against their will, whereas the GATT established a non-binding procedure in which unanimity was required for the adoption of a resolution concerning a trade dispute (hence, countries had a veto right). The supranational or binding element re-emerged in the WTO, whose Dispute Settlement Body may adopt decisions against the will of particular states.

Even though the formal principles are widely acknowledged to be the cornerstone of the multilateral trade regime, several tolerated and non-tolerated violations occur. First, in a

somewhat contradictory way, preferential trade agreements are allowed under GATT Article XXIV. The consequence of this exception has been the formation of a 'spaghetti bowl' of bilateral or regional trade agreements (see earlier) that have often rendered MFN treatment irrelevant. According to the WTO, 319 such agreements were in force in January 2012. Some authors question whether this fragmentation constitutes a step towards further liberalization at the multilateral level or rather an obstacle thereto (Bhagwati 2008; Davis 2009). Second, trade restrictions have continued to exist and resurged in popularity since 2008. They include both quantitative and qualitative trade barriers. Export taxes, for example, are not regulated by the WTO and Argentina used them to ensure domestic supply and lower domestic prices during the 2008 surge in food prices. Moreover, developed countries' environmental regulations have been denounced as 'green protectionism', especially those established by the European Union (EU), and both private and public actors increasingly apply sanitary and phytosanitary standards.

The asymmetrically expanding trade agenda

The evolving structure of the trade regime is closely intertwined with the regime's expanding thematic borders, which have evolved from trade barriers to a number of other domains such as intellectual property rights and the environment. However, that expansion does not happen uniformly across forums: several topics have been integrated in different forums with varying degrees of success.

The ITO encompassed a large number of subjects besides the narrow field of the reduction of trade barriers, such as liberalization of investment, abolition of restrictive business practices, commodity agreements and labour standards. Conversely, the GATT negotiations that started in 1949 narrowed down the scope of the regime to the liberalization of trade in goods, with agricultural goods and textiles excluded from the outset. That exchange of concessions took place according to a bilateral, product-by-product negotiation technique, which prevailed during the first rounds of negotiations but changed gradually as tariff liberalization progressed. The Kennedy Round of 1964 formed an important inflexion point of the trade agenda when the bilateral negotiation approach was replaced by a 'linear tariff reduction' approach: an average tariff reduction to be spread across all goods. The round also aimed at streamlining anti-dumping measures, the tolerated trade restrictions adopted by a country in response to the export of a product by another country at less than its market price. However, the introduction of other topics such as agriculture remained a stumbling block.

The Tokyo Round of 1973 opened the scope of the trade agenda further in the direction of non-tariff barriers. In addition to a new tariff agreement, several 'codes', to which members subscribed voluntarily, were negotiated outside the GATT. Those codes referred to subsidies and countervailing measures (prohibited subsidies for industrial goods and commodities and allowed actions for retaliation), technical barriers to trade (protectionist standards disguised as technical requirements for products, such as packaging), import licensing procedures (simplification of licences to import a product), government procurement (liberalization of purchases by governments), customs valuation (methods to define the value on which to apply tariffs) and anti-dumping. In addition, agreements were concluded on the liberalization of bovine meat, dairy and civil aircraft trade.

Soon it became clear that the 'codes' approach was leading to a fragmentation of the system. Each of the codes mentioned its own consultation and dispute resolution procedure and not a single developing country had entered any of them. Hence, the following (Uruguay) Round became a major attempt to overhaul the trade system towards convergence. The topics

listed by the negotiation mandate (the Uruguay Ministerial Declaration of 1986) were tariffs and non-tariff barriers, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, review of GATT articles, safeguards, expansion of the agreements concluded during the Tokyo Round, subsidies and countervailing measures, dispute settlement, intellectual property rights and the liberalization of investment (Croome 1999: 347–9). During the course of the negotiations, the liberalization of trade in services was added. A difference with previous liberalization rounds was the introduction of the 'single undertaking' as a negotiation technique. Negotiations were conceived of as a single package to be adopted in principle by all the states, rather than the *à la carte* set of agreements of the Tokyo Round.

Until the Uruguay Round, agriculture and textiles had remained largely outside the GATT. On the one hand, agriculture remained a stumbling block due to the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, which was built on the principle of 'community preference' for domestic agricultural products. This principle undergirded the heavy subsidization of the EEC's agricultural and farming sector, as well as the prohibitive tariffs enforced on other goods. Moreover, some agricultural commodities such as cocoa and coffee were the subjects of international commodity agreements negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD, which aimed at improving the developing countries' terms of trade by establishing minimum and maximum prices in the international market. On the other hand, textiles were subjected to a set of treaties outside the GATT, in which textile-exporting nations committed 'voluntarily' to limit their exports to other nations. This mechanism, dubbed 'voluntary export restraints', was first introduced by the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles of 1962, which was followed by the Multi-Fiber Arrangement of 1974, which extended the voluntary export restraints to more textile and apparel products. The Long-term Arrangement was legitimized by the GATT system during the Kennedy Round.

The Uruguay Round's final outcome in 1995 went well beyond its original mandate, with the WTO encompassing a large number of treaties on trade in goods: a revamped version of the GATT itself and agreements on agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, anti-dumping, customs valuation, pre-shipment inspection, rules of origin, import licensing, subsidies and countervailing measures and safeguards. A schedule for the phasing out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement was set, which was intended to complete textile liberalization by 2005. However, when China had prepared itself well for the new situation without quotas, its shipping of large quantities of textile products to the US and Europe in 2005 caused another period with further quotas and another delay in the agreed liberalization. Two other frameworks were adopted in 1995: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which set the stage for future liberalization. In addition, several declarations on different topics such as the environment, least-developed countries, financial services and the movement of natural persons (related to services liberalization) were adopted (Croome 1999).

Paradoxically, the creation of the new WTO was accompanied by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements, which contributed to expand the trade agenda both in developed and developing countries. NAFTA bridged the developing–developed dimension and incorporated investments, labour and the environment into the liberalization of trade in goods. MERCOSUR was a larger, EU-style attempt at regional integration, which involved political dialogue and cooperation on social matters such as social security, migration and industrial relations. The MERCOSUR structure incorporated a Consultative Social and Economic Forum composed of different civil society actors such as workers, employers,

NGOs and environmental organizations. Within the Forum, the gender aspects of MERCOSUR have been discussed.

Three main developments characterized the evolution of the international trade agenda during the post-Uruguay Round period. First, the unfinished work of the Uruguay Round itself set the path for further liberalization in the form of a 'built-in agenda' composed of the implementation of compromises and the further liberalization of textiles and agriculture. Second, the developed countries, especially the EU, attempted to introduce a new agenda going beyond the Uruguay agreements to expand liberalization in the fields of competition, investment, government procurement and trade facilitation, known as the 'Singapore issues' (after the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996). Third, the trade regime became visible to public opinion for the first time since its inception, since the Uruguay Round's comprehensive agenda collided with other regimes at the international and the domestic level, and generated public pressure for the further inclusion of other topics, the most visible of which were labour and the environment. The idea emerged that the liberalization of trade in goods and services would lead, or had led, to a 'race to the bottom', in which countries competitively lowered their labour and environmental standards in order to lower costs and remain competitive (Wilkinson 2006). The three issues created a divide between the developed and the developing WTO member-states that would hamper consensus on trade negotiations during the second half of the 1990s. The developed countries pushed for a new trade agenda, and among them some (the US and Scandinavian countries) took over the public's concern with the environment and labour, while the larger developing countries (Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa) stuck to the 'built-in' agenda, a development discourse and accusations of protectionism (González Garibay 2011).

The confrontation started during the preparations for the WTO's first Ministerial Conference, the highest decision-making body, which took place in Singapore in 1996. The Conference banned the discussion on labour standards from the organization. However, the US persisted in advocating it, and the confrontation reached a climax at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference, where the politically contentious climate was worsened by street protests by NGOs and trade unions, organizational chaos and major disagreements between the US and the EEC on agriculture, as well as the failure of the developed countries to launch the Multilateral Agreement on Investments in the midst of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as an alternative to the WTO. The agreement was regarded by the developing countries and northern NGOs as an imposition, and triggered clamorous NGO protests. The fallout enhanced the fragmented nature of the trade arena: some of the Singapore topics, as well as labour and the environment, were pursued at the bilateral level (for instance the US–Chile agreement), where the developing countries could offer less resistance.

In November 2001 a new multilateral trade agenda emerged after intense negotiations. This Doha Development Agenda attempted to reach a balance between the concerns of developed and developing countries. It refined the existing agenda for some topics such as agriculture (export subsidies, market access and domestic support), services liberalization, elimination of tariffs for non-agricultural products, regional integration and trade-related intellectual property rights, but also continued to discuss the Singapore issues and trade and the environment. In addition, it tackled specific problems of the developing countries such as technical cooperation, aid to Least Developed Countries, technology transfer and the special and differential treatment of developing countries. The single major breakthrough in this round has been the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health of 2001, which relaxes the intellectual property requirements for the trade in medicines between developing

countries. However, the round's overall progress has been slow and fraught with problems. Agriculture remains one of the main stumbling blocks. The Cancún Ministerial Conference of 2004 failed to reach an agreement on the subject and a possible deal was broken in the summer of 2008 due to disagreement on agricultural safeguards between the EEC, India and the US, and on cotton between the US and the West African countries. Moreover, the Singapore issues have remained a matter of contention. All of them, with the exception of trade facilitation, were dropped from the trade agenda in 2004.

The Doha impasse continues. In 2008 negotiations between the WTO members came close to reaching a deal, but disagreement between the US on the one hand and the EEC and India on the other hand with regard to agricultural products brought the negotiations to a halt. With the liberalization impetus slowed down by the economic crisis that began in 2008, the main stumbling blocks include agriculture – where the EEC's and US's widespread subsidization remains a thorn in the eye of agriculture-exporting countries such as Brazil; services, in which the free movement of natural persons (related to migration policies) has confronted developed and developing countries; and non-agricultural market access.

The WTO's immobility does not mean that the trade regime as a whole has remained static. On the contrary, it has enhanced the path towards organizational and thematic fragmentation. An increasing number of preferential trade agreements has incorporated the Doha topics into their provisions, such as intellectual property, labour and the environment, and a new generation of agreements dealing with investment is being negotiated in the early 2010s. However, not all agreements incorporate the same topics under the same form, nor do their negotiations follow the same paths. For instance, the EEC agreement with South Africa signed in 1999 included investment only as a matter of economic cooperation, whereas the EEC–South Korea agreement, in force since 2011, tackles the liberalization of investment. Likewise, the development dimension is more present in some agreements than in others. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was re-launched in November 2011 and which aims at trade liberalization in the Pacific Rim within the APEC platform, would join 13 members that together make up 40 per cent of the world's gross domestic product (more than the EU) (*The Economist* 2011). Even though several of those members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam) are developing countries, development is not prominent on its agenda. Conversely, development is an important pillar of the economic partnership agreements, which should replace the system of historic preferences with a reciprocity-based set of treaties and promote regional integration among developing countries. It should be noted, however, that the EPAs' success has been limited, as their negotiations (2002–9) stalled due to protests. This makes another point clear: the negotiation processes and the participation of non-state actors such as businesses or NGOs may strongly differ from one agreement to another. Non-governmental organizations have been active in the case of both the EPAs and the EEC–India negotiations, and less so for the EEC–South Korea agreement.

The expansion of the trade agenda has also taken place outside both multilateral and regional cooperation settings, as several OECD and EEC countries concluded an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in January 2012, prompting some analysts (Davis 2009) to launch the question of whether the trade regime is experiencing forum shopping, a practice in which states may (opportunistically) select among overlapping institutions when launching a new regulatory initiative (Gehring and Oberthür 2009: 141). ACTA has proven to be extremely controversial. In July 2012 the European Parliament rejected it on the grounds that it might lead to censorship and the seizure of generic drugs produced in developing countries.

The developments discussed here show that the fragmented organizational setting in which the global trade agenda has taken place since the 1990s is intrinsically connected to a

growing thematic fragmentation that displays two main features. First, different topics are addressed in different forums. Second, the way in which topics are approached differs largely across those forums. For instance, regulations regarding labour and the environment are stricter in the preferential trade agreements negotiated by the US than in those by the EU. The differences are the manifestation of each forum's own negotiation and power logics. Trade actors' preferences come more to the foreground in a bilateral or regional setting than in a multilateral setting, where the exercise of power is tempered by the large number of negotiating actors and the possibility to form alliances. Moreover, the participation of non-state actors and the politicization of issues may differ across forums.

Conclusion

The global trade regime swings between a world of coherence under the guidance of the WTO and one of fragmentation in which a variety of preferential trade agreements encompasses an ever-growing list of trade-related topics. The struggle with fragmentation takes place on three fronts: the negotiation structures, the issues, and the relationship between multilateral and preferential trade liberalization.

The integration of new actors into the trade regime means an increased pressure on existing negotiation structures. On the one hand, the increased activism and assertiveness of emerging markets, especially Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC, and with South Africa BRICS), as well as the general economic decline of the Western countries since the financial and economic recession that began in 2008, raise the question of whether a structure whose basis was laid in 1947, when colonialism was still present, is capable of supporting a new economic order. This question is even more important when taking into account the active role that non-state actors have adopted in the trade discussion. This is made clear by the stalled economic partnership agreements negotiations in the EEC and the delay of the generalized system of preferences' renewal in the US. On the other hand, the difficulties with which trade negotiations have proceeded are related to the higher number of parties and issues at play, and may thus point at the limits of the most-favoured-nation principle. The fact that trade preferences need to be extended to an ever-growing number of countries may make sustained liberalization impossible.

Second, pressure is added further by the emergence of myriad new issues related to trade: the economic crisis and the related surge of protectionism, the environmental challenges (green taxes, relationship with the environmental regime), soaring unemployment related to restructuring, food security and the Chinese Yuan's artificially high value. Whereas the original trade regime was specifically designed to deal only with trade liberalization, questions emerge as to whether the trade agenda can be borne by the regime and whether the WTO actually has both the legitimacy and the organizational resources to act as the forerunner of that agenda. The Doha Round's arduous progress, or rather lack thereof, suggests several inadequacies in the system.

A third source of pressure on the present trade regime relates to the relationship between multilateral and preferential trade liberalization. Whereas the WTO has tried to internalize it through GATT Article XXIV and to regard it as a component, or an exemption, of the multilateral order, it can be questioned in the context of the rising number of preferential trade agreements (more than 250 in 2010 according to the WTO) as to whether the pattern is not being inverted. PTAs seem to be able to integrate both new actors and new topics. It is less clear, however, what the WTO's role would be in a PTA-dominated world. The relatively smooth functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body suggests that the

WTO, rather than a forum for liberalization, might become a 'trade court' with global authority.

These challenges boil down to various questions. Should countries and non-state actors create alternative forms of decision making? Is full trade liberalization as the cornerstone of the trade regime a realistic and, above all, desirable goal? Is coherence to be reached by means of a WTO-centred structure? From the regime perspective, these questions can be summarized in one: is the trade regime still a regime? It is unclear, in this setting, whether actors' expectations still converge towards the same basic principle of multilateral trade liberalization, which is based on classic, Western, by now centuries-old theories of growth and welfare.

Recommended for further reading

Croome (1999), Barton et al. (2006), Bhagwati (2008), Davis (2009) and Cottier and Elsig (2011).

Notes

1   I refer to European Economic Community as opposed to European Union in order to preserve coherence throughout the text.
2   The US has signed PTAs with Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru and Singapore. The EEC concluded agreements with Chile, South Korea, Mexico and South Africa.

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Multilateralism under transformation

International organizations and 'clubs'

Mélanie Albaret

Since the end of the nineteenth century, international organizations (IOs), whether world-wide, competence-based or regional, have represented the framework for a majority of multi-lateral practices (Reinalda 2009). Therefore, until recently, most analyses dealing with multilateralism were almost exclusively focused on IOs (e.g. Claude 1971; Archer 2001; Karns and Mingst 2004; Rittberger and Zangl 2006). However, in the past few decades, multilateral practices known as 'club practices' have also been developing. From the G20 summits[1] to the BRICS meetings of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa,[2] right through to the P5+1 group[3] or the Contact Group on Mali (made up of Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria and Togo), the news provides many examples of these less institution-alized forms of multilateralism. These examples show that research on multilateralism, which has not been the focus of much literature as such (Ruggie 1993 was a pioneer), cannot be reduced to an analysis of IOs.

The study of clubs and of their interactions with IOs provides motivation for reflection on the evolution of multilateralism. How can the roles and effects of these new practices on multilateral configuration be interpreted? The analysis presented in this chapter will be threefold. The first two sections analyse the meaning of 'multilateral club practices'. Having reached a definition, the next two sections consider the evolution of these practices and the evolution of their influence on IOs. Finally, the last two sections investigate the ambivalent dynamics which result from the interactions between these different forms of multilateralism and their effects on multilateral configurations.

Characteristics of multilateral club practices

The international scene is filled with a multitude of groups of states:

1 *Groups of world powers* such as the G8,[4] G20, P5, and the Quad: Canada, the European Commission, Japan and the US together form the Quad, which operates within the World Trade Organization (WTO)
2 *Groups of friends* such as the Group of Friends of Haiti and the United Nations Secretary-General Group of Friends of Myanmar

3   *Contact groups* such as the Quartet on the Middle East[5] and the International Contact Group on Somalia[6] and

4   *Negotiation groups* such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS),[7] the Cairns Group of 19 developed and developing agricultural exporting countries[8] and the Cotton-Four (also C4): the four West African cotton-exporting countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali.

States are the main drivers of those clubs, but are not the exclusive members: non-state actors are sometimes also associated with them. For example, the representative of the UN secretary-general in Burundi, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, tried to develop the system of the group of friends with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), hence creating the NGO Group of Friends in 1994–5 (Whitfield 2007: 46).

Despite the apparent diversity of these examples, all represent multilateral club practices that share three characteristics. First of all, participation in these circles is voluntary, and membership results from a deliberate choice and/or co-option, but there is no election process open to all states. Therefore, the UN Security Council with its ten non-permanent members representing all the regions of the world and elected for two years is not a club.

Second, clubs represent 'multilateralism with small numbers' (Khaler 1993). Membership of clubs is restricted, insofar as there is a selection of members. To that effect, all clubs are exclusive, even though some are more select than others (e.g. the P5). The phrases 'exclusive clubs' or 'inclusive clubs', used by Hampson and Heinbecker (2011), are therefore confusing: the former is a redundancy, the latter an oxymoron. Because clubs are a selective form of multilateralism, they therefore clearly differ from all other IOs that have either a worldwide span (the UN), or a more specialized one, but that are open to all states; e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The third common characteristic is that of flexibility, due to the more or less informal nature of these groups of states. This needs to be qualified, however, as it cannot be extended to all clubs. Some are clearly institutionalized, such as the P5 which is made up of the countries that hold a veto at the UN Security Council. However, unlike an international organization which is 'a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members, whether governmental representatives or not, from at least two sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership' (Archer 2001: 33), the P5, just like other clubs, has no material basis or identity separate from its members.[9] Clubs do not have 'founding treaties, a permanent address, a regular budget, [and] staff independent from the states', which are the 'constituent properties' of IOs (Devin and Smouts 2011: 5, my translation). Therefore, there would be no easy answer to the famous question asked by Henry Kissinger about Europe in 1973 if one were to ask it about a club: 'Who do I call if I want to call the Gx?'. Getting in touch with one of the members of the select circle would certainly be the preferred option, but this would be ambiguous. Because the number of members in many clubs fluctuates, it is not always easy to know who is in it, and who is out. Furthermore, addressing one member as if it represents a whole group would accentuate dilemmas linked to the interlocutor's identity: are they a representative of their government or of the group?

In order to try and complete the definition of this selective and rather informal practice, then, it is necessary to differentiate the club from other terms that are often associated with it. Even though 'minilateralism' is a club practice, the two words are not synonymous. Minilateralism is similar in some ways to multilateralism. The latter does not just happen when three or more states decide to coordinate their national policies through *ad hoc* deals, or via institutions (Keohane 1990: 731), but is a form of international action which implies

qualitative and normative dimensions (Ruggie 1993). Following the same logic, minilateralism does not only designate the involvement of a small number of actors, because it is linked to the notion of hierarchy and elitism. Therefore, only clubs of world powers can be considered to be minilateral.

The 'concert' is also closely associated with the idea of a circle of world powers. However, the term concert refers to the notion of an international system, whereas a club is a type of multilateralism. Thus, even though the logic of concert implies a club of great powers, the existence of clubs does not mean that the international system works according to the dynamics of concerts.

A wide range of club practices

Despite the common characteristics mentioned here, and as suggested in the non-exhaustive list of examples, club multilateralism can take many different shapes. Studies that look only at one particular type of club, such as groups of friends, often emphasize the variety of practices hidden behind this unifying designation (Whitfield 2007: 9–11). Even without getting into the various uses of this form of multilateralism by the member-states, clubs differ in their size, their selection criteria, their objectives and their longevity.

To say that the circle is selective does not give any indication as to the actual size of the group. Clubs can be composed of three members such as the IBSA, the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum, or regroup most countries worldwide such as the G77, which was founded in the mid-1960s following the creation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It is a loose coalition of developing states at the UN that had expanded to 132 member-states by 2012. Furthermore, because of the lack of formality of clubs, their size fluctuates. Even though it is usually possible to identify a few leading states, the margins of the groups are often vague. The case of another G20, founded during the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancún, Mexico, in 2003, is a perfect example. The name G20 refers to the 20 states[10] that signed an alternative proposition to that of the US and the EU on 2 September 2003 (Narlikar and Tussie 2004). They were then joined by Egypt and Kenya, hence the name G22 that is often used (also to avoid confusion with regard to the G20 mentioned in footnote 1). However, some of the founding countries have gone (Colombia, Costa Rica and El Salvador), others have joined (Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uruguay) and others are coming and going. Currently there are 23 countries in this group.[11]

Criteria that define the inclusion or exclusion of states in a group may vary. It can be a historical criterion (states that were considered victorious at the end of the Second World War are members of the P5), status in the international hierarchy (groups of emerging powers such as the IBSA and the BRICS), level of development (the G77 and the Least Developed Countries),[12] a common characteristic (such as AOSIS), a regional or quasi–regional criterion (ASEAN+3)[13] or a utilitarian criterion, such as defending an interest or solving a crisis or conflict. It would be impossible to draw up a complete list of criteria as, most of the time, a group would use not just one criterion but would be defined by a combination of variables that cannot be reduced to a list of criteria, as demonstrated by the diversity of groups of emerging powers, such as the IBSA, the BRICS and the BASIC Forum (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). The BASIC forum was founded in 2009, ahead of the Copenhagen climate summit, in order to maximize negotiation coordination. Furthermore, this inclusion/ exclusion question is also related to the identity of the group. By definition, the identity is always moving, contested and subject to various demands and constant adjustments. Reaching

agreement within the group is a challenge. Continually renewed by practices and speeches, this play on identity helps to, at least partially, explain the changing nature of the groups referred to earlier.

Not all clubs share the same objective. It can vary from managing a particular crisis or conflict, such as the Quartet on the Middle East, the groups of friends of a country, contact groups such as the Western Contact Group on e.g. Namibia (Karns 1987), to defending a common interest (the Cotton-Four), to maintaining peace and international security (the P5) or to piloting global governance processes (the G8 and G20). The aim can be modest or much wider ranging. Because of this, the clubs' lifespan can vary a lot. Groups of friends do not tend to become permanent. The first group of friends of the UN secretary-general, on the conflict in Salvador, met between 1990 and 1997. However, because of their duties, the G8 and the G20 are long-lasting groups. For instance, the G20 is the 'premier forum for international cooperation' as announced by the leaders of the G20 in §19 of their statement at the Pittsburgh Summit of September 2009.

The phrase 'multilateral club practices' therefore covers a wide range of practices, which are approached in a fragmented way in academic research. Indeed, research often focuses on historical analyses – for example on the Concert of Europe (Elrod 1976; Schroeder 1994) – or studies specific cases or clubs. Among those, the circles of world powers such as the G8 (Dobson 2007; Hajnal 2007) and clubs linked to the phenomenon of emerging powers (Cooper 2010; Postel-Vinay 2011; Cooper and Thakur 2012) are the main subjects for studies. There are significantly fewer analyses focusing on groups of friends or contact groups (Prantl 2006; Whitfield 2007). Other studies focus on the theme of clubs in order to raise more general questions on the international system (Badie 2011), the new world order (Slaughter 2004) or multilateral negotiations (Weiss 1986; Hampson and Hart 1995; Leigh-Phippard 1999). Even though all those studies are pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, it appears that the existing literature fails to reflect on multilateral club practices as a whole. However, only a general view of those apparently scattered practices, which in reality share the three characteristics of selectivity, voluntary participation and non-formality, allows us to grasp a series of evolutions which are significant for understanding the transformations of multilateralism. The study of those evolutions which 'undoubtedly express a new situation' (Devin and Smouts 2011: 157, my translation) will be dealt with in the next section.

Quantitative and qualitative evolutions

Club practices are not new. The Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century introduced a club of world powers, with Austria, Prussia, Russia, the UK and then France getting together to 'maintain peaceful relations between sovereign states' (Elrod 1976: 160). Those practices would be similar to those of the P5 or the G8 (Kirton 1989). In a comparable way, the invention of groups of friends or contact groups did not appear at the end of the Cold War. Such practices first appeared when *ad hoc* groups were created to counsel the UN secretary-general during Dag Hammarskjöld's mandate. Examples are the Advisory Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on Lebanon and the Congo Advisory Committee (Prantl and Krasno 2002).

The novelty of the current situation comes from the combination of a set of quantitative and qualitative trends. Even though club practices first appeared before the 1990s, they have undergone an exponential growth since then, and have also spread to all aspects of the

international agenda. For example, Whitfield (2007: 43, also 3–4), in her study on informal groups that take part in conflict resolution or management (groups of friends, contact groups), notes that such clubs have been proliferating: their number was four in 1990 and reached over 30 in 2006. This phenomenon is occurring in different areas such as trade, peace and international security. From the 1980s and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), coalitions have been multiplying within the GATT, which used to be a 'rich men's club'. If the Cairns Group is one of the better-known groups (Higgott and Cooper 1990), it is not by any means an isolated case. This trend has developed, so much so that each theme of the international negotiations in the WTO – such as agriculture, non-agricultural market access, rules and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – sees associated, but not overlapping coalitions being formed.[14] Financial regulation is also leading to a 'multiplication of the Gs', which is to say 'those *ad hoc* groups that bring together a restricted number of states, central banks, independent regulation agencies, professional associations or banking firms' (Graz 2008: 56, my translation). The development of many 'platforms for international financial regulation' (for an inventory, see Graz 2008: 58–9), among which are clubs such as the G8, the G10, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Paris Club, the London Club[15] and some IOs (such as the IMF), suggests, for some leaders, a 'balkanization of regulation' (quoted by Graz 2008: 61).

The exponential growth of club practices is further amplified by the variable geometry of some of those circles. Already in the 1970s, the G77 had several sub-groups: the G31[16] which was to be the 'official coordinating body for G77 activities' (Williams 1991: 83), the G24 whose role was to represent the G77 at the IMF, the G19 which operated at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris (1975–7), or the G27 (Sauvant 1981b).[17] Using the same formula as the Library Group in which the economy and finance ministers from France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US met informally in Washington DC since 1973, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing called the first G6 in 1975. It was made up of the heads of state and government from the Library Group, plus Italy. The following year, it became the G7, when Canada joined, then the G8 with the addition of Russia in 1997. In the 1990s, the G8 convened the G22, then the G33 before setting up the G20, which however did not replace the G8.

For the past few decades, more and more clubs have been formed on increasingly varied bases (for an overview, see Reinalda 2009: 765–7), and states are now routinely members of several groups. Alongside these quantitative changes, three main *qualitative* developments can also be seen. First of all, until recently, multilateral club practices were usually part of IOs and their policies, even if their procedures differed. Thus, the concept of the club lies within the framework of the League of Nations, then later of the UN, with the creation of a category of permanent members of the League of Nations' Council and of the UN's Security Council. Furthermore, the rule of the geographic distribution of seats in the different UN organs such as the elected members of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Human Rights Commission/Council, encourages the states to constitute informal consultation groups, such as the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries in the UN (GRULAC), to coordinate their votes. The UNCTAD constitutes another example of the development of clubs within an IO, because it was the first to institutionalize group diplomacy in the UN in 1964. Even though it is possible to find examples of clubs being founded outside of an IO framework before the third quarter of the twentieth century (e.g. the Paris Club founded in 1956), they are the exception rather than the rule.

However, since the 1990s the trend has changed with more and more clubs being formed outside of IOs. The G8, the G20, the BRICS and even the IBSA are among the best known

examples. But this existence, independent from IOs, is not exclusive to clubs of world powers, as can be seen with the Global Governance Group (3G). This group, founded on Singapore's initiative as a reaction to the G20, which was deemed to be lacking inclusiveness and legitimacy, is made up of about 30 countries as of July 2012.[18] This process of evolution, even emancipation, away from IOs is sometimes coupled with a reversal of the situation, with IOs now being members of some clubs. The EU is a member of the G20 and the Quad, and together with the UN, of the Quartet. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) both belong to the international Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau. And two regional bodies, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council, are part of the Financial Action Task Force. The autonomous development of those clubs does not mean that IOs are obsolete, but it underlines that they no longer represent the main framework for multilateral practices.

The second qualitative change reinforces this point. Even though it only affects a restricted number of circles, it is significant nonetheless. Some of those clubs are interested in world affairs as such and in global governance processes. Changes in the G8 agenda are significant in that regard. Although it was first founded to coordinate macro-economic policies between its members, this club progressively widened its interests until it eventually took in all the main themes of the international agenda.

A final change has to do with the identity of the members of a club. Until the 1980s, most circles assembled actors from the South such as the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), or from the North such as the G8 and the Paris Club. More and more clubs are now crosscutting and gather countries from both the South and the North, such as the Group of Cairns, one of the first ones to integrate such diversity.

Evolutions of clubs result from demands for multilateralism

Changes in multilateral club practices are the results of two processes that have developed on two different timelines. The first one goes back to the processes of globalization. Because of these processes, actors across the world are increasingly conscious that they live on the same planet. In these conditions, bilateral and unilateral policies seem inadequate to deal with collective problems, whereas multilateralism seems a more promising option. The multilateral project is becoming more relevant and at the same time is being subjected to required reforms and adjustments so that non-state actors can be integrated into multilateral decision-making processes and practices (Cox 1997).

On the other hand, the end of bipolarity has reinforced this demand for multilateralism generated by the processes of globalization in the international system. The hope that IOs would at last be able to play the role they were created for generated aspirations and demands from a variety of actors worldwide.

This demand for multilateralism comes from both states and societies, as can be seen from the increasing number of states that are members of IOs,[19] the boom in the number of NGOs that have consultative status with ECOSOC,[20] demands for involvement from a wide variety of non-state actors and the widening of themes on international agendas. At the end of the twentieth century, multilateralism is more and more characterized by 'multi-parties, multi-issues, multi-roles and multi-values' (Fagot Aviel 2005: 19).

In this context, club practices are considered as responses to these demands for multilateralism, but they generate different interpretations. Clubs can represent a direct response to demands for multilateralism. They are integrated in the process of developing a new multilateral configuration capable of dealing with global or regional challenges. They participate

in a kind of global or regional division of labour concerning regulation tasks and do not necessarily compete with IOs, or with 'inclusive' multilateralism.

According to another interpretation, however, club practices are regarded not as a direct response to demands for multilateralism, but rather as a makeshift solution to cope with the crisis facing IOs, which are incapable of dealing with the new international context. From that perspective, clubs are palliatives for IOs. As a consequence, they are not so much complementary to IOs as explained in the first interpretation, but rather in direct competition with them. The term competition is also often used to describe the relationship between IOs and a particular type of club, namely great power clubs. In a divergent analysis from that offered here, these 'minilateral' circles are considered as a means by the most powerful countries to regain some control in the multilateral game, as control was threatened by the introduction of a large number of actors in IOs.

When opposed in this way, these interpretations of club practices suggest the following question, which is raised in many analyses (such as Prantl 2006 or Geslin 2011): do clubs work *with* IOs, or *against* them? Such a question seems irrelevant when one looks more closely at interactions between those two forms of multilateralism. The analysis of these relations underlines the differentiated practices of the various actors, and moves the problematic towards the transformations of multilateralism and more generally of international cooperation.

Ambivalent dynamics between clubs and international organizations

Several actors and authors wish to observe functional interactions at play between clubs and IOs. According to them, clubs would bring greater efficiency to this cooperation, while the IOs would give greater legitimacy to the clubs. For example, Kupchan and Kupchan (1991: 144) propose the creation of a 'concert-based collective security organization' which 'combines the breadth of ideal collective security with the effectiveness and practicality of a Concert'. As interesting as this idea sounds, it simplifies the challenges posed by the establishment of functional interactions. It overestimates the efficiency of clubs. Without implying that cooperation between more than 190 countries is necessarily inefficient, working with small numbers seems like a pertinent strategy to overcome the dilemmas of collective action (e.g. Oye 1985; Snidal 1985). However, empirical studies show that in reality, practices are much more ambivalent. The forming of smaller groups in multilateral negotiations is not necessarily synonymous with greater efficiency. In their research on subjects as varied as development, arms control, trade or the environment, academics have come to underline the ambivalence of group diplomacy (Weiss 1986: 6; Hampson and Hart 1995: 5, 352–3). If the reduction of the number of players makes the decision-making process easier in principle, in real life other factors – such as cohesion within the club, the negotiation process within the group and between groups, and the presence of leaders – play their roles as well. Similar arguments are found in the study of contact groups or groups of friends (Leigh-Phippard 1999).

More generally, the idea that clubs are more efficient than IOs with large numbers is arguable when one takes into account the multilateral context. It is often emphasized that multilateralism in general and IOs in particular are not very efficient because of the number of programmes, offices, agencies and other associated bodies, and also because of the lack of coordination between them. The creation of clubs can be part of this counter-productive logic of proliferation if it does not entail coordination with other actors and if it enters into competition with them.

The question of functional interactions between clubs and IOs cannot be reduced to that of efficiency. The challenge is to find a continually renewed balance between the three aspects of functionality, since efficiency is interdependent with legitimacy and representation (Devin and Smouts 2011). Interactions between clubs and IOs show that this equilibrium reflects more than just a trade-off (efficiency versus legitimacy), as illustrated by the reform of the IMF in 2010. It happened under the impulse of a club, the G20, which proposed to modify quotas and the composition of the IMF Executive Board in favour of the developing countries, and in particular, emerging powers. It was 'an important step toward a more legitimate, credible and effective IMF' (Final communiqué of the G20 Seoul Summit, 2010, §16). In doing so, the G20 did not simply contribute to improving the functioning of an IO; it also reinforced its own legitimacy by showing concern for questions of fair representation, and its efficiency by impelling a reform that had been impossible until then.

This quest for a balance is all the more complex since the game takes place on different levels. In the case of a group of friends, it concerns just as much the peace process as the club itself, the UN, which is already a multi-level game by itself. Thus, groups of friends that can be considered 'working'

> have increased the legitimacy of peace processes, enhanced the leverage of the UN Secretary-General with the parties, harnessed the competing interests of would-be rival negotiators and acted as a buffer against others, aided coordination among members of the international community both prior to and following the signing of a peace agreement, and facilitated the work of the Security Council.
>
> *(Whitfield 2004: 311)*

Functional interactions between clubs and IOs that balance efficiency, legitimacy and representation are possible, but very demanding. There is no pre-defined formula, because of the actors' differentiated uses of multilateral practices and the highly probable introduction of strategies which disturb the functionality triangle. Even if strategies that rule over the creation of clubs of world powers do not rule out the opportunity to find this balance, as shown by the example of the reform of the IMF, they do make it a lot more complex.

Oligarchic reactions

Some multilateral club practices can be seen as oligarchic reactions on behalf of the major world powers. They sometimes demonstrate a desire to show some control of the game in order to perpetuate a status quo that is in their favour and to keep the game to themselves. The creation of the contemporary club of great powers, the G8, can therefore be interpreted as a search for minilateral spaces for duplicating their oligarchy, as a reactive strategy to the conversion to multilateralism of a large number of actors. The G8 was founded in the second half of the 1970s, when the IOs were undergoing transformation because countries from the South were joining, which meant that Western countries did not feel that they were controlling the game anymore. In the same way, the Quad asserted itself during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT (resulting in the WTO), which saw the arrival and affirmation of developing countries. This coalition is conceived as a means of keeping control over trade negotiations in what was becoming a less and less transparent game. The formation of these groups where countries can meet among themselves (Petiteville 2011), and where conniving diplomacy is perpetuated (Badie 2011), represents an oligarchic and elitist reaction. From this point of view, clubs of world powers do not so

much indicate a crisis of the IOs, but rather refer to their good functioning, which hinders power politics.

Such aspirations, which control (without preventing) the formation of such clubs, limit the opportunities for lasting functional interactions with inclusive forms of multilateralism. Indeed, such practices generate strong protests from other actors on the world scene, be they states, non-state actors or IOs. Their lack of legitimacy and representation (Keohane and Nye 2002) gives rise to frustration, distrust and suspicion, which are all less than conducive to establishing cooperation.

Paradoxically, protest against clubs of world powers results in the creation of other circles. As mentioned, the founding of the G20 in the context of the WTO negotiations in Cancún in 2003 stemmed from a refusal to ratify an agreement between the US and the EU. In the same way, it is a club, the Global Governance Group (3G), which endeavours to reintroduce the UN, 'the only global body with universal participation and unquestioned legitimacy', to the other G20 (the G8 plus 12) which 'should complement and strengthen the United Nations system'.[21]

The partial and controlled opening of those clubs of great powers constitutes only a superficial response to those protests (Payne 2010). The founding of the G20, which associates emerging powers with the G8, the enlargement of the Quad at the WTO, or even the agreement in principle of an increase in the number of permanent members in the UN Security Council do not announce the end of reactive strategies and oligarchic trends. On the contrary, they underline the attempt at making them more acceptable, by trying to get a better representation and a greater legitimacy from co-option and from a regular invitation to the UN. However, this does not seem sufficient to reach a new balance in the triangle of functionality, or to transform distrust into the benevolence necessary to any cooperation (Axelrod 1984).

Conclusion

This chapter showed that the complex and non-linear interactions between clubs, stemming from a wide range of practices, and IOs, indicate both a search for new forms of governance (the invention of functional forms of multilateralism) and the will to perpetuate a status quo. Despite and for all their ambivalence, it is argued that these relations all contribute to the transformation of multilateralism. As shown by the changes in club practices and the changes in their relations with IOs, this form of international collective action is always at work and constantly renewed by the play of actors. Such an analysis moderates discourses that criticize, often simply from the perspective of institutional reform of the IOs, the anachronism of the present multilateral configuration, supposedly firmly rooted in the realities of 1945. By showing how insufficient the study of IOs is to understanding international cooperation, the analysis of club practices and of club interactions with IOs raises the broader question of the socio-historical changes at play in multilateralism.

Recommended for further reading

Hajnal (2007), Keohane and Nye (2002) and Prantl (2006).

Notes

1   The G20 is a forum made up of developed and emerging countries that discuss international financial and economic cooperation. The member states are the G8 countries: Canada, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), as well as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the European Union (EU).

2 The BRIC countries (without South Africa) first met in 2008. South Africa joined them in 2010.

3 The P5+1, which negotiates with Iran on the nuclear issue, is made up of the P5, i.e. the five perma-nent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US, plus Germany.

4 The G8 is an informal group of countries with developed economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US.

5 The Quartet, established in 2002, is made up of the EU, Russia, the UN and the US. It plays an active role in the peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

6 The International Contact Group on Somalia first met in June 2006, at the initiative of the US. The original members of the group were the EU, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the UK and the US.

7 AOSIS is a coalition of 42 states and observers. They all 'share similar challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change'; see http://aosis.org/about-aosis/

8 The Cairns Group, created in 1986, is made up of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay.

9 This does not apply when there is the same membership in a club and an IO. For example, the EU can be considered as a club of European countries. With regard to the topic of this chapter, i.e. interactions between clubs and IOs, I consider those entities to be IOs. This is why this third criterion is being introduced, albeit in a nuanced fashion.

10 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela.

11 See the document 'Groups in the WTO', http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf, updated 4 July 2012.

12 The category of LDCs, created in 1971 by the UN, regroups the poorest countries. In August 2012 48 countries were in it. For a full list, see the website of the UN Office for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25.

13 ASEAN+3 gathers the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus China, Japan and South Korea.

14 Lists (updated in July 2012) of the different groups by negotiation themes are available on the WTO website, on the 'Groups in the negotiations' page: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm

15 Since 1964 the G10 is made up of 11 members: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. The FAFT was founded in 1989 to take part in the struggle against threats to the integrity of the financial system (for example, money laundering and financing of terrorism). It is made up of 33 states, Hong Kong and two regional bodies (European Commission, Gulf Cooperation Council). The Paris Club is an informal group that gathers 19 creditor countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US). It deals with the debts of countries that are in a difficult situation. The London Club is an informal group of banks that works on restructuring debts.

16 According to the Charters of Algiers (1967), '[I]n all matters relating to preparations for ministerial meetings of developing countries, and during the intervals between these ministerial meetings, and for the formulation of joint positions on issues within the purview of UNCTAD, the competent authority of the Group of 77 is the Group of 31 developing countries. This Group of 31 is composed of the developing countries members of the Trade and Development Board [UNCTAD], and should normally meet concurrently with the Trade and Development Board' (Sauvant 1981a: 325).

17 On the G24 see Sauvant 1981b: 60–2. The G19, an 'offspring of the Group of 77 . . . was to represent the entire Third World' at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (Sauvant 1981b: 70). The 19 countries of this group were Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,

Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia. The G27 is a G77 working group made of nine countries from each region (Africa, Asia and Latin America). It was first created 'to undertake the necessary preparatory work' for the seven special sessions of the UN General Assembly (1975) (Sauvant 1981b: 76).

18 The Bahamas, Barbados, Bahrain, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Vietnam.

19 The UN had 51 founding member-states in 1945, then 104 members in 1961 and 192 in 2012. Originally, only 23 states signed the GATT in 1947, 102 states took part in the Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973–9). As of August 2012, 156 states are members of the WTO.

20 There were about ten NGOs with consultative status at the ECOSOC in the 1940s, over 500 in the early 1970s and 1,000 in the mid–1990s. There are currently over 3,000 of them.

21 Press statement by the Global Governance Group (3G) on the outcomes of the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, 18–19 June 2012, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mf/overseasmission/newyork/nyemb_statements/global_governance_group/2012/201207/press_20120403.html

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